



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 17 FEBRUARY 2010  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding  
Justice Richard Lussick  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Ms Maya Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Wednesday, 17 February 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:27:47 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,  
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J  
9 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura and our case manager, Maja Dimitrova.

09:33:10 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,  
11 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself, Courtenay  
12 Griffiths, with me, Mr Terry Munyard of counsel.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. There are two preliminary  
14 matters that I would like to address the parties on. You will  
09:33:31 15 recall that on Monday the Chamber fixed some time frames for  
16 filing of certain matters, namely, the lists of documents that  
17 each party wishes to tender into evidence. The time frames were  
18 that the lists were to be filed by close of business on Friday,  
19 19 February. The responses from the other side, if any, were to  
09:34:01 20 be filed by Wednesday, 24 February, that's close of business.

21 What I omitted to say is that the replies or the - sorry, the  
22 objections were to be filed by Wednesday. Now, the response to  
23 the objections, if any, may be filed by the parties by the  
24 following Friday, 26 February, close of business. So that is one  
09:34:29 25 matter.

26 Now, the other matter concerns the sitting schedule which,  
27 as you know, fluctuates from week to week because of the need to  
28 share this courtroom with another court. We have been reliably  
29 informed that there is slightly more time available for our court

1 to sit as follows: Now, next week - starting next week, which is  
2 the 22nd - the week of 22 to 26 February, in that week we were  
3 scheduled to sit five afternoons. It now transpires that we can  
4 sit full days Wednesday, Thursday and Friday; that is, we can sit  
09:35:23 5 both morning and afternoon, and this will be 23, 24 and 26  
6 February. The Court will sit - will start sitting at 9.30 in the  
7 morning and will observe the normal full day sitting schedule.  
8 That's Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.

9 Now, the following week, starting 1 March, there we were  
09:35:53 10 scheduled not to sit on Monday and we would sit - we were  
11 scheduled to sit only mornings - four mornings that week. It now  
12 transpires that we can sit the whole of Monday, 1 March; the  
13 whole of Tuesday, 2 March; and then two mornings on Wednesday and  
14 Thursday following. We would not sit on Friday, and so we wish  
09:36:22 15 to make this adjustment: That is, in the week of the 1st to the  
16 5th we shall sit a full day Monday, the normal schedule starting  
17 9.30 in the morning; full day Tuesday; then Wednesday morning and  
18 Thursday morning; we will not be sitting on Friday, 5 March  
19 because the Court will be required for the usual technical  
09:36:45 20 maintenance.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I think there is - the  
22 LiveNote reads that so far as next week is concerned we will be  
23 sitting full days Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, and the dates  
24 given for that are the 23rd, 24th and the 26th, which can't be  
09:37:19 25 right. I think it should be 24, 25 and 26.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, you are absolutely right. I think  
27 my tongue ran away with me. It's 24, 25 and 26, which is  
28 Wednesday, Thursday, Friday respectively that we will be sitting  
29 full days. As for Monday and Tuesday previously, we will be

1 sitting only mornings, starting 9 o'clock.

2 Mr Taylor, you continue this morning with re-examination,  
3 and I remind you, as I normally do, of your declaration to tell  
4 the truth.

09:38:18 5 Mr Griffiths, just wait, please. I wish to correct myself.  
6 It's just been drawn to my attention that next week we were  
7 scheduled to sit in the afternoons, so I will correct myself in  
8 this way: On Monday, 22 February, and Tuesday, 23 February, we  
9 will be sitting afternoons only starting at 3 o'clock in the  
09:39:02 10 afternoon up to 7.30. I really beg your pardon for that error.

11 Mr Griffiths, please continue.

12 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

13 [On former affirmation]

14 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

09:39:16 15 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday when we adjourned for the day we had  
16 commenced to discuss issues that were raised with you on Monday,  
17 1 February of this year in relation to the independence of Felix  
18 Downes-Thomas. Do you recall that?

19 A. Yes, I do.

09:39:49 20 Q. Now, on that Monday, 1 February, three code cables, MFI-70,  
21 MFI-82 and MFI-51, were referred to before we were then referred  
22 to MFI-398, that review report we looked at yesterday afternoon.  
23 Do you recall that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

09:40:14 25 Q. Now, yesterday we commenced to look at MFI-70 but had not  
26 concluded that exercise, so I would like to take things up again  
27 at that point, please. So can we have the bundle again, please.  
28 I am looking behind divider 21. Now, when we concluded yesterday  
29 we had reached paragraph 10 on page 4. So can we take up the

1 exercise from that point, please. Do you have it?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. "This notwithstanding, there have been attempts within the  
4 sub-regional groups to enlist Liberia in efforts aimed at finding  
09:41:35 5 a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Sierra Leone."

6 Now, is that proposition correct, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes, it is correct. This is just, I guess I would say,  
8 further substantiation of the unique role that Liberia was  
9 playing.

09:41:58 10 Q. "To this end, it should be noted that immediately following  
11 the formal session of the 28 December meeting in Abidjan, ECOWAS  
12 convened in 'very' closed, if not secret, session where it was  
13 reported that: Liberia, along with Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina  
14 Faso, was asked to play a role in connection with the 'Foday  
09:42:28 15 Sankoh (RUF) aspect' in the Sierra Leone problem?"

16 Now, did such a secret meeting take place, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes, it did.

18 Q. Were you present at that meeting?

19 A. Yes, I was.

09:42:40 20 Q. And this role that Liberia, along with Cote d'Ivoire and  
21 Burkina Faso were asked to play in connection with Foday Sankoh,  
22 what was that?

23 A. Well, in the case of Liberia and Burkina Faso, it was  
24 specifically because both of the countries had what is termed  
09:43:12 25 revolutionary experience. In the case of la Cote d'Ivoire, la  
26 Cote d'Ivoire, having served very well with the RUF in putting  
27 together the 1996 agreement and hosting Foday Sankoh, he had  
28 developed some what I would call affinity with la Cote d'Ivoire.  
29 And so they brought the three countries together and we sat and

1 we discussed that, "Look, well, you two have revolutionary  
2 experience. Foday Sankoh trusts La Cote d'Ivoire also. You guys  
3 have to now put whatever necessary pressure needed on Foday  
4 Sankoh to carry on this process." I guess - and this point is  
09:43:59 5 very well made here because it also again builds on what I have  
6 told this Court of my unique role that I played, okay, on that  
7 committee. And so I think this is just a further substantiation  
8 of what I have said.

9 Q. Now, it goes on, Mr Taylor:

09:44:22 10 "The Foreign Minister of Cote d'Ivoire expressed suspicion  
11 about the intentions behind the fact that the request (a) above"  
12 - that is the request we have just looked at - "was not made  
13 during the earlier formal session but done, as it were, in camera  
14 and, because of his suspicions, he advised that unless he heard  
09:44:43 15 directly from the ECOWAS chairman, he would be unable to  
16 undertake the assignment. Subsequently, the ECOWAS chairman made  
17 contact with the Ivorian Foreign Minister which led to the ECOWAS  
18 peace initiative on Sierra Leone."

19 Now, can we pause again there. Why was it necessary to  
09:45:06 20 have that meeting in "'very' closed session, if not secret,  
21 session"? Why?

22 A. Well, in fact, there is nothing unique about this. Most  
23 serious decisions in ECOWAS are done in closed session, if not  
24 secret. So there is nothing unique about this. But the issues  
09:45:30 25 at hand that we wanted to get across was, again, these two points  
26 that I have made: The revolutionary, quote unquote, experience,  
27 because Burkina Faso is considered a revolutionary country;  
28 Liberia having gone through the war, I was considered also a  
29 revolutionary. And so these had to - we had to put this into

1 closed discussion that the real reason for what we were expected  
2 to do would not be made public, if not it would have alerted  
3 Sankoh himself that, "Okay, well, they are calling my friends to  
4 put pressure, or people that I know." That's all.

09:46:16 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I am going to ask you the question again.  
6 Now, it may not have been unique, but what was so controversial  
7 about that that it had to be done in very secret session? What  
8 was so controversial?

9 A. Well, controversial not. But the details of what the  
09:46:42 10 leadership was expected to do remains secret. Plans that are put  
11 together to execute certain programmes are not necessarily  
12 exposed. And normally these sessions, when you get down to these  
13 kinds of discussions, all of these meetings are done behind  
14 closed doors. This is a description of Downes-Thomas, but there  
09:47:06 15 is nothing unique about closed session of ECOWAS.

16 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, there is nothing unique about it, but,  
17 given your position, as set out in the previous paragraph,  
18 allegations are being made about Liberia and Liberia's hand in  
19 Sierra Leone. That's right, isn't it?

09:47:27 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. That's what we glean from the previous paragraph, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, if the world doesn't know that you have been  
24 officially asked to play this role, it could lead to  
09:47:39 25 misunderstanding, couldn't it? So why didn't you object? Do you  
26 follow me?

27 A. Yes, I do, I follow you. But there was nothing - I think  
28 the point here made by la Cote d'Ivoire was generally felt as the  
29 right way to go. What la Cote d'Ivoire was trying to say in

1 fact, was, "Okay, we have heard all these accusations spinning  
2 around about Liberia, about Burkina Faso, about Libya" -  
3 remember, in previous discussions before this Court there were  
4 accusations. So La Cote d'Ivoire, probably not wanting to fall  
09:48:19 5 into this, voiced this out. But on my part, I didn't see the  
6 necessity. I am on the committee and ECOWAS is - the region is  
7 an independent region and didn't have to come out and I didn't  
8 see the need to come out and announce, "Well, see what I'm doing,  
9 see what" - I just didn't see any necessity because this was an  
09:48:39 10 ECOWAS decision.

11 Q. Very well. Let's move on:

12 "Recent pronouncement by senior Government of Liberia  
13 officials indicate that Liberia has now adopted a policy of  
14 'pacification and conciliation' towards Nigeria and ECOWAS. In  
09:49:03 15 his annual message to the 3rd Regular Session of the 51st  
16 Legislature convened in Joint Assembly at the Capitol Building on  
17 25 January 1999, President Taylor talked about the 'responsible  
18 and forward looking ECOWAS' and in that context informed the  
19 audience that 'outside influence in ECOWAS States Economic Union  
09:49:28 20 is becoming destructive to the union.' Following positive  
21 references to his good 'friend and brother, the late General Sani  
22 Abacha', he went on to state that 'during the latter part of  
23 1998, we directed much of our time fostering good relations and  
24 closer ties with the new Head of State of Nigeria, Abdul salami  
09:49:57 25 Abubakar, whom we applaud as a progressive leader'. All  
26 subsequent public statements by President Taylor, be they at  
27 formal or informal gatherings, have to date included variations  
28 of this pro-Nigeria/ECOWAS theme. Similar sentiments were  
29 expressed by Foreign Minister Captan at his ministry's annual

1 reception for diplomats where he stated that Liberia would not  
2 engage in acts that would threaten or undermine the continued  
3 existence of ECOMOG. Clearly, there is an expressed  
4 determination on the part of the Government of Liberia to ensure  
09:50:36 5 that current developments do not cause permanent damage to  
6 Liberia's relationship with either ECOWAS or Nigeria."

7 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

8 A. That is true.

9 Q. Bearing in mind the suggestion that was made, has

09:50:55 10 Mr Downes-Thomas put any kind of a gloss on this?

11 A. No, not that I see. No.

12 Q. And then the report moves on:

13 "Impact of latest developments in Sierra Leone on Liberia.

14 President Taylor has acknowledged that problems between

09:51:16 15 Sierra Leone and Liberia have their genesis in the antagonistic  
16 relationship which existed between himself and former President  
17 Momoh."

18 Is that true?

19 A. Yes, at some latter point Momoh and I had difficulties.

09:51:40 20 Q. And is it true that those problems created an antagonistic  
21 relationship between you and President Momoh?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, Momoh was President of Sierra Leone when, Mr Taylor?

24 A. At the beginning of the crisis around 1991, Momoh was

09:52:13 25 President of Sierra Leone at the time.

26 Q. So would you put the genesis of this antagonism back to  
27 then?

28 A. I would - yes, but a little - I would put it to around the  
29 middle of 1991, after Momoh succumbed to the pressure from

1 outside. Being very good friends with Momoh to permitting ULIMO  
2 to be armed to attack Liberia, I felt that that was not right and  
3 that caused some extreme stress in our friendship.

4 Q. Now, the writer goes on:

09:53:09 5 "That he" - the he being you - "maintains his history and  
6 has sought to mend fences with President Kabbah."

7 Is that true?

8 A. That is true.

9 Q. "In this regard, the Abuja mini summit of 26-27 October  
09:53:28 10 1998 and the Mano River Union summit of 12 November 1998 appeared  
11 promising."

12 Is that true?

13 A. That is true.

14 Q. Now, could we pause and look at that, Mr Taylor. Yesterday  
09:53:51 15 you told us that your first inkling of suggestions being made was  
16 when your representative of the United Nations met with the  
17 President of the Security Council, yes?

18 A. Yes. That was about June or so.

19 Q. Of?

09:54:14 20 A. 1998.

21 Q. Now, the two meetings mentioned here are later in 1998,  
22 yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And during those meetings did you attempt to clarify the  
09:54:32 25 situation with President Kabbah?

26 A. Definitely. Definitely. Definitely, counsel. Don't  
27 forget, I think for the Court, the sequence. And I did  
28 everything, but the ball was already rolling. The beginning of  
29 the sequence, just to be very brief on this, the Okelo report

1 that goes forward after the intervention that goes into the  
2 President of the Security Council calling in my representative at  
3 the United Nations and asking for an explanation, at this  
4 particular time things are beginning to evolve. We meet and I  
09:55:10 5 try to reassure President Kabbah that there is no validity to  
6 this. So, yes, I am reassuring him.

7 Q. "... appeared promising. However, relations between  
8 Liberia and Sierra Leone began to show signs of deterioration  
9 with the emergence of accusations and counter accusations by one  
09:55:34 10 towards the other."

11 Now, when did that begin?

12 A. I would say following that Okelo report that was read here,  
13 that was the downhill position. Things started going downhill.

14 Q. Now, again, Mr Taylor, what is summarised in that paragraph  
09:56:01 15 by special representative Downes-Thomas, is that a fair  
16 reflection of what had occurred in terms of your attitude towards  
17 Sierra Leone?

18 A. I would say it's fair.

19 Q. And, Mr Taylor, whilst we are on the topic, the sentiments  
09:56:26 20 expressed here, were they a consequence of you speaking directly  
21 to Mr Downes-Thomas about these issues or what?

22 A. No. The United Nations had a full staff. Downes-Thomas  
23 was not - he was head of mission, but they had several dozen  
24 individuals in Liberia. No, I didn't speak to him.

09:56:49 25 Q. "Most recently, the Government of Liberia justified its  
26 closing of the border with Sierra Leone as a measure aimed at  
27 precluding the operationalisation of what is claimed to be a  
28 planned infiltration of fighters from Sierra Leone to destabilise  
29 Liberia. This was the clearest indication that the latest

1 development in Sierra Leone has adversely affected Sierra  
2 Leone/Liberia relationship.

3           Following accusations of Liberia's complicity with the RUF,  
4 relations between the two countries can best be described as  
09:57:33 5 strained. The mood and sentiments in Sierra Leone are  
6 indisputably anti-Taylor and anti-Liberia. It is also quite  
7 apparent that President Kabbah's stance regarding negotiation is  
8 hardening in the wake of what appears to be a successful ECOMOG  
9 operation to drive the RUF out of Freetown. Thus, it would not  
09:57:59 10 be surprising if relations between the two countries were to  
11 remain chilly for a fairly long period of time."

12           Again, Mr Taylor, is that a fair assessment of the  
13 situation?

14 A. Yes, it is.

09:58:20 15 Q. And did you have a hand in persuading Mr Downes-Thomas to  
16 express himself in this way?

17 A. No, no.

18 Q. And he continues:

19           "The salient aspects of UNOL's peace-building strategy can  
09:58:51 20 be culled from our draft Secretary-General's report to the  
21 Security Council on the activities of United Nations  
22 peace-building support office in Liberia, sent to headquarters.  
23 In addition to that, UNOL has placed emphasis on its basic  
24 mandate, i.e. to assist in mobilising international support for  
09:59:14 25 international assistance to Liberia; to support and facilitate  
26 the work of the UN system in developing an integrated approach to  
27 the peace-building programmes of the Government of Liberia; to  
28 facilitate the provision of technical assistance and support by  
29 the United Nations for reconciliation efforts and the

1 establishment of democratic institutions; and to facilitate  
2 communications between the Government of Liberia and the United  
3 Nations on matters related to peace building. To this end, UNOL  
4 has attempted to sensitise donors on the increasing need for  
09:59:57 5 assistance. It has also given special emphasis to conflict  
6 resolution and the defusing of both internal and regional  
7 tensions. It has further encouraged the government to take  
8 confidence-building measures that have the effect of assuring  
9 its neighbours of its good intentions and to take an active part  
10:00:18 10 in bilateral consultations that would lead to peace and security  
11 of the sub-region."

12 Again, is that true, Mr Taylor?

13 A. That is true.

14 Q. "It has also adopted an approach which focuses on the  
10:00:38 15 strengthening of the capacity of civil society organisations."

16 Is that true?

17 A. That is true.

18 Q. "UNOL's participation in the human rights training of the  
19 Liberian police is perhaps the most visible of such attempts."

10:01:02 20 Now, we will be coming on to the very many questions you  
21 were asked about human rights abuses in Liberia, Mr Taylor. We  
22 will be coming on to that. But is it right that such training  
23 was conducted for the Liberian police?

24 A. Definitely. There were three sets of training, yes.

10:01:20 25 Q. When?

26 A. '98 going into '99, they did help.

27 Q. "While UNOL has worked with institutions involved in  
28 national reconciliation and human rights, its efforts in the  
29 field of human rights have been hampered by the absence of any

1 reference to human rights issues in its mandate.

2 As to the strategy UNOL intends to pursue in the future, I  
3 wish to indicate that we intend to adopt a dual-track approach.  
4 While UNOL will continue to ensure that the government respects  
10:02:06 5 human rights and maintains harmonious relations with civil  
6 society, pursue policies of good neighbourliness and take  
7 constitutional measures that reflect" - that should be  
8 "credibility" - "and accountability, it is our intention to  
9 ensure that the UN system in Liberia utilises its resources to  
10:02:31 10 also strengthen the capacity of all peace-oriented civil society  
11 organisations so that they can play a crucial role in the  
12 consolidation of peace."

13 Now, the next paragraph you will see bears the subheading,  
14 Mr Taylor, "militia units", yes?

10:02:57 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And you will recall in the context of that interview with  
17 Daniel Chea references to militia units, do you recall that?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. So let us look and see, in terms of fairness, what  
10:03:10 20 Mr Downes-Thomas had to say about this.

21 "As regards to the last issue you raised pertaining to the  
22 meaning of 'militia units' as referred to in the statement issued  
23 by the Ministry of State For Presidential Affairs, I have been  
24 informed that the reference to the militia was made in its  
10:03:32 25 general form and relates to all able-bodied men and women who are  
26 likely to be mobilised in the event of an attack against Liberia.  
27 The officials who drafted the statement have informed UNOL that  
28 there was no 'militia units' in operation at the moment. Such  
29 references were therefore meant to portray the government's

1 ability to mobilise non-military citizens in times of emergency.  
2 As a matter of fact, there has been no militia entity since  
3 President Tolbert's era, when an attempt was made to keep a  
4 general roster of reservists who were occasionally provided with  
10:04:25 5 basic military training. Thus, I am led to believe that there is  
6 no particular militia unit attached to the national armed forces  
7 which is enjoying any financial support from the government.  
8 According to Government of Liberia sources, the only elements  
9 which have been deployed on the border are members of the AFL and  
10:04:50 10 other military and paramilitary units, including the police,  
11 border patrols belonging to the Immigration Commission, as well  
12 as members of the National Security Agency who could have been  
13 deployed for intelligence purposes. Thus, to the best of its  
14 knowledge, UNOL has no information on the existence of militia  
10:05:16 15 units."

16 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

17 A. That is true. That is true.

18 Q. So, Mr Taylor, going back to that interview with Daniel  
19 Chea, your Defence Minister, who suggested in that article that  
10:05:36 20 you had deliberately undermined the Liberian army in order to  
21 divert support to these militia units, which is right?

22 A. Well, Chea is wrong. This is right. Let's just be  
23 reminded. The militia units were the NPFL, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, and  
24 LPC. Following my election as President and before then, in  
10:06:08 25 fact, in January 1997, all militia units were disbanded. What we  
26 did, even as he is explaining here, all individuals that even  
27 fought after the initial attack from Mosquito Spray and all of  
28 these other people that led into LURD, fought under the banner of  
29 either the Armed Forces of Liberia, or as police, or ATU or SSS.

1 These militia units that existed under the name as militia did  
2 not exist at this particular time. So this is why I keep saying  
3 I doubt - based on the context that Daniel Chea speaking, I don't  
4 understand. Because Daniel Chea knew, and he knows, that there  
10:06:56 5 were no militia units that were in place during my presidency.  
6 So I don't understand it.

7 Q. "Observations: In assessing the various elements that  
8 constitute potential sources of tension in the sub-region, the  
9 issue of the prevalence of demobilised combatants who are yet to  
10:07:22 10 be rehabilitated and reintegrated into the society warrants  
11 special and focused attention. This is an issue on which I  
12 placed emphasis when I met with donors in America and in Europe  
13 prior to my assumption of duties in Monrovia. I continue to  
14 maintain that neglect of ex-combatants would pose serious  
10:07:49 15 security problems at both national and sub-regional levels. In  
16 this connection, and until this matter is addressed  
17 satisfactorily, Liberia will remain a source of mercenaries."

18 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That is 100 per cent correct. 100 per cent. He uses the  
10:08:16 20 word "mercenaries"; we called them non-state actors. They would  
21 continue to remain.

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, was this a problem you were aware of?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Was this a problem that you discussed with UNOL?

10:08:35 25 A. With UNOL and other partners in the international  
26 community, yes, we discussed these problems with them, that we  
27 could not have these 30,000, 40,000 ex-combatants not properly  
28 demobilised, no assistance in terms of training or retraining or  
29 giving them an opportunity to advance their lives, just hanging

1 around unemployed, that this was the basis for future problems in  
2 Liberia and probably outside of Liberia. This was a major, major  
3 discussion on the part of my government with all international  
4 partners, including UNOL.

10:09:15 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, had you as President of Liberia then sought  
6 to address this? Because this isn't a very flattering reflection  
7 on Liberia, is it?

8 A. I agree. I agree with what you said.

9 Q. Well, what did you do to address it?

10:09:35 10 A. Well, the first thing that we did was we started a training  
11 and retraining programme. We tried to provide a reduced amount,  
12 something like a subsistence, to most of the individuals and just  
13 integrated everyone into what we called the Armed Forces of  
14 Liberia. Giving them very, very small amounts, but trying to  
10:10:12 15 hold them in place while we put together this commission to bring  
16 up suggestions to restructure the armed forces.

17 Q. That was the commission that we dealt with when we were  
18 dealing with Daniel Chea?

19 A. That is correct. And so the only thing we could do was to  
10:10:24 20 try to give them some subsistence, and we did. So the Armed  
21 Forces of Liberia, so to speak, that was about 6,000 before the  
22 war, had grown to some 30,000 after the war because it included  
23 all of these former militia groups, and we wanted to find a way  
24 to give them some money that they could, you know, find some type  
10:10:47 25 of employment. We encouraged them to get into mining of gold,  
26 mining - you know, going back into agriculture. And even my  
27 government passed a law in Liberia that granted all combatants  
28 that fought during the war two things: One, encouraging them to  
29 go back to the regions, and if you decided that you would go back

1 to your regions, we would give you up to about 10 acres of land  
2 to do your farming. And if you returned to your region and you  
3 wanted to build a house, we gave you an acre. That's legislation  
4 we passed, all of these designed to try to keep some lid on this  
10:11:32 5 massive group that no one wanted to provide assistance for. Some  
6 took up that particular challenge and returned to their regions  
7 to do farming, and some were given land to build, you know, their  
8 houses. And those that remained in the Monrovia area, while the  
9 not amount was small in Liberian dollars, but we tried to give  
10:11:53 10 them something that they would have some level of income pending  
11 the training of the new army.

12 Q. "Another issue of concern is Liberia's relationship with  
13 Nigeria and ECOMOG. Even if there is no love lost between the  
14 NPP-led government and ECOMOG, the Government of Liberia would  
10:12:14 15 have wanted to see a scaled-down ECOMOG presence as opposed to  
16 its sudden and massive withdrawal."

17 Is that true?

18 A. 100 per cent true.

19 Q. Explain to us what that means in real terms.

10:12:32 20 A. A massive withdrawal would have left us weak. We did not  
21 want that. We were seeking to have, one, first of all, ECOMOG  
22 and its commanders recognising that their role before as lord and  
23 masters of Liberia would change. So we wanted to see a peace  
24 building process. That is, let's get the armed forces together,  
10:13:00 25 begin a gradual withdrawal; as we begin the training of the armed  
26 forces, you withdraw. But because Abacha and I had clashed over  
27 the recruiting of ex-combatants from Liberia to carry into Sierra  
28 Leone to fight the Kamajors that I was afraid would return and  
29 fight me, which eventually happened, they got angry because I had

1 to really, really gone very strong on Abacha about this  
2 particular matter, okay. And so they just decided, "Well, fine,  
3 then we will just leave", okay. But I did not seek a massive and  
4 unceremonious withdrawal because it would have left us in a very  
10:13:47 5 weakened position. So this is true.

6 Q. You speak of ex-combatants being recruited. What were they  
7 being recruited to do, Mr Taylor?

8 A. To go and fight into Sierra Leone against - I mean to  
9 become a part of the Kamajors to fight against the RUF/AFRC  
10:14:11 10 junta. This starts by the end of 1997. Thousands of Liberians  
11 were taken out to form a part of the Kamajors by ECOMOG.

12 Q. "All the same, ECOMOG has withdrawn its troops with the  
13 notable exception of one company-size team which is to guard the  
14 weapons in the joint custody of the UN and ECOWAS. With the  
10:14:43 15 peacekeeping force having been withdrawn at a period when  
16 relations between ECOWAS and Liberia appear to have reached a low  
17 point, it will be essential to take all possible measures to  
18 encourage the reestablishment of cordial relations between the  
19 two.

10:15:01 20 At the end of it all, what seems quite clear is that the  
21 problem of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and indeed Guinea, are  
22 interrelated. The circulation of former combatants and their  
23 recycling within the countries of Mano River Union combined with  
24 the exchange of accusations among these neighbouring countries,  
10:15:24 25 suggests that one should move from isolated assessments of  
26 individual countries to a bold attempt to grapple with the  
27 recurrent problems in these countries. This should be done in a  
28 manner that would allow for the search and provision of  
29 comprehensive solutions."

1           So, Mr Taylor, that is the first of the three code cables  
2 to which your attention was directed by my learned friend during  
3 cross-examination. Let us now look at the second, which is  
4 MFI-82, which is to be found behind divider 22 in this bundle.

10:16:25 5 Do we have it?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. This is dated 30 March 1999. So it's a couple of months  
8 after the document we have just looked at. We see that it's a  
9 code cable from Mr Downes-Thomas sent to Prendergast at the

10:16:51 10 United Nations. "Observations on Sierra Leone and Liberia" it is  
11 headed:

12           "With reference to your code cable of 25 March 1999, I wish  
13 to thank you for providing me with a copy of special envoy

14 Okelo's code cable of 29 March 1999, together with the note on  
10:17:21 15 his political officer's unannounced visit to Monrovia during the  
16 period between 5 and 11 March 1999. The contents of the cables

17 in question are as contradictory as the differences which exist  
18 within the terms of reference provided to PAO Zongwe by special  
19 envoy Okelo, and the officer's own interpretation of what his

10:17:53 20 trip to Liberia was intended to accomplish. On one hand, the  
21 special envoy advises that his instructions to his officer were

22 'to attempt an assessment of the Sierra Leonean situation from  
23 the Liberian perspective, and observe internal Liberian

24 developments impacting on Sierra Leone'. On the other hand, the

10:18:23 25 officer states that his visit to Monrovia was to participate in  
26 the mission 'on the preliminary findings mission in connection

27 with the disposal of arms collected during the 1996-1997

28 disarmament in Liberia'. But before responding to your request

29 for comments on the officer's note, I would like to formally

1 convey to you my overall views on the matter. These follow.

2 The contents of both communications from UNOMSIL are  
3 incredible and objectionable. Nevertheless, they raise certain  
4 fundamental questions which deserve answers."

10:19:08 5 Mr Taylor, as a former President, that language "incredible  
6 and objectionable", how does that strike you?

7 A. Well, "incredible" is used similar to the way it is used in  
8 legal terms; something beyond reason or understanding.

9 "Objectionable" would be normal, as this has to be used in this  
10:19:46 10 context would be mostly related to the invasion of the territory  
11 of Mr Thomas and his objection to such actions in diplomatic  
12 language. This is my understanding.

13 Q. "Nevertheless, they raise certain fundamental questions  
14 which deserve answers:

10:20:11 15 Can special envoy Okelo or UNOMSIL decide unilaterally to  
16 conduct work in Liberia and if so, on what basis?

17 What are the reasons for UNOMSIL's implicit assumption that  
18 the reporting from UNOL is either inadequate or deficient?"

19 Now, pause there, Mr Taylor. Now remember the other  
10:20:45 20 document we looked at which suggested that Mr Downes-Thomas was  
21 partial. Do you recall that?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Now, bearing that in mind, what do you read into that  
24 second bullet point?

10:21:07 25 A. Well, the same issue. The same issue is at stake. It is  
26 apparent here that Okelo, having fired the first shot in 1998, is  
27 pursuing this line and in fact is questioning the credibility of  
28 Downes-Thomas of which I think Thomas objects properly to. So  
29 this just looks like an internal struggle between the two

1 representatives, one trying to probably call into question the  
2 credibility of his colleague.

3 Q. "What was the need and urgency for UNOMSIL to undertake the  
4 so-called assessment in Monrovia?

10:22:00 5 Does UNOMSIL per se have any role to play in the disposal  
6 of arms and ammunition currently in the joint custody of the  
7 United Nations and ECOWAS whose surrogates are UNOL and ECOMOG?

8 These questions also relate to some basic issues that have  
9 significant bearing on inter-departmental communication as well  
10:22:28 10 as inter-mission cooperation and, in that regard, on the matter  
11 of policy guidance provided to peacekeeping and peace-building  
12 missions.

13 It was wrong and improper for special envoy Okelo to have  
14 sent a junior officer to, in effect, snoop around Monrovia. For  
10:22:50 15 him to have done so without a word about it to me, either before  
16 and during, or even after his political officer's escapades in  
17 Monrovia, is simply extraordinary; if not suspect. In short, the  
18 manner in which special envoy Okelo and his political officer  
19 handled this matter of the Monrovia visit has been thoroughly  
10:23:19 20 unprofessional.

21 Putting aside the special envoy's failure to display, in  
22 this case, elementary professional courtesy, I am even more  
23 surprised by his cavalier indifference to the potentially  
24 disastrous situation that could have been created for UNOL by the  
10:23:40 25 plausible perception that the United Nations is engaged in some  
26 form of spying in Monrovia. This is not far-fetched. Given the  
27 continuing deterioration and complicated relations between Sierra  
28 Leone and Liberia, it becomes an extremely delicate matter for a  
29 UN official, especially one based in Sierra Leone, to be sent

1 surreptitiously to make an assessment of the Sierra Leonean  
2 situation from the Liberian perspective and observe internal  
3 Liberian developments impacting on Sierra Leone.

4 If indeed this so-called assessment was ever intended to be  
10:24:28 5 a serious undertaking, then headquarters - which must have  
6 approved the mission - could have at least informed me  
7 accordingly, and ensured that the assessment was carried out in a  
8 professional, transparent and coordinated fashion. Despite these  
9 remarks, I will refrain from characterising the judgement from  
10:24:54 10 which emerged the decision to send the PAO to Liberia. However,  
11 I do consider that decision objectionable. Clearly unacceptable  
12 is special envoy Okelo and his PAO ascribing unto themselves the  
13 responsibility of assessing and reporting 'on the Liberian  
14 situation and the leadership of President Taylor'. Unless I have  
10:25:25 15 misunderstood the mandate of UNOL, I believe that these matters  
16 are indisputably and strictly within the purview of the  
17 representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia.

18 In this connection, I should draw your attention to the  
19 attached message from me to you dated 9 February 1999. I sought  
10:25:51 20 clarification and guidance about what appeared to be  
21 headquarters' approval of the special envoy's request to visit  
22 Liberia for purposes that I found questionable and smacking of  
23 'mission-creep'. Before its receipt of my message, DPA was as  
24 uninformed about this business of special envoy Okelo undertaking  
10:26:18 25 a mission to Liberia as I suspect it was about the PAO's  
26 assessment mission in Monrovia. Whether or not this points to a  
27 certain internal breakdown in communication, I do not know. What  
28 remains curious, however, is that the PAO's 'assessment' mission  
29 was not fundamentally dissimilar to the terms under which special

1 envoy Okelo was to have visited Liberia.

2 Only in the light of the foregoing, do I now consider it  
3 necessary for headquarters to issue a clear directive concerning  
4 the competence for UNOL and UNOMSIL. Such a directive could  
10:27:11 5 usefully include procedures for cooperation between these two  
6 entities. While I sincerely consider action along those lines to  
7 be somewhat unfortunate, I nevertheless hope that it would serve  
8 to preclude any further attempts at blurring the distinct  
9 jurisdictional areas of both missions' activities.

10:27:36 10 With regard to your request for comments on the officer's  
11 note, I should state that I found it reckless and somewhat  
12 amateurish. My suspicion is that he could have benefitted from  
13 proper instruction and sound guidance. It is therefore not  
14 surprising that he failed to confine himself to strictly Sierra  
10:28:05 15 Leone-Liberia matters. By and large his note is an amalgam of  
16 chatty cocktail gossip, gratuitous observations and dangerous  
17 subjective speculations. Special Envoy Okelo's view that his  
18 officer 'makes perceptive observation on the Liberian situation  
19 and the leadership of President Taylor' is probably as a result  
10:28:34 20 of him being stationed in Sierra Leone. From my vantage point,  
21 however, there is a degree of irresponsibility on the part of  
22 Special Envoy Okelo in forwarding and widely distributing the  
23 note officially. That note, albeit journalistic in nature,  
24 contains dangerous and, in my view, unverified pieces of  
10:29:02 25 information. Be that as it may, the somewhat inconvenient truth  
26 is that the note now officially advises the United Nations that  
27 one of its staff members has confirmed that:

28 President Taylor is a business partner to Mr Radcliffe, a  
29 British diamond dealer believed to be one of the many diamond

1 dealers with connections in Sierra Leone;

2 Sam Bockarie (aka Mosquito of RUF fame) resided in Monrovia  
3 at the house of Liberian Senator Kpoto;

4 The wife of Johnny Paul Koroma (head of AFRC-Sierra Leone)  
10:29:59 5 received money in Monrovia and must have sometime lived or  
6 continued to stay in Liberia; and,

7 Arms and ammunition are being stock-piled in Liberia  
8 (presumably at Yekepa airstrip) 'to be used for a devastating  
9 assault on Freetown, in the event that the proposed political  
10:30:27 10 dialogue between the Sierra Leone and the rebels fails'. (The  
11 underlined is the officer's)

12 With these confirmations, the PAO seems to have unearthed  
13 the evidence of Liberia's complicity in the war in Sierra  
14 Leone - something that up to now has eluded UNOL. The question  
10:30:51 15 this raises however, is whether or not the United Nations should  
16 remain silent about these matters; particularly about the  
17 confirmed information relating to the stock-piling of arms by  
18 Liberia for war against Sierra Leone. I would very much like  
19 guidance on how to proceed with that specific matter. I consider  
10:31:14 20 it an extremely serious allegation and would not want to be  
21 accused at a later stage for having had information of that sort  
22 and failed to act on it."

23 Now, Mr Taylor, firstly, where did you get this document  
24 from?

10:31:45 25 A. Where did I get it from?

26 Q. Yes, where did you get it from?

27 A. This is from the office of the special representative in  
28 Liberia.

29 Q. And when did you receive it?

1 A. During my presidency.

2 Q. Hmm?

3 A. During my presidency [overlapping speakers].

4 Q. What did you do with it after you received it?

10:32:03 5 A. Well, the government had - the Executive Mansion has its  
6 own archives. It was stored in the archives of the Executive  
7 Mansion.

8 Q. And did this document come from the archives, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Definitely. May I just add one thing for the records.

10:32:24 10 Earlier in my evidence I spoke about the first - a first shot  
11 being fired by special representative Okelo. I know the judges  
12 understood what I mean, but for the records, that was a note in  
13 1998 that he sent stating that Liberia was definitely involved  
14 because of the Liberians that were captured during the

10:32:48 15 intervention. Not as firing a gun, for the records. I just  
16 wanted to --

17 Q. So that was when, Mr Taylor?

18 A. 1998 after the intervention Mr Okelo sent a note to  
19 headquarters in the UN stating that Liberia was involved because  
10:33:11 20 of the capture of Liberians during the attack by ECOMOG during  
21 the intervention, which I was referring to figuratively as the  
22 first shot.

23 Q. Now, let us put that together with what we now know about  
24 this document. So that was mid - that was in 1998 sometime.

10:33:32 25 What part of 1998?

26 A. That report was filed somewhere in - I would put it to  
27 March-April 1998, right after the intervention that happened in  
28 February.

29 Q. Now, we know, if we go back to the first paragraph of this

1 document, that this visit by Okelo's political officer, the  
2 unannounced visit, took place between 5 and 11 March 1999. Okay?

3 A. Yes, that is correct.

4 Q. When was the Freetown invasion, Mr Taylor?

10:34:08 5 A. Freetown invasion occurred in January 1999.

6 Q. Now, bearing that timeline in mind, let us now go back to

7 page 3. Now, the report prepared by that political officer

8 contained inter alia the, quote unquote, confirmation that arms

9 and ammunition were being stockpiled in Liberia to be used for a

10:34:46 10 devastating assault on Freetown in the event that the proposed

11 political dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and the

12 rebels failed.

13 Now, Mr Taylor, was there such a stockpile at Yekepa?

14 A. No, not at all.

10:35:02 15 Q. Now, remember this is March 1999, Mr Taylor?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. When were the negotiations in Lome?

18 A. July 1999.

19 Q. Was it the case that three months prior to that you were

10:35:27 20 putting together a contingency plan, in effect, if those talks

21 failed? Do you see what's being suggested?

22 A. Yes, I see.

23 Q. Is that the case?

24 A. That's not the case.

10:35:40 25 Q. Now, these allegations that were made by Mr Okelo's

26 political officer, the four bullet points on page 3, was there

27 any truth in them?

28 A. None. The first bullet point, Mr Radcliffe was an

29 individual - and there were documents that were presented here -

1 that was arrested by Liberian police. I think he is Australian -  
2 British-Australian or Australian-British. He is deported. He  
3 was expelled from Liberia. Now, it would seem to me that if I  
4 had a business partner a diamond dealer in Liberia, I would want  
10:36:26 5 to keep him in Liberia instead of expelling him where the British  
6 and the Australians, or anybody else, would have access to him.  
7 There is no truth to this.

8 The same is true for the second bullet point. Sam Bockarie  
9 was never living in any house in Liberia at this time. At this  
10:36:48 10 time? No, Sam Bockarie does not come to Liberia to stay until  
11 when? December 1999.

12 Q. Who is Senator Kpoto?

13 A. Senator Keikura Kpoto was the President pro temp of the  
14 Liberian Senate, the late Senator Kpoto. If you - he was even  
10:37:09 15 one of the individuals that were on the plane to Sierra Leone.  
16 We have seen a picture of Senator Kpoto here already exhibited.  
17 By this time, March 1999, I don't know Johnny Paul Koroma as a  
18 person; I don't know his wife. So Johnny Paul Koroma's wife, if  
19 she was in Liberia, it had to be something that was very quiet  
10:37:35 20 and she had the properly documentation, could have entered. I  
21 did not know her as his wife to say she had been receiving money  
22 or living there. That is not true.

23 And even the Yekepa situation, the fourth bullet point,  
24 there is no airstrip. There was an old airstrip in Yekepa that  
10:37:59 25 was being used by the mining that had closed down some 10, 15  
26 years. In fact, the airstrip, trees had grown on it. So this is  
27 just all made up.

28 Q. Now, was this report put together as a result of any  
29 pressure you put upon Mr Downes-Thomas, Mr Taylor?

1 A. No. As a matter of fact - no, not at all. I only got to  
2 know about this so-called snooping around after we, the  
3 government, received a copy of his report. I didn't even know or  
4 had never been advised that there was someone in Monrovia  
10:38:39 5 snooping around, because it was ordinary for Liberians - I mean,  
6 for United Nations personnel to come in and go. But when we  
7 found out about this, we did raise some issues and threatened not  
8 to grant any further visas to Okelo or any other person to come,  
9 and I guess this is about - but I didn't even know that someone  
10:39:02 10 was in Liberia snooping around, or whatever he calls it.

11 Q. Was this report put together as a favour to you, Mr Taylor?

12 A. No, I doubt it. It could not have been a favour to me  
13 because if you look at it logically, this was a question as to  
14 the earnesty and the integrity of Mr Thomas. So it seems to me  
10:39:27 15 it was more of a danger to Thomas than it was to me. So no, it  
16 was not put together an as a favour to me. I wouldn't say that.

17 Q. Now I would like us to look at the third of the triumvirate  
18 of code cables referred to you in cross-examination in this  
19 regard. Please look behind divider 23. It's MFI-51. Now, in  
10:40:19 20 light of the suggestion made of partiality, let us look first of  
21 all at the frontispiece, which one needs to turn around in order  
22 to read properly. So if you could remove it, Mr Taylor. Do you  
23 have it?

24 A. Yes, do I.

10:40:39 25 Q. We see that this again is a code cable from Downes-Thomas  
26 to Prendergast. This one is dated September 1998, and it deals  
27 with the subject matter of the Camp Johnson Road incidents on 18  
28 September 1998 and subsequent developments, and it says:

29 "In our efforts to ensure that a report on the situation

1 mentioned above reached New York on 19 September, we had to work  
2 until 5.00 a.m. this morning. Consequently and regrettably, the  
3 report we sent yesterday has some omissions and errors. We are  
4 hereby resubmitting a report which supersedes and cancels the  
10:41:34 5 previous one. Please accept our apologies."

6 Now, Mr Taylor, was either you or a member of your staff up  
7 till 5.00 a.m. guiding Mr Downes-Thomas's hand?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Let's go over the page then, shall we. We know what the  
10:42:02 10 topic is so we can ignore the heading:

11 "Introductory background.

12 On 18 September 1998, at approximately 6.30 p.m., sounds of  
13 gunfire were heard at the Camp Johnson Road and its immediate  
14 vicinity. Subsequent assessment of the situation indicates that  
10:42:31 15 there was an exchange of gunfire between the supporters of  
16 Roosevelt Johnson and members of the Special Security Services  
17 (SSS). That exchange was apparently triggered by the entry of  
18 members of the SSS into a building which had been recently leased  
19 by the Government of Liberia at the junction of Perry Street and  
10:42:56 20 Camp Johnson Road. The SSS took over another building, on the  
21 corner of Camp Johnson Road and Benson Street, which was the  
22 former premise of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

23 The situation which ensued was reminiscent of the April 6,  
24 1996 crisis during which Roosevelt Johnson's supporters were in  
10:43:23 25 direct conflict with the government forces. The sound of gunfire  
26 drove thousands of panic-stricken residents of the Camp  
27 Johnson Road to the Bushrod Island and adjacent localities away  
28 from central Monrovia. The movement of trucks and other vehicles  
29 packed with heavily armed personnel gave a clear indication that

1 we were faced with a potentially explosive situation. *There was*  
2 *fear within the diplomatic community that Liberia was about to*  
3 *plunge itself into another internal conflict.*"

10:44:08 4 The words in italics, Mr Taylor, do you consider those to  
5 be flattering of Liberia?

6 A. No.

7 Q. And I ask in light, you see, of the suggestion that  
8 Mr Downes-Thomas is partial. You do follow, don't you?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10:44:22 10 Q. Paragraph 3:

11 "In the light of the above, and in an effort to assess the  
12 security situation and to contribute towards defusing tensions, I  
13 met separately today with Ambassador Francis Agyemfra of Ghana;  
14 the former vice chairman of the State Council and current  
10:44:46 15 chairman of National Reconciliation and Reunification Commission,  
16 Ms Victoria Refell; the charge d'affaires of the US embassy."

17 A. I think that vice chairmanship refers to Victoria Refell  
18 and the record will reflect it as though it is the charge.

19 Q. Right. So the current chairman of National Reconciliation  
10:45:19 20 and Reunification Commission, Ms Victoria Refell, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Separate person:

23 "... the charge d'affaires of the US embassy, John Bauman,  
24 President Taylor as well as jointly with Ambassador Agyemfra and  
10:45:39 25 the ECOMOG force commander, General Timothy Shelpidi."

26 Now, do you recall these meetings, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. "Meeting with the force commander of ECOMOG.

29 Prior to my meeting with the force commander of ECOMOG at

1 11.35 a.m. today, I telephoned the charge d'affaires of the US  
2 embassy, John Bauman, from the ECOMOG base to ascertain the  
3 prevailing situation at his end. I then informed him that I was  
4 proceeding to a meeting with the President, following  
10:46:20 5 consultations with the force commander of ECOMOG. According to  
6 Bauman, a considerable number of Liberians of the Krahn ethnic  
7 group had sought refuge which he could not offer without  
8 endangering the lives of embassy personnel. He therefore  
9 accommodated the refugee seekers in an area adjacent to the  
10:46:48 10 consular section of the embassy.

11 Since ECOMOG troops assigned to that area had withdrawn, he  
12 was left with no option but to rely on the cooperation of the  
13 director of the Liberia National Police, Joe Tate, who, according  
14 to Bauman, did an admirable job in separating the Liberian  
10:47:10 15 security forces from the Krahns who had converged in front of the  
16 American embassy that morning. However, Tate had to leave the  
17 scene when he received a call from the President. Thereafter  
18 'all hell broke loose'. Also according to Bauman, shooting  
19 started. It resulted in the death of Krahns and the wounding of  
10:47:35 20 two embassy personnel.

21 I asked him if he wanted to ask the President to send back  
22 Joe Tate and his men to the vicinity of the US embassy. His  
23 response was that, while the presence of security police in the  
24 outer parameters of the embassy would be desirable, he preferred  
10:47:57 25 ECOMOG to secure the inner security parameter of the US embassy,  
26 i.e. the area between the two checkpoints on Mamba Point ECOMOG.  
27 I advised the Liberian authorities and ECOMOG accordingly.

28 At 11.35 a.m. I had a joint meeting with the force  
29 commander of ECOMOG, the Ghanaian ambassador as well as with

1 senior staff of the ECOMOG high command. I informed them that I  
2 was about to meet President Taylor and would willingly convey to  
3 him any concerns they may wish to bring to the attention of the  
4 President. It was suggested that I advise the President that:

10:48:48 5 The SSS and the police should withdraw to their respective  
6 barracks, so that ECOMOG could provide security to the central  
7 part of Monrovia;

8 The police and the SSS should withdraw from the diplomatic  
9 enclave at Mamba Point, i.e. the US embassy and its immediate  
10:49:10 10 vicinity, and;

11 I should emphasise to the President that the problems  
12 relating to Krahn's cannot be solved militarily; peaceful methods  
13 should be pursued.

14 While I had no quarrel with proposals regarding the  
10:49:28 15 withdrawal of the Liberian security forces from the diplomatic  
16 enclave and the need to emphasise the importance of pursuing  
17 political solutions to the problems of Krahn's, I expressed my  
18 uneasiness with the request for the removal of all SSS and the  
19 LNP, Liberia National Police, from the entire central Monrovia.

10:49:53 20 Such a request, I pointed out, was bound to resurrect the old and  
21 troublesome debate over sovereignty and the role of the  
22 Government of Liberia in the maintenance of security. The force  
23 commander agreed with me that this issue might pose problems to  
24 the Government of Liberia. He amended his proposal by indicating  
10:50:16 25 he wished to see a return to the status quo as of 6.00 p.m. on 18  
26 September, i.e. that the Liberian security forces withdraw to  
27 positions they held at that time. He also took the opportunity  
28 to elaborate on the nature of the crisis and showed me a letter  
29 addressed to him by President Taylor requesting him to withdraw

1 the ECOMOG security detail attached to Roosevelt Johnson.

2 First meeting with President Taylor.

3 Following a 15 minute discussion with the chairman of  
4 Reconciliation and Reunification Commission, Victoria Refell, I  
10:51:04 5 met the President at his residence at 12.55 a.m."

6 Do you recall that meeting, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. "Also present were Mr Ernest Eastman, Minister of  
9 Presidential Affairs, Eddington Varma, Minister of Justice,  
10:51:24 10 Thomas Woveiyu, Minister of Labour, Mr Francois Massaquoi,  
11 Minister of Sports and Youth Affairs, Mr Benoni Urey,  
12 Commissioner of the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, Reginald  
13 Goodridge, Deputy Minister of Public Affairs, and the President's  
14 press secretary. I was accompanied by my political officer,  
10:51:51 15 Mr Gebremedhin Hagoss.

16 I conveyed to the President those concerns itemised in  
17 paragraph 7 above. He noted that, as far as he was concerned,  
18 there was no such thing as a Krahn problem. In his opinion, the  
19 prevailing problems were caused by certain individuals of the  
10:52:14 20 Krahn ethnic group who were bent on subverting the government.  
21 He indicated that his government was determined to solve the  
22 problem within a framework of its sovereign prerogatives. He  
23 pointed out that charges had already been levelled against those  
24 who had committed treason, murder and engaged in subversive  
10:52:40 25 activities. The President went on to say that the nation could  
26 not continue to be held hostage to the dictates of a few  
27 individuals whose sole intent was to create instability in the  
28 country. He said that he had no problems with the Krahns, and  
29 that many prominent Krahns including General Philip Kama continue

1 to ply the roads of Monrovia in safety and security."

2 Mr Taylor, is that a fair representation of the  
3 conversation you had with the special representative?

4 A. It is.

10:53:44 5 Q. Mr Munyard helpfully points out to me that if one goes back  
6 to page 2, paragraph 7, you see the time given there is  
7 11.35 a.m., yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And when we go over the page now to page 9, that says  
10:54:10 10 12.55 a.m., which would suggest - paragraph 9 - that it's in the  
11 middle of the night?

12 A. Yes, but that is true.

13 Q. So given the sequence of events it appears that this  
14 timing, the a.m. there is wrong and it should be p.m.

10:54:32 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Why don't we hear from the witness.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Because when we go to paragraph 17, we see  
17 that it's 2 p.m.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: But Mr Taylor is sitting right here. He  
19 had the meeting.

10:54:42 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Mr Taylor, what time was the meeting?

22 A. Well, the meeting with Downes-Thomas was in the night  
23 because we were up. This is after the fact. So this is about  
24 12.55 a.m. on the morning of the 19th.

10:55:00 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: So then it's correct.

26 THE WITNESS: It's correct. On the morning of the 19th.  
27 The fighting occurs on the 18th and they had discussions  
28 throughout the evening. 12.55 is the beginning of the 19th, that  
29 night. Night.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. So the meeting took place at night?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay. Well, I can thank Mr Munyard for misleading me.

10:55:37 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: The meeting with the force commander

6 occurred on the 19th also at 11.35 in the morning. The meeting

7 with the force commander occurred before yours.

8 THE WITNESS: Yes. He met with the forces commander before

9 he met with me. Let me see what time - I don't know when he met.

10:56:03 10 11.35 a.m. In my opinion, this 11.35 must be on the 18th. It

11 must be on the 18th. The fighting starts at 6 - early in the

12 morning.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. On which day?

10:56:33 15 A. The fighting starts really on the evening of the 17th and

16 goes into the 18th. All night we are at this, okay. So I don't

17 know why he says, "On September 18th at approximately 6 p.m."

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: But there is no problem if you look at

19 paragraph 4, in which he says, "Prior to my meeting with the

10:56:57 20 force commander at 11.35 a.m. today", and "today" meaning the

21 date of this code cable, which is 19th.

22 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: So on 19 September at 11.35 a.m. he meets

24 with the force commander.

10:57:11 25 THE WITNESS: Yes.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Now, later on that night, which would be

27 early morning of 20 September, 12 - at 12 --

28 THE WITNESS: 55 a.m.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: 12.55, he then meets with yourself, the

1 President.

2 THE WITNESS: Yes, that night.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: This would be on the 20th.

4 THE WITNESS: Of that night, yes.

10:57:34 5 JUDGE DOHERTY: Perhaps we could clarify, then, paragraph  
6 1, in the light of what Mr Taylor has said. Because it says the  
7 incident started at 6.30 p.m. of 18 September.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Is that correct, Mr Taylor?

10:57:51 10 A. The fighting did start in the evening.

11 Q. Let's see if we can - let's just pause for a minute. Let's  
12 pause for a minute and try and work out the sequence, okay?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Let's start with paragraph 1 as indicated by the learned  
10:58:15 15 Justice. 18 September 1998, 6.30 p.m. it starts; is that right,  
16 Mr Taylor?

17 A. From my calculations here, I think we are talking about  
18 18th, 19th and 20th, and the 20th --

19 Q. But my question was very simple, Mr Taylor. Did it start,  
10:58:37 20 as suggested in paragraph 1, at 6.30 p.m. on the 18th?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Now, the next time - paragraph 4, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "Meeting with the force commander, 11.35 a.m. today."  
10:58:56 25 "Today" --

26 A. That's the 19th.

27 Q. -- as the learned Justice pointed out, is the 19th?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Paragraph 7, right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. That's a repeat of the 11.35 meeting with the force

10:59:16 5 commander of ECOMOG, yes?

6 A. That's the 19th, yes.

7 Q. Over the page. Paragraph 9, "Met the President at his  
8 residence at 12.55 a.m.", yes?

9 A. Yes. That's the morning - the beginning day of the 20th.

10:59:35 10 Q. Well, let's go over the page. "At 2 p.m.", paragraph 17,  
11 "I met with the director of police at his residence", yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "At 2.35 p.m.", paragraph 18, "I met with Bauman", yes?

14 A. Yes.

10:59:57 15 Q. Paragraph 19, "At 3.07 p.m. telephoned Ernest Eastman",  
16 yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Paragraph 25, over the page, "Around 7.30 p.m., UNOL  
19 received information to the effect that armed Liberian national

11:00:22 20 enforcement officers were regrouping", and then "I met again with  
21 President Taylor in his residence at 8.00 p.m."?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So what's the sequence then?

24 A. This - based on these times, they all could have happened

11:00:41 25 on the 20th, okay? Because when you look at the beginning, which  
26 is 12.55, that's night. Day breaks, you're still dealing with  
27 the 20th, and it continues on. And all these meetings, while he  
28 does not state it, it is very clear here he is speaking about one  
29 day.

1 Q. Very well.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: There is a bit of confusion, because you  
3 see the front cover of this code cable reads "20 September".

4 MR GRIFFITHS: "5 a.m."

11:01:37 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Which is when the rough draft is sent on the  
7 20th. So it would appear that the events being described in the  
8 body of this document take place during the course of a day and  
9 they are in sequence. If one changes the "12.55" to p.m. as  
10 opposed to a.m., it makes sense.

11:01:57

11 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, the code cable itself a dated  
12 19 September.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: And the one before is 20 September.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: But then, you see, they stay up until 5 a.m.  
15 on the following morning to send it. I mean, we could spend  
16 forever on this and it's --

11:02:18

17 THE WITNESS: No, but if I may just interject. This code  
18 cable is dated on 20 September, not the 19th. It's 20 September.  
19 So all of the times that he is stating here, to me, looks like  
20 the 20th. It's not the 19th. Because he sends this cover - the  
21 cover of it at the front page puts the date now to the correction  
22 that he is making on the 20th. So this whole reflection is about  
23 this report is dated the 20th and not the 19th.

11:02:34

24 JUDGE DOHERTY: With respect, I think we have to read the  
25 body of this 20th to see - in our effort to ensure the report  
26 reached you on the 19th and this is the report of the 19th. I am  
27 not sure if a lot falls on it, but I think we are confusing  
28 ourselves even further.

11:02:56

29 JUDGE LUSSICK: If you send the report at 5 a.m. on the

1 20th from Liberia, it would get to New York on the 19th. That's  
2 what they are trying to say.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: In any event, I think the witness was  
4 here - I mean, was there. He is the one that sat in the meeting.

11:03:35 5 We will go by the evidence he gives.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

7 Q. Let's go back then, Mr Taylor, to - paragraph 11 we had  
8 reached. This is page 3:

9 "He", that being you, "also informed me that he intended to  
11:04:05 10 reach President Abubakar of Nigeria and confer with him on the  
11 modalities of ensuring ECOMOG's compliance with the sovereign  
12 directive of the Government of Liberia. In addition, he intended  
13 to keep OAU as well as ECOWAS apprised of the situation. He  
14 observed that Roosevelt Johnson was brought back to the country  
11:04:30 15 by certain forces that wished to implement a specific agenda.

16 Pointing out that ECOMOG high command was to have relocated to  
17 Sierra Leone and that a few ECOMOG battalions were to be left  
18 behind and led by a colonel, he wondered why so many ECOMOG  
19 troops were patrolling the streets. He also referred to his  
11:04:58 20 confrontational meeting with Shelpidi on 18 September, and  
21 admitted to me that he had to abruptly end his meeting with the  
22 force commander, who, President Taylor explained, did not seem to  
23 be co-operative and appeared unaware of the understanding between  
24 President Abubakar of Nigeria and Taylor regarding the status of  
11:05:22 25 ECOMOG in Liberia."

26 Mr Taylor, had you had such an exchange with Shelpidi?

27 A. Oh, yes.

28 Q. "He emphasised that his government was duly elected and  
29 consequently responsible for the security of its citizens. That,

1 he maintained, was something which the US must accept. He  
2 acknowledged that it was indeed the responsibility of his  
3 government to address anything untoward regarding events and  
4 activities that took place outside the premises of the embassy.

11:05:59 5 In this connection, he stated that the US should understand that  
6 war and military confrontation have never been tidy. He  
7 stressed, however, that he would want to know not only what  
8 happened inside the embassy, but to also have a full account  
9 regarding the number and identity of those Liberians who were  
11:06:22 10 granted refuge within the US embassy. Alluding to the departure  
11 of Police Director Joe Tate from the vicinity of the American  
12 embassy, he made it clear that he wanted to avoid any mistakes on  
13 the part of law enforcement personnel regarding the inviolability  
14 of the premises of foreign embassies. It was that consideration,  
11:06:47 15 he explained, that led to his call for Joe Tate."

16 Is that an accurate reflection of your conversation,  
17 Mr Taylor?

18 A. Very accurate. That is correct, yes.

19 Q. "President Taylor made it clear that he would want the  
11:07:06 20 United States to hand over to him or to his government any  
21 Liberian who had been granted refuge within the precincts of the  
22 embassy, so that, if necessary, the national law would take its  
23 course. He gave assurances that, once individuals were handed  
24 over to the Government of Liberia, there would be complete  
11:07:30 25 transparency with regard to their legal and personal situation  
26 during their custody. He similarly emphasised that the  
27 individual rights of such individuals would be safeguarded.

28 In response to my query as to whether or not the government  
29 was ready to take custody of Roosevelt Johnson, he informed me

1 that Mr Johnson suffers from a heart problem and was therefore  
2 reluctant to have an 'Abiola situation' on his hands."

3 What's an Abiola situation?

4 A. Mr Abiola was the former elected President - at least  
11:08:13 5 claimed to have had been elected President of Nigeria that was  
6 arrested after the electoral process and incarcerated, but died  
7 in jail in Nigeria before the issue was resolved.

8 Q. "The President made it known that he was aware that through  
9 ECOMOG, Roosevelt Johnson and his supporters were in possession  
11:08:36 10 of significant quantities of arms, including those that were  
11 uncovered in the cemetery of central Monrovia. It was this fact  
12 that enabled Roosevelt Johnson supporters to put up a ten-hour  
13 fight.

14 The President also informed me about his plan to address  
11:08:56 15 the nation on the current state of affairs in Liberia later in  
16 the afternoon today.

17 Meeting with the Director of Liberia National Police.

18 At 2.00 p.m., I met with the Director of Police at his  
19 residence to obtain firsthand information about the security  
11:09:14 20 situation around the environs of the US embassy. He updated me  
21 on the current situation and confirmed the information provided  
22 in paragraph 1 above.

23 At 2.35 p.m. I met where Bauman, charge d'affaires US  
24 mission; Rudy Thomas, Director of USAID; and other members of the  
11:09:37 25 US embassy. The embassy staff were all in combat gear - crash  
26 helmets, bulletproof vests. They also carried handguns. Bauman  
27 informed me that prominent Krahns: Namely, Roosevelt Johnson;  
28 George Duweh, the former member of the Transitional Assembly and  
29 a close confident of Roosevelt Johnson; Amos Lincoln, former

1 general of the defunct ULIMO-J, and Deputy Minister of Rural  
2 Development; and two sons of Roosevelt Johnson were in the  
3 custody of the embassy. John Bauman also informed me about his  
4 immediate interest; the evacuation to Sierra Leone, via  
11:10:21 5 helicopter, of some non-essential staff. He was afraid, however,  
6 that the helicopters would be shot at on the erroneous assumption  
7 that they were ferrying abroad Roosevelt Johnson and some of his  
8 supporters. I advised him that he would be useful to seek  
9 clearance and assurance directly from President Taylor. He made  
11:10:45 10 telephone calls accordingly."

11 Did you receive those calls, Mr Taylor?

12 A. The Minister of State did. I did not.

13 Q. The Minister of State did?

14 A. That is correct.

11:10:54 15 Q. And what was the request being made?

16 A. For just assistance for non-essential staff of the US  
17 embassy to be lifted to Freetown. And the minister got my  
18 approval, and I said we were not at war with the United States  
19 and they could leave.

11:11:15 20 Q. So this is an accurate statement then, is it?

21 A. It is.

22 Q. "At 3.07 p.m., at the request of Bauman and from the US  
23 embassy, I telephoned Honourable Ernest Eastman, Minister of  
24 State For Presidential Affairs, to support Bauman's request and  
11:11:33 25 to provide assurances that I would ensure that only embassy  
26 personnel, not refuge seekers, board the helicopters destined for  
27 Sierra Leone. I also alerted Eastman of the need for the  
28 Government of Liberia to consider the arrangement that would have  
29 to be in place to effect the handover of Liberians in the custody

1 of the US embassy, since Bauman had reacted rather favourably to  
2 the prospect of handing over those particular Liberians to their  
3 government.

4 I then briefed John Bauman about my meeting with  
11:12:17 5 President Taylor, emphasising that Taylor wished that I convey  
6 his strong determination to respect the inviolability of the  
7 embassy premises at all times. I also informed him that the  
8 President would like the US to be reassured that any individual  
9 turned over to his government would be treated fairly and in  
11:12:38 10 accordance with the law. In this connection, I also informed him  
11 about President Taylor's apprehensions and conditions regarding  
12 government custody of Roosevelt Johnson.

13 Bauman informed me that he had just been in touch with the  
14 State Department. He specifically said that he had talked to  
11:12:59 15 Vicky Huddleston, Assistant Secretary of State for African  
16 Affairs, and Ambassador Howard Jetter, who in turn were in touch  
17 with Madeline Albright. They were of the view that the handover  
18 of Roosevelt Johnson to the Liberian authorities carried the  
19 possibility that he might be killed in the process. I reiterated  
11:13:23 20 that President Taylor had himself expressed certain reservations  
21 and conditions about accepting custody of Roosevelt Johnson.

22 Bauman expressed the view that Taylor would be better served if  
23 ECOMOG could take charge of these individuals, take them or  
24 rather evacuate to a faraway country to be exiled and thereby  
11:13:49 25 would not pose a security threat to the Government of Liberia.

26 I stated clearly and somewhat categorically that the United  
27 Nations could not be associated with any process or activity  
28 related to the exile of any citizen. Furthermore, UNOL was in no  
29 position to take custody of anybody. Reacting to the position I

1 had just taken, he pointed out that the idea of 'exile to a  
2 faraway country' was a counter proposal to the one I had  
3 proffered regarding the government's desire to take custody of  
4 Liberians that were now in the hands of the embassy. To that, I  
11:14:35 5 simply reiterated my position.

6 Following another telephone call, Bauman informed me that  
7 Washington had decided that its counter proposal would be  
8 presented to President Taylor by Jesse Jackson. I advised him  
9 that I interpreted that piece of information to also mean that I  
11:14:58 10 should forthwith refrain from formally conveying to

11 President Taylor any US suggestions or proposals. He confirmed  
12 that my understanding was correct. He, however, asked me whether  
13 the United Nations could take part, along with ECOMOG, in the  
14 predetermined evacuation of these individuals. I told Bauman

11:15:25 15 that I was not in a position to undertake this responsibility, as  
16 I did not even have the opportunity to secure the directives of  
17 my headquarters on this entire delicate issue. In any case, I  
18 informed him that his government should continue to use the  
19 Jesse Jackson channel to advance whatever proposal the US  
11:15:49 20 government might have and that I would essentially be out of the  
21 loop once Jesse Jackson commenced his contact with  
22 President Taylor. I nevertheless assured him of my availability,  
23 in the event that UNOL's good offices could be of any use to the  
24 embassy.

11:16:07 25 John Bauman informed me that Madison Wion, a close  
26 confidant of Roosevelt Johnson, was killed just outside the gate  
27 of the embassy. He also wanted me to have a discussion with the  
28 Krahn leaders who were in the embassy. I declined that  
29 invitation. However, on my way out of the embassy I greeted

1 them, confirming that they numbered five persons.

2 Second meeting with President Taylor.

3 Around 7.30 p.m. UNOL received information to the effect  
4 that armed Liberian national enforcement officers were regrouping  
11:16:47 5 to storm the American embassy in an effort to secure the release  
6 therefrom of Roosevelt Johnson. I therefore met again with  
7 President Taylor in his residence at 8.00 p.m. He reassured me  
8 that there was no truth to that information and that he had given  
9 orders to all concerned to stay away from the American embassy.

11:17:09 10 I also took this opportunity to inform the President about  
11 my meeting with US embassy officials and about their response to  
12 the views he had shared with me during our midday meeting.

13 Concerning the envisaged role of Jesse Jackson, the President  
14 indicated that he would talk to Jesse Jackson as a friend. He  
11:17:31 15 was, however, not ready to engage in any protracted negotiations  
16 with Reverend Jackson on the handover of Liberians who had sought  
17 refuge in the American embassy. He went on to state that such  
18 matters remain exclusively within the purview of the Attorney  
19 General; not the presidency. He was emphatic in his point of  
11:17:56 20 view that laws and procedures of Liberia should prevail. He  
21 advised that the Government of Liberia will pursue those charged  
22 with treason, murder and participation in subversive activities.  
23 He also stated that the Government of Liberia would insist that  
24 those individuals be tried in Liberia and under Liberian laws.

11:18:23 25 He also observed that any attempt to evacuate Roosevelt  
26 Johnson surreptitiously would be fraught with danger. As far as  
27 he was concerned, a writ had been issued for the arrest of  
28 Roosevelt Johnson on appropriate charges. Johnson was therefore,  
29 at this moment, a fugitive from justice. He would so inform the

1 USA. He was certain, however, that there was no way in which  
2 Johnson could be whisked out of Liberia on a fixed winged  
3 aircraft. It would be disastrous, he asserted, if Roosevelt  
4 Johnson were to be transferred to Sierra Leone or to any country  
11:19:09 5 within the sub-region.

6 At this point Ernest Eastman informed President Taylor that  
7 he had received a call from Howard Jetter regarding the disposal  
8 of the remains of Madison Wion. The Minister of Presidential  
9 Affairs also reported that Jetter proposed that the remains of  
11:19:35 10 Wion be handed over to the Government of Liberia. The President  
11 stated categorically that that was a non-starter. As far as he  
12 was concerned, he had yet to officially learn that Madison Wion  
13 was dead. He went on to say that, even if such information was  
14 provided officially, he would want to know, among other things,  
11:20:02 15 the circumstances surrounding Wion's death. In this connection,  
16 clear information should be provided as to whether Wion was  
17 killed inside or outside of the American embassy. In any case,  
18 the President continued, there was need for an explanation as to  
19 how Wion's body found its way into the embassy. If Wion was  
11:20:27 20 dead, the President asked rhetorically, who - what institution or  
21 government - would be responsible for announcing his death?

22 During the early part of the evening, Monrovia remained  
23 relatively calm. Government security forces and ECOMOG troops  
24 were seen conducting joint patrols. It appears that a  
11:20:51 25 catastrophe of high magnitude was averted. It remains to be seen  
26 whether an early solution could be found for the complicated  
27 problem of the Krahn leaders, who are currently in the custody of  
28 the US embassy. It does not appear likely that the US will be  
29 willing to hand over Roosevelt Johnson to the Liberian

1 authorities. In the event that an agreement is reached on the  
2 evacuation of Roosevelt Johnson, it will be useful to ensure  
3 that, for the stability of the sub-region, he is evacuated to a  
4 country far removed from the ECOWAS sub-region."

11:21:34 5 Now, Mr Taylor, we have gone through that narrative. Do  
6 you agree with the account given?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Is it an accurate reflection of the events which took place  
9 over those days in Monrovia?

11:21:58 10 A. Yes, it is.

11 Q. The conversations conducted with you by the special  
12 representative, do you agree with their content?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. Did you have any part to play in the compilation of this  
11:22:15 15 narrative, Mr Taylor?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Now, in general terms, Mr Taylor, what access did the  
18 special representative have to, let's say, first of all, you?

19 A. Well, he had access - I would say free access depending on  
11:22:42 20 the, one, nature of the situation on the ground as it would be,  
21 and, two, if there was, you know, an urgent need to see me. It  
22 was not like he could just march in anytime. It would have to be  
23 timed and he had to give some explanation as to why he needed me  
24 specifically, to see me specifically, or whether he could have  
11:23:07 25 seen another official of the government.

26 Q. And that's the second part of the question. What access  
27 would the special representative have to other officials within  
28 your administration?

29 A. I would say practical unfettered access. For example, the

1 Foreign Minister and other agencies of government, I would  
2 probably say unfettered access. The President, a little  
3 different.

11:23:44 4 Q. And also, Mr Taylor, was there any obstacle or hindrance to  
5 Mr Downes-Thomas meeting with, for example, Liberian journalists  
6 like Mr Hassan Bility?

7 A. No, no, no.

8 Q. Or was there anything to prevent him from meeting with  
9 members of civil society?

11:24:00 10 A. No.

11 Q. That's all I want to ask you about on that topic,  
12 Mr Taylor. But let's not move that bundle away just yet, please.  
13 Could we now, please, on a different issue, look behind divider  
14 15. This is MFI-371B. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

11:25:04 15 A. Yes, I do have it.

16 Q. Now, as we see, this is an extract, page 105, from a book  
17 entitled "ECOMOG: A sub-regional experience in conflict  
18 resolution, management and peacekeeping, Liberia". Mr Taylor,  
19 when is the first time you saw this work?

11:25:33 20 A. During my trial here. This was apparently one of the  
21 documents - I could be wrong, but it looks like one of the  
22 documents containing those 14 plus folders over the Christmas  
23 holiday.

24 Q. Prior to then, had you been aware of the existence of this  
11:25:51 25 work?

26 A. No, I had never been aware. No.

27 Q. As far as you are aware, Mr Taylor, was any member of your  
28 government consulted before the writing of this work, do you  
29 know?

1 A. I don't.

2 Q. Let's go to page 105, which was put to you. Do you have  
3 it?

4 A. Yes, I do.

11:26:32 5 Q. I am looking at the second half of the page, okay?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, you will note the period we are dealing with,  
8 Mr Taylor. It's 1992, yes?

9 A. That is correct.

11:26:45 10 Q. "Operation Octopus, October 1992.

11 The peace process was to take a further dive in late 1992.  
12 Especially in September 1992, the NPFL received large shipments  
13 of weapons and equipment including four tanks, 20 armoured  
14 personnel carriers, tonnes of artillery pieces, anti-aircraft  
15 missiles, small arms and a number of French, as well as African  
16 mercenaries by both sea and air."

11:27:24

17 Mr Taylor, did the NPFL have such weaponry at their  
18 disposal?

19 A. No, no.

11:27:54

20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall during the course of the  
21 Prosecution case evidence regarding a tank which had been  
22 captured by the RUF which they were seeking to transport, we are  
23 told, to Liberia; do you recall that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

11:28:15

25 Q. Which sank in a river; do you recall that?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, at any stage in the Liberian conflict, did  
28 the NPFL have access to tanks?

29 A. Not one, no.

1 Q. What about armoured personnel carriers?

2 A. Not one, no.

3 Q. What about anti-aircraft missiles?

4 A. Not at all.

11:28:59 5 Q. Were you ever assisted by French mercenaries?

6 A. Never, never.

7 Q. What about mercenaries from other African countries?

8 A. No. Now, again, it depends, I don't want it to be said  
9 later that you said - there were other West Africans, but they  
11:29:28 10 were not mercenaries. We have talked about the Gambians and I  
11 have told this Court that the Gios from La Cote d'Ivoire, there  
12 were other nationals, but in the true sense of the meaning of  
13 mercenaries, one coming in to fight for money and/or other  
14 things, no.

11:29:48 15 Q. Now, help us with one other matter --

16 I don't know how much time I have left, Madam President. I  
17 can't conclude it in one minute.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Then I propose that this is an  
19 appropriate place to break. We shall reconvene at 12.

11:30:10 20 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

21 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Mr Taylor, we were looking at the document behind divider  
24 15 when we adjourned for our morning break, MFI-371B. It's page  
12:02:22 25 105.

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Now, before we continue to look at this paragraph,  
28 Mr Taylor, can you help us with this: In or about September  
29 1992, how much of Liberia did the NPFL control?

1 A. I would say about 75 per cent.

2 Q. Help me with this: How many ports are there in Liberia?

3 A. There are four.

4 Q. What are they?

12:03:12 5 A. The Freeport of Monrovia, the Port of Buchanan, the Port of  
6 Greenville, Sinoe County.

7 Q. So the Freeport?

8 A. And the fourth is the port at Maryland County.

9 Q. So Freeport, Buchanan, Greenville?

12:03:36 10 A. That is correct. And Harper, Maryland, the fourth.

11 Q. What's it called?

12 A. Harper. H-A-R-P-E-R.

13 Q. Now, by September 1992, which if any of those ports did the  
14 NPFL control?

12:03:59 15 A. Three of them. The NPFL controlled the Port of Buchanan,  
16 Greenville and Harper.

17 Q. So Buchanan, Greenville and Harper. What about the  
18 Freeport?

19 A. That was controlled by ECOMOG.

12:04:14 20 Q. Right. Now, Mr Taylor, did you receive these shipments of  
21 arms through any of those ports?

22 A. No. Never received through any of those ports. Neither  
23 did we receive the shipment.

24 Q. Now, before we go any further, help me with some other  
12:04:41 25 details. Operation Octopus was what?

26 A. Operation Octopus was the operation launched by the NPFL to  
27 finally take over the City of Monrovia and end the civil crisis.

28 Q. Who designed Operation Octopus?

29 A. The military establishment of the NPFL designed and

1 selected that code name.

2 Q. What role did you play in the design of the operation, if  
3 any?

4 A. In the design, none. In the approval I did.

12:05:35 5 Q. And was it anticipated, Mr Taylor, that there would be huge  
6 loss of life as a result of the operation?

7 A. No, not at all. Because - no, not at all. This was a  
8 military operation against another military force and so we did  
9 not envisage any large loss of civilian life, no.

12:06:04 10 Q. But a military operation in an urban environment, Monrovia,  
11 crowded with refugees. Is that right?

12 A. Oh, yes.

13 Q. So let me ask you the question again: What were the  
14 anticipated consequences for the civilian population?

12:06:25 15 A. We did not anticipate that because ECOMOG - while ECOMOG  
16 was in Monrovia the military bases of ECOMOG were not  
17 specifically stationed in the city centre. ECOMOG formed a ring  
18 on the outer skirts of Monrovia and these were the bases that we  
19 were attacking and not trying to move into the main city. We  
12:06:49 20 figured that by weakening ECOMOG, then we could move in.

21 Q. Did this onslaught involve artillery bombardment?

22 A. Yes, there were artillery, yes.

23 Q. Bombardment of what?

24 A. Of ECOMOG positions, ECOMOG bases.

12:07:17 25 Q. And to what extent did you personally monitor the progress  
26 of that operation, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Oh, I monitored it. There were reports several times a  
28 day. I monitored it and wanted to know. The military chief of  
29 staff and other people brought - the Defence Minister brought

1 reports to me about the progress.

2 Q. And from where did you monitor it?

3 A. By this time I was in Gbarnga.

4 Q. The operation was a failure, was it not?

12:07:58 5 A. Well, I'm not sure I can say yes. It succeeded in finally  
6 bringing ECOMOG to the realisation that only through negotiations  
7 this matter would have ended, and that, quote unquote, they were  
8 going to flush us out of Liberia would not happen.

9 Q. But was the operation launched to bring ECOMOG to the  
12:08:36 10 negotiation table, or was it launched to secure a military  
11 victory?

12 A. Quite frankly, it was launched to secure a military  
13 victory.

14 Q. Let's go back to this now then, shall we:

12:08:53 15 "All these were in serious violation of the ECOWAS peace  
16 plan. They were made possible by the fact that enforcing the sea  
17 and air blockade was difficult for a force that did not have  
18 enough naval and air assets. Even though it appears to have been  
19 an exaggeration, it was reported that Taylor had mobilised about  
12:09:17 20 70,000 fighters for an offensive. 20,000 of them were positioned  
21 in the INPFL's Caldwell base and another 6,000 in other areas in  
22 a noose around Monrovia. The NPFL maintained pinprick attacks on  
23 ECOMOG that led to the major attack on ECOMOG positions in  
24 Brewerville on 2 October 1992, coinciding with the relief of  
12:09:52 25 Major General Bakut by Major General Al Olurin. On this occasion  
26 the NPFL was pursuing ULIMO fighters when they suddenly changed  
27 their direction and attacked ECOMOG troops. The INPFL, a faction  
28 of it, was believed to have been involved in this attack that  
29 left 56 NPFL and three Nigerians killed. ECOMOG responded by

1 issuing a 'no fly' order to search all aircraft entering Liberian  
2 airspace, while the NPFL declared war on ECOMOG, which had seized  
3 the Sea Rose, a German ship believed to be ferrying supplies to  
4 Gbarnga."

12:10:40 5 The Sea Rose, Mr Taylor, what do you know about that  
6 seizure?

7 A. I know the - yes, I know about the Sea Rose. In fact the  
8 Sea Rose I think was a Firestone ship. It was not an NPFL ship.

9 Q. What was the cargo?

12:10:55 10 A. I really don't know what was on that ship because the Sea  
11 Rose normally came to Liberia empty to pick up rubber for  
12 Firestone to transport it to the United States. And I want to  
13 believe if anything was on that ship they would have said. There  
14 was nothing. It was just like what this piece is. If you look

12:11:15 15 at, for example, counsel, the 20 armoured personnel carriers and  
16 four tanks in '92, that does not show up in '96, '97 at  
17 disarmament. It's similar to some of this thing about "believed  
18 to be ferrying". There is nothing factual about this entire  
19 piece. Where would these tanks and armoured carriers be in 1996

12:11:38 20 and 1997 when disarmament is going on? So I'm just trying to say  
21 when you look at this piece about the Sea Rose and "believed to  
22 be ferrying arms", it's just - this thing is as journalistic as  
23 it comes. There's nothing factual about it. There's nothing on  
24 that ship, it is a Firestone rubber ship that came to pick up  
12:11:59 25 rubber. They stopped the ship, we understand, they searched it  
26 and the ship went. If there was anything on that ship he would  
27 have said they seized this, this and this. This is just  
28 journalistic writing.

29 Q. So what do you say about the accuracy of these references

1 in this book, Mr Taylor?

2 A. I haven't gone through the entire book, but as I'm going  
3 through this I will give it a very, very poor grade. If you look  
4 at the two paragraphs, I can only give a fair judgment on it -

12:12:35 5 the paragraphs - it looks like one here that you've read. This I  
6 will give it maybe 10 per cent. There are not 70,000 NPFL

7 fighters. There are no tanks. There are no armoured personnel  
8 carriers. There is no German ship coming, you know, to bring

9 supplies to Gbarnga, so I give it 10 per cent. This is - I don't

12:13:01 10 know - maybe someone trying to make a name in writing, but

11 there's nothing in this entire paragraph that is factual except  
12 for the fact that, yes, there is an operation called Octopus and  
13 it is factual that General Bakut is the forces commander at the  
14 time. But all this other stuff here, even about 56 NPFL and

12:13:25 15 three, this is all nonsense. Nothing factual. I mean, these  
16 tanks would not have disappeared into thin air. We saw the UN

17 reports here, for example, in this courtroom of the report of the  
18 UN disarmament in Liberia. There's not one tank reported. Where  
19 did these tanks go to? Where did this armoured personnel carrier

12:13:45 20 go to? I will give it 10 per cent.

21 Q. I want us to look now, please, at another page of this book  
22 which was referred to during the course of your

23 cross-examination. It's to be found behind divider 19. It's  
24 MFI-371D. Do we have it?

12:14:39 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Page 270?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. I would like us to begin, please, three lines into the  
29 second paragraph:

1 "Besides soliciting for international assistance, ECOWAS  
2 decided that the cost of retention of ECOMOG in post-war Liberia  
3 was to be borne by the Government of Liberia. This decision was  
4 curiously intriguing considering that the government of President  
12:15:10 5 Charles Taylor was bequeathed with a domestic debt of  
6 \$200 million and an external debt of more than \$2 billion."

7 Now, Mr Taylor, first of all, did ECOWAS decide that the  
8 cost of maintaining ECOMOG troops in post-election Liberia was to  
9 be met by the Liberian government?

12:15:35 10 A. Well, they did not decide. There were discussions  
11 underway, generally, as to who would pay for it. There were  
12 suggestions, but there was no decision.

13 Q. The second part of the passage I've just read, did your  
14 government upon taking power have a domestic debt of \$200 million  
12:16:09 15 and an external debt of more than \$2 billion?

16 A. Yes, that's - while it's not on the button, but that's  
17 fairly true.

18 Q. Now, going back to the first question I asked in relation  
19 to this passage then, help us. Who in the end ended up paying  
12:16:33 20 for the ECOMOG forces stationed in Liberia?

21 A. The individual contributing countries, especially, for  
22 example, like Nigeria. Nigeria bore most of the burden. On the  
23 part of some of the other regional countries, the United States  
24 and other interested parties of the international community  
12:17:00 25 helped those governments in maintaining their troops. Ghana, for  
26 example, I understand - and I could be wrong about that - I  
27 understand that Ghana was assisted by the United States in  
28 providing military services during this period.

29 Q. "Under such economic strain, ECOWAS was obviously asking

1 too much of a government which could have explored other  
2 alternatives for securing its own national peace and security  
3 with or without difficulties.

4 As time went on, however, it became apparent that Major  
12:17:45 5 General Malu's intent was running at cross-purposes with the  
6 desires, intentions and projections of President Charles Taylor,  
7 a situation that sometimes resulted in unpleasant indirect  
8 exchanges."

9 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

12:18:05 10 A. I would say yes.

11 Q. So we can tick that particular box then, yes?

12 A. Yes. Indirect exchanges, yes. Yes.

13 Q. "The force commander was seriously disturbed that following  
14 the visit of President Taylor to South Africa in late 1997, the  
12:18:27 15 President was reported to have returned with a consignment of  
16 arms and ammunition of which ECOMOG should have been officially  
17 informed before they were quickly removed from the Freeport. At  
18 the same time, Nigerians in Liberia, including Nigerian ECOMOG  
19 troops, were being increasingly maltreated by Liberians. There  
12:18:54 20 is indeed no love lost between the President and the force  
21 commander. Besides insisting on his prerogative of determining  
22 his own sovereign defence and security needs and arrangements,  
23 the President accused the force commander of usurping his powers,  
24 and to that end, charged that there could not be two parallel  
12:19:17 25 powers in Liberia, the President and the force commander."

26 Now, first of all, Mr Taylor, this is a suggestion which  
27 has been made to you in cross-examination, that your visit to  
28 South Africa in late 1997 - and do you agree that you visited  
29 South Africa in late 1997?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. Did you return with a consignment of arms and ammunition?

3 A. No, I did not.

12:20:05

4 Q. In late 1997, Mr Taylor, what was the extent of the ECOMOG  
5 presence in Liberia?

12:20:36

6 A. Specifically in dealing with your question and year, since  
7 ECOMOG arrived in Liberia in 1990 they maintained full control of  
8 the Freeport of Monrovia. Never relinquished that control. So  
9 to say at this particular time that ECOMOG - that arms are being  
10 brought into the Freeport - the navy of ECOMOG is based there.

12:20:58

11 The military - there is not one person. Even through my  
12 presidency, ECOMOG was deployed fully in Monrovia and its  
13 environs by this time, directly to your question. So this is  
14 total nonsense that someone could have brought a shipload of arms  
15 into the Freeport that ECOMOG - the navy of Nigeria is running  
16 this port. It's totally, totally crazy here. It's not possible.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you will note that the passage reads, "The  
18 President was reported." Now, did you hear such reports?

12:21:26

19 A. I never heard it. Neither was I contacted. Never heard  
20 about this so-called report of bringing arms. No, never heard  
21 it. And Malu never raised it with me directly or indirectly.

22 Q. I was coming to that. Did Malu, for example, present you  
23 with any intelligence, proof, evidence, anything like that of the  
24 shipment?

12:21:48

25 A. Never. So help me God, never. Malu never discussed this  
26 with me.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we looked at a document yesterday which  
28 spoke of ECOMOG manning checkpoints on the routes leading into  
29 Monrovia, yes?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. And I was correctly reminded that at some stage ECOMOG  
3 handed over control of those checkpoints to Liberian security  
4 forces.

12:22:20 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. When did that handover take place?

7 A. That's beginning '98. As they drew down, they turned over.  
8 As they drew down. By this time in question, late 1997, they are  
9 still in control of those points. Only as they begin to withdraw

12:22:40 10 to Sierra Leone that those checkpoints are beginning to be turned  
11 over.

12 Q. And they withdraw down to Sierra Leone at what time,  
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. That withdrawal started in 1998. I would say about the  
12:22:54 15 second half of 1998 there's this drawdown beginning.

16 Q. Now, is the Freeport actually located in Monrovia or is it  
17 outside Monrovia?

18 A. The Freeport is located - well, it's considered a suburb of  
19 Monrovia. It's not in the main city. It's located on Bushrod  
12:23:27 20 Island. It's considered a part of Monrovia. It's the main  
21 island that connects Monrovia.

22 Q. Now, the other matter that I want to ask you about in  
23 relation to this paragraph is this: Under the terms of ECOMOG  
24 being stationed in Liberia, following your election, would you  
12:23:53 25 have to inform ECOMOG if you as President of Liberia decided to  
26 purchase and import arms and ammunition?

27 A. No. Those were not the terms, no.

28 Q. Because you will see that it says here:

29 "The President was reported to have returned with a

1 consignment of arms and ammunition of which ECOMOG should have  
2 been officially informed before they were quickly removed from  
3 the Freeport."

4 Yes?

12:24:29 5 A. Yes, I see that.

6 Q. Was there such a requirement placed on the Liberian  
7 government?

8 A. No. Maybe in their heads. No, there were no such  
9 requirements.

12:24:45 10 Q. Now, furthermore, Mr Taylor, the passage goes on to suggest  
11 tensions between Liberians and Nigerian ECOMOG troops. Is that  
12 true?

13 A. That is true.

14 Q. How did that tension manifest itself?

12:25:05 15 A. You know, during the conflict, before the NPFL and myself  
16 move into Monrovia, ECOMOG is in Monrovia. The Liberian  
17 citizens, ordinary citizens, complained seriously about the  
18 treatment that ECOMOG meted out to ordinary citizens. At  
19 checkpoints they would beat the people, they would take away  
12:25:30 20 their items, they would - I mean, they were wild. So when the  
21 election occurred and - and Liberians always knew - I was the  
22 person that always talked about the sovereign rights of Liberians  
23 in their country. Upon taking the oath of office, Liberians saw  
24 a opportunity to really dealing with this problem and reducing  
12:25:58 25 this unruly behaviour on part of ECOMOG troops, and so Liberians  
26 were really, really angry. Ordinary citizens that wanted them to  
27 be removed from the checkpoints, they were just tired and  
28 remembered in their heads what the Nigerians had done to them and  
29 were bitter. This is true.

1 Q. Now, before we go to the last part paragraph on that page,  
2 can you help me with this: General Victor Malu, when did he  
3 arrive in Liberia, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Oh, I --

12:26:43 5 Q. This is 1997 remember we're talking about here. So when  
6 had he arrived?

7 A. General Malu, if I'm not mistaken, arrived I would say  
8 about the second half of 1996, just before we begin this whole  
9 process of disarmament, you know, he arrived to take control of  
12:27:10 10 that particular situation.

11 Q. Because when we go on then, we see:

12 "Matters came to a head as President Taylor called for the  
13 replacement of Major General Malu, a request that was quickly and  
14 suddenly effected on 8 January 1998. General Malu did not hide  
12:27:33 15 his feelings when at his farewell parade at ECOMOG HQ he  
16 indicated that, 'I thought we could all finish the job and leave  
17 together, but I am sad to be leaving suddenly.' He was replaced  
18 by Major General Timothy Shelpidi."

19 So putting that together then, you've told us Malu arrives  
12:28:00 20 sometime in 1996.

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And he leaves at the beginning of 1998.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. So he was there for a period of roughly how long?

12:28:12 25 A. I would say Malu was in Liberia for about a year and a few  
26 months.

27 Q. Now, throughout that period, Mr Taylor, was the  
28 relationship as antagonistic as suggested by these paragraphs  
29 here we've been looking at?

1 A. Not the entire time, no. I would - I actually liked  
2 General Malu. I think he was a no-nonsense general and, quite  
3 frankly, General Malu did a beautiful job. But he was placed in  
4 a very, very terrible position and I think he just became the  
12:28:53 5 whipping boy. Because the conflict arose when Malu had to  
6 receive instructions to recruit Liberians to fight in Sierra  
7 Leone. I was opposed to that. So he had to do what he was  
8 instructed from his head office and so I was putting the pressure  
9 on him to stop and he was getting instructions and someone was  
12:29:18 10 hiding his hand who was giving the instructions to Malu and I  
11 just think that he was just unfortunate. And so after he did his  
12 job by creating the Kamajors and helping and arming them and  
13 using Liberians, when the pressure mounted the fastest and safest  
14 thing that Abacha could do when I insisted that it was  
12:29:41 15 unacceptable was to remove Malu. So I think he was just the fall  
16 guy. I still think that Malu was a very effective general.  
17 Q. So help us then. Who was the Nigerian President at the  
18 time?  
19 A. Abacha. Sani Abacha was President.  
12:30:01 20 Q. So where it says here at the beginning of this paragraph,  
21 "Matters came to a head as President Taylor called for the  
22 replacement," did you call for the replacement of Malu?  
23 A. Yes, I did ask General Abacha to remove General Malu if  
24 General Malu felt that he could not do what was expected of him  
12:30:27 25 in Liberia as a sovereign country by ECOWAS. I asked him to  
26 withdraw him.  
27 Q. What was your reason for making that request to President  
28 Abacha?  
29 A. General Malu was very bold and very abrasive. I mean, we

1 did not have any direct confrontation but indirectly Malu, being  
2 used to behaving and performing in certain ways prior to the  
3 election and probably never got in his head that he had to change  
4 and he was quite, you know, an abrasive general, and I'm equally  
12:31:10 5 hard headed person too, and so I was determined, like I said  
6 here, there would not be any co-President in Liberia. So there  
7 was a stalemate, but it was just because of his abrasiveness and  
8 I guess his willingness to carry out orders that were given him  
9 by the then President of Nigeria.

12:31:34 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm just seeking  
11 clarification. When the witness says that Malu had to receive  
12 instructions to recruit Liberians to fight in Sierra Leone, these  
13 were instructions emanating from who?

14 THE WITNESS: I would believe they came from General  
12:31:50 15 Abacha. In order to strengthen - to develop the Kamajors,  
16 because the Kamajors were developed, your Honour, in Liberia.  
17 And so to carry out that mandate of building the Kamajors and  
18 moving in, Malu could not have done that on his own without  
19 direct orders from his President.

12:32:18 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, after his removal did you remain in contact  
22 at all with General Malu?

23 A. Immediately no, but subsequently yes.

24 Q. And subsequently when?

12:32:39 25 A. Oh, I would say about a year later there were contacts on  
26 my visit to - in fact, on my visit to Nigeria when President  
27 Obasanjo took office I spoke very highly of General Malu to  
28 Obasanjo and not too long afterward he was given a senior post in  
29 the military. I think he became either deputy or I think chief

1 of staff of something. But I - and I always - I spoke to him on  
2 the telephone many times. Even while I was in exile in Nigeria,  
3 up until that time.

4 Q. And is General Malu still alive?

12:33:28 5 A. Yes. He is alive. I do not know how well he has recovered  
6 now.

7 Q. Recovered from what?

8 A. General Malu suffered - I'm not sure if - I hate to talk  
9 about people's medical condition because it may be their

12:33:53 10 private --

11 Q. Let's just put it in general terms then?

12 A. Well, last I heard of him he was not well. But we remained  
13 - I would say we remained friends.

14 Q. Right. Put that document away now, please, Mr Taylor.

12:34:29 15 Now, Mr Taylor, can we move back, please, one divider to behind  
16 divider 18. And this is MFI-385, okay?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, this was a document referred to on Thursday, 21  
19 January of this year during the course of your cross-examination.

12:35:15 20 Do you recall this document?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. As we can see, it is the 23rd Progress Report of the  
23 Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in  
24 Liberia. Yes, Mr Taylor?

12:35:31 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And we see that it is dated 19 June 1997, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Do we all have this document?

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I believe so.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Now, we see, Mr Taylor, let's jump to paragraph 2:

3 "Since my last report, the electoral process in the country  
4 has shown significant progress. The Liberian Independent  
12:36:17 5 Elections Commission, which is responsible for organising and  
6 conducting the elections, was installed on 2 April 1997, while  
7 the reconstituted Supreme Court, which is to adjudicate in  
8 electoral disputes, was installed on 7 April, in each case about  
9 one month later than anticipated by the schedule set by the  
12:36:49 10 Committee of Nine of the Economic Community of West African  
11 States. These delays caused preparations for the elections to  
12 fall behind schedule, and cast serious doubt on prospects for  
13 holding credible elections by 30 May 1997, the date originally  
14 set."

12:37:14 15 Now, is that correct, Mr Taylor?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. "UNOMIL and the monitoring group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG),  
18 however, have continued to make their own preparations for the  
19 elections. As explained in section IV below, UNOMIL civilian  
12:37:44 20 electoral observers have been deployed to all 13 counties of  
21 Liberia, and preparations are underway to deploy the 200  
22 observers envisaged in my report of 19 May to observe the  
23 election itself."

24 A. I think that's March.

12:38:05 25 Q. "... 19 March to observe the election itself." Now, pause  
26 there. In light of the suggestion, Mr Taylor, that intimidation  
27 was a feature of the elections in Liberia, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Is it true that there were UNOMIL electoral observers

1 deployed in all 13 counties?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. What was their job?

4 A. To observe the conduct of the electoral process, which  
12:38:47 5 would have entailed harassment or anything of that sort.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, at this point in early 1997 was the NPFL still  
7 an armed standing force?

8 A. No.

9 Q. What was it by this stage?

12:39:13 10 A. By this stage we are the NPP. All the NPFL as of January  
11 had disbanded and had formed a political party. We were now a  
12 political party. All factions had become political parties.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, can you help me with this: Do you have any  
14 idea who prepared this report?

12:39:38 15 A. Yes, the special representative at this time. If I'm  
16 right, it has to be Ambassador Nyaki. I think it's Ambassador  
17 Nyaki, if I'm not mistaken. I stand corrected, but I'm more than  
18 certain it's Ambassador Nyaki.

19 Q. So this is a report prepared by the special representative  
12:40:07 20 based in Liberia. Is that what you're telling us?

21 A. No, no, no. This - well, the information for this report  
22 is from the special representative. This is the  
23 Secretary-General's report, but it originates from the  
24 representative on the ground.

12:40:23 25 Q. "The office of the United Nations High Commissioner For  
26 Refugees (UNHCR) has started repatriating those Liberians in the  
27 sub-region who wish to return immediately to participate in the  
28 elections. Meanwhile, the implementation of bridging programmes  
29 has gathered pace and arrangements are being made to ensure that

1 these programmes" - we can ignore that because we then miss a  
2 couple of pages and we come to page 5, okay?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. We see some figures at the top, don't we, Mr Taylor, and  
12:41:08 5 although that part is not marked with the black line in the  
6 right-hand column I want you to help us with that:

7 "As at 13 June the cumulative total of arms and ammunition  
8 recovered and verified by military observers was 10,036 weapons,  
9 more than 1.24 million assorted pieces of ammunition, while  
12:41:41 10 approximately 3,750 weapons had been reported surrendered to  
11 ECOMOG outside the official disarmament sites. In addition,  
12 ECOMOG cordon-and-search operations have led to the recovery of  
13 approximately 3,500 weapons and 150,000 pieces of ammunition.  
14 Major recent recoveries include heavy artillery from Butlo in  
12:42:18 15 Nimba County, mortars and anti-tank guns from Lofa County and  
16 substantial quantities of small arms from Bong Mines, Buchanan,  
17 Monrovia, Tubmanburg, Bo Waterside, and Voinjama."

18 Now, Mr Taylor, just prior to disarmament and during  
19 disarmament who had control of Lofa County?

12:42:47 20 A. ULIMO-K.

21 Q. Now where we see here that mortars and anti-tank guns were  
22 recovered from Lofa County?

23 A. That's ULIMO. ULIMO-K.

24 Q. That's ULIMO-K?

12:43:04 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. What about the other locations where weapons were  
27 recovered?

28 A. Bong Mines, that would be ULIMO-J. If we remember some  
29 evidence before where we had to subsequently later move them from

1 Kakata and Bong Mines. Buchanan, that's the NPFL. Monrovia -  
2 no, excuse me. Buchanan at this time - Buchanan is LPC.  
3 Monrovia is LPC, ULIMO-J. Tubmanburg, that would be ULIMO-J. Bo  
4 Waterside, that would be ULIMO-J. Voijnjama, that would be  
12:43:54 5 ULIMO-K.

6 Q. So what are you telling us then about these arms recoveries  
7 mentioned here? Who are they from? Are they from the NPFL?

8 A. No, they are from - these positions mentioned here, the  
9 only position that is an NPFL area, before we get to those names

12:44:20 10 where you see "major recent recoveries included heavy artillery  
11 from Butlo, Nimba" that would be the NPFL.

12 Q. So that reference to Butlo in Nimba County, that's NPFL?

13 A. That's NPFL; that is correct.

14 Q. But what are you saying about all the other recent  
12:44:40 15 recoveries?

16 A. All of these recoveries for these places mentioned are all  
17 either controlled by ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K or LPC.

18 Q. Next paragraph:

19 "During the period under review, ECOMOG has continued to  
12:45:05 20 receive considerable reinforcements. In April, 320 troops from  
21 Burkina Faso, 321 from Niger and a 35-man medical team from Cote  
22 d'Ivoire arrived, with a further 250 troops from Benin joining  
23 ECOMOG in May. These reinforcements have brought ECOMOG strength  
24 to approximately 11,000 troops deployed at 48 different  
12:45:42 25 locations."

26 Let's pause there. These 48 locations, Mr Taylor, can you  
27 help us as to, in general terms, where they were?

28 A. In the 13 counties as mentioned in the previous paragraph.  
29 At all strategic - all entries into Liberia airports, seaports,

1 all major highway junctions, all border entries. They were  
2 located in - they had headquarters in the capital of every county  
3 and also in all important areas. So they were deployed  
4 throughout the 13 political subdivisions that were spoken about  
12:46:32 5 here where United Nations personnel were deployed.

6 Q. Now, for how long did they remain at those troop levels and  
7 so deployed?

8 A. Well, for sure throughout the electoral process in July and  
9 I would say going deep into the last quarter of 1997.

12:46:59 10 Q. They were deploy - and by the last quarter, what do you  
11 mean?

12 A. I mean October, November of 1997.

13 Q. And then what happens after October, November 1997?

14 A. That's when there are different drawdowns. Some of these  
12:47:14 15 countries pull their people and the drawdown starts.

16 Q. "Although some ECOMOG troops have been redeployed to Sierra  
17 Leone in connection with the crisis in that country, my special  
18 representative and the chief military observer believe that  
19 ECOMOG at present retains sufficient capability to ensure  
12:47:47 20 security for the forthcoming elections in Liberia. UNOMIL also  
21 assisted in the evacuation of United Nations and other  
22 international personnel from Sierra Leone.

23 UNOMIL has completed its planned deployment at 16 sites,  
24 covering all the 13 counties of Liberia. The field stations  
12:48:17 25 established during the disarmament process have been successfully  
26 converted into electoral observation bases. Each of these bases  
27 is manned jointly by one or two civilian electoral observers and  
28 four or five military observers, who are continuing to undertake  
29 reconnaissance missions in the countryside to gather information

1 on terrain and infrastructure and to identify population centres.  
2 This information has been made available to the elections  
3 commission for use in its planning for the forthcoming  
4 elections. "

12:49:05 5 Yes, Mr Taylor?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And then if we look briefly at paragraph 20 starting three  
8 lines down:

9 "A total of 34 civilian electoral observers have joined the  
12:49:31 10 78 military observers outside Monrovia to form medium-term  
11 electoral observer teams, which are operating from 16 bases in  
12 the field and in Monrovia. In addition to the activities  
13 described above, the medium-term observer teams are reporting on  
14 the activities of political parties and preparing for the arrival  
12:49:56 15 of the additional observers to be deployed during the election  
16 itself. "

17 Now, Mr Taylor, we see then, do we not - no, let me start  
18 again. When is the election?

19 A. The elections are held in July.

12:50:18 20 Q. In July?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And as we can see from paragraph 18, the troop build-up  
23 began in April, yes?

24 A. Yes.

12:50:35 25 Q. Which would be three months before the elections actually  
26 took place, yes?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor. The kind of deployment of ECOMOG  
29 and UNOMIL forces described in this report, did that remain in

1 place throughout that period leading up to the elections?

2 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

3 Q. So that presence was already - of observers, both civilian  
4 and military, was in place for some three months prior to the  
12:51:16 5 elections?

6 A. That is correct. And like you say, and in preparation for  
7 the additional observers which would be your Carter Centers of  
8 this world and other people. But they were in place. That was  
9 the whole purpose of creating an environment for free elections.

12:51:33 10 They were.

11 Q. And you also note from that last paragraph we looked at the  
12 medium-sized observer teams are reporting on the activities of  
13 political parties. Now, what activities are they talking about  
14 there, Mr Taylor?

12:51:52 15 A. General comportmentation. First, are they properly  
16 organised? What are they - how are they behaving in the conduct  
17 of preparing, you know, the campaign material, making sure that  
18 people had access - what was termed then a level-playing field to  
19 radio and all this kind of stuff. Making sure that they could  
12:52:22 20 get their message out. They were observing all of these.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, it has been suggested that this was an  
22 election marred by intimidation. "They killed my Ma, they killed  
23 my Pa, but I will vote for him." Do you recall that refrain oft  
24 repeated in this courtroom?

12:52:50 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, in light of what we see here, a document  
27 produced by the Prosecution during your cross-examination, were  
28 those elections free and fair?

29 A. They were free and fair.

1 Q. Let's go back, please, to behind divider 17. And we're  
2 looking at MFI-384, which was referred to you by the Prosecution  
3 on Thursday, 21 January of this year. Do you have it?

4 A. Yes, I do.

12:53:59 5 Q. Now, we see that this too is a progress report of the  
6 Secretary-General to the United Nations Observer Mission in  
7 Liberia, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, whereas the last one we looked at was dated 19 June,  
12:54:28 10 this is a couple of months earlier on 19 March, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Paragraph 2, please:

13 "During the period under review, further progress has been  
14 made towards the implementation of the Abuja Agreement. There  
12:54:54 15 have been significant achievements in the disarmament of fighters  
16 which, under the revised schedule of implementation of the Abuja  
17 Agreement, was to be completed by 31 January 1997. The  
18 monitoring group of the Economic Community of West African States  
19 has received some of the additional troops pledged to it, and has  
12:55:24 20 continued to extend its presence into the interior of the  
21 country, thus facilitating greater access by humanitarian  
22 agencies. With the improvement in the security situation, the  
23 civilian population is gradually beginning to gain the confidence  
24 to move freely in some hitherto unsafe areas of the country. The  
12:55:54 25 level of disarmament thus far achieved has also made it possible  
26 to begin preparing for the holding of elections. The United  
27 Nations in consultation with the Liberian National Transitional  
28 Government, the Economic Community of West African States and  
29 other partners, has already started to prepare for its role in

1 the electoral process."

2 Now, first of all, Mr Taylor, do you agree with that  
3 description.

4 A. Yes. And to - I would just like to lay emphasis on one  
12:56:36 5 part, that's the significant achievement in the disarmament of  
6 fighters. I think that is very, very crucial because it's been  
7 suggested that, based on what was said - allegedly said by  
8 Mr Chea, that it was a fiasco, but that would not be true. So I  
9 agree with this statement here by the special representative.

12:57:09 10 Q. Let's go over the page, shall we. Paragraph 5:

11 "In keeping with the Abuja Agreement, which required  
12 holders of public office wishing to contest the elections to  
13 relinquish their posts by 28 February 1997, George Boley, Alhaji  
14 Kromah and Charles Taylor have resigned from the Council of  
12:57:47 15 State. They were succeeded by three new members, who were sworn  
16 in on 7 March 1997. The speaker and several members of the  
17 transitional Legislative Assembly who intend to contest  
18 legislative seats also resigned from the assembly."

19 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

12:58:11 20 A. That is true.

21 Q. Then this:

22 "While searching the Executive Mansion on 6 March as part  
23 of its ongoing operations to recover weapons not handed in during  
24 the official disarmament period, ECOMOG discovered a quantity of  
12:58:31 25 weapons and ammunition there. On 7 March, a simultaneous search  
26 was conducted at the residences of the three retiring Council of  
27 State members, George Boley, Alhaji Kromah, and Charles Taylor,  
28 as well as that of Roosevelt Johnson. No illegal weapons were  
29 found at the Boley, Johnson and Taylor residences, but Mr Kromah

1 was detained following the discovery of three truckloads of  
2 weapons and ammunition at his house in Monrovia."

3 Do you recall that, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes, I do.

12:59:17 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's just go back and unpack some of this,  
6 shall we?

7 A. Yes

8 Q. Firstly, the Executive Mansion on 6 March, what building  
9 are we talking about?

12:59:36 10 A. We are talking about the eight-storey building located  
11 where we call Capitol Hill in Monrovia, the official residence of  
12 the President.

13 Q. Now, during the period of the Council of State, who  
14 occupied the Executive Mansion?

12:59:59 15 A. All members of the council occupied the Executive Mansion.  
16 Not in terms of actually sleeping there, but all officers were  
17 there so I will call that an occupation. All of us.

18 Q. Well, help us, Mr Taylor. This quantity of weapons and  
19 ammunition found in the Executive Mansion, who put them there?

13:00:27 20 A. No, no, I don't - I don't think, counsel, they are  
21 referring - the arms that are found I think this is Kromah's own  
22 house though.

23 Q. No, no, no. Paragraph 6:

24 "While searching the Executive Mansion on 6 March" - miss a  
13:00:58 25 couple of lines - "ECOMOG discovered a quantity of weapons and  
26 ammunition there."

27 Simple question --

28 A. All of us.

29 Q. Who put them there?

1 A. All of us.

2 Q. What do you mean?

3 A. All of the security personnel assigned to the various  
4 members of the Council of State were assigned arms by ECOMOG.

13:01:16 5 So, I mean, I don't know why they put it this way. And what they  
6 did on the 6th, the day before the new council is sworn in, we  
7 have to be removed from the building. And so that meant that our  
8 security details would automatically be reduced. So all they did  
9 here was to allow certain numbers of individuals to continue to  
13:01:44 10 work with their leaders of the factions as candidates running,  
11 but reduce the number of arms. So those arms were in fact ECOMOG  
12 arms that had been given and they just took them back. This is  
13 the process.

14 Q. Now, what happened to the truckloads of weapons and  
13:02:04 15 ammunition at Alhaji Kromah's house?

16 A. ECOMOG seized them and took them to their base.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, is it the case that there was mutual  
18 suspicion amongst the various factions even at this time?

19 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely.

13:02:32 20 Q. So, help me, had you put together a stockpile of arms and  
21 ammunition for any eventuality?

22 A. No. No, because I was - in fact we were aware that ECOMOG  
23 would search. No, I did not.

24 Q. Let's continue.

13:02:55 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, is the witness saying that  
26 the weapons referred to as being discovered in the Executive  
27 Mansion were ECOMOG weapons? Is that what you're saying?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Let me ask the question:

29 Q. To whom did those weapons and ammunition belong?

1 A. They originally belonged to ECOMOG. They had been given to  
2 the detachments of security personnel assigned to each council  
3 member on the Council of State. Upon leaving the council, we had  
4 to surrender most of those weapons and only a certain number of  
13:03:36 5 securities were permitted with us as candidates to carry. So in  
6 fact what they did was to come, account for the weapons that had  
7 been given to us before and remove them from the property.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: So the short story is they were ECOMOG  
9 weapons?

13:03:57 10 THE WITNESS: They were.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. "The situation in the country following the discovery of  
13 the weapons cache at Mr Kromah's residence and his arrest  
14 remained relatively calm. Major General Victor Malu, the ECOMOG  
13:04:16 15 force commander, publicly warned Liberians that ECOMOG would not  
16 tolerate any act that might lead to a breach of the peace and  
17 reiterated ECOMOG's determination to retrieve hidden arms.

18 On 14 March, however, the ECOMOG force commander requested  
19 that all charges against Mr Kromah be dropped amid concerns  
13:04:43 20 expressed by many prominent Liberians about the possible impact  
21 of his arrest on the fragile peace process, and in the light of a  
22 statement by Mr Kromah admitting that it had been an error on his  
23 part to keep the weapons beyond 31 January. The force commander  
24 also requested the Liberian authorities to extend a general  
13:05:11 25 amnesty to all others arrested for possession of illegal weapons  
26 after the end of the official disarmament period."

27 So, Mr Taylor, no action was taken against Alhaji Kromah  
28 despite that recovery, yes?

29 A. I wouldn't say no action. He was arrested, incarcerated

1 for a little while and I was one of those that insisted that he  
2 be released.

3 Q. Why?

13:05:47

4 A. Because, you know, the Council of State was in charge and  
5 so for Malu to say that he could hold Alhaji Kromah, who had just  
6 left the council but was replaced by someone designated by him, I  
7 felt that the decision to hold or not to hold Kromah was not - it  
8 was not Malu's decision, it had to be that of the presidency.

9 Q. And so he was released?

13:06:08

10 A. He was released.

11 Q. "Following the dissolution of the armed factions on 31  
12 January, the period under review has witnessed a revitalisation  
13 of civil society, and political parties that remained dormant  
14 during the civil war have been reactivated to prepare for the  
15 elections. As at 18 March 1997, eight political parties had  
16 registered with the Ad Hoc Elections Commission while another 12  
17 had been proposed for registration. These parties have been  
18 engaged in selecting their candidates for the presidential  
19 elections."

13:07:20

20 Now, let's go to paragraph 15, please.

13:08:10

21 "With the recent induction of a 650-man Malian battalion  
22 and a 500-man Ghanaian battalion, the strength of ECOMOG has been  
23 increased to approximately 10,000 currently deployed throughout  
24 the country except in Grand Kru and River Cess Counties, where  
25 they expect to deploy very soon. In ECOMOG's assessment, which  
26 is fully shared by UNOMIL, an additional three battalions would  
27 be required for the peacekeeping force to perform the  
28 security-related and other tasks envisaged for it during the  
29 forthcoming elections. Those troops would also enable ECOMOG to

1 deploy in Grand Kru and River Cess Counties and reinforce its  
2 presence in Lofa, Sinoe and Maryland Counties."

3 Now, Mr Taylor, you recall we just looked at, did we not, a  
4 later report, the 23rd report, in June 1997 which spoke of  
13:09:02 5 additional troops arriving in April 1997? Do you recall that?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. "At a meeting of ECOWAS chiefs of staff that took place in  
8 Monrovia on 10 and 11 February, the chiefs of staff of Benin,  
9 Burkina Faso, The Gambia and the Niger indicated the intention of  
13:09:27 10 their respective governments to contribute additional troops to  
11 ECOMOG.

12 The military component of UNOMIL has now reached its full  
13 authorised strength of one chief military observer and 92  
14 military observers, most of whom are deployed to the ten  
13:09:52 15 disarmament sites of Bo Waterside, Buchanan, Gbarnga, Greenville,  
16 Harper, Kakata, Tappita, Tubmanburg, Voinjama and Zwedru and at  
17 UNOMIL headquarters in Monrovia."

18 Now, Mr Taylor, we don't have the map which was attached to  
19 this, but help us with this: I want you to assist us with these  
13:10:30 20 locations and the particular factions which had control of them  
21 prior to the disarmament process. Do you follow me?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Bo Waterside is who?

24 A. ULIMO-J.

13:10:44 25 Q. Buchanan is who?

26 A. LPC.

27 Q. Gbarnga is who?

28 A. NPFL.

29 Q. Greenville is who?

- 1 A. LPC.
- 2 Q. Harper is who?
- 3 A. NPFL.
- 4 Q. Kakata is who?
- 13:11:14 5 A. ULIMO-J.
- 6 Q. Tappita is who?
- 7 A. NPFL.
- 8 Q. Tubmanburg is who?
- 9 A. ULIMO-J.
- 13:11:30 10 Q. Voijnama is who?
- 11 A. ULIMO-K.
- 12 Q. Zwedru is who?
- 13 A. LPC.
- 14 Q. And what about Monrovia?
- 13:11:51 15 A. LPC and ULIMO-J.
- 16 Q. Now, help me with one other matter, please. Go back to  
17 paragraph 15, yes?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. We see then that at this time in March 1997 the troop  
13:12:33 20 strength is 10,000 deployed throughout the country, except in  
21 Grand Kru and River Cess Counties. Now Grand Kru and River Cess  
22 Counties, Mr Taylor, where are they?
- 23 A. They are in the southeastern part of Liberia.
- 24 Q. Where do they border?
- 13:12:56 25 A. They border Buchanan. River Cess borders Buchanan, Grand  
26 Bassa. And Grand Kru borders between Sinoe County and Maryland  
27 County.
- 28 Q. Do either of those two counties border Sierra Leone,  
29 Mr Taylor?

1 A. No, no, no, they are closer to la Cote d'Ivoire side. No.  
2 No.

3 Q. So what's the situation then in those counties which border  
4 Sierra Leone? Is there, according to this, a troop presence in  
13:13:42 5 those counties as of March 1997? Do you follow me?

6 A. Yes. And what are those counties? Lofa County, one that  
7 borders Sierra Leone. At that time we don't have Gbarpolu yet.  
8 You have Grand Cape Mount County. These are the two counties  
9 that border Sierra Leone, and there's full deployment in those  
13:14:13 10 counties.

11 Q. Just so that we can get the picture then, in March '97  
12 there's anticipation of additional reinforcements arriving to  
13 enable ECOMOG to deploy in all counties, including those two  
14 Grand Kru and River Cess Counties, yes?

13:14:41 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And that deployment then, in the counties bordering Sierra  
17 Leone, according to this, from March 1997 there are ECOMOG troops  
18 deployed in those counties, yes?

19 A. That is correct.

13:15:07 20 Q. And for how long do they remain so deployed, Mr Taylor?

21 A. They remained deployed throughout the period of March all  
22 the way I would put it to about, again, I keep using the last  
23 quarter, November - October, November of 1997. The last quarter  
24 of 1997.

13:15:30 25 Q. Remind us, Mr Taylor, when was it that you went to South  
26 Africa in 1997?

27 A. I get the months mixed up. It's got to be - I really have  
28 forgotten. It's about - I will put it to November or December,  
29 thereabouts. I don't quite remember the month.

1 Q. November, December?

2 A. It's possible, yes. Very late.

3 Q. But would this be a fair summary then of what we've just

4 looked at, that throughout much of 1997 there is an ECOMOG

13:16:22 5 presence throughout the bulk of Liberia, including those counties

6 bordering Sierra Leone? Is that right?

7 A. That would be very fair. That is a fair assessment.

8 Q. And during that same period, Mr Taylor, just help us.

9 What's happening in Sierra Leone? Just deal with March '97

13:16:57 10 through to the last quarter of '97, what's happening in Sierra

11 Leone?

12 A. Well, this is a period that the junta is in power in Sierra

13 Leone.

14 Q. Are they in power throughout that period?

13:17:13 15 A. The junta, yes, they are in power throughout 1997.

16 Q. When is the coup, Mr Taylor?

17 A. The coup staged by the junta?

18 Q. Uh-huh.

19 A. Oh, that would be what? The first quarter, I would say.

13:17:34 20 What is it, March, April or something of 1997. Somewhere there.

21 Q. And prior to the coup, who is in power?

22 A. President Kabbah is President of Sierra Leone.

23 Q. For completeness, let's just look at the rest of the page:

24 "On 10 February 1997, following the formal end of the

13:18:11 25 disarmament and demobilisation phase, I wrote to the President of

26 the Security Council transmitting to him a copy of the United

27 Nations recommendations on a framework for the holding of

28 elections in Liberia, prepared at the request of the Council of

29 State following consultations with the chairman of ECOWAS.

1 Substantially along the lines proposed in the recommendations,  
2 agreement was subsequently reached between the Council of State  
3 and the ECOWAS Committee of Nine on a basic framework for the  
4 holding of elections in Liberia.

13:18:56 5 In a letter dated 18 February, the chairman of ECOWAS  
6 confirmed to me his endorsement of the electoral recommendations  
7 which had emerged from the deliberations of the ministerial  
8 meeting and requested my support in this regard. The chairman  
9 noted that he had asked the Liberian Council of State to take  
13:19:20 10 steps to ensure their implementation before the end of February  
11 1997. The chairman of ECOWAS informed me that he would also be  
12 consulting with other ECOWAS Heads of State on matters related to  
13 the implementation of the peace process."

14 Mr Taylor, now having looked at those two United Nations  
13:19:45 15 documents introduced by the Prosecution during the course of your  
16 cross-examination, now that we have the picture in mind of what  
17 they established, can I ask you now some more general questions  
18 based on the indictment period? In November 1996 where are you?

19 A. I'm in Monrovia.

13:20:17 20 Q. Doing what?

21 A. I'm a member of the Council of State.

22 Q. What is happening in relation to the NPFL at this time?

23 A. Well, we are going through the process of disarmament.

24 Q. What was the date set for the completion of disarmament as  
13:20:39 25 we've noted in these two documents?

26 A. What was it? February, that process should have been -  
27 January, February, should have been completed.

28 Q. What role were you playing in that disarmament process in  
29 terms of the NPFL?

1 A. My role was principally to ensure that all NPFL combatants  
2 disarmed in line with the general decision of the Council of  
3 State in that as the leader of the NPFL, then I would ensure that  
4 that was implemented and there was full cooperation with ECOMOG.

13:21:25 5 Q. Now, you tell us that you are based in Monrovia at this  
6 time, Mr Taylor, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Is there an ECOMOG presence in Monrovia at this time?

9 A. They are headquartered in Monrovia. They are.

13:21:42 10 Q. To what extent during that period are your movements as an  
11 individual monitored?

12 A. 100 per cent. In fact, every former factional leader that  
13 was on that Council of State were given one company of ECOMOG  
14 peacekeepers as your security and they were aware of wherever -  
15 they escorted you. They were with you 100 per cent 24 hours a  
16 day.

13:22:16 17 Q. Now help me. During the month of November, Mr Taylor, did  
18 you still maintain a base in Gbarnga?

19 A. I would say, yes, we maintained a base. The NPFL  
13:22:34 20 headquarters was still in Gbarnga, yes.

21 Q. And did you still on occasions travel to Gbarnga?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. How regularly?

24 A. Oh, not very regularly. I would say maybe once every two  
13:22:55 25 months or so I would go up there. In fact, I visited even during  
26 the disarmament process.

27 Q. Yes. In December 1996, Mr Taylor - and you note that I'm  
28 looking at the indictment period here.

29 A. Uh-huh.

1 Q. The situation you've just described, does it still obtain  
2 in terms of your own movements?

3 A. Oh, definitely.

4 Q. Are you still in Monrovia?

13:23:20 5 A. I'm still in Monrovia.

6 Q. Are you still visiting Gbarnga?

7 A. Once in a while, yes.

8 Q. Are you still assigned a company of ECOMOG soldiers?

9 A. Yes.

13:23:31 10 Q. Who accompany you everywhere?

11 A. Everywhere, yes.

12 Q. Why was that done?

13 A. What ECOMOG was trying to do, it was really like a Russian  
14 roulette situation. Having all of these guys that had been  
13:23:50 15 fighting each other assemble in one building, they were not sure.  
16 So what they said was fine, a few of your security personnel may  
17 carry arms, but your security - each of the warring factional  
18 leaders, your security will still be guaranteed by ECOMOG and we  
19 will provide the armed men, a company for each one, that will be  
13:24:12 20 able to be in charge of arms that were around you. So every one  
21 of us had it because of the security factor.

22 Q. January, on your time scale, disarmament is still taking  
23 place, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

13:24:31 25 Q. Where are you based?

26 A. I'm in Monrovia. I'm now living in Mamba Point directly  
27 opposite the gate of the United States embassy.

28 Q. Yes. January 1997 now, Mr Taylor, where are you?

29 A. I'm still in Monrovia.

1 Q. Doing what?

2 A. January of 1997 I'm still on the Council of State.

3 Q. Yes, doing that?

4 A. Preparing - in fact, making sure disarmament is going on,

13:25:07 5 but preparing to leave the council.

6 Q. Do you still have your company of ECOMOG soldiers guarding

7 you?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Are your movements still being monitored?

13:25:20 10 A. 100 per cent, yes.

11 Q. February, what's the situation?

12 A. By February we leave - I leave the Council of State. I

13 leave the council. I resign. I think it's around February.

14 Q. And then we know from the document we've just looked at

13:25:47 15 that by March we have this deployment of ECOMOG troops?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Throughout the country apart from two counties, yes?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. But specifically deployed in those counties bordering

13:26:01 20 Sierra Leone, yes?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And that situation obtains throughout the electoral

23 process?

24 A. That is correct.

13:26:09 25 Q. And is retained until the last quarter of 1997, which you

26 put at October, November 1997, yes?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, during that period then, Mr Taylor, from November 1996

29 through the next twelve months or so, were you providing arms and

1 ammunition to the RUF across that border?

2 A. No, not at all. But let me just add, even after I leave  
3 the Council of State - after we leave the Council of State, the  
4 company of ECOMOG assigned with us is still with us as factional  
13:27:00 5 leaders. They are not withdrawn at all, okay. So I am not  
6 supplying arms and I'm still monitored by ECOMOG 24 hours a day.  
7 Those men are with me, they are with Kromah, they are with Boley  
8 throughout that particular period up to July for the elections.

9 Q. Now, throughout that period, Mr Taylor, what contact do you  
13:27:28 10 have with the AFRC, if any?

11 A. None whatsoever. None whatsoever.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, what is a company? When  
13 you say a company --

14 THE WITNESS: A company - that's about 100 - the Nigerian  
13:27:46 15 companies were about 130 men. Normal military companies could be  
16 bigger, but the Nigerian company that are with us was about 130  
17 men - Nigerian soldiers were assigned with me commanded by a  
18 captain. Captain Ali.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:28:03 20 Q. And, Mr Taylor, during this period, the twelve months or so  
21 from November 1996, did you have access to radio facilities?

22 A. You said the twelve - that's November 1996 to November  
23 1997?

24 Q. Yes, please.

13:28:22 25 A. Yes, I did.

26 Q. As of when? During the period when you were on the Council  
27 of State, did you?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And during the period after you became President, did you?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And were you using that facility to control your minions  
3 next door in Sierra Leone?

4 A. No, no, no, no, no. By that when you say "you", I'm --

13:28:49 5 Q. I'm talking about you, Charles Ghankay Taylor?

6 A. No. No.

7 Q. Now, these documents which the Prosecution have produced  
8 during your cross-examination, Mr Taylor, which set out this  
9 troop deployment, do you accept them as setting an accurate and  
10 truthful account of the position during this period?

13:29:10

11 A. I do. I have no reason to disbelieve what the  
12 representatives are - because I must say that this appears to be  
13 an accurate account of - from those that were responsible for  
14 that, so I accept it.

13:29:36

15 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Madam President. Would  
16 that be a convenient point?

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, indeed this is a convenient time to  
18 take our lunch break. We will reconvene at 2.30.

19 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

14:25:08

20 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, please  
22 continue.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Mr Taylor, before lunch we were looking at a report to the  
25 Security Council from the Secretary-General, yes?

14:32:06

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Dated March 1997. We'd dealt with that period leading up  
28 to the elections in your country in that year, yes?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. And in light of the information contained therein regarding  
2 troop deployments throughout Liberia, we looked at opportunities  
3 for providing arms and ammunition across the border into Sierra  
4 Leone, yes?

14:32:48 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I'd like to move on now, please, and deal with, at this  
7 stage, three other Security Council documents produced during the  
8 course of your cross-examination. Do you follow?

9 A. Yes, I do.

14:33:09 10 Q. Could I invite your attention at this stage, please, behind  
11 divider 14. This is MFI-377. Yes, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And this document was placed before you on Thursday, 21  
14 January of this year. Now, we see that it is dated 26 August

14:34:12 15 1994, and before we come to look specifically at the document,  
16 Mr Taylor, assist me. First of all, what's the situation in  
17 Liberia at or about that time, mid-1994?

18 A. We - there is hostility.

19 Q. Between?

14:34:40 20 A. The NPFL and ULIMO-K; more specifically, the LPC and what  
21 was called then the coalition forces. Around this time I think  
22 we are preparing in August 1994 for peace talks in Ghana,  
23 Akosombo.

24 Q. And where are you based at this time?

14:35:14 25 A. I'm in Gbarnga.

26 Q. Yes, and at this time, Mr Taylor, do you have contact with  
27 anyone in Sierra Leone?

28 A. No, none whatsoever.

29 Q. Do you know what's going on in Sierra Leone at or about

1 this time?

2 A. Not really. I know there is fighting, but, I mean, we are  
3 also fighting on our side, so I don't know the details on the  
4 ground in Sierra Leone.

14:35:53 5 Q. And help us, what's the primary focus of your attentions at  
6 this time?

7 A. I'm fighting ULIMO-K, LPC and the coalition forces. There  
8 is terrible fighting going on.

9 Q. We see that this is the sixth report of the  
14:36:22 10 Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in  
11 Liberia:

12 "The present report is submitted in response to the  
13 statement of the President of the Security Council of 13 July  
14 1994 and to the council's request that the Secretary-General  
14:36:49 15 report on the situation in Liberia by 2 September 1994.

16 In that statement, the President noted, inter alia, that  
17 limited progress had been achieved in the peace process, that the  
18 Liberian National Transitional Government had been unable to  
19 extend its authority effectively outside Monrovia; and that  
14:37:14 20 preparations for elections had been hampered by a virtual halt in  
21 disarmament."

22 Now, taking matters in stages, Mr Taylor, is it true  
23 limited progress in the peace process at this time?

24 A. Yes.

14:37:32 25 Q. Is it true that the Liberian National Transitional  
26 Government writ did not extend much beyond Monrovia?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Is it true that there had been a virtual halt to  
29 disarmament?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "Accordingly, the council called on the transitional  
3 government, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West  
4 African States, and the Organisation of African Unity, and with  
14:38:12 5 the support of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia to  
6 convene a meeting of the Liberian factions by 31 July 1994 to  
7 address the problems affecting disarmament and to draw up a  
8 realistic plan for disarmament, including a date for the  
9 completion of the exercise.

14:38:34 10 The Security Council also expressed concern about ceasefire  
11 violations and about large-scale displacement of and atrocities  
12 against civilians. The council deplored attacks against UNOMIL  
13 and ECOWAS military observer group personnel and regretted that  
14 sufficient financial support for ECOMOG troops was not yet  
14:39:05 15 forthcoming, despite several appeals to the international  
16 community. The council further requested the Secretary-General  
17 to ensure that all information on violations of the ceasefire and  
18 arms embargo obtained by UNOMIL is promptly made available to the  
19 Security Council and widely publicised, as appropriate."

14:39:30 20 Now, Mr Taylor, "deplored attacks against UNOMIL and ECOWAS  
21 military observer group personnel", taking that slowly, was it  
22 the case that UNOMIL personnel and ECOWAS personnel at this time  
23 were the target of attacks?

24 A. No, I wouldn't say that. They were not targets of attacks.  
14:40:06 25 I wouldn't say that.

26 Q. Were they attacked, however?

27 A. I would want to say, yes, that sometimes they came under  
28 fire. Probably when the factional groups were exchanging fire,  
29 they did come under fire.

1 Q. Now, was that - those instances of UNOMIL and ECOWAS forces  
2 coming under fire, was that limited to encounters with the NPFL,  
3 or was it also involving encounters with other armed factions?

14:40:49

4 A. I would say other armed factions. Mostly the factions  
5 would be involved in conflict and the military observers in the  
6 area sometimes had to really duck for cover. They were not - the  
7 point I want to make: They were not aimed at those units, but  
8 all factions were involved in exchange of fire.

14:41:18

9 Q. Now, just looking at the first sentence in the next  
10 paragraph: "Nearly six month have elapsed since the seating of  
11 the Liberian National Transitional Government on 7 March 1994."  
12 Now, who was head of that government, Mr Taylor?

13 A. That government was headed by Professor David Kpormakpor.  
14 That is already on the records.

14:41:57

15 Q. Let's go over the page. Ignore paragraph 8, and let's go  
16 to paragraph 9:

14:42:17

17 "Since my report of 24 June fighting has continued in the  
18 west between the Krahn and Mandingo elements of the United  
19 Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia. Despite efforts on  
20 the part of UNOMIL, ECOMOG and Liberian negotiators to help these  
21 groups reconcile, tensions between them remain high."

14:42:46

22 Pause there. So at this stage, Mr Taylor, when they speak  
23 of fighting in the west between the Krahn and Mandingo elements  
24 of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia,  
25 what's this about?

26 A. This is the beginning of the split by ULIMO into the two  
27 factions of ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K.

28 Q. "In the southeast fighting continues between the Liberian  
29 Peace Council (LPC) and the National Patriotic Front for Liberia

1 (NPFL), especially around the Firestone plantation."

2 Is that true?

3 A. That is true.

14:43:24

4 Q. Now, we haven't really discussed at any length this  
5 grouping called the LPC, Mr Taylor. What does LPC stand for?

6 A. The Liberian Peace Council.

7 Q. And what were their politics and aims?

14:43:56

8 A. The Liberian Peace Council really was an extension of the  
9 Armed Forces of Liberia that had been used really and put  
10 together by ECOMOG. This is just a grouping that was formed by  
11 ECOMOG with the same leanings as I would say ULIMO-J. ECOMOG at  
12 that time in trying to find an ally to help fight the NPFL  
13 organised the Liberian Peace Council with Dr Boley, which was  
14 about 90 per cent Armed Forces of Liberia personnel.

14:44:27

15 Q. "All factions are experiencing serious problems of command  
16 and control. This is reflected in an increase in banditry,  
17 harassment of civilians, including non-governmental  
18 organisations, and unarmed United Nations military observers with  
19 vehicles being commandeered at will by NPFL and ULIMO combatants  
20 and looting of the World Food Programme and International  
21 Committee of the Red Cross warehouses in Gbarnga and the UNOMIL  
22 regional headquarters in Tubmanburg. Reports have also been  
23 received of clashes between NPFL forces and of public executions  
24 in Gbarnga and continued LPC atrocities against civilians in the  
14:44:53 25 southeast."

14:45:20

26 Now, there's much there to reflect upon, Mr Taylor, so  
27 let's take our time. First of all, problems of command and  
28 control; would you agree?

29 A. Well, problems of command and control, I will give a little

1 bit to it, not very much. A little bit of credence to it but not  
2 very much, from the NPFL perspective.

3 Q. Mr Taylor, this is an observation which is not new. Let me  
4 remind you. Do you remember yesterday we were looking at a  
14:46:13 5 newspaper article referring to quotes attributed to your then  
6 wife Agnes Taylor? Do you remember that?

7 A. Yes, I remember.

8 Q. And do you remember a similar point being made about the  
9 inability of commanders to control young combatants? Do you  
14:46:30 10 remember that?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. This is the same theme, isn't it?

13 A. Yeah, but - yes, it's the same theme. I will just answer  
14 that.

14:46:40 15 Q. It's the same theme, isn't it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And, Mr Taylor, was it a problem? And I'm not limiting the  
18 question to the NPFL. Was there such a problem?

19 A. Generally I would say yes. With the period in question,  
14:46:56 20 yes.

21 Q. And was it right that there was increased banditry,  
22 harassment of civilians, including NGOs?

23 A. Yes, I would say that that is true.

24 Q. Is it the case that both the NPFL and ULIMO did on occasion  
14:47:25 25 commandeer vehicles belonging to these NGOs?

26 A. I would say, yes, the NPFL did that. And I would just add  
27 again, the period involved. We haven't gotten into this  
28 particular period, but yes.

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, at this time in 1994, where are your

1 headquarters?

2 A. My headquarters are in Gbarnga.

3 Q. Yes. You will see three lines from the bottom of that  
4 paragraph, reference is made to the looting of an International  
14:48:04 5 Committee of the Red Cross warehouse in Gbarnga. Did you know  
6 about that?

7 A. Yes, I got to hear about this. Yes.

8 Q. Yes. Who did it?

9 A. Well, I'm not sure if it is the NPFL or ULIMO. I'm not  
14:48:23 10 sure, because this is about the time of the first attack on  
11 Gbarnga and they were pushed - this is why I keep adding, and you  
12 haven't asked me, so I'm not going to go into that. I keep  
13 saying the time involved. So I'm not sure as to whether the NPFL  
14 or ULIMO-K did this. I'm not sure.

14:48:47 15 Q. And at this time, Mr Taylor, who is in control of  
16 Tubmanburg?

17 A. Tubmanburg? By now I - ULIMO-J has - have successfully  
18 pushed out ULIMO-K from Tubmanburg.

19 Q. And what about these public executions in Gbarnga,  
14:49:29 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. I'm not --

22 Q. Second to last line.

23 A. No, no, I see it. I'm not sure what he's talking about  
24 here because at this particular time with the fighting, the  
14:49:45 25 preliminary attack, I'm not aware of any public executions here.

26 Q. Well, let's start at the general and move down to the  
27 particular. Were there executions in Gbarnga during the period  
28 where you were in control and based in that city?

29 A. Yes, there were executions in Gbarnga.

1 Q. Were they conducted privately or publicly?

2 A. They were conducted publicly.

3 Q. And how were they carried out?

4 A. Following trials, there were trials --

14:50:23 5 Q. I'm not asking you about the procedure. How were the  
6 actual executions carried out?

7 A. They were done by firing squad.

8 Q. And where in Gbarnga did this take place?

9 A. I don't know. It had to be on the outskirts of Gbarnga.

14:50:44 10 Once they were approved, they were taken outside and --

11 Q. Were you ever present at such an execution?

12 A. No, no. No.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, these were executions conducted by  
14 who?

14:50:58 15 THE WITNESS: By the NPFL. The NPFL/NPRAG.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. So the death penalty was available in NPFL-controlled  
18 areas, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That is correct.

14:51:18 20 Q. Who for?

21 A. Military individuals that carried out atrocities against  
22 civilians or intentionally murdered other soldiers were  
23 court-martialled and tried and executed, if that was the  
24 punishment that was suggested by the tribunal.

14:51:36 25 Q. Were civilians subjected to the death penalty?

26 A. Never. Never. Civilians were tried in civilian courts.  
27 Never, no.

28 Q. Paragraph 11, please:

29 "There are also signs of a split within the NPFL hierarchy.

1 Skirmishes between groups loyal to different NPFL generals have  
2 occurred in Margibi (Konola), Nimba and Maryland Counties. This  
3 may account for the number of reports of public executions  
4 carried out by the NPFL."

14:52:26 5 Q. Is that true?

6 A. No, that is not true. The representative here makes an  
7 error. He's in Monrovia. The skirmishes and the confusion  
8 between NPFL individuals come with the breakaway of Tom Womeyu.  
9 This representative is not in Gbarnga, so he really doesn't have  
10 access to Gbarnga at the time. So there is a conflict where Tom  
11 Womeyu breaks away and forms what I've been talking about here  
12 called the coalition forces. So there is such a thing, but the  
13 rest of the details he has wrong.

14 Q. Well, help us, Mr Taylor. Tell us what parts are wrong.

14:53:08 15 A. Okay. Where he says here that this is occurring in Nimba  
16 and Maryland Counties, that is not correct.

17 Q. Where was it occurring?

18 A. It occurred in Margibi. Some generals - some individuals  
19 that were assigned in that area did defect and go to Monrovia  
20 with Tom Womeyu.

14:53:26 21 Q. Right. So where mention is made of Margibi, that's right,  
22 yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. But Nimba and Maryland, that's wrong?

14:53:42 25 A. That is totally wrong, yes.

26 Q. But there was a question of loyalty amongst generals within  
27 the NPFL?

28 A. At that time? Generally I can say - I would say no, not  
29 loyalty - the question of loyalty amongst generals, no. There

1 were certain segments that were connected to particular  
2 individuals that there was a question of loyalty. The rest of  
3 the NPFL, no.

14:54:17 4 Q. "On 26 July the Armed Forces of Liberia, the ULIMO Krahn  
5 faction, an NPFL breakaway minister in the Liberian National  
6 Transitional Government and the Lofa Defence Force issued a joint  
7 communique calling for the cessation of all hostilities."

8 Who was that breakaway minister?

14:54:43 9 A. He's talking about Minister Tom Womeiye. That's the  
10 breakaway minister.

11 Q. "While hostilities have not ceased, this communique,  
12 coupled with recent movements of AFL and LPC in the Firestone  
13 plantation has, however, been interpreted as an anti-NPFL  
14 realignment.

14:55:15 15 Owing to the deterioration of the security situation,  
16 especially in the ULIMO and NPFL areas, UNOMIL deployment has  
17 been reduced from 29 to 21 teams in the period since my last  
18 report. Following the kidnapping of six military observers in  
19 Tubmanburg on 28 June, UNOMIL withdrew all its observers from the  
14:55:37 20 western region."

21 Now, pause there, Mr Taylor. Who was in control of  
22 Tubmanburg at this time?

23 A. ULIMO-J.

14:56:07 24 Q. And later in 2000 you were to become involved in the  
25 release of UN soldiers who were kidnapped in Sierra Leone,  
26 weren't you?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, who was responsible for this kidnapping of six  
29 military observers?

1 A. It had to be the ULIMO-K - excuse me, the ULIMO-J people  
2 that were in there, in that area.

3 Q. "While UNOMIL continues to be fully deployed in the central  
4 region, observers have been withdrawn from two of the nine sites  
14:56:42 5 in the northern region because of a lack of security. In the  
6 eastern region, observers are deployed at three sites; however,  
7 UNOMIL has still not been able to deploy to six of the nine sites  
8 in this region. With the slowdown in activities as a result of  
9 the security situation 30 military observers have been reassigned  
14:57:14 10 to Rwanda.

11 Following the seating of the Liberian National Transitional  
12 Government on 7 March, and in accordance with the Cotonou  
13 Agreement, the joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee was replaced  
14 by the Violations Committee, which has met seven times since  
14:57:38 15 then. To date, 49 cases (41 against NPFL and 8 against ULIMO)  
16 have been received and six resolved."

17 Now, explain that procedure to us, Mr Taylor. And I ask  
18 you to do that because there appears to be a disproportionate  
19 number of violations, on the face of it, by the NPFL, do you see?

14:58:14 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Explain that to us, please?

22 A. Because of the sheer size. The NPFL is the largest warring  
23 faction in the country and occupied more land mass than all of  
24 the other groups combined, so it would natural that on a  
14:58:33 25 percentage wide basis there would be a wider base for these  
26 infractions.

27 Q. "Since the month of June, 27 ceasefire violations (20 by  
28 NPFL and 7 by ULIMO) have been reported. Most of these cases are  
29 still under investigation. The chief military observer has

1 written to the high command of both NPFL and ULIMO and is  
2 awaiting information from them on the unresolved cases. The last  
3 two meetings of the Violations Committee had to be cancelled  
4 because of the unexplained absence of NPFL and ULIMO  
14:59:21 5 representatives."

6 Now, again pause there, Mr Taylor. How did this Violations  
7 Committee - no, let me start again. Where was this Violations  
8 Committee based?

9 A. In Monrovia.

14:59:40 10 Q. How were these violations resolved?

11 A. The committee would meet, both sides, NPFL, ULIMO, discuss  
12 what happened. And these violations would really be somebody  
13 going across his control area, maybe looking for food, and  
14 somebody would see him in the bush and fire at him to run away.

15:00:10 15 And we would resolve it and talk about, you know, some - what  
16 they call rules of engagement and promise not to do it again and  
17 then go. In these cases there was nobody getting killed. It was  
18 just a matter of, you know.

19 Q. Now help me, would the NPFL send representatives to the  
15:00:36 20 Violations Committee in Monrovia?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. How is that possible, given the geographical demarcation  
23 which separated the various factions?

24 A. Well, when you read the section that deals with the  
15:00:55 25 Liberian National Transitional Government that is set up in 1994,  
26 the NPFL have a representative on the Council of State that is  
27 headed by Professor Kpormakpor. My representative at that  
28 particular time on the Council of State is the late General Isaac  
29 Musa. So the government is formed by all factions. The leaders

1 are represented on the council. The road to Monrovia had been  
2 declared open where there can be movement. So any time a  
3 delegation is going, the information is passed and as we entered  
4 the area controlled by ULIMO-K or by LPC, there would be ECOMOG  
15:01:43 5 at those points and they would make sure that those delegations  
6 got through.

7 Q. Okay. That being so, why the unexplained absence of NPFL  
8 representatives?

9 A. This could have been a protest. Maybe General Musa at that  
15:02:00 10 time - maybe someone gets angry and says, "I'm not going, these  
11 people are making trouble." I wouldn't know right now precisely  
12 why, but it would just be sometimes someone takes a hard line and  
13 don't go; the next time he's there. Something like that.

14 Q. Very well. Paragraph 15:

15:02:18 15 "ECOMOG continues to be faced with resource and logistical  
16 problems. As a result, ECOMOG's plan to deploy throughout the  
17 country has still not materialised and there has been no further  
18 deployment since my last report. The leader of the NPFL,  
19 Mr Charles Taylor, has extended an invitation to the ECOMOG field  
15:02:45 20 commander to visit Gbarnga to discuss deployment in NPFL  
21 territory, as a prelude to disarmament. Recent ECOMOG rotations  
22 at brigade command and battalion levels and consultations with  
23 NPFL may serve to increase confidence and strengthen ECOMOG's  
24 ability to deploy deeper into the country."

15:03:08 25 Now, did you extend such an invitation to the ECOMOG field  
26 commander, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Yes, I did.

28 Q. Who was the ECOMOG field commander at the time, if you  
29 recall?

1 A. I could be wrong about this. This could have been General  
2 Kopalati.

3 Q. Spell?

4 A. K-O-P-A-L-A-T-I. Phonetically, I would say.

15:03:46 5 Q. Where was he from?

6 A. Nigeria.

7 Q. "At their recent meeting at Abuja, the ECOWAS Heads of  
8 State stressed the need for resources to ensure that ECOMOG is  
9 able to carry out its mandate as provided in the Cotonou

15:04:08 10 Agreement and for the demobilisation and rehabilitation of  
11 ex-combatants. In my reports to the Security Council, I have  
12 consistently emphasised ECOMOG's critical need for resources to  
13 carry out its mandate. On 29 June, I sent a letter to the United  
14 States Secretary of State Warren Christopher informing him of the

15:04:34 15 financial difficulties ECOMOG troop-contributing countries were  
16 encountering. In his reply Mr Christopher outlined the  
17 substantial contribution the United States had already made, both  
18 bilaterally and through the United Nations trust fund for  
19 Liberia. He expressed the hope that other countries would be

15:04:58 20 able to provide financial support to this worthy example of  
21 regional peacekeeping. In July, I also wrote to a number of  
22 other member states, urging them to contribute resources to  
23 ECOMOG through the United Nations trust fund for Liberia. To  
24 date, however, the response has been disappointing and the  
15:05:24 25 resources of the trust fund are running out. Plans are underway  
26 for a delegation of ECOWAS Foreign Ministers to visit donor  
27 capitals to seek additional funding.

28 As a result of the continued fighting and lack of security,  
29 the disarmament process has largely come to a halt. As at 22

1 August 1994, 3,612 combatants (out of an estimated total of about  
2 60,000) had been disarmed and demobilised. My special  
3 representative has reported that individual combatants have  
4 indicated a willingness to disarm, but that their leaders seem to  
15:06:15 5 be halting the process."

6 Pause there. Is that true?

7 A. That is true.

8 Q. "Leaders" must include you then, Mr Taylor?

9 A. That is true.

15:06:27 10 Q. Why were you hindering that process?

11 A. Because right at this particular point the LPC is attacking  
12 our positions in the entire southeast, from Harbel Firestone, as  
13 was mentioned here, Buchanan, River Cess, Sinoe. The LPC, this  
14 newly formed group that was not originally a part of the  
15:06:54 15 disarmament process, is now formed and is attacking NPFL

16 positions, so we cannot disarm because we have to resist them.

17 Q. "Since my last report, only 420 combatants have been  
18 disarmed. Faction leaders have not been willing to allow their  
19 combatants to disarm, owing to the pervasive atmosphere of  
15:07:24 20 distrust amongst them, exacerbated by LPC attacks against NPFL in

21 the southeast and military movements by LPC, AFL and NPFL in the  
22 Firestone plantation. While efforts by the Liberian National  
23 Transitional Government, UNOMIL and ECOMOG, as well as by  
24 influential Liberian groups, to bring about a cessation of

15:07:51 25 hostilities and the disengagement and disarmament of forces have  
26 so far not been successful, it is hoped that the upcoming  
27 Liberian national conference will help define a workable solution  
28 leading to the prompt resumption and completion of the  
29 disarmament process.

1           In view of the slow down in disarmament, a 60 per cent  
2 reduction in the civilian staff at the three operating  
3 demobilisation centres has been effected. However, the remaining  
4 staff will continue to undertake community health, education and  
15:08:33 5 counselling services. Further, with the mobile capability built  
6 into the programme, as many as 150 combatants can be demobilised  
7 daily with a team operating within a radius of 60 miles or two  
8 hours from the existing centres. Once disarmament resumes,  
9 stand-by staff will be immediately reassigned. The national  
15:09:00 10 volunteer programme continues to expand, absorbing some 600  
11 ex-combatants into a labour-extensive food-for-work programme.

12           Large parts of the country, particularly in the west and  
13 the southeast, remain inaccessible to humanitarian organisations  
14 because of fighting and general insecurity."

15:09:32 15           Now, the west, Mr Taylor, where is that?

16 A.   That's around - they must be talking about around Buchanan.  
17 That would be the west.

18 Q.   And the southeast?

19 A.   Sinoe, River Cess, going further down.

15:09:50 20 Q.   And if we go to the top of the page we'll recall mention  
21 being made of LPC attacks against NPFL in the southeast, yes?

22 A.   That is correct.

23 Q.   "Moreover, command and control problems among the various  
24 factions have had a negative impact on the distribution of  
15:10:20 25 humanitarian assistance. Harassment of non-governmental  
26 organisations and United Nations civilian personnel, accompanied  
27 by looting of food stores and trucks and frequent commandeering  
28 of vehicles in both NPFL and ULIMO territories have destabilised  
29 humanitarian assistance supply lines and created a sense of

1 insecurity within the emergency relief community.

2 In spite of these difficult conditions, United Nations and  
3 non-governmental relief organisations continue to make every  
4 effort to assist the displaced people and other vulnerable  
15:11:07 5 groups. Despite the withdrawal last month of UNOMIL from the  
6 western region, several convoys have been dispatched by the World  
7 Food Programme to the area, under ECOMOG escort. Convoys are  
8 also sent periodically from Monrovia to Gbarnga and across the  
9 border from Cote d'Ivoire.

15:11:27 10 Since my last report to the Security Council, displacement  
11 of civilians has been on the increase. In Monrovia the outbreak  
12 of diarrhoeal diseases and a few confirmed cases of cholera  
13 reflect the overcrowding and poor sanitary and health conditions  
14 in sections of the city. Similarly, Buchanan is bursting at the  
15:11:57 15 seams from the steady influx of about 100 displaced persons per  
16 day from the southeast."

17 Who is control of Buchanan at this time?

18 A. We are still in control of Buchanan.

19 Q. "Continued fighting between elements of ULIMO is held  
15:12:15 20 responsible for displacement in Bomi and Grand Cape Mount  
21 Counties in the order of 75,000 people. Reports are being  
22 received of a daily trek of Liberian refugees entering Cote  
23 d'Ivoire at Tabu.

24 Very little information is available for most counties in  
15:12:35 25 the southeast and in upper Lofa. For example, since all  
26 humanitarian activities in Upper Lofa ceased in December 1993,  
27 when ULIMO looted and destroyed the office of the United Nations  
28 High Commissioner for Refugees base camp which served" - page 6  
29 is missing.

1 But just pausing there, Upper Lofa, Mr Taylor, we're now  
2 all familiar with the maps, that is the area which borders both  
3 Kailahun District and Guinea. Is that right?

4 A. That is correct.

15:13:21 5 Q. Controlled by whom?

6 A. ULIMO-K.

7 Q. Page 7 now, shall we, which is the last page which was  
8 presented by the Prosecution, paragraph 29:

9 "I regret to have to report that since my last report to  
10 the Security Council on 24 June the situation in Liberia has  
11 further seriously deteriorated. The factions continue to hold  
12 territory. Command and control problems abound within every  
13 faction. Population displacement from the counties in the  
14 south-east and west continues to grow with every new wave of  
15 fighting and with each report of atrocities against civilians.  
16 ECOMOG is still not fully deployed and UNOMIL has recently  
17 withdrawn from the western region.

18 Rumours of a split within NPFL seem reliable, given the  
19 increasing reports of public executions. The split in ULIMO  
15:14:43 20 remains unresolved. AFL, LPC and the Krahn wing of ULIMO seem to  
21 be realigning with breakaway NPFL officials and are reported to  
22 be preparing a military offensive against NPFL. My special  
23 representative has reminded all Liberians that the United Nations  
24 can play a useful role only if the Liberian National Transitional  
15:15:21 25 Government and the parties have the political will to implement  
26 the Cotonou Agreement of July 1993 and to restore the peace and  
27 stability that the Liberian people have aspired to for so long.  
28 In this context, I welcome the decision of the ECOWAS Heads of  
29 State and Government to reaffirm their commitment to the Cotonou

1 Agreement as the only framework for peace in Liberia.

2 Disarmament has now virtually ceased and there is no clear  
3 prospect as to when elections will or can be held. In fact,  
4 observers fear that some of the parties may prefer to seek a  
15:16:02 5 solution to Liberia's problems through military confrontations  
6 rather than by promoting the democratic process to which they  
7 committed themselves under the Cotonou Agreement. While the  
8 Liberian national conference is not the conference the Security  
9 Council called upon the Liberian National Transitional Government  
15:16:27 10 to organise in order to focus specifically on the pressing issue  
11 of disarmament, many people in Liberia hope that it will  
12 contribute to a reactivation of the peace process and that it  
13 will facilitate an agreement on the key questions of disarmament  
14 and elections. To this end, I have instructed my special  
15:16:53 15 representative to extend support to the conference."

16 Now, Mr Taylor, that's that report presented to you during  
17 your cross-examination. Now, in general terms, Mr Taylor, how  
18 would you describe the situation in Liberia in 1994?

19 A. It starts off very well at the beginning, where the  
15:17:30 20 National Transitional Government is put into place, we send our  
21 representatives, all representatives are there. But I believe  
22 that with the formation of this new armed group that was not in  
23 place in 1991, 1992, and I'm speaking about the LPC, the creation  
24 of this new group by ECOMOG caused a problem of credibility and  
15:17:57 25 distrust. So by the time ECOMOG has encouraged this breakaway  
26 minister and put together this group, and you see here where the  
27 special representative is correct when he says that this  
28 breakaway minister is holding discussions with other groups and  
29 are preparing for an offensive against the NPFL, that did take

1 place eventually; the special representative is correct. And  
2 when did that take place? Round about September, it does take  
3 place. So by this time the whole process has broken down. That  
4 is when ULIMO-K comes from Lofa into Gbarnga. LPC and this  
15:18:39 5 coalition of this breakaway minister, they move from the western  
6 side into Gbarnga and this caused a total breakdown in the peace  
7 process. So by and large I would say it starts off good. By the  
8 middle it begins to deteriorate. By the middle to the end of  
9 '94, the process has stopped.

15:19:04 10 Q. Well, let's just list some of the issues raised in this  
11 document to try and situate it within the context of what is  
12 alleged against you. First of all, it speaks of difficulties  
13 between the two wings of ULIMO, yes?

14 A. That is correct.

15:19:22 15 Q. It talks about the formation of this new group, the LPC,  
16 yes?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. It talks of conflict between the LPC and the NPFL in the  
19 southeast of the country?

15:19:38 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. It also talks about dissension within the ranks of the NPFL  
22 resulting in skirmishes and the departure of your Defence  
23 Minister, Tom Womeiyu?

24 A. That is correct.

15:19:52 25 Q. Yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. It talks of the disarmament process having stalled?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. It talks of general insecurity around the country?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. It talks of attacks upon UNOMIL forces and the theft of  
3 supplies from NGOs, yes, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes.

15:20:17 5 Q. So, Mr Taylor, would you agree it's a somewhat disorganised  
6 situation, a somewhat chaotic situation in Liberia at this time?

7 A. Definitely.

8 Q. And what are you preoccupied with at this time, Mr Taylor,  
9 faced as you were with the departure of Mr Womeiye, fighting in  
10 the southeast with the LPC, attacks from ULIMO-K as you've told  
11 us, what were your priorities?

12 A. Trying to defend NPFL positions after being attacked from  
13 both the west and the east. The west being the LPC and my former  
14 minister and the east by ULIMO-K. So I'm busy fighting two major  
15 fronts.

16 Q. And help us, because we're trying to situate this document  
17 in the overall scheme of things. What are your contacts, if any,  
18 with the RUF at this time?

19 A. None whatsoever. None whatsoever.

15:21:27 20 Q. Or with Foday Sankoh?

21 A. None. Not at all, no. No contacts.

22 Q. Yes. Let's put that document to one side now, please. Let  
23 us now look behind divider 16 at another document presented to  
24 you, MFI-383. Yes, Mr Taylor?

15:22:01 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Now, this document, MFI-383, was put before you on  
27 Thursday, 21 January of this year.

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now, we see that this is a document which goes forward from

1 where we've just been looking to 1997, yes?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Now, we've already looked at two such documents relating to  
4 1997, haven't we, Mr Taylor?

15:22:31 5 A. Yes, we have.

6 Q. The March document, the June document?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. So we go back in time now to the very beginning of that  
9 year?

15:22:42 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. 29 January 1997:

12 "Twenty-first Progress Report of the Secretary-General of  
13 the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia.

14 The present report is submitted pursuant to Security  
15:23:04 15 Council resolution 1083 (1996) dated 27 November 1996, by which  
16 the council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer  
17 Mission in Liberia until 31 March 1997 and requested me to keep  
18 the council informed of the situation in Liberia, especially on  
19 the progress of demobilisation and disarmament. The council also  
15:23:37 20 requested me to submit by 31 January 1997 a progress report and  
21 recommendations on possible United Nations support for the  
22 holding of free and fair elections. The present report reviews  
23 developments in Liberia since my predecessor's last report dated  
24 19 November 1996.

15:24:10 25 Political aspects.

26 During the period under review, some progress has been made  
27 towards the implementation of the Abuja Agreement. The  
28 disarmament and demobilisation process began on schedule on 22  
29 November 1996, but has been hindered by several constraints, as

1 indicated in Section IV of the present report. In accordance  
2 with the revised schedule of implementation of the Abuja  
3 Agreement, the Economic Community of West African States  
4 Monitoring Group has deployed troops in the interior of Liberia  
15:24:49 5 in support of the disarmament process. UNOMIL has also deployed  
6 military observer teams to the disarmament sites.

7 The deep divisions that resurfaced within the Council of  
8 State in the aftermath of the shooting incident at the Executive  
9 Mansion on 31 October 1996 have persisted."

15:25:18 10 Which shooting incident, Mr Taylor?

11 A. The attempted assassination of myself, my person, by  
12 elements connected to the LPC.

13 Q. "However, during their visit to Liberia in mid-January, the  
14 special envoy of the chairman of ECOWAS, Chief Tom Ikimi, Foreign  
15:25:50 15 Minister of Nigeria, the Foreign Minister of Guinea, Mr Lamine  
16 Camara, and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ghana, Mr Mohammed Ibn  
17 Chambas, met separately with the chairman and some members of the  
18 Council of State."

19 Were you there?

15:26:13 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. "The council then met, on 16 January, for the first time  
22 since the 31 October incident. At the meeting, which was held in  
23 the presence of the Economic Community of West African States  
24 delegation, the ECOMOG force commander, my special representative  
15:26:28 25 and others, Chief Ikimi appealed to all members to extend their  
26 fullest cooperation to ensure a successful conclusion of the  
27 Liberian peace process."

28 Then we see at page 3 details are given of the shooting  
29 incident, and we see at paragraph 7 - firstly, that there was no

1 evidence of the involvement of ULIMO high military command and  
2 the investigation into the shooting incident on 31 October at the  
3 Executive Mansion when five persons, including a close personal  
4 aide to Charles Taylor were killed and several injured, is still  
15:27:21 5 underway.

6 Now deployment. Now, this will help us, then, with a more  
7 complete picture of ECOMOG forces deployment throughout that year  
8 of 1997. Do you follow me, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes I do.

15:27:41 10 Q. "The full strength of ECOMOG remains at 7,500 all ranks."

11 Now, we know that by March, from the document we looked at  
12 this morning, it rises to 11,000, yes? Was it 11,000?

13 A. Ten. I think 10. By March I think it's up to 10,000. By  
14 June it's up to 11.

15:28:06 15 Q. Yes, that's right:

16 "To date the additional troops pledged for ECOMOG have not  
17 yet arrived in Liberia, though some of the support pledged by  
18 donor countries is now becoming available. The force commander  
19 has deployed into the interior of Liberia in support of  
15:28:26 20 disarmament process, while retaining a force of sufficient  
21 strength in Monrovia to assist in maintaining its safe haven  
22 status. ECOMOG deployed initially at the designated disarmament  
23 sites of the Barclay Training Centre, Camp Schefflein,  
24 Tubmanburg, Bo Waterside, Kakata, Voinjama, Buchanan, Camp Naama  
15:28:55 25 and Zwedru, and subsequently at three additional sites at  
26 Tappita, Greenville and Harper."

27 Now, Mr Taylor, just looking at that, help me with this:  
28 Now, this is January 1997?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Is Camp Naama still operational at that time?

2 A. Camp Naama is, yes.

3 Q. "ECOMOG has also established buffer zones between ULIMO-J

4 and ULIMO-K in Bomi and Grand Cape Mount Counties, as well as

15:29:41 5 between the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and the Liberian

6 Peace Council in Grand Gedeh County. The creation of a similar

7 buffer between the NPFL and ULIMO-K in Bong and Lofa Counties and

8 between NPFL and LPC in Sinoe, Maryland and Grand Kru Counties,

9 is also be contemplated, but ECOMOG considers that it would

15:30:19 10 require additional troops and logistical support for such a

11 deployment."

12 Pause there. Mr Taylor, were those buffer zones, the ones

13 contemplated, were they ever put in place?

14 A. Yes, they were.

15:30:35 15 Q. When?

16 A. Shortly - I would say about just as we begin the

17 disarmament process. This would be about October, November of

18 1996 going into '97.

19 Q. "With regard to future deployment plans, the ECOMOG force

15:31:10 20 commander has declared that any fighters found with a weapon

21 after 31 January 1997 will be treated as criminals."

22 Now remind us, who is the ECOMOG force commander speaking

23 in these terms at the time?

24 A. Victor Malu.

15:31:24 25 Q. "Following that deadline ECOMOG has indicated that it

26 intends to carry out cordon and search operations to disarm

27 recalcitrant fighters. ECOMOG will also be responsible for

28 providing security for the electoral process.

29 The new chief military observer of UNOMIL, Major General

1 Sikandar Shami, assumed his functions on 16 December 1996. As at  
2 28 January 1997, the military strength of UNOMIL stood at 78  
3 military observers who are deployed at the disarmament sites at  
4 Bo Waterside, Tubmanburg, Kakata, Camp Naama, Voinjama, Zwedru,  
15:32:17 5 Tappita, the Barclay Training Centre, Greenville, Camp Schefflein  
6 and Buchanan. And monitoring teams are also deployed at James  
7 Spriggs Payne Airport and at the seaport in Monrovia."

8 Which is the seaport in Monrovia, Mr Taylor?

9 A. The Freeport in Monrovia.

15:32:47 10 Q. "When the disarmament and demobilisation exercise began on  
11 22 November 1996 as scheduled, UNOMIL and the United Nations  
12 Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office which is responsible  
13 for the operational aspects of demobilisation and for  
14 coordinating bridging and reintegration activities, were facing  
15:33:25 15 severe logistic, financial and manpower constraints. It will be  
16 recalled that during the April 1996 crisis in Monrovia, United  
17 Nations assets were comprehensively looted and owing to the  
18 breakdown of the ceasefire and the deteriorating security  
19 situation, my predecessor was compelled to reduce the strength of  
15:33:51 20 UNOMIL drastically and to adjust the mission's budget to a  
21 minimum level.

22 When the peace process was reactivated with the adoption of  
23 the revised schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement, my  
24 predecessor submitted proposals to the Security Council for  
15:34:13 25 assistance that the United Nations could provide, including  
26 support for disarmament, demobilisation, and the verification of  
27 compliance by the factions. While the Security Council, in a  
28 letter dated 8 November 1996 from the President of the council  
29 addressed to my predecessor, welcomed these proposals and

1 encouraged the Secretary-General to make all appropriate  
2 arrangements necessary to carry them out, it remained concerned  
3 that conditions in Liberia might not be right for the  
4 implementation of the proposals at that time, given the continued  
15:34:56 5 insecurity in some parts of the country. The council also  
6 referred to my predecessor's assurance in paragraph 59 of his 7  
7 October 1996 report that the personnel and logistic resources  
8 needed to implement the proposals would not be deployed unless  
9 the factions took the concrete steps required to implement the  
15:35:23 10 revised timetable of the Abuja Agreement. When the disarmament  
11 and demobilisation exercise began, UNOMIL and HACO did not have  
12 the necessary manpower, financial or logistic resources to carry  
13 out their responsibilities in full. They were operating with the  
14 curtailed level of resources requested, following the aftermath  
15:35:52 15 of the April 1996 crisis, until commitment authority to incur  
16 additional expenditure was granted by the Advisory Committee on  
17 Administrative and Budgetary Questions on 20 December 1996."

18 Now this. You note the line in the margin:

19 "Despite these constraints, UNOMIL was able to deploy two  
15:36:26 20 military observers to each of the designated sites at the Barclay  
21 Training Centre, Camp Schefflein, Tubmanburg..." - ULIMO-J,  
22 Mr Taylor?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Bo Waterside, who's that?

15:36:41 25 A. ULIMO-J.

26 Q. Kakata?

27 A. ULIMO-J.

28 Q. Voi nj ama?

29 A. ULIMO-K.

1 Q. Buchanan?

2 A. NPFL.

3 Q. Camp Naama?

4 A. NPFL.

15:36:52 5 Q. Zwedru?

6 A. LPC.

7 Q. "...on 22 November. HACO also deployed demobilisation  
8 teams to all active sites. Additional sites were subsequently  
9 designated by the ECOMOG forces commander at Tappita."

15:37:14 10 Who, Mr Taylor?

11 A. NPFL.

12 Q. Greenville?

13 A. LPC.

14 Q. Harper?

15:37:20 15 A. LPC.

16 Q. "UNOMIL deployed military observers to Tappita and  
17 Greenville on 19 and 27 December 1996 respectively, followed by  
18 HACO demobilisation teams. Military observers and HACO  
19 demobilisation personnel were expected to be deployed to Harper  
15:37:50 20 by the end of January. The demobilisation exercise coordinated  
21 by HACO is therefore currently being carried out at all  
22 designated disarmament sites."

23 Mr Taylor, I omitted to ask you this. For the record, can  
24 you help us. What does "HACO" stand for?

15:38:11 25 A. I'm sorry, I really don't know.

26 JUDGE DOHERTY: I think it was defined in a preceding  
27 paragraph, Mr Griffiths. I think if you refer to paragraph 12.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination  
29 Office. I'm grateful, your Honour:

1 Q. Now, it continues at paragraph 15, Mr Taylor:

2 "In order to lend credibility to the disarmament and  
3 demobilisation exercise, a fixed ration is given only in exchange  
4 for a serviceable weapon or 100 rounds of ammunition."

15:39:14 5 Now, Mr Taylor, what's a fixed ration?

6 A. A precise amount of food.

7 Q. So was that the quid pro quo for demobilisation?

8 A. That's what they said. Though some of us - I was opposed  
9 to it, but that's what they said they wanted to do.

15:39:40 10 Q. "Reintegration coupons and/or food rations are issued to  
11 the demobilised fighters who are then transported to their final  
12 destinations. ECOMOG has provided limited transportation to make  
13 up for a shortage of vehicles, and additional trucks for UNOMIL  
14 were scheduled to arrive shortly. The World Food Programme has  
15 facilitated disarmament and demobilisation by providing a single  
16 food ration to demobilised combatants who have surrendered a  
17 serviceable weapon. By 26 January 1997, some 596 tons of  
18 assorted food commodities had been distributed to some 12,500  
19 demobilised combatants."

15:40:45 20 Let's now go to page 5:

21 "During the first week of disarmament and demobilisation,  
22 the factions' fighters showed remarkable enthusiasm to disarm,  
23 and turned out in large numbers."

24 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

15:41:07 25 A. Yes, that is true. There is a catch to this, but I will  
26 leave that. It is true.

27 Q. "However, at Zwedru, which is earmarked for LPC, and  
28 Voinjama and Bo Waterside, which are both earmarked for ULIMO-K,  
29 commencement of the process was delayed because of local concerns

1 expressed by the leadership of the factions concerned.

2 During the second week of the exercise the pace of  
3 disarmament started slowing down at all sites. However, as the  
4 present report was being completed, the process gathered speed,  
15:41:51 5 with a surge in the number of disarming fighters over the past 10  
6 days. An ad hoc disarmament site was established at Sawmill on  
7 11 January which resulted in the disarmament of 916 ULIMO-K  
8 fighters. Almost 2,500 fighters were disarmed on 25 and 26  
9 January, along with a significant surrender of heavy weapons by  
15:42:26 10 NPFL at ad hoc disarmament sites established at Gbarnga and  
11 Sanniquellie. ULIMO-J and the Armed Forces of Liberia also  
12 indicated that they would shortly disarm at Tubmanburg and Camp  
13 Schefflein. As of 26 January 1997, a total of 12,510 fighters  
14 had been disarmed and a total of 4,428 serviceable and 1,103  
15:43:10 15 unserviceable weapons surrendered, as well as more than 500,000  
16 pieces of ammunition. At the same time, amid increasing  
17 scepticism, about the declared total of 60,000, a figure  
18 established on the basis of 1993 data, ECOMOG and UNOMIL now  
19 consider that a more realistic estimate of the overall number of  
15:43:37 20 fighters is in the region 33,000. That figure has been conveyed  
21 to all the factions with a request to meet it by the 31 January  
22 deadline."

23 That estimate, that overall estimate of about 33,000,  
24 Mr Taylor, would you agree with that?

15:43:57 25 A. I would disagree.

26 Q. What figure would you put on it?

27 A. Closer to the first figure. Where they went wrong was,  
28 they expected every combatant to have a weapon and that was not  
29 the way that it was. You would have people going to fight,

1 maybe, let's say, a company, about a hundred. The real company  
2 size would be about, let's say, 120. Some go to 144. You would  
3 have about half of the people going into combat without a weapon.  
4 So some people would fight today and you don't see them for  
15:44:47 5 another two, three days, the weapons are made available to other  
6 fighters. And where the problem came from where they only saw  
7 this number of people, everybody came believing that once your  
8 leadership declared you as an ex-combatants, which we had the  
9 rosters, the United Nations and others would accept. But when  
15:45:10 10 they drafted their own designs of what they considered a  
11 combatant, a slow down commenced. And this brings us to a  
12 subject that you haven't raised, so I'll just leave it about,  
13 child soldiers. So everyone looked at this disarmament as a way  
14 to get something. "They're disarming, we'll go, we'll get food,  
15:45:34 15 we get money." So little children went. People that were having  
16 - civilians that never even went, went there and said, "Oh, I'm  
17 an ex-combatant." Children, nine, ten years old, people would  
18 send them as a way of feeding these - some people went there as a  
19 means of getting food to feed their families. So some of these  
15:45:52 20 numbers are large and small because people did not get to  
21 understand what was going on. So I would say the combatants are  
22 closer to the 60,000, but all of them did not have guns and the  
23 international community did not understand at the time what was  
24 going on.

15:46:07 25 Q. "Despite concerted efforts by my special representative  
26 and members of the mediation committee, as well as the ECOMOG  
27 force commander, deep mutual suspicion and mistrust persist among  
28 the factions and constitute the main obstacle to disarmament. As  
29 a result, some local commanders have been actively discouraging

1 their fighters from disarming. In some instances, fighters who  
2 had disarmed without their commanders' consent have been arrested  
3 and punished. In other areas, fighters have been coming to  
4 disarmament sites to disarm under cover of darkness and have been  
15:46:52 5 requesting that they be transported away from these sites for  
6 their safety.

7 It must also be said that the Council of States and the  
8 Liberian National Transitional Government have not been able to  
9 extend their full support to ensure that the fighters disarm.

15:47:12 10 Neither the National Disarmament and Demobilisation Commission,  
11 which is the LNTG agency charged with the responsibility for  
12 coordinating disarmament activities with the factions, nor the  
13 Council of State itself has taken the concerted action required.

14 However, the chairman of the Council of State, Ms Ruth Perry,  
15:47:41 15 addressed the nation on the eve of the exercise and urged the  
16 fighters to come forward to disarm. The chairman also undertook  
17 two trips covering Bomi, Grand Cape Mount, Margibi and Bong  
18 Counties to encourage fighters to disarmament. In this context,  
19 I wrote to the chairman of the Council of State on 14 January  
15:48:02 20 1997 to express concern at the continuing difficulties in the  
21 disarmament process and asking her to urge the faction leaders to  
22 make a serious effort to accelerate it."

23 And then the report goes on to discuss the electoral  
24 process:

15:48:32 25 "It will be recalled that, in keeping with the revised  
26 schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement, the United  
27 Nations received in late October 1996 a formal request from the  
28 Council of State for assistance in developing a suitable  
29 electoral framework for the holding of elections in Liberia by

1 the end of May 1997. Following discussions with ECOWAS, a United  
2 Nations technical survey team arrived in Monrovia on 8 December  
3 1996 and conducted consultations with a wide range of interested  
4 parties, including members of the Council of State and the  
15:49:15 5 representatives of Liberian civil society and the international  
6 community.

7 As requested, the team focused its attention on what steps  
8 would be needed in the prevailing circumstances to create a  
9 viable and credible framework for free and fair elections by the  
15:49:34 10 end of May 1997. It identified three key conditions for success:  
11 A fair and credible political framework; an efficient and  
12 well-planned electoral operation; and adequate support from the  
13 international community. Based on the conclusions of the  
14 technical survey team, a set of draft recommendations were  
15:50:03 15 prepared, dealing primarily with the requirements for  
16 establishing a credible political framework for elections to take  
17 place. The recommendations were also developed on the basis of  
18 the need for the elections to be as inclusive, operationally  
19 simple and cost-effective as possible.

15:50:25 20 On 14 January, I dispatched by Lansana Kouyate, assistant  
21 Secretary-General for Political Affairs, as my special envoy to  
22 the region for consultations on the draft recommendations with  
23 the chairman of ECOWAS, the Head of State of Nigeria, and with  
24 the Liberian parties and civil society. It was proposed to the  
15:50:52 25 chairman of ECOWAS, and accepted by him, that a provisional  
26 electoral package for the forthcoming elections should be enacted  
27 at a special meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine with the  
28 Liberian parties and become an integral part of the Abuja  
29 Agreement. The package would not seek to replace or reform the

1 existing Liberian electoral system, nor to change the country's  
2 constitution, but would serve as a provisional mechanism that  
3 would permit the installation of a government of national unity  
4 and pave the way for a return to constitutional order. It is  
15:51:41 5 expected that the meeting of the Committee of Nine and the  
6 Liberian parties will take place in mid-February and be held at  
7 the summit level.

8 My special envoy found that, while there was broad  
9 agreement among Liberians on many of the ideas suggested by the  
15:52:02 10 technical team, some did not elicit the same degree of support.  
11 Moreover, the inflexible tone of some of the reactions,  
12 especially on the part of certain of the faction leaders, could  
13 be cause for concern. The features of the electoral  
14 recommendations that require further discussion include the  
15:52:25 15 number of chambers in the legislative assembly; whether there  
16 should be a run-off in the presidential elections; the  
17 composition of the electoral commission; voting by refugees; and  
18 the role to be played by ECOWAS and the United Nations."

19 Pause there, Mr Taylor. That seems like quite a list of  
15:52:48 20 matters up for discussion, Mr Taylor.

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And how much of your time was this occupying?

23 A. I was fully engaged in this process. I was one of those  
24 opposed to all of this. I was fully involved in that process.

15:53:09 25 Q. Opposed to what?

26 A. Some of these recommendations that came, I have been a  
27 constitutionalist all the way. My whole idea was, when you begin  
28 to talk about the number of assemblies in - the number of houses  
29 in our assembly, you're dealing with constitutional problems.

1 And my whole thing was that there was no need for all of this.  
2 Take the constitution of Liberia, follow it and there will be no  
3 need for all of this other discussion. And so all of these about  
4 a transitional government and - I just felt was going too far and  
15:53:45 5 treaded on the sovereignty of Liberia. I was opposed to that, so  
6 I was involved in this.

7 Q. Well, help me, Mr Taylor, it is relevant. Were these  
8 matters which you delegated to other members of your team or were  
9 they matters in which you engaged personally?

15:54:05 10 A. No. Personally, I'm engaged with them on the council  
11 level. I'm engaged with them on the council level. Other  
12 members of the team were discussing, but the NPFL's position was  
13 that anything that would be taken outside of the constitution was  
14 unacceptable. That was just our position.

15:54:24 15 Q. "It is hoped that these questions will be resolved through  
16 a fully constructive approach by all the parties, including the  
17 Liberian factions, as further steps are taken towards the holding  
18 of free and fair elections in Liberia. Such steps must be taken  
19 urgently if the elections are to be held on schedule by the end  
15:54:51 20 of May 1997.

21 While it is clear that UNOMIL could, in addition to its  
22 present observation and verification mandate, play a key role in  
23 matters such as coordinating international electoral support and  
24 managing the international trust fund for elections, it will be  
15:55:11 25 necessary to await enactment of the electoral package before a  
26 clear determination can be made as to how UNOMIL and the United  
27 Nations system can best provide support for the elections. Once  
28 the package is enacted and the political and organisational  
29 frameworks have been established, specific recommendations on the

1 role of UNOMIL will be submitted to the Security Council. It is  
2 anticipated that these recommendations would be based upon joint  
3 coordination of the elections by the United Nations and ECOWAS."

4 Then we now come to human rights.

5 "The report of CFVC on the Sinje massacre is referred to in  
6 paragraph 6 above."

7 What's the Sinje massacre, Mr Taylor?

8 A. I think there was some killing in Sinje. This is Grand  
9 Cape Mount County.

15:56:15 10 Q. Who was responsible?

11 A. That's ULIMO-J.

12 Q. "In addition the human rights officer is conducting a  
13 parallel inquiry to ascertain the whereabouts and well-being of  
14 the persons who were abducted and who remain missing. UNOMIL has  
15 also received reports about a series of massacres and other  
16 violations that took place at the end of September 1996 in Bomi  
17 and Grand Cape Mount Counties..."

18 Who controlled those two counties?

19 A. ULIMO-J.

15:56:56 20 Q. "...which are believed to be linked to the Sinje massacre.

21 UNOMIL is conducting investigations into four other  
22 incidents related to human rights which took place in December.  
23 On 1 December 1996, three Ministry of Education personnel were  
24 abducted in Congo Town, just outside Monrovia. According to  
25 newspaper reports, the three were flogged and then killed after  
26 tyres were placed around their necks and set on fire. However,  
27 the deaths of the abducted individuals have not been established.

28 Another investigation now being finalised concerns the  
29 Bloun Town massacre on 7 December 1996, when at least 11

1 civilians were hacked to death. The attack represented the  
2 culmination of a series of clashes in the area over a two-month  
3 period between ULIMO-J fighters and members of the so-called  
4 Congo Defence Force which is affiliated with ULIMO-K.

15:58:15 5 On 14 December 1996, four persons were killed when the taxi  
6 in which they were travelling along the Bomi Highway en route to  
7 Tubmanburg was ambushed by armed men."

8 Who controlled that area?

9 A. ULIMO-J.

15:58:31 10 Q. "The UNOMIL investigation into the incident is continuing.

11 On 16 January 1997, six persons were killed by armed  
12 fighters on Bomi Highway. Five out of the six victims were  
13 identified as ULIMO-J fighters. Accusations are being levelled  
14 at the Congo Defence Force.

15:58:57 15 Reports of other recent apparent or alleged human rights  
16 violations received by UNOMIL include the harassment and  
17 detention of members of the international humanitarian community  
18 by ULIMO-J fighters at Vonzula, Grand Cape Mount County,  
19 resulting in the suspension of humanitarian assistance to the  
15:59:24 20 area on 26 December 1996, as well as the discovery of more than  
21 100 skeletons at Greenville Hospital in December 1996."

22 Who controlled Greenville Hospital?

23 A. LPC.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, have another look over those six paragraphs  
15:59:47 25 under the heading "VI Human Rights". Is there a mention of the  
26 NPFL there?

27 A. No.

28 Q. Let's look at "Humanitarian Aspects" because of paragraph  
29 34, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But to put paragraph 34 in context, let's start at  
3 paragraph 31:

4 "The financial commitment authority of \$10 million granted  
16:00:37 5 by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary  
6 Questions included an amount of 1.71 million for the purpose of  
7 initial reintegration or so-called bridging activities. HACO  
8 will coordinate these activities, channelling funds to  
9 implementing partners. In addition, both the European Union and  
16:01:04 10 USAID have made funds available for this programme, as have  
11 United Nations agencies, particularly the World Food Program, in  
12 supporting all food-for-work activities, and UNDP, through the  
13 United Nations Office For Project Services.

14 To date, a limited number of bridging programmes have been  
16:01:28 15 implemented where logistics and security conditions permit. WFP,  
16 EU and UNDP/Office for Project Services have embarked on a civil  
17 reconstruction team bridging programme in support of the  
18 demobilisation exercise.

19 The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations  
16:01:57 20 will play a major role in the resettlement and reintegration  
21 exercise by providing basic agricultural inputs, as well as  
22 technical support, in order to enable the resumption of  
23 productive farming activities.

24 Child soldiers are receiving special attention in the  
16:02:16 25 reintegration exercise. Statistics on disarmed fighters indicate  
26 that child fighters constitute almost 30 per cent of the total  
27 number of combatants, of which it might be possible to reunite 90  
28 per cent with their families. Operating within the framework  
29 adopted by the Demobilisation Task Force, the United Nations

1 Children's Fund has played a leading role in the demobilisation  
2 and reintegration of child soldiers, together with international  
3 and national non-governmental organisations. Some 3,000 child  
4 fighters have been demobilised since 22 November 1996."

16:03:11 5 Now, Mr Taylor, based on those statistics, yes, let's just  
6 flick back quickly to paragraph 17 and see what the implications  
7 are. Have you got paragraph 17?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Remember you told us that the number of combatants was  
16:03:36 10 closer to the 60,000 figure than the 33,000 figure? Remember  
11 that?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Go back now to paragraph 34. 30 per cent of 60,000, which  
14 is the figure you give, is what? You're the maths teacher.

16:03:57 15 A. That's almost a third.

16 Q. It's almost a third, isn't it?

17 A. I would put it to around 17,000, 18,000.

18 Q. So 17,000, 18,000 children according to this, yes?

19 A. That's - yes, according to that, but that's total nonsense.

16:04:20 20 Q. Why do you say it's total nonsense, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Because these people that came never listened, and that's  
22 the problem in some of these international tribunals right now in  
23 dealing with child soldiers. When these demobilisation and  
24 disarmament programmes started, especially in Liberia - and I'm  
16:04:36 25 sure it has happened in other places - the children that went to  
26 those places had nothing to do with the combat. This - everyone  
27 misunderstood the whole process that was going on. It was a way  
28 that people saw of getting over. Families deliberately sent  
29 their children to demobilisation centres hoping to get something.

1 People were - people thought that they would be paid money and  
2 different things. So when you look at this whole issue of child  
3 soldiers, I'm in no position to say that, I mean, in some of  
4 these conflicts you did not have young people fighting. But  
16:05:15 5 these numbers are totally wrong, because people went there that  
6 were not soldiers. If you call one of those soldiers - I mean,  
7 those kids and ask them who trained you, what was your training,  
8 they wouldn't be able to tell you because they went there seeking  
9 some enhancement, and this is what families did. So the  
16:05:37 10 reuniting process of 90 per cent, I disagree. I say 100 per cent  
11 could be reunited. Everyone came from a home and went to this  
12 place. There was no, like, lost children --  
13 Q. What significance do you attach to that? 90 per cent of  
14 that 17,000 to 18,000 children, they were confident, could be  
16:05:55 15 reunited with their families. What do you say about that,  
16 Mr Taylor?  
17 A. Because, I mean, I would - in fact, I said I would put it  
18 even higher. Because these people were never lost in the first  
19 place, so when you ask someone, "Where's your mother?" he will  
16:06:10 20 tell you where his mother is or, "Where's your father?" They  
21 were just people taking a chance, a lot of this, to get some  
22 little benefit. So I would say 100 per cent of these children  
23 that they're referring to could be reunited. After seven years  
24 of civil war in any normal mind with children that are lost and  
16:06:31 25 disjointed, you would be able to reunite 90 per cent with their  
26 families when their families in some instances could have been  
27 killed? How do you reunite? It simply means that most of these  
28 people were not combatants and we - the NPFL, for my part, we  
29 told these people - we told them. But when they come, they know

1 everything. When they come, they don't listen to nobody. But  
2 this is just - it's totally - the figures are right, but they got  
3 it all wrong.

4 Q. "UNDP has approved an emergency assistance project for key  
16:07:17 5 public institutions in order to enable them effectively to  
6 participate in the reintegration programme. These include the  
7 Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs, Education,  
8 Agriculture, Commerce and Justice, and the Budget Bureau. In  
9 order to improve safety at Spriggs Payne Airport, one of the  
16:07:41 10 major channels for emergency assistance, UNDP has provided a  
11 mobile control tower, which has been operational since December  
12 1996.

13 Since my predecessor's last report, the level of  
14 humanitarian assistance has modestly increased, though  
16:08:08 15 humanitarian activities continue to be impeded by the lack of  
16 secure access to many areas of Liberia. UNICEF supports  
17 sanitation, water, education and health programmes and has  
18 started a national vaccination campaign with the World Health  
19 Organisation in collaboration with the county health teams.  
16:08:35 20 World Food Programme provides relief food to the vulnerable and  
21 to displaced people in the shelters and has launched a school  
22 feeding programme. During the reporting period, WHO has  
23 maintained its support for the health delivery system in the  
24 country through the reactivation of health services and the  
16:08:59 25 supply of medical equipment and drugs, as well as undertaking  
26 epidemiological monitoring and the training of health workers.  
27 FAO has resumed its activities and is currently engaged in  
28 planning for the coming agricultural season. FAO is also  
29 updating the plans and strategies drawn up last year for

1 agricultural activities, as well as for food security.

2 Owing to the slow pace of implementation of the Abuja  
3 Agreement, as well as the frequent violations of the agreement by  
4 the factions, the office of the United Nations High Commission  
16:09:48 5 for Refugees has not yet resumed planning for the organised  
6 return of Liberian refugees from the surrounding countries. It  
7 is hoped that, following the disarmament exercise, conditions  
8 will permit UNHCR to begin to plan for the voluntary return of  
9 the refugees.

16:10:11 10 The Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat  
11 and UNDP jointly launched, on 23 December 1996, the United  
12 Nations consolidated interagency appeal and the United Nations  
13 system interagency appeal for community rehabilitation and peace  
14 programmes in Liberia. The documents focus on the continuation  
16:10:43 15 of humanitarian activities, the reintegration of the affected  
16 population, and the rehabilitation of basic social  
17 infrastructures and governance activities. The Department of  
18 Humanitarian Affairs is coordinating the humanitarian assistance  
19 activities, while UNDP is coordinating long-term  
16:11:10 20 reintegration/rehabilitation activities."

21 And then we come to part VIII, "Economic and Social  
22 Aspects":

23 "Since the 6 April upheaval in Monrovia, economic  
24 activities, especially retail and wholesale trade in food and  
16:11:39 25 general merchandise, have revived to about 70 per cent of the  
26 level of the period before 6 April. The exchange rate has  
27 strengthened to Liberian dollar 52 to US dollar 1 as of 15  
28 December 1996, from a rate of Liberian dollar 80 to US dollar 1  
29 on 1 July 1996. The prices of gasoline, rice and other basic

1 commodities have also relatively declined. However, high  
2 unemployment and arrears in the payment of salaries leave the  
3 general population still unable to meet its basic needs without  
4 humanitarian and development assistance.

16:12:28 5 With UNDP funding, the International Labour Organisation  
6 has started a vocational training programme in order to increase  
7 the availability of skilled labour and jobs. Collaborative  
8 assistance also includes educational support, electricity supply  
9 to the JF Kennedy Memorial Hospital and planning for the  
16:13:00 10 initiation of a governance programme, including continued  
11 assistance for the holding of free and fair elections.

12 FAO resumed operations in Liberia in September 1996 with  
13 the appointment of an emergency coordinator. The primary  
14 objective of the operation is to improve the coordination  
16:13:26 15 mechanism in the agricultural sector, with a view to designing a  
16 strategy to enhance the country's food security.

17 With UNDP funding, the World Health Organisation is  
18 strengthening a rapid epidemic response task force through an  
19 active national disease surveillance system. This initiative  
16:13:47 20 will enhance the government's ability to plan and monitor disease  
21 trends in the country, especially during repatriation,  
22 resettlement and reintegration. The World Health Organisation is  
23 also implementing the community and social mobilisation and  
24 empowerment for health and development programme, the goal of  
16:14:15 25 which is to build on people's own capacity and initiative for  
26 health action.

27 Over the past two and one half months, the Liberian peace  
28 process has witnessed some positive developments. The  
29 disarmament and demobilisation process began on schedule on 22

1 November 1996."

2 So pause there, Mr Taylor. There's a certain symmetry  
3 then, is there not, between the Abidjan Peace Agreement, yes, and  
4 the start of demobilisation in Liberia?

16:15:06 5 A. I would agree.

6 Q. There's a certain - both November 1996, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. "... and, as of 26 January, more than 12,500 fighters,  
9 including approximately 3,000 child fighters, had been disarmed  
10 and demobilised, handing in their weapons and ammunition as they  
11 did so. While this is not a negligible achievement, it  
12 represents little more than a third of the estimated total number  
13 of fighters in the country. The significant rise in the number  
14 of fighters disarming during the past week can be attributed  
15 partly to the public support recently given to this process by  
16 faction leaders. However, some of the smaller factions have yet  
17 to show positive results. At the time of writing, despite these  
18 hopeful signs of compliance, it appears unlikely that the  
19 disarmament process can be effectively completed by 31 January.  
16:16:01 20 I note, in this context, the intention of ECOMOG to use vigorous  
21 measures thereafter to ensure the maximum possible level of  
22 security.

23 Preparations for the elections continue. The support  
24 expressed for this process by interested donor countries and by  
16:16:54 25 the chairman of ECOWAS and Head of States of Nigeria and his  
26 agreement that a special joint meeting of the Committee of Nine  
27 and the Liberian parties should be called in mid-February at the  
28 summit level, are welcome. It is to be hoped that those faction  
29 leaders who have criticised some elements of the electoral

1 recommendations will nevertheless continue to assist in their  
2 elaboration and take part in elections that all agree to be  
3 necessary. In this context, I welcome the 16 January meeting of  
4 the Council of State, to first to be held since the shooting  
16:17:40 5 incident of 31 October 1996, and express my appreciation for the  
6 efforts of Foreign Minister Chief Tom Ikimi of Nigeria, the  
7 Foreign Minister of Guinea, Mr Lamine Camara and the Deputy  
8 Foreign Minister of Ghana, Mr Mohammed Ibn Chambas in that  
9 regard. I call on the faction leaders to continue to meet  
16:18:11 10 regularly and to work together.

11 It is also encouraging to note that the second ECOWAS  
12 verification and assessment meeting reaffirmed ECOWAS  
13 determination to ensure strict compliance with the revised  
14 schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement.

16:18:34 15 Despite these positive developments, the security situation  
16 in Liberia remains volatile. Outbreaks of sporadic  
17 interfactional fighting have continued, mainly between the two  
18 ULIMO factions on the one hand, while LPC continues to harbour  
19 deep suspicion against NPFL on the other. These incidents cast  
16:19:03 20 doubt on the commitment of the factions to the peace process. I  
21 do not believe the international community will be prepared to  
22 support the holding of elections unless they take place in a  
23 reasonably secure environment. The ECOMOG role in ensuring the  
24 security of the elections will be particularly important. For  
16:19:30 25 that reason, I urge member states to assist ECOWAS countries that  
26 have pledged additional troops to ECOMOG to enable them to reach  
27 the mission area and to assist in providing ECOMOG with resources  
28 for the maintenance of their transportation assets. The aid of  
29 the international community is also essential in supporting

1 bridging programmes to sustain demobilised combatants and to  
2 hasten the reintegration programme planned by the United Nations  
3 and the donor community.

4 As the preparations for the Liberian elections advance, in  
16:20:18 5 accordance with the tight schedule mandated by the 31 May  
6 deadline, I will keep the situation there under particularly  
7 careful review and advise the Security Council accordingly."

8 And, Mr Taylor, if we can just quickly look over the page  
9 we see a table setting out the number of - the military component  
16:20:54 10 of UNOMIL. That's the UN's observer mission.

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. And we see they come from a widespread of countries, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And we have some 71 military observers, yes?

16:21:08 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. 78 non-military observers, it would appear, yes?

17 A. No, I think --

18 Q. No, I'm sorry. Sorry. My fault. Seven medical staff, and  
19 when the two are added together we come to 78.

16:21:28 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Now, let's just go over the page now, Mr Taylor, and have a  
22 look at a couple of other tables. And can I seek your  
23 assistance, yes?

24 A. Yes.

16:21:44 25 Q. According to this, NPFL had something like an estimated  
26 strength of 12,500. You see that?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. What do you say to that figure?

29 A. It was higher. Higher.

1 Q. How much higher would you say it was?

2 A. I would put the NPFL fighting force to about 25,000.

3 Q. Right. So I'm going to write in in red ink next to that  
4 25,000. So you would submit that this estimate is about 50 per  
16:22:33 5 cent out?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Now, just going across the top column, according to this  
8 estimate over 50 per cent of NPFL forces - fighters had disarmed  
9 by this time, yes?

16:22:56 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. But if what you're telling us --

12 MS HOLLIS: Well, for clarity, which figure are we using?  
13 Because this 54 per cent is the 12,500 that Mr Taylor says is  
14 incorrect. So if it's 25,000, it's a lot less than 54 per cent.

16:23:20 15 MR GRIFFITHS: More like 25 per cent.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, I think that this  
17 clarification is soon being gotten to.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I was just about to come to that:

19 Q. Because if your estimate is correct, Mr Taylor, then we're  
16:23:33 20 talking more like 25 per cent having disarmed, aren't we?

21 A. That is correct.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, was it 54 per cent of your  
23 figure of 25,000 or was it 6,700 people that were disarmed?  
24 Which is it? It can't be both.

16:24:03 25 THE WITNESS: No, the 6,700 are the individuals that  
26 disarmed from the 12,500 as shown on this page and that - I look  
27 at that 54 per cent as being - 6,770 would be 54 per cent of  
28 12,500. That's how I calculate it. That's my reading of this.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, but we're asking your opinion -

1 counsel is asking your opinion: Is that correct? Would you say  
2 that 54 per cent of the NPFL fighters disarmed? Your 54 per  
3 cent, not the author's 54 per cent.

4 THE WITNESS: I understand exactly what you're saying,  
16:24:49 5 Madam President. I understand exactly what you're saying. The  
6 way how the question is put, because I have looked at fighters in  
7 total. So, I mean, the way you put the question, this is 54 per  
8 cent and I agree with it. Now, if you're talking about the total  
9 NPFL strength, which I say is about 25,000, then we're talking  
16:25:08 10 about a different percentage. Maybe I got you wrong.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. All right. Let's look at this in another way. Let's start  
13 and break it down in simple terms. This table professes to show  
14 breakdown of disarmament by faction as of 26 January 1997. Okay?

16:25:31 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. The first column we see is a revised estimated strength,  
17 yes? And if we look at the asterisk, we see that that includes  
18 101 fighters disarmed on 7 September 1996 at Voinjama prior to  
19 the start of official disarmament on 22 November 1996, okay?

16:25:58 20 A. Yes, yes.

21 Q. With us so far, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So that figure is an estimate.

24 A. That is correct, it's an estimate.

16:26:05 25 Q. But you disagree with it because you say it should be more  
26 like 25,000, right?

27 A. Yeah. See, the way you put it, but the asterisk there does  
28 not apply to the NPFL.

29 Q. No, it doesn't. Ignore the asterisk, all right? That

1 figure of 12,500 we know to be an estimate, yes?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. You disagree with that estimate and say it should be more  
4 like 25,000, right?

16:26:34 5 A. Well, that was not your original question, no. I agree  
6 with this estimate. Your first question was about the NPFL  
7 fighters, the original - some two minutes ago. I agree with this  
8 estimate. From their perspective of those people that came  
9 forward to disarm, I agree with that.

16:26:54 10 Q. I am totally confused now and I'm sure it's my fault.

11 JUDGE DOHERTY: May I clarify. The fighters disarmed,  
12 would that figure come from the official records from the  
13 disarmament centres?

14 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

16:27:11 15 JUDGE DOHERTY: And the other is an estimate.

16 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: It being an estimate of the total  
18 strength of a given faction. Not of the disarmament, but of the  
19 total strength of a given faction?

16:27:27 20 THE WITNESS: I would say yes. Yes.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. All right. Let's put it in a different way, Mr Taylor.  
23 Just going across that first column, bearing in mind that the  
24 6,770 figure are the numbers who have in fact disarmed, are you  
16:27:49 25 with me?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. So of those three figures, which is the only one that can  
28 be stated with any certainty? Do you follow me?

29 A. The only one that can be stated with any certainty is the

1 6,770.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, so far as the 12,500 are concerned, which  
3 is their estimate?

4 A. Yes.

16:28:08 5 Q. Do you agree with it?

6 A. I don't have any problem. That's their estimate. But I  
7 have said officially I disagree. If this estimate is a global  
8 picture of the strength of the NPFL, I don't agree. But they  
9 have done this estimate and I disagree with their total - with  
16:28:27 10 this total amount.

11 Q. Well, I think I'm back to where I felt comfortable  
12 originally. So let's now look at the other figures, shall we?  
13 ULIMO's strength is estimated at 6,800 and that's ULIMO-K, you  
14 recall?

16:28:50 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Of whom 3,507, 51.57 per cent disarmed, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And we can see the figures for the other factions, and we  
19 needn't waste time going through them, okay?

16:29:09 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. But just to get a picture, when one adds ULIMO-K and  
22 ULIMO-J together we're looking at a force of close to 11,000,  
23 aren't we?

24 A. That is correct.

16:29:19 25 Q. So ULIMO, on the basis of this, looks to have a force  
26 almost the same size on their estimate as the NPFL. Is that  
27 right?

28 A. That is correct.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm afraid the tape has

1 advisedly run out. I don't know how you wish to proceed. If you  
2 have many more questions, we can deal with this tomorrow.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay, I have many more questions, so we can  
4 deal with it tomorrow.

16:29:58 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, I caution you, as we normally  
6 do, not to discuss your evidence. The proceedings are adjourned  
7 to tomorrow at 9.30 in the morning.

8 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.  
9 to be reconvened on Thursday, 18 February 2010  
16:30:12 10 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	35167
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GRIFFITHS	35167