



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 15 FEBRUARY 2010
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice, Julia Sebutinde Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Monday, 15 February 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:29:44 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances
6 first, please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Morning, Madam President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J
9 Hollis, Mohammed A Bangura, with our case manager, Maja
09:32:40 10 Dimitrova.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,
12 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself, Courtenay
13 Griffiths, and with me Mr Terry Munyard and we're also joined by
14 Mr Hawi Alot, our Kenyan intern who was with us last week.

09:33:03 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. Before we start
16 with the proceedings, I wanted to run something by both parties.
17 This is by way of time frames for filing those lists of documents
18 to tender. The Chamber is minded to set this Friday as the date
19 for both parties or each party to file their list of documents to
09:33:30 20 tender and then with the responses being due the following
21 Wednesday, which would be Wednesday, 24 February. So it will be
22 Friday the 19th for filing of the lists by each party and the
23 responses thereto would be due close of business Wednesday, the
24 24th. Now, I would like to hear your views on this. Perhaps
09:34:07 25 I'll start with you, Ms Hollis.

26 MS HOLLIS: Those dates are fine with us.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: Likewise, Madam President.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's settled then. Mr Griffiths, are
29 you ready to commence re-examination today?

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, I am.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Taylor, I'll remind you,
3 as I usually do, of your declaration to tell the truth as
4 re-examination commences.

09:34:30 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I commence, Madam President, can I
6 hand out some bundles for use during re-examination?

7 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, could I ask, will these be
8 fresh documents or ones we've looked at already as I tend to mark
9 mine as --

09:35:01 10 MR GRIFFITHS: As I indicated last week, your Honour, all
11 of the documents contained behind the 26 dividers in this bundle
12 have all been introduced during prior testimony, either during
13 evidence-in-chief or during cross-examination, and there is
14 nothing at all new in them.

09:35:22 15 JUDGE DOHERTY: Thank you.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you may commence as soon as
17 you're ready.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

19 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

20 [On former affirmation]

21 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you've been asked a number of questions
23 over the last few months by the Prosecution, and I just want to
24 clarify with you one or two matters raised during the course of
09:38:58 25 that. Now, first of all, can we deal with this: When did you
26 receive the bundle of documentation served by the Prosecution for
27 the purposes of their cross-examination?

28 A. In December.

29 Q. Can you help us as to when in December?

1 A. We were approaching the holidays at the time I received
2 them.

3 Q. And, Mr Taylor, can you give us an estimate as to the
4 quantity of material you received at that stage?

09:39:42 5 A. I would say approximately 14 folders.

6 Q. Are we talking about these kind of folders?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Lever arch files?

9 A. That is correct.

09:40:06 10 Q. Now, help us. The material contained in those folders, in
11 what form were they?

12 A. By form, what do you mean?

13 Q. Were passages highlighted in the various documents
14 contained in those folders?

09:40:31 15 A. Not highlighted. They were marked. The right - some of
16 the documents, the right side had a line drawn. They were not
17 highlighted like a highlighter.

18 Q. Now, you mention a line being drawn down the right side.
19 Is that the right side of the page?

09:40:51 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And were there any other markings on the right side of any
22 of those pages apart from the line?

23 A. Yes. They had - some of the pages had letters "G" and
24 others - I forgot the other letter. "G" and - I forgot the other
09:41:24 25 letter, but it just had the letter "G" and another letter. I
26 just don't recall what the other letter is, whether it was "I" or
27 something like that.

28 Q. In any event, Mr Taylor, did anyone indicate to you what
29 those letters meant?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Having received those materials before the Christmas break,
3 what did you do with them?

4 A. Well, I didn't have a good Christmas.

09:41:55 5 Q. Why?

6 A. Well, I spent a lot of time going through practically every
7 piece of the information I could get through. Like I said, there
8 were many, many folders, so I spent the entire holiday, except
9 for a few days with my family, reading through as many pieces of
10 documents as I could.

09:42:21

11 Q. Now, during the time when you were reading through those
12 documents, Mr Taylor, did you meet with any of your legal team?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Specifically, did you discuss that material with anyone?

09:42:43

15 A. No. The Court order has been very strict about - I
16 considered that would be a part of my testimony and the order is
17 that I was not to discuss my evidence with anyone, so I didn't
18 ask or talk to anyone about it.

19 Q. Specifically, did you discuss that material with your
20 lawyers?

09:43:03

21 A. No.

22 Q. Pardon the pun, Mr Taylor, but did you, Mr Taylor, tailor
23 your evidence as a result of going through that material?

24 A. No.

09:43:23

25 Q. Do you understand what I mean?

26 A. Yes, I think I understand the question. Yeah.

27 Q. What do I mean?

28 A. Well, it's - how does one tailor? We're here to tell the
29 truth. There's nothing to fear, so there's no point in tailoring

1 anything. And in order to tailor you would have to know what the
2 Prosecution intends to use in their cross-examination, so it's
3 impossible to assume that one could tailor his evidence based on
4 what he doesn't know what the Prosecution will put forth in
09:44:05 5 cross-examination.

6 Q. When you say the Prosecution's intention, was there any
7 indication on the papers as to what questions you would be asked?

8 A. No, not at all.

9 Q. So did you bluntly, Mr Taylor, change your evidence on any
09:44:29 10 issue as a result of reading through that material?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Let's move on to another topic, shall we. Now, you
13 appreciate, Mr Taylor, you were cross-examined at length on
14 various financial documents obtained by the Prosecution. Do you
09:45:04 15 recall that?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. Now, you appreciate, don't you, that the suggestion being
18 made was that you were involved in serious financial impropriety
19 whilst President of Liberia. You appreciate that, don't you?

09:45:25 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Now, taking matters in stages, Mr Taylor, first of all:
22 Did you receive diamonds from anyone in Sierra Leone?

23 A. No, I did not.

24 Q. Did you at any stage, either before or after you became
09:45:53 25 President, deal in diamonds in any way?

26 A. No, I did not.

27 Q. Did you, either before or after you became President, give
28 diamonds to anyone?

29 A. No, I did not.

1 Q. Did you, either before or after you became President, use
2 diamonds to purchase arms, ammunition, or any other war
3 materials?

4 A. No, I did not.

09:46:34 5 Q. Do you accept, Mr Taylor, that you did surreptitiously
6 purchase arms and ammunition on the international market?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. When did you begin doing that?

9 A. We - I would say beginning 2000.

09:47:17 10 Q. And for how long did that practice continue?

11 A. Throughout 2002.

12 Q. When did it end?

13 A. I would say about 2002, and I'm responding to the purchase
14 of - the purchase of the arms. But as far as delivery is
09:47:51 15 concerned, delivery ended in 2003.

16 Q. So just so that I am clear, beginning in or about the year
17 2000 you purchased arms on the international market, yes?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. That concluded in or about 2002. Is that right?

09:48:19 20 A. Purchase, yes.

21 Q. But deliveries consequent upon those purchases did not
22 cease until 2003?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Do I understand your evidence correctly?

09:48:32 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. And specifically, Mr Taylor, such arms purchased and
27 delivered in the period so described, how were they paid for?

28 A. They were paid for in cash.

29 Q. Now, you were asked about various bank accounts, Mr Taylor.

1 Do you recall that?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. What was the purpose for setting up those bank accounts?

4 A. Attacks commenced on or around, I would say, April 1999.

09:49:33 5 Q. Attacks by whom?

6 A. Well, it started off with some name Mosquito Spray.

7 Subsequent to that we got to know that it evolved into LURD.

8 Because of the attacks, the Legislature of the Republic of

9 Liberia passed a resolution then authorising the President of

09:50:07 10 Liberia, because of the existence of an international embargo on

11 Liberia and also because of our desire to defend the republic -

12 authorised that the President use any and all means to defend the

13 republic.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, I don't understand. The

09:50:33 15 question was what was the purpose of setting up those bank

16 accounts.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: But you are now talking about attacks of

19 LURD. What does that have to do with the bank accounts?

09:50:44 20 THE WITNESS: Well, I'll explain that, your Honour. The

21 purpose of the account, what I'm explaining is what led to

22 authorisation. It's the process I'm explaining into the

23 authorisation to open the account. That's what I'm going through

24 right now.

09:51:06 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay. Please proceed.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. The resolution you mentioned was passed by whom?

28 A. The Legislature of the Republic of Liberia authorising the

29 President. I had briefed the Legislature that it would take some

1 extraordinary actions on the part of the President, because of
2 the arms embargo on the part of the United Nations, to defend the
3 republic. So they passed a joint resolution authorising the
4 President to use any and all means. And the setting up of the
09:51:33 5 account in its covert form as my personal account while it was
6 not, was the purpose of setting it up so that the tracking of
7 funds used for the purchase of arms and ammunition would not be
8 traced through any immediate government source. So that was the
9 purpose.

09:51:55 10 Q. Now, first of all, that phrase to use --

11 A. Any and all means.

12 Q. Is that a verbatim quote of the decision made?

13 A. That is the decision, yes. That is - well, I would say
14 verbally. I mean practical verbatim, yes.

09:52:16 15 Q. When was that resolution passed?

16 A. It was passed I would say by November, early December 1999.

17 Q. Now can we open up, please, behind divider 9 in the bundle
18 just distributed.

19 A. Yes.

09:53:18 20 Q. Now, you will have become familiar with these documents,
21 Mr Taylor, because you were questioned at length about them, do
22 you recall, by Mr Koumjian?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Now, remind us: When was the resolution passed by the
09:53:41 25 Liberian Legislature?

26 A. I would say - I'll put it back to about November, early
27 December 1999.

28 Q. Looking at the first document behind this divider, what is
29 the date on this new account application?

1 A. 8 December 1999.

2 Q. Go over the page. MFI-306 we're looking at. What's the
3 date on that document?

4 A. 8 December 1999.

09:54:18 5 Q. Go over the page. Is there a date in the bottom right-hand
6 corner of that document?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. What is it?

9 A. 8 December 1999.

09:54:32 10 Q. Now, those are the documents which established that
11 account, aren't they, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, we note that the account bears your name, yes?

14 A. That is correct.

09:54:53 15 Q. And the address, Congo Town, Executive Mansion, yes? Let's
16 go back to the first document behind 15. Sorry, my fault.

17 A. Yeah, but you asked me as to whether it carried my name and
18 I said yes, but that's not correct. It does not --

19 Q. No, let's go back to the first document behind this
09:55:16 20 divider, please.

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. New account application. Have you got it?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. What name appears at the top of that form, Mr Taylor?

09:55:28 25 A. Charles G Taylor.

26 Q. What's the address?

27 A. Executive Mansion.

28 Q. Now, let's take things slowly. Above the words "Executive
29 Mansion" do we see another location specified?

1 A. Yes, it appears - the first letter we can't see, but it
2 looks like an "H". Home address is Congo Town.

3 Q. Congo Town, yes?

4 A. Business address is the Executive Mansion.

09:56:05 5 Q. Right. Now, your address at White Flower was located
6 where?

7 A. In Congo Town.

8 Q. And the Executive Mansion, from what you've told us in the
9 past, is your official residence as President of Liberia. Isn't
09:56:32 10 that right?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And we can see that the starting deposit two-thirds of the
13 way down the document, is that US \$1,000?

14 A. That is correct.

09:56:52 15 Q. And do you accept, Mr Taylor, that directly below that is
16 your signature?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. The suggestion, Mr Taylor, is that this is a clandestine
19 account by which you were personally enriching yourself at the
09:57:12 20 expense of the Liberian people. You do understand that, don't
21 you?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Help me with this. This account bears your name. Was this
24 a personal account in the sense that you enjoyed the fruits of
09:57:31 25 it?

26 A. No, it was not.

27 Q. Help us. What control, if any, did you personally have
28 over these accounts?

29 A. I had - I had full control over this account.

1 Q. In what sense? Just explain to us.

2 A. In that because as President I wouldn't get up and go to
3 the bank or come back from the bank, an assistant minister, my
4 special assistant, but the title is Assistant Minister of State
09:58:09 5 For Presidential Affairs and Special Assistant to the President,
6 was also called in to also sign on this account that that
7 minister would be responsible for the operation, but I would have
8 - if I can use one of the Prosecution words - command
9 responsibilities. That is, this minister could do nothing within
09:58:33 10 this account unless I authorised her to do it.

11 Q. And who was that minister?

12 A. Assistant Minister of State Kadiatu Diarra Findley.

13 Q. I will come back to her later, but for now, by training,
14 Mr Taylor, what's your profession?

09:58:56 15 A. I'm an economist by training.

16 Q. As part of that course, did you ever study accountancy?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 Q. Do you understand and appreciate accounts?

19 A. Yes, I do.

09:59:15 20 Q. Now, help us with this: Bearing in mind what the
21 allegation is, Mr Taylor, that this is a clandestine account for
22 your own personal enrichment, specifically, was this account for
23 your own personal use?

24 A. No. At no time was this account used for my own personal
09:59:48 25 use, no.

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help me. At the time in December 1999 when
27 this account was opened, were you at that stage married to Jewel
28 Howard-Taylor?

29 A. Yes, I was.

1 Q. Help us, Mr Taylor. Did you have other family members and
2 friends whom you trusted resident in Liberia?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Give us examples as to who.

10:00:24 5 A. Well, family. I had my brothers, sisters. Friends that I
6 had in Liberia would include Mr Cyril Allan, I would call a
7 friend, and I would also say a friend would be Mr Urey, I would
8 call a friend.

9 Q. Did you trust them?

10:01:00 10 A. Well, trust, yes. I would say yes.

11 Q. Now, help me, Mr Taylor. If you were intent on enriching
12 yourself, why did you not open this account in the names of a
13 relative or a friend to disguise the fact that you were the one
14 being enriched? Why didn't you do that?

10:01:19 15 A. Because I was not enriching myself.

16 Q. And help me, Mr Taylor. This document we're looking at
17 here bearing your name and signature, who retained this document?

18 A. The bank. The bank had this.

19 Q. And help me, Mr Taylor. The Liberian Bank for Development
10:01:51 20 and Investment based in Monrovia, Liberia, was that linked into
21 the international banking system?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Consequently, would electronic transfers or any other
24 transfers of funds from this account to other accounts worldwide,
10:02:12 25 would that show up on the international banking system?

26 A. Definitely.

27 Q. So help me. Let me ask you again: Why did you open it in
28 your name?

29 A. Because it had to be shown that whatever transactions of

1 monies that went into this account, it had to have the appearance
2 of a personal account.

3 Q. Now, before we come to look at in a bit more detail at some
4 of the documents behind this divider, and I've grouped various
10:02:55 5 MFIs together relating to this topic for ease of reference, let
6 me ask you this: What were the sums which passed through these -
7 this account used for?

8 A. I would say about four categories: The largest
9 disbursement from this account went to arms and ammunition; out
10:03:24 10 of this account we paid salaries for special units, the ATU was
11 paid, the SSS was paid, and various presidential projects in
12 dealing with goodwill within that period was paid out of this
13 account. These are the four categories that were paid out of
14 this account.

10:03:53 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help me.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: What is goodwill?

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to that:

18 Q. What is goodwill?

19 A. Following - well, you know, I will have to explain this
10:04:13 20 because goodwill is the paper, but I have to explain this.
21 Following the - my election as President and because of the seven
22 years of civil - of the civil war, the warring factional groups
23 and leaders that were part of my government still had some form
24 of attachments to them. What do I mean by attachments? Some of
10:04:42 25 the ex-combatants that fought under their control were without
26 jobs. They had no income, and so the leadership from those
27 groups that were part of the government, we gave those leaders a
28 form of I will call it a subsidy that they could use and
29 distribute to some of these ex-combatants that were out there

1 that continuously harassed them. So we just grouped that as
2 goodwill to these leaders that they could help some of the
3 ex-combatants that were still, you know, looking up to them for
4 sustenance.

10:05:28 5 Q. Let me strip away the veil and ask you a blunt question:
6 Was this account used to bribe the leaders of some of the other
7 warring factions to keep them quiet?

8 A. No.

9 Q. That's the blunt question.

10:05:41 10 A. Yeah, it's blunt, but, no, I would not call it a bribe.
11 No. It was not a bribe. There was an understanding, that they
12 had problems, and knowing that following a war as we had in
13 Liberia, it was necessary to continue to help along because an
14 idle mind is the devil's workshop as we said. So we assisted
10:06:07 15 these leaders, that they would assist their former followers to
16 make sure that we did not have any undue crimes like highway
17 robberies, hijackings and all of these things we did not have
18 them because we provided some means of assistance to these
19 ex-combatants that did not have jobs.

10:06:29 20 Q. Now, who were the leaders of these factions who benefitted
21 from this largesse?

22 A. Oh, the two former chiefs of the Armed Forces of Liberia,
23 General Philip Kamah. The second - that is already on the
24 records - General Hezekiah Bowen, another armed forces chief. In
10:06:56 25 fact, Roosevelt Johnson that joined my government before, you
26 know, that started, even though he was getting it from a
27 different account, these are some of the individuals that
28 received subsistence under this programme.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, you mentioned four - you keep

1 saying four categories.

2 THE WITNESS: Yes.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: But I think you've told us about three.

4 That would be the arms and ammunition purchase, the special units
10:07:25 5 like ATU and SSS, and then the goodwill projects. What is the
6 fourth?

7 THE WITNESS: Well, no, no. Well, I think maybe you didn't
8 under - I want to separate. I'm separating the ATU from the SSS,
9 your Honour.

10:07:43 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, please proceed.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Now that you've mentioned that, Mr Taylor, any government,
13 commonsense tells us, is made up of various departments,
14 Judiciary, Defence, so on and so forth, Education, yes. Do you
10:08:01 15 follow?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. Why was the ATU and the SSS favoured in this way over other
18 departments?

19 A. Well, because of the professional nature of their work.

10:08:21 20 Following the war, they were given advance and special training,
21 and in order to keep the - what I want to call it - morale
22 between and amongst the forces hired, we had to separate it by
23 not going through regular governmental payroll. So for those
24 individuals in the ATU, which we were building to be the bedrock
10:08:53 25 of the new armed forces and because of the special training that
26 they had, they had to be paid professionally. That is also true
27 for the SSS.

28 Q. Let me jump forward to come back. You recall being shown a
29 newspaper article involving an interview with Daniel Chea, your

1 Defence Minister; do you recall that?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And do you recall one of the points to which your attention
4 was drawn in that article was his assertion that you had
10:09:32 5 deliberately neglected the Armed Forces of Liberia and not
6 developed it in order to favour militias? Do you recall that
7 point being made?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Is what we see here, the special favours to the ATU and the
10:09:50 10 SSS, part of that complaint being made by your Defence Minister?
11 Do you follow me?

12 A. Yes, I follow you. I would not say so. First of all, let
13 me just add, I'm not sure that the Defence Minister said that
14 because of the paper that we saw here. But let me just inform
10:10:09 15 the Court, the training command for the ATU was recruited by the
16 very Defence Minister. Daniel Chea recruited the general - the
17 South African general and the team. They evaluated that team and
18 made sure that they were proper, General Fred Rindel I think is
19 the name, and that was done with the cooperation and the

10:10:39 20 acquiescence of the Minister of Defence directly, the Defence
21 Minister Daniel Chea. So I would not say that that would be a
22 reflection what of is going on here, no, because Daniel knew.
23 And during this period a commission was set up to draw up the
24 guidelines and proposal for a new Armed Forces of Liberia, which
10:11:01 25 the Minister of Defence Daniel Chea chaired that commission. So
26 that's why I have certain ambivalence about this so-called
27 article that I saw, but Daniel was involved in the recruitment,
28 the evaluation of the team that trained the ATU and the SSS and
29 also was involved in the process of putting together the

1 framework for a new Armed Forces of Liberia.

2 Q. On that same note, before we return to these financial
3 documents, what was the chain of command in respect of the ATU
4 and the SSS? To whom were they directly answerable?

10:11:50 5 A. The SSS, maybe just through tradition, the SSS falls today
6 under the Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs. Also, the
7 ATU, at that particular time, fell under the ministry, but the
8 director of SSS actually also commanded the ATU. He was directly
9 responsible. The commanding officer of the ATU reported to the
10:12:25 10 director of SSS. Now, in any case, of course, if I wanted to
11 speak to somebody, I did.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, the question was: What was
13 the chain of command? That's in the past during your presidency.
14 Your answer is: "The SSS falls today." Did you say "today" or
10:12:47 15 "to date"?

16 THE WITNESS: To date.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Including when you were President?

18 THE WITNESS: That is correct. Reports to the Minister of
19 State.

10:13:00 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. For Presidential Affairs?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And just to clarify, to whom does the ATU report?

24 A. The director of SSS.

10:13:14 25 Q. The director of SSS?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. So both the SSS and the ATU are controlled by the director
28 of the SSS, yes?

29 A. Yes, but ultimately their control is with the Minister of

1 State, so both - okay.

2 Q. Now, going back to these financial documents, Mr Taylor,
3 where did the funds come from which passed through these
4 accounts?

10:13:46 5 A. About one, two - I'd say about two, three sources. But
6 generally two. One source, there were direct donations or
7 contributions made - in fact I would not call it contributions.
8 They were assistance given to the government by the Taiwanese
9 government at the time. And the second source was revenues from
10:14:19 10 the Government of Liberia.

11 Q. And you mentioned a possible third?

12 A. Well, you know, I was going to break down the revenues but
13 I'll just carry that as one source because we had timber revenues
14 coming in and we had other taxpayers revenues coming in, but I
10:14:39 15 will just group it up as revenues because it's just from the same
16 source. All of them constitute taxpayers' money.

17 Q. Now, starting at the first page behind divider 15, I would
18 like us to conduct a fairly swift exercise, please. We've
19 already embarked on that. The date on the first page is 8
10:15:08 20 December 1999, yes?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Likewise on the second page?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Likewise on the third page?

10:15:20 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. When we come to MFI-307, which is the next page, when we
27 turn it the right way up, the date on that appears to be 18 July
28 2000. Is that right?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. When a payment of it would appear to be US \$1,999,975 was
2 paid into that account, yes?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Over the page, please, we see a bank statement, do we not?

10:16:00 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Now help us. Who produced this bank statement?

7 A. Well, the Prosecution brought this here but I would assume
8 it's produced by the LBDI.

9 Q. LBDI?

10:16:20 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Now as far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, the bank details we
12 see recorded on this page, were they kept in electronic format by
13 the Liberian Bank For Development and Investment?

14 A. I would - I would want to believe that.

10:16:42 15 Q. As far as you're aware, who would have access to these
16 details?

17 A. The bank itself, and I'm sure these details would be the
18 bank.

19 Q. Now concentrating for the moment on dates, we see just
10:17:07 20 before the columns of numbers the heading "This statement covers"
21 and what period is that, Mr Taylor? Can you see, your eyesight
22 is as bad as mine?

23 A. Maybe it could be the - it looks like 01 July 2000 through,
24 I would assume, 31 July 2000. That's what it looks like to me.

10:17:44 25 Q. All right. Miss the next page. Okay?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And the page after that, which bears the Citigroup legend,
28 yes?

29 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. And the page after that which says "Citi bank"?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. And the page after that?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 10:18:14 5 Q. And the page after that. Do you now come to MFI-311?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. Which is the wrong way around, yes?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. I'm only interested for the moment in dates. Are you with
- 10:18:34 10 me?
- 11 A. Yes, I am.
- 12 Q. In the left-hand column do we see dates?
- 13 A. Yes, we do.
- 14 Q. Just go down the column and tell us what those dates are,
- 10:18:43 15 please?
- 16 A. I see 07/14/2000.
- 17 Q. 14 July 2000, yes?
- 18 A. That goes all the way from the top to the bottom.
- 19 Q. And then the penultimate entry on that page is for what
- 10:19:01 20 date?
- 21 A. That is 07/17/2000.
- 22 Q. So 17 July 2000. Go over the page. What dates do we see
- 23 there?
- 24 A. 03/29/2000.
- 10:19:20 25 Q. 29 March 2000, yes?
- 26 A. That is correct.
- 27 Q. Which is repeated?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. Then 30 March 2000, yes?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Go over the page to MFI-313, please.

3 A. 312?

4 Q. 313. It's the next page. Do you have it?

10:19:45 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now this replicates a document we looked at earlier. What
7 period does this statement cover?

8 A. 01 August 2000 through 11 September 2000.

9 Q. Good. Miss the next page and go to the page after, which
10 is MFI-314. Do you have it?

10:20:07 11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. This is another bank statement in a different format. Now,
13 there are dates down the left-hand side of that page, are there
14 not?

10:20:30 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Help us. What are those dates?

17 A. The first date on that page I see --

18 Q. September?

19 A. 22.

10:20:49 20 Q. 2000?

21 A. Yes. The next one I can't --

22 Q. But does it look like October 2000?

23 A. Yes, October. Yes.

24 Q. Then November?

10:20:58 25 A. Then December, yes.

26 Q. Then December, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Miss the next page. Go over to the next page. Do you have
29 it?

- 1 A. Yes, I do.
- 2 Q. Help us. Which months and year - year - do the
3 transactions on the next page cover?
- 4 A. This is 2001.
- 10:21:29 5 Q. From which month?
- 6 A. From about March.
- 7 Q. Are we looking at the same document? We're looking at
8 MFI-314, the third page of that document. Do you have it?
- 9 A. Okay, let me see. Oh, no. Okay.
- 10:21:52 10 Q. The first entry on that page is for a sum of 315 --
- 11 A. Okay. No, the date there is 05/01/2001. I was on the
12 wrong page.
- 13 Q. And what's the last entry on that page?
- 14 A. 12/03/2001.
- 10:22:12 15 Q. Miss the next page and go to the next page where the first
16 entry should be 3,187.31?
- 17 A. That is correct.
- 18 Q. What's the first date on that page?
- 19 A. 20/03/2001.
- 10:22:32 20 Q. 20 March 2001. And what's the last entry on that page?
- 21 A. It looks like June 5, 05/06/2001.
- 22 Q. Miss the next page and go to the page after that. Do you
23 have it?
- 24 A. Yes, I do.
- 10:22:54 25 Q. Okay?
- 26 A. Yes.
- 27 Q. Now help us. What's the first entry on that page?
- 28 A. 19/07/2001.
- 29 Q. What's the last entry?

- 1 A. 29/10/2003.
- 2 Q. Right. Now, as of - staying on that page, as of 19 July
3 2001 - yes?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 10:23:19 5 Q. What's the balance in the account?
- 6 A. 19 July 2001, I see something like, what, 3,665.
- 7 Q. If we go to the - coming down, let's stay on the same page,
8 the fourth entry - the fifth entry on that page for 19 July,
9 what's the balance at that stage?
- 10:24:08 10 A. Did you say the fourth entry?
- 11 Q. Down, yes. What's the balance?
- 12 A. I see 3,677.
- 13 Q. Right.
- 14 A. 62.
- 10:24:22 15 Q. Okay. And by the time we get to the penultimate entry on
16 that page, what's the balance?
- 17 A. I see 3,542.
- 18 Q. Yes. So during that period from July through to September
19 that balance has changed from 3677 to 3542, yes?
- 10:24:58 20 A. That is correct.
- 21 Q. So activity of about, what, \$200?
- 22 A. That is correct.
- 23 Q. Go over the page. Now, when we go over the page, remember
24 - no, sorry, my fault. Can we go back to the previous page,
10:25:23 25 please. My fault. That balance of 3,677 is in 2001. Is that
26 right?
- 27 A. That is correct.
- 28 Q. Throughout 2002 it changes by very little, doesn't it?
- 29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. So that by 2003 again there's been very little activity on
2 that account, hasn't there?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Now, what did you tell us earlier about the period when
10:26:04 5 this account was used for the purchase of arms, Mr Taylor? In
6 which years?

7 A. We purchased in 2000, 2001. I have said that deliveries
8 were over the years up until 2003, but these were the principal
9 two years of transaction, 2000 and 2001.

10:26:31 10 Q. Now, just at the bottom right-hand corner of that page we
11 see "For Jesus". What's that about?

12 A. Surely this was not an amount paid to Jesus. There was a
13 programme in Liberia that was a Christian programme launched
14 called Liberia for Jesus that involved overseas partners, the
10:26:59 15 Benny Hinn foundation and others, and this was to pay for some of
16 the activities for launching this crusade in Monrovia.

17 Q. And as a result of that payment in October 2003 there was a
18 zero balance in the account, yes?

19 A. Yes. Well, let's get one thing straight here. I don't
10:27:25 20 understand the entry. This is just maybe showing a reflection of
21 a late payment because by October 2003 I'm not in Liberia. So
22 this entry here, it's a late entry maybe because of the
23 inactivity of the account.

24 Q. And just for completeness sake, when we go over to the next
10:27:50 25 page - yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Although the account is still there, the sums involved are
28 fairly small, aren't they?

29 A. Yes, but let me just point out this is a different and

1 separate account from the covert account. This involves a
2 different account and a different account number. This is the
3 educational foundation which is separate and distinct from the
4 first account.

10:28:18 5 Q. Okay. So let's just go back to the first account then and
6 see if we can summarise where we get to. Remind us: When do you
7 step down as President?

8 A. 11 August 2003.

9 Q. Are we back on the previous page now, Mr Taylor?

10:28:41 10 A. Yes, we are.

11 Q. So let's just look at that page, shall we. On the fourth
12 entry from the bottom of the page, yes, do you have it?

13 A. Where --

14 Q. 31 July 2003?

10:28:58 15 A. Oh, I went back to the beginning. We're talking about
16 MFI --

17 Q. I'm still on MFI-314. Okay?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And I want you to go to the seventh page of that printout.

10:29:20 20 Do you have it?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. The fourth entry from the bottom of that page is 31 July
23 2003, yes?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

10:29:35 25 Q. So that's eleven days before you step down?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. The next entry is after you have left?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Okay?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So just to help us, let us work backwards from 31 July now,
3 okay?

4 A. Yes.

10:29:59 5 Q. On 31 July the last entry before you leave, the balance is
6 3,554, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. That balance has remained remarkably consistent through
9 that first half of 2003 and indeed throughout 2002. Is that
10:30:25 10 right?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. When we go on from there, it's throughout 2001 that the
13 bulk of the activity takes place on that account, isn't it?

14 A. That is correct.

10:30:39 15 Q. Remind us: What was the account set up for?

16 A. To buy arms and ammunition to fight the LURD rebels.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm not sure if I just
18 missed it. This is an account in what currency?

19 THE WITNESS: United States dollars.

10:31:01 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Is there anything else, Madam President?

22 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. When did the bulk of the activity
23 take place on that account?

24 A. 2000, 2001 the bulk of the activities occurred.

10:31:26 25 Q. Now, whilst we have that time frame well in mind, help us
26 with this: During 2000 and 2001 what is going on in Sierra
27 Leone?

28 A. Very little. There is - by 2001 Sierra Leone is far
29 advanced in the peace process. Little discussions here and

1 there, but they are far advanced in their peace process, to the
2 extent that by the end of 2001, if my recollection is correct,
3 they have succeeded in the beginning of 2002, if I recall, Kabbah
4 announces an end to the Sierra Leonean war. So 2000, 2001 Sierra
10:32:29 5 Leone - while they are not at total peace, but they are at
6 relative calm.

7 Q. Now, during this period, 2000 to 2001, whilst this activity
8 is going on on this account, as far as you were aware as
9 President of the neighbouring state, was there any major military
10:32:51 10 activities going on in Sierra Leone?

11 A. No. Not to my knowledge.

12 Q. As far as you were aware as President of the neighbouring
13 state, when was the last time there had been major military
14 action in Sierra Leone?

10:33:10 15 A. I would put it to - I would put it to around May - around
16 May 2000 when we had some - some - some problems in Sierra Leone,
17 in fact in the Freetown area, around May of 2000 I will put it
18 to.

19 Q. And remind us: When was the Freetown invasion?

10:33:41 20 A. That was January 1999.

21 Q. So these arms that you were purchasing in 2000, 2001,
22 Mr Taylor, were they being delivered to Sierra Leone?

23 A. No. These arms were strictly for the protection of the
24 Republic of Liberia, and that is what it was used for. None of
10:34:13 25 these arms were transferred to Sierra Leone for any reason.

26 Q. Specifically, Mr Taylor, given what was going on in Sierra
27 Leone in 2000 and 2001, were there demands from the RUF
28 comparable to that letter you received from Johnny Paul Koroma
29 asking for military assistance?

1 A. No.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: I beg your pardon. Ms Hollis is on her
3 feet.

4 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President. Madam President,
10:34:51 5 we object to the ongoing nature of the leading questions that are
6 being put to this witness. We understand that leading questions
7 can be used to focus his attention, but the Defence counsel is
8 also leading in substantive ways and we would suggest that it's
9 better that this witness testify, not his Defence counsel, when
10:35:08 10 it comes to substantive matters.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Which particular questions are you
12 objecting to?

13 MS HOLLIS: Well, there have been many of them, but first
14 of all, on the latest realm when we were talking about the
10:35:21 15 leading questions, "So these arms that you were purchasing in
16 2000, 2001, were they being delivered to Sierra Leone," that
17 certainly is a leading question. And then the follow-up to that,
18 "Were there demands from the RUF comparable to that letter you
19 received from Johnny Paul Koroma asking for military assistance,"
10:35:41 20 that is a leading question. The question about the Minister of
21 Defence, if his comments were based upon the SSS and ATU being
22 paid out of this account, those are leading questions on
23 substantive matters. We know you have given the Defence great
24 leeway to lead in this instance, but we suggest re-examination,
10:36:03 25 the substantive questions, should not be leading in nature.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Microphone not activated].

27 MR GRIFFITHS: My response is very simple, Madam President.
28 None of the instances referred to by my learned friend in my
29 submission is a leading question. A leading question is one

1 which suggests the answer. In my submission, in respect of any
2 of those questions, Mr Taylor could have answered yes or no. In
3 no way was the question fashioned in such a manner that it
4 dictated only one answer, which is my understanding of what a
10:36:47 5 leading question is.

6 [Trial Chamber conferred]

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're of the view, actually, that these
8 particular questions are propositions that emanate from the
9 Prosecution's own case and in order for the Defence to address
10:37:24 10 these questions as - or these issues as put forward by the
11 Defence, he has to put them in this way to the accused for him to
12 answer them. These are specific assertions by the Defence -
13 sorry, by the Prosecution in their - either in their case in
14 chief or their cross-examination, so I overrule the objection.

10:37:51 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Mr Taylor, let us move on to another topic, in any event,
17 and we can put that bundle away for the moment. Now, Mr Taylor,
18 what I want to move on now to do is to ask you about various
19 groups of personalities. Do you follow me?

10:38:38 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. The first group of personalities I want to ask you about
22 are linked to the topic we've just concluded. The first
23 individual I would like to ask you about, Mr Taylor, is Sanjivan
24 Ruprah. Who is he?

10:39:00 25 A. Sanjivan Ruprah is an individual that worked in an
26 ambassadorial capacity for the Ministry of Commerce and did some
27 work, to the best of my knowledge, for the Maritime Commission.

28 Q. What was his job?

29 A. He was something like a roving ambassador which would

1 entail many things. Any I would say maybe public relations or
2 making contacts on behalf of those agencies. In the case of the
3 Ministry of Transportation specifically was to I think
4 investigate the aircraft signs that were used by the Government
10:40:10 5 of Liberia.

6 Q. Before he became a roving ambassador, what did he do for a
7 living?

8 A. Oh, I don't know. I don't recall. I don't know what he
9 did. He was recommended by the agency. I don't remember what
10:40:23 10 his professional expertise is.

11 Q. Did he own any business in Liberia?

12 A. Not that I know of.

13 Q. Where was he from originally?

14 A. I don't know. That name sounds Indian to me. Sanji - I
10:40:50 15 don't know where Sanjivan Ruprah is. I think he's Indian origin,
16 but he lived in I think Belgium, if I'm not mistaken.

17 Q. Was he a friend of yours?

18 A. Not at all. I don't know him. If you brought him here, as
19 big as this room, no.

10:41:11 20 Q. Have you ever met him?

21 A. No, not to my knowledge. Probably just in passing.
22 Nothing that I remember.

23 Q. Was he a business associate of yours?

24 A. No, not at all.

10:41:24 25 Q. Was he an employee of the Liberian government?

26 A. Well, I guess - I guess I would have to - in the true sense
27 of the word employee, I don't know how to answer this, but
28 because he was a roving ambassador, I could say that in a way one
29 could assume that he was in the employ of the Liberian

1 government.

2 Q. Was he paid by the Liberian government?

3 A. Not that I know of. He could have been paid through the
4 Ministry of Transport, but I don't know. Quite frankly, I don't.

10:42:09 5 Q. Well, if he wasn't paid, Mr Taylor, what was in it for him
6 to become a roving ambassador? Do you follow?

7 A. Well, yes, I do follow you. When the question is asked
8 about employee, I look at employee as being one on a government
9 payroll. Now, he performed a service for the government, and I'm
10:42:37 10 sure for the services rendered he got paid but not in - you know,
11 not in that employee type status. So I would assume that
12 whatever he did, whether it was consultancy or what, he had to
13 get some payment for it, but I don't - based on your question, I
14 don't recall any payroll or payment document that I saw of paying
10:43:01 15 him, but I have to assume that he got paid for his services.

16 Q. Now, this role that he was performing as a roving
17 ambassador, was it being done officially or unofficially for the
18 Liberian government?

19 A. I would say officially. It was done - once he carried that
10:43:20 20 passport, it would be accompanied by a letter and so it was, I
21 would say, official.

22 Q. What would the letter say?

23 A. The bearer or the holder of this passport is this person
24 and he's authorised to act in certain instances on behalf of the
10:43:40 25 Government of Liberia. That's what the letter would say and it
26 would be stamped and it would have a blue Foreign Ministry seal
27 on the letter that whoever he spoke to would know that they were
28 not speaking to, what you would call him, a crook or something;
29 that he was representing the views that he stated he was

1 representing.

2 Q. Did Mr Ruprah facilitate arms supplies for you or your
3 government?

10:44:14

4 A. To my knowledge, I would say no. But he very well could
5 have. Those that he worked with I could - that is possible that
6 he could have done that, but I don't know specifically that he
7 did.

8 Q. Did you ever specifically discuss with him that he play a
9 role in facilitating arms supplies for Liberia?

10:44:40

10 A. No.

11 Q. Have you ever formally been introduced to Mr Ruprah?

10:45:10

12 A. This is why I say probably in passing because - because I
13 cannot recollect it, I'm sure it may have just been one of those
14 passing things where I travel for example in Europe and sometimes
15 several people will be on the line and they come and they shake
16 your hand and you pass and the person will go and say, "I met the
17 President", but I wouldn't know you from - I mean from that
18 minute. So it's very possible that I met him in passing, but I
19 do not recall him in that way.

10:45:26

20 Q. Where is he now?

21 A. Oh, I don't know. I have no idea. I would assume that
22 he's probably in Belgium or someplace. I don't know where he is.

23 Q. As far as you're aware, is he alive and well?

24 A. As far as I would know, I think he is, yes.

10:45:51

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, you said the agency
26 recommended him. What agency were you referring to?

27 THE WITNESS: That's the ministry - the two agencies, the
28 Ministry of Transport and the Maritime Commission.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. The second question I want to ask you --

2 A. Excuse me, counsel, just to help. The UN panel of experts
3 talked to him, so I would assume he's alive.

4 Q. Can you help us as to when they spoke to him?

10:46:20 5 A. Well, if you look through the panel of experts reports as
6 even given here by the Prosecution, I think that would be in 2001
7 or thereabouts.

8 Q. The next person I want to ask you about is Nico Shefer.
9 Who is he?

10:46:39 10 A. Nico Shefer is a South African of Jewish descent, a
11 businessman, and a very close - I would say very close to the
12 ANC. He served in some quasi-official status for the government
13 in South Africa, the Government of Liberia.

14 Q. I'm sorry I missed that. What was that last sentence?

10:47:13 15 A. He worked in some quasi-official state for the Government
16 of Liberia in South Africa.

17 Q. What does "quasi-official state" mean?

18 A. Well, he was something like an honorary consul for Liberia.

19 Q. And what did that involve?

10:47:36 20 A. An honorary consul is one that - by quasi I mean he is not
21 a diplomat, but he performs services as far as recommending
22 business people to Liberia to invest. He would intervene in
23 their behalf at the Liberian embassy in South Africa to get visas
24 for them to travel to Liberia, this kind of work as honorary
10:48:12 25 consul.

26 Q. Was he a friend of yours?

27 A. In a way I would say yes. I'm not - well, let me just
28 qualify it. I would call Nico an acquaintance, because I think
29 we're going to be trying to categorise friend. I would call him

1 a very good - a close acquaintance, but not like friend
2 buddy-buddy.

3 Q. Well, let's explore that, shall we. Did he ever come to
4 White Flower for dinner?

10:48:53 5 A. No, I never invited Nico to White Flower for dinner.

6 Q. Did you ever meet him formally at the Executive Mansion in
7 Monrovia?

8 A. I would say informally. Not formally, no.

9 Q. Did he ever entertain you whilst you were in South Africa?

10:49:24 10 A. I would say - when you say entertain me, I'm not --

11 Q. At his house?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Barbecue, say?

14 A. No.

10:49:32 15 Q. Whatever?

16 A. Well, he offered a delegation - he offered a dinner to one
17 of my delegations while I was visiting South Africa, so that's a
18 form of entertainment, so I would say yes.

19 Q. Did he ever contribute financially, either to you
10:49:51 20 personally or to the Liberian government?

21 A. No. No.

22 Q. Was he ever an official employee or agent of the Liberian
23 government?

24 A. I would say yes, as honorary consul he's a form of agent,
10:50:16 25 yes.

26 Q. Did he ever facilitate arms supplies for you or your
27 government?

28 A. Never. No.

29 Q. Specifically, did you use him whilst in South Africa to

1 purchase arms for the RUF?

2 A. Never. No.

3 Q. You recall a suggestion being made, do you not, that you
4 were involved in such an arms deal in South Africa? Do you

10:50:54 5 recall that suggestion being made?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Were you involved in such a deal?

8 A. Never. No. Not with South Africa or Nico, no.

9 Q. As far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, where is Nico Shefer
10:51:12 10 now?

11 A. I would - I would say he's in South Africa to the best of
12 my knowledge.

13 Q. As far as you're aware, is he still alive and well?

14 A. Yes.

10:51:29 15 Q. So as far as you're aware, he's available to be spoken to,
16 yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Let's go on and deal with somebody else. Talal El-Ndine,
19 yes?

10:51:46 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Who is he?

22 A. Talal is a Lebanese-American that practically - if I'm not
23 mistaken I think Talal was born in Liberia, grew up in Liberia,
24 did everything in Liberia.

10:52:09 25 Q. When you say American?

26 A. He's a citizen of the United States.

27 Q. Just so we're clear, does he travel on a US passport?

28 A. Yes, he does.

29 Q. Was he a friend of yours?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. A good friend?

3 A. A good friend, yes.

4 Q. For how long had you known him - have you known him?

10:52:43 5 A. I first met Talal in 1990 for the - I had heard of him
6 while we in Liberia but I first got close to him in 1990.

7 Q. Now, 1990, can you help us with a time period?

8 A. I would say about - I will put it to around June, July of
9 1990.

10:53:11 10 Q. Where were you at that time?

11 A. I was in Liberia. This occurred in Buchanan in 1990.

12 Q. How did you come to meet him at that time?

13 A. Mr El-Ndine Talal had - he lived in Buchanan at the time as
14 a very big businessman. He had a supermarket chain located in
10:53:48 15 Buchanan and Yekepa and he also owned and operated a flour mill
16 in Buchanan at the time when the NPFL took over Buchanan.

17 Q. And how did you come to meet him?

18 A. After I went to Buchanan most of the business people and
19 prominent citizens of Buchanan had a meeting with me and he was
10:54:17 20 one of those that came to the meeting.

21 Q. What was the purpose of the meeting?

22 A. Well, just to assure the citizens that they had nothing to
23 fear and that life would continue as normal and they could go
24 about their normal duties and, you know, businesses. Because
10:54:38 25 Buchanan was a thriving industrial area and so I just wanted to
26 assure everybody that they had nothing to fear.

27 Q. Bluntly, Mr Taylor, was it a case of them coming to seek
28 your patronage so they could continue their operations?

29 A. No. No, not at all. It was commonplace. Buchanan was one

1 of those cities that - like I say, an industrial area that is the
2 main seaport for the export of iron ore from Yekepa in Nimba
3 County and it was a very well developed city. Grand Bassa,
4 Buchanan is a very well developed city by Liberian standards.

10:55:33 5 And it was just calling them to reassure them. People needed to
6 be reassured that things would - that they could go about their
7 normal lives and it had nothing to do with patronage, no.

8 Q. And you accept that following that meeting you became
9 friends?

10:55:47 10 A. Yes, with Talal, we became friends.

11 Q. And did that friendship continue thereafter until you left
12 Liberia in 2003?

13 A. That is correct. And may I just add, Talal was not the
14 only person that I became friends with, but you asked

10:56:09 15 specifically about --

16 Q. I'm not interested in anybody else for the moment.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. Let's just concentrate on him. He remained your friend
19 thereafter?

10:56:16 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And would you see each other on a regular basis?

22 A. Yes, that is correct.

23 Q. How regular? Give us an idea.

24 A. I would meet Talal I would say about once or twice a month.

10:56:36 25 Q. Even after you became President?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Was it the kind of friendship which allowed him access to
28 you any time he wanted?

29 A. No, I wouldn't put it - I wouldn't put it quite that - no.

1 It would have to - it would have to be at my convenience.

2 Q. Was he then or at any time - was he then when you met in
3 1990, or at any time thereafter, a business associate of yours?

4 A. No, not at all. Never.

10:57:11 5 Q. Was he ever employed by the Liberian government?

6 A. Never.

7 Q. Did he ever play a role either officially or unofficially
8 for the Liberian government?

9 A. I would say yes. I would say yes.

10:57:37 10 Q. Yes to what?

11 A. The unofficial role.

12 Q. And what was that unofficial role?

13 A. Talal would help to bring businessmen to Liberia to seek
14 investment. He - if I'm not mistaken, he played a role in
10:58:09 15 obtaining one of the public relations firms that the Government
16 of Liberia hired through some friends of his.

17 Q. Were those the firms that you were asked about?

18 A. Exactly. I don't remember which one exactly, but through
19 an associate of his that recommended one of those firms, we did
10:58:32 20 obtain one of those firms to work for the Government of Liberia.

21 Q. These were the lobbying firms --

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. -- that you were asked about?

24 A. That is correct.

10:58:40 25 Q. Now, was Mr El-Ndine paid for that unofficial work?

26 A. No, he was not paid.

27 Q. Did he obtain any other benefit from the Government of
28 Liberia for that work?

29 A. No, he did not.

1 Q. Did he, for example, receive favourable terms for the
2 import or export of goods --

3 A. No.

4 Q. -- for his business?

10:59:14 5 A. No.

6 Q. Did he gain any consideration or benefit from the
7 Government of Liberia?

8 A. No. No.

9 Q. Did he provide any benefits to you?

10:59:32 10 A. No.

11 Q. Did he finance any government business?

12 A. No, he did not. No.

13 Q. Apart from through taxation, did he provide any financial
14 support to either you personally or to the Liberian government?

10:59:52 15 A. No, none whatsoever.

16 Q. Where is he now?

17 A. Oh, Talal is either in the United States or Lebanon. He
18 moves between those two points, from the best of my knowledge
19 from the last time.

11:00:10 20 Q. But as far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, is that man still
21 alive and well?

22 A. He is. He is alive and well.

23 Q. So available to be spoken to by anyone who would so choose?

24 A. In fact, he was spoken to by the UN panel of experts.

11:00:32 25 Q. I want to move on and ask you about another individual.
26 Kadiatu Diarra Findley, who is she?

27 A. Mrs Findley served as assistant Minister of State for
28 Presidential Affairs and special assistant to the President.

29 Q. When did you first meet her?

1 A. Oh, I first met then Kadiatu Diarra in 19 - oh, let me see.
2 Oh, I'll put it way back - I'm coming, just one minute - 1980. I
3 will put it to about 1980.

4 Q. 1980?

11:01:33 5 A. '80, yes.

6 Q. And where were you at the time that you met?

7 A. In Monrovia. She was going to school, yeah. I've known
8 her - I've known her growing up as a young girl.

9 Q. And would you regard her as a friend?

11:01:46 10 A. Yes, I would say a friend but of a more - I'm not sure
11 whether I should say friend. It's more of a respectful type
12 situation, but you can call that friend. But it's almost like
13 it's a respectful situation. She's not a --

14 Q. Respectful, what do you mean?

11:02:09 15 A. Well, she is not a colleague of mine and so it was mostly
16 like a boss/worker type relationship over the years.

17 Q. Does she have some kind of a profession?

18 A. Yes. Mrs Findley now has - she has a BSC, that's a
19 Bachelor of Science degree, from the University of Liberia and --

11:02:42 20 Q. In what discipline?

21 A. I think it was in business administration.

22 Q. I have reason for asking. When did she obtain that? Can
23 you help?

24 A. Oh, no, I don't - I know - I don't - I don't know when Kadi
11:03:06 25 received her degrees - her degree. I don't.

26 Q. Okay. You've known her from about 1980. We know that you
27 thereafter went to the United States, returned to start the
28 revolution in Liberia, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. When did you meet up with her again?

2 A. Around - I would say about '91. I will put it to about
3 '91.

4 Q. Where?

11:03:39 5 A. She was amongst the hundreds of thousands that fled
6 Monrovia into the NPFL-controlled area at about - if I'm not
7 wrong - let me just - I will say about late '90 to about '91.

8 Q. And where were you at that time when you met up with her
9 again?

11:04:02 10 A. I was in - I was in - if I'm not mistaken, I was in Kakata
11 when someone from the front line in Monrovia when we were
12 fighting brought her and some other people that said that they
13 knew me personally. They were picked up and brought to verify as
14 to whether they knew me and I said, yes, I knew her.

11:04:31 15 Q. By that stage, had she already graduated from the
16 University of Liberia?

17 A. I'm telling you, I don't want to mislead anybody. I'm not
18 sure. I'm not sure. She very well could have because throughout
19 my presidency I don't recall her going to school, so I want to
11:04:50 20 assume that by then she had her degree.

21 Q. Now, by that stage had the NPRG government been set up?

22 A. Well, we set up in '91 and then she moves on to Gbarnga, so
23 I would say yes.

24 Q. Now, when that government was set up, was she given a role
11:05:14 25 or a job in that government?

26 A. Not that I know of. Not that I know of. I don't - I don't
27 - she was not working - surely she was not working with me at the
28 time, so I really don't know. She very well could have worked
29 for one of the agencies, but, really, I don't know.

1 Q. After you became President, she did play a role for you,
2 didn't she?

3 A. Yes, even before I became President.

11:05:50

4 Q. Okay. Well, tell us about the history of that role,
5 please. When did it first start?

6 A. Well, Kadi was in Gbarnga throughout the NPRAG days. And
7 when I moved to Monrovia in '95, they all went to Monrovia, and
8 by this particular time we're doing a lot of work - in fact, Kadi
9 took up the first position of special assistant I think in '95,
10 '96 as I was on the Council of State.

11:06:24

11 Q. She became your special assistant?

12 A. Exactly. So she worked with me in the mansion at that
13 particular time with the council. And then as we put together
14 the party, they were the very strong activists in the party, and
15 she was a very strong member of the - we called it the women's
16 wing of the party. She played a very active role at the time
17 before my presidency.

11:06:41

18 Q. After you became President, what was her role then?

19 A. She was made assistant Minister of State, special
20 assistant.

11:07:05

21 Q. So by the time she attained that position she had worked as
22 your special assistant and was an activist in your political
23 party for a couple of years?

24 A. Definitely.

11:07:25

25 Q. Did you trust her?

26 A. Yes. She performed well, yes. I would say yes. In her
27 line of duty, yes.

28 Q. For how long did she remain in that role --

29 A. Up until I left --

1 Q. -- as assistant Minister of State?

2 A. Up until I left the presidency on 3 August - 11 August
3 2003.

4 Q. Why did you select her for that role in relation to the
11:07:59 5 accounts that you've told us about? Why her and nobody else?

6 A. Well, the assistant minister - she had a business
7 background and she - throughout the campaign, she was trustworthy
8 with money. During the campaign she had demonstrated to me and
9 many others that she - she was very earnest in dealing with
11:08:23 10 financial matters. And most of all, in government you need
11 people that don't speak about government activities a lot, and
12 the people that exercise discretion in what they say when they
13 met their friends and she was one of those that, in other words,
14 kept her mouth shut. I mean that she would not go to a meeting
11:08:53 15 and go and you will hear it on the street the next day. So in
16 that way she was trusted and she was someone that kept accurate
17 accounts of what she was asked to do, and so she was just about
18 for me and even while vetting that position, the Minister of
19 State and everybody agreed that she was the proper person to deal
11:09:18 20 with that particular function.

21 Q. Apart from you, did anybody else know of the special role
22 she was playing in relation to the account?

23 A. Oh, yes.

24 Q. Who?

11:09:32 25 A. The Minister of State knew.

26 Q. Who is that?

27 A. The then Minister of State was Jonathan Taylor. The --

28 Q. Is he a relative of yours?

29 A. Yes, he is a doctor. In fact, Dr Jonathan Taylor. He is a

1 first cousin of mine.

2 Q. Who else knew?

3 A. The Deputy Minister of State, Martin George, knew. The
4 chief of protocol knew. Musa Cisse knew.

11:10:07 5 Q. Who was the chief of protocol?

6 A. Musa Cisse. He was the chief of protocol.

7 Q. Who else knew?

8 A. I would say the press secretary to the President knew.

9 Q. Who is that?

11:10:23 10 A. It was Varney Passawe. The Minister of Foreign Affairs
11 knew.

12 Q. Who is that?

13 A. Then it was Monie Captan. The national security adviser
14 knew.

15 Q. Who's that?

16 A. John Richardson knew of that particular role. And besides,
17 the president of the bank knew of the special nature of this
18 particular situation.

19 Q. Who was the president of the bank?

11:10:55 20 A. And still is - what is the gentleman's name? I can't - I
21 can't recall it right now. Dennis. I forgot the first name of
22 the president of the bank. He knew of the special --

23 Q. Is he still the president of the bank?

24 A. Yes, he is still the president.

11:11:13 25 Q. So he is alive and well?

26 A. Yes. He knew of the special nature of this account, yes.

27 Q. And I just want to be clear. Even under the current
28 administration in Liberia, he is still the president of the bank?

29 A. That is correct, yes. Yes.

1 Q. And does he live in Monrovia?

2 A. Yes. Excuse me, the first name is Francis. Francis Dennis
3 is the full name.

4 Q. Does he still live in Liberia?

11:11:40 5 A. Yes, he does.

6 Q. Is he based in Monrovia?

7 A. He is.

8 Q. So he is available to be spoken to?

9 A. Oh, yes.

11:11:46 10 Q. So he knew?

11 A. He knew of the special - he didn't know the intricate - he
12 knew of the special nature of this account.

13 Q. Now, what about the legislature who gave you the mandate in
14 the first place, did they know?

11:12:00 15 A. Not every one of them. The speaker knew then, Yundueh
16 Monorkomma. The President pro temp of the Senate, the late
17 Senator Keikura Kpoto knew of this arrangement. The then
18 individual responsible for defence that was senator at the time,
19 Senator Richard Flomo knew of this special account.

11:12:32 20 Q. What about your Defence Minister; did he know?

21 A. Oh, yeah, Daniel knew. He knew of the account.

22 Q. What's his name?

23 A. Daniel Chea. He knew that there was a special account.

24 Q. So would you agree then, Mr Taylor, that this individual,
11:13:02 25 Kadiatu Diarra Findley, assisted you in facilitating the
26 surreptitious purchase of arms on the international arms market?

27 A. I wouldn't say so.

28 Q. She ran the account, didn't she?

29 A. Yeah, but she was not involved in the transactions. She

1 would bring the money and so I wouldn't say that she - she was -
2 no, she was not connected with that aspect. Somebody else. She
3 will bring the money, but the details in dealing with it, no, she
4 had nothing to do with that.

11:13:41 5 Q. Mr Taylor, there is a need at this stage for some
6 transparency because you've told us that you were doing this, so
7 let's understand specifically how did it work? How did the deal
8 go down?

9 A. I don't - the details are a little difficult. The contacts
11:13:58 10 were made.

11 Q. Who by?

12 A. In the case of the Serbian contact, that was made through
13 the Ministry of Defence, the Minister of Defence, Daniel Chea
14 himself.

11:14:16 15 Q. I want us to be very clear about this. What did Daniel
16 Chea actually do to facilitate that?

17 A. The Ministry of Defence drew up and organised what we call
18 an End Users Certificate and detailed the weapons that were
19 needed. That particular document was delivered - it was
11:14:41 20 delivered to our contacts. At the particular time there was a
21 Serbian fellow, I don't even remember him.

22 Q. Based where?

23 A. That used to come in and out of Liberia. That document was
24 taken back to Serbia. It was approved.

11:15:01 25 Q. Who by?

26 A. By the Serbian government. By that time I mentioned a name
27 here, I still remember, I think he was the Prime Minister, Zoran
28 Djindjic, something like that, but it's on the records.

29 Q. Is it on the records?

1 A. It's on the records. And Daniel Chea's function ceased at
2 that particular time. Once we had gotten an approval that the
3 weapons could be bought officially from Serbia, Daniel eased out.
4 Then I used Musa Cisse to physically deliver the money. The guy
11:15:44 5 will come to Monrovia, from my understanding, receive the money
6 and on a few occasions --

7 Q. No, which guy would come to Monrovia?

8 A. There was a Serbian guy that was a representative for the
9 arms place.

11:16:00 10 Q. And he would come to Monrovia?

11 A. He would come to Monrovia.

12 Q. And who would give him the money?

13 A. Musa Cisse would deliver the money to him in cash.

14 Q. In cash?

11:16:11 15 A. Cash.

16 Q. And who would give the cash money to Musa Cisse?

17 A. I would send Kadiatu to the bank, she would pick up the
18 cash, bring it to me and we would store it and she would deliver
19 the cash to Musa.

11:16:28 20 JUDGE DOHERTY: Perhaps in relation to that, it's not clear
21 to me whether that account required two signatures, your
22 signature and Kadiatu Diarra Findley's signature, or just one.

23 THE WITNESS: One.

24 JUDGE DOHERTY: Either of those signatures?

11:16:43 25 THE WITNESS: Yes. If we revert to the document, I think
26 it's MFI-113 or 4, your Honour, it says any of one.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: Let's go back there and see if we can
28 clarify this. It's behind divider 15 in our bundle.

29 JUDGE DOHERTY: I did look, but it wasn't clear to me.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Sorry, I'm giving you the wrong reference.

2 It's behind divider 9:

3 Q. Mr Taylor, just take your time and show us the relevant
4 document, please, which clarifies the learned judge's question?

11:17:21 5 A. Behind that divider, it would be MFI-307, your Honour. If
6 you look at the first document on that page, at the top of that
7 document you will see "Name, Kadiatu Diarra" and you will see her
8 signature there, and you will see there where it says, "Any" -
9 where it says, "Number/combination of signatures required" and it
11:17:58 10 says, "Any one."

11 Q. I'm sorry, Mr Taylor, I don't know which document you are
12 looking at. Could you just take it out and hold it up so that I
13 can see, because --

14 A. Okay. Excuse me, your Honours. This is the document
11:18:13 15 behind MFI - I'm sorry, it's 306.

16 Q. Right. That was my error. It's the second page of
17 MFI-306?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And what are you pointing us to?

11:18:29 20 A. This account have two signatures: My signature and
21 Kadiatu's signature. And if you look at the top of that page on
22 the first set of signatures where you see Kadiatu Diarra and her
23 signature specimen there's a line that says, "Number/combination
24 of signature required", and it says there any one of the two
11:18:57 25 signatures could withdraw from that account.

26 Q. Got it. Thank you very much, Mr Taylor. We can put that
27 away. So just to make sure I understand, Mr Taylor - Madam
28 President, I wonder if there's something I could get the witness
29 to assist you with?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, it was on that document but we've
2 sorted it out, thank you. Please proceed.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. So, Mr Taylor, just so that I am clear, Kadiatu's job was
11:20:33 5 to go to the bank, get the money, give it to you?

6 A. That's one. Well, we have to add she could sign cheques
7 based on my instructions, go to the bank and pick up the money.
8 Because it did not - in fact after this it did not require my
9 signature to withdraw money. Her signature. I would authorise
11:20:58 10 her, "Kadi, go and get this done." She would take the cheque,
11 sign them and go and get it done. And I want to emphasise she
12 did it with my instruction, but she could sign by herself.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm sorry, Madam Assistant Court Manager,
14 could we just go back to that document again. Back to that
11:21:22 15 folder again behind divider 9:

16 Q. On this topic of signatures I just want to obtain your
17 assistance on something else, Mr Taylor, before we move on. Now,
18 Mr Taylor, let's just look at the first page. Go back to the
19 first page behind divider 9, yes?

11:21:51 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. We see your scribble there next to the date, don't we?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So we can identify your signature from that, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

11:22:03 25 Q. And I'm sure - does everyone see where Mr Taylor's
26 signature is on that page? Yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now, if we go to MFI-306, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And the document we looked at just now, we see Kadiatu's
2 signature at the top, don't we?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. We see your signature below that, don't we?

11:22:42 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Now, this is what I want you to help me with. When we go
7 now to MFI-307, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Which is a debit ticket, yes?

11:22:59 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So is this a withdrawal or a deposit, Mr Taylor?

12 A. This looks like to me as a deposit.

13 Q. It's a deposit?

14 A. That's what it looks like, yes.

11:23:13 15 Q. Can you help us as to why it says debit?

16 A. I don't know how they do it in that area, but this is - you
17 would not withdraw like this. If you had to withdraw you either
18 had to sign a cheque, but there's no transfer. So this is more
19 like - for me, my recollection of this is this amount was
20 deposited.

11:23:38 21 Q. The reason I ask is this: I was going to ask you if
22 there's an identifying signature on this, either yours or
23 Kadiatu's. Do you follow me?

24 A. Yes. I don't think it required that.

11:23:58 25 Q. Do you see the point I'm asking you about?

26 A. Yes, I see the point you are making. And maybe the
27 question you asked about the debit, this could be an internal
28 document probably after Citibank makes this amount available to
29 LBDI, so it did not require anyone's signature here.

1 Q. Just to clarify, can you see either yours or Kadiatu's
2 signature on this document MFI-307?

3 A. No, no, no, neither.

4 Q. Okay. Thank you. I think we can finally - and I hope I
11:24:47 5 can keep my word on this - put that away for now.

6 A few more questions about this, Mr Taylor. So Daniel Chea
7 was involved in these purchases, was he?

8 A. No. He was involved in making - in securing the end users,
9 but he was not involved in the purchases, no.

11:25:42 10 Q. And, Mr Taylor, was the source of these purchases always
11 Serbia?

12 A. We used - yes, we used Serbia, yes.

13 Q. Anybody else?

14 A. I'm sure there were manoeuvres in different, different
11:26:06 15 areas. There's one - one set that I know that came through
16 Lebanon and it was assumed to come from Iran, but our purchases
17 during this period was basically from Serbia and delivered at
18 different intervals.

19 Q. And given the nature of these activities, Mr Taylor, that
11:26:29 20 you were, because of the UN arms embargo, having out of necessity
21 to act surreptitiously, were these deals always honoured?

22 A. Were they always what again? Honoured?

23 Q. Honoured.

24 A. No, it was tricky business. Things were - no, not always
11:26:55 25 as straightforward and honoured as - we paid but if you look
26 realistically, we did not by the time I left office receive all
27 of the arms that we had paid for.

28 Q. How much did you lose on those deals?

29 A. Oh, I would - I would put it to about 4 - maybe 4 - 3 or 4

1 million dollars got lost in the process.

2 Q. Was that money ever returned to the Government of Liberia,
3 to your knowledge?

4 A. Not to my knowledge.

11:27:30 5 Q. Who received that money?

6 A. Oh, the money was paid directly to the company in Serbia in
7 cash. In fact that was a very difficult thing. Even when we had
8 misunderstanding with them about deliveries and different things
9 we couldn't officially complain to anybody about it. Even though
11:27:53 10 the Government of Serbia approved the purchase, but they were
11 also concerned - they knew of the embargo and that - that
12 approval was basically to free up the company. But they - they
13 from that particular point were not interested in what happened,
14 so we couldn't complain, so we lost.

11:28:18 15 Q. Now, Kadiatu Diarra Findley, where is she now?

16 A. She is in Monrovia, Liberia.

17 Q. What is her physical condition?

18 A. On this particular part, counsel, because of the question,
19 I would - I would really - you know, with the permission of the
11:28:43 20 Court, ask that we - because it involves her personal health
21 record, to explain her situation, I would ask the indulgence of
22 the Court in maybe a couple of minutes of private session because
23 I wouldn't want that to go in the public.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I note the time. Would
11:28:59 25 that be more conveniently done at 12 o'clock?

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly. If you don't have any other
27 questions that you could ask now, we'll take --

28 MR GRIFFITHS: It would be illogical to move on to
29 something else.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right then. We'll take our
2 midmorning break and resume at 12.

3 [Break taken at 11.28 a.m.]

4 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of
5 the transcript, pages 34934 to 34935, was
6 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as
7 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

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1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just for the members of the public, the
4 Court a while ago went into private session because the witness
12:04:24 5 had information which, if revealed in public, would encroach on
6 the privacy of certain persons. So for that reason we went
7 briefly into private session, and now we are back into open
8 session.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:04:39 10 Q. Mr Taylor, moving on. Another personality I would like to
11 ask you about who was mentioned during the course of your
12 cross-examination: Benoni Urey, who is he?

13 A. Benoni Urey served as Commissioner of Maritime Affairs
14 during my presidency.

12:05:02 15 Q. What are his qualifications?

16 A. Mr Urey has two masters degrees, I think one in business
17 administration and I am not too sure about the second, it may be
18 international relations. But I am sure about business and public
19 administration.

12:05:22 20 Q. And where did he obtain those degrees, Mr Taylor?

21 A. At the University of Southern California.

22 Q. And when did you first meet him?

23 A. I first met him in 1980.

24 Q. Where?

12:05:51 25 A. In Monrovia.

26 Q. In what circumstances?

27 A. I had come from the United States in 1980 as chairman of
28 the union to look into problems with the government, and he was
29 one of the up and coming senior executives working then for the

1 Liberian Electricity Corporation.

2 Q. Doing what?

3 A. I think he was - he was one of the top managers, I think,
4 either - assistant managing director of the LEC.

12:06:28 5 Q. And so that's in 1980. And did that contact continue
6 thereafter?

7 A. I would say yes. In a way, yes, it continued. During the
8 crisis in 1980 when - the coup d'etat in Liberia, I lost sight of
9 him. I think he left the country for a good many years, and the
10 next time bumped into him was - when I say "bump" - that we came
11 into contact was about 1991.

12 Q. Where?

13 A. He had been, apparently, in exile in Sierra Leone, and he
14 found his way through La Cote d'Ivoire and came into the NPRAG
15 area.

16 Q. And where were you based at the time?

17 A. By the time - which is about - I will say about July 1991,
18 I have now moved to Gbarnga.

19 Q. And when he arrives in NPRAG area, did he play any role at
12:07:43 20 all in the NPRAG government?

21 A. He may - I am not too sure. He may - he - with his
22 financial and public administration background, I am sure he was
23 utilised. I can't tell the exact agency where he was utilised,
24 but all of the professionals behind the line at that time were
12:08:09 25 utilised in some capacity. He was not a combatant, never fought,
26 but they were utilised. Maybe either at the Finance Ministry or
27 someplace, but I don't know exactly which agency used him, but he
28 was utilised.

29 Q. When in 1995 you went to Monrovia, did he accompany you?

1 A. Yes, he did.

2 Q. In what capacity?

3 A. By this time he did not have a job in the transitional
4 government. Most of these technocrats, we were using them to put
12:08:44 5 together our manifesto. He participated in putting together the
6 manifesto for the National Patriotic Party waiting for the
7 electoral process to start.

8 Q. So in that period he was a party activist; would that be a
9 fair description?

12:09:03 10 A. That would be fair.

11 Q. In the same way that you described Kadiatu Diarra Findley's
12 role in a similar capacity during this period?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Following the election and your appointment as President,
12:09:20 15 what role did Mr Urey play?

16 A. He was appointed, with the advice and consent of the
17 Senate, as Commissioner of Maritime Affairs. That was his first
18 and only job.

19 Q. Now, that commission was responsible for a substantial part
12:09:39 20 of the government's income, wasn't it, Mr Taylor?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Why did you put him in charge of that?

23 A. Well, because of his academic background and having the
24 working experience at the electricity corporation for so many
12:09:58 25 years - I don't know how many years he had worked there before I
26 met him in 1980, but he had quite a, you know, bit of experience,
27 and he was educated in the United States in one of the top
28 institutions. You know, normally when you say University of
29 Southern California it is at this place or at that place, so I

1 don't remember at which city. But that's a top - you know, top
2 United States university, and we tried to use the best that we
3 had at our disposal at the time.

12:10:38 4 Q. Now, was he appointed to that post because of any personal
5 friendship with you?

6 A. Oh, no, not at all, no; because of his qualification.

7 Q. Was he your friend by this time?

8 A. Well, I would say acquaintance, not a friend. I named my
9 friends. I am older than Ben. Cyril Allen I would say is a
12:10:56 10 friend. I look at friendship when you and the President can sit
11 down and crack jokes about little things, then you people are
12 friends. But he was - I wouldn't look at him in that way
13 because, you know, we dealt on a professional line.

14 Q. Were you ever involved in any business enterprise with
12:11:21 15 Mr Urey?

16 A. None whatsoever. None whatsoever, no.

17 Q. What is Mr Urey currently doing, Mr Taylor?

18 A. I really don't know what he is doing right now. I know - I
19 don't think he is for working for the government.

12:11:42 20 Q. Is he still in Liberia?

21 A. Yes, he is.

22 Q. Is he involved in any kind of business activity, to your
23 knowledge?

24 A. Not to my knowledge and, to be factual about it, I just -
12:11:56 25 some of the newspapers that I received some time ago, I think he
26 is now mayor of a little town, his home town. That's so. I am
27 not sure if it's a government job, but he is not involved in
28 anything that I know of.

29 Q. Is he on the Security Council's travel ban?

1 A. Yes, he is.

2 Q. Is he also on their asset freeze?

3 A. Yes, he is.

4 Q. Now, apart from his role as head of the maritime agency,
12:12:45 5 did he play any other role in the government - in your government
6 in Liberia?

7 A. No, that was it. He didn't have any other specific role
8 other than commissioner and that was - that position of
9 Commissioner of Maritime Affairs put him at a cabinet rank. So
12:13:12 10 he would attend cabinet meetings, but he was assigned strictly to
11 his agency.

12 Q. Now, so far as the revenues collected by that agency, how
13 were they dealt with, can you explain to us?

14 A. The maritime funds to the best of my recollection came in I
12:13:42 15 think twice a year.

16 Q. From where?

17 A. From the shipping registry that we hired in the
18 United States, a company, and I think we went through that, it's
19 called LISCR. It's LISCR now. I think it's around May, June and
12:14:09 20 around November, if I am correct about that, where the shipping -
21 the ship owners begin to pay in into the registry and the portion
22 for the Government of Liberia would be then transmitted through
23 the office of the commissioner.

24 Q. And upon receipt of those funds, what was the commissioner
12:14:36 25 expected to do with them?

26 A. Oh, they are transferred to the Government of Liberia.

27 Q. How?

28 A. They become - they will be sent through either - there were
29 two banking institutions that dealt with that, the Central Bank

1 of Liberia would receive it either directly or it would come
2 through Ecobank, this is a bank that belongs to the Economic
3 Community of West African States, it's called Ecobank, it's about
4 the biggest bank in West Africa. It would come either through
12:15:17 5 those two areas.

6 Q. To whom?

7 A. For use of the government. It will come - it will be paid
8 into a maritime account at Ecobank and from there, based on the
9 instructions of either the Finance Minister or the Governor of
12:15:34 10 the Central Bank, either all the money will be sent to the
11 Central Bank. If government had certain things they had to do,
12 the Finance Minister would give instructions on what to be done,
13 so it could be done in that particular way.

14 Q. Did such transfers include transfers to the account we
12:15:52 15 looked at earlier this morning?

16 A. I am not sure - no, if they would have been - if it was
17 going to that particular account and it was already owned by the
18 Liberian government, no, you wouldn't see such a transfer. We
19 would pick up the cash from Ecobank.

12:16:18 20 Q. I am not sure I understand that, Mr Taylor. Let me see if
21 I can make myself clear in the hope that you can explain to us.
22 Funds come in twice a year to the maritime agency, those funds
23 are either transferred to the Central Bank, you have told us?

24 A. That is correct.

12:16:39 25 Q. Or to Ecobank?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. For the use of the Liberian government?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. What I am asking you specifically is this: That bank

1 account, details of which can be found behind divider 9 in the
2 bundle we looked at, were any funds transferred direct from the
3 maritime agency to that account?

12:17:05 4 A. No. That's what I am saying, no. There may be a couple of
5 case, yeah. There may be a couple of cases, but most of the
6 cases would be just lifting the cash. But there were a couple of
7 cases of transfers.

8 Q. I don't know what that phrase "lifting the cash" means.

9 A. Taking it directly from Ecobank.

12:17:22 10 Q. And doing what with it?

11 A. Once it's authorised by the Finance Ministry and bringing
12 it to carry out our covert activities.

13 Q. So are you saying then, I just want to be clear, that some
14 of the funds received by the maritime agency was used for covert
12:17:46 15 activities?

16 A. Definitely. Definitely.

17 Q. In order to facilitate that use, were any of those funds
18 deposited in cash in the account we saw this morning? Do you
19 follow me?

12:18:05 20 A. I don't think so, no. I can't - no, I don't think so.

21 Q. So just so that we are clear, Mr Taylor, the funds we see
22 passing through that account behind divider 9, are any of those
23 funds traceable to the maritime agency?

12:18:41 24 A. I doubt it, because even if the money went into the
25 account, it came in in cash and we did not have to say it came
26 from the maritime. So it would be difficult to trace it in that
27 way. The areas that you can really trace are the areas that we
28 talked about, either the Taiwanese government or - but that way,
29 no.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: So your answer is no?

2 THE WITNESS: Yes, I said no.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Now we've slightly diverted in order to clarify those
12:19:09 5 matters, but getting back more directly to Mr Urey, was Mr Urey
6 involved in facilitating arms purchases for the Liberian
7 government?

8 A. No. Maybe indirect - well, okay, indirectly, but directly,
9 no.

12:19:36 10 Q. And just so we are clear, that caveat "indirectly yes",
11 what does that --

12 A. Well, he was Commissioner of Maritime Affairs and money
13 would be provided through the Ecobank account. It comes in to
14 me, okay, who authorised the purchase. But he was not involved.
12:20:04 15 So indirectly the money came from his agency, but he didn't know
16 the purpose. So that's what I mean by indirectly yes.

17 Q. Now, dealing with that in a bit more detail, was Mr Urey
18 one of those who was privy to the clandestine activities being
19 conducted by the Liberian government to purchase arms and
12:20:30 20 ammunition? Was he privy to that?

21 A. No. These technocrats, we kept them out, no.

22 Q. Now, you tell us that Mr Urey is still in Liberia?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And as far as you're aware, he is alive and well, yes?

12:20:52 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Now I want to move on from him, please, and the final
27 individual I want to talk about in this chapter is Charles
28 Bright?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Who is he?

2 A. Charles Bright is - he served as Finance Minister in my
3 government. In fact the last Finance Minister before I left
4 office.

12:21:24 5 Q. Now, going through the same process as we have employed
6 hitherto, when did you first meet him?

7 A. I first met Charles Bright I would say about 1991 going
8 into '92.

9 Q. Where?

12:21:46 10 A. In Gbarnga.

11 Q. How?

12 A. Charles Bright was a part of the INPFL, that's the
13 Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia that was headed
14 by Prince Johnson. At some point in '91 there were attempts on
12:22:12 15 my part to mend fence with the INPFL and bring the combatants
16 back together. Charles Bright was one of the representatives
17 sent by the INPFL to Gbarnga for the negotiations and he was
18 selected to come up for those negotiations.

19 Q. What's his background?

12:22:42 20 A. Charles Bright has an MBA.

21 Q. From where?

22 A. From a top United States university. I don't know which
23 one of them. The Bright family, like I say, is about the
24 wealthiest family in Liberia, so I'm sure he went to a very good
12:23:03 25 school. He has an MBA. His business background, he ran - in
26 fact the Bright family had the largest chicken farm in the
27 Republic of Liberia and so he was involved in business, commerce
28 and with his family business.

29 Q. And following that initial meeting, did you maintain

1 contact with him?

2 A. Well, yes, in a way. It's good to note that I got to find
3 out in fact when he came, my wife at the time, Agnes, happened to
4 have been a first cousin of Charles. So when I got to find out
12:23:57 5 that we were all in the same family, we did maintain contact
6 after he left.

7 Q. When you moved to Monrovia in '95 to take part in the
8 interim government, did he come with you?

9 A. Yes.

12:24:18 10 Q. In what capacity?

11 A. Excuse me, when you say did he come with me, no, because
12 Charles was not a part of the NPFL. So he was already living in
13 Monrovia, I said he was with the INPFL. So he didn't come with
14 me to Monrovia.

12:24:35 15 Q. Okay. But once you arrived in Monrovia, did you maintain
16 contact with him?

17 A. Definitely. Definitely. We in fact persuaded him to join
18 the NPP, yes.

19 Q. And what work did he do for the NPP?

12:24:56 20 A. The same organisational work that Urey was doing.
21 Basically at that particular time all the best minds sat and
22 started putting together a programme for the NPP and a strategy
23 to win the election.

24 Q. Okay. Now, was he a friend of yours, Mr Taylor?

12:25:23 25 A. I would say Charles - well, you can call it a friend. We
26 got - yes, I will call it that way. We were both, we found out -
27 I found out Charles was born in 1948 like myself so we used call
28 ourselves the '48 Boys. So we became close. I would call him -
29 I would say he was a friend.

1 Q. And after you became President, did he play any role in
2 your government?

3 A. Immediately, no, Charles did not play any role. He went
4 back into his family business. He did not - and we called him -
12:26:10 5 by the way, no, wait a minute. I made - I said something that is
6 incorrect. Charles at that particular time did come in. He
7 served as president of the National Bank of Liberia at that time.

8 Q. At what time?

9 A. When I came to Monrovia. When I came to Monrovia from
12:26:39 10 their side and the INPFL side, he worked as a - he was given the
11 post of President of the National Bank, and I'm being - because
12 it was changed. Through my government we made it central. It
13 was called the National Bank of Liberia. He was president of the
14 National Bank at that time.

12:26:57 15 Q. Now, that appointment, help me, what year are we talking
16 about?

17 A. We are talking about 1995, '96 --

18 Q. '95.

19 A. Yes.

12:27:08 20 Q. How long did he remain in that role?

21 A. He remained in that role going into my presidency. After
22 my election and the bank was changed, we removed him from that
23 role and he went into his private business.

24 Q. Now, there came a time, as indicated by you earlier, when
12:27:30 25 he became government minister?

26 A. He became Finance Minister, yes.

27 Q. When?

28 A. I will put that to around 2002 Charles took over as Finance
29 Minister.

1 Q. Why?

2 A. We removed - I had removed the Finance Minister at the
3 time, Nathaniel Barnes, for certain improprieties and then put
4 Charles in charge.

12:28:00 5 Q. Now, just pausing for a moment to deal with that. What
6 were the improprieties which caused you to remove Nathaniel
7 Barnes? Do you remember being asked about this in
8 cross-examination?

9 A. Yes, yes. Yes. Nathaniel Barnes, there was a point where
12:28:26 10 the pressure was brought upon the Government of Liberia to audit
11 the maritime account. We agreed to the audit, but I said that it
12 should only be done by one of the top ten accounting firms like
13 your Price Waterhouse and other top ten; that anything below the
14 top ten would be unacceptable to me because they could do

12:29:00 15 something, be controlled by some external force. But any of the
16 big top tens would be - because of their own reputation, would be
17 less likely to be persuaded by any outside force. At that
18 particular time the then Finance Minister Nat Barnes was in
19 favour of another group that was above the top ten. By "above" I
12:29:31 20 mean in a lower category. And then at that point the then

21 leader - head of LISCR came to my office and he brought a
22 recording of a conversation between he, the head of LISCR at the
23 time, and my Finance Minister, where he had agreed to accept
24 payment to persuade the government not to go with one of the top
12:30:11 25 ten accounting firms, and in fact I received the money. In fact,
26 I never told - I never even told Nat Barnes about it. And right
27 away, because he had been paid by the then head of the
28 maritime - of LISCR, I decided to dismiss him.

29 Q. And it was at that point, if I understand your evidence,

1 when Charles Bright was brought in to replace him?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And that was in 2002, you tell us?

4 A. Thereabouts, yes.

12:30:42 5 Q. And for how long did Charles Bright remain in that post?

6 A. Up to my leaving office on August 11, 2003.

7 Q. Now, you have mentioned that Charles Bright, you
8 discovered, was related to whom?

9 A. My ex-wife Agnes.

12:31:00 10 Q. Now I will ask you bluntly, Mr Taylor: Was his appointment
11 an example of cronyism?

12 A. No, not at all. If that was the case, I would have
13 appointed him from my first meeting with him in 1991. I did not
14 appoint him to any position until 2002. And even when we changed
12:31:21 15 the Bank National to the Central Bank of Liberia, I would have
16 nominated him as the first governor. I didn't do that. So no, I
17 would - I would reject that seriously.

18 Q. Now, following his appointment in 2002, was he privy to the
19 clandestine activities you had engaged in in order to obtain arms
12:31:49 20 and ammunition from abroad?

21 A. I can't be sure, but I am sure he must have had some
22 inclination.

23 Q. Some inclination?

24 A. Yes. Well, coming in - by the time he gets in, the major
12:32:05 25 transactions are over. The transactions are 2000 and 2001. He
26 comes in in 2002, so maybe going through some of the records or
27 maybe talking to people, but most of the major activities had
28 stopped. So I don't recall having any conversations with him
29 about that, so I would just assume that he could have had some

1 inclination that something was going on. But by the time he gets
2 into government, the point I am making, everything has already
3 stopped.

4 Q. Now --

12:32:38 5 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before you move on, I would
6 like to clarify part of an answer. It's on page 79, line 21 of
7 my LiveNote. He's speaking about Mr Nathaniel Barnes and the
8 exchange concerning the payment to persuade the government to
9 appoint another accounting firm. The LiveNote record shows,
12:33:04 10 "...in fact, I received the money", but I think it was - is that
11 what the --

12 MR GRIFFITHS: At line 25 of mine, "...in fact, I received
13 the money".

14 JUDGE DOHERTY: I think it was "he received the money."
12:33:18 15 "He received the money." I'm sure I heard that.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: He did say, "He received the money."

17 JUDGE DOHERTY: Perhaps it can be picked up in the course
18 of the --

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I am most grateful for that.

12:33:28 20 Q. Okay. Now, Mr Taylor, just to round off Charles Bright:
21 Where is he now?

22 A. Charles Bright is in Liberia. He is in Monrovia.

23 Q. Doing what?

24 A. I don't know, really. I haven't spoken to Charles in ten,
12:33:48 25 fifteen --

26 Q. But as far as you are aware he is alive and well, is he?

27 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely. Yes.

28 Q. Now I want to close that chapter now, Mr Taylor, and I am
29 going to go on and deal with another shorter group of

1 personalities, okay?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. The first person I want to ask you about is Coco Dennis.

4 A. Yes.

12:34:10 5 Q. Who is he?

6 A. Coco Dennis served as --

7 Q. Is it cuckoo [phon] or cocoa [phon]?

8 A. We call him Coco. We call him Coco. Coco Dennis.

9 Q. Who is he?

12:34:24 10 A. He served --

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is as in the bird? Spelled as in
12 the bird, cuckoo?

13 THE WITNESS: I would say yes. It's spelled C-0-C-0.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:34:38 15 Q. C-0-C-0?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. That's why I pronounced it "cocoa"?

18 A. Cocoa. Well, we just call him Coco.

19 Q. Okay. Who is he?

12:34:42 20 A. He served at one time as navy chief of staff for the NPFL.

21 Q. What was his background prior to that?

22 A. I think Coco served in the United States army for a number
23 of years, and I do not know what else he did before then. But
24 again, that family, the Dennis - the Dennises were very, very
12:35:27 25 well off. I don't know why he joined the army, but he served in
26 the US army. That's as far as I know.

27 Q. And how did he come to be navy commander?

28 A. Oh, Coco came in --

29 Q. Came into where?

1 A. Came into Liberia during the war from the States - he was
2 not there at the time beginning - and he served - with his
3 military background, automatically he had some jump on the rest
4 of the people, especially if he had served any part of any
12:36:02 5 foreign force, especially like the United States army, I think
6 that was good. And so we brought him in, and when he came in he
7 worked with the navy - with the navy chief of staff at the time,
8 Daniel Chea, who later on became Defence Minister. So when
9 Daniel Chea took over the post around 1994 as Defence Minister in
12:36:33 10 the NPFL, Coco Dennis succeeded him as navy chief of staff.

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, for someone reading the transcript in years
12 to come: Navy chief of staff, the navy, did that involve boats
13 or did it involve land forces?

14 A. I would say really, boats and land forces. Boats and land
12:37:05 15 forces. We - during the war, the Government of Liberia, the
16 Armed Forces of Liberia, what we call the - we called them Coast
17 Guards - had two small boats for Coast Guard and navel patrol.
18 Those two boats, the military boats, were captured by the NPFL.
19 So, boats, yes, we had two boats. These were - let me just
12:37:36 20 clarify. They were about 65, 70 footers just for speed for Coast
21 Guard activities. So boats, yes. Land forces, I would say about
22 80 per cent. They just - it was just more - for me it was more
23 like a name. Like the different sections of the armed forces,
24 army, navy. So you had a navy.

12:37:58 25 Q. Okay. Now, was Coco Dennis a friend of yours?

26 A. Well, I would say yes and no. No because I was not
27 friendly with my commanders. I think I would stick mostly to no,
28 because I was not friendly with my commanders.

29 Q. Were you ever involved in any business activities with him?

1 A. Never, no. Ever.

2 Q. After he became commander of the navy division following
3 Daniel Chea's elevation to Defence Minister, how much contact did
4 you have with him?

12:38:51 5 A. Not very much. There would be times, if I am in the navy
6 area, -that would be the Buchanan area, of course - while there,
7 the navy chief of staff would pay a courtesy call. If I needed
8 to ask any questions specifically to a chief of staff, of course
9 I could have the Defence Minister bring him to me. Other than
12:39:18 10 that, these were the contacts.

11 Q. Now, for how long did he remain in that role as navy
12 commander?

13 A. Until the end of 1996 when we - what you call it? I forgot
14 word. When we shut down the NPFL as a military force after
12:39:51 15 we - after all warring factions were disbanded.

16 Q. And what did he do thereafter?

17 A. He went straight into business. Coco got into business.
18 He started doing logging business in Liberia.

19 Q. Did he play any role in your government after you became
12:40:15 20 President?

21 A. None. None whatsoever. No.

22 Q. So for how long was he commander of the navy division?
23 From when until when?

24 A. I will say from about '94 until '96. The end of '96.

12:40:32 25 Q. During that two-year period, Mr Taylor, did you, as leader
26 of the NPFL, receive complaints about his behaviour?

27 A. No, Coco was respected by all. No. I didn't get any
28 complaints about Coco.

29 Q. Was it ever brought to your attention that he was involved

1 in committing atrocities?

2 A. No, the navy - the navy was never accused of committing any
3 atrocities, no.

4 Q. Or him specifically?

12:41:05 5 A. No.

6 Q. As far as you are aware, was he implicated in any way in
7 that incident at Carter Camp?

8 A. No, no. The navy was far from that area. That area was
9 controlled by the Marines and so Coco was not, no.

12:41:30 10 Q. At the time of that incident at Carter Camp where was the
11 navy division deployed as best you can recall?

12 A. In Buchanan.

13 Q. And remind us, the Carter Camp massacre took place where?

14 A. Around Harbel, Firestone.

12:41:52 15 Q. How far is that from Buchanan?

16 A. I would say close to a hundred miles, between Harbel and
17 Buchanan.

18 Q. That's all I want to ask you about him. But let me move on
19 to somebody else. Melvin Sogbandi, who is he?

12:42:16 20 A. Melvin Sogbandi became Marine Chief of Staff around, I
21 would say, 1994 - '93, '94.

22 Q. And what was his background prior to that?

23 A. Oh, I don't know what Melvin did before, but he was always
24 with the navy - you know, with the Marine division. I don't know
12:42:55 25 what Melvin did before he joined the NPFL.

26 Q. Was he a Special Forces?

27 A. No, he was not.

28 Q. How did he come to your attention in order to receive that
29 appointment?

1 A. He had worked with the - he had been working. He was the
2 Deputy Chief of Staff of the Marine division. And after the
3 Marine Chief of Staff was killed, he took over as the Chief of
4 Staff of the Marines.

12:43:35 5 Q. Did you - no, before I ask you that, for how long did he
6 remain in that position?

7 A. He remained in that position up until, again, the
8 dissolution of the NPFL in 1996.

9 Q. And thereafter what did he do?

12:43:57 10 A. Thereafter he decided to return. Oh, okay. He decided to
11 return to school at a university and he went and obtained a
12 degree from the University of Liberia, I think in business
13 management.

14 Q. And after that?

12:44:23 15 A. Following that degree, at about 2000, if I am not mistaken,
16 around 2000, he was made Minister of Post and Telecommunication.

17 Q. Who by?

18 A. By me, in my government.

19 Q. And for how long did he remain in that post?

12:44:46 20 A. He remained in that post until I left office in 2003.

21 Q. So can we try and put those dates together now. He is
22 commander of the Marines from 2002, 2003 to 2006, yes?

23 A. No, I am not sure that's the way it goes.

24 Q. Sorry, sorry. You give me the dates.

12:45:12 25 A. He is made commander of the Marines at about 1994.

26 Q. I am in the wrong decade. I'm sorry, it's my fault. And
27 he remains in that role until when?

28 A. Until 1996.

29 Q. Then when does he get the appointment as minister?

1 A. I would put it to about 2000. I would say about 2000.

2 Q. And he remains in that position until?

3 A. 2003.

12:45:49 4 Q. During his earlier incarnation as commander of the Marines,
5 did you receive any complaints about his behaviour?

6 A. No, I didn't receive any complaints about the Marines'
7 behaviour, no.

8 Q. Was it ever brought to your attention that he was involved
9 in atrocities against civilians?

12:46:04 10 A. No, no.

11 Q. Was it ever suggested to you that he was involved in
12 harassing civilians?

13 A. No.

12:46:23 14 Q. As far as you are aware, did he play a role in the Carter
15 Camp massacre?

16 A. None whatsoever. The only thing that - well, the way you
17 asked the question, did he play a role. Not in the massacre, no,
18 but in trying to - he played a subsequent role, but not in the
19 massacre.

12:46:42 20 Q. And what was the subsequent role?

21 A. Helping to provide assistance to the survivors and people
22 that were fleeing the area, because that area was near his
23 command area under the Armed Forces of Liberia, so as people fled
24 he gave them assistance and shelter and had some of the injured
12:47:05 25 treated in - I mean by the combat medics and different things.

26 Q. Now, remind us, Mr Taylor, following that well publicised
27 massacre at Carter Camp, was there an investigation?

28 A. Yes, there was.

29 Q. Conducted by whom?

1 A. The United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII
2 authorised full investigation of the Carter Camp massacre.

3 Q. And who headed that investigation?

12:47:51

4 A. That investigation was headed by, if I am recalling it
5 right, the former Kenyan Attorney General, Biko [phon], I think.
6 Biko was a former Attorney General of Kenya - was the individual
7 appointed to act and head that investigation.

8 Q. Who appointed him?

9 A. The Secretary-General through the Security Council.

12:48:17

10 Q. And prior to his appointment, did you know this man?

11 A. No, never, no.

12 Q. At the time of this investigation conducted by him, what
13 were you doing?

12:48:40

14 A. I was in Gbarnga taking care of my own business and just
15 making sure that their movements through our area and what they
16 wanted to do was facilitated. I just helped to facilitate the
17 smooth working of the investigation units that came.

18 Q. Did you exercise any control or supervision over that
19 former ambassador appointed independently by the
20 Secretary-General to conduct that investigation?

12:49:09

21 A. Well, I think for the record, I think I said the former
22 Attorney General.

23 Q. Attorney General?

24 A. Of Kenya, yes.

12:49:18

25 Q. Did you exercise any control or supervision over him?

26 A. No, Security Council Chapter VII appointee. I had no
27 control at all.

28 Q. Were the results of the investigations conducted by him
29 published?

1 A. It was.

2 Q. Publicly?

3 A. Yes.

12:49:48

4 Q. And help us. Who did that inquiry conclude was responsible
5 for the Carter Camp massacre?

6 A. The Armed Forces of Liberia and named the individuals that
7 they found to be responsible.

8 Q. Now that independent investigation, did it suggest in any
9 way that the NPFL were culpable for what had happened at Carter
10 Camp?

12:50:11

11 A. No.

12 Q. Did you order anyone to intimidate survivors of that
13 massacre to give false testimony to that inquiry?

12:50:30

14 A. No. In fact, most of the witnesses that appeared before
15 that commission was done in Monrovia and I was not even close to
16 Monrovia. Their offices were set up in Monrovia.

17 Q. Whose offices?

12:50:49

18 A. This commission of inquiry appointed by the Security
19 Council had their offices set up in Monrovia and all of the
20 witnesses were taken to Monrovia to be interviewed. They did not
21 even remain in NPFL area. Any one and every one that that
22 commission interviewed were all taken to Monrovia so they could
23 be properly interrogated, and so I had no contact or had no
24 influence.

12:51:08

25 Q. And the survivors were taken from where to Monrovia to be
26 interviewed?

27 A. They were taken from different - from Harbel, some of them
28 had - those that were injured that had been taken to Gbarnga, had
29 been put in hospital in Gbarnga, were all extracted to Monrovia.

1 Q. Prior to them being taken to Monrovia, were they in
2 NPFL-controlled territory?

3 A. Some of them were and others were not. Because some people
4 went straight toward Monrovia anyway, but some of them were in
12:51:52 5 NPFL area.

6 Q. As far as you're aware, was any pressure put on those
7 survivors who remained in NPFL territory to change their account?

8 A. No. Not at all. Because don't forget I just said even
9 those witnesses that appeared before those individuals, even if
12:52:13 10 you were in the NPFL area, you were taken to Monrovia. So
11 assuming one put pressure, once you got to Monrovia and you were
12 told, "Listen, you are speaking to us, it's the United Nations,"
13 even if you were pressured, you would say, "Well, listen I have
14 to tell you this is the way it happened," this way or that way.

12:52:35 15 They were not permitted to stay in our area. They were put
16 strictly under the control of this commission and they did what
17 they had to do.

18 Q. Because you appreciate what was suggested to you in
19 cross-examination about the role played by, in particular, Melvin
12:52:51 20 Sogbandi in that episode, don't you, Mr Taylor?

21 A. I remember the what I call twisted logic.

22 Q. And you recall it being suggested that in reality it was
23 the NPFL who were responsible for the Carter Camp massacre and
24 not the Armed Forces of Liberia. You remember that suggestion
12:53:10 25 being made?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. What do you say about that suggestion, Mr Taylor?

28 A. I totally disagree and that's why I say it was just
29 twisted, because for someone to even suggest that the United

- 1 Nations Security Council sends out under Chapter VII an
2 investigation that included professionals, these were not
3 ordinary people, pathologists, you name it, across the criminal
4 spectrum, they took as long as they wanted to take in Liberia.
12:53:40 5 They turned every page. For someone to suggest that, you know
6 for me it's just out of this world.
- 7 Q. Very well. Now, the final personality I want to ask you
8 about at this stage, Mr Taylor, is Daniel Chea. Your former
9 Defence Minister, yes?
- 12:54:09 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. Now, you recall being shown an article in which he was
12 interviewed, yes?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. We will come to that article in a moment, but before we do,
12:54:24 15 can you assist us please with some background detail. When did
16 you first meet him?
- 17 A. I first met Daniel in - I would say in 1990. Late 1990 to
18 the beginning of 1991.
- 19 Q. What's his background?
- 12:54:54 20 A. I didn't know Daniel - Daniel was one of those individuals
21 that had been sent on a government scholarship.
- 22 Q. From where?
- 23 A. By the Government of Liberia to the United States. He was
24 in the military.
- 12:55:14 25 Q. Let's take things slowly before we get confused. Firstly,
26 is he a Liberian national?
- 27 A. He is.
- 28 Q. And he was sent by which military?
- 29 A. The Armed Forces of Liberia, under a military cooperation

1 agreement with the United States, sent Daniel as one of the navy
2 commanders for training in the United States.

3 Q. And which regime was in power in Liberia at the time when
4 Daniel Chea went to the United States for that training?

12:55:48 5 A. Samuel Kanyon Doe.

6 Q. Right. So Chea is in the Liberian military under Doe when
7 he gets the benefit from that exchange, yes?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. At that time when he was sent to the United States, did you
12:56:08 10 know him?

11 A. No, no, no, I did not know him at all.

12 Q. When do you first come across him?

13 A. Like I said, in late 1990, 1991. The programme - he
14 completes the programme in the United States. He's a very close
12:56:23 15 friend and tribal mate of then Defence Minister Tom Womeiye.
16 They are both from Grand Bassa County. Womeiye finds out that
17 here is this brother - what we call tribal brother of his with
18 this expertise that is through the training in the United States,
19 engages in the process of encouraging him to come to Liberia, and
12:56:46 20 he comes to Liberia in late 1990.

21 Q. Pause. Now, at the time when Womeiye deploys these
22 persuasive skills, where is Womeiye based?

23 A. Between - Womeiye is Defence Minister. He is based partly
24 in the United States and partly in Liberia. Womeiye used to go
12:57:11 25 in and out.

26 Q. And so as a consequence of that, Daniel Chea ends up in
27 Liberia?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And where were you when you first meet him?

1 A. I am in Harbel Hill, Harbel, Liberia, when Daniel is
2 introduced to me.

3 Q. And help us. Thereafter - at that initial stage, in what
4 capacity does he serve the NPFL?

12:57:54 5 A. Daniel comes in with his expertise as deputy - I think
6 Assistant Chief of Staff of the Navy Division at the time in late
7 1990.

8 Q. Assistant to whom?

9 A. The then chief of staff was a Special Forces called Johnson
12:58:22 10 Leahma. That's L-E-A-H-M-A.

11 Q. And what is Mr Chea's career progression thereafter?

12 A. He moves up in the navy until he becomes chief of staff.

13 Q. Of?

14 A. The navy division of the NPFL.

12:58:41 15 Q. When you go to Monrovia in 1995, does Mr Chea have a role
16 in that - does he have a role in that interim government?

17 A. Daniel - I can't recall right now what Daniel did when we
18 went, because - I don't think he had any specific role in the
19 interim government. Because the Defence Ministry was not with

12:59:20 20 us, and so he just worked with the party. He worked with the
21 party.

22 Q. After you become President, Mr Taylor, who is appointed
23 Defence Minister?

24 A. Daniel Chea.

12:59:39 25 Q. When is he appointed? Just the year and the month --

26 A. 1997 after my election.

27 Q. For how long does he serve in that capacity?

28 A. Excuse me, counsel, for the record, on Defence Minister
29 thing - I know you've asked - because Daniel Chea is appointed

1 Defence Minister in the NPRAG before we move and then it stops.

2 Okay, now so I just want to just for the record --

3 Q. So he was Defence Minister for the NPRAG?

4 A. After Tom Woweiyu leaves in the conflict of 1994, Daniel

13:00:19 5 Chea takes over that position as Defence Minister. He stays in
6 that position up until the disarmament in 1996.

7 Q. Right.

8 A. He does not take another job. When I am elected as
9 President, he is appointed as Defence Minister.

13:00:36 10 Q. And for how long does he remain in that post?

11 A. Up until I leave in August 2003.

12 Q. Now, I ask this question for good reason, Mr Taylor.

13 What's the personality of this man? Is he a retiring person? Is
14 he what - somebody who is willing to speak his own mind? Is he a
13:01:03 15 wilting violet? What's he like?

16 A. Daniel is someone that - sometimes would speak his free
17 mind, I would say.

18 Q. What was your relationship with him as your Defence
19 Minister? How did you get on?

13:01:30 20 A. Daniel, I would say we got along very well. Daniel, as
21 Defence Minister, was on the National Security Council. He was
22 one of those individuals that participated very seriously in
23 National Security Council meetings. I remember he and the
24 Foreign Minister were always going at it. I let them do that.

13:02:01 25 But I would say we got along pretty well and he was - he was in
26 the loop, I would say.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, again I am asking these questions for good
28 reason in light of what we are going to come to in a moment.

29 Now, help us: What was your style of government? Was it

1 dictatorial, or was it democratic in terms of how you dealt with
2 your cabinet? What was it like? Tell us.

3 A. Well, on certain issues I gave the cabinet a chance to
4 really debate. Like I just mentioned, in fact, before you asked,

13:02:47 5 I saw the Defence and Foreign Minister get into a lot of
6 arguments in cabinet meetings on policy issues, national security
7 issues. Not like a fight, but I mean really argue seriously. I
8 would listen very carefully. I would give them sometimes, you
9 know, parameters and issues to discuss and they would come back

13:03:13 10 with their different opinions. If it was on defence matters, in
11 the final analysis I would hear the Defence Minister out. If it
12 was on foreign policy issues, I would permit the argument to go
13 on and I would give the benefit of the doubt to the Foreign
14 Minister, who was the chief foreign policy advisor to the

13:03:36 15 President. So it depended. There were times, and I - yes, as
16 President - I wouldn't call that being dictatorial. I would be
17 firm. If I wanted an argument to stop, of course I would stop it
18 after it had run its course. So in a way some people may call
19 that - I mean, I was very firm about that. After you had spoken

13:04:01 20 your piece, you can only - you know, it has to end. It doesn't
21 go on forever. So I would say it was - amongst the ministers it
22 was democratic, but in dealing with any President, there are so
23 many ways - you can almost assume in some ways it is dictatorial
24 in some ways. Every President - every President, when they say
13:04:20 25 "The buck stops here", that's dictatorial anyway. But they had
26 an opportunity for debate.

27 Q. Well, that partly answers my question, Mr Taylor, but again
28 I emphasise, for good reason, I want to pressure you a little
29 further on that. Now, you speak in that answer of debate between

1 cabinet members and your willingness to allow them, even on
2 occasions, to argue with each other, yes?

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. Could they argue with you?

13:04:59 5 A. No. No.

6 Q. Why not?

7 A. No minister in government that serves at the will of the
8 President argues with him. You make your point to the President,
9 and the President finally goes on his own quiet time and comes up
10 with a decision. I did not tolerate it, and I don't think any
11 President anywhere in the world tolerates an argument with him.

12 You make your point. After it is made, the President retires and
13 he makes a decision. But I did not permit it - I'm not going to
14 lie to anybody - and wouldn't permit it if I had to do it again,
13:05:37 15 no.

16 Q. Very well. Thank you for that answer. Now, in his
17 capacity as Defence Minister following his appointment by you,
18 what were his responsibilities?

19 A. Primarily what Daniel dealt with at that time in the very
13:06:00 20 beginning was beginning to put together a document for the
21 restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia. This was priority
22 number one. The second thing that Daniel was involved with,
23 following the war you had thousands of former so-called Armed
24 Forces of Liberia personnel around. What to do with these people
13:06:29 25 in this new reorganisational structure; how to pay them; getting
26 them their benefits; he was preoccupied with that. These were
27 the two principal things: The restructuring of the armed forces,
28 and trying to identify this massive force that had developed
29 throughout the war through the different factions and what to do

1 with them, and he did come up finally with a possible solution.

2 Q. In terms of his command over armed forces, in inverted
3 commas, in Liberia, which such forces fell within his range of
4 responsibility?

13:07:25 5 A. I wouldn't say any specific force. As Defence Minister, he
6 did not have any command responsibilities. Of course he had an
7 affinity of being an old navy man, but he had no command
8 responsibilities over any specific military unit. The Defence
9 Minister is the civilian representative of the President in the
13:07:50 10 defence establishment, and so he didn't have any specific command
11 responsibilities.

12 Q. The reason I am asking, Mr Taylor, is this: Why wasn't,
13 for example, the ATU, which, you have been at pains to tell us,
14 was the best equipped, best trained fighting force in the
13:08:08 15 country, why didn't that fall under Mr Chea's responsibility?

16 A. Well, I just followed the old mat. The ATU was just the
17 rebirth of the SATU, S-A-T-U, under Doe, which was - this was
18 designed not to be a military force; that's why I didn't want to
19 put it under defence. It was designed to be a paramilitary force
13:08:41 20 mostly like a police responsible for internal security within the
21 country. Because under our laws, the reason why it could not be
22 sent to him and put under Defence is that the Armed Forces of
23 Liberia, under the constitution of Liberia, is responsible for
24 external threats to the republic. So internally, the armed
13:09:03 25 forces has got nothing to do with what is happening on the
26 ground. And what we wanted was - and what Doe did - was to have
27 a paramilitary force that would be able to meet the challenges of
28 the time in terms of terrorism, crimes and other things. So it
29 could not go under defence.

1 Q. And I am asking this for good reason. How does it come
2 about then that this force, which has no responsibilities outside
3 the territory of Liberia, comes to be the best equipped and best
4 trained in the country? How come?

13:09:39 5 A. Very simple. Daniel Chea participated in that process.
6 While trying to put together a mechanism for the new Armed Forces
7 of Liberia, we decided that we would start with what I keep
8 referring to here as the old mat. We always say in Africa you
9 always plait a new mat from an old mat. The intent there was to
13:10:05 10 have a force trained as the ATU but would serve as the bedrock of
11 the new army. So in time they would have changed from ATU into
12 the armed forces, and they would have been the bedrock and
13 beginning - and would have established the command structure.
14 Because what we did very carefully with Daniel's assistance in
13:10:34 15 bringing in this group was to make sure that all of the officer
16 corps developing over there, you had to be out of high school.
17 And in fact, one of our senior officers was a university graduate
18 for the first time. He is now a senator. So what we wanted to
19 do was at the train this force to begin to serve as the bedrock
13:10:55 20 of the new armed forces so by the time a plan was put together
21 for the training of an armed force, we would have had a base.
22 That's the whole purpose.

23 Q. You remember the content of the Chea interview, don't you,
24 Mr Taylor?

13:11:14 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Now, help us. Bearing that in mind, and we'll come to it
27 in a moment, why not expend the time and effort used to create
28 the ATU - why not expend that on the Armed Forces of Liberia ab
29 initio, from the beginning, rather than start with the ATU in the

1 hope that it's going to evolve into the AFL? Do you follow me?

2 A. Yes. Well, there are several reasons for that. One of the
3 first and foremost, we must look at the financial situation in
4 putting together a national army of that size. So we wanted to
13:12:01 5 keep it small, well trained.

6 At the end of the war, there are some 20,000 plus
7 individuals claiming to be AFL personnel. Because what had
8 happened, the Armed Forces of Liberia as it was located in
9 Monrovia, got involved with ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, the LPC, we've had
13:12:33 10 all those names here - all of these factions were all tentacles
11 from the AFL. So what they did very craftily is that after the
12 war all of these ex-combatants that were ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K and the
13 LPC claimed that they were AFL personnel. So what you had at
14 that particular time was the former soldiers that were well

13:13:02 15 trained, some of them had really been trained, plus the
16 combatants that had come in now and claiming to be AFL because
17 they had been drafted by the AFL to fight in these factions. So
18 trying to dismantle that, that would have been a big situation.

19 So what we sought to do then was to begin to look at the
13:13:23 20 total restructuring with certain things in mind. Ethnic
21 composition, regional composition, to making sure that the new
22 army would have a reflection of the tribal, ethnic and all of
23 these diversities and so that took some time. And so that
24 commission was put together I would say in about 1998 and took
13:13:53 25 close to two years. We had - the United Nations were involved in
26 that particular process. We had some foreign governments. I
27 think the United States was involved in that process. We had
28 opposition party leaders. So it was a long process.

29 But at this particular time, to deal with some of the

1 issues that we were being blamed for, like human rights
2 questions, and not knowing what to do, we felt that we had to
3 take a small group immediately, train them topnotch, to begin to
4 move forward. So it was, you know, a very careful decision for
13:14:37 5 these and probably many other reasons.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, if the objective was to create a more ethnically
7 balanced national defence force, why have such a substantial
8 number of Sierra Leoneans in it?

9 A. No, when you look at the number and talking about
13:15:02 10 substantial, we are talking about - by the time the force - we
11 are talking about the Sierra Leonean constituted less than three
12 per cent of the ATU. But they were now - but they were also
13 Liberians now. Don't forget that. They are not Sierra Leoneans.
14 They are Liberians.

13:15:22 15 Q. But the reality is they were former RUF combatants, weren't
16 they?

17 A. Yes, they were former RUF combatants, but they were now
18 Liberian citizens and they could not be denied that particular
19 right anyway.

13:15:37 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, as I say, I am setting the groundwork for
21 us to address that article in due course. Help us with this. Is
22 the reality of the situation this, Mr Taylor: That you were more
23 concerned with internal security and maintaining your position as
24 President, rather than recreating an Armed Forces of Liberia over
13:16:12 25 which you considered you wouldn't have any control? Do you see
26 what I am saying?

27 A. I see what you are saying.

28 Q. I am trying to be as plain speaking as possible. What is
29 the position?

1 A. Well, the first two: Concern about internal security, yes;
2 concerned about my position as President, yes. But foremost on
3 my mind was to develop a national armed forces under the
4 instructions from the legislature. Not for any personal
13:16:43 5 situation. I would say no to that. And I wanted to make sure
6 that it was done and done right, and this is why we got the
7 people that we got involved involved with the process, including
8 the international community, and that plan exists.

9 Q. Very well. Let us now look, please, behind divider 13.
13:17:16 10 This is MFI-362. Mr Taylor, do you recall being asked questions
11 about this article?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Prior to it being presented to you in cross-examination,
14 and prior to you being provided with a bundle of Prosecution
13:17:53 15 documents before Christmas, were you aware of this article?

16 A. No, I was not aware of it.

17 Q. Had you seen it?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Now, we see that it's headed "Frontline World". Have you
13:18:13 20 heard of this publication before?

21 A. Not at all. I don't know what it is.

22 Q. Now, we see a website address at the bottom of the page,
23 <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/liberia/chea.html>. Do
24 you see that?

13:18:36 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. What is the date of this publication?

27 A. It looks like it was published in 2005.

28 Q. What month?

29 A. May of 2005.

1 Q. Now, where were you in May 2005?

2 A. I was in Nigeria.

3 Q. Having left Liberia in August 2003?

4 A. In that is correct.

13:19:08 5 Q. So this is two years after you had left?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Now, jumping forward to come back, you appreciate that some
8 of the comments made in this article by Mr Chea are quite
9 critical of you. Do you appreciate that, Mr Taylor?

13:19:28 10 A. Well, yes. Well, I am not sure. Maybe it would be good to
11 suggest that some of the criticism allegedly made by Mr Chea here
12 because I have no knowledge that Mr Chea actually made these
13 comments.

14 Q. Working on the assumption that he did, some of them are
13:19:48 15 critical of you, aren't they?

16 A. Definitely, yes.

17 Q. Tell me, did Mr Chea ever voice any of those criticisms in
18 the six years he was your Defence Minister from 1997 until 2003?

19 A. Not at all. Not at all.

13:20:05 20 Q. In all those six years whilst he continued to serve your
21 government, did he ever express any of these sentiments to you,
22 or anybody else for that matter, to your knowledge?

23 A. Not to my knowledge, no.

24 Q. And after you stepped down as President in August 2003, did
13:20:34 25 Mr Chea continue to have a role in the Liberian government?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. As what?

28 A. As Defence Minister.

29 Q. Until when?

1 A. I think he served through Moses Blah's term for two months
2 and I think that's about the extent of it. I think he also
3 served during the Gyude Bryant time, I was not following, but he
4 would have been Defence Minister throughout that period.

13:21:04 5 Q. Now, whilst he continued in your absence in that role, are
6 you aware of him during that period voicing any of the criticisms
7 seen in this article?

8 A. No, no. In fact Daniel spoke to me in Nigeria many, many,
9 many times.

13:21:24 10 Q. Say that again?

11 A. He spoke to me while I was in exile in Nigeria many, many
12 times. Never.

13 Q. Have you seen this publication Frontline World before?

14 A. No.

13:21:36 15 Q. Where is it produced?

16 A. Frontline, it looks like an internet thing. That's all - I
17 don't know where it is from. It doesn't say it. This looks
18 like, you know, an internet creation to me. I don't know where
19 it's produced.

13:22:02 20 Q. And who publishes it, do you know?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Who edits it?

23 A. No, I don't know.

13:22:16 24 Q. We see that this interview is conducted in the form of
25 questions and answers. Who asked the questions?

26 A. There is nobody - there is no one mentioned here as the
27 individual interviewing Mr Chea.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment, Madam President?

29 Q. Now, as we see, May 2005, it's headed "A political

1 survivor: Interview with Daniel Chea." Question one:

2 "How do you explain Charles Taylor's reign in Liberia?"

3 "Charles Taylor took this country [in a] frenzy. To
4 appreciate the Charles Taylor story, one must first of all

13:23:21 5 understand our history. There is a general state in this country
6 where people are more or less separated from government. There's
7 a great deal of suspicion between people in the government
8 because of past abuses. When Taylor came, people saw him as the
9 new breed. People saw him as a symbol of genuine change, and he
13:23:45 10 was embraced."

11 Taking things slowly. Do you agree with that sentiment?

12 A. Yes, I agree with that.

13 Q. But he continues, we are told:

14 "But what happened later during the course of the war

13:24:06 15 following the [1997] elections is really hard to explain.
16 Perhaps because he did everything to win favour with the locals,
17 his policies did not go down well with the international
18 community."

19 Would you agree with that sentiment?

13:24:27 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. "He did not receive a lot of assistance..." Would you
22 agree with that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "There was a rumour that the Liberian government was

13:24:46 25 involved with the RUF [Revolutionary United Front] in Sierra
26 Leone and subsequently in Ivory Coast. That was the turning
27 point... He was singled out as the most destructive element
28 within the region and perhaps it was best for him to leave..."

29 Now, pause here. Now, first of all, Mr Taylor, this man,

1 as you have told us, was Minister of Defence, yes?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Now, you have told us that he was the civilian head of the
4 armed forces; would that be one way of putting it?

13:25:37 5 A. Yes, you can put it that way. We normally say he's the
6 civilian representative of the President with the armed forces.
7 That's the same thing.

8 Q. Now, help us. Would the Ministry of Defence have access
9 to, for example, military intelligence?

13:26:00 10 A. Yes. They develop intelligence, so they have access to it
11 in the first instance. They develop the intelligence.

12 Q. Would the Ministry of Defence - the Minister of Defence be
13 appraised of troop deployments both within and outside Liberia?

14 A. Yes.

13:26:23 15 Q. Why?

16 A. Well, once the - the movement of troops in and outside of
17 the country, the minister would have to know because when the
18 plan - there must be a plan for such deployment and that plan is
19 developed by the military professionals and it is the job of the
13:26:51 20 Minister of Defence in conjunction with the chief of staff to
21 bring that information to the President once the order is given
22 for deployment.

23 Q. Would the Minister of Defence also be appraised of the
24 disbursement of arms and ammunition from the national arsenal?

13:27:18 25 A. Yes. Yes.

26 Q. Now, help us with this then, Mr Taylor: Where we see in
27 that paragraph "there was a rumour that the Liberian government
28 was involved with the RUF", if the Liberian government was so
29 involved, would Mr Chea, your Defence Minister, know?

1 A. Of course. Of course he would know.

2 Q. So can you help us with the use of that word "rumour",
3 please?

4 A. Well, the Minister of Defence, here he is talking - this is
13:27:56 5 in 2005. He was aware of all of these accusations. I could
6 remember the incident in 1998, for example, where the Government
7 of Liberia is accused of training RUF rebels inside Liberia at
8 Camp Naama. The minister is involved with that process along
9 with the United States head of military mission in Liberia,
13:28:29 10 Colonel Dempsey, and United Nations personnel, he goes there,
11 when we have this problem where President Kabbah, also in '98,
12 says that Liberia is deploying 5,000 troops. So he knows about
13 all of these and they are turning out not to be true. So my
14 suspicion here is that he is referring to - because they are just
13:28:49 15 rumours and he has had to deal with these rumours on a daily
16 basis, whether it is sending people to the border or going there,
17 you know, himself, or whether it has to do with being on that
18 delegation to Camp Naama along with Colonel Dempsey and the rest
19 of them to see that there is no training. So that's why he is
13:29:13 20 calling them rumours because he is dealing with this on a daily
21 basis, putting out fires.

22 Q. So he knew about the contents of that report in which
23 Colonel Dempsey was involved, did he?

24 A. He was there. He went along with that delegation. He was
13:29:29 25 there. The Defence Minister himself accompanied Dempsey and the
26 UN personnel, he himself went.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time. Would that be a convenient
28 point?

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths, that would be a

1 convenient point. We shall adjourn until 2.30.

2 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

3 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, please
14:30:54 5 continue.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, before lunch we were looking at this
8 article involving Daniel Chea.

9 A. Yes.

14:32:14 10 Q. And we'd got to the end of that second paragraph, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. I'd like to continue where we left off, please:

13 "The fight for us" - continues, according to this,
14 Mr Chea - "was that this man was very popular. In the history of
14:32:47 15 elections, he is the only individual to have won with more than
16 85 per cent - unofficially. If his exit from this country was
17 not done in a proper context, it could ripple into some
18 devastating circumstances. The international community
19 understood that very well."

14:33:11 20 What do you understand by those two sentences, Mr Taylor?
21 "If his exit were not done in a proper context it could ripple
22 into some devastating circumstances."

23 A. This is why I'm wondering about this 2005 thing. At this
24 particular time in 2003 there was a very tense situation that
14:33:41 25 evolved that the President of the United States at that time
26 George Bush said in a statement before a gathering of African
27 ambassadors in Washington DC, "Charles Taylor must leave Liberia
28 and leave now," or to that effect. And I said I was not going
29 anywhere until the peacekeepers arrived, because to leave Liberia

1 at that particular time so unceremoniously would have led to a
2 massive bloodbath at the time. This is the incident in 2003 that
3 is being described here.

4 Q. Okay, thank you:

14:34:33 5 "Led by the United States and the ECOWAS, a lot of
6 negotiations went on behind the scenes, and finally we saw an
7 exit of Mr Taylor from this country."

8 Now, at a later stage, Mr Taylor, I will be revisiting a
9 topic discussed with you at length by the Prosecution which is
14:35:00 10 the circumstances in which you came to stand down. But for now,
11 briefly, was there a lot of negotiations behind the scenes in
12 which the United States and ECOWAS were involved?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And to what effect were those negotiations that were being
14:35:27 15 conducted?

16 A. Could you say that again?

17 Q. What was the purpose of those negotiations behind the
18 scenes involving the United States and ECOWAS?

19 A. The United States had said that upon my departure they
14:35:43 20 would send peacekeeping forces into Liberia; they were sending
21 United States troops into Liberia. We were opposed to that. So
22 the whole point was at what point they would come and at what
23 point did the ECOWAS would take over. And, eventually, they did
24 send 5,000 troops to Liberia that stayed offshore until the
14:36:07 25 ECOWAS troops - so these were the behind the scenes negotiations.

26 Q. Over the page:

27 "What kind of a leader was this man who was elected by such
28 a wide margin?

29 Initially, he was worshipped. A lot of people had high

1 hopes for his administration. They thought that he could change
2 things around for this country, but Mr Taylor had his own
3 problems, his own suspicions and one of those suspicions, and I
4 thought this was a big mistake, was his suspicion of the
14:36:46 5 military. Because of his own suspicion of the army, he decided
6 to transfer most of the responsibility of the army into militia
7 groups."

8 Now, we have skirted around that. In the context of the
9 ATU, I've asked you about this, haven't I, Mr Taylor?

14:37:06 10 A. Yes, you have.

11 Q. What do you say as to the validity of this statement which
12 was put to you by my learned friend?

13 A. No, I don't agree. I felt that at the time we did have a
14 problem with the militias, but that was not my priority, no. I
14:37:25 15 would say that at the point in time that he's talking about, we
16 could not - we didn't have an army and I think that was the - the
17 whole issue here. But I disagree in the way that he puts it here
18 in the way it was put to me, that because of my suspicion of the
19 army I decided to transfer most of the responsibilities to armed
14:37:52 20 militia groups, when in fact we didn't have an army.

21 Q. But you accepting that answer, "We did have a problem with
22 the militias." What was that problem? The answer you just gave,
23 Mr Taylor, to my question you said, "We did have a problem with
24 the militias." What was that problem?

14:38:16 25 A. There were just so many of them, we didn't have the money
26 to pay them, and so that was the problem that we were pushing
27 forward to put together an army. So my main problem with the
28 militias at that time, they were causing a little bit of trouble
29 here and there, grumbling about money, claiming to be armed

1 forces personnel, so that was the basic problem.

2 Q. Did they become lawless?

3 A. There was some mischief that they carried out from time to
4 time and they were punished, yes.

14:38:46 5 Q. Did they harass the civilian population?

6 A. Some of them did.

7 Q. Did you take action against it when it occurred?

8 A. Well, as the Defence Ministry found them out, the Defence
9 Ministry acted against them, because what we did after my
14:39:05 10 election, counsel, every militia we covered. So they came under
11 defence. So whenever - this would be his responsibility.
12 Whenever there was a problem that the defence found out, they
13 acted against it.

14 Q. Now, before we before we continue, "Mr Taylor had his own
14:39:32 15 problems, his own suspicions," plural. Did you?

16 A. Well, I had suspicions. I had suspicions, yes.

17 Q. What about?

18 A. The whole - we brought in ULIMO-J, we brought in ULIMO-K,
19 we brought in the LPC, these coalition forces. For me there was
14:39:53 20 always a problem unless and until we formed a regular army. My
21 suspicion was that at any time these groups felt comfortable they
22 could cause unnecessary disturbance in the country because they
23 still had some loyalties in those groups.

24 Q. It continues:

14:40:20 25 "I thought that was a mistake. And, of course, when the
26 militia groups began to act disorderly" - and you accept that
27 they did, don't you, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Some of them did, yes, I do.

29 Q. "... the people began to reject them." Do you accept that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "They rejected the whole idea of not empowering the armed
3 forces, which is a constitutional entity, and instead Taylor
4 empowered militia forces."

14:40:47 5 Did you?

6 A. No, that I disagree with. That I disagree with.

7 Q. "You also have to understand that he, Taylor, had his own
8 alibi. He created a wall around himself where he repeatedly
9 denied his own involvement. I remember on many occasions when we
10 met with American diplomats who told him, 'You are involved.' He
11 said, 'I am not involved. If you have proof, bring it.'"

14:41:09

12 Do you remember such exchanges with American diplomats,
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, I had these - some exchanges with them, yes.

14:41:27

15 Q. Was it on one or more than one occasion that you had such
16 exchanges?

17 A. I would say more than one occasion. Official delegation,
18 more than one.

19 Q. Did any such official ever produce to you the proof you
20 requested?

14:41:43

21 A. Never. I haven't seen one page till date.

22 Q. And what proof were you asking for, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Well, the accusations at the time were that we were sending
24 arms and - I was sending arms and ammunition into Sierra Leone.

14:42:08

25 There were descriptions of truckloads of arms and ammunition to
26 Sierra Leone and that they were going in. So I'm telling these
27 people, I said, Well wait a minute. At one point you had
28 confirmed that because of the conflict in Liberia and Sierra
29 Leone you had a dedicated satellite feed in this particular area,

1 so if you say that there are trucks going across this border, you
2 must have some evidence of this. There are no trucks going
3 across. So if you have this evidence, bring it, let's see. In
4 fact, at one point my ambassador in Washington DC had been told,
14:42:54 5 The President may be denying this, but we have evidence. We have
6 - you know, we have photos. And so we confronted them several
7 times: Well, you've got something, bring it. You have
8 intercepts, bring it. Whatever you have, confront me:
9 Mr Taylor, here on this date, here is a recorded interview -
14:43:14 10 excuse me, statement that you made on the radio or telephone; or
11 on this date here is the border, here is a photograph of trucks
12 leaving Liberia. Nothing. This is what we were talking about.
13 Bring something to us.

14 Q. And from that paragraph, Mr Chea, if this document be
14:43:35 15 accurate, appears to be suggesting that he was present on
16 occasions when you made these denials. Was he?

17 A. Oh, the Defence Minister, yes. Every major - he was a
18 member of the National Security Council. Every major delegation,
19 whether it was Undersecretary Pickering or any other official
14:44:00 20 delegation, he would be in the meeting.

21 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor. Can you give us a time scale as to
22 when you began demanding the production of such proof?

23 A. I would say from about 1998 the - going into the second
24 quarter of 1998. After the intervention in February of 1998 and
14:44:34 25 news began to circulate that there were Liberians captured and
26 killed during that intervention, the issue was taken to the
27 Security Council and we remember a report that was done by the
28 special representative in Sierra Leone at the time who had
29 written a report saying that Liberia was involved because there

1 were Liberians. And if we remember very well that my - based on
2 a document presented here, the President of the Security Council
3 invited my official. That's about this time, around the second
4 quarter of 1998.

14:45:11 5 Q. And from that time until, Mr Taylor, despite those repeated
6 requests, has any such proof been provided?

7 A. I haven't seen one. None. Even - I haven't seen it.
8 None.

9 Q. Let's go back:

14:45:30 10 "The Ministry of National Defence [Chea] did not get
11 involved in the policies of other countries."

12 It says "Ministry" but it should be "Minister".

13 "We were involved in the defence of our own corridor.

14 President Taylor had his own disjointed militia that he ran from
14:45:51 15 his own mansion."

16 Did you?

17 A. No, that's not correct. No.

18 Q. Did you have personal control over these militias as
19 suggested by your Defence Minister? Did you?

14:46:06 20 A. To the extent that I'm President, yes, but I did not have
21 daily control. If anybody had control over these militias, he
22 would be responsible for the control, yes.

23 Q. "...ran from his own mansion..." What do you say about
24 that?

14:46:24 25 A. Except he's talking about the ATU, which I wouldn't
26 understand the context. If Daniel made this statement, I don't
27 understand the context he was speaking with. But I disagree that
28 there were a disjointed militia being run from the mansion.
29 There was no disjointed militia. I think this could be the

1 writer's own view here, because the only paramilitary force that
2 had anything to do with the Executive Mansion and the SSS was the
3 ATU, and that was very well trained.

4 Q. Now, it goes on. And this is another passage which was
14:47:02 5 emphasised in the course of your cross-examination:

6 "On the Ivorian issue, when I realised that militia forces
7 from Liberia were involved, I talked to him one day, and I said,
8 'Look, before going into one area you must have an objective,
9 either militarily or political, and in this case we have none.

14:47:32 10 We have our own issues; we are under attack by LURD [Liberians
11 United For Reconciliation and Democracy] forces.' And he said to
12 me, 'Well, Dan, sometimes there are things that you do not
13 understand. There are too many things happening in this region
14 and sometimes you get consumed. And you can be assured that
14:47:59 15 whatever it is it will get under control.'"

16 Now, first of all, did you send militia forces into la Cote
17 d'Ivoire?

18 A. Never, no. I didn't have the forces. No.

19 Q. Were there Liberians fighting in the conflict in la Cote
14:48:30 20 d'Ivoire?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. At this time?

23 A. Oh, yes, quite a few of them. Quite a few of them.

24 Q. How had it come about that there were Liberians fighting in
14:48:39 25 la Cote d'Ivoire at this time?

26 A. In fact, this gave us trouble. The reason why they were
27 fighting in la Cote d'Ivoire, because in Nimba County that's the
28 Gio tribe, that's the Dan. The tribe that launched the
29 revolution in la Cote d'Ivoire, General - the late General Guei

1 Robert that we had be talking about that has been killed before
2 is also Gio. So even some of our men from Liberia on their own
3 just because of the family and tribal connection went across the
4 border. I knew that they went across the border. It was
14:49:13 5 reported to me by him, but there was nothing that he could do
6 about it. There's nothing that I could do about it, because
7 these were just ordinary individuals that went across because of
8 the tribal and family lines and fought over there.

9 Q. But, Mr Taylor, we do have this situation now though, don't
14:49:31 10 we, that first of all we have commentators implicating you in
11 having or ordering Liberians into Sierra Leone, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And you've just told us about that from the time of the
14 intervention in '98. And lo and behold there's allegations now
14:49:53 15 that they're Liberians, your own militias, to quote your defence
16 minister, in Cote d'Ivoire. Don't you consider that a bit of a
17 coincidence?

18 A. Well, if he said this, I mean, I would be really shocked
19 that Daniel actually put it this way. But let's take the first
14:50:11 20 instance you gave of the situation in Sierra Leone. Again, there
21 were Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone. Hundreds of them. But
22 who were they? They were people that the Sierra Leonean
23 government employed. So the fact that Liberians were fighting in
24 there didn't mean that I sent them. The Sierra Leonean
14:50:30 25 government employed them; they fought for the Sierra Leonean
26 government as a task force; and they were involved in every
27 facet. We never denied that there were Sierra Leoneans in there,
28 so that issue is very clear. On the Ivorian side, here is the
29 Defence Minister - and I'm not sure he put it in this way - the

1 Defence Minister is aware that Liberians that we do not have any
2 control over crossed these borders and they are fighting into La
3 Cote d'Ivoire. And by the way, the Ivorian government in Abidjan
4 never officially accused the Government of Liberia of having a
14:51:01 5 militia sent into La Cote d'Ivoire, because they knew it was not
6 true, because I worked with Gbagbo on so many occasions. The
7 issue here is that were Liberians, and these are the very
8 non-state actors that no one had control over.

9 Q. Very well. Now, we see also in this passage reference to a
14:51:24 10 discussion about this situation between yourself and Chea.
11 Taking things in stages, did you have such a discussion with him
12 on the situation in La Cote d'Ivoire?

13 A. Yes, the Defence Minister and I talked about the situation
14 in La Cote d'Ivoire, yes.

14:51:44 15 Q. And what was the content of that conversation?

16 A. Well, my recollection is that the Defence Minister was
17 genuinely concerned that some of the individuals that we were
18 depending on to fight the LURD push on us were deserting and
19 fighting in La Cote d'Ivoire. It was a genuine concern, because
14:52:08 20 the whole front from Lofa coming into Bong County and also from
21 Guinea, those that were supposed to be responsible because of
22 their connections in La Cote d'Ivoire had gone there. He was
23 very concerned about that, and when he says here that I said that
24 things will get under control, because he couldn't control it and
14:52:30 25 I said: Listen, Daniel, there's certain things that whatever
26 they are, they will control themselves. If you are the Defence
27 Minister, you cannot control these people, you expect the
28 President to go and do it? So this was - as far as my
29 recollection goes, this was the way this conversation went on.

1 So I don't know how he's explaining it this way.

2 Q. Well, that's what I'm trying to get to, Mr Taylor. Because
3 Mr Chea poses this in terms of him, having been kept in the dark
4 about this, discovering the situation and confronting you with
14:53:07 5 it. Was that the way this conversation occurred?

6 A. Not at all. Not at all. It's exactly as I explained it.
7 Daniel raised the issue that a lot of our good people have
8 crossed the border, and I said to him: Well, look, this is a
9 problem that will come under control and it's your

14:53:27 10 responsibility. But I did not say to him like, you know, here
11 like he's just discovering. He knew that people were going
12 across. He knew.

13 Q. Did he pose a question to you in the terms as recorded in
14 this paragraph?

14:53:42 15 A. Not at all. Not at all.

16 Q. Did you answer him in the terms as recorded in that
17 paragraph?

18 A. Not at all. Not at all.

19 Q. And then he goes on:

14:53:54 20 "In most African countries, if you are assured by the Head
21 of State that he's in control, that he knows what he's doing, if
22 he tells you, 'Look, I will never do anything to harm my nation,'
23 you have to give him the benefit of the doubt."

24 Mr Taylor, did you expect such blind obedience from your
14:54:18 25 cabinet ministers?

26 A. After they've made their peace, in some ways, yes. No one
27 is going to have a cabinet minister that is a loose canon, no.
28 So in a way, yes.

29 Q. "Why did you choose to stay in Liberia working under

1 Taylor?" Before we come to his answer, in light of the contents
2 of this passage, Mr Taylor, can you help us as to why Mr Chea
3 stayed in that post for all those years? Do you have any views
4 on the matter, before we come to his answer?

14:54:55 5 A. Yes. Daniel was - like I say, he was in the loop. Daniel
6 had my ear, so to speak. He could speak to me and he was in the
7 loop, and so there was no way that his life or his person -
8 Daniel was in the loop on everything. Daniel travelled
9 extensively. So I guess he stayed there because he was
14:55:21 10 satisfied.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: By "in the loop" you mean what exactly?

12 THE WITNESS: I mean he was a part of the National Security
13 Council. He was a part of the decision making process. There
14 were virtually no principal decision that was made in that
14:55:36 15 country that members of the National Security Council were not
16 aware of - whether they agreed or disagree at some level - but
17 they were aware. That's what I mean that he was in the loop.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Now, let's have a look at his answer to the same question:

14:55:55 20 "I knew that we were going to get to such times in this
21 country as we did in May, June and July of last year [the three
22 last battles of 2003 were so horrific they were dubbed 'World War
23 I', 'World War II' and 'World War III' by the Liberians]. At
24 that time, we needed someone level headed to be in control. Even
14:56:21 25 though it caused me some embarrassment and some frustration as
26 Minister of Defence, sometimes things would happen that I did not
27 know, but I felt a compulsion to stay on board and that the time
28 would come when some kind of control mechanism would have to be
29 introduced to save the day, I have no remorse.

1 If we had left, there would have been a total break down.
2 LURD forces would have [crossed], the Liberian people would have
3 been slaughtered in the midst of all these forces. And don't
4 forget in those last days, Taylor could not get out of his
14:57:06 5 compound, I was the only one in the streets - the streets that
6 are going to be virtually lawless, and it was going to be
7 anybody's game. Thank God we didn't get to that. It nearly did.
8 But it didn't."

9 Now, before we come to the meat of that answer, Mr Taylor,
14:57:30 10 you will note that at the beginning, he says this, of that
11 passage: "... as we did in May, June, July of last year, the
12 three last battles of 2003 ..." Yet, going back to the first
13 page, this publication is dated May 2005.

14 A. Yes.

14:57:50 15 Q. So the previous year would have been 2003 - 2004?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Can you help us with that?

18 A. I don't know what the writer is talking about. The only
19 thing I can put it to is that this looks like - I don't know,
14:58:18 20 because if he says "last year", he's got to be talking about 2003
21 - I mean 2004 because like you say it was written in 2005. So
22 what I surmise here is that, unless we get the context, this
23 appears to be either incomplete, the way how it is put, because
24 in 2004, Daniel, if he was Defence Minister, that was under Gyude
14:58:46 25 Bryant. That's the best I can say. I don't understand why the
26 writer, whoever this person is, puts it this way.

27 Q. Now, was there a time in May, June and July of your time as
28 President in 2003 which was called World War I, World War II and
29 World War III by the Liberians?

1 A. It's possible. They could have used this expression. I
2 don't doubt it. But I think what they are talking about, I
3 remember there were three principal attacks on the City of
4 Monrovia with mortar shells being logged in all parts of the city
14:59:35 5 and that's the three months. Now, whether they called it World
6 War I, for me, this could very well be true, but I don't know
7 that.

8 Q. Now, thereafter we see an example of Mr Chea's hubris. "We
9 needed someone level headed to be in control." Are you not level
15:00:01 10 headed, Mr Taylor?

11 A. I am and I think that's what he's - I think that's what
12 he's alluding to here. If you go a little further, I'm sure
13 then --

14 Q. "... as Minister of Defence, sometimes things would happen
15:00:20 15 that I did not know, but I felt a compulsion to stay on board and
16 that the time would come when some kind of control mechanism
17 would have to be introduced to save the day, I have no remorse."

18 Was it Mr Chea who saved the day in the end, Mr Taylor?

19 A. No, no, no. And I think, as is written, you only get the
15:00:43 20 thing when you go to the next line where he says "if we had
21 left". He's then - I think Daniel - if he said that he's
22 referring to my refusal to leave during these very crucial times
23 until there were peacekeepers on the ground. So Daniel know that
24 - in fact, they all insisted, "Mr President, if you leave here,
15:01:06 25 we are finished." And that was the saviour of the day and not
26 him.

27 Q. What about that reference to you being unable to get out of
28 your compound. Is that true?

29 A. No.

1 Q. Towards the end, were you a prisoner in your compound?

2 A. No, that's not true. I drove around the city. They would
3 try to stop me. What I think he's describing here is that he had
4 a role as Defence Minister; he was out most of the time. But
15:01:33 5 nobody stopped me from moving. I was on the street myself.

6 Q. "As the Minister of Defence," he is asked, "and as Taylor's
7 friend, weren't there times when you questioned his actions?"

8 "I don't like to talk about myself and what I did. But if
9 you recall, sometime in 2002 I was placed under house arrest."

15:02:07 10 Was he?

11 A. I don't - I think Daniel - I cannot recall the incident,
12 but I think he was placed under house arrest.

13 Q. Let's remind ourselves of what he says is the circumstances
14 of that incident:

15:02:26 15 "A lot of Liberians don't know, but I will take this
16 opportunity to tell you why. One time I came from Lofa County
17 and I asked him, Taylor, 'I'd like to talk to you as my friend,
18 as my big brother,' and I asked him two questions. One of the
19 questions was simply put: 'Why do you think that you are the
15:02:51 20 only one in this country who is right and everybody else is
21 wrong?' The other question I won't tell you."

22 Pause. Do you recall an occasion where Mr Chea posed such
23 a question to you?

24 A. Not at all. If Mr Chea - I tell anybody on this planet -
15:03:13 25 if Mr Chea had posed any such question to me, he would never have
26 served on my cabinet a second later.

27 Q. Well --

28 A. Never --

29 Q. -- according to him, and it's quite clear you would have

1 taken such a question seriously, Mr Taylor.

2 A. Very.

3 Q. You would have considered it an affront, would you?

4 A. Of course.

15:03:35 5 Q. Requiring immediate action?

6 A. Immediate dismissal. If my Defence Minister came to me and
7 asked me to my face, "Do you think you are the only person in
8 this country who is always right," I would have dismissed him
9 from cabinet immediately.

15:03:51 10 Q. Well, according to him you did take immediate action. "The
11 day after, he said I was being arrogant and he ordered me under
12 house arrest. I was placed under house arrest for 72 hours."

13 A. No.

14 Q. Does that now ring a bell, Mr Taylor?

15:04:04 15 A. Not at all. Oh, Daniel, Daniel, Daniel, if he said this he
16 - Daniel knows me. He could have and did not ever ask me this
17 particular question. I don't recall - for him to be placed under
18 house arrest, it had to be something that he had done out there
19 as Defence Minister that called for an investigation or maybe
15:04:29 20 someone said he had done something wrong. But there is no
21 minister in my government, and all of them will tell you now,
22 that would have ever come to me who was serving at my pleasure to
23 ask me such an insulting question to say, "Do you think you are
24 the only one?" He never did and I hope wherever he is, I hope
15:04:52 25 he's hearing it, he knows he could not have.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, can we pause a minute and remind ourselves.

27 Your Vice-President was put under house arrest as well, wasn't
28 he?

29 A. Moses Blah, yes.

1 Q. Now, bearing in mind those facts, do you now recall a
2 situation where you placed Daniel Chea under house arrest?

3 A. No, I don't remember the exact situation. I'm saying that
4 Daniel could have been. I think he was put under house arrest.

15:05:31 5 But if I ordered a minister, because he was a military personnel,
6 he still carried the rank of general, under house arrest for 72
7 hours, it had to be something that he did in the field that maybe
8 intelligence came and we wanted to investigate, but not because
9 of a statement to me, no.

15:05:53 10 Q. "Of course, there was a lot of intervention, and he
11 reinstated me." Again, does that serve to jog your memory,
12 Mr Taylor?

13 A. No, I don't remember the exact issue.

14 Q. "Everybody else was like, 'If he puts his own Defence
15:06:18 15 Minister and friend under arrest, there's no telling what he
16 would do to those he didn't know.'"

17 Now, you see what he's saying there, don't you, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Uh-huh

19 Q. Was it a case of you doing this to your good friend and
15:06:38 20 Defence Minister in order to borrow the French pour encourager
21 les autres?

22 A. No, not at all, counsel. Not at all. And, in fact, I did
23 not consider my Defence Minister as my friend. He worked for my
24 government, he worked for me and Daniel going under house arrest
15:07:04 25 - I don't really know the circumstance, but I'm saying that it
26 had to be something that was related to his action in the field
27 that I ordered him to go under house arrest, investigated it and
28 released him. But it had to be a field matter.

29 Q. And then he continues, Mr Taylor:

1 "If only for once he had stopped in his tracks to recheck,
2 his government would still be here. Even today, there is a
3 popular belief in this country that Charles Taylor had the
4 ability to turn this country around."

15:08:19 5 Do you believe that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "He just let the people down." Do you believe that?

8 A. No.

9 Q. "If you talk about smart Presidents that we've had in this
15:08:34 10 country, he would be written among them." Would you agree with
11 that?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "But he made all the wrong decisions." Would you agree
14 with that?

15:08:45 15 A. No. Well, let's see what he's talking about.

16 Q. "Put himself at loggerheads with the international
17 community, with his own community. You just can't fight on too
18 many fronts. We don't have the resources. We are fighting the
19 international community."

15:09:04 20 Were you?

21 A. No, no, I was not.

22 Q. They were opposed to you though, weren't they?

23 A. They were.

24 Q. "We are fighting civil disagreements." True or false?

15:09:19 25 A. Well, yes, true.

26 Q. "We had our own disagreements with the United States" -
27 true or false?

28 A. True.

29 Q. "... with the United Kingdom." True or false?

1 A. True.

2 Q. "We just opened too many fronts that we could not keep
3 open." Do you agree with that sentiment, Mr Taylor?

4 A. I disagree. We didn't open any fronts. These fronts were
15:09:44 5 opened and Daniel knows. Daniel knows what the world - he went
6 on many quiet trips to America. There was a design for regime
7 change in Liberia and he knows that. So if he says this
8 nonsense, we didn't open any front. These fronts were opened
9 against us and we had to try to fight - we were fighting all of
15:10:11 10 my presidency against these fronts that were opened against us.

11 Q. "Did you ever consider quitting?"

12 "No. I never thought about quitting. I always felt that
13 quitting would have been disastrous. In the midst of all this
14 disjointed militia command, he [Taylor] needed a level-headed
15:10:35 15 person. If I had decided to quit, it would have been over an ego
16 problem. 'I'm Minister of Defence, why don't I know this, why
17 don't I know that?' I could have said to him one morning,
18 'Please, I'm gone.' But it would have been a negative impact, so
19 I stayed on. I played a role that I always envisioned. In the
15:11:01 20 final analysis, someone with a level head had to be around, so I
21 look back now and I'm glad I stayed on board."

22 Did it cross your mind at the time, Mr Taylor, that this
23 was the reason why Mr Chea was staying on board?

24 A. Not at all. Not at all. I think the part where Mr Chea
15:11:32 25 says here, "In the midst of all this disjointed militia command
26 he, [Taylor] needed a level-headed person," well, you know that
27 these militias are around, so who was controlling them? If he
28 says this, he was in charge of the militias. He was in charge of
29 them in trying to reorganise them, so - and they knew him well.

1 He had been fighting. Before Daniel became Defence Minister in
2 the NPRAG and in my government, he was on the field. He fought.
3 He fought during the war. And so I felt that someone with his
4 background, after fighting, and someone with his level of
15:12:14 5 military training, with these guys knowing him as a comrade in
6 arms, he would be the best person to control them. So the
7 decision for Daniel being in the cabinet, I can't judge his own
8 mind of what he was thinking. He could have very well thought
9 that he was this important. For me, I admit he was important in
15:12:36 10 the process because he had the experience and he had fought
11 alongside this guys, but he served at my pleasure. And so my
12 reason for keeping him in, it's far different from his own
13 personal reason why - that he feels that he was so, you know,
14 extraordinary. But my reason was for continuity. That was my
15:13:04 15 reason.

16 Q. Now you told us earlier that he's been Defence Minister in
17 the NPRAG government. Is that right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now, next question:

15:13:15 20 "There were protests when you were named the Defence
21 Minister of the transitional government because you had held the
22 same post under Taylor and were a friend of his. What do you say
23 to the people who are critical of your role in this government?"

24 "You are right, there are a lot of criticisms - 'Daniel
15:13:41 25 Chea is still beholden to Charles Taylor.' I don't know why. My
26 loyalty has always been to this country. Sometimes it landed me
27 in trouble with Mr Taylor; sometimes it landed me in trouble with
28 friends. As a man, you should be able to speak your mind on
29 issues, whether your views are accepted or not. I am here for

1 one thing; for peace. Enough is enough. This country has seen
2 enough war. And clearly we do know that war is not the war to
3 our inherent problems."

4 Was there this disquiet about his appointment when you
15:14:32 5 became President, Mr Taylor?

6 A. No, I think he's talking about - no, not with me; the
7 transitional government.

8 Q. Was there disquiet when he was named Defence Minister of
9 the transitional government?

15:14:47 10 A. It might be so. I was not in Liberia at the time. I don't
11 have any information about that. But it is possible that there
12 could have been disquiet, because people would have said, "What
13 happened here?"

14 Q. Let's go over the next passage quite quickly:

15:15:14 15 "What are you doing personally to improve the situation in
16 Liberia?"

17 "The situation is very simple, and our message has been
18 consistent. We must now take Liberia back for the better. It
19 was a stupid thing in the first place to fight, and we realise
15:15:28 20 the folly of our actions. Let's change. There is more to gain
21 from a peaceful Liberia than a warring Liberia.

22 We have disarmed to UNMIL [United Nations Mission in
23 Liberia] and we have to give Liberians a chance of peace so that
24 opportunities will happen for them. And they know that. Like I
15:15:56 25 say to most of them, if fighting a war would make anybody rich, a
26 lot of us would be millionaires by now. But what have we reaped
27 from years of fighting? Deprivation. Degradation. Poverty. I
28 have a few of them [ex-combatants] now who are in the programme,
29 having gone through disarmament and demobilisation. I have three

1 or four kids who now live in my house. I make sure they go to
2 school. When they come home, I make sure they're doing their
3 work. I want that to serve as an example and I wish other
4 commanders and other officials would do that, because there has
15:16:40 5 to be a mental transformation. You are looking at kids, some of
6 who were only five or six years old when the war started in 1989.
7 Fifteen years later, some are in their 20s. No formal schooling.
8 They have only known one former life, that of violence. It will
9 take a lot of work to transform them."

15:17:04 10 Mr Taylor, do you agree with the sentiments expressed
11 there?

12 A. I would say, you know, it's a little disenchanting, but the
13 sentiments are good sentiments. But we are looking at a
14 political statement by someone, if he made these statements, who
15:17:30 15 is dancing to the tune of this particular government. So I don't
16 know how --

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, it's quite a simple question.
18 It's not who said it, but do you agree with the sentiments
19 expressed there? Regardless of who expressed them, do you agree
15:17:52 20 with the sentiments expressed there?

21 THE WITNESS: Of course. Any normal person would agree,
22 your Honour, with this sentiment. But it's just the hypocrisy
23 behind it that - yes.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:18:08 25 Q. I'm going to skip the next question. No, in fact we
26 shouldn't:

27 "How would you qualify the overall state of the union in
28 Liberia today?"

29 "We are getting there. It may not be at the pace that some

1 people would love to see, but then nobody said it would be easy.
2 Especially after 14 years of war, of misunderstanding, confusion,
3 tribalism. It's going to take a while to put this country back
4 on course. But you were here last year, and you have to state
15:18:50 5 the fact that where we are today is a lot different than where we
6 were last year."

7 Why I decided not to skip it, Mr Taylor, is this: Was your
8 legacy to Liberia after 14 years one of misunderstanding,
9 confusion and tribalism?

15:19:13 10 A. No.

11 Q. "What about the security situation?"

12 "The security situation, I think, is good. We are working
13 around the clock with UNMIL. The armed forces are going through
14 restructuring. We have our own intelligence working with other
15:19:38 15 members of our Joint Security. We definitely know that attempts
16 have been made to get former combatants to take interest in what
17 is happening in Cote d'Ivoire [to recruit Liberian mercenaries to
18 fight across the border]. We are totally opposed to that and as
19 soon as we get that person, we are going to turn him in to UNMIL.
15:20:06 20 We are trying to demilitarise the minds of our young people.
21 Anyone who tries to encourage [combatants] into another war
22 situation is an enemy of peace."

23 Now, we have our own intelligence. Now, in your time as
24 President, was there a military intelligence wing of the Ministry
15:20:41 25 of Defence?

26 A. Oh, yes. Yes.

27 Q. During your time as President, were there attempts made to
28 get former combatants to, in effect, become mercenaries in
29 neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire?

1 A. No, not to my knowledge.

2 Q. Now, you passed an Act against mercenarism, didn't you,

3 Mr Taylor?

4 A. No, not - I didn't pass the Act.

15:21:19 5 Q. Who passed it?

6 A. That Act was passed by, I think, the Tubman administration.

7 It's a very old Act. We only referred to it.

8 Q. Let's go on to the next paragraph:

9 "When UNMIL first arrived in this country, they told us

15:21:47 10 they were here to disarm an estimated 40,000 people. I told them

11 to be prepared to disarm twice that number. The reason is very

12 simple: The disarmament of 1995 was a fiasco. There was no

13 disarmament. It was a haphazard attempt. Unofficially they [The

14 United Nations] will tell you that their own programme was a big

15:22:20 15 disappointment. And I think they learned a lot of lessons, and

16 this time around, I think they came quite prepared. And the

17 programme drawn up by UNDP [United Nations Development Programme]

18 is quite outstanding. We'll use it as a model for other places

19 in the future.

15:22:42 20 At the end of the day, this country must be totally

21 disarmed so that the peace we are building with the help of the

22 international community will be sustained."

23 Was the disarmament of 1995 a fiasco?

24 A. Not at all. It's total nonsense. Not at all.

15:23:03 25 Q. Was it right that UNMIL were told on arrival that they had

26 to disarm some 40,000 people and that number was a gross

27 underestimate?

28 A. I don't know, because the period in question here - he is

29 not talking about the 1995, 1996 disarmament. I'm out of Liberia

1 at this time. He's speaking about the transitional period here.
2 So I was out of Liberia. I don't know.

3 Q. I'm grateful for the clarification. So when UNMIL arrive,
4 you're out of the country. Is that right?

15:23:48 5 A. Definitely. Yes.

6 Q. At the time of the disarmament of 1995 to which he
7 specifically refers, what was Daniel Chea's position?

8 A. Daniel Chea was in charge - in fact, he was Defence - I
9 think he was Defence Minister in 1995.

15:24:07 10 Q. For the interim government?

11 A. No, no, at least from the - I think he was Defence Minister
12 for the interim government. I can't be too sure, but I know he
13 was Defence Minister for the NPFL that came in and was in charge
14 of our side of the disarmament.

15:24:22 15 Q. Now, 1995 was the disarmament process set in train by the
16 interim government as a lead-up to the general elections in 1997?
17 Do you agree?

18 A. No. No, I wouldn't agree. It was the disarmament set in
19 place by ECOWAS and the international community, not the interim
20 government.

15:24:49 21 Q. All right, very well. But ECOWAS and the international
22 community in 1995, and that was to be the prelude to general
23 elections in 1997. Is that right?

24 A. That is correct. That is right.

15:25:02 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, that paragraph, Mr Taylor
26 says the first reference to an estimated 40,000. This is the
27 disarmament of when?

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Well, you answer the question, Mr Taylor.

1 A. Yes, this is the disarmament of, I would say, 2000 and -
2 the disarmament in Liberia 2003, 2004. This is the disarmament
3 that he's referring to here, because they are the ones that are
4 carrying out the disarmament in Liberia and are still in Liberia.

15:25:37 5 Q. I want us to be totally clear about this, because on the
6 face of it there appears - of this paragraph - two periods of
7 disarmament appear to be confused. UNMIL came in when,
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. UNMIL came in at about 2003 when I leave office. That's
15:26:03 10 when UNMIL comes to Liberia. The ECOWAS forces that arrive in
11 Liberia that was a point of discussion with the Prosecution were
12 the - were sent as the advance team, but they were to be UNMIL.

13 Q. Now, I note counsel opposite shaking their heads at our
14 interpretation of this paragraph, so let's look at it again.
15:26:32 15 "When UNMIL first arrived in this country they told us they were
16 here to disarm an estimated 40,000 people." Yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Ask you again: When did UNMIL arrive? UNMIL?

19 A. I would say 2003.

15:26:55 20 Q. Right. "I told them to be prepared to disarm twice that
21 number." End of paragraph. "The reason is very simple. The
22 disarmament of 1995 was a fiasco." The disarmament of 1995 was
23 conducted by whom?

24 A. It was conducted by ECOMOG. ECOMOG carried out the
15:27:25 25 disarmament in 1995. There were United Nations observers, but
26 disarmament was ECOMOG.

27 Q. In '95?

28 A. In 1995.

29 Q. So in this paragraph the interviewee is talking about two

1 different periods of disarmament?

2 A. That is correct. That's my understanding of this. That is
3 correct.

15:27:53

4 Q. And so far as the 1995 disarmament is concerned, Mr Chea is
5 saying that was a fiasco. Now, do you agree with that,
6 Mr Taylor?

15:28:18

7 A. I fully disagree with Mr Chea to say that that was a
8 fiasco. I totally disagree. The United Nations, ECOWAS, the
9 African Union, all of the observers said that the disarmament,
10 while it was not total - and, in fact, no disarmament can be
11 total - the statement used during that period was that there was
12 substantial disarmament sufficient to carry out the elections.
13 And so for him to say it was a fiasco is total nonsense.

15:28:47

14 Everybody agreed that at least if - I didn't hear them assigning
15 a percentage, but the way how it was interpreted by all of us
16 that at least 80 per cent disarmament had been achieved.

17 Q. Now, I will deal with the next paragraph because of the
18 line that we see in the right-hand margin. Okay, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes.

15:29:16

20 Q. Can I preface our reference to this paragraph though with
21 this question: Do you know Daniel Opande?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Who is he?

15:29:37

24 A. Daniel Opande served as forces commander in Liberia. He is
25 Kenyan. He also served as commander later on of UN forces to the
26 best of my recollection in Sierra Leone, retired and became
27 Kenyan Defence Minister thereafter. I know him very well.

28 Q. Did you respect him?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Why?

2 A. He was a professional soldier. Very well trained and
3 professional man.

4 Q. How did you get on with him?

15:30:11 5 A. Oh, I would say very well.

6 Q. "Can you tell me what you think of force commander Daniel
7 Opande and the quality of the work he has done here?"

8 "My answer to your question could be a little bit too
9 personal because Opande and I have known each other since the

15:30:43 10 first war. I think he's a first-class gentleman."

11 Do you agree?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "And a soldier." Do you agree?

14 A. Yes.

15:30:52 15 Q. "A real soldier." Do you agree?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. "And if you ask him, he'll tell you he came to visit the
18 first time because he's always been concerned about Liberia."

19 Was he always so concerned?

15:31:06 20 A. Probably, but he and I did not discuss his concerns about
21 Liberia.

22 Q. "He was a little disappointed that things didn't go the
23 first time as he would love to have seen them go."

24 Now, I've taken a little time to go through that article,

15:31:24 25 Mr Taylor, to give you every opportunity to deal with those
26 comments made by your former Defence Minister. Do you follow?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. Now, is Mr Chea, as far as you're aware, alive and well
29 today?

1 A. Yes, he is.

2 Q. Where is he living, to your knowledge?

3 A. To my knowledge, he's living in Grand Bassa County outside
4 of Monrovia.

15:31:56 5 Q. And what's he doing now, as far as you're aware?

6 A. I really don't know. I know I heard that he was back on
7 his farm, but beyond that I don't know.

8 Q. And as your former Defence Minister, Mr Taylor, I guess
9 I like former President Moses Blah, he could be termed an insider.

15:32:42 10 Was he your friend?

11 A. Daniel?

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. No, I didn't look at it that way. He worked for me.

14 Q. And during the time he worked for you, Mr Taylor, did you
15:32:59 15 ever have any difficulties with him?

16 A. No, I really didn't have any difficulties with Daniel. If
17 I had I would have removed him. I didn't have any difficulties.

18 Q. Any major points of disagreement between the two of you?

19 A. No, not that came to me. Memos would come and go, Daniel
15:33:21 20 would come, we would talk about the difficult problems. None.

21 None.

22 Q. Now, in this interview, Mr Taylor, your former Defence
23 Minister recounts an occasion when he confronted you about
24 Liberian militias operating in Cote d'Ivoire, yes?

15:33:44 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And you recall such a discussion with him, do you, although
27 in different terms?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now, help us. Did Mr Chea ever come and confront you in

1 Like manner over Liberians in Sierra Leone?

2 A. No, never.

3 Q. Did he ever come confront you, suggesting, as your Defence
4 Minister, that you were supplying arms and ammunition to the RUF?

15:34:20 5 A. No, never.

6 Q. Did he make any such allegation to you at any stage during
7 his tenancy of that post as Minister of Defence?

8 A. No. In fact, Daniel was always concerned about why and how
9 these allegations were just - kept rearing their heads and that
10 no one could come up with anything, no.

15:34:46

11 Q. Very well. You can close that folder now for a while,
12 Mr Taylor, but can I ask Madam Court Manager that we don't - if
13 we just leave it under the table for now because we'll be coming
14 back to it fairly shortly.

15:35:17

15 Now, Mr Taylor, another matter you were asked about at
16 length during cross-examination was this incident at Greystone
17 compound, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. First of all, Mr Taylor, what is Greystone compound? What
20 is it?

15:35:40

21 A. Greystone compound is a plot of land adjacent to the United
22 States embassy in Monrovia. It was owned by the JJ Roberts
23 foundation. JJ Roberts, the first President of Liberia. That
24 was used by the United States embassy in Monrovia for some of its
25 activities and it was considered diplomatic grounds.

15:36:11

26 Q. Now, when you say "adjacent to the United States embassy",
27 is it located also in that diplomatic area called Mamba Point?

28 A. Yes. Oh, yes.

29 Q. And what does the compound actually comprise?

1 A. This was virtually nothing. Rocks. No, it was just - it's
2 an open piece of land that was enclosed, had a couple of houses
3 on it, but they just called it the Greystone compound, but it was
4 not like many, many, many houses, no. It was an open plot of
15:37:02 5 land that was enclosed with a few buildings that were used,
6 something like an external part of the embassy.

7 Q. Had it been purchased by the embassy or leased?

8 A. I don't know. I really don't know. I think it was - more
9 than anything it would be leased, if anything of that nature.

15:37:33 10 But I really don't know.

11 Q. And tell us, what activities was the compound used for by
12 the United States embassy? What did they use it for?

13 A. I really - some open programmes and outings, you know,
14 things like that. Nothing more serious than that. I think the
15:38:07 15 United States embassy had been looking at that property for some
16 time because what they were thinking about doing for many years
17 was the construction of a new embassy. So they were looking at
18 the property as a prime spot for building a new embassy.

19 Q. Now, when you say that it was being used by the United
15:38:30 20 States embassy, Mr Taylor, in earlier testimony you described
21 during the Camp Johnson Road incident when US marines allowed
22 those in flight to enter the embassy, remember you telling us
23 about that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

15:38:53 25 Q. Now, help us. The Greystone compound, was that too guarded
26 in the same by US marines as with the embassy?

27 A. No. Not in the same way, no. The US embassy is enclosed.
28 Greystone is not - at the time I left Liberia was not enclosed.

29 Q. So there's no walls surrounding it?

1 A. At the time I was there, no, there was no wall, so to
2 speak, surrounding it.

3 Q. So it's an open piece of land with some building structures
4 on it?

15:39:25 5 A. Exactly.

6 Q. Okay. Now, help us. Now that we've got a mental picture
7 of the location, what do you say happened in this Greystone
8 incident?

9 A. Because the United States embassy was using it, people came
10 there. As the shells were hitting Monrovia, thousands of people
11 came and assembled on the grounds of Greystone. Most people
12 believed this place is so close to the US embassy compound, LURD
13 would not launch mortars near there for fear that it could go off
14 course and probably hit the main compound of the US embassy. So
15:40:09 15 a lot of people rushed there because then they assumed they would
16 come under the protection of the embassy during the war.

17 Q. And of course as you've described, they would have had free
18 access to that area of ground because it wasn't walled in?

19 A. That is correct.

15:40:28 20 Q. Now, did your government take any steps to prevent those
21 people from assembling at that location?

22 A. No, we did not.

23 Q. Why not?

24 A. In fact we welcomed it because it would have provided - all
15:40:50 25 of us assumed that with the indiscriminate way that LURD was
26 shelling the City of Monrovia that they would - that their
27 leadership would show some understanding of diplomatic grounds.
28 Because Mamba Point was basically considered the diplomatic
29 enclave and that by people assembling in that area or in the

1 general Mamba Point area, it will form some kind of security for
2 them. So I personally welcomed it. The government welcomed it,
3 that people could get some degree of security in that particular
4 area.

15:41:27 5 Q. Now, at the time that the incident you're going to go on
6 and describe to us took place, can you give an estimate as to how
7 many people had taken refuge in that location?

8 A. That would simply be an estimate. Oh, the number could
9 vary between 5,000 to 10,000 probably. It would vary. There
15:41:55 10 were a lot of people out there.

11 Q. And over what period of time had they been assembling at
12 that location, Mr Taylor?

13 A. I would say the beginning - around about the third, I would
14 say, February, March, April of 2003 with the intensity of the
15:42:20 15 war, I would put it to about this time that people from what we
16 call across the bridge - that's the Bushrod Island side - the
17 intensification of the war, I would put it to about that.
18 Getting into about the second quarter of 2003.

19 Q. And who had responsibility for their welfare in terms of
15:42:45 20 food, clothes and shelter whilst they were there?

21 A. The United States government would assist. The NGOs, the
22 World Food Programme and other non-governmental organisations
23 were providing assistance to them. Whatever little the
24 government could, through the Liberian Red Cross, was also doing
15:43:10 25 something.

26 Q. And given the somewhat volatile situation in Monrovia, and,
27 indeed, throughout Liberia at the time, did your government take
28 any security measures in respect of this large and potentially
29 possibly dangerous group of individuals amassed so close to the

1 US embassy?

2 A. I wouldn't say they were dangerous. Now, these were
3 fleeing civilians, so for us - no, we didn't see them, and I
4 don't think the United States embassy - and I can't speak for
15:43:50 5 them - considered them a danger. So --

6 Q. Deprivation can lead to anger.

7 A. That's true, I agree. From the government's side, the war
8 is coming from what we call across the bridge. Bushrod Island -
9 like, Monrovia is separated from Bushrod Island by two principal
15:44:16 10 bridges, and so what we were doing, as those people came, some of
11 them that wanted to continue up country, we were providing them
12 transportation to reduce the population in Monrovia. So people
13 were leaving. We provided fuel to fuel trucks and buses to take
14 people away from Monrovia, and by "up country" I mean going
15:44:43 15 toward the Kakata, Harbel area. That's what we call going up
16 country. We were helping to reduce the numbers in Monrovia at
17 the time.

18 Q. Now, I asked you that for this reason: Did you have
19 security personnel stationed in the area of the compound?

15:45:05 20 A. No. Not directly in the area of the compound. In the
21 general Mamba Point area we had ATU personnel deployed on the
22 outskirts of Mamba Point to prevent any lawlessness amongst the
23 fleeing population with people trying to steal their things or
24 take their things away from them, or even some military personnel
15:45:38 25 that may want to break into people's shops and different things.
26 We had security in the general area. But when the tension rose,
27 the United States embassy asked that security personnel from the
28 government maintain a certain distance from the embassy as the
29 Marines, you know, had taken position, you know, to protect the

1 embassy and they did not want any mis - what'd they call it?
2 Unidentified or miscalculations on the part of the Marines where
3 they would see maybe somebody coming in a uniform and consider
4 them hostile or something. We so understood that and accepted
15:46:24 5 and withdrew the ATU to the base of Mamba Point. And by "base" I
6 mean Mamba Point is really an enclave. It's a hill overlooking
7 the city. So we just drew them to the base of the enclave.

8 Q. Now that we've put together that mental picture, describe
9 to what us what happened there, Mr Taylor.

15:46:50 10 A. Well, the shells were raining on Monrovia, and some shells
11 rained and hit the Greystone and killed several people and
12 wounded several people.

13 Q. Who fired them?

14 A. LURD fired those shells. We then complained about the
15:47:17 15 indiscriminate bombing of civilians. Some of the individuals in
16 Greystone on their own gathered some bodies and took them before
17 the United States embassy gate, and there were a lot of wounded
18 people and a lot of people left Greystone to continue their march
19 up country. But there was total chaos at the time, and the
15:47:45 20 government was concerned that the United States government had
21 not officially condemned, even if not the killing of those
22 civilians, but the bombing of diplomatic property.

23 Q. So what did you do?

24 A. Well, we complained about it, and it was the subject of
15:48:06 25 discussions with some of my colleagues. And even as I went to
26 raise some of these issues when I went to Ghana - because in fact
27 that was not the first time that the embassy enclave had been
28 bombed. It was only after this particular period, and this is
29 where - when we were having this discussion here, it is only

1 after this particular time that the civilians were brave enough
2 to take the bodies and carry them to the embassy. But that was
3 not the first time that mortar shells had landed at Greystone and
4 injured people.

15:48:41 5 Q. And did you get a response from the American embassy at any
6 stage?

7 A. Yes, the United States embassy said at the time in fact
8 that the shells that had hit Greystone were not LURD shells, and
9 we had said in fact they were United States government shells
10 that had been given --

11 Q. How did you know that?

12 A. From the marking of the shrapnel that we received that we
13 got from in and around the general area. And subsequent to that
14 the United States ambassador was questioned about it, and in fact
15:49:23 15 he did not deny that those shells were - that the mortar rounds
16 were United States mortars. And in fact, it was not shown here
17 in its totality but there is a video that - I don't think we can
18 do it in re-examination, but that - there is a video of a
19 conversation with the United States ambassador at the time, when
15:49:53 20 confronted about US shells given to LURD that had been used, that
21 did not confirm or deny that the shrapnel shells were United
22 States military material.

23 Q. So what was your government's view as to the reticence of
24 the United States to respond on this matter?

15:50:20 25 A. Well, we looked then at a wide range of issues, and this is
26 what really led to some of the real serious decisions that I made
27 in the final days of my administration. We looked at the issue
28 of the United States Marines in Nzerekore a few miles from our
29 border that were training what they called Guinean regulars that

1 were LURD, of which the United States government accepted that
2 they had US Marines in Nzerekore. That name is on the record and
3 we saw it on the map before. They accepted that they were
4 training Guinean regulars in Nzerekore. They accepted that they
15:51:14 5 had given substantial amounts of money to the Guinean armed
6 forces, but they were not responsible if those regulars got
7 involved with any group fighting in Liberia as LURD. We looked
8 at that. We looked at captured material from LURD, British
9 ammunition that were marked that the British government was
15:51:34 10 confronted with over several, several, several months that in
11 fact they accepted that the mortar - the 81 - in fact, these were
12 81 mortar shells that were marked in their cans with "MOD from
13 Britain". They just said that they did not understand how those
14 things got into LURD's hands.

15:51:58 15 When you look at the training, we look at the British arms
16 and we look at the advance of LURD and what they were doing,
17 coupled with the bombing of the enclave with no official strong
18 statement, we realised that this was something that was even more
19 serious than we thought and that - that led to most of the
15:52:31 20 decisions that I made to let go and save the Republic.

21 Q. Why did it have an effect on the decision you made?

22 A. It was very clear that - all of those actions were very
23 clear. And when President Bush said, "Charles Taylor must leave
24 Liberia, and he must leave now." And I said, "Hell no. I'm not
15:53:03 25 going any place until the peacekeepers are here because there
26 will be a bloodbath." So the pronouncements, the regime change
27 pronouncement, the dispatch of Marines, the training - there were
28 - just all of these led to - it was a package that led to these
29 decisions.

1 Q. And what conclusion did they lead you to?

2 A. That everything would be done - even if they had to destroy
3 the Republic of Liberia, that regime change had to take place. I
4 had to leave. And so I said, "Well, the only thing that will
15:53:41 5 save the rest of the situation is to leave."

6 Q. That brings me, Mr Taylor, to the next topic I want to deal
7 with; the circumstances of your departure as President of
8 Liberia. In June 2003 you went to a meeting in Accra, did you
9 not?

15:54:15 10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. Who had convened that meeting?

12 A. ECOWAS convened the meeting.

13 Q. For what purpose?

14 A. To discuss the deteriorating situation in Liberia and what
15:54:41 15 could be done about it.

16 Q. I ask this for good reason, Mr Taylor. Were you forced to
17 attend that meeting, or did you go of your own volition?

18 A. I went of my own volition.

19 Q. Before you left to go to that meeting in Accra, had you
15:55:08 20 come to any settled conclusion as to your own future as President
21 of the Republic of Liberia?

22 A. At that point, no.

23 Q. Well, help us, Mr Taylor. What was going through your mind
24 on that flight to Accra from Robertsfield?

15:55:30 25 A. Well, I was going there - what was on my mind was - in
26 fact, by the way, LURD representatives had been invited also to
27 the meeting. I was going hoping to start a process of
28 discussions with my colleagues that would lead to beginning
29 negotiations with LURD. This was foremost on my mind.

1 Q. When you were on that aeroplane, Mr Taylor, had you come to
2 a settled conclusion that you would have to step down as
3 President of the republic?

4 A. That ran - that was on my mind. I mean, that ran across my
15:56:21 5 mind that eventually it would come to that. It was just a matter
6 of how long I would be prepared to withstand what was, you know,
7 a fait accompli based on announcements that were being made
8 outside.

9 Q. Now, at that point in June 2003, you having been elected in
15:56:53 10 July 2007 -

11 A. No.

12 Q. Sorry, 1997. I keep getting the decades wrong. 1997, yes?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. When were the next general elections scheduled for?

15:57:09 15 A. November of 2003.

16 Q. When you got on the plane to fly to Accra, were you
17 thinking possibly of extending your stay as President until that
18 election in November?

19 A. Yes. I was thinking that negotiations should start with
15:57:39 20 LURD and that everything would be done to bring about a cessation
21 of hostilities and provide an avenue for LURD and all other
22 groups to participate in the general election. This was what I
23 was calculating.

24 Q. Now, there's a difference between all other groups
15:58:05 25 participating in an election and you stepping down as President.
26 Do you follow me?

27 A. That is correct. Yes.

28 Q. Now, was the thought of stepping down in your mind or were
29 you thinking let's try and maintain some kind of equilibrium

1 until November and then have the election and seek reelection
2 then? Which is going through your mind at the time? Mr Taylor,
3 there's good reason why I'm asking this.

4 A. No, but the two things are going through my mind. There
15:58:45 5 are two. In fact, several things. And the reason why I'm saying
6 two: On the one hand, I'm looking at the possibilities that we
7 could start negotiations, get ECOWAS, AU and everybody else
8 involved, bring about some semblance of normalcy and go to the
9 elections. On the other hand, it's very clear in my mind that
15:59:06 10 there are pronouncements from major western countries that Taylor
11 must go, so I have planted in my mind that I also have an option
12 that if there is a possibility that we can work on the first hand
13 of bringing about negotiations and seeing a normal transition,
14 that would be something I would look at. But foremost in my mind
15:59:29 15 I'm saying, because of the very strong and bellicose remarks that
16 are being made, especially from the United States, from the State
17 Department and from the White House that had announced that
18 Taylor must go, I'm now looking at the prospects of stepping down
19 to save the entire situation in what I saw as a catastrophic
15:59:54 20 situation.

21 Q. All right. So can these judges then accept that when you
22 got off the plane at the airport in Accra you were not at that
23 time minded to say to your fellow Presidents there assembled,
24 "Look, chaps, I'm off"? You hadn't made that - had you made that
16:00:23 25 decision by then?

26 A. No, I had not. I had not made that decision by then.

27 Q. Now, you met with those other Presidents, did you not?

28 A. Yes, I did.

29 Q. Give us a flavour, Mr Taylor, of the type of exchanges

1 which passed between you and they?

2 A. We had cordial greetings, discussions. Then we started
3 talking about the crisis in Monrovia and I laid out to them what
4 was going on. We had out of Sierra Leone directly and out of
16:01:08 5 Guinea, there were now no more - it was no longer hiding that
6 they were supplying LURD. We had the United States flotilla just
7 from Monrovia that you can see. We are getting reports from an
8 area of Monrovia - of the suburbs of Monrovia called Virginia
9 where there is a Baptist institution there called Lott Carey.

16:01:48 10 Q. Spelling, please.

11 A. L-O-T-T, Lott, and C-A-R-E-Y, Lott Carey Baptist mission.
12 There are reports that United States helicopters off the ships
13 are flying supplies into LURD. So I tell my colleagues in the
14 room about it. I say, "Look, I need your help," because what is
16:02:08 15 going on, based on our arrangement in ECOWAS, LURD is now
16 shelling the city. There's another group that's been formed,
17 MODEL. It is very clear that these powers are supporting these
18 people. And I tell you quite frankly, Obasanjo said very, very
19 clearly in that meeting, he said to me, "My brother, there is
16:02:34 20 nothing that we can do because it is clear that they are powers
21 bigger than we are and they are going to do whatever they can to
22 get you. So there is nothing we can do."

23 Thabo Mbeki was in that meeting. Thabo was very disturbed
24 by the news of what I had reported to them. Everybody in that
16:03:01 25 meeting seemed to throw up their hands in that they were
26 impotent, that what I was confronting that apparently they had
27 some information on also was something that they could not help
28 me - you know, they could not push against. They were bigger
29 forces. So they started discussing peacekeepers, could we, you

1 know - I said it was too late because Monrovia was under attack,
2 and everybody was just baffled in the meeting by the bold way in
3 which the United States was behaving.

4 The United States - I mean, maybe they had told Obasanjo
16:03:47 5 because when Obasanjo said, "There's nothing we can do," I, with
6 my experience, I could see now that he had been briefed and this
7 is - I didn't tell him that, but when you are sitting with your
8 colleagues - because Nigeria, before any serious thing went on in
9 West Africa, at least Nigeria would be briefed. Obasanjo said in

16:04:08 10 that meeting, knowing the circumstances, he had talked to Conte
11 and myself twice, Obasanjo was appointed as the President to
12 intervene between Conte and myself to stop the war. When

13 Obasanjo said to me, he said, "My brother, it looks like they are
14 forces that - there are forces bigger than all of us and I don't
16:04:30 15 know what to do." Everybody was just - so I said, "Well, look,
16 there's a simple solution. If by stepping down as the country's
17 being destroyed will bring peace to the process, I will step
18 aside." I swear they were shocked.

19 Q. Continue.

16:04:52 20 A. Obasanjo was sitting next to me and he hit me on my leg,
21 you know, in a typical Nigerian way. He hit me. He said, "My
22 brother, if you are going - if you do this you can come to
23 Nigeria. You can come to Nigeria and stay for as long as you
24 want." Thabo Mbeki smiled. Everybody smiled. Tejan Kabbah was
16:05:11 25 in that meeting too. They were very shocked that I had said to
26 them that if my departure by going will stop this onslaught on
27 the capital and destroy everybody, because I had seen the
28 attitude of the Americans and everybody else, they were shocked
29 and they accepted it, and this is when they said, "Well, look,"

1 he said, "if it's so, we can move along as quickly as possible.
2 You leave, come to - you come to Nigeria. We'll take care of
3 you."

16:05:43 4 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you appreciate why I'm asking you about
5 this, don't you?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Because you remember it being suggested to you in
8 cross-examination that, in effect, it wasn't your decision, you
9 were forced to accept that, in effect, as a fait accompli. You
16:06:03 10 remember being cross-examined on those matters?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. So, Mr Taylor, let me ask you specifically before we come
13 to look at a couple of documents marked for identification: Who
14 first mooted the idea of you stepping down?

16:06:17 15 A. I Charles Ghankay Taylor. I Charles Ghankay Taylor.

16 Q. What was the response of your colleagues when you made that
17 suggestion?

18 A. They were shocked, but appreciative of the fact that now
19 they could see light at the end of the tunnel.

16:06:39 20 Q. Did any of them try to persuade you against that idea?

21 A. No, I'm not --

22 Q. Did any of them suggest that, "Perhaps you're being rather
23 rash here, brother. Stay on until the next election"? Anything
24 like that?

16:06:58 25 A. No. No one said that, no.

26 Q. Was it the case, Mr Taylor, and I'll ask you specifically:
27 Were you forced by that cohort of fellow Presidents to step down
28 and announce your resignation?

29 A. No, no. If it was so, I would be very clear about it and I

1 would say how I detested it. There was no one in that room - I'm
2 not going to lie on anyone. No one in that room suggested to me
3 to step down. Not an individual. No one.

16:07:41 4 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, having made that decision and communicated
5 it to your fellow Presidents - no, let me go back a bit further.
6 Mr Taylor, you tell us that you had been toying with that idea on
7 the trip to Accra.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Is that right?

16:08:05 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. What tipped the balance?

12 A. The statement from Obasanjo in that meeting that from what
13 he could see there were bigger powers and that ECOWAS in itself
14 could do nothing to help the situation. I then figured out right
16:08:35 15 there that Obasanjo was saying - he was saying less than he
16 wanted to say, but I read the fine prints between the lines.
17 Because when he said that, I figured right away, "Oh, my God, he
18 knows about what is about to unfold, in addition to what is
19 unfolding." Because I knew how they behave, and Nigeria, the way
16:09:13 20 how the diplomatic clearance occur in West Africa during the time
21 I was there, Nigeria would be something like the clearing - what
22 we would call the clearing house. If something was about to come
23 down diplomatically in West Africa, it would have to get at least
24 the tacit approval of Nigeria. And so there were regular,
16:09:44 25 regular meetings between the national security adviser in Nigeria
26 and the States, so Obasanjo in my opinion had been given the word
27 that Taylor will go at all costs and we're not going to stop.
28 And when he said, "There's nothing we can do. There are bigger
29 hands," I said that is what tipped it.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, by bigger hands, powers bigger
2 than us, what exactly do you mean or who do you mean?

3 THE WITNESS: I think he was speaking directly about in
4 this case the United States.

16:10:24 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, from the way you've described the
7 intervention by President Obasanjo, are we to understand that
8 sometimes in inter-presidential speak there is a code which needs
9 to be understood?

16:10:57 10 A. Definitely.

11 Q. Are we to understand that out of mutual respect, and
12 perhaps diplomacy, sometimes blunt and direct speech is not
13 adopted?

14 A. I would agree.

16:11:12 15 Q. But nonetheless, the language used is such as to convey in
16 the clearest terms what the options are?

17 A. I would say I would agree.

18 Q. Now, would it be the position, then, that following
19 President Obasanjo's intervention, you knew you were caught

16:11:39 20 between the rock and a hard place and you had nowhere to go?

21 A. I would agree.

22 Q. Hmm?

23 A. Frankly, I would agree.

24 Q. So would you agree then, Mr Taylor, that at one level your
16:11:54 25 decision to step down was, in effect, forced upon you?

26 A. I would say yes, but not by ECOWAS. I would say forced
27 upon me by the United States.

28 Q. But who was the messenger?

29 A. I would say Obasanjo. I would say Obasanjo.

1 Q. Now, bearing that in mind, let us now look behind divider
2 3, please. It's MFI-299. Because my eyesight is so bad I can't
3 read the numbers at the bottom of the page, but I want us to turn
4 to the fifth page behind that divider, a page to which your
16:13:18 5 attention was drawn in cross-examination, Mr Taylor.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. It looks like page 13, I'm helpfully told by Mr Munyard.

8 A. Yes, I have it.

9 Q. Have you got it?

16:13:33 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Now, this was a document introduced by us during your
12 examination-in-chief, Mr Taylor, yes?

13 A. Uh-huh

14 Q. Now, just to put this in context on this page. If we start
16:13:52 15 first of all on the second complete paragraph on the left, "His
16 journey to the Court appearance began on 4 June after the Special
17 Court unveiled a long-sealed indictment." Yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Jump to the next paragraph: "Taylor was then in Ghana..."
16:14:17 20 do you see that?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. So on 4 June 2003 when the indictment is unsealed, you're
23 in Ghana at this meeting you've just described, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

16:14:30 25 Q. "...the host of the Ghanaian government and was engaged in
26 peace talks sponsored by the African Union and the United Nations
27 aimed at ending Liberia's then ever-widening humanitarian
28 catastrophe. Other leaders at the talks, apart from the host
29 John Kufuor, the then ECOWAS chairman, were South African's

1 Mbeki; Mozambique's Joaquim Chi ssano, the then AU chairman;
2 Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo; and Sierra Leone's Tejan Kabbah.
3 Slighting this august gathering, the Court sent the indictment to
4 the Ghanaian authorities via email and then organised a press
16:15:29 5 conference in Freetown to announce it. Chagrined, President
6 Kufuor put Taylor in a Ghanaian presidential jet and flew him back
7 to Monrovia. Later Kufuor told New African that he felt betrayed
8 by the international community when news of the indictment
9 reached him. Five African Presidents, he said, were meeting in
16:15:58 10 Accra to find ways of kick-starting the Liberian peace process,
11 and Mr Taylor had been invited as President of Liberia. 'We were
12 not even aware that a warrant had been issued for his arrest.'
13 Incidentally, the African leadership had taken the initiative to
14 convince Mr Taylor to resign and allow all the factions in
16:16:25 15 Liberia to negotiate."

16 Now, that was the point you were being asked about,
17 Mr Taylor. Do you recall it now?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Now, was it the case that they had taken the initiative to
16:16:40 20 convince an unwilling Mr Taylor?

21 A. No. In fact, the way that this is written, there is a
22 convincing part where they convinced me not to change my mind.
23 So the way how this is written, it would only take maybe one of
24 these Presidents to clarify this. Because the decision is taken,
16:17:10 25 we're walking from the hall - from Kufuor's office to the hall.
26 We get outside, and right in the corridor we are advised of this
27 particular indictment. We return to President Kufuor's office,
28 and I'm upset. Everybody's angry in the room, and the only thing
29 they are doing is saying, "Listen, my brother, we don't want you

1 to change your mind. We want you to continue." That's the only
2 convincing part about it. But the original meeting that led to
3 the decision --

4 Q. The only convincing part was what?

16:17:47 5 A. That I should not change my mind after the unfolding of the
6 indictment. You understand me? I'm not sure, maybe I went too
7 fast for the judges. The decision is taken in President Kufuor's
8 office. We are all happy that I would step down voluntarily. We
9 are now walking together from Kufuor's office toward the
16:18:08 10 conference centre. The President has an office in Ghana in the
11 conference centre. He has a place where he receives. We're
12 walking from that room into the hall, and my Foreign Minister
13 meets me outside and we see everybody is - you know, we see
14 everybody standing amazed that there's been the unsealing of this
16:18:27 15 indictment. Everybody gets upset. The Presidents walk back to
16 Kufuor's office. And I'm upset, everybody's upset, and they are
17 now thinking about: Oh my God, this guy may decide that he's not
18 going to step down again, and they - what they do there is to say
19 to me: Look, we do not think that you should change your mind
16:18:48 20 about this issue. We are going to take a decision now that this
21 indictment is not going to work, and so we are going to ask and
22 instruct the President of Ghana, who is chairman of ECOWAS, to
23 invite immediately the British and American ambassadors
24 accredited near Accra and inform them that it is the decision of
16:19:07 25 ECOWAS and the African Union that this indictment must be
26 squashed against President Taylor in order for there to be peace,
27 and Kufuor delivered that message to the two ambassadors. So
28 that's the only part here about the convincing.

29 Q. But let's go back to the passage, because I want to

1 complete it --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- and look at one other document, hopefully, this
4 afternoon:

16:19:33 5 "Incidentally, the African leadership had taken the
6 initiative to convince Mr Taylor to resign and allow all the
7 factions in Liberia to negotiate. It was when the Presidents
8 were leaving my office" - and remember it's Kufuor speaking now -
9 "for the conference centre where Mr Taylor was expected to make a
16:19:57 10 statement."

11 What statement were you intending to make at that point?

12 A. To the conference and it - I was expected at that
13 conference to announce that I had taken a decision to step aside
14 because of the crisis and let the country go forward.

16:20:17 15 Q. So that was the statement you were going to make?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. "And it's at that point that word came in that a warrant
18 had been issued for his arrest. I really felt betrayed by the
19 international community, and I informed the United States of the
16:20:37 20 embarrassment that the announcement caused."

21 When he says he informed the United States, Mr Taylor --

22 A. Yeah, he's referring to - in fact, this is not complete.
23 He's referring to the information given to both the United States
24 and British ambassadors which will be forwarded to the government
16:21:00 25 of the decision.

26 Q. And that decision was?

27 A. That the indictment that had been unsealed by the Special
28 Court in Sierra Leone against President Taylor, that the United
29 Nations, because they pushed it, should squash that indictment

1 against President Taylor.

2 Q. "The African Presidents meeting in Accra were particularly
3 angry because it was clear that the announcement of the
4 indictment on that very day was meant to scupper the Liberian
16:21:34 5 peace talks, and showed no respect for their efforts."

6 Mr Taylor, was that the sentiment being expressed in
7 Kufuor's office when you went back?

8 A. Yes. Everybody was very angry, yes.

9 Q. "The then Chief Prosecutor of the Court, the American
16:21:51 10 lawyer David Crane, perhaps thinking about the interests of his
11 home government more than the interests of West Africans, may
12 have calculated that a successful conclusion of the Accra talks
13 would lead to elections in Liberia fixed for July 2003..."

14 Is that right?

16:22:12 15 A. That is not correct. November 2003. It's wrong.

16 Q. "... which were likely to be won by Taylor and his NPP
17 party. This was bad news for the external agenda, and the
18 earlier the talks were nipped in the bud, the better.

19 The plan worked. Though the talks continued in Accra,
16:22:35 20 Taylor agreed to step down as President if he was seen as the
21 impediment to peace. And on 11 August 2003 he duly relinquished
22 power and went into exile in Nigeria, after an immunity from
23 Prosecution deal had been arranged and secured by the African
24 Union, ECOWAS, the United Nations, and the United States and UK
16:23:03 25 governments. The five African Presidents who met in Accra -
26 Mbeki, Kufuor, Chi ssano, Obasanjo and Tejan Kabbah - again flew
27 to Monrovia (the Liberian capital) to see the deal ironed out."

28 Mr Taylor, was there such a deal?

29 A. I would say yes. There was a deal, yes. Once that

1 decision was taken there in that room that the two ambassadors
2 would be informed, subsequent to that Olusegun Obasanjo was
3 charged with the responsibility. And he told me and he informed
4 his other colleagues that he had gotten an assurance from the
16:23:54 5 permanent five members of the Security Council of the squashing
6 of this indictment because that was contingent on my departure,
7 and I was assured that that had been gotten. I had not made that
8 defence a here. It wouldn't go anywhere. But there was a deal.

9 Q. Now let us remind ourselves. This was 4 June 2003. Did
16:24:24 10 you return to Liberia on the same day?

11 A. Yes, I did.

12 Q. And as we know from the narrative contained here, that was
13 in the presidential jet of the Ghanaian President?

14 A. Yes, I had a plane on the ground, but what they said to me
16:24:44 15 - there were all kinds of theories at the time. So the news
16 reached the Ghanaians that the Americans had planned to intercept
17 my personal plane that I had taken down there. So the Presidents
18 agreed that it would have been better for the Ghanaian
19 presidential jet to take me back, and my plane followed a few
16:25:09 20 minutes later. That's why he gave me - I had an aircraft on the
21 ground, but news - I'm not saying it is true - it was circulated
22 that there were plans that on my way back my aircraft would be
23 intercepted, and so they agreed that Kufuor's plane should be
24 given to me, so he gave me his plane with his crew.

16:25:31 25 Q. Right, quickly now, Mr Taylor. We've got four minutes to
26 achieve this. Let us look now, please, behind divider 1. Now on
27 the same note, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Do you remember being asked about this letter?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. This is a letter, we can see, dated 16 June?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So this is 12 days after you had returned from Accra, yes?

16:26:19 5 A. Yes.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is this an MFI currently?

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, this is MFI-296. Do your Honours have
8 the document?

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just swiftly, noting first of all the date,
16:26:40 10 so this is 12 days later, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Fourth paragraph down:

13 "Out of deep concern for the future of my country and in a
14 bid a bring urgent closure to the spiral of violence that has
16:27:01 15 torn our nation apart from more than two decades, I have offered
16 to recuse myself from the political process at the end of my
17 first term next January, if in my view this will contribute
18 positively to the achievement of a" --

19 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me. I think there was a word left out
16:27:20 20 of that sentence. It is, "I would offer to consider recusing
21 myself."

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 A. "I have offered to consider recusing myself from the
24 political process at the end of my first term next January, if in
16:27:34 25 my view this will contribute positively to the achievement of a
26 comprehensive and lasting peace."

27 Now, Mr Taylor, firstly, what do you understand by the word
28 recuse?

29 A. To remove myself from the political process. That's

1 stepping down.

2 Q. And what were you intending to convey when you used that
3 word?

4 A. That I would be stepping down from office and that I would
16:28:08 5 not participate, as was my right to do, in any process. It's
6 very clear, in the one minute that we have, and it's very good
7 for the judges to understand, I announced on June 4 that I would
8 be resigning. There was no date announced at that particular
9 time of when that would happen.

16:28:25 10 Q. That's the next thing I was going to ask you about. Why
11 has this date January crept in when you've told - you've
12 mentioned November when the elections were supposed to take
13 place, yes?

14 A. Yes.

16:28:39 15 Q. And we've also had mention of July in this New African
16 article?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So was there a date agreed upon in your own mind by 16 June
19 as to when you would step down?

16:28:54 20 A. No. I had - by this particular time I was thinking about
21 the election and my not taking part as being the end of my
22 presidency. You understand me? It was my right to participate.
23 What I was looking at, not participating in the November
24 election. And where January creeps in, the President of Liberia
16:29:19 25 is elected in November. The transition occurs throughout
26 December and the President is sworn in on the first Monday in
27 January, okay. So what I'm looking at now is not taking part,
28 that's relinquishing my office, okay, but seeing a peaceful
29 transition. This is what I'm explaining to him here.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay, Mr Griffiths, I think that's an
2 appropriate --

3 MR GRIFFITHS: And I've finished that topic as well.

16:29:55

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, just to remind you not to
5 discuss your evidence. We shall adjourn until tomorrow at 9.30.

6 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.

7 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 16 February 2010

8 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	34882
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GRIFFITHS	34882