



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 1 DECEMBER 2008
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Teresa Doherty, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice Al Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr William Romans
Ms Carolyn Buff

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Momodu Tarawalie

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Christopher Santora
Mr Alain Werner
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Terry Munday
Mr Morris Anyah
Ms Amina Graham

1 Monday, 1 December 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:29:23 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning, Mr Santora.

6 MR SANTORA: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours.

7 Good morning, counsel opposite. Madam President, for the

8 Prosecution this morning is Brenda Hollis, Alain Werner, Maja

9 Dimitrova and myself Christopher Santora.

09:30:16 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Munyard.

11 MR MUNYARD: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,

12 counsel opposite. For the Defence this morning there is

13 Courtenay Griffiths QC, Morris Anyah and myself Terry Munyard.

14 Madam President, before we commence any of the proceedings

09:30:37 15 on I think Wednesday morning of last week, certainly on a working

16 day before the Court rose for the judges plenary, I wrote an

17 email to my learned friends opposite asking them to ensure that

18 the tape recordings that the next witness refers to in a number

19 of his statements - that the tapes themselves are brought to

09:31:03 20 Court so that we can see them. I haven't yet had any reply to

21 that email and therefore I am just inquiring through the Bench,

22 as it were, if those tapes have been brought to Court and are

23 available for us to inspect.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: These tapes were referred to in the

09:31:23 25 schedule of prospective pieces of evidence that may be tendered

26 through the witness or might be exhibited?

27 MR MUNYARD: Well, Madam President, I will hold up the

28 file. A lot of that is transcripts of the tape recordings. That

29 is Prosecution disclosure.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see.

2 MR MUNYARD: I hope that answers your question.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think so. Yes, Mr Santora.

09:31:51

4 MR SANTORA: Madam President, I am informed that the
5 original tapes have been brought to Court for this witness.

6 MR MUNYARD: I am very grateful.

09:32:10

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think that disposes of that. When we
8 adjourned on Wednesday we had outstanding the tender of the
9 exhibits that were produced and marked for identification through
10 the last witness. Mr Griffiths, you indicated that there was no
11 objection to the tender of those documents from the Prosecution.
12 That still stands?

09:32:30

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Our position remains the same, Madam
14 President, so I do not anticipate any difficulty in exhibiting
15 those.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: I know it's not your witness, Mr Santora,
17 it was Mr Koumjian's witness.

18 MR SANTORA: It is, Madam President. I am informed
19 Mr Koumjian is indisposed this morning.

09:32:44

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am sorry to hear that.

09:33:09

21 MR SANTORA: However, he did indicate to me a note with
22 regard these MFIs. There are two that the Prosecution is
23 submitting should be marked confidentially. That is MFI-7A and B
24 and then MFI-9. So actually technically three that should be
25 marked as confidential. Just for the record, I don't believe on
26 Wednesday these were actually submitted for admission. So at
27 this point then, if it's appropriate, the Prosecution would
28 submit for admission the MFIs in block and I can read them out.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: It is correct that there was no actual

1 tender on the last hearing day, but Mr Griffiths had made a
2 general indication that there would be no objection. However,
3 according to my notes - and I am trying to go through quickly - I
4 do not record that any of the MFIs were marked confidential when
09:34:30 5 marked for identification. I will seek confirmation or otherwise
6 from Madam Court Officer if my notes or recollection are
7 accurate.

8 MS IRURA: Your Honour, that is the position.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: In which case I will go through these one
09:34:49 10 by one and when I come to those that you seek to have marked as
11 confidential I will invite a response from counsel for the
12 Defence.

13 MR SANTORA: Thank you, Madam President.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Therefore I will go through these one at
09:35:05 15 a time and mark them individually. The first is MFI-1. It is a
16 photograph as identified by the witness and it becomes
17 Prosecution exhibit P-254.

18 [Exhibit P-254 admitted]

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: The next document is again a one page
09:35:34 20 document, a photograph, MFI-5. It becomes Prosecution exhibit
21 P-255.

22 [Exhibit P-255 admitted]

23 The next document, there are two, MFI-6A and 6B. They are
24 photographs as identified by the witness and taken by the
09:36:02 25 witness. They become Prosecution exhibit P-256A and 256B.

26 [Exhibit P-256A and P-256B admitted]

27 The next document is again a photograph and again there are
28 two related photographs as identified by the witness. They
29 become Prosecution exhibits P-257A and B and there is also an

1 application to have them marked as confidential. These are
2 photographs of Addis Ababa airport, Mr Griffiths. Have you any
3 objection to the application for confidentiality?

09:37:00

4 MR GRIFFITHS: No, I don't, Madam President, because in
5 light of the other protective measures afforded this particular
6 witness I can appreciate why in this instance the application is
7 being made, so we have no objection.

09:37:20

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Therefore they become
9 Prosecution exhibit P-257A and 257B. They will be marked
10 confidential.

11 [Exhibit P-257A and P-257B admitted]

12 The next document is also a photograph identified by the
13 witness. It becomes Prosecution exhibit P-258A and travelling
14 with it is 258B. Again, photographs taken by the witness.

09:37:52

15 [Exhibit P-258A and P-258B admitted]

16 The next document is again a photograph, MFI-9, in which
17 the witness identified certain persons and there is an
18 application for that to be marked confidential, Mr Griffiths.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Same reasoning applies, Madam President.

09:38:29

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. It does include a photograph
21 of the witness as identified by him. It becomes Prosecution
22 exhibit 259 and it will be confidential.

23 [Exhibit P-259 admitted]

09:38:55

24 The next document is a photograph identified by the witness
25 and it has another photograph again of persons identified by the
26 witness travelling with it. They become Prosecution exhibit 260A
27 and 260B.

28 [Exhibit P-260A and P-260B admitted]

29 The next document is again a photograph identified by the

1 witness and with certain persons identified on it. It becomes -
2 sorry, I will just note that that was MFI-10B. The next document
3 is MFI-11 and it is a Defence document.

09:39:59 4 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, that is the schedule I put
5 together of interviews and payments made to the witness.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: It is indeed, Mr Griffiths.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: I ask that be exhibited, Madam President.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Santora?

9 MR SANTORA: No objection.

09:40:16 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: There is no objection to this exhibit.

11 It becomes Defence exhibit D-75.

12 [Exhibit D-75 admitted]

13 I think that deals with all matters relating to the
14 previous witness who has been discharged and I will then ask the
09:40:47 15 Prosecution who their next witness will be.

16 MR SANTORA: Madam President, the next witness is TF1-274.
17 Prior to calling this witness, the Prosecution would like to make
18 a submission with regards to this witness's protective measures.
19 This witness was formally covered - is covered under the
09:41:08 20 protective measures decision by Trial Chamber I of the Special
21 Court for Sierra Leone of 5 July 2004. This witness was listed
22 in the submitted annex by the Prosecution to that decision of 4
23 May 2004. The witness was Category C witness on that submission
24 - the May submission - listed as number 15 in the 4 May 2004
09:41:40 25 annex.

26 After consultation with the witness, the Prosecution is
27 seeking to rescind the protective measures that currently apply
28 to this witness to allow him to testify openly. Specifically,
29 the Prosecution is seeking to rescind of the 5 July 2004 decision

1 provisions (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (i), except as
2 relates - except with relations to portions (b) and (c)
3 concerning the witness's addresses and whereabouts.

09:42:34 4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just to make sure we are all ad idem on
5 this, Mr Santora, there will not be use of a pseudonym in the
6 course of the hearing, but there will be a retention of the
7 address and whereabouts under (b) and (c)?

8 MR SANTORA: That's correct, Madam President.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: There will not be a screening device?

09:42:55 10 MR SANTORA: That's correct.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: And there will not be voice distortion?

12 MR SANTORA: That's correct.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am not sure which counsel for the
14 Defence it is?

09:43:06 15 MR MUNYARD: Myself, Madam President.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Munyard, you have heard the
17 application.

18 MR MUNYARD: Yes. The 5 July 2005 - I am sorry, the 5 July
19 2004 decision on the face of it does appear to have applied
09:43:24 20 correctly to this witness. The Defence obviously have no
21 difficulty with today's application by the Prosecution, nor would
22 we seek to press this witness, or indeed any witness, unless it
23 was overwhelmingly relevant for details of their address and
24 whereabouts.

09:43:50 25 [Trial Chamber conferred]

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: We have considered the application and we
27 note that it is not opposed and we grant the application for
28 rescission of those protective measures given on 5 July 2004 in
29 accordance with counsel's application.

1 I note that the screen is down, Mr Santora, so in the light
2 of your application and the order I will direct that it is
3 raised. Is that appropriate?

09:44:21

4 MR SANTORA: That is appropriate. Just for the Court's
5 benefit, the witness will testify in Krio. I will wait.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Krio interpreters are in position?

7 THE INTERPRETER: Yes.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very good.

9 MR SANTORA: And the witness will be swearing on the Bible.

09:45:49

10 WITNESS: DAUDA ARUNA FORNIE [Sworn]

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please proceed, Mr Santora.

12 MR SANTORA: Thank you, Madam President.

13 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR SANTORA:

14 Q. Good morning, Mr Witness.

09:47:29

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, Mr witness, before I ask you any questions I want you
17 to remember to speak slowly. It's very important that you speak
18 slowly so that people can understand what you are saying, okay?

19 A. Yes.

09:47:49

20 Q. First of all, Mr Witness, can you state your name for the
21 Court?

22 A. My name is Dauda Aruna Fornie.

23 Q. Go ahead and spell your name for the Court.

24 A. D-A-U-D-A, A-R-U-N-A, F-O-R-N-I-E.

09:48:17

25 Q. And do you go by any other name?

26 A. Yes, I have other nicknames.

27 Q. What is that?

28 A. Daf. Those are my initials, Dauda Aruna Fornie. I have
29 another nickname that is Solution and then I have another which

1 is Blue Diamond.

2 Q. Okay. Now, just for the record you said D-A-F. Is that
3 correct?

4 A. Yes.

09:49:01 5 Q. When were you born, Mr Witness?

6 A. 8 March 1975.

7 Q. And were you born in Sierra Leone?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Where in Sierra Leone?

09:49:23 10 A. Torma Bum, Bum Chiefdom, Bonthe District, southern region.

11 MR SANTORA: Just for your Honours just to note, this
12 witness can spell and so I was going to defer spellings to him
13 unless it has been on the record before.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. That seems appropriate,

09:49:41 15 Mr Santora.

16 MR SANTORA:

17 Q. Go ahead and just spell the name of your village that you
18 were born in for the record.

19 A. T-O-R-M-A, Torma.

09:50:00 20 Q. Did you say Torma or Torma Bum before?

21 A. Torma is the village and Bum is the chiefdom.

22 Q. Go ahead and spell the name of the chiefdom.

23 A. B-U-M C-H-I-E-F-D-O-M. Bum Chiefdom.

24 Q. Did you have the opportunity to attend school?

09:50:27 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. How far did you reach in school?

27 A. I stopped in the fourth form.

28 Q. Is that secondary school?

29 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Where did you go to school?
- 2 A. I attended the Bo Government Secondary School, Bo.
- 3 Q. So can you read and write?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 09:50:58 5 Q. And aside from Krio, what languages do you speak?
- 6 A. I can speak Mende and English.
- 7 Q. When did you first come into contact with the war in Sierra
8 Leone?
- 9 A. Some time around April 1991. That was when I was captured.
- 09:51:46 10 Q. Where were you living at the time?
- 11 A. Well, I went for holidays in Torma Bum. On my way back to
12 start my - to resume schooling was when I was captured around the
13 Momajo area. That is between Torma Bum and Sumbuya area.
- 14 Q. Can you spell the name of the location you just called out.
- 09:52:23 15 Well, I think you said Momajo area?
- 16 A. Yes, M-O-M-A-J-O. Momajo.
- 17 Q. And you said you were captured. Who captured you?
- 18 A. It was the rebels that captured me, the RUF rebels.
- 19 Q. Describe what happened?
- 09:52:55 20 A. Well, I was going back to school from holidays when we were
21 intercepted around Momajo area, almost entering into Momajo.
22 That is Nimba 2, Mosquito, Sam Bockarie and others, Rebel King,
23 they were - those people were among the group that captured me
24 and from there they took me to a village which is Gandorhun
- 09:53:38 25 Malain and I was put at the training base.
- 26 Q. Okay. Did you say Gandorhun?
- 27 A. Yes.
- 28 Q. Now, you said that you were captured and you called out
29 several names. First of all, when you say "we" --

1 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Santora, he didn't just say Gandorhun.
2 He said Gandorhun something.

3 MR SANTORA: Okay:

4 Q. What was the location you called out? Gandorhun something?

09:54:03 5 A. Malain. Malain Chiefdom.

6 Q. And spell the name of that chiefdom.

7 A. M-A-L-A-I-N. Malain.

8 Q. Okay, so the village was Gandorhun. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

09:54:26 10 Q. Mr Witness, now I am going to ask you to try to call out
11 names instead of using words like "we", "they" and "he". Try and
12 call out the actual name, if you can, okay?

13 A. Okay, I will try to do that.

14 Q. First of all, you did call out several names among the
09:54:51 15 group that captured you. You said one Nimba 2. Who is that?

16 A. Nimba 2 I knew him to be a Liberian vanguard and the other
17 name, like Mosquito, I also knew him to be a vanguard. He was a
18 Sierra Leonean. Rebel King, I knew him to be a vanguard as well.
19 He was a Bassa by tribe from Liberia. Many other people were
09:55:34 20 there, but these are the few that I can recall now.

21 Q. Approximately how many people were in the group that
22 captured you?

23 A. They were there with up to three vehicles, so I cannot give
24 you now an exact number of people who captured me.

09:56:04 25 Q. And aside from yourself, were other people captured?

26 A. Yes. The very day that the RUF captured me in that place,
27 the Momajo area, they also captured many other people in that
28 same place.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Santora, perhaps the witness could

1 tell us what he means by a Liberian vanguard.

2 MR SANTORA: Thank you, Justice Sebutinde. That was a
3 point I was going to raise:

4 Q. You used the phrase - in describing Nimba 2 you referred to
09:56:38 5 him as a Liberian vanguard. What do you mean when you say a
6 Liberian vanguard?

7 A. Well what I meant by a Liberian, that means he was born in
8 Liberia. Vanguard means - in the RUF when we said vanguard those
9 were the senior men who were trained in Liberia to launch war in
09:57:06 10 Sierra Leone. They were the ones who trained us. They were our
11 bosses. So I can say they were the original fighters who came
12 from Liberia.

13 Q. You also mentioned somebody named Rebel King. Who was
14 that?

09:57:38 15 A. Rebel King was an RUF vanguard, a Liberian. He was a
16 vanguard from Liberia.

17 Q. And Sam Bockarie, at that time who did you know him to be?

18 A. Sam Bockarie, at that time I only knew him as a vanguard.
19 I did not know any title for him at that time.

09:58:14 20 Q. How old were you when you were captured then?

21 A. I was 16 years old.

22 Q. Now, these individuals that you mentioned, Rebel King,
23 Nimba 2 and Sam Bockarie, were they with any particular unit?

24 A. The unit in which they were was the Kuwait unit.

09:58:59 25 Q. Just to make sure I understand, you said Kuwait. Did you
26 say Kuwait as in - say it again slowly.

27 A. Kuwait unit was the unit in which Rebel King and others
28 were and he was the commander for that particular unit.

29 Q. Did you ever come to learn why this unit was called the

1 Kuwait unit?

2 A. What I understood about that unit, why it was called
3 Kuwait, according to the discussions that CO Paul, Mosquito and
4 others were having, it was that it was because Kuwait was one of
09:59:50 5 the wealthy countries and when they came their unit which they
6 formed were capturing areas that were in wealthy places. That
7 was why the unit was called Kuwait unit.

8 Q. And finally on this topic, these men that captured you,
9 this group, were they armed?

10:00:29 10 A. Yes. They had arms.

11 Q. Do you know what type of arms they had?

12 A. Yes. They had AK-47 rifles, they had rocket propelled
13 grenades, RPG, they had GPMG. Those were the three main weapons
14 that I saw with them that I can recall now and recognise. Even
10:01:09 15 now I can recall them.

16 Q. After you were captured you said you were taken to a place
17 called Gandorhun in the Malain Chiefdom. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What district is that in?

10:01:35 20 A. Pujehun District.

21 Q. Why were you taken to Gandorhun?

22 A. To go and train me how to shoot a gun, how to fight, how to
23 manoeuvre from the enemies and to tell me the reason why they had
24 brought the war; that was what they referred to as political
10:02:05 25 ideology.

26 Q. First of all, who is "they"?

27 A. The RUF. That is CO Paul, he was the commander at the
28 base.

29 Q. So describe actually what was at Gandorhun. What was

1 there?

2 A. Well, at the Gandorhun training base we were many there. I
3 was there with many other brothers. Some of them were my fellow
4 students who were going to school in that village Torma Bum and
10:02:50 5 the surrounding areas, around the Gandorhun area, Jimmi Bargbo
6 area, and we were captured. Every morning they would call for a
7 formation and we will go jogging. They will teach us tactics,
8 that is combat tactics. And in the afternoon they will teach us
9 political ideology. That is, to tell us what the war was all
10:03:25 10 about. Those were the things that CO Paul and others were
11 teaching us at the base.

12 Q. Who was CO Paul?

13 A. CO Paul was a Liberian and he was a vanguard.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: There is a second area that the witness
10:03:48 15 named that appears as Jimmi in the transcript.

16 MR SANTORA: I thought I heard Jimmi Bargbo. I will
17 clarify because I thought that was spelled for the record
18 previously:

19 Q. Did you mention a location called Jimmi something?

10:04:02 20 A. Yes. Jimmi, Bargbo Chiefdom. That is Jimmi Bargbo. Some
21 men were captured around that area, Jimmi Bargbo area, other
22 students.

23 MR SANTORA: The previous spelling on the record looks
24 right, except Jimmi should be J-I-M-M-I.

10:04:35 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: How do you spell Bargbo?

26 THE WITNESS: B-A-R-G-B-O.

27 MR SANTORA:

28 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. You said there were many of your
29 brothers training, being trained, sorry. Can you approximate the

1 number of people being trained at the training base?

2 A. Those of us who were at the Gandorhun training base, we
3 were more than 250.

10:05:18

4 Q. Can you describe the composition of the trainees in terms
5 of age and gender? Let's start with age.

6 A. Well, there were male and females there. There were
7 children up to 12 years, those were in the SBU, that is the Small
8 Boys Unit, and the women's unit we referred to as the WAC's unit.

9 Q. How long did your training last?

10:06:09

10 A. I spent around two weeks at the base.

11 Q. Aside from CO Paul do you recall any other commanders who
12 were at this training base?

10:06:48

13 A. Yes. CO Cyrus was there. There was a CO Cyrus. I cannot
14 recall the names of others really because sometimes some of the
15 commanders who would come from the front line would join the team
16 at the training base. Some other commanders, that is the
17 fighters, they will join their colleague vanguards, particularly
18 in teaching about the physical fitness, but the political
19 ideology --

10:07:15

20 Q. Go ahead, I was going to ask you about that.

21 A. Like, for the political ideology, people like Mosquito, he
22 used to meet us. For example, if Mosquito taught us ideology
23 today, there was another man who was called Hungry Lion, he too
24 was a vanguard, a Sierra Leonean vanguard, he too used to teach
25 us the same political ideology.

10:07:53

26 Q. Do you remember any other names of people teaching you
27 ideology, and if you don't that's okay?

28 A. No, I don't recall them now.

29 Q. Just for the record you called out one name Cyrus. Can you

1 spell the name Cyrus. If you can't, just say so?

2 A. No, no, no.

3 Q. I have a spelling as C-Y-R-U-S. One just one further
4 question on this, Mr Witness. You talked about ideology training
10:08:44 5 as well as training in tactics and physical training. What do
6 you mean exactly when you say ideology training? What were you
7 being trained in?

8 A. Well, that was political ideology. That is, the ideas.

9 You know, the causes of the war. Why Foday Sankoh and his
10:09:11 10 colleague Special Forces, some students who were at the FBC, why
11 they went to Libya to train. They used to tell us about some of
12 the things that went on in the country. They said they thought
13 those were not supposed to be going on. Like, when the teachers
14 were teaching and they did not get their salaries at the end of
10:09:42 15 the month and if somebody criticised the government that person
16 would be arrested and imprisoned.

17 Those were the things. You know, the wrong - things about
18 the political system in the country. How things were difficult.
19 It was difficult to go to school. And even when some of those
10:10:02 20 who could complete their schooling, they did not get employment.
21 Those were the things that they told us they were against.

22 Q. Mr Witness, earlier you described the word vanguard to
23 mean, "When we said vanguard those were the senior men who
24 trained in Liberia to launch the war in Sierra Leone." What do
10:10:27 25 you mean by that when you say "trained in Liberia to launch the
26 war in Sierra Leone"?

27 A. Well, one concept that was established to us about the
28 vanguards was that the vanguards were people who were trained at
29 a base in Liberia and the base was called Sokoto. And they used

1 to call that same place Camp Naama. So whosoever trained at
2 Sokoto, Camp Naama, and crossed into Sierra Leone, fighting, all
3 of them were known as the vanguards. That is to the best of my
4 knowledge. And what Mosquito, Rebel King, CO Cyrus, original who
10:11:28 5 captured me, and others, what they used to say was that. And
6 those people, the vanguards, we remain to respect them and regard
7 them as the founding fathers throughout the war. They were the
8 founding fathers of the RUF.

9 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Witness, what was the name of the camp
10:11:56 10 that you told us?

11 THE WITNESS: Naama. Sokoto. Camp Naama.

12 JUSTICE SEBUTINDE: With an N at the end?

13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, I do not want to attempt
14 spelling it.

10:12:09 15 JUSTICE SEBUTINDE: Yes, I am asking you what you are
16 pronouncing.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Naama. Your Honours, the pronunciation
18 doesn't have an "N" at the end. Where they trained the place was
19 called Camp Naama, but they used to call the place Sokoto. That
10:12:29 20 was the code name.

21 MR SANTORA:

22 Q. Mr Witness, did you ever come to learn why these people
23 were trained in Liberia?

24 A. Well, those people were trained in Liberia. They completed
10:12:51 25 the training even before they came to us in Sierra Leone, but
26 after they had been trained in Liberia and they captured us in
27 Sierra Leone, we had spent some time with them and they started
28 having confidence in us and we used to do things in common now.
29 They were trying to lecture us about the war, telling us things

1 about the war. They told us things in detail.

2 Q. Mr Witness, again I'm just going to ask you to try to
3 remember to speak slowly. Especially when you are describing
4 something at length there is a tendency to speed up and so just
10:13:36 5 try to listen for the interpreter to make sure he is keeping up
6 with you, okay?

7 A. Okay, I'll try to do that.

8 Q. Mr Witness, now finally on this topic do you know who
9 trained these people at Camp Naama? These vanguards, who trained
10:14:03 10 them, do you know?

11 A. Well I knew of two people that trained the vanguards at
12 Camp Naama, because even when I was with people like the late CO
13 Mosquito and others they regarded CO Isaac highly, Isaac Mongor.
14 Whatever he wanted to do he will say, "Papay, you know you are
10:14:39 15 the guys who trained us and so some of the things you should not
16 do them", so he had high esteem for them and so he was one of
17 their trainers. The other person was Mike Lamin. Mike Lamin.
18 He was a Special Forces member, who was trained in Libya. Mike
19 Lamin taught them political ideology at the base. One other
10:15:15 20 person I knew was the late Mohamed Tarawalli, aka Zino. He too
21 was a Special Forces member. Those are the few people that I
22 know trained them in Sokoto.

23 Q. Now after your training, you said your training was
24 approximately two weeks. Is that correct? Your training in
10:15:52 25 Gandorhun was approximately two weeks long?

26 A. Yes, yes, I spent up to two weeks there.

27 Q. And after that where did you go?

28 A. After we left Gandorhun, we went to Zimmi Makpele.

29 Q. So Gandorhun was the two week training. Was there any

1 further training aside from the training at Gandorhun?

2 A. Yes, we went to Zimmi Makpele and we met another group at
3 the base where we were sent. For about three to four days we
4 were there to have an advance training at Gisiwulo, close to
10:16:51 5 Zimmi Makpele, but we didn't spend a long time there when the
6 enemies - that is the government troops - started advancing on us
7 and so we were sent to the various front lines immediately.

8 Q. So you did further advance training at Gisiwulo. Is that
9 correct?

10:17:10 10 A. Yes, yes.

11 MR SANTORA: Gisiwulo has been spelt on the record before:

12 Q. Do you remember the trainers, if any, at Gisiwulo?

13 A. Cyrus went there, because at that time the Kuwait training
14 base was not functioning any more and so Cyrus and other
10:17:38 15 vanguards were there whose names I cannot recall now.

16 Q. Well, you just referred to something as the Kuwait training
17 base. What are you referring to when you say the Kuwait training
18 base?

19 A. Where I started by training, that is Gandorhun, Gandorhun
10:17:54 20 Malain, that is where I am referring to where I started my
21 training at Gandorhun where Cyrus was one of my trainers.

22 Q. So you also call it the Kuwait training base. Is that
23 correct?

24 A. Yes, it was a training base and it was there that the
10:18:10 25 Kuwait headquarters was in Gandorhun and so that is how we
26 referred to it as the Kuwait training base.

27 Q. Now after this three to four day - well just quickly, when
28 you say advance training at Gisiwulo what did this consist of?

29 A. It was just the same political ideology and about physical

1 fitness that they taught us.

2 Q. After this training, were you assigned anywhere?

3 A. Yes, we were sent across the Moa, that is towards Potoru.

4 That was the first major mission that we undertook together with

10:19:08 5 Rebel King, because I was in that group where he was, to cut the

6 supply route between Bo and Kenema, but that mission was

7 unsuccessful. On the way we fell in an ambush and we retreated.

8 It was when we retreated that the enemies, that is the government

9 troops, chased us. They chased us right up until the time we

10:19:45 10 crossed into Liberia.

11 Q. Okay, I just want to put a time frame on this. Initially

12 you said you were captured around April of '91. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And now you are referring to your first assignment, or your

10:20:04 15 first mission, which was to cut off the supply route between Bo

16 and Kenema. Is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you approximate when this - when you were given this

19 assignment, or this mission?

10:20:26 20 A. It was during the rainy season. I don't want to be

21 specific because I cannot recall the exact month, but it was

22 during the rainy season.

23 Q. Of the same 1991?

24 A. Yes.

10:20:41 25 Q. Now, you said then that this was an unsuccessful mission.

26 Is that correct?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And that you were chased and eventually crossed into

29 Liberia. Is that correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. First of all, just to be clear, the enemy at this time you
3 referred to as government troops. Who specifically was the enemy
4 at this time?

10:21:11 5 A. It was the Sierra Leone government troops. The Sierra
6 Leonean Army.

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Santora, when the witness said to cut
8 off the supply routes, supply routes for what or who does he
9 mean?

10:21:27 10 MR SANTORA:

11 Q. Mr Witness, did you hear Justice Sebutinde's question?

12 A. Yes, that was to set an ambush between Bo and Kenema, which
13 was the main supply route for the Sierra Leone Army. If at all
14 our mission would have been successful, it was to set an ambush
10:21:53 15 and if possible we capture major towns and to destroy any major
16 bridge along the Bo Kenema Highway. That was to prevent the
17 enemies from using the road. That was what I meant by cutting
18 off the supply route.

19 Q. Do you recall who was your commander for this mission?

10:22:20 20 A. Rebel King was our commander.

21 Q. And about how many of you were assigned to this mission?
22 Can you approximately tell?

23 A. We were more than 200 for that mission. We were more than
24 200.

10:22:44 25 Q. Were you armed?

26 A. I personally didn't have arms. I was an SBU. I was in a
27 Small Boys Unit. I did not have an arm.

28 Q. You said you were eventually chased into Liberia. Is that
29 correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. When you mean you, do you mean yourself or do you mean the
3 group?

4 A. The RUF. When the attack failed, the enemies pursued the
10:23:26 5 RUF fighters on the main highway from Juru and they came and
6 captured Zimmi. I can say they swept us, in my own words, from
7 Sierra Leone.

8 Q. Now approximately, if you can approximate, how long - how
9 much time passed between the time you set out on this mission and
10:23:52 10 the time when you were pushed into Liberia?

11 A. It was within three to four weeks' time that they were
12 successful in dragging us out of Sierra Leone.

13 Q. Do you remember where you crossed into Liberia?

14 A. Yes, it was the rainy season of 1991.

10:24:23 15 Q. And where did you cross?

16 A. Well, it was a village along the border. That was where I
17 crossed, because at the time we were in Gendema, when the attack
18 took place, we could not cross through the main bridge. It was
19 risky for us to go through. So I crossed through a village where
10:24:49 20 we went and we assembled in a village in Liberia that is called
21 Tiene. That is where we assembled, we the RUF fighters who
22 crossed over with that group.

23 Q. Where in Sierra Leone approximately did you cross in now?
24 From which district, can you say?

10:25:18 25 A. It was Pujehun District. You know, I don't know the name
26 of the villages that we crossed through.

27 Q. Now, you crossed into a location called Tiene. Is that
28 correct?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Describe what happened when you arrived in Tiene?

2 A. When we arrived in Tiene, we were there for some time and
3 we were there when we received reinforcement from the Bomi Hills
4 area. They brought with them twin barrel and BZT, that is

10:26:10 5 anti-aircraft, and they brought a 16 barrel missile from

6 Tubmanburg, Bomi Hills. That was where the reinforcement came
7 from. When they came they took some RUF men to go and fight to
8 stop the enemies who had crossed, because the enemies when they
9 drove us they entered right up to Bo Waterside. That was the

10:26:38 10 first village that they captured when we crossed over. So the

11 6th Infantry Battalion of the --

12 Q. Mr Witness, before I ask you to continue I just want you to
13 clarify a few things in what you said. First you said, "We were

14 there for some time and we received reinforcement from the Bomi

10:27:03 15 Hills area and they brought with them twin barrel". First of

16 all, who is "they"?

17 A. The NPFL. First - sorry, that's wrong. The 6th Infantry
18 Battalion of NPFL. 6th Infantry Battalion which was headed by
19 One Man One. He was the one who brought the reinforcement.

10:27:33 20 Q. Where was this group based, do you know?

21 A. I don't know exactly where they were based, but they came
22 to the front line as reinforcement. I don't know where they were
23 based, where they came from directly.

24 Q. You said that you received reinforcement from the Bomi

10:27:54 25 Hills area. How do you know it was from the Bomi Hills area?

26 A. Because the vehicle that brought the reinforcement, those
27 were the same vehicles that they used to transport some of us
28 into Liberia at Bomi Hills. They said we were to go and undergo
29 advanced training. Bomi Hills, that was where we went for

1 advanced training, and while we were there we used to see them -
2 some of them would return and they would go at the same Bomi
3 Hills and we used to see them.

4 Q. Okay. Mr Witness, I'm not sure I understand your answer.
10:28:47 5 You said when you initially you were here in Tiene and you
6 received reinforcement. Is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You said that they came from the Bomi Hills area. Is that
9 correct?

10:29:04 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. How do you know at that time they came from the Bomi Hills
12 area?

13 A. We were there together with some other Liberians. We were
14 not living there on our own. Whatever that was going on in the
10:29:23 15 combat camp we were bound to know because we lived together and
16 some of them would come. In fact, they used to call us Sankoh
17 recruits, Sankoh recruits. That's what they referred to us. And
18 some of them will ask us to fetch water for them. They were our
19 COs.

10:29:44 20 Q. About how much time passed from when the moment --

21 MR MUNYARD: I'm sorry to interrupt but I don't know if
22 that answers the question to Mr Santora's satisfaction, but it
23 doesn't seem to me to answer the question that he originally
24 asked which is, "How do you know they came from the Bomi Hills
10:30:03 25 area?" The fact that people called this witness and his
26 colleagues Sankoh's recruits doesn't seem to me to answer the
27 question he was asked.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: It doesn't really, Mr Santora.

29 MR SANTORA: I will ask the question again and try to

1 clari fy.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

3 MR SANTORA:

10:30:25

4 Q. Mr Witness, I just want you to focus on one particular
5 point, okay?

6 A. Okay.

10:30:46

7 Q. That when you were in Tiene, okay, you said, "Some time
8 passed and then that reinforcement arrived from the Bomi Hills
9 area". Just specifically this point: How do you know that this
10 particular reinforcement came from the Bomi Hills area?

10:31:12

11 A. Mosquito and others told us directly. That is Rebel King,
12 Mosquito and others, they told us. Even before they arrived,
13 they told us that they were expecting reinforcement from Bomi
14 Hills and that the truck that was to come with the reinforcement
15 was to take some of us, the Sankoh fighters, because they
16 referred to us as Sankoh recruits at that time. They said they
17 were to take us to Bomi hills to go for advanced training.

18 Q. I will ask you about that. I hope that satisfies your
19 Honours.

10:31:31

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I understand the derivation of his
21 view.

22 MR SANTORA: Thank you.

23 Q. Now, you referred to 6th Infantry Battalion. Who were you
24 referring to when you said that?

10:32:03

25 A. That is NPFL battalion. 6th Infantry NPFL Battalion.

26 Q. And in what context were you referring to them in this
27 situation? What were you referring to the 6th Infantry Battalion
28 for?

29 A. It was from there the reinforcement came and even the

1 vehicles that they used to bring the reinforcement, it was
2 written on them "6th Infantry Battalion".

3 Q. You also referred to somebody called One Man One. Who is
4 that?

10:32:49 5 A. He was the battalion commander for the 6th Battalion of the
6 NPFL at that time.

7 Q. You said that your group was met at Tiene, is that correct,
8 by this reinforcement?

9 A. Yes. The reinforcement met us in Tiene.

10:33:19 10 Q. And then you said that some of you - or you said that you
11 were going to be taken for advanced training. Is that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Again, who do you mean when you say you were to be taken
14 for advanced training? Do you just mean you yourself, or explain
10:33:41 15 what you mean?

16 A. That is myself and the RUF fighters who had crossed into
17 Liberia. Many of us were taken. We were many at the base, those
18 of us who were taken to Bomi Hills. We were many who were taken
19 from the Tiene area. They used to take men from those
10:34:09 20 surrounding villages and we were transported Bomi Hills.

21 Q. Mr Witness, you referred to two locations and you referred
22 to Tubmanburg and Bomi Hills. Why were you referring to
23 Tubmanburg?

24 A. Tubmanburg is the city. Bomi is the county.

10:35:13 25 Q. So were you taken then for advanced training?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Where exactly were you taken to?

28 A. There was a barracks in Bomi Hills. That was where we were
29 taken to. It was a military barracks.

1 Q. Okay. Is Bomi the county or the village?

2 A. It is the city itself. Tubmanburg city, Bomi County.

3 Q. So when you are referring to Bomi Hills are you referring
4 to Tubmanburg?

10:35:51 5 A. Tubmanburg. Exactly. Exactly, yes.

6 Q. You just need to make sure you mention that because it
7 could be confusing otherwise. So you said that you were taken
8 then for advanced training at Bomi Hills or Tubmanburg?

9 A. Yes.

10:36:08 10 Q. If you can, can you approximate when you were taken to Bomi
11 Hills for advanced training?

12 A. Well, at that time it was late in the rainy season, 1991.

13 Q. Now, describe what you saw - describe the situation when
14 you arrived at Tubmanburg. What did you see?

10:36:37 15 A. When we arrived in Tubmanburg, we were taken directly to
16 the barracks. That was where we were put. We were there and
17 almost every day they would bring fighters, RUF commandos. Every
18 morning we would go for training. They would call for a
19 formation and we would go for training, that is physical fitness.

10:37:14 20 Some Liberians were taking us and there was one Alan Blamo, CO
21 Lion. And there was a Sierra Leonean vanguard. He is dead now.
22 I don't recall his name now off the top of my head. He is dead
23 now. He used to teach us political ideology. That was the
24 training that we were undergoing in Bomi Hills.

10:37:46 25 Q. Before you continue you called out two names. One you
26 called out Alan Blamo. First of all, how do you spell the family
27 name Blamo, do you know?

28 A. We spelled it B-L-A-M-O.

29 Q. What nationality was this man?

1 A. He was a Sierra Leonean.

2 Q. And who was he specifically?

3 A. He was a vanguard.

4 Q. You also referred to CO Lion. Who was that?

10:38:26 5 A. That was his alias.

6 Q. Do you know his real name?

7 A. Yes, that is it, CO Lion. Alan Blamo was the one we called
8 alias CO Lion.

9 Q. Okay. So they are one and the same person, is that
10:38:50 10 correct?

11 A. Yes, yes, yes.

12 Q. Then you said there was another individual you can't
13 remember?

14 A. Yes, yes.

10:38:58 15 Q. Now, you said that the training here included physical
16 training - physical fitness and ideology training. What type of
17 ideology training were you receiving here at the barracks in
18 Tubmanburg?

19 A. It was about why the war was brought to Sierra Leone and
10:39:26 20 what the Sierra Leoneans were fighting for, why Pa Sankoh and
21 others went to Libya and they were trained there and they came to
22 Liberia and they took some other Sierra Leoneans with them and
23 they were trained, and why was it that they did not use any other
24 means of changing the system in Sierra Leone except through the
10:39:49 25 use of guns.

26 Q. What did you learn about why Pa Sankoh and others went to
27 Libya and they were trained there and they came to Liberia. What
28 did you learn in terms of the portion "when they came to
29 Liberia"? Why did they come to Liberia, did you know?

1 A. I did not get that question clearly.

2 Q. In terms of your ideology training, did you learn why Pa
3 Sankoh and others came to Liberia after going to Libya?

10:40:43

4 A. If I got you right you said if I knew why when Pa Sankoh
5 and others came from Libya and they came to Liberia. I don't
6 know why they came to - why they decided to come through Liberia.
7 No, that I don't know.

8 Q. Now, you said there were many of you being trained. Can
9 you approximate the number of people being trained in Tubmanburg?
10 Again, just approximate, if you can?

10:41:05

11 A. At all times I will say we were more than 300 because some
12 men were on the front line, so they will take some people, take
13 them to the front line as reinforcement and they would take some
14 people from the front line to come --

10:41:38

15 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat
16 this.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, please pause for the
18 interpreter. You are going too quickly for him. Pick up your
19 answer - please speak more slowly and continue from where you
20 said, "They would take some of the people from the front line to
21 come". Continue from there.

10:41:53

22 THE WITNESS: While we were at the base, they will take
23 some people from the base and send to the front line as
24 reinforcement. Then at the same time they will take some other
25 people, that is RUF recruits from the front line, and brought to
26 Tubmanburg. So really it is not easy to give a specific figure
27 as to how many of us were there. There was a time even when they
28 formed a unit called Black Gadaffa.

10:42:19

29 MR SANTORA:

1 Q. Before I ask you about that, I know you said it's difficult
2 to approximate a number, but the people being trained here in
3 Tubmanburg, what was their nationality?

4 A. Those of us who were being trained all of us were
10:43:08 5 Sierra Leoneans, or majority. What I meant by all of us is I
6 meant majority. If there were other nationals amongst us, the
7 RUF fighters, that I did not know about, but I can say more than
8 90 per cent of us were Sierra Leoneans. Those who were training
9 us were a mixed group. They were Liberians and Sierra Leoneans.

10:43:33 10 Q. And the people training you, what particular unit were they
11 with, if any?

12 A. Well, we called them instructors. That was how we called
13 them, training instructors.

14 Q. Can you remember some of the names of the instructors?
10:44:00 15 Aside from the ones you've called out, any other names you
16 remember?

17 A. Like Cowpopo, he is dead now, and Alan Blamo, who was Lion.
18 Those are the two names that I can recall now, but there were
19 some Liberians who had queer names - queer Liberian names - that
10:44:34 20 I cannot recall now.

21 Q. Mr Witness, you referred to a unit called the Black Gadaffa
22 unit. What is that?

23 A. Black Gadaffa, that was a unit, because when we were in
24 Liberia, you know, the COs - our COs - used to refer to us as
10:45:21 25 Sankoh recruit. They will say, "Sankoh recruit, come here. Can
26 you do this for me? Sankoh recruit, can you do for that for me?"
27 So that was when they formed that fighting unit and it was named
28 Black Gadaffa, they did it so we will have a name other than
29 Sankoh recruit. I don't actually know who brought the idea, but

1 CO Kpelle Boy, who was a Liberian, was the commander for Black
2 Gadaffa. He was the one who would come and take reinforcement
3 from the base and he will take them over. In some cases I will
4 remember he brought trucks and he will take men and he will go
10:46:21 5 with them. At the same time, he will transport some other people
6 to the base - other RUF fighters from the front line - and he
7 will bring them to the base.

8 This same Black Gadaffa all of us were part of Black
9 Gadaffa, but while I was there at the base there were other units
10:46:45 10 that were formed. Among these units, some people were sent to
11 the artillery unit and some other people were attached to the G2
12 unit and then I was attached to the signal unit.

13 Q. Mr Witness, before I ask you about that, I want to clarify
14 from your previous answer some things you've said. First of all,
10:47:22 15 you referred to Black Gadaffa and you said that it was formed as
16 a fighting unit and "They did it so we will have a name other
17 than Sankoh recruit". Who actually formed Black Gadaffa?

18 A. It was the commanders.

19 Q. Commanders of who? What commanders?

10:47:46 20 A. One Man One, Kpelle Boy and others. Because, you know,
21 they were disturbing us. Every now and then we were complaining,
22 because they used to call us Sankoh recruits. Sankoh recruits.
23 It was becoming too much for us because, whenever we went, they
24 called us - the combatants who were going to the front line, you
10:48:10 25 know, when these guys went to the front line they would fight,
26 but they still called them recruits - Sankoh recruits - even
27 though they were fighting. So that was too much for them, why
28 they were being called recruits even when they were fighting.
29 That was when the idea of the Black Gadaffa unit came up and it

1 was formed.

2 Q. Okay. Now, you also said - and again I am going to remind
3 you to try to speak slowly, okay? You mentioned that CO Kpelle
4 Boy was the commander of Black Gadaffa. Is that correct?

10:48:46 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You said, "He was the one who would come and take
7 reinforcement from the base and he will take them over". First
8 of all, when you say "he" who are you referring to?

9 A. CO Kpelle Boy.

10:49:10 10 Q. And you said, "He will take them over". Over where?

11 A. CO Kpelle Boy will take them across into Sierra Leone. He
12 will take them across into Sierra Leone to fight - to fight in
13 Sierra Leone.

14 Q. Did you yourself ever participate in this, while you were
10:49:32 15 based in Tubmanburg?

16 A. No, from the time I went to Tubmanburg I never came back to
17 the Pujehun area. I never went back to fight in the Pujehun area
18 from Tubmanburg.

19 Q. You also said "other RUF fight from the base and he would
10:50:05 20 bring them to the base". What do you mean when you said "other
21 RUF fight from the base and he would bring them to the base"?

22 A. It was an ongoing process. When those of us who were at
23 the base, after some time Kpelle Boy would come with some men and
24 would leave them on the base and he, Kpelle Boy, would take
10:50:36 25 another group and go with them for a mission. That was to go
26 across into Sierra Leone to attack, or to set an ambush.

27 Q. Now, you've referred to several commanders and I just want
28 to - from your observation in Tubmanburg, if you know who was
29 Kpelle Boy's boss?

1 A. Well, the commander that I knew in Tubmanburg was One Man
2 One. He was the most senior officer who was based there, because
3 he was the battalion commander.

4 Q. Do you know who One Man One's boss was?

10:51:35 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Who?

7 A. The boss that I saw that One Man One used to report to was
8 General Degbon, he was code named Energy and there were some
9 other Special Forces who used to visit him like one Anthony
10 Mekunagbe.

10:52:13

11 Q. Who was Anthony Mekunagbe?

12 A. He was a Special Forces; that is Anthony Mekunagbe and
13 General Degbon.

14 Q. Mr Witness, you've referred to the phrase "Special Forces"
15 on a few occasions now. What do you mean when you say "Special
16 Forces"?

10:52:40

17 A. Well, in this case those whom we referred to as the Special
18 Forces were the people who were trained in Libya. The people who
19 were trained in Libya.

20 Q. You have referred to two groups now. You referred to the
21 RUF and the NPFL. Describe at this time in Tubmanburg the
22 relationship between these two groups from your observations?

10:53:06

23 A. Well, our relationship was cordial and they even sent some
24 of us to various units. Like that was an order from Pa Sankoh,
25 because he sent an order that they should send us to various
26 units for us to be taught certain things. Like in the case of
27 communication myself and a few other brothers were sent there,
28 and some other people were sent to the artillery, some were sent
29 to the G2 and some were sent to the G4. So that was what the

10:53:41

1 relationship was like.

2 And even when I was now sent to the signal unit, it was
3 just about one time I recall that I went to the front line with
4 General Degbon around the Wangeko area and that was when the NPFL
10:54:21 5 enemies had crossed into Liberia and they were fighting. We went
6 there and I was with General Degbon as one of the radio
7 operators. Myself --

8 Q. I will ask you more about radio operators momentarily. I
9 want to ask some things before we get to that point.

10:54:41 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before you do proceed, Mr Santora, I
11 notice spelling of General Degbon. We have heard a reference to
12 a person of a somewhat similar name and I am not sure if this is
13 the --

14 MR SANTORA: My understanding is it has been spelt for the
10:54:59 15 record before and I thought it would be picked up. It's been
16 spelled on the record previously as D-E-G-B-O-N.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: So in other words it is the same person.

18 MR SANTORA: Well, I'm not going to say --

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: We cannot - we need evidence.

10:55:12 20 MR SANTORA: In context, but I will just elicit a little
21 further information about this individual he is referring to.

22 Q. You've also referred to one General Degbon. Do you
23 remember saying that?

24 A. Yes.

10:55:29 25 Q. Who was he?

26 A. General Degbon was a member of the Special Forces. And
27 then there was One Man One, his commander.

28 Q. Okay, I'm asking you just about General Degbon.

29 A. Yes, that is what I am describing. He had a code name

1 Energy. He was code named Energy.

2 Q. In terms of units, was General Degbon with any particular
3 unit?

4 A. No, I do not recall that.

10:56:16 5 Q. Do you know who General Degbon's boss was?

6 A. Well, General Degbon's boss, the only boss that I knew for
7 him was the CIC, the CIC, the commander-in-chief who was
8 Mr Taylor, and it was Mr Taylor.

9 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Santora, sorry to interrupt again,
10:56:53 10 there is a location on page 38, where the witness said that he
11 went to the front lines with General Degbon around the Wangeko
12 area.

13 MR SANTORA:

14 Q. Mr Witness, you were referring in your earlier answer to
10:57:22 15 one particular instance when you were with the signal unit that
16 you went to the front line with General Degbon and around a
17 specific area you mentioned. What was the area that you called
18 out?

19 A. Around Wangeko inside Liberia.

10:57:47 20 Q. Can you spell it?

21 A. The way I spell it is W-A-N-G-E-K-O. That is how I spell
22 it.

23 Q. Do you know what county that's in?

24 A. It's in Lofa. It might be Lofa County or I do not actually
10:58:20 25 know. It might be Cape Mount or Lofa, but I don't know really.
26 I don't know.

27 Q. Now, you referred to Foday Sankoh around this time. Where
28 was he around this time, do you know? The time I am referring to
29 is the time you were based in Tubmanburg.

1 A. I did not know any specific base for Foday Sankoh but he
2 used to come to Bomi Hills. He used to move to various areas.
3 Sometimes he would come to us in Bomi Hills. Sometimes he would
4 go to the Kailahun area. Sometimes he would be in Gbarnga. So
10:59:06 5 he was moving around, so I do not actually know any specific base
6 for him at that time.

7 Q. You said he used to come to Bomi Hills. How do you know
8 that?

9 A. He, in fact, met us. At a base at a point in time he spoke
10:59:33 10 to us for us to be courageous, for us to listen to instructions,
11 for us to do what we were there for purely so that we would be
12 able to carry out the liberation struggle and he told us briefly
13 the reason why he brought the war. He said - and that was more
14 for us, the younger ones. He said because if Sierra Leone does
11:00:02 15 not change at that moment those of us who were coming up will
16 have to strain at the end.

17 Q. You said Sankoh told you to listen to instructions.
18 Instructions from who, Mr Witness?

19 A. From the various commanders and he was there also when he
11:00:27 20 gave an instruction, that is he, Foday Sankoh, gave instruction
21 that some of us should be sent to the various units.

22 Q. Now, you've mentioned that you particularly went to the
23 signal unit. I'm going to ask you about that, but before I ask
24 you about that can you describe the units that this were in
11:00:52 25 Tubmanburg or Bomi Hills at this time. What were the names of
26 the units?

27 A. We had, like, for instance, the signal unit. We had the
28 Military Police, the MP unit. The G2 unit was there. The G2
29 unit was there. The G4 unit. The artillery unit was there. The

1 S4 unit was there. There were various units, but to name a few
2 those are the ones I recall now.

3 Q. Now, you said referring to the Black Gadaffa unit that they
4 would cross into Sierra Leone. Is that correct?

11:01:52 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Do you know if any other units were crossing back and forth
7 to Sierra Leone?

8 A. Yes. We were in Bomi Hills and whilst we were there we
9 used to see some reinforcement coming from some other parts of
11:02:16 10 the NPFL liberated zones, who used to come. Like, for instance,
11 the Red Scorpion unit, they had a Scorpion inscription on their
12 T-shirts. They had a Death Squad and they had a human skull on
13 their T-shirts. They had the Zimbabwe unit. Those are the few
14 that I recall now. And those were the units also that I saw that
11:02:50 15 used to come as a fighting unit that went to the various front
16 lines to fight. Like, for instance, the Special Task Force, the
17 STF. Yes.

18 Q. Before I ask you more about these units, how do you know
19 that these units were crossing back and forth into Sierra Leone?
11:03:13 20 How do you know that?

21 A. Well, we used to see T-shirts that were - that those units
22 wore. They had the logos on them, the ones I have named. And we
23 used to interact with them. And even when I was in signal unit I
24 was fortunate to know so many things for me to understand so many
11:03:37 25 things. Even when they were travelling, messages would come. We
26 would discuss those with our colleagues, senior signallers who
27 were there with us. Like, for instance, the signal regional
28 commander Bedcat, Titus, they used to tell us everything about
29 those units.

1 Q. You mentioned a few names and I am going to clarify them,
2 but before I do that, these units, these particular units that
3 you've referred to, Scorpion, Death Squad - and did you say
4 Zimbabwe?

11:04:16 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What group were these units with?

7 A. They were NPFL. They were NPFL reinforcements that used to
8 come.

9 Q. Reinforcements to what, exactly?

11:04:38 10 A. To go and fight at the front line. That was when the war
11 had pushed us to the border. When the government troops, the
12 Sierra Leone government troops had pushed us to the border, and
13 some other fighting forces had emerged who were also coming to
14 fight against the NPFL in Liberia. So those units used to go as
11:05:06 15 reinforcements to repel those attacks.

16 Q. When you say go reinforce the front lines, where
17 specifically do you mean when you say front lines?

18 A. Towards Bo Waterside along the Sierra Leone-Liberian
19 border. That is towards Pujehun District.

11:05:29 20 Q. Reinforcement to who specifically?

21 A. Well, at that time Dixon Wolo was the commander for the
22 Sierra Leonean group. Dixon Wolo. So he was the commander for -
23 and they were going to reinforce him at the front line.

24 Q. Then reinforce what group?

11:05:57 25 A. The fighting force. To go and reinforce us so that we will
26 be able to cross again into Sierra Leone. They were going to
27 reinforce the RUF so that the RUF would be able to repel the
28 enemies and cross over into Sierra Leone.

29 Q. Before I get further, I don't want to let some names escape

1 because there were some called. You said the Zimbabwe unit. You
2 mean as the country Zimbabwe, called out the same way?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. You referred to signal regional commander. Who did you say
11:06:48 5 exactly?

6 A. Bedcat.

7 Q. Slowly say that and if you can spell it.

8 A. B-E-D-C-A-T. Bedcat.

9 Q. And did he have any other name?

11:07:06 10 A. Demmy.

11 Q. Did he have a first name or other name?

12 A. Yes, Joseph Demmy.

13 Q. Can you spell Demmy?

14 A. We used to spell it D-E M-M-Y, Demmy.

11:07:40 15 Q. You said he was a signal regional commander. Explain what
16 you mean, signal regional commander?

17 A. He was the one who covered the region where we were
18 regarding the NPFL communications. He covered all the front
19 lines going to Bo Waterside, Robertsport, Lofa Bridge and some
11:08:10 20 other areas and he was, in fact, the one who trained us in
21 communication. He taught us communication.

22 Q. Mr Witness, you've also referred to several units that were
23 involved in this reinforcement. One of these units you just said
24 was the Special Task Force unit. What is this unit, do you know?

11:09:55 25 A. It was a combat unit, it was a fighting unit.

26 Q. Do you know anything else about this unit?

27 A. Yes. That unit was one of the units from which
28 reinforcement used to come to go and flush the enemies back into
29 Sierra Leone so that the RUF would be able to re-enter Sierra

1 Leone and continue the war.

2 Q. You said that the Black Gadaffa unit was 90 per cent Sierra
3 Leonean. Approximately 90 per cent Sierra Leonean. Is that
4 correct?

11:10:46 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, the Special Task Force unit, do you know the
7 composition of this unit in terms of its nationality?

8 A. They were purely Liberians.

9 Q. You also referred to the Zimbabwe unit. Can you explain
11:11:04 10 anything you know about this unit?

11 A. Yes. They were combatants. And that was one of the groups
12 from which reinforcements used to come from to go and fight in
13 Sierra Leone, to reinforce the RUF to fight in Sierra Leone.

14 Q. Do you know who was in charge of this unit?

11:11:32 15 A. I do not know the commanders exactly who were in charge of
16 those units.

17 Q. And you also referred to a Scorpion unit?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Again, can you explain what you know about this unit?

11:11:52 20 A. The Scorpion unit also was one of the fighting units that
21 used to go and reinforce us in Sierra Leone, as a reinforcement
22 to fight against the Sierra Leone Army, and most of them were
23 Liberians.

24 Q. Were some others non-Liberians?

11:12:21 25 A. I wouldn't recall that, whether there were others who were
26 not Liberians, because I did not actually come across them
27 directly face-to-face. But with my interaction with them I can
28 say most of them were Liberian.

29 Q. You mentioned three units, the Zimbabwe unit, the Scorpion

1 unit and the Special Task Force unit. Do you know where these
2 units were based?

3 A. Well, I do not know the exact base where those units were,
4 all of them.

11:13:01 5 Q. And do you know who sent these units into Sierra Leone?

6 A. The units, sometimes we would be in the station when
7 General Degbon would come and call for reinforcement, say from,
8 like - there was another unit called SS Cobra, yeah, SS Cobra,
9 and the other one Zimbabwe, that was - that happened more when

11:13:36 10 the enemies pressured us on the front lines and One Man One would
11 Degbon and Degbon will give instruction or he would discuss with
12 some of his other colleague commanders from the various areas to
13 coordinate their efforts so that - sometimes he would in fact
14 send message to Ebony, that was Mr Charles Taylor, and he was the
11:14:08 15 CIC, saying that he needed reinforcements to reinforce him on the
16 front line because of enemy threats.

17 Q. Mr Witness, before I go further on this, you also referred
18 to an individual called Dixon Wolo. Is that what you said?

19 A. Yes.

11:14:33 20 Q. Can you spell his family name, his last name. Do you know?

21 A. I'm unable.

22 MR SANTORA: I believe it's been spelled before for the
23 record in another context, but I will just get some context to
24 this individual:

11:14:47 25 Q. Who was this individual, Dixon Wolo?

26 A. Dixon Wolo was the first commander whom I was exposed to in
27 Sierra Leone. He was our battalion commander in Sierra Leone
28 that I was exposed to. That was when - he was the one that Rebel
29 King used to directly report to and he was a Liberian. He too in

1 turn reported to One Man One and Degbon.

2 Q. So what unit was he? Was he commander of a unit?

3 A. He was a commander in Sierra Leone, for all the units in
4 Sierra Leone, the fighting forces in Sierra Leone. Not a
11:15:44 5 specific unit that I recall, but for Sierra Leone within the RUF
6 he was the commander. He was the battalion commander. And that
7 was even before the enemies pushed us, or I can say flushed us
8 out of Sierra Leone in 1991.

9 Q. Mr Witness, when I asked you about Dixon Wolo just now you
11:16:10 10 said first he was a commander in Sierra Leone for all the units
11 in Sierra Leone, and then you said he was the battalion
12 commander. Explain exactly what you mean by those two answers.
13 Can you explain what you know his position to be?

14 A. Yes. It was the way you framed your question, because
11:16:32 15 initially I told you that he was a battalion commander and you
16 asked me again whether he belonged to any unit. That was why I
17 told you that he was the commander for all the units that fell
18 within that battalion, because each and every one of us were
19 directly accountable to him.

11:16:52 20 Q. What battalion was that, do you know?

21 A. That was the 1st RUF Battalion.

22 MR MUNYARD: I'm sorry, but we have got a lot of "he"s in
23 the passage before we embarked on Dixon Wolo. If I could just
24 take us back to the reference to Ebony. It's quite a long
11:17:19 25 answer. On my font it starts at page 47, line 12. I am just
26 going to go to the last part of it. What's recorded is:

27 "Degbon will give instruction or he would discuss with some
28 of his other colleague commanders from the various areas to
29 coordinate their efforts so that - sometimes he would in fact

1 send message to Ebony, that was Mr Charles Taylor, and he was the
2 CIC, saying that he needed reinforcements to reinforce him on the
3 front line because of enemy threats."

4 I don't know who "he" relates to.

11:17:56 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: There are several "he"s there.

6 MR MUNYARD: I waited for Dixon Wolo passage to finish
7 because I didn't want to interrupt my learned friend in the
8 middle of that, but I think we do need some clarification on
9 that.

11:18:10 10 MR SANTORA: I was actually going to clarify that portion.
11 I understand. I was actually waiting until we get to the
12 relevant portion of this examination. Unless your Honours are
13 inclined - I can clarify it now.

14 MR MUNYARD: I'm happy for it to be done at any stage.
11:18:25 15 It's just I thought as we've got all those "he"s in there now it
16 might make sense to tidy it up at this point.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Santora, as it reads it could be one
18 person, but I think in actual fact it's more than one person, so
19 if we can clarify it now.

11:18:44 20 MR SANTORA: I will, Madam President."

21 Q. Mr Witness, I am going to ask you in one of your answers
22 that you gave recently to clarify some portions of it, okay? I
23 was asking you about the various units in Sierra Leone. I'm
24 sorry, the various units that were sent into Sierra Leone as
11:19:02 25 reinforcements and you were describing this and you said:

26 "That happened more when the enemies pressured us on the
27 front lines and One Man One would call Degbon and Degbon will
28 give instruction or he would discuss with some of his other
29 colleague commanders from the various areas to coordinate their

1 efforts - sometimes they sent message to Ebony, that was
2 Mr Charles Taylor, and he was the CIC saying that he needed
3 reinforcements to reinforce him on the front line because of the
4 enemy threats." Do you remember saying that.

11:19:49 5 A. Yes, I can clarify that.

6 Q. I am just going to take you through portions of that
7 because - as I told you before, to try to avoid calling "he" and
8 "him". So I will ask you to try and clarify this a little bit.
9 You said first of all, "He called Degbon and Degbon would give
10 instruction." Who would call Degbon?

11:20:09

11 A. One Man One will go to the radio room and send a message to
12 General Degbon. He would send a message to General Degbon.

13 Q. From where?

14 A. In Bomi Hills. I'm talking about Bomi Hills. That was
15 where we were, from Bomi Hills. That was where we would be when
16 One Man One would send a message to General Degbon. That is,
17 when the enemies would have applied pressure on our fighters,
18 that is those of us the RUF and NPFL fighters on the front lines,
19 so that General Degbon will send reinforcements. And most times
20 when the situation would want to go out of hands General Degbon
21 himself would come to Bomi Hills and most times General Degbon
22 would come and he would go to the radio station, he would go to
23 the radio room, even though he had his own mobile radio, General
24 Degbon.

11:20:35

11:21:05

25 Q. Before you go on and continue, just to clarify, you said
26 this would happen when they were receiving pressure from the
27 front lines. Is that correct?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Front lines where?

11:21:25

1 A. Well, the front lines towards Sierra Leone-Liberian border
2 in Sierra Leone.

3 Q. Who would send the initial message, the first message?

4 A. Well, Dixon Wolo would send message to One Man One.

11:22:01 5 Q. From where was Dixon Wolo sending this message?

6 A. From the front line.

7 Q. And where was Degbon when he received this message?

8 A. Degbon was a roving man. He had his own radio station.
9 Anywhere he was he would receive his message.

11:22:22 10 Q. Okay. Then you said in your answer before, "Degbon would
11 give instruction or he would discuss with some of his other
12 colleague commanders from various areas". When you said Degbon
13 would give instruction, who would he give instruction to?

14 A. He would call some other radio stations and he will send
11:22:52 15 instructions, saying that they should send reinforcements
16 immediately and those were the immediate areas not too far from
17 our own areas. And he would contact some of his other colleagues
18 in the Special Forces who were in charge of those units whom I
19 had said before that I did not know their names. They were the
11:23:19 20 ones that he would contact and explain to them that they were
21 under pressure and that they should try and reinforce.

22 The moment Mr Taylor came in, that was if there was a delay
23 in receiving the reinforcement - at that time he would directly
24 called the CIC, Mr Taylor, who was commonly known as Ebony,
11:23:45 25 Degbon. Degbon would call Mr Taylor, the CIC, for him to make it
26 possible to tell the other men to rush in sending the
27 reinforcements for him on the front lines.

28 Q. Okay. So then later on in the same answer you said,
29 Sometimes they sent message to Ebony, that was Mr Charles

1 Taylor". Who sent message to Ebony? When you say "they", who
2 are you referring to?

3 A. General Degbon. Sometimes Anthony Mekunagbe, Dry Pepe, aka
4 Dry Pepper.

11:24:39 5 Q. And then you said, "And he was the CIC, saying that he
6 needed reinforcements".

7 A. I did say General Degbon used to send message to the CIC,
8 Mr Taylor. That is what exactly I am trying to say here in this
9 case.

11:25:09 10 MR SANTORA: I hope that clarifies that portion of the
11 answer. I know there is some additional clarification needed
12 from these responses and I will get to that.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: One clarification that comes immediately
14 to my mind is was Mr Taylor's code name or pseudonym Ebony?

11:25:26 15 MR SANTORA:

16 Q. When you say Ebony, who are you referring to?

17 A. I'm referring to Mr Taylor.

18 Q. And what was the name Ebony? Why was that name used?

19 A. It was a code name for Mr Taylor that we used on the radio.

11:25:53 20 Q. Now, again in one of your answers you said the words "he"
21 and "they" a lot and I am going to have to ask you to clarify
22 that. I asked you who Degbon would give instruction to about the
23 reinforcement you said that he would call some other radio
24 instructions and he would send some instructions. When you say
11:26:21 25 "he", who do you mean?

26 A. Degbon had areas that he had authority over, like, for
27 instance, some other battalions, and he would send instructions
28 to those battalions for them - for that particular battalion to
29 send reinforcement to One Man One in Bomi Hills.

1 Q. So you said then, "He would contact some of his other
2 colleagues in the Special Forces". Again, when you say "he" --

3 A. That is Degbon that I am referring to.

4 Q. And then you said, "Who were in charge of those units whom
11:27:14 5 I had said before that I didn't know their names". What units
6 were you referring to here?

7 A. I had named like Zimbabwe, Scorpion and others.

8 Q. So in terms of the units, you know the name of the units?

9 A. Yes, those are the names of the units I'm calling now. The
11:27:46 10 Special Task Force, SS Cobra unit.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Santora, we have been alerted to the
12 fact the tape has just about run out. We are now at the time for
13 the normal mid-morning break.

14 MR SANTORA: Thank you.

11:28:09 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, this is the time of the
16 morning when we take a break for half an hour. We will be
17 resuming court at 12 o'clock. I will therefore ask that the
18 Court be adjourned until 12.

19 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

11:57:07 20 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Munyard, I note a change of appearance
22 on your Bar.

23 MR MUNYARD: Madam President, I am grateful to you for
24 reminding me and indeed I should have introduced Ms Amina Graham
12:01:02 25 who joins the rest of the existing Defence team this morning.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Munyard, and we welcome
27 Ms Graham to the Court. Mr Santora, please proceed.

28 MR SANTORA: Thank you, Madam President:

29 Q. Mr Witness, again, before I start asking you questions

1 again I want to remind you to speak slowly, okay, especially when
2 you are explaining something to try to speak slowly. It is very
3 important so that the interpreters can keep up with you. Do you
4 understand that?

12:01:35 5 A. Okay, I will try to keep up to the pace.

6 Q. If you can when you are explaining your answers to call out
7 the names, instead of using words like "he" and "they". I know
8 it is something that can be difficult, but can you try your best
9 to call out names when you are explaining something?

12:01:57 10 A. I will try to do that.

11 Q. And the last thing is, Mr Witness, when you are giving your
12 answer, I know it is part of normal conversation, but please
13 address the judges and look towards the judges when you are
14 giving your answer, okay?

12:02:11 15 A. Okay.

16 Q. Now, there is just one more point and then we are going to
17 move on to a new area, but there is still something that I would
18 like to clarify with you, Mr Witness. Again, I attempted to
19 clarify this with you earlier, and it was a response you gave
12:02:35 20 with regards to the reinforcements that were sent to Sierra Leone
21 and you said with regard to messages sent in relation to these
22 reinforcements, and you said in your response "He needed
23 reinforcements to reinforce him on the front line because of
24 enemy threats". When you said "He needed reinforcements", who
12:03:13 25 did you mean when you said "he"?

26 A. Well, to make it clearly, the messages used to go by
27 stages. Like, the front line commander Dixon, when he wanted
28 reinforcements he will contact One Man One. When One Man One
29 needed reinforcements he would contact Degbon or Anthony

1 Mekunagbe. Degbon in turn had other areas, but I cannot recall
2 now where those units were coming from. He will contact his
3 colleagues. If there was any delay in the movement of the troops
4 he would in turn contact the CIC who was Mr Taylor.

12:04:17 5 Q. Okay. In the context of this answer, do you remember
6 giving this answer when you said that "He needed reinforcements"?
7 In that answer when you were talking about units being sent to
8 reinforce, who were you talking about when you said "he"?

9 A. I recall I spoke about two people, those whom needed
12:04:50 10 reinforcement like Degbon. When One Man One would demand from
11 Degbon, he Degbon would make his request to the various units
12 that I had mentioned before. When the various units would refuse
13 responding, that was when he would contact Mr Taylor directly,
14 General Degbon.

12:05:24 15 Q. And you said further in your answer, "Reinforce him on the
16 front line"?

17 A. Towards Sierra Leone.

18 Q. Who did you mean when you said "him on the front line"?

19 A. That is Dixon Wolo.

12:05:49 20 Q. Okay, reinforce who on the front line?

21 A. To reinforce Dixon, Kpelle Boy and others on the front
22 line.

23 Q. And the front line being where?

24 A. The front line was not static. It used to move from one
12:06:14 25 place to the other, but it was towards Sierra Leone, the front
26 line. Sometimes it would advance and would cross the border and
27 go deep into Sierra Leone and the enemies would repel us and we
28 would come back into Liberia. We would be there for some time.
29 That was how it was so the front line was like that not static.

1 It changed with time. But all of those were towards Sierra
2 Leone, when I am talking about front line in this case.

3 Q. Mr Witness, now you said that you yourself at some point
4 went to a unit called the signal unit. Is that correct?

12:07:04 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Describe the circumstances as to how you went to the signal
7 unit?

8 A. A group emerged in 1991 from the Sierra Leone area which
9 was fighting against Mr Taylor, something like Liberians United
10 something. I cannot recall the exact name of the group which was
11 later called ULIMO. Later, that group, we heard that it was now
12 called ULIMO. Those were the groups that were fighting. Just
13 when we would be pushed from Liberia and we would enter Sierra
14 Leone - just when we would be pushed from Sierra Leone, sorry,
12:07:33 15 and we enter into Liberia, when they moved from Sierra Leone they
16 did not call it Sierra Leone government forces but they were
17 actually fighting alongside the Sierra Leone government forces so
18 when they crossed and they got up to Tiene, Wangeko area.

19 Q. Please slow down and also again don't use the word --

12:08:03 20 A. Okay. When the enemies of the RUF and NPFL crossed, that
21 is the - that is the name of the - I don't recall the name of the
22 group, but later we used to refer to it as ULIMO. They came up
23 to the Wangeko area and so there was a village around that
24 Wangeko area. There is a main road going to Klay Junction in
12:08:30 25 Liberia. That was the end that Degbon based and he requested for
26 a radio operator, who was Titus and he, Titus, was Demmy's
27 deputy. It was Titus who went with General Degbon on that
28 mission. While he was going, for experience he took me because I
29 was a trainee. He took me to go with him, Titus.

1 Q. Mr Witness, trainee for what?

2 A. For radio course. I was a trainee in radio communication.

3 Q. Let's start then from the beginning, okay? Before this
4 incident with Titus, were you picked to be a trainee for radio
12:10:05 5 operating?

6 A. Yes, I was already part of the radio operations in Bomi
7 Hills. At that time I was training voice procedure.

8 Q. I am not asking you about that. I want to ask you how did
9 you start. How did you start with the signal unit?

12:10:32 10 A. I was at the training base at Bomi Hills together with the
11 other fighters when Pa Sankoh arrived at the base. At one time
12 he sent an instruction that they should send some people from
13 amongst us, the RUF fighters who were at the base, to be trained
14 in the various disciplines of the various units. I, together
12:11:07 15 with other people like Junior Koker Skinner, Top Gun, Sylvester
16 and others, we went to the signal unit. There was where we were
17 sent.

18 Q. Okay, I am going to stop you there and then I will ask you
19 to continue, but just to clarify. You said that Pa Sankoh
12:11:31 20 arrived at the base and he sent an instruction that they should
21 send some people from amongst us. First of all, when you said
22 "he sent an instruction", who sent an instruction?

23 A. He gave a direct instruction, Foday Sankoh. He gave Lion,
24 C0 Lion and others. C0 Lion and the other instructors who were
12:12:05 25 there, but at that time C0 Lion was the senior vanguard at the
26 base, so he told him to select from amongst us who would be able
27 to go to the signal and that person should go there and those who
28 were to go to the artillery unit should go there and he sent some
29 people to G2. That is C0 Lion, on instructions from Foday

1 Sankoh.

2 Q. So you yourself were picked for signal unit. Is that
3 correct?

4 A. Yes.

12:12:38 5 Q. Now, about how many of you were picked for signal unit?

6 A. Myself, Dauda Forni e.

7 Q. You don't have to call your name.

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. How many of you? Listen to the question closely,

12:12:56 10 Mr Witness. So if you can listen to my question it will help
11 you. How many of you approximately were picked to go training?

12 A. We were five.

13 Q. Now, you said that some people were picked for other units
14 by CO Lion. Is that correct?

12:13:22 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You said that you were picked to go for signal unit.
17 Signal unit for what entity? What do you mean when you say for
18 signal unit? For who?

19 A. To be trained in voice procedure, how to talk on the radio,
12:13:50 20 how to send messages and how to receive a message. To be trained
21 in communication discipline.

22 Q. I will ask you more about the training itself, but when you
23 say "signal unit" what do you mean? Unit for what group?

24 A. Signal unit was responsible for all radio messages, radio
12:14:24 25 messages; that is the operators who were the various radio
26 stations of the signal unit, any commander who would go to the
27 radio station would give his message, he would write it down and
28 sign it, and when he would have signed this message the operator
29 would encode it and send it to the station that was the intended

1 destination of that message.

2 Q. Listen to the question closely, okay. You said you were
3 sent to the signal unit. For what group was this signal unit
4 operating for?

12:15:02 5 A. Okay. The signal unit - no, we were selected by CO Lion to
6 be trained in communication, the RUF, so we would be able to go
7 into Sierra Leone and coordinate operations through the --

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, listen to the question. You
9 have been asked the same question each time. What group was this
12:15:25 10 signal unit operating for? You have referred to the RUF. Is
11 that the answer? If it is not the answer, say specifically which
12 unit.

13 THE WITNESS: Okay. The group that the signal unit was
14 operating for was the NPFL. It was NPFL signal unit.

12:15:51 15 MR SANTORA:

16 Q. Okay. Who was in charge of the NPFL signal unit at the
17 time you were sent for training, do you know?

18 A. The commander who was there as the regional commander was
19 Joseph Demmy. His code name was Bedcat and in the Liberian
12:16:21 20 English they pronounce it Beckier [phon]. That is the way it is
21 pronounced in Liberian English, Beckier.

22 Q. Now you said you were sent for training and approximately
23 five of you were sent or the training at the signal unit?

24 A. Yes.

12:16:45 25 Q. Where was the signal unit located?

26 A. The signal unit was in one of the quarters of a company - a
27 company that was in Bomi Hills. I don't know whether it was iron
28 ore, or I don't know what it was mining, but it was there, so it
29 was at the quarters. It was not far from One Man One's office.

1 The battalion headquarters office was not far from the signal
2 office also.

3 Q. Do you know why you were picked for radio training - for
4 training in the signal unit?

12:17:49 5 A. I don't know why it was specifically me, but we were asked
6 about our educational backgrounds, those who had attended school
7 academic levels, and we were five in number who went through.
8 Like the communication unit, which is the signal unit, it was not
9 everybody who liked the unit. Not every combatant who liked the
12:18:22 10 unit, because we were just in one place. We didn't go anywhere.
11 Nobody went anywhere. We didn't go to the war front. We did not
12 capture anything. So - but we were selected to go to the signal
13 unit.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Santora, a time frame would be
12:18:39 15 helpful.

16 MR SANTORA: Thank you, Justice Sebutinde:

17 Q. Now, Mr Witness, earlier you said that - well, let me just
18 ask you directly. When approximately was it that you were picked
19 to commence training at the signal unit? Do you know
12:18:59 20 approximately the month and year?

21 A. That was late 1991. Late 1991.

22 Q. Now, how long was the duration - what was the duration of
23 your radio training at the signal unit? Of your training at the
24 signal unit? How long did it last?

12:19:38 25 A. I was on it until mid-1992, in Bomi Hills.

26 Q. So the training itself lasted from end of '91 to mid-92?

27 MR MUNYARD: He didn't say end of '91. He said late '91.

28 MR SANTORA: I am sorry.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: It wasn't late.

1 MR SANTORA: I understand. Thank you for that:

2 Q. The training itself lasted from late 1991 until mid-1992?

3 Is that what you are saying?

4 A. Yes. Really, it was not like a training that you would

12:20:21 5 undergo, for example, they will tell you that now you are

6 qualified for this job and you would be certified or something

7 like that, but while the training was going on we would go on the

8 radio, we would be allowed to prepare messages, and we would

9 receive messages. We will do that on our own. If, for example,

12:20:43 10 anybody called Demmy and others who will allow us to practicalise

11 what we had been learning and I was on that up to mid-92.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, this word practicalise,

13 this is a new word for me. What does it mean?

14 THE INTERPRETER: To practice, your Honour.

12:21:11 15 THE WITNESS: To practise what we were being taught.

16 MR SANTORA:

17 Q. Now you mentioned your training and you referred to several

18 things such as voice procedure. Describe the composition of your

19 training. What did you learn about specifically? Please speak

12:21:37 20 slowly, I am going to remind you, Mr Witness.

21 A. Like, for example, all of us who are here now I would take

22 us to be various battalions - let me say those up there would be

23 the brigade commanders and this other section I will take that

24 then to be a battalion and battalion headquarters and I will take

12:22:02 25 this other area as the front line and I will take myself to be

26 the control station. For example, if I have any instructions

27 from the control stations where I am now, like for example

28 Mr Taylor wants to talk to any of the battalions or brigade

29 commanders, the voice procedure that we were taught was - that is

1 in Liberia and Bomi Hills - like, for example 35, Treetop 35
2 Bravo, then 35 Bravo will respond. Then he will say, "This 35
3 Bravo, carry on", or he will say "35 Bravo Roger". From there
4 again Treetop will tell him to go to this and this frequency.
12:23:02 5 Frequency is the numbers that are on the channels. That is the
6 various channels that are on the radio that we gave codes to.
7 The frequencies also had code names. All of those things were
8 being taught to us, how to use those frequencies and the code
9 names, and apart from that, like the various commanders had code
12:23:30 10 names also. I would say, for example, Ebony may like to talk to
11 Energy, that is like Mr Taylor would like to talk to General
12 Degbon. Then, if it was a message pertaining to reinforcement or
13 movement of troops we would write it down and we would encode it.
14 After encoding it we will transmit it to the receiving station.
12:24:08 15 When the receiving station would have received the message, they
16 will decode it and give it to the commander who was in charge and
17 that commander in charge, after reading the message, would sign
18 underneath that he had received the message and he had read it.
19 Q. Okay. I am going to stop you for a moment and just ask you
12:24:37 20 some questions about what you described. Though as a matter of
21 record, and I guess I could ask for a stipulation on this, if
22 Defence counsel noticed in the beginning of the witness's answer
23 the witness, in trying to explain something, was referring to
24 various sections and was pointing to various areas of the
12:24:58 25 courtroom and I don't know if Defence counsel was able to see
26 that in the beginning of his answer?
27 MR MUNYARD: I can inform my learned friend that I was
28 busily trying to follow this very long answer on the screen and I
29 didn't see a single description of anywhere in the courtroom, I

1 am afraid.

12:25:27 2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, for purposes of record then, the
3 witness tried to give an example by indicating that the Bench
4 would be the commanders, the Defence - the Prosecution would be
5 the front line and the Defence would be - he would be the
6 channels. I am just trying to recall what exactly the Defence
7 was. I think it was the base. Then from that he then went on to
8 describe the line of communication.

12:25:50 9 MR MUNYARD: Well, it all sounds quite appropriate in the
10 circumstances, Madam President.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Indeed.

12 MR SANTORA: I will probably clarify some of this in these
13 upcoming questions:

14 Q. Mr Witness, you were describing how your training and how
12:26:06 15 communications worked. In describing that you pointed to various
16 areas of the courtroom and then you referred to yourself "I will
17 take myself to be the control station". First of all, what were
18 you trying to explain when you referred to various areas of the
19 courtroom and just please take it slowly?

12:26:32 20 A. For example, I am the control station commander and
21 Mr Taylor is the CIC. If he wants to send a message to any front
22 line or he wants to get a message from any front line he would
23 not contact the front line directly, except in unusual
24 circumstances when it's something really urgent that did not need
12:27:03 25 any delay, but normally he will send the message for example that
26 - the example that I set here, that is the highest that I sent
27 from CIC, I am transmitting the message to this section and that
28 is the brigade commander and the brigade commander in turn would
29 send the message to the battalion commanders and the battalion

1 commanders in turn would send a message to the company commander.
2 That was the way the communication went on within the NPFL at
3 that time that I know of exactly.

12:27:55 4 Q. When you say "control station", what do you mean when you
5 say the phrase "control station"?

6 A. Control station, like Treetop at that time was the control
7 station. Treetop was Mr Taylor's radio station. One operator
8 whom I can recall now that I used to communicate with most often
9 was Butterfly at Treetop.

12:28:19 10 Q. Before you give an example, what is a control station?
11 Just define it.

12 A. A control station was the station which had authority over
13 all the other radio stations in the movement, that is the NPFL
14 movement at that time.

12:28:41 15 Q. So at the time you were based in Bomi Hills during the
16 course of your training, do you know where the control station
17 for the NPFL was?

18 A. To the best of my knowledge it was Gbarnga.

12:29:11 19 Q. You also said - and I am just asking you if you could
20 define the term. You used the term "voice procedure". What does
21 that mean, "voice procedure"?

22 A. Well, in communication there are two ways to communicate,
23 the one that I know of. That is there was Morse code, that was
24 "dede dada dede", that was telegraphing, yes. And then the voice
12:29:45 25 procedure was a laid down rule that you should talk on that
26 particular radio net. Like the Liberian NPFLs, they had their
27 own voice procedure. When we went to Pendembu area, that was in
28 late '92, we had - you know Pa Sankoh trained us in the British
29 voice procedure, but we will come to that.

1 Q. Okay. You also referred to - in giving an example you
2 referred to commanders turning to frequencies. Just explain what
3 is a frequency in this context.

4 A. It was operators who would turn to frequencies, not
12:30:37 5 commanders, because it was the operators who operated the radio.
6 Frequency is a chosen number. For example, we had frequencies -
7 like the first frequency that I was exposed to in communication
8 was 70350. That was Bomi Hills. That was the national at that
9 time for the NPFL - for the NPFL's communication system.

12:31:20 10 There were other frequencies like 103400 and most of those
11 names I cannot recall now, because frequencies used to change
12 with time. It was not a fixed thing. Those selected numbers
13 that we used as frequencies, we used to change them with time,
14 most often.

12:31:42 15 MR MUNYARD: Madam President, there is a phrase that is
16 about to disappear and so I think it's best to raise it now in
17 the in the previous answer about two ways to communicate. There
18 was Morse code, "And then the voices procedure was a laid down
19 rule that you should talk on that particular radio net" is what
12:32:01 20 is recorded there and I think that's what the witness said, but I
21 can't be absolutely certain. Can we find out what a radio net
22 is, because I know various nets but none of them are radios.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that was the word used I am fairly
24 sure, Mr Santora, and counsel is referring to, on my font, line
12:32:22 25 14 of page 68. Perhaps you will be coming to that clarification.

26 MR SANTORA: I was going to come to it, but I can do it
27 right now since we are addressing the point:

28 Q. Mr Witness, you referred something called a radio net.
29 What do you mean by that, "radio net"?

1 A. Thank you, Mr Lawyer. A radio net is a group of radio
2 stations that work together on the same frequency. That is what
3 we call radio net. Radio net comprises radio stations and the
4 frequency - an ordinary frequency cannot become a radio net. If
12:33:26 5 you have selected a frequency and a group of radio stations
6 worked there and from that point it becomes a radio net.

7 Q. Mr Witness, this brings me back to my question about
8 frequencies. First of all, how were these frequencies
9 identified?

12:33:46 10 A. Well, the frequencies too were given code names. We would
11 say "upstairs", "downstairs", and so on, because we used to
12 change the names.

13 Q. The frequency itself earlier you said was a number. Is
14 that correct?

12:34:09 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So explain what you mean then when you say code names were
17 frequencies?

18 A. Like 70553, for example, we will take that to be a
19 frequency. When all of us would be on the radio net, that is the
12:34:33 20 national where all of us will assemble, when I would want to talk
21 to a particular - for example, the front line that I said as an
22 example about, I will contact them. I said, "Come in on Hotel
23 One to Treetop". Hotel One would respond to me. When he would
24 have responded and I will take him from that main frequency to go
12:35:09 25 to another frequency. Why we used to do that was because we knew
26 that the enemies were monitoring us. So by the time the enemy
27 would be searching for that frequency we would have completed
28 talking what we wanted to talk on another frequency.

29 I will not say, "Let's go to 60552". If it was like 60552

1 that wanted to go, maybe that frequency we would have given it a
2 code name that was Mango. So I will just tell him that Mango.
3 Right there he would understand that it was that frequency that
4 we were supposed to go. Then the two of us would go there and
12:35:51 5 talk what we were supposed to talk on Mango and from there we
6 would return to the national. That was how the frequencies
7 operated.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, can I remind you again of the
9 need to speak slowly so the interpreters and the people that are
12:36:06 10 recording your answers can get them down correctly.

11 THE WITNESS: I will try, although that's my normal way of
12 talking, but I will try. I will try to adjust to your
13 satisfaction. I will try.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: We understand and what I will do in
12:36:28 15 future is give you a signal if I hear you speeding up. Continue,
16 Mr Santora.

17 THE WITNESS: Okay, I would appreciate that. Thank you.

18 MR SANTORA:

19 Q. So just to be clear and then we will move on, the number
12:36:42 20 70553 referred to what?

21 A. No, that was just an example that I made that we will take
22 it to be like Mango --

23 Q. Of what?

24 A. Of a frequency. 7055, we will take that as an example of a
12:36:59 25 frequency and on that - it could be 7055 or any other figure. We
26 will give a name to that, that instead of calling it say 70555 I
27 will just say Mango. You would know that it was 70555 that we
28 were to go.

29 Q. Who would actually know the names - the code names - for

1 these frequencies?

12:37:54 2 A. Well, those frequencies, most often it was the control
3 station which prepared the codes. When the control station would
4 have prepared the codes the control station would make sure that
5 those codes were circulated to all the various radio stations
6 before we start using that particular code, which means the same
7 thing that would be in a particular code would be the same thing
8 at the other. And if you are not part of that - you don't have
9 any knowledge about that code, you would find it difficult to
10 decode it.

11 Q. You have referred to a frequency called the national
12 frequency and you said later on where all of you would be on the
13 national frequency. What do you mean when you say "the national
14 frequency"? What does that refer to?

12:38:52 15 A. That was the frequency where all of us assembled, so if you
16 needed somebody that was the place you would pick that person up
17 and you would send him to another station or frequency and that
18 was where the two of you would talk to each other.

12:39:18 19 Q. Now, you were describing this as what you learned in
20 training while you were training at the signal unit in Bomi
21 Hills. Is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. From your position at Bomi Hills at the signal unit, could
24 you observe the state of communications going on at that time in
12:39:41 25 Liberia; who was communicating with who?

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Santora, that is --

27 MR SANTORA: It is two questions, I apologise.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, it is two questions, plus it's very
29 wide because we have heard a reference in previous answers to an

1 enemy, we have heard answers to other bases. Something more
2 speci fi c.

3 MR SANTORA: I will withdraw the question. Thank you,
4 Madam President:

12:40:08 5 Q. Mr Witness, from your position at Bomi Hills can you
6 describe the communications situation within Liberia?

7 MR MUNYARD: Well, we are I think now actually even wider
8 than in the previous question. I think if my learned friend
9 wants to get something from the witness about communications
10 within his organisation then that would be the appropriate way to
11 go about it. And may I say that's the last time I propose
12 assisting the Prosecution in how to put their case.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Santora?

14 MR SANTORA: I apologise. I was just looking to the
12:41:06 15 response, I'm sorry. Let me just rephrase the question:

16 Q. At Bomi Hills what communications were you aware of going
17 on?

18 MR MUNYARD: I am very sorry, but we are getting wider with
19 each question.

12:41:20 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Mr Santora, I made an observation
21 that the witness had referred to organisations, e.g. he had
22 referred to the enemy, he had referred to other bases, and I said
23 that your question was very wide. To my mind you have not
24 narrowed that question to the specifics that would be within the
12:41:42 25 knowledge of the witness.

26 MR SANTORA: Right. Okay:

27 Q. From your observation, Mr Witness, at Bomi Hills from your
28 observation you have - well, let me preface this before I ask you
29 the question. You have described that this was a communications

1 signal unit for the NPFL that you were being trained at. Is that
2 correct?

3 A. I did not get that clearly.

4 Q. You said that you were being trained at this particular
12:42:15 5 signal unit at Bomi Hills which was a part of the NPFL's - which
6 was part of the NPFL. Is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. From your position in Bomi Hills, did you observe any
9 communications going on within the NPFL at that time?

12:42:39 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Can you describe some of the communications that you
12 observed?

13 A. Like, I can recall at a point in time, while we were at the
14 radio station at Bomi Hills, One Man One went to the radio
12:43:04 15 stations and said that Bedcat should send a message to Energy
16 that we were under pressure, that is the RUF/NPFL fighters, our
17 men, who were on the front line that they were under pressure
18 from the enemies. In this sense, when I say the enemies, I am
19 referring to the Sierra Leone government troops and the other
12:43:40 20 people who were fighting against Mr Taylor. One Man One sent
21 that particular message. It came for Demmy to send the message
22 and Demmy prepared the message and One Man One signed it and he
23 encoded it and he sent it to General Degbon. General Degbon, his
24 operator received it and decoded it and General Degbon responded
12:44:16 25 to the message that he would be in Bomi Hills within 24 hours.

26 And indeed, General Degbon came there. I was in a radio room at
27 another time when General Degbon sent a radio message to Ebony
28 for him to send reinforcement for the enemies not to overrun the
29 NPFL/RUF fighters on the front line towards Sierra Leone and the

1 message, we saw the reinforcement come. Within four to five days
2 time the reinforcement came from different areas.

3 Q. Okay. You have just given examples of two --

4 A. [Overlapping speakers].

12:45:16 5 Q. Go ahead.

6 A. Yes. Then I also recall that there was a time when Pa
7 Sankoh was in Bomi Hills and Mosquito - let me say, no, wrong, it
8 was not Mosquito, it was one of the commanders, Zino. Zino. He
9 sent a message from Pendembu, that is in Sierra Leone, to say
10 that at that time they were advancing towards Gandorhun, that is
11 towards the Kono area, Gandorhun. Yes, I can also recall that,
12 that particular communication.

13 Q. Mr Witness, before I ask you specifically about these
14 specific communications, you have referred several times in your
15 answer to RUF/NPFL fighters. What do you mean by that when you
16 say RUF/NPFL fighters?

17 A. Well, that was the time we were in Bomi Hills. That was
18 the time we were in Bomi Hills. We were fighting as one group.
19 All of us were fighting as one group. The NPFL and the RUF,
20 those of us the RUF and the NPFL.

12:46:57 21 Q. So at this time from your standpoint, from your
22 observation, in Bomi Hills, describe the state of the
23 communication between the NPFL and the RUF?

24 A. At that time actually, I only recall that they had one
12:47:24 25 station around the Kailahun area that was based in Pendembu.
26 That was time I was in Bomi Hills that I recall and it was CO
27 Nya, he was the commander.

28 Q. Who had one station based in Kailahun area?

29 A. Within the RUF liberated territories, they had one radio

1 station initially, and later they also had another radio station
2 that they established around Kui va area. Around the Kui va area
3 towards Daru.

12:48:14 4 Q. Now, I am asking you typically how did a communication flow
5 between the RUF and the NPFL at this time while you were in Bomi
6 Hills? How did this typically work?

7 A. Well, those of us, the RUF who were around the first
8 battalion area, we did not have any communications on our own.
9 We used purely NPFL communications. In fact, the communication
12:48:42 10 radio stations that I have spoken about that were in Pendembu and
11 Kui va, we all of us operated on the same frequency.

12 Q. Just before you go on, I want you to listen to my question
13 closely. At the time you were in Bomi Hills I am talking about.

14 A. Yes.

12:48:59 15 Q. Okay. Describe typically how a communication - how
16 communications flowed between the RUF and NPFL. I am not asking
17 you about the time you were in Sierra Leone yet.

18 A. That is what I am saying. At the time I was in Bomi Hills,
19 that is what I am talking about. CO Nya and us, we all of us
12:49:21 20 used the same frequency. By the time I was in Bomi Hills, we
21 used the same frequency, the same codes and sometimes CO Nya
22 would contact Demmy to give him updates about us, those of us who
23 were on the other side. That was when CO Mohamed would want to
24 know about our conditions. And those of us who were there
12:49:49 25 together with some other Sierra Leone vanguards, they would go to
26 our radio station to know about developments in the 2nd
27 Battalion. That was, we were referring to the Kailahun area as
28 the 2nd Battalion.

29 Q. Okay. First of all, I am just going to ask you quickly to

1 explain. Who is CO Nya?

2 A. CO Nya was a Liberian and he was particularly a Gio and he
3 was the signal commander for the RUF. He was the overall signal
4 commander for the RUF.

12:50:36 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, did the witness say
6 probably or particularly a Gio?

7 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
8 to repeat that, but I did not hear probably, your Honours.

9 MR SANTORA:

12:50:52 10 Q. Mr Witness, did you say he was probably or did you say he
11 was particularly a Gio?

12 A. He was a Gio. He was a Gio man.

13 Q. Now at the time you were in Bomi Hills, where was CO Nya
14 based?

12:51:12 15 A. He was based in Pendembu. CO Nya was based in Pendembu.

16 Q. Now you were describing how a communication would work from
17 the RUF to the NPFL, and you said that CO Nya would contact
18 Demmy. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

12:51:30 20 Q. From that point, just slowly take it. From Demmy, where
21 would the communication go?

22 A. Well, those were one of the areas that communications went
23 on frequently, and then there was a time again when Foday Sankoh
24 went to the radio room because by then he did not travel with
12:51:59 25 Alfred Brown. He had an operator who was called Alfred Mortor
26 that we used to call Alfred Brown.

27 Q. Mr Witness, I was asking you about your description of how
28 typically a communication would work and you said --

29 A. This is what I am explaining. I am laying the foundation -

1 the basis of the communication. Alfred Brown was a roving
2 operator for Foday Sankoh, and I recall that at a point in time
3 Alfred Brown was not around and the Papay went to the radio
4 station to find out about situations on the other side within the
12:52:48 5 other RUF fighters within the 2nd Battalion in the Kailahun
6 District.

7 Q. Mr Witness, where?

8 A. Pendembu, Kailahun District. We were in the radio station
9 in Bomi Hills when Pa Sankoh met us there and he wanted to find
12:53:06 10 out about a situation in Sierra Leone, within the RUF areas.

11 Q. And did he do that?

12 A. Demmy did and he told me that at that time there was -
13 there wasn't much problem, but the only thing that CO Nya and
14 others spoke about was ammunition.

12:53:37 15 Q. So just to put this in context, Mr Witness. I asked you
16 how typically a communication would work and you said that CO Nya
17 would communicate to Demmy and then you described this incident
18 where you saw Foday Sankoh talking to Demmy, but I want to know
19 typically from Demmy where would messages be transmitted?

12:54:05 20 A. Well, for instance, when we were in Bomi Hills, if there
21 was any message, like for instance Anthony Mekunagbe, General Dry
22 Pepper, was another person who used to frequently visit Sierra
23 Leone to supervise the war. He would go on the 1st Battalion
24 side, that is the Pujehun area, and he would also go to the 2nd
12:54:30 25 Battalion area, that is the Liberian side, and at any time they
26 came to Bomi Hills they will enter the radio station to find out
27 about the situation directly and directly from the situation from
28 the station. I am limiting my - what I am talking about to
29 around 1992. That is what I am talking about, the level of

1 communication that we had whilst I was in Bomi Hills.

2 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: The witness mentioned a time frame and he
3 said around 1992.

4 MR SANTORA: That is what I am going to clarify first and
12:56:11 5 then move on to something else:

6 Q. Mr Witness, your observations that you are describing now,
7 initially I asked you to describe your observations while you
8 were at Bomi Hills, which was late '91 to mid-92, is that
9 correct?

12:56:28 10 A. Exactly, yes.

11 Q. Now, what you're describing in terms of how typically a
12 communication would work, I want to ask you in terms of location
13 where would the communications be transmitted from and to where
14 would they be transmitted to? Let's just start with where would
12:56:49 15 the communication usually originate from?

16 A. Well, sometimes when General Degbon and others got those
17 messages they will want to get on to the Papay, that is Foday
18 Sankoh - General Degbon would want to get on to Pa Sankoh to give
19 him updates about the situation. Sometimes Pa Sankoh himself
12:57:16 20 would enquire things for himself. Sometimes he will enquire from
21 General Degbon.

22 Because most of the commanders, for example the 1st
23 Battalion in which I was, they had that - I was exposed to the
24 Liberia NPFL chain of command at that time. So whenever any
12:57:40 25 message came from the front line, the Sierra Leone area, that is
26 the Pujehun area, it was General Degbon that directly updated
27 Foday Sankoh because at that time RUF did not actually get a
28 radio station on their own to operate its own frequency. So it
29 was the Liberian operators who used to go to the front lines

1 until such a time when we also joined them because by then we had
2 been with them for some time and by then we would go with them
3 for some time now and we share experiences together.

12:58:22 4 Q. The message that came from the front line, the Sierra Leone
5 area, where specifically would that message be transmitted to?

6 A. There were various areas. They would sometimes send it to
7 General Degbon, sometimes General Dry Pepper, Anthony Mekunagbe.
8 And Mekunagbe or Degbon would send a message directly to the
9 leader, Foday Sankoh.

12:58:59 10 Q. Okay, I asked you, Mr Witness, where, not who. Listen to
11 the question. Where were the messages sent to? Do you know what
12 I mean? The messages that came from Sierra Leone, where were
13 they sent to?

14 A. That is in Liberia. In Liberia.

12:59:17 15 Q. Where specifically?

16 A. Well, like for instance in Bomi Hills, sometimes in Gbarnga
17 - the commanders were mobile. They were not static. Like for
18 instance even Foday Sankoh had a base in Gbarnga, he had a base
19 in Bomi Hills, he had a base in Kailahun. So wheresoever they
12:59:43 20 were the message would meet them there.

21 Q. How frequent was the communication between the front lines
22 in Sierra Leone and the NPFL in Liberia?

23 A. It was on a daily basis.

24 Q. How do you know that?

13:00:08 25 A. Because every morning when even - even when I had started
26 gaining much understanding about the communications, sometimes I
27 myself would contact Sierra Leone to get feedback from Pendembu
28 and later I would tell my commander in charge, Demmy, that this
29 was the situation for any commander who was going to come later,

1 because any commander who came he will act for Demmy or Ringo or
2 the other Liberian senior operators who were there with us and
3 that was how the communications went on. They too would in turn
4 contact us to know about the situation. It was on a daily basis.

13:00:51 5 Q. You said that sometimes - that messages would go to
6 Gbarnga. Is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. How do you know that?

9 A. I will be in the radio room. I was there at one point in
13:01:13 10 time when a message came from the front line, the Pujehun area,
11 to Degbon that the enemies, that is the government troops, the
12 Sierra Leone government troops, had crossed the bridge again and
13 that they were advancing. They had come past Bo Waterside and
14 they were advancing towards the Wangeko area and I was there when
13:01:37 15 General Degbon sent that message to Ebony. I was there when he
16 sent the message to Ebony.

17 Q. Where were you? Where were you?

18 A. Bomi Hills. Bomi Hills in the radio station.

19 Q. So how were you able to hear this message?

13:01:51 20 A. The message, he went there and told Demmy that Demmy should
21 send so and so message to explain that this was the situation and
22 the message itself would be written by Demmy and General Degbon
23 will write - sign it, because we had a message logbook where we
24 kept records of all messages. So any operator whosoever entered
13:02:15 25 the radio room, you will turn the pages of the logbook and you
26 will familiarise yourself with the updates of the day.

27 And that besides, at any time General Degbon came to the
28 radio room we will all be present. Or at any time Mohamed
29 himself came there we will be all there. If Dry Pepper came

1 there we would all be there. So all the discussions, we
2 monitored all of them live. Live.

13:02:51 3 Q. Okay, you said you monitored - I will ask you about
4 monitoring in a moment. In this particular description, this
5 example you have given right now, I asked you how you know
6 messages went to Gbarnga from the front lines and you said you
7 were there in the radio room at one point when a message came
8 from the front line to Degbon. Where was Degbon at this time?

9 A. In Bomi Hills.

13:03:17 10 Q. You said that this message informed Degbon that the
11 government troops had crossed the bridge again and they were
12 advancing. Do you remember saying that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Then you said they had passed Bo Waterside advancing
13:03:43 15 towards the Wangeko area and "I was there when General Degbon
16 sent that message to Ebony". Who was there when General Degbon
17 sent that message to Ebony?

18 A. He --

19 Q. Listen to the question. Who was there when General Degbon
13:04:06 20 sent the message to Ebony?

21 A. I was there.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Joseph Demmy was there and some other operators were
24 present when General Degbon gave the instruction to Demmy to
13:04:20 25 transmit a message to --

26 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness come
27 again with the last bit of his testimony.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, the interpreter has not heard
29 the last part of your answer clearly. Please pick up your answer

1 where you said, "When General Degbon gave the instruction to
2 Demmy to transmit a message to --" Continue from there.

3 THE WITNESS: General Degbon gave instruction to Demmy to
4 transmit the message to Treetop for Ebony. That was Ebony's
13:04:56 5 radio station, that is what I am referring to as Treetop. For
6 the message to be transmitted to Ebony.

7 MR SANTORA:

8 Q. Were you present when this message was - well, was this
9 message transmitted to Treetop?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. How do you know that?

12 A. I was in the radio room when Demmy encoded the message and
13 sent it.

14 Q. And where was Treetop located?

13:05:38 15 A. In Gbarnga. That was the control station. That was
16 Charles Taylor's radio station.

17 Q. Now, earlier you described Gbarnga as the location for the
18 control station for the NPFL. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

13:05:54 20 Q. When messages would come from the front line, typically how
21 would they be transmitted from the front line? Actually, let me
22 withdraw the question because I think it will be repetitive if I
23 ask it that way. Mr Witness, the messages that would come from
24 the front line, would they eventually reach Gbarnga?

13:06:23 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And how would they --

27 MR MUNYARD: Which messages from the front line would reach
28 Gbarnga? We have heard of a constant amount of messaging from
29 the front line via all sorts of circuitous routes and if my

1 learned friend is asking about a particular one then we want
2 details, but to put the question in so vague a way is not helpful
3 to anyone, starting with the witness.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: It is indeed very wide, Mr Santora,
13:07:01 5 because the witness has described or given examples of different
6 messages from the front line and in fact from different front
7 lines.

8 MR SANTORA: Okay, I will take the cue, your Honour:

9 Q. Mr Witness, you have referred to code names. At this time
13:07:25 10 while you were in Bomi Hills can you remember some of the code
11 names of some of the commanders?

12 A. Yes, like for example Mr Taylor, we used to call him Ebony.
13 Foday Sankoh was Toyota. Foday Sankoh was Toyota. General
14 Degbon was Energy. Like for some of the call signs, those who
13:08:10 15 were in Pendembu, they were Three-Five or 35. Mr Taylor's radio
16 station was Treetop at a point in time. But really the code
17 names were not static. They changed with time, really. They
18 used to change with time.

19 Q. Now, how long did you remain in Liberia?

13:09:08 20 A. I was in Liberia up to late 1992.

21 Q. Now, you described your training at the control station as
22 going from late 1991 to mid-1992. Is that right?

23 A. Well, not all is right. I have described my training, but
24 not --

13:09:41 25 MR MUNYARD: I do object to this because my learned friend
26 is now cross-examining his own witness. I objected when he said,
27 "You said your training was at the end of '91 to mid-92" because
28 the witness hadn't said that. I pointed out from the transcript
29 that the witness had said late '91 to mid-92 and Mr Santora

1 accepted that he had slightly wrongly phrased the answer. The
2 witness is now being cross-examined on the evidence that he gave
3 earlier that was settled evidence.

13:10:13 4 MR SANTORA: Your Honours, may I respond on that? I have
5 not at all put any inconsistency to the witness. I simply
6 restated for foundational purposes the period of the training he
7 has already stated. I was going to explore if he had any other
8 particular assignment or duty in Liberia. There has been no
9 proposition to this witness that there has been an inconsistency.

13:10:33 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: The sequence of questions started with
11 how long did you remain in Liberia, a very general question, and
12 the witness responded. Mr Santora reminded or restated that it
13 was late '91 to '92 for his training and then said "Is that
14 right?" which technically could be cross-examining your witness
13:11:00 15 because you are saying to him, "Is this evidence that you have
16 already given us correct?" So perhaps rephrase that. I think I
17 know what you are saying, Mr Santora, but rephrase it so that it
18 does not imply that he could correct himself when in fact it has
19 been given clearly.

13:11:18 20 MR SANTORA: I think I can just simplify matters perhaps:

21 Q. When did you leave Liberia, Mr Witness?

22 A. It was in late 1992.

23 Q. So from mid-1992 to late 1992, what did you do?

13:11:49 24 A. Well, we were in Bomi Hills and then myself and the other
25 fighters, the NPFL and all of us, that is what I am referring to,
26 when the ULIMO attacked us in Bomi Hills and they captured Bomi
27 Hills from us. So from there, when we retreated through the Maca
28 crossing point, the next place I based was Kakata and we were in
29 Kakata until the time Foday Sankoh came from Liberia, when Foday

1 Sankoh came from the front line from Liberia, that is Monrovia,
2 he came together with Mr Taylor. That was during the Operation
3 Octopus some time in September '92, something like that, yes.

13:12:48

4 Yes, I am sure. September, during Operation Octopus. When they
5 came from the front line they met us in a formation because he
6 left a message behind saying that because we have been now
7 scattered all over Liberia, that is Foday Sankoh, he sent a
8 message so that Rebel King and the others like CO Lion would put
9 us together to go and join our other brothers in the Kailahun
10 area to continue the arms struggle. That was the time he and
11 Mr Taylor passed through Kakata. They were going in around the
12 areas to Monrovia.

13:13:19

13 Q. Okay, Mr Witness. Before you go on, when approximately did
14 ULIMO attack you - attack your group in Bomi Hills? When
15 approximately did that happen?

13:13:43

16 A. It was during the rains, around late June to July. Around
17 that - around late June to July. It was raining.

18 Q. Of what year?

19 A. 1992.

13:14:06

20 Q. And you said then you retreated through Maca crossing?
21 What exactly did you say; which crossing?

22 A. Maca crossing point.

23 Q. Can you just spell that?

13:14:32

24 A. M-A-C-A, Maca. There is a river there. I do not know the
25 name. That is in Liberia. When you are moving from the Bomi
26 Hills area you will cross the river and the first village you
27 meet there is Maca. That was the area where we were, around the
28 Maca area. I do not actually know the name of the county, but it
29 was at the Maca crossing point.

1 Q. And you said "we retreated". Who actually retreated from
2 Bomi Hills?

3 A. Demmy, myself and all the other NPFL forces who were in
4 Bomi Hills and who had retreated.

13:15:13 5 Q. And you said the next place you were based was Kakata. Is
6 that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. About how long - how much time transpired between when you
9 left Bomi Hills and you arrived at Kakata? Approximately how
13:15:27 10 much time passed?

11 A. About a month, because we spent some time at Maca, at the
12 crossing point that I have just explained about, we were there on
13 defensive. From Maca we went to Kakata.

14 Q. Upon your arrival in Kakata, what happened?

13:16:08 15 A. I was now in Kakata until the time the NPFL launched their
16 Operation Octopus on Monrovia, and we were there because even
17 though we had been there with them, and we had been scattered,
18 but some of the Black Gadaffa units were still intact, although
19 some of its members were on the various front lines, but a part
13:16:40 20 of the people within the Black Gadaffa that I am referring to
21 now, there was a point in time when we were in Kakata and

22 Mr Taylor and Pa Sankoh, they moved from the Gbarnga area and
23 they went to the front line going towards Monrovia. That was
24 Echo Bravo. And whilst Pa Sankoh was going he left a message
13:17:09 25 with CO Lion and he asked him to assemble us so that he will make
26 us go back to Sierra Leone through Kailahun to join the other RUF
27 fighters who were in Kailahun.

28 Q. Okay. First of all, you said that Mr Taylor and Pa Sankoh
29 moved from the Gbarnga area and they went to the front line going

1 towards Monrovia. How do you know that Mr Taylor and Pa Sankoh
2 moved from the Gbarnga area and went to the front line towards
3 Monrovia? How do you know that?

13:18:00 4 A. When they moved from the Gbarnga area, they came to Kakata
5 and CO Lion and others met the Pa, Pa Sankoh, and the message
6 that Pa Sankoh gave to CO Lion was, because I was also on the
7 radio there, so I was one of the persons who CO Lion gave the
8 message to that Pa Sankoh had given to him. He said we should
9 prepare that message. He said if there was any one amongst my
13:18:26 10 fellow, my colleague RUF fighters around Kakata or around that
11 area, he said I should inform that person that Pa Sankoh said we
12 should try and prepare ourselves to go back to Sierra Leone. And
13 he gave a date in fact. He said from the date CO Lion gave me
14 that message, he gave us two days to assemble ourselves and from
13:18:56 15 that time almost everybody was now coming on board. Those of us
16 the RUF fighters, all of us were now coming to assemble around
17 the police station where the NPFL police station was. That is on
18 the highway in Kakata. That was where every one of us came,
19 because at any time Pa Sankoh would come everybody would be able
13:19:18 20 to see him.

21 Q. Mr Witness, remember the original question I asked you was
22 how you know Sankoh - Foday Sankoh, Pa Sankoh, and Mr Taylor went
23 towards Monrovia towards the front line. That is what I asked
24 you. How do you know that?

13:19:43 25 A. It was Mr Lion, Mr Alan Blamo, the Lion, he told me.

26 Q. So that is simple enough. You learnt from Mr Lion, is that
27 what you are saying. From Lion?

28 A. Yes.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Santora, the witness mentioned a

1 phrase Echo Bravo. What is Echo Bravo?

2 THE WITNESS: That was the code name for Monrovia at a
3 point in time. There was a time that was how we used to refer to
4 Monrovia, Echo Bravo, that particular time.

13:20:27

5 MR SANTORA:

6 Q. Now, you said that the message Pa Sankoh gave to C0 Lion
7 that - I am sorry, you said that Pa Sankoh gave to C0 Lion a
8 message. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

13:20:44

10 Q. And you also said "So I was one of the persons who C0 Lion
11 gave the message to that Pa Sankoh had given him." I need you to
12 explain slowly the transmission of this message. You said Pa
13 Sankoh gave a message to C0 Lion. Where was Pa Sankoh when he
14 gave this message to C0 Lion?

13:21:16

15 A. C0 Lion told me that Papay had come, that is Pa Sankoh. He
16 said he had come and he had passed and he had gone towards
17 Monrovia front line. He said he went together with Ebony. He
18 said he will have to come again. And he told him that he said we
19 should try and assemble ourselves in one particular place in
20 Kakata. It was C0 Lion who said --

13:21:39

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, I want you to listen to the
22 question carefully. You start answering the question and then
23 you go into the history. We are only - you are only being asked
24 one question, not the history as well, so listen to the question.
25 You have said - the question was where was Pa Sankoh when he gave
26 the message to C0 Lion. You have given part of that answer but
27 you haven't given it all. Mr Santora, put the question again
28 please. Listen carefully and answer carefully.

13:22:01

29 MR SANTORA:

1 Q. Mr Witness, just the answer to this question. Where was Pa
2 Sankoh when he gave this message to CO Lion?

3 A. It was in Kakata.

13:22:37

4 Q. And after this message was given to CO Lion who, if anyone,
5 did CO Lion give this message to?

6 A. Well, he, CO Lion was telling the various RUF fighters in
7 Kakata to circulate the message. He said - when he came across
8 any one of them he will give him the message and he will tell
9 that person that "at any time you see some other person make sure
10 you tell that person the message", so that was how the message
11 was circulated.

13:23:06

12 Q. And what specifically did the message say?

13 A. The message said we should prepare to go back to Sierra
14 Leone through Kailahun to go and join our colleague RUF fighters
15 in Kailahun.

13:23:25

16 Q. Okay. Originally this question was about you leaving
17 Liberia and you have said now that you have reached this
18 location, Kakata, and now you have described a message that CO
19 Lion sent with - about having Sierra Leoneans go back to Sierra
20 Leone. Is that correct?

13:23:55

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. After this message was transmitted by CO Lion, what
23 happened?

24 A. Well, two days after that Pa Sankoh came to Kakata and
25 fortunately enough he met a good number of us around the police -
26 I mean the MP headquarters in Kakata. He came in the convoy with
27 Mr Taylor. He alighted and spoke to us briefly, but Mr Taylor
28 did not talk to us. He was still seated in his own vehicle.
29 Mr Taylor did not alight. He was still seated in his own

13:24:20

1 vehicle, his own jeep. The glass - the windscreens were up when
2 Pa Sankoh alighted and came and spoke to us. He said, "My
3 children, my brothers, my sisters, all of us now know what the
4 struggle is all about." He said, "You should prepare". And he,
13:25:14 5 Foday Sankoh, was now saying that he was going to Gbarnga and on
6 arriving there he said he was going to send a vehicle or a truck
7 to pick us from Kakata. Indeed, when he went he sent the truck.

8 Q. Who sent the truck?

9 A. Foday Sankoh. Foday Sankoh. Indeed, when he arrived in
13:25:33 10 Gbarnga he sent a truck to pick us from Kakata. We went to
11 Gbarnga, we met Mr Sankoh there, and then all of us travelled
12 together to Sierra Leone through Kailahun.

13 Q. Before you go on, because I can just clarify a few things
14 before the break. You said that Mr Taylor himself did not alight
13:26:01 15 from the vehicle. Is that correct?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. How do you know the individual in the vehicle was
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. It was CO Lion who told me.

13:26:15 20 Q. Was that the first time you ever saw Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, you also said that, "He was going to send a vehicle or
23 a truck to pick us up from Kakata", referring to Foday Sankoh you
24 said. When you said "pick us up", about how many of you were to
13:26:37 25 be picked up from Kakata?

26 A. We were there up to 70 something of us. I do not recall
27 the exact figure anyway.

28 Q. So what kind of truck was he going to send to pick you up,
29 do you know?

1 A. It was a big three wiper Toyota truck that came and picked
2 us up, but we filled the truck.

3 Q. Do you remember how many tyres the truck had?

4 A. It was that big - a large sized three wiper Toyota truck.

13:27:32 5 I do not want to guess anyway.

6 Q. Was the truck eventually sent to Kakata?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you said then that you proceeded to Gbarnga. Is that
9 correct?

13:27:50 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And upon reaching Gbarnga, about how long did you stay
12 there?

13 A. We spent about three days in Gbarnga. We did not stay
14 there for - we did not stay there long. We spent about 72 hours

13:28:14 15 there.

16 Q. And from Gbarnga where did you go?

17 A. From Gbarnga we went to Sierra Leone. We went to Sierra
18 Leone. To be specific, Kailahun. To the RUF controlled zone at
19 that time in Kailahun District.

13:28:35 20 Q. You said that one truck went from Kakata to Gbarnga.

21 Describe the composition of the transport from Gbarnga to Sierra
22 Leone.

23 A. There was one late Rashid Mansaray who was a member of the
24 Special Forces. He was a Sierra Leonean Special Forces member
13:29:02 25 trained in Libya. He was our commander.

26 Q. I am not asking you who. I am asking you what was the
27 composition of the transport? What did you use to travel to
28 Sierra Leone?

29 A. It was the same truck that took us along, plus another

1 vehicle.

2 Q. What was the other vehicle?

3 A. The other vehicle was not actually a truck. It was a
4 pick-up.

13:29:44 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Santora, I am noticing the time. Are
6 you coming to the end of a particular line of questioning?

7 MR SANTORA: It is probably best to resume afterwards.
8 This is convenient.

9 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: We could get have elicited the time frame
13:29:59 10 for this.

11 MR SANTORA: I can do this right now very quickly then:

12 Q. Mr Witness, then the time that you moved from Gbarnga to
13 Sierra Leone - what was the time frame of this in terms of month
14 and year, can you recall?

13:30:12 15 A. It was in November that we moved.

16 Q. What year?

17 A. 1992, November. That was the time we moved from Gbarnga to
18 Kailahun.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Santora. Mr Witness, we
13:30:30 20 are now going to take the lunchtime adjournment of one hour. We
21 will be resuming court at 2.30. Please adjourn court until 2.30.

22 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

23 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Munyard.

14:30:29 25 MR MUNYARD: Good afternoon, Madam President, your Honours.
26 There is a change of representation again on the Defence bench
27 which I have noticed on this occasion and that is to say that
28 Mr Anyah is no longer with us.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. I will note that accordingly.

1 Mr Santora, please proceed.

2 MR SANTORA: Thank you, Madam President. And the
3 composition of the Prosecution bench remains the same:

14:30:59

4 Q. Mr Witness, before I continue I again would remind you to
5 listen closely to the question and also listen to the question
6 that you're receiving from the interpreter. Do you understand?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And again, I also remind you again to try to speak slowly
9 and pace yourself so everyone can keep up with your answer.

14:31:29

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. Mr Witness, before we move on there was one issue I just
12 want to go back to from your testimony this morning. You used on
13 several occasions the term "monitoring". Can you just describe
14 what monitoring is in terms of radio operations?

14:31:59

15 A. Well, there are two ways of monitoring a radio from our
16 discussions this morning. Sometimes a particular commander, for
17 example Degbon, could come and tell Demmy that this is the
18 message that I want you to send to like Ebony or to like the
19 front line. I will be sitting there and hearing that.

14:32:29

20 Secondly, there is the other monitoring. Certain messages
21 that would be going over the air, you will not be taking part in
22 the message, that is, when two other stations are talking, are
23 conversing, when one is receiving a message from the other. You
24 can listen and decode the message. That is the other part of
25 monitoring that I was talking about.

14:32:51

26 Q. Who was able to monitor communications?

27 A. Any operator so far who sat on the radio at a particular
28 point in time. As long as you were on the radio and you had
29 tuned into that frequency you can hear what the other person is

1 saying.

2 Q. Now before the lunch break you were describing the trip you
3 took from Gbarnga to Sierra Leone. Do you recall that?

4 A. Yes.

14:33:35 5 Q. And you said you left with one truck and another vehicle.

6 A. Yes, a van.

7 Q. First of all in terms of the truck, what was in the truck?

8 A. The truck that we travelled with contained ammunition,
9 assorted, mixed ammunition, like AK rounds, GPMG rounds,

14:34:11 10 grenades, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines. It had some -
11 it contained ammunition and us, the humans, we were among that as
12 well. We were in the truck.

13 Q. Where did you obtain this ammunition from?

14 A. Well, the ammunition, I did not know where they had loaded
14:34:46 15 them from, but we were at the house to Pa Sankoh when, after the
16 truck had been loaded with the ammunition we just got on board
17 the truck and travelled. I never asked where they had got the
18 ammunition from and nobody told me that was where we got the
19 ammunition from.

14:35:13 20 Q. Where specifically was the truck loaded?

21 A. It was in Gbarnga.

22 MR MUNYARD: Loaded with what? Loaded with people or
23 loaded with ammunition? I would like us to know what the
24 question relates to, whether it relates to the loading of
14:35:41 25 personnel or the loading of ammunition.

26 MR SANTORA: I thought from the previous question the
27 context was clear.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: I also felt it was - it's not clear to me
29 also from this answer whether the truck was already loaded with

1 ammunition when it arrived for the human beings, or the witness
2 saw it being loaded with ammunition prior to getting on. So
3 there's two aspects there, Mr Santora.

4 MR SANTORA: Okay. Thank you, Madam President:

14:36:12 5 Q. Mr Witness, to clarify what you just described --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Go ahead and clarify it.

8 A. The truck that we travelled with to Sierra Leone, at the
9 time that it got to the point where it picked us up from Pa
10 Sankoh's ground in Gbarnga, it had already been loaded with some
11 ammunition. It contained ammunition. So where I said that I did
12 not know where they had loaded it, that was the question that
13 they asked me. I said no, I did not know where it was loaded.
14 But the place - the truck where the ammunition was, that was the
14:36:51 15 same truck we used to travel to Kailahun.

16 Q. And the men, the human beings as you said, that were on the
17 truck, where did they get on the truck?

18 A. From Gbarnga, at Pa Sankoh's house. It was at the same
19 time place that all of us were when we boarded the truck.

14:37:19 20 Q. And about how many of you, if you can approximate - how
21 many of you were on the truck?

22 A. Around 70 something. Really, I can't get the exact figure
23 now.

24 Q. You also said there was another vehicle, a van, that
14:37:46 25 proceeded on this convoy. Is that correct?

26 A. Yes. That was Pa Sankoh's own vehicle that he was with.
27 It too contained some ammunition. We travelled together with Pa
28 Sankoh up to Pendembu.

29 Q. So who was in the van?

1 A. Pa Sankoh, his securities and some materials, ammunition.

2 Q. From Gbarnga you proceeded to where?

3 A. Pendembu Town, Kailahun District.

4 Q. Describe what happened then when you arrived at Pendembu.

14:38:44 5 A. When we got to Pendembu we were the ones who off-loaded the
6 ammunition which we had taken along, that is the assorted
7 ammunition, and from there the ammunition - Pa Sankoh called on
8 CO Mohamed the late, that is Zino, to receive his own supplies to
9 carry out the supply - the attack on Kono. Then he sent some to
14:39:15 10 the other front lines towards Daru and Bunumbu. From there, the
11 following morning he called for a formation again. Those of us
12 who were part of signals, that is those of us who were taking
13 training in signals, he told us to go to the radio station to be
14 with CO Nya.

14:39:41 15 Q. Who --

16 A. Pa Sankoh. Pa Sankoh said --

17 Q. Let me finish the question. Who called the formation?

18 A. Pa Sankoh. It was Pa Sankoh who called the formation.

19 Everybody so far, you who was a G2 would be sent to the G2 and
14:40:00 20 the combatants were distributed to the various front lines. Pa
21 Sankoh did that. Pa Sankoh --

22 Q. Just before you go into this area, just to clarify, you
23 said that earlier the assorted ammunition and from there the
24 ammunition Pa Sankoh called on CO Mohamed, the late, that is

14:40:24 25 Zino. How did Pa Sankoh call on CO Mohamed? How did he do this?

26 A. He called him through the radio.

27 Q. Do you know where CO Mohamed was at this time when he was
28 called by Pa Sankoh?

29 A. I did not know the exact town, but he was on the front line

1 towards Kono.

2 Q. And you referred to him as CO Mohamed. What was his full
3 name?

14:41:01

4 A. Mohamed Tarawalli, aka Zino. He was the field commander at
5 that time, the battlefield commander.

6 Q. Then you said that Pa Sankoh called a formation. Is that
7 correct?

8 A. Yes, the following morning.

14:41:20

9 Q. What did he say, if anything, in this formation? What did
10 Pa Sankoh say in this formation?

11 A. He spoke to us. He advised us - the combatants were handed
12 over to the MP commander who was in Pendembu to be distributed to
13 the various front lines. Those who belonged to any unit from
14 Liberia were sent - Pa Sankoh sent everybody to his own area or
15 his own unit. For me and the other men, Pa Sankoh - about three
16 of us who had trained in communications from Bomi Hills, along
17 the line whilst we were coming to Pendembu, some other brothers
18 joined us, other people joined us. So like the late Osman Tolo,
19 the late Bongo Man, Pa Sankoh said that morning that we were not
20 going to any front line. We, the radio operators, were to stay
21 in Pendembu so that he can teach us the British voice procedure,
22 how to talk on the radio, and that we were to establish our own
23 communication network independent of the NPFL.

14:41:55

24 Q. Who was Osman Tolo?

14:42:31

25 A. Osman Tolo was one of the radio operators with whom we all
26 trained in Pendembu.

14:43:05

27 Q. And you also said the late Bongo Man. Who was that?

28 A. He was one other radio operator, but he is deceased. All
29 of us trained together in Pendembu.

1 Q. Now you said while you were coming to Pendembu "some other
2 brothers joined us". Where did these other brothers join you, do
3 you remember?

14:43:58 4 A. No. Apart from us who took off from Gbarnga directly no
5 other people joined us, apart from Pa Sankoh's bodyguards. What
6 I meant was that those who joined us in the signal unit, apart
7 from the brothers with whom we had all come up to Pendembu, those
8 were some of them who joined us in the signals unit.

9 Q. So after this formation what happened?

14:44:32 10 A. Everybody was dispatched. Pa Sankoh dispatched everybody.
11 We were in the signals. That very evening we started the signals
12 training to learn - to be taught the British voice procedure. It
13 was Pa Sankoh who himself trained us in that British voice --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat this
14:44:55 15 last bit.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, you have speeded up. The
17 interpreter is trying to keep up with you. So could you please
18 pick up your answer from the point where you said, "It was Pa
19 Sankoh who himself trained us in that British voice". Continue
14:45:08 20 from there and please speak slowly.

21 THE WITNESS: It was Pa Sankoh himself who trained us in
22 the British voice procedure including CO Nya, those whom we met,
23 including CO Nya whom we met in Pendembu as a radio operator.

24 Q. How long was this training, this training under Sankoh, how
14:45:39 25 long did this last?

26 A. About a week.

27 Q. After that week did you remain in Pendembu?

28 A. No.

29 Q. What happened after that week?

1 A. CO Nya assigned me to Kui va, to the Kui va front line, which
2 was Target A, and one other Liberian was there called CO Moses.

3 Q. Earlier you referred to something called a headquarters
4 station. At this time when you arrived in Pendembu was there a
14:46:41 5 headquarters station in Sierra Leone?

6 A. Yes. For those of us who were in Sierra Leone our control
7 station was in Pendembu. That was where CO Nya was operating
8 from.

9 Q. Were there any other stations in Sierra Leone at this time?

14:47:12 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Where were they?

12 A. Two other stations existed. One was in Kono and another
13 was in Kui va.

14 Q. Now, can you describe the RUF radio network at this point
14:47:43 15 in time?

16 A. Yes. After we had gone through the procedure, the voice
17 procedure, which Pa Sankoh had inducted us on, instead of saying
18 on the Liberian net like, "Come in Tally 5 Bravo Echo Bravo" or
19 "Come in Tally 5 Bravo for Treetop", that was completely changed.
14:48:15 20 We were now saying hello - for example, "Hello Alpha one for
21 Alpha two signals, over." Then Alpha two would respond. "Alpha
22 one, okay, over." That was one sector where the change occurred.

23 Then even the frequency, we created ours, our national.
24 Our own national which we established, we were the ones who
14:49:07 25 operated there. The RUF signal unit, I mean. But if at all the
26 Liberians from the Liberian side wanted to find out anything they
27 would come to our own net and enquire. We too would equally, if
28 at all we wanted to communicate to them directly, we would go to
29 their radio net and contact. So that was how the communication

1 was going between us.

2 Q. When you say between us, who do you mean?

3 A. We the RUF and the NPFL.

4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Santora, when did this change occur?

14:50:11 5 When did this change in radio communication occur, if we could
6 establish a time frame?

7 MR SANTORA: Just to be clear, you mean in terms of the
8 procedure --

9 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: When? Time frame when this change
14:50:23 10 occurred that he's just described.

11 MR SANTORA:

12 Q. Go ahead, Mr Witness.

13 A. It was in around December. December, let me say, 1992. In
14 December.

14:50:46 15 Q. Now, Mr Witness, in your answer you said that "Our own
16 national which we established, we were the ones who operated
17 there, the RUF signal unit." Is that correct?

18 A. Yes, we the RUF signal unit.

19 Q. You went on to say, "but if at all the Liberians from the
14:51:16 20 Liberian side wanted to find out anything they would come to our
21 net and enquire."

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Who are you referring to when you say "if at all the
24 Liberians from the Liberian side"? Who are you referring to?

14:51:34 25 A. Like Treetop would contact - Mekunagbe just contact in
26 order to know about development from 35 Bravo that was based in
27 Pendembu.

28 Q. Which stations in Sierra Leone were in communication with
29 the Liberian side?

1 A. Well when we went and took the training, one of us who was
2 trained, that is Osman Tolo, it was he who CO Nya assigned to the
3 Pa, Pa Sankoh. That was one radio station. Automatically we had
4 had four radio stations in Sierra Leone. On all those radio
14:52:39 5 stations, the Pa's own radio station - Pa Sankoh's own radio
6 station - and the radio station that was at the headquarters, CO
7 Nya's radio station, they were allowed to contact at any time and
8 at any other station so far in Liberia, NPFL, especially at the
9 control station, the NPFL control station which is the Treetop.
14:53:25 10 Like we who were at the Kui va area, that is the Liberian-Sierra
11 Leone border area, we were communicating also with the other
12 Liberian station that was in the Vahun area in Liberia along the
13 border. We used to share information also at our own level. At
14 the same time we used to still go to the Liberian frequency to
14:54:03 15 monitor any communication so far.

16 Q. How frequently were the communications between the Sierra
17 Leone stations and the Liberian stations?

18 MR MUNYARD: Well how can this witness necessarily answer
19 that, unless he is constantly monitoring absolutely everything
14:54:29 20 from all four Sierra Leone stations and for that matter in the
21 other direction from an as yet unspecified number of Liberian
22 stations?

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Your reply, Mr Santora?

24 MR SANTORA: Just to clarify, the witness has defined what
14:54:46 25 monitoring is and so he would not have to be at the same time in
26 all four stations.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Santora, the witness has said he was
28 in the Kui va area and so he was in one place. What is not
29 apparent, as a foundation to your question, is whether he was

1 monitoring all the stations from Kui va and if he had the
2 capability of monitoring all the Liberian stations from Kui va.

3 MR SANTORA: I will lay some foundation for that, Madam
4 President:

14:55:21 5 Q. Mr Witness, you said - earlier you described monitoring.

6 A. Yes, when I was in Kui va we used to monitor the NPFL radio
7 net.

8 Q. How often were you monitoring the NPFL radio net?

9 A. Well, it was not - it was not frequent for us in Kui va,
14:55:49 10 because we too had our own communication system wherein my
11 control station would need me at any time so far to feed them
12 with information. So if they contacted and did not get me they
13 would be worried, they would think that there had been an attack
14 or any other thing, but we used to monitor them.

14:56:18 15 Q. So how often would you monitor these communications?

16 A. It was not fixed. It was not fixed.

17 Q. From your observation from your standpoint in Kui va, how
18 often did you monitor communications between stations in Sierra
19 Leone and stations in Liberia?

14:56:46 20 A. Well most times at that time, the time that I used to
21 monitor the communication between Sierra Leone and Liberia, it
22 was when we were at our own national - our own national
23 frequency. Like the Liberian station when it contacts 35, or 35
24 Bravo, that 35 was the station that was based in Pendembu. Foday
14:57:18 25 Sankoh's own roving station was the 35 Bravo. So if we were
26 monitoring and they contact any of those call signs wherever they
27 went and they said those two stations should switch, we too would
28 switch with them to just sit by and monitor what they were
29 discussing, but where 35 or 35 Bravo was going to the Liberian

1 net to contact at that time it was not easy to monitor that
2 conversation because we would have been on our own national
3 frequency.

14:58:12 4 MR MUNYARD: Can we have an explanation of the expression,
5 "We too would switch with them"? I am afraid I don't know what
6 that means.

7 THE WITNESS: Switch in the sense of tuning; tuning into
8 the frequency where the two stations would have agreed to talk
9 on.

14:58:31 10 MR MUNYARD: Thank you.

11 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Santora, I'm just trying to understand
12 when the system changed - the communication system changed - in
13 Sierra Leone to the British procedures and the witness says they
14 continued communicating with stations in Liberia, how were they
14:58:59 15 able to merge the two systems?

16 MR SANTORA:

17 Q. Do you understand the question that Justice Sebutinde
18 asked, Mr Witness? I'll ask it again. Earlier you said that you
19 switched in your radio protocols to a British voice procedure and
14:59:22 20 you further went on to say that there were communications between
21 your stations in Sierra Leone - the RUF stations in Sierra Leone
22 - and the stations in Liberia. How were you able to communicate
23 if you changed to the British voice procedure?

24 A. Well, at that time we shared codes in common. Like when CO
14:59:48 25 Nya prepares the RUF code, he sends them to some designated radio
26 stations in Liberia where they had - where we, the RUFs, had
27 dealings with, we in the border area. Treetop - like the
28 generals, like some of those generals, used to get it. Then
29 their own codes, they used to send theirs to us at that time.

1 Q. I guess, Mr Witness, if you could - in terms of the actual
2 communications that would occur then, would they occur under what
3 procedure, the British voice procedure or a different procedure;
4 that is the communications between the stations in Liberia and
15:00:44 5 Sierra Leone?

6 A. We communicated with them through their own procedures. We
7 were using their own procedures to communicate with them
8 directly. Our own procedure was purely confined to our own
9 operations. When we went to their radio net, we used their own
15:01:11 10 procedures.

11 Q. You also said, Mr Witness, "Well, at that time we shared
12 codes in common". Who exactly do you mean when you say "We
13 shared codes in common"? Who is "we"?

14 A. The NPFL and the RUF.

15:01:34 15 Q. You also said that, "CO Nya prepares the RUF code and he
16 sends them to some designated stations in Liberia". Specifically
17 do you know which stations CO Nya would send these codes to?

18 A. He sent one to Treetop and he sent one to three more along
19 our main supply route, that is Voinjama, Kolahun and Zorzor,
15:02:18 20 those radio stations that were along the route where we got our
21 supplies from Liberia.

22 Q. Now, you've used a - before you said that when you were in
23 Liberia the radio station Treetop was in Gbarnga. Is that
24 correct?

15:02:39 25 A. Yes, yes.

26 Q. Do you know where Treetop was when you were in Sierra
27 Leone?

28 A. It was still in Gbarnga.

29 Q. And do you know who the operator was for the station

1 Treetop?

2 A. One of the operators that I can remember is Butterfly.

3 Q. And you also referred to "several stations on our main
4 supply route". What do you mean when you say "main supply
15:03:25 5 route"?

6 A. Those various stations that I've talked about were stations
7 that were along the road from Sierra Leone to Gbarnga in Liberia
8 in the NPFL controlled zones like Foya, Kolahun, Voinjama, Zorzor
9 up to the headquarters in Gbarnga.

15:04:06 10 Q. Now these communications that you've described between the
11 NPFL and the RUF, about how long did this last?

12 A. Communication existed between us until the end of the war.

13 Q. When was that? Do you know when that was, the end of the
14 war?

15:05:00 15 A. 2001.

16 Q. Now, you said you were assigned from Pendembu and that you
17 went to Kui va. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can you state approximately when this was that you went to
15:05:29 20 Kui va?

21 A. That was in December 1992.

22 Q. Now, are you familiar with an event known as the AFRC coup?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. I'm going to ask you to outline your positions - your
15:06:09 25 assignments and your locations from this point at the end of 1992
26 up to that event known as the AFRC coup, okay? Now, first you
27 said you were in Kui va. About how long were you there for?

28 A. I spent about one to two months in Kui va.

29 Q. Who if anyone was the commanding officer in Kui va?

1 A. The target commander who was there was according to --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat that.
3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pause please, Mr Witness. The
4 interpreter asks that you repeat. Mr Interpreter, was that a --

15:07:05 5 THE INTERPRETER: Name. Yes, the name.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please repeat the name. You said the
7 target commander who was there. Please repeat the name,
8 Mr Witness.

9 THE WITNESS: According to My Built.

15:07:22 10 MR SANTORA:

11 Q. According to your what, Mr Witness?

12 A. My Built.

13 Q. What is built?

14 A. His structure. He was referring to his structure. He was
15:07:37 15 a very tall and thick man.

16 Q. Okay. The original question, do you know who the
17 commanding officer was in Kui va, what was his name?

18 A. Yes, his name was According to My Build.

19 Q. I apologise. I didn't understand the response. Did he
15:08:08 20 have another name?

21 A. I did not know any other name for him.

22 Q. What were your duties in Kui va?

23 A. My duty was to send messages from According to My Built, my
24 commander, and to the field commander and battlefield commander.

15:08:33 25 Then to receive message from any other station to give to the
26 commander who was According to My Built or to any other authority
27 in the target where I was operating from. That was my duty.

28 Q. Who were you specifically reporting to?

29 A. In Kui va, I was referring to According to My Built

1 directly.

2 Q. Earlier you mentioned an individual in Kui va called CO
3 Moses. Who is that?

4 A. CO Moses was the signal commander. He was a Liberian. He
15:09:25 5 was the one whom we met in Kui va. He was the only person there
6 as a radio operator whom I and the other operators met there as a
7 radio commander in Kui va.

8 Q. So what was his function in Kui va, what was his role?

9 A. You mean CO Moses?

15:09:55 10 Q. Yes.

11 A. He was supervising us. He was our supervisor, the signal
12 unit. He was the commander for that radio station in Kui va.

13 Q. Now, if you know, do you know who commander According to My
14 Build was reporting to?

15:10:25 15 A. Yes, According to My Build was reporting to CO Rashid
16 Mansaray directly.

17 Q. And CO Moses, who was he reporting to, if you know?

18 A. CO Moses was reporting to CO Nya in terms of signal
19 operations.

15:10:54 20 Q. And at this time while you were in Kui va where was CO Nya?

21 A. CO Nya was in Pendembu.

22 Q. You said you stayed in Kui va for one to two months. What
23 was your next assignment?

24 A. I went to Mendekeima at the ferry to go to Kono. The
15:11:28 25 Mendekeima crossing point towards Bunumbu.

26 Q. Where is Mendekeima?

27 A. Mendekeima is a few miles from Pendembu, but it was a
28 crossing point going towards Kono. You have to pass through
29 Bunumbu. From there, you will cross over to Manowa, then

1 Bunumbu, then you go to Kono.

2 Q. What if anything was your assignment in Mendekeima?

3 A. My assignment, I was a radio operator in Mendekeima. I was
4 a radio operator. I performed the functions of a radio operator.

15:12:27 5 Namely, like I have been explaining in this Court, as an operator
6 in Mendekeima.

7 Q. In Mendekeima who was your boss?

8 A. The late CO Monami e was my commander.

9 Q. Can you spell Monami e?

15:12:52 10 A. We used to spell it as - I mean most of us, the standard
11 spelling that we had in the RUF was M-O-N-A-M-I-E but it's a
12 proper noun, it's somebody's name. Anybody could have his or her
13 own spelling for it. That was how I was spelling it.

14 Q. How long did you stay in Mendekeima?

15:13:25 15 A. I spent about a month in Mendekeima. Then I was
16 reassigned. Then Pa Sankoh called me to take up assignment in
17 Kailahun, Kailahun Town.

18 Q. Did you proceed to go to Kailahun Town?

19 A. Yes.

15:13:55 20 Q. Now, if you can approximate the month and year that you
21 went from Mendekeima to Kailahun Town?

22 A. Around early 1993. Yeah, let me say. Yeah, it was in 1993
23 anyway.

24 Q. How long did you remain in Kailahun Town - based in

15:14:31 25 Kailahun Town?

26 A. I was assigned to the Mansion Ground in Kailahun Town with
27 Pa Sankoh up to mid-1993.

28 Q. What were your duties in Kailahun Town?

29 A. In Kailahun Town - I was the control station commander in

1 Kailahun Town. I used to receive instructions from Foday Sankoh
2 to contact the various front lines to enquire about situations.
3 I was also receiving reports from the various front lines and
4 passing them on to Pa Sankoh. I was equally contacting Liberia,
15:15:52 5 like Treetop, to send messages from Pa Sankoh to Mr Taylor.
6 Those were my duties, you know, in Kailahun Town; communication
7 purely in Kailahun Town at that time.

8 Q. So when you were assigned to Kailahun Town where was the
9 control station?

15:16:22 10 A. The control station was in Kailahun Town.

11 Q. Earlier you said the control station was in Pendembu. When
12 did this change occur, do you know?

13 A. Yes. It was when we were in Liberia that was when the
14 control station was in Pendembu. But when we came to Kailahun,
15:16:56 15 at that time Pa Sankoh had nothing to do in the Pujehun area.

16 His supply line had been cut off, he had nothing to do there; all
17 his concentration was in Kailahun. He was based in Kailahun. So
18 the Kailahun station became a control station automatically.

19 Q. Now, you said while you were in Kailahun, in terms of your
15:17:22 20 duties, you were - first you said that you would receive
21 instructions from Foday Sankoh to contact the various front lines
22 and enquire about situations. What specifically was discussed or
23 what specifically did you enquire about?

24 A. Well, we were fighting a war. Every morning when I opened
15:17:53 25 the transmission I would check - I would call the various call
26 signs within the liberated zones to get morning reports from all
27 of them. Then I used to go to the Liberian radio net to contact
28 Treetop to know if they've got any information - I mean if
29 Treetop, their father, who was Mr Taylor, if he had anything for

1 us, any message for Pa Sankoh.

2 Then I was also receiving messages from the front lines.
3 Like the front line commanders used to send messages that they do
4 not have medicines, that there have been attacks - that they had
15:18:56 5 been attacked or the attack had been repelled. Like in Liberia,
6 for instance, I can remember that Pa Sankoh used to tell me to
7 contact General Anthony Mekunagbe and one - there was one SSS
8 Cobra commander, whose name I cannot recall, he used to call him
9 to tell him - to ask him for ammunition, to tell him to send
15:19:31 10 ammunition or logistics. Those were part of my duties in
11 Kailahun.

12 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Who are the hims?

13 MR SANTORA: I was going to. Thank you, Justice Sebutinde.

14 THE WITNESS: You mean my last statement?

15:19:54 15 MR SANTORA:

16 Q. In the very last sentence you said he used to call him to
17 tell him, to ask him for ammunition. To tell him to send
18 ammunition. Who --

19 A. Mr Sankoh used to tell me to contact the SS Cobra director
15:20:15 20 at that time to send ammunition for him, and at the same time he
21 used to tell me to contact Treetop saying that we needed
22 ammunition, that we were going through strains for ammunition,
23 for Treetop to pass the message to Mr Taylor. The "him" there is
24 the man's name that I cannot recall, that SS Cobra commander.
15:20:55 25 Something like - maybe I'll recall with time. Something like
26 Cassius - Cassius something. But really, I cannot recall his
27 name anyway.

28 Q. Do you know where this SS Cobra commander was located?

29 A. I did not know the right town where he was based, but he

1 was in Liberia.

2 Q. How often were you in communication with the station
3 Treetop?

15:21:49

4 A. It was daily. Sometimes if we were under enemy pressure,
5 enemy pressure for instance we the RUF, when I would have
6 informed Treetop they often contacted us - I mean, Treetop used
7 to contact us often to know how best we were doing in repelling
8 such attacks.

15:22:24

9 Q. Now at this point who - when you said you were under enemy
10 pressure, who were you receiving enemy pressure from?

11 A. The Sierra Leone Army. The Sierra Leone Army. We referred
12 to them as enemies at that time.

13 Q. Now, you said you stayed in Kailahun until about mid-1993.
14 Is that correct?

15:22:53

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. After that what, if anything, was your next assignment?

15:23:20

17 A. From there we stayed in Kailahun up to the time the Sierra
18 Leone Army recaptured areas like from Kui va up to Pendembu up to
19 the Bunumbu areas. They recaptured all of that. The SLAs
20 recaptured those from the RUF. Then I retreated, together with
21 Foday Sankoh the late, to Sandeyalu. It was in Sandeyalu that I
22 was until in late 1993.

15:24:05

23 Q. Before we move on to that, I just want to clarify one
24 point. You said that during the time one of your duties - you
25 said that Pa Sankoh used to tell you to contact General Anthony
26 Mekunagbe and one SS Cobra commander. He asked you to contact
27 him for ammunition. In terms of this ammunition messages, how
28 often did these occur while you were in Kailahun?

29 A. While I was in Kailahun, almost every week I would send

1 message pertaining to ammunition. Sometimes when the pressure
2 would have mounted from the Sierra Leone Army, almost every day I
3 would still remind them. Sometimes they would send the
4 ammunition. We would be in Kailahun and the ammunition would
15:24:56 5 arrive.

6 Q. How do you know that?

7 A. When the ammunition - before the ammunition arrives, a
8 message would be sent. Like the Treetop would send a message
9 that we should expect, or Cassius something, that SS Cobra
15:25:22 10 director at that time, and when the ammunition reaches us in
11 Kailahun the Pa would tell me to inform Treetop that - the Pa,
12 meaning Pa Sankoh, would tell me to inform Treetop that he has
13 received the consignment.

14 Q. Do you have any information as to which route this
15:26:04 15 ammunition arrived from?

16 A. Yes, it came most often from Gbarnga - Gbarnga through
17 Zorzor, Voinjama, from Voinjama to Foya and then into Sierra
18 Leone. It was - and at any time the ammunition arrives the Pa
19 used to give me instruction to send to the front lines to call up
15:26:50 20 some of those commanders - the front line commanders, the target
21 commanders - to come and receive their ammunition. Sometimes he
22 will tell me to send a message to CO Rashid - I mean, the Lion.
23 Sometimes the Lion will tell me to call CO Rashid to come and
24 receive the ammunition.

15:27:15 25 Q. How do you know that this was the route? The route you've
26 described from Gbarnga through Zorzor, Voinjama, how do you know
27 this was the route?

28 A. There was radio communication and when those men - and when
29 anybody was escorting the ammunition at that time they will

1 inform us in the RUF - in the RUF controlled areas. They would
2 inform me that he has arrived at a particular destination. Like
3 I can recall there was a time when one Kennedy, who was a
4 vanguard who travelled with some materials from Gbarnga, and he
15:28:12 5 met us in Kailahun. Sometimes the Pa would send Domingo and
6 others, his bodyguards, and Jungle - Colonel Jungle - was the
7 person who did those things at the time that I was there with Pa
8 Sankoh.

9 Q. Now, you said that you then went to --

15:28:48 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Santora, "Sometimes the Pa would send
11 Domingo". Which Pa is this?

12 THE WITNESS: The Lion.

13 MR SANTORA:

14 Q. Who is the Lion?

15:29:01 15 A. Foday Sankoh. That was his code name acronym. It was his
16 code name in the Sierra Leone net that was given to him by CO Nya
17 when we established our own radio net.

18 Q. You also earlier said he had a code name Toyota. Is that
19 correct?

15:29:27 20 A. Yes.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat this
22 answer.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, the interpreter asks that you
24 repeat your answer. The question was, "You said earlier ..." -
15:29:42 25 do you remember the question? Yes. Please repeat your answer.

26 THE WITNESS: What I'm saying is Lion was a code name for
27 Foday Sankoh which we used on the RUF radio net. Then Mr Santora
28 asked me about --

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just pause, Mr Witness. Mr Griffiths, I

1 wasn't sure if you were on your feet or just - oh, that is fine.

2 Continue, Mr Witness. You go on with your answer, Mr Witness.

3 THE WITNESS: Okay.

4 MR SANTORA:

15:30:19 5 Q. The name Toyota?

6 A. The name Toyota, we were only using it on the Liberian net.
7 When we came to the RUF net, we did not use Toyota. It was only
8 on the NPFL net.

9 Q. After you left Kailahun Town, you said you went to
15:30:45 10 Sandeyalu. Is that right?

11 A. Sandeyalu. S-A-N-D-E-Y-A-L-U. Sandeyalu.

12 Q. Where is that? Where is Sandeyalu?

13 A. It's in the Kailahun District.

14 Q. About how far is it from Kailahun Town, approximately?

15:31:19 15 A. Around 12 to 14 - you know, really around 12, like that.
16 12 to 14.

17 Q. Do you know the chiefdom that it's in?

18 A. I can't remember. I can't remember.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: 12 to 14 what?

15:31:44 20 THE WITNESS: Miles, yes.

21 MR SANTORA:

22 Q. In terms of - do you know which direction it is from
23 Kailahun Town?

24 A. It's towards Koindu. You will go and get to Balahun from
15:32:13 25 Kailahun. As you soon as you pass Balahun a little, there is an
26 intersection there on the road going to the left-hand side.
27 That's where you use to go to Sandeyalu.

28 MR MUNYARD: On timing, did we have a period of time when
29 the witness was in Kailahun? We have just left Kailahun.

1 MR SANTORA: We did. There is a record of the time frame.

2 THE WITNESS: It was in mid-1993, as I have already stated
3 here.

4 MR MUNYARD: Yes, I'm sorry, but what I meant was how long
15:32:48 5 did he spend in Kailahun? Do we have that on record?

6 MR SANTORA: It is on the record, Madam President.

7 MR MUNYARD: Would somebody mind revealing it to me? I've
8 missed it.

9 MR SANTORA: I can just go ahead and ask the witness again,
15:33:02 10 if that makes it easier:

11 Q. Sir, how long were you in Kailahun Town for approximately?

12 A. I was in Kailahun Town from early 1993 to mid-1993.

13 Q. Now, at Sandeyalu what was your assignment there?

14 A. I was still assigned to the Lion, that is Foday Sankoh.

15:33:44 15 Q. Where was the headquarters station at this time?

16 A. In Sandeyalu. Sandeyalu was the headquarters. At that
17 time Pendembu was not existing under us. Pendembu had fallen to
18 the Sierra Leone Army. Kailahun too had fallen to the Sierra
19 Leone Army.

15:34:11 20 Q. And what were your duties at Sandeyalu?

21 A. Among my duties in Sandeyalu were to coordinate the various
22 commanders on instruction from Foday Sankoh for the various front
23 lines to send messages to them when he says, "Tell this commander
24 to go and reinforce his companion". Then also when we were in
15:34:51 25 Sandeyalu, at the time that ULIMO crossed from Guinea I can
26 recall, when they crossed over - when ULIMO crossed over and
27 captured Vahun - no, wrong, not Vahun. I'm sorry, Voijnama.
28 Voijnama, to be specific. Voijnama, Zorzor. That was the first
29 attempt to cut off our supply route. I was coordinating to call

1 reinforcement from RUF front lines in order to send them across
2 to Liberia to go and fight and repel ULIMO forces along the
3 border so that they would not succeed in cutting off our main
4 supply route. Then I was also getting information - direct
15:35:59 5 information - from the various radio stations which were in those
6 front lines in Liberia.

7 Q. In your last sentence, Mr Witness, what do you mean when
8 you say you were "... getting information - direct information -
9 from the various radio stations which were in those front lines
15:36:21 10 in Liberia"? What radio stations are you referring to?

11 A. The communication radio stations, the VHF radios. I used
12 to contact them every day. There was no time line, there was no
13 specific time for me to contact them. At any hour, I had that
14 authority to check on them at any time so far, and to ask for
15:36:53 15 information and they used to give me the full and accurate
16 information that I needed from the various front lines.

17 Q. What were the locations of these stations?

18 A. Well, at that time, like when the ULIMO attacked Zorzor,
19 because it was Zorzor that first fell before Voinjama, I can
15:37:19 20 remember that time, they retreated and when they were retreating
21 the NPFL forces were retreating. The NPFL forces were retreating
22 and while retreating you wouldn't be able to get specific
23 location for any radio station. They could be here today and
24 tomorrow they could be in another town. Sometimes they would be
15:37:52 25 here or they would advance today and tomorrow they would retreat.
26 It was just like that. But they were operating - the NPFL was
27 operating along the Zorzor/Voinjama axis at that time.

28 Q. Now, just to clarify. Going back to the time you were in
29 Kailahun at the headquarters station, how many other radio

1 operators were working in Kailahun at this time? Approximately
2 how many were working with you?

3 A. At first it was Osman Tolo who was in Kailahun as a radio
4 operator alone. I replaced him. That's what I'm coming to. I
15:38:45 5 replaced him. I was the only person who was there as a radio
6 operator in Kailahun at that time that I replaced Osman Tolo.
7 Osman Tolo, the Pa sent him back to the front line. I mean Pa
8 Sankoh.

9 Q. Okay. And when you were in Sandeyalu how many other radio
15:39:13 10 operators were there aside from yourself?

11 A. When I was in Sandeyalu at one point in time Philip Sano -
12 one Philip Sano, who was mobile satellite, was assigned with me
13 for some time. Then Pa Sankoh sent him to Koindu for him to
14 establish one station in Koindu, after which Perry Kamara, aka
15:39:55 15 King Perry, too was with me in Sandeyalu. Those were the two
16 operators who operated with me in Sandeyalu.

17 Q. How long did you stay in Sandeyalu?

18 A. I was - we were - I left - I was in Sandeyalu for up to
19 late 1993. That is around November, around November. At that
15:40:38 20 time the ULIMO forces had captured the borderline from us. They
21 had come up to - it was only Foya that remained under our
22 control. Then - we, we RUF, we had direct command over Foya at
23 that time, at the time that General Chaman, General Fayah were
24 all there. These were NPFL generals, but they were directly
15:41:17 25 answerable to Foday Sankoh at that time.

26 Q. You called a name, General Chaman, did you say?

27 A. Yes, Chaman.

28 Q. Sherman?

29 A. Chaman. Chaman.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: I must say I heard it more with an A
2 sound.

3 MR SANTORA:

4 Q. Can you spell the name?

15:41:46 5 A. I was spelling it as C-H-A-M-A-N. That was how I was
6 spelling it.

7 Q. I heard it incorrectly there; I apologise. You said you
8 stayed there until late 1993, you stayed in Sandeyalu, is that
9 correct?

15:42:22 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. After that where did you go?

12 A. After Sandeyalu we were there when the enemies, the Sierra
13 Leone Army pursued us. I was able to go to Koindu. We went and
14 arrived in Koindu and I was in Koindu - that was where I was up
15 to December with Pa Sankoh.

15:42:43 16 Q. And what year is that?

17 A. 1993.

18 Q. After Koindu where was your next basing?

19 A. Well, from Koindu, we stayed in Koindu until the enemy
15:43:13 20 pressurised us and cut off our supply routes. Then we were in
21 Koindu when Pa Sankoh told me to contact. That is before we left
22 Koindu I contacted Treetop to contact Mr Taylor for him to do
23 whatever he could to send ammunition for us through the jungle
24 wherein other people from the RUF could go to receive them. I
15:44:05 25 even contacted - there was even a dialogue directly between -
26 between Mr Taylor and Foday Sankoh at that time, and that was
27 really the first time that I saw - that I overheard the two of
28 them directly speaking on the radio, on the VHF radio, whereby
29 Mr Sankoh sent some options to --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat this
2 one.

3 MR SANTORA:

4 Q. Mr Witness, stop for a moment because you were going a
15:44:50 5 little too fast. I want you to, if you can pick up, you said
6 that there was even a dialogue directly between Mr Taylor and
7 Foday Sankoh at that time and that was really the first time that
8 I saw - that I overheard the two of them directly speaking on the
9 radio, on the VHF radio.

15:45:14 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Continue from that point. Continue.

12 A. The dialogue was based on so that Mr Taylor could send
13 ammunition for us because, you know, the enemy had really
14 pressurised us, the SLAs, and the ULIMO too was pressurising us.
15:45:56 15 So Mr Taylor even suggested to Pa Sankoh that he should see if
16 there was any way that Mr Taylor could ensure that a chopper
17 picks up Pa Sankoh from Koindu, or the area that Pa Sankoh would
18 identify. Then Pa Sankoh said that was not a good option for
19 him. He said if he goes out of Sierra Leone that the RUF would
15:46:40 20 go in disarray at that point in time.

21 Q. How do you know that it was Mr Taylor communicating
22 directly on the radio?

23 A. I contacted his radio station, Mr Taylor's radio station.
24 Butterfly I suggest - it was I who suggested the dialogue from
15:47:15 25 Lion. I mean, at that time from Toyota to Ebony that Toyota
26 would want to talk to Ebony on a very important issue. So I
27 mounted pressure until Treetop took it up and he finally was able
28 to get Mr Taylor to come on the radio to talk to his brother, the
29 late Sankoh, directly. I conducted the dialogue. I overheard

1 them speaking.

2 Q. You said that this was really the first time you overheard
3 them speaking directly on the radio. Was there any other time?

4 Let me withdraw the question and be a little more specific. Was
15:48:29 5 there any other time you heard directly Mr Taylor communicating
6 with Mr Sankoh?

7 A. I cannot remember that. I cannot remember that. I cannot
8 remember that. During my regime with Foday Sankoh I can't
9 remember that any more.

15:48:50 10 Q. Now you said that - after you were in Koindu where did you
11 go?

12 A. From Koindu I went towards that Kissi land, Sondokoro-Bendu
13 area. From there Pa Sankoh assigned me to Issa, to Issa. I was
14 with Issa from December. And that December - from that December
15:49:27 15 up to the time Pa Sankoh went and established Zogoda in 1994.

16 Q. One moment, Mr Witness. Who is Issa?

17 A. Mr Issa Sesay was a front line commander towards Koindu at
18 that time.

19 Q. And you said that you went towards Kissi land and then you
15:50:01 20 mentioned a location. Where exactly did you go when you were
21 assigned to Issa?

22 A. The village, we used to call there Issa Ground. Issa
23 Ground. That was how we called the village. I can't recall the
24 right name of the village. There are some villages at that time.

15:50:22 25 We did not call them by their real names. Sometimes, if you
26 surfaced in one village where there was a farm where you had a
27 lot of okra, we would call there okra ground. Yes.

28 Q. You mentioned an area called, and I think you said
29 something along the lines of Kolo Bendu area --

1 A. Sondokoro-Bendu area. Sondokoro-Bendu area.

2 Q. Say that slowly.

3 A. Sondokoro-Bendu.

4 Q. Can you spell it?

15:51:04 5 A. It was around there. It was not the town itself. Yes, I
6 can try. S-O-N-D-O-K-O-R-O hyphen B-E-N-D-U.

7 Q. Okay. I just apologise. This actually was spelt for the
8 record before and it's the same spelling. About how long were
9 you signed with Issa?

15:51:52 10 A. I was with Issa for about a month.

11 Q. And after your assignment with Issa, what was your next
12 assignment?

13 A. My next assignment was in Zogoda with Lion again - with Pa
14 Sankoh again.

15:52:21 15 Q. So approximately when did you arrive in Zogoda?

16 A. That was in January 2000 - wrong. Wrong, please. It's a
17 slip of the tongue. It was in January 1994. January 1994.

18 Q. And what was your assignment in Zogoda?

19 A. Well, my assignment in Zogoda was that of a radio operator
15:53:13 20 for Foday Sankoh. I went there to take care of the control
21 station.

22 Q. So at this point when you were in Zogoda, where was the
23 control station?

24 A. The control station was in Zogoda.

15:53:34 25 Q. About how many other radio operators --

26 A. And I would like to make something clear about this Zogoda,
27 because Zogoda was not a specific location initially. It was a
28 jungle that was moving from one place to the other. It used to
29 be relocated up to until later we started it in one place for

1 quite some time when we left and then Pa Sankoh moved. That's
2 what I mean.

3 Q. Where was this jungle located? What area?

4 A. Zogoda jungle, you mean?

15:54:16 5 Q. Yes.

6 A. Well when I joined Pa Sankoh in Zogoda, the Zogoda zoe-bush
7 - the Zogoda jungle or zoe-bush - was by this Tonkia. This
8 Tonkia, it's in Tonkia Chiefdom. After Gegbwema, Tonkia towards
9 Zimmi Makpele, that area.

15:54:53 10 Q. What district was it in?

11 A. Gegbwema is supposed to be in the Kenema District.

12 Q. You said a reference to zoe-bush. What does zoe-bush mean?

13 A. Zoe-bush is the same as jungle. Jungle. That is the place
14 where we lived in the jungle. The settlement where we lived in
15:55:15 15 the jungle, that was where we referred to as the zoe-bush.

16 Q. Just to clarify, do you know how to spell zoe?

17 A. We spelled it as Z-O-E hyphen B-U-S-H.

18 Q. Now, I had asked you before about how many other radio
19 operators were in Zogoda.

15:55:49 20 A. Well, Zogoda --

21 Q. Mr Witness, just listen to the question. How many
22 approximately? I'm not asking you to call names. I'm just
23 asking you how many radio operators approximately?

24 A. Well, it used to change. Sometimes three, sometimes it
15:56:06 25 could go up to four, sometimes two. It varied.

26 Q. And how long did you remain in Zogoda for?

27 A. When I was in Zogoda, I was in Zogoda until the fall of
28 Zogoda some time in 1996, something like that, but I used to take
29 outskirts assignment around Zogoda. When it takes long without

1 me going anywhere, Pa Sankoh would send me in one of those
2 defensive areas around Zogoda, like Gandorhun, Nayawa [phon],
3 sometimes for a month or two, and from there he would call me
4 back to Zogoda. Sometimes he would send me to the Blama Highway,
15:57:14 5 where I would spend sometimes a month, and he would recall me -
6 Pa Sankoh would recall me - to Zogoda. Really I can say from
7 1994 - early 1994 to late 1996, when I recalled that that's the
8 time that Zogoda fell, all my operations were in and around
9 Zogoda.

15:57:46 10 Q. Now Foday Sankoh himself, did he remain in Zogoda?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Where, if you know, did he go?

13 A. At the time that we were in Zogoda, Zino took over from Pa
14 Sankoh. At that time I was even now at the Blama Highway. I was
15:58:14 15 on assignment at the Blama Highway when Pa Sankoh and others went
16 for the Abidjan peace talks.

17 Q. And while you were at Blama Highway, what was your
18 assignment?

19 A. I was a radio operator.

15:58:43 20 Q. Now you referred to the Abidjan peace talks, when Foday
21 Sankoh went for the Abidjan peace talks. Do you know what
22 happened as a result of those peace talks?

23 A. Many things happened, but the remarkable ones that I can
24 recall was that during the peace talks Zogoda fell in Pa Sankoh's
15:59:16 25 absence and Pa Sankoh himself was arrested by the Nigerian
26 government in Nigeria.

27 Q. Let me just go back to the - ask you a more direct or a
28 more specific question. First of all, where was Blama Highway
29 located?

1 A. It is the highway between Bo and Kenema. Bo and Kenema.
2 There is an intersection that is on the highway. It's one of the
3 big towns between Bo and Kenema. Blama was one of the main
4 defensive areas for the RUF. It was very close to Blama. Almost
16:00:12 5 in Blama itself. That was where the defensive was.

6 Q. Now, you said that at some point Zogoda fell. Is that
7 correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Where were you when this happened?

16:00:28 10 A. I was on Blama Highway when the original Zogoda fell.

11 Q. Do you know who it fell to?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Who?

14 A. It fell into the hands of the Sierra Leone Army and the
16:00:51 15 local militias, the Kamajors.

16 Q. Now, at the time Zogoda fell what happened to you?

17 A. At the time Zogoda fell, the Kamajors captured me.

18 Q. Where were you when the Kamajors captured you?

19 A. I was about paving my way in the jungle to go to either the
16:01:31 20 Kailahun area or to go to Pujehun District to join any of the two
21 battalions, but those of us who were in Zogoda who were with
22 Zino, the field commander, we went into disarray after the fall
23 of Zogoda. Myself and a few other people who crossed towards the
24 Gorahun Tonkia area fell into a Kamajor ambush and some people
16:02:10 25 were killed, but I was fortunate to have been captured and my
26 life was spared. I was in Gorahun Tonkia.

27 Q. So what happened --

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Is that location correctly spelt?

29 MR SANTORA: I am internally debating myself. Let me just

1 verify that:

2 Q. You said Gorahun Tonkia?

3 A. Gorahun Tonkia, yes. Gorahun Tonkia.

4 Q. Do you know how to spell that?

16:02:52 5 A. Well, I spell it G-O-R-A-H-U-N T-O-N-K-I-A. That's the way
6 I spell it.

7 Q. Is that two words, or one word?

8 A. That is two words. Gorahun is the town and Tonkia is the
9 chiefdom.

16:03:13 10 Q. And where is that located? What district?

11 A. That is in the Kenema District.

12 Q. So what happened to you after you were captured by the
13 Kamajors?

14 A. Well, when I was in Gorahun Tonkia I was in the hands of
16:03:53 15 the Kamajors throughout until the AFRC coup took place some time
16 in 1997, yes. Sometimes in 1997 I was in Gorahun Tonkia.

17 Q. So you said you were under the custody of the Kamajors and
18 did you remain in Gorahun Tonkia?

19 A. No, after the AFRC coup I escaped from them and I joined
16:04:57 20 the military vehicle that was in Gorahun Tonkia. It was one
21 Lieutenant Jusu Tarawalli who was there as a commander who took
22 me to Kenema.

23 Q. How did you escape from the custody of the Kamajors?

24 A. I went to the soldier who was there and I explained to him
16:05:27 25 that now that that was the situation at hand, that is the AFRC
26 had taken over, and I was listening to the SLBS that morning, one
27 morning, when I heard - I don't know whether it was in the - yes,
28 one morning, because of course it was a repeated broadcast and I
29 listened to instructions from Foday Sankoh that all RUF should

1 join hands with the AFRC; that is we should come out of the bush
2 and join our brothers. That is the AFRC. From there I went to
3 Galito, that is Lieutenant Jusu, and he took me to Kenema.

16:06:26

4 Q. Just to clarify the name, you said a name "Galito, that is
5 Lieutenant Jusu"?

6 A. It's his alias, Lieutenant Jusu. That was his alias,
7 Galito. That was the name I was more used to.

8 Q. Say the alias slowly.

9 A. I can spell it G-A-L-I-T-O, Galito.

16:07:04

10 Q. Approximately how much time transpired from the moment of
11 the AFRC coup until you left the custody of the Kamajors?

12 A. I did not get you clearly.

13 Q. How much time passed between the time of the AFRC coup and
14 when you left the custody of the Kamajors?

16:07:24

15 A. I cannot give you an exact time frame now for that but I
16 will tell you that it was during the rains. I will say almost
17 late 1996 when Zogoda fell to the government troops, when I was
18 captured I was in Gorahun Tonkia until the AFRC coup in 1997.
19 From '96 ending to '97, I can say. That's what I can recall now.

16:08:12

20 Q. So after you went to Lieutenant Jusu you said he took you
21 to Kenema, is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Approximately when did that happen? Go ahead. The witness
24 was raising his hand.

16:08:42

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: I saw.

26 THE WITNESS: I want to use the restroom.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. Please assist the witness.

28 MR MUNYARD: Madam President, may Mr Taylor depart for
29 similar reasons.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Taylor may be escorted out.

2 Mr Santora, please proceed.

3 MR SANTORA: Thank you, Madam President:

4 Q. Mr Witness, before you took this break I was asking you
16:13:57 5 approximately when you went to Kenema as a result of your contact
6 with Lieutenant Jusu. You said he took you to Kenema. When did
7 that happen?

8 A. I don't recall the exact month, but it was towards
9 mid-1997. I don't know now the exact month. I'm actually
16:14:32 10 supposed to know it. It has just escaped my memory. I don't
11 want to really - you know I am supposed to know it but --

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: If it comes back to you, Mr Witness, you
13 can tell us.

14 THE WITNESS: Okay. Okay, okay. May, or something like
16:14:49 15 that. Around May.

16 MR SANTORA:

17 Q. Just say what you know and --

18 A. Okay, okay. Okay, no problem.

19 Q. Why was he taking you to Kenema, do you know?

16:15:07 20 A. Yes, because even when I was in Gorahun Tonkia before I
21 went, when the coup took place, he was the first person to let me
22 know. He, Jusu. He said that the military had retaken over the
23 government and that there was tendency that the RUF would join
24 the military, they would form a team. I'm referring to the AFRC.
16:16:01 25 And he himself had the willingness, that is Lieutenant Jusu, he
26 had the willingness to take me to Kenema.

27 Q. You said that there was - and I just don't think it came
28 across. You said that Jusu said that the military had retaken
29 over the government and there was something that the RUF would

1 join the military?

2 A. Yes. It was from him first that I heard that before I get
3 the announcement from the SLBS radio. The one that I got from
4 the SLBS, I heard Pa Sankoh's voice clearly, and I knew then
16:16:47 5 indeed that it was Foday Sankoh who was giving such a message.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Witness, did you say that there was
7 tendency that the RUF would join the military?

8 MR SANTORA:

9 Q. What was the word?

16:17:00 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: What was the word you used? Did you say
11 tendency?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes. At that time it had not confirmed it to
13 me yet that such was going on. He had not confirmed it to me yet
14 that the RUF had joined them. It was in the morning - it was the
16:17:18 15 following morning that I heard that on the radio that Pa Sankoh
16 had said - I heard that directly from Pa Sankoh when he said that
17 the RUF should join forces with the AFRC.

18 MR SANTORA:

19 Q. Just to be clear, Mr Witness, what do you mean when you say
16:17:37 20 there was a tendency? What do you mean by the word tendency?

21 A. It means maybe. It was not certain. He did not tell me
22 that RUF had already joined forces. He said maybe the RUF would
23 join forces with AFRC after the overthrow. There was likelihood.
24 He was not very certain. He was not very sure.

16:18:01 25 Q. In this context you're saying he, who do you mean?

26 A. Jusu. Lieutenant Jusu. He was the one who told me.

27 Q. Now aside from yourself was there anybody else with you in
28 the custody of the Kamajors?

29 A. Well, there were other captives who were ex-RUF fighters

1 who had been captured by the Kamajors. I can remember one fellow
2 called Sheku and a Liberian vanguard that I can recall, he was CO
3 Williams, something like that. Yes, CO Williams. He was even
4 the Lion's bodyguard. And there were many women in Gorahun
16:18:50 5 Tonkia whom had been captured by the Kamajors from the RUF during
6 the fall of Zogoda.

7 MR MUNYARD: Madam President, it may just be me but I've
8 gone back through the evidence, I can't work out who Lieutenant
9 Jusu is in relation to this witness's departure from the custody
16:19:12 10 of the Kamajors.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: You're not alone, Mr Munyard. I was
12 hoping that I would be able to get that worked out too. But
13 maybe in due course we can clarify that.

14 MR MUNYARD: Thank you.

16:19:22 15 MR SANTORA: I can clarify it now, Madam President:
16 Q. Just in terms of, when I was asking you about when you left
17 the custody of the Kamajors, you've made reference to this
18 Lieutenant Jusu. Who exactly was Lieutenant Jusu?

19 A. Lieutenant Jusu was part of the Sierra Leone Army.

16:19:41 20 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak into
21 the mic.

22 THE WITNESS: He was a Sierra Leone Army officer.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please come a little closer to the
24 microphone so that the interpreter can hear you. That's good.

16:19:51 25 Okay. You have said he was a Sierra Leone Army officer.

26 Continue from there, please.

27 THE WITNESS: Lieutenant Jusu was a military officer in the
28 Sierra Leone Army and he was - he, Lieutenant Jusu, was the
29 commander in Gorahun Tonkia. That was the company that was

1 there. He was the company commander.

2 MR SANTORA:

3 Q. Just to be clear, who approached who in terms of yourself
4 and Lieutenant Jusu?

16:20:26 5 A. I used to go to him often. In fact at that time I was the
6 one who approached him. Every evening I would go there, we would
7 sit together and we would discuss the news, you know, what was
8 happening around. He would give me some words of courage at that
9 time, you know, to make me feel at home.

16:20:51 10 Q. And were you interacting with Lieutenant Jusu during the
11 time you were in custody with the Kamajors or after?

12 A. Well, even when I was in the custody of the Kamajors I was
13 interacting with Jusu. I interacted with him directly. He was
14 the one who even --

16:21:29 15 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat
16 this.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, the interpreter has not heard
18 you clearly. You said, "I interacted with him directly. He was
19 the one who even" -- please continue from there.

16:21:44 20 THE WITNESS: Lieutenant Jusu, he was the one who made the
21 military medical man who was there to be treating me, who was in
22 Gorahun Tonkia to be treating me whenever I was sick.

23 MR SANTORA: I hope that clarifies it, Madam President.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, it does. It would appear from that
16:22:17 25 answer that the Kamajors and the SLA remained in some form of -
26 what would you say? You wouldn't say contact, it was more than
27 that, in this area.

28 MR SANTORA: I perhaps can clarify that additional point as
29 well:

1 Q. Now upon the occurrence of the AFRC coup what happened, if
2 anything, to the Kamajors who were in this area?

3 A. Well, before the AFRC coup the Kamajors and the soldiers -
4 I did not witness any problem amongst them. The only thing that
16:23:03 5 I saw, that I observed going on, was that when the Kamajors were
6 going on their patrols, whatever they captured - whatever the
7 Kamajors would capture like weapons, like an RUF fighter or
8 civilians, they would not hand them over directly to the military
9 because even when the Kamajors captured me the military officers
16:23:42 10 wanted to interview me - the military officers wanted to
11 interview me. The time that I was initially captured there was a
12 Lieutenant Rogers there. It was later now that Jusu went there.
13 He wanted to obtain statement from me but the Kamajors did not
14 accept that. That was the only thing I observed between them,
16:24:13 15 but apart from that I don't know much about their relationship
16 before that time.

17 Q. No, I asked you though what happened - from your
18 observation what did you see in terms of the relationship between
19 - well, I specifically asked you what happened to the Kamajors
16:24:27 20 after the AFRC coup or upon the occurrence of the AFRC coup, what
21 happened to the Kamajors in the area you were being held?

22 A. In Gorahun Tonkia? Yes, in Gorahun Tonkia we - the
23 soldiers attacked the Kamajors with some RUF, yes. They attacked
24 the Kamajors in Gorahun Tonkia and it was the following morning
16:25:09 25 that Lieutenant Jusu and I went to Kenema.

26 Q. Aside from yourself and Lieutenant Jusu, did anybody else
27 go to Kenema with you?

28 A. Well, those who were with Jusu, I knew that they were
29 soldiers. I was the only one among them who was not a soldier.

1 Q. I don't think this is repetitive. You said you went to
2 Kenema around - you recall around mid-1997. Is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now upon arriving in Kenema what did you do?

16:25:49 5 A. We went directly to Mosquito, Jusu, myself and others.
6 They took me directly to Jusu. At that time Mosquito was with -
7 was at the brigade headquarters. I think that was 3 Brigade.
8 Yes, it was the 3 Brigade headquarters in Kenema. That was where
9 we met Mosquito and many other RUF commandos.

16:26:26 10 Q. Where was Foday Sankoh at this time?

11 A. At that time Foday Sankoh had been arrested in Nigeria.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Santora, I think we're just about up
13 to time. Are you close to the end of this line --

14 MR SANTORA: I can ask one more question.

16:26:48 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. That will have to be the last
16 one, I'm afraid.

17 MR SANTORA:

18 Q. So after Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria do you know who was
19 in charge of the RUF at this time? At the time you arrived in
16:26:58 20 Kenema?

21 A. Yes, it was Mosquito who was in charge directly.

22 MR SANTORA: This is convenient, your Honour.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well, Mr Santora. Mr Witness, we
24 are going to finish here in court for today. This is the time we
16:27:20 25 normally finish. We will be resuming court tomorrow morning.

26 You are now under oath and until the time all of your evidence is
27 finished you are not to discuss your evidence with anyone else.

28 Do you understand this?

29 THE WITNESS: Yes.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please adjourn court until 9.30 tomorrow.
2 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
3 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 2 December 2008 at
4 9.30 a.m.]
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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION:

DAUDA ARUNA FORNIE	21292
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR SANTORA	21292

EXHIBITS:

Exhibit P-254 admitted	21288
Exhibit P-255 admitted	21288
Exhibit P-256A and P-256B admitted	21288
Exhibit P-257A and P-257B admitted	21289
Exhibit P-258A and P-258B admitted	21289
Exhibit P-259 admitted	21289
Exhibit P-260A and P-260B admitted	21289
Exhibit D-75 admitted	21290