



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 15 JULY 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr William Romans
Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Terry Munyard
Mr James Supuwood
Ms Salla Moilanen

1 Wednesday, 15 July 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:31:08 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances
6 first, please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, Maja Dimitrova and myself Brenda J
09:31:38 10 Hollis. And, Mr President, just to bring to your attention,
11 there are two quick matters the Prosecution would ask to address
12 before the accused recommences his testimony.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Ms Hollis. For the
14 Defence, Mr Griffiths?

09:32:00 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning. For the Defence today, myself
16 Courtenay Griffiths, assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris
17 Anyah, Mr Terry Munyard and Clr Supuwood. Also with us is Salla
18 Moilanen, our case manager.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Ms Hollis, I have your
09:32:20 20 assurance that they are two quick matters, is that right?

21 MS HOLLIS: That is correct, Mr President. Thank you. The
22 first matter relates to additional jurisprudence regarding
23 Defence counsel's contact with the accused during testimony. We
24 simply want to provide it in the instance that your Honours are
09:32:37 25 not aware of it. It is actually a Trial Chamber I decision which
26 came from the CDF case. It's dated 16 February 2006 and it
27 addresses this issue.

28 In that instance, the Trial Chamber exercised its
29 discretion differently than your Honours. We do have copies of

1 that decision should it be helpful to your Honours.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We will certainly take that up. I
3 think I know the decision you are referring to, but perhaps if
4 you could leave copies in any event, Ms Hollis, it would be
09:33:17 5 appreciated.

6 MS HOLLIS: Yes, certainly. If we can have the assistance.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Of course, there is nothing to decide at
8 the present moment.

9 MS HOLLIS: No, it's simply to provide your Honours with
09:33:29 10 this jurisprudence as well as to provide opposing counsel with
11 it.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. There is one other
13 matter, is there?

14 MS HOLLIS: Yes, Mr President. It has come to the
09:33:51 15 attention of the Prosecution that yesterday and Monday Defence
16 counsel was apparently displaying something to the gallery on
17 both occasions. It was of course not during court, I think it
18 was before court commenced, but we have been informed that it was
19 some type of message as well as a website address for an
09:34:15 20 association in Liberia that, among other things, solicits money
21 for the Defence of Charles Taylor. Now we would ask if the
22 Defence would be able to show us what they were displaying to the
23 gallery and if indeed it is in the form of some type of public
24 relations message relating to the accused and a website, we would
09:34:39 25 suggest that perhaps the dignity of the courtroom is better
26 served if such displays are not made from the courtroom itself.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you. What is behind that,
28 Mr Griffiths?

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I can assure your Honours that there

1 certainly is no exhibit that we are displaying to the public
2 gallery which we failed to disclose to the Prosecution, so
3 consequently I really don't see what the point is of this
4 particular objection.

09:35:14 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I am understanding Ms Hollis to say
6 that it was some type of website, that possibly is in the form of
7 an advertisement or something like that, shown to the public
8 gallery.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, frankly, Mr President, it's simply
09:35:38 10 that. And it has been on the front of my folder since the trial
11 began two years ago and I see no reason why I have to conceal it,
12 because I see nowhere in the rules where it says I can't.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: What is the point of it though,
14 Mr Griffiths?

09:36:01 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Because I am defending this man and I say he
16 is innocent. I see nothing wrong with displaying that on the
17 front of my folder.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, I don't see anything wrong with that
19 being on the front of your folder, but unless I have this wrong I
09:36:17 20 think Ms Hollis was saying you were holding it up and displaying
21 it to the public gallery.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Well where I am, your Honour, if I lift my
23 folder up the public gallery will see it.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are saying you didn't intentionally
09:36:33 25 show it to the public gallery as some form of incentive or bid
26 for support or advertisement?

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I did show it to the public gallery.
28 Someone in the public gallery had spotted it and asked to look at
29 it and so I showed it to them.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you.

2 [Trial Chamber conferred]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, we've discussed this.

09:39:16

4 Frankly we don't see anything terribly harmful in it, but we
5 would prefer that you don't do it because the situation could get
6 out of hand. For instance if you are allowed to hold up signs to
7 the public gallery, because obviously you believe your client is
8 innocent, we couldn't stop the Prosecution from holding up
9 similar signs to the opposite effect and it could get out of
10 hand. That is why we say to you we would prefer you didn't
11 deliberately hold it up, but of course we are well aware that it
12 is on the front of your folder.

09:39:40

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well, Mr President.

09:40:00

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Now, Mr Taylor, I remind you that you are
15 still bound by your declaration that you made yesterday to tell
16 the truth.

17 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

18 [On former affirmation]

19 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

09:40:12

20 Q. When we adjourned last night, Mr Taylor, you were telling
21 us how those you were dealing with at the barracks were:

22 "Young men who had just come into power and knew nothing
23 about government, knew nothing about international relations, so
24 I am there with them because most of the other progressives were
25 at the ministries and dealing with other members of the council
26 and General Quiwonkpa in the barracks has no one there to help
27 him so I stayed there to help him carry out those functions." Do
28 you remember telling us that yesterday?

09:40:33

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. Now, was there any particularly critical decision that you
2 assisted General Quiwonkpa with during that period?

3 A. Yes, there is one that stands out. Remember I stated that
4 there was this Major Jebo that --

09:41:11 5 Q. What is his name?

6 A. Jebo. Jebo.

7 Q. How do you spell that, please?

8 A. J-E-B-O, if I am not - I stand corrected on that. A
9 commander of another formerly trained group that still had not
09:41:32 10 shown up. We now have a situation where it is believed that he
11 just might stage a counter coup, and so most of his men are
12 being, you know, rounded up and are then brought into the
13 barracks. They are there for fear that they just might do
14 something. On the other hand we have intelligence coming in
09:42:10 15 telling us that the rest of the officers corps of the Armed
16 Forces of Liberia are themselves planning a come back.

17 Now we are in a dilemma here where you arrest these very
18 trained men because you are afraid of Major Jebo, but you still
19 have on the other hand a group of men that could equally do you
09:42:42 20 harm. So the critical situation that occurred was that I advised
21 that those men be released and then encouraged to begin to put up
22 the security corridor that was necessary.

23 Now, let me just make this clear. In the Armed Forces of
24 Liberia, as I guess in most armed forces, you have basic trained
09:43:12 25 soldiers and you have specially trained soldiers. The group that
26 is commanded by Major Jebo is formerly trained and is called the
27 strike force. The new group that just staged the coup is another
28 group, they call themselves the Special Forces and they have just
29 finished their training with what they call live ammunition and

1 they were just about the best trained. So what we sought to do
2 then was to bring the strike force in, encourage them instead of
3 arresting them, and using them to possibly counter any other
4 situation that might have come up.

09:44:03 5 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before you proceed may I
6 clarify a word used by Mr Taylor. On page 5, line 9, of the
7 LiveNote transcript it's recorded as "formerly" meaning
8 previously and he has spoken of some people that were trained and
9 on page 6, line 11, it's "formally", meaning properly trained or
09:44:24 10 going through proper procedure. I would just like to clarify
11 which word Mr Taylor intended.

12 THE WITNESS: Well, I am using "formerly" as to indicate
13 something that had happened before.

14 JUDGE DOHERTY: Thank you. Perhaps Madam Court Attendant
09:44:47 15 could note that for the record.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Now did President Tolbert have a son, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Oh, yes, he did. He had a son and his name was AB Tolbert
19 Junior.

09:45:12 20 Q. Was he married?

21 A. Yes, he was married.

22 Q. To whom?

23 A. He was married to the Goddaughter of the President of Ila
24 Cote d'Ivoire.

09:45:26 25 Q. What was her name?

26 A. Her name was - well, her name is Daisy. She is still
27 alive. I remember in my statement yesterday I did mention that
28 after the death of Tolbert, who was chairman of the OAU, some of
29 the tensions that came up was as a result of him being the

1 chairman of the OAU, but equally so la Cote d'Ivoire became
2 anxious because of the presence in Liberia still of the
3 President's, well, we call it Goddaughter, but in Africa it's
4 just about your daughter, was also of concern to him and this was
09:46:09 5 causing more trouble. So he was married to the daughter, I would
6 say.

7 Q. So the daughter was in Liberia at the time of the coup, is
8 that right?

9 A. That is correct.

09:46:23 10 Q. And help us, did anything in particular occur in relation
11 to her?

12 A. Oh, yes.

13 Q. What was that?

14 A. On or about the third day of the coup, while we were
09:46:35 15 sitting in the commanding general's office - and when I say "we"
16 let me just say who "we" are. I am there, my fiancée is there
17 and other members of the council. A lady is brought in - and I
18 still remember very clearly in a very yellow dress - and she
19 appears to be pregnant and she is fair in complexion and she is
09:47:05 20 really, really stressed out. I say, "But who is this lady?", and
21 they say, "Oh, this is AB Tolbert's wife." But I was still in
22 the United States and I remembered that AB Tolbert was married to
23 the daughter of the President of la Cote d'Ivoire. I said
24 immediately, "General, general, we can't touch this woman. Turn
09:47:28 25 her over immediately to the Ivorian ambassador and quickly." He
26 said, "Okay, fine, fine, fine", and I personally long with my
27 fiancée escorted Daisy to the Ivorian embassy and turned her over
28 to the ambassador.

29 Q. And what happened to her after that?

1 A. She was immediately - thereafter the President of Ivoire
2 d'Ivoire asked permission for an aircraft to come in, he sent in
3 an aircraft and she was picked up and flown to Abidjan.

09:48:08

4 Q. And help us, to which country did Doe make his first
5 official overseas trip?

6 A. To the best of my recollection it was to Ivoire.

7 Q. Now, meanwhile what happened to Tolbert's son?

09:48:41

8 A. AB Tolbert managed to take refuge apparently - and I must
9 say here apparently because news stories put him at several
10 different places - but finally he ended up at the French embassy,
11 accredited near the capital. He was there for a very long time,
12 I would say close to about a year, and intelligence reports and
13 intelligence reports and finally I think it was a cook - and I am
14 virtually sure because I am sure using the word "think" in the

09:49:15

15 transcript may not be proper. I am sure that a cook at the
16 embassy revealed to a friend that there was something funny at
17 the embassy, that food was being prepared and taken into one
18 section of the embassy and they had no access, and there were
19 whispers that AB Tolbert was there. And very sadly and
20 unfortunately before some of us who knew better could intervene -
21 and quite frankly I must say General Quiwonkpa was not a part of
22 this, if not he probably would have listened - orders were given
23 and the French embassy was stormed.

09:49:39

24 Q. By who?

09:50:00

25 A. By orders from the Chairman of the Council, Samuel Doe.
26 The embassy was broken into against the protest of the ambassador
27 and AB Tolbert was taken out of the embassy forcibly, kept at the
28 central barracks prison for several months and later executed.

29 Q. And help me, as far as you are aware how did the President

1 of the Cote d'Ivoire feel about the death of his son-in-law?

09:51:00 2 A. Oh, quite frankly President Houphouet-Boigny - and that is
3 one name I am going to depend on you guys to do that - was very,
4 very not just upset, but sad. Imagine your daughter crying on
5 your shoulder, her husband has just been taken out and executed.
6 It was a very, very, very, very sad, sad picture. In fact, it
7 was very serious because after AB was taken from the embassy
8 there were pleas to save him from not just the President of Ia
9 Cote d'Ivoire, but from so many diplomatic sources. But the
09:51:31 10 senior members of the council decided that they would not have
11 any of that and that their biggest concern was that - in fact,
12 Houphouet-Boigny said, "Well, let me send for him. They gave him
13 to me". And they felt that AB had the capacity, leaving the
14 country to mount a comeback for his father. So they decided that
09:51:58 15 they would not let him live.

16 Q. Now, I asked you about these details for a reason,
17 Mr Taylor. In intervening on Daisy's behalf in ensuring that the
18 President of Ia Cote d'Ivoire was reunited with his daughter, did
19 that prove useful to you at a later stage?

09:52:32 20 A. I would say extraordinarily useful. Daisy did explain to
21 her father my personal intervention and that of my fiancée and he
22 was very pleased and I over the years - in fact, during the years
23 of government President Houphouet-Boigny never forgot it and when
24 we launched our revolution in Liberia, at some point - not at the
09:53:03 25 beginning, at some point that paid off in that he was somewhat
26 probably I can describe as being sympathetic to what we were
27 doing and I can only speculate, and I am sure it would not be
28 useful, that seeing Doe in trouble meant that at least at long
29 last he, you know, was getting his pound of flesh back from Dow I

1 guess.

2 Q. And help us, from which country did you launch your
3 revolution in Liberia?

4 A. We launched our revolution from La Cote d'Ivoire and I want
09:53:50 5 to emphasise here, without the knowledge and/or consent of the
6 Ivorian government. In fact, I mentioned previously in my
7 testimony that we had to buy hunting guns, 12 gauge shotguns,
8 from La Cote d'Ivoire from ordinary markets and even after the
9 revolution was launched I was being sought by Ivorian
09:54:23 10 authorities. So to the extent that we launched it from La Cote
11 d'Ivoire they knew nothing, absolutely nothing about it.

12 Q. One other detail. You mentioned AB Tolbert taking refuge
13 in the French embassy. The French embassy where?

14 A. Accredited near Monrovia.

09:54:44 15 Q. And one spelling, Houphouet-Boigny, H-O-U-P-H-O-U-E-T
16 B-O-I-G-N-Y. Now, how long did you remain in the barracks with
17 Quiwonkpa, Mr Taylor?

18 A. I remained in the barracks for three months. If I may
19 just, your Honours, clarify one thing because I am sure your
09:55:24 20 Honours may know when I say "accredited near" that does not mean
21 that the embassy is outside. It's just what we learn, the
22 diplomatic terminology, or phrase you may call it, that embassies
23 are accredited near capitals. So when I say accredited near it
24 doesn't mean that they are outside of Monrovia, they are in
09:55:45 25 Monrovia.

26 Q. Okay.

27 A. Very good. I remained in the barracks for three months.

28 Q. During that three month period you've explained how you
29 were proffering your advice to General Quiwonkpa but did you have

1 any formal post within the PRC?

2 A. No. At the time, no. I was just considered the leader of
3 the group from America, helping in the barracks, with no formal
4 position.

09:56:14 5 Q. Did there come a time when that situation changed?

6 A. Yes, it did.

7 Q. When?

8 A. Some three months, as I mentioned, after the revolution,
9 one day we are sitting in the commanding general's office,

09:56:36 10 General Quiwonkpa, and he says to me in typical Quiwonkpa form,
11 "Oh, Taylor do you have a job?" I said no. He said, "Oh my God,
12 but all the jobs are gone". So I said, "Well, no. I have
13 learned that there is a post still available, the
14 director-generalship of the general services administration is
09:57:02 15 opened". So he said, "Okay, great. Then come, let's go".

16 Then he took me straight to the Executive Mansion to the
17 chairman, Master Sergeant Doe, and said to him, "Taylor has been
18 working with us and he doesn't have a job". Then Doe said, "Oh
19 my God, you still don't have a job?" I said no. Then he said to
09:57:24 20 him, he said, "Well, he just told me that there's a position
21 open". So Doe said, "Well, would you like that position?" I
22 said, "I don't mind, I will work wherever you send me". He said,
23 "But that is not a ministerial position". I said, "No, it's a
24 director-generalship". So then he says to me, "Well, okay, we
09:57:43 25 will make it a ministry, or at least raise it to a ministerial
26 level".

27 The title remained the general services administration, but
28 I was raised to ministerial level where I could attend cabinet
29 meetings. And then, because of my special status as the leader

1 from America, I was invited then to begin attending council
2 meetings.

3 Q. Now, what was the purpose of the General Services Agency or
4 GSA?

09:58:11 5 A. Yes. The general services administration is modelled after
6 that of the United States. They are responsible for the
7 procurement of government properties. I would say the
8 procurement and the maintenance of those properties. That is
9 all; whether it is from a pencil, to a ship, they are purchased
09:58:50 10 by the general services administration - agency.

11 Q. And did you have a deputy in that role?

12 A. Yes, I did. I had a deputy that was brought home by me by
13 the name of Blamoh Nelson. That is B-L-A-M-O-H N-E-L-S-O-N.

14 Q. And was he brought on at your request or was he foisted on
09:59:18 15 you by the administration?

16 A. No, he was brought on by my request. Blamoh Nelson worked
17 with me as secretary-general to the Union of Liberian
18 Associations in the Americas, ULAA, that we spoke about
19 previously. He had worked with me in the United States for so
09:59:45 20 many years but had come to Liberia before 1980 and worked at the
21 ministry of finance. So he was an old union hand, and union that
22 is again ULAA - and old union hand that I felt that we needed.

23 This is a man who really loves paper. He loves working with
24 paper and paperwork, so I felt he could be very, very useful at
10:00:19 25 the agency as my deputy. I requested that, I was granted and he
26 came on as my deputy.

27 Q. Can we pause for a moment.

28 A. Excuse me. He is presently a senator in the Republic of
29 Liberia.

1 Q. Yes. Can we pause for a moment and seek your assistance
2 with one matter. Can you set out for us, please, the form of the
3 government after the coup. What was the main governing body?

4 A. The main governing body after the coup was the People's
10:00:59 5 Redemption Council. These were the men that staged the coup.

6 Q. And how many members did that council have?

7 A. The council had 20 full members. It increased after
8 certain progressives were permitted to attend the meetings, but
9 the council remained steady, about 20 members. They were full
10:01:30 10 fledged members of the council.

11 Q. And who was the chairman of the council?

12 A. The chairman of the council was the most senior
13 non-commissioned officer, Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe.

14 Q. So far as the cabinet was concerned of which you became a
10:01:53 15 member, how many cabinet ministers were there?

16 A. I am going to have to do a little bit of calculation.
17 There was not a very large cabinet. I would say a little under
18 20. I can name them, but I will have to calculate them. I can
19 name them, I just don't remember the number.

10:02:17 20 Q. Very well. Now, from which parts of the political spectrum
21 in Liberia were they drawn?

22 A. As I look at the framework right now, it was not from a
23 very wide spectrum because, when you look at the cabinet, there
24 may have been about, I would say, one person that I can almost
10:02:51 25 say was from the Americo-Liberian, another half of a person - and
26 what I mean by half of a person, because I was on the cabinet but
27 I was not a fully Americo-Liberian because I am half and half.
28 But the rest of them were from the aborigine population.

29 Q. In terms of political complexion, was there any kind of

1 split or divide within the cabinet?

2 A. Oh, definitely. This may be one of the situations that you
3 call, what, strange bedfellows. If you remember, I talked on
4 yesterday about the progressives. You know, I am talking about
10:03:45 5 the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas. Then we have
6 the Progressive Alliance of Liberia under the leadership of
7 Barcus Matthews who comes to Liberia and forms a political party.
8 Then you have MOJA, the Movement of Justice in Africa. These are
9 all different individuals that have now come into the cabinet and
10:04:12 10 we are in there trying to work, but I did mention, and very
11 carefully, that we all were trying to help these men and then
12 move them toward the democratic process. So, yes, there were
13 these different little hitches but we got along because while we
14 were there and, I mean, jockeying for positions in the future, we
10:04:42 15 did not have any internal conflicts, at least not open.

16 Q. Now, within that cabinet you have already mentioned there
17 was a Dr Amos Sawyer, wasn't there?

18 A. Amos Sawyer was not a member of the cabinet but he was sent
19 as President of the University of Liberia.

10:05:09 20 Q. What about Dr Henry Fahnbulleh?

21 A. My good friend Dr Fahnbulleh became the minister of
22 education.

23 Q. And who was the minister of planning?

24 A. The minister of planning was another MOJA individual,
10:05:24 25 Dr Togbah-Nah Tipoteh.

26 Q. In terms of political complexion, those three men, what
27 part of the political spectrum did they adhere to?

28 A. They to a great extent, I can say, were Marxist-Leninist
29 oriented.

1 Q. But nonetheless they were within the Doe government?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. So within Liberia then what was the supreme decision making
4 body?

10:06:11 5 A. The People's Redemption Council itself.

6 Q. By what method did they rule?

7 A. They ruled by decree, but not - don't let us forget that we
8 are talking about military people and while there were
9 discussions the most senior officer there are times that you just
10:06:33 10 do not challenge your superior. And so the top, top echelon of
11 the council, that is the Chairman Samuel Doe, the Vice-Chairman,
12 the speaker, the Secretary-General and the commanding general,
13 are at that tier - by tier I mean at that level - would probably
14 make certain decisions and virtually pass it down to the rest of
10:07:02 15 the council because there was a strict, strict military channel
16 and chain of command.

17 Q. Speaking of which, did that fact that this was a military
18 administration have any personal consequences for you in terms of
19 your own status?

10:07:21 20 A. Oh, yes, it did have consequences. In fact I mentioned
21 that these were young men, but they were smart men. What they
22 ended up doing to all of us, they said, "Great, now that you are
23 a part of a military government we will induct all of you in the
24 armed forces, give you military ranks and subject you to military
10:07:57 25 orders." Now, all members of the council took the rank of
26 lieutenant-colonel upwards. Members of the cabinet were all -
27 and I use the word inducted. I had never at that particular time
28 had any military training. We did not do any military training
29 to get the rank. Up to now I have never had any military

1 training whatsoever. So we were made majors, deputy ministers
2 for administration were all made captains and assistant ministers
3 were made lieutenants.

4 Now the intent what they said was that we will be subjected
10:08:42 5 to orders, so when you receive an order you had to follow. So
6 members of the council were then divided up, where each council
7 member or maybe a group of two or three were placed in charge of
8 ministries and agencies of governments, and so they became what
9 they call chairpersons of certain committees that headed certain
10:09:08 10 agencies. So, for example, if you were chairman of the People's
11 redemption Council Committee for Finance, so the finance minister
12 reported to you. Now, I was at the general services
13 administration and so I had a chairperson that I reported to.

14 Q. Who was that?

10:09:31 15 A. His name was Robert Nowuku.

16 Q. Spell that, please.

17 A. That is N-O-W-U-K-U. Nowuku.

18 Q. Now your post as head of the GSA, in terms of power how did
19 that compare with other cabinet positions?

10:10:11 20 A. Oh, I would say it was a very, very powerful position, very
21 powerful in that I then had the authority to make certain
22 decisions regarding supplies that ministries received, furniture
23 for offices. Everything that had to do with the functions of
24 these ministries, agencies of government, had to come through my
10:10:42 25 agency.

26 Q. And how did you propose to run that agency when you took
27 over?

28 A. I had read extensively about the operations of the general
29 services administration in the United States and so I set out

1 immediately to try to rein in the agency in terms of being able
2 to save money. At the time that I took over, in fact before the
3 coup, every ministry - every agency - bought its own supply. So,
4 for example, if one ministry wanted say an adding machine he
10:11:38 5 bought a particular brand. So in the Government of Liberia at
6 the time I realised that there were many, many different brands
7 and this was not serving the best interests of government, so I
8 then decided to structure the agency in a way that we will begin
9 to not just save money for government, but to try to standardise
10:12:09 10 equipment and other government items across the board and this
11 caused a major problem.

12 Q. But did that policy work?

13 A. To a great extent it worked. It gave me - that is what I
14 meant by power. It gave us a lot of power, but it also created a
10:12:32 15 lot of enemies.

16 Q. And in putting through those reforms, were you supported by
17 Doe and the PRC?

18 A. Yes, yes.

19 Q. Now was this some kind of federalised system, Mr Taylor, or
10:13:04 20 was it centralised?

21 A. We, in our restructuring, proposed the centralisation of
22 everything. The argument was made - and Doe and the People's
23 Redemption Council accepted it - and our proposition was this.
24 "Look, if you standardise there are several advantages. One you
10:13:33 25 can buy what we call bulk material at lower rates. The ability
26 to service the equipment across government, the repairs, would be
27 easier because if you are in an office and you have an Adler -
28 for example, they used at that time a lot of Adler machines. If
29 an Adler broke down across the hall and could not be repaired

1 under any condition then it was easy to take parts from one Adler
2 and fix another Adler, but if you are in one room and a guy next
3 door to you is using a Canon then that's it if the machine breaks
4 down. That would save. So we introduced standardisation. We
10:14:20 5 also talked about bulk purchasing and that brought about
6 tremendous savings.

7 Q. So in terms of the heads of individual government
8 departments, is it the case that hitherto they had made their
9 purchases on an individual basis?

10:14:40 10 A. Yes, they - and not only made their purchases as
11 individuals, but prices were just so wide apart. One ministry
12 could buy let's say an example let's say a Canon 250 adding
13 machine would be reported for let's just use a rough figure \$100,
14 but another agency would probably show \$200. So this disparity
10:15:10 15 was a major problem because they bought individually and there
16 were no savings.

17 Q. And in reality, Mr Taylor, what was the real root cause of
18 those kinds of disparities?

19 A. Well, let's not mince words here. This was just pure
10:15:34 20 evidence of corruption, you know, to put it bluntly, and coming
21 in and trying to correct it this is what I meant by caused some
22 enemies also.

23 Q. Why did it cause enemies? You need to spell this out for
24 us?

10:15:49 25 A. Well corruption generally is when individuals do unlawful
26 things and steal taxpayers' money and do the wrong things, so it
27 was a way that people made off. They made a living. It was a
28 way that for example a government employee working at any agency,
29 that had a monthly salary of let's say \$200, really didn't care

1 if he was in the procurement department because at the end of the
2 day he was making thousands based on the deals he was cutting
3 here and there. We got to find out that the invoices that were
4 being reported through the general auditing office were all made
10:16:41 5 up invoices and in fact deals were made apparently where they
6 were reporting one amount, but actually the real prices were
7 different at the vendor and by vendor I mean the shops that sold
8 those.

9 Q. And so what was the reaction when you brought in a
10:17:05 10 centralised system?

11 A. As normal with all changes, people resist it, they get
12 angry and they were upset because it meant that, you know, they
13 had lost their little what they call in Liberia one-two one-two
14 and no-one will like that. I guess I am going to be asked later
10:17:38 15 what one-two one-two means. It is just a local little corrupt -
16 when you get your little corrupt thing on what they call the
17 side, they call it one-two one-two.

18 Q. Now, did these or your control extend to for example
19 government vehicles and the use of them?

10:18:15 20 A. Yes, everything. Government vehicles.

21 Q. And in seeking to control their use, did you come up
22 against any particular opposition?

23 A. Oh, yes.

24 Q. Can you explain that to us, please?

10:18:34 25 A. Before the revolution every vehicle assigned to an official
26 - a government purchased vehicle assigned to an official
27 government - virtually became his personal property. In the
28 United States GSA vehicles are marked they are government
29 property. In Liberia it was virtually your property. I then

1 decided that what we would do is we would mark the vehicles. I
2 had even gone to the extent to say that after working hours the
3 vehicles should be parked. That was a no, no, "Oh, no, no, to
4 that", but the President - and by President I mean the Chairman
10:19:22 5 of the Council - took the title on as President, so I am
6 referring to Samuel Kanyon Doe, and Presidents before him took
7 what you call trips around the country to hold executive council
8 meetings. This is one of those meetings that I escorted the late
9 President Tolbert on; the same kind of meeting.

10:19:44 10 Now - but the General Services Agency is responsible to
11 making sure that the President on that trip had what he needed to
12 use. Whether it was vehicles and we took generators, everything
13 that the President had to use the general services administration
14 had to take it on saying to be used. So I realised that every
10:20:12 15 time we had to take a trip we had to virtually buy a whole set of
16 4-wheel drive vehicles, and by the end of the trip whoever got
17 those vehicles, say if the ministers were accompanying the
18 President he would think that the vehicle assigned to him as
19 minister had to be kept in such mint condition that he couldn't
10:20:41 20 let it go on a bad road and so he needed another vehicle to take
21 him, but upon return he would try to hold on to that vehicle. So
22 we were just buying vehicles for almost every trip.

23 So I went to the Chairman and I said to him, "Look, we
24 can't afford this and so from now on when it's time for your trip
10:21:04 25 all GSA vehicles being used by officials, I don't care who the
26 person is, we will stop them and take the vehicle and use it for
27 the duration of your trip."

28 And so there were - and he backed it, so there were some
29 little scimmages from time to time because a day or two before

1 the trip we would set up road blocks across the city, with the
2 help of the police, and take the vehicles.

3 Q. And were people happy to lose their vehicles?

4 A. Very, very unhappy. Very, very, very unhappy. That is why

10:21:40 5 I described it as scimmages would occur. But my colleagues,
6 they were majors. We were all majors. So they couldn't do
7 anything to me. And, again, I had the authorisation of the
8 President, so they just had to complain but stop at some point.

9 Q. But did that make you popular?

10:22:05 10 A. Very unpopular. Very unpopular.

11 Q. Now, you explained to us yesterday how it was that those
12 who took power came from the indigenous population and from the
13 lower ranks of the army. Now, in terms of them now being in
14 power, did that have any consequences for you in terms of you

10:22:38 15 having to meet their expectations?

16 A. Oh, serious consequences.

17 Q. How so?

18 A. My name is Charles Taylor. Now, Taylor in Liberia is an
19 Americo-Liberian name. Now, for us at that particular time and
10:23:04 20 some members of the council that understood I also had aborigine
21 background, I was comfortable and they were comfortable. But for

22 a vast majority of the council, and I am talking about the PRC, I
23 was still considered a Congo man. Now, we will probably get into
24 that later, but this whole thing, there are disparities between

10:23:39 25 use of this country/Congo. So I used to make the argument if you
26 say I am Congo because I carry the name Taylor and you know that
27 my mother is also country then you have a problem. So what I was
28 seen as at that time was - some of them said, "Here is this Congo
29 man, who is the head of the GSA, who does not want us to gain

1 some status".

2 Let me just explain what I mean by "gain status". When the
3 PRC came to power there was the general belief on their part that
4 now we were down, we are up, so we have to be brought up to a
10:24:25 5 certain social status. That social status had to be in line with
6 what they had seen and what they had experienced in dealing with
7 the Americo-Liberians. So they were calling for things that they
8 felt that they were entitled to because the Americo-Liberians
9 before them had those things.

10:24:50 10 Q. Things like what?

11 A. Vehicles. They wanted their homes furnished properly and
12 who would blame them? I surely had nothing against that and
13 still don't. They wanted vehicles of the status that other
14 ministers that were Americo-Liberians had in previous

10:25:14 15 governments. They wanted carpets, furnitures, the whole - what
16 we used to say in America, the whole nine yards. Everything that
17 they felt that the Americo-Liberian groups had when they were in
18 power, they wanted that.

19 Q. And who was to pay for it?

10:25:33 20 A. The taxpayers of Liberia and this is where my problems
21 started where I felt that, yes, while it was proper to do it in
22 the beginning, but some of them just kept extending it and
23 extending it and extending it, so resistance came about from my
24 side and to a great extent Doe backed me on it.

10:25:58 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, sorry, what is the meaning
26 of Congo man? I am not sure I understand.

27 THE WITNESS: The Congo is the same, your Honour, as
28 Americo-Liberian. They also call it Congo. Yes, just like in
29 neighbouring Sierra Leone you've heard about Krio, the Krios are

1 Americo-Sierra Leoneans if you want to call it. Those
2 individuals are the freed slaves that came back to Sierra Leone
3 and Liberia and they are called - you know, they are a different
4 set. In Sierra Leone they are called Krios. In Liberia they
10:26:38 5 call them Congo people or Americo-Liberians.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Now, in your role as head of the GSA, Mr Taylor, did you
8 ever have any cause to come into contact with the United States
9 government?

10:27:01 10 A. Yes. There was - the United States agency for
11 international development, wanting to assist the government at
12 that time, did a survey of ministries and agencies of government
13 and appreciated what we were doing at the GSA and did say at the
14 time that the GSA was the best run agency of the government.

10:27:39 15 Q. Any other contact apart from that, in your role as head of
16 the GSA?

17 A. Yes. There was another little contact some time - I mean a
18 little down the road that was, I would say, a little unfortunate
19 but it happened. This had to do with the - there was a piece of
10:28:06 20 property that was being used by the United States Trading
21 Company. The United States Trading Company was just a name given
22 to one of the many little companies that were owned and operated
23 by the Firestone rubber plantation company in Liberia. The
24 United States Trading Company sold American vehicles in Liberia
10:28:39 25 and other American products and occupied not just a building but
26 a large piece of property in the area of Monrovia called United
27 Nations Drive, near the Barclay Training Centre, BTC that I spoke
28 about in my testimony here on yesterday, where the barracks is.

29 Now, the United States Trading Company closed down its

1 operations at that property and it was turned over to the
2 Liberian government of which - the general services
3 administration being responsible for securing properties, that
4 came under the general services administration.

10:29:26 5 Now, unfortunately - and I really use it unfortunately -
6 the United States government had tried to use that piece of
7 property as a major extension for its intelligence operations
8 where - it was a large piece of property. Let me just say it was
9 situated on, I would say, about a full hectare of land, not just
10:30:03 10 one little lot. But this property is within a thousand metres of
11 the Barclay Training Centre, the military barracks in Monrovia.
12 Unfortunately, because it was owned and operated by the Firestone
13 rubber plantation company, the United States embassy did not get
14 the okay from the General Services Agency before it moved in on
10:30:41 15 the property, had it fenced in and had contracted to a local
16 construction company in Monrovia the contract to renovate and
17 upgrade the property. I objected and said that I did not feel
18 that that property should be used for that particular agency that
19 was supposed to --

10:31:06 20 Q. Which agency?

21 A. It was just an extension of administrative and other
22 facilities for the Central Intelligence Agency. And so I said
23 that the United States was an ally, is an ally and I would still
24 say is still an ally and I have no problems with them, but felt
10:31:31 25 that even with friends and allies there are still secrets and
26 that for the agency to move so close to the barracks, it was not
27 proper and that we should find another piece of property far from
28 the barracks. They did not like this.

29 Q. Who didn't like it?

1 A. The United States government. The embassy complained about
2 it and rightly so, I guess, because they had advanced about
3 300,000, I understand, United States dollars to the contractor
4 who had actually fenced the property in and had commenced work
10:32:12 5 and the work was stopped.

6 The complaint was taken to Doe. Doe called me in and I
7 explained to him and he agreed with me, but he pulled a little
8 fast one on me. He then decides that he is going to send the
9 matter over to the then minister of justice, Counsellor Winston
10:32:37 10 Tubman.

11 Q. That's is a name we've heard before.

12 A. That is correct. Tubman, we mentioned him on yesterday as
13 being at the consulate in New York when I was a student that took
14 it over.

10:32:50 15 Q. So now he is minister of justice, is he?

16 A. In the Doe government. That is correct. Counsellor Tubman
17 rules that he sees no reason why the United States government
18 cannot use the property. The decision is taken to Doe and what I
19 mean by he pulled a fast one, Doe disagreed with Tubman, agreed
10:33:10 20 with me but made the United States embassy understand that all
21 the matter is with Taylor. And I am sure the United States
22 ambassador should have known that there was no way I could
23 disobey the President's order if he seriously wanted them to use
24 that property. So I was then put on the firing line to keep
10:33:38 25 saying, you know, we can't let it happen and if you have a
26 problem go back to the President. But the President had already
27 told me that they should not have it. So that is what I mean by
28 - so that was the second contact I had with the United States
29 embassy at the time.

1 Q. This is in what year, Mr Taylor?

2 A. This is around, I would say about - this could be about
3 '81. Late '81.

10:34:16 4 Q. And were there any consequences later for you because of
5 that?

6 A. There were some pretty mad Americans I know, and probably
7 rightly so they were upset. And I guess this, later on, proved
8 to be why I would say I was on arrested on extradition charges by
9 them. They were pretty angry.

10:34:53 10 Q. Now, I want you to cast your mind back to January 1981.
11 Did anything in particular happen to you in that month whilst in
12 Liberia?

13 A. We were still going through this country/Congo business. A
14 lot of the members of the council knowing my background knew that
10:35:23 15 I was, if anything, half and half, they knew that, but others did
16 not accept it and there were still, like in all organisations,
17 some hardline members, and some of them succeeded in saying that
18 the Congo people were trying to make a comeback and that I at the
19 GSA was a part of it. So the minister of justice who is still in
10:35:53 20 Liberia, a very wild firebrand, his name is Chea Cheapo --

21 Q. Spell that for us.

22 A. C-H-E-A and C-H-E-A-P-O.

23 Q. What is the ethnic origin of --

24 A. Chea Cheapo is Krahn. I was arrested.

10:36:24 25 Q. What for?

26 A. Being a part of conspiracy on the part of Congo people,
27 Americo-Liberians, to return to power. I was stripped at my
28 office.

29 Q. What do you mean stripped?

1 A. My clothes taken off me.

2 Q. Totally?

3 A. Well, no, I was left in my underclothes and driven straight
4 to the barracks and placed in jail.

10:36:54 5 Q. Which barracks?

6 A. The Barclay Training Centre.

7 Q. And what happened when you got there?

8 A. During this particular time I was placed in what they
9 called the post, as in military post, stockade, confused not
10:37:17 10 knowing what was going on. General Thomas Quiwonkpa, the
11 commanding general, was not at the Barclay Training Centre. He
12 was at Harbel.

13 Q. Spell that for us.

14 A. H-A-R-B-E-L. Harbel is the capital of Mount Gebi,
10:37:43 15 M-O-U-N-T G-E-B-I, County, but is the seat of the Firestone
16 rubber plantation in Liberia. He was sick in the hospital and by
17 this time she is now my wife - I am speaking about Tupee -
18 managed to get a message up to him. He was very upset. He
19 immediately returned to Monrovia, drove to the post stockade,
10:38:20 20 released me, provided for me members of the armed forces for my
21 immediate security and then drove - put the military unit at the
22 barracks on alert and drove to the Executive Mansion really in
23 anger and told the Chairman of the Council that he was very upset
24 about what had happened to me, he knew those that were behind it,
10:38:48 25 it was unacceptable, that he had released me and if anyone
26 arrested me again it would mark an end to the revolution.

27 Q. Now, were any precautions taken for your personal
28 protection thereafter?

29 A. Yes, I just mentioned he provided me a full military unit

1 of one platoon of 44 men, fully armed, and the reason why he did
2 this he knew - before he went to the hospital he had intervened
3 on several occasions into this Congo, country, Americo-Liberian
4 situation and he knew of the plot against me. So back in his
10:39:29 5 mind he also knew, and I think this is why he took such a strong
6 move - he also knew that I guess Chea Cheapo had obtained the
7 acquiescence of Doe before carrying that out, but that Cheapo was
8 on the front line. So he took these actions against in the back
9 of his mind realising that even though Doe knew, but because Chea
10:39:56 10 Cheapo was front man he took those precautionary movements hoping
11 that Doe would react, I guess.

12 Q. So what was your relationship with Doe?

13 A. At the time I would assume that Doe and I had no real
14 problems but, because of my days at the barracks, Quiwonkpa and I
10:40:21 15 had grown closer than any other member of the council. Not to
16 say that I was close to a lot of them, but that, I think being
17 together for three months and helping him through the crucial
18 first 90 days, we were very, very close and I married what he
19 would his sister. In the Liberia setting, sister, you know, if
10:40:45 20 you are from the same tribe or ethnic group or area you are a
21 sister or a brother, it doesn't mean biological. But I mean he
22 and other members of the council that were from the Nimba region
23 looked at me highly. And that was another move on my part.

24 There is a so-called Congo man again that is marrying a country
10:41:08 25 woman or an aborigine. That again was very, very pleasing to a
26 lot of them.

27 Q. So in terms of being able to speak to Doe or proffer
28 advice, how did you get on with him?

29 A. I must be very frank and say fairly well. We had no real

1 difficulties. I could speak to Doe freely. He still looked at
2 me at this leader from America, even though I was working with
3 them, and that I was always fair. So when I had to speak to him
4 very frankly, I did.

10:41:45 5 Q. And did he respect your views?

6 A. To a great extent I would say at least he listened to my
7 views. Doe by this time is surrounded by a lot of his Krahn,
8 ethnic people, well educated. And so while I know he listened to
9 my views and respected them, but I know that he had to

10:42:12 10 countercheck with very qualified people that he had around him.

11 Q. Now, you may recall telling us yesterday that part of your
12 motivation in lending your assistance to the coup was the hope
13 and ambition that in due course the soldiers would go back to the
14 barracks and there would be a return to democracy. Did you

10:42:40 15 discuss that with Doe?

16 A. Yes, I did. I did say to him that I felt that he could
17 become one of the greatest Liberians ever. If he, as a young
18 man, a master sergeant, staging this coup, as terrible as it was,
19 the things that happened - if he were to call for elections,
10:43:11 20 return to the barracks, he would look extraordinary. He appeared
21 to agree. He said, "Oh, I think this is a very good idea". I
22 told him, I said, "You know, you will become the national - in
23 fact, you will become the hero of this country".

24 But again I say that there were some very qualified people
10:43:34 25 around him and I do not claim to be the only one that may have
26 been advising him along these lines. I can't say for sure. But
27 I am sure, knowing how other progressives thought, I can almost
28 say that others were advising them to return to barracks,
29 elections that people might be able to turn to, you know,

1 democratic rule.

2 Q. And did the master sergeant seem well disposed towards this
3 proposition?

10:44:14

4 A. Well, in conversations he seemed, but again the end results
5 don't point to that because he didn't return to barracks. He
6 participated and he said he won the elections.

7 Q. And in terms of the foreign policy of the government,
8 Mr Taylor, what course did that take under the Doe regime?

10:44:49

9 A. Well, in terms of foreign policy, Liberia, like I said, has
10 always been the stepchild of the United States and that's what I
11 meant when I said yesterday that they could do more for us than
12 they have done and I hold this against them.

10:45:17

13 Doe has executed Weahseng - I mentioned that on yesterday
14 in my testimony - because of this apparent movement towards this
15 old Soviet Marxist-Leninist situation. This was very pleasing
16 and to - I mean on the part of the United States and they opened
17 up to the PRC and commenced immediately to upgrade their
18 assistance to that particular government and even it continued
19 after Doe was elected. At the time I was not in the country, but
20 from all of the figures that we have seen, during the period from
21 the PRC government to the end of the Doe era, after being
22 arrested by Prince Johnson, the United States had invested a half
23 billion dollars in that Doe government.

10:45:54

24 Now, that was more than all previous years combined of all
25 other administrations. So you can just look at that and see if
26 all other administrations combined did not get that kind of
27 assistance and during that short period Doe got a half a billion
28 dollars, it shows that in terms of policy that the United States
29 embraced Doe. Don't let's forget we are still in the Cold War

10:46:22

1 era, so in terms of foreign policy, he, like all previous and I
2 know all future Liberians Presidents, will lean heavily towards
3 the United States.

10:47:05

4 Q. Now, from which ethnic group did Master Sergeant Doe come
5 from?

6 A. Master Sergeant Doe was from the Krahn ethnic group.

7 Q. And you mentioned a moment ago him surrounding himself with
8 a number of Krahn advisers who were highly educated. Was that
9 indicative of a policy followed by Doe generally?

10:47:26

10 A. To a great extent I can say yes.

11 Q. And how was that?

12 A. Well, when you look at what was going on at that time,
13 imagine here is a young man, not educated. It was normal for him
14 to try to bring people around him that could probably guide him

10:47:54

15 very well, tribal elements that he felt that would be
16 sympathetic, you know, and what we say literally protect his
17 back. And so he did. For example, I mentioned on yesterday, the
18 minister of state, the most senior member of his inner circle was
19 Dr George Boley. He had a PhD in education, very sharp, a very

10:48:20

20 well educated man, a doctorate from the United States. And there
21 were other members of the Executive Mansion crowd that were also
22 very, very well. He had adviser - the former president of the
23 union, I mentioned his name on yesterday by the name of Bai
24 Gbala. Very brilliant, sharp man. He is also Krahn. And so I
25 guess he needed people that could really protect his back and he
26 did.

10:48:44

27 Q. Now, did your relationship with the master sergeant
28 continue to be amicable?

29 A. At some point in time there was a little - I would call a

1 little grey area that developed.

2 Q. How did that come about?

3 A. Doe, upon apparently deciding to stay on in power, realised
4 that he had to make certain moves. Now, General Thomas

10:49:43 5 Quiwonkpa, and any Liberian yesterday, today and tomorrow will
6 tell you, developed to be one of the most respected members of
7 that government throughout. Now, Doe got into a position where
8 he wanted to stay on. Quiwonkpa was one of those that had bought
9 the argument across the board that he needed to return to
10:50:17 10 barracks. General Thomas Quiwonkpa is very strong. He is the
11 commanding general of the armed forces. All the soldiers respect
12 him. The civilian population respect him. He is in favour of a
13 return to civilian rule.

14 So Doe decides that he has to make a move by weakening

10:50:40 15 Quiwonkpa's position. He then decides that the only way he can
16 weaken Quiwonkpa is to move him, and it was a smart move - was to
17 move him from the position of commanding general, move him to the
18 Capitol Building, the Capitol Building, the official offices of
19 the People's Redemption Council that had been used by previous
10:51:08 20 legislators, and make him secretary-general of the council which
21 is just an office job, put one of his own Krahn generals in
22 charge of the armed forces, thus making Quiwonkpa weak and unable
23 to do anything.

24 Now, Doe is aware that some of us are very close to

10:51:38 25 Quiwonkpa and we will go to any lengths to protect him too. A
26 lot of the members of the armed forces, upon the whispering of
27 this particular move, decide that before this happened Quiwonkpa
28 has the loyalty of the army and the population that Quiwonkpa
29 should remove Doe. All of us agree. I agreed. A lot of us that

1 were close to him agreed that this should happen. So Quiwonkpa
2 now refuses to take the position of secretary-general and there
3 is a stalemate.

10:52:26 4 Doe charges that he is what they call in the army - this is
5 insubordination, he said. And what they decide to do then is to
6 put Quiwonkpa out of the barracks, by that I mean the BTC, and
7 that if he did not accept this position he would no longer be
8 commanding general. By this time there is tension developing in
9 the country.

10:52:53 10 Those of us that have agreed that Quiwonkpa should not go
11 are standing our grounds and Doe leaves the country and we tell
12 Quiwonkpa, "It's time to make your move". But this was a very
13 nice young man. Quiwonkpa decides that he would do it, but if
14 there was bloodshed involved he wanted nothing to do with it. So
10:53:23 15 those of us that knew Doe decided that we would leave before he
16 returned from Europe and wreak havoc on us. And so I left and
17 others left. Quiwonkpa was eventually placed under house arrest.

18 Q. Now, which year was that, Mr Taylor?

19 A. We are talking about '83.

10:53:54 20 Q. Now, when you say you left, you left to go where?

21 A. I left first to La Cote d'Ivoire and on to the United
22 States.

23 Q. Now, prior to leaving, had you experienced any other
24 difficulties with the Doe regime?

10:54:14 25 A. Oh, yes. He moved on me also. Doe removed me from the
26 general services administration and sent me over as deputy
27 minister of commerce.

28 Q. When was this?

29 A. This was in 1983.

1 Q. Why was that done?

2 A. Well, he said to me - after he did it I went to him and I
3 said, "Well, why did you move me?" He said, "Well, you know,
4 people are complaining. They are saying that you are taking
10:54:54 5 money from the GSA and giving it to me and that is not true, so
6 I listen, Taylor, go to commerce, hold the deputy ministerial
7 position and within a few weeks I plan to remove the minister and
8 you will become minister of commerce".

9 But the movement from the GSA to commerce at the position
10 of deputy minister was, in fact, a demotion, because the deputy
11 minister was a captain and I was a major. So you have moved me
12 from a senior position, it was a demotion in fact. So he said,
13 "Well, you can keep the rank because you will not be deputy
14 minister very long. Because of your background, you are an
10:55:23 15 economist, so we will have no difficulties in making you
16 minister". But I didn't wait around for that.

17 Q. Who was the deputy minister at that time?

18 A. Before - at that time the deputy minister was a gentleman
19 called Clarence Momolu, M-O-M-O-L-U. Clarence Momolu.

10:56:09 20 Q. Did you get on with him?

21 A. Clarence and I didn't really get along. He was very close
22 to the chairman of the committee that controlled the GSA. The
23 gentleman I mentioned, Robert Nowuku, and they were like brothers
24 because Nowuku was from Lofa County, Momolu is from Lofa also and
10:56:38 25 they were like brothers. So the deal in fact under the whole
26 thing was because the council members thought that I was supposed
27 to be this Congo man not giving them their goodies, the whole
28 point was to bring one of their, quote unquote, own to the GSA.
29 So what they did was to move me from GSA as deputy minister of

1 commerce and move Clarence Momolu from commerce to the GSA.

2 Q. What do you mean "their goodies"?

3 A. As I explained, wanting to be raised to the level, the
4 constant calling for cars and rugs and furnitures and beds. All
10:57:20 5 of these are things that I mentioned earlier that they thought
6 was necessary to bring them up to the status they believed that
7 the Congo people had before.

8 Q. Now, in terms of the popularity of the Doe government
9 within Liberia, were they still as popular by this stage, the
10:57:43 10 stage you are talking about now, as when the coup originally
11 occurred?

12 A. I would say no. There is a little tricky thing here that
13 we must understand. Remember I had mentioned that one of the
14 progressives had gone to the University of Liberia, Dr Amos
10:58:10 15 Sawyer.

16 Q. As president?

17 A. As president. Now, as the years passed the University of
18 Liberia - this is the MOJA man going as president of the
19 University of Liberia. The University of Liberia became a hotbed
10:58:30 20 for ideas. And it was not just Americo-Liberians at the
21 university. We had a large number of people from the aborigine
22 population at the University of Liberia. So what Sawyer tried to
23 do at the University of Liberia at the time was to begin to use
24 the university as his base to begin to put out his own ideas and
10:58:58 25 increase his popularity.

26 So Doe is now working against the quasi-academic community.
27 So he is becoming unpopular now not with, quote unquote, Congo
28 people, but people seeing that they needed to move from this
29 military government into a civilian situation commenced buying

1 the idea that they must return to barracks. So over we are
2 talking about a period now of about two years the idea is
3 catching on that they should return to barracks because actually
4 they were not producing the goods that the majority of the
10:59:46 5 population expected of them.

6 Q. The university you say had become a hotbed of ideas. Did
7 that develop in any way?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. How?

11:00:01 10 A. They were - they started minor demonstrations on campus.
11 They started speaking out. And I am talking about the so-called
12 aborigines and a whole bunch of the students were arrested and
13 most of them were from the aborigine population. One of them
14 that was arrested at the time is a gentleman called Commany
11:00:31 15 Wisseh. Commany, I think it's C-O-M-M-E-N-Y and I stand
16 corrected on this. We may have to - Wisseh is W-I-S-S-E-H.

17 Another that was arrested during that time is a gentleman
18 called Ezekiel Pajibo. That's Ezekiel as normal Ezekiel. I
19 think it's E-Z-E-K-I-L if I'm not mistaken. Pajibo is
11:01:09 20 P-A-G-E-B-O. Both of these gentlemen are Krahns. Commany Wisseh
21 is Krahn. Ezekiel Pajibo is Krahn. They are arrested, charged
22 with treason and Doe wants to execute them.

23 So this is just to explain to you that there is this
24 development and not just from the Americo-Liberian group, but
11:01:35 25 from their own group because this academic community now sees
26 that return to barracks must happen.

27 Q. And apart from those arrests, Mr Taylor, did Doe respond in
28 any way to this budding student unrest?

29 A. Yes, he passed a People's Redemption Council order, a

1 decree that barred any participation - I can even remember all of
2 the no, no, nos in that decree that would bar students or anyone
3 from getting involved. That was a decree, if I am not mistaken
4 it's decree 2A. That was very, very well not liked by anyone in
11:02:39 5 the country. Very Draconian.

6 Q. How long did that decree remain on the statute books in
7 Liberia?

8 A. Until I became President.

9 Q. And then what did you do?

11:02:56 10 A. One of the first two things that I did as President, in
11 fact, I think it was the second - the first. The first thing
12 that I did was to publish an executive order banning that decree.

13 The second thing that I did was during the tenure of the
14 PRC and even during the Doe years there was massive confiscation
11:03:26 15 of properties of all former government officials and as an act of
16 reconciliation, because they had thought been formally charged or
17 there were no proof or any court proceedings against them, their
18 properties were just confiscated and had just been occupied by
19 individuals that did not own them, I returned all of the
11:03:52 20 properties to those that had lost them.

21 Q. Let's come back to the Doe regime though. Now, when those
22 students were arrested did you attempt to do anything about it?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. What was that?

11:04:04 25 A. I went to him and said to him that what they were about to
26 do - in fact, the students had been deemed guilty and there were
27 cries from certain circles to execute them. And I said to him
28 that that was the wrong thing to do and I can remember saying to
29 him that, "If you insist and you try to do this, I am out of

1 here. I do not want to be in Liberia after this situation has
2 occurred. I don't want to be around because" - I told him, I
3 said - "it will be not just a catastrophic mistake, but that will
4 probably mark an end to the People's Redemption Council
11:05:01 5 government".

6 Q. And did that make you popular with Doe?

7 A. Well, quite frankly, I would be fair to Doe. I would not
8 say that on that particular incident I would have become
9 unpopular, no. Doe did not show any real resentment for that
11:05:24 10 statement. But, knowing Doe, you could hardly tell what he was
11 planning anyway. But I do not think that I fell in any bad books
12 with him for saying that. I guess he probably just listened and
13 said, "Okay, I will listen to Taylor", and, you know, he probably
14 decided to do what he wanted to do anyway. But that incident, I
11:05:48 15 did not sense any major rejection.

16 He got a little upset and he said, "Well, you see what they
17 have done and this is unacceptable and these children" - and this
18 and that. He was a little angry, but he calmed down. But at the
19 end of the meeting I didn't leave from the office feeling any
11:06:06 20 particular threat from him.

21 Q. Now some spellings. Commany Wisseh, C-O-M-M-A-N-Y
22 W-I-S-S-E-H. Ezekiel Pajibo, E-Z-E-K-I-E-L PA-J-I-B-O. Just a
23 little detail, Mr Taylor. Commany Wisseh, is he still alive?

24 A. Very much so. Commany Wisseh is alive and well. He has
11:06:46 25 held several positions in the present government of --

26 Q. The present government?

27 A. Of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and to the best of my knowledge I
28 think he was recently nominated as Liberia's ambassador to the
29 kingdom of Belgium.

1 Q. Now, Quiwonkpa, you mentioned earlier that it had been
2 suggested that Quiwonkpa should in effect lead a coup, yes?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Did Quiwonkpa attempt to do so?

11:07:47 5 A. Well, he agreed but did not actually carry out the plan.
6 He said that he did not want blood and so the plan was just
7 stopped in its track.

8 Q. So in late 1993 was Quiwonkpa still in Liberia?

9 A. I left Liberia in late 1993 personally. I left before
11:08:26 10 Quiwonkpa. Now, Quiwonkpa, remember I mentioned was under house
11 arrest when I fled the country. I cannot say precisely when he
12 left Liberia because he was taken from house arrest by some
13 people to hide him, and he was in hiding for a long time. I
14 don't know exactly because I was not in contact with him for a
11:09:00 15 brief period of time. So I can't say precisely whether it was
16 late '83 that he left or early '84 but I knew that he was in
17 hiding and he had been kept by some very good friends of his, I
18 understand.

19 Q. Where?

11:09:15 20 A. I understand it started off in Monrovia. There were some
21 Catholic fathers that had been accused of being a part of this
22 whole thing, they were Americans, and Doe had always accused them
23 but Quiwonkpa was very much liked by everyone because of what he
24 stood for. I understand that they had hidden him for some time
11:09:50 25 and he eventually left, I think went to Sierra Leone, and then on
26 to the United States.

27 Q. What was he doing in Sierra Leone?

28 A. I'm not sure, to be honest. I'm in the United States now
29 and I guess he is trying to manoeuvre his way to get to where he

1 is supposed to get to because I think he was trying to get to the
2 United States.

3 Q. Eventually, let's just conclude the Quiwonkpa chapter
4 please. What is the remaining history so far as Quiwonkpa is
11:10:29 5 concerned? Let's just concentrate on him at the moment?

6 A. Quiwonkpa travels to the United States.

7 Q. Were you in the United States at the time?

8 A. Yes. When he did get to the United States, I was there.

9 By this time I have been arrested - this is in --

11:10:48 10 Q. We are coming back to that.

11 A. Yeah, okay. But I am in the United States.

12 Q. But let's just concentrate on Quiwonkpa.

13 A. I am in the United States.

14 Q. And what happened with Quiwonkpa?

11:11:00 15 A. Quiwonkpa is actually with these two Catholic fathers. I
16 remember one of the name, Father Hayden that Doe had --

17 Q. Spelling?

18 A. I think it's H-A-Y-D-E-N, Father Hayden. And he is with
19 them, and he is also in contact with another Liberian by the name
11:11:30 20 of James Butty. He is presently chief, I think, correspondent
21 for Africa that worked for the Voice of America. They are
22 together and it is apparent that Quiwonkpa begins to put his act
23 together as to what he wanted to do back home in Liberia.

24 Q. In what way was he putting his act together?

11:12:02 25 A. He began planning his move back to Liberia to remove Doe.

26 Q. And what do you know about those plans?

27 A. Well, only what I was told. I, Doe had reached a point
28 where even some of our best friends wanted him out. So Quiwonkpa
29 goes to America. He is with Father Hayden and the rest and he is

1 working along with certain agencies.

2 Q. Which agencies?

3 A. Quiwonkpa's movement is backed I would say by the United
4 States government.

11:12:52 5 Q. My question was very simple, Mr Taylor: Which agencies?

6 A. Well, he is working with the CIA at the time, to help him
7 get back to Liberia.

8 Q. And so where does he go after the United States?

9 A. Straight to Sierra Leone.

11:13:11 10 Q. To do what?

11 A. To train, plan and be armed for the invasion of Liberia.

12 Q. And who is assisting him in doing that?

13 A. His, I would call his managers. We, Father Hayden, plus I
14 do not know the immediate names of his, of the handlers from this

11:13:35 15 agency that I just mentioned but I know he is with Hayden and
16 back in Sierra Leone he is working directly with Dr Henry B
17 Fahnbulleh.

18 Q. And who is the President of Sierra Leone at the time?

19 A. He is General Joseph Momoh.

11:13:57 20 Q. And what actually takes place in Sierra Leone at that time
21 when Quiwonkpa goes back, goes there?

22 A. Quiwonkpa goes to Sierra Leone, and he - all deals are made
23 for the training in Sierra Leone.

24 Q. Training of whom?

11:14:16 25 A. Of military people.

26 Q. From where?

27 A. From Liberia.

28 Q. To do what?

29 A. To overthrow the government of Liberia.

1 Q. And where in Sierra Leone were they training?

2 A. They were training just outside of Freetown.

3 Q. Who was training them?

4 A. The Sierra Leonean government used a gentleman by the name
11:14:38 5 of Mohamed Dumbuya who - and I will spell that if I can.

6 Dumbuya, there was a unit of the Sierra Leonean police, and I am
7 sure your Honours, honourable counsel here knows the SSD, Dumbuya
8 that I know personally was used, instructed to train the forces
9 that were about to invade Liberia, so they were trained under the
10 command of Dumbuya.

11 Q. And then what happened after that?

12 A. They invaded. The arms were bought, were supplied by the
13 President at the time.

14 Q. So the arms were supplied by whom?

11:15:24 15 A. By the Sierra Leonean government.

16 Q. Yes, to do what?

17 A. To invade Liberia.

18 Q. For what purpose?

19 A. To seize power.

11:15:35 20 Q. And overthrow who?

21 A. Samuel Kanyon Doe.

22 Q. And so that is the Sierra Leonean government doing that?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. When?

11:15:44 25 A. This occurred, this initial attack occurred in I think it's
26 1985, if I am not wrong.

27 Q. Can you help us with a month and day?

28 A. No, I just can't recall right now. I am in the United
29 States.

1 Q. And help us: What progress did that make, that attempt?

2 A. General Quiwonkpa, Thomas Quiwonkpa leads the operation
3 into Liberia. They are to a great extent successful. They
4 enter. They seize the radio station, everything, make broadcasts
11:16:36 5 on the radio. But there was something funny that happened on
6 their way in. And now, this is a very important part of it
7 because, again, that upset me because I am, in fact, Thomas did
8 not listen anyway but they go in. On their way at the border the
9 commander of the unit that is leading the troops is killed at the
11:17:15 10 border not by Liberian government forces but by one of the
11 members of the invading force. Now, strangely, what was going
12 on, it is believed, and I have heard nothing to the contrary to
13 say that it is not true, that Quiwonkpa had been used by certain
14 progressives within the invading force. And let me clarify this
11:18:00 15 for the judges.

16 Quiwonkpa arrives in Freetown. He has to recruit and train
17 Liberians, so he has to draw this stock of Liberians from
18 Liberia. And so he contacts almost every progressive. Amos
19 Sawyer sent the famous journalist in Monrovia called Tom Kamara
11:18:29 20 was there. The present chairman of the Election Commission in
21 Liberia Jimmy Fromayan was there. These are the MOJA
22 Marxist-Leninist individuals. Now, so, there is Ellen
23 Johnson-Sirleaf was contacted. Boima Fahnbulleh is there, so his
24 people come. So what is happening now is that that
11:18:55 25 conglomeration of individuals within the organisation have their
26 own agenda. And I want to be very clear about this; I am saying
27 that this is believed but there has been nothing to the contrary
28 to suggest that that is not true. Their objective was to use
29 Quiwonkpa to stage the coup, eliminate him and MOJA would take

1 over the country, so the commander, a gentleman called Biah,
2 B-I-A-H, Biah is killed on the border but as soon - by a member
3 of that group, so they get into Monrovia. The coup is
4 successful. General Quiwonkpa goes to the radio station not even
11:19:42 5 knowing that his commander was killed at the border. He is left
6 naked. Camp Schefflein, that has come up in the testimony and
7 the spelling is in the record, Camp Schefflein, a military
8 barracks just outside Monrovia on the Robertsfield Highway is
9 where you have one of the strongest battalion, I think it's the
11:20:09 10 1st Battalion of the Armed Forces of Liberia, loyal to Doe,
11 commanded by a Krahn officer, and most of the people there are
12 the Doe loyalists. Camp Schefflein has not surrendered to the
13 new government. They forget about Schefflein. Secondly,
14 Quiwonkpa assumes that men have gone to Executive Mansion. Doe
11:20:34 15 is still at the Executive Mansion. Nothing happens to him so
16 eventually the soldiers from Camp Schefflein move into Monrovia
17 with massive force. The Quiwonkpa people scatter. Quiwonkpa is
18 sought, he is captured, he is killed. He is eaten by the Krahn
19 soldiers and that is on the records all over, the records for
11:21:02 20 that, and then the revenge mode sets in.

21 Q. We will come to the revenge mode a little later, but I
22 would like us to just pause for a moment and deal with a couple
23 of spellings. Firstly, James Butty, B-U-T-T-Y. I will have to
24 wait for the others. But, in any event, you mentioned that you
11:21:44 25 yourself has left Liberia. Before we have the short adjournment,
26 I wonder if you could assist us with this: Why did you leave
27 Liberia?

28 A. I left Liberia when General Thomas Quiwonkpa said that he
29 could not order the armed forces to move in because it would

1 involve bloodshed, because he was sure that a certain segment of
2 the armed forces that Doe had loyal to him, especially the Krahn
3 and other groups, would resist. There would be bloodshed. He
4 did not want it. I knew that things would get bad after Doe
11:22:33 5 returned from Europe where he was visiting and so I left, out of
6 fear.

7 Q. Mr Taylor, help us, did you have any other difficulties at
8 that time in terms of your role as head of the GSA?

9 A. None whatsoever. I had no difficulties up to that point
11:22:56 10 because when I left Liberia I was now deputy minister of
11 commerce. I was not at the GSA when I left.

12 Q. Before you left GSA had there been any questions asked
13 about the propriety of your dealings in that role?

14 A. That is correct, yes. The new guy Clarence Momolu that
11:23:21 15 moves into the GSA begins what he calls a massive investigation
16 as to what had occurred at the general services administration.

17 Q. Yes, and what was the outcome of that?

18 A. Well, I really don't know the full outcome because up until
19 the time I left Liberia he was still investigating. But what had
11:23:41 20 arisen at the time, he was concerned about funds that had been
21 paid eight months before his arrival at the GSA for equipment for
22 the Government of Liberia that had not arrived.

23 Q. Now, help us, how many allegations were made about you and
24 your role as head of the GSA?

11:24:16 25 A. As far as I know the allegations came from Clarence Momolu.

26 Q. How many of them?

27 A. I know namely of one for the payment of \$900,000 to a firm
28 in the United States.

29 Q. And, put in simple terms, what was being suggested about

1 you?

2 A. He was trying to suggest that I had personally embezzled
3 money.

4 Q. How much?

11:24:39 5 A. \$900,000.

6 Q. Had you done that?

7 A. No, I had not.

8 Q. When you left Liberia, were those investigations still
9 ongoing?

11:24:53 10 A. They were still ongoing.

11 Q. Did that investigation have anything to do with your
12 flight?

13 A. No, not at all. Not at all. The payment in question had
14 been made eight months before I fled. No. It was very clear
11:25:14 15 that had it not been for this military operation that Quiwonkpa
16 failed on, and I am using the word "failed", I would have not
17 probably left Liberia at that time because quite frankly I was
18 sure that I would have been made minister of commerce and the
19 investigation would have been carried out and they would have
11:25:33 20 found out that all of the proper procedures had been used.

21 And what do I mean by proper procedure? Orders were placed
22 by the GSA. Payments were made through the Central Bank of
23 Liberia. The vendor had received the money eight months before
24 this particular situation. So if there were any questions that
11:25:59 25 would have been answered, it would have been by the vendor who
26 had not denied that he had received the money. So I had no
27 problems with that.

28 Q. Well, help us with this then, Mr Taylor: If, as you are
29 telling these judges, you were not guilty of any wrongdoing, what

1 do you say was the motivation behind those allegations?

2 A. I know that Clarence Momolu wanted to destroy me and some
3 of the other guys wanted to, but they would not have succeeded.
4 It was purely to destroy Charles Taylor.

11:26:40 5 Q. Why would they want to destroy Charles Taylor?

6 A. Well, don't let's forget that we are talking still we are
7 in this mood of what this Congo man that is doing very well, who
8 is so respected and loved by a lot of members of the council, we
9 need to break Taylor, and that's what they wanted to do.

11:27:00 10 Q. And was this being done with or without Doe's approval?

11 A. Quite frankly, I cannot say with any degree of certainty
12 that this was done with Doe's approval, to be very fair to this
13 gentleman. Look, I know Samuel Doe. These allegations, if Doe
14 was behind the allegations, when they first came out, number one,
11:27:34 15 he would have dismissed me from the GSA instantly. I believe
16 that there were other individuals moving in there because, having
17 been President myself, when the President is really behind
18 something - really, really behind something - I mean, you would
19 not - you would almost know, I mean. So I don't think Doe - Doe
11:28:01 20 easily could have said, "Oh, there are allegations, you are
21 dismissed. You will remain out of office until you answer to
22 these allegations", but he did not even comment on it. The
23 Executive Mansion did not do any releases on it. So I would say
24 that this was not of Doe's doing, no.

11:28:22 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I would like you to hold that thought
26 because I note the time and I am going on to another aspect of
27 this, Mr President.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. We will
29 take the short adjournment now and reconvene at 12 o'clock.

1 [Break taken at 11.28 a.m.]

2 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead Mr Griffiths.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please you, your Honours:

12:01:01 5 Q. Mr Taylor, before we adjourned we were talking about these
6 allegations made against you. Do you recall that?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. When did you arrive in the United States?

9 A. I arrived in the United States in, oh, late '83.

12:01:30 10 Q. Can you give us a month?

11 A. No, not precisely.

12 Q. What kind of a passport did you use to travel to the United
13 States?

14 A. I used an ordinary passport.

12:01:48 15 Q. And what was the route that you took?

16 A. La Cote d'Ivoire and then on to New York.

17 Q. And did you travel alone?

18 A. Yes, I did.

19 Q. Now you were married by this time, were you not?

12:02:05 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Was it a Liberian passport you were using?

22 A. Yes, it was.

23 Q. Now, what about your wife? Did your wife remain in
24 Liberia?

12:02:18 25 A. She stayed behind. In fact, my wife - my wife had been in
26 the United States all along and she was aware of what was about
27 to happen, so she had come down to Monrovia and I am glad she
28 did. Hard-headed, some of us wanted to stay there and see things
29 happen, but she came down and prevailed upon me in the last

1 minute to leave and she stayed behind as I left the country.

2 Q. And did she remain in Liberia?

3 A. No, she followed the day after.

4 Q. And by this stage how many children did your wife have for
12:03:02 5 you?

6 A. By this stage we didn't have any kids yet. We were still
7 in the very early stages.

8 Q. But she joined you in the USA, did she?

9 A. That is correct.

12:03:14 10 Q. How soon after you arrived?

11 A. Almost immediately. Almost immediately after I arrived.

12 Q. And just dealing with one small detail before we go on with
13 the narrative, your wife Tupee having arrived in the United
14 States shortly after you, tell us, did you stay together?

12:03:40 15 A. Yes, for some time we did.

16 Q. Yes. For how long?

17 A. I would say we stayed together for, I would say about six
18 to eight months and then an incident occurred and we broke up.

19 Q. Yes. And were you seeing somebody else at the time?

12:04:08 20 A. Yes, I was.

21 Q. Who is that?

22 A. I was then seeing a lady called Agnes.

23 Q. And you were later to marry her, weren't you?

24 A. That is correct.

12:04:22 25 Q. Now, you arrive in the United States late 1983?

26 A. Or thereabouts, may I say, yes.

27 Q. Yes. What happened there shortly after your arrival?

28 A. Not immediately. I, like I said, Tupee and I lived
29 together for a long time, I would say about six or eight months,

1 and then during this particular period there was, round about
2 early '84, I would say about February, if I am not mistaken,
3 1984, the Government of Liberia advanced an extradition request.
4 Let me just clarify something for the Court before we - because
12:05:28 5 in your question you used the word "allegations". The issue
6 before me at the time I was deputy minister of commerce, and in
7 response to your question I said to you Doe really probably
8 didn't back this. We had not reached the stage where Clarence
9 Momolu's accusations, and I want to call it his accusations
12:06:03 10 because if there had been anything substantive in the issues
11 raised about government funds it would have been handled by the
12 department of justice. Clarence Momolu is not a Prosecutor. So
13 it was this internal squabble. He gets to the agency, he begins
14 to talk a whole lot of real, you know, nonsense, but it had not
12:06:24 15 reached the point where there was an ongoing legal process of a
16 legal investigation by the county attorney or the minister of
17 justice so it had not reached there after seven months of his
18 talks. So I want to clarify that for the Court. So as we move
19 now into the United States it is not until February of 1994 --
12:06:53 20 Q. '94?
21 A. Excuse me, am I - is it '94? Yes, '94.
22 Q. Pause.
23 A. Let me just take my time here. '84, 1984, that an
24 extradition request is made by the Liberian government to the
12:07:17 25 United States formally charging me with embezzlement and asking
26 for me to be extradited to Liberia to face charges of
27 embezzlement.
28 Q. Now, when you left Liberia in late 1983, were you the only
29 prominent Liberian who left at that time?

1 A. Well, I left. Several left. I cannot just account for
2 where they went, so maybe that may come later, but several others
3 fled including Moses Duopu, Harry Nyuan. They fled from the
4 capital. I fled out of the country. Some of them fled into
12:08:10 5 Nimba and this is where the other part of the conflict comes up
6 where there is a famous raid in Nimba that Doe begins, but the
7 fleeing from Monrovia, most of us fled. I fled out of the
8 country.

9 Q. In any event - in any event - what was the consequence of
12:08:37 10 the extradition request made by the Liberian government?

11 A. The extradition request was made. After several months of
12 haggling up and down, it depends on - because it has to be
13 presented here as a full story. There are things happening that
14 I think it is important for the Court to know. I am in the
12:09:16 15 United States. At the time of the extradition request we are
16 still working. I go to the United States --

17 Q. Working on what?

18 A. That is what I am coming to now. I go to the United
19 States, but the plan to remove Doe is still afoot. I return to
12:09:41 20 West Africa trying to find General Quiwonkpa because linking up
21 with him would continue the plan.

22 On my first trip I do not find him. I come to La Cote
23 d'Ivoire. I do not find him because I didn't even know, and he
24 had kept very quiet, he is hiding in Sierra Leone. So then I
12:10:09 25 returned to the United States. By the time I get back to the
26 United States this is about the middle of '84. The extradition
27 papers are already circling. We know that these requests have
28 been made. The United States government has not yet moved on it,
29 because I guess they are still studying it, and we know the

1 reason why it took so long and I am sure - I am sure the judges
2 know this, but I will just explain it.

3 Extradition, the issues that are dealt with in extradition
4 cases - and this is why I mentioned before I was not under any
12:10:56 5 criminal investigation in Liberia at the time of my departure. I
6 want to make that very clear. So the extradition request, under
7 extradition requests there are only two issues that are decided.
8 It is mostly a political decision. The first issue that is
9 decided on an extradition, and this is why the United States

12:11:21 10 government took so long by the Court, even though it is processed
11 through the Court, the first issue is: Is there a valid treaty.

12 The Court only has to decide on the validity of a treaty.
13 Thus, after the Court has decided, the Court's functions are
14 finished. It is then the decision of the Secretary of State of
12:11:44 15 that nation to decide as to whether the political situation in
16 that country is of such that that citizen can be sent back to
17 face trial.

18 So the United States government, I was not on trial for
19 embezzlement. I was only being asked to be sent back not even
12:12:03 20 having been under a criminal investigation before I left. I just
21 wanted to get the Court to understand that part, okay? So the
22 extradition request comes through, the United States government
23 has taken its time to consider it. I get to know later why it
24 has taken so long, but eventually I am arrested.

12:12:23 25 Q. When are you arrested?

26 A. I am arrested I would say on or about June of 1984.

27 Q. And just so that we get the chronology correct, the
28 extradition proceedings begin in February, am I right?

29 A. The proceedings begin, yes. From Liberia. Not in the US

1 court.

2 Q. From Liberia?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Thereafter you travel to West Africa and return?

12:13:05 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And it is upon your return in June of 1984 that you are in
7 fact arrested?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. At that stage are you placed in custody?

12:13:24 10 A. Immediately, yes.

11 Q. Where were you placed in custody?

12 A. Firstly, I am arrested in Boston, Massachusetts, and I am
13 taken to the Plymouth County House of Correction.

14 Q. And where is that?

12:13:46 15 A. That is way outside of Boston. I would say - I can't
16 really calculate. I was --

17 Q. In which state?

18 A. Massachusetts.

19 Q. Okay. And for how long are you held on remand at that
12:14:05 20 institution?

21 A. I am held there for about 15 months up to about I would say
22 November 1985.

23 Q. And during that 15 month period what is happening in terms
24 of the extradition proceedings?

12:14:33 25 A. The Court has already decided that there exists a valid
26 treaty between the United States and Liberia. The Courts are
27 finished. The matter is now at the Department of State to
28 determine if they should go ahead with the actual movement of me
29 into Liberia. It is no longer a matter of the law. That is

1 finished.

2 Q. Now, did you instruct lawyers in the United States?

3 A. Well, yes, I did obtain the services of the former United
4 States Attorney-General, Ramsey Clark. He was Attorney-General
12:15:30 5 during the Johnson administration to represent my interests
6 during my incarceration.

7 Q. And after you were held in custody were any further steps
8 taken by the Liberian government to secure your return to
9 Liberia?

12:16:00 10 A. Oh, yes. You have to imagine they were very anxious. Doe
11 wanted me back but we - our concerns - in fact what delayed the
12 request was this: Everybody - and when I say everybody I am
13 referring to the United States government - knew very well that
14 at stake at that time had nothing to do - because I mean with
12:16:38 15 \$900,000, because that was not the issue. \$900,000 had been paid
16 to a vendor, the vendor had admitted that he had received the
17 money so - and they could have gone after the vendor for the
18 money. The money was not paid to Charles Taylor. They knew that
19 the money had been processed, but at the bottom of it they knew
12:16:59 20 that Quiwonkpa having disappeared that Doe wanted me because he
21 knew that Quiwonkpa and I working together would have been a
22 problem, so the United States government was very aware, and what
23 was at stake at that particular time was the Secretary of State
24 was concerned that I would be killed if I was sent back to
12:17:22 25 Liberia.

26 So within that period there were discussions going on and I
27 guess, and I was not part of those discussions, I would say from
28 experience, trying to maybe secure assurances from the Doe
29 government that no such thing would happen. So it took some time

1 because the courts had decided within the first three months that
2 there was a valid - I would say three to six months - that there
3 was a valid treaty, so they were finished.

4 The rest of the time was just diplomatic arguments,
12:17:58 5 agreements, and the United States in a way I would believe, and I
6 am not quoting from any US sources, but they were aware that
7 General Quiwonkpa was planning his return and from my own
8 diplomatic instinct, and I am speaking about the contacts that I
9 had from the prison with General Quiwonkpa, I think that the
12:18:29 10 United States - and this is a thought only, I have no official
11 statement from the United States government - they did not want
12 to send me back to Liberia.

13 I think they were sure that Doe would harm me, but knowing
14 that something was coming up I guess they were buying time for
12:18:51 15 that to take place before I was sent back to Liberia. I want to
16 be right on this. I am not saying this because somebody told me
17 this, but because of the work that they were doing at the time
18 with General Quiwonkpa, fearing that I would be killed, not
19 wanting me to go back all systems buy time, and it is my own
12:19:15 20 genuine belief, and I am not speculating that they were buying
21 time and really didn't want to send me back.

22 Q. Let's pause and seek your assistance with one little
23 detail. Tell me, who was Solicitor General at the time in
24 Liberia?

12:19:31 25 A. The Solicitor General at the time that was processing that
26 extradition sits in this court right now. It was Cllr Lavalie
27 Supuwood, my lawyer.

28 Q. And as Solicitor General of Liberia he was seeking your
29 extradition from the United States, wasn't he?

1 A. That is correct, but he was one of the progressives too.

2 Q. Now, you were telling us about people that Quiwonkpa was
3 working with in the United States. Who was he working with in
4 the United States?

12:20:14 5 A. Now, Quiwonkpa is with the two Catholic fathers and James
6 Butty. I speak to him on a collect call from --

7 Q. Speak to whom?

8 A. General Quiwonkpa on the telephone from the Plymouth County
9 House of Correction you have to call collect calls. I am not
12:20:44 10 sure what they do in other places in America and I speak to him
11 several times, but we cannot really talk. I know he is there for
12 a reason, but he sends a gentleman by the name of Harry Nyuan.

13 Q. Spelling please?

14 A. That, I would say N-Y-U-A-N is really Nyuan - some people
12:21:11 15 call it, they say Nyua, but it is Nyuan - told me to visit with
16 me at the Plymouth County House of Correction in Massachusetts
17 and he briefs me of what is going on regarding what is being put
18 together and urging that I have patience. I then say, ask him to
19 --

12:21:40 20 Q. No, before we get ahead of ourselves, what does he tell you
21 is going on?

22 A. Oh, he tells me that the particular agency that I already
23 mentioned are working along with them.

24 Q. Let's not be coy, Mr Taylor. Which agency?

12:21:59 25 A. We have said the CIA. I mean, we are not going to beat
26 this [i ndi scerni ble].

27 Q. Right. So let's use CIA rather than agency, please?

28 A. Okay.

29 Q. So help us: What did he tell you?

1 A. That they were working very closely with the general and
2 that plans were afoot to return to Sierra Leone - I mean to - not
3 return, to go to Sierra Leone and that all, all plans had been
4 put together for the training in Sierra Leone and the eventual
12:22:36 5 moving into Liberia.

6 And let me just - your Honours, I want to - I made a
7 statement here earlier about who was president. Now, I may be a
8 little off. It had to be somewhere between Siaka Stevens because
9 I can remember Quiwonkpa saying the old man, but old man -
12:22:55 10 because I am in prison in America, I am not - it could have been
11 Siaka Stevens who later died and Momoh took over. I will have to
12 reflect my memory on this. And I am sure it is in the record, I
13 said Momoh, but I thought about it because he kept saying the old
14 man, the old man, and most of us knew Siaka Stevens as the old
12:23:17 15 man. Okay.

16 So I am told that they are moving, they are planning and
17 that the weapons and equipment would be given and that in fact
18 they would be paid for. So the weapons from the Sierra Leone
19 government at that time I am 100 per cent positive, that was used
12:23:37 20 by General Quiwonkpa, was not a donation. They were paid for by
21 the CIA.

22 Q. Okay.

23 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, this Mr Nyuan, is he
24 Liberian?

12:23:51 25 THE WITNESS: Yes, he is. The Harry Nyuan is Liberian. He
26 was sent to me to brief me.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I take advantage of this hiatus,
28 Mr President, to mention a spelling from this morning. James
29 Fromayan, it is J-A-M-E-S, the normal spelling, and the surname

1 is F-R-O-M-A-Y-A-N:

2 Q. So you were telling us the weapons had been paid for by the
3 CIA?

4 A. That is correct.

12:24:24 5 Q. What else were you told?

6 A. And that the training would be done by what I told you
7 before, it would be done by the SSD. Dumbuya would conduct the
8 training and that Liberians would be brought to Sierra Leone for
9 the training and that was done.

12:24:40 10 Q. Now, help us. Why were you, incarcerated as you were in
11 the Plymouth county jail, being told this?

12 A. The relationship between General Quiwonkpa and myself were
13 very strong. As a matter of fact, I may have not mentioned, I
14 had suggested to the general that Dr Fahnbulleh be contacted and
15 brought on board but they knew --

12:25:11 16 Q. When had you suggested that?

17 A. I suggested that to the general while I was in prison in
18 the United States. And I said to him that he needed some very
19 strong people around him and Dr Fahnbulleh was brought on board.

12:25:34 20 Q. So what are you telling us? Were you conspiring with
21 Quiwonkpa and others to stage a coup in Liberia?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And why were you conspiring with others to do that?

24 A. Well, let's get - we have to add the history to this.

12:25:57 25 Let's not forget the progressives and the majority of Liberians
26 want Doe and the PRC to return to barracks. Doe does not want to
27 return to barracks. General Quiwonkpa, Thomas Quiwonkpa, is then
28 removed from his place because he is supporting the return to
29 civilian rule. A coup is planned then. It does not take shape.

1 We flee. I go out of the country. He goes into hiding. A group
2 of those individuals that were supporting the coup in Liberia get
3 disgruntled and go up to Nimba and raid a certain company, it's
4 called the LAMCO mining company. Doe begins to carry out the
12:26:58 5 beginning of the killings in Nimba. We are all out. We are
6 still planning. General Quiwonkpa succeeds in getting out and
7 the whole process is continuing. So we do not stop because we
8 are determined.

9 Now I am in the prison and Quiwonkpa now gets in America.

12:27:22 10 He has the backing of the government of the United States,
11 because the CIA must operate with at least the acquiescence at
12 certain levels and the whole thing is rolling. I mean, I see
13 this as a way of survival myself. If it succeeds I know I will
14 come out of jail, because if sufficient pressure is put on the
12:27:47 15 United States government - by pressure, let me say if they are
16 sufficiently convinced. There is very little pressure you can
17 put on the US government. But I mean if I stay in jail long
18 enough for them to be convinced that, okay, well, maybe we can
19 send him in and nothing will happen, I will be a dead man. So I
12:28:08 20 too am anxious and I want it to happen.

21 Q. Now, help me with something else, Mr Taylor. On the one
22 hand you have told us earlier this morning of the extent of
23 United States largesse towards the Doe government in terms of
24 financial assistance. Now you are telling us that an agency of
12:28:38 25 that same government was planning or assisting Quiwonkpa to
26 overthrow that same government. Can you help us with that - on
27 the face of it - contradiction?

28 A. No, there is no contradiction. The assistance to the Doe
29 government covers the period from the PRC to the end of his

1 government and his assassination - well, his killing by Prince
2 Johnson at the beginning of the revolution that we launched. Now
3 within that period of time, that is before the elections of
4 October 1985 --

12:29:35 5 Q. Elections where?

6 A. In Liberia. Doe is not really, really, really favoured by
7 I would say the international community to really stay on. What
8 these people apparently were doing, they assisted Doe in ways
9 that were sufficient to encourage him to leave. He probably
10 interpreted the assistance as them wanting him to stay, but the
11 views of the strong man, as he used to be called, General Thomas
12 Quiwonkpa, Thomas Quiwonkpa was really liked by the international
13 community and the views coming from him and most of the other
14 segments of the Liberian society was for the army to return to
15 barracks.

16 So there is nothing out of the ordinary that when this coup
17 fails and immediately thereafter, several months after, Doe
18 brings forward an election in October of 1985, that election of
19 1985 Doe says he wins by 50.9 per cent. The international
20 community and all Liberians believe that there is another
21 candidate in this particular electoral process called Jackson
22 Doe, no relationship to Samuel Doe, who actually won the
23 elections. So here we have it, here is a man that they do not
24 want, someone else wins the election, he takes it, so all systems
25 now are open to General Quiwonkpa to hurry up. And, if we can
26 touch this point, in November of 1985 Quiwonkpa attacks.

12:31:13 27 Q. Okay. We will come back to that in a little more detail in
28 a moment, but in any event you are arrested June 1985, yes, and
29 you are in --

1 A. No.

2 Q. '84?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. And you are in custody for 15 months?

12:31:45 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. So that takes us through to when?

7 A. About August 80 - no, no, no. That puts me all the way up
8 until November because I do get out of jail in November of 1985.

9 Q. Now, it's that Houdini episode that I want to talk to you
12:32:11 10 about now.

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. How did you get out of jail, Mr Taylor, without a monopoly
13 type get-out-of-jail card? How did you manage it?

14 A. Well, I must say that I will be able to explain to a great
12:32:28 15 extent how I got out. There are some of the details I don't
16 know, but I will explain to the judges. While in prison this
17 whole episode is being developed - by episode, I mean the
18 planning and training are going on in Sierra Leone. Harry Nyuan
19 comes to me and he informs me of the details. I then ask him to
12:32:58 20 state to General Quiwonkpa to ask the United States government to
21 release me. Why? Because of the contact that I am told that
22 General Quiwonkpa has with the government. Well, since there is
23 this diplomatic stalemate, if you have sufficient contacts at the
24 level that Quiwonkpa was dealing with, he could have said to
12:33:21 25 them, "Look, release Mr Taylor" because it is apparent that they
26 would not have sent me anyway.

27 I am in jail. About two to three days - I don't know the
28 date of the actual attack on Monrovia. I do not know. But I am
29 released from jail about two to three days before the attack. As

1 I arrive in New York City the attack is already gone.

2 About three to four weeks before, one of the prison guards
3 in a supervisory position came and told me that I will be leaving
4 the prison and he wanted to find out that if I was let out of the
12:34:09 5 prison if I could actually get out of the United States as
6 quickly as possible because upon leaving I would have to leave
7 the United States. I said to him, I said, "Well, it will be a
8 little problem, but I will get to my wife and ask her to, you
9 know, raise a certain amount of money that would be made
12:34:31 10 available to me if and when I got out".

11 Now, that was a little sticky because my wife and I are not
12 living together. I have now moved to Boston where I am arrested.
13 I am with this girlfriend Agnes who later becomes my wife, but my
14 wife Tupee and I had bought a piece of land in New Hampshire, so
12:34:54 15 I had to authorise her to sell the land to raise some money that
16 when I got out of jail I would be able to do something.

17 The Plymouth County House of Correction is both a minimum
18 and a maximum security facility. The minimum security facility
19 of that jail, you have people who were about to get out, they go
12:35:22 20 and work in the fields, come in, go out. It is virtually for
21 people that, you know, have no good reason to get out of jail
22 because in that facility you are there. Within the building you
23 have to walk from maximum security through so many gates to get
24 into minimum and the minimum side of the jail is really minimum.
12:35:45 25 Low walls, people walk out and do what they have to do.

26 On the date that I reported back to them, to the guard, and
27 told them that I had arranged with my wife and after she showed
28 me that she had sold the land and had some money, we had to
29 really give the land at a rock bottom price, I told him that we

1 had some money, he verified my passport, he verified that I could
2 get out. I can remember one evening at about 10 he came, opened
3 my cell, it was during lock down time, and escorted me from the
4 maximum security side through several gates to the minimum
12:36:28 5 security side where there were two other detainees there standing
6 - they were already out. They had already - I don't know who cut
7 it, but I think the guards had made these arrangements. Those
8 two guys and myself with the guard, this one guard, and I do not
9 know and will not lie if he was operating with anybody else, but
12:36:54 10 I believe that he had to be operating with somebody else. I was
11 taken out, we got to the window, these guys took a sheet, we tied
12 it on the bar, not very short distance, and we came down, got
13 over the fence.

14 There was a waiting car outside. There were two guys in
12:37:14 15 the car. These other two guys and myself got in the car and
16 drove and their instruction - the guys who were driving the car's
17 instructions were to get me as far as New York where I had told
18 them I wanted to go.

19 They drove me from Boston. We stopped in Providence, Rhode
12:37:34 20 Island. My wife came, brought the money, she was in a second car
21 and the two cars drove. The two guys that were driving the car
22 insisted that I not drive with her. I should stay in their car
23 just in case we were stopped by state troopers. I followed those
24 instructions.

12:37:55 25 I do not know those guys. They never identified themselves
26 to me. I had never known them before. They drove us all the way
27 to New York. I got out of the car and I showed them that it
28 would be okay and then I met a sister of mine, a half sister of
29 mine, and I stayed at her apartment. Those guys plus the two

1 guys that broke out of the jail with me, I have not seen or heard
2 from them to date.

3 Now, what do I mean by I do not know the full story? It is
4 my assumption, and I want to be very clear about this, because I
12:38:40 5 did not pay any money, I did not know the guys that picked me up,
6 I stayed in New York for about - as I am in New York the coup is
7 going on in Liberia. I cannot get a flight out of New York on
8 time. I was not hiding. All this nonsense about being searched,
9 I was not hiding. I did not get a flight out. I was still in
12:39:07 10 New York when General Quiwonkpa was captured. I stayed in New
11 York for about two or three weeks.

12 It was decided by my sister that since things had gotten
13 out of shape, by this time every news agency is reporting that
14 Charles Taylor has escaped from jail. I drive on interstate 95,
12:39:30 15 not hiding, from New York after about two weeks to Washington DC.
16 I spent a couple of days in Washington DC visiting a friend of
17 mine, the later Eric Scott. From there I drive all the way to
18 Atlanta, Georgia, board a plane, fly to Texas, spend time there
19 with some family friends down there for about another month and
12:39:55 20 then go on to Mexico and fly to West Africa.

21 Q. How did you get into Mexico?

22 A. We drove right across the US border there in an open car -
23 not an open top, openly. We drove across at the US border --

24 Q. Who is "we"?

12:40:13 25 A. I was there, my half sister that I talk about, Ann Payne,
26 plus her daughter.

27 Q. Could you give us that name again, please?

28 A. Payne. Ann, like in A-N-N and P-A-Y-N-E. We drive across,
29 no one - all of my documents are inspected. We drive across the

- 1 border. We get across. I am given a visa at the - I am not sure
2 if it has changed right now, because I could be asked about it.
3 At the time I crossed the border into Mexico you don't get a
4 Mexican visa on the border. Not on the border. You had to go -
12:40:53 5 I think the visa was given me some - I think 10 or 20 miles
6 inside Mexico there is an area that you go. If you want to go to
7 Mexico City you have got to get a visa. But when I travelled
8 through there at the time a visa was not required. Neither was
9 it required at the US border as I crossed any specific things.
12:41:13 10 But I am trying to say my name was on my passport, Charles
11 MacArthur Taylor. No one asked me any questions. We drove
12 across.
13 Q. Which passport was this, Mr Taylor?
14 A. I was using an ordinary passport. A Liberian passport.
12:41:27 15 Q. Was it the same passport you had used to enter the United
16 States?
17 A. No, I had used a diplomatic passport to enter the United
18 States. That passport, it was left at Tupee's place so I didn't
19 have that one.
12:41:45 20 Q. So how did you get this additional passport?
21 A. In government, we all not knowing what will happen the next
22 day, we had a diplomatic passport and we had an ordinary
23 passport, because once you get fired from government you are no
24 longer entitled to a diplomatic passport, so there was always an
12:42:03 25 ordinary passport that we kept.
26 Q. So that is the latter that you used to enter Mexico?
27 A. That is correct.
28 Q. And then you told us that you applied for and obtained a
29 visa.

1 A. A visa, yes. That's another strange thing. We were given
2 - I was given a visa at this town not on the border, somewhere
3 inside Mexico, but this visa was not stamped into my passport.
4 The visa was given on a small slip of paper that you hold in the
12:42:35 5 passport like if any questions were asked. I don't know why they
6 did not stamp it in. Because when I get to this place and I
7 request the visa this particular Mexican immigration officer had
8 several visas stacked in his bag, in his carrying briefcase. I
9 think it is a system over there at the time where visas were not
12:43:01 10 stamped but the visas are given on the slip. I get a visa to
11 enter Mexico and I then go on Mexico City which is a little
12 distance from the main border point. Strangely at this time
13 there had just been an earthquake in Mexico City that had just
14 hit the city when I reached there. After that I bought a ticket.

12:43:28 15 Q. To where?

16 A. And boarded a Sabena aircraft, Sabena, I think it's
17 S-A-B-E-N-A, the Belgium airlines, into Brussels and then on to
18 Ghana, West Africa.

19 Q. Now, let's just pause there for a minute. By the time you
12:43:50 20 have made good your escape and arrived back in Africa, the
21 attempted coup by Quiwonkpa - no, the elections of 1985 have
22 taken place in the October, is that right?

23 A. Yes, the election took place in October.

24 Q. Then in November we have the --

12:44:12 25 A. The coup.

26 Q. The coup by Quiwonkpa?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. When Quiwonkpa is arrested and killed?

29 A. A few days later, yes.

1 Q. And that is in November of 1985, you tell us?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. So what date is it when you arrive back in West Africa?

4 A. Because I mean I was very sad. I was very sad. I am still
12:44:32 5 in New York City when Quiwonkpa is arrested and killed. That
6 must be clear. So, in other words, I have missed the whole
7 thing. And it appears that my release from the Plymouth County
8 House of Correction was intended to be in West Africa for this
9 particular situation, because I am out, I get in New York and
12:45:03 10 about a day and a half to two days after my arrival in New York
11 the coup is in action. I have already missed - because the
12 original plan I had said, I was going to catch a flight out of
13 JFK straight into West Africa, but I did not. We were delayed
14 and my wife, my ex-wife, panicking, was very slow in getting to
12:45:29 15 me. So we were delayed in Providence, Rhode Island on a highway
16 waiting for her to reach me.

17 These guys were just so adamant. I said, "Well, let's go".
18 They did not want to go. I am talking about the two guys that
19 had the car. That car was a type of secure car because they
12:45:50 20 insisted that I would have to stay in that car until I got to New
21 York because if I got stopped on the highway in the other car I
22 would be probably picked up. So I stayed in their car. My
23 assumption again was that it had to be a government car, that
24 they were sure that I would not be taken out of their car, okay?
12:46:09 25 So we go all the way. So that delay now I think caused me not to
26 be present for the coup.

27 Q. Okay. I just want to clarify one detail before we carry on
28 with the narrative. Earlier, and I am sure it may well be my
29 fault - earlier today you told us that when you fled from Liberia

1 and went to the United States you travelled on a Liberian
2 passport, an ordinary passport?

3 A. That is correct.

12:46:50

4 Q. You have told us now, a couple of minutes ago, that it was
5 a diplomatic passport. So which is it?

6 A. Well, let's see. I hope I didn't misspeak. I am saying
7 that upon leaving office in Liberia you do not have a diplomatic
8 passport. I entered the United States on a diplomatic passport,
9 but I left the United States on an ordinary passport because the
10 diplomatic passport had been left at Tupee's place when we broke
11 up. I moved from New Jersey. I was now in Boston.

12:47:13

12 Q. Mr Taylor, I want us to be very clear about this, so let us
13 just recall the details of what you told us this morning.
14 Initially you flee from Liberia and you go to the United States?

12:47:37

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Extradition proceedings begin in the February of 1984?

17 A. That is correct.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

19 MS HOLLIS: I hesitate to rise, but this is direct

12:47:52

20 examination and if counsel wishes to go over these matters again
21 it would be more appropriate to ask the witness to give the
22 information. He is essentially summarising testimony.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths?

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I am merely clarifying something,

12:48:09

25 Mr President. If my learned friend would advert to page 54, line
26 15, I am merely seeking to clarify that.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you. I will overrule
28 the objection and allow you to continue your clarification,
29 Mr Griffiths.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. If I understand the account you gave us, Mr Taylor, you
3 leave Liberia, you go to the United States?

4 A. Yes.

12:48:36 5 Q. Stage two is the issuance of extradition proceedings?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. You then go back to Africa?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And return to the United States for a second time?

12:48:48 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Now the question is very simple. On the first occasion
12 that you left Liberia and entered the United States, what
13 passport did you use?

14 A. I travelled on a diplomatic passport.

12:49:02 15 Q. On the second occasion when you returned to the United
16 States again, what passport did you use?

17 A. I am still travelling on a diplomatic passport.

18 Q. When you leave the United States, enter Mexico and travel
19 to Belgium, what passport are you using?

12:49:19 20 A. I am travelling on an ordinary passport.

21 Q. Thank you. So you then return to Ghana?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Now, help us with this, please: By this stage the
24 Quiwonkpa coup has failed?

12:49:37 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Why then are you returning to Africa?

27 A. Well, upon my release - well, I am calling it release
28 because I didn't break out so to speak. In Ghana is my good old
29 friend, Dr Henry B Fahnbulleh. While I am still outside I am in

1 touch with Dr Fahnbulleh who is now in Ghana. The coup has
2 failed. People have scattered and most of those individuals did
3 not hang around Sierra Leone. After the failure of the coup they
4 moved into Ghana.

12:50:24 5 He then encourages me, because everyone knows that I am a
6 part of that whole operation even though I am still behind - he
7 encourages me to come to Ghana because he is good friends with
8 senior officials of the then government of Rawlings who had just
9 come in and that friendship - that friendship was very deep
12:50:49 10 because, for those that may not know, at the beginning Jerry
11 Rawlings has just come to power into Ghana and it starts off as a
12 Marxist-Leninist revolution and so the MOJA people are deeply
13 rooted in Ghana. He invites me to come to Ghana. That's how I
14 come to Ghana.

12:51:13 15 Q. Now, we will come back to the Ghanaian episode in a moment,
16 but let us just complete the Quiwonkpa episode. After the
17 killing of Quiwonkpa, what happened after that in Liberia?

18 A. Well, you need - I think your original question - I think
19 we need to, you know, complete that circle, because I think the
12:51:44 20 question was what caused me to come back to West Africa. The
21 fire is still burning. Fahnbulleh is in this particular place
22 and they are still hoping that they can regroup, okay? So I
23 really wanted to end that part of the thing to answer your
24 question.

12:52:03 25 Q. But in the meantime what has been happening in Liberia
26 following the failed Quiwonkpa coup?

27 A. Doe has now unleashed the full force of his army and he is
28 really on I would call it a blood-letting spree. Nimba is being
29 practically torn apart.

1 Q. Who is in charge of this?

2 A. Well, Samuel Doe at that time had a very famous general by
3 the name of Charles Julu, that is J-U-L-U, who was in charge of
4 the operations in Nimba County. But I want to mention that that
12:53:03 5 spree that I referred to did not just occur in Nimba. There were
6 other counties that suffered as well and by suffering I mean
7 individuals from the Kpelle ethnic group, the Loma ethnic group.
8 Any ethnic group that was once sympathetic to General Quiwonkpa,
9 or if you were a member of the armed forces and you were from any
12:53:31 10 of these ethnic groups you were also targeted.

11 Q. Which ethnic group was Quiwonkpa from?

12 A. Quiwonkpa was from the Mahn. That is M-A-H-N. The Mahn
13 ethnic group sometimes called the Mano, but the actual name is
14 Mahn. Like you hear Gio in Liberia but the actual name is Dan.
12:53:57 15 The Dan ethnic group, people call them Gios because it is the
16 language. The Mahn ethnic group is what you call the Manos. So
17 he was from the Manos or the Mahn ethnic group.

18 Q. And in which county in Liberia are they concentrated, those
19 two groups?

12:54:15 20 A. They are concentrated in Nimba County and they are so close
21 that the Mahns speak Dan and the Dans speak Mahn, so if you are
22 Gio you speak Gio and Mano because you can almost understand each
23 other. So, and maybe it is important to note here why this
24 bloodletting was so bad, because in Nimba County, since you
12:54:45 25 mentioned the county, you also have Krahns that live in Nimba
26 County and these three ethnic groups are really relatives.

27 So the Krahn, the Mahn and the Dan are three ethnic groups,
28 so in Nimba County, while you had the Mahn and the Dan there was
29 a segment on the border with Grand Gedeh where the Krahns are

1 predominantly settled, you have Krahn's in Nimba. Okay. So there
2 are other tribes but I will wait until you find them, because
3 whoever was in that area had the full weight of Doe at the time.

4 Q. And when you say weight, what are we talking about?

12:55:32 5 A. Oh, killings, burnings, lootings, raping. There was a
6 terrible situation that followed. Don't let's forget now.
7 Quiwonkpa has come to Monrovia, he has failed. It is believed
8 that his Mahn and Dan fellows in the army are supporting him and
9 that the Gios from Nimba County are supporting him. He has been
12:55:59 10 captured; he has been cut into little pieces. It is on
11 television, his flesh was eaten by the military people at the
12 time, and Doe is now in control. He begins a revenge situation.
13 This is what I am explaining.

14 Q. Now, let's jump forward for a moment in order to come back.

12:56:25 15 When you began the revolution on Christmas Eve 1989, Mr Taylor,
16 which county in Liberia did you choose as your springboard?

17 A. Naturally Nimba.

18 Q. Why?

19 A. During this terrible orgy on the part of the Doe
12:56:51 20 government, a lot of the young men and women fled Nimba County
21 into La Cote d'Ivoire, by the hundreds, and so you will get to
22 find out that about 90 per cent of the people that we used to
23 train as Special Forces are these fleeing Nimbadians, and I will
24 put that percentage as 85/90 because there were other tribal
12:57:20 25 groups that joined, but they were predominantly from the Mahn/Dan
26 ethnic groups in La Cote d'Ivoire and so the natural return where
27 obviously we would get the sympathy, the cooperations and
28 assistance from the general population was on my mind, so
29 naturally, we chose to launch the revolution from there and it

1 was planned as such because if you look at the quantity of people
2 that we used, you don't launch a revolution with the number of
3 people that we used but there was a plan that they would be the
4 forerunners of the revolution but we were depending on the
12:58:03 5 population to launch the revolution, really.

6 Q. Let's go back now. So you arrived in a Ghana ruled by
7 Jerry Rawlings' regime, yes?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. You have chosen to do that because Dr Fahnbulleh, who you
12:58:34 10 have spoken to, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And you decide to join him?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Now, were there other anti-Doe dissidents living in Ghana
12:58:48 15 at the time?

16 A. Oh, yes. The cream of the MOJA crop were all in Ghana.
17 Dr Fahnbulleh was there; a gentleman I mentioned before during
18 the morning hours was Tom Kamara, who is presently the editor of
19 The New Democrat newspaper, that does not get tired writing about
12:59:11 20 Charles Taylor, he was there. He was also in the training camp
21 in Sierra Leone. Also in Ghana is Commany Wisseh that I
22 mentioned before in my testimony. They are all now settled back
23 in Ghana.

24 Q. And so when you arrive do you meet up with this group?

12:59:37 25 A. Yes, I do. Every one of them.

26 Q. And what is being proposed at this stage?

27 A. Well, there are plans. Some people are suggesting - at
28 first it was anticipate, in fact, they really expected that Ghana
29 would have helped them re-intervene. That was not forthcoming,

1 so there was this scramble right away to try to see how pieces
2 could be put back together for this whole idea to be launched,
3 and let me mention what I failed to mention earlier in one of
4 your questions.

13:00:15 5 This group that attacked Liberia led by General Quiwonkpa
6 was called the NPFL. That was the name of that group and I want
7 to interject this now, because my NPFL was the second NPFL that
8 came after that first NPFL, So I think it is important to mention
9 that. They are there and we are all beginning to throw ideas
13:00:39 10 around on what to do that this whole idea would not fail and that
11 Doe should not be left alone to, you know, to rejoice after
12 everything that he had done.

13 Q. Now, are you living in - are you living in Ghana by
14 yourself at this time?

13:00:59 15 A. No. Shortly thereafter Agnes joins me in Ghana.

16 Q. Now, when you say that Quiwonkpa's group had been called
17 the NPFL, what did the NPFL stand for, so far as the Quiwonkpa
18 group is concerned?

19 A. National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

13:01:27 20 Q. And the group you later formed, what did that NPFL stand
21 for?

22 A. National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

23 Q. So they both had the same meaning?

24 A. Same meaning, same name, and I will - can almost say same
13:01:42 25 organisation.

26 Q. Now, did you remain unmolested in Ghana?

27 A. No.

28 Q. What happened?

29 A. I arrive in Ghana, Dr Fahnbulleh receives me. We are going

1 along and some three, four weeks into my arrival there I am
2 arrested by the Ghanaian authorities very strangely, and I am
3 accused by the Ghanaian security at the time of being an agent of
4 the CIA, so I am saying to them, "What are you talking about?"

13:02:32 5 But the argument was at this time - and this is the little
6 Catch-22 - Rawlings comes to power in Ghana, it is a
7 Marxist/Leninist revolution, it starts along that line and there
8 are serious conflicts with the United States. The cousin of
9 Jerry Rawlings by the name of Michael Susidis --

13:03:05 10 Q. Spell that for us, please?

11 A. Oh, Susidis, S-U-S-I-D-I-S, Susidis he is - that name is a
12 European name I am sure, Susidis, and I stand corrected on this -
13 I guess that is what you guys will be doing - is arrested in the
14 United States and charged with espionage. Rawlings retaliates

13:03:32 15 immediately by arresting even some American officials and some
16 Ghanaians that Rawlings claims are CIA spies, he arrests them too
17 and so the argument is, "But wait a minute. You cannot tell us
18 that you got out of the prison in a maximum security prison in
19 the United States and come here if the CIA didn't help you to
13:03:56 20 come so you are a spy". So I am caught in this web of - it was a
21 major problem and we can find, I am sure the Ghanaians it was all
22 documented, so this problem is going on between the two
23 governments, okay?

24 I am now arrested as a US spy, whereas I am not, but they
13:04:15 25 believe that - they believe in the impossibility of escaping
26 without US assistance and because this scenario is taking place
27 at the same time I fall into that. I am investigated for several
28 months. I mean, I am held at the security quarters for about
29 six, seven months. I explained. By this time Dr Fahnbulleh and

1 the groups around there are working very hard trying to explain
2 that, no, he is coming here, he is a part of what we were doing,
3 but he was in prison, but they just had to go through their
4 security own analysis, and then they granted me asylum in Ghana,
13:04:59 5 and that was what you may call some form of molestation, but that
6 was what happened at that time.

7 Q. Now, after your release what did you do?

8 A. I am released and realising that the people that I meet, we
9 are friends, but ideologically there is a divide. I then begin
13:05:26 10 to --

11 Q. What divide?

12 A. Well, they are Marxist, I am not, and so the direction they
13 want to go I don't want to go down their route. I begin to
14 pursue my own route and then begin to contact people in La Cote
13:05:40 15 d'Ivoire that are more - are seriously connected to our general
16 belief. And who are these people? There is the very Harry
17 Nyuan, who does not come to Ghana, he is in Ivory Coast. There
18 is another gentleman called Moses Duopu from Nimba, from the Gio
19 ethnic group, who was with me in the Union of Liberian
13:06:04 20 Associations in the Americas, so most of those that were not
21 along these Marxist/Leninist orientation did not come to Ghana;
22 They went, they fled to La Cote d'Ivoire. I then started moving
23 in and out of La Cote d'Ivoire trying to join them to organise
24 our response to what Doe had done.

13:06:31 25 Q. And so where were you actually based during this period?

26 A. At the beginning stage I am based in Ghana, but there is
27 another arrest in Ghana. After I begin these movements, and
28 apparently these groups have seen that I am making some progress,
29 I am re-arrested in Ghana for the second time.

1 Q. On what - for what reason?

2 A. I tell you this time these guys didn't accuse me of
3 anything. What they had said was that they were working with the
4 group in Ghana to try to do something in Liberia and that what I
13:07:22 5 was working towards was going to either expose or counter what
6 they were doing, So my arrest really was just to stop me, I
7 guess.

8 Q. I am sorry, Mr Taylor, I really don't understand that and I
9 may not be alone. What do you mean when you were telling us that

13:07:42 10 "They were working with a group in Ghana to try to do something
11 in Liberia"? What are you saying?

12 A. Okay. Well, you have a point there. Quiwonkpa is dead.
13 The desire to go back and fight Doe is what I am referring to.
14 They are working in Ghana trying to organise recruitment and all

13:08:10 15 to --

16 Q. Who is trying to do this?

17 A. The group, the MOJA group now in Ghana under Dr Fahnbulleh
18 and the rest of them, are trying to recruit, in fact they do
19 recruit some people to be trained to relaunch this revolution in
13:08:27 20 Liberia.

21 Q. Are they being assisted by anyone?

22 A. Well, they are definitely assisted by their comrades in
23 this new Rawlings government at a particular level. Whether
24 Rawlings knew I can't speak for it, but there are different
13:08:45 25 levels when you are operating in these things. Maybe the close
26 people that were operating with Fahnbulleh and these people were
27 the diehards like Captain Tshikata, Kojo Tshikata who was the
28 head of national security, he is an old revolutionary. Tshikata
29 I think is T-S-I - you guys are going to have to help me with

1 this one, but the name is Tshikata, Captain Kojó Tshikata, and so
2 they were working very hard.

3 Q. And you said they were training?

4 A. Yes.

13:09:18 5 Q. And where was this training taking place?

6 A. My understanding is that they were training at a place
7 called - again don't ask me to spell it - Achiasi is a place
8 outside of Accra at a guerrilla base at a town called Achiasi, we
9 may have to get the spelling for that.

13:09:40 10 Q. Do you have any idea what kind of numbers we are talking
11 about in terms of those being trained?

12 A. Not at all. I did not go there because I was trying to
13 pursue my line, because my whole orientation was not
14 Marxist-Leninist. This is why I moved away from them and moved
13:09:57 15 into Côte d'Ivoire in and out to organise something other than
16 what they were doing, because I did not believe that if they
17 succeeded that a Marxist revolution in Liberia was the right
18 thing and I was opposed to that.

19 Q. And just so that we are clear, Mr Taylor, those training in
13:10:21 20 Ghana were training to do what?

21 A. I would say restart what Quiwonkpa had just lost, what they
22 had lost, to restart the attack, the revolution, in Liberia.
23 That is what they were training to do.

24 Q. So are you suggesting they were intending in due course to
13:10:42 25 invade Liberia?

26 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely. Without a doubt. Without a
27 doubt. That was the whole purpose.

28 Q. And so just again that we are clear, we have a situation
29 then, do we, where there is this group training in Ghana to

1 invade Liberia and you are trying to organise another group in
2 Cote d'Ivoire for the same purpose?

3 A. That is correct.

13:11:18

4 Q. I see. And had you managed to progress your own idea in
5 Sierra Leone - in Cote d'Ivoire?

6 A. Yes, I succeeded in bringing all of the groups that were in
7 la Cote d'Ivoire together. Everybody was happy to see me on my
8 first visit and they too were just there anxious too and were
9 thinking about the same thing about planning to return, because

13:11:39

10 in reality - and I can just predict - the group training in Ghana
11 could not have been a very large group because when I reached to
12 la Cote d'Ivoire the vast majority of the people from Nimba,
13 whether they were ex-soldiers that had fled Liberia, were in la
14 Cote d'Ivoire and so that appeared to me then to be the base of

13:12:04

15 where we would get what we wanted. But we were faced with a very
16 serious problem. There was the idea. There was the manpower.
17 The question then arose how do we train, where do we train and
18 where do we get assistance from? That was the dilemma right
19 there.

13:12:25

20 Q. But in between times, as you have indicated, you are
21 arrested for a second time in Ghana?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And help me, on what basis?

13:12:42

24 A. They did not really accuse me as they did before of working
25 for the CIA, no. This time they just said that I was doing
26 something that would interfere with what they were planning. I
27 was planning and meeting groups in la Cote d'Ivoire to stage this
28 return to Liberia to overthrow the government, they were doing
29 the same thing and that I would disrupt the process. And so they

1 just kept me. That is all.

2 Q. For how long?

3 A. Eight months. Eight months.

4 Q. How many times were you in custody the first time in Ghana?

13:13:15 5 A. For about six months.

6 Q. And then on this second occasion for eight months?

7 A. Eight months.

8 Q. And upon your release what did you do?

9 A. Before I am arrested I have succeeded in putting together
13:13:36 10 the individuals in La Cote d'Ivoire for this operation. I had
11 also succeeded in making the necessary contacts for where the
12 training would occur and where assistance would come from. I
13 have contacted while in Ghana the late good friend of mine the
14 ambassador of Burkina Faso, the late Lady Mamuna Yatara.

13:14:10 15 Q. Spelling?

16 A. Mamuna is I think M-A-M-U-N-A, Mamuna, and Yatara is
17 Y-A-T-A-R-A. Yatara.

18 Q. And her position, remind me?

19 A. She was ambassador. She was ambassador to Ghana from
13:14:32 20 Burkina Faso.

21 Q. Uh-huh?

22 A. Now, I had visited Burkina Faso and had been lucky to have
23 met with the late Thomas Sankara, who became a very good friend
24 of mine, and his immediate deputy Blaise Compaore. That is
13:14:54 25 C-O-M-P-A-O-R-E. Blaise Compaore. And so - who had upon my
26 request put us in touch with the Libyan section dealing with
27 pan-African activities at that particular time. Now --

28 Q. Pause there. Where was that Libyan connection based?

29 A. In Ouagadougou at the embassy. There was a bureau - there

1 was an office there. I was introduced to them and I asked to
2 meet some authorities in Libya to see how this - because at that
3 time Libya was the champion - and rightly so - of pan-African
4 activities in Africa at the time and I will probably get into
13:15:58 5 that if that is a desire of the Court.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Let us just pause for a moment and deal with
7 some spellings. Kojo Tshikata. K-O-J-O and Tshikata is
8 T-S-H-I-K-A-T-A. Achi asi, Ghana, site of training,
9 A-C-H-I-A-S-I. Thomas Sankara S-A-N-K-A-R-A. As yet we can find
13:16:38 10 no spelling for Susides:

11 Q. Right. So you have made those contacts, Mr Taylor, and
12 help me. You had made those contacts, did you say, before you
13 were incarcerated for the second time by the Ghanaian
14 authorities?

13:17:01 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. So upon your release what did you do?

17 A. Well, let us not fail in making one connection here.
18 Remember the contacts I made. I go to Burkina Faso, I meet an
19 individual introduced to me, I travelled to Libya, the entire
13:17:23 20 plan now has been put together for the training of these
21 pan-African forces and I return to Accra. On this particular leg
22 where I am now going to La Cote d'Ivoire to begin the movement of
23 the men for training I am arrested, and I am saying now that the
24 Ghanaian authorities knew all along what was going on and so this
13:17:57 25 arrest was to cut the process and so I am held in jail for eight
26 months. While I am in jail, the process does not stop. Thomas
27 Sankara is killed by his forces and his deputy takes over.

28 Q. Who is his deputy?

29 A. Blaise Compaore. A renewed request is made to the Ghanaian

1 government for my release, I am released and given 48 hours to
2 leave Ghana, I drive directly from Accra into La Cote d'Ivoire
3 and on to Ouagadougou. That is the connection I wanted to make.

13:18:47

4 Q. And so by this stage then the President of Burkina Faso is
5 someone with whom you had already struck up a relationship before
6 your arrest?

7 A. Yes, he and his deputy.

8 Q. So what happens when you get to Burkina Faso?

13:19:12

9 A. By the time I get to Burkina Faso the first two groups of
10 individuals that are to go to Libya have already been sent.

11 Q. Pause there.

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. How many people are we talking about?

13:19:28

14 A. Oh, the two groups would make no - they went in small
15 groups. The first group may have been 18/20, the second group
16 along that line and this very Blah that sat here was in that
17 second group. Moses Blah.

18 Q. Moses Blah was in that second group?

19 A. In that second group, that is correct.

13:19:50

20 Q. And let's just get a little time line here, please,
21 Mr Taylor. By this stage, your second release, what year are we
22 in?

23 A. Oh, we have to add now.

24 Q. Take your time.

13:20:07

25 A. October '85 and November I arrive in Accra and I begin this
26 whole process. Eight plus six is 14 and so we are now looking at
27 around late '86/'87. If you add the six months I am initially
28 arrested and I am out for some time and then the eight months, so
29 we are getting into the beginning of '87 or thereabouts.

1 Q. Right. And so by this stage we have already got two groups
2 of Liberians in Libya being trained?

3 A. No, not in Libya. Not two groups in Liberia - I mean
4 Libya. You have one group in Achiasi, but in Libya you have yet
13:20:59 5 my group, but there is strangely - okay, there is something going
6 on there, because we meet a Liberian group in Libya also. So we
7 meet a Liberian group inside Libya.

8 Q. I don't understand that.

9 A. Sometimes it beats me too. Dr Henry B Fahnbulleh while in
13:21:26 10 Ghana had apparently some little differences with the rest of his
11 colleagues and had himself carried a Liberian group to Libya that
12 were already in the training camp when my group started arriving.
13 So in fact, yes, there are two Liberian groups training in Libya.
14 There is another Liberian group training in Achiasi in Ghana.

13:22:02 15 Q. Now, where in Libya is this?

16 A. The groups are being trained outside of Tripoli and I guess
17 we are going to probably deal with why we chose Libya because
18 there was a good reason for that.

19 Q. Okay, let's deal with why we chose Libya.

13:22:32 20 A. Well, we are dealing with a period - and I am talking about
21 between the years I would say almost 1980. Libya is now
22 championing pan-African activities in Africa, rightly so, and I
23 think that it is an effort that we ought to be very proud of.

24 And what do I mean? At that particular time every major
13:23:22 25 revolutionary group or activity happening on the continent of
26 Africa had it not been for the very, very good work done by the
27 Libyan people at that time they would not have succeeded.
28 Whether it had to do with Uganda, or whether it had to do with
29 South Africa where the struggle was - now we know it to be South

1 Africa, but that revolution was about Tanzania, that should have
2 been the name, or whether it was South West Africa that was
3 called South West Africa that now we know as Namibia, or whether
4 it was Ghana, the very Ghana that the honourable President of the
13:24:09 5 United States just went to, without the assistance of Libya and
6 the Mataba that we went to at that time it would not be Ghana as
7 we know it now, or Burkina Faso, or most of the pan-African
8 movements in Africa at that time were rightly so supported by
9 Libya, whether people liked it or not, including maybe some other
13:24:32 10 external groups.

11 So this, I am trying to explain to the group, is the period
12 of the pan-African movement and the only person that was - that
13 had the guts to support pan-African activities at that time since
14 Kwame Nkrumah was already there and the others was Gaddafi. So
13:24:52 15 we chose there because there were no strings attached. These
16 were not terrorist camps. These were pan-Africans that were
17 fighting trying to stabilise things and without him a lot would
18 not have happened. That is why we chose there. And so we moved
19 our people there to take the training in discipline, okay, to
13:25:14 20 begin to go back to really unleash our people from this whole
21 colonial yoke that still remains upon Africa.

22 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, did I hear the word Mataba?

23 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:25:38 25 Q. How do you spell Mataba?

26 A. M-A-T-A-B-A. The Mataba is the pan-African organisation
27 within the Libyan organisational structure responsible for
28 pan-African activities. That office is called the Mataba. Now,
29 getting back to your specific question, they were trained in a

1 town outside of Tripoli at a place called Tajura.

2 Q. Pause there. I wonder if the witness could be shown,
3 please, our exhibit 208 which should be at tab number 1, your
4 Honours, in binder number 1. Now, Mr President, I intended at
13:26:50 5 this stage to go into a little detail about events in Libya with
6 the assistance of these maps and I note the time, and rather than
7 open it and then have to adjourn, would this be convenient?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think it would be, Mr Griffiths.
9 Just before we do adjourn, this map that you are going to show
10 the witness has already been exhibited. Is that correct?

11 MR GRIFFITHS: No, it hasn't. We have not exhibited any
12 documents at all. I will be asking for this to be marked.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. I thought I heard you say Defence
14 exhibit 208.

13:27:33 15 MR GRIFFITHS: No, my fault. I think I should more
16 properly refer to it as DCT-208.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. That is clear. Yes, thank you.
18 We will adjourn now until 2.30.

19 [Lunch break taken at 1.28 p.m.]

14:24:30 20 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

23 Q. Mr Taylor, just before lunch I rather prematurely placed
24 before you a map but before we come to the map I think we need to
14:33:31 25 lay a bit more groundwork. Now, upon your release following that
26 second incarceration in Ghana, did you travel anywhere outside
27 Africa?

28 A. After my release from Ghana I went straight to - I went
29 straight to Ivory Coast, then I went to Burkina Faso. I verified

1 my trip into - I went into Libya to see the situation of the men,
2 returned, and then before I went to France.

3 Q. Why did you go to France?

4 A. I did not put the second NPFL together alone. This second
14:34:44 5 NPFL was put together by those of us - I remember saying to the
6 Court there was a group in La Cote d'Ivoire. Now working along
7 with us in La Cote d'Ivoire was a gentleman called Toniya King.

8 Q. Pause there please. How do you spell the first name?

9 A. Toniya, it's a Vai name. T-O-N-I-Y-A, I want to believe.
14:35:19 10 If it's wrong we can correct it another day. Working with me
11 outside, and may I just emphasise Toniya went along for some
12 time, but once the Libyan connection was cemented Toniya broke
13 away from us, he no longer participated, but two others remained.
14 There's a gentleman called Tom Woveiyu, we mentioned that on
14:35:48 15 yesterday, that's W-O-W-E-I-Y-U, and the present President of
16 Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the three of us finally were the
17 individuals that put the NPFL together, so upon leaving Ghana I
18 had travelled to Paris to meet with Ellen Johnson and Tom Woveiyu
19 in Paris.

14:36:16 20 Q. And when you say that the current President of Liberia,
21 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, was one of the organisers, in what way did
22 she assist?

23 A. Oh, Ellen is an old revolutionary. She's been involved in
24 - she was involved in part with the first NPFL. That was not new
14:36:40 25 to Ellen.

26 Q. Which first NPFL?

27 A. I remember I told the Court that the first invasion into
28 Liberia that was launched by General Quiwonkpa was called the
29 NPFL, and this second or maybe it's better to say this

1 continuation of the NPFL, Ellen was also a very good part of it
2 because Ellen was also a very close friend of General Quiwonkpa.

3 Q. So she was involved in the Quiwonkpa coup?

4 A. Well, I am - you know, when you hear me say she was
14:37:16 5 involved, I would not be able to give you all of the details
6 because I'm sure you know from the Prosecution questions will
7 come. I was out, but I know she was close to Quiwonkpa and the
8 extent of her involvement, if I'm pressed on this, I wouldn't be
9 able to give you the extent, but I do know she was associated
14:37:33 10 with Quiwonkpa. She associated with the training outside where
11 she knew about it, okay, and she knew about ours, but in my case
12 she was really involved in helping me financially.

13 Q. Financially how?

14 A. Ellen raised money throughout while the training was going
14:37:52 15 on. In fact, I had taken the first two picture groups to her in
16 Paris. She had then moved to the United States.

17 Q. The first two what?

18 A. Picture groups. The first group - remember I mentioned
19 here just before the break that the trainees went into groups.
14:38:16 20 The first two groups had gone, and I did mention that in the
21 second group was Moses Blah, or Blah. We had pictures of these
22 combatants, so I flew into Paris. We met at Orly Airport. In
23 fact at the Holiday Inn Hotel at Orly Airport where I was. She
24 came and I showed her the two sets of pictures. She was very,
14:38:44 25 very pleased and then this was really to convince her that her
26 efforts were not being wasted in what she was doing.

27 And by that I mean she was doing two things: Ellen raised
28 most of the money that we needed for all of this movement in the
29 early stage and even during combat and, secondly, I now cannot go

1 back to the United States. She is, if I'm not mistaken, is
2 working with a bank somewhere in the Washington DC area and has
3 tremendous contacts. So we used Ellen to do our so-called
4 diplomatic contacts outside and to raise money.

14:39:29 5 Q. Now. Another name you mentioned was Tom Woveiyu?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Can I inquire whether we have a spelling for that name?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: We do, yes.

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, we do.

14:39:52 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Now, do you recall telling us that he was a member of the
12 union, ULAA?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And when did you first come across him?

14:40:08 15 A. I first met Tom in the early 70s, around 1972.

16 Q. Where?

17 A. In the United States when I arrived, and this process of
18 trying to put together the different organisations that I

19 explained to the Court in different parts of the United States,

14:40:30 20 Tom was stationed in the state of New Jersey, one of the largest
21 chapters of the union, and was very influential in working with
22 different groups in the New York, New Jersey area.

23 Q. Now, did he remain in the United States during this period
24 we're concerned with now when you're travelling around West

14:41:00 25 Africa to put the NPFL together?

26 A. No, no, no. Tom made several trips to West Africa even
27 before the men were moved to Libya, he made several trips. We
28 were in and going through the organisational phase of this so he
29 made several trips during the organisational phase. Ellen did

1 not come to West Africa to see me during this phase of putting
2 men together; she was busy in Washington. But, you know, Tom was
3 in direct contact with her and whatever little funds she could
4 raise he would bring it down. We moved to Libya, Tom is still
14:41:41 5 coming in and out. He goes to Libya many, many times, even when
6 I can't be there because I do not live in Libya, I only visit the
7 camp maybe for a day or two, live at the Mataba, come back. Tom
8 is moving up and down, but Ellen doesn't come.

9 Q. Now, so we've dealt with Tom Woveiyu. I just want to ask
14:42:05 10 you a little bit more, please, about Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. When
11 had you first met her?

12 A. Ellen was in Liberia during the coup years of 1980, Ellen
13 was there. Ellen had an apartment at a penthouse on Broad Street
14 atop of the ministry of education building, so she was there.

14:42:37 15 She went and came and became very friendly and very, very
16 friendly.

17 Q. With whom?

18 A. With General Thomas Quiwonkpa.

19 Q. And what about you; were you friends with her?

14:42:49 20 A. Yes, I knew Ellen at that time exactly. Because Quiwonkpa
21 went nowhere almost without me, of course. We got to know each
22 other then.

23 Q. Yes, my question is very simple: Were you friends with
24 her?

14:43:02 25 A. Well, I would say yes, because she was very close to my
26 friend General Quiwonkpa, so we became friends.

27 Q. And what about Johnson-Sirleaf's relationship with Doe?

28 A. No, to the best of my recollection Ellen really never got
29 along with Doe.

1 Q. And what happened to Ellen after the October 1985 elections
2 in Liberia?

3 A. To the best of my recollection I think Ellen was arrested,
4 she --

14:43:44 5 Q. By whom?

6 A. By Samuel Doe who was the President, and I understand that
7 she managed to get out - I don't know how - of Liberia and she
8 was saved by some, I understand, some mutual friends. It is
9 believed that she was helped by a gentleman, a very good friend
10 of hers, at least I hope they are still friends, called Gabriel
11 Doe, I understand assisted in getting her out of the country when
12 she got out of prison.

13 Q. Now, so putting all of this together, who were the main
14 people in putting together this second NPFL?

14:44:29 15 A. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Charles Ghankay Taylor and Thomas
16 Womeiyu, finally.

17 Q. Were there others involved in an organisational capacity?

18 A. Not really. Not really. I just mentioned to the Court
19 that there were others that dropped, including the gentleman I
14:44:52 20 mentioned Toniya King. He dropped aside because he just wouldn't
21 go to Libya; he was just frightened, he wouldn't go there. We're
22 talking about the Cold War period and that name Libya was almost
23 like black snake. But, you know, we appreciated Libya for what
24 they were doing, supporting the whole pan-African idea, so we
14:45:17 25 were not frightened to be labelled whatever they wanted to call
26 us.

27 Q. Now Toniya King, what was his background?

28 A. Toniya King is married to the daughter of the late
29 President William R Tolbert that we discussed here that was

1 killed in the coup d'etat by Doe and immediately thereafter he
2 settled in la Cote d'Ivoire.

3 Q. Now, was Toniya King in a position to provide any
4 particular assistance to those seeking to put together the NPFL?

14:45:58 5 A. Definitely. Toniya assisted in providing the food, the
6 contact. He's in la Cote d'Ivoire living with his wife. He's
7 known by all of the senior people in the Ivorian establishment.
8 Why?

9 Remember I spoke about Daisy being married to AB Tolbert,
14:46:26 10 the son of the late William R Tolbert, whose sister is married
11 now to Toniya King. So there is sympathy in the establishment
12 for that family in total and so he helps substantially. He helps
13 in whatever way he can and I'm saying to you he breaks away at
14 the Libyan part, that apparently he just couldn't take, I guess.

14:46:56 15 Q. Apart from contacts with the Ivorian establishment, did he
16 have any other contacts in Cote d'Ivoire?

17 A. Yes, of course. Toniya had been a very - he was trained in
18 the intelligence field. In fact at the time of the coup d'etat
19 in Liberia Toniya is what we call Commissioner of Immigration and
14:47:30 20 Naturalisation, which is a part of the security establishment.
21 He had good friends among the British and American embassies in
22 Ivory Coast. He had very good contacts.

23 Q. Contacts with whom within those embassies?

24 A. Of course the officials; the ambassador, the intelligence
14:47:48 25 people, he knew all of them.

26 Q. Intelligence people like whom?

27 A. I don't know the names of the individuals but when we talk
28 about intelligence from the United States, especially external
29 intelligence we're talking about, what, the central intelligence

1 people. He did not introduce us to them because he's an
2 intelligence officer but he had extensive contacts with them.

3 Q. And was that of assistance to the NPFL?

4 A. Well, I didn't ask Toniya where he got his little money
14:48:17 5 from, but he assisted with little funds and meals and things were
6 just made easy for us. Remember now, moving people across West
7 Africa from Ivory Coast to Burkina Faso to Libya, there was no
8 leakage anywhere. No one nowhere anywhere on this planet knew at
9 that particular time that Charles Taylor was training people in
14:48:47 10 Libya. So I must assume that those connections were used very
11 well because we moved people throughout that region. We got
12 travel documents for them. So Toniya used his links very well.

13 Q. Let me just pause for a moment. Dealing with the same
14 topic, did you have a secretary when you were at the GSA,

14:49:13 15 Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Can you recall her name?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What is it?

14:49:20 20 A. My secretary at the General Services Agency was called
21 Grace B Minor. It was not just secretary, it was something like
22 an assistant directorship and special assistant. Grace Beatrix
23 Minor who later on also fled to the United States and after --

24 Q. When did she flee to the United States?

14:49:50 25 A. At the time of my departure from the General Services
26 Administration, when Clarence Momolu arrived at the GSA, he went
27 after Grace Minor and the deputy Blamoh Nelson that I said is now
28 a senator in Liberia. Blamoh remained in Liberia but Grace went
29 to the United States and she remained in contact with me

1 throughout this period and was the second main link to Ellen
2 Johnson-Sirleaf; that was a very, very, very and very close buddy
3 of Grace Minor.

14:50:40 4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, two things: The spelling
5 of Minor?

6 MR GRIFFITHS: M-I-N-O-R.

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And the date of the French trip, when it
8 was that you went to France.

9 THE WITNESS: Okay. That is after I come out of jail. I'm
14:50:55 10 going to have to approximate this, Justice. I'm released from
11 the prison in Accra in late say '86 I go, so that trip to Paris
12 has to be somewhere in the first half of '87.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. So that's Grace Minor. Now you've already told us that
14:51:41 15 many of your recruits came from Liberians living in Cote
16 d'Ivoire. Was there anyone in particular who had the main
17 responsibility for that process of recruitment in the Cote
18 d'Ivoire?

19 A. Yes. The one that comes to mind is the late Alfred May.
14:52:11 20 Alfred was responsible. He is late now. He is the one that
21 comes to mind right now.

22 Q. You mentioned earlier a man called Moses Duopu.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Now, who was Moses Duopu?

14:52:31 25 A. Moses Duopu was a mutual friend of mine and General Thomas
26 Quiwonkpa. We were in the States together in the Union of
27 Liberian Associations in the Americas. I think I mentioned that
28 in my testimony yesterday. It so happened that Tupee, my wife -
29 my wife's sister was also - Tupee's sister was also married to

1 Moses Duopu. So we were in the union together, but these are two
2 guys that were married in the same family and so we were very
3 close. He was very, very close to General Quiwonkpa also and was
4 also in Ia Cote d'Ivoire at the time.

14:53:17 5 Q. Now, you spoke of a split with Toniya King over the Libyan
6 connection. Was Toniya King --

7 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me, but I think that mischaracterises
8 what the witness said. He didn't talk about a split. He talked
9 about Mr King being afraid to go to Libya.

14:53:46 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

12 THE WITNESS: I can clarify that.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Well can you help us then, please, Mr Taylor?

14:53:53 15 A. Yes, I think counsel is right. Toniya is with me all the
16 way, but he just would not travel to Libya. He was afraid. And
17 again we are in this period of the Cold War and Libya is not the
18 type of word that anybody wants to hear.

19 Now, just to - I don't want to use the word "speculate"
14:54:21 20 because the Court doesn't accept that, but my own guess, I will
21 put it this way, is that Toniya has intelligence connections and
22 maybe it's good that he didn't go because his connections with
23 the diplomatic community in Ivory Coast just might have exposed
24 him, but he did not go and so we - I got upset and felt that if
14:54:43 25 we had put men together to send for training and he was not
26 prepared to visit them as Tom had visited them and it's not like
27 Ellen who was in the United States and by coming would have
28 probably burned her track, they would have gotten to know, but
29 being right in West Africa if he didn't go then we had to drop

1 him and we dropped him.

2 Q. Was anybody else dropped from the original organising
3 group?

4 A. No, nobody else was dropped. The Moses Duopus of this
14:55:23 5 world and the other people as we advanced in this process - maybe
6 I can see where your questions are coming from. I just want to
7 explain this. There were some of the individuals down there that
8 were anxious and wanted to get people to train and they wanted to
9 fight. They were reluctant and may I just suggest scared when it
14:55:57 10 came to Libya. They would go all the way, "Oh, my God. If the
11 people knew that we're in Libya."

12 So some of us were prepared to do it because we believed in
13 this whole pan-African approach and we knew how Libya had been
14 helping other areas like this terrible apartheid regime in South
14:56:19 15 Africa that if it had not been for Gaddafi they would probably
16 still be sitting there, you understand me, and they would be
17 still be sitting in South West Africa that we now call Namibia
18 and most of these revolutionary movements just - at that
19 particular time Libya was something like a black snake, but some
14:56:35 20 of us was prepared - I mean were prepared because this man was
21 genuine in trying to help the pan-African cause. And I'm not
22 talking terrorism. I'm talking about the pan-African cause. So
23 those of our friends and brothers that wanted to do something but
24 were not prepared, we just had to drop them. That included the
14:56:56 25 Duopus of this world and the rest of them.

26 Q. The rest of them like who?

27 A. Oh, there are just so many of them in La Cote d'Ivoire.
28 Harry Nyuan was down there. He didn't go along. Sam Dokie was
29 there. There's a whole bunch of them. I mean, there's a whole

1 list that were not prepared to take that extra step to get
2 training done in Libya. Maybe in any other place they would
3 have, but Libya was a no, no.

4 Q. Dokie, how do you spell that?

14:57:22 5 A. Samuel Dokie, D-O-K-I-E. Samuel Dokie. He joined me
6 subsequently, but he was in the area.

7 Q. Does the name General Podier mean anything to you,
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. Podier was the --

14:57:42 10 MS HOLLIS: I object. That's a leading question.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well it is leading, Mr Griffiths, but are
12 you asking something that's in issue?

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Well I was hoping it wasn't in issue, your
14 Honour, but maybe I ought to tread with care:

14:58:18 15 Q. Who was Samuel Doe's Vice-President on the PRC?

16 A. After the execution of General Thomas Weahseng, that was
17 mentioned here, General Podier became the Vice Head of State.

18 Q. Did he remain in that position?

19 A. No, no, no. General Podier, the question that you asked me
14:58:44 20 earlier, if I were to begin to name everybody it would be
21 virtually impossible because everyone that was anti-Doe was out
22 of Liberia there, including Podier. Podier was there.

23 Q. Now, how did Podier come to be there?

24 A. Well, Podier had - he had also broken away. After the
14:59:06 25 elections of Samuel Doe, Podier and all of these guys were
26 sidelined.

27 Q. Uh-huh?

28 A. And I'm talking about the elections of October 1985. They
29 were all sidelined and then Podier and all of these guys became

1 disgruntled and left the country and were prepared to fight to
2 remove Doe.

3 Q. In what circumstances was General - did General Podier
4 leave Liberia?

14:59:29 5 A. I can't - I'm sorry, I can't recall the exact situation, I
6 was not in Liberia at the time, but I know that his life was
7 under threat and he came out of Liberia.

8 Q. Now, you've told us about groups of Liberians training in
9 Ghana and in Libya. Did anything happen in relation to
14:59:57 10 General Podier and any such attempt?

11 A. Well, let's get the sequence here right. These guys,
12 Podier, Duopu, all of them remained in La Cote d'Ivoire. The men
13 are now training and I think early to middle 1987 Podier now so
14 impatient, may I say, foolishly decides that he has found an
15:00:50 15 African witch doctor that can make him invisible and so he's
16 going to become invisible, go to Liberia, enter the mansion,
17 catch Doe and take power.

18 Now it may sound crazy, but this is exactly what happened.
19 He goes into Liberia, but before then Doe begins to lure him into
15:01:16 20 Liberia. Doe tells him to, "Come back and I'll make you
21 Vice-President."

22 Okay, we are not now in La Cote d'Ivoire. We're moving our
23 people for our training in Libya. So he foolishly agrees and
24 says now that he has this so-called witch doctor disappearing
15:01:39 25 power he will accept the invitation, go and catch Doe and kill
26 him. So he goes and as he reaches Ganta, this is a town in Nimba
27 County, Doe is already prepared for him, Doe arrests him and I
28 think one other gentleman and kills him. That's the end of the
29 Podier story.

1 Q. Now, I want to look in more detail at the actual logistics
2 involved in putting together the NPFL. Where did the main
3 recruitment take place?

4 A. La Cote d'Ivoire.

15:02:25 5 Q. And for the most part those recruited came from which
6 ethnic groups in Liberia?

7 A. About 90 per cent were members of the Gio and Mano ethnic
8 groups from Nimba County.

9 Q. By which route did they travel from Cote d'Ivoire to Libya?

15:02:46 10 A. They travelled via a road from Cote d'Ivoire, Ouagadougou and
11 then a flight to Libya.

12 Q. Who paid for it?

13 A. The Libyan - the Mataba. The Libyan Mataba paid for it.

14 Q. In what numbers did they travel from Cote d'Ivoire to
15:03:10 15 Libya?

16 A. They travelled in small groups of 15/20, not large groups
17 at the time, to make sure that it was just not too open - too
18 large numbers of persons moving. Some of them would travel by
19 buses and some would travel by train into Ouagadougou.

15:03:33 20 Q. And where did they obtain the necessary travel
21 documentation from?

22 A. All of that was arranged by - Toniya helped with the
23 arrangement for the travel document. Alfred May that I mentioned
24 before also helped with the arrangement for the travel document.

15:03:55 25 All that was required - and this is important. ECOWAS member
26 states, that's the Economic Community of West African States, do
27 not require visas for the member states. You can travel on what
28 is called a laissez-passer to any of these countries and in the
29 case of what we call the Francophone group - and what is that?

1 Those countries in West Africa that had France as their colonial
2 masters are the Francophone. The Anglophone are those that the
3 British were their masters. So in the case of the Francophone
4 with an identity card, even without a passport, you could travel.

15:04:49 5 So what we sought to do, and I must admit I do not know the full
6 detail yet because don't forget I'm in jail in Ghana when the
7 first two groups move, but after I get out this is what I meet.

8 They get laissez-passers from using Toniya's contact, some
9 from the Liberian embassy and some of these guys - well, let me
15:05:22 10 move that word guys. Some of these men are Gios. Now, the Gio
11 ethnic group is a very large ethnic group that you find in La
12 Cote d'Ivoire and in Liberia. They speak the same language.

13 In La Cote d'Ivoire they would throw one or two French
14 words, but a Gio from La Cote d'Ivoire, and a Gio from Liberia,
15:05:59 15 you would know the difference because when they meet they speak
16 Gio. This is also true for the Manos and as we progress this is
17 also true when it comes to the Sierra Leone side of the border.

18 So the Gios from Liberia that spoke Gio went to the
19 gendarmerie and speaking Gio they were able to get identity
15:06:26 20 cards. Now that's why I went through this whole thing to explain
21 to you. So to become an Ivorian for the Gios all you had to do,
22 once you spoke their language you went to the Ivorian gendarme
23 office in Danane, which is a town, I think that is D-A-N-A-N-E
24 and that's in the records, or in Man, a little bigger town

15:06:53 25 outside of Danane. Once you got there and you spoke Gio and said
26 that you were coming from let's say a border town with Liberia,
27 you, you know, an Ivorian, and you got a card identity. So they
28 could also use that to travel to Burkina Faso because the carte
29 d'identite, they had during that particular period and I think to

1 a great extent it still exists, you've got this - I think it's
2 something is entente.

3 Q. Something what?

4 A. It's called entente. I think it's a French for entente.

15:07:40 5 Q. As in Entente cordial?

6 A. Voila, voila, that's it.

7 Q. This is an English speaking court by the way, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Well, you said as in cordial. Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire,
9 Togo, Benin and I want to believe to a great extent Senegal,
10 there was a time that ministers - I mean individuals from those
11 countries became French ministers, so that whole cooperation
12 existed so using an identity card between these countries was
13 very, very simple because they exchanged civil servants.

14 If you were very good and you were say, for example,
15 Ivorian, you could become a minister in Burkina Faso. I mean a
16 minister in government. It's that type of cordiality that was
17 amongst these states so that's why it was so easy for the carte
18 d'identite to be used between and amongst them.

19 Q. And help us with this: What was the criteria for
15:08:48 20 recruitment of men into the NPFL?

21 A. First you had to be of age, you had to be of 18 which is
22 the legal age in Liberia for men. I guess you had to be mad
23 enough to want to fight, you had to be physical, but I mean, if
24 you were not serious enough, I mean, there were sufficient angry
15:09:14 25 people, but you had to be angry enough to want to fight.

26 Physically fit and of age and you went in.

27 Q. Now let's move to Libya then and I wonder if now I can be
28 assisted with Defence document 208. Now, Mr Taylor, we have here
29 a map of Libya and can you see on that map Tarabulus, Tripoli?

1 A. Yes, I can.

2 Q. Now, the camp to which these men were taken was in what
3 location?

15:10:53

4 A. I did say that the men were taken to a town outside of
5 Tripoli called Tajura.

6 Q. How do you spell that?

7 A. That is T-R-H-U-R-A-H [sic].

8 Q. Now, if we look at another map which looks like this, we
9 see Tarabulus and we also see highlighted Tajura, yes?

15:11:25

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now first of all, Mr Taylor, just physically what was this
12 camp like at Tajura?

15:12:04

13 A. Tajura is a very, very huge former United States military
14 base that was built in Libya before the revolution of Colonel
15 Gaddafi. It's an extraordinarily huge military base that was US
16 owned but had been vacated at the time of the revolution.

17 Q. When was the first time that you went to Tajura?

15:12:36

18 A. Following my release from jail I visit Libya again and then
19 the men are now in the camp. I go to the camp to visit them
20 because they had not seen me. I had been in jail for eight
21 months, they had not seen me. I was just about to take them.
22 They are now on the base and so I went there to, you know, to
23 greet them and to, you know, tell them thanks for what they were
24 doing because they had not seen me.

15:12:57

25 Q. Pause there. How many men are we talking about?

26 A. The first two groups are already there. They are
27 continuing - the movement is continuing. I get out. I've gone
28 through this process. I go to - I have now gone to France, I
29 have informed Ellen. I come back, I go to Libya, now to go and

1 visit with the men. By this time the first two groups of men
2 that have travelled, all I have seen of them myself are the
3 photos. I have not physically met them yet. Even by the time I
4 show those photos to Ellen I have not met them yet.

15:13:43 5 Q. But my question, to go back to it, Mr Taylor, was how many
6 men are in the camp at that stage?

7 A. There are about 40. Forty, 45 men at that stage.

8 Q. In due course what was the maximum number of men that you
9 had at Tajura?

15:14:07 10 A. In due course the total number of men finally reached about
11 168, I would say. Round about 168.

12 Q. Now, I want to go through this part in some detail,
13 Mr Taylor, because you appreciate it's suggested that the plan to
14 terrorise the people of Sierra Leone was hatched in Libya. You
15 appreciate that, don't you?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. So taking things slowly and in stages, firstly, what was
18 the Libya to which these recruits were sent?

19 A. You say what was Libya?

15:15:07 20 Q. Yes, what was it like?

21 A. Well, we are now dealing with a Libya that is championing
22 pan-African activities. That is, helping out across the
23 continent those peoples that believed in the pan-African approach
24 and those that were interested in democratic governance. And let
25 me make it very clear: When I got to Libya, that Libya that I
26 met was anti-communist. In fact Libya has never indulged or
27 embraced communism. It was never then and now.

28 They were helping out in terms of training. They were
29 seriously involved in trying to free the rest of Africa and

1 that's why I think that Gaddafi, whether people like it or not,
2 is an African hero by helping people to stand up against some of
3 the terrible filthy things that were going on on the African
4 continent under the guise of their colonial rule, even though it
15:16:36 5 was neo at the time, neo-colonialism in different shapes and
6 form, he was the only that had the backbone to stand up to them
7 and that's the Libya that I met. I met a pan-African Libya. I
8 met a Libya willing and able to help and did help. Almost every
9 major functioning government of any revolutionary credentials
15:17:01 10 from east, central, southern and West Africa, they owe it to the
11 Libyan people.

12 Q. Now, you mentioned before the luncheon adjournment Mataba?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Now, explain to us what was Mataba?

15:17:18 15 A. The Mataba was an organisation set up specifically to
16 support pan-African revolutionary activities in Africa and I
17 would hope - I would believe - other places, but I want to deal
18 with Africa, in Africa, that I am positive about.

19 Q. And I want you to help us. Is Mataba an organisation, and
15:17:57 20 if so how is it composed? Help us, please.

21 A. Good. Members - the Mataba is not just Libyans.
22 Individuals with revolutionary zeal, those that were interested
23 in fighting this neo-colonial situation across Africa, you became
24 a member. If you were a leader you became a member of that
15:18:26 25 organisation. So the Mataba was not just Libyans, but the Mataba
26 was those Libyans that were there to help but they were mostly
27 the organisations across Africa that needed a help comprised the
28 membershi p.

29 Q. Right. Now, just give us the names of some of the

1 organisations from around Africa which was part of that Mataba,
2 please?

3 A. The NC full member, SWAPO.

15:19:05

4 Q. Where was SWAPO? Remind us. Not everyone is 61 years old,
5 Mr Taylor.

6 A. I'm sorry for being so old.

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And also, if we could have the full names
8 rather than the acronyms.

15:19:23

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour. The ANC is the African
10 National Congress that is now in power in South Africa. SWAPO
11 was the southern African political organisation under the --

12 MR GRIFFITHS: I can't see that there's any dispute about
13 this. It's actually the South West African People's --

15:19:47

14 THE WITNESS: South West African People's - SWAPO that was
15 headed then by our good friend Sam Nujoma. You also had the
16 Ghanaian revolution that was headed by Jerry Rawlings.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. They were a member too?

19 A. Of course.

15:20:08

20 Q. Who else?

21 A. You had Burkina Faso, they were members of the Mataba. You
22 had Uganda was a member of the Mataba.

23 Q. What was that organisation called or did it have a name?

15:20:27

24 A. No, no, no. Uganda went there, this is the time of - we're
25 talking all the way back '86/'87. At that particular time they
26 did not go there as an organisation. My good friend in Uganda
27 was going through his own problems but they had representatives.

28 Q. Who is he?

29 A. I'm talking about the present President, Moseveni.

1 Q. So he was there as well, was he?

2 A. No, not he personally. He had a representative there.

3 Q. Okay, and what was that representative's name? Do you
4 know? If you don't, tell us.

15:20:55 5 A. I don't quite recollect. I will see if I can go through my
6 head but there was a representative there.

7 Q. Do you know someone by the name of Mbabazi?

8 MS HOLLIS: Objection. That is leading.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say, Mr Griffiths?

15:21:23 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, Mr President, I understand that
11 leading questions are not disallowed where you're dealing with
12 non-contentious issues. If it is contentious then of course I
13 will act with more care, but normally I understand it where
14 you're not dealing with matters in dispute then there's no
15:21:49 15 objection to leading but I stand corrected if a different rule
16 applies.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is it in dispute?

18 MS HOLLIS: That was not the position taken during the
19 Prosecution case in chief, and we don't know if it's in dispute
15:22:04 20 because we don't know what they want to use it for and we have no
21 idea who the representative was, so it's not a matter that is of
22 common knowledge.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, you can renew your
24 objection if it turns out it is in dispute. I'll allow the
15:22:18 25 question. Go ahead.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

27 Q. Do you know that name, Mr Taylor?

28 A. I know Amama Mbabazi very well.

29 Q. And who was he?

1 A. He was a representative that went in and out from Uganda.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Some spellings, Sam Nujoma, N-U-J-O-M-A,
3 Yoweri Y-O-W-E-R-I Moseveni M-O-S-E-V-E-N-I and Amama Mbabazi
4 A-M-A-M-A M-B-A-B-A-Z-I.

5 THE WITNESS: Amama Mbabazi.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes:

7 Q. Now so far you've mentioned various groups from around
8 Africa, Mr Taylor. Were there groups there from any other part
9 of the world?

15:23:24 10 A. Yes, we met a group. Some of them I really cannot recall
11 their own affiliations at this particular time, but there were
12 groups from other parts of the world.

13 Q. Help us, what parts of the world?

14 A. There were groups from Europe. There were groups from --

15:23:41 15 Q. Such as? What parts of Europe?

16 A. The United Kingdom. There were groups from --

17 Q. Where in the United Kingdom?

18 A. Well, there were Irish groups there from the IRA. There
19 were IRA representatives. I don't know because most of these
15:24:02 20 individuals you have to be lucky to know their names, but there
21 were groups from different parts. I don't recall some of their
22 names from the southern hemisphere, Sumatra and I've forgot what
23 area that is, Sumatra. There were representatives from the
24 Island States and from all over.

15:24:27 25 Q. So how many people were - give us an idea. How many people
26 were actually a part of the Mataba? How many people are we
27 talking about?

28 A. Well in terms of individuals I don't know the number, but
29 in terms of organisations there could have been as many as 25

1 different groupings and organisations that comprised the Mataba.

2 Q. Now, what did the Mataba actually do as an organisation?
3 How did it manifest itself?

15:25:12

4 A. The Mataba provided funds, provided means of training,
5 provided what I will call an enabling situation for those that
6 were yearning for change and help, but within that what you
7 wanted and how you wanted it was a part of a collective
8 discussion.

15:25:40

9 So, for example, let's say I'm at the Mataba - and some of
10 the people that we met I forgot to mention other groups that were
11 there. The Gambian group was there. So I reached to the Mataba
12 and at any given meeting, for example some of the meetings that I
13 sat in, you have - there were Sierra Leoneans - there was a
14 Sierra Leonean, there was a Gambian, there was a Ghanaian, there
15 was a Burkinabe, there could be a South African, but you would
16 sit down, discuss your problems and what possibly had to be done
17 to assist you, what type of assistance.

15:26:04

18 Libyans will sit in the meeting and based on your own
19 personal desires the Libyans will come in and help you to achieve
20 that, but you had to go through a process what we call then
21 establishing your revolutionary credentials. So no flukies went
22 to sit at that Mataba to talk about revolution. You had to be
23 practically vetted. You had to know what you were talking about.

15:26:28

24 And what do I mean by fluky? You could not just go to Libya and
25 say, "Hey, I want to launch a revolution and become a member of
26 the Mataba." You had to show that you had the capacity and, if
27 you wanted to stage let's say an arms struggle, you had to show
28 that you had the manpower to accomplish it and that you were
29 willing to be disciplined, you know, and respect laws of war. We

15:26:56

1 had to go through all of this at the Mataba.

2 So, for example, those people that I associated with during
3 the time I was there were the Sierra Leonean leader Ali Kabbah,
4 the Gambian leader Dr Manneh, M-A-N-N-E-H, Kukoi Samba Sanyang is
15:27:41 5 his real name and we are going to have to get the thing for that,
6 the Burkinabe people - I mean, not people. The Burkinabe
7 representative that was there. And so we would go through this
8 discussion and determine if or what you tell your problems and
9 see how we could converge together. So the Mataba must not be
15:28:01 10 looked at as though it was an organisation on its own. The
11 Mataba was an organisation within itself comprising individuals
12 that wanted to stage pan-African activities on the continent.

13 Q. I need to press you for more information on this,

14 Mr Taylor. So you've explained the composition of the group.

15:28:33 15 You've explained how you needed to establish your revolutionary
16 credentials. Was there an overarching philosophy at the Mataba?

17 A. You know, I've always not gone into these political
18 philosophies. The Mataba did not press anyone to adopt a Libyan
19 style government, or movement. The Mataba was about assisting in
15:29:03 20 the overall philosophy of pan-Africanism, where Africans will
21 want to take control of their own continent and I mean real
22 control. That's the principal philosophy that we met there.

23 Q. For example, we appreciate the link between Colonel Gaddafi
24 and the Little Green Book. Was that required reading for
15:29:27 25 everyone at the Mataba?

26 A. Yes, you were required to at least read it, but you were
27 not required to adopt it as a philosophy or else.

28 Q. So was there an all encompassing philosophy at the Mataba
29 which had, for example, a Marxist-Leninist base?

1 A. Gaddafi would have never permitted anyone to stay in Libya
2 if you had a Marxist-Leninist communist base. I said before in
3 my testimony he was and is not communist. So it had to do with a
4 pan-African approach as far as a political philosophy was
15:30:11 5 concerned. Gaddafi is a socialist as far as economic ideas are
6 concerned, okay? So it was not that Marxist. Marxism, no, no,
7 no.

8 Q. Give us an idea of the total number of people who were at
9 that camp at Tajura?

15:30:35 10 A. I don't know.

11 Q. What are we talking about, Mr Taylor? Can you give us some
12 kind of idea in total?

13 A. No, I don't know. I'll put it this way. The leaders of
14 the groupings in Libya did not stay in the camps. They visited
15:30:55 15 their men in the camps. In the camps all groupings that went -
16 the Camp Tajura is so huge it probably could train 10/15/20,000
17 people at a time, but I would be misleading to say that I can
18 approximate the number of people that were in there.

19 But what I do know, when I arrived in Libya with my men the
15:31:25 20 Sierra Leonean group was already in Libya, the Gambian group was
21 already in Libya and the first Liberian group taken by
22 Dr Fahnbulleh was already in Libya.

23 Now I did not even know how many Liberians were in that
24 first group, because you were not concerned and you were not
15:31:51 25 permitted to associate with other groups. The only thing you
26 knew, you knew that groups were there because you met their
27 leaders almost on a daily basis; not in the camp, but in Tripoli
28 at the Mataba.

29 Q. Why I'm asking you about numbers is I want to get an idea

1 how easy it would be to know, for example, all the members who
2 were there from South Africa who were training, all the members
3 from Gambia who were training. That's why I'm asking. So did
4 you have any idea about that?

15:32:35 5 A. No. I hope this explanation will help the Court. You're
6 talking about a very, very huge military base that I think - and
7 I stand corrected on this, maybe the records will show - may have
8 been the largest US base in Libya at the time. So United States
9 bases are not small bases. They are humongous.

15:33:07 10 Now, there were large groups because their leaders were -
11 you know, they're considered to be, you know, extraordinary. The
12 Liberian group that I carried may have been one of the smallest
13 groups. The point I'm trying to make here is that that base was
14 capable of training at any one time 10/15/20,000 people and there
15:33:29 15 were times that you could have had as many - and I don't want
16 questions to come up later, "Well, you said that there were 10
17 ,000 or 15,000 people." There were probably more people, because
18 when you think about some of the groups that went there for
19 training some people carried thousands of people.

15:33:46 20 But the point I want to drive home here is that you would
21 very rarely be able to put your finger on exact amounts, because
22 no matter how small or how large the group was it was not your
23 business. You did not have contact with the groups. You only
24 had contacts with the leaders.

15:34:09 25 Q. Were you ever permanently based at the camp in Libya,
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. Never. I just said that I never lived at the camp. No
28 leader in Libya that was a member of the Mataba lived at the
29 military barracks at Tajura. You had an apartment in Tripoli.

1 There was a guesthouse for those of us that went in and came out
2 that stayed at the guesthouse in Libya, or at a hotel in Tripoli,
3 but you never, ever stayed in the camp.

4 You could go and visit your men for several hours, sit
15:34:49 5 around, talk with them, which was encouraged because you didn't
6 want to just carry people to a military camp, drop them and they
7 never hear from you again when you just come back and say, "Hey,
8 guess what we're ready to take you." So you could go, which was
9 a good idea and it showed good leadership skills, to go and sit
15:35:10 10 with your men.

11 Now, it must be important to note this. The men within the
12 camp did associate with each other. So, for example, people from
13 I would say the African continent, most of the men that trained,
14 a lot of them knew each other very well because they were in the
15:35:30 15 same camp. Sometimes let's say my men for example, 168 men, did
16 not comprise - that's just about I would say probably a company
17 size militarily, one company, and so if they wanted to say train
18 a battalion size, maybe 4 or 500 men, they would put groups
19 together. That is for the training of the men in the camp, but
15:36:03 20 they would not permit leaders to go there to go and meddle with
21 other people or get to know who was there. That was not your
22 business. The men knew each other, but the leaders knew each
23 other.

24 Q. Were the leaders in Tripoli based in the same guesthouse?

15:36:20 25 A. Some were in the guesthouse. Some were in hotels. Ali
26 Kabbah, Kukoi Samba Sanyang, myself - most of the West Africans
27 that did not really stay there a whole lot used the Mataba
28 guesthouse. I had - there was an apartment in Tripoli that I
29 used, okay, but most of them - and I came to Mataba every day.

1 And as is normal, and I'm sure the judges will understand it,
2 you're from West Africa and of course you want to hang with West
3 Africans, and so at the Mataba most times Dr Manneh, Ali Kabbah
4 and myself would be together, you know, conversing all of the
15:37:08 5 time when I was there.

6 Q. What about Foday Sankoh?

7 A. Foday Sankoh was - I will tell you what I heard of Foday
8 Sankoh for the first time on the BBC. Foday Sankoh was nothing.
9 He was not at the Mataba. Foday Sankoh was apparently one of Ali
15:37:29 10 Kabbah's men that were in the camp. Foday Sankoh knew my men. I
11 did not know Foday Sankoh, just as Ali Kabbah did not know my
12 men. No, Foday Sankoh was no way with the type of credentials to
13 be a member of the Mataba, because if he had to be a member of
14 the Mataba then it meant that Ali Kabbah would not be there and
15:37:52 15 it was Ali Kabbah there.

16 Q. And Ali Kabbah, that surname Kabbah, who is he related to?

17 A. Well, I'm going to tell you what Ali told me. Ali Kabbah
18 told me that he was - he had been a student, a pan-African
19 student activist at Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone. There
15:38:29 20 were problems at Fourah Bay. I think he got in trouble once or
21 twice, either got thrown out. His - and I want to be sure of
22 this because again in Africa when you say uncle, father, brother
23 you have to be very careful. But Tejani, Tejani Kabbah, former
24 President Tejani Kabbah, Ali told me upon his retirement from the
15:38:57 25 United Nations, where Tejani I think had risen to the rank of
26 Under Secretary-General had retired, he sought to move Ali from
27 Sierra Leone.

28 Q. Who sought to move Ali?

29 A. I'm saying Tejani, Tejani Kabbah, moved Ali from Sierra

1 Leone because of the problems he was experiencing and some, and a
2 few other individuals from Fourah Bay into Ghana and on to Libya
3 where this whole pan-African thing was going on and that's what I
4 know about him, that Ali told me that Tejani is his uncle.

15:39:32 5 Now, I could be asked about this and I don't know whether
6 it's an African uncle or a biological uncle because in Africa
7 when we say uncle it could mean an older man or whatever. But
8 that's how he got there and Tejani knew he was there. That's
9 what Ali told me. I met him there, I met the group there.

15:39:55 10 Q. Can I pause for a moment and deal with some spellings,
11 please. Dr Manneh, M-A-N-N-E-H, whose name is also Kukoi Samba
12 Sanyang, K-U-K-O-I S-A-M-B-A S-A-N-Y-A-N-G. Burkinabe,
13 B-U-R-K-I-N-A-B-E. Now, what kind of training did you want for
14 your men at Tajura, Mr Taylor?

15:40:46 15 A. My own revolution as we planned was based on one principal
16 strategy, that my men would be trained in military discipline and
17 that they would be well trained and that these men would then
18 stand as the eyes and ears of the revolution that was actually to
19 be launched by the Liberian people. By that I mean going back
15:41:22 20 into Nimba. And so they did military training and I think my men
21 probably stayed in Libya longer than almost any group.

22 As a matter of fact, because I do not know exactly when the
23 Sierra Leonean group got there, but I remember the Sierra Leonean
24 group left Libya before my group. I do not know where they went
15:41:54 25 to, but I lost sight of Ali as of that time.

26 Q. Let's unpack that a little further, please. Firstly, when
27 did your men first arrive in Libya?

28 A. The men - remember I mentioned I was still in jail. The
29 men started arriving in Libya in early - what would that be? '87

1 that had to be. Early '87 they started arriving in Libya.

2 Q. When did they leave?

3 A. My men did not leave Libya until the - around the middle of
4 '89. Two, almost two full years of military training.

15:42:46 5 Q. Now, during that two year period, help us, how much did you
6 spend in Tajura?

7 A. None. A day, several hours at a time whenever I was there.
8 I just mention for the record I, and no other leader, lived in
9 Tajura. We could not.

15:43:14 10 Q. How regularly would you visit then?

11 A. I, during that period, would probably visit Libya probably
12 once every three or four months and when I did not go, Tom
13 Womeiyu would go and visit with the men because I was busy trying
14 to plan on what the men would do when they returned from Libya.

15:43:45 15 Now, for the - not to confuse anyone - you have 168 men in Libya
16 that have been trained. But Libya is far away from Liberia, so
17 how are you going to get these men back from Libya and more
18 particularly get them into Liberia was what I was involved with,
19 moving in the West African sub-region in trying to put that end
15:44:16 20 of it together, so by the time the men actually were ready that
21 there would be an available country to take them, one with close
22 proximity to Liberia that they would be able to enter. That was
23 my job. So I did not run up and down on that at that particular
24 place.

15:44:36 25 Q. So where were you based during that period?

26 A. Burkina Faso.

27 Q. Where in Burkina Faso?

28 A. Ouagadougou, the capital. I had a house there.

29 Q. Were you living in that house by yourself?

1 A. No, no, no, I was living there with Agnes.

2 Q. And where is Tupee at this time?

3 A. Tupee and I - I mean, we are separated and she is --

4 Q. But where was she living?

15:45:04 5 A. She's in the United States.

6 Q. Now, you've told us that you were aware that there were
7 Sierra Leoneans in the camp at Tajura?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Do you know when they had arrived there?

15:45:25 10 A. Not particularly, no. I just knew that they were there
11 because Ali was there; he told me that his men were in the camp.

12 Q. Did you know how many Sierra Leoneans were there?

13 A. No, I did not. And that is not all because I did not even
14 know how many other Liberians were there.

15:45:48 15 Q. I don't follow that, I'm sorry.

16 A. Well, I'm trying to say it is not odd that I would not know
17 how many Sierra Leoneans were there because it was nobody's

18 business. I did not even know how many other Liberians -

19 remember I mentioned to the Court that Dr Fahnbulleh had men in

15:46:06 20 the camp. I didn't even know how many men he had in the camp,
21 even though they were Liberians.

22 Q. What about Gambians? Did you have any idea how many
23 Gambians were there?

24 A. Yes, because the Gambians were not in the camps. The

15:46:24 25 Gambians had, before we got to Libya, had attempted an uprising

26 in The Gambia led by Kukoi Samba Sanyang about a year or maybe

27 earlier and had fled The Gambia, so they were already trained

28 soldiers. They were not more than I would say 25. I know this

29 because the Gambians were used as security personnel at the

1 Mataba facilities. Okay, so they were not trainees any more.

2 They had already - they were like revolutionaries, they had

3 already attempted a revolution, had failed and they were all

4 there, their leader was there. So we got to know most of the

15:47:14 5 boys because they were outside at the gates. They were the

6 security personnel at the Mataba.

7 Q. Now, you've told us about meeting with Ali Kabbah,

8 Dr Manneh. Concentrating on these two for the moment, did you

9 come to any mutual agreement with them to assist each other in

15:47:42 10 your revolution?

11 A. Not at all. We were there looking for assistance

12 ourselves, so how could we assist anybody? No, no one was

13 looking for assistance. In my case, no. In Ali's case, no. In

14 Manneh's case, no, because in fact we were there and all the

15:48:03 15 assistance that we needed, we were getting it through our Mataba

16 colleagues.

17 Q. Maybe you misunderstand me, Mr Taylor. Did you say for

18 example to Ali Kabbah, "When I launch my revolution I want you to

19 help me"?

15:48:23 20 A. Never, no. No.

21 MS HOLLIS: That is leading the witness. It would be much

22 better if the witness would testify.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, he's answered the question.

24 THE WITNESS: Well, I - look, it's very clear. I did not

15:48:38 25 seek any assistance from Ali Kabbah. Ali Kabbah did not seek any

26 assistance from me. I said Manneh did not seek any assistance

27 from me or Ali Kabbah and vice versa. We were not in the Mataba

28 to ask to assist each other in what they wanted to do. We were

29 there to exchange pan-African jargons and talk about it but at no

1 time - at no time did I promise Ali Kabbah or he promised me. At
2 no time did I request from Ali Kabbah any assistance or at no
3 time did Ali Kabbah ask of any - or for any assistance from me.
4 At no time.

15:49:22 5 Because Ali Kabbah's own revolution, as far as he had
6 explained it to me, Ali Kabbah who, by the way, if it were
7 possible I will still bring him to this Court because I think
8 he's available, he's just frightened, Ali Kabbah said to me that
9 within the armed forces of Sierra Leone and the police and the
15:49:48 10 other security apparatus, he had all of the assistance that he
11 needed and that the men he was training in Libya would return
12 directly to Sierra Leone and that upon their return from inside
13 Sierra Leone they will launch the revolution. So there was no
14 request or no - nothing from him to me or from me to him. It was
15:50:13 15 not necessary. It did not happen. There were no promises and
16 could have never been.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Another aspect of this, and you appreciate why I'm asking
19 you about - in such detail about this, Mr Taylor?

15:50:29 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. You've already explained that your men were receiving
22 military training. Now, apart from military training was there
23 any kind of ideological or philosophical training?

24 A. No. My men did not receive any ideological or
15:50:57 25 philosophical training. At Tajura the men- I was aware of the
26 fact that all, and may I say most of the people there were given
27 an opportunity to read the green book. But the green book was
28 not a prerequisite for assistance. So we did not - we were not
29 subjected to ideological or psychological training at all. We

1 were there for our own revolution to launch it our way. We were
2 given an opportunity to read the green book. If we wanted
3 anything, fine. I did not subscribe to everything that was a
4 part of the green book, so my people were not ideologically
15:51:46 5 trained with the green book, no.

6 Q. But help us, Mr Taylor: On those occasions when you
7 visited the camp did you address the men as a collective?
8 Collectively?

9 A. Yes. My men? My men.

15:52:03 10 Q. Yes. Now help us: What did you say to them as to why
11 they're there, what your intention is, what you're seeking to
12 achieve? What did you tell them?

13 A. Well, very simple. Don't let's forget Liberia was not in
14 the dark at the time of these people. These men that were there,
15:52:26 15 they were not of the calibre of the People's Redemption Council.
16 We had educated people. For example, I told you Womei went
17 there. We talked about this change of moving Doe, we talked
18 about the type of government that we wanted to set up that would
19 be free of tribalism, sectionalism and all this kind of stuff.
15:52:55 20 We talked about eliminating this --

21 Q. Well, I'm not interested in "all this kind of stuff".

22 A. But that's what we talked about.

23 Q. I want you to spell it out, please. It is suggested that
24 you formed a plan there to terrorise the civilian population, so
15:53:07 25 take your time, Mr Taylor, and tell us what was the plan?

26 A. The whole purpose - the whole purpose - for the two years
27 that we spent in Libya was to make sure that people were trained
28 as military people and trained in the laws of war. We realised -
29 and I have made it very clear to this Court - the 168 men that we

1 trained we were basically depending on the civilian population in
2 Liberia to launch the revolution.

3 Now, it would be silly and really stupid for anyone wanting
4 to launch a revolution using civilians to want to terrorise them.

15:53:56 5 We were too small a number to go and fight a war, so we needed
6 the people. So principally we dealt with - we dealt with how to
7 act with civilians, how to behave, what to do --

8 Q. And how was that?

9 A. Well you do not harass people, you do not take their goats,
15:54:19 10 their chickens, you do not rape, you do not loot and where - even
11 during the crisis where it happened we acted. So we dealt
12 directly with organising our people to first of all care. For
13 any revolutionary leader - any guerilla leader - must know that
14 unless you take good care of the civilians you will go no place,
15:54:42 15 so primarily we considered our attitude toward the civilian
16 population as paramount to being successful in our revolution and
17 because we did we were successful.

18 Q. So what did you say to them about the type of government
19 you wanted to establish in Liberia?

15:55:06 20 A. It was going to be a democratic government. We wanted to
21 go in, launch the revolution and submit ourselves to free and
22 fair elections.

23 Q. And help us, because again this is relevant, with what was
24 the military philosophy taught at the camp?

15:55:31 25 A. Well, when you talk about philosophy I'm going to need some
26 help from the Court. In terms of military philosophy there could
27 be quite a few, but maybe I will get some assistance from the
28 Court on this as to what you mean by military philosophy.

29 Q. Well how were you soldiers taught, or were they taught, as

1 to how to wage their guerilla war? What tactics to adopt?

2 A. Well, okay, I'm not sure if you're talking philosophy or
3 military strategy. As far as - I thought I had dealt with
4 this --

15:56:15 5 Q. Well, all right.

6 A. -- but I'll go back through it. There was an overall
7 strategy - and, again, 168 men don't launch a war in a country.
8 We sought to have our men well trained and disciplined - well,
9 basically in the military you have discipline and courtesy - to

15:56:44 10 make sure that we could go in and sufficiently work with the
11 local population. Once we had launched the revolution the local
12 population will come in and help, we did not have to coerce them
13 and we did not have to subject them to any abuse, and that
14 through that process our numbers will rise, they will be trained
15:57:07 15 basically and we will be successful in our revolution. That is
16 basically the overall strategy that we designed.

17 Q. Well I'm sorry for labouring this, but it's so important I
18 fear I must. What was the philosophy regarding the treatment of
19 civilians?

15:57:38 20 A. I guess we're going, you know, this and that, but I will
21 just answer you. I said earlier if you abuse any civilians, if
22 you took their property away from them, if you took their homes
23 from them you will lose their support. What we said that
24 military people would deal with military people, but civilians
15:58:07 25 would deal with civilians and this is why even as we entered
26 Liberia we did not dismantle the civilian apparatus that we met
27 on the ground. We took advantage of our chiefs, our elders, our
28 Zoes to work along with the population.

29 Q. Our what? Zoes?

1 A. Well, yes, Z-O-E-S. Our Zoes are our traditional native
2 people. That anything involving civilians should be referred to
3 the civilian administration. Anything military will be dealt
4 with the military. That is why in my testimony I think yesterday
15:58:56 5 I mentioned very clearly that we accept that those military
6 people that carried out atrocities were arrested, they were
7 court-martialled under the uniform code of military justice and
8 they were dealt with. That is why there is not one instance that
9 has been presented before this Court where there was a civilian
15:59:17 10 that was executed by the military command of the NPFL. It is
11 because of the separation that we did. We separated military
12 activities from civilian activities and left the civilian
13 activities to the civilian administration in the country.

14 Q. Let me break it down further. What was said about the
15:59:42 15 treatment of children?

16 A. We did not at all encourage any children under the age of
17 17 to be involved in military activities. We did not. In fact,
18 we did not close the schools. This is one thing that has not
19 come up in the trial.

16:00:08 20 Q. No, no, Mr Taylor. I am talking about Libya where the plan
21 is supposed to start. What is taught about how children should
22 be treated?

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Are you there, Mr Interpreter? I think
24 it's being adjusted. The Court Manager is enquiring as to which
16:00:55 25 channel has been switched.

26 MS IRURA: Your Honour, the AV booth is liaising with the
27 interpretation to find out what could have transpired.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, in the meantime can we continue
29 without interruption? Have they adjusted whatever they were

1 doing wrong?

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, they are checking. I will give
3 them a call back to find out.

16:01:24

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Go ahead and let's just hope it doesn't
5 happen again, Mr Griffiths.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

16:01:40

7 THE WITNESS: Well in answer to your question, no child was
8 to be recruited or used or trained for military activities.
9 That's the order as regard children. Only people of military
10 age, men and women, were to be received for military training.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Now what did the actual military training consist of,
13 Mr Taylor?

16:02:09

14 A. Basic drills. Learning how to, what do you call, conceal
15 yourself in combat. They learn how to assemble - well, first
16 disassemble and assemble rifles. They learned how to take
17 position to shoot. They learn military formation. They learn
18 how to carry out search procedures. They learned how to carry
19 out cordon procedures. They learned - and we were very specific
20 about this. They learned how to also individually care for
21 prisoners of war. They learned how to deal with prisoners of war
22 and even those that were trained also learned a part of their
23 military training how to deal with civilian populations. This
24 was the entire course.

16:02:46

16:03:09

25 Q. And was all the training --

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm sorry to interrupt, but
27 there was just one part of that piece of evidence I didn't
28 understand and that was the reference to was it cordon
29 procedures?

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, what cordon procedure is, your Honour,
2 is if the military went into an area to search it they would
3 secure the area before searching it. It's called I think cordon.
4 That's how I know it, cordon.

16:03:39 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understand now, thank you.

6 THE WITNESS: Very well.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. And was all of this training land based?

9 A. In Liberia?

16:03:53 10 Q. In Libya?

11 A. In Libya, no, no, no. We did both land and we did seaborne
12 operations.

13 Q. Any others?

14 A. No, these were basically land and sea based operations. I
16:04:06 15 do not recall any other right now.

16 Q. And what did the sea based operations involve?

17 A. Oh, learning how to - we called them navy commandos. How
18 to use small boats to navigate secretly into enemy territory
19 using the sea. There were a few that specialised in carrying out
16:04:32 20 diving activities. For example, you could dive and go into
21 areas. And we did this because Liberia has one of the longest
22 coastlines in West Africa, so how do you get from one point if we
23 had to use the sea? These navy personnel could use it, because
24 for us there are certain - and when I talk about boat I'm not
16:05:01 25 just - let me just - maybe there's another name for it. It is
26 boat too, but there are certain trees in Liberia that we use for
27 what we call a canoe. It's a very light wood that you cut and
28 you can dig it out, hollow it out, and use it. We knew that this
29 existed, so even if we did not have the western built little

1 boats we could almost use our canoe, okay, to do it.

2 So we got that and trained navy personnels most importantly
3 to swim. How to swim, rest, and don't ask me, I don't know how
4 it was done, but they were trained to do it, they can swim in the
16:05:54 5 water and rest in the water. Now, that's almost impossible for
6 me. Rest in the water and continue swimming. So if we had to
7 get to certain areas on the Liberian coast, otherwise we needed
8 people that were trained that could do that and so we did the
9 seaborne training.

16:06:14 10 Q. Now was Tajura a terrorist training camp, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Tajura was never and is never a terrorist training camp and
12 in fact if it had been I think the United States would have
13 destroyed it, because we were still in Libya when I think the
14 Reagan administration, if I'm not mistaken, ordered the bombing
16:06:48 15 of Tripoli.

16 Q. You were there at the time?

17 A. My men were there during that raid on Tripoli and I am just
18 surmising here that if they felt - and the buildings that were
19 bombed were in Tripoli. If Reagan, who ordered the bombing of
16:07:07 20 Tripoli, thought in his mind that Tajura was a terrorist base
21 they would have bombed it.

22 Q. I want to move on now, please. You earlier mentioned that
23 there were three principal personalities behind the organisation
24 of the NPFL.

16:07:33 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Did anyone eventually emerge as an undisputed leader?

27 A. Yes, I did.

28 Q. By what process did that occur?

29 A. Well, during the training - in fact an important

1 arrangement came up. That decision was actually made by the men
2 that had been taken to do the training. Now, let me explain
3 this.

16:08:25 4 I'm affected, yes, but the individuals from Nimba, the
5 Nimbadiens, the Dan and Mahn individuals that comprised 90 per
6 cent of the personnel in training, see this also as their
7 revolution and an opportunity to go back and avenge the death of
8 their people.

16:08:49 9 In fact, what these people in Nimba at the time were
10 actually looking for, they were really looking for a leader,
11 somebody that could put a programme together for them to go back
12 and fight Doe. I mean, this was what - this was it. And so we
13 came up with an arrangement. We sat and the arrangement was
14 this:

16:09:09 15 Okay. Mr Taylor, you have gone through all of this
16 headache, you've helped to put this whole thing together. The
17 arrangement is this: We get back to Liberia, God willing we
18 succeed, you are the leader, but one of us must be your
19 vice-president. So in direct answer to your question that
16:09:40 20 decision was taken by the men that were taken for training. That
21 was their decision.

22 Q. And when was that decision made?

23 A. That decision was made in training in 1988 before we left
24 to come to Liberia - or West Africa at least.

16:10:04 25 Q. Now, this training was going on for some two years. Did it
26 go totally undetected, to your knowledge?

27 A. To the best of my knowledge it went undetected.

28 Q. No one knew?

29 A. Well, when you say no one, I can't say absolutely no one

1 but I think those people that matter, and I'm speaking about Doe
2 surely did not know because he never accused - he never accused
3 Libya at the time. We did not get this feedback from any major
4 western intelligence source and so I can't say no one but I think
16:10:44 5 those that it would have mattered for did not really get to know.

6 Q. Moving on. Does there come a time, Mr Taylor, when it's
7 decided that training has come to an end and your forces must be
8 moved on?

9 A. Yes. And this is the hard part that I explained earlier
16:11:18 10 that I had been in and out because I had to put certain
11 programmes together. I had come to West Africa. There was no
12 problem in the men coming to Burkina Faso, they left from Burkina
13 Faso, but the problem was at what point do they enter Liberia to
14 launch the revolution? So they surely could not probably do it
16:11:48 15 from La Cote d'Ivoire because there was just too many people, so
16 we did not think about La Cote d'Ivoire initially. That left one
17 option, going back to our old friends in Sierra Leone.

18 I travelled, and as I recall now, and I'm glad that I
19 probably mentioned it earlier, your Honours, actually the
16:12:10 20 Quiwonkpa situation was with Siaka Stevens because now I think
21 Momoh is chief of staff at the time, I will now go and Momoh is
22 president by late - by '89. I then go to Momoh and the contacts
23 with Momoh, sadly there was a gentleman, he is late now, called
24 Prince Barclay who --

16:12:38 25 Q. Barclay spelt how?

26 A. B-A-R-C-L-A-Y, who was part Liberian and part Sierra
27 Leonean that knew Mohamed Dumbuya very well. So arrangements
28 were made for, through Dumbuya, to see if I could come down to
29 Sierra Leone to speak to Joseph Momoh. Those arrangements were

1 concluded and so I flew into Freetown. I meet with Dumbuya and
2 he introduces me to a very nice gentleman that is dead now who
3 was a personal, trusted friend of General Momoh.

4 Q. Who is that person?

16:13:41 5 A. The gentleman is - I only know his last name because we
6 called him - he was a brigadier, Toronkai, a very shortish man, a
7 very good nice guy, Brigadier Toronkai, who was a deputy chief of
8 staff then of the Sierra Leonean armed forces.

9 Q. Pause. Any chance of a spelling, Mr Taylor? I know it's
16:14:06 10 late in the day.

11 A. Maybe we could ask your colleagues on the opposite side to
12 help us. Mr Mohamed, he should go know. He is a Sierra Leonean.
13 Toronkai, it could be T-O-R-E-N-K-A-I - I'm not too sure, I'm
14 sorry, your Honours, but it's Toronkai.

16:14:23 15 Q. Well, I'm not going to be the one to ask them.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we'll continue, Mr Griffiths, and
17 the name may come up again.

18 THE WITNESS: Brigadier Toronkai, short, nice gentleman,
19 met with me and he went on to President Momoh and explained to
16:14:46 20 him that I had arrived and that night I was taken to President
21 Momoh.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Pause for a moment, Mr Taylor. Can you help us with a date
24 here?

16:14:55 25 A. Oh boy. This, this I would say was in the - this had to be
26 in '89. I will say about the first quarter of '89. About the -
27 don't hold me on this, but it was about the first quarter of '89
28 and I was really struggling trying to get this thing going. Now,
29 Toronkai was not the chief of staff of the armed forces. The

1 chief of staff of the armed forces was major general, I just
2 remember the last name, Tarawalli, I remember that very well.
3 But Momoh did not trust Tarawalli so he trusted this operation
4 with Toronkai and said to me specifically that he didn't want
16:15:49 5 Tarawalli to know anything about this. And so in that meeting
6 were President Momoh, Brigadier Toronkai and myself met. We had
7 discussions. Momoh remembered as deputy chief of - as chief of
8 staff the first operation.

9 Q. Which operation is that?

16:16:08 10 A. That's the operation that I mentioned that involved General
11 Thomas Quiwonkpa. But he had some concerns. Momoh said to me,
12 he said, "Look, the first attack out of here that Quiwonkpa went
13 with did not succeed and Doe almost retaliated by trying to
14 overrun this country. I have to be absolutely sure, one, that
16:16:38 15 you have the manpower to carry out the operation successfully,
16 and, two, that you have the equipment. The equipment to do it."
17 I showed him on both counts that we had the manpower and we had
18 the equipment to do the job.

19 Q. Pause. Did you have the equipment?

16:17:01 20 A. We had been promised the equipment from Libya at the time,
21 but when I told Momoh he balked again. His second concern was
22 this quantity of equipment, if it came here, what if it got into
23 the hands of the Sierra Leonean Army, they will probably move me.
24 So we were basically talking about this, and he decided that he
16:17:33 25 wanted me to go and return at a later date. He and Toronkai
26 would throw it around and see how, if he permitted such equipment
27 to come to the country, how it could come, be moved out almost
28 immediately to the point on the Sierra Leone/Liberian border to
29 enter and making sure that it was all out. He had to work that

1 out in his own head first and then work it out with Toronkai to
2 see how it would work. So I left Sierra Leone only to return at
3 a later date.

4 Q. And how soon after did you return?

16:18:13 5 A. I went. I returned I would approximately say after about
6 two months I returned because by this time the men were through
7 with training and one thing you get to learn, when you train
8 people for a mission you send them out to carry the mission. If
9 not they get lazy, they get tired and they will probably forget
16:18:38 10 what they learn and these are soldiers. And so I returned after
11 two months at a very bad time.

12 Q. Why?

13 A. Momoh had travelled to London. I think there was a donors'
14 conference, and so I arrive. I meet with Dumbuya, I meet with
16:18:58 15 Brigadier Toronkai, but at that time there was a very - how will
16 I call him - a very tough, terrible guy that was the inspector
17 general of police by the name of Bambi Kamara. I think he's
18 late, Bambi Kamara. I do not know whether Bambi worked for Doe
19 or whatever, but there is a sense that any one of us entering
16:19:44 20 Sierra Leone meant something, and apparently Doe had established
21 good intelligence in Sierra Leone.

22 I arrived there. President Momoh is out of the country.
23 Bambi Kamara arrests me. Now, there is a problem here. Toronkai
24 knows the whole deal. Dumbuya knows the whole deal. But Dumbuya
16:20:12 25 in the SSD is a member of the police, and he is only a junior
26 assistant I think superintendent of police. So even though he is
27 commanding the SSD, but he is low in the rank, so he cannot
28 question Bambi.

29 Toronkai is in a mess because his boss, the chief of staff,

1 Major General Tarawalli does not know about this deal. So Bambi
2 arrests me. They rush to Toronkai and Dumbuya, Dumbuya has to
3 run for cover, because he probably could have gotten arrested.
4 Toronkai intervenes with Bambi. Bambi doesn't want to listen to
16:20:59 5 Toronkai. He calls Tarawalli. Tarawalli doesn't know.
6 Tarawalli gets angry that this thing - in fact Toronkai tells
7 him, "Oh, the President is aware that Mr Taylor is here and he
8 has invited him and don't touch him", I know. So Tarawalli is
9 asking him, "But what do you know?" He can't tell him because
16:21:21 10 the President doesn't want for Tarawalli to know.

11 So I'm stuck and I'm put in Pademba Road Prison. I am
12 there for about three days. Momoh is informed by Toronkai. He
13 rushes back, releases me, puts me on a plane and gets me out of
14 the country immediately. That ends the whole Sierra Leonean
16:21:40 15 thing. There are no arms, there is nothing that come. Sierra
16 Leone at that particular time is dead. But Momoh and I are still
17 in contact.

18 Q. What do you mean you're still in contact?

19 A. Prince Barclay is taking messages from me to President
16:21:55 20 Momoh, to Brigadier Toronkai who is still trying to say it's
21 over. He is saying, "Oh, the news is out now, so it's a risk".
22 So he kept delaying and delaying and delaying and may I say
23 rightfully so, because in fact the news had leaked. By this time
24 in Liberia Doe is already aware of this arrest and, not knowing
16:22:19 25 that I'm released, is calling for Momoh to extradite me to
26 Liberia. So this is the whole picture.

27 So with all of these things spilling, the newspapers are
28 covering it, Momoh decides to just hold fast. So he's telling us
29 that, "Look, you've got to wait until this thing dies down". But

1 in the meantime the men are just getting nervous and they are
2 stuck in Tripoli now for two years, so we decide that I would
3 take another move or make another move.

16:23:01 4 Q. But just to complete the circle at this point, did your
5 arrest in Sierra Leone cause you to have any antipathy towards
6 Momoh?

7 A. No, not at all. Not at all. Not at all. President Momoh
8 and I remained good friends. Momoh was not responsible. In fact
9 he cut short his trip to London, because things were getting so
16:23:22 10 much out of control he had to rush back and control this himself
11 and we remained very good friends. No, no. If Momoh had wanted
12 to do evil to me he would have turned me over to Doe. No, he
13 remained my very good friend. Even when I launched the
14 revolution in Liberia, Prince Barclay was still getting messages
16:23:42 15 in to Momoh. No, he remained a very good friend of mine.

16 Q. And was he still your friend in 1991, March?

17 A. Well, not exactly. By March of 1991 this situation
18 occurred where the - if I'm not mistaken this is about the attack
19 on Sierra Leone, if I'm not mistaken?

16:24:19 20 Q. Yes.

21 A. And it was virtually impossible in all the attempts that I
22 made to convince Momoh, you know - and this is why maybe it's
23 good we're in this Court. You know, you have to distinguish
24 between all the propaganda and the rumours and the lies. Here I
16:24:44 25 am, you can't blame Momoh. There is an attack in Sierra Leone
26 and I'm telling Momoh, "I don't know anything about it", but
27 there are others telling Momoh, "He does know about it. It can't
28 happen unless he knows". So finally there is a problem because
29 in about I think around January there had been a little looting

1 incident on the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone where the
2 Sierra Leonean soldiers and our own soldiers had an altercation
3 over looted property. So people just kept pumping Momoh, "Oh, he
4 must know. If he doesn't know then who else would know?" And
16:25:29 5 this continued and continued. But this fighting was going on.

6 That is what subsequently led to the ULIMO coming into
7 Liberia, because Momoh was convinced beyond reasonable doubt, it
8 appeared, that because his friend had done this to him he had to
9 do something too. That's why he armed ULIMO and then later on I
16:25:54 10 sought, you know, to work with the RUF. So this is how all this
11 happened. Just on, okay, it must be so, it's not so. And this
12 happens all the time between countries, where one leader would
13 accuse the other, it has got nothing to do with facts. But this
14 is what happened.

16:26:32 15 Q. Now during these travels around West Africa to Sierra
16 Leone, for example, as you just described, where did you maintain
17 your base so to speak?

18 A. In Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Don't forget Ghana is a
19 no-no because they've already given me 48 hours, I'm never to go
16:27:02 20 back there. So I'm in Burkina Faso.

21 Q. So from the time of your release until the launch of the
22 revolution in 1989, December, where are you based?

23 A. Burkina Faso.

24 Q. Can I give a spelling. James Bamba, B-A-M-B-A, Kamara,
16:27:37 25 K-A-M-A-R-A. And what was his position?

26 A. Well, we used to call him Bambi. Maybe it's Bamba. Bambi
27 Kamara. He is inspector general of police.

28 Q. Of which police?

29 A. Of Sierra Leone.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: And I'm told, Mr President, that the
2 spelling for Toronkai is T-O-R-O-N-K-A-I.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I, before I forget, ask that the two
16:28:21 5 maps be marked for identification.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We'll make them - I think I can
7 safely say MFI-1 and we'll make them A and B. The untitled map
8 will be MFI-1A and the map entitled "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" will
9 be MFI-1B.

10 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful. Would that then be a
11 convenient point?

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We'll adjourn today and continue at
13 9.30 tomorrow. Mr Taylor, you're going to be hearing this every
14 day but it's something I must say. You are cautioned not to
16:29:16 15 discuss your evidence with any other person. Thank you. We'll
16 adjourn.

17 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.29 p.m.
18 to be reconvened on Thursday, 16 July 2009 at
19 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

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