



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Tuesday, 15 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:31:54 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,  
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J  
9 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura and our case manager, Maja Dimitrova.

09:32:10 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
12 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself, Courtenay  
13 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah of counsel and we're also  
14 joined by one of our interns, Ms Haydee Dijkstal, who has been  
09:32:28 15 with us before.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Taylor, I'll remind you're  
17 still bound to tell the truth. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

18 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

19 [On former affirmation]

09:32:37 20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

21 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday during the course of dealing with the  
22 evidence of a witness, TF1-567, you recall that mention was made  
23 of an incident at Spur Road at the home address of Foday Sankoh?  
24 Do you recall that?

09:32:53 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Now, let me remind you what it was that the witness said.  
27 This is page 130 - I think we need to go into private session for  
28 this, Mr President.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that going to reveal the identity --

1 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't see that it's going to reveal the  
2 identity of the witness, but I don't know if there's an  
3 objection. It deals with a particular discrete incident which is  
4 a matter of public knowledge, and as far as I'm concerned, it's  
09:33:31 5 perfectly capable of being dealt with in a public arena without  
6 identifying the witness.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's a little bit difficult to forecast  
8 until I know what you're going to say.

9 But are you able to say anything at this stage, Ms Hollis?

09:33:51 10 MS HOLLIS: What is the page and date reference, and is it  
11 in private session?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: It's in the private session, 7 July 2008,  
13 page 13020. I'm only interested in lines 25 on page 13020  
14 through to line 20 on page 13021.

09:34:41 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

16 MS HOLLIS: Our position would be that the information on  
17 page 13021, taken along with everything else that's been elicited  
18 about this witness, would make it better if it remained in  
19 private session.

09:35:01 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I think for the same reason we gave  
21 yesterday, Mr Griffiths, we ought to go into private session. I  
22 note that, through nobody's fault, some of the questions put to  
23 the witness quoting evidence given by the protected witness would  
24 have revealed his identity.

09:35:30 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I make this suggestion then,  
26 Mr President, because this is a matter of some significance which  
27 goes directly to the credibility of this witness: That the  
28 reference to the passage, in order to identify the occasion, be  
29 in private session, but then we immediately move into public

1 session to deal with the implications of this testimony.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: But his testimony is going to discuss the  
3 passage that's just been put to him in private session, isn't it?

09:36:07

4 MR GRIFFITHS: I will only be dealing with the date once we  
5 go into public session.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: How long is this passage?

7 MR GRIFFITHS: The passage is some 25 lines of the  
8 transcript.

09:36:28

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: But as Justice Sebutinde commented  
10 yesterday, with other witnesses, it's possible to ask the  
11 question in a form that doesn't endanger the protected witness.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, it can be done in that form.

09:37:00

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, Ms Hollis, we've done  
14 this with other witnesses before, so I think, to keep this on the  
15 public record, we'll allow Mr Griffiths to proceed in that  
16 fashion.

09:37:41

17 Is there any confusion here, Mr Griffiths? I was referring  
18 to the passage itself that you're going to quote and subsequent  
19 questions on it all being in open session but worded in such a  
20 way --

21 MR GRIFFITHS: That it will not identify the witness.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That's what I meant. I didn't mean  
23 that the passage you quote is in private session.

09:37:56

24 MR GRIFFITHS: No, I agree. I do not intend now to refer  
25 to the passage itself. I will summarise the import of what is  
26 said and then we will refer to other evidence.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Let's proceed along those  
28 lines.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Mr Taylor, do you recall an incident which occurred at Spur  
2 Road which resulted in shooting and a number of fatalities?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. What's the date of that event?

09:38:29 5 A. To the best of my recollection, it's 8 May.

6 Q. Of which year?

7 A. 8 May of 2000.

8 Q. Now, you will recall that a witness to whom we referred in  
9 the past claimed to have seen you that night.

09:38:49 10 A. That is not possible.

11 Q. Why is it not possible?

12 A. Because I left Liberia on the evening of 8 May, and by  
13 evening I mean before 6 p.m., for a Heads of State meeting in  
14 Abuja, Nigeria.

09:39:09 15 Q. How can you be sure about that?

16 A. Well, the meeting occurred on the 9th and the 10th. It's  
17 well documented in ECOWAS records and I was in attendance of that  
18 meeting and I did leave on the evening of the 8th.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, can I ask, please, that everyone takes  
09:39:31 20 up from week 33, binder 1 of 4, please. Can we look behind  
21 divider 45:

22 Q. This a document we've looked at already, Mr Taylor, but  
23 let's revisit it in light of this evidence, please. What do we  
24 see behind divider 45?

09:40:37 25 A. This is the list of the delegation that accompanied me to  
26 Nigeria for this Heads of State meeting.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think for the record we'll state here  
28 that that document has already been marked for identification  
29 MFI-133.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, what date is on that?

3 A. There's the date of 9 and 10 May 2000.

4 Q. And when was this meeting due to start, on which day?

09:41:13 5 A. The meeting starts on the morning of the 9th and ends on  
6 the 10th.

7 Q. So when did you travel to Abuja?

8 A. I left for Abuja on the evening of the 8th, because the  
9 meeting is not an afternoon meeting, it's a morning meeting, so I  
09:41:31 10 left on the 8th.

11 Q. And arrived in Abuja when?

12 A. I arrived in Abuja the early evening, about I would say 5,  
13 6 in the evening.

14 Q. Yes. And stayed where?

09:41:45 15 A. I stayed at the Nicon Noga hotel.

16 Q. Pardon?

17 A. It's called the Nicon Noga hotel.

18 Q. What is that?

19 A. It's a hotel in Abuja.

09:41:58 20 Q. And who was there with you?

21 A. My delegation.

22 Q. The names that we see on this list?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. A document disclosed to the Prosecution several weeks ago,  
09:42:08 25 yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And are they in a position to verify the names on this  
28 list, that you were in Abuja and not Monrovia on the night of 8  
29 May 2000?

1 A. Of course. These people are all alive and well.

2 Q. And let's just go behind the next divider, shall we,

3 MFI-139. What do we see here, Mr Taylor?

4 A. This is the final communique at of that meeting.

09:42:45 5 Q. And let's have a look, please, at the second page. Who is  
6 the third Head of State said to be present?

7 A. I'm a third Head of State present.

8 Q. And we see that that's a Tuesday, 9 May, yes?

9 A. That is correct.

09:43:02 10 Q. And just to remind ourselves, let's go over to the next  
11 page, shall we, paragraph 5. Five lines from the top of the  
12 paragraph:

13 "In this regard, they approved the mandate given by the  
14 current ECOWAS chairman and by the Heads of State of the Mano  
09:43:28 15 River Union to the President of the Republic of Liberia, His  
16 Excellency Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, to involve  
17 himself personally to ensure the liberation of the hostages and  
18 the resumption of the application of the Lome Peace Agreement."

19 Yes?

09:43:50 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And when did you return from Abuja, Mr Taylor?

22 A. I returned from Abuja on the 10th, at the close of the  
23 meeting.

24 Q. So what do you say about the suggestion that you were at  
09:43:59 25 the Executive Mansion having a meeting on the night of 8 May  
26 2000? What do you say to that suggestion?

27 A. I say it's a blatant lie. I was not in Liberia on the  
28 night of the 8th. It's a blatant, blatant lie.

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when did the penny first drop that you

1 weren't in Monrovia on the night of Monday, 8 May?

2 A. While you were - when we went through this transcript on  
3 yesterday, it occurred to me that: Wait a minute, there is  
4 something wrong here, when I'd heard the - when you read to me  
09:44:41 5 the accusation as levelled by the witness in question. I said,  
6 "But wait a minute, this is not possible. This is not possible."

7 Q. So when did the first occur to you?

8 A. While we were going through this process on yesterday.

9 Q. Now, to this limited extent just answer this question yes  
09:45:02 10 or no: Prior to yesterday, had you informed your lawyers that  
11 you were elsewhere on the night of 8 May 2000?

12 A. No.

13 Q. So, Mr Taylor, in summary, that being an indication, what  
14 do you say about the veracity of that witness?

09:45:45 15 A. In fact the witness is totally - as far as I can see, this  
16 witness is typical of what we have under these conditions. These  
17 boys hang around the fringes of things, they pick up little bits  
18 and pieces of information here and there, and when people or  
19 their friends ask them, they go on blabbing off about things that  
09:46:15 20 are not even right. And they are not in the loop, but they try  
21 to impress people that they are in the loop, and as a result I do  
22 not see how credible some of these people are, because they do  
23 not know. But they try to present an image of knowledge, and  
24 there is no credibility to what they're saying because they  
09:46:38 25 really do not know, but they try to act as though they know.

26 Q. Let's leave that man now and deal with another witness.

27 TF1-375. Now, Mr Taylor, again no names are to be mentioned, do  
28 you understand me?

29 A. Yes, I do.



1 Q. Now, this witness gave evidence in June 2008. The first  
2 aspect of his evidence I'd like us to deal with - and this is  
3 page 12488 of the transcript of 23 June 2008 - the witness says  
4 this:

09:47:50 5 "A. Superman told us to go to Kenema District and meet  
6 Sam Bockarie.

7 Q. How did you go to Kenema?

8 A. Yes, we went to Kenema and we met Sam Bockarie. We  
9 went to collect ammunition from Sam Bockarie, but when we  
09:48:09 10 got to Kenema Sam Bockarie told us that the ammunition have  
11 not yet arrived in Kenema and so he told us to continue to  
12 journey. He gave us a car - Salami was the driver, was  
13 driving the car, the late Salami Kabbah, and he told use to  
14 go to Pendembu so that we will meet somebody there that was  
09:48:35 15 called Jungle who was bringing the ammunition. But the car  
16 had a breakdown, and so we went with another car to collect  
17 the ammunition. We met Salami Kabbah - I mean, Jungle, and  
18 we met another man called Senegalese. He is a Liberian, a  
19 tall fellow."

09:48:51 20 Do you know anyone by the name of Senegalese, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, I don't.

22 Q. "He was Liberian, a tall fellow. We met him. We explained  
23 the situation to him, and then Jungle told us to get  
24 civilians around so that they will transfer the ammunition  
09:49:08 25 into the other car. So when we assembled the civilians, we  
26 asked them to transfer the ammunition to the car. After  
27 that, Jungle decided to join us to come down to Sam  
28 Bockarie and meet him in Kenema. So after all, when we got  
29 to Kenema Sam Bockarie asked us to get some of the

1 ammunition to be carried to Superman in Freetown. That was  
2 the assignment given to us."

3 Q. What year was this?

09:49:52

4 A. 1997. We went with some men to escort the ammunition,  
5 but I can't recall the actual figure. We went with two  
6 pick-ups with us, so we transferred the ammunition from  
7 Jungle's own car. Jungle brought with him a big truck, so  
8 we transferred the ammunition from the truck to the two  
9 Land Cruiser pick-ups. Salami Kabbah was driving one of  
10 them and our own driver. So when we travelled back to  
11 Kenema, we turned the ammunition over to Sam Bockarie. We  
12 received GPMG rounds, AK-47, rounds, PPG rockets. Those  
13 were the ammunitions we received.

09:50:08

14 Q. Who was Jungle?

09:50:35

15 A. Jungle was in the SSS in Liberia. He was a member of  
16 the SSS in Liberia. He was a bodyguard to President  
17 Taylor, close protection unit."

18 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

09:50:51

19 A. There was no such person called Jungle in the close  
20 protection unit of the SSS. That is blatantly false. We have  
21 presented here a list of close protection people under Charles  
22 Kollie. There is no such person called Jungle in that unit.

23 Q. Jungle's real name, we are told, is Daniel Tamba. Did you  
24 have a member of your close protection unit called Daniel Tamba?

09:51:15

25 A. No. No.

26 Q. "Q. Was this the first time you had met him?

27 A. That was my first time to meet him. I knew him later  
28 and he became my personal friend, a best friend of mine.

29 He was just like an elder brother to me. I was very close

1 to him. He was with me until his death.

2 Q. Do you know where Jungle had got the ammunition which  
3 you then transferred to Sam Bockarie in Kenema?

09:51:56

4 A. The first time I met him we did not discuss that much,  
5 but when I got to know him later, he explained to me how he  
6 used to get the ammunition that he crossed with from  
7 Liberia. He told me that he used to take the ammunition  
8 from - sometimes the President used to send him to get the  
9 ammunition from White Flower, the Executive Mansion, to  
10 take it to Sam Bockarie, and that was not his first time to  
11 cross over with ammunition."

09:52:13

12 Pause there. So you understand what the witness is saying,  
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes.

09:52:25

15 Q. In 1997 Jungle is sent with a truckload of ammunition to  
16 Sam Bockarie and that Jungle tells this individual that you were  
17 the person who was sending the ammunition. What do you say to  
18 that?

09:52:53

19 A. I say he's lying. Totally lying, and he is - he must be  
20 confused. If you look back, he talks about 1997. And where is  
21 this? He talks about Freetown in 1997. These are some of the  
22 problems. He's lying. How would I - I, as President - I don't  
23 even know who this person is. But he's protected, so I don't  
24 even know his name. But I, as President of Liberia, would take  
25 ammunition and give it to - I don't even know if he's Liberian or  
26 Sierra Leonean. What, I have nothing else to do as President but  
27 to be a little shop boy to go and take ammunition and give it to  
28 someone? He is lying. And 1997, I don't know of any incident,  
29 even with all the testimony here, in 1997 in Freetown. I don't

09:53:16

1 understand it.

2 Q. Well, let me give you a little more information from his  
3 testimony.

09:53:49

4 "... sometimes the President used to send him to get the  
5 ammunition from White Flower, the Executive Mansion, to  
6 take it to Sam Bockarie, and that was not his first time to  
7 cross over with ammunition.

8 Q. Now, after you took the ammunition to Sam Bockarie what  
9 became of the ammunition, if you know?

09:54:05

10 A. Sam Bockarie just got outside and looked at the  
11 ammunition, and he told us not to delay. He said we should  
12 take the ammunition immediately to Superman in Freetown,  
13 because they heard that ECOMOG will soon be attacking us in  
14 Freetown. So we took the ammunition to Freetown to  
15 Superman and we turned them over to Superman."

09:54:26

16 1997 this is, Mr Taylor. Why were you sending arms to the  
17 RUF in Freetown in 1997?

18 A. I never did. I never did, and I don't even know what could  
19 have been happening in Freetown in 1997. Never gave anybody any  
20 ammunition.

09:54:50

21 Q. Well, according to the witness, it's an anticipation of an  
22 ECOMOG attack. Now, do you know of an anticipated ECOMOG attack  
23 in 1997?

24 A. No, I'm unaware of any anticipated ECOMOG attack in 1997.

09:55:08

25 Q. When was the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Best of my recollection, it's February of 1998.

27 Q. So help us, can you think of any reason why you would be  
28 wanting to send arms and ammunition to the RUF in anticipation of  
29 an ECOMOG attack in 1997?

1 A. None whatsoever. None whatsoever. And if we look at 1997,  
2 I'm sure the Court is aware that's when I'm elected as President,  
3 in July of 1997. By this time if ammunition is crossing the  
4 border from Liberia into Sierra Leone in a truck, then ECOMOG  
09:55:53 5 must be carrying it. Because don't let's forget ECOMOG, with  
6 18,000 soldiers, are fully deployed in Liberia. Upon my election  
7 they don't pack up and leave the country. So if the truckload of  
8 ammunition is crossing from Liberia to Sierra Leone, it must be  
9 with the complicity of ECOMOG. It's just not possible. So I  
09:56:18 10 don't know how he made up this lie. It did not happen. It's a  
11 lie.

12 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, he says that the truck, based on what he's  
13 saying, must have travelled from either White Flower or the  
14 Executive Mansion all the way to Sierra Leone. So what are you  
09:56:39 15 saying about that?

16 A. I say it's a lie. In fact, White Flower does not exist in  
17 1997. White Flower does not exist. I managed to get that house  
18 - White Flower is my private home. It's not a government  
19 building. And I moved into that building in January of 1999. So  
09:56:57 20 there is no White Flower at this time, none. So if he even  
21 mentioned it, he's lying. There's no White Flower in 1997, okay.  
22 So it's a blatant lie. That's the best I can say. There is no  
23 such thing going on in 1997 that I know of in Freetown. The  
24 intervention occurs in February 1998. I don't know how he  
09:57:21 25 managed to make up this one, but it's a made up lie, that's all.

26 Q. And he continues:

27 "Q. Did Jungle tell you whether he took anything back?  
28 You say he would take ammunition to Sierra Leone. Did he  
29 say whether he would take anything back to Liberia?

1 A. Yes, when I got to know him better later, we were very  
2 close. Like he used to explain to me. He used to say that  
3 he was the person that was serving as liaison between Sam  
4 Bockarie and President Taylor."

09:58:01 5 This is Jungle. Did you have such a liaison, Mr Taylor?

6 A. There's no such liaison. There is no such - when I finally  
7 meet Sam Bockarie, I send for him. He doesn't - when I meet Sam  
8 Bockarie in 1998 for the contact, I send and ask him to come and  
9 see me. There was no liaison called no Jungle. This witness is  
10 lying.

09:58:27

11 Q. And when you - following that invitation to Sam Bockarie,  
12 when thereafter you saw him?

13 A. I saw him --

14 Q. How would you communicate with him?

09:58:41 15 A. Sam Bockarie? When we wanted Sam Bockarie, we would call  
16 him. We would have a radio message go through. We set up a  
17 radio at the guesthouse on the second visit, so we would contact  
18 him by radio.

09:58:59

19 Q. In light of that, did you have need for a Jungle to act as  
20 liaison between you and Sam Bockarie?

21 A. No, there was no need. No need whatsoever. Whenever I  
22 needed Sam Bockarie, we called him. Everything was official.  
23 Nothing hidden. No.

09:59:18

24 Q. "He used to take diamonds to President Taylor and he will  
25 in turn give him ammunition to take it to Sierra Leone. Jungle  
26 told me that personally. But because he said he had a personal  
27 problem with Sam Bockarie - he used to explain all of these  
28 things to me. Jungle was having personal problems with Sam  
29 Bockarie before his death."

1 Now, does that help you to identify this Jungle, a man with  
2 whom Sam Bockarie was having problems?

3 A. No, I do not know Jungle. No, I do not know him.

4 Q. And he goes on:

09:59:56 5 "Yes, at the time, Jungle was having some personal problems  
6 with Sam Bockarie. He used to call me and explain things to me.  
7 He said Sam Bockarie said is sidelining him and that Sam Bockarie  
8 is not recalling what used to happen in the past and that he was  
9 the one that created the contact between Charles Taylor and Sam  
10:00:17 10 Bockarie."

11 Pause there. Do you understand the import of that,  
12 Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. This witness is saying that Jungle told him that it was  
10:00:29 15 Jungle who set up the link between you and Sam Bockarie. Is that  
16 true?

17 A. That is totally untrue. That is totally untrue, and let's  
18 be reminded, there was not a Jungle or any other person involved  
19 in this. I received from the Foreign Ministry of Liberia in  
10:00:50 20 August of 1998 a letter that had been written by Ambassador  
21 Tiagen Wantee advising that an Eddie Kanneh had come to Conakry  
22 to the embassy to say that there was one Sam Bockarie and, he,  
23 Eddie Kanneh that wanted to come and see me to reveal a plan that  
24 had been hatched by - with the knowledge of some senior members  
10:01:12 25 of the UN to disrupt the Government of Liberia. I saw that as an  
26 opportunity. I contacted my colleagues on the Committee of Five  
27 and told them that I had received information that this Sam  
28 Bockarie wanted to come and see me. They all felt that it was a  
29 good opportunity. And in September of 1998 I, Charles Ghankay

1 Taylor, invited Sam Bockarie to come to meet me in Monrovia.

2 There was not a Jungle or nobody.

3 Q. "He was the one that created the contact between  
4 Charles Taylor and Sam Bockarie. That he was the one who used to  
10:01:53 5 talk to the President about him and all the diamonds they used to  
6 give to him. He used to be very honest with them."

7 What do you say about this diamond business, Mr Taylor?

8 A. That's a total, total, total falsehood. Total.

9 Q. He continues:

10:02:14 10 "Jungle told me that Sam Bockarie sidelined him because he  
11 was the person who went to receive Sam Bockarie and he went along  
12 with Varmuyan Sherif and they brought him to Monrovia."

13 What do you say about that?

14 A. That's a lie. You can see - I can see the Varmuyan Sherif  
10:02:35 15 - in fact, Varmuyan must know this person because the way how  
16 this lie comes - Varmuyan Sherif is the individual mentioned in  
17 the letter from Ambassador Wantee as being the contact, okay, of  
18 Sam Bockarie in Monrovia, that which we did not even know that  
19 this Sherif, I mean, was a contact of Sam Bockarie. When I got  
10:03:00 20 ready, I sent General Dopoe Menkarzon to the border to receive  
21 Sam Bockarie and bring him down to me. I did not even use anyone  
22 even called Varmuyan Sherif. I used General Menkarzon.

23 Q. But, Mr Taylor, if you recall, yesterday when we were  
24 looking at that witness, TF1-567, you recall that it was  
10:03:23 25 initially Jungle who had brought Sam Bockarie, and then on  
26 another occasion it was Varmuyan Sherif who had brought him.  
27 We're now hearing that it's Jungle and Varmuyan Sherif who had  
28 brought him to Monrovia. What do you make of that?

29 A. That's the concoction. That's how they - maybe they all



1 know each other and made this lie up.

2 Q. Let's just remind ourselves:

3 "Jungle told me that Sam Bockarie sidelined him because he  
4 was the person who went to receive Sam Bockarie and he went along  
10:03:53 5 with Varmuyan Sheriff and they brought him to Monrovia."

6 Did that ever happen, Mr Taylor?

7 A. This never happened. But, if I recall, and we may have to  
8 go back into the records, if we look at Varmuyan Sheriff's own  
9 testimony, I don't recall, and I stand corrected, of him

10:04:15 10 mentioning that Jungle was a part of his delegation that he  
11 claimed crossed from Vahun into Sierra Leone, get arrested and  
12 all of this kind of stuff. We may need to check it. But, I  
13 mean, it is totally, totally false.

14 Q. We'll come to Mr Sheriff. Don't worry:

10:04:35 15 "But when they got to Monrovia, Sam Bockarie was now trying  
16 to push him far off from him, that he put him on a \$200 US  
17 payroll and he put others on a \$400 US payroll."

18 Do you know anything about that?

19 A. No, I don't. No.

10:04:59 20 Q. Now, from whom was Sam Bockarie receiving money when he got  
21 to Monrovia, Mr Taylor, in December of 1999? Who was supporting  
22 him?

23 A. I supported him; the government. The government.

24 Q. "So he said Sam Bockarie sidelined him. He said he was not  
10:05:24 25 feeling good about that at all. He explained that to me, and I  
26 used to tell him to take care, to just take things cool, that  
27 things will be fine one day. Jungle started complaining about  
28 Bockarie in 2001 because by then Bockarie was in exile and he  
29 used to complain. When Bockarie used call on Benjamin Yeaten's

1 satellite phone, I used to pick the phone up."

2 Were you aware of such telephone contact between Benjamin  
3 Yeaten and Bockarie?

10:06:02

4 A. Well, not directly, no, but it would not be unusual that  
5 they would have been in contact. But I'm not aware of the  
6 day-to-day, but there would be nothing strange about that for me.

7 Q. Did Benjamin Yeaten have a satellite phone, to your  
8 knowledge?

9 A. Yes, Benjamin had a satellite phone.

10:06:42

10 Q. Now, the witness goes on that he's sent on a mission by Sam  
11 Bockarie, page 12532 of the transcript of 23 June 2008:

12 "A. We went to Buedu ... when we got to Sam Bockarie and  
13 we saluted him, he told us to rest. From there he told us  
14 to get prepared to join Eddie Kanneh and that we were  
15 to take all instructions from Eddie Kanneh that we were  
16 going to Liberia?

10:07:05

17 Q. Who was Eddie Kanneh?

18 A. He was once an NPRC official and later AFRC, a  
19 minister, at that time when we retreated and went to  
20 Buedu."

10:07:21

21 And he continues:

22 "Q. After Sam Bockarie had given you that instruction,  
23 what happened then?

24 A. We moved and we went to Foya, Foya district, Voinjama  
25 county in Liberia.

10:08:08

26 Q. Did all of the group that had arrived in Buedu go on to  
27 Foya, all of those from Superman Ground?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Who went to Foya?

1 A. Myself, Colonel Bakarr, Eddie Kanneh and some senior  
2 people who came from Sam Bockarie's side."  
3 He goes on to describe that he was travelling in a vehicle.  
4 "A. When we got to Foya, Zigzag Marzah received us. I  
10:08:41 5 think within 30 minutes we saw a helicopter that landed at  
6 the Foya airfield and we went on board the helicopter and  
7 they took us to Gbarnga at the President's farm.

8 Q. Now, you said Zigzag Marzah. Did you know him prior to  
9 meeting him in Foya?

10:09:03 10 A. Yes, I saw him in Buedu once.

11 Q. Who was he?

12 A. He was from the AFL in Liberia, at the same time SSS."

13 Mr Taylor, Zigzag Marzah, firstly, did you know him?

14 A. I first saw Zigzag Marzah in this Court. No, I did not  
10:09:25 15 know him personally, no.

16 Q. When you saw him in this Court, did you recognise him?

17 A. No, I didn't recognise Marzah.

18 Q. Now, tell me, I don't know if you can help us with this:

19 "He was from the AFL in Liberia, at the same time SSS." What do  
10:09:46 20 you make of that?

21 A. It doesn't - the only thing I can make out from this is  
22 that - I don't know what year he's talking about, whether he's  
23 referring to 2001, am I right about that?

24 Q. Well, it's difficult to say. I'm sorry, I can't help you.

10:10:14 25 A. Well, it would not be - this Zigzag Marzah ends up being an  
26 orderly to Benjamin Yeaten. Now, an orderly to Benjamin Yeaten,  
27 if it's 2001 when we are actually involved in combat, it would  
28 not be surprising for me that if Benjamin Yeaten is in the field  
29 that Zigzag Marzah would be fighting, and those that are fighting

1 are called AFL, okay. So when he says here SSS at the same time  
2 AFL, that is possible, as far as their description go, okay. But  
3 an SSS orderly to Benjamin that is an ex-combatant in by 2001  
4 would fight in the field, so I can see why he would refer to him  
10:11:03 5 as AFL.

6 Q. But the witness goes on. Zigzag Marzah was a colonel. "He  
7 was a colonel in the SSS." Are you aware of that?

8 A. No, I'm not aware. An orderly to Benjamin Yeaten that  
9 cannot read and write, no. A colonel, no, I doubt that very  
10:11:25 10 much. I don't think Zigzag would be a colonel.

11 Q. Now, in the normal course of events, Mr Taylor, would you  
12 have knowledge of someone of the rank of colonel?

13 A. Well, not necessarily. It depends on the assignment of  
14 that particular person in the Secret Service. I can tell you  
10:11:51 15 quite frankly, I may know not more than a dozen Secret Service  
16 personnel that I can identify by face and name, because the  
17 service is a big service and no President goes around trying to  
18 remember, Are you John Brown? No, it doesn't work that way. So  
19 I wouldn't really know. I mean, senior people like the commander  
10:12:20 20 who rarely is changed from that enter circle, you would know him  
21 and a few of the very close quarter people that are frequent  
22 around you, but you would not know. Depending on the assignment,  
23 you can see any number of people. You look, you may just see a  
24 face, but you can't identify that face and that name. Nobody  
10:12:42 25 President is able to do that. Nobody.

26 Q. Anyway, he continues:

27 "We went on board the helicopter that came from Gbarnga.  
28 It took use to the President's farm in Gbarnga. At that  
29 time they used to call it the President's farm.

1 Q. Who was the President?

2 A. President Taylor. Charles Taylor.

3 Q. After the helicopter went to the farm in Gbarnga, what  
4 happened?

10:13:08 5 A. I met Benjamin Yeaten.

6 Q. Had you ever met Benjamin Yeaten before?

7 A. No.

8 Q. And how was he introduced to you?

9 A. He was introduced to me as the director of the SSS.

10:13:21 10 They said, 'This is the President's SSS director Benjamin  
11 Yeaten.' Eddie Kanneh told us that to meet him and he  
12 introduced us. He said, 'These are the boys that I brought  
13 along with me to collect the ammunition.'

14 Q. So when you got to the Gbarnga to the farm, what  
10:13:54 15 happened?

16 A. They gave us two cars from the farm and they told us  
17 from the airport that we should go to the President's house  
18 to go and load the ammunition in the two cars. The cars  
19 were driven by Jungle and Sampson Weah."

10:14:09 20 Do you know Sampson Weah?

21 A. Yes, I know Sampson. Sampson is a cousin of Benjamin  
22 Yeaten. Yes, I know Sampson.

23 Q. "They were both from the SSS. The ammunition was parked at  
24 the car park of the President's house in Gbarnga. We loaded the  
10:14:24 25 ammunition." Do you recognise that description of your farm,  
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. No, but I tell you what happened. If any President will  
28 sit down and - where he lives and make it an arms storage, then  
29 maybe the Secret Service should not even assist. There is no way

1 that in where I'm sleeping on my farm somebody's going to load  
2 bombs in the building. Like, the Secret Service can't keep it in  
3 their houses, they're going to bring it in my quarters and keep  
4 it? This is bizarre, as far as I can seeing this.

10:14:58 5 Q. Hold on a second, Mr Taylor. Let's go on and try and  
6 identify which building he's talking about.

7 "Q. When you say 'the President's house', what house are  
8 you referring to?

9 A. When President Taylor used to say, because the house -  
10:15:11 10 I think the house was for his sister. By then he had not  
11 finished his own house. That was where he used to say, at  
12 the farm."

13 Recognise that?

14 A. That's my house. It was a farmhouse where I stayed.

10:15:28 15 Q. No, he's saying the house was for your sister?

16 A. That's why I'm saying: No, it's not for my sister. It's  
17 my house.

18 Q. How many houses were there on the farm?

19 A. There is - I built a small house on the farm where I was  
10:15:42 20 staying, and I was building a regular house where I would be.  
21 That house is still not completed. It's standing on the farm in  
22 Gbarnga right now. But the small house was my house, not my  
23 sister's house.

24 Q. And then it continues:

10:16:09 25 "Q. Where exactly did you get the ammunition from?

26 A. The President's residence.

27 Q. Was it in the house? Was it outdoors? Where was it?

28 A. The garage, at the car park where he used to park his  
29 car."

1 Recognise that, Mr Taylor?

2 A. This is totally, totally a lie. You want to tell me the  
3 house that he met Benjamin Yeaten in? You cannot keep ammunition  
4 there and RPG bombs. Benjamin Yeaten is going to bring the  
10:16:50 5 storage of ammunition to my house, in my garage?

6 Q. Where you park your car.

7 A. Then that means the SSS director wants to blow me up. It  
8 just did not happen. Never happened this way. Never.

9 Q. "Q. Well, what kind of ammunition was in the garage?

10:17:07 10 A. AK rounds in boxes, RPG rockets, GMG rounds and others.

11 Q. And what did you do with this ammunition?

12 A. Eddie Kanneh told us that Jungle would lead us to Foya  
13 and that he was going to Monrovia with Benjamin Yeaten to  
14 see the President."

10:17:36 15 Now, do you recall such a meeting with Eddie Kanneh and  
16 Benjamin Yeaten, Mr Taylor?

17 A. No, I don't.

18 Q. Sorry I can't help you with a year, but can you?

19 A. No, no.

10:17:46 20 Q. Were you aware of these activities going on on your farm in  
21 Gbarnga?

22 A. No, I was not aware of arms - SSS arms being given to the  
23 RUF. If it happened, I'm not aware, no.

24 Q. Were you aware that your garage on your farm was being used  
10:18:05 25 to store ammunition?

26 A. In fact, we didn't really have a garage at that house, so I  
27 don't know what this fellow is talking about. The typical sense  
28 of a garage, what you know, would be a car park where you close  
29 maybe the doors. There's no such thing on my farm. In fact, the

1 house I'm living in is just a temporary house that I put - it's a  
2 small house, and I'm trying to fix the big one. So there is  
3 nothing fancy about it like a garage and things. It's just an  
4 open place where the car can drive where they put zinc over it  
10:18:44 5 that when it rains, it doesn't come on it. It's not enclosed on  
6 any side. So where would this thing be? So there's no garage at  
7 this house, okay? There's no garage, so I don't know - when  
8 they're making up these lies, they put words in there. There is  
9 no garage at this little house that I'm living at, no.

10:19:04 10 Q. Anyway, he continues that the arms were loaded up on to  
11 Toyota Land Cruiser pick-ups, they drove the Buedu, where they  
12 handed the ammunition over to Sam Bockarie:

13 "Q. What happened after you took the ammunition to the  
14 ammunition dump in Buedu?

10:19:31 15 A. Sam Bockarie told us to get ready to receive our own  
16 ammunition for Kono and he started distributing the  
17 ammunition. He gave some of the ammunition to Akim to  
18 attack Daru, and he gave ours for us to take it to Kono  
19 District to Superman.

10:19:49 20 Q. Where did this ammunition come from?

21 A. The same ammunition that we brought from Gbarnga, that  
22 was the ammunition that he distributed to us. It was to  
23 attack Segbwema, Daru barracks, at that time.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: We need a time frame, please.

10:20:10 25 THE WITNESS: Yes, I remember. It was in '98. I think it  
26 was some time around the starting - the beginning of the  
27 rainy season."

28 When does the rainy season begin in that part of the world,  
29 Mr Taylor?



1 A. Well, in Liberia, the best I know the rainy season starts  
2 around May/June. Around May, that's when the rains are coming  
3 in. So if he's talking about - now that we have some time frame  
4 attached to this and he is saying this is 1998 --

10:20:46 5 Q. Round about the start of the rainy season?

6 A. Okay. So we look at May 1998, and he's talking about a  
7 Kono attack in all of that, so maybe if we - I don't offhand -  
8 but if I'm looking at this, I may have to associate this with  
9 Kono and what we've heard in this Court, there was supposed to be  
10 Fitti-Fatta and there was supposed to be Kono before they went on  
11 to Freetown. So maybe if we begin to zoom in on some of those.  
12 I'm just hearing this here, so --

13 Q. Well, I'll help you to zoom in. Because he continues,  
14 bearing in mind beginning of the rainy season '98, page 12540, he  
10:21:36 15 is then asked whether the rainy season is different in Liberia  
16 and Sierra Leone and he says: "In both of the countries it's the  
17 same, Sierra Leone and Liberia." He can't remember the month,  
18 but he did take the ammunition to Superman:

19 "Q. Was there any operation after you took ammunition to  
10:21:56 20 Superman?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Did that operation have a name?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What was the name?

10:22:05 25 A. Yes, Fitti-Fatta."

26 So understand now what is being said. Arms taken from your  
27 farm are transported to Buedu, it's then handed out to Superman  
28 for this Fitti-Fatta operation round about the beginning of the  
29 rainy season in 1998. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Well, that did not happen. But I would have to really - in  
2 really trying to get to the bottom of this witness's testimony,  
3 we would have to compare that, in my opinion, to some of the  
4 other witnesses and what they have said about - because we've  
10:22:48 5 heard a lot about Fitti-Fatta here in this Court. So because I'm  
6 just seeing the transcript - you know, I studied these a lot, so  
7 I'm sure I'd better be able to work on this. Because other  
8 witnesses have given this whole Fitti-Fatta and Kono business, it  
9 looks, if I remember, going towards the last quarter of 1998, if  
10:23:10 10 I'm not mistaken. So I may have to go and reflect on this maybe  
11 for another witness, but no such thing happened. I did not give  
12 any ammunition. That's the --

13 Q. We'll do our homework as we go along, Mr Taylor, with these  
14 witnesses. But he's then asked whether the Fitti-Fatta mission  
10:23:29 15 was successful in taking Koidu. "No."

16 Now, that's that Fitti-Fatta mission that the witness  
17 speaks of. Let's move on to another topic. Page 12642, 24 June  
18 2008:

19 "Q. You mentioned that President Taylor had a satellite  
10:24:03 20 phone. Just tell us, how did you know that President  
21 Taylor had a satellite phone?

22 A. Because I had his number at the time - direct number  
23 from him and I had his satellite, the direct number for his  
24 satellite phone and the cell phone. But presently I can  
10:24:26 25 only remember the cell phone because it's very short, but I  
26 can't remember that for the satellite phone.

27 Q. What's his cell number?

28 A. 06510547."

29 Shaking your head isn't very useful, Mr Taylor, because it

1 doesn't go on the transcript. What do you want to say about  
2 that?

3 A. That's the biggest lie I've ever heard. There is no such  
4 cell phone of mine that this witness, whoever he is, would have  
10:25:03 5 of mine, because when it comes to my - when it comes to my  
6 cellular phone, even cabinet ministers, not all of them had my  
7 cell phone number. My cell phone number was not a number that  
8 anyone could just get that way, and in fact that was one of the  
9 only numbers in Liberia that was really protected. And by  
10:25:30 10 "protected", I could call anyone and the number would not  
11 register on the other side, while in Liberia at that time it was  
12 unlawful for that service to be given to anybody else. I mean,  
13 there is no way - Benjamin Yeaten --

14 Q. Mr Taylor, can I interrupt you so that we can get one or  
10:25:50 15 two details. Firstly, when did you first, if you can recall,  
16 have use of a cell phone?

17 A. I would say this in 1998 the cell company came to Liberia.

18 Q. Which cell company?

19 A. The cell company is Lone Star cell telephone.

10:26:19 20 Q. And they came to Liberia when?

21 A. I would say in 1998 we brought them in.

22 Q. And who was your service provider for the cell phone?

23 A. Oh, boy, I don't know how they do it here. I don't even  
24 know. We just knew the company was Lone Star. I don't know how  
10:26:38 25 they do it in Europe, like providers and different things. The  
26 company's called Lone Star, that's all I know.

27 Q. Let me put the question this way: Who did you pay your  
28 telephone bills to?

29 A. We - I did not pay telephone bills. The ministry - okay,

1 well, okay, I know you don't mean me. The Ministry of State,  
2 they paid it directly to Lone Star.

3 Q. To Lone Star?

4 A. Yes.

10:27:08 5 Q. Right. Now, can you remember the number of your cell  
6 phone, Mr Taylor?

7 A. My cell phone in Liberia was 06 - I think it's 557777. I  
8 think there were four 7s. I think there were six numbers. I  
9 remember the last four was 7777, which was the number I used -

10:27:40 10 the number that I won the election with, the 7. So four 7s. The  
11 first two numbers were the 065 and I think 7777.

12 Q. And how many cell phones did you have?

13 A. I had one cell phone in the Republic of Liberia, that  
14 number.

10:28:00 15 Q. Did you have a satellite phone as well?

16 A. Yes, I did have a satellite phone.

17 Q. And can you remember the number of that?

18 A. No, I cannot remember the number of that phone, no.

19 Q. When did you get that satellite phone?

10:28:21 20 A. Actually, I got that satellite phone during the height of  
21 the war. In fact, it was from a company called Thuraya. I think  
22 it's spelt T-H-R-U --

23 Q. I think that name is on the record already.

24 A. Okay. It's called Thuraya, okay, which is a small phone  
10:28:47 25 about the size of this eye glasses case. It's a small phone. It  
26 was very advanced. You just pull out the antenna and you could  
27 call. It was not one of those desks - it was just about the size  
28 of this - almost the size of a regular telephone, Thuraya.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Taylor, could you kindly repeat your

1 cell phone number without breaking it up?

2 THE WITNESS: Okay. Liberia is 06 and the number is - I  
3 think it was 557777.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:29:36 5 Q. Now, moving on, Mr Taylor, who had your mobile - your cell  
6 phone - let's stick to the American phrase. Who had your cell  
7 phone number?

8 A. I will start with my wife, the Vice-President, the Speaker  
9 of the House of Representative, the President pro tempore of the  
10:30:10 10 Senate, the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister, the adviser  
11 on national security. I don't remember the other members of the  
12 -but the members of the national security council, the seniors  
13 members. That would be defence, foreign affairs, justice, these  
14 are the individuals - okay, Heads of State. The Heads of State  
10:30:40 15 of West Africa, most of them had that particular number that they  
16 could call me directly. But these are the people that had it. I  
17 would say, on the whole cabinet, except for the members of the  
18 national security council, most other cabinet ministers had to go  
19 through the Executive Mansion line to get me.

10:30:58 20 Q. I was coming to that, Mr Taylor. For what purpose did you,  
21 as a President of a country, have a mobile phone, a cell phone?

22 A. That is when I'm moving or in places where there's not a  
23 landline that I could be reached by senior members of government  
24 or other colleagues wherever they were.

10:31:24 25 Q. And apart from those occasions you've described, what  
26 telephone would you normally use?

27 A. I would normally use my cell phone, depending on - it  
28 depends on the location, okay. If I'm in the Executive Mansion,  
29 for example, and I'm not in the office or near a land desk phone,

1 of course, I would probably - there are two ways. I would inform  
2 the aide-de-camp of a number that I wanted to reach and they  
3 would process it through the operators. At the mansion there are  
4 operators on duty that will place calls, receive calls and  
10:32:16 5 transfer it to wherever I was in the building. Now, if I'm,  
6 let's say, driving in a convoy in the car and I had to reach  
7 somebody urgently, I would then use my mobile telephone.

8 Now, on the farm - on my farm or, let's say, other parts of  
9 the country where the cell signal is not - I mean, has not  
10:32:47 10 reached, I would use the Thuraya phone. The Thuraya could call a  
11 local number as well as the cell number. By local number I mean  
12 landline number.

13 Q. Because, help us, Mr Taylor, at this time in 1998, what was  
14 the extent of cell phone coverage in Liberia?

10:33:11 15 A. Cell phone by this time I would say only Monrovia, I would  
16 say right in the city. The cell phones that at particular time I  
17 would put it to a radius of about maybe 20 miles. 15 to 20  
18 miles, but not more.

19 Q. I ask for this reason: Could you use your cell phone to,  
10:33:36 20 for example, call a number in Sierra Leone?

21 A. My cell phone to call a number in Sierra Leone?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. Yes, you could.

24 Q. You could?

10:33:47 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. So the coverage extended as far as Sierra Leone, did it?

27 A. No, no, no, but we're talking about a different thing.

28 With a cell phone, if you wanted to make an overseas call, you  
29 could make an overseas call. But the local position - let's say

1 if you were in Kakata in that particular period where there is  
2 not an antenna that could pick up the signal, if you had another  
3 cell in Liberia, no, you couldn't be reached. But the cell  
4 phones that were in Monrovia, if you wanted to call overseas, you  
10:34:25 5 just - you dial and it goes directly. That's different from if  
6 you were deal with it locally where antennas would be posted.

7 Q. Now, having gone through all of that, the witness then said  
8 this:

9 "Q. Did you ever speak to President Taylor on President  
10:34:47 10 Taylor's satellite phone?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay, thank you, Mr Witness. Do you know the mobile  
13 number, the cell number, for Benjamin Yeaten?

14 A. Yes.

10:35:00 15 Q. Could you please tell us that number, if you remember  
16 it now?

17 A. 06510244. 510244. It's his own mobile phone number."  
18 Do you recognise that number, Mr Taylor?

19 A. No, I don't recognise it. I very rarely would speak to the  
10:35:28 20 Secret Service men on the phone.

21 Q. Why?

22 A. The Secret Service director, if I needed him, he was  
23 called. I didn't have anything to speak to Benjamin about on the  
24 phone. I mean, that's totally, in fact, beyond protocol. It  
10:35:45 25 would be the highest of respect maybe if Benjamin were to receive  
26 a call from the President. I mean, except where a situation if  
27 I'm out of the country and Benjamin is not there and I wanted to  
28 speak to him, I would place a call, but I never would talk to  
29 Benjamin. I really don't - I didn't know his cell phone number,

1 no. If I needed him I would just say, "Get me the SSS director."

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I don't know if you recall the particular  
3 individual - remember, we're not mentioning names - the  
4 particular individual who gave this testimony to this Court. Do  
10:36:29 5 you recall?

6 A. Yes, I think now as I'm listening, I think I recall who  
7 this person is.

8 Q. The reason I'm asking you is this: Did that person have  
9 your cell phone number?

10:36:48 10 A. No, he did not have my cell phone number, and that number  
11 that he mentioned is not my cell phone number.

12 Q. So, Mr Taylor, did you recognise the individual when he  
13 came to court --

14 A. No.

10:37:05 15 Q. -- as someone you'd seen before?

16 A. No, I did not recognise him.

17 Q. So what do you say about this suggestion that this man was  
18 speaking to you on the phone?

19 A. You know, when I think about it, I swear, you know, there  
10:37:26 20 are just so many surprises that I have met during this trial.  
21 There is no way that this particular individual spoke to me on  
22 the phone or sat to talk with me. As I remember his testimony  
23 now, no, it just did not happen.

24 Q. Was he, for example, one of your government ministers?

10:37:45 25 A. No, he was not a --

26 Q. Was he a senior official in Liberia?

27 A. No, he was not. Not even a junior.

28 Q. Was he a close personal friend of yours?

29 A. Close personal friend?



1 Q. That's what I'm asking.

2 A. No, no, no, no, no, no.

3 Q. So how do you explain this man suggesting then, Mr Taylor,  
4 that he's got your mobile number?

10:38:21 5 A. I really don't know. I've heard so many strange things  
6 here. I really don't know how he came up with this. This is  
7 nobody that is senior anywhere, whether in Liberia or any other  
8 place. This is - I mean, I don't know how they got him to say  
9 this, or whatever, but I don't know the fellow. I don't know  
10:38:43 10 him. I have never met before in my life. He is nobody that is  
11 senior in the military or anything that I know. He's not a part  
12 of the SSS. He's not a part of the AFL. I don't know the  
13 gentleman. I don't know.

14 Q. Now, let's go on with his testimony, please. He was asked  
10:39:10 15 this question on a similar note:

16 "Q. You mentioned Sam Bockarie going into exile. Did you  
17 ever have - did you have any communication with Sam  
18 Bockarie after he left Liberia?

19 A. Yes.

10:39:23 20 Q. Can you tell us the circumstances?

21 A. Yes ... Sam Bockarie called on Benjamin Yeaten's  
22 satellite phone and Benjamin Yeaten refused to answer the  
23 phone for the first time. When Benjamin Yeaten saw the  
24 number and it was Sam Bockarie, he told me to answer the  
10:39:42 25 call and to tell him that he was not around. When Sam  
26 Bockarie started talking, when I said it was me speaking, I  
27 the witness, he said, 'Oh, you are now a big man.' And  
28 then he started laughing. And then he said, 'I am really  
29 suffering here.' He said, 'The people with all the

1 agreements we had before I left to go on exile have been  
2 turned down. I don't have money. Everything is finished.  
3 All the things I brought with me here, so I am suffering.  
4 So I please want you to tell Benjamin Yeaten.' And then I  
10:40:18 5 said, 'I will do that, sir.' That was what we  
6 communicated. We first communicated in 2001.

7 Q. Where was he at the time of this communication?

8 A. Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou."

9 Now, as far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, in 2001, was Sam  
10:40:44 10 Bockarie in Burkina Faso?

11 A. To the best of my knowledge, when Sam Bockarie left  
12 Liberia, I really don't know where he went to. I don't know if  
13 he was in there because during this time, 2001, it was still  
14 being said on all of the news wires that Sam Bockarie was still  
10:41:06 15 in Liberia and I was - the Government of Liberia was fighting  
16 tooth and nail to say, "This man has been expelled. He is not  
17 here." But they were still saying - I do not know. To the best  
18 of my knowledge, Sam Bockarie left Liberia through La Cote  
19 d'Ivoire. Where he went from there, I can't be sure. I have  
10:41:29 20 heard accounts in this Court of where in travelled, but I really  
21 don't know. I only know he went through - into La Cote d'Ivoire.  
22 From there on, I have no knowledge and had no contacts with him.

23 Q. Now, he went on to say:

24 "The third time I spoke to him" - that being Sam Bockarie -  
10:41:47 25 "he was in the Ivory Coast. At the time he was in the Ivory  
26 Coast, he called. When he called, I think at the time we were on  
27 the President's farm, and he started talking about - he was  
28 talking - the conversation was about a machine. He had a  
29 machine. He said at the time he was in exile in Burkina Faso.

1 He was suffering, nobody cared about him, and that when he  
2 crossed over to Ivory Coast and he looted some machines, at that  
3 moment the Government of Liberia was asking for that machine, for  
4 it to be crossed over to Liberia, and he said he was not going  
10:42:26 5 to allow that, and he said he was not taking any orders from the  
6 Liberian government any more. He was aggressively saying that  
7 over the satellite phone. He talked to me and he talked to the  
8 late Salami."

9 Any knowledge of that, Mr Taylor?

10:42:42 10 A. No. No, I'm not aware of these discussions, no.

11 Q. Do you recall Sam Bockarie having in his position in Cote  
12 d'Ivoire a machine which the Government of Liberia wanted?

13 A. No. No.

14 Q. Now this:

10:43:07 15 "Q. Now, you have indicated that on a couple of occasions  
16 Sam Bockarie told you he was suffering and nobody cared  
17 about him. Did he explain what he meant by that?

18 A. Yes, he even made mention about diamonds. He said the  
19 amount of diamonds that he crossed with - he said he was  
10:43:27 20 told to turn the diamonds over to President Taylor, by  
21 President Taylor himself, and that President Taylor will  
22 support him, and later he did not see the support. So at  
23 present they were telling him to cross over with the yellow  
24 machine. He said he was not going to allow that."

10:43:53 25 Do you understand what he's suggesting there, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. Did Sam Bockarie turn diamonds over to you at your request?

28 A. Sam Bockarie never turned diamonds over to me at my request  
29 or he never turned any diamonds over to me. But if Sam Bockarie

1 was supposed to have diamonds, there is testimony before this  
2 Court by a Prosecution witness that says that even while Sam  
3 Bockarie was living in Liberia, he started to try to work to get  
4 involved in diamond mining to - as assistance to himself because  
10:44:26 5 the money that we were giving to him as a government was not  
6 sufficient. So logically one would say so why would Sam Bockarie  
7 bring diamonds over to Charles Taylor? He is suffering in  
8 Liberia, that he has to go out and try to work and do diamond  
9 work in Liberia to survive, so what is he giving me the diamonds  
10:44:46 10 for? It's just not true.

11 Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia in 1999, December, and the  
12 Government of Liberia is assisting him. He's on government  
13 payroll. His men are put into the ATU, they are taken away from  
14 him and given citizenship. There is no such thing of Sam  
10:45:08 15 Bockarie coming to Liberia and giving me diamonds and have to  
16 suffer and go back into the diamond field in Liberia to work. It  
17 just didn't happen.

18 Q. Mr Taylor, what is a "front line meeting"?

19 A. I don't know what - a front line meeting? I don't know  
10:45:27 20 what that is, a front line meeting.

21 Q. Listen to this:

22 "Q. Mr Witness, when you were in Liberia did you attend  
23 any meetings where the President of Liberia was there?

24 A. Yes.

10:45:47 25 Q. What kind of meetings were these?

26 A. We had preparation of front line meetings. I attended  
27 meetings at his farm about Sam Bockarie when Sam Bockarie  
28 returned to Liberia."

29 Do you know anything about that?

1 A. No, but there is something strange about - I don't think  
2 this - would it - maybe I need some help from the Court by  
3 identifying the country where this witness is from. Does it give  
4 too much - I need some help from the Court. Not the name, but  
10:46:37 5 just the country. If I identify the country, would that hurt?

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think you just answer your counsel's  
7 question, Mr Taylor, and he'll take it from there.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Do you have any idea where this man is from, Mr Taylor?

10:46:52 10 A. Yes, he's non-Liberian. He's non-Liberian, and what would  
11 a non-Liberian be doing in - I mean, of the calibre of this  
12 witness, a non-Liberian, one individual, one non-Liberian, a  
13 little fellow, would be sitting in a meeting - in a senior  
14 meeting with me? I mean, it's crazy. It just didn't happen. As  
10:47:19 15 I recall this - what would this one little fellow from a  
16 different country be doing sitting in a senior meeting with me  
17 and ministers and top generals and different things or whatever.  
18 It didn't happen.

19 Q. Well, let's look at his own words:

10:47:36 20 "Q. When you are talking about the front line meetings,  
21 just explain what you mean by 'front line meetings'.

22 A. When we talk about front line meetings, we will go to  
23 the meetings and he himself" - that's you - "as chief of  
24 the armed forces can plan the wars for the front line. He  
10:47:54 25 himself will be there with us in the meeting."

26 A. It is not true. It is not true that this person would be  
27 in a meeting who - he has testified he was a bodyguard. He says  
28 he's a bodyguard to Benjamin Yeaten. I can't - I don't know,  
29 because the way how things worked over there at this time - and

1 we're talking about 2001, if I'm not mistaken - the war is  
2 intensifying in Liberia. Benjamin Yeaten, who is a Special  
3 Forces, an SSS director, is having a very active role at the  
4 front line because he's one of those trained commanders that have  
10:48:52 5 done several additional trainings in different countries. So he  
6 is taking an active role. At the front line there are large  
7 units because, I mean, he's going to the front line of combat,  
8 and he has a lot of people around him.

9 Now, of the unit that was assigned to Benjamin Yeaten,  
10:49:17 10 there were two individuals that were senior SSS people that were  
11 assigned with Benjamin on his unit that I knew personally because  
12 - and that was the commander and the deputy. The commander is a  
13 fellow - if I'm not mistaken, I remember his name is Gbarjulu,  
14 G-B-A-R-J-U-L-U, was the commander, and his cousin - Benjamin  
10:49:51 15 Yeaten's relative, I think his first cousin in Liberia called a  
16 brother, Sampson Weah, was a deputy commander.

17 But the rest of the people - and the reason why those  
18 individuals I would not - the commander could even come closer  
19 with Benjamin Yeaten to where I was then any other of the people.  
10:50:15 20 Let's say if I'm sitting here and Benjamin Yeaten's jeep came and  
21 it stopped at a level, the commander of his unit would carry the  
22 rank of about - at least in the SSS - at least a lieutenant  
23 colonel or even a colonel, but he would have the type of  
24 clearance that he could come within the vicinity. That's how I  
10:50:33 25 would know them.

26 But the rest of the people I would not know. Even like the  
27 Zigzag Marzah, did not know him. And in fact, if it's White  
28 Flower, entering that fence would be just so difficult, one like  
29 a Marzah would never be able to enter. So this is completely - I

1 wouldn't fight with the idea that he may have been a bodyguard to  
2 Benjamin Yeaten of the group that I do not know if - I don't  
3 remember if he's one of those that came over with Bockarie in  
4 1999, because most of them that came were already in the ATU.

10:51:11 5 But I wouldn't know him, and there is no way this person would be  
6 in a senior meeting with me. No, no, no, no, no.

7 Q. Well, he continues, Mr Taylor:

8 "Q. Where did these front line meetings take place?

9 A. We meet at the Executive Mansion. We meet at his  
10:51:36 10 house, his residence in Congo Town, White Flower.

11 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: This man was in Liberia over a period of  
12 two years. Could you give us some indication of when these  
13 meetings happened, these particular meetings?

14 A. 2002 and early 2003."

10:52:07 15 So he's saying he's attending these front line meetings  
16 where you were present in 2002, 2003. What do you say about  
17 that?

18 A. That's totally false. What these people have done  
19 successfully - and I'm not sure if it's successful - right now  
10:52:26 20 I'm defence minister. I've seen throughout this trial there's  
21 nothing mentioned about the Defence Ministry and what they're  
22 doing. There's nothing mentioned about the chief of staff and  
23 other senior members of the army. I am the little ragamuffin  
24 down there giving arms, doing everything, holding meetings,  
10:52:45 25 sending people into combat. There's no Defence Ministry I have.  
26 I don't have a defence minister I have no government left with  
27 this thing that these people are brought here on me.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, you're running it single handedly?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. You're pulling the strings?

2 A. There's no one. Which is totally ludicrous, totally false.  
3 He's a little boy here talking about him being in a meeting with  
4 me, so Charles Taylor is reduced to nothing. I'm not even  
10:53:14 5 President. I'm just that little fellow who I'm authorising  
6 everything and handling everything. The arms are being kept in  
7 my garage, whether I get blown up or not.

8 Q. Now, he further suggests, Mr Taylor, that there were four  
9 occasions upon which he collected ammunition from White Flower.

10:53:44 10 These occurred twice in 2000 and again in 2001. Do you know  
11 anything about these?

12 A. Nobody ever picked up weapons from White Flower. No human  
13 on this planet ever picked up weapons from White Flower,  
14 including Benjamin Yeaten. They have brought the word White  
10:54:10 15 Flower to mean, maybe for some interpretation, the entire area.

16 White Flower is the name given to my residence in a fence -  
17 fenced in a 20-foot wall, and I'm sure that we will have to bring  
18 those pictures so this Court can see. Only my building is in  
19 that fence. The vicinity, there are other service buildings. So  
10:54:35 20 if someone says that someone picked up weapons from a building

21 next to White Flower or in the area, that sounds reasonable. But  
22 they keep saying White - nobody picked up anything. Benjamin -  
23 White Flower is my house in the fence. The Secret Service  
24 building is a building outside of the fence in a different place.  
10:54:58 25 My house, that will be shown to this Court, has a 20-foot fence  
26 surrounding it on all sides. The security live in the vicinity  
27 of my house.

28 Now, there is an SSS building where the Secret Service use  
29 for their offices and they store all their different gear and



1 whatever. If they are talking about that building, then I don't  
2 know what the Secret Service put in that building, I don't know  
3 what they took out. But for anybody to tell this Court that  
4 somebody came to White Flower, and they ventured to explain White  
10:55:35 5 Flower as my house, is a lie that is beyond reason. They are  
6 referring to another building, and they keep saying White Flower,  
7 White Flower. There is no such thing in my fence, okay? And we  
8 will show the building that has been referred to. That building  
9 is not White Flower.

10:55:53 10 So, you know, I can accept if somebody says that - the  
11 building near White Flower, and I think that's what they ought to  
12 be saying, of which I don't fuss about, because I wouldn't even  
13 know, and I'm not here to confirm or deny that materials came out  
14 of that place. I'm not aware, but I know that the SSS, the  
10:56:17 15 Secret Service, did keep some material there for their personal  
16 use. I know that, okay, because that's the way things work. But  
17 it is not White Flower.

18 Q. Now, just to assist you with some details, Mr Taylor. The  
19 witness said this in relation to the third of the four trips that  
10:56:43 20 he describes. Page 12662, 24 June 2008: "The third time we  
21 collected the ammunition from White Flower together with some ATU  
22 officers including Mike Francis." Does that name ring a bell?

23 A. No, I don't know.

24 Q. "He was the driver for the car. Liberian Mike Francis. It  
10:57:13 25 was a Land Rover. An ATU Land Rover defender. We loaded the  
26 ammunition, Martin, together with other people, I can't recall  
27 all of them, the late Martin, and we took - they took it direct  
28 to Issa Sesay in Kono."

29 Does any of that assist in any way?

1 A. No, I'm not aware of what he's explaining here, no.

2 Q. Then in relation to the fourth trip, he provided these  
3 additional details:

4 "At that time we were in Vahun. Benjamin Yeaten told us to  
10:57:50 5 go to Monrovia and collect ammunition, and when we got to  
6 Monrovia we went to the armoury dump commander, at that time Kai  
7 and G4 Moses."

8 Now, we've heard those names before, haven't we, yesterday?

9 A. Yes.

10:58:06 10 Q. "Kai told us that he did not have enough GMG rounds at that  
11 time at White Flower and so we collected some AK rounds, RPG  
12 rockets and we went to the Executive Mansion and collected the  
13 remaining ammunition from there and then we proceeded to Benjamin  
14 Yeaten at Vahun. When we got to Vahun, Benjamin Yeaten told us  
10:58:26 15 to cross over with the ammunition to Mende Buima. So we crossed  
16 over with the ammunition to Mende Buima."

17 Now, a couple of things. Firstly, the armoury dump  
18 commander. First of all, do you know of an armoury dump in  
19 Monrovia?

10:58:54 20 A. Yes, I know of an armoury dump in Monrovia, yes.

21 Q. Where?

22 A. This is with the Ministry of Defence where - this is a  
23 general area where they keep all of the arms and ammunition for  
24 the armed forces.

10:59:12 25 Q. And where's that located?

26 A. This armoury dump is located on Benson Street in Monrovia.

27 Q. Now, was there a commander of the armoury dump?

28 A. Yes, with the armed forces, yes, but I don't know him. I  
29 don't know him, but I know there's a dump.

1 Q. Was Kai the armoury dump commander?

2 A. No, no.

3 Q. What was Kai?

4 A. Kai was my governor at White Flower.

10:59:44 5 Q. And G4 Moses you've already indicated you don't know.

6 A. No, I don't know a G4 Moses. I know a different Moses,  
7 but --

8 Q. But in general terms, Mr Taylor, do you have any knowledge  
9 of those four alleged arm shipments?

11:00:01 10 A. No. During the war, the movement of arms for the armed  
11 forces in the combat field, I wouldn't really - I don't have the  
12 details of that. That's strictly with the Defence Ministry and  
13 what they were doing. I wouldn't know. So I can't - if he's  
14 fighting, Benjamin is at the front line and Benjamin is ordering  
11:00:25 15 material from the armoury dump from defence, it could be  
16 possible, but I'm not aware of the details of the movement of  
17 material in and out of the war theatre, no, I'm not aware. I'm  
18 not in position to dispute his account because I really don't  
19 know.

11:00:45 20 Q. Now, the witness went on, page 12664 of the transcript:

21 "JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Koumjian, what happened to the  
22 ammunition that crossed over to Mende Buima?"

23 Menda Buima is a place, not a person.

24 "MR KOUMJIAN:

11:01:05 25 Q. Sir, when you got to Mende Buima with the ammunition,  
26 what happened?

27 A. We turned the ammunition over to a bodyguard, Issa  
28 Sesay's bodyguard called Boise."

29 Now, I mention that for completeness, but let's go on now

1 and deal with another topic. Does the name Superman mean  
2 anything to you, Mr Taylor?

3 A. I've heard that name many times. Yes, Superman was  
4 supposed to be a Liberian that was fighting on the side of the  
11:01:37 5 RUF.

6 Q. Did you ever meet him?

7 A. No, I never met Superman.

8 Q. This witness was asked about Superman in this respect, page  
9 12664:

11:02:04 10 "Q. You have mentioned previously in your testimony  
11 Superman. Did you ever know if he was ever in Liberia  
12 after you went to Liberia?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What he was doing in Liberia, if you know?

11:02:14 15 A. Superman crossed over to Liberia to help fight against  
16 the LURD. At that time LURD was pressuring to take over  
17 Lofa County.

18 Q. Who did Superman fight with?

19 A. I don't understand that question.

11:02:32 20 Q. Was Superman working in any particular army or force  
21 when he was fighting - you said when he came to fight  
22 because the LURD was pressuring.

23 A. Superman was fighting with all the groups. He was  
24 fighting alongside Benjamin Yeaten. He was taking direct  
11:02:49 25 instructions from Benjamin Yeaten at that time.

26 Q. Do you recall what year this was?

27 A. 2001.

28 Q. Did you ever learn what happened to Superman?"

29 There was then an intervention by Mr Munyard as to the

1 identity of the groups he was fighting with and the witness  
2 answered in this way:

3 "We had different groups. We had the ATU, we had the SSS  
4 who used to take part in combat, we had the militia forces and in  
11:03:30 5 the militia, the militia was divided into different divisions.  
6 We had the Navy division, Marine division, Army division and we  
7 had the Jungle Fire. That was not a division actually, but later  
8 we were formed into a division, the Strike Force division, and  
9 Superman will fight with any of those divisions and they were  
11:03:54 10 all..."

11 Now, just dealing with that, in 2001, were all those  
12 divisions mentioned fighting in Lofa against LURD?

13 A. Really, I do not know which divisions were fighting in  
14 Lofa. But what I do know is that there were strict orders - I do  
11:04:25 15 not think there were any ATU fighting in Lofa because we did not  
16 want, especially the Sierra Leoneans going close to the Sierra  
17 Leonean side. These were strict orders from me. But there were  
18 fighting going on, but as to the individual unit fighting, I  
19 really don't know which particular unit was fighting in Lofa  
11:04:51 20 because we were also fighting in Cape Mount and in Bomi. I don't  
21 know.

22 Q. Now, you remember the question previous was, "Did you ever  
23 learn what happened to Superman?" Well, the witness just went on  
24 to describe Superman being killed. And then he was asked this  
11:05:08 25 question:

26 "Q. I just want to be clear about Benjamin Yeaten.  
27 Eventually you said Benjamin Yeaten told you some years  
28 later about the killing of Superman. Did Benjamin Yeaten  
29 indicate whose idea it was to kill Superman?

1 A. After the death of Superman 2001, early 2002, Benjamin  
2 Yeaten, when the war was getting intensified in Liberia, he  
3 told me that he regretted the death of Superman because  
4 when Superman was alive, the rebels never used to overrun  
11:05:49 5 us like that and they misled them into killing Superman.  
6 Then I asked him, 'Chief, when you say them, who are you  
7 calling them?' He said, 'People, the ATU that were  
8 assigned in front of the American embassy at Mamba Point in  
9 Liberia, Monrovia.' They said they used to see Superman  
11:06:08 10 going every day in the American embassy. So they gave the  
11 information to the President and they discussed it, that  
12 the only way they can stop that was by killing him and Issa  
13 Sesay was aware of that too. So all of them agreed to kill  
14 him."

11:06:31 15 And then he went on:  
16 "A. Okay. The only way they can stop Superman not to go  
17 to the embassy or not to connive with the Americans was to  
18 kill him. That was the only way they can stop that and  
19 Issa Sesay was aware of that. Benjamin Yeaten told me that  
11:06:47 20 he was instructed by the President to do that and I  
21 believed that, because the President said something that  
22 made me know about Benjamin Yeaten."

23 Mr Taylor, what do you say about that?

24 A. Yeah, I don't know what world these boys are in. That's  
11:07:08 25 totally untrue. Totally untrue. Who is Superman? I don't know  
26 Superman. I've heard the name. If Superman is going to the US  
27 embassy, what would killing Superman - what, he's not under the  
28 Government of Liberia command. I don't even know that Superman  
29 is fighting alongside Benjamin Yeaten. I have no idea what is

1 going on. I never received any information that Superman was  
2 going to the US embassy to discuss what. I never received any  
3 such information. That is totally untrue.

11:07:54 4 Q. And he goes on: "On various occasions, President Taylor  
5 called a muster parade at the Executive Mansion." Did you?

6 A. No, the President doesn't call a muster parade. I would  
7 call a muster parade at the Executive Mansion? No.

8 Q. That's what he said, page 12677 of the transcript, line 29:

9 "A. On various occasions, President Taylor called a muster  
11:08:17 10 parade at the Executive Mansion, in front of the ATU, SSS  
11 and some senior officers, or senior members of his  
12 government and said, 'Benjamin Yeaten, whatever he sees,  
13 whatever he says, I, President Taylor, said it. When he  
14 sees something, I, President of Taylor, sees that. When he  
11:08:42 15 hears anything, I, President Taylor, would hear that.'

16 That was in everybody mind, that whatever Benjamin Yeaten  
17 said, it was from the President. That was the thing that  
18 made Benjamin Yeaten very powerful in Liberia. He said  
19 that twice at his farm and at the Executive Mansion."

11:09:07 20 What do you say, Mr Taylor?

21 A. I say it's crazy. What a muster parade is, I'm sure - I  
22 don't know if the Court knows what a muster parade is. A muster  
23 parade what s what the military people call when lining people in  
24 formation. I'm not - the President coming down to call a muster  
11:09:31 25 parade? That's what officers in the armed forces do, call  
26 muster. I am not involved in - that's why I said, I've been  
27 reduced - I'm not even President, I'm just out there. It did not  
28 happen that I will call a muster. That's not even an officer of  
29 the SSS.

1 Q. Forget the word "muster parade". Did you say those words  
2 about Benjamin Yeaten?

3 A. Never said it. He said I did it at a muster, and I'm not  
4 at a muster, so I can't say that. Never said that. How would  
11:10:06 5 Benjamin Yeaten be - what he says I say - what the director of  
6 SSS - so where is the Vice-President? Where are the other senior  
7 officials of government?

8 Q. Well, I'm going to come on to that because he deals with  
9 that. Let's continue reading:

11:10:20 10 "Q. Mr Witness, you said Benjamin Yeaten was very powerful  
11 in Liberia. How would you describe his power in Liberia?

12 A. Benjamin Yeaten was powerful, just like he was the  
13 second man to the President, because I think in Liberia, on  
14 what I saw, what I used to see there from Charles Taylor,  
11:10:40 15 nobody was powerful equal to Benjamin Yeaten at that time  
16 in Liberia, at the time that I was there. I do not know  
17 before, but the time that I was in Liberia, up to the  
18 departure of President Taylor, nobody was powerful to equal  
19 him."

11:11:03 20 What do you say?

21 A. Total, total nonsense. That's all I can say. Total  
22 nonsense that anybody would think that the SSS director would be  
23 more powerful than the Vice-President, the Speaker, the Defence  
24 Minister, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, people that are  
11:11:21 25 ordered that Benjamin have to salute. What --

26 Q. "Q. When you say 'equal to him', no one was powerful  
27 equal to who?

28 A. Benjamin Yeaten.

29 Q. A small question about Benjamin Yeaten, Mr Witness:



1 Did Benjamin Yeaten have any parking space reserved for  
2 him.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Where were these parking spaces - space, or spaces?

11:11:50 5 A. The man had a special parking space at White Flower in  
6 front of the President's residence. He had a special  
7 parking space at the Executive Mansion and no other person  
8 can park there except him."

9 True?

11:12:03 10 A. Well, I want to say that that is true at the Executive  
11 Mansion. The Executive Mansion parking lot is marked. It's been  
12 marked from President Tubman that built that building. Only  
13 officials at the Executive Mansion have a parking space. It is  
14 marked the "Ministry of State", the "Deputy Minister of State".

11:12:34 15 They are all numbered. Benjamin Yeaten, as SSS Director, is 50.  
16 That is marked 50, 51, 52. All of the lots at the Executive  
17 Mansion of the officials that worked there, from the director of  
18 the budget down to this little foolish boy, all of the spaces are  
19 marked. So there is not anything special thing for Benjamin  
11:12:55 20 Yeaten. All of the officials working in the mansion have at the  
21 back of the mansion where it's a secured area, they have - those  
22 that work in the mansion have a parking lot. The visitors to the  
23 presidency have a separate parking lot. In that official parking  
24 lot yes, all officials have their marked-in places.

11:13:10 25 Q. Not according to this witness, because he goes on:

26 "Q. Do you know the other senior officials" --

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Sorry. You said, Mr Witness, "down to  
28 this foolish little boy". Who did you mean?

29 THE WITNESS: This witness.

1 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Do you mean he had a parking space  
2 marked?

3 THE WITNESS: No, no, no. In fact, if he put it down that  
4 I said that, "down to this foolish little boy", no. I said --

11:13:38 5 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: That is what the record reads.

6 THE WITNESS: No, but that's wrong. That's wrong.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. What were you saying, Mr Taylor?

9 A. No, I was identifying the foolishness as discussed in his  
11:13:53 10 argument, okay? But not that. He wouldn't even have a place  
11 there. I'm saying all officials who were working at the mansion  
12 had a marked parking space. That's what I'm trying to get  
13 across.

14 Q. Well, the witness goes on:

11:14:09 15 "Q. Do you know, did other senior officials have reserved  
16 parking spaces at White Flower at the Executive Mansion?

17 A. Yes. They had different parking spaces for different  
18 people, categories of people, but Benjamin Yeaten parked  
19 directly in front of the President's gates and no other  
11:14:27 20 person was allowed to park there except him. The  
21 ministers, they parked across the road. They parked their  
22 cars across the road and came to the President's house."  
23 What do you say about that?

24 A. White Flower --

11:14:42 25 Q. This is the house?

26 A. Yes, that's White Flower now. White Flower is situated -  
27 and when we bring the pictures - on the boulevard. You walk out  
28 of the gate at White Flower and you walk straight on the  
29 sidewalk, okay? Now, there are no parking spaces. This is the

1 highway. This is the boulevard, okay? Ministers come. No one  
2 enters the fence; Benjamin, or any other person. No car. And  
3 the only cars that enter into White Flower fence are the  
4 President's vehicle. All other vehicles park outside because of  
11:15:23 5 security. Directly on the side of White Flower all of the SSS  
6 officers park their vehicles in front of that sidewalk for  
7 security purposes to make sure that the traffic - because we  
8 never stop the traffic on the boulevard - that no traffic parks -  
9 because we do right-hand driving - nobody parks on that side. So  
11:15:53 10 those are all security vehicles for security concerns that are  
11 parked there. There may be about at least - I think they use  
12 four jeeps as something like a buffer that nobody will run into  
13 the President's fence, okay? So there are four jeeps. The SSS  
14 director and the jeeps used in the convoy are lined up there.

11:16:19 15 Maybe he doesn't know, but there is a security concern for  
16 parking on that side of the street as opposed to other visitors  
17 parking on the other side of the street. He doesn't know, but --

18 Q. But did Benjamin Yeaten have this special privilege?

19 A. No.

11:16:34 20 Q. His own parking space in front of White Flower?

21 A. That is not true. There is no parking space - and we will  
22 look at the pictures very clearly. There was no marked - there  
23 was nothing of that sort. His vehicle, along with others, parked  
24 there for security corridors on that side of the building.

11:16:52 25 Nothing special to him, no.

26 Q. "Q. What about the President of Liberia at that time?

27 A. The Vice-President at the time, he understood that  
28 even when he wanted to come to the President's house he had  
29 to go through Benjamin Yeaten at the time. He did not just

1           come to White Flower. I was there on some occasions when  
2           he parked his car in front of the President's house. The  
3           SSS boys will tell him - the close bodyguards to President  
4           Taylor will tell him, 'Oh, Mr President, this place is for  
11:17:27 5           Unit 50. Please move your car', and he will move his car.  
6           Moses Blah at the time, I know him, he will move his car.  
7           They will take permission from him. They will tell him  
8           that this space was for Unit 50 and he will his car, he  
9           won't park there".

11:17:47 10           Were you aware that your Vice-President was being treated  
11           with such disrespect, Mr Taylor?

12           A. No, and I don't think it happened. I don't think it  
13           happened. Of course, before the Vice-President comes to the  
14           mansion he would - no Vice-President anywhere in the world gets  
11:18:01 15           up from his office and zips over to the President's office. It  
16           doesn't ever happen anywhere in the world. Before the  
17           Vice-President leaves his office, I already know that he's en  
18           route to me. We would have either a talk or --

19           Q. Did he have to go through Benjamin Yeaten?

11:18:15 20           A. No. No, he doesn't have to go through Benjamin Yeaten.  
21           The only - he either calls me and tells me that he is coming over  
22           on something important, he wants to see me, or I call him and  
23           tell him I want to see him. In any case, the first person that  
24           is informed after me would be the Minister of State, okay? Once  
11:18:33 25           the Minister of State is informed, the next person that is  
26           informed is the chief of protocol; the third person that is  
27           informed is the aide-de-camp; the fourth person would be the SSS  
28           director. There's a whole line in preparation for the  
29           Vice-President to come. If I'm at White Flower the

1 Vice-President will come, he will drive his car into White  
2 Flower, he would disembark, and the car would drive outside and  
3 park outside until he's through. They will come back inside and  
4 pick him up. This is not the way it works, what he explains  
11:19:07 5 here, no.

6 Q. Before I move on from this topic, Mr Taylor, let me just  
7 ask you plainly and bluntly: You're supposed to be a war lord  
8 dictator. Was there this other power in the land called Benjamin  
9 Yeaten?

11:19:22 10 A. No. No. No. Benjamin Yeaten was not this other power in  
11 the land, no. There was a whole line of people in that place  
12 that had ten times more authority than the SSS director. Far,  
13 far, far more. No.

14 Q. Now, the witness during the course of his testimony  
11:19:53 15 traversed other areas. One such area was Zigzag Marzah, and he  
16 said this:

17 "Q. You have mentioned in your testimony Zigzag Marzah.  
18 Can you tell us what his duties were that you know of in  
19 Liberia?

11:20:13 20 A. I do not understand that.

21 Q. What was Zigzag Marzah's responsibility? What did  
22 Zigzag Marzah do in Liberia for his work?

23 A. Zigzag Marzah was part of the SSS at the same time, the  
24 Armed Forces of Liberia, but I knew him as the Death Squad  
11:20:36 25 commander or Death Squad group for Charles Taylor at the  
26 time."

27 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Totally, totally, totally false.

29 Q. Did you have a Death Squad?

1 A. There was no such unit that I knew of called Death Squad in  
2 Liberia, no. No.

3 Q. Are you sure about this?

4 A. I'm very sure.

11:21:01 5 Q. Wasn't there a special group within the SSS led by Marzah?

6 A. No, I don't know of Marzah leading any special group in the  
7 SSS.

8 Q. And he goes on:

9 "Q. Did he ever command troops to your knowledge?

11:21:27 10 A. Yes, he, Zigzag Marzah, commanded a troop."

11 Did you know about this?

12 A. No, I'm not aware. I know that Zigzag Marzah from - if  
13 he's part of Benjamin Yeaten's group, I'm sure as an orderly,  
14 when Benjamin was in combat he would fight. But to command? I

11:21:47 15 don't know if he directly commanded any troops. I don't know.

16 Q. Well, the witness goes on to say this in answer to this  
17 question:

18 "Q. Do you recall any particular operation where Zigzag  
19 Marzah was commanding troops?

11:22:05 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did that operation have a name?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What was the name of the operation?

24 A. They said Operation No Monkey."

11:22:19 25 Now, you remember we've had Operation No Living Thing.

26 Well, we had to have an animal involved, so this one is Operation  
27 No Monkey, all right?

28 "Q. When did operation take place to the best of your  
29 recollection?

1 A. I think in late 2002.

2 Q. What was this Operation No Monkey?

3 A. I was there when Benjamin Yeaten instructed Zigzag  
4 Marzah and other fighters to go to Belle Forest and  
11:22:53 5 destabilise all the civilians that were in the forest, and  
6 anybody who refused should be killed and no monkey should  
7 even stand in front of them. That was why they named the  
8 operation No Monkey. No monkey can stay in the forest.  
9 Everybody should move from that forest to come to the safer  
11:23:09 10 area, because the LURD fighters were trying to get into  
11 Belle Forest to come to Bomi Hills and attack Monrovia, and  
12 indeed they used the route. Zigzag Marzah went there and  
13 did the operation in Belle Forest."  
14 Do you know about that?

11:23:26 15 A. No, I'm not aware. I'm not aware that such an operation  
16 went on in the Belle Forest, and the defence minister never  
17 informed me of such. I really do not know.

18 Q. Now, he goes on to make this suggestion: That in 2002 -  
19 early 2002 Benjamin Yeaten gave him, Sampson Weah and other  
11:23:56 20 fighters, including Busy Boy, Mohamed Foday and others:

21 "Benjamin Yeaten told us to go and arrest Zigzag Marzah at  
22 his residence, YWCA area, close to the First Lady, Jewel  
23 Howard-Taylor."

24 Do you know anything about that?

11:24:17 25 A. No, I'm not aware of any order to arrest Zigzag Marzah, no.  
26 I'm not saying it didn't happen or happen. I just don't know.

27 Q. This was supposedly because of some domestic dispute  
28 between Benjamin Yeaten and Zigzag Marzah over a woman. Do you  
29 know anything about this, Mr Taylor?

1 A. No, sorry, I don't. I don't. For his orderly and him to  
2 be in confusion over a woman? No, it just sounds unlikely to me  
3 that an orderly would be - if the woman - if an orderly of  
4 someone would be brave enough to play with his woman, this is  
11:25:03 5 strange to me, but I really don't --

6 Q. No, it goes this way:

7 "It was for a woman's business", said the witness. "Zigzag  
8 Marzah at the time monitored some communication where Zigzag  
9 Marzah was blasting over the radio, our local radio, that he will  
11:25:18 10 never respect Benjamin Yeaten because Benjamin Yeaten was loving  
11 his wife."

12 To you know anything about that?

13 A. No, but that's what I'm saying. For the SSS director to go  
14 after his orderly's wife? I mean, this is strange to me. But I  
11:25:32 15 wouldn't - this wouldn't reach to me. If it's true, it wouldn't  
16 get to me. I really don't know.

17 Q. He goes on to give descriptions of the arrest of Marzah.  
18 I'm not going to delay over that. But it continues in this vein,  
19 and this is why I ask you about it, Mr Taylor: Marzah was  
11:26:03 20 arrested and put in custody and according to the witness, page  
21 12684 of the transcript, line 10, Marzah tells the witness that  
22 you, Charles Taylor, ordered Marzah's release from custody. Did  
23 you?

24 A. No, I didn't. I didn't even know that Marzah was under  
11:26:24 25 arrest. No.

26 Q. Not only did you release him from prison, you also gave him  
27 money.

28 A. No, no. I thought you were still reading. No, I did not  
29 release Marzah. I didn't even know that he and Benjamin had



1 problems for me to get from my level to be involved in a conflict  
2 between the SSS director and his orderly with a woman business,  
3 they wouldn't be stupid enough to bring that kind of thing before  
4 me to talk about it. I mean why would they want to even - I  
11:27:11 5 didn't even know that Marzah was arrested.

6 But if Benjamin is this so powerful person - in fact the  
7 whole outcome doesn't sound straight. Where he says earlier that  
8 Marzah is saying on the open radio that he's no longer going to  
9 respect Benjamin Yeaten, by open radio I'm assuming that this is  
11:27:34 10 the SSS radio. Oh, I don't see the possibility of that, because  
11 that - well, I don't want to jump to conclusions to really decide  
12 what he means by open radio, so I don't want to make that  
13 assumption, it would be wrong. But the only radio that I know,  
14 if it's the SSS - I'll put it this way, if it's the SSS radio, I  
11:27:57 15 cannot say that any such conversation could have occurred on the  
16 SSS radio because what would have happened, the communication  
17 would have been intercepted immediately and I'm not sure that  
18 Zigzag Marzah would have a Secret Service handset. At his level,  
19 no, I would doubt that very seriously that he would have an SSS  
11:28:20 20 radio. No, I doubt it.

21 Because those handsets are cryptic. They were given to  
22 selected members - most of the Secret Service that let's say were  
23 in the presidential convoy did not have handsets. There are  
24 receivers, there are very tiny receivers that a Secret Service  
11:28:45 25 operative would put into his ear. He cannot communicate but he  
26 can hear the communication on the handsets. So for example  
27 orders are being given by supervisors and commanders, he would  
28 hear the orders, but the actual handset is not divided with  
29 people except you are in a real command position. Not everybody

1 would have it, no, not at Zigzag Marzah's level.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,  
3 Mr President? I don't think I'll have sufficient time to  
4 complete this particular topic.

11:29:19 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. We'll  
6 adjourn for the morning break now and reconvene at 12 o'clock.

7 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

8 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:00:49 10 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment, you recall I  
11 mentioned an operation that Zigzag Marzah, the alleged commander  
12 of the Death Squad, was supposed to have led in the Belle Forest,  
13 you remember that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

12:01:11 15 Q. Well, in conclusion on that particular topic, the witness  
16 said this:

17 "Zigzag Marzah told us that he believed there was nobody in  
18 the forest when they returned, because more people said they  
19 can't leave their farms to come to the safer side. He put all of  
12:01:31 20 them to death, and I trusted him. I believed that Zigzag Marzah,  
21 wherever he went, one or two persons must be killed. When he  
22 said that, I did not doubt. I believed what he said, that people  
23 were killed and some houses were burnt by them, the fighters of  
24 Charles Taylor, the Jungle Fire boys, and others."

12:01:52 25 Were you aware of such an incident, Mr Taylor?

26 A. No, I was not aware and I doubt if it happened, because  
27 they - at least some official, defence or military, he would  
28 not - if Zigzag had gone to a place and had killed someone with -  
29 because the Defence Minister at that time, Daniel Chea, was a

1 very, very decent and strict fellow, he would have dealt with  
2 this matter. I doubt very much if it happened.

3 Q. Now, another topic that I would like to deal with - well,  
4 two other topics with this witness. The first is this. The  
12:02:32 5 witness was asked:

6 "Q. Did you ever see any RUF commanders other than  
7 Superman and Bockarie in Liberia while you were there?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can you tell us who you saw?"

12:02:45 10 And he mentioned Gibril Massaquoi, Issa Sesay,  
11 Morris Kallon, Mike Lamin, and others. And then he was asked:

12 "Q. Where did you see the people that you named? In what  
13 part of the Liberia?"

14 And this is the passage I want you to comment on:

12:03:03 15 "A. I saw Gibril Massaquoi at White Flower."

16 Is that true?

17 A. What year is he talking about?

18 Q. He doesn't give a date. Do you recall Gibril Massaquoi  
19 ever being at White Flower?

12:03:20 20 A. I - well, I tell you what, I'll put it this way. I would  
21 not dispute - I cannot recall the exact time, but during the  
22 reign of Issa Sesay, that's in late 2000, if - and I don't really  
23 recall. But if Issa Sesay came to White Flower, it's very  
24 possible that Gibril Massaquoi could have come to White Flower in  
12:03:57 25 late 2000 or early 2001. Gibril Massaquoi was the official

26 spokesperson for the RUF from Robertsfield when he became leader.  
27 So I would - I would not doubt that Gibril Massaquoi could have  
28 come to White Flower in late 2000 - even though he didn't give a  
29 time, but I want to be clear about this - between late 2000 and

1 2001, it is possible.

2 Q. And the next question I am going to ask you: Did Issa  
3 Sesay come to White Flower?

4 A. I am sure he did, yes. Issa Sesay as leader.

12:04:35 5 Q. Because the witness goes on to say:

6 "I saw Gibri I Massaquoi at White Flower. I saw Issa Sesay  
7 at White Flower", and he also saw Issa Sesay at Hotel Boulevard.  
8 Do you dispute any of that?

9 A. No, I don't dispute that. I don't dispute that.

12:04:53 10 Q. And he goes on to say that he saw Morris Kallon, Mike  
11 Lamin, in Vahun, Lofa County. Are you in a position to dispute  
12 that?

13 A. Well, I really - I will just say I don't know. I don't  
14 know the details of that. And in my acceptance of the fact that  
12:05:11 15 Issa Sesay came to White Flower, it must be after he becomes  
16 leader, so I want to draw the line. It has to be in 2000 or in  
17 between 2000 and 2001, yeah.

18 Q. Was he a regular visitor to White Flower at that time?

19 A. No, no, no, no, no. No. White Flower will be - for  
12:05:34 20 example, if Issa Sesay came into Monrovia and that particular  
21 weekend if I was spending the weekend at White Flower and I had  
22 to see anybody - I received Jimmy Carter at White Flower. I  
23 received Kofi Annan at White Flower. So there's nothing unique  
24 about - we've got pictures of Kofi Annan in my house at White  
12:05:52 25 Flower and Jimmy Carter. So if Issa Sesay came at a time that it  
26 was necessary to meet him at White Flower, I did.

27 Q. Now, on topic of Issa Sesay, there is another discrete  
28 topic that I want to deal with in relation to this particular  
29 witness. The witness was asked this:

1 "Q. Did you ever receive any orders that had anything do  
2 with Issa Sesay's visits to Liberia?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Can you please tell about that?

12:06:25 5 A. When Issa Sesay was at the Royal Hotel - Royal Hotel  
6 now, Benjamin Yeaten called us, Busy Boy and I, the younger  
7 brother - younger brother of Benjamin Yeaten. Yes, the  
8 same person, Calvin Yeaten."

9 Do you know a Calvin Yeaten, Benjamin Yeaten's younger  
10 brother?

11 A. No, I don't know Calvin.

12 Q. Mr Taylor, before I go on, can I pause. Because the  
13 shorthand writer's complained to me that this morning you were  
14 speaking rather fast.

15 A. Really?

16 Q. So can I ask you to be more measured now, please?

17 A. Sure, I will be.

18 Q. I had forgotten to remind you when you came in.

19 A. Okay.

12:07:11 20 Q. "Q. And what happened after Benjamin Yeaten called you?

21 A. Benjamin Yeaten told us to get in his car and go to  
22 White Flower, the President's house. When he got to  
23 White Flower, he told us to wait for him. He entered in  
24 the President's compound. After 10 to 15 minutes he came  
12:07:27 25 outside. He called us in the car and gave us a parcel. It  
26 was a big something. We just called it parcel, because we  
27 used to call it at the time parcel. It was like a big  
28 envelope. Money was inside. But we put them in a bag. We  
29 put the envelope in a bag, but the envelope was very big.

1 We were told to go to the Royal Hotel and give it to Issa  
2 Sesay, and we left for the Royal Hotel. We got to the  
3 Royal Hotel. They showed us the room number. I think room  
4 102. We got to reception. They rang the room and Issa  
12:08:09 5 Sesay sent his bodyguard, FOC at the time, FOC. FOC came  
6 and collected us and took us to room 102. We met with Issa  
7 Sesay and he said he was expecting something, whether we  
8 brought the tin, and he started laughing. We said they  
9 have had given us something, but we do not know what was  
12:08:28 10 inside, so he said we should hand over everything to him.  
11 He called FOC, Eddie Kanneh and others, I think one of  
12 Foday Sankoh's bodyguards a Black Guard, but I do not  
13 recall his name, and they started counting the money. They  
14 opened the envelope and they started counting the money.  
12:08:48 15 When they counted the money, the figure, the money - the  
16 figure was \$85,000 US. Straight away Issa Sesay changed in  
17 the room. He started yelling on himself. That was not the  
18 money he was expecting. He was not expecting that type of  
19 money. He was expecting half a million, \$500,000 to get  
12:09:12 20 cars and other things for the campaign - for the campaign  
21 of the RUF in Sierra Leone. In fact, he would not take the  
22 money. He would prefer going back. But the diamonds that  
23 he brought was not the money that had been given to him.  
24 Then Busy Boy - because Busy Boy told him that, 'Chief, we  
12:09:32 25 have brought this money, but we need \$100 to go and eat'.  
26 He said he was not responsible for us; we should take the  
27 money back. Then FOC told him that, 'But Chief, you can't  
28 leave certainty for uncertainty. When you've got \$85,000,  
29 you can easily call Benjamin Yeaten and tell him about the

1 money, that this was not the money that you were expecting  
2 from the President. But don't return the money. The  
3 people would get annoyed with you.' So he was convinced  
4 and he received the money. He told us he was not going to  
12:10:06 5 give us anything. So we too went and got some food from  
6 the hotel and we said the Chief will pay, Issa Sesay. I  
7 and Busy Boy, we left the hotel and went. We went to  
8 Benjamin Yeaten and told him that Issa Sesay was  
9 protesting, but he did not look at us. He just forgot  
12:10:25 10 about us. He did not listen to us."

11 There was then some dispute about the particular language  
12 used by the witness, and then the witness continued:

13 "Issa Sesay said that the diamonds he had brought and gave  
14 to the President, he was expecting half a million - half a  
12:10:50 15 million for those types of diamonds, \$500,000 US. He called the  
16 money straight and then Busy Boy said, 'Hey, these people are  
17 playing with big money.' And I said, 'My man, you have not seen  
18 money yet.' He said, 'Well, Chief, we want to eat.' Issa Sesay  
19 said that the diamonds that he brought and gave the President was  
12:11:13 20 worth \$500,000, so that was when Busy Boy started saying that the  
21 people were playing with plenty money."

22 Mr Taylor, did that happen?

23 A. No, where this boy got this thing? Never, ever happened.

24 No.

12:11:32 25 Q. You understand what's being suggested, don't you?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. That in effect, you diddled Issa Sesay on those diamonds?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. That they were worth \$500,000, he was expecting the money

1 to use in their political campaign, and you shortchanged him and  
2 only gave him \$85,000?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Did you, Mr Taylor?

12:11:55 5 A. No, I did not. And I'd guess the best person would be the  
6 - I don't recall of anybody even talking about this or Issa  
7 himself. That is not true.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's just examine this in a little more  
9 detail. And we are coming to deal with diamonds as a discrete  
12:12:14 10 topic in due course, but help us with some practical things at  
11 this point. Did you, as President of Liberia, know people to  
12 whom you could sell diamonds?

13 A. No. I did not know anyone.

14 Q. Were you in contact with diamond dealers to whom you could  
12:12:40 15 sell diamonds of this kind of value, half a million dollars?

16 A. No, no one. I did not know anyone.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, whilst President of Liberia, were you handling  
18 these quantities of cash, \$85,000?

19 A. No, we wouldn't keep this kind of cash, no. Small amounts  
12:13:09 20 - like, for example, with the Ministry of state, there would be  
21 \$20,000 to \$25,000 in petty cash that would be kept at the  
22 presidency, but nothing higher than that. And it's accounted for  
23 through the Finance Ministry, but nothing --

24 Q. Mr Taylor, could you physically have got hold of \$85,000 in  
12:13:38 25 cash when you were President?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. How would you have gone about it?

28 A. Through the Ministry of Finance, maybe after a process,  
29 they would make it available. For example, in fact, we've gotten



1 more than that. On travel, when the President - let's say the  
2 biggest travel time, let's say if you are coming to Europe with a  
3 with a large delegation sometimes you would get more than  
4 \$85,000.

12:14:10 5 So in answer to your question, yes, but at specific times,  
6 especially on foreign travels, you would have that - the  
7 delegation that the President is leading would have that kind of  
8 cash to take care of hotel expenses and all of that, yes.

9 Q. And tell me, in the situation you've described, would there  
12:14:30 10 be a paper trail documenting that such sums had been handed over?

11 A. Yes, because it is processed through the Ministry of  
12 Finance, yes.

13 Q. But, Mr Taylor, at the same time were you involved in back  
14 street dealings with, you know, diamond dealers, where you were  
12:14:51 15 receiving sums like half a million dollars in cash?

16 A. No, not at all, no. In fact that kind of cash, let's  
17 assume for a minute that that would even be possible, any  
18 large-scale diamond buyer or dealer that would be able to have  
19 that quantity of cash at any one time would probably most likely  
12:15:15 20 be Europe. For example, Belgium.

21 And in any case, nobody, nobody - absolutely no one in this  
22 financial world and even at that time would be able to walk into  
23 a bank and withdraw a half a million dollars cash and walk out of  
24 the door with it. It's not possible. I mean, it's just not  
12:15:44 25 possible, okay, for that to happen.

26 So even if you are a diamond buyer and somebody came into  
27 let's say Antwerp in Belgium and sold diamonds amounting half a  
28 million, you would never get that money in cash, ever. That's  
29 not the way it's done. That diamond buyer would have that money

1 maybe transferred to a bank account or they would give you a  
2 cheque, but nobody walks in this day's world and at this time  
3 with this kind of money. No, you don't just - it's not possible.  
4 I don't know, maybe things have changed since I have been  
12:16:19 5 incarcerated. Half a million, go in, take it and walk out, no  
6 it's possible that way.

7 Q. Let's me ask you another question then in this regard. Did  
8 you have an agent who was working for you?

9 A. No.

12:16:32 10 Q. Who was brokering these diamond deals on your behalf?

11 A. No. And I know if I had one, wherever he was he would have  
12 come forward, they would have found him by now. Never, never did  
13 any diamond sale or transaction in my life. Never.

14 Q. Was, for example, Ibrahim Bah your agent for the sale of  
12:16:59 15 diamonds?

16 A. Never, never. And I will say it again, this very Ibrahim  
17 Bah in question has spoken to almost every human on this planet  
18 you can think about from the - I don't know if he has spoken to  
19 the Special Court, and there is no reason why they haven't spoken  
12:17:18 20 to him. I know he spoke to the - we have documents released by  
21 the Prosecution that shows that Ibrahim spoke to many western  
22 intelligence agencies and I swear that if Ibrahim Bah had been  
23 working for me he would have told them and this Prosecution, as  
24 they have come after me, would spare no time in bringing those  
12:17:44 25 documents to this Court.

26 Because we have documents disclosed to us where he spoke to  
27 Belgian intelligence officers, he's been interviewed by every  
28 western intelligence agency you can think about. And I can't see  
29 any reason why - and this is a document that we have had

1 disclosed to us by the Prosecution - that he would say something  
2 that would incriminate me that they would not bring forward. He  
3 never worked for me. And I hope any means should be used to  
4 bring him before this Court. Never did Ibrahim Bah ever work for  
12:18:09 5 me.

6 Q. Now, just to put this episode in context, the witness  
7 continued in this vein:

8 "Q. Do you recall when it was this incident occurred when  
9 you took the parcel to Issa Sesay at the hotel?

12:18:30 10 A. I can't remember the exact timing, but I can remember  
11 the event. It was at the time the disarmament was going on  
12 and they were talking about political parties. RUF was to  
13 register as a political party in Sierra Leone. That was  
14 the time, but I can't remember the actual date. And he  
12:18:50 15 stated that they wanted to buy cars to go and run the RUF  
16 campaign with the money."

17 Justice Sebutinde asked if that was disarmament in Sierra  
18 Leone, which he agreed with, and he went on to say, "It was a  
19 campaign to run political parties."

12:19:15 20 Now, Mr Taylor, that is all I want to ask you about the  
21 testimony of this particular witness.

22 A. But just before you go off this witness, counsel, I  
23 remembered - in dealing with the communication problem with this  
24 phone number, I can remember when the evidence was given by this  
12:19:44 25 witness about having my cell phone number and the number that he  
26 gave to this Court, I recall now that investigations were done by  
27 this Defence team and we have identified the owner of that  
28 telephone number and I think that it would be important to know  
29 that that telephone number was never mine. And I think it's very

1 important for his own credibility that that telephone number and  
2 the individual have been identified through our investigators.  
3 So he lied about that number and I am sure it will come forward.

4 Q. So do you know who the number belongs to, Mr Taylor?

12:20:37 5 A. Based on the records sent by the investigators, I don't  
6 quite recall the name, but the time of the obtaining of the  
7 number and the individual who is still alive and well, if I am  
8 not mistaken I think even an affidavit may have been filed and  
9 that person can be brought before this Court. He lied. That  
10 number was never my number.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Now can I seek some guidance, please,  
12 because I intend to move on to another witness, a witness who  
13 gave evidence in closed session, a witness whose name was written  
14 down on a piece of paper by Mr Taylor on a previous occasion. I  
12:21:25 15 am anxious that I don't trespass into any forbidden areas in  
16 relation to the witness. So I am merely seeking some guidance as  
17 to how we should proceed.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, firstly, I don't know what you are  
19 going to ask Mr Taylor about that witness. But obviously if your  
12:21:47 20 questions are going to reveal the identity of that witness then we  
21 ought to go into closed session. If on the other hand you can  
22 tailor your questions so that it would not have that effect, then  
23 there is no need to go into closed session. It's a matter for  
24 you. You know what you want to ask.

12:22:03 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

26 Q. Now, the first thing I want to ask you, Mr Taylor, is this:  
27 In May of 1990 were the schools and universities in Liberia  
28 closed as a result of the civil war?

29 A. May of 1990 --

1 Q. May of 1990, I asked, Mr Taylor, the civil war having begun  
2 on Christmas Eve 1989, what effect did that have on the school  
3 situation in Liberia?

4 A. I am trying to figure that out because in the Monrovia area  
12:23:21 5 where the university is, I can't be sure about that because the  
6 war had not really moved to Monrovia. So it's possible they  
7 could have been open, closed. Back into our area, some schools  
8 were still operating, some schools were not.

9 Q. What about in Harbel? Had you reached Harbel by May of  
12:23:47 10 1990?

11 A. I will put it to, yeah, May/June, we had reached the Harbel  
12 area.

13 Q. Are you aware of a place in Harbel called Unification Town?

14 A. That's where Harbel is. There is a place called  
12:24:08 15 Unification Town, yes.

16 Q. Now, August 1990, as we know, ECOMOG entered Liberia, did  
17 they not?

18 A. Yes, they did.

19 Q. Now, what effect did that have in terms of foreign  
12:24:30 20 nationals living behind NPFL lines?

21 A. In August 1990, ECOMOG arrived and they arrived fighting.  
22 We attacked them almost immediately. We had said that they  
23 shouldn't come. They arrived fighting. Some of the foreigners  
24 in Greater Liberia at the time, some of them were picked up, some  
12:24:59 25 of them were interrogated - because of some of the precision that  
26 was being used by ECOMOG in their bombing campaign and the  
27 infiltration into our area, we picked up some foreigners for  
28 investigation.

29 Q. But were you routinely behind NPFL lines subjecting such

1 foreigners to vigorous questioning and harassment?

2 A. Well, I, no. But the instructions were to carry out  
3 investigations. This is wartime and we did - I wouldn't call it  
4 harassment. We did investigate those. Especially we were  
12:25:41 5 targeting - we were trying to find Nigerians that were going and  
6 coming between the lines. I wouldn't call that harassment. It  
7 was normal. Like in war situations, these things happen where  
8 people are interrogated. I can name any number of wars.

9 Q. Now, at or about the time that ECOMOG entered Monrovia,  
12:26:06 10 Mr Taylor, did you make a radio broadcast in which you said that  
11 if during the course of the fighting any of the NPFL forces  
12 sustained death, then you were mandating your forces, the NPFL,  
13 that if one person died among the Liberians, then simultaneously  
14 one person should be killed from nationals from the troops  
12:26:37 15 contributing to ECOMOG?

16 A. Well, I don't recall it in that way. I know there was a  
17 lot of anger on the part of those behind the line, as they used  
18 to call it, with ECOMOG coming and dropping bombs, killing  
19 civilian. I mean they were dropping bombs on civilian areas and  
12:27:02 20 there was a lot of anger. So I don't remember the exact words,  
21 but, I mean, it's very possible that I could have said, "If you  
22 keep killing our people, dropping bombs, this very Unification  
23 Town and other civilian areas in Harbel - if you come and  
24 deliberately kill our people, you do not expect that your people  
12:27:20 25 will be safe because anger" - I mean, we couldn't control the  
26 anger of the people.

27 There was not an order given by me but I was warning that  
28 you cannot expect us to protect your people from the contributing  
29 countries that are bombing civilians and your people are amongst

1 people here, you make it very dangerous for them. This was the  
2 essence of what I was getting across.

3 Q. So we are talking about foreign nationals behind NPFL  
4 lines. You were saying, in effect, that their lives would be  
12:27:55 5 threatened if ECOMOG killed Liberian civilians?

6 A. No, I wouldn't put it that way. I wouldn't even --

7 Q. Well, that's the effective the sentiment, isn't it?

8 A. No. Foreign nationals behind the line included Americans  
9 and others. There were no - what my - what was being said at the

12:28:15 10 time was that there were Ghanaians, there were Nigerians and  
11 others that were involved with ECOMOG. And we were saying to  
12 them, You have to stop this bombing and killing innocent Liberian  
13 civilians because that gives us a very, very, very tough job to  
14 protect your nationals that are behind the line here. When they

12:28:42 15 see their families being blown up by Nigerians and Nigerians are  
16 in their midst, you subject their lives to danger. This is the  
17 essence we were trying to get across.

18 Q. But did you, in effect, state, Mr Taylor, that so far as  
19 the five countries that contributed initially to ECOMOG, that one  
12:29:12 20 person from each of these countries that contributed troops to  
21 ECOMOG would be killed if a Liberian was killed?

22 A. No, I didn't. I didn't. I didn't make any such public  
23 statement to the best of my recollection, and I don't think any  
24 of those nationals were killed.

12:29:31 25 Q. Now, as a consequence of this intervention by ECOMOG, were  
26 foreign nationals from the five contributing countries detained  
27 behind NPFL lines?

28 A. Yes, some nationals were detained, especially from about  
29 three of those countries: I would say Nigeria, Sierra Leone,

1 Ghana, some of their nationals, to the best of my knowledge - and  
2 I was not involved in the process - but some of them were  
3 detained, yes.

12:30:09 4 Q. You may not have been involved in the process, but did you  
5 order their detention?

6 A. Yes, I ordered their investigation. Their arrest and  
7 investigation, yes, I did.

8 Q. Why?

12:30:23 9 A. Because we wanted to find out if anyone was a spy amongst  
10 them giving them coordinates to the bombing countries, and those  
11 individuals that were investigated and found not to be involved,  
12 they were let go.

13 Q. So what do you say to the suggestion that people weren't  
14 told why they were being arrested; they were just detained by  
12:30:52 15 your NPFL forces?

16 A. Well, I don't know what he means by people were not told.  
17 Look, we arrested people, we interrogated them, we let them go.  
18 Those - I mean, in fact, if I remember this witness's testimony,  
19 he doesn't speak of anyone being killed. Look, the process, how  
12:31:13 20 he describes it, I mean, that's his - but I am sure that the type  
21 of questions that security wanted to find out, once they got  
22 those questions answered, the Nigerians went - everybody. There  
23 were no Nigerians killed; there were no Ghanaians killed; nobody  
24 was killed based on even his testimony, but an investigation took  
12:31:33 25 place. Now, people didn't have to go and arrest and bring  
26 somebody in and say, "We are bringing you in to find out if you  
27 are talking to ECOMOG." You were brought in, interrogated, and  
28 let go.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I realise that you are



1 referring discreetly to a transcript. We are all guessing here  
2 what this evidence is addressing, but what would be helpful,  
3 without your mentioning even the TIF number, is the page of the  
4 transcript.

12:32:04 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. My fault. I am sorry. I am  
6 looking at page 23133 of the transcript of 21 January 2009:

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help us if you can. Amongst the sites  
8 where such foreign nationals were detained, did that include  
9 Harbel Junior High School, to your knowledge?

12:32:41 10 A. No, I don't know. I don't know.

11 Q. Are you aware of a Harbel Junior High School?

12 A. There could very well be, yes, Harbel Junior. There was a  
13 junior high school. Yes, there's a Harbel Junior High School. I  
14 have heard that name.

12:33:04 15 Q. Now, the witness went on to say that whilst in detention  
16 they were visited by a Sierra Leonean who spoke to them in Krio  
17 who he later discovered was Corporal Foday Sankoh. Now, help us,  
18 Mr Taylor. In September of 2000, when, according to the witness,  
19 he was detained, where were you based at that time?

12:33:54 20 A. September 2000? 2000?

21 Q. Sorry. September 1990, my fault.

22 A. September 1990 I am based in - to the best of my  
23 recollection I am based in Tappita, I think. I am still based in  
24 Tappita by that time, because September 1990 - Doe is killed in  
12:34:34 25 September - I am based - to the best of my recollection, I am  
26 based in Tappita.

27 Q. How far is that from the Harbel area?

28 A. Tappita could be I would say about maybe 200 miles. 150,  
29 200 miles from Harbel. Tappita is way going into the southeast,

1 in Nimba County.

2 Q. Now, did you Corporal Foday Sankoh by any other name?

3 A. No, I didn't know him, so I didn't know any other name.

4 Q. Jumping forward to come back, did you ever hear Foday

12:35:28 5 Sankoh referred to by the name - perhaps this is a nom de guerre  
6 - Pa Morlai?

7 A. I heard that here. I heard that here in this courtroom.

8 Q. I am at page 23135 of the transcript, for your Honours'  
9 assistance. Did you ever hear him referred to by that name?

12:35:48 10 A. No, not for the brief period that I knew him, no.

11 Q. Now, it is said that Pa Morlai talked to some Sierra  
12 Leoneans who were detained and told them that they should not  
13 feel despondent.

14 "We should not blame the NPFL for maltreating us or  
12:36:18 15 detaining us because the problem came from our country, from our  
16 leaders. They have interfered into the Liberian civil war, and  
17 they had no business to interfere into that war. As a result,  
18 they have prevented the NPFL from taking power in Monrovia, so  
19 this is why we were being treated that way, because we come from  
12:36:39 20 countries that contributed troops to ECOMOG."

21 Now, I mention that for this reason, Mr Taylor: That is a  
22 sentiment you would share, wouldn't you?

23 A. Yes, in a way I would.

24 Q. Now, is it purely coincidental that this man, who you claim  
12:37:00 25 not to know, is expressing such sentiments to Sierra Leoneans  
26 held captive at that time? Do you follow me?

27 A. I follow you. I am not surprised that he would say that,  
28 if he is talking to Sierra Leoneans and he wants to pacify them.  
29 Any smart person would say something like that. I am not

1 surprised.

2 Q. Now, it is said that the man who gave him his name as Pa  
3 Morlai was dressed in military outfit and that he had a red  
4 beret. Now, help us, were these Special Forces trained in Libya  
12:37:50 5 distinguished from other soldiers by any particular item of  
6 uniform?

7 A. No, at this time, no. In fact, most of the soldiers at  
8 that time didn't really wear a uniform. So, no, they did not  
9 have any specific outfit that would identify them, no.

12:38:18 10 Q. Now, it is also said that the man who gave his name as Pa  
11 Morlai - and I am at page 23136 - had a badge on his uniform on  
12 which was written "Adviser on National/International Affairs".  
13 Does that make any sense to you, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Nobody would wear such a badge, even if it were a Liberian  
12:38:53 15 adviser on national and international affairs. With all of the  
16 qualified people that we had with me at that particular time, I  
17 mean, very smart and educated people, I don't see how anybody  
18 would be an adviser called Pa Morlai to me on international or  
19 national affairs.

12:39:21 20 Q. National and international affairs?

21 A. Total nonsense.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, let us be quite clear why I am asking you about  
23 these little details. You're claiming you don't know this man at  
24 this time?

12:39:34 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. And it may well be suggested in due course that you are  
27 quite deliberately distancing yourself from Foday Sankoh at this  
28 stage. I am seeking to put to you details which might be used to  
29 suggest that you are not being totally frank about that. Because

1 if this man is going around in Liberia speaking to Sierra Leonean  
2 detainees wearing such a uniform with such a badge, the question  
3 is: How come you didn't know about it? Do you follow me?

4 A. That is correct, I do.

12:40:18 5 Q. So that's why I am asking you about this. Now, what do you  
6 say about that suggestion?

7 A. There is no one in the NPFL area, officials or not, that  
8 are wearing badges. There is no one that is really unified,  
9 let's say, military uniform and berets and different things. We  
12:40:37 10 don't - nobody goes around wearing a badge about his position in  
11 government. That's totally, totally untrue. I do not know - I  
12 am not here to argue that a Pa Morlai or Foday Sankoh, whatever  
13 he is calling himself, was not in Liberia at the time. I don't  
14 really know, because I had no contacts with him. And if I had  
12:41:05 15 known, I would have done something about it. But I am answering  
16 the issue of somebody being an adviser to me. If you an adviser  
17 to me, I must know you, and, of course, nobody is wearing badges.  
18 And so I am responding to the issue that he is not an adviser to  
19 me; I am not responding to the fact that he may or may not have  
12:41:27 20 been there at the time.

21 Q. All right. Well, let's look at another aspect of that.  
22 Because apparently, according to what we were told, Sankoh later  
23 informed these individuals that he was special - a member of the  
24 Special Forces. That means he trained in Libya. And this:

12:41:52 25 "That he was working for Mr Taylor in Liberia, though he  
26 was a Sierra Leonean, but he was happy to fight in Liberia and  
27 that he had, he told us later at the training base in Camp Naama,  
28 that he served as adviser to President Taylor on  
29 national/international affairs, just as it was indicated on his

1 uniform?"

2 Do you understand that?

3 A. I do.

4 Q. So that's what he was telling people. Now, help me,  
12:42:30 5 Mr Taylor. If, as you are telling us, you didn't know this man,  
6 how is it that he is saying these kind of things at Camp Naama  
7 and not a word gets back to you? Do you follow me?

8 A. Yes, I do follow you. I don't know why it doesn't get back  
9 to me. If he is there, I don't know, because the people in the  
12:42:51 10 field, from one of the most trusted people at the time, my  
11 defence spokesman, Defence Minister Tom Womeiyu, and others would  
12 have known him. So I really don't know. And where I am at the  
13 time, it just doesn't get to me. That's why I am saying that I  
14 am sure there will be a lot of other people that - witnesses that  
12:43:14 15 will testify in this case that will be able to maybe help unlock  
16 the Foday Sankoh situation.

17 But I am not aware that Foday Sankoh is in Liberia at the  
18 time. He is not an adviser to me. And for some reason it  
19 doesn't get to me because probably it's a hush-hush situation.  
12:43:32 20 My Defence Minister doesn't tell, because Womeiyu moves around.  
21 The most senior officer of the armed forces at that particular  
22 time, General Musa, doesn't tell me. And there are other  
23 civilian advisers around at the particular period. It doesn't  
24 get to me. And no one brought to my attention that Foday Sankoh  
12:43:52 25 was in Naama training and that he had said that he was an adviser  
26 to me. It doesn't get to me.

27 Q. But, Mr Taylor, let's just look at the practicalities,  
28 because we've heard testimony that training at Camp Naama was not  
29 limited to Sierra Leoneans, there were Liberians there, and no

1 doubt if there are Liberians there being trained in the same  
2 camp, there must be Liberian senior officers there as well?

3 A. Definitely.

4 Q. And if we have a man going around masquerading as your  
12:44:27 5 national/international adviser, surely one would expect someone  
6 to mention it to you. Do you follow me?

7 A. Yeah, I follow you. But if you look a little deeper at  
8 that, when you say somebody - his explanation and they were  
9 masquerading around, where is this masquerading supposed to be  
12:44:51 10 occurring? I mean, that's his own interpretation of what he is  
11 talking about.

12 I mean, at this particular time by 1990 September that we  
13 are talking about, the structure of the - you know, strangely,  
14 this witness, as I go back into his testimony, he doesn't talk  
12:45:09 15 about Foday Sankoh coming to Buchanan to visit me or Tappita. He  
16 talks about Gbarnga. So if you look at the whole picture, I am  
17 not sure if this is a statement that Foday Sankoh is making  
18 around or this is the witness's own interpretation of what he was  
19 told by Sankoh.

12:45:31 20 So if the explanation is that he is masquerading around, I  
21 mean, I would strongly disagree with that because anybody that is  
22 masquerading around as my adviser would be able to come and meet  
23 with me. And there is no such thing. So what kind of adviser is  
24 that if I don't know him and he doesn't meet with me? And we are  
12:45:53 25 talking about September 1990, so how is that possible?

26 Q. Now, help me with this, Mr Taylor: By about December of  
27 1990, so one year after the commencement of the civil war in  
28 Liberia, just give us an idea of how many combatants the NPFL  
29 would have in training around the country?

1 A. By December of 1990, the NPFL by that time I would say  
2 would have between 25,000 and 30,000 combatants at least.

3 Q. No, in training.

4 A. In training?

12:46:41 5 Q. Being trained. I ask for a very good reason.

6 A. Well, at - and by "being trained" you must be talking about  
7 all of the bases.

8 Q. Yes, I am.

9 A. Oh, we are talking about 15 bases plus, oh, this is - I  
12:47:06 10 don't know what to really put it to. But I would say, if we were  
11 to take an average of about 500 persons per base, and some bases  
12 would have more than 500 - so ten, that 5,000. So at this  
13 particular time in question, 15, that's another half, I would  
14 say - I would put it between 4,000 and 7,000 that could be in  
12:47:40 15 training across the country.

16 Q. Very well. Let's now go to the particular. Camp Naama you  
17 have told us was the largest military base in Liberia. Is that  
18 right?

19 A. That is correct.

12:47:56 20 Q. By December of 1990, just give us a rough idea, how many  
21 people do you think would have been in training at Camp Naama?

22 A. Oh, and this is a guess because I don't have the statistics  
23 to know, but because we are talking about Bong and Lofa County  
24 and the NPFL is just moving in that area, I would say in excess  
12:48:29 25 of 3,000 would be --

26 Q. In excess of 3,000?

27 A. Would be at Naama because that's the first major base in  
28 that part of the country, because I have explained we don't come  
29 from Nimba through Gbarnga. We come via Buchanan, Harbel and

1 then go back up. So I would say about 3,000 could be on that  
2 base.

3 Q. Now, this is why I am asking, page 23148 of the transcript,  
4 21 January 2009: "We were about between 130 and 150 that took

12:49:11 5 the initial training up to December 1990." Okay, that's Sierra  
6 Leoneans. So we are talking about that number, 130 to 150 Sierra  
7 Leoneans in amongst how many thousand possibly training at Naama?

8 A. Could be possibly I would say about 3,000.

9 Q. Now, tell us, would that number, 130 to 150, in the overall  
10 scheme of things, be something significant? Do you follow me?

12:49:40 11 A. I follow you. No, it would not be significant and the  
12 reason why it would be insignificant, not just because of the  
13 number, that's one factor, but because there are other West  
14 African nationals training. So it would not be strange that

12:50:07 15 there were 150 Sierra Leoneans or maybe several hundred Ivorians  
16 or something like that. No, it would not be unusual for us, no.

17 Q. Because it is said, this is of the 130 to 150, "Some were  
18 NPFL members, but they came and joined us to train together."

19 A. But that's not possible.

12:50:43 20 Q. "Q. So you are saying 130 to 150 took the additional  
21 training up to December 1990?"

22 A. After the training programme in December, Pa Morlai  
23 told us that the number was too small for us to enter  
24 Sierra Leone and that most of us were inexperienced,  
12:51:07 25 meaning that we had no pre-knowledge on guerilla warfare or  
26 rebel war, so he is going to get some NPFL fighters who  
27 were old fighters who had been trained before by the NPFL  
28 and have experience at war in the various fronts, so they  
29 will come with us for another three months, then after that



1 we will all proceed to Sierra Leone."

2 Now, did you know about this?

3 A. No, no. And we have to make some very clear-cut line.

4 Number one, the first part where that document speaks about NPFL

12:51:47 5 coming to train along with them, that cannot be true.

6 Q. Why?

7 A. Because if you are an NPFL you are already trained. So

8 those individuals that train with them must be civilians that

9 they recruit. And we have evidence of that, some of the

12:52:09 10 civilians that were recruited that have - and the records are

11 before this Court about individuals that went to train.

12 Now, if you were an NPFL that means you were already

13 trained and that's where I would put another witness that came

14 before this Court, like Mongor, who is not protected, would be

12:52:36 15 with some Sierra Leonean background that maybe by going around

16 they could recruit.

17 So you must look at two different sets of Liberians. The

18 civilians that maybe he was able to recruit - and don't let's

19 forget, let me remind the Court, there is a protected witness

12:52:51 20 that I am not going to name that came before this Court and

21 explained how she was recruited. And she was not an NPFL at the

22 time, through sister's arrangement and different things. I am

23 not going to get into the name because she is protected, but

24 there were two different sets. People that went around

12:53:13 25 civilians, recruiting. In fact some of the Vanguard's that we got

26 to know that were not NPFL people were recruited. So that's two

27 different things I think we ought to separate. So I was not

28 aware that that kind of thing was going on.

29 So when we look at that particular individual that is

1 protected, if we look at one of the other fellows that was not  
2 protected, and I want to be sure about this, who was a radio  
3 operator, these were people with Sierra Leonean background that  
4 apparently an opportunity was used to pick them, okay. So that's  
12:53:58 5 how I would explain that part.

6 Q. It was also said, Mr Taylor, that Sankoh told these 130 to  
7 140 recruits, because of the shortage of numbers and experience,  
8 that he was going to get his brother who was Pa Taylor. "He  
9 would get some fighters from him to come and join us so that they  
12:54:41 10 will be with us." Now, that suggests direct contact between  
11 Sankoh and you in order to get this additional manpower. Do you  
12 follow?

13 A. I do follow. I do follow.

14 Q. Was there such direct contact?

12:55:04 15 A. There was no such direct contact. But I am not sure if the  
16 witness states as to whether they received these men from me. I  
17 forgot that part of the testimony. Because if this Pa Morlai was  
18 supposed to be coming to his brother to get some men, then he  
19 should be able to say that either they received the men from me  
12:55:28 20 or didn't. I don't quite remember that part of the testimony.  
21 But there was no such contact.

22 Q. Now, let's look at another inference from this passage:

23 "After the training programme in December, Pa Morlai told  
24 us that the numbers were too small, so he was going to get some  
12:55:55 25 NPFL fighters who were old fighters who had been trained before  
26 by the NPFL and have experienced war at the various fronts, so  
27 they will come and be with us for another three months."

28 Now, think about it. Not immediately apparent, but just  
29 think about that. Three months from December 1990 takes us to

1 when?

2 A. March.

3 Q. 1991?

4 A. That is correct.

12:56:27 5 Q. Which is precisely when the invasion of Sierra Leone began?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So that what is being suggested is that as early as  
8 December 1990 there was contact between you and Sankoh in order  
9 to provide the support for an invasion three months hence. Do

12:56:57 10 you follow it?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. And so consequently you were deeply involved and implicated  
13 in matters some three months before the invasion took place. Do  
14 you follow?

12:57:09 15 A. I follow.

16 Q. Was that the case, Mr Taylor?

17 A. That was not the case. And to show you that it cannot be  
18 the case, there are other witnesses that testified before this  
19 Bench that said that they were not supposed to start, but there  
12:57:24 20 was supposed to be some emergency that came up and they had to  
21 rush and get it started earlier than originally planned. So that  
22 shows you, and I am sure we will research it because I have  
23 mentioned it for the Bench - but that shows you that side.

24 But it's important for the Court to understand, and there  
12:57:46 25 are some - you know, when you go through some of the logic that  
26 have been presented by this Prosecution by some of their  
27 witnesses, it really challenges one's own concept of really truth  
28 and logic. Here I am, I am supposed to be - first of all,  
29 100-and-some-odd Sierra Leoneans go train for an invasion that I

1 planned, and don't let's forget, from where? I was supposed to  
2 put in plan together in Libya. This is a Libyan plan that I put  
3 together in Libya. So I do all this planning, only to come to  
4 see that 120 Sierra Leoneans are trained to carry out this plan.

12:58:35 5 And it's not until after the training and Pa Morlai Sankoh  
6 realises that the numbers are small and he says, "Oh, I need to  
7 go back and see if I can get something."

8 Now, if you look at it, you know, if you really want to  
9 destroy someone, fine. But if you look at it, it doesn't make  
12:58:57 10 sense. I make this plan in Libya with Sankoh, only to come to  
11 Liberia and there is a handful of Sierra Leoneans that go and  
12 train, and he has to say, "No, it's too small. I need some  
13 additional Liberians." It just doesn't ring a bell to me. So I  
14 really don't know what they are talking about.

12:59:18 15 Look, three Sierra Leoneans, Sankoh, Mohamed Tarawalli and  
16 Rashid - I forgot his last name - three individuals that I did  
17 not know in Liberia that are not counted to be what we call at  
18 that time revolutionaries that have been able to past the test  
19 and know people - know the people at the Mataba, being able to  
12:59:42 20 address issues, do non-paper, white papers. Somebody that I  
21 don't know, I am supposed to come and take three individuals at  
22 lunch, whatever they are talking about. It did not happen. No,  
23 it did not happen as the witness describes it there. No. And I  
24 am sure I can bet if Woveiyu, who was with me, who helped to put  
13:00:10 25 the NPFL together, even though Ellen was not there, but Tom  
26 Woveiyu and some of the other key individuals in this  
27 organisation, if they had gotten any wind that there was supposed  
28 to be a group being trained to attack Sierra Leone, it would have  
29 gotten to me. That situation that happened there was purely,

1 purely a very secretive underground situation that happened,  
2 because like I say, Momoh and I were still very good friends at  
3 the time of this attack on Sierra Leone. Momoh and I were still  
4 friends. We were still friends.

13:00:54 5 Q. Now, the account continues in this way: That you provided  
6 arms, Berettas, AK47s, GPMG, which are general-purpose  
7 machine-guns, and other heavy duty weapons like 30 and 50 calibre  
8 weapons and RPGs, RPG rockets, that you supplied them courtesy,  
9 we are told, of President Charles Taylor for training at Camp  
13:01:37 10 Naama.

11 A. I never did that. The training - in fact, in training  
12 camp, to the best of my knowledge of information given me, there  
13 were two sets - types of weapons that I was aware, based on what  
14 I was briefed, that went around training camps. I will tell you.

13:02:01 15 All training camps in the NPFL at that time had a unit  
16 responsible for security. Training bases were protected by a  
17 security force, but the training itself were not done with good  
18 weapons. The training was done with demonstration weapons. They  
19 would take weapons, and only for the purpose of disassembling and  
13:02:33 20 assembly. Trainees, to the best of my knowledge, and unless my  
21 commanders misinformed me, were not given weapons on that

22 training base. They were protected by a trained unit in case the  
23 base came under attack by the AFL, but the trainees only had  
24 demonstration weapons to tell them what the weapon was, how to  
13:02:57 25 dismantle and assemble, and very few. There were nothing - we do  
26 not do any live ammo training, no. So that is not true that the  
27 trainees were given weapons. No. Then if that happened, then  
28 you know it was unofficial. No major authority in the NPFL could  
29 have known about it, no. No.

1 Q. Now, it is also said that:

2 "Pa Morlai, at the time of this training, he used to tell  
3 us everything. He was not hiding anything from us any longer.

4 First of all, he made us during the training exercise to

13:03:43 5 understand that he was doing everything through the goodwill" -

6 page 23151, I'm sorry - "of his brother, that was

7 Mr Charles Taylor, and that Charles Taylor provided him the

8 training base, provided him with food for his recruits, provided

9 him with materials and assisted him with manpower to reinforce

13:04:11 10 the Sierra Leonean recruits."

11 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

12 A. That is totally false. Never gave Sankoh any manpower,

13 nothing.

14 Q. No, no, no. It's not just manpower. A training base, one,

13:04:34 15 food, two, recruits, materials, and manpower.

16 A. None of them. None of them. Food, training base, none of

17 them. And this manpower that was described, we cannot take it

18 into isolation. Let's just look at manpower. The individuals

19 that have come before the Court, like Mr Isaac Mongor, that's the

13:05:04 20 manpower? So I haven't seen any list of individuals that were

21 even mentioned by Mr Mongor here of individuals that were sent.

22 He says that he was sent, which is not true - we will get into

23 that later - but there is no manpower. And the fact that people

24 own Naama. Naama is a base. I don't give it to them. I don't

13:05:29 25 visit Naama at the time that he is talking about. I don't really

26 know, because there are so many bases. So the four items you

27 mention are not true; that is, the base, the food, the manpower

28 and the weapons are not true.

29 Q. Now, you understand that what's supposed to be going on in

1 terms of recruitment, training at Camp Naama, is in this period  
2 after the ECOMOG intervention from around about September 1990  
3 through to march 1991 - you follow me?

4 A. Yes, I do.

13:06:11 5 Q. So we are talking about that seven-month or so period, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And you are saying that all of this is going on throughout  
8 that seven-month period and you don't know a thing about it?

9 A. I don't think any senior - I don't know anything about it,  
13:06:31 10 and no other senior NPFL person is aware of that. Those that  
11 ought to know, I think, know.

12 Q. Now, we were told that amongst the areas of training --

13 A. Excuse me, counsel, I just said something here. I'm sure -  
14 when I said "Those that ought to know," I think I need  
13:07:00 15 to - before it be taken what - I am referring to those  
16 individuals that later on we get to know that are conniving with  
17 Foday Sankoh are the ones that know. That's what I mean by  
18 "Those that ought to know," because I didn't just want to stop  
19 there and leave you with "Those that ought to know," no.

13:07:23 20 Q. Thank you for that. Now, amongst the areas of training, we  
21 were told, was ideology. Now, I want you to listen carefully to  
22 a description; that ideology simply means how they ought to know  
23 when we get into the country, how we should behave, what we  
24 should do to civilians, to fellow soldiers, the manner in which  
13:07:54 25 they should comport themselves, to speak politely to civilians,  
26 to pay fairly for what you buy from civilian, not to take  
27 liberties with women.

28 Now, were those kind of principles part of NPFL ideology,  
29 Mr Taylor?

1 A. Let's get that word "ideology". As far as the NPFL was  
2 concerned, we didn't go to military bases teaching ideology.  
3 There was no ideological training on any NPFL base while I was  
4 the leader of the NPFL, no. What the NPFL did, we taught  
13:08:35 5 military science and we taught the laws of war, and that is why  
6 we didn't have those kinds of atrocities in Liberia that you  
7 found in other place, okay? We did not teach ideology on any  
8 NPFL base, no.

9 Q. Well, interesting that you should give that answer,  
13:08:57 10 Mr Taylor, because if ideology is being taught at Camp Naama, all  
11 more reason why you should find out about it, do you see?

12 A. Yes. But, I mean, it was not taught on that Naama that I -  
13 it could not have been, okay? And if ideology was taught - if I  
14 recall a witnesses - a couple of witnesses that testified before  
13:09:22 15 the Court, they testified that the training base that we were on  
16 was separate from the NPFL. And now I can understand why there's  
17 a separation, because probably it is secret. I think there is  
18 testimony to that effect, that there was a separate training. No  
19 NPFL, so this cannot be an NPFL operation. We didn't teach  
13:09:43 20 anything called ideology. We were very strict in military  
21 science, discipline and courtesy, and we were very strict  
22 regarding the laws of war and the Geneva Convention. We did  
23 teach the laws of war. Every soldier in the NPFL - they called  
24 them general orders. You had to know - in fact, they could  
13:10:07 25 almost repeat general order - I don't even know them, but they  
26 used to call them general orders from number one through - I  
27 think there's seven of them: Take care of this post; how to be  
28 on guard post. I don't know, I've never taken training. But  
29 they used to call them general orders, and you had to know them.



1 But there were no ideological mechanism attached to the NPFL like  
2 that, no.

13:10:47 3 Q. And in that vein, Mr Taylor, you recall that recently we  
4 looked at an RUF publication "Footpaths to Democracy" which made  
5 mention of an earlier ideological statement issued in 1989, do  
6 you remember that?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. Now, did the NPFL have a similar document?

9 A. No.

13:10:59 10 Q. The NPFL's Little Red Book?

11 A. No, never. Never did that, no. Never published any book,  
12 never had that kind of thing, no.

13 Q. Did you, for example, bring back from Libya their Little  
14 Green Book?

13:11:14 15 A. No, that's why we were a little different. We didn't go -  
16 we didn't - you know, the Liberian group that went to Libya, in  
17 fact, we did not go to Libya to look for any ideological  
18 training. We went to Libya seeking assistance as a part of a  
19 pan-African movement to launch a revolution. The Green Book, I  
13:11:39 20 was a trained - when I went to Libya I was a trained economist.

21 I didn't go to Libya to look at socialist ideas and all that kind  
22 of thing and the Green Book. Because I had been trained in the  
23 west, I believe in capitalism and democracy. I'm a capitalist to  
24 the core. I don't believe in that stuff that you got to remain  
13:11:58 25 poor, broke, down and dirty before you are supposed to be a human  
26 being. I'm a capitalist to the core.

27 Q. I am not so sure that's what socialism is about, Mr Taylor,  
28 but we can have that political debate some other time.

29 A. Exactly. So I didn't bring the Green Book back. In fact,

1 Liberia and the people involved with me - there were three of us:  
2 I say Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf trained Harvard, which is not an  
3 economies - trained Harvard, public administrator; Tom Womeiyu.  
4 We had educated people that didn't go there for that, so we  
13:12:35 5 didn't bring back the green book, no.

6 Q. Now, this account continues in this way, and we are still  
7 at Camp Naama being trained:

8 "Q. The Liberian trainees at the base, do you know what  
9 their tribal or ethnic affiliation was?

13:12:59 10 A. No, they were all mixed up but the tribe from Nimba,  
11 that is the Gio and Mano, were in the large majority."  
12 Would you agree with that at Camp Naama?

13 A. No, I wouldn't agree with that. We are in the area - I  
14 think the Kpelles from Bong were in the majority at Camp Naama  
13:13:20 15 because that's in the Kpelle zone. No, there were major bases  
16 still in Nimba. So, no, he is wrong about that.

17 Q. Then this:

18 "Q. You indicated that after training had been completed  
19 in December that Foday Sankoh, through Charles Taylor, got  
13:13:41 20 some experienced NPFL fighters and brought them to the base  
21 for training. What kind of training did these NPFL  
22 fighters receive?

23 A. Well, as old fighters, they were more concentrated on  
24 physical training and then the ideology.

13:13:59 25 Q. And their ideology training, was it as you described  
26 for the other trainees? That is, you and the others who  
27 trained in December?

28 A. Yes, we all used to have the ideology training  
29 together, we and the old fighters together."

1 Now I ask again, Mr Taylor, did you know anything about  
2 that?

3 A. No, I did not know that NPFL old fighters had gone there.  
4 And I wonder who some of these people be, because if we look at  
13:14:36 5 the records before the Court, you know instead of these people  
6 just speaking widely, just openly, on a wild range, if we listen  
7 to the testimony before this Court, I can mention in terms of  
8 Liberians whose names have come up, just I would say about, what,  
9 maybe ten or less, the names that I have heard. We have heard  
13:15:10 10 Boston, Boston Flomo, we have heard Superman, and we know of  
11 Mr Mongor who says he was trained in Nimba. We've heard of the  
12 radio operator who said that - so I don't know where these  
13 fighters - they just mix statements and say "fighters". You can  
14 tell, I mean, there is no - I am sure Foday Sankoh, if he was  
13:15:41 15 doing that, which they have said he did, were to find some Sierra  
16 Leoneans - and most of the people that have been named before  
17 this Court, the majority of them are with Sierra Leonean  
18 backgrounds. So there are no fighters that are sent by me.

19 Q. Now, the beginning of the war is described and mention is  
13:16:11 20 made of the fact that those members of the RUF who trained in  
21 Naama came to bear the name Vanguard, yes, and there were some  
22 200 and so of them. Do you recall that evidence?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. That's a rough figure. Now, it is said that following the  
13:16:39 25 invasion of Sierra Leone, the NPFL fighters who had accompanied  
26 them on the invasion were in effect taking the lead role and this  
27 caused discontent amongst the Sierra Leonean Vanguard. Now, we  
28 are talking about 1991, Mr Taylor. Remind us, when do you say  
29 you established a "relationship" with Foday Sankoh?

1 A. I would say about August '91 that we opened this  
2 relationship.

13:17:43 3 Q. In August 1991, when you established the relationship, at  
4 that stage, were you aware that NPFL fighters were deeply  
5 embroiled in what was going on in Sierra Leone?

6 A. No. I knew that Liberians had voluntarily - some of them  
7 in the border area. I knew that Liberians were fighting over  
8 there, but not NPFL people, no. But I knew that Liberians had  
9 gotten involved in it.

13:18:02 10 Q. But, on the evidence, some of your more senior commanders  
11 had become involved, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Like who? No, there is no senior commander of mine  
13 involved, no. Who is he suggesting that is supposed to be --

14 Q. What about Dopoe Menkarzon?

13:18:29 15 A. No, no, no. Dopoe Menkarzon is not involved at this  
16 particular time. Dopoe Menkarzon becomes involved after the  
17 relationship. The troops go in, he supervises them from time to  
18 time. The commander over there is not even a Special Forces.  
19 The commander is Sam Tuah. But Dopoe Menkarzon as of August of  
13:18:58 20 1991, yes, but not before that, no.

21 Q. What about Oliver Varney?

22 A. We get to find out Oliver Varney and Anthony Mekunagbe are  
23 the two culprits that are responsible for - and this I am talking  
24 about after the fact that we find out are responsible for this  
13:19:21 25 collaboration with Sankoh that leads to this situation and that's  
26 how they get into trouble.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when did you discover that?

28 A. I tell you, it was - we got to find out about the Anthony  
29 Mekunagbe situation after they got into trouble and doing the

1 investigation. That is somewhere I would say by late 1991 to  
2 early '92, thereabouts, that they begin this move to destroy me  
3 and the leadership of the NPFL. It was during their arrest and  
4 interrogation that we got to the bottom of finding out that in  
13:20:21 5 fact Mekunagbe, who was the commander, Special Forces,  
6 responsible for Bong and Lofa County at the time, had put this  
7 whole scheme together with Sankoh, backed by Oliver Varney to  
8 carry out the rest of the plan that they had made in Libya when  
9 they wanted to kill me.

13:20:41 10 Q. Now, what was Mekunagbe's position, just remind us?

11 A. Anthony Mekunagbe was Special Forces and he was the  
12 regional commander for Bong and Lofa at the time, which was a  
13 very, very powerful position.

14 Q. A very senior position?

13:20:58 15 A. Definitely.

16 Q. Secondly, Oliver Varney, was he a Special Forces?

17 A. Special Forces.

18 Q. And what rank was he?

19 A. He carried the rank of major general. Also Mekunagbe. He  
13:21:11 20 commanded the region of Cape Mount and Bomi. So these were  
21 regional, not just zonal. These were regional commanders.

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I have to ask: How could men of such  
23 seniority have been collaborating with Sankoh without you  
24 knowing?

13:21:30 25 A. Very easy. I mean, if somebody expects me to be Superman,  
26 then I am not. I mean, we are running an organisation. I mean,  
27 in any country what gets to the President or the leader at that  
28 particular time is as much as is supposed to get to him. The  
29 leader and the President cannot be expected to be everywhere

1 every time, know everything. It's not possible. It's not  
2 possible.

3 The Special Forces that are brought to Liberia are brought  
4 and they are trained to hold positions, occupy it and administer  
13:22:05 5 at the same time. These Special Forces - Mekunagbe, very  
6 experienced. Before he went to Libya he had served as a police  
7 officer in Liberia before from Nimba. So he was an experienced  
8 personnel in dealing with people. He was trained as a Special  
9 Forces and became a senior commander at that particular time.

13:22:27 10 So what is going in that region. Nobody is coming - it's  
11 so easy to do. People are training. Sierra Leoneans, Ivorians,  
12 the few Nigerians, Ghanaians, West Africans in general, everybody  
13 is fighting. No one is taking notice of anything sinister. If  
14 you want - if you really want to do it you can do it as they did.

13:22:54 15 So you are getting food, and I can see how food would reach to  
16 the base. Mekunagbe had food. Look, we didn't go harassing  
17 civilians for food, no. We provided the food in the field for  
18 our people to keep them from harassing people. So all of these  
19 things were available to Mekunagbe.

13:23:16 20 At the time we are talking about what is going on? We are  
21 not bringing weapons into Liberia. The only weapons that we are  
22 getting we are getting it from what? Captured material from the  
23 NPFL.

24 Mekunagbe captures Naama. So he has access. He is  
13:23:32 25 reported, but he has access to a lot of material. So I can see  
26 why he would do it; because there is Camp Naama. Where Oliver  
27 Varney captured in Bomi, in that was the 6th Battalion base of  
28 the Armed Forces of Liberia. He captured a lot of material on  
29 that side. That's far from where I was. Because, remember now,

1 we have explained this, Monrovia is here, we had to go around  
2 through the forest to get to Bomi.

3 So we are talking about people at far distances, so we did  
4 not require them to bring all of the material into central  
13:24:07 5 storage at that particular time. And the central area where the  
6 chief of staff Isaac Musa was operating out of was Kakata. So  
7 people that captured weapons would be required to bring them to  
8 Kakata. But Cape Mount is so far from that particular area  
9 because you cannot come through Monrovia. So Oliver had a lot of  
13:24:29 10 weapons. Mekunagbe had a lot of weapons. So I understand that  
11 they could have done this kind of thing. I can see how they did  
12 it, okay. And those Special Forces were so powerful that - I  
13 mean, ordinarily people would not ask them questions because it  
14 is assumed that they are doing the right thing. So I can  
13:24:51 15 understand how they could have done that.

16 Q. Now, let's try quickly to deal with another topic before we  
17 adjourn for lunch. Mention was made of the capture of a mining  
18 company called MMC during the invasion of Sierra Leone. I'm at  
19 page 23180. Following the capture, some diamonds were found and  
13:25:42 20 retained and it is said that Foday Sankoh took those diamonds to  
21 Gbarnga and gave them to you.

22 A. And this witness was present?

23 Q. No.

24 A. Never happened.

13:26:02 25 Q. The witness learned about it later in 1992, but it happened  
26 in 1991. So let's put it together. What is being suggested is  
27 in 1991 these diamonds are captured after this company MMC is  
28 captured, Foday Sankoh takes them to Gbarnga and gives them to  
29 you and this individual finds out about this a year later in

1 1992. Now, let's just deal with the core allegation. In 1991,  
2 Mr Taylor, did that happen?

3 A. Never happened in 1991. Never.

13:26:51

4 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you accept that following August 1991 you  
5 did set up a relationship with Foday Sankoh, yes?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. And that you were providing him with, you say, small  
8 amounts of arms and ammunition, yes?

9 A. That is correct.

13:27:06

10 Q. Were you doing it purely on a gratis basis?

11 A. Purely, purely on a gratis basis. Purely.

12 Q. Or did you not on occasions welcome a little sweetener from  
13 Foday?

13:27:29

14 A. Never. Never. Whatever Foday Sankoh had - he very well  
15 could have had diamonds. I did not know about them, because when  
16 Foday Sankoh came to Gbarnga, during that particular period I  
17 have said, food, what they call condiments and other things that  
18 were obtained by the RUF, I didn't have to provide them. He  
19 bought them. So maybe he did have some diamonds. I can't

13:27:48

20 dispute that. But look, as a revolutionary, I tell you what  
21 happened. Never, never, never, never did I take any - look, we  
22 will get to find out - I am sure this Court will get to find out  
23 as we go into this defence. Whether it was Sankoh, or whether it  
24 was Sam Bockarie, or whether it was Issa Sesay, I never, never

13:28:10

25 took anything from any one of them, and I am sure this Court will  
26 find out as we go along. Never. It would have been a disgrace  
27 to me. If I couldn't help somebody, I would - I just would not  
28 take anything from any one of them. I gave. Then maybe Johnny  
29 Paul Koroma had brought me diamonds. When Johnny Paul Koroma



1 came to Liberia, I saw this thing, I gave them money, well he and  
2 his West Side - I never took anything and would never do that,  
3 and I'm sure the evidence will be presented here.

13:28:46 4 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, would that be a convenient  
5 point?

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We will take the lunch adjournment  
7 now and reconvene at 2.30.

8 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

9 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:31:37 10 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Mr President. I remain standing  
11 simply to note for the record that as of 12 o'clock today the  
12 Prosecution has been joined by Christopher Santora.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. That's noted.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

14:31:58 15 Q. Mr Taylor, before lunch you were discussing certain events  
16 in 1990, 1991 concerning some testimony we had heard in the past,  
17 yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, do you recall in April of 1992, Mr Taylor, that there  
14:32:30 20 was a coup in Sierra Leone and President Momoh was ousted from  
21 power?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, we're told that at the time of that event Foday Sankoh  
24 instructed his spokesman, one Allieu Mustafa, to have an  
14:33:09 25 interview with the BBC welcoming the coup. Do you recall that?

26 A. I don't recall the specific statement. It could have  
27 happened. I don't deny that it happened. I don't recall it.

28 Q. Now, the reason I ask is this: Because it was suggested  
29 that the interview conducted by Foday Sankoh's spokesperson,

1 Allieu Mustafa, was conducted at the Executive Mansion Ground in  
2 Gbarnga using - with the BBC using your satellite phone.

3 A. Is that April --

4 Q. -- 1992.

14:33:59 5 A. I don't recall. I did have a satellite phone in 1992. By  
6 April 1992, that's the period that Foday Sankoh could have been  
7 in Gbarnga. I don't recall Foday Sankoh doing an interview from  
8 that phone.

9 Q. It wasn't Foday Sankoh, Mr Taylor. It may be that I've  
14:34:26 10 misled you. The person who conducted the interview was a  
11 spokesperson for Foday Sankoh called Allieu, A-L-L-I-E-U,  
12 Mustafa.

13 A. No, I don't recall him. I don't recall him.

14 Q. Very well. Now, during the time, Mr Taylor, that you  
14:35:01 15 accept you had an ongoing relationship with Foday Sankoh, do you  
16 agree that he would come to visit you at the mansion ground in  
17 Gbarnga on a regular basis?

18 A. No, I wouldn't agree with regular, but he visited me there.  
19 Not regularly.

14:35:17 20 Q. But he would go backwards and forwards, wouldn't he?

21 A. Yeah, he would come there, yes.

22 Q. Now, I just want your comment on this suggestion: Would  
23 you agree that when Foday Sankoh came to see you at the mansion  
24 ground, it was usually in order to obtain assistance with  
14:35:48 25 materials and the like?

26 A. No, I wouldn't agree with that.

27 Q. What would you say was the main purpose of his visits to  
28 you then?

29 A. Foday Sankoh would come. We would discuss the activities

1 of my special operations people inside Sierra Leone dealing with  
2 ULIMO, fighting ULIMO from in Liberia crossing, going to Sierra  
3 Leone. We would talk about some of the difficulties that we were  
4 having and not having material, but it was not just receive.

14:36:34 5 Because sometimes Foday Sankoh came and he didn't receive any  
6 material because we couldn't either spare it or didn't have it  
7 ourselves. So the trips were not just based on ammunition. They  
8 were based on the activities of the men and what they were doing  
9 and how the problem of - my problem was being solved and some of  
14:36:53 10 his problems.

11 Q. What do you say about this: That he was on occasion  
12 seeking fighting materials from you and he got some materials,  
13 some boxes of AK rounds and some RPG bombs, but so far as  
14 Mr Sankoh was concerned there were not enough for him to take  
14:37:19 15 them to Sierra Leone to continue with the fight, so he,  
16 Mr Sankoh, was disappointed?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you agree with that, such a description?

19 A. Yes. I - yes, I agree with that.

14:37:39 20 Q. Sankoh was kind of disappointed with your level of support,  
21 wasn't he?

22 A. Yes, that's true.

23 Q. Now, what about this part of it: That there was a time  
24 when Mr Sankoh couldn't sleep and he was sitting up talking to  
14:38:05 25 his senior officers and he expressed a view that he was

26 disappointed because he wasn't getting enough support from you,  
27 Charles Taylor, and he suggested that that was probably because  
28 you were not receiving anything from him in return; that is,  
29 precious minerals, diamonds. How would you interpret such a

1 view?

2 A. Well, you know, there are two parts to that. Number one,  
3 I'm sure he was disappointed and I don't know as to whether he  
4 was up talking to himself or not. But on the part that - where  
14:38:52 5 he would speculate that the reason why he not receiving support  
6 is because he is not giving me diamonds, I would say that it  
7 would be disingenuous if Sankoh were to state that because that  
8 could be looked at two ways: Presupposing that that happened  
9 before and now he is cut off, but I never did anything for  
14:39:19 10 Foday Sankoh expecting diamond or any minerals in return.

11 Q. Because if I can just explain something to you, then put a  
12 couple of propositions to you, Mr Taylor. Because we were told  
13 that one consequence of you not providing adequate support to  
14 Foday Sankoh was that the RUF were in a zigzag position. The war  
14:39:51 15 was stagnant. Today the advance was small, then the government  
16 troops would come and capture them, and then there was infighting  
17 between the RUF and the NPFL, which made them lose ground, so no  
18 new territory was captured. Now, the propositions I want to put  
19 to you are as follows: You've explained to us that you had  
14:40:23 20 strategic reasons for providing support for Sankoh for that  
21 seven-month period, yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Well, I misstate your evidence. Not seven months. From  
24 August 1991 to May of 1992.

14:40:38 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. And what were those strategic reasons, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Very, very simple. The first - the first and foremost was  
28 an issue of security. We wanted to fight. Since the Government  
29 of Sierra Leone, beginning with Momoh, had armed ULIMO that had

1 crossed into Liberia and were fighting us in Liberia, my first  
2 strategic purpose was to fight ULIMO in Sierra Leone that they  
3 would not come into Liberia and fight us. That was my principal,  
4 principal reason as strategic, yes.

14:41:18 5 Q. So let's strip away the strategy and ask a blunt question:  
6 Were you using the RUF? You understand my question, don't you?

7 A. I do understand your question. In all honesty, I guess one  
8 could interpret it that way. Personally, I would feel, you know,  
9 that's not my style, so it would be a little offensive to say  
10 using. But my - I would describe that particular programme as  
11 taking advantage of a situation that we considered as being  
12 strategic to ours - you know, own security.

13 Q. Now, the reason why I deliberately used the word "use",  
14 Mr Taylor, is this: If, frankly, you fully wanted to -  
14:42:30 15 Foday Sankoh and the RUF to achieve their objective, why did you  
16 not give them adequate support? Do you follow me?

17 A. Oh, yes. Because, quite frankly, it was not a part of my  
18 programme to support a revolution in Sierra Leone. So, in fact,  
19 the point can be made, if my purpose was to support a revolution  
14:43:05 20 in Sierra Leone, I can say here very, very frankly and boldly, we  
21 were in a position that we could have increased the amount of  
22 supplies we were giving to them. If that was a strategic  
23 objective, we would have - we could have put in more energy.

24 Q. That's why I used the word "use", you see. Because,  
14:43:35 25 effectively, by just giving them enough to become a thorn in the  
26 side of the Sierra Leonean government thereby protecting your  
27 flank, you were, in effect, just using them, weren't you,  
28 Mr Taylor? Do you follow me?

29 A. I follow you. You know, I'll say quite earnestly, some

1 people did interpret it that way. But, you know, for me that is  
2 too cruel because that was not the intent. But, you know, like I  
3 say, we took advantage of a unique situation, that we had a  
4 government supporting a rebel movement against us and we used  
14:44:21 5 that opportunity. I would not go so far to say using them  
6 because we were not using RUF individuals to fight the NPFL's  
7 war. So in that way --

8 Q. But, Mr Taylor, please, by protecting your flank and  
9 occupying the attention of ULIMO, it was serving your purpose,  
14:44:47 10 wasn't it?

11 A. Oh, it was. It was. It was.

12 Q. And your purpose being to get power in Liberia?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Yes?

14:44:56 15 A. Yes, I agree.

16 Q. So, Mr Taylor, that's why, you see, I've got to press you  
17 again. You were use them, weren't you?

18 A. That is too cruel for me, counsel. I mean, but --

19 Q. War is a cruel thing, Mr Taylor?

14:45:10 20 A. Well, I don't know, I'm really trying to be very earnest  
21 about this. It has been interpreted by some as using them, but  
22 for me, in my head at the time, we were taking advantage of a  
23 very unique situation. You know, when it comes to other human  
24 beings in dealing with them like that, I don't know, I wouldn't  
14:45:44 25 be - I wouldn't be as cruel to say I'm using them, but I guess  
26 the result was that.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: Did you have a question, your Honour?

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, did you mean was the NPFL  
29 using the RUF to fight ULIMO in Sierra Leone?

1 THE WITNESS: No.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. The question is very simple.

4 A. No. The RUF did not fight in - no, the NPFL was not using  
14:46:20 5 the RUF to fight in Sierra Leone. The "use" I guess he is  
6 referring to, was I using the RUF to provide security for my  
7 flank, okay. So in a way, by fighting Sierra Leonean government  
8 forces and ULIMO on that side, because they were fighting Sierra  
9 Leonean government forces, that help, we were fighting ULIMO also  
14:46:50 10 within the same corridors. So if you look at the whole  
11 operation, we were using the presence of the RUF in that area as  
12 a security protection.

13 Q. Earlier you said, Mr Taylor, that if you had wanted to you  
14 could have provided sufficient assistance to Foday Sankoh, yes?

14:47:26 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. To achieve his objective?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But hold on a minute. That was the plan you had agreed  
19 with him in Libya, wasn't it?

14:47:37 20 A. No, there was no plan in Libya. I didn't know Sankoh.

21 Q. You do follow me, don't you?

22 A. I follow you. Because there was never a plan, I mean, we -  
23 if you look at the - if you look at the RUF at the time that  
24 Sankoh and I were in contact, we had captured, between Camp Naama  
14:48:00 25 and Schefflein, the whole artillery concerns of the Armed Forces  
26 of Liberia. I'm talking about 105 Howitzers, I'm talking about  
27 106 recoilless cannons with thousands of rounds of ammunition and  
28 these recoilless, 106 recoilless are guns that can be mounted on  
29 a small jeep and they fire a distance of - the 106s could fire, I

1 would say about 3 or 4 miles and you can stand them on the ground  
2 and they will fire without any real protection.

3 I mean, if you watch the whole RUF operation, there are no  
4 artillery piece that is are transferred from Liberia to the RUF,  
14:48:54 5 105s or 106s. There are no heavy artillery. Whether we're  
6 talking about - the American arms that we had, you know that the  
7 armed forces had, there's a giant mortar, it's called a 4.2 deuce  
8 mortar that will fire almost I think about 11 kilometres or  
9 thereabouts. We're talking about 120 millimetre mortars. None  
14:49:26 10 of those, if you watch all the testimony that have come here -  
11 none of those arms were transferred to the RUF. What was given  
12 to the RUF was ammunition, okay, and a few light rifles.

13 So the NPFL under my command at the time did not have a  
14 strategic partnership with the RUF that would have led us to  
14:49:55 15 supplying them with the type of means to gain, you know, military  
16 power in Sierra Leone because there was no strategic alignment as  
17 such. So what the NPFL's own strategic alignment as far as we  
18 looked at it was only a situation involving security.

19 This is what I mean that if there was a strategic objective  
14:50:26 20 where there as an alignment that was supposed to be a plan in  
21 Libya where I would have assisted them to enter and they were  
22 there, we had certain capabilities that we could have given them  
23 that would have moved them even I would say ten-fold in obtaining  
24 their objective. And so all of the individuals that you see  
14:50:48 25 coming here would never tell you of the transfer of any serious  
26 artillery and other heavy equipment into Sierra Leone at that  
27 time.

28 Q. So was it the case, Mr Taylor, that you deliberately  
29 under-supported Foday Sankoh for your own reasons?



1 A. Well, you can put it that way. You can put it that way. I  
2 don't have a quarrel with that, yes.

3 Q. So that, as someone went on to say, because of Mr Sankoh's  
4 disappointment, he wrote you a letter in May, did he not?

14:51:33 5 A. Yes, he wrote me one.

6 Q. A letter complaining about the level of support you were  
7 providing?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And what was your response to that letter, Mr Taylor? Or  
14:51:53 10 should I ask first of all: Did you respond to his letter?

11 A. Well, I told him that we did not have the quantity of  
12 things that he was asking for and that we were doing the best  
13 that we could under the circumstances, because we were not  
14 getting assistance from anywhere.

14:52:11 15 Q. Sorry to interrupt, Mr Taylor. You were doing the best  
16 that you could?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But hold on. A moment ago you were telling us that had you  
19 so desired you could have provided even more powerful support?

14:52:25 20 A. Yes, that's true.

21 Q. So is there a degree of duplicity in the answer you were  
22 giving to Mr Sankoh?

23 A. No, no, it's not a degree of duplicity. What I see in that  
24 dealing is a degree of deception with him, but not duplicity in  
14:52:45 25 my answer because when I said to him that's all we can do,

26 actually I admit with that answer I'm being deceptive with him.

27 You understand me? But I mean - but there is a strategic plan

28 and in diplomacy deception is a tool. I couldn't tell him I have  
29 the material, I'm not going to give it to you. I just said this

1 is the best that we can do.

2 But I'm saying to this Court in all honesty that was being  
3 deceptive in what I said to him because we did have it, but I did  
4 not have a strategic objective of getting involved in Sierra  
14:53:24 5 Leone as he might have wanted. That's what I'm saying.

6 Q. So that letter was in May?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you say, Mr Taylor, it was at or about that time that  
9 you severed links with him?

14:53:45 10 A. That is correct. That is correct.

11 Q. So are we to understand then that those operations which  
12 we've heard so much about, Top 20, Top Final, so on, did they  
13 take place at or about that time?

14 A. Yes, it is that and those operations that led to the final  
14:54:10 15 straw that broke the camel's back.

16 Q. So just so that I'm clear about what you are telling us, so  
17 that letter from Sankoh complaining, expressing his  
18 disappointment at the level of your support, that happens at or  
19 about the same time as this major rift takes place between the  
14:54:31 20 RUF and the NPFL?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And you decide there and then to end your relationship?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Let me just ask you about a couple of names. Now, during  
14:55:33 25 that period of cooperation, Mr Taylor, and I'm looking at page  
26 23201 of the transcript of 21 January 2009, was Dopee Menkarzon  
27 that you've mentioned before assigned to Kailahun District?

28 A. Never. Never.

29 Q. I'm talking about during the period of cooperation between

1 the NPFL and the RUF?

2 A. No. He was not assigned. He could have gone there because  
3 he was - he inspected the activities of our special ops people  
4 there. So I don't know if he went to Kailahun, but he was not  
14:56:25 5 assigned there. There was only one commander for the forces  
6 inside. That commander was not a Special Force. Dopee Menkarzon  
7 was a Special Force that would go in, inspect and come back but,  
8 no, he was not assigned in Kailahun, no.

9 Q. General Francis Menwon?

14:56:47 10 A. Yes, Francis Menwon, yes, Special Forces.

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. I'm sure he went in there during that time and came out,  
13 but he was not assigned in there, no.

14 Q. There is one other detail I should ask you about that  
14:57:06 15 letter you received from Mr Sankoh, because in that letter, if  
16 you recall, something to this effect was said: That what you  
17 provided him with will sustain me for some time while awaiting  
18 the long-term supply that you have promised me. You remember  
19 those words being used in the letter?

14:57:30 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Had you made him such a promise?

22 A. Yes, I had told him that this is all we can afford and at  
23 some point in the future when we can afford more we would give  
24 him something better.

14:57:46 25 Q. And did you mean it?

26 A. If I wanted to give Sankoh what I had, he would have had it  
27 at that time. Quite frankly, we were not expecting anything. We  
28 already had things. So that was not --

29 Q. But were you intending to provide this long-term supply?

1 A. No, not really.

2 Q. Now, the final matter I want to deal with in relation to  
3 this area of testimony is this: The Court was told that Foday  
4 Sankoh came to Gbarnga in June 1992, so a month after the letter,  
14:59:24 5 yes? And his purpose was to prevail upon you for fighting  
6 material, and he stayed for about a month, and you did provide  
7 him with some assistance. June 1992?

8 A. No. Foday Sankoh - to the best of my recollection, I  
9 withdraw the men from Sierra Leone in May of 1992. Now, that's  
15:00:03 10 got to be, I would say, between the middle to the end of May this  
11 happens. Now, if - I wouldn't - I wouldn't be too - too sure if  
12 Sankoh was not in Liberia maybe early June. But, you know, when  
13 we use the general June - but there is no material and there is  
14 no contact within this particular - after this period. And, you  
15:00:42 15 know, we can fuss about the last week in May, first week in June,  
16 but following the withdrawal of NPFL special operations people  
17 that were inside Sierra Leone fighting ULIMO, following that  
18 withdrawal, Foday Sankoh did not get one arm, not one piece of  
19 ammunition from NPFL or myself, and that trip or travelling from  
15:01:16 20 Sierra Leone to Liberia ended. He never came back.

21 Now, we can look at the time, whether it is late June -  
22 May, early June, but that period, the withdrawal ended that  
23 particular cooperation with Foday Sankoh. That's the fact. It  
24 ended. There was no more movement by Foday Sankoh in or out of  
15:01:42 25 Liberia. There were no contacts. I was upset and Foday Sankoh  
26 did not confront me or try to come back into Liberia after this  
27 time for any reason. That is not true. That is not true.

28 Q. Could you be mistaken about the date, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Well, there is always a possibility, but I wouldn't be far

1 off. That's why I am saying we are talking about maybe late May,  
2 early June, but I'm not far off. I'm talking about maybe a week  
3 or two, but I'm not far off. We're not talking months, no.  
4 We're not talking months.

15:02:35 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I'm just running a check on a  
6 couple of things. If I could just have a couple of moments to  
7 sort something out.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

15:02:45 10 Q. Mr Taylor, we're about to move on to another witness, okay?  
11 Now, for everybody's assistance, this witness is TF1-539. It's a  
12 protected witness, so, again, we will proceed with care. Yes?  
13 Yes, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes.

15:03:17 15 Q. Now, the witness speaks of this event, 10 June 2008, open  
16 session, page 11469. He describes going to the mansion:

17 "We went to the protocol officer's waiting room. We met a  
18 Pa who was an elderly man called Jungle Jim. I met Benjamin  
19 Yeachen" - spelled Y-E-A-C-H-E-N - "and I recognised him and I

15:04:15 20 met the protocol officer. Those were the ones I met and the  
21 protocol officer advised us to wait. After waiting, the protocol  
22 officer went to some offices and entered the office of His  
23 Excellency, that is, President Charles Taylor. Then Zigzag

24 Marzah and Mr Benjamin Yeachen, all of us went into the waiting

15:04:41 25 room and Mr Benjamin Yeachen got up and followed Sesay Musa while  
26 I - while Zigzag Marzah and I and Jungle Jim, and I also met two  
27 other people whom I did not know, we entered His Excellency's  
28 office. He did not stay that long and they all came out together  
29 with His Excellency himself and I saw Marzah got up and the other

1 men - all of us got up. I too got up and they gave courtesy to  
2 His Excellency. That was the first time for me to meet with  
3 Mr Charles Taylor and he shook my hands."

15:05:28 4 Now, I don't know if you recall the visual features of this  
5 individual who came to give evidence, Mr Taylor.

6 A. No, I don't even know - I cannot associate the number with  
7 the name. I don't remember.

8 Q. Very well. But remember you telling us that Zigzag Marzah  
9 was not really someone who would move in your circle?

15:05:56 10 A. Definitely. Definitely.

11 Q. But according to this individual, it appears that Zigzag  
12 Marzah had access to you. What do you say about that?

13 A. Zigzag Marzah never had access to me and we will prove it  
14 in this court. Never. Zigzag Marzah, Benjamin Yeaten's orderly,  
15:06:26 15 did not have access to Charles Taylor. Never, never did, Zigzag  
16 Marzah.

17 Q. The witness went on to say this, Mr Taylor, in answer to  
18 this question:

19 "Q. What happened after Charles Taylor came in?

15:06:59 20 A. As I said, that was my first time to meet with him. He  
21 welcomed me and he told me that this was the home of  
22 revolution and that what had happened to me was just a  
23 misfortune and that I was very lucky because some people  
24 who faced situations like those could even lose their  
15:07:22 25 life."

26 Now, do you recall saying that?

27 A. No, I don't even - no. I don't recall this situation.

28 Q. And then he went on to say that you took out an envelope  
29 and gave it to the protocol officer, who in turn later gave it to

1 him and that it contained \$1,500 US. Do you know anything about  
2 that?

3 A. No, I can't recall this situation. Maybe if I - I can't  
4 recall this. I can't recall this.

15:07:58 5 Q. I know it can be difficult, Mr Taylor, when we're dealing  
6 with evidence in this anonymous way, but can you recall any  
7 situation like that with a Zigzag Marzah present, a Benjamin  
8 Yeachen, who I think we know the person he is referring to, and  
9 this individual where you described a location as being the home  
10 of revolution? Do you remember anything like that?

11 A. No, I can't recall anything like this, no.

12 Q. Very well. Now, this witness went on to describe an  
13 occasion in March 1999 when he made a trip to Burkina Faso just  
14 before the Lome Peace Accord, yes?

15:09:56 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. And he describes travelling to Burkina Faso with a Colonel  
17 Razak, also with Sam Bockarie --

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

19 MS HOLLIS: Could we ask for the reference, please?

15:10:18 20 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm sorry, page 11509 for 11 June 2008.

21 Sorry:

22 Q. A Colonel Razak, General Sam Bockarie, General Ibrahim, Pa  
23 Cisse Musa, and Eddie Kanneh going to the President's office.  
24 Who was President of Burkina Faso in 1999 March?

15:10:50 25 A. Still Blaise Compaore. Blaise Compaore was President.

26 Q. Then he went on to say that they returned from Burkina Faso  
27 with a plane loaded with ammunition. Do you know anything about  
28 that?

29 A. No. What did you say, March 1999?

1 Q. March 1999.

2 A. No. No. Now, there's a catch to that also, then this  
3 could be what he may be referring to - this witness now is  
4 referring to a second set of ammunition that's supposed to be  
15:11:53 5 coming from Burkina Faso now, because we've had others that talk  
6 about ammunition coming in 1998, so now he has now gone to March  
7 1999. I'm surely not aware of this particular situation, no.

8 Q. And we're talking about, on this trip, three Leyland trucks  
9 worth of arms and ammunition which were brought on that plane.

15:12:28 10 Do you know anything about this, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Nothing. And I don't know anything about it, and I would  
12 strongly say in the most emphatic way that just never happened.  
13 No March of 1999, never. Never, never happened.

14 Q. Now, this is the month before April 1999 when we've heard  
15:12:56 15 evidence to the effect that you were busy discussing with the UN  
16 special representatives in Sierra Leone and Liberia for the  
17 transit of RUF representatives through Liberian territory to Lome  
18 for the peace talks, yes?

19 A. Yes. Yes.

15:13:23 20 Q. Now, were you the month before, Mr Taylor, conniving with  
21 President Blaise Compaore, another leader present at those peace  
22 talks in Lome, to bring in a shipment of arms destined for the  
23 RUF?

24 A. No, not at all. March 1999, that's a month after the  
15:13:51 25 Freetown invasion. March 1999. Because it occurs in January,  
26 and so we're in March. That's about roughly a month. And there  
27 are so many discussions and manoeuvres going on where we get a  
28 ceasefire, we have meetings and discussions.

29 So the programme that starts in April didn't just jump off



1 the wall. It took all those months between this 6 January 1999  
2 attack, between that time, to get that peace thing going on in  
3 April. There is nothing on our minds - my mind but trying to get  
4 the peace process on track. That's a total lie. It's not true.

15:14:42 5 March 1999? No. That's untrue.

6 Q. Benjamin Yeaten's house was not far from White Flower, was  
7 it?

8 A. No, not far.

9 Q. Was there a store of arms and ammunition at Benjamin  
15:15:40 10 Yeaten's address to your knowledge?

11 A. At his house?

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. I don't know. I don't know. It's possible that he could  
14 have had some there, but I really don't know.

15:16:15 15 Q. This particular individual also claimed that he made a road  
16 trip with Sam Bockarie and the wives of Tamba Brima and Ibrahim  
17 Bazy along with Jungle and Sampson and during the trip Bockarie  
18 threatened to kill him but the killing was allegedly stopped by  
19 you. Do you know anything about that?

15:16:50 20 A. No. No. I stopped Bockarie from killing him while they  
21 were on their trip?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. No, know nothing about it. That's not true. No.

24 Q. Tell me, Mr Taylor, you've expressed difficulty in  
15:17:23 25 identifying this individual?

26 A. Uh-huh.

27 Q. From that fact, if this was an individual with some status,  
28 do you think you would recall him?

29 A. Well, I'm not sure if I would recall him based on status.

1 I would be able to recall him on the basis of my recollection of  
2 the facts that he's presented. I would try to associate it with  
3 him or maybe - you know, anybody else, for that matter, not just  
4 on status.

15:18:27 5 Q. Now, the witness went on to say, at page 11541, "The only  
6 time Issa Sesay left Kono was when Mosquito Spray cut off our  
7 supply route." Pause there. Who is Mosquito Spray?

8 A. We first heard that expression Mosquito Spray on the - if  
9 I'm not mistaken, the first group that attacked Lofa. He called  
10 himself Mosquito Spray when he attacked - I think it was around  
11 Kolahun. He called himself Mosquito Spray.

12 Q. When was this?

13 A. The first attack, that was, if I'm not mistaken, in 1998.  
14 Somewhere late 1998 when this Mosquito Spray attacked.

15:19:25 15 Q. And he says:

16 "Well, the only time Issa Sesay left Kono was when Mosquito  
17 Spray cut off our supply route. That was when they attacked  
18 Foya, Lofa County. When that attack occurred it was when  
19 Sam Bockarie sent a message that all the fighters that we had in  
20 Kono should organise themselves and Issa Sesay should get a  
21 reinforcement for these men so we would come and capture and  
22 clear the ULIMO off from Foya. That was an order he had received  
23 from President Charles Taylor."

24 Did you give such an order, Mr Taylor?

15:20:13 25 A. I never gave such an order. In fact we are not fighting  
26 ULIMO. I didn't hear anything about ULIMO. The people that  
27 attacked us were calling themselves Mosquito Spray. Later on we  
28 got to know that they were LURD, not ULIMO. So this confuses me  
29 of what he is talking about, but no such thing occurred.

1 Q. Well, perhaps I should do justice to the witness by  
2 reminding you of his next answer. He is asked this question  
3 immediately after he gave the answer I just read out to you:

15:20:50

4 "Q. Sir, you mentioned Mosquito Spray. Do you know who  
5 Mosquito Spray was?

6 A. Although I don't know him or I did not see him, he was  
7 a ULIMO. He was the commander of the LURD rebels. They  
8 were the ones who cut off our supply route."

15:21:15

9 Now let me pause. Did you know Mosquito Spray to be a  
10 former LURD combatant - a former ULIMO combatant?

11 A. Until now when I sit here I have not fully - I do not fully  
12 know the identity of this Mosquito Spray but I have to assume  
13 that he was a former ULIMO. I still don't know his identity.

14 Q. Why do you make that assumption?

15:21:41

15 A. Well, because most of the LURD people - most of the LURD  
16 people were ULIMO but there were also LPCs and there were also  
17 other people that were involved. It is only after I get to know  
18 the identity of Mosquito Spray that I would know, but I know that  
19 the group that came in called themselves LURD but I cannot really  
20 say with any certainty that Mosquito Spray was a ULIMO. If he  
21 says so, probably he knows him. But I still don't know who  
22 Mosquito Spray is.

15:22:05

23 Q. Very well. He goes on:

15:22:28

24 "A. They were the ones who cut off our supply route, our  
25 supply route in Foya, because everything came from Liberia  
26 for us. So Mosquito Spray came. Mosquito Spray and others  
27 came and cut off our supply route and that created a  
28 problem for us. That was why Issa put men together to go  
29 and clear that supply route.

1 Q. How long was - first of all, just to be clear, when  
2 Issa Sesay left Kono because of the Mosquito Spray attack,  
3 was that before or after the Lome Peace Accord was signed?

4 A. That was after the Lome Peace Accord."

15:23:14 5 So just dealing with what is being suggested there. First  
6 of all that LURD has cut off their supply route to Liberia, which  
7 assumes that up until 1999 and the Mosquito Spray attack you were  
8 the supplier of arms to the RUF. You follow that, don't you?

9 A. I do.

15:23:48 10 Q. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

11 A. That is not true. That is not true. After the Lome Peace  
12 Accord in July of 1999 - in fact while we're trying to move, I  
13 think this Mosquito Spray situation could have occurred somewhere  
14 if I'm not mistaken around the time that we begin to move people  
15:24:14 15 to Lome. That doesn't even last for 24 hours. It is stopped  
16 immediately. That Mosquito Spray thing stops.

17 It is around the third attack, which I think occurred at  
18 Voinjama, before we begin to experience things and that's going  
19 into late 1999, going into 2000. So what he is talking about  
15:24:44 20 here, no, this did not happen after the Lome agreement as he  
21 talks about. I'm sure he has his time mixed up.

22 Q. So you're suggesting that this is a later event?

23 A. Yes, if he's talking about Mosquito Spray, Mosquito Spray  
24 was just that; it was sprayed and that was it. It as a very,  
15:25:11 25 very short situation and we didn't hear from them again until the  
26 second or third attack if I recall that was made on Voinjama. We  
27 repelled that attack and then we had the situation with the  
28 unruly behaviour against the UN property and different things.  
29 But I think this is a different time. He is wrong.

1 Q. Okay. Now, the witness goes on to say this, Mr Taylor: He  
2 speaks of an occasion when he goes to the Executive Mansion for  
3 the first time in his life. This is page 11656 of the transcript  
4 of 12 June 2008. And then he goes on:

15:26:38 5 "A. It was not the following day that Zigzag Marzah  
6 arrested me. It took some time. That was after Benjamin  
7 and I had discussed about the new development when  
8 Sam Bockarie came and the gems were sorted out. It was  
9 during that time that I was taken to the protocol office in  
10 the President's waiting room that I saw the President for  
11 the first time.

12 Q. And you had never been in the mansion before?

13 A. Yes, my Lord.

14 Q. I think that's a yes that means a no. Are you  
15:27:18 15 agreeing with that suggestion?

16 A. Yes."

17 Well, first let's pause there. Question: Gems and  
18 Sam Bockarie and Executive Mansion, what are you saying about  
19 that?

15:27:35 20 A. Total fabrication. There's no gems and Sam Bockarie  
21 bringing gems to me at the mansion. I'm assuming this is still  
22 after Lome? Are we still dealing with - how would Sam Bockarie  
23 bring gems to me at the mansion? They made this whole thing up  
24 and finding people to come and talk about what they do not know.  
15:27:58 25 Never, ever happened.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm going to leave that witness for now because  
27 there's a couple of details that I want to check and I will come  
28 back to him. So we're going to move on to another Prosecution  
29 witness and return to this particular witness at a later stage.

1 Now, the witness I want to go on to now is witness TF1-360. The  
2 witness says he was captured and taken to a training base at  
3 Zimmi, yes? The witness's name is Perry Kamara, TF1-360. And  
4 I'm beginning at page 3025 of the transcript of 4 February 2008.

15:30:10 5 And the questions asked go like this:

6 "Q. Mr Witness, at the time you were captured, and you say  
7 you were taken to the training - to a training base at  
8 Zimmi, were you told anything by the persons who captured  
9 you?

15:30:27 10 A. Oh, yes. They said a lot of things. In fact, when I  
11 was captured, I was not alone. We were captured, we were  
12 many, male and female. They said it is a war that has come  
13 to this country. Foday Sankoh is the leader of the RUF  
14 that came with this war from Liberia. He came along with  
15 Sierra Leoneans and Liberians that Charles Taylor had asked  
16 to join them to come with the war to Sierra Leone."

17 What's your view on that?

18 A. I don't know what this Perry Kamara is talking about here,  
19 really. That's not true.

15:31:09 20 Q. This is in April of 1991, Mr Taylor. Now, the reason why I  
21 tell you the date is because, on your account, you don't start  
22 any relationship with Foday Sankoh until August 1991.

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. This witness, Perry Kamara, however, says that in April  
15:31:37 25 1991, that's what he's being told. What do you say to that?

26 A. I say that's totally untrue. The name Charles Taylor -  
27 people just - somebody is captured and say, what happened? "Oh,  
28 you were captured. It's Charles Taylor." I don't know whether  
29 it's being used because I'm the leader of the RU - of the NPFL

1 revolution and so everything is Charles Taylor. The soldiers are  
2 for Charles Taylor; the food is for Charles Taylor. Maybe that's  
3 how they interpret their whole situation. But by this time in  
4 the - in this area, Zimmi, it's in Sierra Leone, but on the  
15:32:21 5 Liberian side, it's - I think that's the Cape Mount, Bomi - it's  
6 the Cape Mount area. That's where the other gentleman, Mr Varney  
7 - General Varney, Oliver, is operating in that area. I don't  
8 even know - I haven't been to Zimmi before. I don't know what is  
9 going on on that end and what he is being told. But I would just  
15:32:49 10 interpret this as being the leader of the NPFL revolution as  
11 being Charles Taylor. That's the only way I can look at this.  
12 Other than that, for me, this doesn't make any sense.

13 Q. But if we just consider the implications of this for a  
14 moment, Mr Taylor, of course, you are not in Sierra Leone and  
15:33:12 15 you're not in a position to comment on what individuals like  
16 Perry Kamara are being told by those who, as he says, captured  
17 them. But if it's being publicly stated in Sierra Leone at this  
18 stage that Foday Sankoh and the RUF have the backing of Charles  
19 Taylor, question: How come this didn't reach your ears? Do you  
15:33:41 20 follow me?

21 A. I follow you. What's happening in Sierra Leone? I didn't  
22 - we didn't have any people in Sierra Leone that would have been  
23 able to relay this information back to us. I don't --

24 Q. Well, there are NPFL soldiers over there at this stage.

15:33:58 25 A. Well, I don't know if there were NPFL soldiers. I know  
26 there were Liberians, but NPFL soldiers would be a different  
27 thing. There are Liberians that have been - have joined them,  
28 but the NPFL, as far as I'm concerned, I didn't authorise any  
29 NPFL soldiers, so to speak, to go and fight with them. No, we

1 still had a war. Don't forget this time we haven't won the war  
2 in Liberia yet, so where am I going to be sending my troops out  
3 to a different country to go and fight and stage a revolution on  
4 that side? No. They are Liberians, but not NPFL.

15:34:36 5 Q. Because the witness goes on to say this: "They," that is  
6 his captors, "said it is a war for this country to overthrow the  
7 APC government," page 3026, "and the war, those that brought it,  
8 Foday Sankoh is the leader for the RUF who came through Liberia  
9 and also there is somebody who was assisting him who was Charles  
10 Taylor. He too contributed fighters to come through the borders  
11 of Sierra Leone."

12 Now, the witness also went on to say, this is page 3028,  
13 evidence of 4 February 2008. He speaks about receiving training  
14 in radio communication, and he claims that he was told by

15:35:56 15 Foday Sankoh, who provided the training himself, that he was  
16 going to you, Charles Taylor, top of page 3029, for you to give  
17 him some radios to return to Sierra Leone and complete their  
18 training, Perry Kamara being a radio operator. Did you provide  
19 Foday Sankoh with radios?

15:36:26 20 A. No, I did not provide Foday Sankoh with radios, but I don't  
21 know how this guy can be training without a radio. So what is he  
22 training with? He trains and then goes for the radio? So how  
23 does he - what is he training on? I don't think he is really  
24 training. Maybe there is some academic thing on a board, I don't  
25 know. But I don't see - Foday Sankoh captures most of his radios  
26 that he used from Sierra Leonean government forces, to the best  
27 of my knowledge.

28 Q. Now, tell me, during that period when there was cooperation  
29 between your governments - between the NPFL and the RUF,



1 Mr Taylor, would Foday Sankoh come to you for military advice?

2 A. No. No. Foday Sankoh would not ask me military advice.

3 Foday Sankoh was a trained military man on his own and he could  
4 teach me. He could give me military advice.

15:37:38 5 Q. Did your generals provide him with military advice?

6 A. I would not - they were all - well, most of the generals  
7 that I had were all Special Forces. We did not have any senior  
8 officers from the Armed Forces of Liberia that we had been  
9 fighting, so - in fact, Foday Sankoh, outside of the Special

15:38:06 10 Forces training, would have been as experienced to maybe help,  
11 you know, give our generals advice. The two most senior former  
12 Armed Forces of Liberia personnel that we had, General Varney and  
13 Prince Johnson, were already in opposition. So, no, I'll doubt  
14 if they will be able to give him military advice, no.

15:38:45 15 Q. Now, what was Varney's first name?

16 A. Samuel Varney. He was an old colonel, artillery commander  
17 in the Armed Forces of Liberia.

18 Q. Now, the witness describes going to Liberia, and when in  
19 Liberia, he saw two generals, a General Devon and a General  
15:39:24 20 Peper. Do you know them?

21 A. Let me see. I know General Devon. I don't know - oh,  
22 okay, these are - okay, yes. I know what he is talking about  
23 Peper, General Devon and Peper. Peper, that was the code name -  
24 these are the - that's that group. I see why he met them.

15:39:58 25 General Peper is the code name that was used by Anthony  
26 Mekunagbe. He was called General Peper. That's Mekunagbe.

27 Q. Now, he goes on to say this: "When we were in Liberia, we  
28 saw the generals I have named: General Devon and General Peper."  
29 Now, you say General Peper, what --

1 A. That's Anthony Mekunagbe.

2 Q. What was the full nickname? Was that the nickname for him?

3 A. That was his code name, Peper, General Peper. His full  
4 name was Anthony Mekunagbe.

15:40:36 5 Q. "They came with arms and ammunition in trucks together with  
6 food. They said it was Charles Taylor who sent them to organise  
7 us so that we can fight back to Sierra Leone because they had  
8 been forced back to retreat so a meeting was called. They said

9 we should form a unit. In that meeting there we got the name of  
10 - there we got the name of the unit. We called it Black Ghadafa.  
11 This Black Ghadafa constitutes the NPFL of Liberia and the RUF."  
12 What do you say about that?

13 A. What year? I missed the year that this boy is talking  
14 about. I don't know. He is just going. Because that would be  
15:41:23 15 very important.

16 Q. Why?

17 A. Because I know Black Ghadafa very well. I know this Black  
18 Ghadafa. That was that Black Ghadafa that got - I want to make  
19 sure that we - he knows what he is talking about because it is  
15:41:40 20 this Black Ghadafa group that caused the arrest of the Mekunagbe,  
21 the Degbon, the Oliver Varney and it was during that

22 investigation that we got to know the assistance that they had  
23 given to Sankoh and this Black Ghadafa was not an NPFL unit. It  
24 was the movement they were forming now to counterattack me. So I  
15:42:06 25 know - so that's why I want to get the year. I know the Black  
26 Ghadafa. That's the Black Ghadafa that got them in this whole  
27 thing.

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, is Oliver Varney and Samuel  
29 Varney one and the same?

1 THE WITNESS: No, your Honour. They are two different men.  
2 Samuel Varney is the older brother. They are brothers. He was a  
3 retired colonel that had joined us, but he joined Prince Johnson.  
4 When Prince Johnson broke away, the younger brother, Oliver  
15:42:31 5 Varney, remained with us. He is the commander in the Bomi, Cape  
6 Mount region at that time.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Now, he goes on on this note, Mr Taylor, to say this:

9 "A. So from there then, General Devon and General Peper  
15:42:48 10 appointed a commander that would lead the units that we  
11 formed. That was - which was Black Ghadafa.

12 Q. Who was appointed to lead your unit?

13 A. It was Pele Boy, a Liberia NPFL.

14 Q. Mr Witness, at this time, do you remember who was the  
15:43:12 15 leader of the NPFL?

16 A. Yes, Mr Taylor was the leader for the NPFL.

17 Q. Now, after you had formed the unit Black Ghadafa, did  
18 you engage in any fighting?

19 A. Yes, we engaged in fighting throughout. We came to  
15:43:30 20 Sierra Leone and we crossed a river. We came to Sierra  
21 Leone, fight and then return.

22 Q. And what was the focus of this, the fighting that you  
23 engaged in at that time?

24 A. Well, we were fighting to regain the areas we were  
15:44:04 25 before we were pushed across the border. Then also he  
26 said if we fight very strongly he will come with ammunition  
27 for us to continue our war in Sierra Leone. That is the  
28 reason why we keep fighting inside and then going back.

29 Q. Mr Witness, when you say 'he', who are you referring

1 to?

2 A. It was a message from Charles Taylor through General  
3 Devon and General Peper. Then after some time he too  
4 visited us.

15:44:24 5 Q. When you say 'he too' visited you, who visited you?

6 A. Mr Taylor visited us at Senge."

7 S-E-N-G-E. Where is Senge?

8 A. Senge is in Grand Cape Mount County. I know Senge.

9 Q. Did you visit them at Senge?

15:44:47 10 A. No, I did not visit them at Senge.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, help us with this: From what this witness is  
12 telling us, at the formation of this unit Black Ghadafa, the NPFL  
13 was already in existence and the RUF was already in existence?

14 A. That is correct.

15:45:10 15 Q. Can you help us as to the reason for starting this third  
16 organisation?

17 A. Black Ghadafa - and I got to know this after the  
18 investigation. Just a reminder, while on the base in Libya - and  
19 I'm going to be very short with this, I don't want to bore the  
15:45:34 20 judges with this because they have heard this before - a plan was  
21 made to use me to launch the revolution and then eliminate me.  
22 Mekunagbe, Oliver Varney, Degbon were all part of this  
23 conspiracy. They were arrested.

24 Q. Can I interrupt shortly. Was Devon a Special Forces?

15:45:57 25 A. Degbon. He was a Special Forces, well educated, trained in  
26 Europe, from Nimba County, he had a masters degree in geology.  
27 But he did not do physical training, but because he was at the  
28 base everyone that went to the base was considered a Special  
29 Force, okay. Very smart boy. They concoct this plan. We get

1 into Liberia and what they do - and this is what we got to find  
2 out. What they do is they begin this process of trying to  
3 establish a security for themselves by helping Foday Sankoh. All  
4 of the names that you mentioned here were the people that were  
15:46:45 5 involved with Foday Sankoh in putting this training together in  
6 Liberia. Anthony Mekunagbe is responsible for Bong and Lofa.  
7 Oliver Varney is responsible for Cape Mount and Bomi. Degbon,  
8 being the educated one, is going and visiting all the front  
9 lines, seeing the problems. Arms and ammunition captured, he  
15:47:08 10 would have security with him, he would pack them in trucks and  
11 carry them to the central location in Kakata.

12 They then arrange that they need this operation after  
13 Foday Sankoh - they are already fighting in Sierra Leone. They  
14 agree now it is time to put together the plan. Because what they  
15:47:28 15 are talking about here, what this fellow is talking about here,  
16 we are talking about 1991. So they feel now that they are in  
17 position to eliminate Charles Taylor. We.

18 Begin to get from military intelligence that this group is  
19 being formed. I don't know anything about it. Any unit or any  
15:47:50 20 new operation being formed, at least the General Musa would know.  
21 He did not know, but intelligence is reporting that these people  
22 are getting together. The distance between Anthony Mekunagbe and  
23 Oliver Varney, it's a long distance. We've gone through that  
24 from the map. From Bong to Grand Cape Mount is a long distance,  
15:48:17 25 but they are in contact.

26 The shortest position to get to Bomi Hills is out of  
27 Kakata. When you go to the area that we've talked about in this  
28 Court - I'm sorry we don't have a map, but Bong Mines, you cross  
29 a river and you're on the Bomi side. Degbon is operating between

1 Kakata and Bong Mines. When we get the full information that  
2 they are using Sierra Leoneans in this operation and they are  
3 waiting to move on me in Kakata, we conduct the arrest of Degbon,  
4 the Mekunagbe, Oliver Varney.

15:49:03 5 At that particular time I think there is also Timothy  
6 Mulibah who is on that side. All Special Forces that were  
7 involved in the very thing in Libya. We investigate them. They  
8 are court-martialed, they are tried and it is through this  
9 hearing that we hear about the plan of assisting Sankoh because  
15:49:24 10 they wanted - that if anything went wrong in the operation they  
11 wanted someplace to run to. This is why we got to know at that  
12 time why they assisted Sankoh in putting through this training.

13 Both Mekunagbe and Oliver Varney we got to know were  
14 involved in assisting the training. When the training was over  
15:49:43 15 some of the men went to Oliver Varney, as they attacked some of  
16 them went to the Mekunagbe side. So if you look at the evidence  
17 before this Court you have the two attacks from the two general  
18 positions; one from Oliver Varney and one from Anthony Mekunagbe.

19 Q. Attacks to where?

15:50:00 20 A. To Sierra Leone. The initial attack on Sierra Leone  
21 occurred from the two positions that these two generals were  
22 commanding, Cape Mount and Lofa. We get to know this before - I  
23 mean during the investigation. They are all executed. All  
24 three, Mekunagbe, Oliver Varney, they are all whatchamacallit.

15:50:24 25 In fact Mekunagbe - while the investigation is going on actually  
26 he dies in jail, but those that survive are tried, they are found  
27 guilty, the punishment and they are executed.

28 Q. But, Mr Taylor, this witness is suggesting if I just  
29 continue a little further with his account, having said that you

1 visited them at Senge he then said:

2 "Q. What happened during that visit?

3 A. This time around Mr Taylor came along with ammunition.  
4 By then we were all together. General Devon was there  
15:51:02 5 General Peper was there, together with some of the  
6 authorities.

7 Q. Was anything said at the meeting?

8 A. Yes, Taylor stood before us and said this ammunition he  
9 had come with was to fight very strongly and to push ULIMO  
15:51:17 10 out of Liberia so that the other ammunition he brought was  
11 for we, the RUF. There was some arms that was written on  
12 it RUF. He brought them. It was - they distributed them  
13 to the RUF."

14 So pause there, Mr Taylor. You are saying Black Ghadafa  
15:51:44 15 was this clandestine unit set up secretly by your opponents to  
16 get rid of you, yes?

17 A. Definitely.

18 Q. But according to this witness, you're there providing  
19 ammunition to this group. So where does the truth lie?

15:52:03 20 A. Well, the truth lies in what I have told you. Following  
21 the execution of those men there was no more Black Ghadafa ever,  
22 ever, ever heard about in the NPFL area. Why would I be putting  
23 a unit together that I am backing and supporting and grab all of  
24 those involved, have them court-martialed tried by a military  
15:52:23 25 tribunal, found guilty and executed? He doesn't know. This is  
26 the type of thing that is destroying me in this place, okay.

27 These people don't know what they are talking about. Maybe  
28 he is being used by the same people but maybe I'm sure - I'm sure  
29 he will say later on, if I remember the testimony, what happens

1 to them. Why would I form a unit? Why under this sun would I  
2 form a unit that I'm backing and supporting and grab all of the -  
3 and these are not little people, these are Special Forces of  
4 mine, and put them before a court martial where they admit that  
15:52:59 5 the plan that they had was to do this to me and reveal all this  
6 information? Why does he think that that unit was never, ever  
7 heard about?

8 It's not that we dealt with them and later on black - there  
9 was no other name of such in the NPFL. Why? They just make up  
15:53:20 10 these things because they do not know what they are talking  
11 about. He may have been used by these people telling him this,  
12 but none of these people survive that attack that they were  
13 trying to destroy the entire hierarchy of the NPFL.

14 Q. The witness went on to explain the following which might  
15:53:41 15 assist us. Question from Mr Bangura:

16 "Q. Mr Witness, you mentioned that you had been captured  
17 in April 1991. You also mentioned that you spent two  
18 months in training, guerilla training, and another month in  
19 training as a radio operator. Now, can you give the Court  
15:54:02 20 an idea what time we're talking of now that you were  
21 crossing Liberia?

22 A. I was in Liberia from 1991 to 1992 and what I'm saying  
23 now is from 1991.

24 Q. Mr Witness, my last question was whether you had on any  
15:54:21 25 other occasion seen Mr Taylor while were you in Liberia.

26 A. Yes, the other time, which was in 1992, I saw Mr Taylor  
27 at Kakata in Liberia.

28 Q. And what happened on this occasion that you saw  
29 Mr Taylor at Kakata?



1 A. Well, Mr Taylor gave a message to one of his major  
2 commanders who was Isaac Musa. He was in Kakata as a  
3 commander."

4 Now earlier he said that they had been pushed back to  
15:54:54 5 Kakata by ULIMO. Does that help you at all, Mr Taylor, in terms  
6 of timing?

7 A. He said that they had been pushed back to Kakata?

8 Q. Yes, they had been pushed by ULIMO and they retreated to  
9 Kakata?

15:55:08 10 A. Okay, they retreated to Kakata. I think Musa here was the  
11 overall commander of the NPFL. He was stationed in Kakata and I  
12 would go to Kakata from time to time.

13 Q. But just in terms of timing, a push by ULIMO which results  
14 in a retreat to Kakata, can you help us with a time?

15:55:54 15 A. I'm not too sure that there was any situation where there  
16 was a total retreat to Kakata by a push from ULIMO. That had to  
17 be probably late - late I would say in '92 or early '93 before  
18 ULIMO had that kind of capacity where they attacked Bong Mines  
19 and they retreated to - so the time he is talking about, this has  
15:56:18 20 got to be - no. I would put this to late '92. About late '92.

21 Q. In any event, do you recall an occasion, Mr Taylor, when  
22 the push by the RUF into southern Sierra Leone, into Pujehun  
23 province, was repelled and they were forced to retreat back into  
24 Liberia? You've heard much evidence about that, haven't you?

15:56:51 25 A. What part - where is Pujehun? What's that?

26 Q. That's just across the border, over the Moya River from Bo  
27 Waterside?

28 A. That would be Cape Mount side. I am not aware of that kind  
29 of push, but it would not be surprising that if there's a serious

1 attack that people would run into Liberia, but I'm not aware of  
2 that in any way, no.

3 Q. Now, I ask that for this reason. The witness goes on to  
4 say this: "Mr Taylor gave a message to one of his major  
15:57:37 5 commanders who was Isaac Musa. He was in Kakata as a commander",  
6 and you agree Isaac Musa was a commander there.

7 "Q. What was the message?

8 A. What he told Isaac was that he should bring all the RUF  
9 together that were in Kakata and the surrounding villages.

10 He said Foday Sankoh will collect all of them and take them  
11 to Sierra Leone, he had a very big mission."

12 Did you give such an order to Isaac Musa?

13 A. No, no, no, no. I did not give any such message to Isaac  
14 Musa to collect all the Sierra Leoneans and Foday Sankoh will  
15:58:18 15 take them back. Because by late 1992 we have no contact with the  
16 RUF, so except he is talking about 1991 where he may have been in  
17 Kakata, and I don't dispute he was there. But, no, I gave no  
18 such message to Isaac Musa, no.

19 Q. The evidence continued in this way, page 3034 of the  
15:58:41 20 transcript:

21 "Q. Was he alone when he passed this message to Isaac  
22 Musa at the time?

23 A. Well, we were on that parade ground when Foday Sankoh  
24 himself came with a convoy from Sierra Leone. He,

15:58:59 25 Mr Taylor, had his commanders who were there together with  
26 his bodyguards."

27 Do you recall such a meeting?

28 A. No, I do not.

29 Q. "Q. Now just before we move on further, you earlier said,

1 I believe it was in your first meeting that the arms that  
2 Mr Taylor had brought for you at Senge were distributed.  
3 To whom were these arms distributed?

15:59:34

4 A. Well, these guns, many of it was given to the RUF  
5 because some of the NPFL had guns.

6 Q. Also you've just mentioned that Mr Taylor gave a  
7 message to Isaac Musa to tell you that you were going to  
8 have a big mission in Sierra Leone. What did he say or  
9 what did you understand by this statement 'a big mission'?  
10 Was it explained?

15:59:54

11 A. From that point in time I didn't understand a thing  
12 except when we came to Sierra Leone I was able to  
13 understand that that was the mission.

16:00:09

14 Q. Now you were telling us about the arrival of  
15 Foday Sankoh during that meeting. Can you continue,  
16 please?

16:00:24

17 A. When Foday Sankoh arrived at the meeting, we were happy  
18 because it had taken some - it had taken a long time  
19 without seeing him and now he had requested for us to go  
20 back to Sierra Leone, so they brought trucks. These trucks  
21 had arms and ammunition covered with bags. Those trucks,  
22 it was Mr Taylor who gave Foday Sankoh together with the  
23 ammunition. Those ammunitions were taken from Harbel.  
24 There they got the ammunition from because in the meeting,  
25 Mr Taylor said Sankoh had gone to collect ammunition from  
26 Harbel, so therefore we should be on standby to move."  
27 Do you recall this, Mr Taylor?

16:00:48

28 A. No. I mean, what is mixing me up here is I don't even know  
29 the timing. I'm off with all the years and the timing that he is

- 1 using here. But, in any case, while the years are important,  
2 there is no time when Foday Sankoh goes to Harbel to collect  
3 ammunition or - if - if I'm supposed to be giving an order to the  
4 officer commanding all NPFL forces, where is this man standing  
16:01:37 5 that he would hear such an order that I'm telling an order? No,  
6 this story that he is explaining is totally off. This is King  
7 Perry or Perry Kamara. No, that's not true. That is not true,  
8 because during the time that we have this relationship with the  
9 RUF, I don't recall any major retreat into Liberia by the RUF in  
16:02:01 10 that Kakata area where people will come. During that period  
11 there are movements. Sierra Leoneans coming across and going  
12 back. But I cannot recall any incident where, on that side, in  
13 the Bong mine Kakata area, what is far from the Sierra Leonean  
14 border, that there will be such a retreat in that area that I  
16:02:27 15 will give Isaac Musa an order of such. No, that is not true.  
16 Q. But what about the provision of trucks to Foday Sankoh?  
17 Did you ever provide such assistance to him?  
18 A. Trucks, no. I never provided trucks, as he is describing  
19 here, to transport RUF people from Kakata, no.  
16:02:52 20 Q. Did you provide trucks for any other purpose then?  
21 A. No. No.  
22 Q. At any stage?  
23 A. No. When Foday Sankoh came to Liberia, he brought a truck.  
24 He brought what he want and he - I gave him no trucks at any  
16:03:09 25 stage, no.  
26 Q. What do you mean when Foday Sankoh came from Liberia? What  
27 are you talking about?  
28 A. He came to Liberia from Sierra Leone.  
29 Q. When he came to Liberia, which occasion is this you are

1 talking about?

2 A. We're talking about the period during the time between  
3 August and May 1992.

4 Q. So he provided his own transport, did he?

16:03:30 5 A. When Foday Sankoh came, he brought a truck. He brought a  
6 truck.

7 Q. Now, the witness went on that by then, the stage when these  
8 trucks were provided, Gbarnga was the headquarters for Mr Taylor  
9 in 1992. And he then asked this?

16:03:57 10 "Q. Which month in 1992 are we talking about?

11 A. I believe it was around November, early November."

12 So you see the significance of that, don't you, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. What's the significance?

16:04:14 15 A. This man is trying to - is trying to put the impossible  
16 here, really.

17 Q. What do you mean?

18 A. Well, he cannot be talking about November 1992.

19 Q. Why not?

16:04:30 20 A. Because the NPFL and the RUF have split up, have broken up  
21 by May 1992. So he cannot - he is not there. That's the problem  
22 with what they do when they put these lies together. He or no  
23 other RUF is in Liberia at that time. No. That's not true.

24 Witnesses upon witnesses have come before this court and have  
16:04:58 25 talked about the disconnect in May 1992, so I don't know how he  
26 got into Liberia in November 1992. It's a lie. It just didn't  
27 happen.

28 Q. Now, the witness went on to say this, page 3037:

29 "A. So many things happened and so many things continued

1 to happen. When we arrived in Pendembu - when we were in  
2 Pendembu, they would go for manpower in Liberia with those  
3 RUF persons that were there and then bring them together  
4 with arms and ammunition. When we arrived in Pendembu,  
16:05:58 5 those who were fighters were sent to various targets?

6 Q. You had said before that you started to be trained as a  
7 radio operator. Now, when you got to Pendembu, did you get  
8 any further training at all?

9 A. Yes, immediately after we arrived at Pendembu, the next  
16:06:19 10 day, Foday Sankoh requested for us and we reported to him  
11 that we are the people. The reason why he requested for  
12 us, he said we should continue our training in Pendembu,  
13 and that was what actually exactly happened. There a  
14 Liberian was introduced to us whose name was Nya, he is  
16:06:45 15 Mano. He is a NPFL from Liberia."

16 Do you know that man?

17 A. I first saw him here.

18 Q. Nya?

19 A. Nya, I first saw him here. But I don't think this is his  
16:07:00 20 account that he was an NPFL. Nya told this Court how he got into  
21 Sierra Leone.

22 Q. So are you suggesting he was not NPFL?

23 A. Nya was not NPFL. Nya Lansana, what he called himself, Nya  
24 Korto, was a half Sierra Leonean half Mano boy that apparently,  
16:07:25 25 if I recall, was in Sierra Leone, came back and got caught across  
26 there, came back to Liberia and went back. He was not an NPFL.  
27 He was not an NPFL. As far as I know - as far as I know, Nya  
28 went to Sierra Leone on his own. On his own.

29 Q. But this witness, Perry Kamara, went on to say this:

1 "A. Well, what they told us, what Foday Sankoh told us and  
2 even Nya himself, he said he is representing communication.  
3 He is representing the communication between the NPFL and  
4 Liberia. He said Mr Taylor sent him personally to be with  
16:08:10 5 Foday Sankoh, so therefore he said he is responsible for  
6 our training, how to use the Liberian code and the Sierra  
7 Leonean code, how we are supposed to be sending messages to  
8 Liberia and how to receive message from Liberia when we  
9 need them. That was what he told us. From there he  
16:08:33 10 started to show us. During the time of the training,  
11 Foday Sankoh used to send him talking to Mr Taylor in  
12 Liberia through the radio. Mr Taylor will send a message  
13 from the station in Liberia to the RUF station in Pendembu.  
14 Nya will receive it and decode it and then put it in the  
16:08:54 15 logbook, and then send a copy to Foday Sankoh in Pendembu.  
16 That was what he used to teach us."

17 So, according to him, he is in direct contact with you,  
18 Mr Taylor.

19 A. You mean Nya?

16:09:12 20 Q. Yes.

21 A. Oh, that's not true. At this particular time, if we are  
22 talking about - and he is way off limit. I don't even know what  
23 time he is talking about here. But the time he is talking about,  
24 if he is talking about October as he has mentioned late 1992,  
16:09:33 25 that is not happening. Before that time, Foday Sankoh comes to  
26 Gbarnga. My radio operator is Butterfly. I don't know who the  
27 radio operator is on the other side. But I guess, if we - as we  
28 go further, we will see what Nya's explanation is to this Court  
29 as to how he got into Sierra Leone, which I'm sure differs from

1 this description of King Perry.

2 Q. Page 3045, please, 4 February 2008:

3 "Q. How did the RUF get its supplies during the period?

4 A. At what time are you talking about?

16:10:39 5 Q. 1992 through to 1994.

6 A. Well, from 1992, RUF used to get supplies from Taylor  
7 through Foya until the time that the military situation  
8 changed.

9 Q. When you say the RUF had supplies, what sort of  
16:11:09 10 supplies did you get?

11 A. We were getting arms, ammunition, food and drugs from  
12 Mr Taylor.

13 Q. Now, how were these supplies brought into Sierra Leone?

14 A. In the first place, the way I saw it, the ones that I  
16:11:26 15 saw, let us start with that, when they went for the RUF  
16 members in Liberia, the RUF would load the ammunition that  
17 were given to them by Mr Taylor. They would put it inside  
18 the truck and cover them with bags of rice and manpower and  
19 then they will move from Gbarnga and sometimes from Harbel  
16:11:47 20 and then they will penetrate inside. Even when that  
21 happened, it's every two weeks. Mr Sankoh will go and  
22 collect ammunition and then bring them back.

23 Even when Mohamed Tarawalli entered Kono, all the things  
24 that were captured like diamond, physical cash, a meeting -  
16:12:12 25 Foday Sankoh summoned a meeting of the RUF members and then  
26 said that we are going to use these diamonds and this money  
27 to get ammunition through Mr Taylor and we were at Pendembu  
28 when Foday Sankoh moved. After Foday Sankoh moved he was  
29 in Liberia and only sent a message that ammunition was on



1 the way and ammunitions would come and they will put them  
2 in the store. We continuously stored ammunitions that we  
3 had a pile of them and then he himself came back to Sierra  
4 Leone. And then when he came back he said, 'The diamond  
16:12:56 5 that I took along with me, these are the ammunition in  
6 return for them from Mr Taylor. Now we should start the  
7 fighting.' "

8 Now, there's a lot involved there so let's take our time.  
9 Firstly, the question 1992 to 1994, do you remember that,  
16:13:16 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. "Well, from 1992, RUF used to get supplies from Taylor  
13 through Foya until the time that the military situation changed."  
14 What do you say about that?

16:13:31 15 A. Well, it depends on what he means from 1992, because some  
16 of the ways these guys speak. I'll tell this Court a million  
17 times: Up until May of 1992, I did give Foday Sankoh small  
18 amounts of ammunition. Beyond that time, it never - every  
19 witness that have come here have told this Court that  
16:14:01 20 communication and all contacts were cut off at that particular  
21 time. So if he is saying from - and he didn't go even beyond  
22 that. He said from 1992, but based on the question extending  
23 through 1994, I don't know how or where or why this man would  
24 have come up with this explanation when he knows that all  
16:14:26 25 contacts were cut off in 1992. So this statement is not true.

26 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let us remind ourselves of another aspect  
27 of the Prosecution case: That ULIMO cut off the border, as one  
28 witness we looked at yesterday claimed, from 1993 until 1998. Do  
29 you remember that evidence?

1 A. Yeah, but that's not true. There's also countless number  
2 of other Prosecution witnesses that says 1992, which I agree  
3 with. It's 1992. So their own witnesses contradicted each other  
4 because some that said 1992.

16:15:08 5 Q. Now, the other aspect of this account given by the witness  
6 which I want to bring to your attention for your comment, is  
7 this: He says that these trips were happening every two weeks?

8 A. No, no. But, you know, if Foday Sankoh is getting this  
9 large amount of ammunition in trucks every two weeks - every two  
16:15:46 10 weeks he is coming in, loading up and going - then what is he  
11 complaining about? What is he complaining about when he writes  
12 me and tells me the little five boxes of ammunition you gave me -  
13 what is he complaining about if there is all this ammunition  
14 around? How far would this lie go?

16:16:05 15 Foday Sankoh is complaining and his people are saying he is  
16 bringing it by the truckload every two weeks, so which - it's not  
17 true. Foday Sankoh is getting very, very small amounts of  
18 ammunition, mostly ammunition, small amounts, okay. Because,  
19 number one, I've already - I'm not going through that again.

16:16:27 20 I've already explained what my strategic objective was at that  
21 time, so there's no need in boring the Court with that. But this  
22 man here is not telling the truth about what he is saying that  
23 there were truckloads of ammunition every two weeks, because that  
24 will very much contradict what Foday Sankoh has been complaining  
16:16:45 25 about.

26 If I were getting - I will tell you what happened. If the  
27 RUF was getting truckloads of ammunition from Liberia every two  
28 weeks, I don't think the war would have lasted. They would have  
29 won. We didn't give them that kind of ammunition and it is

1 proven by the fact of the complaints of Foday Sankoh that's even  
2 documented in his letter. So at this time this man is talking  
3 about - and when is this letter from Foday Sankoh dated? In 1992  
4 as early as what?

16:17:19 5 Q. May.

6 A. May. In May of 1992 when he is saying that every two weeks  
7 there are truckloads Foday Sankoh is complaining, "Please, things  
8 are rough. What we're getting is not sufficient. We're waiting  
9 for the big stuff, but we don't know when it will come, but  
10 please help us some more." So there's a big contradiction. It  
11 did not happen as this young man is saying here. It didn't.

12 And I do not deny the cooperation at that particular time.  
13 I do not. So, I mean, if I was giving Foday Sankoh jet fighter  
14 bombers I would say and I would feel justified because the  
15 Government of Sierra Leone was supporting an insurgency against  
16 me. ULIMO had been armed by the Government of Sierra Leone and I  
17 felt and the NPFL at that time felt it had every right to use  
18 counterinsurgency too against the Government of Sierra Leone. So  
19 I wouldn't deny it for my life. I wouldn't deny that. So this  
16:18:20 20 is not true. It's not true.

21 Q. He goes on:

22 "The diamonds that I took along with me" - this is  
23 Foday Sankoh reporting back - "These are the ammunition returned  
24 for them from Mr Taylor. Now we should start the fighting."

16:18:43 25 Now, Mr Taylor, here we have that same suggestion again.

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. That Foday Sankoh was, contrary to what you have told these  
28 judges, not receiving this arms and ammunition free, but he was  
29 paying for them with diamonds which he was giving to you.

1 A. That is not true. And the reason why it cannot be true is  
2 that Foday Sankoh would have been a fool to be supplying me these  
3 diamonds and getting the little piecemeal thing that he was  
4 getting. He would have been foolish. And if he did not - and  
16:19:28 5 when he had the opportunity to really confront me, I think the  
6 best - and the best and the most appropriate place would have  
7 been to have confronted me. Instead of trying to appeal to me to  
8 increase supply he could have said, "Listen, my brother, if you  
9 did not take these diamonds from me I would have been able to  
16:19:48 10 sell them." And of course I want to believe that if Foday Sankoh  
11 had diamond I would say it's possible that he could have sold  
12 them in Gbarnga. There were Lebanese there and Foday Sankoh used  
13 to buy a whole lot of stuff on his way back.

14 But Foday Sankoh would not be giving me diamonds and then  
16:20:06 15 appealing, "Will you please give me this. Why are we waiting?"  
16 It would not happen that way. So Foday Sankoh never gave me a  
17 diamond, just the same way they assume that Sam Bockarie and Issa  
18 - these never happened.

19 Q. You see, the evidence from more than one witness now,  
16:20:24 20 Mr Taylor, is that in effect this was a commercial relationship  
21 so far as the provision of arms and ammunition was concerned?

22 A. But that's --

23 Q. And Sankoh was paying for them?

24 A. No.

16:20:37 25 Q. You, in effect, were a purveyor of arms and ammunition to  
26 the RUF?

27 A. That is incorrect. Totally false. Nothing commercial.  
28 What I gave to Foday Sankoh, I did it for my own security  
29 concerns and my protection and my going to Monrovia. It had

1 nothing to do with any commerce. Never accepted anything from  
2 him, no. That's not true.

3 Q. And the cynic might suggest, Mr Taylor, that the reason for  
4 the complaints in the letter was because effectively you were  
16:21:13 5 short changing him?

6 A. But he would have said it in the letter, don't you think?  
7 He would have said it. You know, "What I'm giving you I'm not  
8 getting the - you know, the returns on what I'm giving to you,  
9 so, you know, what's going on?" I mean, he would have raised it  
16:21:31 10 instead of appealing for assistance. He would have been - at  
11 least I would have been stronger. If I were giving somebody  
12 something and they were not giving me things in return I would -  
13 you know, in the most appropriate way say, "Look, I mean, what I  
14 see I'm not getting a proper return based on what I'm giving you,  
16:21:56 15 so what's going on? Could you see if we could adjust this?"

16 There is no authoritative language I'm getting out of - well,  
17 since coming out of Foday Sankoh's letter. There's nothing that  
18 is with some authority that, you know, "I have good grounds." He  
19 is operating here on very, very, very weak grounds.

16:22:26 20 Q. Now, the witness continued.

21 "A. It was in 1993 - late 1992 and 1993 Mohamed was in  
22 Kono.

23 Q. Which Mohamed is this?

24 A. Mohamed Tarawalli, alias Zino."

16:22:55 25 Pause for a moment. Did you know that man?

26 A. No, I didn't ever know Mohamed Tarawalli. All the time  
27 that Sankoh came to Liberia he never brought him, no.

28 Q. "And what happened in Kono at the time?" Note the date  
29 Mr Taylor, late 1992 and 1993.

1 "At that time Mohamed Tarawalli went to Kono. Before he  
2 went there we had a meeting. The RUF had a meeting. The RUF  
3 leadership summoned a meeting and that was Foday Sankoh. He said  
4 he had just returned back from Mr Taylor and now he said he is  
16:23:35 5 there to organise us so that we will use this ammunition to  
6 attack Kono so that we will be able to get diamonds and money  
7 that will help us to get more ammunition. That was what he said  
8 Taylor told him. So he sent Mohamed Tarawalli on that particular  
9 mission. Luckily for Mohamed Tarawalli he succeeded. All the  
16:24:02 10 things that Tarawalli brought to Buedu, I saw them with my naked  
11 eyes and these were diamonds and they were in a big bottle and  
12 included US dollars. Kono is a major mining area in Sierra  
13 Leone, so he took those and took them to Liberia to Mr Taylor.  
14 In return, he brought ammunitions and we will store them. In  
16:24:30 15 fact, any time ammunition were ready for Mr Taylor he will send  
16 radio message to Sankoh and then Sankoh would move or dispatch  
17 some of his men to go and collect the ammunition from Gbarnga.  
18 This happened many times."

19 What do you say, Mr Taylor?

16:24:53 20 A. Well, if this man says that his people, Foday Sankoh or  
21 anybody else came to Liberia in late 1992 to early 1993, let's  
22 forget about ammunition bringing. Just coming into Liberia, then  
23 I'm already guilty. Then I may as well just give up this case.  
24 I'm guilty.

16:25:21 25 This human never - nobody calling himself Foday Sankoh or  
26 whoever this man is came to Liberia in late 1992 of what this man  
27 is talking about. It never happened. You understand me? And  
28 unless all of his other colleagues that testified here are wrong  
29 about the disconnect in May of 1992, then - this never happened.

1 Never happened. Late 1992 to 1993, no. It never happened.

2 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, you see, when I pressed you on this topic  
3 about a commercial relationship with the RUF in terms of the  
4 provision of ammunition, you referred back to that letter of May  
16:26:12 5 1992 and the improbability of there being such a relationship in  
6 light of that letter. But what this witness is saying is that  
7 having captured Kono, the situation changed because the RUF were  
8 now in a position to pay?

9 A. Uh-huh.

16:26:35 10 Q. Now, was the situation the relationship transformed once  
11 diamonds became available?

12 A. Well, I would say no. But how did they get into this  
13 Gbarnga in 1993? Where did they pass to get into Gbarnga would  
14 be a question for this man. Where did they pass in 1993, early  
16:27:05 15 1993, to get into Gbarnga? Where is ULIMO? Where is ULIMO at  
16 this particular time? Where did he pass? Did he fly? Where did  
17 he pass? Because by the time he's talking about, early 1993,  
18 ULIMO, okay, is in control of Lofa. So where did he pass?

19 It's not possible. It's not possible. Except he fought  
16:27:33 20 through ULIMO lines - and look at all the other evidence before  
21 this Court about when ULIMO took over and had control of there.  
22 Where did he pass through? This is totally erroneous. This is  
23 not true. Except he fought ULIMO from Mendekoma all the way to  
24 Gbarnga. ULIMO is occupying the area, so how did he get through?

16:28:01 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I was about to move to another  
26 topic but I see the time. I wonder if that would be a convenient  
27 point.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think we'll adjourn now.

29 Mr Taylor, you're ordered not to discuss your evidence with

1 anybody. We'll adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

2 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.  
3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 16 September  
4 2009 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	28846
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	28846