



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 20 AUGUST 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr William Romans  
Mr Lionel Nicholas

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Thursday, 20 August 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:29:08 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,  
6 please.

7 MS. HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A  
9 Bangura, Brenda J Hollis, and the case manager, Maja Dimitrova.

09:29:56 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. Mr Griffiths?

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
12 couple opposite. For the defence myself, Courtenay Griffiths.  
13 With me Mr Morris Anyah, Mr Terry Munyard and Ms Amelia  
14 Montgomery.

09:30:08 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

16 Mr Taylor, once more I will remind you that you are bound  
17 by your declaration to tell the truth.

18 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

19 [On former affirmation]

09:30:20 20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

21 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday when we adjourned we were looking at a  
22 white paper you had prepared on the topic of peace in the  
23 Mano River Union, do you recall that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

09:30:35 25 Q. Can we go back and conclude that, please. We are looking  
26 at binder 2 behind divider 67. Do you have the document,  
27 Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. Can we go to page 11, please.

1 It's binder number 2, your Honours, week 33.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, please, Mr Griffiths.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. We now come to the issue of diamonds, Mr Taylor, and you  
09:32:10 5 say this:

6 "In spite of the gallant efforts of the Liberian government  
7 to remain consistently engaged for peace in Sierra Leone, the  
8 international community remains unappreciative and incorrigibly  
9 accusative of Liberian in complicity, diamond dealing and  
09:32:35 10 gunrunning to the RUF.

11 The government categorically denies all of these  
12 allegations and challenges anyone to produce one shred of  
13 evidence.

14 In the first place, it is wrong to assume that the war in  
09:32:49 15 Sierra Leone is only about diamonds, since diamond dealing in  
16 that country has thrived for decades under British rule and since  
17 independence of the Sierra Leonean state.

18 The war in Sierra Leone cannot, and must not, be  
19 trivialised by assertions of diamond dealing as its primary  
09:33:12 20 cause, when other issues, such as ethnicity, tribalism, mistrust,  
21 the use of mercenaries, and the struggle for state power have not  
22 yet been addressed.

23 Nonetheless, it is the moral obligation of the Liberian  
24 government to set forth the following principles to first  
09:33:34 25 exonerate itself of the false charges as a first step in  
26 contributing to the resolution of the crisis.

27 The Government of Liberia fully supports UN resolution  
28 1306, which calls for the certification of all diamonds exported  
29 out of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, and will not hesitate to

1 apprehend and prosecute anyone found to be illegally dealing in,  
2 or smuggling diamonds across, the borders of Liberia.

3 The Liberian government has invited the United Nations, the  
4 Mano River Union governments, the United States and Great Britain  
09:34:19 5 to monitor the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border.

6 The Liberian government takes note of the report from  
7 De Beers company in South Africa, which states that allegations  
8 of illicit diamonds coming from Liberia are false and that most  
9 of the diamonds are coming from out of Eastern European  
09:34:38 10 countries, but are marked 'Liberia' to avoid paying taxes to  
11 their governments."

12 Was that true, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, that was true.

14 Q. And can you help us, Mr Taylor, when that report by  
09:34:54 15 De Beers was published?

16 A. Oh, boy. I don't have a copy here; I don't quite remember,  
17 but it had to be probably sometime before this. That report came  
18 out - I don't have a copy. I do not know how it's not in my  
19 papers, but this is factual. We may just have to search, I  
09:35:15 20 guess.

21 Q. "The Liberian government is instituting means to empower  
22 the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy to monitor, scrutinize,  
23 and control all diamond transactions in the Republic of Liberia.

24 The Liberian government invites Mano River Union members  
09:35:38 25 states to collaborate in the exchange of information and  
26 coordinate the implementation of UN resolution 1306.

27 The Liberian government calls on the international  
28 community to provide logistical support to the formation of a  
29 joint Mano River Union diamond monitoring unit that will report

1 directly to the United Nations any violations of UN resolution  
2 1306. Such assistance should include training, uniforms,  
3 vehicles, housing and salaries."

4 And then when we go over the page, Mr Taylor, we have the  
09:36:25 5 concluding topic, which is:

6 "Liberia's position for a final resolution.

7 More than any other country in the Mano River Union, and  
8 even within ECOWAS, Liberia is in an enviably unique position to  
9 foster peace and stability in the region, having been a direct  
09:36:47 10 beneficiary of a peace plan crafted and successfully implemented  
11 by ECOWAS to end the seven-year civil conflict.

12 The ECOWAS formula used then is still the most reasonable  
13 and relevant of the many prescriptions that are now being  
14 proposed to end the hostilities in Sierra Leone. The Liberian  
09:37:08 15 peace formula, basically embodied in the Lome Agreement, remains  
16 the best hope for a final resolution in Sierra Leone as follows:  
17 Participation of all parties in the peace-building process;  
18 complete cessation of hostilities and disarmament and  
19 demobilisation.

09:37:29 20 More than any other country, Liberia recognises the  
21 pitfalls that can delay indefinitely any peace proposal, given  
22 the diverse nature of the participants and interests attendant to  
23 the war in Sierra Leone.

24 The Liberian government has been forthright in condemning  
09:37:49 25 the actions of the RUF, particularly in the taking of UN  
26 hostages, but it must be recognised and accepted that all parties  
27 to the Sierra Leonean conflict should bear responsibility for the  
28 collapse of the peace process and the commission of varying  
29 degrees of misdeeds.

1           Aside from the efforts of the international community, the  
2 President of Sierra Leone, His Excellency Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, has  
3 to maintain a practical leadership role as a 'Big Brother' and  
4 call all parties to the table like good, patriotic  
09:38:28 5 Sierra Leoneans. He must create the atmosphere for trust,  
6 confidence and integrity among all parties without fault or  
7 favour. His leadership at this time is critical for peace among  
8 his people.

9           Unless there is a resolution to what is basically a  
09:38:45 10 Sierra Leonean problem within the ECOWAS-backed Lome Accord, any  
11 injection of a new prescription to suit outside interests can  
12 only delay peace indefinitely. At the end of the day, only  
13 Sierra Leoneans are suffering and dying. Sierra Leoneans must  
14 hold together with one accord and determine what is best for the  
09:39:08 15 future of their country.

16           To this end, Liberia is opposed to any escalation of the  
17 war in Sierra Leone along the lines of massive arms build-up in  
18 the West African theatre. Just as British arms have found their  
19 way into the hands of dissidents that have attacked Liberia from  
09:39:27 20 Guinea, they could also find their way into the hands of  
21 dissidents all across the sub-region, thereby posing imminent  
22 danger to stability.

23           On the issue of bringing to trial culprits who are  
24 suspected of derailing the peace process in Sierra Leone, Liberia  
09:39:45 25 believes that this move is premature. The question of trials for  
26 one party to the conflict while the country is infested with arms  
27 could be a misjudgment of the solution. If trials have to occur,  
28 then a full investigation of all parties to the conflict must be  
29 carried out in a free, fair and transparent manner following the

1     disarmament and demobilisation process."

2             Mr Taylor, that sentence "the question of trials for one  
3     party", what do you mean by that?

4     A.     Well, there are other parties to the problem in

09:40:26 5     Sierra Leone. It was not just the RUF involved in the war. You  
6     had the SLA, you had the Sierra Leonean government, you had  
7     Kabbah as defence minister, you had the Kamajors with my late  
8     good friend Hinga Norman that was deputy defence minister. So  
9     when we look at responsibility, we were saying that you had to  
09:40:51 10    look at all of the parties, because there were many parties to  
11    the conflict. And the only person that was being talked about at  
12    the time was: We're going to put Foday Sankoh on trial. I'm  
13    saying, well, look, it's premature. Let's get the guns, let's  
14    get everything and look at everybody including the defence  
09:41:10 15    minister, who was also President.

16    Q.     Because you go on:

17             "Carrying out trials of leaders of any of the warring  
18    parties while their supporters remain fully armed is not only a  
19    disincentive for ceasefire, disarmament and demobilise, but could  
09:41:29 20    lead to tribal, social and political backlash long after the war  
21    has ended.

22             Additionally, no member country of ECOWAS is prepared to  
23    sacrifice its young men in a war of attrition in Sierra Leone,  
24    when peace can be achieved through a thorough understanding of  
09:41:44 25    the problem, with patience and fair play.

26             Consequently, the Government of Liberia fully adheres to  
27    the ECOWAS plan of action, a speedy return to the implementation  
28    of the Lome Accord.

29             The Liberian government fully supports an immediate

1 ceasefire in Sierra Leone, a return to the original line as of  
2 the signing of Lome agreement on July 7, 1999, demobilisation and  
3 disarmament of all factions in the Sierra Leonean conflict.

09:42:21 4 The Liberian government invites statesmen of international  
5 stature such as former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa,  
6 to investigate all allegations against Liberia and help to  
7 mediate the dispute in the Sierra Leone crisis and the  
8 Liberian-Guinea border issue.

09:42:47 9 The Government of Liberia is prepared to host a round of  
10 talks in Monrovia through the auspices of the United Nations,  
11 Mano River Union and ECOWAS, that would bring together all  
12 parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone, in order to find a way  
13 forward and put the peace process back on course?

09:43:06 14 The Government of Liberia offers to host a round of talks  
15 in Monrovia, bringing together Kabbah, RUF, AFRC,  
16 Mano River Union and ECOWAS.

09:43:27 17 Finally, the Liberian government does admit to a  
18 relationship with the RUF, which is no secret. However, the  
19 government rejects any notion that that relationship is based on  
20 pecuniary gain from diamond dealing and gun-running. Liberia has  
21 never, nor does it intend to represent the RUF at any forum.

22 Pause there. "The Liberian government admits to a  
23 relationship with the RUF", Mr Taylor, what were you speaking of  
24 there?

09:43:46 25 A. '91, '92 when we did have a relationship with them, yes.

26 Q. "What the Liberian government expects is that the  
27 international community" --

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Sorry, Mr Griffiths, I haven't understood  
29 that answer. What is the answer?



1 THE WITNESS: Well, I said there is evidence I led here,  
2 your Honour, about our brief relationship with the RUF in the  
3 years beginning 1991 and ending in May of 1992.

09:44:20 4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And the relationship exactly is what? Or  
5 was what?

6 THE WITNESS: Okay. Well, if I can explain here. We do  
7 recall that on the issue of the border with Liberia, at the time  
8 the NPFL, at the time, had a security arrangement with the RUF  
9 for the protection of our borders at the entry of ULIMO from  
09:44:46 10 Sierra Leone. That evidence is before the Court.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. "What the Liberian government expects is that the  
13 international community will use its relationship with the RUF,  
14 as with other parties to the conflict, in a constructive manner  
09:45:06 15 to bring peace to Sierra Leone and keep the Mano River Union  
16 stable and prosperous."

17 Now, Mr Taylor, what did you do with this document after it  
18 was produced?

19 A. It was widely circulated, as most white papers are,  
09:45:24 20 throughout the Mano River Union countries and most ECOWAS  
21 countries. We unsuccessfully did not get it done in French but  
22 the Anglophone countries, Nigeria, Ghana, it was distributed  
23 through our embassies in those countries.

24 Q. So did it go, for example, to President Kabbah?

09:45:44 25 A. Yes, yes.

26 Q. And did you get any response from President Kabbah about  
27 it?

28 A. No, I did not get any response. This was not a letter  
29 addressed to him so probably he didn't see a need to respond

1 directly to it. But it was published, as it was intended to be,  
2 but we didn't get any direct comments from him.

3 Q. Okay. Now, Mr Taylor, apart from the situation in  
4 Sierra Leone, were there any other difficulties in West Africa at  
09:46:22 5 that time?

6 A. Yes. We had difficulties in La Cote d'Ivoire. There was a  
7 conflict that had developed following the elections of Laurent  
8 Gbagbo.

9 Q. Could you spell that for us?

09:46:42 10 A. I think it's G-B-A-R-G-B-O. Maybe we can check that.  
11 Laurent Gbagbo was elected as President in a disputed election  
12 with the general that had overthrown former President Bedie in  
13 person of Robert Guei and there was a major war raging in La  
14 Cote d'Ivoire. I was a part of the discussions trying to bring  
09:47:17 15 peace there. We met in Togo. I was also invited to Paris and  
16 President Wade of Senegal was chairing that mediation group. He  
17 wrote me to inform me of the progress on the Ivorian situation.

18 Q. Now, did you go to Paris?

19 A. Yes, I did.

09:47:43 20 Q. And when was that?

21 A. That was in 2000. We had a meeting on the Ivorian rebel  
22 problem in Paris.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I deal with a spelling before we move  
24 on. Laurent Gbagbo, L-A-U-R-E-N-T G-B-A-G-B-O. Lest I forget,  
09:48:14 25 can I ask, please, that that document, "President Taylor's  
26 formula for peace in the Mano River Union" dated 22 July 2000 be  
27 marked for identification MFI-157, please.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-157.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

1 Q. Now, you said that President Wade of Senegal wrote to you,  
2 Mr Taylor, yes?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Have a look behind divider 70, please. And just to explain  
09:49:01 5 what is behind this divider, we first see a letter from the  
6 minister of foreign affairs, don't we, Mr Taylor?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. "I present my compliments and have the honour to enclose  
9 the original and an unofficial translation of a letter of 20 July  
09:49:20 10 2000 addressed to you from His Excellency Mr Abdoulaye Wade,  
11 President of Senegal."

12 Wade is spelt W-A-D-E. And then we see the French version  
13 over the page, don't we, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, we do.

09:49:44 15 Q. And then the unofficial translation is behind that, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. "Mr President and dear brother, following the OAU summit  
18 resolution in Lome as regards dispatching a delegation to Abidjan  
19 and in consultation with President Eyadema, current chairman of  
09:50:05 20 the OAU and General Robert Guei, President of the Republic of  
21 Cote d'Ivoire, I would like to submit herewith the following plan  
22 of action:

23 1. Schedule of the OAU, presidential delegation to  
24 Cote d'Ivoire, 11, 12, and 13 August 2000."

09:50:25 25 Did you attend that meeting, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes, I did.

27 Q. "This delegation would consist of the Heads of State of  
28 ECOWAS member countries as well as the President of Gabon.

29 3. This delegation headed by the current chairman of the

1 OAU will be structured as follows: Co-chair, Alpha Konare, the  
2 current chairman of ECOWAS; Rapporteur, President Wade of  
3 Senegal.

09:51:02 4 The delegation will arrive in Abidjan on the morning of 11  
5 August 2000 to meet with the authorised concern as well as other  
6 parties in order to find a durable political solution guaranteed  
7 by the OAU.

8 All observations should be directly addressed to President  
9 Eyadema."

09:51:17 10 Now, Mr Taylor, didn't you have enough on your plate with  
11 what you were doing in relation to Sierra Leone?

12 A. I didn't ask for this, counsel. The outside was looking at  
13 me differently, but my colleagues in ECOWAS and on the continent  
14 was looking at me differently and I didn't ask for this. They  
09:51:36 15 asked me to be involved. In fact, there were some adjustments to  
16 this meeting, we will only tell by the pictures. We go first to  
17 President Eyadema's farm at Kara and all of us we take pictures  
18 and hold a preliminary meeting before coming down to Abidjan.  
19 Those pictures are available.

09:51:59 20 But I guess there used to be the joke that they used to  
21 joke me in meeting that, "You are a former rebel leader so you  
22 know how to deal with rebels." So they got me involved in all of  
23 these discussions and I would want to believe that they felt that  
24 my contribution was significant.

09:52:20 25 Q. So there was now, at this stage, just to sum up the  
26 situation, conflict in Cote d'Ivoire?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Conflict in Sierra Leone?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And then we've got the incursion from Guinea in Lofa?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. So on three sides you are having to deal with conflict?

4 A. That is correct.

09:52:55 5 Q. Now, whilst you are engaged in that, Mr Taylor, how was the  
6 situation in Sierra Leone developing at this time?

7 A. Things were not moving. We had successfully put together  
8 the new leadership of the RUF and may I just correct something.

9 In reviewing the transcript, I did not - in fact, I failed to  
09:53:38 10 express that the meeting that I mentioned on yesterday with the  
11 Heads of State to bring together, to find a leadership for the  
12 RUF, there were two parts to that meeting. The first part did  
13 include more than two persons. There were about at least four.  
14 The last part of that meeting included Sesay and Gibril

09:54:04 15 Massaquoi. It had slipped me and I thought to correct the  
16 records.

17 Q. When say the first part of that meeting there were --

18 A. There were at least three or four delegates from the RUF.  
19 I forgot that part, because they left the room after some time.

09:54:24 20 When it got down to the major decision, Issa kept Gibril  
21 Massaquoi with him. But the first part of that meeting, there  
22 were others that came into that room, spent some time. I just  
23 did not mention it yesterday. It slipped me. And going through  
24 the transcript, I recall that there were more than two in the  
09:54:46 25 room. I wanted to correct the records.

26 Q. Okay. But you were going on to say what?

27 A. That we had put the new leadership into place. Issa Sesay  
28 appeared to be very understanding and wanting to move forward.  
29 The RUF immediately - Issa Sesay announced that they were

1 prepared to return the equipment that had been seized from the UN  
2 forces and that we've talked about here before. He also agreed  
3 to start immediately the disarmament and demobilisation process.  
4 And he had also asked that the - if you remember that the ECOWAS  
09:55:31 5 members that were assigned to the UN be deployed in RUF areas  
6 immediately.

7 Now, these were very hot and interesting issues to move the  
8 peace process forward. So we are now asking for the troops to  
9 now be deployed, but specifically the United States said that  
09:55:55 10 they were opposed to the deployment of troops unless and until  
11 they were trained for six months.

12 While this is going on there is still bloodshed in Sierra  
13 Leone, so by late August all of us are getting frustrated now.  
14 All of us, again, myself, the members of the committee, ECOWAS  
09:56:19 15 member states, we are all grumbling. So I write a letter  
16 immediately, a very long and detailed letter to again the  
17 Secretary-General of the United Nations asking that that letter  
18 be published as a Security Council document complaining about the  
19 attitude of the international community in not grabbing this  
09:56:41 20 opportunity that is now afforded by the new leadership of the  
21 RUF, to move this process forward instead of encouraging this war  
22 to continue in Sierra Leone.

23 So I write a letter to Kofi Annan and it is published as a  
24 security document in late August, because of the continued  
09:57:00 25 conflict and the failure - I am not sure if failure is a good  
26 word. I would want to say the - I don't know what good word to  
27 describe it, but the inability of the international community to  
28 move, you know, to stop this problem.

29 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before you proceed, the

1 statement, "Unless and until the troops were trained for six  
2 months", which troops are these, because my understanding was  
3 that the ECOWAS troops were trained troops?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour, that's the whole problem.

09:57:49 5 You're right. They are trained, but we couldn't understand why  
6 the United States was saying that before those same troops be  
7 redeployed, they should be trained - retrained for six months.  
8 That is why some of us started saying, "But wait a minute." It  
9 appears now that the military option has been decided by the  
09:58:09 10 principal powers, and this was disturbing for some of us, okay?  
11 These people are trained, they have been fighting. You said that  
12 they should not deploy until they retrain. It was disturbing for  
13 us, and I fired off a letter immediately to the Secretary-General  
14 complaining about this.

09:58:27 15 After discussing with my colleagues: Well, you know, this  
16 is your thing. You are responsible. We want to be holding you -  
17 so you write the letter and we will all, you know, discuss it.  
18 And I did in late August.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we come to that letter, could I  
09:58:46 20 ask, please, that the letter from President Wade of Senegal to  
21 President Taylor dated 20 July 2000 be marked for identification,  
22 please.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Said document is marked for  
24 identification MFI-158.

09:59:02 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful.

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, before we come to look at the letter which  
27 you wrote, can I just seek some clarification on a couple of  
28 matters, please. Firstly this: You have helpfully provided some  
29 additional evidence regarding that meeting in July with Issa

1 Sesay, and you had said that initially there were four or so  
2 members of the RUF present?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. But when it got down to the nitty-gritty of the discussion,  
09:59:40 5 only two remained.

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Now, can you help us with the identities of those who were  
8 there initially?

9 A. Oh, boy. One of those individuals that - there was a  
10:00:00 10 short, dark fellow. I don't quite remember his name. Shortish,  
11 stockish. I don't remember his name. Maybe if I saw a picture,  
12 I could identify him. But one of the other individuals that came  
13 in earlier has testified before the Court. One of the  
14 individuals testified before the Court.

10:00:38 15 Q. Now, the letter you wrote to Kofi Annan, can we look behind  
16 divider 79, please, in this same bundle. Now, Mr Taylor, taking  
17 things slowly, the first three pages we see the letter you wrote,  
18 don't we?

19 A. Yes.

10:01:15 20 Q. And then behind that, that letter was later published by  
21 the Security Council?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. So it's two different formats of the same document, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

10:01:30 25 Q. Let's look at the Security Council version then, shall we.  
26 Letter dated 28 August 2000 from the President of Liberia  
27 addressed to the Secretary-General.

28 "I extend compliments on behalf of the people of Liberia  
29 and in my own name to you on the occasion of the convocation of



1 the millennium summit, where leaders of the world would be  
2 expected to define problems besetting our global family and  
3 determine solutions in the alleviation of those problems,  
4 engendering hope in the future of our one world, and carving new  
10:02:19 5 aspirations for the United Nations. Against this background, I  
6 am pleased to acquaint you with the current status of Liberia's  
7 engagement in Sierra Leone, a troubled portion of our global  
8 village.

9 You may recall the commitment of the Government of Liberia a  
10:02:36 10 to remain constructively engaged in the resolution of the crisis  
11 in the sisterly country of Sierra Leone. Recently our  
12 involvement, among other things, culminated in the release of  
13 over 500 United Nation peacekeepers who were, unfortunately, held  
14 against their will by the Revolutionary United Front. Our  
10:03:02 15 government will continue to be steadfastly bound to an immediate,  
16 peaceful, and diplomatic solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone,  
17 as well as the maintenance of peace, security and stability in  
18 the sub-region and will continue to offer public and practical  
19 expressions to these endeavours.

10:03:25 20 However, the apparent silence of the international  
21 community to the repeated violations of our territorial integrity  
22 by armed insurgents from the area of the Guinea-Sierra Leone  
23 borders, including a third and most recent attack emanating from  
24 the Republic of Guinea, which is ongoing, continues to overburden  
10:03:51 25 the Liberian government with unnecessary loss of life and  
26 property and the displacement of a large number of our people.

27 It is the request of the Government of Liberia that you  
28 utilise all forms of influence at your disposal to ensure the  
29 sanctity of our borders and the maintenance of peace, security

1 and stability within the framework of the Mano River Union.

2 As the inviolability of the borders between Liberia, Guinea  
3 and Sierra Leone remains a crucial issue, I recommend the  
4 following and request the support of the United Nations in  
10:04:34 5 ensuring their speedy implementation:

6 (A) the Government of Liberia again calls for a monitoring  
7 presence of the United Nations at these borders to monitor all  
8 crossing points capable of conveying vehicular traffic. We  
9 recognise the enormous cost to individual nations of policing the  
10:05:00 10 entire length of the borders and suggest the utilisation of an  
11 airborne multispectral service in detection of any unusual  
12 movements along the entire border. Intelligence gathered  
13 therefrom could be shared by all appropriate authorities. The  
14 cost, which is relatively minor, could be borne by the  
10:05:22 15 international community.

16 (B) on the status of the RUF, as has been previously done,  
17 the Liberian government has again called for the immediate  
18 disarmament and simultaneous deployment of troops from the  
19 Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, under the  
10:05:45 20 United Nations mission in Sierra Leone in areas recently  
21 considered as RUF dominated. Along these lines, RUF has  
22 announced a new leadership acceptable to ECOWAS and has informed  
23 ECOWAS, through its chairman, that it welcomes our call for  
24 disarmament and demobilisation and that it has begun the process  
10:06:13 25 leading to its transformation to a political entity and  
26 subsequent reintegration into society.

27 Additionally, RUF has informed ECOWAS of its wish to return  
28 weapons retrieved from United Nations peacekeepers and its desire  
29 to establish communications with the high command of UNAMSIL to

1 facilitate and accelerate the return of the weapons and the  
2 process of confidence building.

3 In keeping therewith, it is our recommendation that these  
4 initiatives be immediately exploited by the United Nations  
10:06:48 5 leading to a ceasefire; the withdrawal of all belligerent forces  
6 to positions as at 7 July, 1999; the simultaneous deployment of  
7 ECOWAS troops under UNAMSIL; and the total disarmament and  
8 demobilisation of the armed factions.

9 You are doubtlessly aware of our unreserved support for  
10 Security Council resolution 1306 of 2000 calling for an end of  
11 the smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone. As evidence of this  
12 we are undertaking several initiatives, including the enactment  
13 of a statute criminalising the export of undocumented or  
14 uncertificated diamonds; the enforcement of legislation requiring  
10:07:39 15 the Central Bank of Liberia to issue certificates of origin; and  
16 our request to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank  
17 to second experts who would assist in the development of a  
18 transparent process. Furthermore, the government calls for  
19 assistance from the international community to convene a meeting  
10:08:00 20 of international experts to focus on the trade and certification  
21 process in the Mano River Union countries.

22 The Government of Liberia assures you of its continued  
23 commitment to the pursuit of peace and stability, both at home  
24 and in the sub-region, and we welcomes the convening of this  
10:08:22 25 summit with hope and anticipation for the evolution of solutions  
26 that will make our world a safer place for our children.

27 Finally, I wish to request that you kindly circulate the  
28 present letter to all members of the Security Council as a  
29 document of the council."

1 Now, Mr Taylor, did you get a response to that letter?

2 A. Yes, the Secretary-General did respond to this.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we proceed, can I that ask that  
4 that letter be marked for identification, please. The letter  
10:08:56 5 from President Taylor to the Secretary-General Kofi Annan,  
6 published by the Security Council, dated 28 August 2000, be  
7 marked for identification MFI-159, please.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are also marking the original?

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I would like the original letter to be  
10:09:20 10 marked.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Both, then as the one document?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: As one document.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-159.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:09:41 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you recall that yesterday we looked at a  
16 document attributed to General Jetley regarding the situation in  
17 Sierra Leone?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Did General Jetley's report receive any publicity at the  
10:10:11 20 time?

21 A. Yes, it was widely published. I got a copy of a  
22 publication that was gone by The Guardian newspaper.

23 Q. Which newspaper?

24 A. The Guardian newspaper.

10:10:24 25 Q. In which country is that newspaper published?

26 A. Out of Britain. Detailing the pitfalls of the  
27 Sierra Leonean crisis and the comments that had been made by  
28 General Jetley.

29 Q. Yes. Have a look, please, behind divider 80. Do you have

1 it?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. And we see the handwritten file in the left-hand corner,  
4 Mr Taylor, whose writing is that?

10:11:03 5 A. I can't be sure, counsel, but probably someone from the  
6 office. I don't know precisely.

7 Q. "Sierra Leone peace force accused of sabotage.  
8 Chris McGreal in Freetown.  
9 Saturday, September 9, 2000.

10:11:21 10 The United Nations force commander in Sierra Leone has  
11 accused Nigerian political and military officials at the top of  
12 the UN mission in Freetown of working hard to sabotage the peace  
13 process and the Nigerian army command of looting diamonds in  
14 league with the now imprisoned rebel leader, Foday Sankoh.

10:11:43 15 In a devastating four-page confidential report obtained by  
16 The Guardian, Major General Vijay Jetley paints a picture of a  
17 conspiracy to force him out as the UN commander in Sierra Leone.

18 The public airing of bitter differences within the UN  
19 operation in Freetown comes at a particularly sensitive time as  
10:12:03 20 world leaders pledge to overhaul peacekeeping in Africa after a  
21 decade of humiliating failures in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and  
22 Sierra Leone. With 7,000 more UN troops destined for Freetown,  
23 General Jetley's report will force the Security Council to  
24 confront issues beyond the numbers of peacekeepers and their  
10:12:29 25 mandate and to consider whether the whole operation is a further  
26 threat to stability in West Africa?

27 The memorandum called 'Report on the crisis in  
28 Sierra Leone' was written during the upheaval in May that  
29 prompted British intervention to prevent the rebel Revolutionary

1 United Front from seizing power. General Jetley never officially  
2 submitted the document to the UN but it has been widely  
3 circulated among members of the Security Council and other major  
4 players in Sierra Leone. It's damning criticism of the Nigerians  
10:13:05 5 and its exposure of the deep divisions that have all but  
6 paralysed the UN mission has added pressure for a major shake up  
7 of a discredited peace keeping force that Britain is counting on  
8 to play a leading role in the defeat of the RUF.

9 General Jetley singles out three Nigerians for particular  
10:13:26 10 criticism. Kofi Annan's special representative in Freetown,  
11 Under-Secretary-General Oluwemi Adeniji; the former head of  
12 ECOMOG, the West African intervention force for Sierra Leone  
13 which worked with the UN for six months, Major General Gabriel  
14 Kpamber; and the deputy force commander Brigadier General Mohamed  
10:13:57 15 Garba, who is General Jetley's immediate subordinate. The report  
16 lays bare the personal animosity between General Jetley and the  
17 men he accuses, but it goes further by detailing a series of  
18 actions that he says amounts to collusion with the rebels to  
19 wreck last year's peace accord because Nigeria wants a free hand  
10:14:19 20 to run Sierra Leone and its army wants to control the diamond  
21 trade. At the heart of the accusations lie charges that the  
22 Nigerians compromised General Jetley's efforts to free 500 of his  
23 peacekeepers taken hostage by the RUF in May.

24 The mission directive given to me and which I tried to  
10:14:38 25 follow implicitly, directly conflicted with the interests of not  
26 only the warring factions but also of the major players in the  
27 diamond racket like Liberia and Nigeria.

28 As an Indian, and having no hidden agenda to promote, I  
29 became a victim of the machinations of these countries. By

1 placing their stooges in the right places they have not only  
2 tried to scuttle the peace process, but also tried to denigrate  
3 me and the country I represent to promote their own personal  
4 ambitions and personal interests.

10:15:14 5 It is my opinion that the ECOMOG force commander, along  
6 with the special representative Mr Adeniji, and DFC General Garba  
7 have worked hard to sabotage the peace process and show Indians  
8 in general and me in particular in a poor light. Keeping the  
9 Nigerian interest was paramount even if it meant scuttling the  
10:15:37 10 peace process and this also implied that UNAMSIL was expendable.

11 To this end, the special representative and deputy force  
12 commander cultivated the RUF leadership especially Foday Sankoh  
13 behind my back.

14 But the report came as no surprise to western and senior UN  
10:15:58 15 officials who say there is ample evidence that the Nigerian army  
16 remains heavily implicated in the illegal diamond trade, that its  
17 senior officers worked closely with the RUF despite having also  
18 fought it, and that the Nigerians believe that, as the largest  
19 troop contingent in the UN mission, they should have overall  
10:16:23 20 command."

21 Mr Taylor, can I pause there for a minute. This accusation  
22 about the Nigerian military being involved in the diamond trade,  
23 was it an accusation aired at any of the Committee of Six  
24 meetings you attended or the ECOWAS meetings?

10:16:45 25 A. Not officially. Unofficially it was whispered around the  
26 room, yeah, that there were indications that some of the soldiers  
27 were involved in the trade of diamonds.

28 Q. I mean, for example, did President Kabbah directly accuse  
29 any of the succession of Nigerian Presidents of being involved

1 in, in effect, the diamond trade in Sierra Leone?

2 A. No. Kabbah wouldn't do that.

3 Q. Why wouldn't he do that?

4 A. I don't think - maybe diplomatically one would be wrong,  
10:17:26 5 but I don't think Kabbah is that brave a figure to do that. He  
6 wouldn't do that. You have got some 10,000 troops on your soil,  
7 heavily equipped, you depend on them for your very survival, they  
8 have brought you back to power through ECOWAS. This is the type  
9 of thing that Kabbah would not do. I know him. He wouldn't do  
10:17:47 10 that.

11 Q. "General Jetley argues that senior Nigerian army officers,  
12 particularly General Kpamber and Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe  
13 who died earlier this year, did not want to withdraw from Sierra  
14 Leone because they were making huge amounts of money from illegal  
10:18:07 15 diamond mining and payments from the RUF.

16 It is well known that public opinion in Nigeria was against  
17 the continued deployment of Nigerian troops as part of ECOMOG in  
18 Sierra Leone. However, the Nigerian army was interested in  
19 staying in Sierra Leone due to the benefits they were getting  
10:18:28 20 from the illegal mining. General Khobe was known as the 'ten  
21 million man'. It is alleged that he received up to \$10 million  
22 to permit the activities of the RUF. The ECOMOG force commander  
23 General Kpamber was also involved in the illegal diamond mining  
24 in connivance with RUF leader Foday Sankoh, General Jetley wrote.

10:18:52 25 In January, General Kpamber astonished a meeting of  
26 regional Heads of State on the peace process by praising  
27 Mr Sankoh as a saviour of the nation. The two were often seen in  
28 each other's company, travelling to diamond towns from which the  
29 UN was barred. Sierra Leoneans referred to General Kpamber as



1 Sankoh's ADC.

2 General Jetley lists a series of actions by the Nigerian  
3 army which he concludes amounted to colluding in the abductions.  
4 He notes that while Kenyans, Zambians and Indians were taken  
10:19:32 5 captive, the rebels let the Nigerians go.

6 But the alleged relationship between Sankoh and senior  
7 Nigerian officers and officials would explain why the rebel  
8 leader was trying to get to the Nigerian high commission when he  
9 was captured. General Jetley blames low morale for the mass  
10:19:46 10 surrender of his troops."

11 Mr President, can I ask that that Guardian newspaper  
12 article on General Jetley's report, dated 9 September 2000, be  
13 marked for identification MFI-160, please.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-160.

10:20:37 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Now, that article, as we see, Mr Taylor, appeared in  
17 September 2000?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, at this stage, what was the state of your relationship  
10:20:59 20 with the Guineans?

21 A. Things were deteriorating, they were at a very low stage,  
22 and so I tried to get the chairman of ECOWAS involved in a  
23 process to try to help to stabilise the situation, so I wrote him  
24 a letter. I think I also got the Secretary-General involved in  
10:21:30 25 trying to look into the Liberian-Guinean problem to see how we  
26 could bring about a successful resolution.

27 Q. Who was the ECOWAS chairman at this time?

28 A. This particular time, what are we talking about, 2000?  
29 Alpha Konare is still chairman.

1 Q. So was the incursion still going on, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes. We had had an incursion as late as July that was  
3 still going on. There was an incursion in July. That was still  
4 going on. And so what we did was - we were, by this time, also  
10:22:31 5 harassing Downes-Thomas to do something and wondering about why  
6 the international community was so indifferent to this and so we  
7 also harassed him. While I am getting ECOWAS involved, we  
8 harassed him to see if he could alert the United Nations of the  
9 problems going on with the failure of Liberia and Guinea to get  
10:23:00 10 this matter resolved.

11 Q. Now, did Mr Downes-Thomas do anything about it?

12 A. Yes, he did. He did send over a memo that we were given a  
13 copy of an explanation trying to draw the UN attention to these  
14 deteriorating circumstances between the two countries and  
10:23:26 15 pointing to our complaint of what we called the indifference of  
16 the international community to this.

17 Q. Have a look behind divider 82, please. Do you have it?

18 A. Yes, this is the document here.

19 Q. Now we see that it's an outgoing code cable from  
10:24:02 20 Mr Downes-Thomas to Prendergast and to Adeniji who is the special  
21 representative in Freetown let us remind ourselves. It's dated  
22 12 September 2000 and the subject is "Liberia-Guinea relations":

23 "Thank you for your code cable dated 8 September on the  
24 subject above. I attach, for your information, copies of  
10:25:03 25 articles carried in today's newspapers on the matter. It is to  
26 be noted that, in the wake of the most recent developments in  
27 Guinea, six of yesterday's newspapers carried lead headlines on  
28 Liberia-Guinea relations, while five of them devoted their  
29 editorials to the same topic."

1 Was that the case, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So it was a very topical issue?

4 A. Yes.

10:25:29 5 Q. "The most recent manifestation of the unease which now  
6 typifies the relations between both governments is to be found in  
7 the widely reported harassment, threats to and detention of  
8 Liberian and Sierra Leonean nationals, especially refugees in  
9 Guinea."

10:25:49 10 Was that going on?

11 A. Yes, yes, there was a problem even at the embassy environs  
12 and that Liberians in Liberia were also getting upset that if our  
13 people were ill-treated in Guinea, then they should expect some  
14 reciprocal action. It was a little tense, yes.

10:26:14 15 Q. But, Mr Taylor, I am trying to understand what's going on  
16 here because on the one hand you say that the Guinean government  
17 was supporting or permitting Liberian dissidents to operate from  
18 their territory. On the other hand this is suggesting that  
19 Liberians were also being harassed by the Guineans. So which is  
10:26:35 20 right?

21 A. Both of them are right. You just need to make it clear.  
22 We have the pro-government and the anti-government camps. In the  
23 refugee camps, they were going in there and recruiting people to  
24 fight. Those that refused to fight were being harassed, yes.

10:26:52 25 Q. "Liberian perspective on the matter is unanimous in its  
26 outrage and in its appeal to the Guinean authorities to  
27 demonstrate restraint. In this respect, the threat by the  
28 Guinean Prime Minister to go on the offensive against Liberia is  
29 particularly worrisome."

1 Had he said that?

2 A. Yes, he did.

3 Q. "The current strained relationship between Guinea and  
4 Liberia has serious implications, not only for the two countries,  
10:27:23 5 but also for all members of the Mano River Union. The  
6 deterioration in relations has its genesis in the first armed  
7 attack in Voinjama, the capital of Lofa County, on 21 April  
8 19199, which the Government of Liberia blamed on Guinea. The  
9 second attack, launched less than four months later, on 10 August  
10:27:49 10 1999, and the latest on 8 July 2000, have confirmed the worst  
11 fears of even those who had given Guinea the benefit of the  
12 doubt. While the Government of Liberia was able to repel the  
13 first two incursions within a matter of weeks, the latest  
14 fighting has been raging for the past two months with no  
10:28:11 15 immediate signs for a quick resolution?

16 All three attacks exhibited a number of common features:  
17 They all involved an attack on the city of Voinjama; they were  
18 executed by dissidents allegedly affiliated to former faction  
19 leader Alhaji Kromah and all were concentrated in Lofa County,  
10:28:36 20 despite the fact that two other counties, Bong and Nimba, also  
21 share the border with Guinea. Repeated denials by Guinea of its  
22 involvement in these attacks were dismissed by the Government of  
23 Liberia as disingenuous, leading to a war of words between the  
24 two neighbours. It is not inconceivable that the dissidents may  
10:29:01 25 indeed have training bases in Guinea, as alleged by Liberia, but  
26 without the knowledge of the Government of Guinea, as alluded to  
27 by the Guinean ambassador to Liberia.

28 The Guinean envoy has conceded in the past that among  
29 Liberian refugees in Guinea were some former factional elements

1 who felt insecure staying in Liberia after the 1997 elections.  
2 He, however, emphasised that if these people are returning home  
3 and rearming themselves for whatever reason against their own  
4 government, we have no input and no knowledge about such actions.

10:29:37 5 Despite public protestations to the contrary by the Guinean  
6 government, Liberia insists that it has evidence that dissidents  
7 opposed to the Liberian government were being trained at an  
8 agricultural institute outside of Macenta, Guinea, not far from  
9 the Liberian border. President Taylor has complained about the  
10:30:04 10 international community's silence whenever there was an incursion  
11 into Lofa from Guinea. His government has been telling the world  
12 about the untoward activities of Liberians abroad, especially  
13 Messrs Vamba Kanneh and Alhaji Kromah and their supporters in  
14 Guinea against Liberia and, not unpredictably, felt that the  
10:30:24 15 international community had turned a deaf ear to its concerns.

16 It is worth noting that the difference between the previous  
17 attacks and the current one is in the latter's magnitude and its  
18 propensity to engulf the whole sub-region in the absence of  
19 timely interventions, particularly by the ECOWAS leadership and  
10:30:44 20 the United Nations. Unlike in the past, when dissident  
21 activities were confined within Liberian borders, Guinea had  
22 become the latest victim of cross-border attacks, allegedly from  
23 the Liberian and Sierra Leonean sides of the border.

24 As with most conflicts, it is ordinary civilians,  
10:31:04 25 particularly those in border towns, who are caught in the  
26 crossfire. An immediate cause for alarm is the growing  
27 xenophobic round-up of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans residing in  
28 Conakry on the orders of President Lansana Conte."

29 Mr Taylor, I thought Kabbah and Conte were supposed to be

1 friends.

2 A. Oh, yes, they were more than friends; they were brothers,  
3 yes.

4 Q. So can you help us as to why Sierra Leoneans were being  
10:31:37 5 rounded up in Conakry?

6 A. Well, very well. Civilian Sierra Leoneans are part - most  
7 of them are part of what? Of the Kamajors. So if you are in  
8 Guinea or in Liberia and you are not a part of the Kamajors and  
9 you are just sitting there, you will be harassed. So those that  
10:31:59 10 are being harassed are considered as anti-government elements of  
11 President Kabbah, not the pro-government elements.

12 Q. "The Guinean government has accused Liberian and  
13 Sierra Leonean refugees and ordinary civilians of being used by  
14 dissidents opposed to President Conte's government to undermine  
10:32:20 15 it. Since yesterday, the Government of Liberia has used local  
16 radio stations to appeal to Liberian citizens not to engage in  
17 revenge attacks in Guineans resident in Liberia. The appeal has  
18 so far been successful.

19 At present, relations between Liberia and Guinea have  
10:32:41 20 reached a critical juncture. On the surface, the current tension  
21 between the two countries would seem to suggest the two sides'  
22 determination to resolve the conflict militarily, notwithstanding  
23 recent reconciliatory statements by the Government of Liberia. A  
24 military option would have obvious adverse effects on the general  
10:33:06 25 state of affairs in both countries, particularly on their economy  
26 and on the wellbeing of their citizens. If the experience in  
27 Lofa over the past 18 months, where there have been three  
28 military incursions, is anything to go by, then it goes without  
29 saying that Liberia has genuine and legitimate security concerns

1 regarding its porous borders. Nevertheless, UNOL continues with  
2 its efforts to ensure that the government of Liberia does not  
3 consider the military option as a solution to the current  
4 crisis."

10:33:41 5 Was the military option an option at all for you,  
6 Mr Taylor?

7 A. It was an option, but not an option to end the crisis. We  
8 had to take the military option to keep protecting our lives and  
9 property. It was not a final option.

10:33:59 10 Q. "Appeals to ECOWAS, the Organisation of African Union, and  
11 to the United Nations to intervene speedily to avert any further  
12 escalation of sub-regional tensions and save the nascent  
13 Mano River Union revival, abound. The fact that Guinean  
14 authorities now consider the presence of refugees as a heavy  
10:34:21 15 burden, coupled with the events of the past few days in Guinea,  
16 underscores the need for urgent action on this front as a third  
17 step.

18 In this regard, the proposed interdepartmental meeting is a  
19 step in the right direction. It will hopefully establish some  
10:34:41 20 sort of framework which will facilitate the safe and early return  
21 of Liberian refugees in Guinea to Liberia and establish  
22 modalities for a comprehensive arrangement for assistance to  
23 refugees and returnees in each of these three countries.

24 What is also needed is a two-pronged and sustainable  
10:35:07 25 diplomatic intervention by both the United Nations and ECOWAS.  
26 Swift intervention by ECOWAS, either in the form of an emergency  
27 summit or a mini summit restricted to the major players,  
28 including all Mano River members, is needed now more than ever.  
29 Such a summit could endeavour to resuscitate the Mano River Union

1 conflict resolution mechanism through the Union's joint security  
2 committee.

3           Attempts were made to jump start it following the 8 July  
4 incursion into Liberia, but the efforts fizzled out for lack of  
10:35:40 5 international support in providing logistics. One may consider  
6 urgently encouraging the governments of the Mano River Union to  
7 widen the scope and terms of reference of the committee of  
8 inquiry into the incursions into Liberia created by the joint  
9 security committee. This will permit the committee to take a  
10:36:00 10 comprehensive look at the escalation in cross-border incursions  
11 sub-regionally and to recommend the related remedial measures for  
12 sub-regional stability.

13           Other options may include inviting the Guinean government  
14 to jointly monitor, with Sierra Leone and Liberia, their common  
10:36:20 15 borders under the Mano River Union's security mechanism. Such an  
16 arrangement will benefit tremendously from United Nations'  
17 support. While one is not unaware of the difficulties of the  
18 question of controlling these areas, it may also be worth  
19 exploring, as a temporary measure, the idea of the creation of a  
10:36:39 20 buffer zone along the contiguous border areas of Liberia, Guinea,  
21 and Sierra Leone. "

22           Can I pause there, Mr Taylor. At this time, Mr Taylor,  
23 there is this incursion in Lofa County. Is that right?

24 A. That is correct.

10:37:04 25 Q. And do the dissidents who have launched this incursion  
26 control any Liberian territory?

27 A. Yes, they do.

28 Q. Can we have a look at a map, please, and seek your  
29 assistance. And can we look at - yes, this map will do, L1. I



1 am interested in the area of Lofa County. So if we can get all  
2 that area, the green area on the map, on the screen. I am not  
3 interested in anywhere else.

4 Now, let's start off with this, Mr Taylor. What  
10:38:43 5 part - just trace with a pen, please, on that map, without  
6 marking it, the area controlled by these dissidents who had  
7 entered Lofa.

8 A. This is Voijnama right here. Now, it looks short here, but  
9 from here to the border with Guinea here, I would approximate it  
10:39:16 10 to be about 3 to 5 miles. This is forest area with mostly little  
11 towns. So they had infiltrated from here into Voijnama and the  
12 fight was going on here. But the surrounding small towns that  
13 are not indicated in this map are being occupied by the rebels,  
14 and so they have a free opening here for supplies, resupplies,  
10:39:42 15 evacuation of the wounded. So they have opened this beachhead  
16 here and are controlling this section here - this entire section.

17 Q. Okay. And have you sent troops to oppose them?

18 A. Yes. There is what we call a push-post situation going on.  
19 We would attack them, push them a little bit, occupy, they would  
10:40:13 20 reinforce, come, push us out. But it's taken some time now to  
21 fully defeat them, and so they now have a foothold because they  
22 do not fully retreat all the way back into Guinea, so they  
23 occupied here. You can't see it from this map, it looks very  
24 short from the drawing, but there's a good bit of territory  
10:40:36 25 behind here in this general area.

26 Q. Now, also we know across the border into Sierra Leone, that  
27 area around Kailahun is RUF territory; that's right, isn't it?

28 A. Yes, we can say so, yes.

29 Q. Now, in terms of northern Lofa County, that part of

1 Liberia, how would you describe the situation in that part of the  
2 country as a result of the incursion from Guinea and what's  
3 happening across the border in Sierra Leone? Is life orderly, or  
4 what?

10:41:18 5 A. Well, this is a period on that side of the border where you  
6 have - you still have conflict now. You still have - remember,  
7 we are just coming out of the UN hostage people businesses a few  
8 months back, so the whole disarmament, demobilisation has not  
9 taken place yet. So there is conflict across the border on that  
10:41:39 10 side.

11 Q. But what I am interested in is, is that conflict - combined  
12 with the incursion from Guinea - what impact is that having on  
13 life in northern Lofa County?

14 A. You have displaced people. People are - it's a terrible  
10:41:55 15 burden on the people. People are becoming displaced again,  
16 moving because of the fighting.

17 Q. So are things chaotic in that part of Lofa?

18 A. Very. Very, very chaotic. Just to remind the Court,  
19 remember the second attack that we've stated here on the records,  
10:42:16 20 remember occurred at Foya, which was the attack in August. I am  
21 talking about August of the previous year. That occurred in  
22 Foya. So once Voinjama is under attack, people, there are probes  
23 around here, so this entire area here becomes unbearable for the  
24 people to remain.

10:42:46 25 Q. Yes, thank you, Mr Taylor. You may go back now and we can  
26 put that map to one side.

27 "Given the foregoing, it would also be worthwhile to set  
28 our sites to the future. For its part the United Nations needs  
29 to establish strong working relations with ECOWAS. Serious

1 thought should be given to establishing a United Nations  
2 operational mechanism or entity for this purpose. Such a  
3 mechanism/entity would, among other things, serve to foster  
4 closer collaboration with the Mano River Union as well as with  
10:43:40 5 ECOWAS, especially in matters pertaining to peace and security  
6 where coordinated approaches can contribute to a significant  
7 reduction in sub-regional tensions. It would also provide the  
8 United Nations with the much needed sub-regional dimension and  
9 approach to its work in this part of the world.

10:44:01 10 Given the porous nature of the borders of Mano River states  
11 and taking into account the cultural, linguistic and ethnic  
12 links, as well as the economic interactions among those states,  
13 it should be clear that the security of its members is  
14 intrinsically intertwined. This becomes even clearer as we  
10:44:24 15 acknowledge the presence of combatants (former and current) and  
16 realise that their circulation and recycling within these  
17 countries had for some time been a source of accusations and  
18 counter-accusations in each of these countries. Consequently, it  
19 would be extremely difficult to resolve one member's security  
10:44:52 20 concerns while ignoring the security of the others in the hope of  
21 achieving a durable peace.

22 UNOL continues to advise the Government of Liberia on the  
23 need to not only keep its communication lines open to the Guinean  
24 authorities, but to also extend its reconciliation policy to  
10:45:12 25 Liberians outside its borders, particularly those in neighbouring  
26 countries and in the United States."

27 Now that paragraph 12, Mr Taylor, we see the recurrence -  
28 we are now in September 2000 - of this concern about combatants,  
29 former and current, circulating and being recycled in these

1 countries?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Has that problem gone away?

4 A. When you say has it gone away, you mean looking at it even  
10:45:56 5 from today?

6 Q. Yes?

7 A. I doubt it. I doubt it. It has not really gone away.

8 These combatants are circling and being recycled. Right now,  
9 look, since the end of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crisis,  
10:46:13 10 you go into Liberia right now, you've got hundreds and probably  
11 thousands of ex-Sierra Leonean combatants that have now moved to  
12 Liberia living. You have thousands of Liberian ex-combatants  
13 that are now living in Sierra Leone. The same is true for La  
14 Cote d'Ivoire. They are moving out of their own crisis, but  
10:46:38 15 these actors are all over the place.

16 So even right now you still have the presence of these  
17 people and they still - if something, God forbid, were to happen  
18 you will see they would rush right into it. There is always this  
19 demand for what they call trained guerrilla fighters. So if I  
10:47:00 20 look at it right now, I would say, yes, potential exists right  
21 now for these same heads to rear themselves up again.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask that that document, code cable  
23 from Downes-Thomas to Prendergast on Liberia-Guinea relations  
24 dated 12 September 2000 be marked for identification MFI-161,  
10:47:28 25 please.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI-161.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this deteriorating situation on the  
29 Guinea-Liberian border, was concern about it limited to the

1 special representative or were other leaders in the sub-region  
2 equally concerned about it?

3 A. Yes, other leaders were concerned about it.

4 Q. And did you communicate with them in seeking to resolve  
10:48:05 5 this situation?

6 A. Yes, I did. I sent envoys out to several West African  
7 countries to talk about the problem and asking that we try to get  
8 it resolved as it was tearing the region apart again.

9 Q. And how much of your time was this occupying at this time,  
10:48:32 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. I would almost say almost all of it. I was just  
12 overwhelmed at all sides with these problems. While I am trying  
13 to secure my problem, we are still trying to work on the  
14 Sierra Leonean problems. Because the whole thing is Sierra

10:48:52 15 Leonean and we are now becoming to see - if we look back there  
16 was something that was mentioned in the Guardian report that was  
17 read that we didn't touch, but that gave - that should give a  
18 picture of some of our concerns, that outside powers had  
19 apparently resolved that they were now coming in and they were  
10:49:27 20 going to decide what would happen. So we could not - I just  
21 could not look at the Liberian problem as, "Well, let's me fix my  
22 problem." We still had to fix the Sierra Leonean problem because  
23 a major power had come in and said that they were going to solve  
24 Sierra Leone.

10:49:46 25 And by the same taken, there was training going on in  
26 Guinea attacking us by another power. So for me it became very  
27 - it engulfed my entire time in trying to solve not just one now,  
28 but trying to resolve all of these problems in getting other  
29 Heads of State even more seriously involved in that venture.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did any of the African leaders in the  
2 sub-region try to intervene to resolve this Liberia-Guinea  
3 difficulty?

4 A. Yes. For example, we sent a delegation out to The Gambia  
10:51:27 5 because remember Gambia was not a part of the Committee of Six  
6 but had played a very important role in getting this new  
7 leadership for the RUF settled in the July 2000 meeting of the  
8 Heads of State with Issa Sesay. So I sent a special envoy out to  
9 President Jammeh to talk about the issue and to ask him to begin  
10:51:56 10 to get more involved in trying to resolve some of these issues  
11 because at that time we understood he had some very close  
12 relationships with President Conte, so we tried to get him  
13 involved. Not leaving out Konare who was chairman, that we were  
14 also prodding to get more involved in trying to resolve the  
10:52:26 15 problem between Guinea and Liberia.

16 Q. Now, did President Jammeh agree to assist in this regard?

17 A. Yes, Yahya received my envoys and on their return he wrote  
18 me a letter to that effect.

19 Q. Have a look behind divider 83, please. Yes, Mr Taylor?

10:53:08 20 A. Yes, this is the letter from my friend Yahya Jammeh on  
21 receiving my envoys that I sent to talk about this issue.

22 Q. And we see that it reads as follows, it's dated 18  
23 September 2000:

24 "Your Excellency and dear brother,

10:53:29 25 It was with a deep sense of gratitude and indeed with much  
26 appreciation that I received your communication of 7 September  
27 2000, delivered by your special envoys, the Honourable Benoni  
28 Urey, Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, Republic of Liberia, and  
29 His Excellency, Musa Cisse, chief of protocol at the Executive

1 Mansion. As I was out of the jurisdiction, the said envoys were  
2 received in audience by Her Excellency the Vice-President on the  
3 date of their arrival in Banjul and I am pleased to intimate that  
4 the objective of their mission as well as the content of the  
10:54:11 5 special message had been faithfully reported to me immediately  
6 upon my return.

7 The rapidly deteriorating security situation around the  
8 Liberian borders with Guinea and Sierra Leone has been noted with  
9 much concern and I would hasten to appeal that all parties  
10:54:26 10 involved exercise maximum restraint for the time being to avert  
11 yet another catastrophe in our cherished sub-region. The  
12 dialogue process should be engaged as a matter of urgency and the  
13 OAU and ECOWAS secretariats seized on the issue.

14 Let me take this opportunity to reiterate my plea for  
10:54:49 15 African leaders and for us in the sub-region in particular to  
16 give concrete expressions to our professed commitments to the OAU  
17 charter and ECOWAS protocols respectively. Needless to say, it  
18 is only with determined efforts in the maintenance of peace and  
19 stability that we can move our respective development agendas  
10:55:12 20 forward and, as has already been highlighted elsewhere, posterity  
21 and the future generations would never forgive us if we are found  
22 wanting in this respect.

23 I also pledge my personal intervention in the pursuit of a  
24 speedy and definitive solution to the brewing crisis and look  
10:55:33 25 forward to the further cementing of the cordial relations of  
26 friendship and solidarity that exist between our two countries  
27 and people."

28 So did President Jammeh intervene at all?

29 A. Well, yes, a little later on. I pushed further and at a

1 meeting a little later on, right in line with our own protocols  
2 to get an emergency meeting of ECOWAS to look into the problems  
3 that were now coming up, he was very constructive at that  
4 meeting.

10:56:12 5 Q. So we are now in late September, Mr Taylor?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. In late September, did the situation in Lofa change in any  
8 way?

9 A. Not for the better. It remained very, very, very serious.

10:56:32 10 Q. Now, was your foreign minister still Mr Captan at this  
11 time?

12 A. Yes, he was.

13 Q. And in late September, did you require him to communicate  
14 with the special representative at all?

10:56:59 15 A. Yes. We did - there are different types of communication.  
16 In this case, we have what we call an official note. This was  
17 not one of the regular things where, "Would you do this? Please  
18 do this." We brought it to the - what we call the official  
19 attention, which meant that it was something of the utmost  
10:57:27 20 urgency. We sent a note verbale to the foreign ministry to the  
21 special representative on the matter and the seriousness, asking  
22 the international community again to take it more seriously.

23 Q. And was there any particular event which occasioned that  
24 note?

10:57:48 25 A. Well, we - you have a crisis on hands. The prevailing  
26 situation of the expansion of the war and the burden that it's  
27 placing on the country is - for me at that time is the most  
28 serious.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we come to look at that note,



1 could I ask, please, that letter from President Jammeh of Gambia  
2 to President Taylor dated 18 September 2000 be marked for  
3 identification, please, MFI-162.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-162 for  
10:58:46 5 identification.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Right, Mr Taylor, have a look, please, behind divider 84.  
8 Do you have it?

9 A. Yes.

10:58:55 10 Q. We see it's from Downs-Thomas to Prendergast, and again  
11 it's on the topic of Liberia-Guinea relations, and it provides  
12 that it attaches a self-explanatory note dated September 22. So  
13 let's go over the page, please, where we find the note, and we  
14 see that this note is from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

10:59:29 15 "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Liberia  
16 presents its compliments to the special representative of the  
17 Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to  
18 draw the latter's attention to the seriousness which the  
19 Government of Liberia attaches to the recent shelling of Zorzor  
10:59:52 20 on Friday, September 22, 2000, by Guinean forces from the border  
21 town of Koryamah causing wanton destruction of towns and villages  
22 along the Liberia-Guinea border as well as severe casualties."

23 Now, Mr Taylor, who is doing this; dissidents, or what?

24 A. The kind of artillery and the distance - Zorzor, if you  
11:00:20 25 look on the map, is a little distance - it's a little distance  
26 from Koryamah. So at that distance, our military people advised  
27 that it had to come from sophisticated machinery. We are talking  
28 a distance of about 15 miles - that would be about almost 20,  
29 21-odd kilometres - and our securities were at a forward position

1 between Zorzor and Koryamah, and those rounds, you know, were  
2 going over them. And so after we assessed that it was coming  
3 from Koryamah, we figured that it was being done by long-range  
4 artillery. To our intelligence, the rebels did not have  
11:01:17 5 long-range artillery to fire 20 kilometres. That's the distance  
6 of something like - I would say from my minimal military  
7 knowledge, that would be done by something like probably a  
8 155-millimetre canon or something like a BM-21. A BM-21 can fire  
9 about that distance, and a BM-21 is a mobile mounted piece of  
11:01:50 10 equipment that the rebels would not have. So we then concluded  
11 that it was coming from a better equipped and better built armed  
12 forces, and this had to be the Government of Guinea.

13 Q. And just quickly, Mr Taylor, if we can just put the map on  
14 the screen and just remind ourselves where Zorzor is. Just so we  
11:02:13 15 can get the relationship between this new area of conflict and  
16 the earlier area you had indicated. Do you follow me?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So where is Zorzor?

19 A. Right here is Zorzor.

11:02:41 20 Q. And earlier you had indicated that the incursion was  
21 further north around the Voinjama area?

22 A. That is up here. That is correct.

23 Q. Yes. Thank you.

24 JUSTICE SEBUTINDE: I was wondering, Mr Griffiths, if  
11:03:07 25 perhaps the witness could show us this town of Koryamah.

26 THE WITNESS: This is Zorzor here. Strangely this map does  
27 not show Koryamah, because this is Zorzor. Yella is Guinea and  
28 the border. Koryamah is somewhere in this area here. Koryamah  
29 is a military base, maybe that's why they do not mention it here.

1 But Koryamah is about I would say 12 to 15 miles from Yella here,  
2 which Yella is here, it's a Liberian-Guinea border town. There  
3 is a little creek here. Koryamah is in here. So Zorzor is about  
4 10 miles just about from the border with Yella.

11:03:57 5 So we had forces here at Yella. And what I was saying that  
6 the rounds were passing over us, when those rounds are  
7 travelling, your Honours, you can see the fire at the tail of the  
8 rocket. If it's a long-range BM-21 you can see the trace behind  
9 it. So our soldiers could look up and see rounds coming over  
11:04:20 10 them. We may have to find a Guinean map for the judges so we can  
11 point out Koryamah, but it's not mentioned on this map, but  
12 Koryamah is somewhere in this area. It's a military base.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Mr Taylor, whilst you're in front of the map, something  
11:04:35 15 just rather curiously has been brought to my attention. If you  
16 look to the northeast of where Zorzor is, there appears to be two  
17 Foya's on this map. Do you see? Northwest, do see two Foyas?  
18 Look where Kolahun is. There is a Foya and a Foya, do you see?

19 A. Yes, that happens in that area. I think one could be -  
11:05:07 20 they have - this could be Foya Tenge. Foya is just a general  
21 name but it would be Foya this and Foya that. One is Foya  
22 Kamala. There are two Foyas. One is Foya Kamala and one is Foya  
23 Tenge, I think.

24 Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr Taylor, you may return.

11:05:38 25 "The Government of Liberia views the action on the part of  
26 Guinea as provocative and tantamount to coercing Liberia to  
27 retaliate which could have adverse repercussion for the region.  
28 The series of attacks on Liberia by dissidents from the territory  
29 of Guinea has brought to the attention of the United Nations.

1 The first attack occurred on 21 April 1999, while the second was  
2 on 10 August 1999. The third attack which began on 10 July 2000  
3 is still in progress.

4 The Government of Liberia cannot continue to sit supinely  
11:06:23 5 while its territory is being destroyed and its citizens  
6 innocently killed by Guinean forces. President Conte directed  
7 that Liberians and Sierra Leoneans be attacked. As a result of  
8 that directive, Liberians were beaten, raped and imprisoned and  
9 their properties destroyed. The Guinean authorities have refused  
11:06:48 10 to allow Liberian citizens to leave Guinea, and up till now have  
11 not given permission for Liberian aircraft to land in Conakry to  
12 evacuate Liberians. In this connection, the government is  
13 finding it difficult to contain its citizenry from carrying out  
14 reprisal action against Guineans in Liberia, although Liberians  
11:07:15 15 have been admonished to be calm and to allow the government to  
16 handle the situation diplomatically.

17 The ministry of foreign affairs, in view of the foregoing,  
18 requests the special representative to use his good offices in  
19 seeing to it that Liberian citizens are permitted to leave  
11:07:36 20 Guinea, that the Government of Guinea contains dissidents from  
21 cross-border attacks from Liberian territories and that Guinean  
22 forces desist from shelling villages near the Liberia-Guinea  
23 border in Lofa County."

24 Now, Mr Taylor, did you try to open any lines of  
11:07:53 25 communication with President Conte about this?

26 A. Yes, we did. We tried ourselves and even tried others to  
27 do. Amongst them Conte and I met in Abuja, we sat with the very  
28 Obasanjo. Conte denied - in fact, Conte and I went one step  
29 further. We were received by our friend, the King of Morocco,

1 Mohamed VI. We met there. Mohamed sitting here, Conte there,  
2 I'm here, to discuss this.

3 There is always these denials, but I think the presence of  
4 outside influence had really pushed matters I think beyond his  
11:08:45 5 control, I guess. But we did try. Because we didn't have an  
6 army, remember. We didn't have the arms to fight. I don't think  
7 Conte would have done that if Liberia had not destroyed her arms  
8 because they knew that we had the material in the country that  
9 could have defended ourselves. But don't forget we have  
11:09:09 10 destroyed the arms, we don't have an army and they took  
11 advantage.

12 Everybody - this is why, until today, Liberians feel that  
13 it was a trick to destroy us when they asked us to destroy all of  
14 the arms in the country. And now we are under attack and  
11:09:26 15 everybody is saying, "Oh, no it's not an internal problem", until  
16 we are destroyed.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, that that official note  
18 from the foreign minister of Liberia to the United Nations  
19 special representative, dated 22 September 2000, be marked for  
11:09:48 20 identification, please.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for  
22 identification MFI-163.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let us turn now from that border and look  
11:10:04 25 at what is going on in parallel across the border in  
26 Sierra Leone. Is progress being made so far as the peace process  
27 a concerned by late September?

28 A. No, progress is not being made. The offer from the RUF new  
29 leadership is being pushed aside and nothing is being done over

1 there in the direction of peace. There appears to be more  
2 belligerence and a decision to fight.

3 Q. So do you do anything about it?

4 A. I guess that's why they say I have been interfering. I  
11:10:50 5 write Kofi Annan again telling him, "Look, my country is on fire.  
6 The proposal from the RUF in Sierra Leone is not being looked at.  
7 The whole region is in flames." I write him and the chairman of  
8 ECOWAS, Alpha Konare, saying, "Listen, guys. We have got to get  
9 together quickly and bring this thing to an end because the thing  
11:11:18 10 is not getting smaller, it's getting bigger." So I write Kofi  
11 Annan and I write Alpha Konare.

12 Q. Have a look behind divider 85, please. What do we see  
13 behind that divider?

14 A. This is a letter. Excuse me, counsel, I just wanted to say  
11:11:47 15 something. I am sorry to the Bench. Sometimes I guess to see me  
16 smile, there is nothing funny. I hope - I want to give my  
17 apologies. These smiles are not funny smiles to say Mr Taylor is  
18 not taking it seriously, your Honours.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: We haven't drawn any conclusions at all,  
11:12:06 20 Mr Taylor.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now, what do we see behind this divider, Mr Taylor?

23 A. This is the letter that I write to Secretary-General Annan  
24 on this particular issue I just mentioned about the offer from  
11:12:21 25 the RUF and nobody wants to take it up and people are still dying  
26 in Sierra Leone just as they are dying in Liberia.

27 Q. What offer?

28 A. Well, the RUF has said, "Look, we are prepared to go for a  
29 ceasefire. We are prepared to return all of the UN equipment.

1 We want the ECOWAS unit with UNAMSIL to deploy. We want to get  
2 serious. We want to move." And everybody is saying, "No, let's  
3 wait. Let's wait." What are you waiting for?

4 Q. Let's have a look at the letter:

11:12:55

5 "I have the honour to present my compliments and herewith  
6 bring to your attention the deep concerns of my government  
7 relating to the very slow pace of the peace process in  
8 Sierra Leone since the breakthrough of the change in leadership  
9 of the RUF."

11:13:10

10 Pause there. Because that change in leadership had  
11 occurred by 21 August, hadn't it?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And so we are over a month later?

14 A. That is correct.

11:13:25

15 Q. And is that the reason for your concern that nothing  
16 appears to have happened in the interim?

17 A. That is correct, yes.

18 Q. "Following a meeting in Liberia on 21 August between  
19 His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo, President commander-in-chief of  
20 the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, His  
21 Excellency Alpha Oumar Konare, President of Mali and chairman of  
22 ECOWAS, and myself, at which time we agreed to accelerate the  
23 peace process in consonance with the new development. I am taken  
24 aback by the slow response of the international community to the  
25 offers of the RUF leadership to enhance the process.

11:14:05

26 I recall the offer by the new RUF leadership to effect a de  
27 facto ceasefire, open lines of communication with the UNAMSIL  
28 command structure and to return the military equipment seized  
29 several months ago when United Nations personnel were abducted."

1 Had you been notified of that offer made by the RUF,  
2 Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes. Everybody concerned with this process had been  
4 notified. ECOWAS, United Nations, everybody.

11:14:45 5 Q. "I am disappointed that this offer has not been taken up  
6 and further delay in this respect could mean more delays in the  
7 peace process. I therefore urge the international community to  
8 take advantage of this window of opportunity to effect deployment  
9 of UNAMSIL forces in the RUF areas of control.

11:15:10 10 I believe that this can be accomplished with the existing  
11 troop levels, rather than waiting for up to six months for  
12 reinforcements as has been prescribed through the training of  
13 additional troops from around the sub-region.

14 The earlier such engagements take place, the better  
11:15:30 15 confidence will be enhanced between the RUF and UNAMSIL, thus  
16 contributing to better implementation of the peace process."

17 Now, did you consider the RUF offer of a ceasefire to be  
18 genuine, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes. All of us did. I did, most particularly, yes. I  
11:15:53 20 think it was genuine. Even if they did not mean it, well, let's  
21 put the - what they say, the testing of the pudding is to taste  
22 it. If they say they wanted a ceasefire, well let's call their  
23 bluff on this.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, just on that note, are you in contact with the  
11:16:15 25 new interim leader of the RUF throughout this period?

26 A. Yes, I am in contact with him. May I also add, I mentioned  
27 on yesterday that other Heads of State, now Obasanjo and Konare  
28 and Kabbah, are also in direct contact with Issa Sesay.

29 Q. And that contact is by what means?



1 A. By telephone. We can call Issa by telephone and by radio.  
2 If I need him we can get him on the phone. We can inform our  
3 people to inform the people at the guesthouse, the guesthouse is  
4 still operating, and by this time the RUF leave Gibril Massaquoi,  
11:17:01 5 that's why I remember this name very well - is left as the  
6 spokesman. He is practically assigned now in Monrovia at this  
7 time at the guesthouse, Gibril Massaquoi.

8 Q. Gibril Massaquoi?

9 A. That is correct.

11:17:14 10 Q. And help us, can you help with a date as to when Massaquoi  
11 was deployed at the guesthouse?

12 A. I would say as of the taking over by Issa Sesay, that  
13 period, he remained there.

14 Q. Which we know took place on 21 August?

11:17:32 15 A. Yes, but you have to back it up now to - I would put it to  
16 about July as a permanent time, because August is the final  
17 installment - I mean installation, but don't forget in July there  
18 is a meeting. So I would say as of July, because he does not  
19 return after the 26 July meeting when they go to make this  
11:18:02 20 decision, I can't be too sure, but Gibril is then posted at the  
21 guesthouse.

22 Q. And for how long does he remain there?

23 A. Wow, I think Gibril is there for several months. About at  
24 least six months or more. Gibril is official spokesman and most  
11:18:21 25 of the public pronouncements regarding this period would either  
26 be made by Issa or sometimes it would be made by Gibril.

27 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, these lines of communication that  
28 are open, do you personally speak to Issa Sesay and Gibril  
29 Massaquoi, or is that delegated to someone else?

1 A. I sometimes speak to them and other times others speak to  
2 them. But may I just add here, counsel, based on the Justice  
3 Doherty's original question about this, aren't those soldiers  
4 already trained. You can see here, justice, I also raised it  
11:19:06 5 with the Secretary-General when we talk about - in the paragraph  
6 on page 2 where I say instead of waiting up to six months for  
7 reinforcements that has been prescribed through the training of  
8 additional troops, I am making reference to that.

9 Q. Now, you said that you also wrote Alpha Konare. Is that  
11:19:30 10 right?

11 A. That is correct.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: But before we come to look at that letter  
13 can I ask that the letter to the United Nations  
14 Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, from President Taylor, dated 25  
11:19:49 15 September 2000, be marked for identification MFI-164, please.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked for identification  
17 MFI-164.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Look behind divider 86, Mr Taylor. What are we looking at  
11:20:19 20 there?

21 A. This is the letter to the chairman of ECOWAS, Alpha Konare,  
22 on the same problem.

23 Q. And we will see that it bears the same date as the letter  
24 you wrote to the Secretary-General?

11:20:36 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. That is 25 September 2000?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And the letter is in these terms:

29 "Predicated on our 21 August meeting at the Roberts

1 International Airport in Liberia, at which time we took certain  
2 critical decisions relating to the enhancement of the peace  
3 process in Sierra Leone, I write to express my concern over the  
4 very slow pace of movement in the process, particularly in view  
11:21:11 5 of the change of leadership in the RUF.

6 I recall the offer by the new RUF leadership to effect a de  
7 facto ceasefire, open lines of communication with the UNAMSIL  
8 command structure and to return the military equipment seized  
9 several months ago when United Nations personnel were abducted.

11:21:35 10 I am disappointed that this offer has not been taken up and  
11 further delay in this respect could mean more delays in the peace  
12 process. I therefore urge the international community to take  
13 advantage of this window of opportunity to effect the deployment  
14 of UNAMSIL forces in the RUF areas of control.

11:21:57 15 I believe that this can be accomplished with the existing  
16 troop levels rather than waiting for up to six months for  
17 reinforcement as has been prescribed through the training of  
18 additional troops from around the sub-region.

19 The earlier such engagements can take place, the better  
11:22:17 20 confidence will be enhanced between the RUF and UNAMSIL, thus  
21 contributing to better implementation of the peace process."

22 Now, Mr Taylor, did those letters to Konare, chairman of  
23 ECOWAS, and the United Nations Secretary-General have the desired  
24 effect of speeding up the process next door in Sierra Leone?

11:22:51 25 A. Not - sometimes it's how to quantify and evaluate. I can  
26 say there were little movement, but I pushed it further. By the  
27 time the month ends, I push further for a Heads of State meeting  
28 where this matter would be - in fact, an emergency meeting of  
29 ECOWAS to bring this matter front and centre. Because, yes, I

1 know these organisations, they are huge organisations and they  
2 are hard to move, but it is better to get these matters before  
3 them so people can begin thinking about them. So there is not  
4 any substantial move, but I don't stop. I push further for an  
11:23:40 5 emergency meeting of ECOWAS to bring it front and centre.

6 Q. And how do you go about that?

7 A. I sent the very Moses Blah that was here out with letters  
8 to about four or five Heads of State to ask them to support my  
9 call for an emergency session of ECOWAS to discuss it. Under the  
11:24:03 10 rules, you alone can't just get up and call for an emergency  
11 meeting. You have to get at least the concurrence of I think  
12 almost 50 per cent of the union, and I stand corrected on this,  
13 in order for the chairman to call for an emergency meeting. So I  
14 do that.

11:24:25 15 Q. Okay. Now, before we come to look at the letters that you  
16 dispatched with Moses Blah --

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, perhaps this is a good time  
18 to for me to interrupt. I want to understand the decision to  
19 delay the disarmament of the RUF and the decision to go through  
11:24:48 20 this additional training of troops, whose decision was that?

21 THE WITNESS: This was the position of the United States  
22 government. I think there will be a document further that will  
23 show that. It was a decision that - the people that fund these  
24 forces decide on what happens. They were funding these forces,  
11:25:09 25 the United States and Britain, and without the funds nobody could  
26 do anything and their opinion was that the troops had to be  
27 properly trained before they go in and it would take about six  
28 months to retrain them in a special way. We felt that this was  
29 wrong.

1 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And this was the UNAMSIL troops based in  
2 Sierra Leone?

3 THE WITNESS: That is correct. What they were trying to  
4 do, your Honour, they were trying to use ECOWAS forces, ECOWAS  
11:25:37 5 member states troops, to come under the banner of UNAMSIL, okay,  
6 and those troops were the troops that they were saying had to be  
7 properly trained, even though they were soldiers already, but  
8 those countries that were sending them, those troops should be  
9 trained before being deployed in the theatre.

11:25:55 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: So then the Indian contingent had left by  
11 this time?

12 THE WITNESS: No. The Indian contingent was not a very  
13 large contingent to occupy the entire area. In fact, we were  
14 trying to build the forces of deployment.

11:26:20 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. Now before I forget, letter to  
16 President Alpha Konare from President Taylor dated 25 September  
17 2000, may it be marked MFI-165, please.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-165.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

11:26:49 20 Q. Now, the letters you dispatched with Moses Blah that you  
21 told us about, have a look behind divider 88. And to how many  
22 places did you dispatch him?

23 A. I dispatched Moses to at least four countries. This is  
24 just one of the countries that he went to.

11:27:18 25 Q. Now, we see that we are now in October 2000, aren't we?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. 5 October 2000. It's a letter from you to Alpha Konare,  
28 President of Mali, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. "As we work together for peace, security and stability in  
2 our sub-region, I extend to you fraternal greetings and  
3 felicitations. The work that lies ahead for the resolution of  
4 conflict in the Mano River Union and the prevention of conflict  
11:27:56 5 in la Cote d'Ivoire continues to consume a major part of our  
6 energies as leaders of ECOWAS?

7 It is in this respect that I have the honour to dispatch  
8 the Honourable Moses Blah, Vice-President of the Republic of  
9 Liberia, to deliver a special message in line with ongoing  
11:28:16 10 consultations.

11 A primary focus of the mission of my Vice-President would  
12 be to solicit your endorsement of our suggestion for the  
13 convening of an emergency ECOWAS summit as soon as possible with  
14 a view to finding workable solutions to the problems of the  
11:28:38 15 sub-region. "

16 Now, Mr Taylor, why was it necessary to dispatch Moses Blah  
17 to carry these letters? Why not just send them through the post?

18 A. No, they will take too long. And normally, in addition to  
19 the letter, there is a message, a whole - you know, there is a  
11:29:09 20 fraternal message given during that particular time that you just  
21 don't put in the post.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I think that would be a convenient point.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will take the morning adjournment and  
24 reconvene at 12 o'clock.

11:29:31 25 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

26 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue, Mr Griffiths.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honour, yes.

29 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment we were looking at

1 a letter sent in the custody of Moses Blah, Vice-President to  
2 Alpha Konare, dated 5 October 2000, yes?

3 A. That's correct.

12:01:40 4 Q. It's behind divider 88. Now, Mr Taylor, you told us that  
5 you wrote similar letters and dispatched Moses Blah to carry them  
6 to other Presidents in the region.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Turn to behind the next divider, please. Now, this letter  
9 is in almost identical terms, is it not?

12:02:13 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Save that there's an extra second paragraph?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Where you say, "I recall with fond memories receiving your  
14 special envoy several weeks ago in Monrovia and the kind  
15 sentiments that you expressed through him on the long-standing  
16 relations between Senegal and Liberia and your concerns over the  
17 situation in the sub-region." But apart from that, it's the same  
18 letter as the one before. If you would just flick back, you can  
19 see that the other paragraphs are identical, yes?

12:02:41 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And just to complete the picture, if we go over the next  
22 divider, again, it's the same letter to Blaise Compaore, the same  
23 date, in the same terms, isn't it?

24 A. That is correct.

12:02:58 25 Q. And if we go over the next divider, it's the same letter  
26 again, in the same terms to President Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia,  
27 yes?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And the idea of sending out these four letters was, as we

1 see from the last paragraph, to set up an emergency ECOWAS  
2 summit. Is that right?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. On the situation in Sierra Leone. Is that right?

12:03:30 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Because of the absence of progress on that issue, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. So, Mr Taylor, you writing these letters, can we take it  
9 then that it's your initiative to organise this emergency summit?

12:03:50 10 A. Yes, that is correct. It's a part of the protocols. I'm  
11 not the only one to do this kind of stuff. This is my initiative  
12 now, yes, but it is a custom that if any member of the community  
13 would like to have an emergency meeting on any particular subject  
14 matter, they follow the same procedure.

12:04:15 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I proceed further, can I suggest,  
16 Mr President, that because we're dealing with identical letters  
17 but the addressees change, that we give them all the same MFI  
18 number but then A, B, C and D.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

12:04:34 20 MR GRIFFITHS: So that letters requesting an emergency  
21 ECOWAS summit, dated 5 October 2000, the letter to Alpha Konare  
22 is MFI-166A; the letter to President Wade of Senegal becomes  
23 166B; the letter to Blaise Compaore becomes 166C and, finally,  
24 the letter to President Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia becomes 166D.

12:05:15 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those letters are so marked for  
26 identification.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, what about President Kabbah, did you send a  
29 letter to him?



1 A. Yes, around about this time, but the letter to Kabbah did  
2 not just contain this particular matter. About this time,  
3 President Kabbah sent his Vice-President, Joe Demby, to me to  
4 discuss the issue of the repatriation of refugees. And while  
12:05:51 5 Joseph Demby is there, we talk about this meeting, and I did ask  
6 for him to convey to his President my desire to having him  
7 support my call for an emergency meeting.

8 Q. Can we look behind divider 92, please. Yes, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes.

12:06:21 10 Q. We see this is a letter dated 5 October 2000 addressed to  
11 President Kabbah:

12 "By the hands of your special envoy, the Honourable Albert  
13 Joe Demby, Vice-President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, I have  
14 been delivered your missive of 27 September 2000 regarding the  
12:06:44 15 wrangling matters of the Mano River Union, which, in particular,  
16 relate to the Sierra Leonean refugees who desire to be  
17 repatriated and on whose behalf you have solicited my  
18 cooperation.

19 As you are aware, my dear brother, nothing has claimed my  
12:07:02 20 attention more than the conflict now besetting our union. In  
21 every way possible, I have endeavoured to secure total  
22 restoration to our distressed peoples, not only for the citizens  
23 of Liberia, but for all members of the union. If I make my  
24 appeal for Liberian refugees in Guinea to be repatriated,  
12:07:25 25 certainly, my dear brother, that appeal translates into  
26 unequivocal empathy for refugees everywhere. On this matter,  
27 accordingly, you are my vigorous support for meeting the desires  
28 of your citizens to return home from Liberia, and I do fervently  
29 hope that their sojourn with us has not been marred by any

1 unbrotherly acts of unkindness and inhospitality."

2 And the normal salutation thereafter, yes, Mr Taylor?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Now, we're in October of the year 2000, and as we see from

12:08:17

5 all those - that correspondence, you are anxiously at this time

6 trying to organise this emergency summit. Is that right,

7 Mr Taylor?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Now, help us, what are relations like with the United

10 States of America at this time?

11 A. Things are hotting up at this time. Remember, the

12 Under-Secretary of State had come. We had exchanged --

13 Q. That is Pickering?

14 A. Pickering. We had exchanged views. But, normally, these

15 high-power trips are not just for exchanging views, even though

16 we exchange views. But it is apparent that by the time Secretary

17 Pickering came to Liberia, the United States government had taken

18 certain principal decisions. And so his trip to Liberia, why we

19 discussed, but those decisions, apparently, had already been

20 taken. So within this period, that is, the period just before, I

21 would say, between I would say this - the 1st and about the 10th

22 and 12th of the month, the first week and a half, we were

23 confronted with a decision on the part of the United States to

24 suspend official visas to Liberian officials and what not. And

25 so we then decided to take some actions in response to the

26 actions of the United States government in suspending official

27 visas to our diplomats that were there, that those who were on

28 vacation would not be granted diplomatic visas to return. So we

29 decided to act in line with what the United States had done,

1 reciprocally.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we go into that in more detail,  
3 can I ask, please, that the letter to President Kabbah from  
4 President Taylor, dated 5 October 200, be marked for  
5 identification MFI-167.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-167.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Now, you say, Mr Taylor, that you decided to- that there  
9 was this difficulty about visas, yes?

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Now, did the Liberian government decide to publicise this  
12 fact in any way?

13 A. It was already public. Yeah, we publicised it too. There  
14 was an official announcement by the United States government that  
15 these actions would be taken, and so we decided to respond to  
16 that.

17 Q. And how did you respond?

18 A. Reciprocally through reciprocity. We decided to suspend  
19 United States government officials that had travelled, and those  
20 American diplomats that were on vacation, we suspended their  
21 visas too, that they would not return to their posts until the  
22 United States decided to reinstate our official visas.

23 Q. And did they?

24 A. After two or three weeks of this, they had more to lose  
25 through this process than we did. They had more officials on  
26 vacation, and so they decided that we should call a truce, and we  
27 did.

28 Q. Now, did you - did the government - let me start again.

29 Did the Liberian government seek to make this exchange

1 between the Liberian government and the United States government  
2 public in any way?

3 A. Yeah. But I've said that they publicly took this action,  
4 and so our response was public also, yes.

5 Q. Public?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And did you publish anything as a result?

8 A. Yes. We did a - there was an official press statement  
9 delivered on or around the - I would say, just before the  
10 Security Council delegation, that's just around, I would say, 13  
11 October or thereabouts. It's got to be close to that  
12 delegation's arrival.

13 Q. Which delegation?

14 A. There is a Security Council delegation visiting Liberia led  
15 by Jeremy Greenstock. We do this just before they arrive in  
16 Liberia.

17 Q. Okay. Have a look behind divider 93, please. What is this  
18 document, Mr Taylor?

19 A. This is the official statement on our reaction to that  
20 particular visa situation.

21 Q. Now, we see that it's a press release issued by the  
22 ministry of foreign affairs, Monrovia, Liberia, dated 13 October  
23 2000.

24 A. That is correct.

25 Q. "The Government of Liberia has today imposed reciprocal  
26 visa restrictions on officials of the United States government  
27 and members of their immediate families. Additionally, the  
28 Liberian government reserves the right to evaluate the re-entry  
29 of US embassy personnel who are withdrawn temporarily or

1 otherwise under the prevailing circumstances.

2 The Government of Liberia wishes to inform the general  
3 public and the international community that the fighting in  
4 northern Liberia is restricted to that area and does not place at  
5 risk the safety and security of Liberians and foreigners  
6 throughout the rest of the country. Hence, the US travel warning on  
7 Liberia at this time is most surprising."

8 Pause there. What was this US travel warning, Mr Taylor?

9 A. You know, there are certain actions taken by major  
10 countries that cause devastating effects on little countries. We  
11 are having this problem in Liberia. The United States, a good  
12 friend and the worst, only super power, announces that it is  
13 warning - which is their constitutional responsibility. I don't  
14 quarrel with it - warning Americans to stay away from Liberia  
15 because of the conflict. This conflict is in Lofa. There is a  
16 Security Council delegation coming with senior diplomats coming  
17 to the country, normal things going. But these announcements -  
18 and those out there that are listening to this, they know what I  
19 am talking about. When these announcements come out, when the  
20 United States government says, "For reasons of security, we are  
21 reducing our embassy staff in Liberia and our" - right away, all  
22 flags go up all over the world. Everybody reacts. It's a  
23 destabilising effect. And sometimes we - well, in my case, I  
24 thought it was mischievous, in our case. You know we are trying  
25 to contain the problem. There are worse problems in other  
26 places, but this is - these are some of the steps that are taken  
27 to put pressure on governments, okay. Because once that  
28 announcement comes out from the United States, that we are  
29 reducing our embassy staff, other Western governments follow

1 suit. Before you look, the country is empty. But this is also  
2 maybe unintentional on their part. This is also a signal to the  
3 insurgents to "step up your activities. You don't have to be  
4 concerned because foreigners are leaving the country." It's one  
5 of the most devastating things that can happen, and I don't take  
6 any - I don't - I mean, I'm sure it's the responsibility of the  
7 President to do it at that time, because he has to do it by law.  
8 But I'm just explaining the effects on little countries like ours  
9 that those kinds of announcements causes. That's what I'm  
10 talking about.

12:20:40

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: The LiveNote has broken down again I see.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm happy to continue so long as it's  
13 recording, Mr President.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Manager, it will be recorded,  
15 won't it, even though LiveNote is not working?

12:20:40

16 MS IRURA: Your Honour, the recording continues and I see  
17 the Internet has come back again. I presume it was an  
18 interruption, so I think users can click the reconnect button if  
19 that appears on their screens.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: None of us have got a reconnect button.

12:20:41

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Neither have I.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: If you're prepared to continue --

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm happy to continue. So long as we're  
24 assured it's recording, I'm happy to continue.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Go ahead Mr Griffiths.

12:20:41

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Mr Taylor, can we go back to the document. It continues:

28 "Nevertheless, as always the Government of Liberia welcomes  
29 people of goodwill from everywhere and will continue to ensure

1 the safety and security of all nationalities residing within our  
2 borders including Americans.

3 The Government of Liberia categorically rejects the  
4 continued accusations of the United States government that the  
12:20:41 5 Liberian government is supporting the Revolutionary United  
6 Front. "

7 MS IRURA: Your Honour, I'm sorry to interrupt, but my  
8 LiveNote has also stopped so I would have to ascertain what the  
9 situation is presently.

12:20:41 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, in the circumstances I had better  
11 pause because it may be that we're not recording now.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll have the audio recording, of  
13 course, but it's always good to have a fallback recording as  
14 well.

12:20:41 15 MS IRURA: Your Honour, the technical problem appears to be  
16 with the stenographer's machine. She would therefore need to  
17 restart it.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm sorry, she would need to?

19 MS IRURA: To restart her system.

12:20:42 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: And how long is that likely to take?

21 MS IRURA: Your Honour, I would approximate ten minutes or  
22 so.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We'll go off the Bench for  
24 ten minutes to allow that repair to take place.

12:20:42 25 [Break taken at 12.19 p.m.]

26 [Upon resuming at 12.31 p.m.]

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor. Before the brief adjournment we were  
29 looking at the press release behind divider 93.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And we just concluded looking at the second paragraph. Can  
3 we now turn to the third paragraph:

4 "The Government of Liberia categorically rejects the  
12:32:26 5 continued accusations of the United States government that the  
6 Liberian government is supporting the Revolutionary United Front  
7 and impeding the peace process in Sierra Leone and that it is  
8 involved in the illicit trade in diamonds and weapons. These  
9 accusations, which the United States government has been unable  
12:32:47 10 to prove, are unfair and arbitrary.

11 The President of Sierra Leone, Dr Alhaji Tejan Kabbah,  
12 recently conveyed his profound thanks to President Taylor for the  
13 positive role he is playing in the Sierra Leone peace process.  
14 As a matter of fact, Liberia-Sierra Leone relations have not  
12:33:13 15 deteriorated and could be said to be improving."

16 Was that true, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes, Joe Demby is just coming from Liberia --

18 Q. The Vice-President?

19 A. The Vice-President.

12:33:27 20 Q. Of Sierra Leone.

21 A. Yes. Kabbah and I are talking. There's no problem.

22 Q. "The matter of Sierra Leone is under consideration by the  
23 United Nations Security Council of which the United States is a  
24 permanent member. That body has constituted a panel of experts  
12:33:43 25 to investigate the illicit trade in diamonds and arms with regard  
26 to Sierra Leone. The panel recently concluded a fact-gathering  
27 mission to Liberia and has not yet reported its findings."

28 Pause there. Mr Taylor, did you meet with that panel when  
29 they came to Liberia?



1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. When did they come to Liberia?

3 A. I can't recall really, but it had not been too long. I  
4 think about a month or two before this time. I can't really  
12:34:18 5 recall.

6 Q. "And has not yet reported its findings. In addition, a  
7 delegation of the Security Council, including the United States,  
8 is due in Liberia on Saturday, 14 October" - so that's the next  
9 day?

12:34:47 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. "... to discuss the issue of Sierra Leone with the  
12 Government of Liberia. The Government of Liberia expresses its  
13 concern at the timing of the imposition of visa restrictions on  
14 Liberia by the US government and hopes that this action was not  
12:35:06 15 taken to prejudice the outcome of the panel of experts report and  
16 the results of the upcoming meeting with the Security Council  
17 delegation in Monrovia."

18 What do you mean by that last sentence?

19 A. To prejudice the decision?

12:35:24 20 Q. Yes, what do you mean by that?

21 A. Well, these actions, once taken, this could be seen by the  
22 panel coming as a very strong move by its most powerful member of  
23 the international community and act in conjunction with those  
24 decisions. It's the timing. These kinds of decisions taken just  
12:35:50 25 before meetings or while meetings are in place by major players  
26 on the international scene are intended to prejudice the  
27 decisions.

28 I mean, when you are about to receive a delegation and a  
29 day or two before the United States announces that, "We're taking

1 these decisions against Liberia", right away people believe that  
2 there is substantial evidence that led to those actions and which  
3 we still have none. So this is why we say that this - even  
4 though we said we hope it's not intended, we know it is intended  
12:36:26 5 to prejudice the outcome.

6 Q. And then you go on:

7 "In this connection the Government of Liberia intends to  
8 treat this matter strictly as a bilateral matter that will not  
9 impact upon the upcoming meeting with the Security Council  
12:36:49 10 delegation. The Government of Liberia wishes to reiterate that  
11 its position on the Sierra Leone conflict remains unchanged and  
12 that it will continue to act in concert with the ECOWAS  
13 initiatives and decisions of the authority of Heads of State and  
14 Government of ECOWAS. The United States' presumption that the  
12:37:10 15 President of Liberia, President Charles Ghankay Taylor, has the  
16 ability to influence the RUF based on his successful mediation of  
17 the release of the 500 UN hostages a few months ago, is overly  
18 simplistic and lacks an appreciation for the complexity of the  
19 Sierra Leone conflict".

12:37:33 20 Can we pause again, please, Mr Taylor. Did you have any  
21 influence over the RUF?

22 A. None whatsoever. None.

23 Q. So how had you been able to secure the release of the  
24 hostages then?

12:37:47 25 A. I would just put it to the long term of our association  
26 with the peace process and, having built that confidence over the  
27 months and the years, that we could talk to them and this is  
28 important in mediation. You must build up that trust. You must  
29 build up the confidence that when you say yes, you mean yes and

1 when you say no, you mean no. And it is based on this type of  
2 contact that they were able to take us very seriously as we  
3 spoke, not for ourselves, but we spoke for ECOWAS in our position  
4 at that time.

12:38:33 5 Q. Mr Taylor, let me pose the question differently. Did you  
6 have more influence over the RUF than any of your brother  
7 Presidents in the sub-region?

8 A. No, I didn't. I would say that Nigeria had very, very good  
9 contacts with the RUF. I would also say Burkina Faso had very  
12:39:03 10 good contacts. Mali had very good contacts. La Cote d'Ivoire -  
11 let's go back to the original agreement of November 1996. They  
12 had developed a very strong contact through the then President  
13 Konan Bedie and especially the foreign minister Amara Essy that  
14 had developed. So there were quite a number of countries that  
12:39:33 15 had very good contact with them, so they believed that I now  
16 being the mediator at this time have this magic wand that I can  
17 wave, it's foolhardy of them and we want to make that very clear.

18 Q. Mr Taylor, if you didn't have more influence over the RUF  
19 than your colleagues, why did your brother Presidents make you  
12:39:57 20 the point man?

21 A. Well, I guess we share a border. There are two borders  
22 that surround Sierra Leone: Guinea and Liberia. The reason why  
23 in '96 we have Ivory Coast taking over is because, remember now,  
24 there is major conflict in Liberia. If not, I would suppose that  
12:40:25 25 they would have called upon Liberia even at that time. But I  
26 think it is the fact that they are contiguous borders and they  
27 have this animosity with Guinea. I mentioned here before that  
28 the RUF considered Kabbah, from what all the senior leaders said,  
29 as a foreigner and he was Guinean so they wanted to do nothing

1 with Guinea, so they just felt that my experience in warfare,  
2 having led a rebel movement myself, and the fact that at some  
3 point during that particular time in '91 and '92 there had been  
4 this brief contact, they wanted for us to use all of that and our  
12:41:11 5 experience to do so. I guess this is the only reason.

6 Q. "President Taylor has consistently tried to encourage the  
7 RUF to cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the  
8 international community in peacefully resolving the Sierra  
9 Leonean civil war. The initiative of President Taylor which was  
12:41:34 10 mandated by ECOWAS requires the support and cooperation of the  
11 international community.

12 In letters written to President William Jefferson Clinton  
13 and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan by President  
14 Taylor dated 23 August 2000 and 1 September 2000 respectively" -  
12:42:01 15 just to remind ourselves, the Clinton letter is behind our  
16 divider 75 if anyone wants to make a note for reference purposes.

17 "... respectively he made concrete proposals to address  
18 United States concerns regarding the situation in Sierra Leone  
19 and called for their support for a cessation of hostilities,  
12:42:32 20 deployment of peacekeepers into territories occupied by the RUF,  
21 the relaunching of the DDR programme, and a general surveillance  
22 of the borders of the Mano River Union countries. Even though  
23 the letter to Secretary-General Annan has been published as a  
24 document of the United Nations Security Council, there has been  
12:42:57 25 no response from the United States administration to President  
26 Taylor's letter supra."

27 So Clinton never responded to your letter of 23 August,  
28 Mr Taylor?

29 A. Not directly, no.

1 Q. "Despite all of these efforts and the present window of  
2 opportunity existing in Sierra Leone as a result of the lull in  
3 fighting for the past several months, the Government of Liberia  
4 was disappointed to learn that the deployment of peacekeepers  
12:43:36 5 into RUF territories to relaunch the disarmament programme has  
6 been unduly delayed by the insistence of the United States to  
7 first train ECOWAS peacekeepers for a period of six months. This  
8 delay has the potential of plunging the Sierra Leonean conflict  
9 into a state of regression. This concern was raised by President  
12:44:03 10 Taylor in his recent letters of 5 October 2000 to United Nations  
11 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, ECOWAS chairman Alpha Konare, and  
12 President Olusegun Obasanjo respectively."

13 Pause there. Mr Taylor, you've mentioned before this  
14 decision by the United States to first train ECOWAS peacekeepers  
12:44:38 15 for a period of six months and the delay that that would cause.  
16 Do you recall that?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Did the United States give a rationale for that decision?

19 A. The criticism was that the soldiers had acted  
12:45:01 20 unprofessionally, that they were seriously disorganised in the  
21 face of serious RUF combat, they could not stand - I think this  
22 was also alluded to in part by General Jetley when he was trying  
23 to talk about the comportmentation of the soldiers. So they just  
24 felt that they were not trained for this kind of mission and had  
12:45:30 25 to be trained.

26 In fact, for the disarmament of the more than 500 UN troops  
27 there were reports that they - when they were confronted they  
28 just handed their arms over to the rebels. So the Americans were  
29 saying that, "Well, look, we need to train these people before

1 putting them in the combat theatre", but leaving the void was a  
2 bigger problem because to say that everybody needed training was  
3 some of our concerns; that we felt that for example if you felt  
4 that the Nigerians were better trained or the Ghanians let's put  
12:46:10 5 those in theatre, let's get the process going, don't leave this  
6 void for an additional six months.

7 Q. "The Government of Liberia was taken aback and disappointed  
8 by the assumption of the United States government that it has to  
9 impose sanctions against Liberia to influence Liberia to support  
12:46:32 10 the peace process in the sisterly African Republic of Sierra  
11 Leone. Liberia's commitment to Sierra Leone is a matter of  
12 fraternal duty and African solidarity.

13 The Government of Liberia will continue its engagement on  
14 Sierra Leone through ECOWAS, the Organisation of African Unity  
12:46:57 15 and the United Nations. The Government of Liberia welcomes the  
16 United States government's participation in the United Nations  
17 delegation due to shortly arrive in Monrovia for discussions on  
18 Sierra Leone."

19 Before I move on, can that press release from the Liberian  
12:47:23 20 ministry of foreign affairs dated 13 October 2000 be marked for  
21 identification, please, MFI-168.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-168.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

24 Q. Now, the next day, as you've already indicated, Mr Taylor,  
12:47:47 25 there was you United Nations Security Council mission to Liberia,  
26 wasn't there?

27 A. Yes, they had come - it was not specific to Liberia I think  
28 we need to note, but they had come to Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
29 They were touring the region.

1 Q. And what had prompted this?

2 A. It's the overall Sierra Leonean problem and the  
3 understanding in view of the fact that we had now come up with  
4 these solutions to the Sierra Leonean problem with the new  
12:48:28 5 leadership and the whole problem of getting the hostages out.  
6 This was a full assessment mission to see what we would call  
7 which way forward on Sierra Leonean problem.

8 Q. Now, did you meet with this mission?

9 A. Yes, I met with the mission.

12:48:54 10 Q. Were notes made of the meeting?

11 A. Yes, following the meeting, yes, the Liberian government  
12 did her notes. Also present in that meeting were their own staff  
13 personnel including the special representative from Liberia. We  
14 did our notes based on our interpretation of what happened in the  
12:49:16 15 meeting and exchanged that with the special representative  
16 Downes-Thomas. They did their notes on what their interpretation  
17 was based on what they saw or heard in the meeting and exchanged  
18 that with us. So we exchanged, so we had our notes and we  
19 compared it with their notes to see if we had left anything out,  
12:49:44 20 added too much, subtracted, or whatever. So, yes, there were  
21 notes done on both sides and exchanged.

22 Q. Now who headed this United Nations security mission?

23 A. Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's permanent  
24 representative to the Security Council.

12:50:06 25 Q. Let's go behind divider 94, please. What do we see there,  
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. Now here we have the - these are the Liberian government  
28 notes on what our officials saw as what transpired during the  
29 meeting.

1 Q. Okay. We see that the document is headed "Pertinent notes  
2 of the meeting between members of the United Nations Security  
3 Council mission to West Africa and the Government of Liberia held  
4 at the Executive Mansion on Saturday, October 14, 2000, Monrovia,  
12:50:57 5 Liberia":

6 On Saturday, 14 October 2000, the President of Liberia, at  
7 the head of a delegation of Liberian government officials,  
8 diplomats and foreign policy experts, received in audience an  
9 eleven-member United Nations Security Council mission headed by  
12:51:20 10 Sir Jeremy Greenstock, ambassador of the United Kingdom to the  
11 United Nations. The meeting was characterised by an atmosphere  
12 of cordiality, warmth, understanding and a determination to  
13 facilitate the objectives of the United Nations mission.

14 Commencing the discussions, Ambassador Greenstock took note  
12:51:47 15 of the fact that his mission was the largest of its kind to be  
16 dispatched from the UN headquarters to Africa, thus signaling the  
17 importance of the mission's agenda. Besides Liberia, the  
18 mission's itinerary also included visits to Guinea, Nigeria, Mali  
19 and Sierra Leone. Ambassador Greenstock pointed out the  
12:52:14 20 objectives of his mission as follows:

21 To define a coordinated strategy for the resolution of the  
22 crisis in Sierra Leone since it has the potential to export  
23 rebellion; to seek regional (ECOWAS and Mano River Union)  
24 cooperation in finding a political solution to the crisis; to  
12:52:38 25 gain a greater understanding of Liberia's strategic security  
26 concerns with a view to ending the rebellion at Liberia's border  
27 with Guinea on the one hand, and Guinea's border with  
28 Sierra Leone; to request Liberia's cooperation in curbing the  
29 trafficking of diamonds and arms in the Mano River Union areas;



1 to find out what role President Taylor is prepared to play and  
2 what are his priorities in the context of the ECOWAS peace plan  
3 for the speedy resolution of the Sierra Leonean conflict and  
4 thereby prevent the isolation of Liberia by the international  
12:53:19 5 communi ty.

6 In further discussion of the possible prescriptions for  
7 resolving the crisis, Ambassador Greenstock pointed out the  
8 following: He called for the RUF to enter a formal agreement for  
9 a ceasefire and move rapidly towards disarmament and  
12:53:39 10 demobilisation. "

11 Pause there, Mr Taylor. In earlier correspondence you had  
12 mentioned that the RUF were prepared to have such a ceasefire  
13 hadn't you?

14 A. Yes.

12:53:54 15 Q. And since when had they been prepared to have such a  
16 ceasefire?

17 A. From 21 August they had made that very clear. 21 August  
18 referring to the appointment of Issa Sesay. That was very clear  
19 and I can see there's a little briefing error here on the part of  
12:54:13 20 the ambassador because the United Nations had been written even  
21 by me to talk about this and some of the other African leaders.  
22 So probably he had not been properly briefed.

23 Q. "In the interim, he called for the UNAMSIL forces to move  
24 in to protect the diamond fields currently occupied by the RUF. "

12:54:40 25 Mr Taylor, you were at this meeting so help us, why was  
26 that seen as a priority?

27 A. We're talking about maybe it's an interests of Britain,  
28 maybe it's a strategic interest, but again there's a briefing  
29 problem and you wonder sometimes, because a part of this whole -

1 of the letter that I wrote to the Secretary-General had to do  
2 with, "Listen, these guys want deployment" but Greenstock is  
3 forgetting here, and I think he is reminded later, that the very  
4 United States is stopping this because they want six months of  
12:55:15 5 training. So on the one hand he is calling for this, but he  
6 knows what the obstacles are, he knows, but we remind him about  
7 it.

8 Q. "He urged President Taylor to accept the training of a new  
9 Sierra Leonean army as being in the interests of the security of  
12:55:31 10 Liberia. He said it was out of the question for RUF leadership  
11 currently detained to be part of any new arrangement in the peace  
12 process."

13 "RUF leadership currently detained" is who?

14 A. Sankoh.

12:55:48 15 Q. So Greenstock is saying that Sankoh cannot be involved in  
16 the peace process?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did you consider that to be wise?

19 A. I didn't really matter what I thought. I don't think it  
12:56:08 20 was a wise stuff because if Greenstock had remembered, or if he  
21 had been briefed, he must know that the decision that had been  
22 taken in Freetown when Konare and Obasanjo went along with Kabbah  
23 and met Sankoh, Issa Sesay was appointed interim leader and they  
24 - all of us in ECOWAS knew the procedures used to get to that  
12:56:37 25 decision for Issa Sesay to take over.

26 But here we have it now, this is a major power, and since  
27 he is heading a United Nations Security Council delegation, under  
28 these conditions right away if you are in that room you must take  
29 note of the fact that this is a decision now that has been taken

1 not just by Greenstock. We look at this now as a decision by the  
2 powers - the major powers of the world have decided Sankoh is not  
3 going to take part and so we took note of that.

4 Q. Right:

12:57:17 5 "He called for new arrangements for either elections or an  
6 interim government as President Kabbah nears the end of his  
7 tenure, hinting that Kabbah may not be interested in retaining  
8 the presidency."

9 Had you detected such a sentiment on the part of President  
12:57:39 10 Kabbah, Mr Taylor?

11 A. No, he had not discussed that with me, no.

12 Q. "Following an exhaustive exchange of views on the above  
13 outlined points, Ambassador Greenstock offered other members of  
14 his mission the opportunity to make remarks.

12:57:57 15 Ambassador James B Cunningham of the United States.  
16 Reading from a prepared text, Ambassador Cunningham reiterated  
17 the oft repeated allegations of the United States government that  
18 the Government of Liberia is primarily responsible for aiding the  
19 conflict in Sierra Leone. He referred to the recent action of  
12:58:18 20 the US in imposing visa restrictions on Liberian government  
21 officials as the first step in a series of anticipated actions to  
22 pressure the Liberian government into playing a more constructive  
23 role in Sierra Leone."

24 How did you respond to that, Mr Taylor, given that you were  
12:58:42 25 at this meeting?

26 A. By this time the air-conditioning is not really working  
27 very well. The heat is beginning to come up in the room  
28 literally. Because as soon as he pulled out this prepared text  
29 we knew that this was the same old line that we had warned about

1 in the press statement the day before that we hoped that this  
2 would not prejudice the meeting and we sensed that they were  
3 going to be up to this little trick, to come in there and this is  
4 a prepared statement coming all the way back from when  
12:59:22 5 Under-Secretary Pickering came. So from a diplomatic study you  
6 can see all the connections. By this time we knew that - in fact  
7 we expected this and the room started getting unpleasant.

8 Q. "Ambassador Cunningham expressed the desire of the United  
9 States to work cooperatively with Liberia as a traditional friend  
12:59:43 10 and said that his government is prepared to work with other  
11 governments to guarantee Liberia's security (in light of the  
12 cross-border incursions) if President Taylor plays a constructive  
13 role to solve the Sierra Leone problem."

14 Can I ask you to pause again please, Mr Taylor. When the  
13:00:03 15 American ambassador, Mr Cunningham, made that statement, did you  
16 ask him for proof?

17 A. Right in the meeting. When we had an opportunity to speak,  
18 because we took it by turn, we raised all the issues of proof,  
19 asked them in that meeting to produce it, reiterated that it  
13:00:25 20 never, ever produced any proof, that these allegations had been  
21 just lingering out there. But we never got any.

22 Q. Over the page, please:

23 "Ambassador Doutriaux of France. The French ambassador  
24 expressed concern over the current development in the Mano River  
13:00:48 25 Union with respect to cross-border conflict between Guinea and  
26 Liberia. He encouraged President Taylor to initiate meetings and  
27 confidence building measures through negotiations in order to  
28 restore peace and stability in the Mano River Union."

29 Then we had Ambassador Peter van Walsum of The Netherlands

1 who indicated that although he had not met General Issa Sesay,  
2 the new interim head of the RUF, it was his understanding that he  
3 had been described as strikingly insignificant. If this were  
4 true, he inquired of President Taylor how could General Sesay be  
13:01:30 5 expected to be of any significance in the peace process.

6 Was that your assessment of Issa Sesay, Mr Taylor?

7 A. It was not my assessment and I later on told him - I told  
8 him exactly how to assess somebody in my response to him, that  
9 you don't look at a person and say - how do you say somebody is  
13:01:51 10 strikingly insignificant?

11 Q. "Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdhury of Bangladesh referred  
12 to reports of conflict diamonds being trafficked in the Mano  
13 River Union and asked whether President Taylor was aware of  
14 intelligence reports of such diamonds passing through Liberian  
13:02:10 15 territory."

16 Help me, was any such intelligence report produced by any  
17 of these ambassadors?

18 A. No, no, no, but the word was out there that diamonds were  
19 passing through and we had never disputed the possibility that  
13:02:24 20 they were passing through.

21 Q. But were you shown any intelligence reports?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Then we go over the page we see the remarks and responses  
24 of the President of Liberia:

13:02:37 25 "Following expressions of thanks to the mission and  
26 acknowledging the importance of the visit, President Taylor gave  
27 a historic background on the genesis of the conflict in the Mano  
28 River Union beginning with the invasion of Liberia in the early  
29 1990s by the ULIMO faction assisted by the Sierra Leonean

1 government under President Joseph Momoh.

2 He also described the complications of the Sierra Leonean  
3 conflict through the introduction of mercenaries, the defection  
4 of the Sierra Leonean army which then joined forces with the RUF  
13:03:13 5 to overthrow the government of President Kabbah, and the unusual  
6 precedent set when ECOWAS, at the urging of the late Nigerian  
7 Head of State Sani Abacha, established the policy of  
8 re-establishing by force regimes that had been overthrown by the  
9 military.

13:03:36 10 The President also mentioned the three unprovoked  
11 incursions of Liberian territory by insurgents from Guinea, the  
12 silence of the international community, and the accommodation  
13 given the insurgents by the Guinean government as actions that  
14 have fueled instability in the Mano River Union.

13:03:58 15 On the critical issue of resolution of the Sierra Leonean  
16 crisis, President Taylor made the following proposals:

17 He reiterated his firm commitment to work within the ECOWAS  
18 framework for the resolution of the crisis; he lamented the  
19 simplification of the crisis in Sierra Leone to diamond smuggling  
13:04:23 20 in view of other larger issues such as tribal differences,  
21 misreading of the conflict, struggle for power, and misjudgment  
22 of the strength of the RUF. He also rejected the consistent  
23 unproved allegations against him personally and his government  
24 for gun-running and diamond smuggling; the President said he  
13:04:47 25 supports the establishment of a neutral interim government at the  
26 end of the Kabbah tenure; he called for the revisitation of the  
27 Lome accords with the original signatories; he said he is not  
28 opposed to trials for Corporal Foday Sankoh but he should be  
29 tried for crimes committed after the Lome accord was signed. "

1           Why do you think that was significant, Mr Taylor?

2       A.     Because the Court had dealt with the issue of amnesty for  
3     all individuals. It is enshrined in that particular agreement.

4       Q.     "The President called for the international community to  
13:05:40 5     take advantage of the window of opportunity provided by a lull in  
6     the fighting and the positive engagement between the RUF and  
7     UNAMSIL officers to deploy peacekeepers in RUF territory to  
8     further enhance confidence building; on the issue of training,  
9     the President called for the training of members of all factions,  
13:06:01 10    rather than training a new Sierra Leonean army, which could  
11    become a new faction in the conflict; he finally stressed the  
12    need for an increased role for ECOWAS in the process adding that  
13    the sub-region should not be sidelined."

14           MR GRIFFITHS: Do your Honours have behind this a letter  
13:06:29 15    dated October 3, 1999?

16           PRESIDING JUDGE: Some of us do and some of us don't.

17           MR GRIFFITHS: It's a rogue document which shouldn't be  
18    there:

19       Q.     Now, before we move on, Mr Taylor --

13:07:06 20           MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, could we mark that document  
21    for identification, please, MFI-169.

22           PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-169.

23           MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

24           JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, sorry to interrupt again.  
13:07:25 25    From this document, there's an issue that I'm still trying to  
26    understand. There's talk of training the Sierra Leone Army for  
27    six months. I'm not sure to do what exactly. And then there's  
28    the earlier issue of training UNAMSIL for six months to move into  
29    the RUF areas.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I seek your Honour's assistance to  
2 this extent: Where in particular in this document is the  
3 reference to training of the Sierra Leonean army for six months?

13:08:04 4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: If you look at - unfortunately, it's not  
5 paginated, but page 2, where you have sort of in the top-middle  
6 the bullets, bullet 1, 2, 3, "He urged President Taylor to accept  
7 the training of a new Sierra Leonean army as being in the  
8 interests of the security of Liberia."

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I see the passage.

13:08:22 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: That is the aspect I'm referring to. I  
11 wish to understand from the witness who was in this meeting, was  
12 the proposal to train a Sierra Leone Army for six months to take  
13 over RUF controlled areas, or was the proposal to train the  
14 UNAMSIL Nigerian peacekeepers to take over control?

13:08:48 15 THE WITNESS: Well, your Honour, I'm still a little lost on  
16 the six months for the Sierra Leonean army training. I'm still a  
17 little lost on that part, according to this document.

18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: [Microphone not activated].

19 THE WITNESS: I'm trying to --

13:09:03 20 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: It's on the second page, the bullet 1, 2,  
21 3 - bullet 3 on the second page of that document. "The training  
22 of a new Sierra Leone Army."

23 THE WITNESS: Yes. What I'm concerned about now,  
24 your Honour, is the six months attached to that. I don't think  
13:09:32 25 there's a time frame attached to the training of the  
26 Sierra Leonean armed forces that's why I'm asking for help here.  
27 The six months applies to the training of ECOWAS forces that will  
28 be placed under UNAMSIL to be deployed in the RUF area. But --

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Perhaps it was my connection with your



1 earlier testimony that you were opposed to the six months'  
2 training of UNAMSIL as that would delay the process of moving  
3 into the RUF areas and therefore the ceasefire.

13:10:10 4 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honour. That is  
5 correct.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: So since you were opposed to that and  
7 this bullet speaks of asking or urging you to accept the  
8 training --

9 THE WITNESS: These are two different trainings,  
13:10:22 10 your Honour.

11 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Are they two different --

12 THE WITNESS: They are, your Honour. I'm opposed to the  
13 training - the time it will take, the delay in trying to train  
14 trained people to deploy to get the process moving. That's  
13:10:37 15 UNAMSIL taking on ECOWAS military personnel for that purpose.

16 This particular point here I have raised in an earlier  
17 document are concerns about the heavy armament being brought into  
18 Sierra Leone by the British government under the guise of wanting  
19 to train a new Sierra Leonean armed forces while the peace  
13:11:05 20 process is still not resolved. So it will mean that one sector  
21 will get trained and the other would not get trained. But what  
22 we had anticipated in the Lome agreement was that, at the end of  
23 the process, members of all of the warring factions will be  
24 recruited and trained and a new national army would be built on  
13:11:27 25 to the old SLA. This is where we are.

26 Did I clarify that?

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Yes, thank you.

28 THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honour.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Did we mark that document for --

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's MFI-169.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you mentioned earlier that the United  
4 Nations special representative was also present at this meeting.

13:11:59 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And he made his own notes which were exchanged with you.

7 A. That is correct, the Government of Liberia, yes.

8 Q. Right. Can we have a look behind divider 97, please. Now,  
9 we see from the first page that this is an outgoing code cable

13:12:54 10 from Special Representative Downes-Thomas to Prendergast dated 18  
11 October 2000 attaching his account of the meeting held on - in  
12 Monrovia on October 14, yes, Mr Taylor?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Let's go over the page, please:

13:13:17 15 "Meeting between the Security Council mission to  
16 Sierra Leone and President Charles Taylor held at the Executive  
17 Mansion, Monrovia, 14 October 2000.

18 The Security Council mission to Sierra Leone, headed by  
19 United Kingdom permanent representative to the United Nations,  
13:13:40 20 Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, together with its support staff,  
21 attended a meeting with President Charles Taylor at the Executive  
22 Mansion in Monrovia on Saturday, October 14, 2000. The President  
23 was accompanied by twelve of his most senior advisers, including  
24 his Vice-President, minister of state for presidential affairs,  
13:14:04 25 director of cabinet, foreign minister, permanent representative  
26 to the United Nations, chairman of the ruling national patriotic  
27 party and national security adviser. Also in attendance were  
28 Mr Felix Downes-Thomas, representative of the United Nations  
29 Secretary-General in Liberia; Mr John Kakonge, UN resident

1 coordinator; two members of staff of the United Nations peace  
2 building support office in Liberia; and one political officer  
3 from the United Nations mission in Sierra Leone.

4 Ambassador Greenstock explained the mission's mandate and  
13:14:44 5 pointed to the fact that his mission was the largest Security  
6 Council mission ever to travel on a single issue. He highlighted  
7 the implications of the visit, not only for peace in  
8 Sierra Leone, but more importantly within the West African  
9 region. He was of the view that what was urgently needed to

13:15:05 10 secure peace and stability was a coordinated strategy on  
11 Sierra Leone, founded primarily on regional cooperation which  
12 took into consideration the political and security aspects of the  
13 Mano River Union relationship. He stated that, having heard from  
14 Presidents Konare, Kabbah, Conte and Obasanjo, as well as from  
13:15:32 15 ECOWAS's executive secretary, Kouyate, their views on how best  
16 one could arrive at a political solution to the Sierra Leonean  
17 crisis, the Security Council was eager to hear from President  
18 Taylor. He wanted President Taylor to know that his input was  
19 essential to arriving at any solution for lasting peace in the  
13:15:54 20 sub-region. "

21 Did you need to be reminded of that, Mr Taylor.

22 A. No, I did not.

23 Q. "In light of the above, Ambassador Greenstock had several  
24 pointed questions for President Taylor:

13:16:09 25 What did he (Taylor) need to help bring about stability in  
26 the sub-region?

27 How could he assist in devising a mixture of measures that  
28 would end the exportation of trouble and the frequent cross  
29 border hostile activity affecting the Mano River Union member

1 states?

2 What recent contacts did he have with the RUF leadership to  
3 encourage the organisation to strike a deal to put an end to the  
4 conflict?

13:16:40 5 What role did he see for ECOWAS in putting an end to the  
6 conflict?

7 What are his priorities, and how can he retain stability  
8 for Liberia?

9 President Taylor, in response, promised to pour his heart  
13:17:00 10 out and to 'address the issue squarely'. He provided a  
11 historical analysis of the conflict in the sub-region, which had  
12 as its points of departure the invasion of Liberia by ULIMO  
13 forces from Sierra Leone while 'Liberia's civil war was going  
14 on'. He emphasised that he had always known Foday Sankoh as well  
13:17:22 15 as several other Sierra Leonean officials including  
16 Sierra Leone's deputy defence minister who had taken refuge in  
17 Liberia for periods which go beyond a decade. Sierra Leone, he  
18 said, had experienced terrible mayhem and that he had always  
19 wanted peace. He cautioned that 'sometimes we confuse the  
13:17:43 20 process of seeking peace with getting at individuals'. He was of  
21 the view that the origins of ULIMO in Sierra Leone allowed for  
22 some of its former combatants to settle in Sierra Leone, thus  
23 fueling the crisis.

24 President Taylor expressed his support for President Kabbah  
13:18:11 25 as the elected Head of State of Sierra Leone. He described him  
26 as 'a good man who is unfortunately a technocrat placed in a bad  
27 situation'."

28 What did you mean by that, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Oh, Kabbah had worked for the UN all those years. They are

1 just used to paperwork and discussions. Being out there in the  
2 real world is a little different from sitting in UN headquarters  
3 as a diplomat and that he is a good man, he is a good technocrat,  
4 educated, smart, but - I mean, you are dealing with a different  
13:18:48 5 type of situation on the ground, and he was just in a bad  
6 situation. And I don't think he knew how to handle it, and I was  
7 frank about it.

8 Q. "He pointed out that his Sierra Leonean counterpart became  
9 President in the midst of an ongoing war in that country. With  
13:19:06 10 no disarmament and no demobilisation process in place, President  
11 Kabbah was not able to solve the problem he found in  
12 Sierra Leone. After his overthrow by Johnny Paul Koroma, the  
13 situation became even more difficult for him (Kabbah) as he now  
14 faced a dual opposition with the invitation to the RUF to join  
13:19:25 15 the government of the AFRC. During this period there was a  
16 massive importation of arms into Sierra Leone."

17 How do you know?

18 A. Well, these were all reports. There were reports of a  
19 Russian vessel coming in with the AFRC in place. The AFRC  
13:19:46 20 itself, upon seizing power, had large amounts of arms that had  
21 been given them to help to fight against the rebels.

22 Q. Hold on a second, Mr Taylor. Are you forgetting something  
23 here? Are you forgetting a letter from Johnny Paul Koroma,  
24 shortly after the coup and shortly after you became President,  
13:20:08 25 begging for weapons? Do you remember that?

26 A. Yes. Yes, I remember the letter.

27 Q. So what's the situation? Where do you get this notion from  
28 that there was this massive importation of arms under the AFRC?

29 A. Well, during that particular time you have to remember that

1 we get reports of Sandline and other people that had been paid to  
2 come to assist. Even Kabbah did before he left office. Kabbah  
3 is being assisted. So the weapons that are in Sierra Leone are  
4 not just what they are bringing but what even Kabbah had brought  
13:20:43 5 in that had been taken over when his army left him. So I don't  
6 know why Johnny Paul would even want weapons because they do have  
7 a lot of weapons.

8 Q. "President Taylor further explained that in trying to deal  
9 with this complex situation, the west had not taken into  
13:21:05 10 consideration many African traditions which were a crucial factor  
11 in that situation and had consequently sought to apply unworkable  
12 solutions in an effort to find peace at all costs. He emphasised  
13 that with the RUF and the SLA as the new political contestants  
14 for power an agreement was signed at Lome against the objections  
13:21:32 15 of the western countries to allow sleeping dogs to lie and to  
16 avoid the question of trial for atrocities. Bearing the above in  
17 mind, it was President Taylor's considered view that unless we  
18 are now prepared to create a government of national unity under  
19 Lome, there can be no real way forward. He emphasised that he  
13:21:57 20 had never been against the idea of having Foday Sankoh stand  
21 trial for crimes committed after Lome.

22 President Taylor expressed his frustration with the  
23 frequent accusations made against him by the west of fueling  
24 the war in Sierra Leone and recounted his efforts to bring peace  
13:22:19 25 in that country. He reminded the mission that he had been called  
26 upon by his ECOWAS colleagues, after President Kabbah's return to  
27 power, to do all in his power to bring peace to Sierra Leone."

28 We've dealt with the various meetings where that was said,  
29 have we not, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes, we have.

2 Q. "He recounted his difficult but successful mediation  
3 efforts to bring Johnny Paul Koroma, a man he had never met, and  
4 Foday Sankoh and to encourage them into the political  
13:23:00 5 mainstream."

6 A man you had never met, Mr Taylor. Is that right?

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. When was the first time you met him?

9 A. First time I met Johnny Paul Koroma was in August of 1999.

13:23:12 10 First time. I had never met him before.

11 Q. "He wondered who then was responsible for the violation of  
12 the Lome agreement and what aspects of Lome were not adhered to.  
13 He recalled that similarly, when Sankoh had problems with  
14 Sam Bockarie, he (Taylor) was again called upon by the  
13:23:39 15 Secretary-General to intervene. He had successfully managed 'to  
16 pull Bockarie out of the fighting' only to be accused later of  
17 having invited Bockarie to Liberia to further train him for the  
18 battlefield."

19 Pause there. Who had made this accusation that you had  
13:24:06 20 invited Bockarie to Liberia to further train him for the  
21 battlefield?

22 A. Same two countries; Britain and America had said that it  
23 was possible because he only brought him to train him.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: What about Sierra Leone?

13:24:27 25 THE WITNESS: Well, yes, your Honour, to a great extent.  
26 But the Sierra Leonean accusation, I'm sorry - I'm talking about  
27 the principal ones that really made a difference. At some point  
28 later, yes, Sierra Leone does complain about it and we can go  
29 back to the delegation that visited Naama and all that. But

1 Sierra Leone, yes, your Honour, was a part of that too.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. "He complained that none of these efforts seemed to satisfy  
4 his accusers of his genuine desire for peace and that the latest  
13:25:03 5 accusations regarding gun-running and diamond smuggling levelled  
6 against him by the US and UK governments are simply not true.

7 In this regard he reminded the mission that Liberia has  
8 diamonds of its own. He pointed out that indeed illegal diamonds  
9 may have passed through Liberia and found their way on to the  
13:25:28 10 international market."

11 Pause there. Mr Taylor, have you ever denied that?

12 A. Never. Never denied that.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I wonder if you could pause  
14 there. I hope that's a convenient place to pause for this  
13:25:48 15 morning. There is just something I wanted to say before we take  
16 the lunch adjournment. That is to place on record the Trial  
17 Chamber's concern at the delays that are being caused by problems  
18 experienced with the equipment used to record these court  
19 proceedings. There have been delays in the past, but they seem  
13:26:17 20 to be happening with increasing regularity. Earlier this week we  
21 had to adjourn court altogether to enable repairs to the  
22 equipment to be effected and earlier today we had to go off the  
23 Bench for the same reason.

24 There's every possibility that these delays, caused by  
13:26:44 25 faulty equipment, are going to get worse. So I think it's  
26 appropriate at this stage not only to record the Trial Chamber's  
27 concern, but direct that our concern and our comments be brought  
28 to the attention of the Registrar and also the attention of the  
29 President.



1           Having said that, we will adjourn for lunch and we'll  
2 resume at 2.30.

3                               [Lunch break taken at 1.26 p.m.]

4                               [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:30:46 5           PRESIDING JUDGE: Please go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

6           MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

7 Q.     Mr Taylor, before we adjourned for lunch we were looking at  
8 this document prepared by the special representative of the  
9 Secretary-General, Mr Downes-Thomas?

14:31:03 10 A.     Yes.

11 Q.     Recording that same meeting on 14 October with the Security  
12 Council mission to Liberia, yes?

13 A.     Yes, that's correct.

14 Q.     And we had got to paragraph 8 of that document, yes?

14:31:24 15 A.     That is correct.

16 Q.     "In this regard, he reminded the mission that Liberia has  
17 diamonds of its own. He pointed out that indeed illegal diamonds  
18 may have passed through Liberia and found their way on to the  
19 international market, but not with the knowledge or acquiescence  
14:31:49 20 of the Government of Liberia. The Government of Liberia has no  
21 record of sales of any diamonds. If there is an illegal market,  
22 he advised, then there must also be a legitimate market. On this  
23 matter, he repeated his call to his accusers to provide him with  
24 the name/names of companies that could testify to doing business  
14:32:21 25 with Liberia or with Charles Taylor."

26           Pause there. Mr Taylor, have you, then or since, been  
27 given the name or names of any company with whom you're supposed  
28 to have been dealing in diamonds?

29 A.     No, we have not. We raised this issue with them. In fact,

1 what I had said to them was a little more expanded. I said,  
2 Look, diamonds are bought and sold in Belgium, South Africa.  
3 Belgium is a major European country. There is no way you can  
4 take diamonds into any buying area in Belgium, sell them, and be  
14:33:19 5 paid in cash that you put in a bag or a whole bundle of money and  
6 walk out. If and when diamonds are sold in Belgium, the buying  
7 agency will give you, what? A cheque. Or maybe you give them  
8 some bank account that they will have to transfer the money.  
9 Nobody walks around the streets of Belgium with a half a million  
14:33:51 10 dollars in a plastic bag from selling African diamonds. So the  
11 banking system in Europe is very good. If anybody comes into a  
12 Belgian place that is registered with the government to sell a  
13 large amount of diamonds it would be registered and reported to  
14 the government. There is no way it can be hidden, because they  
14:34:09 15 have to pay taxes to their government. So nobody - you come from  
16 Africa with a million, a half a million dollars worth of diamonds  
17 and walk into the place, nobody is going to buy it under the  
18 table. There's got to be an exchange of change of money and not  
19 physical cash. There's ways that you can check on these things  
14:34:28 20 without having to make these foolish accusations that this person  
21 is trading in diamonds. Where is this trade going on?  
22 Everything is registered. Everything is reported in Belgium, in  
23 South Africa. So why don't we try to go and see if these things  
24 are there. There are no businesses, no records of any companies  
14:34:47 25 at that time, counsel, until now. Nobody has brought a company:  
26 Mr Taylor, here we have - here is a company that was registered  
27 in your name or somebody that you know that sold this quantity of  
28 diamonds and claimed it was for you. None of this kind of stuff  
29 until today, nothing.

1 Q. "He said that it was grossly unfair to reduce the whole  
2 situation in Sierra Leone to his perceived desire for war.  
3 President Taylor also reminded the mission that he had, on more  
4 than one occasion, requested airborne surveillance of the region  
14:35:29 5 to either deter the cross-border illegal activity or to confirm  
6 the same. He had similarly written to the Security Council as  
7 well as to ECOWAS and the Secretary-General, suggesting the  
8 deployment of peacekeeping forces on the Liberian side of the  
9 border. He had also requested that observers be deployed at  
10 Liberia's international airports. All of these requests, he  
11 stated, had yet to receive any positive response from any  
12 quarter.

13 With respect to the accusations against him of providing  
14 arms to the RUF, he warned that 'the peacekeepers need to be  
14:36:18 15 careful'. He declared that the NPFL had bought many of its  
16 weapons from the peacekeepers during Liberia's civil conflict and  
17 advised that Liberia has no tanks here, but that the RUF, which  
18 is not a machete group, has its own."

19 Pause there. Did the RUF have tanks?

14:36:41 20 A. They captured - the reported - these are part of the  
21 equipment that they want returned. They have tanks now that  
22 they've seized from them. Heavy artillery, everything, yeah.

23 Q. Did Liberia have that kind of armament?

24 A. No. Throughout up until I left office we never had a tank,  
14:37:02 25 never. Never had one.

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you had mentioned on an earlier occasion  
27 that the NPFL had bought many of its weapons from the  
28 peacekeepers, and this is a sentiment which you're sharing at  
29 this stage with this group as well?

1 A. That is correct, yes. Once you had money, we could buy  
2 arms. We could buy arms. When the NPFL was actually fighting,  
3 we would be fighting one unit on one side and buying arms from  
4 the other unit in another part of the country, so that was  
14:37:42 5 normal. Once you had money, the men were not paid, they were out  
6 there trying to get whatever they could. So we bought weapons  
7 from the peacekeepers, yes.

8 Q. "President Taylor then made the following proposals to the  
9 mission:

14:37:57 10 While recognising President Kabbah as a friend and Head of  
11 State, it is clear that he is too weak to solve the problems  
12 associated with restoring peace while upholding government.  
13 President Kabbah needs to be strengthened."

14 Did you believe that, that he was too weak?

14:38:19 15 A. Yes, yes, definitely. I would not have said this if I  
16 didn't believe it. It's true.

17 Q. "There is a need to look at the question of insuring the  
18 establishment of a National Transitional Government at the end of  
19 his current term, if his government does not succeed in bringing  
14:38:37 20 the required level of peace to Sierra Leone.

21 Consonant with his assertion that following the change of  
22 the RUF leadership he has never opposed putting Foday Sankoh on  
23 trial for acts committed after Lome, there is a need to adhere to  
24 the provisions of Lome in this regard."

14:39:01 25 And that's the particular provision granting amnesty to the  
26 combatants?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. "While he is not opposed to revisiting Lome, only those who  
29 negotiated Lome should take part in its revisiting. There should

1 be no extraneous parties involved."

2 Who are you referring to as extraneous parties?

3 A. The steps now being taken by Britain and America - I'm  
4 referring to Britain and America - that seem to be coming in to  
14:39:36 5 take over this agreement from ECOWAS.

6 Let me point out something that may not have been pointed  
7 out. From the moment in July of 1999 that the Lome agreement was  
8 signed, it was evident there, and all of us got to see that - we  
9 mentioned this a little earlier - the west, mostly Britain and  
14:40:00 10 America, were not in favour of the agreement, and most of us  
11 considered that agreement doomed from the moment it was signed  
12 because of the outside interference. So when you look at all of  
13 our communication coming after, we are talking about the ECOWAS  
14 plan and the Lome plan, because we know that they begin to

14:40:23 15 contest the plan from Lome. And one issue that was contested in  
16 Lome by the British and the Americans, and most of the western  
17 countries, was this issue of the amnesty that we talk about here.  
18 From the beginning they set out to sabotage this agreement, and  
19 so we were always reminding them of the fact that we were aware  
14:40:45 20 of what they were up to.

21 Q. What was the particular reason for the opposition to the  
22 amnesty, Mr Taylor?

23 A. You know, we were talking about trying to solve it the  
24 African way, and they were not prepared to solve it the African  
14:41:01 25 way. They did not think that amnesty was the proper way to go.  
26 They wanted to put people on trial. They wanted to - they were  
27 pushing for the Foday Sankoh trial at that particular time, and  
28 we told them that no - I remember all of the Heads of State, we  
29 just decided: No, this agreement, this is what ECOWAS wants, and

1 we only ask you people to back us. But obviously they did not  
2 want to back us, and they didn't. So they kept undermining it.  
3 Remember, it starts with - even though I didn't like the  
4 gentleman because Shel pidi - let's go back a little bit.

14:41:38 5 Remember, it was through the injection of these negative ideas  
6 also against Shel pidi by the then British Foreign Secretary Robin  
7 Cook that insisted that Shel pidi be moved. So it goes on and  
8 goes on. So that intervention started from as far back then when  
9 Robin Cook ingrained himself into the whole process and they  
14:42:07 10 started to undermine us. So we were pretty, pretty, pretty  
11 scared when they started this process.

12 Q. "He would welcome an opportunity to review Lome's  
13 provisions with a view to changing some of them."

14 Some of them like which ones?

14:42:26 15 A. Well, we didn't know - we did not know what they would have  
16 come up with. We didn't know. Because I'm talking to them -  
17 they are the ones that are saying that we must go back to Lome.  
18 So I say well, okay. The first thing, those that negotiated Lome  
19 should look at Lome. We don't want you people coming with a new  
14:42:46 20 set of negotiations, and of course we're open to some adjustments  
21 if we have to, but we want this to be a West African solution.  
22 This was the whole problem. And if you look at what Sir Jeremy  
23 Greenstock even said before in a meeting, he begins to suggest  
24 that Kabbah may not be interested in the position after. So that  
14:43:17 25 whole issue - in some circles we had heard that they were  
26 dissatisfied also with Kabbah and were going to encourage him not  
27 to push any forward. But he puts it in diplomatic terms by  
28 saying that Kabbah may not be interested after his official term,  
29 so this whole process is interfering, really.

1 Q. And then the next point you made was that:

2 "The ongoing efforts by the United Kingdom to train the  
3 Sierra Leone Army are counterproductive. 'The SLA overthrew  
4 President Kabbah under Johnny Paul Koroma with the very soldiers  
14:43:59 5 the British are now trying to train, claiming that they wanted to  
6 be part of the process. Would the natural RUF reaction to this  
7 not be "why train only a part of the parties to the conflict?"  
8 The policy of picking and choosing who should be trained will  
9 only foment further hostility and alienate some forces as  
14:44:28 10 evidenced in the recent British experience with the West Side  
11 Boys.' The current training of the SLA needs to be curtailed."

12 The recent experience with the West Side Boys, what's that  
13 about? What's that a reference to?

14 A. That was, from all reports, major combat between the  
14:44:43 15 British army in Sierra Leone and the West Side Boys. They  
16 fought, I think, for a day or two. There were casualties on, I  
17 think, both sides, and so - but the West Side Boys were also part  
18 of what? The SLA. So you are now going and training, some of  
19 them are not being trained, but when you - this is also in  
14:45:06 20 disregard of the Lome agreement, because the agreement was  
21 pushing - bringing people from all of the factions and training  
22 them. So when they come in now, change everything around, change  
23 the commander of the forces in Sierra Leone, even the commander  
24 of the Sierra Leonean forces, who was the late Khobe, is changed.  
14:45:30 25 A British officer is sent as commander of the Sierra Leonean  
26 armed forces. That's how he is sent. And so we see this with a  
27 part of the West Side Boys that are the SLA out, another part you  
28 are training, it's just not a stable environment.

29 Q. And then go on to say that "the current training of the SLA

1 needs to be curtailed." The next point you made to them was  
2 this, Mr Taylor:

3 "UNAMSIL should be the only source of military force on the  
4 ground until the demobilisation and disarmament exercises have  
14:46:12 5 been completed. All other forces should disarm to UNAMSIL.  
6 Thereafter, a cohesive force may be trained."

7 Now, when you were saying that "all other forces should  
8 disarm to UNAMSIL", were you including in that, Mr Taylor, the  
9 Sierra Leonean army?

14:46:30 10 A. Yeah, what was then called the Sierra Leonean army. All of  
11 these forces had fought. And as a reminder, the Sierra Leonean  
12 army split up into two. At the point of the overthrow of  
13 President Kabbah, some of the soldiers remained loyal to him,  
14 while others joined this AFRC situation.

14:46:57 15 Now, the part of the army that is being trained now is that  
16 part of the army that remained loyal to Kabbah. A vast majority  
17 of the rest of the armed forces is not being trained. Also, who  
18 is being trained? They are now training some of the Kamajors.  
19 So you have one part of the Sierra Leonean army not being  
14:47:23 20 trained, you have the RUF not being trained, I see that as a  
21 very, very troubling factor because you would only discourage  
22 people from disarming. And what is even troubling about it, you  
23 are doing this while disarmament is not over.

24 Why start this kind of thing to cause trouble? So people  
14:47:47 25 can say, "Oh, yes, so you're only training these people and you  
26 are arming them to fight us? We are not going to give up our  
27 arms." So I'm trying to tell them, get disarmament over first,  
28 then do your selection and your training.

29 Q. "The Government of Sierra Leone needs to take advantage of



1 the window of opportunity provided by the de facto ceasefire to  
2 now enter into dialogue with the new RUF leadership. If it had  
3 difficulties in so doing, he (President Taylor) would be a 'go  
4 between'. He could not, however, speak on behalf of the RUF and  
14:48:31 5 would never sacrifice the government and people of Liberia to  
6 save the RUF."

7 Why did you feel it necessary to make that statement?

8 A. Well, again, you know, you have to be careful in these  
9 discussions. You are talking about - I'm the mediator, but I  
14:48:49 10 want them to know that there is only so far I will be prepared to  
11 go, and that if this - I'm hinting that if this process continues  
12 to threaten the peace and security of my government and Liberia  
13 that I would not - I mean, I would go for, what, Liberia first  
14 because I'm constituted - I'm the constitutionally-elected  
14:49:14 15 President of Liberia, so my first obligation is to Liberia.

16 Q. "UNAMSIL forces should 'stay out of any exchange of fire,  
17 except when provoked'. The United Nations must be seen to remain  
18 neutral.

19 ECOWAS forces under UNAMSIL should be allowed to move into  
14:49:38 20 and establish control over the diamond areas immediately."

21 Did you mean that, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes, because this was the British main - this was their  
23 main concern. Remember, the first thing that Greenstock said was  
24 that they needed for forces to move where? Into the diamonds  
14:49:55 25 areas.

26 Q. But I think you misunderstand my question, Mr Taylor. This  
27 is you saying that "ECOWAS forces under UNAMSIL should be allowed  
28 to move into and establish control over the diamonds areas  
29 immediately."

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, you're saying that?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. But, Mr Taylor, if UNAMSIL, that is, neutral forces, move  
14:50:18 5 in and control the diamonds areas, then you can't get access to  
6 the RUF diamonds and you're supposed to be the one trading in  
7 those diamonds. So are you being hypocritical in suggesting  
8 this? Do you follow me?

9 A. I follow you very well. I do not control them. That's  
14:50:36 10 their warped thinking, but I do not control any diamonds and I  
11 want to bring this thing to a peace. So saying the diamond is  
12 the main problem, let's move into their quickly. No, I do not  
13 control them and I think people know that too.

14 Q. "When groups from within the region came into Liberia to  
14:50:55 15 assist with demobilisation, this helped psychologically."

16 What do you mean by this?

17 A. There's this fear factor. There's a fear factor in  
18 disarming. These guys felt better. When they saw - by groups  
19 I'm talking about contributing countries from ECOWAS to the  
14:51:23 20 military force. So when they saw people come from Niger, they  
21 saw some other soldiers, in fact, come from The Gambia or maybe  
22 they see - there were some soldiers from Mali, they begin to feel  
23 that, you know, they should remove the fear factor of giving up  
24 the arm and surely they will be making some progress, because  
14:51:44 25 there's always - the situation that I experienced, there's always  
26 the villain amongst the peacekeepers. There's the villain.

27 Now, the villain, for a long time, in our case, was  
28 Nigeria. So we felt comfortable when Ghana sent in forces, you  
29 know, and Mali sent in forces, okay, fine, so it's neutralised.

1 There's always a villain. So in the case over in Sierra Leone, I  
2 do not know who the RUF had seen then as the villain, but you  
3 always want to bring in more peoples that the villain will be  
4 overshadowed.

14:52:22 5 Q. "The RUF will not wish to attack United Nations or ECOWAS  
6 forces. One should therefore use this window of opportunity now,  
7 rather than wait until after further training is provided to  
8 Nigerians and Ghanaians."

9 Is that a further reference to this six months' training  
14:52:43 10 thing?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. "The UN should seize on the desire for peace demonstrated  
13 by the new leadership of the RUF. Their willingness to return  
14 captured United Nations material should be capitalised on, though  
14:52:57 15 one should not expect, in the short term, to retrieve too many of  
16 the light weapons."

17 Why were you saying that, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Because of the unstructured nature of these guerilla  
19 armies. These boys - I was talking about from the NPFL  
14:53:20 20 experience. Because things are not structured, you don't have  
21 any real control over these people. I tell you, some people are  
22 taking a beating for nothing. You don't have control over these  
23 combatants. You do not.

24 They are fighting here today, they may get a rifle. Let's  
14:53:40 25 say this disarm these peacekeepers and there were soldiers  
26 standing around without weapons and let's say they handed a  
27 weapon to them, this guy may be fighting here. By tomorrow, he  
28 could be three, four, five miles away under a new commander.  
29 There is nothing structured about these groups.

1           So I know from the Liberian experience that these weapons  
2 would have been dispersed so widely because you don't even  
3 remember who you gave them to. Nobody - there is no roster with  
4 John Brown, this weapon, weapon number 4561 - there is none of  
14:54:17 5 this thing in these guerilla armies.

6           You find a weapon, you hand it to the first man available  
7 and he's gone. So there is no way, I figured, and I could have  
8 been wrong, that they would have retrieved it because of my  
9 experience in the unstructured nature of the way these guerillas  
14:54:33 10 operate.

11 Q.       "President Taylor reiterated that no one should count on  
12 him to exercise any control over the RUF. It was simply not  
13 possible for him to do so, nor was it his desire. Liberia, he  
14 said, does not want trouble, but peace within its borders and  
14:54:57 15 within the sub-region. He expressed his desire to leave for  
16 posterity a legacy of peace, not war. In this regard, he  
17 complained about the three attacks which Liberia had sustained  
18 from dissidents operating out of Guinea. He was not impressed by  
19 the fact that assistant Secretary-General Fall had come to the  
14:55:25 20 region and had not mentioned in his recent briefing to the  
21 Security Council attacks on Liberia but made clear reference to  
22 attacks emanating from Liberia."

23           Is that true?

24 A.       Yeah, I think Fall made a mistake, yes, and we pointed that  
14:55:42 25 out. That's true. Maybe he made a mistake. He wanted to say  
26 "attacks on Liberia", but he said "emanating from" and we took  
27 exception to that.

28 Q.       "He further expressed his government's frustration over the  
29 treatment of Liberian diplomats and refugees in Guinea,

1 especially in light of his futile appeals made to the  
2 Secretary-General and the Security Council to intervene with the  
3 Government of Guinea on his behalf.

4 President Taylor appealed with the council to lift the arms  
14:56:20 5 embargo imposed on Liberia. He commented that this request had  
6 been conveyed to the council on more than one occasion, and  
7 pointed out that the request was made in light of the three  
8 incursions Liberia had suffered over the last two years. He  
9 pleaded for at least a limited capacity to import sufficient  
14:56:46 10 weapons to enable the Government of Liberia to protect itself."

11 Mr Taylor, can we pause there for a moment, please. We  
12 spoke during the course of 1999 about the destruction of those  
13 weapons collected during disarmament, yes?

14 A. Yes.

14:57:12 15 Q. And we dealt with that in some detail, and we're now aware  
16 that between July 1999 and October 1999, we looked at a list of  
17 weapons and other war material which was destroyed. Do you  
18 recall that?

19 A. Yes, I do.

14:57:29 20 Q. Now, running in parallel with that process of weapons  
21 destruction, we've had attacks - three incursions into Liberia,  
22 yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. The most recent beginning in July and still continuing?

14:57:49 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Had you, despite the UN's arms embargo, made any attempt to  
27 import arms into Liberia?

28 A. By that time, no. Not at that time, no.

29 Q. So by this date, 14 October, had any new arms come into

1 Li beria?

2 A. No, we had not brought in any new arms. This is why the  
3 rebels were able to stay so long. From 8 July they attacked,  
4 this is all the way - they are still in because we don't have the  
14:58:30 5 means to really fight them. No, we had not brought in any  
6 weapons.

7 Q. So, help us, Mr Taylor, what weapons were therefore being  
8 used to fight them?

9 A. Remember, I have said that when this thing - when we got  
14:58:47 10 the first and second attacks there was a call to all able-bodied  
11 men and women to come forward and it was at this time that as  
12 these soldiers came some of them in a very - I would say this was  
13 not a good thing, but they did - some of them had hidden their  
14 little individual rifles and we saw - people went digging up  
14:59:16 15 rifles. They brought - most of the guys that came brought the  
16 little one rifle. So this is why the disarmament was not as  
17 substantial as one would want. But the thousands that came, a  
18 lot of them brought - some of them brought two packs of  
19 ammunition. Not boxes. Maybe two packs, maybe a rifle. Some of  
14:59:39 20 them had hidden grenades, they brought them. So it is this  
21 collection of weapons from this national call across the country  
22 that we started using to push the rebels.

23 Q. So what about the ATU, Mr Taylor? Where did they get  
24 weapons from?

14:59:57 25 A. The ATU were being trained and we had collected some of the  
26 same old weapons, this is what the ATU were using. They were not  
27 using anything more sophisticated than the rest of the country.  
28 Everybody was using the same.

29 Q. "He also stated that if the council decided to deny Liberia

1 the capacity to defend its territorial integrity, then the  
2 council had a duty to protect Liberia.

3 The President concluded his remarks with an appeal to the  
4 council to support the Mano River Union and ECOWAS. He expressed  
15:00:39 5 the view that the latter 'should be permitted to play a stronger  
6 role than is currently the case'. He cautioned that New York or  
7 Washington cannot make decisions for the region or sub-region and  
8 pointed out that some countries will not contribute troops to the  
9 peacekeeping effort if they believe they are being sidelined.

15:01:09 10 The burden for peacekeeping in the region needed to be put  
11 squarely back on the shoulders of ECOWAS.

12 Ambassador Greenstock, in responding to some of President  
13 Taylor's comments, pointed out that Under-Secretary-General  
14 Prendergast, Mr Fall's boss, had recently briefed the council and  
15:01:35 15 made clear mention of the attacks on Liberia, which emanated from  
16 Guinea. He emphasised that there is now an urgent need for a  
17 settlement of the crisis in Sierra Leone as well as in the  
18 sub-region. He insisted that President Taylor needed to play a  
19 more constructive role in this respect and advised him that it  
15:02:00 20 was in his interest to make some choices or expect that without a  
21 change in circumstances, instability in Sierra Leone would be  
22 re-exported to Liberia and Guinea."

23 "He insisted that President Taylor needed to play a more  
24 constructive role". Pausing, Mr Taylor: Did you think you had  
15:02:29 25 been playing a constructive role?

26 A. Yes, all along I have been playing, yes.

27 Q. "Ambassador Greenstock agreed that engaging the RUF in  
28 dialogue was important. He saw a role for Liberia in that  
29 regard. What was also important, he emphasised, was to begin

1 putting in place the modalities for commencing dialogue. He  
2 expressed a view that that could be achieved within the present  
3 arrangements and without having to restructure Lome. He  
4 mentioned that it was important for the RUF to come clean on a  
15:03:15 5 ceasefire and on disarmament. He also expressed the view that a  
6 strategy for deployment of UNAMSIL forces in the diamond areas  
7 and ECOWAS forces in the border areas needed to be more fully  
8 explored. "

9 Now, let's pause again, Mr Taylor. Did you detect a reason  
15:03:40 10 for UNAMSIL forces in the diamond areas and ECOWAS forces in the  
11 border areas?

12 A. Well, he tied up so many packages in this whole part you  
13 through out here. There are so many little snares and things  
14 that Greenstock talks about, but I will comment on what you just  
15:04:09 15 asked me.

16 This is an expression of lack of confidence in the ECOWAS  
17 forces. This is why he was talking about UNAMSIL and this - this  
18 is - and this is the very thing that was annoying most of us, and  
19 maybe the big mouth - those of us that had the big mouth, we were  
15:04:23 20 talking. But the mumbling in these meetings was very --

21 Q. Which meetings?

22 A. ECOWAS meetings. Mumbling and mumbling and mumbling.

23 Q. Mumbling about what?

24 A. "The British are coming. They are trying to disturb us.  
15:04:37 25 This is an ECOWAS thing. We did it in Liberia. We can do it in  
26 Sierra Leone. They are coming and they are interrupting." But  
27 that's the end of it. It stayed right in the meeting walls,  
28 okay? Only a few of us will come out and really spread it out  
29 because, you know, we felt that we had a duty to. But you find



1 that a lot, I mean, around. So Greenstock put - he tied many  
2 little things in here. When he talks about that things can be  
3 done within the framework, that's another diplomatic word for  
4 saying, "Yeah, we will do some of what you're doing within your  
15:05:20 5 framework, but there's some other things we want to." There's so  
6 many things that they throw out in the way to really let you know  
7 that when we want to do something we get it done, and that's it.

8 Q. "President Obasanjo was willing to speak with President  
9 Taylor on this matter. He informed the meeting that President  
15:05:45 10 Obasanjo also wanted President Taylor to know that he needs a  
11 deal now with President Taylor clearly involved constructively.  
12 According to Ambassador Greenstock, it was also important to  
13 consider the length of the political period leading up to  
14 elections, but it was up to Sierra Leone to decide on that issue.

15:06:09 15 In that regard, he suggested that President Taylor could also  
16 take concrete steps to counsel General Sesay, as a prolonged  
17 vacuum could not be in anyone's interest."

18 So Greenstock is saying that you should counsel General  
19 Sesay. What did you understand that to mean, Mr Taylor?

15:06:34 20 A. In the first - I didn't even try to. I objected to this  
21 immediately. Because what Greenstock is saying, "That's your  
22 little boy that you control, so go and tell him what to do." I  
23 was having none of that nonsense. And they had gone to Obasanjo,  
24 and Obasanjo tells them very - you know, they were trying to do  
15:06:52 25 that divide and rule. Obasanjo told them, he said, "Listen, we  
26 know what President Taylor has been doing in this region and we  
27 want him involved." They were trying to undermine. Now he comes  
28 here and says in smooth, diplomatic language, "We want you to  
29 counsel." I was not Sesay's counsellor. He was not my boy. I

1 didn't control them. In other words, he is really saying here:  
2 "You control them, so talk to them and bring them under control."  
3 I was having none of this.

15:07:32 4 Q. "President Taylor observed that there was a need to call an  
5 urgent meeting to deal with a signed agreement on ceasefire."

6 Pause. Now, remember this is 14 October, Mr Taylor, and on  
7 5 October you had sent out your emissary, Vice-President Blah,  
8 with a letter trying to set up an emergency summit of ECOWAS. By  
9 the 14th, this meeting, had that taken place?

15:08:05 10 A. No, it had not taken place yet. It had not taken place.

11 Q. "President Taylor observed that there was a need to call an  
12 urgent meeting to deal with a signed agreement on a ceasefire.

13 He proposed that it could be done in Bamako prior to the further  
14 deployment of forces. He was of the view that no disarmament

15:08:24 15 will take place in the absence of deployment. President Taylor

16 further emphasised his concern about delays in moving ahead and  
17 suggested that UNAMSIL and the RUF might raise the bar on the

18 level of the contacts between the two organisations. He did not  
19 think that it was wise to continue seeking solutions to Sierra

15:08:52 20 Leone's problems outside the arena of conflict and urged that  
21 support should be given for talks to take place on Sierra Leonean

22 soil. The President pointed out that the RUF must know what they  
23 want, as they have begun the transformation from warring faction

24 to political party. Such a party mechanism, he said, should be  
15:09:18 25 given a chance to establish itself on the ground. The political

26 leadership of the organisation must be given the opportunity to  
27 get itself organised. In that regard, he lamented that 'All the

28 political muscle of the RUF is locked up in Freetown'."

29 What's a reference to?

1 A. Foday Sankoh was not the only one arrested at that time.  
2 There were quite a few other senior people. I didn't know the  
3 exact amount, but we had reports that some senior, senior RUF  
4 people were also arrested.

15:09:59 5 Q. "He advised that 'those who must be put on trial must be  
6 put on trial. Those who need to be let go, must be let go'."

7 Yes, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. "President Taylor further offered to invite them to sign an  
15:10:21 10 agreement, but cautioned that this time it could be somewhat more  
11 difficult because of Sankoh's actions."

12 What are you referring to there in terms of Sankoh's  
13 actions?

14 A. Well, it was alleged that the fracas - the information that  
15:10:41 15 got to us was that the fracas that occurred that led to Sankoh's  
16 arrest was provoked by him by firing on unarmed demonstrators,  
17 and so my concern now is that with Sankoh being in - that action  
18 resulted to many of the senior RUF political figures being  
19 arrested. Those actions are what I'm referring to, now have a  
15:11:10 20 backlash on what they want to do.

21 Q. Okay, and then the writer goes on, paragraph 16:

22 "Deputy US Permanent Representative Ambassador Cunningham  
23 read a statement which provided clarification on the United  
24 States' policy regarding visa restrictions imposed on the  
15:11:38 25 Government of Liberia officials and their families. He was  
26 appreciative of President Taylor's frankness and in the same  
27 spirit disclosed that Washington was not happy with how he works.  
28 Ambassador Cunningham cautioned that unless President Taylor used  
29 his considerable authority to ensure that Sierra Leone diamonds

1 were used for the benefit of Sierra Leonean development, the  
2 United States government was prepared to contemplate other  
3 measures. Ambassador Cunningham called on President Taylor to  
4 create a credible process that would enable his government to  
15:12:20 5 work with other governments and added that the US was willing to  
6 work towards a restoration of ties in its relationship with  
7 Liberia which is 'in peril'.

8 The permanent representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador  
9 van Walsum, sought an explanation as to why General Sesay, who is  
15:12:53 10 assessed as being politically unimpressive and decidedly  
11 insignificant, would be allowed to assume such a heavy  
12 responsibility as the leadership of the RUF entailed. President  
13 Taylor responded that in the field Sesay had acted for Sankoh as  
14 a commander. He urged the ambassador to look beyond his  
15:13:15 15 insignificant appearance to see whether he could deliver the  
16 goods. As to whether Sesay could be a politician, the response  
17 was negative, but here again President Taylor sought the help of  
18 the council on behalf of the political voices of the RUF, who are  
19 locked up in Freetown."

15:13:44 20 Pause there. Mr Taylor, earlier in this document we saw at  
21 the end of paragraph 14 the suggestion that you should take  
22 concrete steps to counsel General Sesay. Do you see that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. When we go back over the page now to the passage we've just  
15:14:10 25 read, Sesay is being described by a member of this mission as  
26 politically unimpressive and decidedly insignificant. Did you  
27 see a connection between those two comments that you should  
28 counsel this politically unimpressive and decidedly insignificant  
29 individual? Did you see a connection?

1 A. Yes, big connection. This fellow was really saying  
2 something that was - from how we read it at that particular time  
3 that was - I almost consider it as being very rude on his part to  
4 describe another human being in such a way. But the deeper link  
15:14:59 5 is that he's saying, "But, look, Taylor, here you are, you have  
6 taken your little boy who really can't do anything. You've  
7 brought him here and you've given him to the world. We don't  
8 think he - I mean, from what we look at, this looks like one of  
9 your little hand-picked individuals that you want to do  
15:15:24 10 something, and we don't think that is going to work." This is  
11 what he's really saying here. There is a link. There's a direct  
12 link. So because you've brought this known entity to us, well,  
13 go and counsel him, go and control him, go and tell him what to  
14 do. But I dealt with - some of the things that we talked, you  
15:15:47 15 can't get all here, but I dealt with it. You know, maybe when  
16 they come to think that we are not educated too, but I dealt with  
17 it.

18 Q. Well, let me ask you a very blunt question then, Mr Taylor.  
19 Had you selected Issa Sesay, that unimpressive and decidedly  
15:16:05 20 insignificant individual, to become the interim leader of the RUF  
21 because it suited your purpose because you could control him?

22 A. No. That's why he felt he was being smart, but he had  
23 forgotten how Issa Sesay - or maybe they didn't even care to  
24 know. You can tell that at least they were not properly briefed.  
15:16:27 25 If he had cared or if he were properly briefed, he would have  
26 known how Sesay became leader of the RUF. And because of this  
27 level of thinking - this is the some of the same ideas that  
28 floated around in putting together this whole case against  
29 Charles Taylor. He sent for Issa Sesay, he came and he installed

1 him as the leader of the RUF and he sent him away, knowing the  
2 facts - knowing the facts are quite different from what is being  
3 stated right now, okay. They've always known this. But this is  
4 the type of thinking that had been reflected in some of their  
15:17:03 5 minds.

6 So he didn't really care about ECOWAS leaders meeting in  
7 Monrovia, taking a decision along with Sesay and Sesay's  
8 so-called War Council and that those same Presidents, with the  
9 very Tejan Kabbah, sat down, as Foday Sankoh signed a letter  
15:17:22 10 authorising the interim leadership. Nobody wants to look at  
11 that. It is factual. And even Kabbah talks about it when he  
12 meets the Truth Commission. All this information is out there.  
13 Nobody wants to take it seriously, but it is the fact, other than  
14 what people want to portray as what I did in the Sierra Leonean  
15:17:43 15 crisis. So I do see the connection. There is.

16 Q. "French Deputy Permanent Representative Ambassador  
17 Doutriaux referred to the relationship between Liberia and Guinea  
18 and appealed to President Taylor to make a positive contribution  
19 to the work on confidence building undertaken by Presidents  
15:18:09 20 Konare and Obasanjo as well as by ECOWAS Executive Secretary  
21 Kouyate. He reiterated that the positive contributions by  
22 Liberia and Guinea would go a long way to end the conflict and  
23 alleviate the plight of refugees. President Taylor responded  
24 that his Vice-President had only just returned from a four-nation  
15:18:35 25 trip within the region to canvass support for an emergency  
26 session of ECOWAS to deal with the three incursions into Liberia  
27 from Guinea.

28 President Taylor made a special appeal to the United States  
29 to 'consider its own stance in the world as the only superpower'.

1 He appealed to the United States to demonstrate its adherence to  
2 the concept of justice and fair play in its dealing with Liberia.  
3 He reminded the US deputy permanent representative that the  
4 burden of proof was on the US, which should not continue to  
15:19:10 5 confront Liberia with only accusations, but also with verifiable  
6 facts. He reiterated Liberia's innocence of the accusation of  
7 fueling the crisis in Sierra Leone by supporting the RUF with  
8 arms and diamond smuggling. He emphasised that Liberia cannot do  
9 without the United States. Liberia, he said, wants peace and  
15:19:37 10 development, not conflict.

11 The Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, Ambassador  
12 Chowdhury, referred to public reports on 'conflict diamonds' and  
13 asked whether the Government of Liberia had any knowledge of such  
14 diamonds or arms passing through its territory. President Taylor  
15:20:02 15 responded that the control of diamonds is a serious and difficult  
16 undertaking. According to him, 'People do all sorts of things  
17 with diamonds. Some swallow them.' He said that he was sure  
18 that from time to time, diamonds did transit Liberian territory,  
19 but not with the specific knowledge or acquiescence of the  
15:20:31 20 Government of Liberia. There was no control whatever by his  
21 government over diamonds exported from the country."

22 Are you saying that that trade was totally unregulated,  
23 Mr Taylor?

24 A. It's very difficult. You cannot regulate - to talk about  
15:20:55 25 regulating diamond trade is like regulating drug trade. Even  
26 with the Kimberley Process, it's going to be tough. It's very  
27 difficult. It was unregulated. Very difficult. Even with the  
28 border - now in America where they're building a fence between  
29 the United States and Mexico, they're not going to stop the

1 drugs. It's a very difficult situation, trying to control a  
2 little rock that everybody's going out to find. You can find it,  
3 you can swallow it, you can eat it, do all kinds of things with  
4 diamonds. You can hide it, move through the bushes, nobody will  
15:21:27 5 see you --

6 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, I understand all of that, but what I'm  
7 saying is, you have an economy in a precarious position because  
8 of the lack of inward investment. Surely, taxation imposed on  
9 diamond sales would be a source of income. So bearing all of  
15:21:50 10 that in mind, are you saying that you had no systems in place for  
11 the regulation of the sale of diamonds in Liberia? Do you follow  
12 me?

13 A. I follow the question. We have a tax system in Liberia.  
14 If it's followed, you will collect. If it's not followed, you  
15:22:09 15 will not collect any revenue. We did have a system.

16 Q. I'm sorry, Mr Taylor, I'm going to have to press you  
17 further.

18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I absolutely agree. I was going to say,  
19 he hasn't answered the question. The question was not whether  
15:22:31 20 you had a system of taxation but whether you had a system of  
21 regulation for the sale of diamonds in Liberia.

22 THE WITNESS: With that, there was not a system for the  
23 sale of diamonds. A system was being put into place. We did not  
24 have a system in place, no. We had a tax system that taxed  
15:22:55 25 revenues from diamonds, but that's different, because the type of  
26 system that people are talking about, they talk about a Kimberley  
27 system, certification, we did not have that.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. All right, Mr Taylor. Let's try and break it down a bit



1 further then. Was a diamond merchant in Monrovia required to  
2 register his credentials with the Liberian government or with an  
3 authority falling under the Liberian government?

4 A. Okay. There was not such a system. There was not such a  
15:23:45 5 system. I understand your question very well. There was not a  
6 law in Liberia at the time that set up that someone who bought a  
7 diamond had to pay a certain amount and register with the  
8 appropriate tax authority as a sale from diamonds. This is what  
9 - I had cut it short by saying that taxes were paid. Diamond was  
15:24:11 10 not being considered as it's considered now. People were  
11 registered, you buy and you sell, you had to pay an income tax  
12 based on your income, and it did not specify whether it was  
13 income from diamonds or income from wood. That's what I'm trying  
14 to cut it short to say.

15:24:33 15 Q. Well, I'm sorry, Mr Taylor, but I still have to press you  
16 further on this.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. For you, an economist, now President, did it not appear to  
19 be a logical thing to do to require that anyone dealing in  
15:24:51 20 diamonds in your country register, because it could be a  
21 lucrative source of government income? Didn't it cross your  
22 mind?

23 A. People dealing in diamonds were registered as business  
24 people. Yes, they were registered.

15:25:08 25 Q. Yet, were they registered as businessmen or were they  
26 registered as diamond dealers?

27 A. They were registered as businessmen. That's what I am  
28 trying - honestly, they were registered as businessmen and  
29 reported an income from their business. They were not registered

1 specifically as a diamond man. Or this other man is saying, "I'm  
2 a timber man." It's not done - you register as a business and  
3 you pay an income from that business. So we lost a lot.

15:25:43 4 Q. Now, you did have a government department called the  
5 ministry of land and mines, didn't you?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And the minister responsible for that department was one  
8 Jenkins Dunbar.

9 A. That is correct.

15:25:58 10 Q. Also known as Mineral?

11 A. Yes, that was his code, yes.

12 Q. Now, help me, did that department keep any records  
13 regarding the quantity of diamonds produced, the sale of diamonds  
14 or the export of diamonds, given its name, ministry of lands and  
15 mines?

15:26:16 16 A. No, we did not have that.

17 Q. Why not?

18 A. Because the ministry of lands and mines was not responsible  
19 for sale. They do not collect revenues. They are not  
15:26:32 20 responsible. Their responsibility was to identify areas, give  
21 out certificates of claim of where to work. After that point,  
22 they were not involved anymore.

23 Q. Let's go back to the document, please:

15:27:06 24 "There was no control whatever by his government over  
25 diamonds exported from the country. Consequently, there was  
26 nothing in his government's budget on revenues from diamonds."

27 Does that mean that you as the President could not identify  
28 what portion of your income came from diamond sales?

29 A. No, we could not. We could not.

1 Q. "The President rejected claims that Liberia may have  
2 exported \$1.7 billion worth of diamonds. He expressed his  
3 agreement with the Security Council's resolution on the  
4 establishment of a mechanism to control the sale of diamonds but  
15:27:52 5 cautioned that, without the cooperation of buyers, this could  
6 prove futile. He pointed to the fact that most of the traders  
7 around who sold diamonds on the outside were Lebanese  
8 businessmen. On the question of arms, he said that arms might  
9 have travelled into Sierra Leone from Liberia as most of ULIMO's  
15:28:19 10 combatants did not disarm."

11 Pause there - no, before we pause, let's read on a little  
12 further:

13 "In addition, the border areas between Liberia and Sierra  
14 Leone were controlled by ULIMO forces up until the time of his  
15:28:45 15 assumption as President of Liberia."

16 Now, Mr Taylor, at the time you made that statement to this  
17 mission, had you seen the salute report prepared by Sam Bockarie  
18 in September 1999 for his leader Foday Sankoh?

19 A. No, no, no. I had not seen it, no.

15:29:09 20 Q. So when you were speaking here of this connection between  
21 arms travelling across the border and ULIMO, on what basis were  
22 you making that assertion?

23 A. Most of the senior ULIMO generals that joined us after my  
24 election in 1997 told us that they used to sell weapons to the  
15:29:36 25 RUF people. That's how we got to know.

26 Q. So you knew of that connection before you saw it confirmed  
27 in Sam Bockarie's salute report?

28 A. Definitely. Sheriff and all of them. The very Varmuyan  
29 Sheriff had told us that this is how they survived on that side.

1 Q. "That notwithstanding, he reiterated that the RUF had no  
2 problems with arms. He repeated that for as long as there are  
3 crooked peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, the RUF will buy arms. He  
4 again reminded Ambassador Chowdhury that the NPFL had bought arms  
15:30:21 5 from the peacekeepers during the Liberian conflict.

6 In his summation, and in response to President Taylor's  
7 appeal for the lifting of the arms embargo on Liberia',  
8 Ambassador Greenstock explained that it was not wise to consider  
9 lifting it at this time on account of Liberia's current profile  
15:30:46 10 and on account of the security situation in the sub-region.

11 President Taylor protested that this was unfair and reiterated  
12 his call for the Security Council to protect Liberia. Ambassador  
13 Greenstock warned that Liberia was in trouble and cautioned  
14 President Taylor that, 'We look to your actions more than your  
15:31:09 15 words. Serious action by you is needed.' President Taylor  
16 brought the meeting to its conclusion with the promise, 'I will  
17 do the best I can to move forward Liberia's interest, which is  
18 peace'."

19 Now, Mr Taylor, when you were being told by Ambassador  
15:31:32 20 Greenstock that Liberia was in trouble, what did you understand  
21 that to mean?

22 A. Well, exactly what followed. That they had decided to  
23 destroy my government, that's all, and that Liberia - that's what  
24 he meant, that we are telling you now that we are going to expect  
15:31:53 25 the worst.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we move on can I ask, please,  
27 that this document be marked - which is notes taken by Felix  
28 Downes-Thomas, the special representative of the  
29 Secretary-General at a meeting on 14 October 2000 between the

1 United States Security Council mission and the Government of  
2 Liberia, be marked for identification MFI-170, please.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-170.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:32:38 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help us. Following that visit and meeting  
6 on the 14th, was there any response by the Government of Liberia  
7 to Ambassador Greenstock's mission?

8 A. Yes. Immediately following that meeting the - after all of  
9 the veiled threats and we knew what was coming, I instructed the  
10 foreign minister to write a letter to Ambassador Greenstock  
11 outlining again from an official perspective what Liberia's  
12 positions were and what to expect from the government.

13 Q. Let us look, please, behind divider 96. What is that  
14 document, Mr Taylor?

15:34:09 15 A. This is the letter from the foreign minister to Ambassador  
16 Greenstock.

17 Q. And we see that it's dated two days after the meeting on 16  
18 October:

19 "Dear Ambassador Greenstock, the President of Liberia has  
15:34:37 20 directed me to convey to you that the government and people of  
21 the Republic of Liberia take cognisance of the important and  
22 historic visit to Liberia of the United Nations Security Council  
23 mission that you headed. The crucial discussions held pertaining  
24 to the Security Council resolutions on Sierra Leone aimed at  
15:35:03 25 aiding the implementation of measures taken by Secretary-General  
26 Kofi Annan are reassuring.

27 Reflectively, we are particularly encouraged by your  
28 understanding of the critical nuances relating to security and  
29 stability in the Mano River Union. We are also pleased that your

1 mission was receptive of the Liberian government proposals in  
2 line with the objectives of ECOWAS for a speedy resolution of the  
3 conflict in Sierra Leone.

4 The President of Liberia has consequently conveyed to his  
15:36:01 5 colleagues, Their Excellencies, Olusegun Obasanjo, President,  
6 Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of  
7 Nigeria, and Alpha Oumar Konare, President of the Republic of  
8 Mali and Chairman of ECOWAS, the following key points of his  
9 proposal. They are as follows:

15:36:21 10 1. That a meeting be convened within two weeks by ECOWAS.  
11 Such a meeting should bring together the Sierra Leonean  
12 government and the new RUF leadership to negotiate and sign a  
13 formal ceasefire agreement and a commitment to work cooperatively  
14 for peace. President Taylor would be pleased to host such a  
15:36:47 15 meeting in Monrovia and help derive a constructive and positive  
16 result.

17 2. Following the signing of the ceasefire agreement,  
18 ECOWAS forces working under UNAMSIL should be speedily deployed  
19 in RUF-controlled territory to make use of the window of  
15:37:07 20 opportunity provided by the lull in the fighting.

21 3. Immediately following the deployment of UNAMSIL forces,  
22 demobilisation and disarmament should recommence.

23 It is our conviction that progress can be made if we  
24 maintain a commonality of understanding as events unfold in the  
15:37:30 25 weeks and months ahead. We believe that Liberia can play a  
26 constructive role in these endeavours.

27 Kindly share the contents of this letter with your  
28 colleagues of the Security Council.

29 I am further enclosing a summary of the highlights of the

1 discussions held with President Taylor."

2 That summary is the document which we looked at earlier?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. The document behind divider 94, yes?

15:38:10 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Can that letter, please, letter from the  
7 Liberian Foreign Minister to Ambassador Greenstock, dated 16  
8 October 2000, may that become MFI-171, please.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That document is marked for  
10 identification MFI-171.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall that you had written to  
13 President Clinton in August?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15:38:51 15 Q. Did you get any kind of a response from the US government?

16 A. A letter was written by Sandy Berger, sent, that we did not  
17 respond to.

18 Q. Did you receive a response from the President himself?

19 A. No, I did not.

15:39:16 20 Q. So this letter from Sandy Berger, was that meant to be a  
21 response to your letter in August?

22 A. Well, it was supposed to. Because what he says in his  
23 letter, he says he addressed the issue directly that I wrote the  
24 President about. And so he responded to it, but we didn't  
15:39:39 25 respond to him.

26 Q. Have a look behind divider 95, please. Is that the letter?

27 A. This is it, yes.

28 Q. We see that it's dated 16 October 2000?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, we see that it's on White House headed paper dated 16  
2 October 2000:

3 "Dear Mr President, while I appreciate the intent of your  
4 recent letter to the President, I must unfortunately conclude  
15:41:12 5 that your actions have not matched your words, particularly with  
6 regard to support for the RUF rebels.

7 In your letter you state your commitment to the US  
8 objectives, as communicated by Under-Secretary Pickering, of  
9 attaining an immediate diplomat solution to the civil war in  
15:41:42 10 Sierra Leone. However, your support for the RUF continues,  
11 enabling it to disrupt the United Nations peacekeeping mission  
12 and prolong the misery of the war-weary people of Sierra Leone.  
13 Until you cease such support, the conflict in Sierra Leone, and  
14 the misery of the people of Sierra Leone, will not end."

15:42:05 15 Mr Taylor, tell me, did you ever receive a document from  
16 the United States government, or, indeed, the British government,  
17 saying, "We know for these reasons that you are supporting the  
18 rebels in Sierra Leone"?

19 A. No, I've never. Because if such a document existed, it  
15:42:33 20 would probably be in this Court right now. Never, never, ever.

21 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: The record shows the author as Sandy  
22 Berger.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: But letter this written is not by a Sandy  
15:42:55 25 Berger.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: It's written by a Samuel Berger.

27 THE WITNESS: Okay. It's Samuel, but he was called most  
28 times - this is a short stuff, and I think your opposite side  
29 will recognise - Sandy, Samuel. But everybody just used to call



1 him Sandy Berger, but it is Samuel R Berger for the record, but  
2 it's Sandy Berger. They call him Sandy Berger.

3 MS HOLLIS: If I could just be of assistance on that. The  
4 Prosecution would agree that he was often referred to as Sandy  
15:43:43 5 Berger, this person Samuel.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I thought Sandy was his public name  
7 really. I didn't know he was called Samuel.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Neither did I.

9 Q. "As Under-Secretary Pickering has informed you, the United  
15:44:17 10 States would welcome a sincere effort on your part to cease all  
11 support for the RUF, to persuade RUF rebels to demobilise, to  
12 cease your involvement in activities that destabilise the region  
13 and to legally abide by diamond export controls. We might, under  
14 some circumstances, consider a monitoring regime along the lines  
15:44:38 15 you mentioned in your letter. Such a regime would lack  
16 effectiveness and credibility, however, absent genuine,  
17 transparent cooperation from all levels of the Liberian  
18 government. When and if you should decide to take the steps  
19 outlined above, we will be fully aware and will respond  
15:44:55 20 accordingly. Until that time, we must conclude that, sadly,  
21 Liberia is unwilling to commit itself to finding a solution to  
22 West African ills."

23 A bit of a blunt letter, that, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Yes.

15:45:11 25 Q. Did you respond to it?

26 A. No, we did not. We didn't see a need. We now knew that  
27 the American government - because the way national security works  
28 is very simple, the Under-Secretary of State comes, he tells you  
29 one thing. The ambassador of the United Nations is on the same

1 track. This is the national security adviser. This should tell  
2 you, if you've got any sense about yourself, that this is a  
3 decision by the United States government to continue along this  
4 line and they will not stop, just like as right now there are  
15:45:47 5 weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that we still haven't found.  
6 But they were on a course that the missile had been launched and  
7 there was no recall. So we didn't - of course, I didn't respond.  
8 If we had responded, I would have had my national security  
9 adviser write, Sandy Berger, but we just left it.

15:46:07 10 We were now convinced that America was on the course to do  
11 what she wanted to do and really didn't care if there were any  
12 critical information that they were prepared to provide. They  
13 had taken a decision at the highest level of the American  
14 government and it would take some time before it would be  
15:46:29 15 reversed. We knew that.

16 Q. Now, you will recall, Mr Taylor, that earlier we looked at  
17 a letter you addressed to the Secretary-General of the United  
18 Nations dated 25 September 2000. Do you recall that?

19 A. Yes, I do.

15:46:47 20 Q. Did you ever get a response to that letter?

21 A. Yes, he responded after this period, after the UN visit,  
22 recognising what I had said was factual and that he would urge  
23 the UNAMSIL forces to engage with the RUF as quickly as possible,  
24 yes.

15:47:12 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we come to look at the  
26 Secretary-General's response, can I ask, please, that the letter  
27 from Samuel R Berger, Assistant to the President for National  
28 Security Affairs, to President Taylor, dated 16 October 2000, be  
29 marked for identification, please, MFI-172.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-172.

2 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I note there is a received  
3 stamp on the top of that letter with what appears to be a  
4 handwritten notation saying "December 11/00" which could be 11,  
15:47:53 5 2000, or it could be 11 o'clock, but am I to take it from that  
6 that it was received in December?

7 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honour. This is very  
8 late.

9 JUDGE DOHERTY: Yes, two months after the date it is dated.

15:48:09 10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Can you explain how that comes about, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Maybe they wanted something. I don't know. But it  
14 shouldn't take this long. But at the time it was received at the  
15:48:27 15 - at our area, we would normally stamp it. You see most of the  
16 letters are stamped. I can't account for that. I'm sorry, I  
17 can't help with that. I would hate to say something that is  
18 incorrect, but I can't help as to why it took this long.

19 Q. Because it is an inordinate period of time, isn't it?

15:48:48 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. Yes. Now, we were moving on, were we not, to deal with the  
22 response of the Secretary-General to your letter of 25 September?

23 A. That is correct, yes.

24 Q. Can we look, please, behind divider 98. Now, we see that  
15:49:33 25 there is a covering letter which encloses the letter which is on  
26 the second page.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And we see that the letter is dated 19 October.

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. "Excellency, thank you for your letter of 25 September 2000  
2 in which you brought to my attention the concerns of your  
3 government relating to the peace process in Sierra Leone since  
4 the change of leadership of the Revolutionary United Front.

15:50:24 5 As you know, in its report on the visit to Sierra Leone and  
6 other countries of the region, a copy of which is attached, the  
7 Security Council mission that met with you in Monrovia on 14  
8 October has made several important recommendations with regard to  
9 promoting the peace process and I am giving serious consideration  
15:50:47 10 to their earliest implementation. In the meantime, I have  
11 directed the United Nations mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, to  
12 follow up on the understanding reached with the RUF leadership at  
13 the 21 August meeting in Monrovia concerning the return of  
14 weapons and equipment seized from UNAMSIL as part of a dialogue  
15:51:17 15 that should lead to an early and effective ceasefire. To this  
16 end, it is my sincere wish that you would continue to exert all  
17 possible positive influence over the RUF. With this in mind, I  
18 would appreciate it if you could maintain continuous contacts  
19 with my Special Representative for Sierra Leone, Mr Oluyemi  
15:51:44 20 Adeniji, with the view to exploring practical ways to urgently  
21 put the peace process back on track."

22 Mr Taylor, help us, why this emphasis now on you being in  
23 contact with their special representative in Sierra Leone when  
24 you've already got a special representative in Monrovia?

15:52:06 25 A. Well, I guess it's just because of my role and he's saying  
26 that, look, you know, you can also talk to him in Sierra Leone.  
27 There is no specific reason, because Thomas is there. He's just  
28 saying that if there's an urgent matter, to just short circuit  
29 it, you can talk to Adeniji.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, Mr President, for that letter  
2 from the Secretary-General Kofi Annan to President Taylor, dated  
3 19 October 2000, could it be marked for identification, please,  
4 MFI-173.

15:52:55 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, marked MFI-173.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

7 Q. Now, what was happening in the Cote d'Ivoire at this stage,  
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. We had - fighting had flared up in La Cote d'Ivoire. They  
10 had started fighting. And there were some of these non-state  
11 actors that had shown up in La Cote d'Ivoire, Liberians also.  
12 And because I knew all of the parties --

13 Q. Pause for a moment. Non-state actors, do you mean former  
14 combatants?

15:53:45 15 A. Yes, I have used those expressions together before, yeah.  
16 These are the ex-combatants of the war that are referred to  
17 non-state actors, yes.

18 Q. So some Liberians had turned up in Cote d'Ivoire involved  
19 in that conflict?

15:54:02 20 A. That's it. On all sides, yes.

21 Q. So by this stage then, you've got Liberians involved in the  
22 Sierra Leone conflict and they're also now involved in the  
23 conflict in Cote d'Ivoire?

24 A. That is correct.

15:54:16 25 Q. And you were going on to say, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Well, I was going - I was then - we did a press release to,  
27 really, try to put the two sides on notice that we were aware  
28 that Liberians were over there and that we would not accept their  
29 stay over there, and if any of them could be arrested, they

1 should be arrested and tried in Ivory Coast because they had no  
2 business being there. We were trying to discourage Liberians  
3 from going across there and threatening that anyone going across  
4 that border that we find going over there for war purposes would  
15:54:59 5 be arrested and prosecuted.

6 Q. Now, you said a press statement was issued.

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Could you look behind divider 99, please. Do you recognise  
9 that document, Mr Taylor?

15:55:26 10 A. We - this is - I do recognise this document, but this is  
11 not the document dealing with the particular issue in question.  
12 This is another one that deals with the post - the pre-election  
13 process.

14 Q. Very well. Look behind divider 100 then, please. Do you  
15:56:04 15 recognise that document?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, let me ask you: Do we have a complete copy of  
18 this document here?

19 A. Let me see. This is not the complete - it should be signed  
15:56:36 20 if it's complete. I don't think this is the complete document.

21 Q. Very well. Let us leave this document for now and I'll  
22 cause checks to be made to provide a full copy.

23 Now, speaking of that conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, Mr Taylor,  
24 where is Sam Bockarie at this time, October 2000?

15:57:16 25 A. October 2000? Sam Bockarie is still in Liberia by October  
26 2000. He's still in Liberia.

27 Q. Is he still residing in the compound provided by you?

28 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

29 Q. Has his presence in Liberia caused any difficulties or

1 problems?

2 A. Of course, they've always - they've been causing problems,  
3 yes.

4 Q. But internally, within Liberia, has his presence caused any  
15:58:04 5 problems?

6 A. Not really. Not really, no. Internal to Liberia, no.

7 Q. And, Mr Taylor, during this, what, ten months or so, by  
8 October 2000, that he's been in Liberia, how regularly do you see  
9 him?

15:58:28 10 A. Not regularly. Because Sam Bockarie is now a free man in  
11 Liberia. He is not of any VIP importance to me. I don't see him  
12 regularly, no. There's no need to see him.

13 Q. Do you see him at all?

14 A. Once in a while, I would hear of him but, no, I don't  
15:58:55 15 really see Sam or know what he's doing.

16 Q. I mean, we need to have an idea of your relationship with  
17 him at this time because it might be of assistance in determining  
18 your prior relationship. Did you regard Sam Bockarie as a  
19 friend?

15:59:16 20 A. No. Sam Bockarie was not a friend to me. Sam Bockarie I  
21 looked as just as a young man that could be my son. He was young  
22 enough to be my son, may I put it that way. In fact, my oldest  
23 daughter is older than Sam Bockarie. So he was not a friend of  
24 mine, no.

15:59:38 25 Q. Did he refer to you as Papay?

26 A. Well, that question there, people call me many names,  
27 including Papay. Sam Bockarie used that word Papay too, yes, but  
28 so did hundreds of thousands of other people. In fact, in  
29 Liberia right now you ask about President Taylor, they say, "Oh,

1 the Papay." So the name Papay, that's what I'm talking about.

2 But we have to be careful about how that word is applied to - any  
3 older person is called - old man - "Papay". "Papay" really means  
4 old man. So they called me old man, yes.

16:00:15 5 Q. And by this stage, we're talking about October 2000, what's  
6 the position regarding those who had accompanied Sam Bockarie  
7 into exile in Liberia?

8 A. By October, this time these boys are - they have - some of  
9 them have gone through the first initial training programme.

16:00:47 10 Some of them have qualified for officers training. They are now  
11 in training for about a year, and some of them are already in  
12 active service with the ATU.

13 Q. And what's the role of the ATU within Liberia?

14 A. The ATU was trained - very well trained as an  
16:01:13 15 anti-terrorist unit, and they were used in Liberia to provide  
16 protection to foreign embassies, diplomatic properties, major  
17 government ministries and agencies. They were trained to protect  
18 those environments.

19 Q. Why the use of the name Anti-Terrorist Unit?

16:01:42 20 A. You're talking about a war. Don't forget, Liberia is  
21 engrossed in a war now, attacks, and we do not know who is going  
22 to launch the attack from where. So this is the period where  
23 terrorism is being talked about a whole lot. And besides, we had  
24 had such a unit before, so --

16:02:04 25 Q. What was it called?

26 A. It was SATU. Special Anti-Terrorist Unit that had been  
27 trained by the Israelis some years before.

28 Q. Under whose regime?

29 A. President Doe's. And so all we did was to just move the



1 "S" off it and just call it Anti-Terrorist Unit and train a real  
2 good force for that purpose. But that force would also serve as  
3 the bedrock for the beginning of a new armed forces.

4 Q. Was it your own private army, Mr Taylor?

16:02:41 5 A. Charles Taylor never had his own private army. I was  
6 President of Liberia. The ATU was a paramilitary force,  
7 something similar to the police, that is authorised under the  
8 constitution of Liberia. No President in Liberia has ever had a  
9 private army, no.

16:02:59 10 Q. And did the ATU have a reputation for being a little  
11 heavy-handed at times, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Not to the best of my knowledge. They were the best  
13 trained and we could put them - I tell you, the ATU was so  
14 trained - we had visits from the military mission of the United  
16:03:22 15 States in Liberia that provided assistance to the ATU in terms of  
16 pencils, papers, notebooks. They were very happy, and the ATU  
17 provided security for the American diplomatic facilities in  
18 Monrovia. So I don't accept that they were a little  
19 heavy-handed, no. I don't accept that, no.

16:03:47 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Could I invite everyone to put this  
21 volume away from the moment, please, and to take up volume 4 of  
22 4.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, I want us to look at a series of photographs,  
24 and I seek your assistance with them in order to identify the  
16:04:36 25 occasions depicted in them. Okay?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Can we look behind divider 152. Mr Taylor, who do we see  
28 in this photograph?

29 A. You see me and the President of the Democratic Republic of

1 the Congo.

2 Q. Of where?

3 A. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila.

16:06:12 4 Q. Okay. Now, the gentleman seated to your left is Joseph  
5 Kabila, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Who are the other two white gentlemen in the background?

8 A. The one that is seated right behind the - excuse me,  
9 counsel, would it --

16:06:34 10 Q. Yes, it would be help. I think it would be best if you  
11 move over, Mr Taylor.

12 A. The gentleman seated here is a Libyan official. I don't  
13 recall who this is. This is also another Libyan official. He  
14 must be somebody from the foreign ministry. I don't know his  
15 name. We are just chatting here and he's listening in.

16 Q. Mr Taylor, what occasion is this?

16:07:11 17 A. You know, this - I'll put this to around 2001. We are in  
18 Sirte, Libya, and this is the occasion that we are in this  
19 serious, serious discussion from the OAU to what you have now as  
16:07:56 20 the African Union. This is around 2001.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I'm in the Court's hands for  
22 this reason: That we need to come to some kind of logical way of  
23 grouping together what is a large number of photographs, and I'm  
24 just wondering whether we should first of all identify the  
16:08:33 25 occasions, and then perhaps group them according to occasions?  
26 Would that be helpful?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think that's probably commonsense  
28 really, Mr Griffiths. It's not much point grouping them all  
29 under the one main heading if they're different occasions.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: I agree.

2 Q. All right, Mr Taylor, the photograph behind the next  
3 divider, 153, this is the same occasion - or at least it looks  
4 like it - yes?

16:09:07 5 A. That is correct, yes.

6 Q. Okay. Right. So what we're going to do is we're going to  
7 call this first batch OAU/African Union meeting, Sirte, Libya,  
8 2001.

9 A. Yes.

16:09:23 10 Q. Is that helpful?

11 A. That is help, yes.

12 Q. So OUA/AU meeting, Libya, 2001. Okay, so this is the  
13 second photograph in the series, yes?

14 A. Yes.

16:09:53 15 Q. Right, Mr Taylor. We now know who the personalities are in  
16 this photograph, don't we?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. It's yourself shaking hands with Joseph Kabila?

19 A. Yes.

16:10:08 20 Q. Yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And we see the two Libyan officials in the background, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And we see the gentleman now in the dark glasses to the  
16:10:19 25 left. Who is that?

26 A. This is a Secret Service personnel from Liberia, the  
27 Assistant Director for operation, Edward Thomas.

28 Q. What?

29 A. Edward Thomas. The Assistant Director of Liberian SSS, the

1 Secret Service of Liberia, SSS.

2 Q. Okay. Let's go behind the next divider. Is this the same  
3 meeting, Mr Taylor?

4 A. That is correct. We are walking together to the meeting  
16:11:04 5 hall, yes.

6 Q. Now, the gentleman to your right, is that the same Joseph  
7 Kabila?

8 A. Yes, that's Joseph.

9 Q. Is there anybody else you can assist us with in this  
16:11:20 10 photograph?

11 A. Well, the same gentleman, this is the Liberian Secret  
12 Service personnel here. This is a Secret Service personnel from  
13 the Congo. I don't know him. But I can't figure out anybody  
14 else.

16:11:41 15 Q. Okay. Over the page, DP75.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Joseph Kabila?

18 A. Yes, right here.

19 Q. Yes. Yourself?

16:12:02 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Colonel Gaddafi?

22 A. Right there.

23 Q. Who else can we see?

24 A. The gentleman right here is Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the  
16:12:20 25 President of Algeria.

26 Q. I'll help with a spelling in a moment, Mr Taylor. Anybody  
27 else you can help us with?

28 A. No, nobody of significance. This is just an interpreter -  
29 I don't know his name - an English interpreter. No.

1 Q. Let's go over to DP76. Same occasion?

2 A. Yes, same occasion, same people.

3 Q. Same occasion, same people. So we can move on then, yes?

4 A. Yes.

16:13:04 5 Q. DP77 you're in a tent, yes?

6 A. Yes, we are here in a tent.

7 Q. And who is "we"?

8 A. There is Joseph Kabila here. You can't see the head here,  
9 it is Gaddafi; this is the King of Lesotho; and this is myself

16:13:33 10 right here.

11 Q. So this is the king of Lesotho?

12 A. That is correct.

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Is that the King of Swaziland?

14 THE WITNESS: The King of Swaziland. Excuse, me, I said

16:13:50 15 Lesotho. The King of Swaziland. Thank you, Justice.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Seventy-eight, same occasion.

18 A. Yes, I'm sharing a joke with Bouteflika here, the President  
19 of Algeria, and I think this could be Joseph still looking on.

16:14:17 20 These are just other Libyans assistants of no significance.

21 Q. Spelling Mr President. Joseph Kabila, J-O-S-E-P-H, normal  
22 spelling. And then Abdelaziz Bouteflika, A-B-D-E-L-A-Z-I-Z, new  
23 word, B-O-U-T-E-F-L-I-K-A. And Swaziland, of course,

24 S-W-A-Z-I-L-A-N-D:

16:14:59 25 Q. Mr Taylor, over the page to DP79. This, according to  
26 what's written in the top left-hand corner, is a different  
27 occasion, isn't it?

28 A. Yes, this is a far different occasion.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: All right. Before we get into this

1 occasion, Mr President, can I ask that photographs DP72 to 78 can  
2 be all marked under MFI-174 so that DP72 would become MFI-174A  
3 et sequentes.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those photographs are marked  
16:15:44 5 MFI-174A to G.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Right, Mr Taylor, DP79. Where are we?

8 A. 79.

9 Q. Right, Mr Taylor. So what are we looking at here?

16:16:24 10 A. This is - July 2000, this is the arrival of Alpha Konare  
11 for the meeting in July.

12 Q. Meeting where?

13 A. At the Executive Mansion, the 26th celebration and the  
14 meeting with Issa Sesay.

16:16:43 15 Q. Right. So this is 26 July 2000, yes?

16 A. Yeah, and this is Alpha Konare arriving right here. This  
17 is Alpha Konare.

18 Q. So this is Alpha Konare in the middle?

19 A. That is correct.

16:17:03 20 Q. And the aircraft, Mr Taylor, where's that from?

21 A. This is a Nigerian government aircraft.

22 Q. And the person in white immediately behind him is who?

23 A. That's me.

24 Q. And the gentleman in the rather colourful cap, gold and  
16:17:27 25 red, who is he?

26 A. This is my deputy. This is the most senior deputy chief in  
27 Liberia.

28 Q. What's his name?

29 A. They call him Chief Jallah, J-A-L-L-A-H; Loon, L-0 - let's

1 call it L-0-0-N, Loon. It's a tribal name, Loon. The  
2 pronunciation is lung. Phonetically, lung. Let's say L-0-0-N-G.  
3 I don't know, but that's as close as I can get, your Honours.

16:18:21 4 Q. Mr Taylor, the gentleman in the black and gold cap just to  
5 his left, who is he?

6 A. He's another chief.

7 Q. And I guess that's another chief in the red and white?

8 A. This is a lady - you mean here?

9 Q. Yes.

16:18:30 10 A. This is a lady. She is a traditional elder, the lady right  
11 there. When Heads of State come like this, there is a programme  
12 here, there is a white chicken, here you can - and there are kola  
13 nuts that the chiefs and elders come to receive Heads of State  
14 and give them blessing as they arrive in the country. This is  
16:18:59 15 the traditional welcome.

16 Q. So that's a chicken?

17 A. Right here, it is a chicken. It's a white chicken.

18 Q. And that's a traditional sign of welcome, is it?

19 A. Definitely, yes.

16:19:17 20 Q. Over the page, DP80. Same occasion?

21 A. Just a minute. Yes, same occasion.

22 Q. I think we've got Alpha Konare in the safari jacket, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You in the white?

16:19:51 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And is that Obasanjo in the blue?

27 A. This is Obasanjo. Here arrives now and we are now walking  
28 him, yes.

29 Q. And this is where?

1 A. This is at Roberts International Airport.

2 Q. Right. So that's DP80. Let's go over the page.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Possibly I'm wrong here, but what was the  
4 description given in previous photo Abdelaziz, President of what?

16:20:34 5 THE WITNESS: Of Algeria.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Mr Taylor, this photograph now, which occasion is this?

8 A. This is a departure now. Alpha is returning. You can see  
9 this plane is smaller. He's returning from the visit to Liberia.

16:20:58 10 Q. Okay. And who is that shaking his hand?

11 A. That's the chief of protocol RL.

12 Q. Over the page, DP82, Mr Taylor. Who is that?

13 A. This is still at Roberts International Airport.

14 Apparently, just before Alpha walks to the plane, I'm bidding him  
15 farewell. Alpha Konare right here.

16:21:37 16 Q. Over the page, please, DP83. Same occasion?

17 A. Yes, this is just another photograph on another angle  
18 walking Obasanjo, who comes in after Alpha, we are walking him  
19 now from the plane to the waiting place.

16:22:20 20 Q. Can you help us with any other identities in this  
21 photograph or are they security personnel?

22 A. They're security personnel.

23 Q. Okay. Including the female?

24 A. Yes, she's a protocol officer.

16:22:36 25 Q. Right. Over the page, DP84. Is this the same occasion,  
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. Now, this is - let me see. This is a different occasion  
28 here. This could be probably in 2002. It's not the same  
29 occasion here. This is also a 26 July programme. I can see me



1 in uniform, so I know it's 26 July. But this looks like 2002.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. I'll tell you what we'll do, before  
3 we look at that one any further, so that we can keep to our  
4 categories, MFI-175, Mr President, A to E.

16:23:40 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. The photographs showing the Defence  
6 marking DP79 through to DP83 are marked for identification  
7 MFI-175A to E.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you say this is an Independence Day  
16:24:05 10 celebration?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Why do you know that?

13 A. The President of Liberia only wears uniform on this day.  
14 All Presidents of Liberia. Previous, myself and even now. You  
16:24:21 15 put on uniform on that day for certain occasions.

16 Q. Okay. So that is an Independence Day. Can you be certain  
17 about the year?

18 A. I tell you --

19 Q. If you can't, Mr Taylor, just say so.

16:24:36 20 A. I really - it looks closer to me to 2002. I would put it  
21 to 2002. But I really cannot be 100 per cent certain, but I know  
22 it's a 26th celebration, that's all.

23 Q. To the next divider, please. What have we got here now?

24 A. Now, this photograph is a smaller version - this is - I  
16:25:21 25 would put this to 1999. This is at the Barclay Training Centre,  
26 the military barracks in Monrovia, and this the occasion of the  
27 burning of the arms. I can tell from the - you can't see where  
28 I'm pointing to here. I can tell from the - this area is BTC.  
29 This is the tarmac at BTC and these are the leaders that came for

1 the burning of the arms.

2 Q. A particular date, can you help us with?

3 A. This is also in July. We do this in July around the 26th  
4 also.

16:26:05 5 Q. So this is July 1999?

6 A. That is correct.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: All right. What we'll do then is,  
8 Mr President, with your permission, the previous photograph about  
9 which Mr Taylor cannot be sure as to the date, save that it is an  
10 Independence Day celebration, can we call that one MFI-176,  
11 please, because it's a different event.

16:26:27 12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That photograph which has the  
13 Defence label DP84 is marked for identification MFI-176.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:  
15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this now, you say, is the occasion of the  
16 destruction of the weapons, yes?

16:26:48 17 A. That is correct.  
18 Q. And it's July 1999?

19 A. That is correct.

16:27:07 20 Q. And who do we see in the photograph?  
21 A. This is Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. This is Obasanjo right here.

22 This is a close version. There's a bigger version of this.  
23 Q. Over the page, please, 86. Who is that?

24 A. That's Tejan Kabbah, and this is upon me receiving him at

16:27:45 25 the airport. This is the same occasion.  
26 Q. This is the same occasion?

27 A. Occasion.

28 Q. If you flick back, you will see he's got the same tie and

29 suit on, and as the President of a country, you'd expect him to

1 have more than one tie.

2 A. Yes. So it's the same occasion. This is his arrival. I  
3 go to meet him. And you can see from the seating that he is  
4 arriving.

16:28:09 5 Q. Right. That's DP86, so we can group these two together.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Is this also Independence Day?

7 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour.

8 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: '99?

9 THE WITNESS: 1999, yes.

16:28:25 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Now, can we go over to the next photograph, please,  
12 Mr Taylor.

13 A. This is a totally different occasion.

14 Q. Right. Pause there, then.

16:28:37 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask then, Mr President, that those two  
16 photographs, DP85 and DP86, become our MFI-177A and B.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Those two photographs, DP85 and 86, are  
18 marked for identification MFI-177A and B respectively. And I'm  
19 thinking that might be an appropriate place to pause for the day.

16:29:17 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, just before we adjourn, I'll  
22 remind you that you're ordered not to discuss your evidence with  
23 any other person.

24 We will adjourn court now until 9.30 a.m. Monday morning.

16:29:32 25 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.  
26 to be reconvened on Monday, 24 August 2009 at  
27 9.30 a.m.]

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29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	27261
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	27261