



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 16 JULY 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr William Romans
Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr James Supuwood

1 Thursday, 16 July 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:31:07 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances
6 first, please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, Maja Dimitrova and myself Brenda J
09:31:37 10 Hollis.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, your Honours, Mr President,
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay
14 Griffiths assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah and
09:31:52 15 Clir Supuwood. Whilst I am on my feet, Mr President, can I raise
16 a very short matter.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: It's merely this: We appreciate that we are
19 now moving a lot faster than we anticipated and I hope the Court
09:32:11 20 will be pleased to hear that. We will slow down when we get to
21 the critical time period because of the weight of documentation
22 we will have to deal with at that stage. But one consequence of
23 us moving faster is the timing of disclosure of exhibits and that
24 two-week time frame, so that sadly we have now reached a point
09:32:41 25 where we may well reach exhibits for which the Prosecution have
26 not had their allotted two weeks notice.

27 Now, because of the logistical problems that this raises,
28 what we've decided to do is this: We will serve on the
29 Prosecution by close of play today all exhibits on the current

1 exhibits list. They will be served today and they will also be
2 served in chronological order, which is essentially the order in
3 which we will be using them, so that they will be by date and
4 year in that order so that the Prosecution can essentially
09:33:30 5 appreciate the way in which we will be moving through those
6 documents.

7 Now, we've circulated to all concerned an email outlining
8 what we propose to do and we do hope, frankly, that, with a
9 degree of flexibility by all parties, we may be able to approach
09:33:54 10 that two-week disclosure period with some kind of indulgence for
11 the Defence which allows the trial to proceed without any major
12 adjournments or hiccups.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. I have noted
14 those and we do have a copy of that email you referred to as
09:34:19 15 well.

16 Mr Taylor, I remind you that you are still bound by your
17 declaration that you have taken to tell the truth. Go ahead,
18 Mr Griffiths.

19 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

20 [On former affirmation]

21 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

22 Q. Yesterday afternoon, Mr Taylor, when we adjourned for the
23 evening we had dealt with your dealings with President Momoh in
24 Sierra Leone. Do you recall that?

09:34:47 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. And we will of course return to your dealings with him when
27 we come to 1991, but I now want to pick up the account in or
28 around 1988/'89. Now, at that stage, were you still resident in
29 Burkina Faso?

1 A. Yes, I was.

2 Q. And help us. Who was the President of Burkina Faso at that
3 time?

4 A. Blaise Compaore.

09:35:32 5 Q. And what were your relations with him like?

6 A. Very good. We became very good friends because I had
7 stayed in Burkina Faso since my expulsion, I will call it, from
8 Ghana and so we had grown to be very good friends.

9 Q. What was the availability of travel from Ouagadougou to
09:36:08 10 Tripoli?

11 A. There were regular weekly flights from Ouagadougou to
12 Tripoli provided by the Russian airline Aeroflot and so it was
13 very easy at least twice a week to travel between Ouagadougou and
14 Tripoli.

09:36:39 15 Q. By let's say the middle of 1988, how many men did you have
16 then training in Libya?

17 A. The full 168 men were on the ground in Libya by that time.

18 Q. Now, did you consider that number, 168, as being capable of
19 carrying out your project?

09:37:05 20 A. No, not at all.

21 Q. So how did you plan on using such a small number of men?

22 A. Excuse me, your Honour. The whole process of having men
23 stay in Libya for two years, as I've mentioned previously to the
24 Court, was to have them train not just as soldiers, but as
09:37:38 25 revolutionaries knowing very well not just the art of war, but
26 how to deal with civilians, how to treat the citizenry in
27 particular and how to remain the what we call eyes and ears of
28 the revolution.

29 So our plan then was to train these whole men, may I say,

1 and whole I mean in all aspects: the civilian administration,
2 being military and being able to handle and understand the
3 intricacies of what is necessary if we were lucky to take power
4 that there would not be any excesses. They would then go into
09:38:37 5 the country and because of the sympathy that existed on the
6 ground, and may I say on an extreme level maybe the desire to
7 maybe fight back at Samuel Doe, they would be in a position to
8 take control. So one special force commander, we call them
9 commandos, was capable of handling on his own. Now, let me --

09:39:04 10 Q. Of doing what?

11 A. Of handling on his own. Let me explain what I mean by
12 handling on his own. As we got into the country and spread, I
13 could send one special force commando to a region and he was
14 capable of organising, identifying people capable of being
09:39:27 15 trained militarily, looking at the civilian administration and
16 being able to practically serve as a type of administrator on his
17 own without having to get that day-to-day instructions from
18 central headquarters. So that is why it took them so long. It
19 was a partial academic training, may I say, military training,
09:39:54 20 administrative. Everything was put into these Special Forces.

21 Q. Now, when did you start moving those men out of Libya?

22 A. By I would say the second quarter of 1989 we started moving
23 them out of Libya.

24 Q. To where?

09:40:28 25 A. Into Burkina Faso.

26 Q. And where were they being housed and accommodated in
27 Burkina Faso?

28 A. Because of the sheer size and number of them, we had
29 requested a place outside of the capital Ouagadougou where they

1 could stay and probably do some work. By work I mean a little
2 farming, because let me just clarify one thing here. By the time
3 these men are about to move we are desperate.

09:41:13 4 What do I mean by desperate? Remember I explained to the
5 Court we have not gotten yet a firm okay to move arms that we had
6 been promised but had not received to Sierra Leone because of
7 what I explained of the ambivalence on the part of Momoh and his
8 own fear of what I explained of having such a large amount of
9 arms come into the country.

09:41:40 10 Burkina Faso is available, but they really can't help
11 because they don't share a border with Liberia. The men are in
12 Libya, the training is over and they are now anxious to move.
13 Everyone is just jittery about moving. So the only solution is
14 to move them into Burkina Faso and then provide - ask for a place
09:42:08 15 that they could stay and do a little bit of farming at a
16 subsistence level for themselves until something could be worked
17 out. By something I mean that a mechanism was put into place to
18 move them to their objective.

19 Q. Right. So that is the second quarter of 1989?

09:42:36 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And were they moved in one go, or did they gradually move
22 into Burkina Faso?

23 A. They were moved, to be exact, I would say in about three to
24 four groups.

09:42:59 25 Q. And help us, who was paying for the transport from Libya to
26 Burkina Faso?

27 A. The transportation was paid for by the Mataba. That is the
28 Libyan government, I would say.

29 Q. And whilst in Burkina Faso, how much contact did you have

1 with them?

2 A. By "them" are you referring to the men?

3 Q. To the men?

4 A. Oh, I had all contacts with them. I am living in Burkina
09:43:32 5 Faso before and I am back in Burkina Faso, so they are taken out
6 of town to a place where they could do a little bit of
7 subsistence farming but I visited them regularly.

8 Q. Now those men who moved from Libya to Burkina Faso, what
9 nationality were they?

09:43:57 10 A. They were all Liberians.

11 Q. Did either Foday Sankoh or Dr Manneh provide logistics for
12 the move to Burkina Faso?

13 A. No, no, no, no. At the time Dr Manneh was himself
14 scrambling to get something done, neither he nor I knew Foday
09:44:25 15 Sankoh. So, no, in fact they needed help - he needed help
16 himself.

17 Q. So was there any kind of cooperation between you and either
18 of those two men regarding this issue --

19 A. No.

09:44:40 20 Q. -- of movement?

21 A. Movement not at all, no. In fact, on the Sierra Leonean
22 side I mentioned to the Court that the Sierra Leonean group that
23 was in Libya left before the Liberian group, long before the
24 Liberian group. The only person that was in Burkina Faso, as we
09:45:05 25 moved in, was Kukoi Samba Sanyang, the Gambian leader.

26 Q. Now did they know, that is Sankoh and Dr Manneh, that you
27 were moving your men from Libya to Burkina Faso?

28 A. No, I keep hearing the word - the name Sankoh. Sankoh is
29 not in the picture. I don't know him. He - in fact Kabbah, Ali

1 Kabbah, has disappeared with his men several months before the
2 Liberian movement, so the only person that is aware as we are in
3 Burkina Faso and moving is Dr Manneh who has his little group of
4 men already on the ground in Burkina Faso.

09:45:54 5 Q. So did you consult with anyone at all about the movement of
6 these men from Libya to Burkina Faso?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So who did you consult with?

9 A. The President of Burkina Faso. He is the only one that I
09:46:10 10 consulted. I had to get his agreement - his okay - to move the
11 men back into Burkina Faso. He was explained to - in fact he
12 knew the difficulties we were running into and expressed some
13 sympathy for what we were going through, but there was very
14 little that he could do except help with our lodging because he
09:46:36 15 didn't have the type of arms and ammunition that would have
16 helped us to go into Liberia.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you had told us yesterday about the other
18 organisers of the NPFL. Did you consult with them about this
19 movement?

09:46:53 20 A. Oh, yes. Ellen knew. Tom Womeiyu knew. When you talk -
21 when you use the - I am sorry if the Court got confused. When
22 you say consulted, they were informed. Discussions occurred. I
23 interpreted consultations in a little different way, but they
24 were informed and aware because they were part of the
09:47:19 25 organisation and did not necessarily need consultations because
26 they were a part of the whole planning process for movement. So
27 I am sorry if I misunderstood what you said.

28 Q. And help us, did either of those two visit with you and the
29 men whilst you were in Burkina Faso?

1 A. Yes.

2 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, this entire line of questioning
3 has been leading in the sense it's calling for yes or no answers,
4 it includes in the question suggestions as to the answers and we
09:47:54 5 would ask that Defence counsel ask open ended non-leading
6 questions.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I totally disagree, Mr President. I suggest
9 it's not leading at all, because none of my questions have
09:48:09 10 suggested the answer I submit.

11 [Trial Chamber conferred]

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, we will overrule you, Ms Hollis. Go
13 ahead, Mr Griffiths.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:48:35 15 Q. How did you supply the men whilst they were in Burkina
16 Faso?

17 A. Well let me just ask the time of the Court. I had not
18 answered your question did either of the two go to Burkina Faso,
19 yes. Tom Woveiyu visited us in Burkina Faso. Ellen did not
09:48:59 20 while we were in Burkina Faso. She visited at another time at
21 another place, but I will wait for that part.

22 Q. Now, how did you provide for the men whilst they were in
23 Burkina Faso?

24 A. While in Burkina Faso the Mataba, knowing our dilemma,
09:49:29 25 continued to assist with a little bit of money - by a little bit
26 of money I mean a few thousand dollars, \$3,000/\$5,000 - but the
27 government of Burkina Faso at the time helped to provide some
28 basic food stuff as sustenance to the men.

29 Q. And at this stage did you have any supplies of arms and

1 ammunition?

2 A. None whatsoever. In fact this --

3 MS HOLLIS: We are going to object again. This is more
4 than directing the witness. This is indicating what - that in
09:50:11 5 fact he is talking about supplies. He is directing it. He is
6 asking for yes or no answers. He is not asking for explanations.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well what I see in these questions, even
8 though we are now outside the indictment period, is an attempt to
9 answer in context the allegations in the indictment.

09:50:39 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Precisely.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, and as my learned friend Justice
12 Sebutinde says and also the Prosecution evidence to the contrary.
13 So I will overrule the objection and I will allow the question.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful.

09:50:59 15 THE WITNESS: No, we had no arms and neither did we have
16 any ammunition. Let me just remind the Court that one of the
17 reasons why we are in this mess - and by mess I mean not going
18 straight to Liberia - is because we don't have the means to go.
19 Here is Momoh willing but hedging, Burkina Faso does not have the
09:51:30 20 arms and ammunition necessary to carry out the objective and so
21 we are just stuck and have to wait for a mechanism because second
22 to that without the arms and ammunition we can't enter Liberia
23 just that way. So we did not have anything at this time and that
24 is the cause of the delay in Burkina Faso.

09:51:59 25 Q. Now, yesterday you told us that there was another group of
26 Liberians in Libya. Do you recall telling us that?

27 A. Yes, I did.

28 Q. And they were under the control of whom?

29 A. Dr Henry B Fahnbulleh had taken them to Libya.

1 Q. What had happened to those men?

2 A. At some point during the training the group that he had
3 taken to Libya was apparently very small. I do not know the
4 quantity, but a question arose at the Mataba as to the capacity
09:52:41 5 for his men to be able to stage any successful revolution in
6 Liberia and, secondly, the wisdom in having two competing
7 Liberian groups in Libya at the same time.

8 Now, the reason why I know his group was smaller is because
9 a decision was taken that the two groups should come together and
09:53:06 10 that their group should join our group because their group was
11 smaller. And I am using "smaller" just in that sense because I
12 don't know the numbers. But because their group was said to be
13 smaller I have to say that it was less than 168.

14 Dr Fahnbulleh did not agree. In fact, we had not sat to
09:53:30 15 discuss this. He and I did not meet while we were there. And
16 so, the group broke up.

17 Two persons that were attached to his group decided that
18 they would not leave. They would join the NPFL. The two - one
19 was, and I am saying was, because he is deceased, was called
09:54:04 20 Putu, that's P-U-T-U, Putu Major, that's M-A-J-O-R. The second
21 is Paul Nimely, who is presently in Liberia - decided that they
22 would join us and this is what brought the total up to now,
23 instead of - we've been using the total of 168 in terms of the
24 final number, but it was 166 plus two that led to the 168. So
09:54:40 25 I've used in 168 in looking at the total NPFL at the time, but I
26 think it's appropriate now that we explained that it grew to 168
27 as a result of these two that were connected to Dr Fahnbulleh
28 joining the NPFL instead of leaving the training programme.

29 Q. Now, what was the relationship like, Mr Taylor, between you

1 and your men?

2 A. Well, I would say bittersweet, more sweet than bitter, and
3 let me explain what I mean by this. While we were in training -
4 and by we I mean the NPFL. Let me note here that I did not take
09:55:35 5 any military training. A little group within the NPFL decided
6 that they would use me, put the revolution together. They had
7 already said to me - remember I explained to this Court that the
8 decision for the leadership of the NPFL was made by the men and
9 there was an agreement I mentioned to this Court that upon the
09:56:13 10 completion of the revolution I would be President, but one of
11 them should be Vice-President. And I will explain later how
12 Moses Blah became Vice-President, not because of any big
13 qualification but because of that promise.

14 They decided - by "they" that little group in the NPFL
09:56:33 15 decided that great, we want to do this but when we get on the
16 ground and succeed to a particular point we will kill him. Since
17 one of us will be Vice-President we will have everything in our
18 hands. Most of them did not agree. This story broke up and a
19 bunch of them were found to be involved in this conspiracy.
09:56:58 20 Those that were found and even disciplined on the base included a
21 gentleman called Anthony Mekunagbe. That name has come through -
22 it's on the records. There was Oliver Varney. There was the
23 late also Samuel Varney. You also had another one called Timothy
24 Mulibah. Also a part of that group was a gentleman called Yegbeh
09:57:35 25 Degbon. That is also on the record. That name has come forward.
26 These are the individuals that formed this little gang. They
27 were dealt with on the base by being punished, but as we go
28 further we will know that they still harboured this intention as
29 the revolution started.

1 Q. What do you mean as we go forward?

2 A. Well, once we get into Liberia something unfolds and I am
3 not sure I want to jump the gun here, but something unfolds
4 because that group kicks into motion and begins planning all over
09:58:16 5 and they are caught and that group of generals that was brought
6 forward here by the Prosecution, including the Oliver Varney, the
7 Mekunagbe, they end up being tried and executed in Liberia. That
8 is what I mean as we go forward, so we will get to that.

9 Q. Okay. Now, as far as you are aware, was the Doe regime
09:58:48 10 aware of your presence in Burkina Faso?

11 A. I, based on my - and I make this statement based on my own
12 knowledge of intelligence. I would just say he should have
13 known. It would have been - it would have been silly if he
14 didn't know because of the time that it had taken, and knowing
09:59:16 15 that some people, by some people I mean the group that we left in
16 La Cote d'Ivoire - by group I mean some of the names like Duopu,
17 Nyuan, and all of these, Harry Nyuan, had all not gone. There
18 was, I can say, that distinct possibility that he should have
19 known.

09:59:35 20 Q. Now, you've already told us of an attempt by the Doe regime
21 to extradite you from the United States?

22 A. That's right.

23 Q. Was that the only attempt he made to extradite you?

24 A. No. As I was arrested in Sierra Leone by the late
09:59:58 25 inspector of police Bambi Kamara, that news had spread that I had
26 been picked up in Sierra Leone. Doe requested at that time that
27 I be sent back to Liberia.

28 Q. Any other attempt?

29 A. Not that I can recollect at this particular time.

1 Q. So let's go to Burkina Faso then. How long did your men
2 remain in Burkina Faso?

3 A. From the second quarter of '89 up until I would say the
4 about the beginning of the fourth quarter of '89. That is I
10:00:51 5 would put it to around October. We had gotten very desperate.
6 Things had not changed. There appeared to be no way and we were
7 within inches of losing the men. Some of them were threatening
8 to leave. So we decided to leave on or about I would say the
9 middle to the end of October.

10:01:19 10 Q. And went where?

11 A. We decided to spread in La Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea. Those
12 that were from the Mahn or the Mano ethnic group could go to
13 Guinea. Those from the Dan ethnic group could go to La Cote
14 d'Ivoire. And, for your Honours, you have the Dan ethnic group
10:01:57 15 predominantly in La Cote d'Ivoire, also in Liberia, and the Mahn,
16 which are the Manos, are also in Liberia and mostly in Guinea.
17 So the Mahns are more closely attached to the Guinean side of the
18 border and the Dans are more attached to the Dans on the Ivorian
19 side.

10:02:22 20 So we tried to break them up and put them back into these
21 countries to begin doing minor work while we continued to fight
22 to see if we could find locally, and by locally, I mean from
23 security groups and friends - if we could get - you know, maybe
24 buy a few rifles to at least start something, because these men
10:02:50 25 were well trained and they kept saying to me: "Chief, look, we
26 are trained. We will go in without weapons if we have to and we
27 will have to get weapons even if we have to steal them from the
28 army until we get sufficient". So they were anxious and so we
29 split them up in these countries to just stay low and see if we

1 could work something.

2 In the meantime I obtained a few thousands dollars from the
3 Mataba that would have assisted us if we found such sympathy
4 amongst the securities either of the Guinean side of the border
10:03:30 5 or the Ivorian side that we could in fact buy a few rifles if
6 they were available.

7 Q. So how long did this particular period of dispersal last
8 for?

9 A. It lasted for close to two months and that is as of late
10:04:01 10 October, or thereabouts, all November and most of December. By
11 most of December, if the Court recognises, we launched the
12 revolution on the 29th, so that's almost I would say a full two
13 months. So we had pushed and pushed and set a date that come
14 hell or high waters we would have to do something on that date
10:04:31 15 and so we were in that area for close to two months.

16 Q. And what were you doing during that period?

17 A. I would say sweating blocks of ice. I was under so much
18 pressure. I couldn't afford to lose the men and they were on my
19 back door. I was under tremendous pressure, moving around,
10:05:00 20 visiting them surreptitiously, going in and trying to stay in
21 contact, you know, to get something going, between Burkina Faso,
22 La Cote d'Ivoire. I did not go into Guinea. I would come into
23 La Cote d'Ivoire. And these men were not concentrated, I am
24 using the general name La Cote d'Ivoire - not in Abidjan area.

10:05:26 25 They were concentrated on the Ivorian-Liberian border in a major
26 town called Bin-Houye. I think that's B-E-I-N and I think it's
27 H-U-E-I. It's a French word. If we have got a map I am sure we
28 will find it. It's Bin-Houye. These are all Gio towns spread
29 across the border and so - but I was moving up and down during

1 that particular period, trying to get things to work and finally
2 resulted to unorthodox tactics to get the revolution started.

3 Q. And what was that?

10:06:10

4 A. We had to end up buying hunting guns, shotguns, 12 gauge
5 shotguns, and shotguns shells in La Cote d'Ivoire that was
6 available on the regular market.

7 Q. How many of those were you able to buy?

10:06:39

8 A. We bought a total of three shotguns and a lot of shotguns
9 shells. The whole point was then what to do with these three
10 shotguns. It was decided that, look, there was an army post of
11 not more - I would speculate not more than about a platoon,
12 that's about 44 men and probably not up to about 50. The whole
13 point was that we would attack that post, get the ammo dump, by
14 that I mean where the armoury was kept, and use those weapons to
15 begin. Now, at that outpost --

10:07:13

16 Q. Where was that?

17 A. In the town of Gbutuo, that is on the records here -
18 Gbutuo, right on the Liberia-Ivorian border. And that was the
19 strategy. It was a very risky one. Quite frankly, I didn't
20 believe it would work. But, like I said, these men were well
21 trained and they had the confidence and were very brave men and
22 so we decided to use that method. But we also put into place a
23 second plan and that is what we are going to get to. We did not
24 just - that was one of about three plans put into place.

10:07:33

25 Q. Well, tell us about the others, please?

10:07:59

26 A. While we were in training we had established contact with
27 some of the Mahn and Dan ethnic members of the Armed Forces of
28 Liberia that were stationed both in the capital of Monrovia and
29 at Camp Schefflein. We sent regular messages into Liberia. In

1 fact, one of the guys that was being trained as a special force
2 came periodically from Libya and went into Liberia, so there was
3 a group within the Armed Forces of Liberia that was aware of this
4 operation taking place.

10:08:55 5 We also made some contacts at Camp Naama. That is on the
6 records also, N-A-A-M-A, in Bong County. We had in our midst a
7 former colonel of the Armed Forces of Liberia, Colonel Samuel
8 Varney. Varney was a trained veteran of about 25/30 years of the
9 armed forces. Now, Camp Naama served as the artillery base in
10:09:35 10 the Republic of Liberia. Naama is about the largest military
11 base in Liberia. It hosted the artillery command and the then
12 engineering command of the Armed Forces of Liberia. Now,
13 Colonel Varney once commanded that base and had sympathy and
14 respect amongst the officers on that base.

10:10:06 15 Now, what we did was we sent him with that Guinean
16 delegation on that operation - I am using the word "delegation",
17 sorry, with that Guinean group, and their job was to try to get
18 in on the base, find some of the loyalists to Colonel Varney and
19 use them to start and take over Camp Naama.

10:10:37 20 The third part of this was to send into Monrovia, both at
21 the Barclay Training Centre and Camp Schefflein, some of our
22 Special Forces that would be at those bases with their contacts
23 that once the operation started on the border we anticipated that
24 the Naama and the Gbutuo operation would take place. That would
10:11:12 25 draw the Armed Forces of Liberia to begin to move reinforcement
26 out of the city to the border. Those Special Forces in town and
27 their collaborators would then seize Schefflein and BTC, which
28 meant a very quick operation. This is how it was planned.

29 Unluckily for us we had - and I don't want to be held to

1 specific numbers. It has been a long time. But we sent into
2 Monrovia about a command or platoon of about 44 men. They were
3 divided into those two areas. Unsuccessfully for us, as the men
4 were infiltrating into Monrovia some of them had reached their
10:12:04 5 targets. They did not go in a group of a platoon. It would be
6 silly. It took us several days to infiltrate them by the twos,
7 by the threes, different - it may have taken us almost a week to
8 infiltrate the men in there.

9 The last group, as they were going into the city, some way
10 somehow as information sometimes will leak the security picked it
11 up and some of these men were arrested immediately, a few of them
12 killed and the rest of them commenced exposing the plan,
13 confessing. Even those that had already reached their
14 destination at both Camp Schefflein and the Barclay Training
10:12:56 15 Centre were very much in danger and they too began to scatter and
16 trying to find their way back to the border to join the group
17 that was supposed to attack Gbutuo.

18 The group that was on their way to Camp Naama --

19 Q. From where?

10:13:19 20 A. From la Cote d'Ivoire through Guinea. They were already in
21 Guinea, leaving to get to Camp Naama, and they had to travel all
22 the way near a town in Guinea called Nzerekore.

23 Q. Spell that.

24 A. I am sorry, I am going to need some help from the Court on
10:13:41 25 this one. That is in Guinea. It's a border town in Guinea.

26 Q. Pronounce it again for us, please.

27 A. Nzerekore.

28 Q. Nzerekore.

29 A. Unlucky for us a trained soldier sometimes is good, but

1 sometimes he can be stupid. The way they moved and behaved there
2 were other soldiers there that looked at these guys and said,
3 "But you guys look a little different. I mean, your movements
4 are movements of military people." And what happened to those
10:14:25 5 boys that was explained to me later is there is a trick that I
6 think military people use. At the back of the foot, behind the
7 heel, a soldier can be picked up almost immediately. It's a
8 little darkened because of the wearing of the boots. That was
9 the inspection that was carried out on them and they saw the dark
10:14:46 10 spot between the heel, coming up to the ankle. They said, "But
11 you guys should have been in military training", and they ended
12 up arresting most of them and so that part of the plan had
13 failed.

14 The only other thing that was left was Gbutuo and these men
10:15:03 15 successfully went into Gbutuo and successfully are led by Prince
16 Johnson.

17 Q. How many men?

18 A. By this time the group that went to Gbutuo I would say was
19 about a platoon and a half, around 60 plus men. Not more than a
10:15:19 20 platoon and a half, because remember I said we had spread these
21 men. There were only 168 men and we had spread them out.

22 They successfully captured Gbutuo and it took another full
23 day to two for those that were fleeing Monrovia. Imagine having
24 to escape from Monrovia. There is only one road from Monrovia
10:15:45 25 all the way up country through Gbarnga to the border. Some of
26 them had to be avoiding security checkpoints. In fact, it took
27 some of the boys almost up to a week to finally get back to their
28 units. By this time the units have captured Gbutuo and have
29 started advancing inward and so those boys reached.

1 The group in Guinea we had to use some of their friends
2 that they knew, because remember I said they had been sent into
3 Guinea with the Mahn ethnic individuals that they knew. They all
4 started putting pressures in, "These are our family people. They
10:16:27 5 are not soldiers", so eventually I would say within five to seven
6 days they were released.

7 So what happens is everyone started moving back to La Cote
8 d'Ivoire and by this time everybody knows that the troops are
9 moving, so I would say by the second week almost the entire unit
10:16:49 10 is now together and moving in the country.

11 Q. When you say "entire unit", how many men are we talking
12 about?

13 A. I am talking about approximately - the unit now I would say
14 about one hundred and I would say fifty, because the rest of the
10:17:07 15 men some of them are serving as security to me hiding out in La
16 Cote d'Ivoire.

17 Q. So you are in La Cote d'Ivoire at that time?

18 A. Oh, definitely. I don't go in with the men. I am not a
19 soldier, so I don't go in.

10:17:25 20 Q. Where in La Cote d'Ivoire?

21 A. I was in Bin-Houye.

22 Q. So who was actually directing operations at the front line?

23 A. We initially had chosen a gentleman, late now, by the name
24 of Isaac Musa. He turned out to be not able, or maybe he didn't
10:17:53 25 have the stomach, to carry out the operation and immediately a
26 very professional soldier, Prince Johnson, who before joining the
27 NPFL was a trained member of the Armed Forces of Liberia, Prince
28 Johnson immediately moved forward and led the operation that
29 captured Gbutuo. And then once the information got to me I just

1 authorised him to continue to hold over the command of the unit
2 since Isaac Musa had retreated and was with me now in La Cote
3 d'Ivoire, so Prince Johnson was ordered by me to hold the command
4 of the unit.

10:18:40 5 Q. What was Prince Johnson like?

6 A. Well, first of all Prince is now a senator in the Republic
7 of Liberia. He is there. Prince Johnson is, or was then, a
8 professional soldier and a disciplinarian. A very, very tough
9 and professional soldier, I would say, and tough to the point
10:19:06 10 that maybe sometimes he went a little overboard, but he was very
11 professional.

12 Q. What do you mean he went a little overboard?

13 A. Before the NPFL launched its revolution in Liberia, there
14 was what is called in the military an operational order. That
10:19:30 15 operational order laid down in black and white and spelt out the
16 behaviour and compartmentation of the men as military people;
17 what they could do and what they could not do. That operational
18 order was strict and it was clear to them that who did not follow
19 that operational order would be court-martialled and would be
10:19:56 20 dealt with.

21 Now, there arose an incident in Liberia as Prince was
22 commanding. A couple of the Special Forces misbehaved. I think
23 they fled in the sight of battle and endangered the troops. Now,
24 Prince got annoyed and he executed them. Now, he did not have
10:20:33 25 the authority to do that. He had no right to do that. That
26 report reached to me and I ordered that he report and be
27 available for an investigation.

28 Because of your question I will stop there, okay? So I
29 have just explained that he was a disciplinarian, but that is

1 what I meant by sometimes he went a little overboard. While he
2 could have taken action by arresting these men and probably
3 disciplining them, he did not have a right to take that action
4 against them and that is why I ordered his arrest.

10:21:14 5 Q. Now, was the attack upon Gbutuo successful?

6 A. Extraordinarily successful. We captured the post and all
7 the arms and ammunition that they had in the armoury, plus some
8 of the soldiers that just ran and dropped their arms, and so by
9 the end of the Gbutuo attack I can say almost all of the 60 men
10:21:42 10 that had gone into Gbutuo had at least a rifle.

11 Q. Were you in contact with the men from where you were in
12 Bin-Houye?

13 A. Yes, I was.

14 Q. How?

10:21:59 15 A. What they would do - in fact, the first thing that Prince
16 did very well I remember he sent back - we would have a courier,
17 someone who would leave Gbutuo and it is just a few hours walk to
18 the big town of Bin-Houye, and they will go in and report to me.
19 Every day Prince sent someone to report to me in the progress
10:22:23 20 every day.

21 Q. And what progress was being made after Gbutuo?

22 A. Oh, the men were moving. They were moving very fast. They
23 had captured Gbutuo and moved on forward to another town called
24 Tiaplay. I am sure it's in the record, Tiaplay. They covered
10:22:46 25 most of the border towns and maybe in some future if I got a map
26 I can point it out.

27 Q. Well, that is precisely what I am trying to do.

28 A. They moved and by this time don't let's forget - let me
29 remind the Court we are in friendly territory. Nimba is friendly

1 territory. So thousands of people are coming in immediately,
2 which any training group would do. Training bases are opened
3 immediately to volunteers. So there are thousands of people
4 coming. And as rumours would have it, and this is where we have
10:23:32 5 now that we are dealing with, that's what's got me here, there
6 are good rumours and there are bad rumours. Now, there were some
7 good rumours at the time that the NPFL had entered with thousands
8 of men, and so the Armed Forces of Liberia was really put off
9 track, but that was not true. We only had the exact number that
10:23:56 10 I mentioned to this Court. So this whole bad rumour of thousands
11 of men, just threw the Armed Forces of Liberia off and they were
12 just - we went into towns that we didn't have to fight. I mean,
13 they were just running and leaving the place. Okay.

14 And those that were further away from Nimba, because what
10:24:20 15 Doe had done successfully, the troops that are placed in Nimba -
16 remember, Nimba is a hotbed, Doe is already angry, so the
17 soldiers that are in Nimba are neither members of the Dan nor the
18 Mahn ethnic groups. So these soldiers are just fleeing. They
19 know they are in hostile territory so they just virtually desert.
10:24:53 20 So within a very short time, within the first month, we had
21 virtually captured all of Nimba County.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Pause there. I wonder if we could display
23 this map helpfully provided by the Prosecution on an earlier
24 occasion.

10:25:11 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: While that is happening I wonder if the
26 witness could indicate kind of a time line when he says the
27 Gbutuo attack happened, in terms of a month maybe and a year.

28 THE WITNESS: Yes.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Also the attack on the Nimba County.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. If you could explain that, please, Mr Taylor, which is a
3 very clear question.

10:25:43

4 A. Yes. Gbutuo occurred on 29 December 1989, exactly on that
5 particular day, and we progressed. Gbutuo is in Nimba County and
6 it is from that point that we commenced spreading into Nimba.

7 Q. The map is labelled L1 for the assistance of my learned
8 friends. Mr Taylor, I wonder if you could change seats for a
9 moment, please.

10:26:16

10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, does the Bench have that
11 map?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: You should, your Honour. It should be the
13 first - you know that bundle is divided into two sections and the
14 second section is the Liberia section. It should be the first
15 map in that section, I think. Or it was at least in my bundle.
16 It's the one that looks like that.

10:26:32

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: These exhibits are given numbers. It
18 would be helpful --

19 MR GRIFFITHS: It's L1.

10:27:21

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: We have an L section in this but it
21 helpfully starts at L2, Mr Griffiths.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I am sure it has helpfully been put in a
23 completely inconvenient position.

10:28:06

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: We have found it now, Mr Griffiths. It
25 was on the back of another map.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Do we all have the map, your Honours?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we do now, yes. I think you can
28 go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Mr Taylor, with the assistance of this map, I wonder if we
2 could now just briefly review some of the information you've
3 recently given us. Firstly, can you locate Bin-Houye in the Cote
4 d'Ivoire?

10:30:16 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Could you just indicate - point the pen at it, please. We
7 see you are indicating just over the border in Cote d'Ivoire
8 spelt B-I-N H-O-U-Y-E?

9 A. That is correct.

10:30:39 10 Q. So that is where you were based?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Can you also see Gbutuo?

13 A. Yes. Just above Bin-Houye there is Buutuo that's spelt
14 B-U-U-T-U-O. Just above on the Liberian side there is Buutuo
15 right there.

10:31:04

16 Q. Now, I want us to be quite clear about this, Mr Taylor,
17 because if you look just to the left of the word Bin-Houye there
18 is a B-E-A-T-U-O as well.

19 A. That is a town in Nimba but that is not called Buutou.

10:31:27 20 That's Beatuo.

21 Q. Okay. So it's the one above Buutou?

22 A. Yes. Buutuo is just above the name Bin-Houye. That is
23 Buutuo on the border. Further down what you talked about is
24 Beatuo. Those are two different towns.

10:31:44 25 Q. And can you just indicate for us Nimba County.

26 A. I will just use the back of the pen. Nimba runs in this
27 direction. It includes Tappita, all the way, I see Sagleipie,
28 come all the way up here. This entire horn coming all the way
29 down through here is Nimba County.

1 Q. Now, you mentioned that rapid progress was made and that
2 you captured Tappi ta. Where is Tappi ta?

3 A. Right here. "Tapi tta". I am sure your Honours can see
4 that, where I am pointing. That's Tappi ta right there.

10:32:56 5 Q. And how long did it take for your troops to capture
6 Tappi ta?

7 A. I would say by the end of January of 1990 to the beginning
8 of February we had captured Tappi ta.

9 Q. And what about the rest of Nimba County?

10:33:28 10 A. Let me just explain here. If you look up, your Honours,
11 going toward the horn of Nimba there is a place here where I am
12 pointing called Sanniquellie. Now, if you follow that red line
13 coming on down you are going to come to Ganta. That red line is
14 the only highway that runs all the way through Liberia, all the
10:34:01 15 way down to Monrovia. The only highway. So this section of
16 Nimba was about the last area to be captured. But what we did
17 do, realising that the strength of the armed forces then had
18 moved into Ganta using the highway, we moved westward, coming
19 into the direction of Buchanan, down here, where we had the least
10:34:38 20 resistance. So while we had not captured all of Nimba County by
21 the - let's say the beginning to the middle of February, but we
22 had advanced substantially westward into the areas of less
23 resistance. Okay. Because this is all bush area, forest area,
24 so the commandos took the liberty of moving westward.

10:35:09 25 So I just - I am saying this because I don't want the Court
26 to believe that we are just stuck in Nimba trying to grab Nimba
27 and if we have not grabbed it we have not moved, no. We are
28 spreading and capturing those areas. So we were able for example
29 to actually capture Buchanan before we even captured Gbarnga,

1 which comes further down on that Monrovia Highway. If you follow
2 my pen coming on down there is Gbarnga, right there. So you will
3 see that we had moved from Gbutuo, all the way westward, but we
4 had not moved fast enough going northeastward.

10:36:00 5 If your Honours need any more clarification, I don't want
6 it to be confusing, because we are not just stationary, the
7 troops are spreading out. The areas of most resistance, we leave
8 in a particular direction. The area of less resistance, we move
9 full force and this is what we were doing.

10:36:16 10 Q. Okay. Can we leave that map there for the moment, please,
11 Mr Taylor, and could you return to your other seat, please. Now,
12 you've spoken there about the geographical advance of your men.
13 In terms of numbers that you can call upon, had there been any
14 advance in that respect?

10:37:04 15 A. You mean in terms of increase in numbers?

16 Q. Yes, please.

17 A. Oh, tremendous. By about the first month, which we are now
18 moving into, January, there are, like I mentioned, thousands of
19 ordinary Liberians coming in, volunteering to fight. So I would
10:37:24 20 say within that month of January we could have had as many - and
21 I do not want to exaggerate. I would say as many as 7 to 10,000
22 volunteers that had come from Nimba County. Others had been
23 walking from Bong County. We had two training bases that had to
24 be opened immediately. There was not even any place for them to
10:37:53 25 sleep in, because this is the rainforest region. They, being
26 trained as guerrillas, had to sleep in the forest areas where -
27 so it was just a large, large, large group.

28 Q. Can you assist us with the locations of those two training
29 bases?

1 A. Yes. The first training base was opened in a town called
2 Tiaplay. That's on the map. The second was opened in the town
3 called Gborplay.

4 Q. I apologise for moving you around like this, Mr Taylor, but
10:38:27 5 before we lose contact with that point I wonder if you could just
6 briefly change seats again, please, and point out those two
7 locations for us?

8 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, what was the name of that
9 last town?

10:38:39 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Gborplay.

11 THE WITNESS: The last town was called Gborplay. That's
12 G-B-O-R-P-L-A-Y, Gborplay.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. So the first place was called Tiaplay?

10:39:28 15 A. Tiaplay. If you look upward, I would say going up the map
16 toward the horn above where we just came from Buutuo, there is a
17 place there where I am pointing T-I-A-P-L-A-Y, that's Tiaplay.

18 Q. And the other location was?

19 A. Gborplay. I am looking now to see that Gborplay is a
10:39:56 20 little town right on the border. I am not sure if Gborplay is
21 shown on this map.

22 Q. How do you spell it?

23 A. G-B-O-R-P-L-A-Y. It is a little town right on the border
24 there and I am not sure if it's mentioned on this map.

10:40:19 25 Q. Do you see where there is B-O-R-G-P-L-A-Y, just to the left
26 of Buutuo? Just to the left of Buutuo in the blue, do you see a
27 town beginning B-O-R-G-P-L-A-Y?

28 A. Okay. Well, that is - okay. That's Gborplay, but it's
29 supposed to be G-B because that phonetic "bor", maybe this was

1 done by an American or English group, they can't do that "bor".

2 Q. Above it do you see a G-B-O-L-O-R --

3 A. I am looking. Are we looking at the same map?

4 Q. Yes.

10:41:12 5 A. Maybe something is wrong with my glasses because I don't -
6 I see Garplay, but I just --

7 Q. Very well, if it's not there, Mr Taylor, let's not delay
8 over it. Let's move on.

9 A. Very well.

10:41:42 10 Q. Let's try and do without the map for a while while I ask
11 about something else. Now, taking things slowly, firstly, at
12 those two training camps, who was in charge of training?

13 A. The training camps were under the command of one of our
14 Special Forces called Samuel Sleshee. That's spelt

10:42:34 15 S-L-E-S-H-E-E. It's pronounced Sleshee. It's a Gio name so I may
16 not even get it right myself, but it's Sam Sleshee, one of our
17 Special Forces commanders.

18 Q. And what did the training involve?

19 A. The training involved basic military formation, covering
10:43:05 20 and concealing oneself, learning how to disassemble and assemble
21 rifles, learning how to carry out military formation, learning
22 orders. They were taught, again, how to deal with civilians.

23 They were taught not to take food or other items in their
24 handling of civilians. I mentioned on yesterday they were again

10:43:51 25 taught about what we call cordon and search operational
26 procedures and I explained to the justice, the President, what I
27 meant by cordon on yesterday. Basically - and also the rules of
28 - to the extent about the arrest and treatment of prisoners of
29 war.

1 Q. How long did that training last, Mr Taylor?

2 A. The training - the initial training lasted for about six
3 weeks. Subsequent trainings were much longer. Now, let me just
4 let you know that we should take into consideration here that by
10:44:40 5 the time this training is going on, members of the Armed Forces
6 of Liberia that are from the Nimba region are now working their
7 way backward. Members of the police that were trained - the
8 police in Liberia were trained as task force personnel. By this
9 time they have worked their way back.

10:45:03 10 Q. I don't understand you, Mr Taylor.

11 A. The war is going on --

12 Q. Worked their way back? What do you mean?

13 A. The war is going on. These are Nimbadians and other tribal
14 groups that really want to join the fight. They are not in the
10:45:18 15 Nimba area, they are away from Nimba. But as the war is going
16 on, those men that are armed and at locations in counties that
17 border Nimba begin to come back and join the rebels. So the
18 amount is swelling while this training is going on.

19 Q. And those former police officers and the like who come
10:45:52 20 back, as you say, did they also require training?

21 A. No, no. The trained men went straight into combat.

22 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Exactly who was being trained?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to that:

24 Q. So exactly who was being trained then, Mr Taylor?

10:46:08 25 A. The volunteers from Nimba that had joined. The civilian
26 voluntarily population that had come in their thousands were the
27 people being trained.

28 Q. And help us. What was the gender of those volunteers,
29 civilian volunteers?

1 A. Male and female.

2 Q. And their ages?

3 A. No one was accepted for military training or military
4 combat under the age of 18.

10:46:41 5 Q. Were there any volunteers under the age of 18?

6 A. Yes, there were. There were volunteers under the age of
7 18, but they came and they provided services to the training
8 command.

9 Q. Such as?

10:46:56 10 A. They would what we call go for water, cut wood for cooking
11 and wash clothes, you know, for those that were in the training
12 command. They would carry out services for the training command.

13 Q. Was there any system of conscription?

14 A. No. No. The NPFL did not have to worry about conscription
10:47:28 15 because we - there were too many people available. People
16 volunteered, came forward, and we received them. We did not have
17 to go out asking people. They came in their thousands.

18 Q. Was anyone forced to join the NPFL?

19 A. To the best of my knowledge, no. This is not to mean that
10:47:53 20 some people were not influenced because of the connections of
21 their family, but, for someone to be forced to join the NPFL, no,
22 not at all. No, not to my knowledge.

23 Q. This Court has heard evidence about the phenomenon of
24 so-called bush wives. Did that occur?

10:48:15 25 A. To the best of my knowledge, no. Bush wives, as I heard in
26 the - during the trial testimony, did not occur in Liberia, no.
27 We did not have - at the time that we started this revolution,
28 no, that did not happen with my knowledge. It would not have
29 been accepted, because that would have constituted rape and we

1 executed several soldiers for that. So we were very, very, very,
2 very stringent.

3 That phenomena in Liberia, I can't see it because you can
4 have more than one wife. So, you know, and there are tribal
10:49:06 5 procedures for getting married. We didn't have to go and get a
6 licence. There were procedures that you could have one, two,
7 three wives. So I am not claiming before this Court that that
8 did not happen. I would not make such a claim. I am saying that
9 to the best of my knowledge, it was not brought to my attention
10:49:28 10 and if it had happened and it had been brought to my attention,
11 that soldier would have been dealt with.

12 Q. Now, assist us with this: You've already recounted the
13 history of the behaviour of the NPFL in Nimba County, and the
14 majority of your Special Forces, and indeed recruits, you tell
10:50:03 15 us, were Manos and Gios, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Bearing in mind their experience, did you appreciate that
18 revenge may be on their minds?

19 A. Oh, definitely.

10:50:19 20 Q. What did you do to curb or forestall any such behaviour; if
21 anything?

22 A. The first real indication of where we started taking action
23 was, it was brought to my attention that while it was true the
24 soldiers that were killed by Prince Johnson had done something
10:50:48 25 wrong, but it was also brought to my attention that that was also
26 based on an old family conflict. And immediately, the action was
27 taken in an attempt to arrest Prince Johnson, we did not, but,
28 the pursuit of Prince Johnson commenced and we chased Prince
29 Johnson from the Gborplay area all the way into Monrovia. We did

1 not relent.

2 I said that Prince Johnson had to be arrested at all costs.
3 He got afraid that we might take some very stringent actions as
4 maybe court-martialling him and probably killing him and so he
10:51:35 5 did not yield but, as we continued, every soldier, and I am not
6 going to sit here and play no angel, every military personnel of
7 the NPFL that violated that operational order that I explained
8 before this Court by raping a woman or murdering a civilian or
9 murdering another soldier, was court-martialled and a decision of
10:52:01 10 that court martial was carried out to the limit.

11 Q. But hold on a second, Mr Taylor. We are not just talking
12 about Special Forces now, are we? We are talking about civilians
13 without that training who might have revenge in their hearts.
14 What did you do to try and curb that?

10:52:29 15 A. I mentioned to this Court that the Special Forces were also
16 trained to turn these matters over to civilian courts. We did
17 not dismantle the NPFL. When I say we, we did not dismantle the
18 civilian structures that were on the ground. And they were told
19 and taught that if civilians committed acts against civilians
10:52:50 20 they went to justices of the peace. They were dealt with by
21 civilian administration. Maybe this is one of the reasons why I
22 won such a large percentage during the elections.

23 When we got in, we knew what we wanted. Civilian
24 activities remained. This is why - it's not to say that
10:53:10 25 civilians did not do wrong things, but all of those executed were
26 soldiers and so you wonder, "Well, did only soldiers do bad
27 things?" No. But civilians that committed crimes were judged in
28 civilian courts and they were sentenced and put in jail, so there
29 were jails, there were justices of the peace, there were judges

1 still that were put back into place in NPFL held territory.

2 Q. You mentioned bad things, Mr Taylor. What are you talking
3 about?

10:53:48

4 A. Well, by bad things I mean let's say if a civilian went and
5 stole or killed another civilian, or went on their little old
6 family tribal feud, that is what I am talking about, you would be
7 dealt with in a civilian environment.

8 Q. But, Mr Taylor, we are not just talking about stealing
9 other people's property, are we?

10:54:07

10 A. No, we are talking about killing.

11 Q. This Court has heard evidence about roadblocks festooned
12 with human entrails and human heads. We've heard about
13 decapitations and the like. Those kinds of things. Now, help
14 us. Did they occur?

10:54:24

15 A. To the best of my knowledge, let me explain what I heard
16 here from this boy Marzah. There were at checkpoints in Liberia
17 skulls, not human heads. Skulls were used as symbols of death.

18 I saw them, yes, not what the Prosecution said he drove by human
19 heads. I drove by those skulls. They were used as symbols, I
20 asked specifically, and these were not our people. The combat
21 had gone on, enemy soldiers had been killed and skulls were used.

10:55:03

22 I knew that and did not bother it, because again I am a member of
23 western fraternal organisations. Symbols as skulls are used now
24 today in western circles, at universities and other things.

10:55:39

25 I saw - and I will be honest because this is about my life.
26 I saw nothing wrong with using skulls. It's a blatant diabolical
27 lie that I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, or anyone because of the
28 discipline we had would drive by a human head and intestine.

29 But let's think about it for a minute. How long would an

1 animal intestine last? How long? If you even took an animal,
2 say a sheep or a goat, intestine and you tied it up in the sun,
3 within a few hours it would probably be disintegrated. It is
4 total nonsense just to try to advertise and make this big
10:56:29 5 publicity as though people are brutes and savages. Well, we are
6 not. I am not.

7 There were skulls, I knew of them and let me tell me I am a
8 past noble father of the Grand United Order of Oddfellows. It's
9 in Britain. It's in the United States. It is western. If any
10:56:48 10 Oddfellow member is hearing this, we know what symbols are.
11 Those were only skulls that I saw and would not have tolerated
12 anyone killing or putting some human head up. It would have
13 never happened and did not happen.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Taylor, who was using these human
10:57:07 15 skulls and where did they come from?

16 THE WITNESS: These skulls are enemy soldiers that are
17 killed. Enemy soldiers were not buried during the war. Some
18 bodies - some skulls were found. Some soldiers got lost. Some
19 of them died. They did not bury. We buried our dead. It was
10:57:33 20 compulsory that we bury our dead. No soldier left - if an NPFL
21 soldier died he had to bury him. So these were enemy skulls that
22 after you have fought in an area and people came by and they went
23 in the bushes, if you found a skull you brought the skull and you
24 put it at the gate as a symbol of death.

10:57:56 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I am just curious why was it necessary
26 for the NPFL to do this - to display skulls?

27 THE WITNESS: As I say, your Honour, it was a symbol. They
28 use it as a symbol that death had occurred by the enemy.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Was it to instill fear, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Well one could assume that if someone saw a skull, of
3 course, normally it would - it could instill fear, but a skull
4 even in fraternal organisations is used also to say certain
10:58:39 5 things that, "If you do wrong, this is the result." I am not
6 going to go over - I don't have permission to expose western
7 fraternities but, when you use symbols, symbols are designed to
8 give a lesson that, "Look, here is the situation. If you don't
9 do this then this happens, okay? This is the result of not
10:59:07 10 following orders, okay?" That is why these skulls - not at every
11 gate, but there were certain areas that skulls were there. I saw
12 them, I investigated and I got to realise that they were enemy
13 skulls and we did not think that that symbol meant anything
14 wrong.

10:59:28 15 Q. Let's not deal with investigation yet please, Mr Taylor.
16 Did you order the setting up of skulls at these checkpoints?

17 A. No, no, no, no. I had the operational order as a way of
18 instilling fear. I did not - I did not order that, no. I mean,
19 why would I? No, not at all.

10:59:57 20 Q. Was it part of NPFL policy --

21 A. No.

22 Q. -- to make areas fearful by such devices?

23 A. No, not at all. Let me just again deal with that word
24 "fearful" as was interpreted in Liberia by the NPFL. If you
11:00:24 25 reached a village, from a guerilla standpoint - now, I know all
26 the hoopla that has been around about going to murder to make
27 areas fearful. For the NPFL let me tell this Court what fearful
28 meant. If you reached a village and the village was abandoned
29 but you saw food and maybe you saw smoke but there is not one

1 human, a guerilla was taught in the NPFL to be leaving right
2 away. It was possible that an enemy was there and probably there
3 was a possible ambush and so that area was a fearful area.

4 That's how our commandos were trained, because ambushes can
11:01:22 5 be - you get in a village and you see no-one, but you see let's
6 say raw rice and you see smoke maybe from where there had been
7 fire, it's possible that other soldiers were there and abandoned
8 it. And we did fall - some of my soldiers did fall into ambush
9 in that particular way.

11:01:41 10 So from that particular point there were strict
11 instructions that, "When you meet a deserted area, but signs of
12 life, you must know it's a trap." That's what we interpreted a
13 fearful area as being, not an orgy of murder and rape and
14 nonsense. I sat here and listened to all of that. That is what
11:02:04 15 the NPFL - any trained guerilla and any military person here
16 would know you don't play with those kind. Those are the fearful
17 areas in the NPFL. Deserted area, but sign of life that you have
18 to be concerned about. So immediately they were taught, "You
19 move into this area and you see it, what do you do? You withdraw
11:02:23 20 immediately and observe the area for some time to see as to
21 whether it is an ambush in the making."

22 Q. Very well, but I'm still going to press you further on this
23 topic. You accept, from what you've said, that you saw skulls at
24 such checkpoints?

11:02:47 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. So why didn't you do something about it?

27 A. Because, as I said, I did not interpret the presence of a
28 skull - and not a head - at that particular point as it was
29 interpreted as a symbol, and knowing that I had also seen skulls

1 in fraternal organisations that are western I felt that there was
2 nothing wrong with a skull.

3 I am not talking about - and I may as well clear this up.
4 I am not talking about hundreds of skulls scattered all over the
11:03:35 5 place. We are talking about at certain strategic junctions you
6 may see a skull. I am not talking about not more than I would
7 say a handful of strategic points where there would be such, but
8 I had seen skulls before in university in the United States in
9 fraternal organisations. I knew I had seen skulls in fraternal
11:04:02 10 well-known organisations. Quite frankly, it could be considered
11 a bad judgment. I did not consider it a bad judgment and I did
12 not order them removed.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, I am still pressing you on this --

14 A. Yes.

11:04:19 15 Q. -- because we are not talking about a campus at an American
16 university. We are talking about Liberia.

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Did it cross your mind that by not doing something about it
19 you, the leader of the NPFL, would be seen as condoning that
11:04:37 20 activity?

21 A. Quite frankly my interpretation of that particular skull
22 being there did not cross my mind as something that will come up
23 where the leader of the NPFL would be said to have condoned this
24 or that, no. I did not see the presence of that symbol as being
11:05:07 25 at that time, in my own calculation, what it has been interpreted
26 here otherwise of being.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, were atrocities committed by members of the NPFL
28 or individuals hiding behind the NPFL banner? Were they?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you know that such activities were taking place?

2 A. We found out that they were taking place and we acted in
3 bringing those responsible to justice.

11:06:03

4 Q. Mr Taylor, do you accept that such activities were quite
5 widespread?

6 A. I do not accept that at all, that it was widespread,
7 because of the action that was taken against those individuals.
8 Look, when you see the leader of the NPFL court-martial generals
9 and Special Forces - and don't forget it took me two years.

11:06:45

10 These were the best trained men, I can almost say, in West
11 Africa. When you see me put them on trial and a court martial
12 board comes down and says they are guilty and they are executed
13 based on the ruling of the court martial, a junior commando or
14 anybody else would have to be a fool to do the same thing. So it

11:07:08

15 was not widespread, because we dealt with people from senior
16 members of the NPFL that the Prosecution has talked about here.
17 They've talked about Samuel Larto that the very Moses Blah spoke
18 about here that was executed. They've talked about Oliver
19 Varney. These are all Special Forces.

11:07:29

20 Now, when you take those actions against the most senior of
21 your armed forces, that is a lesson, and no one, no one can, in
22 his or her rightful mind, say that it was widespread. It was not
23 widespread. I deny that seriously. It was definitely not
24 widespread. And if you can remember here, I - just before I
25 stop - there has not been one case brought before this Court
26 where there was an amputation in Liberia, not one. Not one case.
27 So it was just not tolerated.

11:07:57

28 Q. Help us with this, please, Mr Taylor: What systems were in
29 place to impose discipline within NPFL controlled areas?

1 A. The first very, very principle thing was the operational
2 order. That order was displayed from training camp. Every
3 commander in the field had that order. That is the first thing.
4 The second thing that was in place was a court martial board.

11:08:58 5 The third thing that was put in place was a military police unit,
6 and designated military jails. Those were in place. And people
7 did appear before the military tribunals. They did get arrested
8 by military police. Some of them did get executed. Some of them
9 did get incarcerated.

11:09:26 10 Q. And help us: Was there someone assigned to supervise
11 discipline?

12 A. The discipline, yes, there was someone. That someone was,
13 what we had, what we call our provost, our marshall general at
14 the time.

11:09:49 15 Q. And can you assist us with a name?

16 A. Yes. The provost marshall general at the time that we used
17 also sat at the head of the tribunal. It's a gentleman called
18 McDonald Boam. That's B-O-A-M, Boam. He also chaired the
19 tribunal.

11:10:09 20 Q. Now, I'm going to --

21 A. And he was a Special Forces commando also.

22 Q. Thank you. I am going to come back to the structure of
23 command within the NPFL. But before we come to that, there is a
24 matter that I would like to deal with in the time available

11:10:35 25 before we have the short adjournment. In the narrative
26 chronology of events so far, we have come to the end of the first
27 month or so of the revolution. During that time, had you set
28 foot in Liberia?

29 A. No, no. No.

1 Q. Where had you been based during that time?

2 A. I am still across the border in Bin-Houye. The commandos
3 would not let me come in. They said that they had to properly
4 secure a sizeable area and set up a base for me.

11:11:29 5 Q. Right. So let's go forward to come back. When did you
6 first set foot during the campaign on Liberian soil?

7 A. In April of 1990 I first went into a base that had been
8 prepared for me on the border in the town of - that I mentioned,
9 Gborplay. That's where I am based.

11:11:53 10 Q. Where the training camp was situated?

11 A. Just outside of the town, yes, Gborplay, yes.

12 Q. So, between December and April when you arrive on Liberian
13 soil, how had you maintained contact with your men?

14 A. Every day, there was a courier that came from inside
11:12:20 15 Liberia, to me in Bin-Houye. There were regular, regular
16 messages. By this time we don't even have radio communication.
17 We are just sending people across the border, okay, informing us
18 of what is going on.

19 Another thing that was being done, at a particular time,
11:12:42 20 the other gentleman that I mentioned, one of the other
21 individuals that is a part of putting together the NPFL, Tom
22 Woveiyu at this particular time, is getting information and
23 becomes the spokesperson of the NPFL, so the third source, even
24 sometimes we got some information ourselves, Focus on Africa
11:13:10 25 became a famous place. They were reporting. So someone would
26 call Tom and Tom what announce, because there were times I didn't
27 even know where my front line was. By front line, I mean the
28 military unit is moving - it's not moving like a conventional
29 army on a straight line and progressing. You will find some

1 people here, some people are maybe 15, 20 miles ahead because the
2 advantage that we had, we were not using highways. These
3 guerrillas would go into the bush, take short paths and
4 everything, so I didn't even know for the most part where our
11:13:48 5 front line was, but as they received message, the command
6 structure would send the message across the border to me.

7 Q. Now, you mentioned that you didn't have radios?

8 A. Not at that time.

9 Q. At what stage did you obtain radio communication
11:14:07 10 facilities?

11 A. I would say somewhere about the mid of the year. After I
12 moved into Liberia, and the news has spread about the NPFL
13 operations in Liberia, I then come back out but by this time the
14 security problems that had me hiding in La Cote d'Ivoire had
11:14:46 15 dissipated and so I can now come out. So I came out.

16 I get in in April. I come out and then go back to Burkina
17 Faso to begin to see if I could plead with the authorities there
18 for some real assistance in terms of communication, you know, to
19 be able to reach our men at long distance areas.

11:15:12 20 Q. And did you obtain that?

21 A. Yes. We did get initially some assistance in terms of
22 radios and these are not military radios. Now, this Court has
23 been hearing testimony about these so-called radios. What was
24 not mentioned that these are not military radios, your Honours.
11:15:37 25 These are your basic SSBs that even in America they use them on
26 trucks. That anyone who is on that frequency will listen to it
27 so these were not sophisticated radios. We wouldn't have been
28 able to move sophisticated radios through La Cote d'Ivoire so it
29 had to be something that just out of the ordinary that we could

1 go through, so these were ordinary SSBs that we obtained to try
2 to reach to some of our people.

3 Q. Now, at that stage you tell us that you obtained that
4 assistance from Burkina Faso. Did you consider requesting such
11:16:34 5 assistance from say the Sierra Leoneans or Dr Manneh and his
6 Gambians?

7 A. No. Dr Manneh is in Burkina Faso. His men are in Burkina
8 Faso. They themselves are struggling, trying to put their act
9 together and get their own revolution going, so he could not have
11:17:03 10 helped me at all. He needed help himself.

11 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, there was two parts to -
12 there were really two questions in that. You asked about the
13 Sierra Leoneans or Dr Manneh and his Gambians and I haven't got an
14 answer to the Sierra Leoneans.

11:17:20 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to that just now.

16 Q. So what about the Sierra Leoneans, where were they, to your
17 knowledge?

18 A. Which Sierra Leoneans? Are you talking about President
19 Momoh?

11:17:30 20 Q. No, no, no, we are talking about the Sierra Leoneans who
21 had been in Libya?

22 A. No, I have explained to this Court that the Sierra Leoneans
23 left Liberia before I left. I don't know where they had gone to.
24 The only people that were in Burkina Faso were the Gambians, and
11:17:47 25 if you can see, up until this time the Gambians are not even
26 involved with us; they get involved later. But they are not a
27 part of the NPFL entry into Liberia. These are trained Special
28 Forces. They are not a part of the Liberian operation at all.

29 Q. But just to go ahead to come back: Did there come a time

1 when the Gambians became involved?

2 A. Yes, there was a time.

3 Q. Now, you've told us, Mr Taylor, that you had not been in
4 Liberia until April 1990?

11:18:31 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Had you, however, made any attempt to address the Liberian
7 people?

8 A. Oh, yes.

9 Q. How?

11:18:43 10 A. We would call the BBC, Focus on Africa, and speak from I
11 Cote d'Ivoire.

12 Q. And were any other methods of communication adopted?

13 A. Well, I just mentioned that Tom Womeiyu was also out there
14 speaking. Ellen was in America speaking to - doing press

11:19:11 15 releases but the one that comes to mind right now is the use of
16 international radio to do interviews via the telephone.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness please be shown exhibits -
18 documents for week 29, document at tab 2 please.

19 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, we would object to the witness
11:19:45 20 being shown this document until there is some foundation as to
21 what the document is, how the witness knows about the document.
22 Otherwise, the document would be leading the witness. That is
23 what was ruled during our case.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's correct. Mr Griffiths.

11:20:13 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. In January 1990, Mr Taylor, did you issue any statement in
27 Liberia?

28 A. Yes, I did.

29 Q. In what form was that statement?

1 A. There was a statement setting out the aims of and
2 objectives of launching this revolution.

3 Q. Who created that statement?

4 A. That statement was ordered by me but created by one of the
11:20:46 5 founding members of the organisation by the name of Thomas
6 Woweiyu.

7 Q. Have you seen that statement?

8 A. Yes, I have. I approved it.

9 Q. When did you first see that statement?

11:21:02 10 A. Well, I had known of it and it had disappeared for some
11 time because it was issued at the time. In recent weeks I've
12 come across it.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness can now be shown
14 that document.

11:21:18 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, show the witness that document.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Is this the document, Mr Taylor?

11:22:05 20 A. This is the document.

21 Q. Now, we see at the top that it's dated 1 January 1990. Do
22 you see that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Based on what you've told us, so this would have been
11:22:22 25 shortly after the campaign was launched?

26 A. On the 29th, that's correct.

27 Q. Could we now look at this document please. It's headed
28 "Statement by Charles Ghankay Taylor Leader of the National
29 Patriotic Front of Liberia", is that right?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. It reads as follows:

3 "Since the bloody military coup of April 12, 1980, which
4 brought the regime of Master Sergeant Samuel K Doe to power in
11:22:54 5 Liberia, the Liberian people have endured ten years of
6 oppression, summary killings, human rights violations, ethnic
7 genocide, gross economic mismanagement and blatant widespread
8 corruption."

9 First of all, whose assessment was that?

11:23:22 10 A. Well, I could almost say it was the assessment of the vast
11 majority of the Liberian population, in the first instance. I
12 was just conveying the sentiments before we launched this
13 revolution as to why we did this.

14 Q. It continues:

11:23:46 15 "In October 1985, despite threats and intimidation, the
16 Liberian people turned out in massive numbers to express their
17 will at the polls for a peaceful change of government, only to
18 see the electoral process subverted by the Doe regime which
19 unilaterally declared itself the winner despite all independent
11:24:12 20 evidence to the contrary."

21 To what were you adverting there?

22 A. I explained to this Court, I think on yesterday, the
23 elections are held in Liberia in 1985. A vast majority of the
24 citizens believed that the elections was won by I mentioned on
11:24:38 25 yesterday Jackson Doe, N Doe, but Samuel Doe claimed to have won
26 with a margin of 50.9 per cent. A vast majority of the family of
27 nations disagreed that Doe had won the election. This is what I
28 am alluding to.

29 Q. And then it goes on, paragraph 3:

1 "Following the aborted elections the popular resistance
2 movement, under the leadership of the late commanding General
3 Thomas Quiwonkpa sought to overturn the Doe regime with minimal
4 force and restore democracy to Liberia. The Doe regime brutally
11:25:25 5 put down this uprising and took harsh retaliation against
6 innocent civilians in the northern counties taking hundreds of
7 innocent lives, and forcing thousands of Liberians to flee their
8 homes as refugees."

9 You've already recounted that history and so we won't
11:25:47 10 delay:

11 "Having exhausted every possible avenue of reason and
12 having seen every effort to peacefully effect a change of
13 governance by constitutional means crushed by the harshest use of
14 force we, the members of the National Patriotic Front, under the
11:26:11 15 leadership of Charles Ghankay Taylor, feel it is our right and
16 bounded duty to rid the people of Liberia of this cancerous
17 despotism by whatever means at our disposal with the following
18 objectives."

19 Before we come to the objectives, however, help us with
11:26:31 20 this please: It says on the first line of that paragraph, having
21 exhausted every possible avenue of reason. What were they?

22 A. Not just Charles Taylor but the Liberian people had asked
23 Doe to step aside and turn the presidency over to the individual
24 that, for the most part, even the international community agreed
11:27:02 25 had won the election. That was Jackson Doe.

26 These arguments continued for a long time. He did not and
27 then you had the incoming just barely one month after the
28 elections in November, General Quiwonkpa launches this attack.
29 He is crushed brutally. We again call for Doe to step down.

1 Jackson Doe is still here. He does not so for us these were the
2 reasonable things that we had done.

3 Q. Now, noting the date of this statement, let us now look at
4 the first stated objective.

11:27:48 5 "The restoration of full constitutional democracy to the
6 Liberian people through free, fair and open elections, to be
7 conducted as soon as practically possible following the
8 conclusion of military actions and the restoration of law and
9 order to the country."

11:28:14 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I will just caution you
11 that the tape is almost exhausted.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is this convenient now to leave at this
14 point?

11:28:22 15 MR GRIFFITHS: It is as convenient as any.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you. We will have a
17 short adjournment and resume at 12 o'clock.

18 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

19 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

12:00:26 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, continue, Mr Griffiths.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

22 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment we were looking at
23 a document. Do you still have that document in front of you?

24 A. Yes. May I take it now? I still have it.

12:00:41 25 Q. It's the second tab and we were looking at the first
26 numbered paragraph and the relevant passage read as follows:

27 "The following objectives:

28 1. The restoration of full constitutional democracy to the
29 Liberian people through free, fair and open elections to be

1 conducted as soon as practically possible following the
2 conclusion of military actions and the restoration of law and
3 order to the country."

12:01:29 4 Now was that a general sentiment on the part of the NPFL,
5 Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes, it was extraordinarily genuine. Yes.

7 Q. And so these elections that you were proposing, how soon
8 were you intending to embark upon that course?

9 A. We had first of all to defeat Doe. We did not know how
12:01:59 10 long that would take. We were making rapid progress. But
11 following the defeat of Doe it meant that you had to put into
12 place the structures that would probably enable a democratic
13 process.

14 And what do I mean by structures? First there would have
12:02:25 15 to be an interim arrangement of a government of a sort and in
16 even dealing with electoral processes you have to deal with,
17 what, voters' registration. You had to deal with probably some
18 Parliamentary source and we had not quite figured that out to get
19 election laws promulgated. We would have needed the cooperation
12:02:56 20 of the international community, election advisors. It's a whole
21 process. So by saying here "practically possible", I'm
22 describing that process that we had to go through to secure an
23 enabling environment for free and fair elections.

24 Q. Now, help us with this. It goes on to say at paragraph 2:

12:03:23 25 "The rebuilding of the Liberian economy on the basis of our
26 traditional free enterprise system and the protection of private
27 property, without excessive government bureaucracy and government
28 corruption but with concern for basic health, education, housing,
29 employment and food for the vast majority of our populace."

1 Why was it thought necessary to mention to a commitment to
2 a free enterprise system?

3 A. Quite frankly, we had taken a jab at the Marxist-Leninist
4 group that we know are lurking some place that, "Hey, we are not
12:04:07 5 going to have this. Even when we get in there will be none of
6 that. We are going to subscribe to a free enterprise system."

7 Q. And what about the mention of the protection of private
8 property?

9 A. That's also a part of the democratic process. Under
12:04:28 10 certain systems, you know, that private property don't exist - it
11 did not exist under the communist system, so again this whole
12 paragraph is dedicated towards saying, "Look, we're not going to
13 be Marxists. We're not going to be Leninists", or whatever you
14 call it. "We are going after the free enterprise system", and we
12:04:51 15 wanted to be very clear on that at the outset.

16 Q. Now, going on it says this:

17 "3. The unification of all Liberian people without regard
18 to class, social status, ethnic origin, religion or political
19 philosophy in the common task of nation-building. The National
12:05:19 20 Patriotic Front is a broad-based, popular, non-sectarian
21 nationalist movement which believes in the right of every
22 Liberian to equal protection and opportunity under the law and
23 which does not subscribe to ethnic and social" - and I think that
24 word should be factionalism - "or recriminations."

12:05:41 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Why was that considered necessary?

27 A. I have explained to the Court the still intrinsic problem
28 in Liberia of this divide between the so called Americo-Liberian
29 and the aborigines. That is still a problem and until that

1 problem is even resolved in Liberia today Liberia will not
2 progress. I come in as the first possible leader of the country
3 that stands squarely in the centre of this divide. I am half
4 Americo-Liberian and half aborigine and so I see myself being in
12:06:20 5 a unique position to begin to spell out I mean right away that,
6 "Look, we cannot continue this. We are not going to accept it.
7 We want to make sure that Liberia is going to be for Liberians
8 and that anyone trying to bring about this sectional or racial
9 divide would just be denied by the rest of us."

12:06:46 10 Q. Now, the document continues in this way:

11 "The National Patriotic Front is not beholden to any
12 foreign group or power and believes in the maintenance of
13 Liberia's traditional relationships with its close friends and
14 allies, particularly the United States, and intends to work
12:07:14 15 closely with this foreign partners in the reconstruction of the
16 country."

17 Pausing there. First of all, where in that paragraph it
18 says, "The National Patriotic Front is not beholden to any
19 foreign group or power", was that the truth?

12:07:31 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. But what about Libya?

22 A. That's what we were - that's the very point we were trying
23 to make here. We are dealing with an era of the Cold War. Libya
24 has been bombed by the United States. Libya is supposed to be
12:07:52 25 the pariah in the international community. Surely having trained
26 in Libya will be an issue.

27 We while training in Libya, and I remember telling this
28 Court, the Green Book - listen, I led a group into Libya as an
29 educated man. We were not a bunch of - the three of us, Ellen,

1 Tom and I, are educated people. The Green Book I said we read
2 and it was not imperative that it be accepted in Libya. Libya
3 did not insist on that.

4 Now knowing that we had trained in Libya and it would be an
12:08:40 5 issue during that period, we had made it clear to Libya - and
6 Libya did not insist otherwise - and we remained very strong in
7 our views and we wanted to make it very clear here and now that,
8 "Look, for those of you that might come out and say because these
9 people are trained in Libya these are supposed to be Gaddafi
12:09:02 10 personal people, we are setting it straight here and now that we
11 are not. We owe nothing to Gaddafi. He did not ask for anything
12 in return for whatever assistance he gave." We wanted to set the
13 record straight because our traditional friend the United States
14 would have raised these kinds of issues and we wanted to assure
12:09:21 15 the United States immediately that if we succeeded that they
16 would remain our traditional allies, as they are.

17 Q. But what about Burkina Faso? They'd assisted you, hadn't
18 they?

19 A. Yes, but Burkina Faso like Libya made no demands
12:09:47 20 whatsoever. Their assistance was from a purely revolutionary
21 standpoint and again they were dealing with people that knew what
22 we wanted. We were not like sheep being herded into the field.
23 They were dealing with sound people. We were one of the groups
24 that knew ourselves, so to speak. So there were no questions
12:10:12 25 about us lingering in thoughts, no. We went there, we asked for
26 assistance and we made it clear - very clear - about our
27 orientation, which direction we leaned toward and since there
28 were no specific demands from either of the two countries we had
29 nothing to worry about. Our main concern was at that time how

1 would our traditional ally interpret our accepting training in
2 Libya during the Cold War. That was our concern, because those
3 two countries had posed no particular threat to us.

12:10:59 4 Q. I was coming to that. Why was it felt necessary to
5 particularly mention the United States of America?

6 A. Look, no President of Liberia yesterday, no President today
7 and no President tomorrow will be able to lead successfully in
8 Liberia if there is the slightest view that Liberia is pulling
9 away from our traditional relationship with the United States.

12:11:43 10 It would be suicidal. It would never happen because Liberia is
11 still considered to be America's little farm in West Africa.

12 And I do not use that word "farm" in a negative sense.
13 Liberia little brother. Let's not forget Liberia was established
14 as a place of asylum for the black man by the American

12:12:17 15 colonisation society and has remained in contact with America
16 ever since. It was not Ghana, as President Obama went to. I
17 mean, the blacks that returned from the United States went to
18 Sierra Leone and Liberia. We are just unlucky Ghana is getting
19 the glory. But the black population came from the southern
12:12:37 20 states and all back to Liberia and so that connection with

21 Liberia remains until this very day. America has always felt
22 that her little brother is Liberia and that's why I mentioned as
23 former President that America has not been the friend that she is
24 capable of being.

12:12:57 25 Now if you look in Africa, I mentioned yesterday the
26 Francophone block and I did mention that these are those that had
27 colonial masters as France. You had the Anglophone block and
28 these were the British that were their masters. Liberia was
29 never colonised by any country. The United States upon sending

1 the freed slaves did not seek to colonise Liberia, so Liberia is
2 neither Francophone nor Anglophone and so we are just a little
3 island hanging out there that has traditionally stuck close to
4 the United States. I hope I have explained it.

12:13:43 5 Q. So at this early stage in the revolution then, Mr Taylor,
6 were you seeking to send a positive signal to the United States?

7 A. Most definitely. Most definitely. Not only was I seeking,
8 I was anxiously trying to make sure that it got understood and we
9 did other things immediately thereafter to pursue that particular
10 line, yes.

11 Q. Other things such as what?

12 A. Besides just an open statement, I instructed the other
13 colleague of mine, Mr Womeiyu, to send a direct and even clearer
14 statement to the United States State Department detailing and
15 re-emphasising our desires at the time.

12:14:44 16 Q. We'll come to that in a moment, but let us conclude with
17 this document first please. Paragraph 5:

18 "The National Patriotic Front believes strongly in the
19 implementation of all fundamental human rights guaranteed to
12:15:06 20 every citizen of Liberia by the constitution, particularly the
21 right of life, liberty and security; the right to freedom of the
22 thought, expression, movement and peaceful assembly; and the
23 right to equal protection and due process under the rule of law."

24 Were you being sincere when you included that paragraph in
12:15:34 25 this document?

26 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

27 Q. But, Mr Taylor, the cynic might say, "But your NPFL
28 soldiers and those under their umbrella were committing
29 atrocities in Liberia at this time and so this is the height of

1 hypocrisy", so what do you say about that?

2 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me, Mr President. This is not really
3 rebutting an allegation in the indictment and this is leading.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well what do you say to that,

12:16:12 5 Mr Griffiths?

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I suggest it's not. This is the
7 suggestion at the heart of the Prosecution case, that Mr Taylor
8 was from the outset a bloodthirsty warlord with no belief in the
9 rule of law or human rights, and it seems to us necessary, as we
10 stated in our opening, to address that suggestion full on and
11 that's what I'm seeking to do.

12:16:33

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I'll overrule the objection. Go
13 ahead.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

12:16:46

15 Q. What do you say to that, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Well I'm going to probably need some help, before I help
17 you, from the Court. There are two parts to that question. When
18 you say "under your umbrella", what are you referring to?

19 Q. Well you were speaking earlier, were you not, of the desire
20 for revenge on the part of many people in for example Nimba
21 County. Do you remember telling us about that?

12:17:09

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. That's what I'm talking about.

24 A. Okay, I asked that question because "under your umbrella"
25 goes again to the heart of this very indictment that it could be
26 construed that the RUF was under my umbrella, so if we're not
27 talking about the RUF I will continue while you have clarified
28 this.

12:17:25

29 Well I don't know, your Honours, what else I could have

1 done in Liberia. I entered the country. I trained the men in
2 the rule of law and respect for human rights. I keep into place
3 civilian courts. I set up a court martial board. I put into
4 place all the mechanism. There are several individuals at the
12:18:16 5 highest level of the NPFL, my Special Forces that I took so long
6 training, and you must understand it was painful for me to
7 execute some of them. I followed the law and I meant everything
8 that I said here and it was demonstrated on the ground. I don't
9 claim for one minute that there may have been some things that
12:18:43 10 went on that I did not know, or that did not come to the
11 attention of authority, but I had everything put into place and
12 even Prosecution witnesses who have come before this Court have
13 talked about the tribunals and they've talked about the
14 execution. I meant this. I followed it to the letter.

12:19:04 15 Q. And it concludes:

16 "We therefore call upon every patriotic Liberian,
17 including the many truly patriotic elements of the Armed Forces
18 of Liberia, and all freedom-loving peoples everywhere to make
19 every sacrifice and join with us in this right and historic
12:19:28 20 struggle to free the Liberian people and nation of the shackles
21 of tyranny and injustice once and for all."

22 Pausing there, that appeal to "all freedom-loving peoples
23 everywhere", to whom was that addressed?

24 A. We had several target audiences, I would say. Again,
12:19:59 25 principal was the response of the international community to what
26 was going on. That was very principal in our traditional ally.
27 That was very - this was one of our principal target populations.
28 We were also looking at Liberians in the diaspora. We were also
29 looking at other democratic countries around the world, because

1 again - and I hate to keep repeating myself - we are dealing with
2 the period of the Cold War. Anything, a little group like the
3 NPFL going into Liberia and removing - and by the time of this
4 crisis in Liberia, don't let's forget Doe has - while he's not
12:20:57 5 liked for what happened during the elections, but Doe is
6 beginning to receive support from the United States in an attempt
7 to probably encourage him to leave. So Doe is not hanging out
8 there to dry. So we are beginning almost immediately to appeal
9 to the United States and the powers that be that this is a worthy
12:21:24 10 cause and that we cannot be looked at as one of these groups that
11 were coming to start some communist Marxist-Leninist regime in
12 the heart of West Africa. So this is very intentional and it's
13 very targeted in trying to deal with democratic nations across
14 the world that we knew could come after us with the hammer.

12:21:56 15 Q. Bearing in mind the nation of the allegation you face,
16 where it says in that paragraph "all freedom-loving peoples
17 everywhere", was that a reference to your supposed
18 co-conspirators in the RUF and the Gambians say?

19 A. No, I mean we're talking apples and oranges. Who are these
12:22:24 20 people that someone will have to appeal to them? I mean, number
21 one I don't know even - the three letters you use RUF I don't
22 even know who they are, because I mentioned to you I met Ali
23 Kabbah in Libya. He had several unions there, but they were not
24 called RUF. They were the Sierra Leonean Pan-African
12:22:51 25 Revolutionary Movement, so RUF is something that doesn't even
26 play. The little Gambian group that is in Burkina Faso are not -
27 these are not the people to appeal to.

28 What I'm appealing to are the large democratic nations, the
29 leaders of the free world. When we talk about that, who are we

1 talking about? We're talking about the United States, we're
2 talking about Britain and we're talking about Europe in total
3 because that's the free world at that time. So that appeal is
4 going to nation states.

12:23:26 5 Q. I was coming to that. To whom were you addressing this
6 document?

7 A. This is a general pronouncement, but targeted at these
8 nation states.

9 Q. So to whom was it distributed?

12:23:46 10 A. To the press and the international media that was in La
11 Cote d'Ivoire and it was published - it was distributed in the
12 United States by our man in the United States, Tom Woweiyu, to
13 press individuals and individuals that wanted to read about it.
14 So this was a public document intended for mass distribution, but
12:24:11 15 I'm in La Cote d'Ivoire and so it's going to the press.

16 Q. Was it distributed, for example, to members of the NPFL?

17 A. Oh, definitely. Everyone knew. Yes, they had copies.
18 Yes, yes.

19 Q. And again, Mr Taylor, in light of the allegation you face,
12:24:31 20 bearing in mind it is suggested that from the outset your
21 intention was to terrorise the civilian population and that
22 you're no more than a terrorist, what were you seeking to do with
23 this document?

24 A. This document is - imagine this. The news wires, the radio
12:24:59 25 stations, are reporting that there is some group that has
26 attacked, you know, Liberia called the National Patriotic Front
27 of Liberia. The first question in the minds of everyone, "Who
28 are these people? Who are these people?" The next question
29 logically will be, "What do they stand for?" We are setting out

1 immediately to answer these questions that are surely to come and
2 they did come, but we - you don't start a revolution, you don't
3 start these kinds of things, without setting out for all
4 interested parties and what we referred to here as
12:25:41 5 "freedom-loving people" - setting out your objective: "Why are
6 you doing this? After you do this, what do you expect to do
7 thereafter?" If you are a serious minded person that knows what
8 you are doing, you have to set out these general and specific
9 objectives. That's what we're trying to do here.

12:26:05 10 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that this was not the only
11 initiative taken at this time and that there was another
12 initiative directed specifically to the US State Department. Do
13 you remember telling us that?

14 A. That is correct.

12:26:22 15 Q. And what was that initiative?

16 A. We constructed under the signature of my other colleague,
17 Thomas Woveiyu, a document to a senior State Department official
18 by the name of John Dobrin to also explain instead of in a
19 general level which I'm sure the United States Government saw
12:26:50 20 this copy, but we wanted to in a specific way speak to the United
21 States Government as to our aims and our objectives and what we
22 wanted to accomplish and we did that.

23 Q. Have you seen the document which was sent to John Dobrin?

24 A. Yes.

12:27:14 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness could be shown,
26 please, from the Defence documents for week 30, the item behind
27 tab 2:

28 Q. Have you seen that document before, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, this is the document.

1 Q. Now it's headed "Memorandum" and we see that it's addressed
2 to Mr John Dobrin, US Department of State. Pausing there. Did
3 you send any memorandum like this to any other government around
4 the world?

12:28:57 5 A. No. To my recollection we did not target any other
6 government immediately. We targeted our traditional ally, the
7 United States.

8 Q. Who is John Dobrin?

9 A. Well, I'm not sure where he is now, John could be dead.
12:29:13 10 John Dobrin was a senior United States State Department official
11 I think at the level of - and I stand direct on this - I think he
12 was at least at the level of Assistant Secretary of State or
13 thereabouts.

14 Q. Why was he selected?

12:29:31 15 A. Because he would have necessarily been in charge of the
16 African situation and even more specifically the Liberian
17 situation.

18 Q. Now, we see below that from Jucontee Tom Woveiyu, National
19 Patriotic Front. Who is he?

12:30:00 20 A. Remember I've mentioned Jucontee Tom Woveiyu is the same as
21 - that Tom is just short, it's Thomas, the Thomas Woveiyu who is
22 the other individual along with Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf that I said
23 put the final touches on the NPFL.

24 Q. At the time that this document was issued, and we see it's
12:30:30 25 dated 22 January 1990, where was Mr Woveiyu?

26 A. Mr Woveiyu was in the United States.

27 Q. And we see then that it's headed "The current situation in
28 Liberia" and below that "objective".

29 "1. The military action that commenced on December 24,

1 1990 in Gbutuo Nimba County has as its objective the overthrow of
2 the Doe dictatorship and its replacement in a two-phase process
3 by a democratically elected government."

4 Let's pause there. Mr Taylor, this morning you told us
12:31:20 5 that it commenced on 29 December, so which is right?

6 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, Defence counsel is attempting to
7 rehabilitate his witness on direct examination.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say to that?

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honour, I find it amazing that my
12:31:45 10 learned friend should make this objection. The fact that it
11 began on 24 December, Christmas Eve, is an historical fact. Now,
12 for my learned friend in those circumstances to say that in
13 effect I'm trying to assist Mr Taylor on a date seems to us
14 completely ridiculous.

12:32:07 15 Obviously he misspoke this morning. Not everyone,
16 particularly in the pressurised position of sitting in the chair
17 being cross-examined, can recollect every date and every occasion
18 and it seems to us perfectly legitimate for us to seek to assist
19 the witness in this way and in effect correct the record where at
12:32:32 20 page 50, line 19, I'm helpfully assisted, he evidently made an
21 error. That's all we're seeking to do.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's all right. I will overrule the
23 objection and allow the question.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

12:32:47 25 Q. So which is right, Mr Taylor?

26 A. The revolution was launched the day before Christmas. I
27 apologise; I did misspeak. It was launched the day before
28 Christmas in Nimba.

29 Q. And where it says in that paragraph "in a two-phase

1 process", what does that mean?

12:33:27 2 A. I tried to explain that earlier. The first phase is the
3 military phase. The second phase is putting in the structures
4 that I described before, that whole process of going to election,
5 the participation of the international community from your
6 voters' registration, to your voters' education, to the
7 establishment of political parties, that's that second phase that
8 I'm referring to. So the first phase is military, the second
9 phase is this - all of the trappings of the democratic process
12:33:51 10 before elections are held.

11 Q. Then it goes on:

12 "Political programme. Upon the successful completion of
13 the military campaign, a provisional administration will be
14 established, led by the National Patriotic Front. Its mandate
12:34:13 15 will be to restore order and prepare the country for multi-party
16 presidential and legislative elections in accordance with the
17 Liberian constitution. Although the precise composition of the
18 provisional government has not yet been decided, it is envisaged
19 that it will comprise elements of the various groupings that are
12:34:38 20 making a contribution to the struggle for the restoration of
21 democracy in Liberia."

22 Can we pause there, please.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now help us: Where it says "although the precise
12:34:55 25 composition of the provisional government has not yet been
26 decided", was that true?

27 A. That was true.

28 Q. But you had told us earlier, Mr Taylor, that it had already
29 been agreed that you would be president and a Special Forces

1 would be vice-president?

2 A. That is true.

3 Q. So what does that mean then?

4 A. Well, let me tell you.

12:35:19 5 MS HOLLIS: Your Honour, at the risk of incurring the wrath
6 of the Court, Defence counsel is once again attempting to
7 rehabilitate his witness by reconciling possibly different
8 language in a document and testimony. Contrary to what Defence
9 counsel has just said, this witness is not under the pressure of
12:35:38 10 cross-examination, this is direct examination, and we think that
11 it's improper.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: This witness is not in the ordinary
13 position of other witnesses. This is the witness the Prosecution
14 has alleged committed 11 serious - extremely serious counts and
12:35:59 15 has called 91 witnesses and hundreds of documents in an attempt
16 to prove those counts against this witness, the accused.

17 Now, in the opinion of this Court, this accused has got the
18 right to fully reply to those allegations and that evidence and
19 questions directed to that aim will be allowed by this Court.
12:36:29 20 Having said that, I'll overrule the objection and you go ahead,
21 Mr Griffiths.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

23 Q. So what's the position, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Well, let me just explain this. When we talk about the
12:36:48 25 composition has not been decided, we have to look at it in this
26 particular light: The Special Forces agreed that if we succeed
27 I, if I became the president, one of them would be
28 vice-president. That's the military revolutionary process that
29 is going on.

1 This process that I'm talking about, I do not become
2 President of Liberia until after an election. I am only known as
3 leader of the NPFL. It was known that I would participate in the
4 election. This process that I'm describing here, when I say the
12:37:31 5 composition has not been decided, we have a typical example right
6 here in court, your Honour.

7 There were groups in Liberia, right in Monrovia, the
8 gentleman sitting at the rear of the Court, Cllr Lavalie
9 Supuwood, a member of my legal defence team, was one of the
12:37:59 10 individuals in Monrovia that was dispatched via La Cote d'Ivoire
11 to bear message from supporting groups of - remember I talked
12 about progressives in Monrovia - to bring word to us that they
13 were with us. So we had support in Monrovia.

14 So by the time we succeeded militarily there would have had
12:38:26 15 to be a transitional government. It is those progressives that
16 would have to be brought on board in setting up this transitional
17 government that would then put into place the mechanism for
18 elections.

19 Now, Charles Taylor was going to be a candidate, so the
12:38:48 20 deal was wherever I led one of them would be vice-president and
21 that is what happened. So, when I talk about not knowing the
22 composition, we did not know yet in Monrovia who all were going
23 to join the government, because everybody from the same Amos
24 Sawyer, Cllr Supuwood in - the whole group in Monrovia said they
12:39:12 25 paid his way, go, carry out message. That's how he came in the
26 bush and joined us.

27 Q. Now, what are you talking about in this document when it
28 says "of the various groupings that are making a contribution to
29 the struggle"?

1 A. That's what I'm talking about. I'm talking about in
2 America we still have our major base over there, the Union of
3 Liberian Associations in America. They are doing press releases,
4 they are supporting. You've got in the Monrovia area, you've got
12:39:49 5 - remember I mentioned to the Court that you had the Progressive
6 Alliance of Liberia that later on became the PPP, the political
7 party headed by Barcus Matthews. They are down there rooting for
8 us. And that's why they sent him.

9 So all of these groupings that were outside of Liberia,
12:40:14 10 Liberians in the Diaspora that wanted to see this change, were
11 out there supporting it. So if you were in Europe and a
12 television or radio or a journalist came up to you and asked you
13 questions, your mere statement of support meant something to us.
14 That's what I'm talking about.

12:40:33 15 Q. Very well. It goes on at paragraph 3:

16 "One of the most unsettling features of the Doe
17 dictatorship has been the injection into our body politic of
18 pernicious tribal cleavages. Although this is a familiar theme
19 in much of Sub-Saharan Africa it has never been part of our
12:40:56 20 political culture. One of the urgent tasks of the NPF government
21 will be to establish the principle that Liberia belongs to all
22 Liberians, including the vanquished Krahs."

23 What's that about?

24 A. Well, we have to pay attention to the third line where it
12:41:20 25 talks about tribal cleavages. I have told this Court we have
26 this divide between Americo-Liberians and aborigines as two
27 groups. Doe comes in and he brings into place a third dimension
28 that is now not a group dimension but a tribal dimension of the
29 Krahn ethnic group where the Krahs then move forward and almost

1 broke this whole thing down into not like Americo-Liberians
2 versus aborigines, it almost became the Krahn ethnic group versus
3 the rest of the country.

4 Q. Just the Krahns?

12:42:08 5 A. Well, let me probably give the Court some information.
6 There are four groupings in Liberia that speak different
7 languages but practically understand each other. I will name
8 them. One is called the Kru. The other is called the - that's
9 K-R-U. The second is called the Sapo, that's S-A-P and some say
12:42:45 10 P-P-O. The third grouping you have the Grebos, that's
11 G-R-E-B-O-S, and then you have the Krahn.

12 Now, close to the Krahn are the Sapos that speak the same
13 language. So, as an extension of the Krahn ethnic group at that
14 particular time the Sapos stopped calling themselves Sapos and
12:43:15 15 started calling themselves Krahns. So we are talking about an
16 extension of the Krahn Sapos. The Grebos did not join the Krahn
17 in that way, neither did the Kru, but we are mostly talking about
18 the Sapos and the Krahns.

19 Q. And it goes on at paragraph 4:

12:43:40 20 "The ideological orientation of the principal players in
21 the current Liberian movement for democracy is pro-west, pro the
22 free enterprise system. It our hope not nearly to retain ties
23 with our traditional allies, but to expand them in a way which
24 will command mutual respect. The undignified spectacle which we
12:44:10 25 have had to endure these past years of a Liberia with its hands
26 constantly outstretched in supplication is one we are anxious to
27 change."

28 Why was it felt necessary to make that statement?

29 A. Well, the first part is similar to the document we just saw

1 before. Right away we want to tell them that: Look, this is no
2 Marxist-Leninist operation. So we're going to just be, in other
3 words, pro you. The second part of this is the pan-African wing
4 of this that: Look, we are part of you, but we are not your
12:44:53 5 little child. We want to be able to take care - for you to help
6 us to take care of ourselves. We are tired of having to come to
7 you respectfully to beg for a little money here, a little food
8 here. We are looking at a process now where, in the old saying,
9 you would teach us to grow our food instead of just giving us.
12:45:17 10 We are tired with your handouts and treating us like your little
11 children. We want to be looked at with some respect as a
12 sovereign nation. We want you as our friend, we want you as our
13 ally but we don't want you treating us as though we are on your
14 plantations. This is what we are actually getting at here.

12:45:38 15 Q. Now where it says "of the principal players in the current
16 Liberian movement", why was it necessary to make that reference?

17 A. Well, you have one of our main individuals Ellen Johnson is
18 very well known and respected in the United States and in the
19 west. So we are - Tom Woweiyu is also in the United States, he
12:46:03 20 is known from our days in the union. I am known. So we are
21 really trying to deal with them knowing that, well, we are the
22 guys in control. So you don't have to worry about some other
23 influence, we are the individuals that you have to look at. So
24 you can depend on us, in other words.

12:46:24 25 Q. Go over the page, please. "Economic programme". Paragraph
26 5:

27 "Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Doe administration
28 has been the despoliation of the Liberian economy. Ten years of
29 negative growth, gargantuan deficits financed through heavy

1 foreign borrowing and raids on the domestic banking system and
2 abject neglect of the country's physical and human infrastructure
3 have taken a heavy toll. An urgent priority will be to put into
4 place the kinds of policies that will begin to address these
12:47:43 5 problems in a meaningful way."

6 What's all that about?

7 A. I'm going to have to break this down because there are
8 about three, four different constructs in here. Let's deal with
9 ten years of negative growth, guaranteeing deficits financed
12:48:09 10 through heavy borrowing. The military comes to power. Doe is
11 there; investment begin to dwindle. Most foreign investment in
12 the country begin to find themselves pulling out because here we
13 have a situation where the military is there; we've had an
14 attempt before.

12:48:41 15 We are still going through this terrible problem and there
16 are open secrets that something - that Liberians are not, you
17 know, were not prepared to permit this whole process to continue
18 and that probably there will be trouble in the country, so this
19 serves as a disincentive to foreign investment. So we had the
12:49:09 20 decline in investment that led to this negative growth. And so
21 what Liberia had to do at that particular time was Doe kept
22 trying to borrow money to fill this gap that had been left as a
23 result of this negative growth.

24 This part that deals with the abject neglect of the
12:49:35 25 country's physical and human infrastructure have taken a heavy
26 toll. The human infrastructure had to deal with that segment of
27 the up-and-coming students and the educated already population in
28 Liberia and also in the Diaspora. Liberians that were educated
29 and trained in various disciplines that might have wanted to come

1 home found themselves not coming.

2 Our universities found themselves losing assistance to the
3 academic process, and so this whole process of renewal, training
4 - growing and training to over time replace and keep the civil
12:50:32 5 service and other parts of the economy going were all hampered
6 because of this massive loss of revenue because of the negative
7 growth. And so this is what we were talking about in that
8 particular part.

9 Q. It continues:

12:50:51 10 "An implementable economic recovery programme is being
11 drafted with specific prioritised goals which it is hoped will
12 serve as a basis for discussions with our bilateral and
13 multilateral partners.

14 As a general principle, the broad thrust of NPF economic
12:51:17 15 policy will be to diminish the commercial public sector presence,
16 reorienting government's role away from that of active player and
17 more towards that of regulator/referee. There will also be
18 conscious efforts to provide opportunities for the development of
19 Liberian entrepreneurship while at the same time providing a more
12:51:48 20 hospitable environment for foreign investment."

21 So what kind of economic route were you proposing there,
22 Mr Taylor?

23 A. Well, let's deal with the diminishing of the commercial
24 public sector and then I will work into what I'm talking about
12:52:09 25 here. It's important for the Court to understand that Liberia is
26 one of those curious countries where the commercial part of our
27 economy was - I would almost say 85 per cent held by foreign
28 nationals; Lebanese, Indians and other nationals that you could
29 hardly find a Liberian with one little storefront to sell dry

1 goods and other things.

2 Liberians continued to remain dependent on the presence of
3 foreign - and I don't say this in a negative way because we, I
4 appreciate the presence of foreigners, they've contributed
12:52:58 5 significantly - but this was to encourage Liberians to get
6 involved in the whole economic structure by doing some business,
7 do something, and not just leave it up to foreigners to do. Now
8 that's what we meant by this commercial situation.

9 The second part was that we are still hinting to
12:53:24 10 non-government involvement in the - as far as control as in a
11 communist type economic environment where there would be a free
12 enterprise but there would be a type of what is referred here as
13 a regulator/referee.

14 So instead of owning, the government owning and operating
12:53:57 15 the systems of distribution in the country, it would do what most
16 western economies do is to - what you call regulate and referee
17 and I guess if they had done that we would not have the - if they
18 had continued doing that in the West we would not have the
19 present global economic crisis.

12:54:14 20 Q. Now pausing there for a minute, Mr Taylor. At this stage
21 we're talking about 1990?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Who is President of the United States?

24 A. 1990. I've got to be very careful with this one. It's got
12:54:32 25 to be - I think it's the old man George Bush, if I'm not
26 mistaken.

27 Q. And help us also: Can you recall now who was Prime
28 Minister in England?

29 A. Yes, I can. It was the Iron Lady, Margaret Thatcher.

1 Q. And help us: What kind of economic programme had come to
2 be associated with her?

3 A. Well, to the best of my recollection, at that time Margaret
4 Thatcher, to the best of my recollection, was a conservative and
12:55:19 5 so there were some problems in Britain at the time with
6 demonstrations from - I think on the part of trade unions and
7 there was some restructuring of the British economy. That's the
8 extent of my recollection and it was pretty tough. I think
9 Britain was in dire economic straits during that particular time
12:55:44 10 and she brought about some very tough, stringent measures that I
11 think helped to rein in the trade unions and it did cause some
12 problems.

13 Q. I'm just looking here at the context in which you were
14 saying this. Now could you put that document to one side,
12:56:03 15 please. So we've now looked, Mr Taylor, in a little length at
16 two documents dating from January 1990, so weeks after you had
17 embarked upon this revolution, yes? And between those two
18 documents do they set out what your goals were at the time?

19 A. Yes.

12:56:41 20 Q. Can you now please, Mr Taylor, help us with the progress of
21 the Liberian revolution thereafter in 1990?

22 A. Well I will do my best here, because by January/February of
23 this particular time while we are moving Doe is really beginning
24 to go after people in the Monrovia and general area that he
12:57:32 25 suspects are trying to help. Now, by May of 1990 NPFL forces
26 take Buchanan. Now it's important, because if I have an
27 opportunity it's important for this to be seen from a map
28 because --

29 Q. Well let's go to the map then, please.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Can we replace this map please, L1, which we've been
3 looking at earlier today.

4 A. Yes. We have captured Buchanan and if you look Buchanan
12:58:16 5 now is to the far west, but we have not reached to Gbarnga. I
6 want to go to through this even before I get to the map, because
7 I don't want it to be said that the map is leading me because I
8 know this. So we have progressed west to Buchanan, we've
9 captured Buchanan, but going northeastward towards Gbarnga we
12:58:44 10 deliberately do not capture Gbarnga.

11 By July - and this is very interesting. By July of 1990
12 the NPFL forces have reached the outskirts of Monrovia, by July,
13 and so we are talking about a period of about six months we had
14 moved from the border all the way right on the outskirts of
12:59:19 15 Monrovia. We had practically encircled Monrovia. We still have
16 not moved into Gbarnga.

17 What we do, we go into Buchanan and then we move northward
18 towards the town of Kakata. Now, Kakata - because you asked me
19 the question about 1990. Kakata is on the road between Monrovia
12:59:52 20 and Gbarnga. Now, from a military tactical position we have left
21 Gbarnga in natural terms behind us. What we did was to go and
22 capture the town of Kakata. There were still Armed Forces of
23 Liberia troops in Gbarnga and to a great extent all the way back
24 in the other part of Nimba, so when I told this Court we had not
13:00:23 25 captured all of Nimba County, that part of Nimba County as I
26 mentioned that is the northeastern side on the main highway that
27 I tried to direct, Ganta coming on to Gbarnga, are still being
28 held by the armed forces. So we bypass them, come to Buchanan,
29 cut across to Kakata and leave Gbarnga and Ganta behind us.

1 What happens then? The troops from the Armed Forces of
2 Liberia have been cut off from the rest of the troops in Monrovia
3 and most of them flee. Then we work our way back from Kakata
4 towards - and I'll then show what I'm talking about on the map.

13:01:12 5 Q. Please do.

6 A. Now, remember we enter at Gbutuo and begin to expand. We
7 come, your Honours, all the way, we capture the town of Tappita.
8 If you look coming right where I'm pointing is the town of
9 Tappita.

13:01:55 10 Now this is important here, because behind Tappita if you
11 look going westward is Grand Gedeh. Grand Gedeh is the home
12 county of Samuel Doe and there was a major military position
13 here, but there is only one road into Grand Gedeh in and one road
14 out and that is that road coming through Tappita that goes on -
13:02:26 15 if you watch it, we don't have good roads in Liberia. From
16 Tappita the next road you have to go up to Ganta before you go to
17 Monrovia.

18 Now, we captured Tappita and take this forest route that
19 you see I'm going through here. I'm not sure if the judges are
13:02:46 20 seeing this. Are you?

21 JUDGE DOHERTY: [Microphone not activated].

22 THE WITNESS: Okay. We take this bush road here and attack
23 Buchanan. We capture Buchanan. We do not advance behind to
24 Grand Gedeh. From Buchanan we work our way all the way up to the
13:03:07 25 town of Kakata. So we move from Buchanan. We begin to fight.
26 This is - right here is Roberts international airport and we move
27 and we capture the town of Kakata, putting Harbel, which is the
28 Firestone rubber plantation, in our control area.

29 If you look, your Honours, further to your left there is

1 that town - the military barracks - of Camp Schefflein right
2 here. We do not go in that direction. We do not attack
3 Schefflein. It's too strong. But we go up to Kakata, capture
4 Kakata, station a major force there and begin to work our way
13:03:52 5 backward to Gbarnga and backward to Ganta, joining now the full
6 control of Nimba County and this entire area that involves Nimba,
7 Bong, here is Margibi, this entire area. So we in effect have
8 captured the very centre of the country.

9 Doe forces that are in Grand Gedeh are cut off from
13:04:20 10 Monrovia so we can fight them. Monrovia is still on that side,
11 but we are dead centre and there can be no connection between the
12 troops of the Armed Forces of Liberia. This is what happened.

13 By this time, that's in May, we move to Kakata and push
14 further toward Monrovia. We go on down to the town of - where is
13:04:49 15 Careysburg? We come all the way here to Careysburg and then come
16 near Monrovia and then we stop. We do not attack Camp
17 Schefflein. It's a major military post and we don't touch it,
18 but we just spread out.

19 By this time in 1990 we get to Gbarnga. From Gbarnga we
13:05:12 20 then started moving our troops toward the Lofa angle, but we
21 crossed the St Paul River, we come into this Belle Yella area and
22 attack this Bomi/Cape Mount area. So by July we have encircled
23 Monrovia, but we have already now penetrated and we have captured
24 most of Lofa and Cape Mount. So what has happened in effect by
13:05:49 25 July, Monrovia is totally encircled from the Bomi/Cape Mount side
26 all the way back up to the town of Tappita. That's the situation
27 as of July.

28 In August of 1990, this is when ECOMOG, the West African
29 peacekeeping forces, come into Liberia and meet us and we begin

1 fighting the ECOMOG and there is a reason for that.

2 By September of 1990 Samuel Doe is killed. He is killed a
3 month after the ECOMOG forces get into the country in September.
4 By that time he had done some terrible things in Monrovia. The
13:06:48 5 UN compound had been raided, somewhat earlier than July.

6 Q. Can I ask you to pause at this stage please, Mr Taylor,
7 because you've helpfully provided us with an outline of events
8 for the first nine months of 1990.

9 A. That's correct.

13:07:09 10 Q. I'd like us now to pause, please, and deal in a little bit
11 more detail to assist these judges with some of the events you've
12 mentioned. First of all, can you help us with the month in which
13 Kakata was captured?

14 A. Kakata was captured - May is Buchanan, so by late May/early
13:07:34 15 June we are moving up there. We moved straight across to Kakata.

16 Q. Now, did Buchanan have any significance as a town?

17 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

18 Q. What's that?

19 A. Buchanan is - has a seaport. It was an iron ore staging
13:07:57 20 post. Buchanan is about I would think the second city I would
21 say to Monrovia. A very, very, very well planned and well
22 organised city of industrial activities. This was important
23 because it had a seaport. It was important because it meant a
24 major blow to the government to lose such a commercially
13:08:26 25 important part of the country.

26 Q. Now, Harbel is the location for what economic activity?

27 A. Harbel is the location of the Firestone rubber plantation.
28 The largest - at that time I would say one of the largest rubber
29 plantations in the world.

1 Q. And what was the significance of capturing that?

2 A. You had immediately a means that would provide the needed
3 financial assistance that we needed for the revolution.

4 Q. How?

13:09:14 5 A. Well, once Harbel fell in our control - this was a major,
6 major industrial area. Rubber was being sent out, rubber was
7 being exported to the United States. So once we captured Harbel
8 we then made it very clear to the Firestone plantation company
9 that they could no longer be permitted to exercise allegiance to
13:09:45 10 the government in Monrovia; that that which in terms of revenue
11 were being generated from the sale of rubber that we did not ban
12 had to be paid to the National Patriotic Front. So it became at
13 that particular time our most significant principal source of
14 foreign exchange.

13:10:07 15 Q. And what kind of sums are we talking about?

16 A. Well, depending on the sale of rubber, we could do an
17 average of one, two million dollars probably every two quarters.

18 Q. And who received that money?

19 A. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia received that
13:10:32 20 money.

21 Q. And who controlled it?

22 A. I controlled the National Patriotic Front.

23 Q. No, who controlled the money?

24 A. The organisation. We had a whole system set up that we
13:10:45 25 could buy food and medicine and different things. There was a
26 whole structure put into place that would be a financial
27 structure to deal with the collection and distribution of the
28 money. I want to clarify one thing. I am not eluding here.
29 What Firestone did at that particular time was that, because of

1 United States laws, Firestone, and I want to be very clear about
2 this, did not pay money to the NPFL. I'm going to be very clear
3 about this.

4 What happened is that we took rubber in return for what and
13:11:34 5 we sold the rubber mostly to La Cote d'Ivoire and then got the
6 money from there. We had a mechanism set up where the rubber
7 would be turned over to us and we would then send the rubber to
8 La Cote d'Ivoire that was buying and exporting rubber and it was
9 being bought by local merchants and we used the money that way.
13:11:54 10 Firestone did not pay to us.

11 Q. And I am dwelling on this topic for a reason, Mr Taylor.
12 The money you received, was that in cash or was it kept in a
13 bank?

14 A. No, we sold on the market in La Cote d'Ivoire in cash.

13:12:17 15 Q. Yes, and where was the money kept?

16 A. And then the money was brought back - by now we are in
17 Harbel, we moved to Gbarnga, by now we begin to set up our
18 headquarters in Gbarnga. So it is being now used by what we call
19 our ministry of finance.

13:12:34 20 Q. But how is it kept?

21 A. Not in a bank. It was kept by the ministry officials I'm
22 sure in the building there. There was no operating bank in
23 Greater Liberia at the time.

24 Q. And who was the minister of finance?

13:12:50 25 A. The minister of finance at that particular time started off
26 to be a gentleman we called Togar McIntosh.

27 Q. Can you spell the first time?

28 A. Togar, T-O-G-A-R and the last name is spelt
29 M-C-I-N-T-O-S-H, I think, McIntosh.

1 Q. Thank you. Now moving on, your assistance, please.

2 Roughly when was Gbarnga captured? Just a month will do.

3 A. I would put Gbarnga to about - roughly about the same time
4 that we are progressing toward Monrovia, so we are talking about
13:13:49 5 roughly between June/July. We are moving in two directions. A
6 group is going towards Monrovia, and a group is going backward to
7 Gbarnga. Gbarnga may have been captured a little earlier than
8 our encirclement of Monrovia because, as I mentioned to the
9 Court, there is virtually no resistance behind us.

13:14:10 10 Once we cut these people off most of the soldiers flee and
11 so the first scout unit that we sent to the area didn't really
12 find anything, so it was a very short time. So I would really
13 put this to - if I really wanted to be pushed on this - to not
14 later than maybe June because it was captured a little earlier
13:14:30 15 than getting the circle around Monrovia.

16 Q. Good enough for my purposes, Mr Taylor, but can I just
17 return briefly, and I apologise for this, to the issue of money.
18 The money that you were receiving from the sale of rubber, was
19 any of that being sent to any groups outside Liberia?

13:14:54 20 A. No, no, no, no, no, no. We are not supporting any group or
21 sending money to any groups outside Liberia at this particular
22 time.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 A. No.

13:15:07 25 Q. Another little detail. Given that you had come as far as
26 Harbel, which we can see on the map is not that far from
27 Monrovia, why did you not make a strike for Monrovia at that
28 time?

29 A. We encircled Monrovia. As I said --

1 Q. By when?

2 A. By July of 1990. By this particular time there are all
3 kinds of efforts underway for a peacekeeping unit or the
4 involvement of ECOWAS in this whole process.

13:15:59 5 Q. Just ECOWAS?

6 A. Well, I'm coming to that. We are refusing to permit ECOWAS
7 to come in at a time that we are about to capture Monrovia, but
8 no one is listening to us. At this particular time our good
9 friends the United States - now we're going - I want to make this
10 clear now: We encircled Monrovia around July. We are moving on
11 where there are discussions going on for these troops. The
12 troops finally, I mentioned to the Court, entered in August.

13 Q. Which troops?

14 A. The troops from ECOWAS finally entered. But there are
13:16:50 15 these discussions going on.

16 Q. Between whom?

17 A. The NPFL, the ECOWAS leadership about should it happen,
18 should it not happen. All of that is going on. We are still
19 insisting even after they get into Monrovia that: Hey, you're
13:17:06 20 here, you do not meddle and this is unlike the meddling that the
21 Prosecution mentions of me in Sierra Leone. You have nothing to
22 do with what we are doing here, we are going to take Monrovia.
23 We are now going forward.

24 In September Doe is killed while ECOWAS is - the ECOMOG
13:17:32 25 forces are in town. By or around October comes in the Assistant
26 Secretary of State for African affairs.

27 Q. Who?

28 A. Herman Cohen.

29 Q. Herman Cohen comes into the bush on the border at a

1 different area now. He comes into an area called Loguato, that's
2 on the map, in a little town just outside of Loguato called
3 Duanplay to ask me and in fact to deliver a message to me,
4 secretary Cohen came in the bush to deliver a message to me that
13:18:24 5 it was the desire of the United States government that I not
6 attack the city of Monrovia because there were close to a million
7 citizens in the city and to attack the city would result to
8 massive loss of life.

9 And because we had captured Grand Cape Mount County, I
13:18:46 10 explained to the Court not only had we - the encirclement of
11 Monrovia means that we had come across and captured - I mentioned
12 Lofa, Grand Cape Mount and Bomi.

13 He secondly asked that we open a humanitarian corridor
14 between Monrovia through Cape Mount to the Sierra Leonean border
13:19:09 15 that citizens that wanted to leave could leave. We accepted.
16 That's why we did not take Monrovia. We felt that it was a
17 reasonable request and we accepted not to storm Monrovia.

18 Q. Do you think you made a right decision?

19 A. On second thought one would look at it in a little
13:19:38 20 different light, but I'll put it this way, counsel: I have no
21 regrets that we took that decision because I believe that the
22 United States was right, we did save lives. But on the other
23 hand it did prolong the military operations in Liberia beyond a
24 particular point, because what happened is that ECOMOG launched a
13:20:05 25 counter-offensive against us. So how do I answer you?

26 I am very glad that we saved lives because it was true that
27 there would have been massive loss of lives, but regrettably
28 there was almost on the other hand exactly what we were trying to
29 prevent, unfortunately. So in direct answer I can't say now that

1 I regret that decision because, on a whole, I think even more
2 lives would have been more lost, the city would have been
3 practically wiped out, and so I just have to - you know, to leave
4 it at that.

13:20:46 5 Q. Now, you mentioned that in September, a month after ECOMOG
6 arrived, Samuel Doe was killed.

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. Who by?

9 A. Now just to remind the Court, I had mentioned that my
13:21:15 10 commander Prince Johnson had executed two individuals without due
11 process.

12 Q. Pause there. When?

13 A. We are talking all the way back now in about February of
14 1990.

13:21:33 15 Q. Thank you.

16 A. He is now being still pursued by my forces to have him
17 arrested. He manages to evade us all the way and he's ahead of
18 us and so he gets within the Monrovia area.

19 Q. And by this stage that he's in Monrovia, is he by himself?

13:22:04 20 A. Well, Prince Johnson pulled a little trick. He gets into
21 the Monrovia area with a group that he calls the INPFL, that is
22 the Independent National Patriotic Front. Along the way Prince
23 Johnson is telling everywhere he reaches "I am working for my
24 leader Charles Taylor and I'm just moving along." And so he got
13:22:36 25 along with a whole lot.

26 He gets into Monrovia and he strikes a deal with Samuel Doe
27 and he actually enters the city. Prince Johnson comes and he
28 captures and sits into an area of Monrovia called the Freeport of
29 Monrovia. Unfortunately, this is where Doe is killed. Prince

1 Johnson works out a deal with Samuel Doe by telling Doe that he
2 wants peace and he wants to join Doe to help to fight against me
3 because in fact I am chasing him. Doe begins to supply Prince
4 with material.

13:23:20 5 Q. What kind of material?

6 A. Arms and ammunition. But by this time Doe is under a
7 little pressure to leave, but Prince is now in the city with the
8 INPFL, in direct answer to your question.

9 Q. And so how does the death of Doe come about?

13:23:50 10 A. One of the things that was said to me by secretary Cohen,
11 and secretary Cohen has written extensively, he has a book
12 published and these facts can be verified in his book. Secretary
13 Cohen has said to me that: Look, this has to end. If and when
14 you capture Roberts International Airport - now Roberts

13:24:27 15 International Airport is in Harbel and there is the Firestone
16 plantation in Harbel, the airport is in Harbel but the airport
17 remained a strategic position for the Government of Liberia still
18 under Samuel Doe and not far from the airport is this military
19 barracks right down the road called Camp Schefflein. So Camp
13:24:49 20 Schefflein is the barracks that is used to protect Roberts
21 International Airport. So it is heavily defended by the
22 government. Heavily defended. This is the only place that the
23 government has to bring in its arms and ammunition to continue
24 the war.

13:25:10 25 Secretary Cohen says to me: If and when the NPFL captures
26 Roberts International Airport we will know the war is over and
27 the United States will convince Doe to step down and leave the
28 country. This is what he said; it's in his book. He told me
29 that. And when we captured Roberts International Airport shortly

1 thereafter what happened was that Doe then was pressured and he
2 was trying to leave the country.

3 Q. Pause there, help us: When was Roberts international
4 airfield captured, just roughly, just the month?

13:25:56 5 A. Yes. Well, Roberts International Airport was captured
6 around August of 1990.

7 Q. Continue.

8 A. Around that time. Doe now, depending on this Prince
9 Johnson boy, is leaving the country at the Freeport of Monrovia
10 under the protection of the peacekeepers.

11 Q. Which peacekeepers?

12 A. The ECOMOG. The Economic Community of West African States,
13 the peacekeeping force that had been sent is called the Economic
14 Monitoring Group, ECOMOG. He is captured at the Freeport. Now,
13:26:39 15 don't let's forget the Freeport of Monrovia and that area is
16 under Prince Johnson's command. But Doe relaxes because he
17 believes that Prince is his ally now. He goes at the port with
18 his team to leave, Prince Johnson attacks Doe, peacekeepers
19 whoever, and captures Doe alive and subsequently kills him.

13:27:00 20 Q. Now you speak of peacekeepers arriving in Liberia in August
21 of 1990?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Were there any other troops unassociated with the
24 peacekeepers who arrived at any time?

13:27:19 25 A. Well, at around this time, for the protection of American
26 citizens, some 2,000 United States marines had been dispatched to
27 Liberia. We were consulted also.

28 Q. Who by?

29 A. By our contacts in La Cote d'Ivoire, at the United States

1 embassy in La Cote d'Ivoire, and they even came to Buchanan and
2 other places to help evacuate American citizens. But the only
3 other military force that came in and entered the territory of
4 Liberia with the knowledge of Doe and myself was 2,000 United
13:28:05 5 States marines.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Mr President. Would that
7 be a convenient point?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we'll adjourn now. We'll reconvene
9 at 2.30.

13:29:21 10 [Lunch break taken at 1.29 p.m.]

11 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please you, your Honours:

14 Q. Mr Taylor, before we adjourned for lunch you were - oh, I
14:30:54 15 am sorry, there is a change of appearance on our side. We are
16 joined this afternoon by my learned friend, Mr Terry Munyard.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Right, thank you. That is noted.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Before we adjourned for lunch, Mr Taylor, you were dealing
14:31:07 20 with the arrival of some 2,000 United States marines in Liberia
21 in 1990. Do you recall that?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Now, who had arrived first? The ECOWAS led force or the US
24 marines?

14:31:32 25 A. The ECOWAS forces arrived in August. I think that is a
26 little ahead of the marines.

27 Q. Now you had told us before the luncheon adjournment,
28 Mr Taylor, that you had been - the NPFL had been involved in
29 discussions with the ECOWAS countries prior to the deployment of

1 that force. Is that right?

2 A. Well, there were discussions going on. We had spoken to a
3 few, yes.

4 Q. Who had you spoken to?

14:32:11 5 A. Well, we had our representatives, our principal
6 spokesperson, Mr Woveiyu, who had on different radios been
7 talking about it. Let me be clear: There was no formal meeting
8 or discussion with ECOWAS at this particular time. Okay, ECOWAS
9 is looking at the problems in Liberia. The theory is advanced
14:32:47 10 and we got to set the stage for where you are. At this
11 particular time the chairmanship of ECOWAS is headed by Sir Dawda
12 Jawara, then President --

13 Q. Spelling?

14 A. Oh --

14:33:12 15 Q. Fine, no problem. Continue?

16 A. Please find out. Sir, Dawda Jawara the President of The
17 Gambia is then the sitting chairman of ECOWAS. This is still
18 during the administration of the elder Bush. So Dawda Jawara,
19 hearing of this problem, and this I must attribute to him, a
14:33:44 20 theory was developed that the revolution in Liberia is about to
21 destabilise West Africa. I guess he could have drawn this
22 experience from his own encounter with the gentleman I have
23 mentioned here before, Kukoi Samba Sanyang as leading the
24 problems in The Gambia. And so discussions are going on. There
14:34:16 25 is no real consultation but discussions between and amongst
26 states are going on. Nigeria is involved, but more than Nigeria
27 Ghana, and a decision is taken to try to intervene but all along
28 we object. The NPFL is objecting to their intervention at that
29 time.

1 Now, crucial to this objection is this: At this time the
2 President of Nigeria is Ibrahim Babangida. Now, again the Court
3 will have to help me with Babangida. He was President of
4 Nigeria. I am sorry, your Honours, I am not as good as some of
14:35:06 5 the other spellers, but I know the details.

6 Babangida has developed a very, very close relationship
7 with Samuel Doe. He is supplying arms and ammunition to Doe.
8 They are good friends. Babangida is contacted by Jawara,
9 Rawlings is still the President of Ghana. I at this time have no
14:35:40 10 dealings with Ghana. As you know, I am arrested. I am out of
11 Ghana.

12 This revolution now is being led by us, but I can almost
13 say with certainty that Rawlings is concerned because this
14 Marxist group with the Sawyers and the Tiptehs of this word and
14:36:09 15 the Commany Wisseh are based in Ghana, and remember I have been
16 arrested because I was in a way disrupting what they were about
17 to do.

18 So, Ghana has interests in the intervention of ECOMOG, but
19 Nigeria is drawn in because of their relationship with Doe. We
14:36:31 20 then object. We see Nigeria's involvement because Nigeria is
21 known as the powerhouse of West Africa. We see Nigeria's
22 involvement as a way of holding and keeping Doe in power, so we
23 object and we say: If ECOMOG troops arrive we will attack them
24 because this is a backdoor way of keeping Doe in power. You
14:36:59 25 understand me?

26 Q. Yes. Now that ECOMOG force, Mr Taylor, how was it
27 composed?

28 A. At that time the largest contingent was from Nigeria.

29 Q. Yes.

1 A. Followed by Ghana.

2 Q. Mm-hm.

3 A. And guess who? The Gambia sent a force.

4 Q. Anybody else?

14:37:24 5 A. Along with Sierra Leone and Guinea.

6 Q. Now, dealing with each of those contributing countries in
7 turn, Nigeria, you have already told us, led by Ibrahim
8 Babangida, What was his background?

9 A. Oh, General Babangida is a military. He is from the
14:37:49 10 military background.

11 Q. How had he come to power?

12 A. He had seized power militarily.

13 Q. A military coup?

14 A. Oh, that is correct.

14:37:58 15 Q. Now, help us: Ghana, who was in charge of Ghana at the
16 time?

17 A. Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. He had also seized power
18 in a military coup.

19 Q. Sierra Leone, who was in charge there?

14:38:16 20 A. It was also a military man who had not seized power by
21 force of arms. He had had power handed over to him as a result
22 of Siaka Stevens's removal, but he was a general in the armed
23 forces, General Joseph Momoh.

24 Q. What about Guinea?

14:38:36 25 A. We had there a military general who had seized power by
26 force of arms following the death of Ahmed Sekou Toure.

27 Q. So of the five countries, no, no, no, let's complete the
28 picture. Gambia, who was in power?

29 A. Gambia at this particular time Sir Dawda is still there,

1 but he is frightened by this new phenomena because of his
2 experience, and I must say this is not what Sir Dawda Jawara
3 said, I am just trying to, based on what I believe, because of
4 his whole reaction in helping to develop this theory that the
14:39:21 5 NPFL had set out to destabilise the entire West African --

6 Q. I am coming to that, but just pause. But what was his
7 background, Sir Dawda?

8 A. Oh, I really don't know, but he had come - Sir Dawda, well,
9 you know, that sir comes from the British situation. He had come
14:39:46 10 into The Gambia almost from the very beginning of independence,
11 so I am not sure that I know his - I can almost say he was not
12 military, but I am not sure of the rest.

13 Q. But in any event, of the five contributing countries four
14 were led by military dictatorships?

14:40:05 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And the fifth, The Gambia, yes, you have told us that its
17 leader was afraid of destabilisation in West Africa?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now, you recall telling us of some Gambians you had met in
14:40:28 20 the training camp in Libya?

21 A. That is correct. To be correct - not I had met in Libya,
22 not at the training camp, but they were in Libya. They were not
23 --

24 Q. They were in Libya?

14:40:40 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. And was there a basis for this fear that Sir Dawda had
27 about destabilisation?

28 A. Oh, I want to believe so. I want to believe so. Yes, I
29 want to believe so. The gentleman that staged the attempted

1 takeover from Sir Dawda Jawara, Kukoi Samba Sanyang that is also
2 known as Dr Manneh, is in Libya. I meet him there with his men.
3 They are not in the camp, but they serve as security guards at
4 the area I keep referring to as the Mataba. So Sir Dawda's own
14:41:26 5 experience I want to believe just led him to believing that
6 knowing that again it had been said that the NPFL had trained in
7 Libya and I know he knew that Kukoi and his boys had gone to
8 Libya, just probably connected the whole thing and said, "No,
9 this is going to destabilise West Africa. We cannot let the NPFL
14:41:53 10 take over".

11 Q. So let us just clarify the situation then, shall we? First
12 of all, help me with this. The attempted coup in The Gambia,
13 that you mentioned, when had that occurred?

14 A. I apologise for this. I really cannot recall the year. I
14:42:11 15 am not up to snuff on that, but I do know that it could have
16 occurred --

17 Q. Just give us a rough time frame in terms of years before,
18 months before, or whatever.

19 A. Okay, I begin going to Libya around '87 and so I would
14:42:35 20 really put it to somewhere before 1987. That's as good as I can
21 get.

22 Q. Very well. So we have this situation then: The leader of
23 The Gambia has had that experience, he knows that you have been
24 training in Libya with those who attempted to overthrow him.

14:43:05 25 Have I got that right so far?

26 A. Well, not quite because I am sure it's going to be
27 reflected in the record. I am not sure if he - well, okay,
28 training in Libya, but I really want it to be clear that they
29 were not a part of any training that we were a part of because

1 they had already been trained. So I do not want training to be
2 construed in the future under cross-examination, "You said that
3 you trained with the Gambians". I did not train with the
4 Gambians.

14:43:39 5 Q. However, there is this link with Libya?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And so he perceived what you were doing in Liberia as a
8 threat to the peace of the sub-region, you tell us?

9 A. That is correct.

14:44:05 10 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. Did you have ambitions to become a
11 Napoleon-type figure in West Africa?

12 A. No and there is a reason for that. A little, little,
13 little Liberia. You have got huge armed forces like Nigeria.
14 You have Ghana. A powerful military in Guinea. I think one
14:44:38 15 would have to be a cuckoo to believe that he could become, even
16 if he ever thought so, a Napoleon. What would happen to Nigeria?
17 You have to, what, conquer, you know, Nigeria to become a
18 Napoleon. That's pure nonsense. It could have never been a
19 thought even remotely in my mind.

14:45:02 20 All I was interested in and all the guys that I led were
21 interested in was trying to solve our little internal problem in
22 Liberia, build an environment where our people would have some
23 peace, democracy and the rule of law. There was no act of
24 adventure, no place at all.

14:45:30 25 Q. Now, can I pause for a moment to assist with some
26 spellings. Sir Dawda Jawara, D-A-W-D-A J-A-W-A-R-A. Ibrahim
27 Babangida, I-B-R-A-H-I-M B-A-B-A-N-G-I-D-A. So you told us
28 earlier then, Mr Taylor, you decided to attack ECOMOG. Is that
29 right?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. When did you make that decision?

3 A. Even before they came they were warned that we construe
4 your intention to be one of preventing us from completing our
14:46:30 5 objective. We construe your intentions of being one to
6 perpetuate Doe in power. This we consider as being interference
7 and if you put foot on Liberian soil we will attack you. We
8 warned them before and when they landed we did attack them.

9 Q. Well, help us then with this, Mr Taylor. How many troops
14:47:00 10 did ECOWAS send to Liberia?

11 A. Well, in military terms they may say one thing, it could be
12 differently. We understood at the time that they were 3,000, but
13 they could have been as many as 5,000. You never believe these
14 military stories.

14:47:21 15 Q. To the best of your knowledge, were they well armed?

16 A. Yes. ECOMOG came in with a full Nigerian backed armoured
17 unit. By armoured I am talking about tanks and armoured carrier.
18 Here you can remember I said the city of Monrovia is not
19 captured, it is surrounded. But there is an airport in Monrovia
14:47:57 20 other than Robertsport. It is called Spriggs Payne airport.

21 ECOMOG comes in with an air force, a Nigerian with Alpha Jet
22 bombers, stationed at the airport and a large mechanised unit of
23 tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Very well.

24 Q. Spriggs Payne spelling?

14:48:27 25 A. S-P-R-I-G-G-S, Spriggs, and P-A-Y-N-E. Spriggs Payne
26 airport. That is in the Sinkor section of the city of Monrovia.
27 In fact the Special Court has offices there at Spriggs.

28 Q. Now in comparison with the armaments available to that
29 ECOMOG force, how well were the NPFL fighters armed at that time?

1 A. By this time the NPFL was not just well armed, but we had
2 grown very intensively in numbers. We are talking now in or
3 around July/August of 1990. Because ECOMOG comes in in August.
4 We have captured all or most of the arms, ammunition and armament
14:49:40 5 of the Armed Forces of Liberia from Naama. Remember I told this
6 Court that Camp Naama was the main artillery base.

7 We had captured Camp Naama. We had backtracked. The
8 soldiers ran away from Gbarnga, I mentioned to the Court, and
9 Ganta and left their principal equipment - I mean equipment. In
14:50:07 10 Ganta they had left what you call a BM-40. Now what a BM-40 is,
11 this is a 40 tube multi-launcher rocket vehicle. It is called a
12 BM-40. With most of the armament. At Camp Naama we had captured
13 close to two dozen American-made 105 Howitzer guns. Howitzer, I
14 think it's H-O-W-I-T-Z-E-R. Howitzer gun. With all of the
14:50:48 15 armaments. These artillery pieces can fire I think a distance of
16 about 20 kilometres or more depending on I think some other
17 military factors. We had those plus all of the armaments.

18 We had another American-made recoilless rifle gun, it is a
19 106 millimetre cannon. It is a recoilless rifle. What I mean by
14:51:27 20 recoilless, it fires I think I would say - I would put it to
21 about three kilometres or more, but it is a gun that would sit
22 practically on this table, lock it a little bit and it could fire
23 without a massive push back. It was a very mobile type gun that
24 you could mount on a jeep or whatnot. In fact it is used
14:51:54 25 extensively, at least before, by the United States military
26 because they - and let me clear this up before I misquote it. I
27 am not saying that the United States gave us these weapons. The
28 United States always trained and armed the Armed Forces of
29 Liberia. That is how these weapons got there. We captured

1 tonnes of that.

2 The Armed Forces of Liberia at the time use the US M16
3 rifles. We captured thousands of M16 rifles, plus their
4 ammunition. We also captured large amounts of United States 81
14:52:41 5 milli mortar guns. We also captured a very large mortar,
6 military people will know, it is called the 4.2 deuce mortar.

7 Q. Spell that.

8 A. I think it is D-U-C-E. 4.2 deuce mortar. It has a range
9 of about I would say 12-15 kilometres, I would say. And we also
14:53:12 10 captured a lot of 60 mortar guns.

11 So, in answer to your question, we were well equipped and
12 really didn't care about whatever forces ECOMOG came with. And
13 in terms of number of troops, by this time the NPFL forces - and
14 I am saying I can't give you a correct number, but I will give
14:53:40 15 you very close and the reason being we are talking about a
16 guerrilla force; there are no large rosters of I've got 1,000.
17 We trained - and so we could have been in the neighbourhood of 15
18 to 18,000 fighting men at the time.

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I note that in that last answer, page 104,
14:54:04 20 line 3 on my font, you say that you were well equipped and really
21 didn't care about whatever forces ECOMOG came with. Well, you
22 may not have cared about them. Did you care about the increased
23 civilian casualties in Liberia which might occur if you decided
24 to take on ECOMOG?

14:54:26 25 A. Yes, we thought about it and that is very clear because
26 remember we had agreed with the reasonable request made to us by
27 the United States government not to take Monrovia in the first
28 place. But we have also done one thing why I am saying we did
29 not care. Remember I also told this Court that one of the

1 requests of Secretary Cohen was that we open a humanitarian
2 corridor along the Liberian-Sierra Leonean road.

3 So the population in Monrovia started reducing
4 significantly because they were all - I mean, we didn't hide it.

14:55:10 5 We made it very clear, we did threaten and say that we would
6 attack ECOMOG if they came into the city and we were very, very
7 clear about ECOMOG and we were not just thinking about
8 overrunning the city, but we were trying to target ECOMOG and
9 they had announced that they were coming into the Freeport of
14:55:30 10 Monrovia.

11 Q. Now moving on somewhat, and we are still dealing with the
12 summer of 1990, you mentioned this morning that there had been a
13 number of little incidents involving Doe during that period.
14 What incidents are we talking about?

14:56:10 15 A. I will have to - that is very general. When I talk about
16 with Doe as far as dealing I am a little off on this one.

17 Q. Well, let's address it in this way: At the beginning of
18 1990, Mr Taylor, was your father still alive?

19 A. Oh, yes, my father was alive.

14:56:39 20 Q. Was he still alive by the end of the year?

21 A. No, he was not alive by the end of the year.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. Okay. What - when I speak about incidents I am talking
24 about the - and I think I did mention it at the beginning of the
14:56:57 25 morning - Samuel Doe commenced a few terrible things. The United
26 Nations, as the war progressed and we are talking about - this is
27 the early part now of 1990 - people from the Nimba area that felt
28 that they were not safe took refuge at the compound of the United
29 Nations.

1 Q. Where is that?

2 A. In Monrovia. The first thing that Doe did was he stormed
3 the UN compound and took these citizens out and really killed
4 them. He stormed the compound.

14:57:40 5 Q. How many people?

6 A. There could have been as many as a couple of hundred
7 individuals. The second incident involved me personally. During
8 this particular time my father took refuge in the Lutheran
9 church.

14:58:03 10 Q. Where?

11 A. In the city of Monrovia because we had all thought and
12 always believed that churches, mosques and whatever were off
13 limits. Doe ordered the soldiers into the church and everyone in
14 that church were killed, including my father.

14:58:29 15 Q. How did you feel about that, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Well, I was very, very, very angry. I was very, very sad,
17 because my father and I were very close and Doe knew him well,
18 very well.

19 Q. How?

14:59:03 20 A. Doe had explained to me that as a young man in the Armed
21 Forces of Liberia, during those years I was in exile and had not
22 started this situation, he had some problems with a Lebanese
23 merchant in Monrovia and was taken to court. There was a system
24 in Liberia called the LPA, the Legal Power of Attorney. What
14:59:36 25 that was, during the course of the month you could go to a
26 Lebanese store and pick up little provisions for your family and
27 you will sign an IOU note. He would take your money at the end
28 of the month, but that had to be in line with the dispersing
29 officer of the Armed Forces of Liberia.

1 So young Doe had a problem where the Lebanese man has
2 seized his cheque on a couple of occasions. This time he
3 manoeuvred and got the cheque before the Lebanese man and he took
4 him to court. And my father was the presiding judge in this case
15:00:22 5 and so my father just told the Lebanese man, "Listen, I am not
6 going to send this young soldier to jail because he managed to
7 get some money." He said, "He will pay you the next time so we
8 are going to accept that" and gave him time to pay and Doe
9 remembered it, but he didn't really know that that was my father
15:00:40 10 until some time later - I can remember I we are sitting in his
11 office talking about - he said "But Taylor is your father in
12 Monrovia?" I said, "Yes." He said "Where is he?" I say, "He is
13 across the street" and by across the street I mean the mansion,
14 the Temple of Justice the courthouse in Monrovia is not too far
15:01:04 15 from the mansion. I said, "He is the judge over there." I said
16 "Judge Taylor." He said, "No, Judge Taylor?" I said, "Yes." He
17 said, "Judge Taylor is your father?" I said, "Yes." He said,
18 "No, no, no, is it Judge Taylor?" I said, "That is my father."
19 He said "What?" Then he, Doe, explained the story to me, and
15:01:20 20 Said, "Your father saved me before. Is he doing fine?" He said,
21 "Go and bring him to me." And I went across and brought my
22 father to his office. So he knew him very well.
23 Q. And when did this occur, Mr Taylor, the killing of your
24 father?
15:01:35 25 A. Oh, boy, I have tried to really wipe that out of my mind.
26 This was in or around June/July I want to believe in 1990. I
27 have really tried to not remember that date. I always get
28 sensitive.
29 Q. Now, just so that we can place this all what is happening

1 in little Liberia in some kind of global context, what other
2 major international event or was there a major international
3 event taking place in the summer of 1990, Mr Taylor, that you
4 recall?

15:02:20 5 A. Oh, event. Well, if we want to call it that. Well,
6 remember I think in August of 1990 was the first Gulf War at that
7 particular time. That is about the time that all these military
8 forces are moving. ECOWAS is moving. It is the first Gulf War.

9 Q. Now, I just want to tidy up this period before moving on.
15:02:53 10 You mentioned earlier the capture of President Doe by Prince
11 Johnson's men and his killing, yes?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. What happens to Prince Johnson and the INPFL thereafter?

14 A. Well, Prince Johnson and the INPFL remain in Monrovia, but
15:03:21 15 they get involved in a squabble with ECOMOG because when ECOMOG
16 arrives in Liberia they are now dealing with the president still
17 of Liberia who is Samuel Doe, and ECOMOG is in charge of Doe's
18 security as they go into the port. So it created a very major
19 embarrassment for ECOMOG, but after Prince Johnson carried out
15:03:49 20 that act he then tried to - and the Court needs to understand
21 this. The port of Monrovia, I am sorry we don't have a map, but
22 I will explain it the best way I can. The port of Monrovia is
23 located in a section of the city called Bushrod Island.

24 Q. Spell it please.

15:04:12 25 A. That is B-U-S-H-R-O-D Island. Now Bushrod Island is
26 connected to the city of Monrovia by two major bridges. One is
27 the - known as the Gabriel, that is G-A-B-R-I-E-L, the Gabriel
28 Tucker Bridge and the second bridge is known as the
29 M-E-S-U-R-A-D-O Mesurado River Bridge. So Doe then kills -

1 excuse me, Prince Johnson kills Doe and then tries to cross into
2 the city of Monrovia to where the Executive Mansion is located to
3 seize power and ECOMOG engages him in a major battle.

4 Q. And what was the outcome of that battle?

15:05:17 5 A. Oh, he was just - he just did not manage to take the city,
6 but he also very craftily agreed to a process of helping to set
7 up an interim administration in Liberia as a way of bringing an
8 end to the fighting.

9 Q. Now, at this time, geographically where was ECOMOG
15:05:53 10 deployed?

11 A. For the most part on Bushrod Island and in the city of
12 Monrovia around the presidency, to the best of my knowledge.

13 Q. Now, you have told us that the death of Doe occurs in
14 September?

15:06:09 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Can we just conclude this chapter by you outlining for our
17 assistance the events for the rest of that year of 1990?

18 A. Well, attempts are now made by ECOWAS to quote/unquote set
19 up an interim government and to hold elections. This is again
15:06:43 20 being driven by Nigeria, The Gambia.

21 Q. Pause there. Help us with a date for that event in 1990.
22 A month?

23 A. Well, I think we want to be careful here and I am saying
24 attempts because there are several meetings.

15:07:02 25 Q. Very well.

26 A. So let me deal with it. We have at the beginning - we are
27 now operating in the last quarter of 1990. There is the Bamako
28 meeting where we try for peace. We don't get anywhere.

29 Q. I don't know if we have had a spelling for Bamako before?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't think we have.

2 THE WITNESS: Bamako is B-A-M-A-K-O and Bamako is the
3 capital of the West African country of Mali, that is M-A-L-I. At
4 that time the President of Mali General Moussa Traore was the
15:07:49 5 president.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Carry on, Mr Taylor.

8 A. You have all these - you have the Bamako meeting with all
9 success. It ends up now, but we agree that we would set up an
15:08:12 10 interim government but we still felt that such a government
11 should be hated by the NPFL because we, by this time, have
12 captured some 90 per cent of the country.

13 As I explained to the Court, and we stopped at the point
14 where our forces I did mention had come to Tappita, the strategic
15:08:40 15 highway into Grand Gedeh, but this is, we don't stay there, we
16 push into Grand Gedeh, so by this time the entire Republic of
17 Liberia is in the hands of the NPFL save for the city of
18 Monrovia.

19 Q. Very well.

15:08:55 20 A. So we demand that we lead that government and that we would
21 permit others - we would bring everybody on board, but we had to
22 lead that government. And what is that predicated on?

23 We are aware in the back of our minds that the whole
24 attempt of bringing ECOMOG in Liberia at that time is to stop us
15:09:21 25 because of this theory that permitting us would cause the
26 destabilisation of the entire West Africa.

27 We now agree that a meeting will be further held in The
28 Gambia, in the capital. We agree that we would attend the
29 meeting in The Gambia. We - a date is set. We send our

1 delegates to this meeting. We are represented at that meeting by
2 two individuals. We are represented by Mr Tom Woveiyu that I
3 mentioned, and the gentleman that is not in court this afternoon
4 Lavalie Supuwood. To our surprise they get to the airport and
15:10:22 5 they are arrested. They are stopped.

6 Q. Which airport?

7 A. At Banjul. Banjul, the capital of The Gambia. Banjul
8 airport. They are not put in prison. They are just detained at
9 the airport and not given an opportunity to go to the meeting.

15:10:49 10 The meeting is held. There are 24 delegates at the meeting from
11 different groupings and I understand - and this is only an
12 understanding because we were not present - that Amos Sawyer was
13 I will call it selected as the interim President of Liberia.

14 At the close of that meeting our people then were released
15:11:17 15 and put on a plane and sent back out and the NPFL decided that it
16 would have none of that, that we would continue to fight until
17 there was justice and we continued the fight. Amos Sawyer was
18 brought into the city of Monrovia as the so-called interim
19 President and we continued to fight.

15:11:41 20 Now, I had mentioned before based on the question that you
21 asked as to whether I had any regrets, and this is what I meant
22 when I said that on the one hand I am glad that we accepted the
23 reasonable statement from Secretary Cohen, and by Cohen I mean
24 the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States for African
15:12:05 25 Affairs Herman Cohen. But following our acceptance all of these
26 machinations followed and so in some way it is regrettable.

27 That's what I was alluding to.

28 Q. Let's see if we can sum-up the situation then by the end of
29 1990. If I understand what you are telling us you - the NPFL

1 control all of the country except Monrovia?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And what is preventing you from seizing Monrovia and thus
4 controlling the whole country?

15:12:48 5 A. What?

6 Q. Yes, what is preventing you from doing that?

7 A. Well, I would say - now what I will say would be ECOMOG,
8 but behind that it would be specifically Nigeria and The Gambia.
9 At most I would lay on their doorstep.

15:13:15 10 Q. Now, we have already examined this morning two documents
11 setting out the programme which would have been implemented by
12 the NPFL had they seized complete power. Do you recall telling
13 us about that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15:13:34 15 Q. Now, following the ECOMOG intervention, which you say
16 prevented you from gaining control of Monrovia, how many more
17 years did the civil war in Liberia last, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Many more years. This is the main problem. The civil war
19 lasted up until actually 1995.

15:14:06 20 Q. So another five years?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Had you secured control of Monrovia by the end of 1990, so
23 just, what, over 12 months after it had begun, what would you
24 have done?

15:14:32 25 A. As I mentioned to the Court, our objective was to set up a
26 national unity government involving the what I keep referring to
27 as progressives, bring on some individuals, stabilise the country
28 and hold free and fair elections. Our calculations, if we look
29 at 1990 in the end as the base year, I would say that another at

1 most two years could have accomplished our objective as we saw
2 it. That is the years 1991 and 1992 would have brought an end to
3 the military situation and we could have had elections by the end
4 of 1992.

15:15:21 5 Q. Now by this stage, Mr Taylor, the end of 1990, where are
6 you based - you personally?

7 A. Well, I don't want to lose the Court. I begin in Gborplay.
8 As we move forward I move my headquarters - I moved from Gborplay
9 to Tappita. After Tappita, after - in May when Buchanan is
10 captured, secured, people move forward, I then move on to
11 Buchanan. By the time in July we have surrounded Monrovia and
12 all this stuff is going on, Harbel is under full control, I move
13 into Harbel.

14 Now, we are now coming toward the end of 1990, but because
15 of this situation that occurred in The Gambia where they have put
16 this Sawyer man over Monrovia and we used to call him the
17 President of Monrovia, the NPFL at that particular time sat with
18 our senior military and civilian personnel and decided that they
19 were not ready, they were not serious, that we would put into
20 place a government. And we decided on that government. The name

15:16:56 21 was supposed to be the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly
22 Government, NPRAG. And it was decided then that we would
23 establish a headquarters. And because the war was still going on
24 there were arguments about making Buchanan the headquarters,
15:17:29 25 about making Harbel the headquarters. But it was decided that
26 Gbarnga would be used as the headquarters and that all regions
27 that were under our control would use a typical system of - I
28 really wouldn't call that election. I would call it of selecting
29 an assembly that will convene in Gbarnga, establish ministries

1 and agencies of government, the NPRAG government that will seek
2 and secure the welfare of those that were then called by the name
3 of Greater Liberia.

4 Q. Who did the selecting?

15:18:15 5 A. The individuals in the different regions. Our military had
6 nothing to do with it. Remember I said to the Court that we did
7 not dismantle the civilian mat that - I mean mat, M-A-T, that we
8 met on the ground. We left that to them. So all we asked the
9 regions to do was to use their own methods and some of those were
15:18:42 10 local methods where the chiefs, the elders, would get together,
11 call the senior people and they knew who they wanted and they
12 would do an assembly and send it down to Gbarnga.

13 Q. And so when did you then move to that new centre of
14 authority for Greater Liberia?

15:18:59 15 A. Now this process - after agreeing upon this process we then
16 set out to go - to send up to Gbarnga, review the area, select
17 buildings and everything. So I as the leader moved to Gbarnga
18 around the middle of 1991.

19 Q. '91?

15:19:26 20 A. '91.

21 Q. Now, there is another matter I want to clarify. At this
22 stage, late 1990, with your forces controlling the majority of
23 the country apart from Monrovia, how were your forces deployed
24 around the country?

15:20:01 25 A. We had our forces deployed in every major city and every
26 strategic highway around almost like a U-form from Bomi coming
27 all the way down and going all the way through Kakata, Gbarnga,
28 but were deployed in the cities.

29 Q. And what was the command structure?

1 A. We then had established a ministry of defence. After that
2 decision was taken a ministry of defence was established and
3 Mr Womeiyu became the minister of defence. Under the ministry of
4 defence we had the Special Forces and then under the Special
15:20:55 5 Forces we had all of the battalions and the different - first the
6 divisions and then the battalions and coming on down.

7 Q. So you have the ministry of defence and then below them the
8 Special Forces. Now, taking things slowly, by this stage how
9 many Special Forces remain, roughly?

15:21:18 10 A. By this time we have lost a few in combat. I would say we
11 could have lost in combat as many as 15, at most 20, in general
12 combat.

13 Q. And when you say they became the second tier of command,
14 were they all in Gbarnga, or what?

15:21:52 15 A. No, no, no, no, no. And the reason why they are second in
16 command - no, I am sorry if I am taking too long, but the Court
17 has to understand this. The Special Forces I said were the eyes
18 and ears of the revolution, so they were put in a special
19 category. And so they had at that particular time command
15:22:21 20 responsibilities across the country. There was no human other

21 than the Special Force in Liberia that had senior command
22 position. That is why we had defence, we had the Special Forces
23 that were regarded as the leaders of the revolution, then before
24 we had divisions. So whether it was a division or whether it was
15:22:45 25 a battalion, all positions were held by Special Forces wherever
26 they were deployed in the country.

27 Q. So how were they deployed?

28 A. Well, we had the navy division, we had the marine division,
29 we had the army division, we had the strike force division.

1 These were all headed by Special Forces. Then under those
2 divisions you had different battalions under those divisions.
3 And again each battalion was commanded by a Special Forces and in
4 most cases his immediate executive officer, that is the number
15:23:31 5 two man, was a Special Forces. But as the other people that we
6 call our junior commandos, the very bright ones had command
7 responsibilities for companies and for platoons. But at that
8 high level, only Special Forces could do it.

9 Q. And help me, how much power did these Special Forces, the
15:24:01 10 eyes and ears of the revolution - how much power did they
11 exercise?

12 A. The only individuals who were superior to the Special
13 Forces were God and Charles Taylor. The Special Forces had
14 tremendous power. They could take a lot of decisions wherever
15:24:18 15 they were. It is assumed that they knew what they had to do.
16 They had real power, yes. Real, real power.

17 Q. And, Mr Taylor, effectively how much control did you have
18 over them?

19 A. Well, there were times - I had very good control, but in
15:24:44 20 that bunch there are little things that are still afloat and let
21 me explain to the Court what I mean by little things. Remember I
22 spoke about while in training men conspired to kill me upon
23 getting back to Liberia and them taking over the rest of the
24 operation.

15:25:20 25 Now, these men are back in Liberia and are really, really
26 doing some things that are - you know, we are getting a lot of
27 reports that they are beginning to really get a little
28 mischievous. I forgot to mention when Prince Johnson fled he did
29 flee with some of these - a few of the Special Forces followed

1 him, but they are beginning to do some things, because of the
2 authority given them, that did not reach to me.

3 Q. Such as?

4 A. Well, they would mete out punishment to soldiers without
15:26:04 5 having to follow the regular chain. No commander has a right to,
6 on his own, take harsh measures against a soldier. If a soldier
7 has done something they knew wrong, he could remove him from that
8 unit and send him to face a court martial board, but he could not
9 - what some of them were doing, some of the junior commandos did
15:26:32 10 something wrong, they would flog them as they - I mean, that was
11 unacceptable.

12 So they were really beginning to really what we say in the
13 African way, they were beginning to grow wings and this is
14 evident by certain things that had happened where they were
15:26:56 15 beginning to get rotten by getting involved in some minor
16 looting. We had to weed those Special Forces out.

17 There is a famous, a very terrible incident that happened
18 where this gentleman, one of the individuals from Libya that had
19 caused the trouble, Anthony Mekuagbe, was really, really, really
15:27:19 20 - he was becoming outrageous and had actually carried on some
21 looting and firing at the Sierra Leonean border in January.

22 Q. January of which year?

23 A. Of 1991. He had - he was the commander in Lofa and very,
24 very, very terrible boy that we were beginning to put the squeeze
15:27:44 25 on him. In fact, we did put the squeeze on him.

26 Q. Now, January 1991, that is a couple of months before, as
27 this Court has been told, an invasion took place of Sierra Leone?

28 A. Sierra Leone, that is correct.

29 Q. So are you telling us, Mr Taylor, that in the January of

1 that year you were aware of misbehaviour by one of your
2 commanders along the Liberian-Sierra Leone border?

3 A. That is correct. Anthony Mekunagbe, after he was arrested
4 for our investigation had, along with some Sierra Leonean
15:28:25 5 soldiers, gotten involved in a looted property deal where they
6 had sold some properties to the Sierra Leonean side and payment
7 was not forthcoming, and Anthony Mekunagbe attacked the Sierra
8 Leonean soldiers on the border for the property.

9 That came to my attention and my good friend President
15:28:51 10 Momoh. We exchanged information on this. Momoh got upset,
11 ordered the Sierra Leonean forces to come inside Liberia. In
12 fact the Sierra Leonean armed forces came near Foya. We drove
13 them back and Momoh and I, using our intermediary Prince Barclay,
14 were able to bring that situation under control and I arrested
15:29:17 15 Anthony Mekunagbe. I punished him. In fact he was in
16 confinement for a short while, released and sent back to his
17 assignment. This is in January of 1991.

18 Q. Now, I don't want us to get ahead of ourselves, Mr Taylor.
19 Now, we are just talking about the structure - the hierarchy - of
15:29:45 20 command at this stage?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So are you telling us that you were experiencing
23 difficulties in controlling these Special Forces?

24 A. Without a doubt. Without a doubt. And I acted, and
15:29:59 25 because we were experiencing problems we had to act almost
26 immediately in a particular way. And what we did, after we
27 realised that these Special Forces were behaving in this way, and
28 we were getting reports that some of the other troublemakers from
29 Libya, that is, the Oliver Varneys and Degbon, without my

1 knowledge or consent, were putting together some group. On the
2 other side, intelligence were coming called Black Kadaffa. I
3 then knew that we were about - that is K-A-D-A-F-F-A they call,
4 or F-F-Y, and when we got to know that Oliver Varney, Degbon,
15:31:01 5 these are all in the transcripts, your Honour, were involved in
6 some activities on that side I then knew that I was headed for
7 trouble. So there was trouble beginning to mount at that
8 particular time.

9 Q. On which side?

15:31:18 10 A. On the Liberian side.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. They had - these guys were now going about organising their
13 own units and hardly waiting for instructions from headquarters.

14 In fact, one of the reports that came to me that really caused me
15:31:38 15 to move in a direction that I will soon explain, Degbon --

16 Q. Who?

17 A. Yegbeh Degbon, that is in the records, Yegbeh Degbon was an
18 educated person like myself. He had a Masters Degree in Geology,
19 he had studied in Europe, so he was not on the front line
15:32:01 20 fighting. We used to use Degbon to service, to take - to come to
21 headquarters, get arms and ammunition, food and medicine -
22 medical supply for the troops - and he also was responsible for
23 picking up arms and ammunition in the field that was captured and
24 bring it to headquarters. And what do I mean by that?

15:32:27 25 All arms and ammunition that were captured in the field by
26 the forces, if your battalion captured material you couldn't keep
27 them. You had to list these material, report it to headquarters,
28 because the same material could be used and distributed into
29 areas that did not have it.

1 We realised that Degbon was not bringing all of the
2 material that was being turned over to him to headquarters.
3 Sometimes he will come and report that, oh, he was bringing
4 material but another unit needed some and he gave it to them not
15:33:09 5 knowing they were putting together this group called Black
6 Kadaffa.

7 So what we had to begin to put into place at this
8 particular time was to dilute the powers of the Special Forces.
9 This was a plan thought about and it really came into being just
15:33:32 10 around the time that I moved into Gbarnga by the middle of 1991
11 where those junior commandos that had shown good judgment, we
12 began moving them up into command positions for battalions and
13 others, but we did - we were experiencing problems at this time
14 with not all but some of these same troublemakers, that is the
15:34:00 15 Mekunagbe, Yegbeh Degbon, that is the Oliver Varney, there was a
16 Timothy Mulibah. Also involved in that to a certain level was
17 the very Sam Larto, they were all a part of a network that really
18 frightened us.

19 Q. I am going to come to that in a bit more detail in a
15:34:22 20 moment, but I want to pause to ask you about one or two specific
21 matters. We are at a stage now where you are controlling all of
22 the country apart from Monrovia?

23 A. Mm-hm.

24 Q. In the vast majority of the country that you controlled,
15:34:40 25 were there abuses of civilians?

26 A. Yes, there were some abuses. One or two notable cases that
27 I can refer to that finally reached us a little later, these,
28 some of these Special Forces, like I say, were actually out of
29 hand. They were taking matters in their own hands. They were

1 beating civilians and in fact one of the Special Forces that got
2 executed was, he executed one or two civilians. We arrested him,
3 court-martialled him. He was found guilty and he was executed
4 for killing those civilians. So I will admit there were some
15:35:29 5 abuses creeping up, but as they came we dealt with it.

6 Q. Now, the abuses you speak of, did that include rape?

7 A. Oh, yes, there were a couple of cases that I know of of
8 rape and those that were involved, the soldiers that were
9 involved, were executed. And they were not just Special Forces.

15:35:57 10 These are now some junior commandos but they were held to the
11 same standard and they were executed, but there were a couple of
12 cases.

13 Q. Just a point of clarification, in parentheses: Junior
14 commandos means what?

15:36:11 15 A. Well, all of the individuals that were trained by our
16 Special Forces were called junior commandos.

17 Q. Very well. To distinguish them from?

18 A. Special Forces commandos.

19 Q. Thank you. So you accept rapes occurred. What about the
15:36:26 20 use of child soldiers?

21 A. No. This is one thing I have to explain very well. There
22 were young people under the age of 18 that performed tasks for
23 the military. I have explained this. Now, there is another
24 phenomenon that developed that, quite frankly, there was very
15:36:57 25 little we could do about it. Look, we have got about 15, 20,000
26 soldiers. Some of them are leaving home. They take along with
27 them younger members of the family. You have a young cousin,
28 10/12, you take him along. He would carry your food. He would
29 carry maybe even your rifle. He will hold it while they are

1 going into areas where they are about to go into combat, And this
2 I observed. The reports came, but why we did not really do
3 anything serious because those young men were not involved in
4 combat. They live at home with their relatives in the army and
15:37:48 5 when they are going around to places they go along with them, but
6 they were not trained for combat, and did not engage in combat.
7 They were used to cook food; they were used to wash clothes; they
8 were used to man gates and search vehicles because why was it
9 necessary to search?

15:38:12 10 We got scared at a particular point where weapons now could
11 not be accounted for, so all vehicles going into the combat area,
12 we would have a senior commander at the gate. So at that gate
13 the commander - there would be soldiers and if those soldiers
14 that are at that gate had any of their relatives with them,
15:38:38 15 whether it was their girlfriends or their wives, they all would
16 sit around the gate.

17 So when you hear of reports that there were some young men
18 seen in Liberia carrying rifles, those reports are true, but what
19 the reports don't say is this: That the men that they see
15:38:58 20 carrying those rifles are young men walking with their family,
21 but do not enter combat. Never entered combat.

22 Q. Another detail, please: Were soldiers within the NPFL
23 paid?

24 A. No, soldiers in the NPFL were not paid. They were all
15:39:32 25 volunteers, but - okay, well, let me put it this way: When we
26 look at pay in terms of a salary cheque at the end of the month,
27 no. They were volunteers. But what was provided for the
28 fighting men in Liberia, we provided food, we provided medical
29 care and we provided clothing for our soldiers. So, on the one

1 hand if you want to look at that as pay, yes. On the other hand
2 if you are looking at it in terms of a salary cheque, no.

3 And we were lucky - and I did not mention - when we
4 captured Buchanan in or around May of 1991 it was reported to us
15:40:25 5 that the Government of Liberia had just ordered 300,000 bags of
6 rice for their military purposes. That ship was docked off the
7 coast of Buchanan and the friendly people of Buchanan at the port
8 told us about the ship. So we went and we brought the ship into
9 harbour and off-loaded the 300,000 bags of rice, so Doe lost and
15:41:00 10 we won. And it is that food. We never sold one grain of that
11 rice. It is that rice that we provided to displaced centres free
12 of charge and we fed the armed forces.

13 So in a way while it was not that kind of pay, but they did
14 get something. They were not just out there struggling on their
15:41:24 15 own, having to fend for themselves. They received food, rice.
16 The government bought - by then I am talking about the NPRAG
17 bought oils and salt. All of the provisions to feed the armed
18 forces, they were fed by us.

19 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you have heard evidence during the course
15:41:45 20 of these proceedings of a phenomena called food finding missions?

21 A. Nonsense. Total nonsense. Maybe in their environment, but
22 even they forgot to ask their most famous witness, Moses Blah.
23 He knows that the armed forces, the NPFL men were fed.

24 Q. Are you saying that there was no such thing as food finding
15:42:07 25 missions in the Greater Liberia which you ruled?

26 A. Well, I tell you. I will put it this way. You know, there
27 are bad apples in every sack and I think I will be misleading
28 this Court if I were to say that there were never any occasions
29 where there was food finding, but I can say this much: We fed

1 the army and if anybody engaged in that particular action that
2 came to the knowledge of the authorities you will be sorry that
3 you did it.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: A name was mentioned earlier, Mr President.
15:42:50 5 Could I assist with a spelling now, Moussa Traore.

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, the former President of Mali.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: M-O-U-S-S-A T-R-A-O-R-E acute:

8 Q. Now, having dealt with those matters, Mr Taylor, I
9 mentioned that I would be returning to the topic of the Special
15:43:22 10 Forces. I wonder if the witness could be shown Prosecution
11 exhibit 116, please. Prosecution exhibit 116, for the assistance
12 of the Court, is the original roster of the Special Forces
13 commandos of the NPFL and this was a document introduced on 21
14 May 2008 during the testimony of Moses Blah. During the course
15:44:33 15 of his testimony, just to remind ourselves, former President Blah
16 was asked to place an X against the names of those Special Forces
17 who had been executed. Do you recall that evidence, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Now we see at number 1 on this list the name Charles
15:45:03 20 Ghankay Taylor, is that right?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. The next name is Cooper G Miller and you will note that
23 former President Blah has put an X by that name to indicate that
24 Cooper G Miller was executed. Mr Taylor, was he?

15:45:35 25 A. No, Cooper Miller was not executed. As a matter of fact,
26 Cooper Miller was not with us. After some time the INPFL
27 somewhere in - if I am right, somewhere in 1991 Cooper Miller had
28 joined the INPFL and in combat at the INPFL base in Caldwell,
29 that is C-A-L-D-W-E-L-L, Cooper Miller was killed in combat.

1 So I guess what Moses was referring to here is that he is
2 dead, but he is not one of those that had any trouble with me
3 after we left this place. He was not with the NPFL as we came
4 in. Cooper Miller was one of those troublemakers that we had
15:46:53 5 incarcerated during the early part of the revolution that went
6 into Monrovia via Lagos, Nigeria, and flew in and was a part of
7 Prince Johnson but he was never executed by Prince or me. He
8 died in combat at the base.

9 Q. Now we see an X against a name Augustus Wright. Was he
15:47:18 10 executed on your orders?

11 A. Yes, he was.

12 Q. What for?

13 A. You are going to have to look at this boy. This Augustine
14 Wright, Peter Kerseh, these were the people that were involved in
15:47:38 15 this second tier issue involving Black Kaddafi and the objective
16 of Black Kaddafi in what we found out eventually that they had
17 given assistance to certain individuals and were seeking
18 assistance in return. Now I can get into these details about
19 that. Black Kaddafi was a group that involved Liberians and
15:48:05 20 Sierra Leoneans that had been brought into Liberia just off
21 Kakata as a possible standby unit to stage an attack against us,
22 the rest of the NPFL. That was the objective of Black Kaddafi
23 with the Oliver Varney on the one side and the Anthony Mekunagbe
24 and all of them on the other side. So these were the people that
15:48:30 25 were involved in that conspiracy.

26 Q. Now, help us, because Black Gaddafi has featured in the
27 evidence placed before this Court by the Prosecution, so I want
28 your assistance with it.

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. When did this phenomena of Black Kadaffa occur?

2 A. Black Kadaffa started around the early part of - the late
3 to early part of 1990 and 1991. That is when this whole thing
4 started developing of Black Kadaffa under the real command of two
15:49:12 5 - three principal people.

6 Q. Who were they?

7 A. Anthony Mekunagbe, Yegbeh Degbon and Varney - Oliver
8 Varney.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want - so there is three names you have
15:49:27 10 given us, Mekunagbe, Degbon and Varney?

11 A. Oliver Varney. Oliver Varney.

12 Q. Right. Let's just take this in stages, please, and slowly
13 so we can follow. The page which is on the screen which is the
14 first page of this, take a look at entries number 10 and 11,
15:49:48 15 please. Can you see them?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. Now we see the name there Samuel J Varney?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Is that a different individual from the one you are talking
15:50:01 20 about?

21 A. That is a different individual from the one I am talking
22 about.

23 Q. We see below that at number 11 Yegbeh Degbon. Is that one
24 of the individuals you are talking about?

15:50:14 25 A. That is one of the individuals that I am talking about.
26 That's one of the main individuals that put together Black
27 Kadaffa.

28 Q. Right, so that's number 11. Can you find Oliver Varney and
29 the other gentleman you mentioned on the list, please, and give

1 us the numbers?

2 A. Yes, Oliver Varney is number 75. That's on page 3.

3 Q. I wonder - let's take this slowly so that we can follow.

4 Page 73.

15:50:45 5 A. No, not page 73.

6 Q. Number 73?

7 A. No, Oliver Varney is number 75.

8 Q. I'm sorry. Oliver Varney. Okay, number 75?

9 A. That is correct.

15:50:57 10 Q. And before we proceed we note there is not an X placed
11 against that number. Now the third person you mentioned was
12 Anthony Mekunagbe. What number is he?

13 A. He is number 88. I do not know why Moses didn't put an X
14 here, but he was executed.

15:51:18 15 Q. Right, so Anthony Mekunagbe, again we see no X?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, it has been brought to my notice, please do not
18 mark that document.

19 A. But I just did. Then I will not mark it again.

15:51:42 20 MS IRURA: Your Honours, the document he has is a copy.
21 The original is on the screen.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful for that.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I will leave it to you, Mr Griffiths, but
24 the original is a Prosecution exhibit and of course can't be
15:51:57 25 marked, but whatever you do with that copy is a matter for you.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Well, I suggest then, Mr Taylor, given that it is a copy,
28 thankfully, that you mark those three, please. So that is
29 numbers 11, 75 and 88.

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Okay.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am assuming, Court Manager, that that
4 copy is available for the witness to mark. Is that correct?

15:52:31 5 MS IRURA: Your Honour, the copy is before the witness
6 presently.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. No, what I am asking you is it
8 wasn't a copy that you were using for some other purpose?

9 MS IRURA: Your Honour, no.

15:52:42 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. So if you mark those three, please, Mr Taylor; 11, 75 and
13 88. Now that we have identified them, noting in passing that
14 there is no X next to 75 and 88, you say these three were the
15 chief conspirators in Black Gadaffa, is that right?

15:53:06

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And you tell us that Black Gadaffa was a grouping composed
18 of both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians intent on deposing you?

19 A. That is correct.

15:53:27 20 Q. And that they commenced or embarked upon this course of
21 action some time in late 1990?

22 A. Yes, with Black Kadaffa, but the whole action of trying to
23 remove me started from Libya, yes.

24 Q. Yes, but in any event, going forward to come back, what was
15:53:49 25 the fate of these three men?

26 A. Anthony Mekunagbe while awaiting trial by court martial
27 died in prison. Well, we will call that - it was our
28 responsibility. The other two men plus a few others - and I am
29 saying that these were the gang leaders, it did not mean that

1 there were not others involved, but they were all tried,
2 convicted and they were executed.

3 Q. So numbers 11 and 75, yes?

4 A. Executed, yes.

15:54:31 5 Q. Both executed?

6 A. Yes. 38 was also executed.

7 Q. In relation to this same thing?

8 A. That same thing.

9 Q. And who is number 38?

15:54:44 10 A. Timothy Mulibah. I have mentioned that before.

11 Q. And we note an X against that name. Now I want to examine
12 one of the details you just gave us, Mr Taylor. You said that
13 some of those involved in Black Gadaffa were Sierra Leoneans, is
14 that right?

15:55:21 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Were those Sierra Leoneans members of the NPFL?

17 A. No, they were not.

18 Q. So can you help us as to how they came to be associated
19 with some of your Special Forces?

15:55:45 20 A. Excuse me. Well, let me take my time and go through this.
21 In January - remember I explained to the Court Mekunagbe had
22 misbehaved on the border over looted property, exchanged fire.
23 My friend Joseph Momoh and I have to settle it in a rather
24 unusual way. He is punished and released and sent back.

15:56:18 25 Q. Sent back from where?

26 A. Sent back to his post as commander in Lofa. Now,
27 subsequent to that, as we develop at around - I would put it to
28 about April/May or thereabouts of 1991 as I - and this is almost
29 the middle of 1991 - as I move into Gbarnga, don't let's forget

1 in March there is an attack on Sierra Leone. This attack is this
2 famous attack that goes across the border.

3 Now, there is one thing I am not sure if this is the time
4 that we have not talked about, this rise in - at least we haven't
15:57:15 5 talked about the composition of the NPFL forces, and I am sure
6 you will get to that, but this attack occurs in Sierra Leone in
7 March. There are allegations on the air that most of the people
8 are quote/unquote NPFL forces. We are denying these allegations
9 because in fact we know nothing about it, but the news finally
15:57:46 10 breaks as we arrest these people around about May, I will call
11 it, of 1991 on the Black Kadaffa situation. We get to know that
12 Anthony Mekunagbe had been working with a Sierra Leonean called
13 Foday Sankoh that were friends with them on the base and --

14 Q. Which base?

15:58:20 15 A. In Tripoli, Libya, and what they were trying to do at this
16 particular time, I understand they assisted him in training
17 Liberians to go to Sierra Leone to invade, and in return what
18 they were using was Black Kadaffa. Now that Sankoh had gone in
19 they had some Sierra Leoneans that they were using on our side of
15:58:47 20 the border in the Bong Mines area as Black Kadaffa to
21 counter-attack me.

22 This is when we arrested all of them. So Anthony Mekunagbe
23 was tried. He was in jail, he died. Degbon behind Black Kadaffa
24 was also tried, convicted and executed but it was at this
15:59:13 25 particular time that we as the authority got the information that
26 in fact Anthony Mekunagbe, Oliver Varney, Timothy Mulibah and the
27 rest of them, Degbon had assisted a gentleman called Foday Sankoh
28 in going across into Sierra Leone.

29 Q. Now pausing there, because we are going to come back and

1 deal with that in more detail, but help me with a detail. Was
2 there any family link between you and Anthony Mekunagbe?

3 A. Not blood family. Anthony at that particular time was
4 going out with a sister of mine, a half sister of mine.

16:00:06 5 Q. What is her name?

6 A. Her name is Thelma. T-H-E-L-M-A.

7 Q. And how did Anthony's death in custody, did Anthony's death
8 in custody affect your relationship with Thelma?

9 A. Yes, a little bit at the time but the wounds were healed.

16:00:37 10 Q. And what was the effect?

11 A. Oh, she was, you know, issues of heart are very difficult
12 to deal with. She was hurt because, you know, her loved one had
13 been what she called killed by her brother.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, can we put up, please, the first page
16:01:08 15 of the list:

16 Q. And can I invite your attention back to that first page,
17 please, Mr Taylor, because I want us to be systematic about our
18 examination of this list. Now, we have dealt with Cooper Miller
19 and Augustus Wright, haven't we?

16:01:38 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. We then see at number 8 the name Moses Z Blah?

22 A. Mm-hm.

23 Q. And below that Peter Kerseh. Now, there is an X beside
24 that name signifying, according to former President Blah, that
16:02:07 25 that individual was executed; is that true?

26 A. That is true.

27 Q. Again number 11 again another X. Was he executed?

28 A. He was executed.

29 Q. Can we see the remainder of the list - of that page,

1 please. There are no further Xs on that page?

2 A. No.

3 Q. But we note at number 12 Prince Y Johnson?

4 A. That is correct.

16:02:52 5 Q. And that is the Prince Johnson of whom you have spoken,
6 yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Can we see the second page, please, starting at the top
9 hopefully. We see an X against the name Timothy Mulibah, yes?

16:03:19 10 A. That is the Black Kadaffa Sankoh group, yes.

11 Q. Was he executed?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can we see the remainder of the page. In passing,
14 penultimate entry on that page Enoch Dogolea, did he serve in any
16:03:56 15 position in the Liberian government?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What was that?

18 A. Enoch Dogolea both during the revolution at the
19 establishment of the NPRAG, and again that is the National

16:04:15 20 Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government, became
21 vice-president even after the elections in 1997 because of - I

22 have informed this court of my original promise to the Special

23 Forces. He was carried on as the first vice-president during the
24 election - after the elections in 1997.

16:04:36 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Right. Can we see the next page, please:

26 Q. Now, we can't see any Xs. Can we see the bottom?

27 A. Counsel, remember we just talked about number 75.

28 Q. So there should be an X against number 75?

29 A. Yes, Oliver Varney. That is correct.

- 1 Q. Thank you. I am grateful.
- 2 A. And also --
- 3 Q. And there should be an X, based on your testimony, against
4 number 88?
- 16:05:23 5 A. That is correct.
- 6 Q. I wonder if it might be sensible to assist us later if you
7 could add an X against those two names?
- 8 A. Yes, I have already X'd them here.
- 9 Q. And have you marked the other X on the first page which
16:05:44 10 should have been there? I may be wrong.
- 11 A. Well, number 11 had already been X'd by Moses and so I have
12 X'd it too, but it was X'd I think by Moses.
- 13 Q. Very well. Can we then move on to the page which
14 immediately follows entry number 92 and we see an X against a
16:06:30 15 name Joe Doe?
- 16 A. Are we on page --
- 17 Q. Page 4, Mr Taylor.
- 18 A. Okay, I will find it. My page is a little different. You
19 are talking about number 10 --
- 16:06:55 20 Q. Page 4, entry number 103?
- 21 A. Yes, Joe Doe. Yes.
- 22 Q. Was he executed?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. What for?
- 16:07:04 25 A. Ah, he was a part of that Black Kadaffa movement.
- 26 Q. Can we see the bottom of the page, please. At number 121
27 Benjamin Yeaten, yes?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. He was a Special Forces, was he?

- 1 A. That is correct.
- 2 Q. And what role did he play after you became president?
- 3 A. He became the director of the Special Security Services.
- 4 Q. Now, at 123 we see Dopoe Menkarzon, yes?
- 16:07:55 5 A. That is correct.
- 6 Q. Was he executed?
- 7 A. No, he was not.
- 8 Q. Did he have any particular role in your Greater Liberian
9 government?
- 16:08:06 10 A. No - oh, Greater Liberian government. Dopoe Menkarzon rose
11 to the rank of general and commander of one of the major
12 divisions of the NPFL.
- 13 Q. Which division?
- 14 A. He was in charge of the Strike Force Division.
- 16:08:35 15 Q. Did he have any nickname, Dopoe Menkarzon?
- 16 A. By nickname, I just know him to be --
- 17 Q. Any alias?
- 18 A. His military - his military name was applied to him was
19 Ground, G-R-O-U-N-D, Ground.
- 16:09:00 20 Q. Can we have a look at - before we leave that page, there is
21 a matter of detail. Prince Quiwonkpa, any relation to Thomas?
- 22 A. A brother of General Quiwonkpa.
- 23 Q. The next page, please. We see an X against a name of Sam
24 Larto. Was he executed?
- 16:09:35 25 A. Yes.
- 26 Q. What for?
- 27 A. Sam Larto was executed for two principal reasons, two
28 different issues as we were trying to get him. We had the deaths
29 of some civilians in the southeastern part of Liberia. While

1 that was under investigation Sam Larto, in or around the - I
2 think the Monrovia area - had shot and killed a civilian. In
3 fact shot him in the head - someone that - it was claimed he was
4 a thief and he was I think stealing a television and he shot and
16:10:40 5 killed him. He was arrested for that wanton - for those two
6 crimes and he was court-martialled, tried, found guilty and he
7 was executed for those civilians.

8 Q. Now, on a number of occasions, Mr Taylor, you have told us
9 that he was court-martialled, tried and executed. Help us. The
16:11:04 10 trial process you are talking about, what did that involve?

11 A. It was a full - a five member court martial board headed by
12 McDonald Boam.

13 Q. By who?

14 A. McDonald Boam. That's already in the records. But they
16:11:31 15 were assisted by trained lawyers.

16 Q. Who was assisted by trained lawyers?

17 A. We are talking about the board. The court martial board
18 was assisted by trained lawyers as prosecutors and the military
19 men that came before them were also defended by trained lawyers.
16:11:47 20 I am talking about actual members of the bar of the Republic of
21 Liberia. In the case of Sam Larto, I can remember very, very
22 well Sam Larto was represented by a very famous counsellor in law
23 in Liberia right now, Francis Galawolo.

24 Q. Francis who?

16:12:07 25 A. Galawolo, G-A-L-A-W-O-L-O. So they were represented. This
26 was not a kangaroo court with military men not knowing what they
27 were doing. They were prosecuted by lawyers assisting the court
28 martial board and they were defended by lawyers, yes.

29 Q. You say that the chair of the board was McDonald Boam?

1 A. Boam, yes.

2 Q. The other four individuals who sat on that board, first of
3 all, where were they selected from?

4 A. To the best of my knowledge they were all - in fact
16:12:50 5 McDonald Boam is a Special Forces. He is on this list, so he was
6 not a stranger. And the other members - the other four, my
7 recollection is very bad on this. I do not know - I do not
8 remember quite frankly the name of the - I do not know who were
9 the others that sat on it, but Boam --

16:13:09 10 Q. Very well.

11 A. Boam was the chairperson of that.

12 Q. Maybe for completeness you should try and find the name,
13 just so that we can have it well in mind.

14 A. Yes, McDonald Boam. Yes, McDonald Boam is number 78 found
16:13:26 15 on page 3.

16 Q. Thank you. And this military court, at what location did
17 it sit?

18 A. In Gbarnga, the capital.

19 Q. And was there a dedicated building or facility for these
16:14:02 20 hearings?

21 A. Yes, I was not just - it was not just a board that came up
22 and went down after a case. It was a permanent setting.

23 Q. And help us, how regularly did that board try cases?

24 A. Not - I can say there were - that board may have looked
16:14:30 25 into as many as three major cases while - what I can remember.
26 The first set of cases had to do with these Black Kadaffa people.
27 The second had to do with the Sam Lartos [indiscernible] for
28 wanton killing of civilians or other soldiers. The third had to
29 do with an incident in 1994 after the fall of Gbarnga with the

1 Cassius Jacobs group situation.

2 Q. We will come to that. Now, for how long was that
3 particular board a part of the disciplinary structure of the
4 NPFL?

16:15:26 5 A. Up until 1995.

6 Q. Okay. And you have spoken of the board sitting in a
7 dedicated building, but did they, for example, have detention
8 facilities attached?

9 A. Not detention facilities attached to the board as it is,
16:15:52 10 but there were detention facilities in Gbarnga that were used by
11 the board.

12 Q. And help us, what were those detention facilities?

13 A. There's a jail. There's a jail located in Gbarnga.
14 There's a jail.

16:16:13 15 Q. Were detainees held in metal containers?

16 A. Metal containers? Never. No, no, no, no.

17 Q. To your knowledge were they kept in holes in the ground?

18 A. No, there were jails. I mean Gbarnga is a major city. By
19 the time we get there there are two prison facilities in Gbarnga;
16:16:35 20 one held by the police for regular civilian matters and there is
21 a national prison in Gbarnga. This is where - no, no, no, no.

22 On container matters, before I got into Liberia I understand that
23 at Gborplay without prison facilities some people were being kept
24 in containers down there and when I got there I was so upset

16:17:07 25 those that were responsible were very lucky and I had everybody -
26 in fact it was a terrible situation. I had every one of them
27 released. But we are talking about now the very early part of
28 the situation. But no, no, no, these other cities had civilian
29 facilities that were used.

1 Q. Now lest I forget, did I complete all the names on the
2 list?

3 A. No, you didn't.

16:17:34

4 Q. I think there was one remaining sheet that we needed to
5 examine, wasn't there?

6 A. Yes, but there is another X placed at number 155, Elmer
7 Glee Johnson.

8 Q. Yes?

16:17:50

9 A. He was not executed. This is a very good friend of mine
10 that was killed in combat and I think what Moses was trying to
11 mark off here was the death of him, but he was not executed. He
12 was a very good friend of mine.

13 Q. Can we look at the final page, please, and we see at number
14 160 Tom Wowei yu?

16:18:21

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Was he in fact a Special Forces? Did he train in Libya?

17 A. No, Tom has never had any military training. If you look
18 at it, I am number 1, I have never had military training in my
19 life but I am number 1 and they just put - I do not know who made
20 this list and those to put him at number 160. If they really
21 wanted to do justice they should have probably put him as number
22 2. But no, no, no, Tom has never had any sort of military
23 training.

16:18:38

24 Q. Right. Can we have the first page back up, please, and a
25 couple of questions before we finally leave this document.

16:18:53

26 Firstly we note two dates, 1990 to 2001. Help us. Is that date
27 2001 of any significance, or are either of those two dates 1990
28 to '91 [sic] of any significance?

29 A. I don't see why 2001 would be of any real significance. I

1 really can't put my hand on this one. 1991, I don't see why you
2 are referring to '91.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment, please. Okay, can we
4 put that exhibit away now, please, and, lest I forget, can I ask
16:20:21 5 that the document marked by the witness be marked for
6 identification. So I think we would be on MFI-2.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's correct. That document can be
8 marked as MFI-2.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

16:21:04 10 Q. One final matter before we move on, Mr Taylor. This board
11 - returning to that topic briefly - what punishments were they
12 entitled to hand out?

13 A. Well, let's not forget, even though they have lawyers this
14 board is operating under the uniform code of military justice
16:21:34 15 which is separate from civilian law, so they can hand out death
16 by firing squad, they can hand out - these are military legal
17 decisions that are handed down. It could be life imprisonment.
18 It could be anything. Based on, what I described before, the
19 operational order. The order was there which was the blueprint
16:22:02 20 that was respected of military people, but they were tried under
21 the uniform code of military justice. They knew their general
22 orders, they knew everything, and so they were tried not under
23 civilian law.

24 Q. Was flogging, by way of an example, a punishment which they
16:22:23 25 could impose?

26 A. No, flogging I am not sure. Flogging is not a part of the
27 punishment under the uniform code of military justice. I do not
28 claim to be an expert, but I do not think that corporal
29 punishment is one of those - maybe some of the military people

1 may be able to help the Court with that, but I doubt very much if
2 corporal punishment is a part of a discipline. I mean soldiers
3 are incarcerated, they are - under extreme conditions are
4 executed, but I do not believe so and I stand corrected on that.

16:23:07 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we have got five minutes left and I would
6 like to embark on another topic with you, please. We have
7 mentioned it in passing, but I would like us at this stage to
8 begin our examination of it. Bearing in mind we are now at the
9 end of 1990, beginning of 1991. We know of the situation on the
16:23:38 10 ground; 90 per cent of the country under your control apart from
11 Monrovia. At that stage of events what was the composition of
12 the NPFL?

13 A. The NPFL at this particular time is a combination of
14 Liberians, Gambians, Ivoirians, Ghanaians, even a few Nigerians,
16:24:26 15 because there was no volunteer situation. This is the
16 composition. And a few Mahn Guineans whose relatives on the
17 Liberian side could encourage them to join. In fact, I remember
18 specifically a number of around 200 Ivoirians from the Dan ethnic
19 group that joined the NPFL. I remember this so well because
16:24:58 20 following my - the disarmament in 1995 I then collected those men
21 and took them and delivered them to late President
22 Houphouet-Boigny who used them in the gendarmerie because they
23 were very highly trained.

24 Q. Now, correct me if I am wrong but I am looking at the
16:25:29 25 LiveNote. You said Liberians, Gambians, Ivoirians, Ghanaians,
26 even a few Nigerians. Were there any Sierra Leoneans?

27 A. At this particular time, no. The Sierra Leoneans that were
28 in Liberia we understand had - with this Mekunagbe situation, had
29 gone into Sierra Leone. At the beginning of the training around

1 and the fighting in the early 90s there were a few Sierra
2 Leoneans that fought alongside the NPFL, in 1990.

3 Q. In 1990?

4 A. That is correct.

16:26:11 5 Q. So, all right. So in 1990 there were some Sierra Leoneans?

6 A. Let's not - there are hundreds of Sierra Leoneans in
7 Liberia that go there looking for work. They, some of them are
8 teaching. Some of them are - Sierra Leoneans are in Liberia I
9 mean by the hundreds. There are some of them that do join the

16:26:39 10 NPFL as they get into - as you get into the Buchanan-Harbel area
11 that is the corridor that Sierra Leoneans who are living in and
12 working. Sierra Leoneans used to come to Liberia to look for a
13 job so some of them had joined by 1990.

14 Q. Now, I want us to deal with this topic with care and let's
16:27:09 15 start with the Sierra Leoneans. When did you first become aware
16 that there were Sierra Leoneans within the ranks of the NPFL?

17 A. I would say around May - around May of 1990 when they first
18 got into Buchanan, they did report, because a training base was
19 created in Buchanan. Sierra Leoneans and Nigerians working in
16:27:49 20 that general area, a few Nigerians looking for adventure, did
21 join.

22 Q. Pause there. Now, from what you have - the totality of
23 what you have told us, Mr Taylor, there is a distinction between
24 Special Forces and volunteers?

16:28:12 25 A. Oh, definitely.

26 Q. At the stage we are talking about, May 1990, were you aware
27 of any Sierra Leonean Special Forces within the ranks of the
28 NPFL?

29 A. Never, no, no, no, no. As a matter of fact let me - I

1 think we better clarify this.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I think - Mr President, I am not sure, I am
3 not sure we will have time to embark on this now and it may be
4 more convenient if we hold that thought until our next session.

16:28:50 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. The Court Manager has advised us
6 that we have less than two minutes left at the moment, so if that
7 is a convenient place we will adjourn.

8 Mr Taylor, I will remind you again: You are directed not
9 to speak to any other persons about the evidence you have given
16:29:15 10 and the Court will rise. We will resume on Monday morning at
11 9.30.

12 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
13 to be reconvened on Monday, 20 July 2009 at
14 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

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