



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 16 FEBRUARY 2010  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding  
Justice Richard Lussick  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Ms Ruth Mary Hackler

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Tuesday, 16 February 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:29:24 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J  
9 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura and Ruth Mary Hackler.

09:31:41 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,  
11 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay  
12 Griffiths, with me Mr Terry Munyard of counsel.

13 Madam President, whilst I am on my feet, can I alert the  
14 Court to the real possibility that we may run into difficulties  
09:32:02 15 this week in this way: I have looked carefully at the issues I  
16 want to raise in re-examination and cut it down to the minimum.  
17 As a consequence I think my re-examination will conclude perhaps  
18 early tomorrow. Now, the difficulty arises in this way: Our  
19 first witness, and we've already served on the Prosecution in the  
09:32:29 20 court the details of that witness, will not be arriving in The  
21 Hague until this evening which creates a difficulty.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: What difficulty is that?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, it creates this difficulty: That  
24 Mr Anyah, who will be taking that witness, will need an  
09:32:48 25 opportunity of speaking to the witness before the witness is  
26 called into court to give evidence and we anticipate that the  
27 earliest that will be possible will be on Monday. That's the  
28 difficulty, because we are not sitting on Friday of this week.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Why Monday? I don't understand. Why

1 Monday? If the witness is arriving tomorrow and you're  
2 concluding your evidence tomorrow, why can't this witness start  
3 on Thursday?

09:33:22 4 MR GRIFFITHS: Because Mr Anyah is of the view that he will  
5 need at least a couple of days to familiarise himself with the  
6 witness and the evidence the witness is to give. I mean, this  
7 situation may not come to pass, Madam President, but I am just  
8 alerting the Court to the real possibility that this situation  
9 may arise. It may well be that my re-examination will go into  
09:33:50 10 Thursday, I know not, but I thought it wise to alert the Court at  
11 the earliest stage of the possibility that this situation may  
12 arise.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay, I will say this much: You are  
14 obviously not applying for an adjournment at this stage.

09:34:07 15 MR GRIFFITHS: No, I am not.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are simply informing both the Court  
17 and the other side of a likely situation which I think we will  
18 cross that bridge when we come to it, but of course the Court is  
19 minded to expedite this trial. We have granted you an  
09:34:29 20 adjournment all of last week in the hope that there wouldn't be  
21 further delays in the trial. But we will see. We will see as we  
22 go along.

23 Mr Taylor, as we continue this morning, I remind you of  
24 your declaration to tell the truth.

09:34:48 25 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

26 [On former affirmation]

27 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

28 Q. Mr Taylor, when we concluded yesterday afternoon we were  
29 dealing with the circumstances surrounding your stepping down as

1 President of Liberia. Do you recall that?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. And we concluded with you telling us that the elections  
4 were scheduled for November 2003. Is that right?

09:35:21 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. But the outcome of that election and the inauguration of  
7 the new President would not take place until January. Is that  
8 right?

9 A. That is correct.

09:35:33 10 Q. Now, that system, Mr Taylor, where the election takes place  
11 in November and the inauguration doesn't take place until the new  
12 year, is that unique to Liberia?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Where else does a system of presidential changeover like  
09:35:52 15 that take place?

16 A. In the United States. We copied that directly since 1847  
17 from the United States.

18 Q. And so when you referred in that letter to President Bush  
19 to recusing yourself in January, what in fact were you saying?

09:36:12 20 A. That I will be stepping down formally from office. By not  
21 participating in the elections and the smooth transition, that  
22 constituted stepping down.

23 Q. Now I would like us to move on to another topic, please,  
24 Mr Taylor. Could I invite attention, please, to behind divider 2  
09:36:35 25 in this bundle. Behind divider 2 we should have transcripts of  
26 the proceedings from the 11 November 2009 which was the second  
27 day of your cross-examination by my learned friend Ms Hollis.

28 Now, could I invite your attention, please, behind that divider  
29 to the page numbered 31595 in the top right-hand corner. Do you

1 have it?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. Now, you were asked this question, line 3:

4 "Q. We could also agree, could we not, that at least  
09:38:08 5 during this time period you provided Foday Sankoh and the  
6 RUF with facilities in Gbarnga, your NPFL headquarters at  
7 the time, we can agree on that, can we not?

8 A. Well, it depends on what you mean by 'facilities'.  
9 What are you speaking about, counsel? Help me.

09:38:30 10 Q. Well, let's see. What a bedroom, living room and  
11 kitchen facilities made available in your Executive  
12 Mansion. We can agree that you provided that, can we not?

13 A. No.

14 Q. No?

09:38:47 15 A. Not in my Executive Mansion. That is incorrect.  
16 That's a misstatement of the fact. I did not provide those  
17 in my Executive Mansion and I challenge you to show me in  
18 the reference here where I said that.

19 Q. Of course, Mr Taylor. If we could please look at the  
09:39:09 20 20 July 2009, at page 24808 beginning at line 9:

21 'Q. So where you lived at Gbarnga at this time in 1991,  
22 what was it called at that stage?

23 A. The Executive Mansion.

24 Q. Now, what facilities were made available to Foday  
09:39:33 25 Sankoh within that residence?

26 A. Oh, ordinary things. A bed. We have, you know,  
27 furniture for the bedroom, living room. He was provide  
28 light current. In fact, one of the things we did install  
29 - even in Buchanan we had 24-hour light in Buchanan.

1 Gbarnga was also provided - the entire city of Gbarnga was  
2 provided with light current, so he received light. He had  
3 just the basic facilities for his bedroom, the living room  
4 and kitchen facilities.'

09:40:01 5 Now, that's what you said in response to your Defence  
6 counsel's question about what facilities you provided  
7 within the Executive Mansion in Gbarnga in 1991,  
8 Mr Taylor."

9 Now, Mr Taylor, question: Did Foday Sankoh ever live in  
09:40:25 10 your Executive Mansion?

11 A. No, he did not, ever.

12 Q. Where was it in Gbarnga that Foday Sankoh lived?

13 A. Foday Sankoh lived a few blocks from me in an area of  
14 Gbarnga where he was provided a house.

09:40:50 15 Q. What was that area called?

16 A. Oh, I am not sure. I don't quite remember the name.  
17 Either - I don't quite remember the name, but - New Gbarnga, some  
18 name, I don't remember the name, but it was a few blocks from me.

19 Q. And what facilities were available in that residence in  
09:41:17 20 which Foday Sankoh lived?

21 A. Bedroom - beds in his bedroom and the second room,  
22 facilities for the kitchen, stove. And in the living room,  
23 furniture, chairs and other things.

24 Q. And apart from - no, let me start again. Did Foday Sankoh  
09:41:48 25 live at that address permanently or was it an address he used on  
26 the occasions that he visited Gbarnga?

27 A. Only on the occasions that he visited Gbarnga. He was  
28 never permanent at that address.

29 Q. Did any member of his, Foday Sankoh's, organisation live

1 permanently at that address?

2 A. Yes. He kept a few of his - I do not know if they were  
3 workers or security, I didn't know them personally, but he did  
4 keep a few people there for the upkeep of that property.

09:42:37 5 Q. Did the facilities made available to him at that address  
6 include a radio?

7 A. I'm not sure, but he could have installed a radio. There  
8 were no restrictions on him having to install a radio there. I  
9 think he had a radio - a long-range radio installed at that  
09:43:11 10 property. It would not have been out of the ordinary.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, that's not the question. The  
12 question is whether you made available to him that radio, not  
13 whether he had one of his own that he installed.

14 THE WITNESS: No, I did not make available a radio to him.

09:43:29 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Did he have an arms and ammunition dump at that residence?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Would you have permitted such a thing?

19 A. No.

09:43:47 20 Q. Why not?

21 A. Because the way that I operated with him, we were not  
22 in - we were not what I would call cooperating at a level where  
23 he could have stored large amounts of arms and ammunition. Today  
24 Sankoh came and left, so I would not have permitted him to  
09:44:17 25 stockpile arms and ammunition at that house. It would have  
26 created a security threat for the city. I would not have  
27 permitted that, especially when he was not a part of the Liberian  
28 revolution.

29 Q. Now, I read to you, Mr Taylor, a passage from your

1 testimony quoted to you by my learned friend on 11 November 2009,  
2 and that passage was taken from testimony given by you on 20 July  
3 at page 24808. Do you understand that?

4 A. Yes, I do.

09:45:04 5 Q. Now, if we go on now to page 31598 at the top, you will see  
6 that during the course of your cross-examination I intervened at  
7 line 8 and made reference to testimony you gave at page 24807, so  
8 that was the page immediately before the page quoted to you by  
9 Ms Hollis. Do you follow me?

09:45:44 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. And just to confirm that, let us just flick back to 31595,  
12 line 19; yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So at line 19, that passage was - taken from page 24808 was  
09:46:10 15 quoted to you. When we go now to page 31598, we see on the page  
16 prior to the page quoted to you, that being page 24807, beginning  
17 at line 13, you were asked this question:

18 "Q. Where was this residence in relation to another  
19 residence that we've been told about which you occupied?  
09:46:40 20 Where were they in relation to each other?

21 A. Foday Sankoh lived a little distance from my area."

22 So on page 24807 you had told the Court that Sankoh lived a  
23 little distance from where you lived. You were then quoted what  
24 you had said on page 24808, that he lived in the Executive  
09:47:10 25 Mansion. So, help us, Mr Taylor: Which of the two is right?

26 A. Foday Sankoh never spent a night at the Executive Mansion.  
27 My family and children lived there; he never did. The correct  
28 version is that he lived a little distance from me. I gave him  
29 the residence. He never lived at the Executive Mansion with me.

1 Never even spent a night there.

2 Q. Now, just to complete this aspect, Mr Taylor, for how long  
3 was that residence in Gbarnga made available to Foday Sankoh?

09:48:05

4 A. That residence was made available to Foday Sankoh between  
5 August 1991 until the break-up between us in about May, June  
6 1992.

7 Q. Thereafter, did the RUF have available to them such a  
8 facility in Gbarnga thereafter?

9 A. Never, no.

09:48:35

10 Q. When was the next time that the RUF had similar facilities  
11 in Liberia?

12 A. In 1998 facilities were given in the City of Monrovia in an  
13 area called Sinkor to the then RUF leader Sam Bockarie, 1998.  
14 And to be specific, October 1998.

09:49:10

15 Q. And for how long did the RUF enjoy that facility in  
16 Monrovia?

17 A. Throughout up until I would say about 2000 - late 2000 to  
18 early 2001.

09:49:46

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, still on the topic of Foday Sankoh, do you  
20 recall being cross-examined about an interview conducted with you  
21 by one Mary Harper?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Now, help us: When did you first meet Foday Sankoh?

24 A. I first met Foday Sankoh in August 1991.

09:50:14

25 Q. Where?

26 A. In Gbarnga.

27 Q. Did you know him in Libya?

28 A. Never met Foday Sankoh, no. I did not know him in Libya.

29 Q. Did you meet him in Burkina Faso?

1 A. Never met him in Burkina Faso.

2 Q. Did you meet him in Cote d'Ivoire?

3 A. Never met him in Cote d'Ivoire.

09:50:51

4 Q. Was he a subordinate of yours or assistant in the launch of  
5 the Liberian revolution?

6 A. No, not at all.

7 Q. That's all I want to ask you about that topic, Mr Taylor.

8 Now, Mr Taylor, did you advise President Abacha against the use  
9 of force against the junta?

09:51:42

10 A. Well, yes and no.

11 Q. What does that mean? Let's start with the "yes" part.

12 A. There was an advice, and it is detailed in the letter that

13 I wrote to him. The advice was that it would be wrong for

14 him - for Nigeria to have unilaterally gone against the junta

09:52:17

15 without two things: One, the approval of ECOWAS; and two,

16 getting an approval under Chapter VII of the United Nations,

17 which is the only organisation that can authorise the use of

18 force. In that way, yes.

19 The "no" part of it is if you look at it in its global form

09:52:45

20 by just saying yes, it would mean that I was against the eventual

21 use of force. I was not against the eventual use of force. I

22 was against unilaterally doing it in the absence of a Chapter VII

23 resolution to authorise the use of force.

24 Q. Now, you appreciate that it was suggested that the reason

09:53:08

25 for your advice to President Abacha was that, in effect, you were

26 seeking to preserve your protege, the AFRC/RUF alliance, in power

27 in Sierra Leone. You appreciate that, don't you?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. Mr Taylor, did you at any stage support the AFRC/RUF

1 alliance?

2 A. Not at all. Never, never supported them in any way, no.

3 Q. Did you seek to use your influence with your fellow  
4 Presidents in order to protect them and preserve them in power?

09:54:04 5 A. No, not at all. In fact, I was one of those that just  
6 wanted to follow the law. And by that I mean the ECOWAS had  
7 agreed - the Committee of Five had agreed and had given the junta  
8 a time frame that was far beyond February of 1998. It was later  
9 on that if they had failed, what would happen. And so I was just  
09:54:37 10 strict about the rules. And because Nigeria is the powerhouse of  
11 West Africa, I wanted to make - and along with other small  
12 countries - absolutely sure that Nigeria did not then, and would  
13 not in the future, use a free hand to act in whatever way it  
14 wanted to whenever it chose to do so without the approval of the  
09:55:05 15 Security Council. If not, all little countries in West Africa  
16 would be at risk. So, in a way, my actions were more like geared  
17 toward containing the powerhouse, Nigeria, and making sure that  
18 Nigeria acted within the law. This is what I was - this was what  
19 was foremost in my mind. So in no case, at no time, did I ever  
09:55:31 20 support that alliance or the junta. My actions were geared  
21 toward more like containing Nigeria in case of any - any type of  
22 eventui sm [sic].

23 Q. Now, what are you telling us, Mr Taylor? Are you saying  
24 that your view was that if Nigeria was allowed to intervene  
09:55:59 25 unilaterally in Sierra Leone, that would set an unwelcome  
26 precedent?

27 A. That is 100 per cent correct.

28 Q. Did you fear that setting such a precedent might endanger  
29 your own position in Liberia?

1 A. Yes. Yes, and other small countries too, yes.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: I beg your pardon, Ms Hollis.

3 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President. Once again the  
4 Prosecution will object to the leading nature of these questions.

09:56:37 5 This is not meeting a Prosecution allegation; the Defence is  
6 simply testifying for the witness. The witness is capable of  
7 testifying with a non-leading question.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths?

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, let us look at the answer  
09:57:00 10 given by the witness which led to the question which I asked.

11 The answer was:

12 "No, not at all. In fact, I was one of those that just  
13 wanted to follow the law, and by that I mean the ECOWAS agreed -  
14 the Committee of Five had agreed and had given the junta a time  
09:57:26 15 frame that was far beyond February 1998. It was later on that if  
16 they had failed, what would happen. And so I was just strict  
17 about the rules. And because Nigeria is the powerhouse of West  
18 Africa, I wanted to make - and along with other small countries -  
19 absolutely sure that Nigeria did not then, and would not in the  
09:57:50 20 future, use a free hand to act in whatever way it wanted to  
21 whenever it chose to do so without the approval of the  
22 Security Council. If not, all little countries in West Africa  
23 would be at risk. So in a way, my actions were more like geared  
24 towards containing the powerhouse, Nigeria, and making sure that  
09:58:12 25 Nigeria acted within the law. That is what I was - this was what  
26 was foremost in my mind."

27 Now, following upon that I then asked a question:

28 "Did you fear that setting such a precedent might endanger  
29 your own position in Liberia?"

1 Now, it's clear from the answer the witness had given that  
2 my question is merely a consolidation of the point he had made,  
3 so it follows on from what the witness has already said. So in  
4 my submission it is not a leading question. It is merely  
09:58:49 5 reframing the witness's answer in a much more concise form.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think you are right, Mr Griffiths, but  
7 please do be careful not to put words in the witness's mouth.  
8 Some of your running questions do border on putting the answers,  
9 if you like, in the witness's mouth. But I will let you go on  
09:59:21 10 this one. Objection overruled. On the witness's answer, yes.  
11 Indeed, the witness has answered, but please do be careful,  
12 Mr Griffiths, not to suggest answers in future.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Mr Taylor, let us move on to another topic. Did you ever  
09:59:52 15 work for the CIA?

16 A. Never, no.

17 Q. Were you ever in contact with the CIA?

18 A. When you say "were you", as an individual?

19 Q. Let's start with that. Were you as an individual ever in  
10:00:14 20 contact with the CIA?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Were you, as leader of the NPFL, ever in contact with the  
23 CIA?

24 A. Yes, as an organisation. "You" as an organisation, yes.

10:00:33 25 Q. When?

26 A. Between 1990 into about '93.

27 Q. And what was the nature of that contact?

28 A. Exchange of - the normal information and communication and  
29 other assistance to the NPFL at the time.

1 Q. Exchange of information like what?

2 A. Well, your basic - in our case, from the NPFL side, we  
3 provided information as to positions and locations of American  
4 citizens that were scattered throughout the 95 per cent of the  
10:01:40 5 country that we were in control of at the time. From their side,  
6 it was more like basic information regarding certain positions of  
7 the Armed Forces of Liberia at the time in protection of American  
8 lives. And from their side also we were given sophisticated  
9 communication equipment to aid our progress and also keep them  
10:02:20 10 informed.

11 Q. Did you pass on details of the Quiwonkpa coup to the Doe  
12 government?

13 A. Oh, no. I was a part of it, so I didn't. No, I did not.

14 Q. You recall, do you not, that suggestion was made to you in  
10:02:46 15 cross-examination?

16 A. Yes. That was very twisted, yes.

17 Q. Now, at the time of the Quiwonkpa coup, Mr Taylor, where  
18 were you?

19 A. At the time of the Quiwonkpa coup I was still in the  
10:03:03 20 United States.

21 Q. Where in the United States?

22 A. I had gotten out of jail and I was in the New York area.

23 Q. At that time, Mr Taylor, were you in contact with the Doe  
24 government?

10:03:25 25 A. No, not at all. I have been socked by the Doe government.  
26 No, not at all.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you asked the witness did  
28 you pass on details of the Quiwonkpa coup and his answer was,  
29 "No. I was a part of it, so I didn't know." A part of what?

1 THE WITNESS: I was a part of the coup.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you mean?

3 THE WITNESS: I knew about it. I was briefed about it in  
4 jail before I broke out, so I knew about it. I knew about the  
10:03:55 5 planning of it. So I was a part of it, your Honour.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: But your answer is, "I was a part of it,  
7 so I didn't know."

8 THE WITNESS: No. Maybe the way how they're writing it.  
9 Period N-0, no. Maybe they put K-N-0-W. I said I didn't, then I  
10:04:14 10 said "no". So maybe it's the way the transcript is written,  
11 your Honour.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's very good that you've clarified  
13 that. Even I had thought you - the answer was not clear.

14 THE WITNESS: That's okay.

10:04:27 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Mr Taylor, at that stage when you were in New York, did you  
18 have the means or contacts to get in touch with the Doe  
19 government?

10:04:46 20 A. No. It would have been foolish. Had I made such a contact  
21 it would have broken the pledge that I had made to those that  
22 actually got me out, that I should get out of the United States  
23 as quickly as possible. No, I would never have contacted Doe and  
24 I didn't.

10:05:07 25 Q. Mr Taylor, in order to cover all the bases in terms of the  
26 suggestion made to you, can I ask you this then: Did you buy  
27 your freedom by selling out the Quiwonkpa coup? Do you follow  
28 me?

29 A. Yes, I follow you. No, not at all. No. No, I

1 couldn't - it would be impossible to buy my freedom by selling  
2 out the Quiwonkpa coup because the Quiwonkpa coup was supported,  
3 the weapons were paid for by the CIA. So who would I sell out  
4 to? Siaka Stevens received the money directly. Those weapons  
10:05:52 5 were paid for. So, no, I didn't.

6 Q. Now, also on Monday, 16 November 2009 you were asked  
7 whether you provided information to the CIA. Did you?

8 A. Never. No.

9 Q. It was also suggested that once you were back in Africa,  
10:06:58 10 after your escape, were you acting in any way as an agent of the  
11 CIA. Do you remember being asked that question?

12 A. Yes, I remember that. No. And I remember saying that  
13 there's no amount of money I could be paid to work for the CIA.  
14 Never, no.

10:07:24 15 Q. You were also asked, while in Libya, were you an agent of  
16 the CIA. Were you, Mr Taylor?

17 A. No, never. No.

18 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. In light of all those questions you  
19 were asked about your involvement with the CIA, yes, what was the  
10:08:01 20 extent of your involvement with the CIA?

21 A. Personally, none whatsoever. From an organisational  
22 standpoint, the CIA was acting really I would say for its own  
23 safeguard really, as it should act, of American citizens. And so  
24 they were caught in a position where what we call they gave a  
10:08:27 25 little and got a whole lot.

26 And let me explain what I mean by that. If you look at the  
27 document presented by the Defence, and the Prosecution dealt with  
28 it in dealing with Herman Cohen's - that chapter on Herman  
29 Cohen's book, Herman Cohen skirts around the cooperation at that

1 particular time in language that you have to really dig into to  
2 understand when he talks about some communication agency and all  
3 that kind of stuff. He's skirting around it.

10:09:07 4 The fact of the matter is there were thousands of Americans  
5 in NPFL area at the time. The CIA had the assignment of tracking  
6 those Americans and safeguarding their lives and making sure that  
7 no harm came to them. In order to do so, they had to contact the  
8 NPFL at the time in order to provide them - to provide the  
9 American security in our areas, which we did, but also we got  
10:09:39 10 something in return. And so that's as far as my dealing on an  
11 organisational level has ever been with the CIA. Personally,  
12 never and would not.

13 Q. Before I close this chapter, Mr Taylor, can I ask you one  
14 other question about this. Was your entry into Liberia aided and  
10:10:04 15 abetted by the CIA?

16 A. No, not at all. No. Not at all. No.

17 Q. What I am asking is this, Mr Taylor: Were you, in effect,  
18 a double agent?

19 A. Never.

10:10:27 20 Q. Obtaining assistance from the Libyans and at the same time  
21 obtaining assistance from the CIA?

22 A. No. No, the CIA contacts came after the war started, but  
23 not before, no.

24 Q. Because you appreciate that the case against you is that  
10:10:52 25 your co-conspirators, if I can style them as such, were Colonel  
26 Gaddafi and Blaise Compaore. You appreciate that's the case put  
27 against you?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And in cross-examination now it's suggested that you were

1 working for the CIA. So help me, Mr Taylor, which of the two is  
2 right?

3 A. Well, I will take the first one as right. I have never  
4 ever and will not ever work for the CIA or any other intelligence  
10:11:28 5 agency. Never, no.

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want to deal now with another matter.  
7 You are incarcerated at the United Nations detention facility in  
8 Scheveningen, aren't you?

9 A. I don't know if it's the UN detention centre. I know I am  
10:12:04 10 being held at the Dutch prison there. It could be, I'm not sure.

11 Q. Now help me, what access do you have to the telephone?

12 A. I can make calls that are controlled - that are placed,  
13 controlled and recorded by the prison facilities. That's the  
14 extent of my access.

10:12:35 15 Q. Are all of your calls recorded and monitored by the prison  
16 authorities?

17 A. All of them. Every one. They are placed and monitored and  
18 recorded.

19 Q. Just help us, please. What is the procedure which you have  
10:12:55 20 to follow in order to make a telephone call from the facility?

21 A. First, I have to submit a number of an individual that I  
22 would like to call at some time. The process takes two weeks for  
23 the Sierra Leonean Court and the facilities to do their security  
24 check on the number and the individual. After about two weeks,  
10:13:35 25 that number is approved for calling. I cannot just automatically  
26 get up and say, "Please call this number," no. It has to be  
27 vetted and approved by the Sierra Leonean Court. That list is  
28 kept by the guards. The telephones are at the desk of the  
29 guards. In my cell I have an extension. The guards place all

1 calls. I have to go to the guards and ask to place a particular  
2 call from a list that they have. They then place the call and  
3 transfer it to an extension in my cell. They then record the  
4 conversation. This is the procedure.

10:14:28 5 Q. Now, the list you have told us about, Mr Taylor, is it just  
6 one list of names?

7 A. Yes, it's one list of several names.

8 Q. And just give us an idea how many names are on that list?

9 A. Right now my list contains about - I would say about 80  
10:14:56 10 names.

11 Q. Now, are you able, through that facility, to speak to your  
12 legal team?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Are those calls privileged?

10:15:21 15 A. They are.

16 Q. Help us: Which members of your legal team are on that  
17 privileged list?

18 A. All of the lawyers on the team are on that list except for  
19 Mr Munyard.

10:15:50 20 Q. Now, when you want to speak to a member of your legal team,  
21 Mr Taylor, what's the procedure?

22 A. Well, first of all the list is approved by the Sierra  
23 Leonean Court, the legal team. The procedure is just as is done  
24 with the non-privileged calls. The list is with the guards. You  
10:16:19 25 walk to the desk and you ask to place a call to a specific  
26 counsel. The guards make the call - place the call and again  
27 transfer it to your extension. I cannot on my own dial a call,  
28 no.

29 Q. Is Counsellor Lavalie Supuwood on that list?

1 A. Yes, he is on that list. He is co-counsel on the team. He  
2 is on the list.

3 Q. Have you spoken to Mr Supuwood on the telephone?

4 A. Oh, yes.

10:17:03 5 Q. Have you ever, whilst speaking to Mr Supuwood, spoken to  
6 anybody else on the same call?

7 A. While I am speaking to him?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. Yes.

10:17:20 10 Q. Why?

11 A. Well, we have - we had a case - in fact, two specific cases  
12 - where there were potential witnesses that I was seeking out in  
13 Monrovia, and I had asked him to contact those individuals. He  
14 invited them to his office, and they wanted to speak to me

10:17:52 15 because they were reluctant to testify, and to make sure that I  
16 was asking them to testify. And so I assured them yes, it was my  
17 desire and if they did not mind. I spoke to two such persons.

18 Q. Mr Taylor, has it ever been - no. Who within the structure  
19 of the Special Court for Sierra Leone has a responsibility for  
10:18:28 20 your welfare and the conditions of your detention here in The  
21 Hague? Which department of this Court is responsible?

22 A. I would think it's the Registrar's office. I don't speak  
23 to them directly, but I would suppose it's the office of the  
24 Registrar.

10:18:49 25 Q. Taking things in stages, has the Registry ever suggested to  
26 you that you were abusing that telephone by, for example, seeking  
27 to intimidate witnesses for the Prosecution or anything like  
28 that? Has such a suggestion ever been made?

29 A. No. None whatsoever, no.

1 Q. Have you ever used the telephone facilities in the prison  
2 to issue orders to anyone to intimidate Prosecution witnesses?

3 A. Never. As I said, all of the calls are recorded. They are  
4 monitored by the Registry in The Hague and Sierra Leone. No, not  
10:19:48 5 at all. Never.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, the recordings of your calls, are those  
7 recordings kept solely by the prison authorities, or does anyone  
8 else have access to them?

9 A. The Registrar of the Special Court of Sierra Leone has  
10:20:10 10 total and complete access to all of my phone records.

11 Q. Has anyone from the Registry ever accused of you trying to  
12 intimidate witnesses?

13 A. No. No one ever.

14 Q. Let's move on, Mr Taylor and deal with another matter.

10:20:56 15 Now, you mentioned this individual yesterday, Colonel Dempsey,  
16 yes?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Who is he?

19 A. Colonel Dempsey was the chief of US military missions  
10:21:13 20 accredited near Monrovia with diplomatic status in Liberia at the  
21 time. The United States had what they called a military mission  
22 to Liberia, and he headed that mission.

23 Q. What was the purpose of that mission?

24 A. Over the years there have been - there had been military  
10:21:38 25 cooperation between the United States and Liberia, and my  
26 government was pushing to re-ignite that relationship in our new  
27 dispensation of trying to restructure the Armed Forces of Liberia  
28 while the United States had not accepted, but we were going  
29 through discussions. And that's their purpose in Liberia.

1 Q. Now, you mentioned yesterday, when dealing with questions  
2 which were asked of you about Daniel Chea, that Daniel Chea had  
3 been involved in an inquiry with Colonel Dempsey. Is that right?

4 A. That is correct.

10:22:30 5 Q. And, Mr Taylor, help us: What was that inquiry about?

6 A. There were allegations coming from the Sierra Leonean  
7 government at the time that Liberia was training Sierra Leonean  
8 dissidents - and I am speaking specifically this occurred in  
9 1998 - were training Sierra Leonean dissidents in Liberia for the

10:23:07 10 sole purpose of launching an attack against the neighbourly  
11 nation of Sierra Leone. And they were specific that these  
12 trainings - the training was going on at Camp Naama in Bong  
13 County, and the airwaves were rife with these accusations and we  
14 kept denying them, and so the Government of Liberia decided that

10:23:38 15 it would ask for a delegation of the United Nations and our  
16 government and other interested parties to go to Naama and  
17 inspect the facilities and see if anything was going on. This is  
18 when gladly the United States government authorised Colonel  
19 Dempsey to go along with the Defence Minister of Liberia,

10:24:08 20 representatives from the Secretary-General's office, and other  
21 military personnel to take a trip and do a complete inspection of  
22 the property at Camp Naama, which is a military base, and then  
23 report back to all of our governments of what they observed at  
24 the base.

10:24:33 25 Q. And was your Defence Minister, Daniel Chea, fully involved  
26 in that investigation?

27 A. Yes, he was.

28 Q. And did Daniel Chea brief you as to the conclusions of that  
29 investigation in which Colonel Dempsey, that American military

1     attache, was involved?

2     A.     Yes.  He briefed me, a report was done.  All of the  
3     participants contributed to that report.  Colonel Dempsey did.  
4     In fact, I saw a copy of the report that was done at that  
10:25:25 5     particular time and what it said and what their conclusions were.

6     Q.     And what were the conclusions?

7     A.     It was agreed:  One, that no training were being conducted  
8     at Camp Naama, one; in the second instance, in fact no training  
9     had been conducted at Naama for a very long time because the  
10:25:51 10     place was growing up in bush and there were no tracks of any  
11     recent activities - fresh grass all over the place - that nothing  
12     had been there; and they also got into the issues of arms and the  
13     movement of arms.  They also investigated - and let me just be  
14     clear - it was not just the visit of Naama, but that delegation  
10:26:20 15     looked at the possibility of the movement of arms out of Liberia  
16     into Sierra Leone and the possible movement of diamonds.  So it  
17     was a three-prong mission that this group had, and it took them a  
18     little time to do it.

19             The second conclusion was that, yes, it appeared that small  
10:26:46 20     amounts of arms were going across the border, but they were not  
21     at the level that could be - I would say in so many words could  
22     be concluded as being an official transfer of arms.

23             And the other conclusion that was specifically a note made  
24     by Colonel Dempsey was that it appeared that diamonds were being  
10:27:11 25     traded across the border and that it could not have been done  
26     without the knowledge, at least, of the President of Liberia.  We  
27     disagreed with that particular part of Dempsey's conclusion in  
28     his comments, but we let the report go forward anyway because we  
29     knew that at least it was fair in saying - I don't know how he

1 could have concluded that a small item as a diamond could not be  
2 going across the border except it was done with the knowledge of  
3 the President. But that's the extent of it.

4 Now, I must add here, without being told that I am going  
10:27:52 5 too far, that while under certain rules of this Court, the  
6 comments of Colonel Dempsey have not been used because of certain  
7 rules of this Court. But I think in all fairness to me, I think  
8 the judges ought to be able to see what Dempsey said because  
9 that's a subject of the accusation, even though the rules  
10:28:14 10 restrict us from using it, but I think in all fairness to me the  
11 judges ought to see what Dempsey said in his own words about the  
12 transfer of arms from Liberia to Sierra Leone and the training at  
13 Naama and other things.

14 Q. Now, on that same note, Mr Taylor, of the allegations being  
10:28:38 15 made of you being involved in the training of Sierra Leonean  
16 dissidents in Liberia at Camp Naama, do you recall being  
17 cross-examined about a letter written by President Kabbah to the  
18 Secretary-General?

19 A. Yes, I do.

10:29:09 20 Q. A letter dated 5 January 1999?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Could we please look behind divider 11 in the bundle. This  
23 is MFI-343. Do you recall being cross-examined about this  
24 letter, Mr Taylor?

10:29:59 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Let us look at it again, please. First of all, let's  
27 ignore the cover sheet and go straight to the letter. We see the  
28 letter is dated 5 January 1999, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor. Did President Kabbah send you a  
2 copy of this letter?

3 A. I don't recall receiving a copy of this letter, no.

4 Q. It reads as follows:

10:30:41 5 "Current security developments obliged me to revert to a  
6 matter which was the subject of my communications to you dated 13  
7 October 1998."

8 Pausing there. Did you receive a copy of that earlier  
9 letter dated 13 October 1998?

10:31:08 10 A. I don't recall getting a letter because this would be a  
11 letter to the President of the - I mean to the Secretary-General.  
12 I don't recall getting a copy of that letter.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in October 1998, were you in contact with  
14 the RUF?

10:31:34 15 A. October 1998, yes.

16 Q. In particular, with whom were you in contact in October  
17 1998?

18 A. With Sam Bockarie.

19 Q. Had you informed President Kabbah that you had established  
10:31:59 20 such a link with Bockarie?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. Well, at this time it was not necessary to inform him.

24 Q. Why had you contacted Bockarie in October 1998?

10:32:23 25 A. Well, actually that was the second contact. I'm on the  
26 Committee of Five and I'm working on the Sierra Leonean problem,  
27 so I have no duty or responsibility to informing Kabbah if and  
28 when I contact the RUF. So that particular time was specifically  
29 to pursue the peace, so I didn't.

1 Q. That being so, Mr Taylor, wouldn't it be neighbourly to  
2 inform your brother President next door?

3 A. Not necessarily.

4 Q. Why not?

10:33:10 5 A. Because, like I say, Kabbah is a party to the conflict.  
6 There's a conflict, he is a party to the conflict. So contacts  
7 with the other side and informing him of those contacts could be  
8 construed as a betrayal, okay. When you are mediating like this,  
9 you have to try to be aboveboard.

10:33:37 10 So this has got nothing to do with neighbourliness, it's  
11 got nothing to do with being a brother. Once my actions were in  
12 line with the mandate of the Committee of Five, I don't think any  
13 of the other leaders would have done a contact with him and say,  
14 "Oh, we met today, we did this today." That's not the way it  
10:33:59 15 works, so I didn't.

16 Q. Which Presidents were on the Committee of Five?

17 A. You had La Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Burkina Faso came on, and  
18 if I am not mistaken Togo could have been on it at the time.

19 Q. And who was the fifth?

10:34:23 20 A. Ivory Coast - Guinea was on it.

21 Q. Just run through them again, please.

22 A. Guinea, La Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Liberia.

23 Q. So Kabbah wasn't on it?

24 A. No, no, no, Kabbah was a party to the conflict. He was not  
10:34:48 25 on the Committee of Five.

26 Q. Let's go back to the letter:

27 "You may recall that, upon receipt of my letter, you  
28 strongly urged that my government adopt a conciliatory approach  
29 in dealing with the situation. I immediately acted in accordance

1 with your suggestion and my spokesman even made a public  
2 statement to the effect that President Charles Taylor and I were  
3 doing everything possible to ameliorate the situation.

4 Regrettably, it would appear that my conciliatory approach  
10:35:31 5 and persistent efforts to maintain friendly and cordial relations  
6 with President Charles Taylor are being interpreted by him as a  
7 sign of weakness and a lack of resolve on my part. There is a  
8 mountain of evidence that the current rebel offensive in Sierra  
9 Leone has been initiated and sustained by the Government of  
10:35:58 10 Liberia. "

11 Let us pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, this letter is dated 5  
12 January, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So the current rebel offensive is what?

10:36:16 15 A. When you say "the current"?

16 Q. The letter refers to "the current rebel offensive in Sierra  
17 Leone" and the letter is dated 5 January 1999. So which  
18 offensive is being spoken about?

19 A. I am not sure what he is speaking about here to the  
10:36:41 20 Secretary-General, which offensive he is talking about, because  
21 this is before the January 6th. So this is on the 5th, so he  
22 must be talking about a period prior to January 5. I don't know  
23 what he's talking about here.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this mountain of evidence to which he  
10:37:03 25 refers, have you ever seen it?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Did, for example, the Secretary-General provide you with  
28 that mountain of evidence?

29 A. No. The only thing I can point to that was provided in

1 terms of information, even though this letter is dated January 5,  
2 but I would say that Kabbah could be referring to issues coming  
3 out of, I would say, 1998. And so what we do have is again  
4 coming from the accusation about Liberians involved in the  
10:38:01 5 Freetown fighting during the February intervention and the  
6 subsequent build-up of these things, this is what - the general  
7 thing I would say he is referring to by a mountain of evidence,  
8 where Okelo writes and says that there are Liberians involved.  
9 This is all I can put my hand on.

10:38:24 10 Q. "I am aware that President Charles Taylor has publicly  
11 denied most categorically that his government is involved in the  
12 rebellion in Sierra Leone. For my part, I can emphatically  
13 affirm that these denials of President Taylor are not credible.  
14 We have concrete proofs that arms, personnel, logistics and moral  
10:38:51 15 support for the rebels emanate from the Government of Liberia  
16 with the clear intention to destabilise Sierra Leone. We know  
17 for certain of the five camps in Liberia which are used to train  
18 rebels who are then sent across the border to fuel the rebellion,  
19 commit atrocities and retard our economic development  
10:39:16 20 programmes."

21 Mr Taylor, were those concrete proofs provided to you?

22 A. Never. Kabbah never had a one, not one.

23 Q. And help us, these five camps in Liberia, where are they?

24 A. I have no idea what Kabbah is talking about here.

10:39:43 25 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, I have to press you on this. He is being  
26 very specific here. Five camps; what are their names, please?

27 A. Well, I don't think he is being specific. He doesn't name  
28 them here. I don't know what he's talking about. The only camp  
29 name that comes up in 1998, that is Naama which we investigate,

1 so --

2 Q. That's why I am asking you, where are the other four?

3 A. I don't - there were none. There was just something made  
4 up by Kabbah.

10:40:14 5 Q. Well, help us, Mr Taylor. You have been listening intently  
6 to the evidence called by the Prosecution beginning in January  
7 2008. Which other camps have been mentioned by Prosecution  
8 witnesses, help me, apart from Camp Naama?

9 A. In terms of where they trained? None. None that I know  
10:40:35 10 of.

11 Q. Well, where are the other four then? Help us. Where is  
12 Kabbah getting this from? Where are they?

13 A. There are no camps where people are being trained, so  
14 Kabbah is making this up. So I can't identify a camp because  
10:40:51 15 there is just not another camp.

16 Q. "Which are used to train rebels who are then sent across  
17 the border to fuel the rebellion, commit atrocities and retard  
18 our economic development programmes."

19 Now, Mr Taylor, your fellow President is there suggesting  
10:41:18 20 that you had an intention to destabilise Sierra Leone. Did you?

21 A. No.

22 Q. What did you stand to gain from that?

23 A. Absolutely nothing.

24 Q. "We also know that the large number of mercenaries who are  
10:41:41 25 actively engaged in the current offensive entered the territory  
26 of Sierra Leone from Liberia."

27 Which mercenaries are they, Mr Taylor?

28 A. I have no idea what Kabbah is talking about here  
29 whatsoever. None whatsoever.

1 Q. Mr Taylor, do you agree that there were large numbers of  
2 unemployed and perhaps unemployable former combatants in Liberia  
3 following your election as President in '97?

4 A. Yes, I do.

10:42:23 5 Q. To your knowledge, did any of those act as mercenaries in  
6 Sierra Leone?

7 A. In a way I can say yes.

8 Q. Did they act as mercenaries anywhere else, to your  
9 knowledge?

10:42:40 10 A. Beg your pardon?

11 Q. Did they act as - that pool of unemployed and unemployable  
12 former combatants, did they act as mercenaries anywhere else  
13 apart from Sierra Leone?

14 A. Yes.

10:42:54 15 Q. Where?

16 A. They acted in La Cote d'Ivoire. I also heard that  
17 Liberians ended up in Angola. I also heard that mercenaries  
18 ended up in the Congo, Liberians, and in southern Sudan. Some, I  
19 understand, Liberians were involved down in those areas as  
20 mercenaries.

10:43:29 21 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. Was it your intention to  
22 destabilise Angola?

23 A. No, no. I didn't send them there. They went on their -  
24 Liberians just went there. Liberians were there.

10:43:41 25 Q. What about the Congo; were you trying to destabilise there  
26 as well?

27 A. No, they just went on their own.

28 Q. What about Sudan; were you trying to destabilise there as  
29 well?

1 A. No.

2 Q. "Natural resources, particularly diamonds, are handed over  
3 to President Taylor by the rebels, and this is the means by which  
4 the rebellion is financed and fuelled in Sierra Leone."

10:44:13 5 So there we have President Kabbah making an allegation  
6 against you which is at the root of this indictment. What do you  
7 say?

8 A. I say this is total nonsense. And you know, maybe - you  
9 know, maybe it's for the good that I didn't know of this letter  
10:44:32 10 at the time it went to the Secretary-General. Probably if I had  
11 known, I would have taken a different disposition during that  
12 particular period that Kabbah, who was calling me and talking to  
13 me and visiting Liberia, could write a letter making such an  
14 accusation. I really didn't know about it. It would have  
10:44:53 15 probably changed me significantly in dealing with Kabbah.

16 Q. To what? Changed you to what?

17 A. Probably, number one, I would have gotten off the  
18 committee, and I think the relationship between Kabbah and myself  
19 would have stopped, quite frankly, because I would not have  
10:45:08 20 tolerated Tejan Kabbah - maybe he's big to other people -  
21 accusing me of such. I would have demanded that he bring proof  
22 of this and I would have pursued it. I would not have played  
23 Kabbah's game at all.

24

10:45:28 25 Q. "My government is gratified that the deepening involvement  
26 of the Government of Liberia in the rebel activities in my  
27 country is, at the present time, being fully appreciated by the  
28 wider international community.

29 For some time we have been warning about this, but it is

1 only now when the involvement has greatly increased, with greater  
2 and destructive damages, that alarm is being expressed by many  
3 governments.

4 As you are aware, I personally have done everything humanly  
10:46:01 5 possible to reach an understanding with President Charles Taylor  
6 so that he can leave my country and people in peace. Your own  
7 efforts, as Secretary-General at Abuja, and those of the  
8 Reverend Jesse Jackson, the envoy of the President of the  
9 United States of America, are glaring examples. However, we  
10:46:26 10 cannot allow ourselves to be swayed, by denials and unworkable  
11 proposals about border surveillance and joint patrols, from  
12 realising the enormous dangers ahead for all of us."

13 Who had suggested border surveillance and joint patrols,  
14 Mr Taylor?

10:46:51 15 A. Beg your pardon?

16 Q. Who had suggested border surveillance and joint patrols?

17 A. I had.

18 Q. What was President Kabbah's reaction to that suggestion?

19 A. Tejani agreed that it was a good idea for there to be  
10:47:13 20 border patrols. He agreed.

21 Q. Did he suggest to you that those proposals were, quote  
22 unquote, unworkable?

23 A. No, no. In fact, Kabbah backed it and so did Conte.  
24 Kabbah backed it.

10:47:32 25 Q. So what in the end caused those proposals not to be  
26 implemented?

27 A. From my perspective, it was mostly funding and the  
28 technical assistance necessary, because I had proposed that to  
29 the United Nations in many, many letters and different things.

1 It was waiting for the funding and technical assistance necessary  
2 for the proposal.

3 Q. Now, unless I'm asked to, that's all I want to deal with in  
4 relation to that document, which is MFI-343, so we can put that  
10:48:23 5 away for the moment. But whilst we have got the bundle there,  
6 could we look behind divider - well, before we look behind the  
7 divider, let me ask you a simple question, Mr Taylor. How do you  
8 spell the name Dankpannah?

9 A. It is D-A-H K-P-A-N-N-A-H. Dah Kpannah.

10:49:03 10 Q. Could you say that again, please?

11 A. D-A-H and K-P-A-N-N-A-H. Dah Kpannah.

12 Q. Is that a word unique to Liberia?

13 A. I wouldn't say - no, it's not unique to Liberia.

14 Q. When had you first received that title, Mr Taylor?

10:49:34 15 A. Early 1997.

16 Q. And by the year 2000, then you would have had that title  
17 for what, three years?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Tell me, Mr Taylor, when, as President of Liberia you  
10:50:00 20 wanted to write a letter, who would do the actual typing for you?

21 A. It would be done by the Ministry of State. Depending on  
22 who the Minister assigned, depending on the letter, it could be  
23 done through the National Security Adviser's office. But the  
24 specific person I wouldn't really know, but generally it would be  
10:50:24 25 through the Minister's office. Someone would do it.

26 Q. And help us, please: Would you - were there secretaries in  
27 that ministry who did the typing?

28 A. Yes. I would say yes, there were secretaries.

29 Q. And was it a permanent staff, Mr Taylor, those secretaries?

1 Were they there permanently?

2 A. I would say so, yes, because - they had to be permanent  
3 because they had to get security clearance to work in that area.  
4 They had to get security clearance, so they would have to be  
10:51:17 5 permanent.

6 Q. Can we now look, please, behind divider 20 in this bundle.  
7 This is MFI-134, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall being asked some questions  
10:51:50 10 about this letter by Mr Koumjian?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, just to remind ourselves. If we look at the last page  
13 of this letter, you see it's a letter from General Essa Seasay,  
14 yes?

10:52:08 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And do you recall Mr Koumjian commenting on the spelling of  
17 that name?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And do you recall Mr Koumjian also suggesting that this was  
10:52:20 20 a letter written in your office on behalf of the RUF? You  
21 remember that?

22 A. Yes, I remember that.

23 Q. Let's go to the first page, please. Is that the correct  
24 spelling of your name Dah Kpannah?

10:52:45 25 A. No, it's not.

26 Q. What's wrong with it?

27 A. The H is absent in the - after the D-A, the H is absent.

28 Q. Well, can you help us, Mr Taylor, how it is that this  
29 letter, alleged by the Prosecution to be written by you, ends up

1 with your name being misspelled? How? Help us.

2 A. The only thing I can suggest here is that the person that  
3 wrote this letter did not know the correct spelling of it.

10:53:28

4 Q. Yes, but Mr Koumjian suggested directly to you that you  
5 wrote this letter. So help us: Why did you spell your name  
6 incorrectly?

10:53:51

7 A. Well, because it was not written by any - there is no way  
8 any individual in my office in 2000 would be writing my name, in  
9 fact, this title and misspelling it, especially when they would  
10 have dealt with it maybe hundreds of times. So it simply tells  
11 that it was not written, as he suggests, from my office.

12 Q. And whilst we are on that, you will see three lines from  
13 the bottom of the first paragraph, "Vice-President of the  
14 County". What should that be, given the context of sentence?  
15 "To our leader in his capacity as Vice-President of the County".

10:54:26

16 A. It should be "country". I don't know what they mean by  
17 "county" here. It should be "country".

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, what do you say to this suggestion made  
19 directly to you by Mr Koumjian that you wrote this letter?

10:54:49

20 A. Very simple. I said practically what I would say now what  
21 I said before. It is twisted logic and it is a blatant, blatant  
22 falsehood that such - and in fact, I don't know what else to say  
23 about it, that he would suggest such a thing.

24 Q. Now, let us just look at the letter in light of the  
25 suggestion made by Mr Koumjian.

10:55:21

26 "Dear Mr President:

27 In view of the developments unfolding in our county; the  
28 violations of the Lome Peace Accord by the United Nations, which  
29 attacked our position at Makeni, Magburaka and Lunsar, driving us

1 to the current situation; the noncompliance by President Kabbah  
2 and his government of the Lome Peace Accord; refusing to appoint  
3 RUF representatives to designated government positions; refusing  
4 to create a commission to be chaired by the RUF, while insisting  
10:56:05 5 that the United Nations maintain conditions; creating a personal  
6 army, minus RUF participation, by including the other factions,  
7 Kamajors, SLA-AFRC; refusing to issue a diplomatic passport to  
8 our leader in his capacity as Vice-President of the county; plus  
9 numerous other affronts, and despite repeated protests by our  
10:56:38 10 leader to the international community, the United Nations and  
11 especially the ECOWAS, we have never received the slightest  
12 response, even negative.

13 It is in this environment of complete indifference and  
14 abandonment by all parties the United Nations orchestrated and  
10:56:54 15 executed their unwarranted attack on our positions.

16 Mr President, due to the inability of the United Nations to  
17 guarantee our leader's security, as well as that of our other  
18 members in Freetown, and the inability of the government to  
19 control its own militias, Kamajors and SLA-AFRC, we now face a  
10:57:18 20 situation that is more complicated than ever, especially with the  
21 direct involvement of the British army.

22 Mr President, we have the firm conviction that the  
23 situation in our country can only be resolved by the ECOWAS, and  
24 not by the United Nations, whose involvement was never envisaged  
10:57:41 25 in the Lome Peace Accord.

26 Here blow, Mr President, are the demands we make on behalf  
27 of our" - I can't read that word. I don't know if anyone can  
28 assist me.

29 A. Maybe "movement". I don't know, I'm sorry.

1 Q. Could be "movement".

2 "1. The unconditional release of our leader, who we  
3 consider to be detained by the United Nations;

10:58:19

4 2. The immediate halt to the distribution of weapons to  
5 the militias by the United Nations;

6 3. The convening of an ECOWAS summit to restart the  
7 dialogue with the participation of all parties;

8 4. The immediate re-examination of the Lome Peace Accord  
9 in Monrovia;

10:58:32

10 5. The creation of a National Council of State to govern  
11 the country during a transition period until elections are held;

12 6. The complete disarmament of the country, including the  
13 so-called national army, created by President Kabbah, comprising  
14 the other factions, without the RUF;

10:58:53

15 7. The immediate cessation of hostilities, followed by the  
16 establishment of a verification committee directed by the ECOWAS;

17 8. The travelling ban should be lifted on all RUF and  
18 walk forward to the Lome Peace Accord.

19 Mr President, we are convinced that your mediation will  
10:59:20 20 achieve an end to the war in our country, given your experience  
21 and your abilities, which are recognised by all.

22 Mr President, we are your complete disposal to enable you  
23 to bring peace back to our country. We assure you of our  
24 complete cooperation as well as our profound desire to assist you  
10:59:41 25 in attaining this objective.

26 Respectfully yours.

27 General Essa Seesay, RUF field commander."

28 Now, Mr Taylor, first of all, bearing in mind the  
29 suggestion made by Mr Koumjian, what did you stand to gain by

1 writing this letter under the name of Essa Seasay?

2 A. Absolutely nothing.

3 Q. Let's turn the suggestion on its head then. Why was Essa  
4 Seasay writing to you?

11:00:30 5 A. I would say because of my unique position throughout the  
6 peace process. That's why he would write me. They all knew my  
7 unique position as being the point individual on Sierra Leone and  
8 if you look at this, what, May 11, they all knew.

9 Q. What did you say, "the point individual on Sierra Leone"?

11:00:54 10 A. The point President on the committee dealing with Sierra  
11 Leone.

12 Q. Well, I might have to ask you some questions about that in  
13 a moment. But the details contained in this letter, the  
14 particularised request, Mr Taylor, did you have knowledge of

11:01:13 15 these concerns?

16 A. Well, yes. This is the 11th of --

17 Q. May 2000, yes?

18 A. We have just had - in fact, we have just come back - I have  
19 just come back from an ECOWAS meeting in Abuja. I returned on 10  
11:01:39 20 May and, if I recall, remember Foday Sankoh has been arrested on  
21 8 May. So there is conflict at this particular time that brings  
22 this particular situation. And so I am aware because even at the  
23 ECOWAS summit in Abuja at that time where Kabbah is there, we get  
24 a full report of what happens. So I am aware of the controversy  
11:02:10 25 at this time, yes.

26 Q. Just so that we get the sequence then, based on

27 Mr Koumjian's suggestion, Sankoh is arrested on the 8th, yes?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. You return from Abuja on the 10th, yes?

1 A. Yes, the evening of the 10th, yes.

2 Q. And so on the next day, you decided to write this letter  
3 for Issa Sesay, Essa Seasay, on the 11th. That's the sequence,  
4 right?

11:02:41 5 A. That's what he's suggesting.

6 Q. Any truth in it at all, Mr Taylor?

7 A. No truth whatsoever.

8 Q. Now, you mentioned point President and you were asked  
9 several questions about that, weren't you, in cross-examination?

11:03:01 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Do you still maintain that you were point President,  
12 Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, I do. I was the --

14 Q. You appreciate it was being boldly suggested to you by the  
11:03:21 15 Prosecution that that was a lie and that you weren't. You  
16 remember that?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Taking things slowly - let's not move that file too far,  
19 please. Taking things slowly, when were you appointed point  
11:03:42 20 President - Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes, I am listening.

22 Q. When were you appointed point President?

23 A. That confer, I would call it, came about as early as 1997  
24 when I was first put on the committee and the jokes came about,  
11:04:12 25 "Well, you are former rebel, you know how to deal with these  
26 people."

27 Q. Yes, you've told us that.

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Who appointed you point President?

1 A. Well, the committee agreed as a whole. It's not like  
2 somebody gave me a letter of appointment. The committee agreed  
3 that, "Look, you have experience in dealing with these kind of  
4 matters, so do the best that you can and keep us informed", and  
11:04:36 5 everybody worked actually, I am not going to say that the others  
6 didn't work, but I was asked to take on that responsibility.

7 Q. Now, does the chairman of ECOWAS have the power to grant a  
8 mandate to a particular President to carry out a certain role?

9 A. Well, not directly, no. He can suggest.

11:05:11 10 Q. When you say "not directly", what do you mean?

11 A. Well, he can suggest it but eventually ECOWAS operates on a  
12 consensus. So whatever role a President is playing, the rest of  
13 the union will know. So when the committee meets and says

14 President Taylor will do this, it is discussed in the general  
11:05:32 15 meeting. There are no votes taken, because we operate on  
16 consensus, but everybody else would know what a specific leader  
17 is doing.

18 Q. Let's have a look, please, behind divider 25 in this  
19 bundle. It is MFI-139. Now, we see, Mr Taylor, it's a final  
11:06:34 20 communique, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. We have looked at several of these documents and so we  
23 don't have to run through the explanation again. It is dated 9  
24 May 2000.

25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And we go to the second page, we see your name third on the  
27 list as being present at this meeting in Abuja on Tuesday, 9 May  
28 2000, yes?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Now this is the meeting you were telling us about a moment  
2 ago?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Yes?

11:07:06 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And we see that your name is spelt correctly there?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. In Abuja. And this is the meeting the day after Foday  
9 Sankoh was arrested, yes?

11:07:25 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Two days before you're alleged to have written that letter  
12 under the name of Essa Seasay, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Go over to the next page, please. Paragraph 5, five lines  
11:07:45 15 from the top of that paragraph:

16 "In this regard, they approved the mandate given by the  
17 current ECOWAS chairman and by the Heads of State of the  
18 Mano River Union to the President of the Republic of Liberia,  
19 His Excellency Dahkpanah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor to involve  
11:08:13 20 himself personally to ensure the liberation of the hostages and  
21 the resumption of the application of the Lome Peace Agreement."

22 What was that mandate, Mr Taylor?

23 A. The mandate was to stay engaged and make sure that peace  
24 prevailed. This was the mandate. This is the overall mandate  
11:08:37 25 and this is what they are asking me. But the reason why they are  
26 emphasising this, because by this time there is so much  
27 controversy that I am threatening to leave the whole thing and  
28 walk away. This is why it is re-emphasised here. In fact the  
29 Mano --

1 Q. What is re-emphasised?

2 A. That, no, you must get involved, stay involved and solve  
3 this problem.

4 Q. And when you say "stay involved", stay involved in what?

11:09:09 5 A. In the peace process, with the Sierra Leone - first of all  
6 here, we have the hostages, get these hostages released and stay  
7 involved because the Lome Accord is the peace.

8 Q. And stay involved in what role?

9 A. As the lead person. This is what you - I must stay  
11:09:29 10 involved. Even it doesn't specifically say stay involved, like  
11 the Prosecution was trying to say, as the lead person. But this  
12 is the problem. Because of my unique role and my threats, they  
13 are saying, "No, you must stay. In fact, get personally  
14 involved." This is what they are emphasising here.

11:09:51 15 Q. But it's suggested, Mr Taylor, you were not granted this  
16 role as point President; that you have lied to this Court about  
17 it.

18 A. Well, that's total nonsense. This is the same Prosecution  
19 that said I was meddling in their Rule 98 response, that we were  
11:10:14 20 meddling. Now I am there but I am not playing a role. So this  
21 is all nonsense. I mean, this is all the talk and talk and talk  
22 and talk and we haven't seen the proof. I am involved because of  
23 my unique role that had been given me by ECOWAS. And because I  
24 am angry now with the continuous accusation, and I say, "This is  
11:10:37 25 it, I am through with this process", Mano River Union countries  
26 meet, Kabbah - and mind you, and it's good for the judges to  
27 know, when it says, "In this regard they approved the mandate  
28 given by the current ECOWAS chairman and by the Heads of State of  
29 the Mano River Union", that Mano River Union, that's Liberia,

- 1 Sierra Leone and Guinea, we had met and I had told Kabbah in that  
2 meeting, "This is it, I am finished with this thing", and they  
3 suggested even then, "No, no, no, this thing has gone too far, we  
4 have to take it all the way to ECOWAS to encourage  
11:11:16 5 President Taylor to remain on board, because if he leaves this  
6 process it's going to falter." This is what is going on here.  
7 So it now moves from the Mano River Union, all the way to the  
8 Heads of State to say, "We cannot let him go."  
9 Q. On the same topic, Mr Taylor, let's look behind divider 26,  
11:11:40 10 shall we. And again we are familiar with these documents, yes;  
11 it's a final communique?  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. This one is later in the same month of May 2000, yes?  
14 A. That is correct.  
11:12:04 15 Q. And when we go to the second page, we see that --  
16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Does it have an MFI number?  
17 MR GRIFFITHS: This is MFI-143:  
18 Q. And when we go over the page, Mr Taylor, we see once again  
19 your name there "Dahkpanah" correctly spelt, yes?  
11:12:30 20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. And this meeting is once again in Abuja, yes?  
22 A. That is correct.  
23 Q. Let's go to page 6 of the document, please. And remember  
24 we are dealing with the suggestion that you were not the point  
11:12:47 25 President. Do you follow me?  
26 A. Yes, I do.  
27 Q. Page 6, do you have it?  
28 A. Yes, I do.  
29 Q. Paragraph 21, at the bottom of the page, five lines down:

1 "They congratulated President Charles Ghankay Taylor on the  
2 speed and effectiveness of his actions in the execution of the  
3 mandate given to him by his colleagues. They expressed their  
4 gratitude to the Liberian President for sparing no effort in  
11:13:26 5 securing the release of a large number of the hostages and  
6 renewed his mandate to use his good offices in obtaining the  
7 release of the remaining hostages and the recovery of the arms  
8 seized."

9 What's that mandate, Mr Taylor?

11:13:47 10 A. The mandate is stay on track with this Sierra Leonean  
11 problem, make sure that you continue to help. In this case,  
12 there are two specific issues now that I am dealing with. It has  
13 to do with the release of the hostages and the arms seized from  
14 the UN personnel by the RUF.

11:14:13 15 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you were not the point President, were you?

16 A. I was. If they did not think that way, they would have  
17 never tried to keep me engaged at this time.

18 Q. In fact, it's suggested you gave false testimony to these  
19 learned judges on that point. That's the suggestion. What do  
11:14:37 20 you say?

21 A. I say that's twisted logic and the suggestion is wrong.

22 Q. And just remind us, please, Mr Taylor, now we have looked  
23 at those two official ECOWAS documents confirming the mandate you  
24 were given, when were you appointed point President on Sierra  
11:15:05 25 Leone?

26 A. As far back as 1997.

27 Q. Were you meddling in Sierra Leonean affairs, as at one  
28 point suggested against you?

29 A. Never. Never was I meddling.

1 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I am reluctant to labour this  
2 point, but I understood Mr Taylor to spell the name Dah Kpannah  
3 with two Ns on the last part of the name, and I note that in tabs  
4 25 and 26, which he acknowledged to be correctly spelt, there is  
11:15:54 5 one N at the last part. Did I mishear the spelling?

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Mr Taylor, what's the spelling?

8 A. You did not. It's spelled with two Ns. Kpannah, some  
9 people do spell it with one N, but I have always spelled it with  
11:16:13 10 two Ns.

11 Q. So where it appears in these two documents with one N --

12 A. That is good.

13 Q. -- is it wrongly spelt, or what?

14 A. No, no, I would say it is good. Because Kpannah is spelled  
11:16:30 15 with either one N or two Ns.

16 Q. But there are also two Hs in the name; is that right?

17 A. That is correct. At the end of Dah, there is one H, and at  
18 the end of Kpannah there is another H.

19 Q. Right. Thank you. Mr Taylor, my apologies for jumping  
11:17:36 20 around in this way, but can I deal with another issue with you.  
21 You were cross-examined at length about human rights abuses in  
22 Liberia, and in particular the incident involving a Channel 4  
23 film crew, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

11:18:00 25 Q. And a Mr Sorious, yes?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, what happened in relation to that incident?

28 A. The - what happened was this: It appears that Sorious and  
29 this group had written - in fact, had written the government,

1 through the Ministry of Information, to come in to do some  
2 journalistic work. They came into the country and had gone about  
3 their regular business. They bumped into one of our undercover  
4 people and asked certain questions and suggested certain things.

11:19:12 5 And our people were informed - our intelligence were informed  
6 immediately that the types of questions and suggestions that were  
7 being made were something that we needed to look at.

8 But before this group came into Liberia, which is about  
9 2000, we had received some information, and they were very  
11:19:40 10 persistent. We had refused, apparently, the Minister tells me,  
11 for so long. There was this fear that because of the attacks  
12 against me - at this particular time in 2000 there were vigorous  
13 attacks against me, the news media, the BBC, Washington Post and  
14 everything - that we needed to be very careful, and even their  
11:20:10 15 insistence on filming me, I should be - we should be very  
16 careful, because cameras exist that have certain capabilities  
17 that could harm leaders.

18 One of the examples that had been given by our - I mean, to  
19 our security was the killing of Ahmad Shah Massoud of Afghanistan  
11:20:44 20 by using some similar electronic camera or something and that  
21 this - and that cameras existed that had rays or beams that could  
22 be pointed to an individual and could cause them in some way some  
23 bodily harm after the fact. So we were very, very much on high  
24 alert.

11:21:15 25 And when this informant came and informed the NSA of the  
26 type of questions and the document that had been seen, the  
27 Justice Department went to court and obtained a search warrant to  
28 search the hotel that these people were occupying. They  
29 discovered the document. There were in fact two documents, two

1 scripts that had been written that were detailing things that not  
2 only were not true, but that were being put in anticipation of  
3 what the final documentary would show; for example, speaking in  
4 the present tense like, "Mr Taylor is sitting in his vehicle. He  
11:22:08 5 is listening to Puff Daddy music," I mean, this is, you know,  
6 totally, totally wrong. The camera was seized, those documents  
7 were seized, and they were charged with espionage before a court,  
8 they received a lawyer, and this is what happened.

9 Q. Now, what was the outcome of that court proceedings?

11:22:57 10 A. They were placed in custody, went to court. But while the  
11 proceedings were going on, the pressure mounted. I received  
12 calls from so many leaders. President Mandela called me at least  
13 twice and asked me to release them. And I promised him that we  
14 would see what we could do, but the Justice Department was  
11:23:27 15 looking at it and that he should give me a day or two, I will get  
16 back to him and see where these things were in the courts.

17 By this time, if I am not mistaken, we sent him copies of  
18 the two documents that were in question. After he saw the  
19 documents, he called me back and he said, "Listen, my brother, we  
11:23:53 20 understand these kinds of things, but I would advise you to find  
21 a means and let them go and bring an end to all of this."

22 And so we found a way out by talking to the owners of  
23 Channel 4 that wrote a letter admitting and apologising that in  
24 fact what had happened was wrong and there was reason for anyone  
11:24:23 25 to make some of the conclusions that we had made. And based on  
26 that apology, the Justice Department dropped the charges and they  
27 were able to leave the country.

28 Now, I was shocked to hear that they were manhandled, but  
29 throughout this entire episode they were in the presence of

1 lawyers. They had - like I have said before, the best law firm  
2 in Liberia represented them because they were - there was a  
3 British - a couple of British guys and other people. So they  
4 were well represented, even by diplomatic missions in Liberia.

11:25:02 5 So this is what happened.

6 Q. And what was the nature of the programme they were supposed  
7 to be making in Liberia?

8 A. They were doing a documentary on diamonds and arms in 2000,  
9 at the heart of this - and in fact, the script was stating that

11:25:27 10 there were these diamonds moving and, you know - it was almost  
11 like a movie these people were trying to put together. But it  
12 was being done in a way that it appeared that there was something  
13 factual taking place every step of the way. It was supposed to  
14 be a documentary they were putting together.

11:25:49 15 Q. And did you knowingly allow those filmmakers to be abused,  
16 Mr Taylor?

17 A. No. No. No.

18 Q. Right, Mr Taylor. In the time available I would like to  
19 look at another document, please. Could we have a look behind

11:26:40 20 divider 8, please. Now, this is Prosecution exhibit 33B. Do you  
21 recall being asked questions about this, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. We see that it's an interview with you in Le Monde, yes?

24 A. Yes.

11:27:38 25 Q. The French newspaper?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And it's headed, we see: "Charles Taylor, former warlord  
28 and President of Liberia, 'British officials are after Sierra  
29 Leone's diamonds'", yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And we see "Comments noted by Jean-Baptiste Naudet and  
3 Stephen Smith", yes?

4 A. Yes.

11:28:12 5 Q. Now, first of all, do you recall this interview, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Where was it conducted?

8 A. In Paris.

9 Q. What were you doing in Paris at the time?

11:28:26 10 A. I was visiting. It may have been the France Afrique summit  
11 in Paris.

12 Q. Now, Stephen Smith, where do you know him - did you know  
13 him before, prior to this interview?

14 A. Yes.

11:28:47 15 Q. From where?

16 A. Liberia.

17 Q. How?

18 A. This was the individual that we had been asked by  
19 Ivory Coast, our friends at the CIA in Ivory Coast at the offices  
11:29:07 20 there that we had been asked to pick him up and get him across  
21 the border as he was in danger.

22 Q. In danger of what?

23 A. Of losing his life after he crossed the line from our side  
24 into the INPFL line near Monrovia. We were asked to arrest him  
11:29:29 25 and get him out of our area.

26 Q. And did you?

27 A. Yes, we did.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you have to continue from  
29 here after the break because our time is up. The tape is over.

1 We shall resume at 12 o'clock.

2 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

3 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:02:07 5 Q. We were looking at an article from Le Monde when we broke.  
6 It's behind divider 8, Mr Taylor.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. The article is dated 15 November 2000.

9 "Charles Taylor is back in Paris, the only western capital  
12:02:44 10 where, two years ago, he was given an official welcome.  
11 Boycotted by the United States and Great Britain, in the course  
12 of this private stay he will be received by neither the President  
13 nor the Prime Minister. But he is counting on France to end his  
14 isolation. Accused of trafficking Sierra Leone's 'blood  
12:03:14 15 diamonds', the ex-warlord Head of State counterattacks.

16 'What do you think of the peace efforts in Sierra Leone?  
17 Sometimes it seems you are treated as if you were to restore  
18 peace, other times as if you were nothing more than diamond  
19 traffickers.'

12:03:34 20 'It's unfortunate that by trying to demonise President  
21 Taylor the war in Sierra Leone is reduced to a conflict which  
22 Liberia is trying to get something out of. Does the fact that  
23 young British soldiers go off to fight in the forests of Sierra  
24 Leone and are doing so to stop the Sierra Leoneans from killing  
12:03:57 25 one another make any sense? No, it doesn't hold up. Yes, I  
26 think the war in Sierra Leone is a war for diamonds. But not  
27 because Liberia wants those diamonds. We already have diamonds.  
28 This war is taking place because the British want those diamonds.  
29 There are British officials who, via limited public companies

1 Located in Vancouver (Canada) own those (diamond) mines (in  
2 Sierra Leone). That's what British soldiers are over there for.  
3 Not because of us. Accusing us of diamond trafficking is like  
4 accusing Saudi Arabia of smuggling petroleum. Liberia has been  
12:04:48 5 exporting diamonds for 150 years now. Suddenly the world is at  
6 war to make for peace in Sierra Leone. But can't it make for  
7 that peace without demonising little Liberia?' "

8 Pause there. Mr Taylor, where you say, "The British want  
9 those diamonds. There are British officials who, via public  
12:05:22 10 companies located in Vancouver, own those diamond mines in Sierra  
11 Leone", where do you get that from?

12 A. These were published reports that all the companies that  
13 were doing business in Sierra Leone were all British  
14 foreign-owned companies.

12:05:41 15 Q. So what do you say was the motivation for the Blair  
16 government to send British troops into Sierra Leone?

17 A. To protect British interests. Simple as that. No other  
18 reason. To protect British interests.

19 Q. But the British government said, Mr Taylor, that they were  
12:06:09 20 there for humanitarian reasons?

21 A. It's the same reason why they were in Iraq and Kuwait.  
22 Look, it's about interests. Diplomacy out there, it's not about  
23 - what, some young British boy's going to be going to fight in  
24 some jungle in Sierra Leone because of humanitarian? They can  
12:06:31 25 pay somebody else to do it. It's about interests, simple.

26 Whether they say so or not, that's what it's always been.

27 Q. "'The United States is very hostile towards you. Why?'

28 'The United States accuses me of being involved in diamond  
29 trafficking. The United Nations Security Council set up a board

1 of inquiry. But the US has started accusing Liberia even prior  
2 to the slightest finding. That's unfair. We are willing to  
3 cooperate fully in any investigation whatsoever of the Security  
4 Council. Because we know that these accusations are lies.

12:07:16 5 Liberia has never been involved in any organised diamond  
6 trafficking. I am now looking at the results of the US  
7 elections. Now the US knows that mistakes can happen. Now they  
8 can see what third-world countries can have to go through! "

9 What are you talking about there in the last couple of  
12:07:41 10 sentences?

11 A. I'm talking about the chad - the chad votes being counted  
12 in Florida, the contest between George Bush and Al Gore with the  
13 chad and count this - all this nonsense that was going on; that,  
14 you know, they too make mistakes. That's the point I'm trying to  
12:08:05 15 make.

16 Q. Mr Taylor, before we go any further, do you recall giving  
17 this interview?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. And do you recall making these statements?

12:08:11 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. "'What role can France and the European Union play?

22 'France has a constructive role, experience with African  
23 problems. France is fair with Liberia, even if we are not a  
24 French-speaking country. We want to launch a full investigation  
12:08:35 25 into the accusations against Liberia. We are accused of  
26 trafficking arms and diamonds. We want an investigation because  
27 it's the only way to be cleared of those accusations. Europe can  
28 help investigate. They may cut off aid. They may not like  
29 Charles Taylor. But there are Liberians who are dying, who need

1 aid. The British managed to halt European aid to Liberia but I  
2 am a Christian, so God sent floods to Great Britain. Those  
3 floods which will cost a billion dollars or two. God punished  
4 Great Britain!'

12:09:21 5 'Do you think the Revolutionary United Front must be part  
6 of the peace process in Sierra Leone?'

7 'Only the belligerents can resolve conflicts. There is no  
8 way peace can be made in Sierra Leone while excluding a party  
9 from the peace process. As the African saying goes, "You can't  
12:09:47 10 catch anything with one finger, you need two fingers." The RUF  
11 committed terrible atrocities. People will have to answer for  
12 that. But the same people who are the cause of the problem have  
13 to be part of the solution. Great Britain has problems with the  
14 IRA. But the Irish Republican Army participates in the peace  
12:10:16 15 process. To the point that the pro and anti UK terrorists who  
16 were in Maze Prison were let out. That doesn't make them angels.  
17 The RUF people aren't angels either. But it's time to put an end  
18 to the crisis in West Africa. So can we apply some of your  
19 solutions? Nobody calls Yasser Arafat a terrorist any more. So  
12:10:44 20 what do we Africans have to do? Never forget? Never end our  
21 crises?'"

22 Now, Mr Taylor, where you say there, "The RUF committed  
23 terrible atrocities", do you believe that?

24 A. Yes, the RUF did some things. Yes, they committed  
12:11:06 25 atrocities that were reported out of Sierra Leone that we had  
26 never heard of in Liberia, never saw them in Liberia, and so yes.

27 Q. And where you say, "People will have to answer for that",  
28 what did you mean?

29 A. I mean that some system - I had seen systems one way or the

1 other - I looked at the South African system. I meant that some  
2 mechanism had to be put together where people will answer in  
3 whatever way. We Africans have ways of dealing with some of  
4 these problems, and some of them are being applied and were  
12:11:49 5 applied at the time. I'm looking at a system that would be set  
6 up for some kind of accountability.

7 Q. Did you have in mind a war crimes tribunal?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Why not?

12:12:01 10 A. Beg your pardon?

11 Q. Why not?

12 A. Because there have been conflicts all over the world, and  
13 in fact, the crimes in question here are crimes that are

14 punishable under the laws in most courts. And so most of these  
12:12:22 15 countries do not send those to a special tribunal; they deal with  
16 them locally under the existing criminal codes. And so for  
17 Liberia - excuse me, for Sierra Leone, I was looking at a process  
18 where - Foday Sankoh had been put on trial before. Years before  
19 Foday Sankoh there were coup d'etats in Sierra Leone. People had  
12:12:50 20 been tried in Sierra Leone. People had been, unfortunately,  
21 executed. So I'm looking at a procedure - I was looking at a  
22 procedure where people would be held accountable based on the  
23 internal criminal codes.

24 Q. "'Does Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Sierra Leone  
12:13:12 25 rebellion, have any future other than a trial?'

26 'That is for the Sierra Leoneans to decide. I am not  
27 opposed to Foday Sankoh being tried but he must not be the only  
28 one held responsible, the only one to have breached the Lome  
29 Peace Accord. And what's more, Africa is not yet in the third

1 world. Wanting to apply first-world criteria will destroy  
2 everything. In Africa you always have coup d'etats. There  
3 haven't been any in the west for half a century. In Africa there  
4 are ethnic, tribal problems. Let's hang Foday Sankoh. And the  
12:13:58 5 north of Sierra Leone will want to avenge him. We cannot go on  
6 applying first-world remedies to third or fourth world  
7 problems.' "

8 What do you mean by that, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Well, I think they got something wrong here. There's a  
12:14:16 10 misprint or something when he says that Africa is not yet in the  
11 third world, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying Africa is  
12 the third, not yet in, they are the third world. When I talk  
13 here about the ethnic and tribal problems?

14 Q. Where you're saying here, "We cannot go on applying  
12:14:39 15 first-world remedies to third or fourth world problems."

16 A. Yes. What I'm saying here is realistic. Look, we cannot  
17 set the bar at the same level on certain issues as it is being  
18 set in the United States or Western Europe. These civilisations  
19 are old, they are far developed, they have had hundreds of years  
12:15:13 20 of trial and error. It's like saying that you expect Liberia to  
21 launch a spacecraft. It's not going to happen. So African  
22 countries are still going through the developmental stage. So a  
23 lot of things that are acceptable in first world countries, I  
24 mean by first world I'm talking about the west, Europe and the  
12:15:41 25 United States, if those are applied straight across the board to  
26 Africa, that would - you will never be able to get what you call  
27 real justice.

28 And I really want to be blunt in this Court. I listened to  
29 some of the questions coming from the Prosecution. That's an

1 American prosecutor. If Mr Bangura was asking certain questions,  
2 there would be a little twist to it and a different understanding  
3 of the African issues. When you apply your western ideas to  
4 Africa, and I'm not talking about impunity, it just doesn't fit.

12:16:18 5 So there are so many occasions where African solutions will have  
6 to be applied to some of our African problems because the  
7 context - everything about it is different. This is what I'm  
8 talking about here. Everything is different.

9 Q. What are you saying, Mr Taylor? Are you advocating that  
12:16:37 10 somehow Africa should be exempt from international norms like  
11 human rights?

12 A. Not at all. Not at all. No, no, I'm not suggesting that.  
13 I will give you an example. Liberia was carried before the  
14 International Labour Organisation for child labour, and what was  
12:17:04 15 the case? We still in Africa, when mothers and fathers are going  
16 to the farm, our children go with us to the farm. When we're  
17 coming, they would bring little firewood on their head, a little  
18 bunch of firewood. We were taken there, that children were  
19 coming from the farm and carrying wood on their heads. It was  
12:17:24 20 investigated and somebody said, "Listen, just throw this thing  
21 out. It doesn't make any sense." You can't find that in Europe,  
22 okay.

23 And I tell you, there are some - so this kind of  
24 situation - we're not talking about being exempted, but people  
12:17:37 25 have to begin to give Africans an opportunity to grow to some of  
26 their standards. Okay. There are some standards that are  
27 acceptable in the west, even until now it's rejected in Africa.

28 I will give you another example. This gay and lesbian  
29 business in the United States as a human right in parts of

1 Europe, some places in Africa, some of us don't accept the way it  
2 is interpreted. So there are these levels that people are still  
3 growing and maturing. I have nothing against gays and lesbians,  
4 but I don't think that some of the ideas as portrayed in the west  
12:18:14 5 can and should be pushed upon us in Africa in that way until we  
6 gradually work to it. So this is what - I'm just giving a brief  
7 thesis here of how some of us still think about these issues.  
8 It's not about impunity or being exempted, no.

9 Q. "'What solutions do you see to the conflict with Guinea?'

12:18:36 10 'Oddly, last year we were the victims of a first attack  
11 coming from Guinea. We protested. There was a second attack on  
12 us. In the course of a meeting the President of Guinea Lansana  
13 Conte promised to do his utmost to prevent attacks of that kind.  
14 But to our great surprise, three months later there was a third,  
12:19:00 15 very serious and devastating attack. I said to President Lansana  
16 Conte, "Can you do something to show me you are making an honest  
17 effort (to stop these attacks)?" That wasn't done. I asked for  
18 a face-to-face meeting with him. President (of Nigeria) Obasanjo  
19 agreed to host such a meeting.

12:19:28 20 These incursions from Guinea into Liberia occur in a forest  
21 area. It is very hard to ascertain if and when we cross the  
22 border with Guinea. Were we to do so there would be plenty of  
23 justification if a base in the forest somewhere had been used  
24 against Liberia. We have the right to destroy such bases.

12:19:51 25 Liberia is not in a position to go to war. The United Nations  
26 maintains its arms embargo on us. We don't want this war. But  
27 if we are forced to, of course we will have to fight. And we'll  
28 come up with the means. We have the right to defend ourselves.  
29 Because Liberia is not the aggressor.'"

1 Now, Mr Taylor, when you were giving this interview, were  
2 you aware that it might be published?

3 A. Oh, yes, yes.

12:20:36

4 Q. Now, let us remind ourselves, this is dated 15 November  
5 2000, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And do you recall that yesterday we spent a little time  
8 going through some banking documentation?

9 A. Yes.

12:20:46

10 Q. And you told us during the course of that that during the  
11 year 2000, 2001 you had operated an account for the clandestine  
12 purchase of arms, yes?

13 A. Yes.

12:21:11

14 Q. Now, when here in this paragraph you're saying, "And we'll  
15 come up with the means. We have the right to defend ourselves,"  
16 what were you talking about?

12:21:34

17 A. I'm talking strictly about our right under chapter - under  
18 Article 51. And I was really hinting here that, yes, we know  
19 that there's an embargo, but we're going to make all the efforts  
20 to defend ourselves. Again, in diplomatic ways in dealing with  
21 some of these things you are hinting to everyone that, "Listen,  
22 we're not just going to sit there and be overrun because, you  
23 know, we - but we will find the means at all costs."

24 Q. So let us leave that document now then, Mr Taylor, yes.

12:22:39

25 Madam President, can I just have a second just to check my notes  
26 on something?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I should really have dealt with this topic

1 when we were dealing with the spelling of your name on that  
2 letter from Essa Seesay this morning. But just to refer - just  
3 to return briefly to this topic of Dah Kpannah, what does that  
4 title mean?

12:23:36 5 A. The Dah Kpannah?

6 Q. Uh-huh.

7 A. The short way to put it is first amongst the first. First  
8 of first. First among the first.

9 Q. Okay. Well, let's break it down. Dah, the D-A-H, means  
12:24:13 10 what?

11 A. The first. The biggest. The highest.

12 Q. And Kpannah?

13 A. Kpannah is again the first name traditionally. It's like  
14 in some tribal languages group in Africa you may have some people  
12:24:37 15 on certain days of the week you are given a certain name, but the  
16 first in line is called Kpannah, no matter where it is. Now, the  
17 Dah, which means first, it means amongst the Kpannahs, this Dah  
18 is the first amongst all of them.

19 Q. Right. Where does the title originate from?

12:25:00 20 A. It originates from the traditional societies of Liberia.

21 Q. Who determines the individual who bears that title?

22 A. The elders, the chiefs and the Zos, these three groups make  
23 that determination.

24 Q. How do they make that determination?

12:25:37 25 A. They meet. They meet in what we call - I will just put it  
26 generally. They meet in certain forest areas. They meet and  
27 there's a procedure that I can't explain here that you go through  
28 to determine who to give that to, because whoever receives that  
29 title is in our tradition the owner of the land. So in giving

1 that title, you have to be very careful in giving that title  
2 because whoever holds that title holds what we call, quote  
3 unquote, the land, holds the republic. Because for our  
4 traditional people, our wealth is not - our protection is our  
12:26:35 5 land. That's how we look at it in Africa - I don't want to say  
6 generally. I can't speak for other countries. Liberia. The  
7 land - the ownership of the land is the real power.  
8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, why am I asking you about this topic?  
9 A. Why are you asking me?  
12:27:01 10 Q. Why am I asking you about this?  
11 A. Oh, boy, I would assume because the Prosecution raised the  
12 issue that I am no longer Dah Kpannah and that I misled the  
13 Court as to the title and that I still hold it. I would suppose.  
14 Q. Did you seize that title?  
12:27:24 15 A. No, I did not. No.  
16 Q. Is it a title that can be seized?  
17 A. No. You cannot seize that title.  
18 Q. Is it a title that you can just wake up one morning and  
19 decide "because I'm President of Liberia, I want to be Dah  
12:27:44 20 Kpannah"?

21 A. No, no, no, no. You cannot. In fact, you can be President  
22 of Liberia and not Dah Kpannah.

23 Q. Now, help us. If you're unable to explain this to us,  
24 Mr Taylor, then say so, but I ask in light of the suggestion  
12:28:06 25 made. How is that decision made in the forest? Can you tell us  
26 about it, or is it something which has to be kept secret?

27 A. Generally I can explain that. I won't give - we have what  
28 we called elders in amongst the some 12, 13 of our tribes that we  
29 call the Mende Mea in Liberia that constitute about 80 per cent

1 of the population. The elder - to become an elder you must be at  
2 least 65 up to become an elder and you would have performed  
3 certain tasks within the community and you are well known. The  
4 chiefs - in Liberia we have two - we have three classifications  
12:29:02 5 of chiefs in Liberia. We have the paramount chief, we have the  
6 clan chief and --

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, what was that age you stated  
8 again?

9 THE WITNESS: About 65 or above, okay, to become an elder.

12:29:30 10 Then the classification of chiefs: We have the paramount chief;  
11 we have the clan chief; and we have the town chief; and in some  
12 areas we even have what we call the quarter - the quarter chief.  
13 That age is not important, but in Liberia it comes from the  
14 family line. You cannot just automatically be a chief. It comes  
12:29:53 15 down almost like a kingship. It comes down.

16 The Zos are the traditional healers that - both men and  
17 women that are endowed with certain gifts that they use herbs to  
18 treat most of - you can almost think about any sickness, they -  
19 you know, they can treat you, and these are the groups of people.  
12:30:24 20 And those people are given special respect. Midwife - you know,  
21 in the interior before you get to hospital, our people still  
22 preside - the women preside over delivery of babies and different  
23 things. There is a custom to that.

24 Now, all of these three groups have something like a tribal  
12:30:45 25 organisation, and they are the ones that have to get together and  
26 decide, and no one is pushing them because these are large  
27 groups - and decide on who to give the land to to become the Dah  
28 Kpannah.

29 Q. Okay. Now --

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Could I ask a question curiously. Is the  
2 Dah Kpannah chosen amongst the elders, or amongst anybody?

3           THE WITNESS: He is chosen from amongst anybody, not just  
4 the elders. From anybody.

12:31:27 5           MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, Chief Jallah Lone, what was his role within  
7 that hierarchy you've just described?

8 A. Chief Jallah Lone is my deputy, he is Dah Kollie,  
9 K-O-L-L-I-E. He is Dah Kollie; I am Dah Kpannah. He is my  
12:31:53 10 deputy, Dah Kollie.

11 Q. And when was he appointed to that position?

12 A. He was appointed to that position at the time that I was  
13 made Dah Kpannah.

14 Q. And what's his role as Dah Kollie?

12:32:17 15 A. He is my deputy still. He presides over all of the chiefs,  
16 the elders and the Zos of the Republic of Liberia. He is the  
17 most senior and will act only upon receiving some authorisation  
18 to act in dealing with the present situation where - in Liberia  
19 we have two periods - and those names have come out in this Court  
12:32:58 20 before - the period of the Poro society and the period of the  
21 Sande society; the Poro being the men and the Sande being the  
22 women. They operate at different times for their traditional  
23 training. And a decision has to be taken, because the two cannot  
24 operate at the same time, when one will start and end and when  
12:33:26 25 the other will begin. So Dah Kollie on the ground is the only  
26 one that can make that final determination.

27 Q. And do you have any idea how old Chief Jallah Lone is?

28 A. Jallah Lone is about - he's about 100, maybe 101, 102. But  
29 he's a little over 100.

1 Q. Did you receive that title on the occasion you married  
2 Jewel Howard-Taylor, Mr Taylor?

3 A. No, I received it before then, but I announced it at the  
4 period. But it was before.

12:34:23 5 Q. Now let us move on and deal with another topic.

6 A. Excuse me. You know, the President of the Court asked a  
7 question and I know why the President - as to whether the Dah  
8 Kpannah could be selected from amongst the elders or from amongst  
9 anybody. I answered it, but there's some part left and I don't  
10 know if the President wanted more on it, but I will leave it at  
11 that.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: For me the answer was good enough.

13 THE WITNESS: Okay.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I want to move on to another topic, but I'd  
12:35:20 15 be grateful for some assistance here from Madam Court Manager.

16 If we look behind divider 10 in our bundle, there is a newspaper  
17 article which was referred to during the course of Mr Taylor's  
18 cross-examination and bears the appellation MFI-323.

19 Unfortunately, the copy we had, if everyone recalls, we had  
12:35:44 20 difficulty reading when initially presented to the witness.

21 That's behind divider 10. Now I wonder if the original is  
22 available? So that everyone can benefit from this, I wonder if  
23 it could be put up on the screen:

24 Q. Now, the particular article to which your attention was  
12:36:56 25 directed, Mr Taylor, was the one in the bottom right-hand corner,  
26 yes? Do you recall this?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And we see there's a picture there of your then wife  
29 Mrs Agnes Taylor, yes?

1 A. Yes, that's --

2 Q. And under the heading "My husband must head government", do  
3 you see?

4 A. Yes.

12:37:25 5 Q. And this is taken from The Inquirer newspaper, 19 March  
6 1991, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And if we go to the top of the page, the very top of the  
9 page, please, we see Volume 1, Number 19, The Inquirer, Tuesday,

12:37:51 10 March 19, 1991, Monrovia, Liberia. Now help us with this,  
11 Mr Taylor, in March of 1991 where were you?

12 A. March of 1991 I was in, oh, I would say, by this time  
13 either Buchanan or Harbel.

14 Q. Were you in Monrovia?

12:38:18 15 A. No, no. This is at the very height of the war. No, no.  
16 Not at all.

17 Q. Did, at that time, Monrovia-based journalists have access  
18 to areas controlled by the NPFL?

19 A. Oh, no. You couldn't cross the line except there was a  
12:38:42 20 special trip arranged by ECOMOG. But no Monrovia-based  
21 journalist could cross the line. Never.

22 Q. Now, these Monrovia-based newspapers, did they circulate  
23 also in NPFL-held areas?

24 A. No, they could not cross. There was a buffer zone. They  
12:39:07 25 could not cross, no.

26 Q. So where were these newspapers available?

27 A. Only in Monrovia. Only in Monrovia.

28 Q. Now, we see that - let's go back to the bottom of the page,  
29 please, Madam Court Manager. Reference is made at the end of the

1 article to page 3, yes? Can we go to page 3 now, please, to the  
2 continuation of the article, which should have in the top  
3 right-hand corner "Sound thinking".

4 A. Yes.

12:39:51 5 Q. No, I'm sorry, I've got the wrong one. It's to the right  
6 of that. "My husband must head government", yes? And it reads  
7 as follows:

8 "Mrs Agnes Taylor, wife of Charles Taylor, leader of the  
9 National Patriotic Front of Liberia, said anyone who heads the  
10 government will have a serious problem with young combatants of  
11 the NPFL.

12 She said this problem will develop because the young  
13 fighters do not listen to anyone else except to her and her  
14 husband.

12:40:27 15 As a result of this, Mrs Taylor said that the government  
16 must be headed by Agnes and Taylor. She was speaking in an  
17 interview with the BBC recently."

18 Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall your then wife giving such an  
19 interview?

12:40:51 20 A. No. To the BBC? No.

21 Q. Was there a problem containing young combatants of the  
22 NPFL?

23 A. No, I don't - there was no problem containing combatants -  
24 young combatants of the NPFL.

12:41:13 25 Q. And was it the case that, in effect, you were demanding to  
26 be made President of the country and would not allow anyone else  
27 to become President of Liberia?

28 A. That was not the case. We had made the point - and as I'm  
29 looking at the date this paper is published, we are beginning

1 discussions outside of Liberia and we are saying - and we made  
2 the point that any transitional government should be headed by  
3 the NPFL because we had 95 per cent of the country. That was our  
4 position.

12:42:00 5 Q. Now, by the time you became President in 1997, Mr Taylor,  
6 where was Agnes?

7 A. By then she was - I think she was in London at the time.

8 Q. Were you still married?

9 A. No.

12:42:33 10 Q. Yes, could we put that away, please. Now I want to ask you  
11 about another matter, Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor, do you recall being  
12 asked a number of questions about the Lome Peace Agreement?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, first of all, why did you become involved in the  
12:43:10 15 negotiations which led to that agreement?

16 A. Because of my unique role on the Committee of Five.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, did you become involved in the discussions which  
18 led to Lome in order to ensure that your protege organisation,  
19 the RUF, received the lion's share of the gains of that  
12:43:44 20 agreement? Do you follow?

21 A. I follow. That's total nonsense. No.

22 Q. Do you recall being taken through the details of that  
23 agreement at length?

24 A. Yes, I do.

12:43:53 25 Q. Do you recall it being suggested that the RUF benefitted  
26 more than any other party from that agreement?

27 A. I remember the suggestion.

28 Q. Is that proposition correct, Mr Taylor?

29 A. It is incorrect.

1 Q. Mr Taylor, who gained from the Lome Peace Agreement?

2 A. The people of Sierra Leone.

3 Q. Was it just the RUF who gained?

4 A. No.

12:44:35 5 Q. Was the Government of Sierra Leone represented at the  
6 discussions in Lome?

7 A. Oh, yes.

8 Q. Who by?

9 A. I don't remember, but at one point Kabbah was there. Not  
12:44:52 10 just represented. Don't let's forget, the negotiations in Lome  
11 were between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, so they  
12 were the negotiators.

13 Q. Now, you sent, as President of Liberia, a delegation to  
14 Lome, did you not?

12:45:22 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Why?

17 A. Because, again, of the unique role that we played in  
18 getting the ceasefire. And which ceasefire am I talking about?  
19 I'm talking about the January 1999 ceasefire. Helping and being  
12:45:47 20 a part of getting all of the parties to Lome through Liberia in  
21 working with the United Nations as of April 1999. All of these  
22 put us in the full front as mediators to making sure that it was  
23 a success. And, in fact, the Committee of Five was primarily  
24 responsible for being mediators during those talks, along with  
12:46:20 25 the United Nations, the African Union and other diplomatic  
26 representatives.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just help us, please, with the composition  
28 of the delegation you sent to Lome. Who led it?

29 A. The team was led by former Liberian Foreign Minister

1 D Musul eng-Cooper.

2 Q. What were her qualifications, apart from being an  
3 ambassador, for that role - a former ambassador?

4 A. You mean a former Foreign Minister.

12:47:02 5 Q. Foreign Minister, sorry.

6 A. Yes. Well, former Foreign Minister Cooper had a master's  
7 degree from - I think it's the University of San Francisco. She  
8 did her masters in San Francisco in I think public

9 administration. She had come and she was working as I think  
12:47:35 10 vice-chancellor, if I'm not mistaken, of Cuttington University  
11 College. She was in education for so many years before being  
12 appointed as Foreign Minister of Liberia.

13 Q. Now, prior to her appointment as head of the Liberian  
14 delegation, had she had any role to play in either Sierra Leone  
12:48:02 15 or with the RUF?

16 A. None. None whatsoever, no. None.

17 Q. Did she have a history of relationship with the RUF?

18 A. No, not that I know of. No.

19 Q. Who else was in the delegation, Mr Taylor?

12:48:20 20 A. On that delegation, I sent one of our Special Forces. Joe  
21 Tuah was one the delegation.

22 Q. Why?

23 A. For the military aspect, that is, military - he is a career  
24 - this Special Forces is a career soldier with some 30 years  
12:48:42 25 experience, that if military issues had come up, he could advise  
26 the Foreign Minister on it because she knew nothing about the  
27 military, so he was there for that purpose.

28 Q. Now, Joe Tuah, again, did he have a prior relationship with  
29 the RUF?

1 A. No, not that I know of. He knew Foday Sankoh because he  
2 was trained in Libya, so to that extent he knew Foday Sankoh, but  
3 I don't - I have no information as to his involvement with the  
4 RUF beyond that.

12:49:19 5 Q. Who else went on that delegation from Liberia?

6 A. There were two or three others. I can't remember who they  
7 were.

8 Q. Help us. Was there anyone on that delegation who had legal  
9 qualifications?

12:49:38 10 A. No, there was no one with legal qualification on that  
11 delegation.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in Lome who was actually responsible for  
13 the physical act of writing the agreement, drafting the  
14 agreement? Who was responsible for that?

12:50:01 15 A. The executive secretariat of ECOWAS. The executive  
16 secretariat. That is, the executive secretary was present and  
17 the staff of ECOWAS was responsible for the drafting, because at  
18 the time the chairman of ECOWAS now is President Gnassingbe  
19 Eyadema, so the entire organisation of ECOWAS is on the ground as  
12:50:36 20 far as the secretariat in dealing with this issue. So like the  
21 previous question you asked about lawyers, there were ECOWAS  
22 lawyers there, there were ECOWAS experts there to make sure that  
23 things went on smooth.

24 Q. Right. Now, that expertise from ECOWAS, Mr Taylor, did it  
12:50:57 25 include people who were experienced statutory draftsmen and  
26 women?

27 A. Yes, yes. There is the secretariat. I don't know and I  
28 can't say to this Court the names of the personnel that were  
29 there. I'm just saying that they had the personnel there, yes.

1 Q. So just help us with the process, Mr Taylor, and I'm asking  
2 you this because it's suggested you sent a delegation there in  
3 order to secure certain benefits for the RUF, that's why they  
4 went, and in the end the RUF ended up benefitting, all right?

12:51:39 5 A. Yes, I understand.

6 Q. That's the suggestion made to you which we're addressing  
7 now. So what I want you to do for us is just to just explain to  
8 us in simple terms, who have never been involved in any kind of  
9 negotiations like this, how it happens. How does the

12:51:57 10 negotiations between the two parties actually end up on paper?

11 Do you follow me?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you tell us?

14 A. Well, the first thing that we had in Lome, we had an

12:52:11 15 agreement and I'm referring to the 1996 Abidjan Accord that had  
16 been negotiated between the Government of Sierra Leone and the  
17 RUF. That agreement was on the table as the starting point.

18 That's what they dealt with. The process would be normally,  
19 unless people object, it would be a roundtable - in this case it

12:52:41 20 was not - where the parties, the two parties themselves will sit  
21 and first they will come up with positions. Each side will bring

22 all sorts of positions to the table. And then you have experts  
23 there and mediators there that begin to talk to them to find out  
24 what's the - you know, the red line issues and what are the - by

12:53:12 25 red line issues I mean those issues that, no matter what comes,

26 we will not negotiate beyond this point. And you begin to work  
27 it. It's a grooving process. You begin to work, try to get

28 people to reduce demands, try to dilute demands. It's this type  
29 of process, but only the two parties are going through this with

1 the help of other people. They go in together, they talk. When  
2 they get stuck - stuck, that's S-T-U-C-K - stuck in these  
3 negotiations, people come in and try to aid. This is the process  
4 that goes on.

12:53:48 5 Q. But the point I would like you to assist us with,  
6 Mr Taylor, is that's all well and good, they're in the room  
7 discussing with each other, on occasions hitting the buffers.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Assistance, as you've described, being brought in, right?  
12:54:08 10 But, one, how does that discussion get on to paper in terms of a  
11 written agreement? What happens?

12 A. Okay. As the points are decided they are noted, and I'm  
13 saying all agreements have framework. You have a framework.

14 There are certain basic languages - a language that you find  
12:54:34 15 almost in every agreement. So there's a basic framework. The  
16 only part are the negotiating points. So there are basic styles  
17 for an agreement. "Wherefore this", and all, that's normal. And  
18 where it really - after points have been agreed, the negotiators  
19 take that and lay it aside, and move to the next point. Agreed,  
12:54:55 20 and move it. So by the end of the day the basic language is  
21 constructed, but the most important points will be the agreed  
22 points. That's the way it works.

23 Q. Now, help us. That delegation you sent to Lome, were any  
24 of them actually involved in the physical process of writing the  
12:55:14 25 Lome Agreement?

26 A. Not at all. They did not constitute a part of the ECOWAS  
27 secretariat. That was done by the ECOWAS secretariat. My  
28 delegation did what all of the other mediating delegations did.  
29 And what was that? They sat on the fringes of the room.

1 Liberia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, La Cote d'Ivoire; all of  
2 them had delegations sitting on the fringes of the room only  
3 waiting to see how they could help. The African Union had its  
4 own people. The United States had people in the room. But all  
12:55:54 5 you do is sit on the fringes and see how you can be of assistance  
6 in moving things forward. So my delegation did exactly what all  
7 of the other delegations did in that room.

8 Q. So the simple question I'm going to ask you then: Was  
9 Liberia the only country outside of Sierra Leone which sent a  
12:56:17 10 delegation akin to the delegation led by D Musuleng-Cooper to  
11 Lome?

12 A. No. All of the states of the Committee of Five had  
13 representatives there. All of them.

14 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. If all these other countries had  
12:56:38 15 delegations there, how was your delegation able to exercise the  
16 kind of control suggested by this Prosecution? How?

17 A. We didn't. That's why I say it was twisted logic. We  
18 didn't.

19 Q. How were you able to get the lion's share of the gains for  
12:57:01 20 the RUF as suggested, Mr Taylor? What magic did your delegation  
21 weave? Please tell us.

22 A. None. We did nothing outside of everybody else. None.

23 Q. Now, in terms of the agreement, the Lome Agreement, was the  
24 RUF the only faction involved in Sierra Leone which received -  
12:57:34 25 which benefitted from immunity?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Who else did?

28 A. The agreement, as far as I can still remember, stipulated  
29 immunity for all of the participants.

1 Q. So was that a benefit limited to the RUF, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Let's go on and deal with something else. Mr Taylor,  
4 during the Liberian civil war and the period leading up to

12:58:27 5 elections in Liberia in 1997, did your NPFL collaborate with any  
6 other faction in Liberia?

7 A. No.

8 Q. What was the nature of the relationship between the NPFL  
9 and ULIMO, for example?

12:58:53 10 A. ULIMO, which one, J, K?

11 Q. Well, let's take them in turns. ULIMO-K.

12 A. We tried to make peace really, just make peace with ULIMO,  
13 following our going to Monrovia in 1995 and tried to work to  
14 maintain that peace. That was the relationship.

12:59:27 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I've deliberately used the word  
16 "collaboration" because it was suggested to you that you and your  
17 NPFL collaborated with ULIMO. Did you?

18 A. No, we did not.

19 Q. Was there ever a stage when the NPFL collaborated with  
12:59:49 20 either ULIMO-K or ULIMO-J?

21 A. Well, the way the word's used, to collaborate, I would say  
22 - generally I can say yes, there was such a time.

23 Q. When was that?

24 A. I would say - I say at - that was in 1996 dealing with the  
13:00:28 25 advent of the attempted arrest of Roosevelt Johnson of ULIMO-J  
26 while we were on the Council of State. That, I would call some  
27 form of collaboration.

28 Q. Collaboration with whom?

29 A. Well, that's why I said "collaboration" is a little

1 technical. But with ULIMO-K, in trying to effect this arrest as  
2 ordered by the Council of State. ULIMO-K.

13:01:25 3 Q. Now, when you make that assertion, Mr Taylor, in practical  
4 terms what actually went on between the two organisations at that  
5 time?

6 A. Well, I'm not sure it was anything specific. There was an  
7 incident where a murder had been carried out and the courts had  
8 ordered the arrest of - in fact, first he had been summonsed to  
9 court, he had refused, and an arrest warrant was put out for him.  
13:02:02 10 And the Council of State, which was the government - the head of  
11 government at the time - the Head of State and government at the  
12 time concluded that the order of the Court should be carried out,  
13 and the only area in any government capable of carrying out a  
14 court order is the Executive branch of any government. Without  
13:02:22 15 the Executive branch, court orders would never be executed.

16 Q. So what was the extent of that? And I'm looking at the  
17 answer you gave earlier:

18 "I would say that was in 1996 dealing with the advent of  
19 the attempted arrest of Roosevelt Johnson of ULIMO-J while we  
13:02:46 20 were on the Council of State. That, I would call some form of  
21 collaboration."

22 Now did the NPFL and ULIMO-K act in a coordinated manner  
23 towards ULIMO-J?

24 A. Yes.

13:03:12 25 Q. For how long did that cooperation last?

26 A. The cooperation regarding the conflict with ULIMO, or that  
27 and including thereafter?

28 Q. That and including thereafter.

29 A. Oh, we continued until the factional groups were dissolved

1 in January or thereabouts of 1997.

2 Q. 1997?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. January?

13:03:49 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. So just so that we can get the time scale - and we need to  
7 go slowly here - the problem with Prince Johnson which triggered  
8 this cooperation --

9 A. No, you mean Roosevelt Johnson.

13:04:07 10 Q. Roosevelt Johnson. Sorry, my fault. My fault. When did  
11 that begin?

12 A. The problem with Roosevelt Johnson, 1996, that would - I  
13 would put it to around September, if I'm not wrong. September or  
14 thereabouts.

13:04:27 15 Q. And continued until when?

16 A. That lasted for about a month. Through October, I would  
17 say.

18 Q. Now, during that period, what was the nature of your  
19 relationship with the head of ULIMO-K?

13:04:51 20 A. Oh, we were on fairly good terms. We were, you know,  
21 buddies, friends. We were like friends. Colleagues, at least,  
22 let me - I prefer colleagues.

23 Q. Did you exchange between yourselves military intelligence  
24 from your individual organisations?

13:05:19 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And at that stage did ULIMO-K have control over any  
27 geographical area in Liberia?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And which area was that?

1 A. By this time ULIMO-K had full control of Lofa and parts of  
2 Gbarpolu Counties.

3 Q. Right. Now, we've visited maps in the past and looked at  
4 their area of control, and I don't intend to waste time by going  
13:06:11 5 through that again, Mr Taylor. But did their area of control  
6 effectively - was that coterminous with much of the border with  
7 Sierra Leone?

8 A. Definitely.

9 Q. When you were having these dealings with the leader of  
13:06:30 10 ULIMO-K at this time, did he mention to you any link between them  
11 and the RUF?

12 A. No, he didn't.

13 Q. Now, we're talking about the autumn - for you  
14 American-trained, the fall - of 1996 when this begins, yes?

13:07:04 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And we appreciate that November 1996 is also the timing of  
17 the Abidjan Accord, yes?

18 A. Just about --

19 Q. In Sierra Leone, yes?

13:07:15 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And thereafter sometime in '97, yes, Sankoh is arrested?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. You recall all of that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

13:07:33 25 Q. I'm asking you all of this, Mr Taylor, because of the  
26 suggestion put to you about collaboration with ULIMO-K. Do you  
27 follow me?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. Can we now look, please, in light of your answers, behind

1 divider 7. This is exhibit D-9, which we've visited in the past.

2 Have you got it?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you recall seeing this document before, Mr Taylor?

13:08:20 5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. And as we can see, it's a salute report prepared by Sam  
7 Bockarie dated 26 September 1999, yes?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. "Upon your departure", paragraph 3. Now, bearing in mind  
13:08:47 10 this is addressed to Sankoh, when was Sankoh's departure?

11 A. From records here, 1996. Early 1996 when he goes to Sierra  
12 Leone - Ivory Coast.

13 Q. "Upon your departure, I initiated contact with ULIMO, as  
14 per your instructions, in a bid to buy materials to repel the  
13:09:26 15 vicious attacks of the Kamajors at a time when there was a peace  
16 document in place and we were not expecting to fight."

17 Now, that peace document is when?

18 A. About November, or thereabouts, 1996.

19 Q. Okay. This is so we can understand the time frame in which  
13:09:56 20 the writer is speaking.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. "At first ULIMO arrested me, thinking that I had come to  
23 them to surrender. Later I was able to convince them to release  
24 me and we commenced a mutually beneficial relationship."

13:10:16 25 Now, Mr Taylor, you've told us, yes --

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. -- that in the autumn of 1996, yes --

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. -- you began this collaboration with --

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, you're on your feet.

2 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President. I think that's a  
3 misstatement of what this witness said. He talked about the  
4 arrest of Roosevelt Johnson in 1996. The evidence before this  
13:10:48 5 Court is very clear that he's talking about the early April  
6 arrest in 1996 that kicked off the fighting in Monrovia that  
7 lasted for some time. 1996 was not the fall in relation to  
8 Roosevelt Johnson. At least, not the evidence that this witness  
9 has put out in this Court.

13:11:08 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Mr Taylor, when did your collaboration, the term used in  
12 your cross-examination, with ULIMO-K begin?

13 A. It commenced, I would say, in about 1996 on the Council of  
14 State. That's when it commences.

13:11:39 15 Q. What time? What part of the year?

16 A. Well, that's, oh, about, I would say, the beginning of 1996  
17 we are on the Council of State. That's when we start  
18 collaborating.

19 Q. And for how long does it continue?

13:11:57 20 A. Up until the end of our period on the Council of State in  
21 about January of 1997, when all of the warring factions  
22 abolished, the relationship between ULIMO-K and the NPFL ceased.

23 Q. Just so that we're clear, Mr Taylor, then, yes, just give  
24 me again the start and the finish dates of this period of  
13:12:36 25 rapprochement between NPFL and ULIMO-K?

26 A. I would put the start to the coming into being of the  
27 Council of State, 1996, the beginning. And I would put to the  
28 end to 1997, January, when the warring factions are abolished.

29 Q. In the autumn of 1996 - that is the period from or about

1 September through to December 1996 - is that relationship  
2 continuing?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Yes?

13:13:18 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And this is with ULIMO-K, who controlled Lofa at the time?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Let us superimpose on that now what we can glean from this  
9 salute report. In or about, it would appear, the end of 1996,  
10 the writer of this report tells us that he established contact  
11 with ULIMO, yes? Yes, Mr Taylor?

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, before you respond.

13 Ms Hollis?

14 MS HOLLIS: Thank you. I apologise for interrupting, but  
13:14:18 15 again the Defence counsel is misstating what he himself has put  
16 on the record. The plain language is, "Upon your departure I  
17 initiated contact with ULIMO", and it has been established that  
18 Foday Sankoh departed in early 1996, not the end of 1996.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is correct. That is what at least  
13:14:38 20 the note that I have in the margin --

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm most grateful:

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let me start again and it's entirely my  
23 fault. So from the departure in early 1996, and I'm grateful to  
24 my learned friend, this contact is made with ULIMO, yes?

13:15:03 25 A. Could you ask that again so we can get it --

26 Q. From early in 1996, following the departure, we see from  
27 this report that contact is made with ULIMO, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And you've told us that from your arrival on the Council of

1 State, yes, you had this contact with the leader of ULIMO-K, yes?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. What's his name?

4 A. Alhaji GV Kromah.

13:15:36 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, question one: Did Mr Kromah inform you  
6 during this period of rapprochement between the two of you that  
7 this link with the RUF had been established?

8 A. No, he never, never told me, no.

9 Q. Secondly, in light of the suggestion that you were  
13:16:16 10 collaborating with ULIMO, help us, why did you, Charles Ghankay  
11 Taylor, leader of the NPFL and controller of the RUF, why did you  
12 not suggest this link up to the RUF? Do you follow me?

13 A. I follow you.

14 Q. Why didn't you do it?

13:16:50 15 A. Because I was not the leader of the RUF so I couldn't  
16 suggest any link up. Neither did I have any contact.

17 Q. Because it is being suggested that you are collaborating  
18 with ULIMO-K. We know from this salute report that collaboration  
19 is going on at the same time between ULIMO and the RUF. So help  
13:17:10 20 us, Mr Taylor, why did you not establish that link?

21 A. Because I was not in contact with the RUF and could not  
22 have suggested any links, and I do not know what anyone expected  
23 in speaking about collaboration that peace is on its way in  
24 Liberia and Alhaji Kromah and I are on the Council of State and  
13:17:38 25 he and I are supposed to be throwing blows, that would be silly.  
26 So even collaboration - and I keep saying it's a little funny  
27 word based on what the Prosecution put it to, but nobody expected  
28 for Taylor and Kromah on the Council of State forming a part of  
29 the collective presidency not to work together. So, I mean, it's

1 just ludicrous that it would be put that way by the Prosecution.  
2 I disagree with how they put it, but - but, counsel, the first  
3 paragraph that you read, "before leaving the ground in November  
4 of 1996", it may be important to help the Court because the  
13:18:28 5 Prosecution said something about this, records - in fact,  
6 documents before this Court show - in fact, not documents,  
7 evidence. Foday Sankoh leaves for La Cote d'Ivoire at the  
8 beginning of 1996, but we have evidence led before this Court  
9 that he returns to brief his men in November about the agreement,  
13:18:53 10 okay, before going back to La Cote d'Ivoire. So we don't need to  
11 get lost in the fact as to when he left. Yes, he left early  
12 1996, but there's evidence here that he returned. So this could  
13 be the reference of November 1996 that is being made here. Not  
14 to obscure the fact that in fact he had left, but he returned and  
13:19:14 15 left again.

16 Q. I'm not really interested in that.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. But the fact of the matter is, whether he left in April,  
19 returned in November, however one puts it, during the period this  
13:19:36 20 writer is talking about you were on the Council of State with  
21 Alhaji Kromah, were you not?

22 A. That is correct, I was.

23 Q. Throughout the relevant period. That's right, isn't it?

24 A. That is right.

13:19:49 25 Q. And throughout that relevant period, Alhaji Kromah did not  
26 alert you to the fact that this was what was going on on the  
27 ground. Is that right?

28 A. That is right.

29 Q. Yes. We can put that document away now, please. Right,

1 Mr Taylor, I want to deal with another topic. Mr Taylor, it was  
2 specifically suggested to you in cross-examination that you  
3 organised the Magburaka shipment. Do you recall that?

4 A. Yes, I do.

13:21:12 5 Q. Now you help us, from what you've heard in this Court, when  
6 did the Magburaka shipment take place?

7 A. From my recollection, based on what I heard here, late  
8 1997.

9 Q. In 1997, Mr Taylor, did you go to South Africa?

13:21:48 10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. When in 1997?

12 A. September, October or thereabouts.

13 Q. For how long?

14 A. I was in South Africa for no more than I would say close to  
13:22:09 15 two weeks, not more.

16 Q. What for?

17 A. I went there for a medical check-up and to visit with  
18 President Mandela.

19 Q. Who did you meet whilst you were down there?

13:22:29 20 A. I met President Mandela.

21 Q. Anybody else?

22 A. Yes. I was at a dinner invited by President Mandela that  
23 had - Naomi Campbell was at the dinner. I think Quincy Jones was  
24 there. What they call the lady? She was I think married or  
13:23:09 25 something to Woody Allen. I will think on her name. She's an  
26 actress too, was there. I don't - the name was called here.

27 Anyway, I will think about it and remind the Court. I can't  
28 recall her name right now. There were quite a few celebrities  
29 there. The cricket - I think it's cricket, a former player from

1 Pakistan was there. He used to be a cricket star I think. He  
2 was there. I don't remember his name. But there were quite a  
3 few other dignitaries and I was invited - I was the only other  
4 Head of State besides President Mandela that was there and I was  
13:24:02 5 invited by him to grace the occasion.

6 Q. Okay. Now, Mr Taylor, whilst you were --

7 A. Farrow. Mia Farrow, yes.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, whilst you were there, did you meet with  
9 Nico Shefer?

13:24:20 10 A. Yes, I met with Nico.

11 Q. What for?

12 A. He was honorary consul, so from the moment I arrived until  
13 I left he was there to perform any service as honorary consul,  
14 any little errands that had to be run. Any ANC or any officials  
13:24:43 15 that somebody on my delegation had to meet, that was a part of  
16 his function to help to make that happen.

17 Q. Did you meet any arms dealers whilst you were in South  
18 Africa?

19 A. No, not at all. Not at all, no.

13:24:55 20 Q. Because you appreciate that it's being suggested that you  
21 whilst on that trip to South Africa organised the Magburaka  
22 shipment. You know that's the suggestion, don't you?

23 A. Yes. A very foolish one too.

24 Q. Why is it foolish, Mr Taylor?

13:25:16 25 A. Because no Head of State goes into an advanced country like  
26 South Africa and just buys weapons. I mean, and as it's  
27 reported, and the weapons come into the Freeport of Monrovia.  
28 Even sailing time from South Africa to Liberia would take more  
29 than two weeks. So how does somebody purchase weapons, put it on

1 a ship and send it into the Freeport of Monrovia as suggested  
2 where ECOMOG is in control of? It's total nonsense. I mean, an  
3 advanced country like South Africa and a decent man like Mandela  
4 will approve me buying arms to bring? It's just totally  
13:26:02 5 nonsensical.

6 Q. Now, this Magburaka shipment, Mr Taylor, what did you have  
7 to do with it?

8 A. Absolutely nothing had to do with any shipment called  
9 Magburaka. Nothing.

13:26:20 10 Q. Where did that shipment come from?

11 A. I have no idea. From the evidence here, it was flown in.  
12 It sure didn't get flown in from Liberia.

13 Q. How do you know it never got flown in from Liberia?

14 A. Because the very reports that came here that the  
13:26:37 15 Prosecution put through, the Roberts International Airport is  
16 controlled by ECOMOG. The Freeport of Monrovia, the ECOMOG navy  
17 is there. For God's sake, I don't know how a plane can come into  
18 Liberia with arms and ECOMOG would not know, only for the report  
19 to say, as suggested here, "It was reported," according to what I  
13:27:01 20 saw here on the - "It was reported." Total nonsense. Total  
21 nonsense.

22 Q. Now, you do recall, Mr Taylor, that reference has been made  
23 in these proceedings to a letter you received from Johnny Paul  
24 Koroma seeking military assistance?

13:27:21 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Can you recall now when that letter arrived?

27 A. That letter came around I would say September, and I'm  
28 trying to put it straight because that came after the General  
29 Assembly meeting in New York. So that had to be around

1 September, going October, somewhere around there I would put it  
2 to.

3 Q. Now, help me - let me put it differently. Did that letter  
4 arrive before or after you went to South Africa?

13:28:09 5 A. I think that letter arrived before I went to South Africa.  
6 I think it arrived before.

7 Q. Remind us, when did you go to South Africa?

8 A. I would put it - it's been so long now. I would put it to  
9 probably November or thereabouts. October, November. I can't be  
13:28:36 10 held on that, but it was very late in '97.

11 Q. Well, let's - you're inaugurated when?

12 A. August 1997.

13 Q. Your first trip abroad after your inauguration is to where?

14 A. I remember - I think it is an ECOWAS summit that should be  
13:29:18 15 either Nigeria or Ghana. I don't quite recall right now quite  
16 frankly. But I go to an ECOWAS meeting first. That's my first  
17 trip outside.

18 Q. And then to where?

19 A. And then I - I think at the end of the year it is South  
13:29:34 20 Africa. I may have made a couple of others but I really can't  
21 recollect right now.

22 Q. All right. Now, that Magburaka shipment, Mr Taylor, came  
23 in on an airfield near Makeni. Did you give orders to the RUF to  
24 construct that airfield?

13:29:58 25 A. No, I was in no communication whatsoever with the RUF. No,  
26 never did.

27 Q. Did you give instructions to the RUF to construct an  
28 airstrip in Buedu?

29 A. Never, no. Never.

1 Q. When you became President of Liberia did you have access to  
2 aircraft capable of delivering arms by air into Sierra Leone?

3 A. No, the Liberian government had no aircrafts. Not even a  
4 Cessna.

13:30:44 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, that might be an  
6 appropriate place to take a break.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will adjourn to 2.30 this afternoon.

9 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

14:24:50 10 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, perhaps you could wait a  
12 moment. It appears to me there is no broadcast of these  
13 proceedings. I think the AV people were not quite ready by 2.30.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

14:31:45 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Officer - yes, it seems now  
16 we're ready to proceed. Please proceed.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, before we adjourned for lunch we were  
19 looking at the Magburaka shipment. Do you recall that?

14:32:13 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, was there ever a time when you provided  
22 assistance to the AFRC junta regime?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Was there ever a time when you assisted in the provision of  
14:32:35 25 arms to the AFRC junta regime?

26 A. No.

27 Q. When you were President - appointed President in 1997 until  
28 the intervention by ECOMOG in 1998, did you have knowledge of any  
29 provision of arms to the AFRC junta regime?

1 A. No, I think you said when I was appointed. When I was  
2 elected.

3 Q. When you were elected President.

4 A. Yes. No. No to your question.

14:33:24 5 Q. Did you have any involvement with that AFRC junta regime?

6 A. None whatsoever.

7 Q. Did you, whilst President of Liberia from 1997, speak to  
8 Johnny Paul Koroma before the Lome Agreement?

9 A. No.

14:34:00 10 Q. When was the first time you spoke to Johnny Paul Koroma?

11 A. In - no, let me - let me correct that. I first spoke to  
12 Johnny Paul Koroma in August 1997. That's after.

13 Q. Where? August 1997?

14 A. Yes.

14:34:36 15 Q. Where?

16 A. First in Sierra Leone before his release by the RUF, I  
17 spoke to him on the telephone.

18 Q. Before his release by the RUF? When was he released by the  
19 RUF?

14:34:58 20 A. Johnny Paul was released by the RUF in 1999, August.

21 Q. Yes. So when did you first speak to Johnny Paul Koroma?

22 A. In August 1999. Before Johnny Paul Koroma is formally  
23 released by the RUF, I speak to him on the telephone in  
24 captivity.

14:35:22 25 Q. A moment ago you told us it was in August 1997, Mr Taylor.

26 A. No, no.

27 Q. Which is right?

28 A. I'm sorry, that's a mistake. August 1999. That was the  
29 first time I spoke to him.

1 Q. And apart from Johnny Paul Koroma, Mr Taylor, when was the  
2 first time you spoke to a representative or agent of the AFRC  
3 junta regime?

14:36:15 4 A. I would say about August 1997 or thereabouts that I - wait  
5 a minute. You are not talking about contact. You say spoke to.

6 Q. Spoke to.

7 A. Oh, no, I didn't speak to anybody. I had contact, but not  
8 speaking to.

14:36:29 9 Q. Right. Now that we've dealt with spoke to, what about  
10 contact?

11 A. Okay, there was a delegation sent, I told my government, in  
12 by about August 1997, and that's the contact, but I did not  
13 interact or speak to them.

14 Q. Why not?

14:36:49 15 A. Well, at the time we were looking very seriously at the  
16 problem involving the AFRC, and to have spoken to them during the  
17 crucial part of the investigation at that particular - in fact,  
18 the discussion at that particular time would have been improper  
19 and would have been considered undermining the ECOWAS members  
14:37:21 20 dealing with that issue at the time.

21 Q. How so?

22 A. Well, I was not a part of the committee dealing with the  
23 AFRC. I was not a part of that.

24 Q. Which was the committee dealing with the AFRC?

14:37:48 25 A. When I came on board elected as President, Ivory Coast,  
26 Guinea, Ghana. There was a committee I think of about nine at  
27 the time, but Liberia was not a part of that committee at the  
28 time.

29 Q. Was that committee separate and discrete from the Committee

1 of Four which later became the Committee of Five?

2 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely it was different. The  
3 committee that was dealing with the AFRC negotiations on giving  
4 up power - in fact Nigeria too. I forgot Nigeria was on there.

14:38:33 5 No, it's completely different from this Committee of Four dealing  
6 with the RUF/Sierra Leonean problem. Different.

7 Q. When did you join the Committee of Five, Mr Taylor?

8 A. In 1997 after my first ECOWAS meeting.

9 Q. And your first ECOWAS meeting was when?

14:39:07 10 A. I will put it to August, September or thereabouts.

11 Q. So let's be clear. Did you volunteer to go on that  
12 committee or were you invited to join it?

13 A. Well, both. I was - I volunteered my expertise and it was  
14 considered proper with our colleagues in discussion. So both.

14:39:45 15 Q. And why did you volunteer your expertise, as you put it?

16 A. Well, having fought a seven-year civilian revolution and  
17 dealing with all of the different peace agreements and peace  
18 accords and everybody else and knowing some of the problems that  
19 - and misunderstandings and misinterpretations of some of the  
14:40:16 20 actions on the part of belligerent groups, I felt that I had  
21 something to contribute.

22 Q. Did you have any other motivation for joining that  
23 committee, Mr Taylor?

24 A. None other than what I've explained. None other.

14:40:31 25 Q. I want you to think about it, Mr Taylor. Did you have any  
26 other motivation?

27 A. None. Of course peace is always the main motivation, but  
28 I've explained the connection with that and peace. Nothing else.

29 Q. I ask for this reason, you see: Do you recall it being

1 suggested to you that you used your position on the Committee of  
2 Five to further the interests of the AFRC and the RUF? You  
3 remember that being put to you?

4 A. I remember that very well.

14:41:02 5 Q. That's why I'm asking you, Mr Taylor, and I want you to  
6 help us. Did you volunteer to go on that committee with that  
7 motivation in mind?

8 A. Not at all. Not at all, except we're talking about the  
9 Spanish Inquisition for people to begin to read psychological  
14:41:24 10 minds. This is total nonsense. I went on that committee  
11 strictly to help to bring peace in West Africa and not the logic  
12 of the Spanish Inquisition.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help us. How does a committee like that  
14 Committee of Five operate?

14:41:53 15 A. The committee would exchange information. They would ask  
16 different Presidents on the committee to put in their little bit  
17 regarding whatever expertise they have. If there are diplomatic  
18 points that had to be erased, they will raise it. Ivory Coast,  
19 for example, was on the committee because Ivory Coast had had a  
14:42:17 20 long-standing dealing with the Sierra Leonean problem, especially  
21 the first RUF and the AFRC. I come on for a reason. Nigeria was  
22 on the committee because Nigeria was the powerhouse in West  
23 Africa. At the time Ghana was on the committee because I think  
24 Ghana chaired ECOWAS, if I'm not mistaken, at that particular  
14:42:44 25 period. So each person comes on with a particular thing, but you  
26 exchange information, you coordinate your activities, whatever  
27 one is doing the others are informed and that committee would do  
28 whatever it could and then report to ECOWAS in total.

29 Q. But what I'm more interested in, Mr Taylor, and I'm seeking

1 your assistance with is this: That committee would meet how  
2 regularly?

3 A. The committee would not very rarely meet. Most of the work  
4 was being done by Foreign Ministers. There would be a lot of  
14:43:28 5 shuttle diplomacy, but --

6 Q. Involving who?

7 A. The Foreign Ministers of those countries.

8 Q. And "shuttle diplomacy", what do you mean by that?

9 A. For example if I had a very serious issue that I wanted not  
14:43:39 10 putting on the telephone, or I was pursuing a particular line,  
11 you would send your Foreign Minister to brief his colleagues on  
12 this issue that would in turn brief their Heads of State.

13 Q. When the Heads of State on that committee met, what in  
14 practical terms would go on?

14:44:03 15 A. Oh, they will meet, exchange views, agree and then go on to  
16 the regular ECOWAS meeting and tell what progress had been made  
17 by the committee.

18 Q. And help me, Mr Taylor. When you went on that committee in  
19 1997, who were the other personalities as Heads of State on that  
14:44:29 20 committee?

21 A. Lansana Conte was on the committee.

22 Q. Pause there. Lansana Conte, President of?

23 A. Guinea.

24 Q. Friend of yours?

14:44:41 25 A. No, not at all. Lansana and I didn't get along.

26 Q. Right. Fine. I'll come to the reason for asking in a  
27 moment. Who else was on the committee? Which other  
28 personalities?

29 A. Konan Bedie, the President of La Cote d'Ivoire. He was --

- 1 Q. Yes, how did you get on with him?
- 2 A. Very well.
- 3 Q. Yes?
- 4 A. Yes. Ghana, Jerry Rawlings was on the Committee of Five.
- 14:45:04 5 Q. How did you get on with him?
- 6 A. Jerry and I got along pretty well.
- 7 Q. He had arrested you in the past though and thrown you in
- 8 prison, hadn't he?
- 9 A. Yes, but we made up later. We made up later.
- 14:45:15 10 Q. Who else was on the committee?
- 11 A. Nigeria was on that committee.
- 12 Q. So who was the Nigerian Head of State in 1997?
- 13 A. That would be Sani Abacha.
- 14 Q. Right. So let's just run through again. Lansana Conte?
- 14:45:34 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. No great friend of yours?
- 17 A. Not at all.
- 18 Q. Bedie, President of Cote d'Ivoire?
- 19 A. I would say a friend of mine.
- 14:45:45 20 Q. Sani Abacha and Rawlings?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. Mr Taylor, you understand what's being said, don't you?
- 23 That in effect you went on that committee so that you could use
- 24 your influence to assist the AFRC and the RUF. Now were you able
- 14:46:06 25 to do that with the personalities we've just described?
- 26 A. No. It's almost to say that these Presidents were weak and
- 27 stupid and I reject that. No.
- 28 Q. But were they weak and stupid --
- 29 A. No.

1 Q. -- such that you could get your own way with them?

2 A. Not by the stretch of the imagination. No. No. Sani  
3 Abacha was a pretty - Jerry Rawlings is a pretty tough cookie, so  
4 was Abacha and Bedie also. In fact, Liberia comes on this  
14:46:38 5 committee as just coming from war and if there's any weak link on  
6 this committee it's Liberia. I'm just coming out of a war where  
7 all of these countries assisted in bringing us to peace. So the  
8 weakest link really on that committee, if you look at it from a  
9 diplomatic and a technical point, it's Liberia. So I'm not in  
14:46:58 10 any position to influence Abacha. How do I influence General  
11 Abacha?

12 Q. Well, help us, how do you influence Lansana Conte who used  
13 his territory to launch military incursions into Liberia?

14 A. I can't. And in fact even before then Lansana Conte is the  
14:47:18 15 one that equipped Alhaji Kromah from ULIMO. So we have a long -  
16 so there's no love lost between Lansana and myself. None.

17 Q. Were you able to use your position on that committee as  
18 suggested, Mr Taylor, to aid the AFRC and the RUF?

19 A. No.

14:47:40 20 Q. Did you attempt to do so?

21 A. No. No.

22 Q. Did you have a reason to do so?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Following on from that. You've explained to us how it was  
14:48:14 25 that you came to be on that committee and the particular skills  
26 which you brought to the table. Yes, Mr Taylor?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Was it your understanding that you were expected by your  
29 colleagues on that committee to deploy those skills immediately?

1 A. Oh, yes, they - they wanted me to do that, yes.

2 Q. So, help us, as of your appointment in 1997 what steps did  
3 you take to do that?

4 A. Well, we started - I started putting out feelers and then  
14:49:06 5 got briefings from - in fact my Foreign Minister, and there are  
6 records to that, attended the briefings during that particular  
7 time regarding the impasse between ECOWAS and the junta. We  
8 started attending those briefings. And then what actually  
9 happened was that I was a bit slowed down in trying to make  
14:49:45 10 progress because having agreed that a junta would relinquish  
11 power somewhere I think it was agreed, if I'm not mistaken,  
12 around May, June of 1998 and seeing the action taken in February  
13 and I would almost say unilaterally, even though we all came in,  
14 we were slowed down until months later before we began again. I  
14:50:20 15 had instructed my ambassador --

16 Q. What do you mean "we were slowed down"? I'm sorry to  
17 interrupt.

18 A. The whole Committee of Five. If we remember very much,  
19 I've said to this Court, and I think the records have proven  
14:50:35 20 that, the February intervention in Freetown was not authorised  
21 under Chapter VII by the Security Council.

22 Q. Yes, you've told us that.

23 A. Yes. It was done and we went and explained the reason and  
24 it was just too late and the Security Council passed the  
14:50:54 25 resolution welcoming the government. So everybody got slowed  
26 down at that point. And then following the intervention what did  
27 we have in Sierra Leone? We had fighting from February. And  
28 then my own problem developed where we are accused, because of  
29 the Liberians that were found in Freetown, some of them killed

1 and captured, it was then construed that they had been sent by  
2 me. So all of these complications slowed me down and slowed the  
3 committee down until we could find our way.

4 So I instructed my envoy - my ambassador in Freetown to  
14:51:31 5 begin to pull some strings here to see. So we were very happy  
6 later on when we get a message that attempts are being made to  
7 reach us. But so far as what did I do, we were trying to touch  
8 whatever little strings we could touch to make sure --

9 Q. That's what I'm coming to, Mr Taylor, and it's on that that  
14:51:54 10 I want your assistance. Let us approach it in this way: When  
11 did your government first make contact with the RUF?

12 A. The first contact that my government had with the RUF was  
13 about August 1998 when we finally made our first --

14 Q. And what was that contact?

14:52:21 15 A. Finally, I don't know if the message got through, but a  
16 senior official of the RUF - AFRC/RUF, what they were called,  
17 junta, whatever - travelled to Conakry, Guinea, to meet with my  
18 ambassador to deliver a message that they had and to ask  
19 permission for the then leader of the RUF, Sam Bockarie, to come  
14:52:55 20 to see me in Liberia.

21 Q. We've dealt with that, Mr Taylor. Now the question: Given  
22 that you're brought on to this committee in 1997 because of your  
23 special skills, yes?

24 A. Yes.

14:53:12 25 Q. And you yourself accept that way back in the day your NPFL  
26 had had contact with the RUF, yes?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. So help us: Why immediately upon your being put on that  
29 committee did you not use those old contacts to make immediate

1 contact with the RUF in 1997? Do you follow me?

2 A. I follow you.

3 Q. Why weren't you proactive rather than reactive in 1998? Do  
4 you follow me?

14:53:49 5 A. I understand. Well, at this particular time, between the  
6 period that I'm on the committee and the period that you just  
7 mentioned, we are now dealing not with the RUF again. We are now  
8 dealing with, what? The AFRC/RUF junta, and there's a  
9 leadership. So this is why I have to try to move through the  
10 ambassador in Freetown. There is the junta and the junta doesn't  
11 cease to exist until February 1998. So the period in question  
12 we're dealing with the AFRC government and not just the RUF. So  
13 there was no point in trying to contact the RUF when we were now  
14 dealing with the junta.

14:54:39 15 Q. But one point might have been to use whatever influence, in  
16 inverted commas, you might have on the RUF in order to reach the  
17 leadership of the junta. Do you follow me?

18 A. Yes, but that - that was not the way how we figured it out  
19 at the time because in terms of the RUF, the only person that I  
14:55:09 20 knew from the RUF at that particular time was Foday Sankoh, and  
21 he was in jail. And I didn't even know the Sam Bockarie or any  
22 other senior official.

23 Q. Well, why didn't you make inquiries?

24 A. What kind of inquiries? To say who is the - who is what?

14:55:29 25 Q. "Who is currently leading the RUF in the absence of  
26 Mr Sankoh?" Simple question.

27 A. No, no, but, I mean, it was known. I say I did not know  
28 Bockarie, but it was known, from the pronouncements from the  
29 junta we had a very clear - I had a very clear idea of who the

1 officials of that junta government were, including the name  
2 Bockarie without knowing the individual.

3 Q. That's what I'm saying, Mr Taylor. I will press you  
4 further on this. We know from the evidence called before this  
14:56:03 5 Court that Bockarie, after a brief sojourn in Freetown, returned  
6 to Kailahun where he remained - returned to the Kailahun District  
7 and was in large measure based there, yes?

8 A. From evidence I led here, yes.

9 Q. So he is just over the border, so easy to contact. So why  
14:56:29 10 didn't you?

11 A. Because we were dealing with the junta government. I was  
12 not - again, I was not concerned just with the individual. We  
13 were dealing with the junta government and it did not cross me at  
14 the time that I should contact the RUF because the RUF was a part  
14:56:45 15 of that junta and we were dealing with the junta government as a  
16 committee.

17 Q. And as that committee - as you've told us - decision had  
18 been made to take action against them, but that was pre-empted by  
19 Nigeria --

14:57:03 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. -- in February 1998, yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Now, when that intervention took place, Mr Taylor - we're  
24 now in the early part of 1998 - did it then cross your mind that  
14:57:25 25 it might be an idea, given your particular position, to try and  
26 contact the RUF?

27 A. Yes, it did.

28 Q. So what steps did you take to do so?

29 A. We tried to get - tried to get messages across the border,

1 but we just didn't get through to Bockarie because apparently  
2 maybe he didn't know me. That did not work. We then tried to go  
3 through some of their - to ask my ambassador in Freetown to  
4 contact some of the officials, but those that were in - in  
14:58:07 5 Abidjan - in Freetown did not have the power to make decisions, I  
6 guess, and so we got nowhere with that.

7 Q. And then, as you've told us earlier, there was the contact  
8 made by - with the Liberian ambassador in Conakry, yes?

9 A. That is correct.

14:58:34 10 Q. What's his name?

11 A. Tiagen Wantee.

12 Q. And can we just briefly, please, look behind divider 6 in  
13 the bundle. This is MFI-49. We see this is a letter dated 12  
14 August 1998, yes?

14:59:24 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Bearing the letterhead of the embassy of Liberia in  
17 Conakry, Guinea, yes?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And we see handwritten in the top right-hand corner  
14:59:37 20 "Received 8-14-98", which would be 14 August 1998, a couple of  
21 days after the letter was written?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. There is a reference in the top left-hand corner "Lec  
24 266/98" and then this, "Mr Acting Minister". Now, if we go to  
15:00:08 25 the bottom of the page, we see that "Honourable Christopher  
26 Minikon, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign  
27 Affairs, Monrovia, Liberia". Yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. What happened to Monie Captan?

1 A. He is minister.

2 Q. He is minister?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So what does acting minister mean?

15:00:28 5 A. Under our system whenever the Foreign Minister leaves the  
6 country on mission there's always an acting minister. The  
7 immediate deputy becomes acting.

8 Q. Very well:

9 "I have the honour to present my compliments and to inform  
15:00:43 10 government that one Major Eddie P Kanneh former Secretary of  
11 State of the defunct military junta-RUF of Sierra Leone, on  
12 August 8, 1998, called on me and provide some confidential  
13 information regarding security threats against the Liberian  
14 government."

15:01:04 15 Now, this man, Major Eddie P Kanneh, at this time in August  
16 1998, Mr Taylor, did you know him?

17 A. No.

18 Q. "According to Major Kanneh, his sister has learnt from the  
19 number two of the United Nations - according to Major Kanneh, his  
15:01:27 20 sister has learnt from the Guinean Number-Two of the United  
21 Nations representatives that they are doing everything possible  
22 to overthrow President Charles Ghankay Taylor."

23 Now, remind ourselves, Guinea's President is who?

24 A. Lansana Conte.

15:01:47 25 Q. "... everything possible to overthrow President Charles  
26 Ghankay Taylor. He emphasised his strong desire of meeting with  
27 the Liberian leader in order to have him informed about the  
28 situation. The major, who holds a Guinean GSM mobile telephone  
29 number 224-11-216739, further said that he had contact with a

1 Guinean government official whose vehicle would drive him up to  
2 the frontier. He then requested the issuance of a Liberian  
3 travel document to facilitate his travel to Monrovia, which we  
4 considered illegal, until contacts and proper arrangements were  
15:02:37 5 made with the appropriate authorities."

6 Let us pause there. And we're looking at this letter,  
7 Mr Taylor, because we - you were asked in cross-examination, if  
8 you recall, about your first meetings with Sam Bockarie. Do you  
9 remember that?

15:02:56 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. And the purpose of those meetings; do you recall that?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And you recall that it was also suggested to you that you  
14 had in fact met Bockarie much earlier in 1998 than you suggested?

15:03:10 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Do you recall that?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Now, bearing all of that in mind, help me with a detail,  
19 please. He then requested the issuance of a Liberian travel  
15:03:23 20 document. Mr Taylor, the members of the junta, had they been  
21 placed on a travel ban by the United Nations Security Council?

22 A. By this time, yes.

23 Q. Was that travel ban still in existence at this time in  
24 August 1998?

15:03:42 25 A. Yes. I would say yes.

26 Q. When this request was made for a Liberian travel document  
27 by this Major Kanneh, former Secretary of State of the defunct  
28 military junta, were you prepared to do that to facilitate  
29 contact to issue him with a Liberian travel document?

1 A. Yes. Once it had been determined by us that it was within  
2 the prospects of peace, yes.

3 Q. So despite his presence on that list of persons banned from  
4 travelling, you would nonetheless have issued a Liberian travel  
15:04:28 5 document in order to meet him?

6 A. Yes. But don't let's forget, the man crossed from Sierra  
7 Leone, he is into Guinea. So, I mean, how did he get into  
8 Guinea? So he had to travel there on some sort of document. But  
9 yes, to your question, I would have. Once it had to do with the  
15:04:43 10 peace, I would have issued - I would have authorised the issuing  
11 of what we call a laissez-passer. Not a passport. It's a  
12 temporary travel document that can be issued for maybe 30 days or  
13 so.

14 Q. "Meanwhile, Major Kanneh, who remains a strong advocate of  
15:05:04 15 the RUF-junta forces, reiterated his plan of travelling to  
16 Liberia along with six other members of his organisation and  
17 would cross into Sierra Leone to join their men after his meeting  
18 with the Liberian leader."

19 He named one Sidiki Janneh. Who is that?

15:05:30 20 A. I don't know him. I have no idea of Sidiki Janneh, no.

21 Q. "... and Brigadier Bockarie ..." Now, Mr Taylor, on the  
22 face of this letter this Major Kanneh is telling your ambassador  
23 in Conakry about this Brigadier Bockarie, but according to the  
24 Prosecution, you were already in contact with this man. So help  
15:06:06 25 us, what's going on?

26 A. The only thing that's going on, because I'm not in contact  
27 with him, so he could have equally said here - if I had been in  
28 contact with this man, I think the English language and the  
29 construct here would have been a little different, because - he

1 says this because I've never met the man before.

2 Q. "... both Sierra Leonean nationals, including" - and on my  
3 copy I think the next word is "including" but it's been deleted -  
4 "one Mr Sherif, assistant director of Special Security Service of  
15:06:48 5 Liberia as contact persons in the country."

6 Now, Mr Taylor, Mr Sherif was indeed assistant director of  
7 Special Security Services, wasn't he?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Now, help us. Do you recall this morning us discussing  
15:07:09 10 your relationship with Alhaji Kromah on the Committee of States?

11 A. Council of State.

12 Q. The Council of State.

13 A. Yes, that is correct.

14 Q. Do you recall that?

15:07:21 15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. Now, help us. Was this man Sherif assistant director of  
17 Special Security Service, was he a member of Mr Alhaji Kromah's  
18 ULIMO-K?

19 A. Oh, yes. One of the more senior generals in ULIMO-K.

15:07:42 20 Q. A senior general in ULIMO-K?

21 A. Oh, yes. Very senior.

22 Q. As far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, did Alhaji Kromah know  
23 Mr Sherif?

24 A. Oh, yes. That was Alhaji's right hand, Varmuyan Sherif,  
15:08:00 25 yes.

26 Q. And help us. We spoke about Mr Kromah this morning in the  
27 context of contacts in 1996 between the RUF and ULIMO for the  
28 purchase of arms. Do you recall that?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. Now, here we have a letter in August 1998 referring to a  
2 former ULIMO-K general as one of the contact persons with these  
3 RUF individuals who want to enter the country. Yes, Mr Taylor?

4 A. That is correct.

15:08:40 5 Q. Now, at this time in August 1998 were you aware of any  
6 prior history between ULIMO-K and in particular Mr Sherif and the  
7 RUF?

8 A. No. No.

9 Q. Over the page please:

15:09:10 10 "In the midst of the recent news reports of accusations  
11 against the Government of Guinea, one cannot underestimate the  
12 authenticity of this information or the intentions of Major  
13 Kanneh. On the other hand, why would we want to travel to  
14 Liberia with six RUF junta men for continuation to Sierra Leone  
15:09:35 15 when in fact ECOWAS leaders yearn for sub-regional peace and  
16 security."

17 Now, Mr Taylor, what did you understand by that paragraph,  
18 which on the face of it is somewhat convoluted?

19 A. The ambassador here, with his training, he's a very trained  
15:09:55 20 individual, is a little - from my interpretation here, is a  
21 little suspicious of all of this and is concerned, from what I  
22 can interpret it here.

23 Q. Concerned about what?

24 A. About having junta people coming, you know, and going into  
15:10:16 25 Liberia like that at this particular crucial time.

26 Q. We're going to come back to that paragraph in a moment.  
27 But just to complete the picture, let's look at the last  
28 paragraph:

29 "In view of the above, and in consideration of the

1 prevailing political situation, coupled with the recent smuggle  
2 of Mr Roosevelt Johnson into Liberia, I would highly suggest that  
3 maximum security measures be mounted at all border posts and  
4 strategic locations in the country to curb any subversive  
15:10:53 5 attempts."

6 Now, Mr Taylor, remember this is the context of you meeting  
7 Bockarie.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Do you recall receiving this letter, first of all, or  
15:11:05 10 seeing this letter?

11 A. I was briefed. Yes, I recall seeing this letter, yes.

12 Q. What did you do as a consequence of receiving it?

13 A. Immediately upon receiving this letter, I contacted other  
14 members of the committee and told them that I have received word  
15:11:26 15 finally that Bockarie wished to come to see me in Liberia and  
16 that I felt it was a good idea and I will go ahead and meet with  
17 him. And then I selected one of our best generals to go to the  
18 border with sufficient security to check the situation and to  
19 bring him to Monrovia.

15:11:47 20 Q. This is where I bring you back to the first paragraph on  
21 that second page, "ECOWAS leaders yearn for sub-regional peace  
22 and security." Your ambassador in Guinea is in effect warning  
23 you against meeting these people, is he not?

24 A. In a way, yeah.

15:12:05 25 Q. Because of his concerns that it might jeopardise  
26 sub-regional peace and security. That's right, isn't it?

27 A. That is correct. But you have to take the first two lines  
28 now. He says, "In view of the accusation against the Government  
29 of Guinea." He is looking at this also as Guinea trying to

1 manipulate a process and could cause instability also.

2 Q. So you contact the other members of the Committee of Five,  
3 yes?

4 A. Yes.

15:12:42 5 Q. What did they say?

6 A. They feel that it's a welcome development. That by this  
7 particular time for the leader of the RUF to want to come to see  
8 me would be a welcome development.

9 Q. So what did they say to you?

15:13:08 10 A. "Go ahead and meet with him."

11 Q. So you were given the green light?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. So what was the next thing that you did?

14 A. I then looked at the possible security situation. Because  
15:13:21 15 again we were concerned. Just as the ambassador put here,  
16 Roosevelt Johnson is back in the country. We know who is  
17 involved in bringing Roosevelt surreptitiously into Monrovia.

18 Q. Who?

19 A. The United States brought Roosevelt Johnson. He came from  
15:13:41 20 America straight - he didn't come into any airport. He didn't  
21 come into any road. How he got into Liberia, until today  
22 Liberians still don't know how he got into the country. So we  
23 then decided that we would want to make sure from a security  
24 standpoint that if the leader of the RUF was coming in along with  
15:14:02 25 other individuals, we would be sure. So I took - I asked General  
26 Dope Menkarzon, one of our best trusted generals, to go with  
27 sufficient security to the border, check the situation out with  
28 him and his delegation and have him brought to Monrovia.

29 Q. But help us with this, Mr Taylor. You tell us you saw this

1 letter. Did you contact Mr Sheriff?

2 A. No, we asked Varmuyan. Not I. Did I? No. Varmuyan was  
3 investigated. In fact Varmuyan was asked and Varmuyan said that  
4 he had known these people from the time they controlled the  
15:14:45 5 border but that he did not represent their interests in Liberia.  
6 This was Varmuyan's own reaction.

7 Q. But let's look at this situation. You've now been told, in  
8 effect, the RUF contact person in Liberia is your assistant  
9 director of the SSS, yes?

15:15:11 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Why not use him to go and contact Bockarie rather than  
12 Menkarzon?

13 A. Because Mr Sheriff at this particular time, while he  
14 assistant director of SSS, he is not one of the close trusted  
15:15:31 15 people. And in fact he himself is under observation, being an  
16 enemy general working in the mansion. So for him it was  
17 sufficient for him to tell us, "Yes, I dealt with the RUF, we  
18 used to sell them material, but I don't represent them." So our  
19 first effort was to isolate him, because we did not know what  
15:15:51 20 could happen from a security standpoint. He was not a trusted -  
21 this is an enemy general.

22 Q. So when then thereafter do you first meet Bockarie?

23 A. Bockarie comes in September.

24 Q. And I'm not going to rehearse with you now the sequence of  
15:16:23 25 meetings which you've earlier described between you and Bockarie  
26 because we've dealt with that, but, Mr Taylor, was that the first  
27 time you met Sam Bockarie?

28 A. That was the first time I, Charles Taylor, met Sam  
29 Bockarie.

1 Q. Can we now go on and deal with another discrete topic,  
2 please.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, before you leave this  
4 letter there's something I haven't quite understood. This was a  
15:16:57 5 letter speaking of one Major Eddie Kanneh wanting to come to  
6 Liberia.

7 THE WITNESS: I didn't get what the President said.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: I haven't finished. I haven't asked the  
9 question. I'm saying this letter we've just been looking at,  
15:17:14 10 MFI-49, is a letter that generally speaks of one Major Eddie  
11 Kanneh wanting to come to talk to the Liberian President. And in  
12 your testimony, sir, you mentioned that you reported to your  
13 colleagues that Sam Bockarie wanted to come and see you. Now,  
14 did I miss something?

15:17:35 15 THE WITNESS: Yes.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: I thought it was Major Eddie Kanneh who  
17 wanted to come and see you.

18 THE WITNESS: No, I think you missed something, Madam  
19 President. If you look at the third paragraph it states that  
15:17:46 20 Major Kanneh is coming but there are six others coming along and  
21 on that delegation is Brigadier Bockarie.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: So you report to your colleagues that  
23 Major Bockarie has requested to see you?

24 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, because he by then - we know by then  
15:18:11 25 he is the leader of the RUF.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. Okay. Please proceed.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Mr Taylor, when you spoke to your colleagues, did you say  
29 to them that Bockarie was coming to see you on his own?

1 A. No, I told them that the leader of the - the leader of the  
2 RUF on the ground was coming - that wanted to see me. The leader  
3 of the RUF.

4 Q. Yes. Now, as the learned Justice has asked you, the letter  
15:18:49 5 actually says that Major Kanneh wants to come along with six  
6 others. Now, what did you actually say to your colleagues on the  
7 Committee of Five? What did you tell them?

8 A. I simply told them the leader of the RUF wanted to come to  
9 see me. I didn't name who all were coming along with him,  
15:19:11 10 because delegations could change, but I just mentioned that I had  
11 received communication that the leader of the RUF desired to come  
12 to Monrovia to speak to me.

13 Q. Why mention the leader of the RUF and not the other members  
14 of the delegation?

15:19:23 15 A. What - I mean, because, number one, you don't really know  
16 if those delegations will come. But when you're dealing with  
17 these matters diplomatically you don't say the President and -  
18 once the President, you cover everybody else. The leader of the  
19 RUF covers whoever else is coming. That's the way it's done.

15:19:53 20 Q. Now, before we leave this particular episode, Mr Taylor,  
21 help us with this: What was the purpose of that initial meeting  
22 you had with Sam Bockarie?

23 A. The purpose --

24 Q. In September, you say, of 1998?

15:20:17 25 A. The purpose was to discuss the cessation of hostilities in  
26 Sierra Leone and get back to the 1996 peace accord signed in  
27 Abidjan. That was the purpose.

28 Q. On Monday, 18 January of this year it was suggested to you  
29 by my learned friend that that initial meeting with Bockarie was

1 not for the purpose of peace. What do you say to that  
2 suggestion, Mr Taylor?

3 A. I disagree with the learned counsel from the other side. I  
4 disagree. That's totally, totally out of the question. I  
15:21:02 5 disagree.

6 Q. Now, that suggestion was made in respect of that initial  
7 meeting. The subsequent meetings that you had with Bockarie,  
8 Mr Taylor, for what purpose did you meet with him?

9 A. Continuation of the first meeting. What could be done, how  
15:21:26 10 we should - how it could be done and what were the issues that  
11 they were concerned with.

12 Q. Now, in this context it was put to you that Operation No  
13 Living Thing was announced by Bockarie in early September 1998.  
14 Do you recall that?

15:21:49 15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. The suggestion being that having announced such a campaign  
17 - let me start again. First of all, Mr Taylor, were you aware of  
18 the announcement of an operation called No Living Thing by Sam  
19 Bockarie, leader of the RUF, in early September 1998?

15:22:22 20 A. I was not aware.

21 Q. Had you been aware of the announcement of such an  
22 operation, Mr Taylor, would you still have met him?

23 A. Yes, in all earnesty I would have met him.

24 Q. Why?

15:22:48 25 A. To really discourage any such actions and I would have  
26 probably made it very clear to him - not probably. I would have  
27 made it very clear to him that such actions were unacceptable and  
28 that while we are pursuing peace, such actions would not be  
29 tolerated by ECOWAS and that I will convey that to the rest of

1 the leadership. But I would have met him to make sure that I  
2 could convey that and discourage any such actions.

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I have spent a little time on this point  
4 because it is quite clear how the Prosecution put their case in  
15:23:36 5 this regard. Because my learned friend continued on that same  
6 day, Monday, 18 January of this year, to put directly to you that  
7 Bockarie announced Operation No Living Thing with your knowledge,  
8 control and/or consent. Do you recall that?

9 A. I recall that.

15:23:59 10 Q. Is that true?

11 A. That is totally, totally untrue. Totally.

12 Q. Now, just so that you get the full picture, Mr Taylor, so  
13 you have an opportunity of dealing with it before finally your  
14 testimony concludes, clearly what is being suggested is this:

15:24:21 15 Bockarie comes to Monrovia in September 1998 and is given  
16 instructions by you to launch Operation No Living Thing. And  
17 let's just add in another little detail to the scenario being  
18 suggested. Do you recall being cross-examined about a similar  
19 operation in Liberia called Operation No Living Thing? Do you  
15:24:49 20 recall that?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. So you understand the suggestion globally now. There's  
23 been an operation No Living Thing in Liberia. Mr Bockarie comes  
24 to Monrovia, and guess what? At or about the same time --

15:25:14 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

26 MS HOLLIS: That's misstating what was put to the witness.  
27 In fact what was put to the witness is that Operation No Living  
28 Thing in Liberia was later than Operation No Living Thing in  
29 Sierra Leone. That's what was put to this witness. Not that it

1 was earlier or the same time.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. Very well:

3 Q. Now, was that phrase "Operation No Living Thing" your  
4 invention, Mr Taylor?

15:25:39 5 A. No.

6 Q. To be used by you again, you know, like stock on the shelf,  
7 at a later date in Liberia?

8 A. No. That was not - that was not an expression from  
9 Liberia. It was not anything that we developed or knew of.

15:26:47 10 Q. Now, let's move on to deal with another discrete topic, and  
11 it's this: Mr Taylor, when did you first become aware of the  
12 setting up of the Special Court for Sierra Leone?

13 A. Oh, I will put that somewhere - put that somewhere around  
14 2002, 2003. Maybe 2003 that I became aware that there was a

15:27:34 15 Court in Sierra Leone. I will put it to around 2003.

16 Q. When did you become aware that you were indicted?

17 A. June 2003.

18 Q. Where were you when you became acquainted with that fact?

19 A. Accra, Ghana.

15:27:55 20 Q. Prior to that, Mr Taylor, had you harboured any suspicion  
21 that you might indeed be indicted?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Do you recall being shown an ECOWAS document in which it  
24 was clearly stated by leaders of ECOWAS that individuals would be  
15:28:22 25 charged for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Do you  
26 recall that?

27 A. Yes, I recall that.

28 Q. Did that fact alert you to the possibility of your own  
29 indictment?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Now, during the period, Mr Taylor, 2002/2003, did you have  
3 an ambassador in Freetown?

4 A. I had a charge there.

15:29:01 5 Q. A what?

6 A. A charge in Freetown.

7 Q. Help me, I'm a novice in these things. What's the  
8 difference between a charge and an ambassador?

9 A. The charge is a second or third lower ranking official, but  
15:29:18 10 he runs the embassy in the absence of an accredited ambassador.

11 Q. Why no accredited ambassador in the neighbouring country of  
12 Sierra Leone?

13 A. Well, the charge felt that we had nominated one and we were  
14 trying to renovate the embassy. There had been an ambassador  
15:29:43 15 named and that was McDonald Bowen, but the embassy was destroyed  
16 during fighting in Freetown and we were still trying to renovate  
17 it, so we just kept the charge there.

18 Q. Why do governments have ambassadors overseas in other  
19 countries, Mr Taylor?

15:30:14 20 A. Actually, the ambassadors are representatives of the Head  
21 of State to the Head of State of that country for the purpose of  
22 maintaining ties with his government. There are those that  
23 believe that ambassadors represent countries in the way, but  
24 ambassadors actually represent the Head of State to the other  
15:30:46 25 Head of State to maintain diplomatic, business and other ties  
26 with that Head of State.

27 Q. Is the ambassador also your eyes and ears on the ground in  
28 that foreign country?

29 A. Oh, surely, yes.

1 Q. Now, I ask for this reason, Mr Taylor: If that be so,  
2 during 2002, early 2003, did not your charge d'affaires in  
3 Freetown alert you to the creation of a new court called, guess  
4 what, the Special Court for Sierra Leone?

15:31:40

5 A. Well, not me. Yes, it will go through the Foreign  
6 Ministry. Like I said, we did hear about the creation of the  
7 Court, yes.

8 Q. And did that not alert you to the possibility of your own  
9 indictment?

15:31:56

10 A. No. The Court, from all indications, what I got, was a  
11 Sierra Leonean court.

12 Q. Very well. I want to move on to another topic now,  
13 Mr Taylor, and it's this: Mr Taylor, as part of your team, have  
14 you had an individual with the title called an international

15:32:46

15 investigator?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Who was your first international investigator?

18 A. I went through a series of them. The first one is  
19 British - no, no, no, excuse me. The first international

15:33:08

20 investigator is Counsel Morris Anyah was first international  
21 investigator on the team.

22 Q. Who took over from him?

23 A. A British barrister, Kadiatu - Adiatu. Adiatu took over  
24 from him.

15:33:35

25 Q. Adiatu who?

26 A. What is Adiatu's - I've forgotten her last name. I'm sorry  
27 about that.

28 Q. Was she - is that --

29 A. She is Sierra Leonean.

1 Q. She is Sierra Leonean?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Who else, if any, have acted in that role?

4 A. After her, we brought on a senior Nigerian from a  
15:33:59 5 diplomatic ambassador, the late - may I just add, who served in  
6 Liberia during the crisis - Ambassador Joshua Iroha. That's  
7 spelt I-R-O-H-A, Iroha. Joshua Iroha.

8 Q. Now, you say he served in Liberia. In what capacity?

9 A. He was a senior Foreign Ministry official. He subsequently  
15:34:25 10 served as ambassador. He was also Nigerian ambassador to  
11 Brussels. He was a career diplomat.

12 Q. He was also Nigerian ambassador to where?

13 A. To Liberia. He served briefly. Before then he had served  
14 in Brussels. But he was on the ground throughout the entire  
15:34:46 15 Liberian crisis as a senior Foreign Ministry official in Liberia  
16 at the time, and he volunteered actually to work on the team  
17 because of his personal views that this was just going too far.

18 Q. Now, sadly, what happened to him?

19 A. Sadly, Ambassador Iroha died last - I think it was last  
15:35:13 20 year, at the very beginning or thereabouts.

21 Q. Thereafter, who became your international investigator?

22 A. We brought on board a senior United Nations - a former  
23 senior United Nations official, Ambassador Winston Tubman, who  
24 served in the legal department at the UN before accepting the job  
15:35:44 25 of special representative of the Secretary-General of the United  
26 Nations to Somalia, former presidential candidate of Liberia and  
27 an international lawyer.

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I'm asking you about these individuals in  
29 the context of many questions you were asked about the source of

1 various documents we have placed before this Court. Do you  
2 follow me?

3 A. Yes, I do.

15:36:23

4 Q. Now, just so that we get the picture, what was your  
5 understanding of the role of the international investigator?

6 A. My understanding, they were to go anywhere and everywhere  
7 to seek for and find, if possible, any and all documents that  
8 could assist this Court - [indiscernible] first in this Court in  
9 ascertaining the facts of this case.

15:36:56

10 Q. And help us. In discharge of that role, as far as you're  
11 aware, where did that fact-finding mission take your various  
12 international investigators?

13 A. Many places.

14 Q. Such as?

15:37:20

15 A. New York, the United Nations headquarters.

16 Q. What for?

17 A. To search for documents there and to obtain permission to  
18 get certain documents from headquarters.

19 Q. And was such permission obtained?

15:37:31

20 A. To the best of my knowledge, yeah. Some documents were  
21 obtained from the United Nations officially from my information  
22 given me. They went to ECOWAS headquarters in --

23 Q. Where is that?

24 A. In Abuja, Nigeria.

15:37:46

25 Q. To do what?

26 A. To obtain official ECOWAS documents; that would be  
27 communique, final communique and other works of ECOWAS. They  
28 were met with enthusiasm. The executive secretary of ECOWAS  
29 ordered the staff at ECOWAS to make available all requests made

1 by the Defence team. They travelled to --

2 Q. Who was the executive secretary of ECOWAS who was so  
3 magnanimous?

15:38:39

4 A. Dr Chambas, C-H-A-M-B-A-S, who still serves now as  
5 President of the ECOWAS - they have changed it since I've been  
6 here - of the ECOWAS commission. As President of the ECOWAS  
7 commission.

8 Q. Where else did they go?

15:39:01

9 A. Oh, they went to Addis Ababa, AU headquarters. They  
10 went --

11 Q. To where?

12 A. Addis Ababa.

13 Q. To which headquarters?

15:39:09

14 A. At that particular time it was the OAU, but the AU  
15 headquarters.

16 Q. Yes?

15:39:29

17 A. To check for information from there. They travelled to  
18 Sierra Leone in the offices of the Justice Minister, the former  
19 Vice-President's office, because it was suspected that he had a  
20 lot of information that had not been given to anybody. And I'm  
21 speaking about a gentleman called Mr Solomon, I think, Berewa or  
22 something.

23 Q. Can you help us with a spelling?

15:39:48

24 A. No, I'm sorry. Maybe your colleague on the other side may  
25 be able to help, but I don't know. But they travelled to the  
26 United States. Besides just New York, others went to Washington  
27 to talk to a former ambassador. They just went far and wide  
28 trying to solicit and get information.

29 Q. And as far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, were documents

1 obtained from these various locations?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And were these documents shown to you?

4 A. Yes.

15:40:35 5 Q. Spelling Berewa, B-E-R-E-W-A. Solomon being the first  
6 name. Now, the second aspect of this that I want to ask you  
7 about, Mr Taylor, is this: Who is Felix Downes-Thomas?

8 A. Felix Downes-Thomas is a retired career diplomat and United  
9 Nations civil servant that served as special representative of  
10 the Secretary-General accredited near Monrovia.

11 Q. For how long?

12 A. I would say close to three years he was there.

13 Q. Yes. And how did you get on with him, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Ambassador Thomas, as I said, is a career diplomat. He  
15:41:55 15 retired from the UN system after I think 30 years.

16 Q. After how many years?

17 A. I think about 30 years. I don't claim to know the exact  
18 number of years that you have to serve in the UN system before  
19 you retire and receive retirement, but he exhausted those years  
15:42:10 20 and retired honourably and he's on his retirement. We got along  
21 fine, he is West African and, you know, he got along well with  
22 Liberians and he understood the West African problem, so I got  
23 along with him pretty well.

24 Q. You do recall it being suggested to you that

15:42:49 25 Mr Downes-Thomas was your lackey. You recall that, don't you?

26 A. I recall that and I resent that with a degree of anger.  
27 Ambassador Thomas, a career man, who served all his life with the  
28 United Nations at various posts, to be brought down to a level of  
29 other people's own level I think is ridiculous.

1 Q. In particular, Mr Taylor, can we look, please, behind  
2 divider 24. This is MFI-398. Do you have it?

3 A. Yes, I do.

15:44:42

4 Q. Can we turn to page 14, please. Do you see the subheading  
5 "Relation with political actors, institutions and civil society"?  
6 Do you see that?

7 A. Yes, I do.

15:44:59

8 Q. "In the interests of respecting and preserving the  
9 sovereignty of the country, peace-building offices are  
10 established with the agreement of the elected authorities, and  
11 are intended to support the efforts of those authorities to  
12 foster national reconciliation and to establish a lasting peace.

13 This has presented representatives of the Secretary-General with  
14 a significant dilemma and a challenge; to what extent should they  
15 work independently with other - opposition and civil society -  
16 groups."

15:45:27

17 Pause there, Mr Taylor. That paragraph appears to be  
18 highlighting a potential tension inherent in the role of special  
19 representative. Do you agree with that?

15:45:50

20 A. I agree.

21 Q. And as far as you were aware, Mr Taylor, was  
22 Mr Downes-Thomas - did he appear to have the ability and capacity  
23 to deal with that tension?

24 A. Yes. I would say yes.

15:46:11

25 Q. "This has been interpreted to mean that the representative  
26 of the Secretary-General must work with all political actors, but  
27 must work particularly closely with government and especially the  
28 head of its Executive branch. It has involved a complex  
29 balancing act to avoid perceptions of partiality. Because of the

1 particular influence that a sitting government has on political  
2 and economic events, the representative of the Secretary-General  
3 has spent a disproportionate amount of time advising and  
4 sometimes providing frank opinions critical of government  
15:47:05 5 positions from behind the scenes. Perhaps inevitably, in order  
6 to preserve their effectiveness and influence, representatives of  
7 the Secretary-General must provide such advice in a confidential  
8 manner that can rarely, if ever, be divulged to the public or  
9 other political actors outside government. This has resulted in  
15:47:29 10 fairly frequent, if not fully justified, charges that the  
11 representative of the Secretary-General - and the United Nations  
12 by extension - are too closely associated with the government and  
13 even that they tend to favour the government."

14 Pause there. Mr Taylor, do you see anything in that  
15:47:53 15 paragraph which prevents a special representative from sharing  
16 with the government of the country in which he is placed his  
17 thoughts? Can you see anything which prohibits that in that  
18 paragraph?

19 A. No, I don't.

15:48:13 20 Q. Let us remind ourselves of the words:

21 "Representatives must provide such advice in a confidential  
22 manner that can rarely be divulged outside government."

23 So, Mr Taylor, when Mr Downes-Thomas provided you with  
24 copies of code cables which were being forwarded to UN  
15:48:45 25 headquarters in New York, help us: Was he prohibited from so  
26 doing, bearing in mind the contents of this paragraph, a document  
27 produced to this Court by the Prosecution?

28 A. Nothing could prohibit him, no. And I don't think he would  
29 have jeopardised his job if - even within the context of what

1 happened if he felt that he was doing something wrong. His job  
2 was more important, I think, than trying to destroy his family  
3 livelihood. So no.

4 Q. "Only in Liberia could such accusations - beyond being a  
15:49:27 5 matter for continuous monitoring - be a matter of legitimate  
6 concern. Indeed, UNOL was perceived by all those consulted to be  
7 too close to the government. Discussions with the staff of UNOL  
8 and the government alike suggested strongly that both the office  
9 and the government viewed the role of UNOL as being an  
15:49:57 10 intermediary between the government and the outside world, a role  
11 perhaps likely to be viewed as all the more important with the  
12 recent imposition of sanctions. Opposition parties, civil  
13 society organisations, and the press all indicated that they had  
14 virtually no interaction with the representative of the  
15:50:22 15 Secretary-General and UNOL, thereby seriously putting into  
16 question its objectivity as a political actor. Some went so far  
17 as to suggest that UNOL was an apologist for the government.  
18 Nevertheless, it was pointed out by both the representative of  
19 the Secretary-General and the government that on occasion the  
15:50:47 20 representative of the Secretary-General had delivered messages  
21 that were highly unpalatable to the government and that such  
22 interventions were not known by the other actors. Examples cited  
23 included insistence by UNOL on the destruction of a cache of arms  
24 contrary to the wishes of the government and the role that the  
15:51:14 25 representative of the Secretary-General played in the Camp  
26 Johnson incident."

27 Pause. Firstly, that reference to the destruction of a  
28 cache of small arms, Mr Taylor, tell us about that if you recall.

29 A. Yes. Well, we had captured some arms but, because there

1 was an agreement on the destruction of arms from the war, the  
2 view of the special representative and others were that these  
3 arms had to be destroyed because they formed a part of the arms  
4 that were never picked up during that particular time of  
15:52:05 5 disarmament. And we felt that we needed the arms, and it was a  
6 source of some tension.

7 Q. Now, this reference to the Camp Johnson Road incident and  
8 the role of the special representative, what's that about?

9 A. This must be referring to the September 1998 incident of  
15:52:34 10 Roosevelt Johnson trying to overthrow the government when he -  
11 and we've gone through that here, when he flees and is rescued at  
12 the United States embassy. The special representative played a  
13 very important role in shuttling between the mansion, the US  
14 embassy, and some of the other areas, to ECOMOG headquarters, to  
15:53:00 15 help to reduce tension.

16 Q. Bearing in mind that paragraph which was put to you by my  
17 learned friend, let us now seek to put this document in a wider  
18 context. First of all, help us with this: Can you recall now  
19 when special representative Downes-Thomas was assigned to  
15:53:28 20 Liberia?

21 A. Downes-Thomas came to Liberia I would say - Ambassador  
22 Thomas, I would put it to about '98. I will put it to around  
23 '98.

24 Q. '98?

15:53:50 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Now, let's go to the first page of this document MFI-398.  
27 Now, we see that this document is dated 20 July 2001. So  
28 Mr Downes-Thomas would have been in that role, if your  
29 recollection is right, somewhere in the region of three years?

1 A. That's why I said close to three years. I said around  
2 three years.

3 Q. Let's look at the third page now to understand what this  
4 document is that we're looking at. And we see "Introduction":

15:54:30

5 "A joint Department of Political Affairs/UNDP Review  
6 Mission undertook visits to the Central African Republic,  
7 Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Tajikistan during May and June 2001.  
8 Its objective was to assess the performance of the United Nations  
9 post-conflict peace-building offices, and to recommend changes to  
10 improve their operation and enhance effectiveness of the United  
11 Nations system as a whole in the consolidation of peace and  
12 stability in post-conflict environments.

15:55:03

13 Conditions prevailing in the four countries prior to the  
14 establishment of the offices varied considerably, although some  
15 similarities - a fractured society, broken-down economic

15:55:28

16 infrastructures and weak governance institutions - were evident  
17 in all. While the United Nations have little control over the  
18 post-conflict conditions in a country where a peace-building  
19 presence is being contemplated, it is possible to identify

15:55:52

20 certain minimum pre-conditions for the establishment and  
21 successful operation of such a presence. The instrument of a  
22 post-conflict peace-building support office was intended to be a  
23 transitional mechanism aimed at supporting national structures to  
24 consolidate peace and provide for an environment to help address  
25 the longer term structural causes of conflict.

15:56:18

26 The Review Mission considered the way the mandates of the  
27 peace-building offices have been implemented. This includes the  
28 transition that three of the four offices have been made from  
29 peacekeeping to peace-building operations, political challenges,

1 administrative issues, the value added to United Nations  
2 peace-building efforts at the country level, and relations  
3 between the peace-building offices and the country teams and  
4 other entities of the United Nations system. Whereas there is  
15:56:58 5 almost universal support for the core political functions  
6 undertaken by the representatives of the Secretary-General and  
7 peace-building offices, difficulties arise when peace-building  
8 offices become involved in operational activities which are  
9 traditionally the work of funds, programmes, and agencies,  
15:57:22 10 particularly in the absence of a peace-building strategy. To the  
11 extent possible, peace-building offices should be catalysts and  
12 facilitators rather than direct implementers."

13 Now, Mr Taylor, question number one: Were you made aware  
14 of this review being conducted in 2001?

15:57:53 15 A. No, I don't recall being told about this.

16 Q. Now, you will note from the first paragraph that those  
17 conducting this review mission, and sadly from this document we  
18 don't have their names or identities, made a visit to Liberia.  
19 Yes?

15:58:18 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, do you recall whether those who conducted this review  
22 spoke to any minister or department of your government?

23 A. I don't recall. They very well could have. I would not  
24 have - I don't recall, quite frankly. I don't recall. They very  
15:58:45 25 well could have spoken to them, because I can see if they talked  
26 to civil society, they very well could have. I don't recall.

27 Q. Because when we go back now to page 14 - and can we go back  
28 there, please - six lines from the top of that bottom paragraph:

29 "Opposition parties, civil society organisations and the

1 press all indicated that they had had virtually no interaction  
2 with the representative of the Secretary-General and UNOL,  
3 thereby seriously putting into question its objectivity as a  
4 political actor."

15:59:47 5 What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor?

6 A. I don't know what to make of this. My understanding of  
7 this is, given my knowledge of the Liberian situation where  
8 people expect a governor general and not a representative of the  
9 Secretary-General, I have some understanding of opposition,  
16:00:14 10 people in some civil society, people knowing the prevailing  
11 situation in Liberia, I can understand why they would say this,  
12 speaking to the investigators, that they had no contact. We have  
13 to be careful with the language in Liberia. When a Liberian man  
14 says, "I have not eaten," it does not mean he has not eaten any  
16:00:36 15 food. It probably means his stomach is not full. So I don't  
16 understand this, quite frankly.

17 So, you know, you have to be very careful in these  
18 countries when people are talking to you to understand what they  
19 are saying. They may have had some, but maybe they wanted -  
16:00:52 20 unless they see what they are proposing going on, they feel that  
21 they are not making an impact, and I guess I have some  
22 understanding for what is going on here.

23 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor. You've told us that  
24 Mr Downes-Thomas began his tour of duty in or about 1998, yes?

16:01:14 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Can you recall now when he left?

27 A. I would say somewhere - I will put it to late 2002 or early  
28 2003, because I know another guy comes in. Musa comes in. So I  
29 will put it to 2002, early 2003 or thereabouts.

1 Q. Now, bearing in mind, Mr Taylor, that what in effect was  
2 being suggested against you - against Mr Downes-Thomas was  
3 partiality on his part, yes?

4 A. That's what's being suggested here.

16:02:03 5 Q. Tell me, in July 2001, did you become aware of any steps by  
6 the United Nations to remove him?

7 A. No. That is internal to the UN. I did not have any idea.  
8 Because, you know, normally you have to think very carefully  
9 before you remove ambassadors. I had no idea that such changes  
16:02:36 10 were being contemplated.

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in light of the suggestion made to you  
12 about this career diplomat, I would like us now, please, to take  
13 a look at a couple of other documents, please. And can we start  
14 off, please, with - one moment. Yes. Behind divider 21, MFI-70.

16:03:55 15 Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. MFI-70. Now, this we see is an outgoing code cable dated  
18 30 January 1999, yes?

19 A. Yes.

16:04:08 20 Q. And it's from Mr Downes-Thomas to Prendergast at the United  
21 Nations in New York. And just remind us, who is Prendergast?

22 A. Prendergast is Under-Secretary-General.

23 Q. And, remember, we're looking at this document in light of  
24 the suggestion of partiality on the part of Mr Downes-Thomas. Do  
16:04:38 25 you follow me?

26 A. I do.

27 Q. So let us look at this and a couple of other documents with  
28 care. It's dated 30 January 1999:

29 "I refer to your code cable of 20 January which requested

1 my comments on a PANA news article" - what's PANA, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Pan-African News Agency.

3 Q. Thank you, Madam President:

4 "... article of 15 January 1999 on the withdrawal of

16:05:15 5 Nigerian ECOMOG contingent from Monrovia as well as my views on

6 the implications of that move on the security situation in

7 Liberia and on the ECOWAS/Liberia relationship. I have also

8 taken due note of the additional requests for my analysis of the

9 impact of developments in Sierra Leone on Liberia and on

16:05:36 10 relations between the two countries. I respond to these requests

11 and those related to UNOL's strategy and clarification of the use

12 of the term 'militia units' in the statement from the Ministry of

13 State for Presidential Affairs as follows:

14 Comments on PANA article.

16:05:59 15 Apart from the fact that the PANA article includes

16 observations by the Foreign Minister of Nigeria following his

17 meeting with special representative Okelo, it is basically a

18 journalistic precis of the attached statement as issued by the

19 Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The allegations against

16:06:24 20 Liberia that are contained in both the statement and the article

21 have been echoed consistently in other quarters and notably by

22 the ECOWAS ministerial meeting that was held in Abidjan on 28

23 December 1998. The recent frequency of these allegations,

24 combined with the apparent confidence with which they have been

16:06:50 25 made, would tend to suggest that they are based on material

26 evidence. Such evidence, however, is not known or available to

27 UNOL. It is worth noting that those who make these allegations

28 publicly have yet to provide their supporting evidence or

29 justifications publicly. This apparent reluctance to furnish

1 incontrovertible evidence of Liberian complicity promises to  
2 remain the enigmatic element in this saga of allegations and  
3 corresponding denials regarding Liberia's involvement in the  
4 Sierra Leonean crisis."

16:07:40 5 Now, Mr Taylor, you note that these sentiments are being  
6 expressed following a meeting on 28 December 1998, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Now, you've earlier told us, this morning, about a meeting  
9 between Liberia's representative to the United Nations and the  
10 President of the Security Council in 1998 which you say triggered  
11 the making of various allegations against Liberia. Do you recall  
12 telling us that?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. We see now that this is dated 30 January 1999.

16:08:20 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So this is after the Freetown invasion, yes?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. And at this point in time after the Freetown invasion we  
19 see that Mr Downes-Thomas, in his position as special  
16:08:41 20 representative, states three lines from the bottom of that  
21 paragraph:

22 "The apparent reluctance to furnish incontrovertible  
23 evidence of Liberian complicity promises to remain the enigmatic  
24 element in this saga of allegations."

16:08:59 25 Now tell us, Mr Taylor, was Mr Downes-Thomas doing you a  
26 favour because of his partiality to you --

27 A. No.

28 Q. -- in writing that paragraph in the way he has?

29 A. No, I don't think so. I don't see it that way.

1 Q. Had you influenced him to choose this wording?

2 A. No. No.

3 Q. How did you as President of Liberia view the role of the  
4 special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General?

16:09:39 5 A. One that was completely autonomous to the Government of  
6 Liberia's activities.

7 Q. What do you mean by "autonomous"?

8 A. I mean he was not part of our government. He represented  
9 the United Nations through the Secretary-General and so he owed  
16:09:51 10 no allegiance in any shape or form to the Liberian government.

11 Q. And such an individual, Mr Taylor, a representative of the  
12 United Nations, what criteria would you as President of Liberia  
13 expect to govern the content of any report he makes to his  
14 superiors in New York?

16:10:18 15 A. It would have to be faithful.

16 Q. What do you mean by that?

17 A. True and faithful. That is, in line with his duties he  
18 would tell the truth and he would advise based on his own  
19 knowledge of the situation on the ground and he would do it with  
16:10:37 20 faithfulness as a boss - I mean as someone who works with someone  
21 who will report to his boss.

22 Q. Just so that we understand, Mr Taylor, what is being  
23 suggested here by this Prosecution. To what use would the  
24 Secretary-General in New York, who is not on the ground in  
16:11:01 25 Monrovia - to what use would he put a report such as this?

26 A. This report would then be broken down and it would form a  
27 part of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council in  
28 his reports on different regions where he has been authorised by  
29 the council to look at, as the council will continue to remain

1 seized of the issue or issues in that country or region.

2 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. From your vantage point, if the  
3 special representative of the United Nations, as a consequence of  
4 some misplaced partiality, misinformed his superiors in New York,  
16:12:00 5 what would you consider the consequences of that as the leader of  
6 a nation?

7 A. Well, he would be - he would be dismissed immediately and,  
8 for a professional man, he would have lost his career. He would  
9 be dismissed.

16:12:16 10 Q. Let's go back to the document, please:

11 "In the meantime, the picture of purported RUF supporters  
12 is becoming crowded, if not unclear. From various reports on the  
13 situation in Sierra Leone, indications are that Burkina Faso,  
14 Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritania are in some way linked with the  
16:12:41 15 RUF's current operations. Ukrainians, Yugoslavs, Israelis and  
16 the ICRC" - what's that?

17 A. I would suppose this is the International Committee of the  
18 Red Cross.

19 Q. "... have also been reported to be actively supporting the  
16:13:03 20 RUF. Most recently, Sierra Leonean civilians in Freetown have  
21 been included in the pro-RUF list according to ECOMOG spokesman  
22 Colonel Olukolade, civilians in Freetown are actively  
23 collaborating with insurgents. If allegations about Liberian  
24 supply of fighters and war material to RUF are true, then one  
16:13:34 25 must conclude that either such supply antedate the recent events  
26 in Sierra Leone, or that the joint ECOMOG/Liberia monitoring of  
27 the closed Liberia-Sierra Leone border has been thoroughly  
28 ineffective."

29 Let us pause and look at that contradiction. What he is

1 saying is either the Liberians have gone in after the Freetown  
2 invasion or they have gone in despite the fact that ECOMOG and  
3 Liberia are monitoring the closed Sierra Leone border and that  
4 has been ineffective. Now, taking matters in turn, were ECOMOG  
16:14:28 5 and the Liberian authorities at this stage monitoring a closed  
6 Sierra Leone-Liberia border?

7 A. Yes. Liberian border was closed. Yes. They were  
8 monitoring it.

9 Q. And from where did the ECOMOG troops come who were involved  
16:14:51 10 in this operation?

11 A. Well, remember now this is in early 1999 that he's writing  
12 this, January, so the period in question is 1998 of the - so  
13 we're talking about units that are still in Liberia along the  
14 Liberian-Sierra Leone border, Bo and other places, that are  
16:15:16 15 monitoring the border.

16 Q. Okay. Now, Mr Taylor, remember we're looking at this  
17 document because it's been suggested that Mr Downes-Thomas was in  
18 your pocket. Do you follow me?

19 A. Yes, I do.

16:15:32 20 Q. Let's look at the next paragraph, 4:

21 "As a generalisation, it is fairly accurate to state that  
22 in the wake of ECOMOG's withdrawal, the Liberian population  
23 harbours concerns regarding the conduct of Liberian security  
24 agents. There are Liberians who hold the view that, in the  
16:15:53 25 absence of ECOMOG, Liberian security agents may become menacingly  
26 unruly. They are particularly apprehensive about the overall  
27 conduct of members of the Special Security Services whose modus  
28 operandi account for quite a number of human rights violations.  
29 A sense of insecurity is also felt within certain sections of the

1 international community and definitely by NGOs and by some  
2 members of the expatriate population in Liberia."

3 Mr Taylor, this man who was in your pocket, did you tell  
4 him to write that about your security services?

16:16:36 5 A. No, I did not. And if he were in my pocket he would not  
6 have written that.

7 Q. "ECOMOG has deployed its personnel primarily in Monrovia  
8 and, in that connection, more visibly at checkpoints in and along  
9 roadways leading to Monrovia."

16:16:57 10 Pause there. Where is White Flower located, Mr Taylor?

11 A. In Congo Town, near Monrovia.

12 Q. And to go from Congo Town in Monrovia to the Sierra Leone  
13 border, which routes are available?

14 A. There's just one. You have to come through Monrovia, then  
16:17:30 15 go through the famous checkpoint that's been mentioned in the  
16 evidence here, Klay, and then take a left into towards Sierra  
17 Leone border.

18 Q. Are there any other routes?

19 A. Oh, no. From White Flower, no - oh, you have to - from  
16:17:55 20 White Flower now if you wanted to go to the other side of Sierra  
21 Leone, that would take you from Monrovia, through Kakata, that's  
22 mentioned, Gbarnga, Zorzor, Voinjama, Kolahun --

23 Q. Yes, we know the route. But let's just pause for a minute  
24 and deal with this:

16:18:13 25 "ECOMOG had deployed its personnel primarily in Monrovia  
26 and, in that connection, more visibly at checkpoints in and along  
27 roadways leading to Monrovia."

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. From when had that been the situation?

1 A. Oh, for a long time. .from --

2 Q. What's a long time, Mr Taylor?

3 A. I would say as far back as - I would put it '95, '96 these  
4 points that ECOMOG has strategic entry into the outskirts of the  
16:18:53 5 city, they had put those checkpoints there over several years. I  
6 would put that all the way back to '95.

7 Q. Now the implication from this document is that from January  
8 1999 those checkpoints were still in place. Is that true?

9 A. Yes, the strategic checkpoints, yes.

16:19:10 10 Q. "However, concerns have been raised regarding the ability  
11 of government forces to contain organised violence anywhere in  
12 the country. The Camp Johnson Road area" --

13 MS HOLLIS: Unless I was not following I think Defence  
14 counsel left out a very important sentence after:

16:19:35 15 "ECOMOG had deployed personnel primarily in Monrovia and,  
16 in that connection, more visibly at checkpoints in and along  
17 roadways leading to Monrovia."

18 The next sentence that I have is:

19 "Liberian security officers have successfully taken over  
16:19:49 20 the manning of those checkpoints."

21 I'm not sure that sentence was read.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm not sure that counsel can be told  
23 what he may or may not read. I don't know what he wants to read  
24 Mr Griffiths?

16:20:04 25 MS HOLLIS: Well, it's misleading if it's not read if the  
26 point is ECOMOG is controlling the checkpoints, Madam President.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm happy to read it.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: He says he is happy to read it.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. "Liberian security officers have successfully taken over  
2 the manning of those checkpoints." When did that take place,  
3 Mr Taylor?

4 A. Oh, at the - I would say, oh, maybe by the middle - by the  
16:20:33 5 beginning of 1998 going onward the transformation started taking  
6 place. As ECOMOG started reducing her presence, Liberian  
7 security started taking over those points.

8 Q. "However, concerns have been raised regarding the ability  
9 of government forces to contain organised violence anywhere in  
16:20:54 10 the country. The Camp Johnson Road area, once a volatile section  
11 of Monrovia, has remained calm since the incidents of 18-19  
12 September 1998. Also, there is a generally shared view among  
13 Liberians that organised armed robberies and other forms of  
14 similar criminal activity, prevalent at an alarmingly high rate  
16:21:21 15 during the latter half of 1997, have been contained and reduced  
16 very significantly by the efforts of the government. Until now,  
17 the transition from ECOMOG-provided security to security provided  
18 by the Government of Liberia has been uneventful and smooth. It  
19 would not be surprising, however, if in the prevailing security  
16:21:49 20 situation within the sub-region the Government of Liberia is  
21 taking steps that would enable it to defend Liberia against  
22 externally perpetrated aggression."

23 Let us pause there:

24 "It would not be surprising, however, if in the prevailing  
16:22:12 25 security situation within the sub-region the Government of  
26 Liberia is taking steps that would enable it to defend Liberia  
27 against externally perpetrated aggression."

28 Now, Mr Taylor, this is being written in January 1999, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. "In this connection, it is probably useful to note that  
2 there is currently a new case load of 13,000 refugees camped in  
3 Guiglo, Cote d'Ivoire. This refugee population is reported to be  
4 composed basically of Liberians from the Krahn ethnic group. It  
16:22:56 5 also includes hundreds of Krahn military personnel who were  
6 previously with the Armed Forces of Liberia. There are,  
7 therefore, certain uncomfortable similarities between this  
8 situation and that of the Rwanda/Mudende camp.

9 The Government of Liberia has been silent on the specific  
16:23:20 10 matter of ECOMOG's withdrawal. The reason for this is probably  
11 twofold: One, any publicly expressed regrets about ECOMOG's  
12 withdrawal could conceivably constitute a telling statement on  
13 the Government of Liberia's capacity to guarantee security in  
14 Liberia and two, the Government of Liberia has probably come to  
16:23:44 15 terms with the reality that it has to shoulder the concomitant  
16 responsibilities of being independent and sovereign. Despite  
17 these speculations on my part, one can safely assume that for the  
18 Government of Liberia, the withdrawal of ECOMOG is an unwelcome  
19 move since the Government of Liberia itself had formally  
16:24:11 20 requested some form of ECOMOG's continued presence in Liberia.  
21 Relatedly, it is worth noting that ECOMOG's sudden withdrawal  
22 took place at a time when the Government of Liberia and ECOWAS  
23 were expected to conclude protocols that were to define the  
24 nature of the envisaged new relationship between the Government  
16:24:37 25 of Liberia and ECOMOG."

26 Paragraph 8 for completeness:

27 "The relationship between ECOWAS and Liberia is intricate  
28 and complex. Any valid generalisation of this relationship must  
29 be placed within a certain historical perspective and must take

1 into account the nature of the interactions between Liberia and  
2 Nigeria, which is a dominant force within ECOWAS. With regard to  
3 the historical perspective, the following succinct observations  
4 should suffice:

16:25:19 5 Nigeria led the campaign to organise a peacekeeping mission  
6 in Liberia, under the authority of ECOWAS. Taylor opposed  
7 intervention by ECOWAS/ECOMOG and vowed to resist it.

8 The NPFL fought to stop ECOMOG from landing in Liberia on  
9 24 August 1990. In response to the ECOWAS call for a ceasefire,  
16:25:45 10 Taylor countered by proposing an all Liberia conference, to be  
11 held inside Liberia, as a precondition to accepting ceasefire.

12 Taylor rejected the ECOWAS supported proposal for a  
13 triumvirate - an executive with three Presidents - as unrealistic  
14 and proceeded to establish his own government in Gbarnga.

16:26:09 15 Reportedly, President Babangida of Nigeria together with  
16 President Doe (the man Taylor sought to oust) had mutual  
17 commercial interests in Liberia. Together these Presidents owned  
18 the Liberian National Petroleum Company.

19 Following ECOMOG's successful establishment of a ceasefire,  
16:26:32 20 and the Yamoussoukro IV Agreement, ECOWAS recognised Sawyer as de  
21 jure President of Liberia while Taylor was treated as a rebel  
22 leader.

23 The implications of the above listed observations have  
24 intermittently reflected themselves in the relationship between  
16:26:55 25 the Government of Liberia and ECOWAS."

26 Now, Mr Taylor, pausing there. Bearing in mind we're  
27 conducting this exercise because of the suggestion that the  
28 writer of this document is partial, the five bullet points set  
29 out there, do you agree or disagree with them?

1 A. I agree with them.

2 Q. Yes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. From your vantage point, is that a fair assessment of your  
16:27:26 5 position on those various things?

6 A. At the time in question that he is mentioning, yes, he is  
7 speaking - he brought up the rear from 1990. That's - that's the  
8 fact as - these are the facts as they exist at that time.

9 Q. Paragraph 9: "In the context of more recent events, it  
16:27:49 10 would appear that, with regard to the ECOWAS/Liberia  
11 relationship, all is not well. Nigeria, the most powerful member  
12 of ECOWAS, led the onslaught of allegations against Liberia in  
13 connection with the situation in Sierra Leone. Ghana, a  
14 significantly influential member of ECOWAS, is reported to have  
16:28:13 15 viewed Liberia's alleged support to RUF as a 'stab in the back of  
16 ECOWAS.'" You've seen that phrase?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Who is supposed to have uttered those words?

19 A. It was said that Jerry Rawlings said that. If the  
16:28:37 20 allegations were true, it was Jerry Rawlings.

21 Q. Right. "The ministerial meeting of ECOWAS, held in Abidjan  
22 on 28 December, roundly denounced Liberia for complicity with the  
23 RUF. In this light, Liberia appears as a pariah within ECOWAS.

24 This notwithstanding, there have been attempts within the  
16:29:00 25 sub-regional groups to enlist Liberia in efforts aimed at finding  
26 a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Sierra Leone. To this  
27 end, it should be noted that immediately following the formal  
28 session of the 28 December meeting in Abidjan, ECOWAS convened in  
29 a very closed, if not secret, session where it was reported that:

1 (a) Liberia, along with Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, was asked  
2 to play a role in section with the 'Foday Sankoh (RUF) aspect' in  
3 the Sierra Leone problem; and (b), the Foreign Minister of Cote  
4 d'Ivoire expressed suspicion about the intentions behind the fact  
16:29:52 5 that the request (a) above was not made during the earlier formal  
6 session but done, as it were, in camera and, because of his  
7 suspicions, he advised that unless he heard directly from the  
8 ECOWAS chairman, he would be unable to undertake the assignment.  
9 Subsequently, the ECOWAS chairman made contact with the Ivorian  
16:30:17 10 Foreign Minister which led to the ECOWAS peace initiative on  
11 Sierra Leone."

12 Now, Mr Taylor, again let us pause here. Do you recall  
13 that closed session?

14 A. Yes.

16:30:36 15 Q. And is it true that the decision marked (a) here was made?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. We'll come back to that tomorrow morning.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, this is an appropriate time to end  
19 the day. The tape has run out.

16:30:57 20 Mr Taylor, I remind you not to discuss your evidence.

21 Proceedings are adjourned to tomorrow, 9.30 a.m.

22 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.

23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 17 February 2010

24 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	35030
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GRIFFITHS	35030