



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 21 JANUARY 2010
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Thursday, 21 January 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:30:50 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J
9 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura, Christopher Santora and our case
09:31:25 10 manager, Maja Dimitrova.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,
12 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay
13 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah and Mr Terry Munyard of
14 counsel.

09:31:41 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Before we begin, Ms Hollis, I think on
16 Tuesday you had undertaken to let the Court know how much longer
17 cross-examination would take. Have you been able to work
18 something out yet?

19 MS HOLLIS: Yes, Madam President. Madam President, the
09:32:00 20 Prosecution's estimate for the remaining cross-examination is
21 seven to eight days. Of course, that is an estimate. We will
22 try to be very efficient with our time. It will of course be
23 dependent on how concise and direct the answers are to the
24 questions that are asked. But that is our estimate, seven to
09:32:21 25 eight days.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Griffiths, is that
27 helpful?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: That is extremely helpful, Madam President,
29 and it will allow us now to organise ourselves in terms of the

1 future progress of the trial.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. In which case, Mr Taylor,
3 good morning. I remind you, as we always do, of your declaration
4 to tell the truth.

09:32:57 5 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

6 [On former affirmation]

7 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS HOLLI S: [Continued]

8 Q. Mr Taylor, you recall yesterday I was directing your
9 attention to questions and answers that had been elicited in and
09:33:06 10 provided on 16 November 2009. You recall that, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. And, just to remind ourselves, on 16 November 2009 the
13 questions relevant to yesterday were based on your testimony in
14 direct examination that during the time ECOMOG was in Liberia,
09:33:34 15 that force may have numbered as many as 18,000 or 20,000 troops.
16 That was a question that was put to you at page 31752 of 16
17 November and you were asked if that was correct and you said:

18 "A. Yes, that is fair. At the height of the deployment we
19 were told - and military people may inflate or deflate. We
09:34:02 20 were told at the height of the deployment there were about
21 18,000 troops.

22 Q. At one point you indicated perhaps a 20,000 figure
23 would be reflected ECOMOG and UN observers, is that right?

24 A. I want to stick closer to the 18 or 20, but that's a
09:34:21 25 reflection of all the military and other observers in the
26 country."

27 You remember that exchange back on 16 November, Mr Taylor?

28 A. I remember that exchange, yes, counsel.

29 Q. And you were also asked at that time that during your

1 testimony on direct you talked with the judges about your
2 recollection that at some point these 18,000 or so were deployed
3 throughout your county and you said, "Yes, throughout,
4 throughout." And then you were asked that you had indicated they
09:34:53 5 were deployed throughout your country both before the elections
6 and even after you had taken office and you said, "That is
7 correct. Not throughout my presidency, but, yes, following my
8 election after some months there was a draw down." Do you
9 remember that, Mr Taylor?

09:35:11 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Then it was put to you that the figures of 18 or 20,000
12 were not accurate, and also that most of the time they were not
13 deployed throughout your country. Do you recall those points
14 being put to you, Mr Taylor --

09:35:29 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- on 16 November. Then from that flowed a series of
17 questions about numbers relating to ECOMOG at various times and
18 also numbers relating to United Nations military observers.
19 Mr Taylor, do you recall that beginning on 16 November 2009?

09:35:48 20 A. I don't recall the date, but I recall the overall
21 discussions that you've described.

22 Q. And you recall at that time we did not have the benefit of
23 documents to refer to during those questions and answers?

24 A. That is correct.

09:36:00 25 Q. And so now, Mr Taylor, we are returning to some of your
26 answers on that topic now that we do have documents to refer to.
27 All right, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Okay.

29 Q. Now, you may recall, Mr Taylor, that on 17 November you

1 were unable to recall the numbers of Tanzanian and Ugandan troops
2 that came to join ECOMOG by January 1994. Do you recall that,
3 Mr Taylor?

4 A. That is correct.

09:36:31 5 Q. If we could please look back at what has now been marked
6 MFI-376, I believe; the document at tab 67 in annex 3, which is
7 the second progress report of the United Nations
8 Secretary-General on UNOMIL dated 14 February 1994. That is
9 binder 3 of 3 for annex 3. Madam President, I believe I have
09:37:38 10 that MFI number correct as 376?

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, you do.

12 MS HOLLIS:

13 Q. We see this second progress report and if we could turn to
14 paragraph 24 of that report, please. That should be on page 5.
09:38:13 15 We see at paragraph 24, expansion of ECOMOG force, subpart (c) of
16 paragraph 24:

17 "It will be recalled that, throughout the peace
18 negotiations in Geneva and in Cotonou, the expansion of ECOMOG
19 was viewed as a crucial prerequisite for the implementation of
09:38:36 20 the peace agreement."

21 Then if we skip down a sentence:

22 "The battalions from the United Republic of Tanzania,
23 consisting of 773 personnel, and Uganda, consisting of 796
24 personnel, arrived in Monrovia on 8 January and 28 January 1994
09:38:58 25 respectively. The Tanzanian battalion, located at Kakata, and
26 the Ugandan battalion, located at Buchanan, are preparing for
27 deployment to the northern and eastern regions of the country.
28 Consultations with the government of Zimbabwe are continuing on
29 the deployment of the third battalion of additional ECOMOG

1 troops."

2 So, Mr Taylor, as of January there were 773 personnel from
3 Tanzania and 796 personnel from Uganda who had joined ECOMOG. Do
4 you recall that now, Mr Taylor?

09:39:42 5 A. Yes, I accept the Secretary-General's explanation.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, you recall that during these questions and
7 answers about the presence and numbers of ECOMOG in your country,
8 we had also talked about the logistical and other difficulties
9 that ECOMOG had while they were in country. Do you recall that,
09:40:04 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. If we could look at paragraph 27, please. That is on page
13 6. We see the first sentence:

14 "The additional ECOMOG troops have not yet received the
09:40:23 15 logistic and maintenance support required for their deployment
16 throughout Liberia."

17 And then the last sentence:

18 "While I expect that this issue will be resolved shortly,
19 ECOMOG is facing major financial difficulties, which are of great
09:40:39 20 concern."

21 Then if we could look at paragraph 29:

22 "The existing ECOMOG troops are also facing difficulties in
23 their own logistic support. It should be remembered that the
24 present ECOMOG troops have been assisting the peace process in
09:40:58 25 Liberia since 1990. This effort is taxing the budgets of the
26 contributing countries."

27 So, Mr Taylor, again this is a reflection of these
28 continuing logistical and financial problems set out by the
29 Secretary-General in this report. Yes, Mr Taylor?

1 A. That is correct as it is set out in the report.

2 Q. Thank you. If we could please also in this same regard
3 look back at tab 21 in annex 3, which is the book "Liberia's
4 Civil War" by Dr Adebajo. For these purposes, Madam President, I
09:41:43 5 believe this has been marked MFI-372.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, basically; 372A and B.

7 MS HOLLIS:

8 Q. If we could please look at page 137 and if we could look at
9 the paragraph at the bottom of that page:

09:43:28 10 "By 28 January 1994, 773 Tanzanian and 796 Ugandan troops
11 arrived in Liberia to join the expanded ECOMOG."

12 So Dr Adebajo is also reflecting the numbers of 773
13 Tanzanian and 796 Ugandan troops. Yes, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, he is reflecting that. I agree with that figure now
09:43:56 15 as reported in the Secretary-General's report.

16 Q. And, Mr Taylor, he goes on to say: "They were part of the
17 OAU's contribution to assist the disarmament process but were
18 placed under ECOMOG command." And that was correct, was it not,
19 Mr Taylor?

09:44:12 20 A. I don't recall as to whether - I don't know the process,
21 but they were a part of ECOMOG. I don't know how the decisions
22 were made. I don't know.

23 Q. Now, Dr Adebajo goes on to say:

24 "The expected Zimbabwean contingent did not join ECOMOG due
09:44:32 25 to financial disagreements with the UN."

26 Do you recall, Mr Taylor, the Zimbabwean contingent failing
27 to join ECOMOG in Liberia?

28 A. Factually, I do not remember the presence of a Zimbabwean
29 unit, so I have to say that they were not a part of ECOMOG.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, Dr Adebajo goes on to say:

2 "Charles Taylor gave a hint of the difficult times ahead
3 for the peacekeepers when he warned that only the Liberian
4 National Transitional Government had the power to supervise
09:45:16 5 disarmament. This was contrary to the terms of the Cotonou
6 Agreement, which had given ECOMOG primary responsibility for
7 disarmament."

8 Mr Taylor, did you warn that only the Liberian National
9 Transitional Government had the power to supervise disarmament?

09:45:33 10 A. No. That - no. He incorrectly states my position at the
11 time. My position at the time - there were discussions of first
12 forced disarmament, and I said that from a legal standpoint only
13 the government had the power to disarm its army - and I mean
14 through the process of order - but that forced disarmament would
09:45:59 15 not be the right way to go.

16 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, if I could ask that this page
17 be marked as 372C.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Page 137 of Dr Adebajo's book is marked
19 as MFI-372C.

09:46:32 20 MS HOLLIS:

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall being asked about a January
22 1994 meeting in Gbarnga between yourself, the ECOMOG force
23 commander, General Inienger and the Tanzanian army Chief of
24 Staff, and this was at page 31826?

09:47:08 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And do you recall, Mr Taylor, also being asked if you
27 recalled making a statement that you would not disarm to the
28 Tanzanians or Ugandans until the transitional government had been
29 installed? Do you recall being asked about that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And also you were asked if you again called for a reduction
3 of ECOMOG troops and heavy weapons, and you indicated that you
4 did not recall making such a statement about not disarming to the
09:47:45 5 Tanzanians or Ugandans until the transitional government had been
6 installed, and you also said you did not recall again calling for
7 a reduction of ECOMOG troops and heavy weapons. Do you remember
8 that exchange, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Vaguely, yes.

09:48:01 10 Q. Now, if we could look again at number 21 - tab 21 in annex
11 3, this time at page 138. If we could look at the very top
12 paragraph, please. You see, Mr Taylor, this very top paragraph
13 talks about the ECOMOG field commander, General Mark Inienger,
14 travelling to Gbarnga with Tanzanian chief of army staff General
09:49:08 15 Kiwelu to discuss the disarmament requirements of the Cotonou
16 Agreement with you.

17 "At this meeting, the NPFL warlord bluntly told both
18 generals that he would not disarm his men to the newly arrived
19 Tanzanian and Ugandan ECOMOG troops until the Liberian National
09:49:28 20 Transitional Government had been installed. He also continued to
21 call for a reduction of ECOMOG troops and heavy weapons."

22 Mr Taylor, do you now recall making those statements?

23 A. First of all, I would like some help, counsel. This
24 document, where is this from, Adebajo's book?

09:49:50 25 Q. This is still Dr Adebajo's book, yes, Mr Taylor.

26 A. Okay, just to be sure, okay. I am not sure if this is the
27 meeting, but in all earnesty, I can remember making a statement
28 that I would not, in fact, disarm to ECOMOG until the LNTG was
29 installed. Now, as to whether it is at this specific meeting, I

1 can't be sure. But I can recall making such a statement that
2 until the transitional government has installed, that the NPFL
3 would not disarm. So I am not sure if this is the meeting, but I
4 can recall making such a statement.

09:50:31 5 Q. Do you recall again calling for a reduction of ECOMOG
6 troops and heavy weapons?

7 A. I recall making statements of reduction, but I don't recall
8 that it is at this specific meeting, because I made that
9 statement several times. I do recall making that statement. I
09:50:50 10 am just - my problem is this specificity of the date. I can't be
11 sure of the date, but I did make both of those statements.

12 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that this page 138
13 be marked as MFI-372D as in delta.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Page 138 is so marked.

09:51:13 15 MS HOLLIS:

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, there were many pronouncements during the
17 time that ECOMOG was in your country to the effect that ECOMOG had
18 insufficient financial support as well as insufficient logistical
19 resources, isn't that correct, Mr Taylor?

09:51:41 20 A. That is correct, yes.

21 Q. And indeed, these problems of logistical and financial
22 resources were echoed throughout the time that ECOMOG was in your
23 country, isn't that correct, Mr Taylor?

24 A. I wouldn't put it - well, you see, when you say
09:52:03 25 "throughout" I would just differ a little. I know they were
26 echoed at various points, but when you say "throughout", I can't
27 be sure as to the continuity of such problems. But I do know
28 that they were at different times. Depending on the situation,
29 there were pronouncements of difficulties.

1 Q. And those statements of concern about sufficient support
2 certainly were made in 1994; you recall that, yes, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes. 1994, yes.

4 Q. And also in 1995?

09:52:46 5 A. 1995? I could say yes. '95 we are about to set up the
6 transitional government. Yes, '95, yes.

7 Q. And indeed, there was a pronouncement that ECOMOG, which
8 had been entrusted with the primary responsibility for
9 supervising the implementation of the peace agreements in

09:53:16 10 Liberia, has been hampered in the performance of this complex
11 task by a lack of financial and logistical resources. That
12 concern was expressed in 1995, wasn't it, Mr Taylor?

13 A. I have just answered you and said yes.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, you will recall we also talked about a 7
09:53:38 15 March 1994 agreement actually that came about as a result of
16 meetings in Monrovia. You recall us talking about that? That it
17 called for - actually, it wasn't - yes, it was dated 7 March and
18 it called for three things to happen simultaneously: The
19 installation of the Liberian National Transitional Government;
09:54:05 20 disarmament; and deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL peacekeepers to
21 all areas of Liberia. You recall we talked about that?

22 A. Yes, that had been my view, yes.

23 Q. And because of these three events agreed upon, it was
24 sometimes referred to as the Triple 7 Agreement, and you
09:54:26 25 indicated that you didn't recall it being known by that name?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Yes? But you do recall that agreement with those three
28 things to occur simultaneously, yes?

29 A. Yes, that was the whole point of my - I do agree that - and

1 this was the reason for your first question when I said that we
2 would not disarm until a government is installed, then
3 disarmament, and then that. That's correct, I recall that.

09:54:57 4 Q. Mr Taylor, we also talked about whether you had a
5 recollection of the number of combatants who had been disarmed by
6 mid-May 1994, and you indicated that you did not recall the
7 number of combatants that were disarmed by that time. Do you
8 recall how many had been disarmed as of June 1994?

09:55:24 9 A. No. It's very difficult now. I know some had been, but I
10 don't know the specific number, counsel.

11 Q. And if we could perhaps assist in that by looking at
12 MFI-276. That is DCT-184. This is ECOWAS' official journal. If
13 we could look at page 23, please. Indeed, perhaps let's look at
14 page 22 first, and that will show us what this is in relation to.
09:57:00 15 We see, Mr Taylor that there is a final report, the second
16 meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECOWAS Committee
17 of Nine on the Liberian crisis at Tunis, Tunisia, 10 June 1994.
18 And then if we look at the next page of this final report, and we
19 see in subpart IV, "Report of the situation in Liberia since the
09:57:35 20 signing of the Cotonou Accord", and if we look at paragraph 13:

21 "The field commander recalled that by the terms of the
22 Cotonou Accord and the Monrovia Agreement of 15 February 1994,
23 disarmament and demobilisation of the warring factions were to
24 start concomitantly with the installation of the transitional
09:58:03 25 government. The disarmament process started on 8 March 1994
26 based on the schedule drawn out by ECOMOG and UNOMIL in
27 accordance with Section K, Article 2 of the Cotonou Accord. Out
28 of an estimated number of 60,000 combatants, only 3,000 had been
29 disarmed and demobilised. Generally, the disarmament process,

1 which had started on a note, had virtually grounded to a halt."

2 Then at paragraph 14 the field commander gives reasons for
3 the hampering of the disarmament process.

4 So, Mr Taylor, as of the time of this final report, 3,000
09:58:49 5 of the estimated number of 60,000 combatants had been disarmed
6 and demobilised. Do you recall that now, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Well, now, if you are asking me if I - I agree with this
8 report. As to recalling it - I agree with the report. And I
9 smile because we were busy fighting at that time, dealing with
09:59:12 10 the word concomitant and dealing with it. But I know the
11 particular situation, and I accept what the ECOWAS report says
12 here about the 3,000. I still wouldn't be able to say I recall
13 the number, but I agree with the 3,000. I agree with the report.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr Taylor. Perhaps we could also look at
09:59:37 15 paragraph 8 on page 22, the previous page, at the bottom of that
16 page where:

17 "The chairman recalled some of the major steps taken toward
18 the implementation of the Cotonou Accord and indicates that
19 although significant steps had been taken on the political front,
10:00:05 20 he recounted regretfully that little had been achieved on the
21 military aspects of the accord."

22 So, Mr Taylor, at this point this was the chairman
23 expressing his regret that little had been achieved on the
24 military aspects of the accord. Yes, Mr Taylor?

10:00:24 25 A. Well, again, I agree with the account as stated in the
26 document here. I have no reason - this is a Foreign Ministers
27 meeting, I was not there, but I agree with the account.

28 Q. Then if we could also look at tab 68 in annex 3. If we
29 could put the first page of the up, please, and show the very top

1 of that page. We see that this is United Nations
2 Security Council S/1994/1006, dated 26 August 1994, Sixth
3 Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
4 Observer Mission in Liberia. If we could please look at
10:02:12 5 paragraph 17 of that report:

6 "As a result of the continued fighting and lack of
7 security, the disarmament process has largely come to a halt. As
8 at 22 August 1994, 3,612 combatants (out of an estimated total of
9 about 60,000) had been disarmed and demobilised. My special
10:02:52 10 representative has reported that individual combatants have
11 indicated a willingness to disarm but that their leaders seem to
12 be halting the process. Since my last report, only 420
13 combatants have been disarmed. Faction leaders have not been
14 willing to allow their combatants to disarm, owing to the
10:03:12 15 pervasive atmosphere of mistrust among them, exacerbated by LPC
16 attacks against NPFL."

17 Mr Taylor, as of 22 August 1994 do you accept this figure
18 that only 3,612 combatants had been disarmed and demobilised?

19 A. Yeah, I have no reason to doubt the Secretary-General's
10:03:41 20 report here.

21 Q. And, Mr Taylor, it is also correct, is it not, that you and
22 other leaders of the factions had been halting the disarmament
23 process?

24 A. But I can't speak for the other leaders. I know, because
10:03:56 25 of exactly what the Secretary-General says here, because of
26 attacks on the NPFL, we had shown some delays, but I can't
27 account for the other leaders.

28 Q. So you certainly are in agreement to the extent that
29 because of these attacks by the LPC you had been delaying the

1 disarmament of your fighters. Is that right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Is that right, Mr Taylor?

4 A. On my side, that is correct.

10:04:25 5 MS HOLLIS: If we could ask that this document be marked
6 for identification.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Sixth Progress Report of the
8 Secretary-General on the UNOMIL, dated 26 August 1994, is marked
9 MFI-377.

10:04:42 10 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President:

11 Q. Mr Taylor, do you also recall on 17 November I asked you
12 about the merchant ship MV Sea Rose being held in ECOMOG custody?
13 Do you remember that, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes.

10:05:19 15 Q. That was at page 31854 and 31855?

16 A. Yes, I said I remember that.

17 Q. And I suggested to you, Mr Taylor, that the MV Sea Rose was
18 held in ECOMOG custody because it was a ship that was bringing
19 arms and war material to you, and you denied this. Do you
10:05:42 20 remember that, Mr Taylor?

21 A. I remember that very well, yes.

22 Q. I also suggested to you that you were receiving arms and
23 war material from outside Liberia during this time, and you also
24 denied that. Do you recall that, Mr Taylor?

10:05:56 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Now, if we could please look at tab 32 in annex 4, which is
27 "ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience", which was marked for
28 purposes of these questions as MFI-371. If we could look at page
29 105, please?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: For Mr Taylor's benefit, this is the book
2 by Colonel Festus Aboagye.

3 MS HOLLIS:

10:07:37

4 Q. Mr Taylor, would you like to see the cover page of that
5 book to remind yourself of it?

6 A. No, I believe what the President says.

7 Q. First of all, if we could look at the first paragraph under
8 "Operation Octopus, October 1992":

10:07:56

9 "The peace process was to take a further dive in late 1992.
10 Especially in September 1992, the NPFL received large shipments
11 of weapons and equipment including four tanks, 20 armoured
12 personnel carriers, tons of artillery pieces, anti-aircraft
13 missiles, small arms, and a number of French as well as African
14 mercenaries by both sea and air."

10:08:21

15 First of all, Mr Taylor, it is correct, is it not, that in
16 September 1992 your NPFL received large shipments of weapons and
17 equipment?

18 A. No.

10:08:38

19 Q. Mr Taylor, it is correct that you received those both by
20 sea and air, is it not?

21 A. No. The NPFL throughout - from 1989 until I left office,
22 we never had a tank, we never had an armoured personnel carriage.
23 Never, no. That's not true.

10:09:02

24 Q. Mr Taylor, do you agree that during that time, September
25 1992, you received tons of artillery pieces, anti-aircraft
26 missiles, small arms, and a number of French as well as African
27 mercenaries. Do you agree with that?

28 A. No, I disagree. I disagree. Artillery, we never ordered
29 artillery. We seized all from the armed forces. No, I disagree

1 100 per cent.

2 Q. If we can skip the next sentence, talking about the
3 shipments by both sea and air:

4 "They were made possible by the fact that enforcing the sea
10:09:37 5 and air blockade was difficult for a force that did not have
6 enough naval and air assets."

7 And that is correct, is it not, Mr Taylor?

8 A. No, I would disagree. There is only one airport in
9 Liberia, there are several seaports and the Nigerian had a navy
10:09:57 10 force out there and they had command of the airport. Now, let me
11 see, I want to be clear about this. If we are talking about
12 1992, no, they did not have control of Robertsfield. They would
13 control of Spriggs in Monrovia. But it was not very difficult
14 for them. They had the capabilities. I don't think so.

10:10:23 15 Q. If we could look at the very bottom of that page:

16 "ECOMOG responded by issuing a no fly order to search all
17 aircraft entering Liberian airspace, while the NPFL" - and this
18 is the part I'm interested in, Mr Taylor - "declared war on
19 ECOMOG, which had seized the Sea Rose, is German ship believed to
10:10:49 20 be ferrying supplies to Gbarnga."

21 Now, here the author says "a German ship believed to be
22 ferrying supplies to Gbarnga." In fact that ship was ferrying
23 supplies to Gbarnga, was it not, Mr Taylor?

24 A. No, absolutely not.

10:11:03 25 Q. And the seizure of that ship provoked your additional
26 response toward ECOMOG. Isn't that correct?

27 A. No. In fact, the incident in - as a reminder to the Court,
28 I remember the incident of the Sea Rose. ECOMOG did seize from
29 reports that we heard at that time a ship called the Sea Rose,

1 but it had no arms. In fact, the Sea Rose, if my recollection is
2 correct, was a rubber - a ship that was being brought in by
3 Firestone, if my recollection is correct, to transport rubber.
4 There was no arms or ammunition on the boat and that whole matter
10:11:46 5 fizzled out.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, we do see that there is a footnote for that last
7 sentence, footnote 19. If we could look at page 109, please. If
8 we could look at first at footnote 19:

9 "ECOMOG interceptions of ships with war-like materials or
10:12:14 10 whose captains confessed to delivering such materials to the NPFL
11 should have convinced ECOMOG that Taylor was arming for a major
12 operation, which was bound to be launched in time. An
13 Italian-registered ship flying the flag of Burkina Faso was
14 intercepted in 1991. The captain disclosed that he had sailed
10:12:36 15 from Tripoli with goods including arms and was sailing back to
16 Libya with rubber."

17 Mr Taylor, that's the ship that you just referred to, is it
18 not?

19 A. No, no.

10:12:49 20 Q. Mr Taylor, the footnote goes on:

21 "A truckload of arms labelled as foodstuffs from Burkina
22 Faso was also detained on the Ivorian border in 1991."

23 So, Mr Taylor, indeed during this time you were receiving
24 arms and war materials from outside Liberia. Isn't this correct?

10:13:10 25 A. Well, the way the question is posed, I have never denied
26 that the NPFL received arms from outside of Liberia, small
27 amounts. Most of our arms were inside. But it's strange here if
28 you look at that footnote, here is a ship - Burkina Faso is a
29 landlocked country. I don't see how a ship could have sailed to

1 Burkina Faso and load up and drive to Liberia. It's a landlocked
2 country, so --

3 Q. Mr Taylor, it doesn't actually say that. Let's read it
4 again.

10:13:38 5 A. No, it doesn't, but --

6 Q. "An Italian" --

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, can I inquire, given the
8 content of that footnote, whether this is being put forward for
9 impeachment purposes or as proof of guilt?

10:13:56 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Does it really matter? Does it matter?

11 MR GRIFFITHS: In our submission, it does because if it is
12 for the latter purpose then it seems to us that its incumbent on
13 my learned friend to justify the use of that material.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Because, Mr Griffiths, the Chamber has
10:14:18 15 consistently said in referring to passages in these document that
16 really the intention or purpose for which a piece of a paragraph
17 is read out is really immaterial when it comes to its use. That
18 if you stand up and object in time to its use, the Chamber can
19 consider those submissions regardless of the intention for which
10:14:46 20 the paragraph is read. So when you ask what does the Prosecution
21 intend to use it for, I think it's the wrong question. Are you
22 objecting?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I am objecting, and the reason for the
24 objection and the belated nature of my intervention is this: The
10:15:07 25 footnote to which - I was not aware that my learned friend would
26 be referring to footnote number 19 because it's not obvious on
27 page 105.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: But it is marked in the margin of this
29 document.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: I know it's marked in the margin on page
2 109, but I wasn't aware that she would - my learned friend would
3 be referring to it in conjunction with this particular passage,
4 otherwise I would have intervened at a much earlier stage. But
10:15:40 5 it seems to us, given the content of that footnote, that we are
6 here talking about material which goes to guilt, and in our
7 submission, it is - my learned friend should justify its
8 admission or use at this stage.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, would you like to respond,
10:16:04 10 please?

11 MS HOLLIS: May I suggest that before I respond I actually
12 be allowed to also go to footnote 18, which is what I was going
13 to do next, because I believe they are the same issue, and so we
14 could address both of them together.

10:16:22 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, you can't. You can't go to use 18
16 unless we have settled the issue of footnote 19. So please
17 address me or respond to the objection in relation to footnote 19
18 first.

19 MS HOLLIS: All right. First of all, Madam President, we
10:16:40 20 would suggest that the objection based on footnote 19 shows the
21 difficulty of the situation because there has not yet been an
22 objection to page 105, which talks about the seizure of the Sea
23 Rose, a German ship believed to be ferrying to Gbarnga. So that
24 also talks about supplies to Gbarnga, and also the paragraph
10:17:16 25 above talking about the shipment of weapons and equipment in
26 September 1992. And I would suggest to your Honours that Defence
27 counsel's initial question when he stood up is of significance in
28 your determination on this matter, and that is, it is of
29 significance when you are considering this matter to determine

1 the purpose for which this information will be asked to be used.

2 Now, we in our marking have not indicated the letters I and
3 G, and as we had explained in the disclosure cover letter, only
4 those sections we would ask to be used for the purpose of both
10:18:08 5 impeachment and guilt would be marked, and they would be marked
6 "I" and "G". So the Prosecution's intended purpose for this
7 footnote was for impeachment and we had made prior arguments,
8 both as to the interest of justice and the right to fair trial,
9 that materials that we are using for impeachment would not
10:18:36 10 violate the accused's right to fair trial, and it is in the
11 interest of justice to do so.

12 Those arguments are on the record. We would rely on those
13 arguments, and we would suggest that indeed the purpose for which
14 this information will be requested to be used should be a factor
10:19:00 15 that your Honours consider when you are looking at this two-prong
16 test about potential probative value. We are not asking that it
17 be considered for guilt.

18 We believe that those are significant factors that would
19 sway the balance in favour of the use of these materials, both as
10:19:19 20 in the interest of justice and as not violative of the rights of
21 this accused to a fair trial. That would be my response,
22 Madam President.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please let me confer with my colleagues
24 on this.

10:19:41 25 [Trial Chamber conferred]

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, we are trying to understand
27 your objection. When we look at the footnote, in light of the
28 passage and our interpretation thereof, we are trying to
29 understand how footnote 19 goes to guilt. Could you clarify that

1 for me, please?

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, we are here talking about the
3 importation of arms at or about a time when, it is suggested by
4 the Prosecution, this defendant was engaged in providing
10:22:25 5 assistance to the RUF. And even though I note that it is not
6 within the indictment period, nonetheless, much evidence has been
7 called by the Prosecution in relation to that issue. So to that
8 extent, in our submission, it's relevant to guilt.

9 [Trial Chamber conferred]

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: We've conferred. First of all, let me
11 say this: In our decision of 30 November and in subsequent oral
12 decisions, the Chamber has made it very clear that in determining
13 objections based on the content of a document and its use in
14 Court in cross-examination, the intention or purpose for which
10:23:38 15 the Prosecution intends it is immaterial and irrelevant in our
16 determination of whether the document will or will not be used.

17 What is relevant and what is important is whether
18 potentially the passage contains material that is probative of
19 guilt. It's not the intention for which it is meant, but rather
10:24:06 20 the content.

21 Now, in this particular case, we are of the opinion that
22 footnote 19, read together with the passage on page 105, is
23 definitely capable of proving the guilt of the accused, and
24 therefore footnote 19 cannot be used in this way. Because as far
10:24:38 25 as we are concerned, the two-fold test in our decision of 30
26 November has not been illustrated by the Prosecution.

27 MS HOLLIS:

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if we go back to page 105, the first part
29 of the paragraph under "Operation Octopus", October 1992, and we

1 see the sixth line down also gives us a footnote 18. Do you see
2 that, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes, I do.

10:26:03

4 Q. If we could go back to page 109 to footnote 18, which is
5 referred to in reference to these large shipments of weapons by
6 sea and air. We see footnote 18:

7 "An unmarked Russian plane arrived at Robertsfield with six
8 French and these weapons on 25 August 1992 prior to a shipment of
9 the four tanks and anti-aircraft missiles" --

10:26:32

10 MR GRIFFITHS: I am sorry --

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, can I indicate that my
13 objection to footnote 19 equally applies to my objection to
14 footnote 18. Note the date August 1992, at a time when,

10:26:57

15 according to this Prosecution, this defendant was earnestly, to
16 borrow a word, engaged in supporting the RUF. In our submission,
17 this too potentially goes to guilt, and in our submission, it
18 behoves the Prosecution to justify their use of this material.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, do you have anything
20 additional to respond?

10:27:21

21 MS HOLLIS: No, Madam President, we would rely on our
22 previous arguments.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

10:27:37

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: By a majority on the Bench, we disallow
26 the use of footnote 18 for the same reasons.

27 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that you mark page
28 105.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Page 105 of Mr Aboagye's book is marked

1 MFI-371B.

2 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President:

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, going back to the number of military
4 observers in your country. It is correct, is it not, that by
10:28:30 5 mid-September 1995, only about 52 United Nations military
6 observers were in the country, isn't that correct?

7 A. Counsel, I will rely on all the evidence that I have given
8 regarding these numbers. I have no way of confirming or denying
9 the proposition put because I don't recall or I am not on top of
10:29:03 10 the internal United Nations activities. But I admit, if there is
11 a United Nations document that shows that, I will have no reason
12 to dispute it. But I personally cannot recall the exact numbers.

13 Q. Could we please look at tab 184 in annex 1, again being
14 mindful that, since the tab sheets only go up to 100, it will be
10:29:35 15 marked as 84 in binder 3 of annex 1. This will be the Twelfth
16 Progress Report, dated 13 September 1995. If we see, this is
17 United Nations Security Council S/1995 --

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could you please hold on while we
19 find our way there.

10:31:13 20 MS HOLLIS: Sorry, Madam President. This would be binder 3
21 in annex 1. It should be marked as 84 inside the binder as the
22 tab numbers do not go above 100.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am afraid we don't appear to have that
24 particular folder. Could our legal officers search for binder 3
10:33:01 25 of 3, please?

26 MS HOLLIS: It would be binder 3 for annex 1.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is it possible for the Presiding Judge to
28 have a physical copy?

29 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, if they can't find it we do

1 have a clean copy we can provide you.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, we found the document. Please
3 proceed.

4 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

10:34:46 5 Q. We see the first page, "United Nations Security Council
6 S/1995/781, 13 September 1995, Twelfth Progress Report of the
7 Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
8 Liberia." If we could please first go to paragraph 15. We see
9 paragraph 15:

10:35:31 10 "In section VII of my last report (S/1995/473), I informed
11 the Security Council of my intention to withdraw those UNOMIL
12 military observers who, in the absence of a ceasefire and the
13 resumption of disarmament, could not perform their monitoring
14 functions effectively."

10:36:01 15 And then if we could look at annex 2 of this report, which
16 should be at page 13, and if we could have the top portion of
17 that as well, we see the composition of military component of
18 UNOMIL as at 31 August 1995 and in the far right column we see
19 total 52, and under observers we see 45. So, Mr Taylor, do you
10:36:51 20 accept as of 31 August 1995 there were a total of the military
21 component of UNOMIL of 52 in Liberia?

22 A. Based on this annex I have no reason to dispute the
23 Secretary-General's report on this issue.

24 Q. And of that 52, 45 were observers and seven were personnel
10:37:14 25 fulfilling other duties?

26 A. Well, it says "others" here, so I will just stick with what
27 the Secretary-General says.

28 Q. All right. Now, if we could also look at paragraph 43 of
29 this report:

1 "ECOMOG, which has been entrusted with the primary
2 responsibility for supervising the implementation of the peace
3 agreements in Liberia, has been hampered in the performance of
4 this complex task by a lack of financial and logistical
10:38:08 5 resources. Such resources are necessary if ECOMOG is to deploy
6 across the country, ensuring respect for various aspects of the
7 Abuja Agreement."

8 So, Mr Taylor, again we see on the part of the
9 Secretary-General this expression of concern about the lack of
10:38:28 10 financial and logistical resources for ECOMOG, correct?

11 A. That is correct in this paragraph, yes.

12 Q. And that such resources are necessary if ECOMOG is to
13 deploy across the country. The Secretary-General also expresses
14 that concern, yes, Mr Taylor?

10:38:46 15 A. As expressed here, that is correct.

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if we could also look at paragraph 10 of
17 this report which indicates that the new Council of State was
18 inaugurated on 1 September in Monrovia. Was that the date that
19 the new Council of State was inaugurated in 1995, Mr Taylor?

10:39:25 20 A. I have no reason to doubt this. I don't have - I don't
21 specifically remember the date, but I have no reason at this
22 point to doubt what the Secretary-General says here.

23 Q. Thank you. Finally, if we could look at paragraph 16 of
24 this report, which would be on page 4, and we see, this is the
10:40:03 25 premise:

26 "In accordance with the Cotonou Peace Agreement and
27 exchange of letters, ECOMOG is responsible for providing security
28 to unarmed United Nations military observers and civilian staff.
29 This remains the basic premise for all United Nations operations

1 in Liberia. Hence, the proposed deployment of additional UNOMIL
2 personnel will depend on ECOMOG's ability to guarantee and
3 provide effective security for these personnel."

4 So here, Mr Taylor, the Secretary-General is reiterating
10:40:41 5 that their ability to deploy additional personnel would depend on
6 ECOMOG's ability to guarantee and provide effective security,
7 yes, Mr Taylor?

8 A. I agree with that assessment, yeah.

9 Q. And that was true throughout the relationship that existed
10:41:00 10 in Liberia between the UN military observers and ECOMOG. Isn't
11 that correct?

12 A. No, I can't say that with certainty. I'm responding to
13 this particular passage. I cannot say with certainty that this
14 was true throughout. I cannot say that with certainty.

10:41:22 15 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, could I ask that this document
16 be marked for identification.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Secretary-General's Twelfth Progress
18 Report on UNOMIL, dated 13 September 1995, is marked MFI-378.

19 MS HOLLIS:

10:41:55 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you may recall that on 17 November I also
21 asked you about the agreement that ECOMOG strength would be
22 increased up to 12,000, the minimum number they said they
23 required. Do you recall that?

24 A. Yes.

10:42:14 25 Q. And also that by October 1995 UNOMIL had only about 50
26 military observers in country, and you indicated you could not
27 recall the number. Do you remember that, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. Now if we could look at tab 69 in annex 3. We see on the

1 screen, "United Nations Security Council S/1995/881, dated 23
2 October 1995, Thirteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General
3 on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia." And if we
4 could please look at page 6 of this document we see under subpart
10:44:21 5 V, concept of operations:

6 "(a) Deployment of the Economic Community of West African
7 States Monitoring Group and the United Nations Observer Mission
8 in Liberia."

9 And if we look at paragraph 25:

10:44:37 10 "In order to fulfil these tasks, ECOMOG plans to increase
11 its strength to 12,000 all ranks and to deploy its forces to nine
12 safe havens (6,600 all ranks), 10 to 13 assembly sites (3,400 all
13 ranks), and at 14 border crossing points (2000 all ranks)."

14 So this is indicating that ECOMOG planned to increase its
10:45:13 15 strength to 12,000, correct, Mr Taylor?

16 A. That's what, yeah - that's what they are saying in this
17 paragraph, yes.

18 Q. And it gives the various strengths at various locations.
19 Do you accept these numbers as set out by the Secretary-General,
10:45:32 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. I have no reason to doubt them.

22 Q. Now if we look at paragraph 27:

23 "In order to implement this concept of operations, it is
24 estimated that approximately 160 military observers will be
10:45:50 25 needed."

26 So at this point in time, Mr Taylor, the United Nations is
27 determining that 160 military observers will be needed. Do you
28 see that?

29 A. Yes, I see what the Secretary-General says here. It's

1 still internal to them, that's what I'm saying. Yes, I see that.

2 Q. And you remember yesterday in relation to an earlier
3 document it had been estimated that 303 military observers would
4 be required; you remember that, Mr Taylor?

10:46:21 5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. And then if we look at page 8, paragraph 35, under
7 "Resource requirements of the Economic Community of West African
8 States Monitoring Group":

9 "ECOMOG has estimated that it would require some 12,000
10:46:48 10 troops to carry out its concept of operations. Its current
11 strength is 7,269 all ranks. It will therefore require an
12 additional 4,731 troops."

13 So, Mr Taylor, do you accept that as of the 23 October
14 1995, ECOMOG had estimated it would require some 12,000 troops to
10:47:17 15 carry out its concept of operations?

16 A. Yes, I see what the Secretary-General says. I will believe
17 him.

18 Q. And do you accept that the current strength of ECOMOG at
19 that time was 7,269 all ranks?

10:47:31 20 A. If that's what he says, I agree.

21 Q. Meaning that ECOMOG would require an additional 4,731
22 troops?

23 A. I think it's an operational decision, so I agree with his
24 report. I have no reason to doubt what he is saying.

10:47:48 25 Q. And if we could, please, look at paragraph 37.

26 "It will be recalled that a severe shortage of logistic
27 support was a main reason for the inability of ECOMOG to carry
28 out its task under the Cotonou Agreement. As the chairman of
29 ECOWAS and I have stated repeatedly, it is imperative to the

1 success of the peace process that ECOMOG be provided with the
2 logistic support it needs."

3 So, once again, Mr Taylor, we have the Secretary-General
4 expressing concern about the lack of logistic support for ECOMOG,
10:48:30 5 yes?

6 A. I am not sure if - well, I am not sure if he is saying
7 "lack". I would agree he is complaining about shortage, so I
8 will use his word and not "lack".

9 Q. And indeed, recalling that a severe shortage of logistic
10:48:47 10 support was a main reason for the inability of ECOMOG to carry
11 out its task under the Cotonou Agreement, yes, Mr Taylor?

12 A. I have no reason - yes, I have no reason to doubt him.

13 Q. Now, if we look at annex 2 of this report on page 18. If
14 we could bring that down so we can see the top of that, please.

10:49:22 15 This is "Composition of the military component of the United
16 Nations Observer Mission in Liberia as at 18 October 1995." We
17 see in the column that says "total", that at that time they are
18 reflecting 60 personnel, yes, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That is correct.

10:49:44 20 Q. And under the "observer" column we see that they have 53
21 observers listed?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And then that they have seven as "others", correct,
24 Mr Taylor?

10:49:57 25 A. That is correct.

26 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that this document
27 be marked for identification.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Thirteenth Progress Report of the
29 Secretary-General on UNOMIL is marked MFI-379.

1 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President:

2 Q. You may recall that on 17 November I also asked you that if
3 you remember that as of mid-December of the same year, 1995, you
4 did not yet have a full deployment for the UNOMIL observers, and
10:50:48 5 you responded that you could not remember whether there was a
6 full deployment at that time or not. Do you remember that --

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. -- Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10:50:58 10 Q. And if we could please look at tab 8 in annex 3. It should
11 be S/1995/1042.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: I have this as marked MFI-329. It's
13 marked MFI-329.

14 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President:

10:52:33 15 Q. Now, if we could please look at this document. If we could
16 just first put the first page on so that we are sure of what we
17 are looking at. Again, that is S/1995/1042, 18 December 1995,
18 "Fourteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General". If we
19 could look at paragraph 13, please, under "Deployment of UNOMIL
10:53:59 20 and ECOMOG":

21 "Major General Mahmoud Talha, Egypt, assumed the duties of
22 Chief Military Observer of UNOMIL on 7 December 1995. In its
23 resolution 1020 (1995), the Security Council authorised a maximum
24 deployment of 160 military observers. The total military
10:54:25 25 strength of UNOMIL is currently 71 observers (see annex)."

26 And then it indicates that recently arrived observers have
27 enabled UNOMIL to strengthen its presence at the field stations
28 in Buchanan and Kakata and to create mobile teams for Monrovia
29 and Tubmanburg.

1 It further indicates that the Monrovia team has started
2 operating; the Tubman team has not yet been deployed, and it
3 talks about - the final sentence:

4 "Further deployment of UNOMIL military observers will
10:55:05 5 depend on the deployment of ECOMOG troops and progress in the
6 peace process."

7 So, Mr Taylor, do you accept that as of the date of this
8 report there were currently 71 observers in country in Liberia?

9 A. I have no reason to doubt it, so I accept what the
10:55:27 10 Secretary-General says.

11 Q. And then if we look at paragraph 14:

12 "In accordance with the schedule of implementation of the
13 Abuja Agreement, the deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL was to have
14 commenced on 2 October and to have been completed by 14 December
10:55:48 15 1995. Owing to the lack of logistic resources, ECOMOG troops
16 were not able to deploy beyond their present area."

17 So, Mr Taylor, again noting that lack of logistic resources
18 was preventing ECOMOG troops from further deploying; correct,
19 Mr Taylor?

10:56:12 20 A. Well, I wouldn't put it quite that way based on your
21 proposition. I think what the Secretary-General is saying here,
22 that ECOMOG troops could not deploy beyond their present areas.

23 Q. Correct.

24 A. Now, I would have to know what their present areas are to
10:56:28 25 agree with your proposition. So I would want to just stick with
26 the language of what the Secretary-General is saying, because the
27 areas - I see two areas mentioned here, but in a previous report
28 that carried a number a little higher than this, I just observe
29 that this is still, what, the 14th or 15th report. But the

1 report previous to this had another number that also named
2 another area. So I am not sure of the areas the
3 Secretary-General is referring to here, but I take his word that
4 they cannot be deployed beyond their present areas, not knowing
10:57:13 5 the specific areas he is referring to.

6 Q. And, Mr Taylor, if we look up at paragraph 10:

7 "Although the ceasefire has generally held and no
8 widespread or protracted fighting has been reported, recurrent
9 skirmishes were reported between NPFL and ULIMO-K in the areas
10:57:39 10 around Suakoko, Gbarnga and Saint Paul River bridge in October."

11 Do you remember those skirmishes in October 1995,
12 Mr Taylor, between your forces and ULIMO-K?

13 A. Yes, there were always little skirmishes around, yeah.

14 Q. "Since the signing of the memorandum of understanding
10:58:03 15 between Mr Taylor and Mr Kromah on 30 November, hostilities
16 between the factions have reportedly ceased."

17 And this report, as we said, Mr Taylor, is as of 18
18 December 1995, so some short time after your memorandum of
19 understanding between yourself and Mr Kromah, yes?

10:58:29 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And if we could please turn to the annex at page 8. We
22 see, "Composition of military component of the United Nations
23 Observer Mission in Liberia as at 15 December 1995", and under
24 the Total column we see 71 total personnel, under the Observers
10:58:59 25 we see 64. Do you accept those figures, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes, I have no reason not to. I do.

27 Q. Thank you, Mr Taylor. Now, Mr Taylor, on 17 November we
28 also talked about an increase in UNOMIL strength as of
29 mid-January 1996 and you were asked if you recall that as of

1 January 1996 UNOMIL strength had increased to about 82 people and
2 you indicated you could not recall. Do you remember that
3 exchange, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes, I do.

10:59:42 5 Q. If we could please look at tab 45 in annex 3. This is
6 S/1996/232. We see, "United Nations Security Council S/1996/232,
7 1 April 1996, Sixteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General
8 on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" and if we
9 could look at paragraph 25, please. Under paragraph 25 we note
11:01:42 10 that:

11 "UNOMIL currently has a total strength of 93 military
12 observers. The UNOMIL disarmament team withdrew from Tubmanburg
13 on 30 December 1995 because of fighting between ECOMOG and
14 ULIMO-J. It was redeployed to that area on 31 January but was
11:02:09 15 withdrawn a second time, on 2 March, following the withdrawal of
16 ECOMOG troops the previous day without prior notice to UNOMIL.
17 The UNOMIL mobile and disarmament teams which withdrew from
18 Kakata on 8 March because of fighting between NPFL and ULIMO-J
19 were redeployed there on 23 March."

11:02:32 20 Mr Taylor, do you accept that as of this report UNOMIL had
21 a total strength of 93 in country?

22 A. Yes, I accept what the Secretary-General says here.

23 Q. And do you recall the withdrawal of the UNOMIL disarmament
24 team from Tubmanburg because of the fighting between ECOMOG and
11:02:59 25 ULIMO-J?

26 A. Yes, I do. I don't recall the date, but I do recall the
27 incident, yes.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, it wasn't between ECOMOG and
29 ULIMO-J. It was between NPFL and ULIMO-J.

1 THE WITNESS: No, your Honour. It's between - there was
2 fighting between ECOMOG and ULIMO-J.

3 MS HOLLIS: Fighting between ECOMOG and ULIMO-J. I am
4 looking at paragraph 25, they withdrew from Tubmanburg on 30
11:03:31 5 December because of fighting between ECOMOG and ULIMO-J.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the earlier part of that
7 paragraph. I was referring to the latter part of the paragraph.

8 MS HOLLIS: Yes and I was about to ask about that:

9 Q. Do you recall, Mr Taylor, the military observers
11:03:53 10 withdrawing from that area a second time on 2 March because of
11 the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops from that area? Do you recall
12 that?

13 A. You are saying 2 March?

14 Q. "It was redeployed to the area on 31 January 1996 but was
11:04:14 15 withdrawn a second time, on 2 March, following the withdrawal of
16 ECOMOG troops the previous day."

17 Do you recall the UN observers withdrawing from Tubmanburg
18 a second time because ECOMOG had also withdrawn from that area?

19 A. Yes. The date I'm not sure, but there was a second
11:04:34 20 withdrawal, yes.

21 Q. And you also accept the UNOMIL mobile and disarmament teams
22 withdrawing from Kakata on 8 March because of fighting between
23 NPFL and ULIMO-J?

24 A. I don't remember the exact date, but there is evidence led
11:04:54 25 here substantially on this. The NPFL, because of the obstruction
26 of ULIMO-J, moved into Kakata, expelled them and asked the
27 peacekeepers to redeploy. I am very aware of this. The date, I
28 don't recall the date, but I recall the incident.

29 Q. And you recall the UNOMIL mobile and disarmament teams then

1 redeploying to that area later in March?

2 A. Yes, about 10 to 14 days later they - we turned the place
3 over to them, yes.

11:05:32

4 Q. And we see in paragraph 26, "UNOMIL is currently deployed
5 in Monrovia, Buchanan" - and how do you pronounce this last one,
6 Mr Taylor, S-U-E-H-N?

7 A. Suehn.

8 Q. Suehn is in what county?

11:05:52

9 A. It's in Montserrado County. Well, I guess I could be
10 wrong. No, I'm sorry. It's in Bomi County just on the border
11 between Bomi and Montserrado.

12 Q. And do you accept that as of the time of this report they
13 were deployed in Monrovia, Buchanan and Suehn?

14 A. Yes, I agree.

11:06:11

15 Q. "Regular patrolling, investigations of ceasefire violations
16 and monitoring of the overall military and security situation
17 remain the main tasks of the military observers."

18 And indeed that was their main task in country, isn't that
19 correct, Mr Taylor?

11:06:28

20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. "UNOMIL will redeploy to Tubmanburg as soon as the security
22 situation stabilises. Deployment to Greenville is expect to take
23 place shortly, as soon as logistic requirements have been moved
24 by ship to the area. UNOMIL deployment in other areas is
25 contingent upon ECOMOG deployment, as well as the security
26 situation. It should be noted, however, that LNTG has insisted
27 on clearing UNOMIL's deployments and has not always provided the
28 cooperation required on a timely basis."

11:06:46

29 And it is correct, is it not, Mr Taylor, that LNTG had

1 insisted on clearing UNOMIL's deployments?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Indeed it would be fair to say that LNTG had not always
4 provided the cooperation that was required on a timely basis.

11:07:25 5 That would be fair to say at that time, isn't that correct,
6 Mr Taylor?

7 A. Well, this is a subjective thing, but I wouldn't argue with
8 the Secretary-General, but timely is a question, but I wouldn't
9 disagree with him.

11:07:40 10 Q. Then if we could please look at the annex on page 11. Here
11 we see, "Composition of the military component of UNOMIL as at 25
12 March 1996" and under the Total column we see 93 and then under
13 the Observer column we see 86. Yes, Mr Taylor?

14 A. That is correct.

11:08:17 15 Q. Before we move on from this document, if we could move back
16 to page 5, paragraph 24, please. We see here this paragraph is
17 talking about deployment of ECOMOG as of the time of this report
18 and it says:

19 "At present, ECOMOG is deployed in Monrovia, Gbarnga,
11:08:53 20 Buchanan, Greenville, Kakata, Suehn and Konola. ECOMOG has
21 received an additional infantry battalion from Nigeria,
22 increasing its total strength from approximately 7,000 to 7,500
23 troops, as well as three helicopters and 20 trucks as part of the
24 logistic assistance pledged by the United States of America."

11:09:22 25 So, Mr Taylor, do you accept that as of the time of this
26 report ECOMOG's total strength had grown to 7,500 troops?

27 A. I have no reason - I don't know the details, but I have no
28 reason to doubt what the Secretary-General says here.

29 Q. This would still, of course, leave them understrength by

1 several thousand troops as compared to their 12,000 objective.

2 Yes, Mr Taylor?

3 A. That's almost an opinion I would give.

4 Q. Well, it's math. 12,000, 7,500?

11:10:04 5 A. I know but it's asking for - I don't know. I would agree
6 that this is under what their anticipated amount is.

7 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that you mark this
8 document for identification.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Sixteenth Progress Report on UNOMIL,
11:10:26 10 dated 1 April 1996, is marked MFI-380.

11 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, on 17 November we also dealt with the 6
13 April 1996 fighting in Monrovia. Do you remember that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

11:10:53 15 Q. You had indicated that radio or television stations were
16 not vandalised and burnt in the city, that private radio stations
17 were all secured, including the Catholic radio station. Do you
18 remember talking about that?

19 A. Yes, I remember talking about that.

11:11:14 20 Q. And you also indicated that it was possible that looting
21 could have included United Nations properties, international aid
22 organisations, their buildings and warehouses?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And you didn't think that there were many, many civilian
11:11:31 25 casualties as a result of this fighting. Do you recall that,
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. And you indicated that you knew that following the outbreak
29 of this fighting on 6 April the number of UNOMIL observers was

1 reduced, but you did not know the numbers. Correct, Mr Taylor?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. You also indicated, Mr Taylor, that most of the looting in
4 Monrovia in your view was carried out by civilians, correct?

11:12:03 5 A. Well, I am not sure if I said "most". I could have said
6 "most", but civilians carried out a lot of looting, yeah.

7 Q. If we could please look at tab 6 in annex 3, Liberian TRC
8 final report. Yesterday, for purposes of these questions, we I
9 believe had that marked MFI-373?

11:12:39 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the correct MFI.

11 MS HOLLIS:

12 Q. If we could look, please, at page 129. If we could please
13 look at the bottom of that page, the ninth line down in the last
14 paragraph with the sentence that begins, "Factional fighting

11:13:44 15 which erupted in Monrovia on April 6." Do you see that,
16 Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. "Factional fighting which erupted in Monrovia on April 6,
19 1996, proved very destructive as Taylor, Kromah, and ECOMOG

11:14:05 20 battled to subdue former ULIMO-J leader, Roosevelt Johnson, in a
21 power play bordering on revenge and the guise of enforcing the

22 rule of law. The 100-day fighting was notorious for its bloody

23 impact, economic devastation, and the resultant humanitarian

24 disaster with over 80,000 internally displaced people seeking

11:14:30 25 refuge at the US Greystone compound in Mamba Point, Monrovia.

26 The unresolved cross-factional issues of Kromah, combined with

27 Taylor's political mischief, and the miscalculation of Johnson's

28 resistance, which, when combined with the support from the LPC

29 and the remnants of the AFL soldiers in the BTC, proved most

1 formidable for the big two and their accomplices. The untold
2 suffering, property damage and death toll devastated Monrovia and
3 collapsed LNTG II. This was, perhaps, the worst fighting in
4 three years. Death toll was high as all civil society activists
11:15:18 5 in Monrovia went underground to protect themselves. The prison
6 was broken into as newspaper offices were burned. Monrovia was
7 massively looted by all factions, and the warehouses and offices
8 of international relief organisations and the UN were not spared.
9 A total of 489 vehicles commandeered from the United Nations and
11:15:44 10 other aid agencies at value put at US \$8.2 million, constraining
11 further assistance to a population desperately in need."

12 So, Mr Taylor, that is an accurate depiction of the results
13 of the fighting that began on 6 April 1996, is it not, Mr Taylor?

14 A. That is a very mischievous lie. I could say to you,
11:16:18 15 counsel - I could put it this way: There are about 25 different
16 issues I could deal with in this paragraph, but because you have
17 couched it as one, I disagree with that paragraph.

18 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that this page be
19 marked for identification, and I believe we are at B as in bravo.
11:16:41 20 This is page 129.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: The TRC report on Liberia, pages 129 and
22 130, are marked for identification MFI-373B.

23 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President:

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, also in relation to these events and the
11:17:13 25 consequences of these events, if we could look at tab 70 in annex
26 3, please. This should be S/1996/362. If I said 70, I misspoke.
27 It should be - may I consult for a moment, Madam President? 362
28 is number 71.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we found the document.

1 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President:

2 Q. And we see this is United Nations Security Council
3 S/1996/362, dated 21 May 1996, "Seventeenth Progress Report of
4 the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
11:19:43 5 Liberia", and if we could look at, initially, paragraph 2:

6 "The deterioration of the peace process in Liberia
7 throughout the first months of the year, as described in my last
8 report, culminated on 6 April in the eruption of fighting in
9 Monrovia. In my letter to the President of the Security Council
11:20:14 10 dated 22 April (S/1996/312), I described the widespread looting
11 and complete breakdown of law and order which ensued. Despite a
12 short lull, hostilities have continued since 6 April, seriously
13 jeopardising the Abuja peace process."

14 Mr Taylor, at paragraph 3 it describes the genesis of the
11:20:45 15 crisis, indicating it was sparked off by the attempted arrest of
16 General Roosevelt Johnson, the leader of the ULIMO-J, but
17 indicates that the underlying causes are much deeper. It talks
18 about skirmishes between Alhaji Kromah's and General Johnson's
19 wings of ULIMO and between the National Patriotic Front of
11:21:13 20 Liberia (NPFL) and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) have recently
21 created discord among members of the Council of State.

22 "As large number of fighters came into Monrovia,
23 purportedly to protect their leaders, security in the city
24 deteriorated."

11:21:31 25 Now, Mr Taylor, it is correct, is it not, that large
26 numbers of fighters came into Monrovia around the time of the
27 6 April commencement of fighting purportedly to protect you and
28 other faction leaders?

29 A. Well, I wouldn't say so. For me, the - I did order NPFL

1 forces to assist ECOMOG in trying to arrest Johnson, not
2 specifically to protect me. So this, "as purportedly to
3 protect", that was not my intent at the time. I did order forces
4 to combat Johnson forces and to arrest him, but not to protect
11:22:23 5 me.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, I believe you have told the judges about that
7 before. Who did you bring into Monrovia to do this?

8 A. The NPFL forces.

9 Q. Do you remember which of those force you brought in?

11:22:34 10 A. I brought a combination of different units. The Marines
11 division came in. We brought in, I think, some individuals from
12 the army division and probably the navy division.

13 Q. And how many personnel did you bring in?

14 A. I could have brought as many as 5,000 men into --

11:23:05 15 Q. And you brought them in from what bases or locations?

16 A. From the Kakata area, from the Buchanan area, and the
17 general Gbarnga area.

18 Q. So it talks about the large number of fighters came into
19 Monrovia.

11:23:36 20 "At the same time the Council of State seemed determined to
21 assert itself in ways contrary to the spirit of the Abuja
22 Agreement, reportedly against the advice of some of its own
23 members. It adopted protocols under which the transitional
24 government would be called the 'the Government of Liberia' and
11:23:55 25 the Council of State the 'collective presidency'."

26 And indeed, the transitional government did adopt such
27 protocols, yes, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Which protocols now?

29 Q. The protocols under which the transitional government would

1 be called "the Government of Liberia" and the Council of State
2 "the collective presidency"?

3 A. Yes, that is correct.

11:24:25

4 Q. "Mr Taylor and Alhaji Kromah begin referring to their
5 forces as government forces as they went into the ULIMO-J
6 strongholds of Kakata and Tubmanburg in mid-March, asserting that
7 they were helping the ECOMOG to maintain security in those
8 areas."

11:24:41

9 And indeed, it is correct, Mr Taylor, is it not, that you
10 referred to your forces that you were using for this purpose as
11 government forces?

11:25:01

12 A. Well, they were no longer my forces. They were government
13 forces. I am a member of the council. And counsel, may I just
14 add: In a previous question that you asked - and these things
15 come back to bite - when you read a paragraph and I said there
16 were so many things, but because you couched it in words, I would
17 say no. Now, I would like for you to know and the Bench to know
18 that within that paragraph there are some factual things in that
19 paragraph, and I don't want to mislead the Court when I said I
20 disagree because of the way you couched it. But since you didn't
21 get into details --

11:25:24

22 Q. This, Mr Taylor, was the --

23 A. It's passed now. I'm just reminding --

24 Q. -- Liberian TRC that I read?

11:25:38

25 A. That is correct, yes, for the record.

26 Q. Pages 129 to 130?

27 A. I guess that's it. When I said to you, I said the way you
28 couched it, I have to disagree. Now, I don't want this to come
29 back later and say, well - because there are some factual things

1 in there, but there are so many things and there were so many
2 issues. So, generally - but there are some factual points, if
3 you had broken them down. I just wanted that for the record.

11:26:38 4 Q. Mr Taylor, perhaps before the morning break we could go
5 back to be sure that we are clear and we would go back to the
6 Liberian TRC, pages 129 to 130. That should be at tab 6 in annex
7 3. It has been marked as 373B.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, are we done with this
9 document?

11:27:18 10 MS HOLLIS: No, but since Mr Taylor has gone back to this
11 other, I thought perhaps we would clear this up before we moved
12 on.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps at this moment it is proper for
14 me to mention, Ms Hollis, as we proceed in this manner, we are
11:27:42 15 spending a lot of time finding files, documents, jumping from one
16 file to another, cumulatively we are spending a lot of
17 unnecessary time this way. But this is compounded by the way
18 questions are asked in a compounded manner, as Mr Taylor has now
19 shown, that when you compound a question with so many statements,
11:28:02 20 we are now going back and forth. What would help is if when you
21 bring out a document, you ask questions that are not compounded,
22 a single question relating to a single fact. I remember he did
23 raise this objection back and you just passed it by and now we
24 are spending time finding our way back into these volumes.

11:28:38 25 Please proceed.

26 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we are now again on page 129 of the
28 Liberian TRC final report, volume 2, and you recall we had begun
29 at the bottom paragraph with the "factional fighting which

1 erupted in Monrovia on April 6, 1996, proved very destructive".

2 Do you agree with that?

3 A. I agree that the factional fighting started on April 6, but
4 it did not just - when it says "proved destructive", it was
11:29:20 5 destructive, yes.

6 Q. "And as Taylor, Kromah and ECOMOG battled to subdue former
7 ULIMO-J leader Roosevelt Johnson." Do you agree that --

8 A. Taylor, Kromah and ECOMOG, yes.

9 Q. Taylor, Kromah and ECOMOG battled to subdue former ULIMO-J
11:29:38 10 leader Roosevelt Johnson?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. "In a power play bordering on revenge and the guise of
13 enforcing the rule of law"?

14 A. I disagree with that. That's an opinion that I disagree
11:29:49 15 with.

16 Q. "The 100 day fighting was notorious for its bloody impact,
17 economic devastation and the resultant humanitarian disaster."
18 Do you agree with that?

19 A. Yes, there was - yes.

11:30:03 20 Q. "With over 80,000 internally displaced people seeking
21 refuge at the US Greystone compound in Mamba Point, Monrovia"?

22 A. I would disagree with the numbers.

23 Q. Do you agree that a large --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: We have to take a break there because the
11:30:21 25 tape has run out. We will adjourn until 12 o'clock.

26 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

27 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, please continue.

29 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President:

1 Q. Mr Taylor, at the break we were looking at page 129 of the
2 Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission final report, volume
3 2. If we could have that put on the screen again, and if you
4 would also please bring page 130.

12:02:40 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, just remind me of the tab.

6 MS HOLLIS: Sorry, Madam President. This is tab 6 of annex
7 3, and we're looking at pages 129 and 130. It has been
8 previously been marked as MFI-373B. If we could look at the
9 bottom of that page, please:

12:03:16 10 Q. At the break we had just finished talking about the
11 statement of over 80,000 internally displaced people seeking
12 refuge at the Greystone compound. Remember, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, I remember that.

14 Q. The next sentence:

12:03:47 15 "The unresolved cross-factional issues of Kromah, combined
16 with Taylor's political mischief and miscalculation of Johnson's
17 resistance, which, when combined with support from the LPC and
18 remnants of AFL soldiers in the BTC, proved most formidable for
19 the big two and their accomplices."

12:04:15 20 First of all, do you know anything about what they're
21 referring to here, "The unresolved cross-factional issues of
22 Kromah"?

23 A. No, I don't. I don't know.

24 Q. And do you agree with this statement, "combined with
12:04:22 25 Taylor's political mischief"?

26 A. I disagree with that. "Combined with Taylor's mischief," I
27 disagree with that.

28 Q. Do you agree there was a miscalculation of Johnson's
29 resistance?

1 A. That's an opinion that - to an extent I can agree - there
2 were - yes, I could agree with the miscalculation of his
3 resistance. I can agree with that part.

12:04:49 4 Q. "And the miscalculation of Johnson's resistance, combined
5 with support from the LPC and remnants of AFL soldiers in the
6 BTC". So, Mr Taylor, did the LPC support Johnson?

7 A. Yes, the LPC did.

8 Q. And remnants of AFL soldiers in the BTC, did they also
9 support him?

12:05:06 10 A. Well, the AFL did. I would disagree with "remnants", but
11 the AFL did.

12 Q. "Proved most formidable for the big two and their
13 accomplices." It's talking about you Alhaji Kromah, I believe,
14 Mr Taylor?

12:05:20 15 A. No, I think they are talking about more than that, counsel.

16 Q. What "big two" do you think they're talking about?

17 A. They're talking about Kromah and Taylor, but their
18 accomplices, you know, is the part that you didn't --

12:05:35 19 Q. Do you agree that this combination we've just mentioned of
20 Johnson, LPC, AFL proved formidable?

21 A. I would agree with that part. The accomplices here I think
22 would be ECOMOG.

23 Q. "The untold suffering, property damage and death toll
24 devastated Monrovia." Do you agree with that?

12:05:54 25 A. Well, no. The way it's put, I would disagree. If it was
26 put to me like the untold suffering caused some damages. When it
27 says "devastated Monrovia", that's also subjective. I would have
28 - I don't know the interpretation of what they mean "devastated".
29 Whether it's total, in part, or what, they didn't state. So I

1 have some disagreement with the way it is put.

2 Q. And did this lead to the collapse of LNTG II?

3 A. No, it did not at all.

12:06:33

4 Q. "This was perhaps the worst fighting in three years." Do
5 you agree with that?

6 A. No, I wouldn't agree. I wouldn't agree.

7 Q. "The death toll was high, as all civil society activists in
8 Monrovia went underground to protect themselves." Do you agree
9 with the death toll was high?

12:06:46

10 A. Again, yeah, I would say. There were a lot of deaths. I
11 can't get specifics. I think when we started this a couple of
12 days ago numbers came up, if I'm right about this. But there was
13 a high death toll.

12:07:07

14 Q. Do you agree that all civil society activists in Monrovia
15 went underground to protect themselves?

16 A. No, that's not true.

17 Q. "The prison was broken into"; do you agree with that?

12:07:23

18 A. I'm not sure, excuse me, because the prison is in the
19 Barclay Training Centre, the BTC. The prison is within that, and
20 that's where the barracks is. The Armed Forces of Liberia, the
21 prison is in their barracks, so I cannot say with any certainty
22 that it was broken into.

23 Q. "As newspaper offices were burned"; do you agree with that?

12:07:46

24 A. Well, again, I - there were a few offices that may have
25 been burned. I don't have any knowledge of the specific ones,
26 but again I'm more concerned about how these things come out at
27 the end when you lawyers begin to argue. When it says "newspaper
28 offices were burnt" without specifying which offices, for me this
29 is almost total, which is not the case. If you say "some offices

1 were burned", I would agree.

2 Q. "Monrovia was massively looted by all factions"; do you
3 agree with that?

4 A. I would agree.

12:08:16 5 Q. "And the warehouses and offices of international relief
6 organisations and the UN were not spared"?

7 A. I would agree.

8 Q. "A total of 489 vehicles commandeered from the UN and other
9 aid agencies at a value put at US \$8.2 million"?

12:08:40 10 A. I would have problems with that. I have not seen - and did
11 not see at that time - a report from the United Nations as to the
12 number of vehicles that were stolen and the cost attached as we
13 see here. So I would be, you know, deceiving the Court if I were
14 to say yes. I admit that UN properties were taken. I don't know
12:09:01 15 the exact quantities.

16 Q. And the taking of these vehicles constrained further
17 assistance to a population desperately in need. Do you agree
18 with that?

19 A. That assessment, I think, is - one can accept that, yes.

12:09:21 20 MS HOLLIS: Now, Madam President, at the risk of incurring
21 your wrath, I would ask that your Honours go back to tab 71 in
22 annex 3, S/1996/362.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is the Seventeenth Progress Report
24 of the Secretary-General?

12:10:25 25 MS HOLLIS: That is correct, Madam President, dated 21 May
26 1996, S/1996/362:

27 Q. If we could please move to paragraph 19, "Deployment of
28 UNOMIL":

29 "Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Monrovia, UNOMIL

1 military personnel were deployed in Monrovia, Buchanan, Kakata
2 and Suehn. See annex IV. Following the outbreak of fighting, 88
3 of the mission's 93 military observers were relocated to Freetown
4 and Dakar with the assistance of the United States government.

12:11:31 5 The military observers deployed to the field stations at Kakata
6 and Suehn were escorted by ECOMOG to Monrovia on 13 April."

7 Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall as a result of the outbreak
8 of this fighting 88 of the mission's 93 military observers being
9 relocated out of Liberia?

12:11:55 10 A. No, I don't know the specifics but I - this I can accept
11 from the Secretary-General about the inner workings and their
12 number and dates and places. I don't have a quarrel with that.

13 Q. And the military observers deployed to the field stations at
14 Kakata and Suehn being escorted by ECOMOG to Monrovia on 13

12:12:17 15 April, do you accept that?

16 A. I will accept that. I don't know the [overlapping
17 speakers].

18 Q. "Those at Buchanan returned to Monrovia by sea on 14 April
19 on board an ECOMOG ship." Do you accept that?

12:12:26 20 A. I will accept what he says. I don't know it is as a fact,
21 I mean, as it occurred, but I accept what the Secretary-General
22 says.

23 Q. "Most of these military observers have now been
24 repatriated. However, 10 remain on standby in Freetown and will
12:12:40 25 return to Monrovia as soon as conditions permit."

26 Mr Taylor, do you accept that number and that they are on
27 standby in Freetown as of this report?

28 A. I accept his explanation.

29 Q. "Five military observers (including the chief military

1 observer) remain in Monrovia." Do you accept that?

2 A. I would accept that.

3 Q. And then we look at "Deployment of the Economic Community
4 of West African States Monitoring Group" and at paragraph 20:

12:13:12 5 "ECOMOG was not able to halt the hostilities when they
6 erupted on 6 April. It maintained that the fighting was a matter
7 between the factions and that it could not intervene in view of
8 its limited manpower and resources, as well as the nature of its
9 mandate as a peacekeeping force. Given these constraints, ECOMOG
12:13:31 10 was also unable to provide protection for United Nations
11 personnel and property."

12 Now, Mr Taylor, it is correct, is it not, that ECOMOG was
13 unable to halt the hostilities commencing on 6 April?

14 A. Well, the way the Secretary-General puts it here, I would
12:13:51 15 disagree with the Secretary-General because ECOMOG was a part of
16 the fighting. So to say that they were fighting - helping to
17 arrest Johnson, and by the same token saying that they were
18 unable to stop it, I think is a misnomer. So I would disagree
19 with what the Secretary-General says here.

12:14:08 20 Q. Mr Taylor, they are talking about the hostilities
21 commencing on 6 April. You see that, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And it's also true, is it not, Mr Taylor, that ECOMOG
24 maintained the fighting was a matter between the factions and
12:14:21 25 that it, ECOMOG, could not intervene in view of its limited
26 manpower and resources.

27 A. I disagree.

28 Q. That was their position, was it not, Mr Taylor?

29 A. No, no, I'm not - no, it's impossible. ECOMOG was a part

1 of a fighting on the 6th. So to say here that they had limited
2 and they could not maintain, ECOMOG, the NPFL and ULIMO-K were
3 the forces that were ordered by the council to arrest Johnson.
4 So I disagree with what the Secretary-General says here.

12:14:53 5 Q. Mr Taylor, it's also correct, is it not, that given these
6 constraints, ECOMOG was unable to provide protection for United
7 Nations personnel and property?

8 A. Well, I can't speak to that. I can't speak to that. If
9 the Secretary-General feels that there were constraints that they
12:15:12 10 could not - I was not aware of ECOMOG's inability to providing
11 protection for the United Nations personnel and property in
12 Monrovia.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, if we look at paragraph 21, the very bottom line
14 of the paragraph on that page speaking of ECOMOG:

12:15:35 15 "It has not been able to deter the massive movement of
16 fighters in and out of the city centre from other areas."

17 That was correct, was it not; ECOMOG was unable to deter
18 this movement of fighters?

19 A. As the Secretary-General puts it here, it's a bit
12:15:51 20 confusing, so I have to disagree. I have to disagree because
21 this also suggests again that ECOMOG is probably not a part of
22 the fighting, and so I would disagree.

23 Q. Indeed, Mr Taylor, they were not part of the fighting, were
24 they?

12:16:07 25 A. They were. You just read a previous statement where it
26 says that ECOMOG, ULIMO-K and the NPFL were involved in that, in
27 a previous statement, which I agreed with.

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if we can look at - continue with this
29 paragraph on page 6:

1 "ECOMOG deployed in central Monrovia as fighters started to
2 withdraw from the city, establishing checkpoints and undertaking
3 patrols."

4 That was correct, was it not, Mr Taylor?

12:16:34 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. "Fighters continued to move freely, however, and when the
7 ceasefire broke down on 29 April, ECOMOG withdrew to specific
8 locations in sufficient numbers to deter attack from the
9 factions."

12:16:49 10 So, first of all, even after ECOMOG had established
11 checkpoints and undertaken patrols, fighters continued to move
12 freely, did they not?

13 A. After the ceasefire, I would disagree with that. After the
14 ceasefire, I was in Monrovia. The ceasefire occurred. I would
12:17:06 15 disagree with that.

16 Q. And the ceasefire broke down on 29 April. Isn't that
17 correct?

18 A. No, I would disagree.

19 Q. And at that time ECOMOG withdrew to specific locations in
12:17:16 20 sufficient numbers to deter attack from the factions. Isn't that
21 correct?

22 A. No. To the best of my recollection, once we had a
23 ceasefire, that remained in place. I was about the only council
24 person left in Monrovia with the chairman of the council. So
12:17:31 25 there was a ceasefire and it stayed in place.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, at the time of this report, ECOMOG was deployed
27 on Bushrod Island and maintained a presence at the
28 telecommunications headquarters. Isn't that correct?

29 A. At the time of the report? I don't understand the

1 question, but let me just say --

2 Q. Well, at the time of this report, which was 21 May 1996.

3 A. Yes, in a way. ECOMOG was always deployed on Bushrod
4 Island. That was their headquarters, yes.

12:18:02 5 Q. And they also had a presence on the two bridges leading to
6 the north and at the airport?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. And they also maintained a presence at the seaport and
9 around the Riverview compound?

12:18:13 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. What was the Riverview compound?

12 A. Riverview compound was where United Nations personnel
13 lived. That was a United Nations personnel lodging headquarters,
14 so they remained around there because they had to provide

12:18:33 15 protection at Riverview. That's out at the OAU area in Virginia.

16 Q. Mr Taylor, if we look at paragraph 22:

17 "Outside Monrovia, ECOMOG has continued to maintain its
18 presence in Buchanan and Kakata."

19 That was correct, was it not, Mr Taylor?

12:18:55 20 A. I would agree, yes.

21 Q. "However, ECOMOG has completely withdrawn from Gbarnga, Bo,
22 Tiene and Sinje." That was correct as well, yes, Mr Taylor?

23 A. From Gbarnga, I can say yes. Bo, Tiene and Sinje, I would
24 just have to take the Secretary-General's word for it because
12:19:08 25 that's ULIMO-J area, so I'm not aware of what they are doing on
26 that side, but I would have to accept what the Secretary-General
27 says. As to my knowledge, I can account for Gbarnga, Kakata and
28 Buchanan.

29 Q. And ECOMOG had reduced its strength in Buchanan and Kakata

1 to provide reinforcements for Monrovia?

2 A. I would agree. I would agree.

3 Q. Now, if we could look at paragraph 28, please. It is under
4 the caption "Looting of United Nations Equipment":

12:19:47 5 "As noted above, UNOMIL and all United Nations agencies
6 have been systematically looted by fighters from all factions
7 since 6 April."

8 That was correct, was it not, Mr Taylor?

9 A. I agree. That's correct.

12:19:59 10 Q. And that included your NPFL?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. "Fighters cleaned out all the United Nations offices,
13 damaged the buildings and looted United Nations warehouses." And
14 that was correct as well, yes?

12:20:12 15 A. I would say yes, partly correct. I would maybe - you know,
16 the Secretary-General would add civilians, but it's not just done
17 by fighters, would just be a comment, but I agree with what he
18 says, that there is looting.

19 Q. "Some 80 per cent of UNOMIL vehicles were taken and many
12:20:32 20 were destroyed." That was correct as well, yes?

21 A. I don't know that as a fact. There were United Nations
22 vehicles that were taken. Whether it was 80 per cent, I have no
23 knowledge of that.

24 Q. "A large number of accoutrements bearing the United Nations
12:20:49 25 insignia were stolen by fighters who took to wearing the blue
26 berets and other United Nations emblems."

27 That's correct, is it not, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I remember seeing a few and they really got dealt with
29 for doing that, yes.

1 Q. "UNOMIL telephones, computers, photocopiers, communications
2 equipment and general consumable items, including goods related
3 to demobilisation were all looted."

4 Correct, Mr Taylor?

12:21:16 5 A. I would say yes. There was massive looting, yes.

6 Q. "UNOMIL is currently estimating the value of looted goods
7 and equipment. At least three months would be required to
8 rebuild the mission's logistic base."

9 Do you accept that, Mr Taylor?

12:21:33 10 A. I accept his - yes.

11 Q. "My special representative has urged the faction leaders to
12 ensure that the vehicles and equipment looted from UNOMIL, the
13 United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations are
14 returned."

12:21:51 15 And, indeed, the special representative did urge you to do
16 that, as well as the other faction leaders, yes, Mr Taylor?

17 A. I speak for me. I know I was told.

18 Q. "The faction leaders have asserted that it would be
19 difficult to retrieve the loot from the fighters." That's
12:22:06 20 correct, is it not, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, well, I would say, on my side, we did retrieve some
22 vehicles, so I cannot speak for the other leaders. But the NPFL
23 did retrieve a lot of UN property and returned it.

24 Q. And then at the very last sentence: "It is unlikely,
12:22:29 25 however, that a substantial amount of equipment will be
26 returned."

27 A. But he did say just above that that subsequently some
28 equipment, marketable items and other things, were retrieved.

29 Q. And that was because they were loaded - they learned they

1 were loaded on ships destined for certain West African ports,
2 correct?

3 A. Well, not exactly.

4 Q. That's what they say.

12:22:52 5 A. Well, not exactly because I did return a lot of the things.

6 Q. "Even so, after UNOMIL received information that some
7 United Nations equipment was loaded on to ships destined for
8 certain West African ports, it requested the concerned
9 governments to assist the United Nations in retrieving the goods.

12:23:11 10 Subsequently some equipment, mostly small marketable items, was
11 retrieved."

12 That's what it says there, yes, Mr Taylor?

13 A. That's what it says. What he fails to say, that it was -
14 in fact, those things were looted by ECOMOG. It was a Nigerian
12:23:28 15 ship carrying those things that were seized.

16 Q. And if we could look, please, at page 10, paragraph 45:

17 "At their recent meeting at Accra, the ECOWAS Foreign
18 Ministers reaffirmed the Abuja Agreement as the only basis for
19 peace in Liberia and agreed upon a number of steps necessary to
12:24:09 20 resume its implementation."

21 Mr Taylor, did you have representatives at this meeting?

22 A. Yes, the transitional government, yes. Yes.

23 Q. "ECOWAS warned the faction leaders that if they did not
24 implement those steps it would reconsider its involvement in
12:24:27 25 Liberia at its next summit meeting scheduled for early August
26 1996."

27 And that indeed was a warning that was given, correct,
28 Mr Taylor?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. "The withdrawal of ECOMOG from Liberia could be
2 catastrophic not only for the country but also as for the
3 sub-region as a whole.

12:24:54

4 46. Should ECOWAS be compelled to take the decision to
5 disengage from Liberia and withdraw ECOMOG, UNOMIL would have no
6 choice but to do the same. Therefore I strongly urge the
7 Liberian faction leaders to consider carefully the wide ranging
8 consequences that their actions during the next two months will
9 have and in this light to implement immediately the measures
10 agreed upon by ECOWAS at Accra."

12:25:10

11 Now, Mr Taylor, at page 11, paragraph 49, we see the
12 mandate for UNOMIL, but the note that, "In the present insecure
13 and unstable conditions that prevail in Monrovia and throughout
14 Liberia, there is little that UNOMIL can accomplish with respect
15 to these objectives." So, Mr Taylor, you see this being voiced
16 by the Secretary-General that at this time there is little that
17 UNOMIL could accomplish in support of those objectives?

12:25:56

18 A. Yeah, but I think this is in consonance with the previous
19 paragraph where everyone agreed that a situation had to prevail
20 where peace would come. Now, I think this is being shown as -
21 and I don't want to predict what the Secretary-General is
22 referring to here, but he could be referring to the period of
23 6 April into the ceasefire. I'm projecting. But beyond that, I
24 have said to this Court that stability prevailed and that's what
25 led to the elections.

12:26:25

26 Q. Indeed, Mr Taylor, if we look at paragraph 53, which
27 discusses - this is on page 12 - the involvement of UNOMIL:

28 "I have stressed from the very beginning that the role
29 foreseen for UNOMIL in Liberia was predicated upon the assumption

12:26:51

1 that ECOMOG would be in a position to perform the wide ranging
2 task entrusted to it. Unfortunately, ECOMOG never received the
3 manpower and resources necessary to enable it to carry out its
4 responsibilities effectively. It would be an illusion to think
12:27:33 5 that this innovative model of peacekeeping will be able to
6 succeed in Liberia, especially under current conditions, unless
7 sufficient and reliable sources of funding are provided to
8 ECOMOG, and unless the force is strengthened and structured in a
9 manner that will enable it to carry out its task as a
12:27:54 10 professional peacekeeping force."

11 Do you, Mr Taylor, accept those comments by the
12 Secretary-General?

13 A. Yes, in a way I can agree with him. And I think that was
14 done.

12:28:05 15 Q. And if we could please look at annex 2 at page 15. And we
16 see "Composition of the Military Component of the United Nations
17 Observer Mission in Liberia". At 5 April 1996, it shows 93 as a
18 total. At 15 May 1996 in Monrovia it shows 5 as a total and on
19 standby in Freetown it shows 10 as a total. Do you accept those
12:28:44 20 figures, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes, with a little addition for the Court. I think this
22 reflects from 5 April. The fighting starts on - this reflects
23 the period of the fighting, really. At the beginning, before the
24 fighting starts, and at the end. I agree with that.

12:29:03 25 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that this document
26 be marked for identification.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Seventeenth Progress Report of the
28 Secretary-General, dated 21 May '96, is marked MFI-381.

29 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in relation to the damage done to the media
2 facilities, could we please look at tab 32 in annex 4. This is
3 again the ECOMOG book at pages 124 and 125. If we look at the
4 bottom of page 124, about midway down we see the caption "The 6
12:30:48 5 April 1996 mayhem in Monrovia". Do you see that, Mr Taylor, just
6 for a frame of reference?

7 A. Yes, I do see that. I'm sorry, I keep bothering you about
8 the source of this document. Which area is this from now?

9 Q. This one is not Dr Adebajo. Instead, it is Lieutenant
12:31:13 10 Colonel Aboagye.

11 A. Okay, just for the record, okay.

12 Q. That book "ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict
13 Resolution".

14 A. Okay.

12:31:21 15 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor? Now if we would turn, please, to page 125,
16 and if we would look at the last sentence of the paragraph that
17 is continued at the top of that page:

18 "Additionally, all the media facilities, except the
19 NPFL-controlled Kiss FM radio station, were vandalised."

12:31:53 20 That is correct, is it not, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, that is totally, totally incorrect. No.

22 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, if I could ask that this be
23 marked for identification, and this book, I believe it would be
24 371C.

12:32:09 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Right. Aboagye's book at page 125 is
26 marked 371C.

27 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that you include
28 page 124 simply to show the "6 April 1996" heading.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: So that would be pages 124 to 125 of this

1 book is marked MFI-371C.

2 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

3 Q. Mr Taylor, you may recall that on 17 November we also
4 discussed the strengthening of ECOMOG and UNOMIL after the 6
12:32:54 5 April fighting, and I suggested to you that by October 1996
6 ECOMOG had some 7,500 troops in Liberia. Do you remember that,
7 Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes, I can remember questions along those lines, yes.

9 Q. And that by November the number remained less than the
12:33:31 10 12,000. Do you remember that, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, vaguely, yes, I remember that.

12 Q. And I also suggested to you that about 10 UNOMIL military
13 observers were in Liberia as of October 1996 and some 24
14 additional observers were expected to arrive. Do you recall
12:33:58 15 that, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And perhaps we could look at tab 72 in annex 3, the
18 Nineteenth Progress Report of the United Nations
19 Secretary-General. This is dated 17 October 1996.

12:35:30 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please proceed.

21 MS HOLLIS:

22 Q. We see this is United Nations Security Council S/1996/858
23 dated 17 October 1996, Nineteenth Progress Report of the
24 Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
12:35:51 25 Liberia. Then if we could please to page 4, paragraph 19, and we
26 see this paragraph is under "Deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL":

27 "The current force strength of ECOMOG is estimated at some
28 7,500 all ranks ..." Mr Taylor, would you accept that figure as
29 of the date of this report?

1 A. I would accept what the Secretary-General says, but
2 counsel, let's just - for the record now, I'm sure this is being
3 done to impeach something that I said, but you've stated to me in
4 this Court your questions. I haven't heard my response, but if I
12:36:43 5 recall, my response was that I did not know the inner workings
6 and had no specific knowledge of the exact numbers.

7 Q. I think indeed that was your general response --

8 A. Very well.

9 Q. -- to those questions, that you didn't know these numbers.

12:36:59 10 A. Okay. Very well. But I accept what the Secretary-General
11 says here.

12 Q. "... 7,500 all ranks and is deployed in Monrovia, Kakata
13 and Buchanan and the Po River area". Do you accept that,
14 Mr Taylor?

12:37:19 15 A. I would accept that.

16 Q. And if we look at paragraph 21:

17 "UNOMIL's current military strength consists of 10 military
18 observers who perform the following duties in pursuance of their
19 mandate ..."

12:37:35 20 And it lists the duties. But would you accept the numbers,
21 Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Ten military observers?

24 A. Yes, I think the Secretary-General had said in a previous
12:37:44 25 statement that a few people remained in Monrovia while others
26 were sent to - yeah, I accept what he says here.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, if we look at paragraph 28 on page 6, where it
28 is talking about the mandate and ECOMOG's revised concept of
29 operations and goes on to estimate what UNOMIL would require.

1 The last two sentences:

2 "The final composition of UNOMIL's military component would
3 be dependent on ECOMOG's deployment but would not exceed a total
4 of 92 military observers. This would represent a reduction of
12:38:36 5 some 68 military observers from the total strength of 160
6 authorised under resolution 1020 (1995)."

7 So do you accept that the final strength of the UNOMIL's
8 military component would not exceed 92 military observers under a
9 revised concept of operations?

12:39:00 10 A. Well, I accept what the Secretary-General says in this - in
11 the sentence you read. I accept what he says.

12 Q. And indeed, this would be a reduction of some 68 military
13 observers from the total strength of 160 which had been
14 authorised under resolution 1020. Yes, Mr Taylor?

12:39:20 15 A. Well, I'll have to do some quick math, but I don't have a
16 problem with that.

17 Q. Then if we could look at the annex at page 14, please.
18 "Composition" --

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't have an annex, and it appears
12:39:50 20 like Court Management doesn't have an annex either.

21 MS HOLLIS: Then we will certainly not refer to that, Madam
22 President, and I would ask that you mark for identification this
23 document.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is the Nineteenth Progress Report of
12:40:10 25 the Secretary-General on UNOMIL, dated 17 October '96. It's
26 marked MFI-382.

27 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we also talked about the numbers of ECOMOG
29 that were present in early 1997, and I put to you that the ECOMOG

1 numbers remained at about 7,500, and you indicated that you did
2 not recall those numbers. Yes, Mr Taylor?

3 A. That is correct.

12:41:03

4 Q. And also I put to you that the UNOMIL strength had been
5 increased up to about 71 military observers, and you indicated
6 that you did not recall that that was the number by the end of
7 January 1997. Do you recall that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. That sounds right, yes.

12:41:22

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Manager, the LiveNote seems
10 to have frozen. At least on the Bench anyway. What is going on?

11 MS IRURA: Your Honour, I will broadcast my LiveNote for
12 purposes of continuing the trial. We could be experiencing a
13 problem with the internet.

12:41:56

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Shall I give you a moment to do that so
15 that we can follow?

16 MS IRURA: Please press the button "PC-1" on your panel to
17 be able to view the LiveNote.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue, Ms Hollis.

12:42:45

19 MS HOLLIS: I would ask that we look at tab number 73 in
20 annex 3. If we could bring that down so that we can see that.

21 "United States Security Council S/1997/90, 29 January 1997,
22 Twenty-First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
23 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia". And if we could
24 please turn to page 3 of the document at paragraph 8 under the
25 heading "Deployment of the Economic Community of West African
26 States Monitoring Group and the United Nations Observer Mission
27 in Liberia."

12:44:19

28 Q. Under paragraph 8, "The force strength of ECOMOG remains at
29 7,500 all ranks". Do you accept that statement by the

1 Secretary-General, Mr Taylor?

2 A. I have no reason to doubt it.

3 Q. "To date the additional troops pledged for ECOMOG have not
4 arrived in Liberia, though some of the support pledged by donor
12:44:51 5 countries is now becoming available. The force commander has
6 deployed into the interior of Liberia in support of the
7 disarmament process, while retaining a force of sufficient
8 strength in Monrovia to assist in maintaining its safe haven
9 status. ECOMOG deployed initially at the designated disarmament
12:45:14 10 sites of the Barclay Training Centre, Camp Schefflein,
11 Tubmanburg, Bo Waterside, Kakata, Voinjama, Buchanan, Camp Naama
12 and Zwedru and subsequently at three additional sites at Tappita,
13 Greenville and Harper."

14 Do you agree with that statement of deployment, Mr Taylor?

12:45:38 15 A. I would agree with him.

16 Q. Under paragraph 9:

17 "ECOMOG has also established buffer zones between ULIMO-J
18 and ULIMO-K in Bomi and Grand Cape Mount counties as well as
19 between the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the
12:46:03 20 Liberian Peace Council (LPC) in Grand Gedeh County. The creation
21 of a similar buffer between the NPFL and ULIMO-K in Bong and Lofa
22 Counties and between NPFL and LPC in Sinoe, Maryland and Grand
23 Kru Counties is also being contemplated but ECOMOG considers it
24 would require additional troops and logistic support for such a
12:46:31 25 deployment."

26 So, Mr Taylor, at this time do you agree that ECOMOG had
27 established buffer zones between your NPFL and the LPC in Grand
28 Gedeh County?

29 A. Yes, I agree.

1 Q. And that a similar buffer zone between your NPFL and
2 ULIMO-K in Bong and Lofa Counties --

3 A. I would agree.

4 Q. -- was being contemplated?

12:46:57 5 A. Well, they did deploy. I cannot speak about the
6 contemplation, but afterward, they did deploy. So they
7 contemplated, but --

8 Q. And a similar buffer zone between your NPFL and the LPC in
9 Sinoe, Maryland and Grand Kru Counties was also being

12:47:21 10 contemplated. Do you accept that as of the time of this report?

11 A. I would say - I take his word for it, yes.

12 Q. But that ECOMOG considered that they would need additional
13 troops and logistic support for such a deployment. Do you accept
14 that statement?

12:47:35 15 A. I accept the statement, yes.

16 Q. And then if we look at paragraph 11:

17 "The new chief military observer of UNOMIL, Major General
18 Sikandar Shami, assumed his functions on 16 December 1996. As of
19 28 January 1997, the military strength of UNOMIL stood at 78
12:48:02 20 observers ..."

21 Do you accept that number, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. "... who are deployed at the disarmament sites at Bo
24 Waterside, Tubmanburg, Kakata, Camp Naama, Voijnama, Zwedru,
12:48:14 25 Tappita and the Barclay Training Centre, Greenville,
26 Camp Schefflein and Buchanan."

27 Do you accept the Secretary-General's statement about the
28 deployment areas?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. Monitoring teams are also deployed at James Spriggs Payne
2 Airport and at the seaport in Monrovia. Do you accept that?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. And then if we do look at page 12, annex 1, and this should
12:48:57 5 be included, for your Honours, in this document. "Composition of
6 the military component of UNOMIL as of 26 January 1997".
7 Mr Taylor, you see under "Total" 78 and under "Military
8 observers" 71?

9 A. That is correct.

12:49:23 10 Q. Do you accept those numbers, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that you mark this
13 document for identification.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Twenty-First Progress Report of the
12:49:38 15 Secretary-General on UNOMIL, dated 29 January '97, is marked
16 MFI-383.

17 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President:

18 Q. Mr Taylor, when you were asked about an increase of ECOMOG
19 troops by mid-March of 1997, you indicated that you can sense the
12:50:05 20 increase in the troops but you were not aware that the numbers
21 were up to 10,000. Do you remember saying that, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. If we could please look tab 74 in annex 3. This should be
24 S/1997/237, "Twenty-Second Progress Report", and we see on the
12:50:57 25 screen "United Nations Security Council S/1997/237, 19 March
26 1997, Twenty-Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on
27 the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia". If we could
28 please look at page 4 of that document.

29 MS IRURA: Your Honour, the LiveNote service seems to have

1 been restored.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Ms Hollis, please continue.

3 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

4 Q. At paragraph 15 of the document:

12:53:23 5 "With the recent induction of a 650-man Malian battalion
6 and a 500-man Ghanaian battalion, the strength of ECOMOG has been
7 increased to approximately 10,000 ..."

8 Do you accept that number as of the date of this report,
9 Mr Taylor?

12:53:39 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. "... currently deployed throughout the country, except in
12 Grand Kru and River Cess Counties where they expect to deploy
13 soon."

14 Do you accept that statement regarding deployment?

12:54:00 15 A. I do.

16 Q. "In ECOMOG's assessment, which is fully shared by UNOMIL,
17 an additional three battalions would be required for the
18 peacekeeping force to perform the security related and other
19 tasks envisaged for it during the forthcoming elections. Those
12:54:15 20 troops would also enable ECOMOG to deploy in Grand Kru and River
21 Cess Counties and reinforce its presence in Lofa, Sinoe and
22 Maryland Counties."

23 Do you accept the Secretary-General's statement of ECOMOG's
24 assessment and UNOMIL's agreement with that assessment?

12:54:34 25 A. Yes, I accept what he says.

26 Q. If we could look at paragraph 17:

27 "The military component of UNOMIL has now reached its full
28 authorised strength of 1 chief military observer and 92 military
29 observers ..."

1 Do you accept that, Mr Taylor?

2 A. I accept that.

3 Q. "... most of whom are deployed to the 10 disarmament sites
4 of Bo Waterside, Buchanan, Gbarnga, Greenville, Harper, Kakata,
12:55:08 5 Tappita, Tubmanburg, Voinjama and Zwedru and at UNOMIL
6 headquarters in Monrovia."

7 Do you accept that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. I do.

9 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that you mark this
12:55:21 10 document for identification.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Twenty-Second Progress Report of the
12 Secretary-General on UNOMIL dated 19 March '97 is marked MFI-384.

13 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

14 Q. Mr Taylor, we also talked about relative strengths of these
12:55:53 15 groups as of June 1997. Do you recall that? We talked about
16 that still on 17 November.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And you indicated you were not aware that by June 1997 the
19 ECOMOG troop strength had moved up to 11,000 personnel. Do you
12:56:15 20 remember that, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes I do.

22 Q. If we could look at tab 75 in annex 3. This should be
23 S/1997/478, Twenty-Third Progress Report. We see this on the
24 screen, "United Nations Security Council, S/1997/478, 19 June
12:57:09 25 1997. Twenty-Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on
26 the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia". And if we would
27 look, please, at page 5, paragraph 18. We see under "ECOMOG and
28 UNOMIL Deployment":

29 "During the period under review, ECOMOG has continued to

1 receive considerable reinforcements. In April, 320 troops from
2 Burkina Faso, 321 from Niger and a 35-man medical team from Cote
3 d'Ivoire arrived, with a further 250 troops from Benin joining
4 ECOMOG in May. These reinforcements have brought ECOMOG strength
12:58:05 5 to approximately 11,000 troops deployed at 48 different
6 locations."

7 Do you agree with that statement of numbers, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. And do you agree with the statement that the sum -

12:58:28 10 approximately 11,000 troops have deployed at 48 different
11 locations?

12 A. Yes, I have no reason to dispute the Secretary-General.

13 Q. And the next sentence:

14 "Although some ECOMOG troops have been redeployed to Sierra
12:58:42 15 Leone in connection with the crisis in that country, my special
16 representative and the chief military observer believe that
17 ECOMOG at present retains sufficient capability to ensure
18 security for the forthcoming elections in Liberia."

19 So, Mr Taylor, do you accept the Secretary-General's
12:59:02 20 statement that as of the date of this report some ECOMOG troops
21 had been redeployed to Sierra Leone?

22 A. I accept what he says. I don't know the details, but if he
23 says so, I have no reason to disagree.

24 Q. And if we look at paragraph 19:

12:59:23 25 "UNOMIL has completed its planned deployment at 16 sites,
26 covering all the 13 counties of Liberia."

27 Do you accept that, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. If we look at the annex on page 15, we see a total for the

1 composition of the military component of the United Nations
2 Observer Mission in Liberia as at 15 June 1997, a total of 93 and
3 military observers listed as 86. Yes, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes.

13:00:09 5 Q. Do you accept that?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, could I ask that this be
8 marked for identification.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Twenty-Third Progress Report of the
13:00:23 10 Secretary-General on UNOMIL dated 19 June '97 is marked MFI-385.

11 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

12 Q. Mr Taylor, I had put to you on 17 November that after the
13 elections, Nigeria was concerned because Nigerians were being
14 increasingly harassed and maltreated in Liberia. Do you recall

13:00:54 15 me putting that to you?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. And you disagreed with that, saying:

18 "How do you maltreat and harass an armed soldier?"

19 Everybody is disarmed. No, I would disagree."

13:01:07 20 Do you remember that, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. If we could look again, please, at tab 32 in annex 4, and
23 again this is the ECOMOG book, the Lieutenant Colonel who is the
24 author of this book, Mr Taylor. If we could please look at page
13:01:51 25 270 of this book. Mr Taylor, if we look at the second full
26 paragraph on that page beginning, "As time 20 on, however."

27 Now, we have visited this before for another purpose, but
28 we see a reference six lines down to late 1997. Do you see that,
29 Mr Taylor? A line beginning, "Late 1997"?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And then if we go down three lines from there:

3 "At the same time, Nigerians in Liberia, including Nigerian
4 ECOMOG troops, were being increasingly maltreated by the
13:02:54 5 Liberians."

6 Now, that was a correct statement, was it not, Mr Taylor?

7 A. I would still say incorrect. You say that Liberians - by
8 "the Liberians", I would disagree. He is not referring to
9 militias, so he said by ordinary citizens. I would disagree.

13:03:21 10 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, we have dealt with this page
11 before in relation to information that was not allowed to be
12 used. We would ask, however, that we be allowed to have this
13 page 270 marked for consideration of the two words "late 1997" in
14 the second full paragraph and consideration of the sentence:

13:03:46 15 "At the same time, Nigerians in Liberia, including Nigerian
16 ECOMOG troops, were being increasingly maltreated by Liberians."

17 For that specific portion only, we would ask that this page
18 be marked for identification.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Page 270 as referred to by counsel is
13:04:18 20 marked MFI-371D.

21 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President:

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, on 18 November I asked you if you recalled
23 that at the point of the elections, ECOMOG had begun to reduce
24 their forces quite significantly, as had the UNOMIL mission in
13:04:51 25 Liberia. You stated that you didn't recall it in that way, that
26 they had reduced significantly prior to elections. Now,
27 Mr Taylor, perhaps we have a communication difficulty here, so
28 let me be specific.

29 You have said you did not recall a significant reduction

1 prior to elections, yes, Mr Taylor?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Do you recall a significant reduction immediately after
4 elections?

13:05:26 5 A. Significant reduction immediately after elections?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. No, I don't.

8 Q. If we could again look at tab 32, the ECOMOG book, in annex
9 4, and this time at page 267, please.

13:06:12 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Again this is Aboagye's book?

11 MS HOLLIS: Yes, Madam President:

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if we look at this page we see,
13 "Post-electoral concept of deployment and operations." Just to
14 give us a reference: "Immediately after the electoral process,
13:06:43 15 ECOMOG reviewed its concept of operations and deployment." Then,
16 Mr Taylor, if we look at "Scaling down of forces" at the bottom
17 of the page:

18 "The force level was drastically reduced with the
19 withdrawal of several national contingents after the successful
13:07:03 20 peace process. Nigeria repatriated a few of its battalions and
21 redeployed a significant force to Sierra Leone."

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, please pause.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I just object to the premise upon which
24 this question is based. The question which prompted reference to
13:07:23 25 this passage was: Do you recall after the elections the ECOMOG
26 contingents being drastically reduced? That was the question
27 which prompted reference to this passage.

28 Now, the point is this: When we look at this passage, we
29 see on line 1 "Immediately after the electoral process", but then

1 when we go to the next paragraph upon which emphasis is made, we
2 see "After the successful peace process". So is after the
3 election and after the successful process one and the same thing?

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, do you wish to respond?

13:08:20 5 MS HOLLIS: If I'm allowed to continue, I think that we
6 will clear this up. I don't understand the objection. I was not
7 able to finish reading and then put my question to Mr Taylor.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: The objection is the earlier question
9 refers to a certain time frame, that is, immediately after the
10 election. Now the part that you are now reading, which begins
11 "The forces level was drastically reduced", deals with a
12 different time frame, that is, after the successful peace
13 process. And the question is: Are the two time frames the same?
14 That is the question to which I would appreciate if you responded
15 before you proceed.

16 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, that is a matter of
17 interpretation and I was going to explore that with Mr Taylor.
18 Because I am not the author of this book, in fairness I put it in
19 context with the immediately after the electoral process ECOMOG
13:09:29 20 reviewing its concept of operations and deployment, and then I
21 went down to "Scaling of the forces" and read what was there, and
22 I was about to then put the question to Mr Taylor in a two-phased
23 manner: First of all as to the scaling down; and secondly, as to
24 the time frame.

13:09:54 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay, Ms Hollis, I think I'll let you
26 continue.

27 MS HOLLIS: Thank you: Now if I can find where I left off
28 reading.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think you had better repeat that

1 passage.

2 MS HOLLIS: Thank you:

3 Q. Mr Taylor, under "Scaling down of forces":

4 "The force level was drastically reduced with the
13:10:30 5 withdrawal of several national contingents after the successful
6 peace process. Nigeria repatriated a few of its battalions and
7 redeployed a significant force to Sierra Leone. Ghana
8 repatriated one of its battalions, leaving one in the mission
9 area. Benin, Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea pulled out completely,
13:10:48 10 while Burkina Faso and Niger both left token forces behind."

11 Now, first of all, Mr Taylor, do you agree - and we will
12 discuss time period in a moment, but that - and we'll use this
13 language: "After the successful peace process, Nigeria
14 repatriated a few of its battalions." Do you agree with that?

13:11:17 15 A. Well, again it raises a question here for me even in my
16 mind as to whether the election is equated with the successful
17 peace. I would say that the peace process doesn't end with the
18 election.

19 Q. Let's try it a different way then. Mr Taylor, do you
13:11:39 20 recall after the election at some point Nigeria repatriating a
21 few of its battalions from Liberia?

22 A. Well, yes, some time after the election. That's later in
23 the year.

24 Q. In your recollection, when was that?

13:11:52 25 A. I would put it to about the - around the end of 1997, given
26 the fact that me, as President, I was not asked or consulted
27 whenever units were being moved, maybe for tactical or security
28 purposes. But I would say around the end of 1997 we --

29 Q. This is a repatriation of a few of its battalions,

1 Mr Taylor, yes?

2 A. I'm looking at repatriation as moving them out of Liberia.

3 Q. In addition, do you recall, at some point after the
4 elections, Nigeria redeploying a significant number of its force
13:12:36 5 to Sierra Leone?

6 A. No, I wouldn't know the significance of - when you say
7 "significant" force, "significant" I'm interpreting as being a
8 large force. I don't know that as a fact. I know Nigeria, by
9 the end of the year, removes some forces. I don't know as to
13:12:56 10 whether it is a significant force. I can't say that.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, after your election do you recall Ghana
12 repatriating one of its battalions?

13 A. Ghana did, to the best of my recollection, remove one of
14 its battalions.

13:13:16 15 Q. And what is your recollection as to when that occurred?

16 A. All of these are happening - I would put it to about the
17 end - going towards the last quarter of 1997, or thereabout.

18 Q. And is it your recollection that Ghana left one battalion
19 in Liberia?

13:13:36 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And also is it your recollection that after the election,
22 Benin pulled out completely?

23 A. I don't know. I was not told that.

24 Q. Is it your recollection that they remained, or you have no
13:13:57 25 recollection of what happened with them?

26 A. I have no recollection of what happened. The system was
27 not set up that ECOMOG had to report to the Government of Liberia a
28 how it managed the forces at its disposal. In fact, a lot of the
29 thing I'm talking about here are things that our people would

1 pick up and say: Well, there's a unit moving here or there. So
2 I don't recall what - the Benin situation. Ghana I remember
3 quite well because Rawlings, you know, and I are friends and, you
4 know, Ghana would tell me directly, but not from the ECOMOG side.

13:14:41 5 Q. And, Mr Taylor, do you recall Cote d'Ivoire pulling out
6 completely after your election?

7 A. Some time after. And I know this because most of the Cote
8 d'Ivoire people are medical type people, and so as they're
9 leaving the hospitals, the Minister of Health, I can remember,
13:14:58 10 did say that some of the medical individuals from La Cote
11 d'Ivoire were leaving.

12 Q. Do you remember about when that was?

13 A. No, counsel, I can't. They did not leave in a hurry like
14 the rest of these people, so I would late 1997 going to the
13:15:16 15 beginning of 1998, there are still a few Ivorians, medical
16 personnel, there.

17 Q. And do you recall Guinea pulling out completely?

18 A. Not precisely. The Guinean situation is more complex.
19 Guinea did pull out, but I don't remember exactly when they
13:15:36 20 pulled out.

21 Q. Do you recall that Burkina Faso and Niger left only token
22 forces behind?

23 A. I'm aware of that. The two Presidents at the time, I'm in
24 very good relationship with them, so I get to know from them,
13:15:53 25 yes.

26 Q. Thank you for that, Mr Taylor. Now, Mr Taylor, you will
27 recall that on 18 November we also talked about conflicts that
28 occurred between you and General Malu, and we talked about - or I
29 put to you that General Malu's insistence that ECOMOG be the one

1 to restructure and train the AFL, police and security forces was
2 one of the conflicts between you. Do you remember that?

3 A. Yes.

13:16:38

4 Q. And that his insistence was to ensure that these forces
5 would reflect a national composition, not a factional
6 representation. Do you remember my putting that to you?

7 A. Yes.

13:16:55

8 Q. And you indicated that that was totally incorrect and a
9 misrepresentation of your government's position. Do you remember
10 saying that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. That your aim was that the forces would reflect a factional
13 representation. Do you remember that?

14 A. I said that the forces - my forces --

13:17:07

15 Q. That your aim was that these forces would reflect a
16 factional representation.

17 A. I don't remember that. Probably I misspoke. I don't
18 recall that.

13:17:27

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, it is correct, is it not, that the
20 disagreements between you and General Malu culminated in him
21 being replaced at the force commander?

22 A. Would you ask that again?

13:17:47

23 Q. It is correct, is it not, that the - let me be sure I say
24 it exactly the same, Mr Taylor. Is it correct, is it not, the
25 disagreements between you and General Malu culminated in him
26 being replaced as the force commander?

27 A. I would say so.

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, one of the disagreements with General Malu
29 revolved around the relationship that would exist between ECOMOG

1 and your government. Isn't that correct?

2 A. That's very general though. That's a wide brush. If we
3 break that down, I would say that's a component, but that's a
4 very wide brush, counsel.

13:18:35 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, it actually revolved around the interaction
6 of ECOMOG with your government. Isn't that right?

7 A. Interaction, okay, yes, I can put it. Yeah, I will say
8 interaction, yes. Generally, yes.

9 Q. And indeed it had to do with your plan to put ECOMOG under
13:19:10 10 your own command. Isn't that correct?

11 A. No, that's totally incorrect. No. Never a plan, never
12 anticipated, no.

13 Q. And the second major part of that again was General Malu's
14 insistence that it would be ECOMOG who would restructure
13:19:35 15 Liberia's army. Isn't that correct?

16 A. I wouldn't say that is totally incorrect. That was a part
17 of General Malu's argument, but that was not the total argument,
18 but I would say that was a part of the argument, but there is a
19 disagreement as to - in your first question when you talk about
13:20:02 20 the interaction and understanding from our position on the issue
21 of sovereignty and what we saw an ECOWAS force to be, in total,
22 that's it, I would say. But that was a part of General Malu's
23 argument.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, perhaps if we could look again at tab 21 in
13:20:25 25 annex 3. This is Dr Adebajo's book.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, do I take it that you didn't
27 want to mark for identification the last page, 267?

28 MS HOLLIS: That is correct. I did not wish to have that
29 marked:

1 Q. This is tab 21 in annex 3. Perhaps we could put the cover
2 page on just to - no, we need tab 21, which would be Dr Adebajo's
3 book, the Liberian civil war.

13:22:23

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, do you have a page in this
5 book?

6 MS HOLLIS: The pages that we will refer to are initially
7 pages 233 and 234 and then page 239:

8 Q. Mr Taylor, again we're talking about Dr Adebajo's book.

9 A. Okay.

13:23:15

10 Q. If we could initially look at page 233, please, and show
11 the bottom of the page. If we look at the third line up from the
12 bottom:

13 "Taylor successfully pressured Abacha to remove ECOMOG
14 force commander Victor Malu who had resisted Taylor's plans to
15 bring ECOMOG under his own command and insisted forcefully that
16 ECOMOG restructure Liberia's army."

13:23:37

17 Now, that is correct, is it not, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Well, in that particular sentence there's some part right
19 and there's some part incorrect.

13:23:58

20 Q. Tell us what part you say is right?

21 A. Taylor pressured Abacha to remove Malu, that is correct.
22 On the assumption that Taylor wanted to bring ECOMOG under his
23 own command, it's totally false and erroneous. I understood
24 ECOWAS - the command of ECOMOG was always the command of the
25 chairman of ECOWAS and the inner workings with the secretariat.

13:24:19

26 That was not the issue. Adebajo is wrong 100 per cent on this.

27 Q. And, Mr Taylor, we see, "And insisted" - and he's referring
28 back to General Malu - "forcefully that ECOMOG restructure
29 Liberia's army." Is that part correct in your view?

1 A. I don't see the full thing but as you read it, no, that was
2 totally - "and insisted forcefully", I don't see the other part.

3 Q. "And insisted forcefully that" - and if we turn the page -
4 "ECOMOG restructure Liberia's army." Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

13:25:03 5 A. If that was a part of what Malu said?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Malu did say that, yes.

8 Q. If we could also look now at page - well, first of all,
9 Mr Taylor, at the end of that sentence on 234, "restructure

13:25:20 10 Liberia's army", you see there is a footnote number there, number
11 7. Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, I see the footnote.

13 Q. If we could turn to page 239, please. You see, Mr Taylor,
14 under footnote 7, "Personal interview with General Victor Malu,

13:25:44 15 former ECOMOG force commander, Lagos, 2 October 2001." So that
16 footnote 7 refers to a personal interview. Do you see that,
17 Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yeah, but in the absence of that interview - I see it, but
19 I don't see the personal interview, so I have a disagreement with
13:26:05 20 Adebajo, you know, as to his assessment of what it was. I don't
21 even see the interview here.

22 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that these three
23 pages, 233, 234 and 239 be marked as the next in number for
24 MFI-372 which I believe is E.

13:26:34 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the three pages are so marked.

26 MS HOLLIS:

27 Q. If we could also look again at tab 6 of annex 3, the
28 Liberian TRC report, volume 2, and if we could look at page 133
29 of that report, please. If we could look at the bottom of that

1 page, please. If we look at the last paragraph on that page,
2 seven lines up:

3 "No sooner a disagreement arose between President Taylor
4 and ECOMOG commander Victor Malu" - it says here "Marlu" - "over
13:28:08 5 Taylor's strategy for reconstructing the army. Malu argued that
6 under the peace accord it was the responsibility of ECOMOG to
7 build the new army in an open and transparent manner."

8 Now, Mr Taylor, I believe we have covered the - well, first
9 of all, do you agree with the statement that there was a
13:28:30 10 disagreement between you and Victor Malu over your strategy for
11 reconstructing the army?

12 A. Well, I wouldn't call it a disagreement, but I agree, like
13 I said, that Malu did state that it was ECOMOG's responsibility.

14 Q. And do you agree that Malu also argued that it was ECOMOG's
13:28:51 15 responsibility to build the new army in an open and transparent
16 manner?

17 A. I don't know if that was his argument, but I think it was -
18 I think Malu didn't understand what was going on. He did state
19 that, in all earnesty; Victor is still a good friend of mine.

13:29:09 20 But he did not understand maybe as a military man the
21 constitutional and legal issues that were being raised by my
22 government. But he did state that it was their responsibility to
23 build a new army and I told him that under the constitution of
24 Liberia, where the constitution was in force it is the
13:29:32 25 legislature of Liberia under our constitution that builds an
26 army. So that was the disagreement really.

27 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I would ask that this page 133
28 be marked next in order, MFI-373C.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is correct. The page is so marked.

1 MS HOLLIS:

2 Q. Mr Taylor, also on 18 November - your Honour, I don't think
3 I'm going to be able to get through this before the luncheon
4 break, the next reference.

13:30:12 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think there's not enough or
6 sufficient time to look at another passage. We will adjourn
7 until 2.30.

8 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

9 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:30:51 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Ms Hollis, please
11 continue.

12 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I should note for the record
13 that Mr Santora is no longer at the Prosecution table:

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I would like to turn to another topic.

14:32:45 15 Mr Taylor, you recall that during the direct examination, your
16 counsel discussed with you the testimony of many of the
17 Prosecution witnesses. Do you recall that, yes, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Mr Taylor, please understand that it is the Prosecution's
14:33:04 20 submission to you that during the Defence counsel's questions to
21 you about the testimony of these Prosecution witnesses, that
22 Defence counsel and you yourself consistently misstated the
23 Prosecution evidence. I want you to understand that, Mr Taylor.
24 And that is correct, is it not, Mr Taylor?

14:33:31 25 A. Well, it depends on what you are talking about. I totally
26 disagree that there were any attempts on my part or counsel's
27 part to consistently misinterpret the words you used of any
28 evidence before this Court. I think that's totally incorrect.

29 Q. And, Mr Taylor, let's look at 6 August 2009 at page 26213,

1 where your counsel begins to put to you some questions relating
2 to the testimony of Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF1-334. This is 6
3 August, 26213. Now, we have this page before us, and if we could
4 please look at - beginning at line 12 of that page. Your counsel
14:34:53 5 is putting this to you, Mr Taylor:

6 "Q. Now, Mr Taylor, another direct allegation that I want
7 to give you an opportunity to deal with. On 24 April 2008
8 another Prosecution witness, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF1-334,
9 to which pages 8515 of the transcript refers, said to you -
14:35:25 10 said that you, Charles Taylor, gave \$15,000 and said it was
11 support for Johnny Paul Koroma's men whilst they wait for
12 Foday Sankoh to arrive, and you did that in May 1998. What
13 do you say about that?

14 A. I think he made a mistake. I think he made a great,
14:35:57 15 great mistake, because the incident that he is referring
16 to, if it's anything, it must be May of 1999. If he said
17 1998, it's a blatant lie. He must be - maybe he made a
18 mistake, but that's for him to correct, because the period
19 in question in dealing with Johnny Paul, we have already
14:36:25 20 brought Johnny Paul Koroma to Liberia and he is waiting for
21 Foday Sankoh to - no, no, no. May of - no, no, no, no, no,
22 no. I thought that was in 1999. No, that is not true."

23 You remember that exchange with your counsel, correct,
24 Mr Taylor?

14:36:49 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. So he is putting to you that Alimamy Bobson Sesay at page
27 8515 indicated that he received \$15,000 - or that you gave
28 \$15,000 and you did that in May 1998, and you're saying, no,
29 that's not true. Now, you go on, Mr Taylor, to say:

1 "But let's look at the information there. Let's look at
2 the information. What is happening in Liberia in April
3 1998 according to the evidence before this Court? 6 April
4 or thereabouts are we not fighting in Monrovia?

14:37:34 5 Q. '98?

6 A. 1998? When are we involved in this fight with Johnson?
7 That's about this time."

8 Then your counsel helps you out, Mr Taylor:

9 "Q. I thought that was September/October 1998, the Camp
14:37:58 10 Johnson Road incident?

11 A. The Camp Johnson Road, yes, September. Okay.

12 And then your counsel asked another question:

13 "Q. What's happening in April 1998, Mr Taylor? Think
14 about it. '98."

14:38:15 15 And then you now have it:

16 "A. April 1998. Oh, February we have the intervention.
17 March, April. There is just really the crisis. I think we
18 are putting people - we're trying to get ECOMOG to work
19 along with us on the border. That's as much as I know
14:38:34 20 about April 1998.

21 Q. But help me: Did you in May 1998 give \$15,000 saying
22 it was support for Johnny Paul Koroma's men whilst they
23 wait for Foday Sankoh to arrive?

24 A. No, that's what I'm saying. That's not - he got it all
14:38:55 25 mixed up. That's not true. No, he got it all mixed up."

26 Then he asks you if you at some stage give money to Johnny
27 Paul Koroma and you answer:

28 "A. That \$15,000 is in evidence in August - in
29 August/September 1999, that \$15 comes out in the same

1 Bobson Sesay - that's why I'm saying, he is making the
2 year. So that \$15,000 that he is taking about refers to
3 evidence before this Court of money that were given to
4 Johnny Paul Koroma and his men in my office where it's
14:39:36 5 described that I pulled this briefcase and gave the money.
6 So I'm sure that he got that whole thing mixed up. And
7 that's what you do when you're lying; you get things mixed
8 up."

9 You remember that exchange, Mr Taylor?

14:39:53 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. In fact, Mr Taylor, the witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, as
12 you will well remember, never said that the \$15,000 was given to
13 him and the others in May 1998. You recall that, don't you,
14 Mr Taylor?

14:40:12 15 A. If what do I recall?

16 Q. That the witness never said this money was given in
17 May 1998?

18 A. Well, I'm not saying the transcript. I'm responding to a
19 statement put to me and I'm telling counsel - I'm not reading the
14:40:28 20 transcript - that if there's any money given, it is in
21 August 1999.

22 Q. Let's look at page 8515 of 24 April 2008. We're looking at
23 24 April 2008, page 8515. Mr Taylor, if we look from the very
24 first line on that page all the way to the bottom of the page, if
14:41:37 25 we look at that and review it, we're going to see that nowhere on
26 that page does Alimamy Bobson Sesay tell the Court that he
27 received - he and his group received \$15,000 from you in
28 May 1998. That is nowhere to be found on that page, is it,
29 Mr Taylor?

1 A. I don't see it on this page.

2 Q. Now, indeed, let's look at 24 April 2008 at page 8504,
3 where the witness is talking about this trip, and at line 6:

14:42:43

4 "Q. When you arrived at the President's office, did you
5 meet anyone?

6 A. Upon our arrival the ADC, who was Momo Dgiba, received
7 us and took us to the conference room and we were there in
8 waiting.

9 Q. And what happened after this?

14:42:56

10 A. Well, we waited for some time after which President
11 Taylor came together with Momo Dgiba and he also introduced
12 his Defence Minister to us, Daniel Chea. They came into
13 the conference room. They sat down and Johnny Paul
14 introduced us, the squad that went to President Taylor.

14:43:21

15 Q. So, witness, do you recall a date for this meeting?

16 A. Well, as I said it was going towards August.
17 July/August. August 1999. After the Lome Peace Accord had
18 been signed. Early August, that's when we went to
19 Monrovia, in 1999."

14:43:40

20 So, Mr Taylor, the witness is talking about this meeting
21 with you as occurring in August 1999 and that's when that meeting
22 did occur with you. Isn't that correct, Mr Taylor?

23 A. That's when the meeting occurred, in August 1999, yes.

14:43:55

24 Q. Then in the next page the witness goes on to answer
25 questions about the meeting. And then if we could go to page
26 8506, which on that page continues to discuss the meeting. And
27 if we look at line 16:

28 "Charles Taylor took \$15,000 and gave it to Johnny Paul for
29 it to be given to us the men who came, so we could refresh

1 ourselves and buy things. He said we should feel free and buy
2 things in Monrovia until we await the arrival of Foday Saybana
3 Sankoh who had left Lome for Ghana and that he was on his way to
4 come - he was on his way to Liberia."

14:44:42 5 So, Mr Taylor, it's in the context of your meeting in
6 August 1999 that this witness says that you gave this \$15,000,
7 and that is correct, is it not, Mr Taylor?

8 A. I'm not sure if it's in the context, but I don't understand
9 - if your questions are premised on your introduction, then I'm
14:45:07 10 responding to an issue put before me by counsel and I'm saying
11 that the money issue occurs in August. So if your quarrel is
12 that counsel made an error, I'm sure that's a different matter,
13 but I think I have done my part to say to counsel that if he says
14 it is not May, it is in August. So --

14:45:30 15 Q. Mr Taylor, looking at page 8504 and then 8506, this witness
16 is saying that \$15,000 was given during this August meeting. And
17 it was given during this August meeting, was it not, Mr Taylor?

18 A. That's what the witness is saying. I agree it was given -
19 money was given during the August meeting, that is correct.

14:45:54 20 Q. And that is August 1999, correct?

21 A. It's August 1999, that is correct.

22 Q. Thank you, Mr Taylor. Now, Mr Taylor, if we could look at
23 some of the documents that have been marked for identification by
24 your counsel. If we could first, please, look at MFI-296. This
14:46:41 25 was DCT-255, tab 128 in binder 3 of 4 for week 33. MFI-296, do
26 your Honours have it before you?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: What's on the overhead is different.
28 MFI-296, according to our records, or my records, is the outgoing
29 code cable to Prendergast of 14 April. Is that the document

1 you're referring to?

2 MS HOLLIS: No, that is not what we have as MFI-296.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: That's what I have as MFI-296, an outgoing
4 code cable dated 14 April from Downes-Thomas to Miyet at the UN.

14:48:05 5 That's 296, and it's also DCT-296.

6 MS HOLLIS: DCT-255.

7 MS IRURA: Your Honour, what we have as MFI-296 is letter
8 from President of Liberia, which is DCT-255.

9 JUDGE DOHERTY: To confuse things further, that's what I
14:48:26 10 have in my personal notes.

11 MS HOLLIS: The letter to President George Bush. I have
12 that as DCT-255. Obviously there's some clarification that's
13 required for the MFI number, but the document I wish to look at
14 is the letter to George W Bush, 16 June 2003.

14:49:01 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just give us a moment until we locate
16 this. I think in order to save time we'll just go by the
17 document that is displayed on the overhead. We'll sort out the
18 MFIs later.

19 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, just to assist perhaps in the
14:49:41 20 ultimate resolution, we have this being marked and referred to on
21 10 November at page 31513, just for your assistance, the document
22 we have marked as MFI-296:

23 Q. Mr Taylor, you see this letter before you?

24 A. Yes, I do.

14:50:05 25 Q. And at the bottom of the letter, "Dankpannah Dr Charles
26 Ghankay Taylor." Mr Taylor, did you not keep a signed copy of
27 this letter?

28 A. Normally these letters would be - the signed copy would go
29 out to the individual receiving it. There would only be initial

1 copies that would be kept by government.

2 Q. Mr Taylor, is this initialled in some location on this
3 letter? I don't see it.

4 A. Then I can't see the --

14:50:44 5 MS HOLLIS: Could you raise it up so that Mr Taylor could
6 see the rest of the letter.

7 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know if the reproduction - but
8 this is my letter. I remember it. I know it. I wrote it to
9 Bush.

14:51:06 10 MS HOLLIS:

11 Q. Mr Taylor, it is dated 16 June 2003. Is that the date that
12 you actually forwarded it or sent it on to President Bush?

13 A. It could be on that day, it could be a day or two later,
14 depending on the routing at the presidency. I don't know - once
14:51:34 15 I signed the letter, I don't know, one would assume it would go
16 out but normally it could take - it could be the same day or the
17 next.

18 Q. And in what archive would they have the copy that was
19 actually signed by you, Mr Taylor?

14:51:48 20 A. Well, there should still be copies at the mansion. I had
21 copies. I had copies in my own personal archives, but there
22 could be copies still at the mansion.

23 Q. And this letter before us as it is, this is the copy that
24 you had in your archive?

14:52:06 25 A. This is a copy of the letter, yes, that I kept.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, is this one of the documents that you had
27 collected and put in your archive before you left Liberia?

28 A. This is one of the documents that I had before I left
29 Liberia, yes.

1 Q. If we look at the third paragraph where it talks about
2 peace talks sponsored by the International Contact Group on
3 Liberia, you talk about instructing your - you have instructed
4 your negotiating team to sign a ceasefire agreement drafted by
14:52:45 5 experts under the auspices of the ICGL. Mr Taylor, these
6 experts, who were they, do you recall?

7 A. No, they were teams from different - from the United
8 Nations. Different people were present.

9 Q. Then, Mr Taylor, you in the next paragraph indicate that
14:53:03 10 you have offered to consider recusing yourself from the political
11 process at the end of your first term next January. And you're
12 indicating that to President Bush in this letter, that you have
13 offered to consider recusing yourself, yes?

14 A. That is correct.

14:53:24 15 Q. And that was your position at that time, that you were
16 offering that you would consider recusing yourself?

17 A. I don't understand your question now. What is it?

18 Q. Well, your position at this time was that you were offering
19 that you would consider recusing yourself from the political
14:53:43 20 process at the end of your first term?

21 A. Well, the way how, if I'm hearing your question, you asked
22 me if I had offered - what the document said, I'm saying here I
23 have offered to consider - that's the language there - recusing
24 myself.

14:54:06 25 Q. Mr Taylor, you indicate that you envisaged, for example,
26 the immediate deployment of a unit of American forces giving
27 logistics and administrative support to a contingent of West
28 African peacekeepers sanctioned by the United Nations?

29 A. What part are you reading?

1 Q. I'm sorry. This is the second paragraph from the bottom:

2 "It is in this regard that my government again requests the
3 United States to play a leading role in the restoration of peace
4 and stability in Liberia."

14:54:36 5 Yes, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Then you go on to indicate that you envision, for example,
8 the immediate deployment of a unit of American armed forces
9 giving logistics and administrative support to a contingent of
10 West African peacekeepers sanctioned by the United Nations. So
11 that was part of the role you envisioned the United States would
12 play at that time?

14:54:51

13 A. Because these were - yes. These were discussions that the
14 United States had said they would play a role, yes.

14:55:09

15 Q. Those are all the questions I have for that document. If
16 we could please look at MFI-285. According to our records, this
17 should be DCT-354, tab 6 in the binder for week 38. MFI-285. It
18 is a BBC news report. Mr Taylor, we see in this report that it
19 is dated Monday, 4 February 2002, and the caption, "Liberia
20 struggling to defeat rebels." Yes, Mr Taylor?

14:56:09

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. If we look at page 2 of this document and if we look at the
23 second paragraph from the bottom of that page:

24 "Tubmanburg mayor Gbeley Karnley said that civilians and
25 government soldiers had looted goods belonging to the fleeing
26 refugees."

14:56:43

27 So, Mr Taylor, this is a report that government soldiers
28 were among those who had looted goods belonging to fleeing
29 refugees. Were you aware of that fact, Mr Taylor?

1 A. No, I was not made aware. This is the mayor of Tubmanburg
2 and at the time this report is made I do not see how he can refer
3 to government soldiers because that part of the country - I would
4 disagree with whoever this person is because the Government of
14:57:11 5 Liberia soldiers are not in Tubmanburg at this time. So I would
6 disagree.

7 Q. By the way, did you know this man?

8 A. No, no, no.

9 Q. Gbeley Karnley, did you know him?

14:57:23 10 A. No.

11 Q. If we look at the next paragraph:

12 "The military authorities in the town have warned that any
13 soldiers found guilty of looting will be punished."

14 So, Mr Taylor, when he refers to military authorities in
14:57:35 15 the town he is referring to your military, is he not, Mr Taylor?

16 A. No, he must be referring to LURD. This is Tubmanburg, Bomi
17 Hills and LURD - it's got to be LURD. It cannot be our forces.

18 Q. So the LURD authorities in the town have warned that any
19 soldiers found guilty of looting will be punished?

14:57:52 20 A. That's possible, yeah. I'm saying, you know, we are not
21 there.

22 Q. Thank you, Mr Taylor. Now if we could also look at
23 MFI-288. This was DCT-365, which was tab 1 in binder 39.

24 Mr Taylor, we see that this is a Ministry of Information,
14:58:39 25 Monrovia, Liberia, press release, 7 January 2003. Mr Taylor, do
26 you know who it was who wrote this press release?

27 A. No, I do not.

28 Q. Did you review this press release before it was in fact
29 released?

1 A. No, I did not.

2 Q. Did you provide any inputs into this press release?

3 A. I'm answering you because you are talking about "you, you,
4 you".

14:59:14 5 Q. I'm talking about you personally, Mr Taylor

6 A. Okay, very good. No, the President wouldn't get involved
7 in that. There are people that do that.

8 Q. And the Government of Liberia constructive engagement
9 policy which is referred to here, who would have prepared that

14:59:35 10 Government of Liberia constructive engagement policy?

11 A. That policy will be a result of wide-ranging debate across
12 government over a period of time and then a policy would be
13 drafted. So it would be across many agencies of government to
14 come up with a policy.

14:59:55 15 Q. Would you be the one who would ultimately approve this
16 policy?

17 A. Yes, with the national security council, I would finally
18 approve it, yes.

19 Q. And at what point in time did the Government of Liberia
15:00:11 20 implement this constructive engagement policy?

21 A. From almost - well, again, now, I don't know as to whether
22 it would be important for you. What is the constructive
23 engagement? You don't want to know what it is.

24 Q. No, I think it explains it, but what I am asking you,
15:00:30 25 Mr Taylor, is when.

26 A. I would say the policy took shape somewhere - I would say
27 about the - during the beginning of my administration.

28 Q. So this is just a restatement of that policy. Is that what
29 this is?

1 A. This is what I will put it to.

2 Q. Mr Taylor, the Ministry of Information, Monrovia, Liberia,
3 as of January 2003, fell in what branch of the government?

4 A. It's under the Executive branch of government.

15:01:05 5 Q. And the Ministry of Information, do you recall at this time
6 who headed it?

7 A. 2003?

8 Q. January 2003.

9 A. Yes. I can't recall. I can't recall who headed it.

15:01:18 10 Q. And that person would have reported to you. Isn't that
11 correct, Mr Taylor?

12 A. No, not necessarily. He is a minister in the government,
13 and under this issue, he is a part of the council and so he
14 doesn't have to report to me directly. These statements are not

15:01:37 15 just done by one individual or one agency. So he is under the
16 Executive branch, but he wouldn't have to report to me to clear -
17 it's a clearing house for this. The security - the national
18 security council would clear an official statement by the
19 Government of Liberia.

15:01:55 20 Q. In terms of the way your Executive branch was set up while
21 you were in the Executive branch, the Minister of Information
22 would fall directly under you, would he not?

23 A. Well, the way you put it, he is a minister and all
24 ministers fall under the Executive branch and then the President.

15:02:15 25 Q. Under the President?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Was there any intervening person in that chain between you
28 and the Minister of Information?

29 A. No, there's no intervening chain between the President and

1 any minister.

2 Q. Mr Taylor, if we could look at page 4 of this document. If
3 we could look at number 2, the paragraph, where you are talking -
4 where this is talking about another key demand of the US Security
15:03:10 5 Council - and here it says, "US Security Council resolution
6 1408". You mean there UN Security Council resolution, Mr Taylor,
7 or is that intentionally listed as US?

8 A. I'm sure they - you are saying "you" again. I'm sure that
9 they meant UN. That's an error.

15:03:29 10 Q. And then you say:

11 "Initially the United States State Department tried to
12 coerce the Liberian government to use a hand-picked audit firm,
13 the Crown Agents."

14 Can you tell us what this firm was, the Crown Agents?

15:03:43 15 A. I have no idea who they were. That's what we said, no, we
16 will get one of the top ten internationally known accounting
17 firms. I don't know who these Crown Agents were.

18 Q. To your knowledge, were they a top firm - accounting firm?

19 A. Well, they very well could have been, but they were not
15:04:07 20 amongst what is known as the international top ten accounting
21 firms, CPA firms, like Price Waterhouse and all of that. To my
22 knowledge, they were not one of those from my information.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if we look further down the page, the
24 International Contact Group on Liberia, ICGL:

15:04:30 25 "The International Contact Group on Liberia is a group of
26 self-appointed mediators whose stated intent is to help resolve
27 the Liberian crisis with LURD."

28 Mr Taylor, the International Contact Group on Liberia was
29 actually invited in to take part in the peace efforts.

1 A. By whom?

2 Q. Isn't that correct? Wasn't it invited in by ECOWAS and the
3 UN?

4 A. No.

15:05:01 5 Q. To your knowledge, who invited it in, Mr Taylor?

6 A. During the crisis, in trying to find a solution, the United
7 States and other countries, consistent with the whole process of
8 developing contact groups, said it would be a good idea. And let
9 me state on the outset, I accepted this idea. But this was an

15:05:24 10 idea that was initiated by the United States and we felt it was a
11 good idea and because it had been used before.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if we look at page 6 of this document and
13 we look at the third full paragraph beginning with:

14 "There is a strong sense of frustration among Liberians

15:05:56 15 from all walks of life that the US is not dealing honestly with
16 Liberia and that her policy lacks consistency."

17 Mr Taylor, had you taken some form of poll of Liberians at
18 this time, or on what basis did you indicate this strong sense of
19 frustration among Liberians?

15:06:20 20 A. Well, on your first question, did we take a poll - I know
21 you're going to go on scientific polls - from around - we have a
22 different way in Liberia. We talk to our elders. We talk to our
23 chiefs. We go around talking to the people. It is not as
24 scientific, you know, as you will see a western poll, but we got,
15:06:44 25 from talking to our elders, our Zos, our chiefs, that everybody
26 was frustrated that the United States was not being upfront.

27 Q. And, Mr Taylor, remind us again, when you say Zos, what do
28 you mean?

29 A. Our traditional people. We go around - Liberia is

1 two-thirds of our people. We go around to the towns and
2 villages, the chiefs, the clan chiefs, the paramount chiefs and
3 we talk to people.

4 Q. And so Zos would be people who held what positions?

15:07:13 5 A. Zos are traditional titles given to certain of our
6 traditional people. They are respected. They are something like
7 people that heal people. Some medical conditions, they heal
8 people and different things. We call them generally Zos.

9 Q. And Zos, would they have membership in any of the
15:07:42 10 traditional societies in Liberia?

11 A. Yes. Practically all.

12 Q. And then it goes on to say:

13 "In fact, Liberians are convinced that US policy toward
14 Liberia is really no policy or a hands-off policy."

15:08:00 15 So the feeling in Liberia was that the US was exercising
16 either no policy at all or a hands-off policy. Was that the
17 feeling in Liberia?

18 A. I would say yes. Yes.

19 Q. I have no other - well, one other question on page 1 of
15:08:22 20 this document. At the very top, it appears to be a handwritten -
21 if we could see the very top of the page. The handwritten letter
22 or whatever that is. Do you know what that is, Mr Taylor?

23 A. To me it looks like "file". Like an F-I-L-E. That's how
24 it looks like to me.

15:08:51 25 Q. This would be a file copy of this document?

26 A. I would say yes.

27 Q. In whose file would that have been kept?

28 A. Copies of these would be kept at the Executive Mansion. A
29 copy would be kept at the Ministry of Information. But this

1 would be an Executive Mansion copy, I would suppose.

2 Q. And you may very well know that, but the way that's
3 written, do you recognise that writing as a file copy that you
4 would keep at the Executive Mansion, the way that word is written
15:09:19 5 there?

6 A. Now, let me understand your question.

7 Q. Or do you recognise this writing?

8 A. Well, you asked me to give - and I'm saying it looks like
9 "file", like somebody writing, but this, it looks like to me, I
15:09:31 10 recognise it as "file".

11 Q. But you don't recognise the writing per se, the
12 handwriting?

13 A. Now, that question means as to maybe who could have written
14 it?

15:09:40 15 Q. Yes.

16 A. No, no, no, I wouldn't know.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, was this one of the documents that you had
18 gathered up before you left Liberia?

19 A. Yes.

15:09:52 20 Q. Thank you, Mr Taylor. If we could please look at MFI-282.

21 And we see this is "Liberia's diamond links, dated 18 July 2000,
22 BBC West Africa correspondent Mark Doyle reports from Monrovia on
23 the links between diamond smuggling and Liberia's backing of
24 Sierra Leone rebels." Mr Taylor, did you have any input into
15:10:59 25 this article?

26 A. Did I have an input into this article?

27 Q. You yourself.

28 A. No, I don't work for the BBC.

29 Q. Were you interviewed in connection with this article at

1 all, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No, not that I know of.

3 Q. Do you know - or did you at that time know Mark Doyle?

15:11:22

4 A. Well, I had heard the name on the BBC. I didn't know him
5 personally, no.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, on the first page here, "In Sierra Leone most of
7 the diamonds from there are white." This is down at the bottom
8 of the page. "'In Sierra Leone most of the diamonds from there
9 are white,' says Mr Shour." He is identified above as a fully

15:11:49

10 licensed legal trader in Liberian diamonds. "In Liberia they are
11 always greenish, yellowish diamonds." Mr Taylor, do you know
12 anything about the quality of diamonds?

13 A. No, I don't.

14 Q. So you wouldn't know what relevance the fact that a diamond
15 was white, what relevance that would have to its quality?

15:12:09

16 A. No, I wouldn't.

17 Q. And you wouldn't know what relevance to its quality it
18 would have that a diamond was greenish, yellow?

19 A. No, I wouldn't.

15:12:22

20 Q. Mr Taylor, thank you. Then if we could please look at
21 MFI-281. This is DCT-165, tab 59 in binder 2 for week 33. Now,
22 Mr Taylor, we see at the top "State House, Freetown, Republic of
23 Sierra Leone". We see "19 June 2000, His Excellency," your name,
24 "President of the Republic of Liberia, my President and dear
15:13:18 25 brother." And then - and this is a letter from President Kabbah,
26 as you testified. Yes, Mr Taylor?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. And he indicates, "My main interest in the report," and he
29 is talking about "information contained in the attached documents

1 reflecting recent reports carried by the Washington Post," and he
2 indicates:

3 "My main interest in the report relates to the alleged
4 movement of arms into Sierra Leone territory which our
15:13:58 5 intelligence agencies have been noticing."

6 Mr Taylor, it indicates here that he is sharing with you,
7 "in accordance with the agreement between us, information
8 contained in the attached documents reflecting recent reports
9 carried by the Washington Post." Mr Taylor, do you remember what
15:14:20 10 those documents were that were attached to his letter?

11 A. No, but I think it's very clear here. Yes, I remember.
12 All he is talking about is a copy of the post that he sent.
13 That's all he sent.

14 Q. He indicates "attached documents". Do you recall how many
15:14:37 15 documents were attached?

16 A. No. Only I think there were two pages or more of the
17 Washington Post. That was all.

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the second page of this MFI, DCT-165, that
19 we have is at the top MFA/8, there's a paragraph 14, done in
15:15:07 20 Bamako on March 2, 2000 and there are various names and
21 signatures here?

22 A. Excuse me, I don't see what you are talking about, counsel.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: What are you referring to, Ms Hollis?

24 MS HOLLIS: I'm referring to the second page that we have.

15:15:24 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Which is not part of the MFI.

26 MS HOLLIS: DCT-165.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's not part of the MFI.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: It's not part of the MFI because this, you
29 will see, is a document which was disclosed to us by the

1 Prosecution and only one page was disclosed to us, and it's only
2 that page which was marked for identification. There was never a
3 page 2 in our possession which we marked.

4 MS HOLLIS: But there was a page 2 to the DCT-165, yes?

15:15:53 5 Are we incorrect about that?

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I think you are incorrect about that,
7 because we in wrote fact to your case manager asking for the
8 second page of this letter. We were told that there was no such
9 second page in existence.

15:16:06 10 MS HOLLIS: And we do not have a second page, but we were
11 given the DCT-165 as two pages with a second page with the
12 heading "MFA/8".

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: You were given it by who?

14 MS HOLLIS: The Defence disclosure. It was at tab 59 in
15:16:26 15 binder 2.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: How could they disclose to you what they
17 don't have?

18 MS HOLLIS: It's not a signature page for this letter.
19 That's the point. It's some other document.

15:16:35 20 MR GRIFFITHS: I clearly recall this letter because when we
21 were thinking of disclosing it to the Prosecution, my case
22 manager actually wrote to Ms Dimitrova and asked where is the
23 remainder of this letter, because it had originally been
24 disclosed by the Prosecution, and we were told that's the only
15:17:00 25 page and that's the only page as far as I understand that we
26 disclosed as part of our disclosure.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Let me get it straight. This letter in
28 MFI-281 is originally a Prosecution document disclosed to the
29 Defence.

1 MS HOLLIS: This page. It has our ERN number at the top.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: And the Defence says that at the time
3 they received your disclosure of MFI-281, it was only this one
4 page that we see and that they requested for a second page, which
15:17:38 5 your case manager indicated did not exist.

6 MS HOLLIS: That we did not have, yes.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: So where has the second page come from?

8 MS HOLLIS: When we were given DCT-165, it was a two-page
9 document and the second page was MFA/8. That was in the binders
15:18:01 10 of disclosure that we were given when the Defence was providing
11 the information. Perhaps this could just be shown to the Defence
12 so they know what I'm talking about. It was in tab 59, binder 2
13 for week 33, DCT-165. This was not a signature page for this
14 letter, but this was the second page that was given to us as
15:18:34 15 DCT-165.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I think there must be an error here, because
17 my tab 59 of binder 2 is only a one-page document. So there has
18 to be some confusion here.

19 MS HOLLIS: All right. I will move on from that then.

15:19:06 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is the Defence disowning this second
21 page?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't know whether to own or disown it,
23 Madam President, because I haven't got a clue where it comes
24 from. It may well have been disclosed in error in the copy given
15:19:25 25 to the Prosecution. That's all I can assume.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is it part of DCT-165?

27 MS HOLLIS: It was in the DCT-165 that was given to us.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: In your assessment is it part of - does
29 it logically follow?

1 MS HOLLIS: Not at all, and that's why we wanted to ask
2 about it.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Then in that event I think you just
4 discard it.

15:20:01 5 MS HOLLIS: If we could please look at DCT-278.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Does it have an MFI number?

7 MS HOLLIS: I'm sorry, it is MFI-278, DCT-104, which was
8 tab 69 in binder 2 of 4 for week 33:

9 Q. Mr Taylor, you see this is an article by Edward Epstein,
15:21:00 10 "UN is diamond cartel's best friend." Mr Taylor, was this one of
11 the documents that you included in your archive before you left
12 Liberia?

13 A. There were thousands of documents. I can't be too sure
14 whether this is a collection on the part of the general Defence
15:21:27 15 team. I'm sorry, I may not be able to remember specifically
16 every one of the thousands of documents. This looks like a
17 newspaper report to me that could have been put together also by
18 the Defence team. I don't recall specifics, whether it came from
19 - in my archives. It could be, but --

15:21:48 20 Q. We see at the bottom in handwriting, "August 3, 2000, page
21 A14". Is that your handwriting, Mr Taylor? So you can see that
22 on the right on the bottom?

23 A. No, it doesn't look like my handwriting.

24 Q. And the author, Mr Epstein. Were you interviewed by
15:22:23 25 Mr Epstein before he wrote this article?

26 A. I don't recall ever being interviewed by Mr Epstein.

27 Q. Do you know if any of your representatives were interviewed
28 by Mr Epstein before he wrote this article?

29 A. When you say any of my representatives, is that to be

1 equated with any official of my government?

2 Q. Anyone acting on your behalf, Mr Taylor?

3 A. No, I'm not aware that anyone acting on my behalf was
4 interviewed by Mr Epstein. It very well could have been, but --

15:23:00 5 Q. Mr Taylor, do you know if, before he wrote this article,
6 Mr Epstein interviewed any of the civilians in Sierra Leone who
7 were mining diamonds?

8 A. I don't know. I don't know if he did.

9 Q. Do you know what sources Mr Epstein relied on to write this
15:23:20 10 article?

11 A. No.

12 Q. And I understand you may not remember but, if you do, could
13 you tell me when do you recall first seeing this article?

14 A. Oh, I would say over the past maybe four years. Four or
15:23:47 15 five years. Four years, I would say.

16 Q. 2006, is that what we're talking about?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. That's your best recollection of when you first saw it?

19 A. That is correct.

15:23:57 20 Q. Thank you, Mr Taylor. If we could please look at MFI-274,
21 which was DCT-210. This was tab 2 in the materials for week 29.
22 Mr Taylor, we see this is a 1 January 1990 statement by Charles
23 Ghankay Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of
24 Liberia. Do you remember talking about this statement with your
15:25:59 25 counsel --

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. -- In direct examination, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. If we could look down at the fourth paragraph that begins,

1 "Having exhausted." Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes, I see it.

3 Q. Your Defence counsel read this document including this
4 paragraph:

15:26:14 5 "Having exhausted every possible avenue of reason and
6 having seen every effort to peacefully effect a change of
7 governance by constitutional means crushed by the harshest use of
8 force, we the members of the National Patriotic Front under the
9 leadership of Charles Ghankay Taylor feel it is our right and
15:26:41 10 bounded duty to rid the people of Liberia of this cancerous
11 despotism by whatever means at our disposal with the following
12 objectives."

13 Then you list the various objectives. Mr Taylor, you
14 remember the Defence counsel asking you what you meant by this
15:26:58 15 language, "Having exhausted every possible avenue of reason and
16 having seen every effort to peacefully effect a change of
17 governance by constitutional means crushed." Do you remember
18 being asked what that meant, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Not offhand.

15:27:14 20 Q. This was on 16 July and, Mr Taylor, do you remember telling
21 the Court that what you meant by that was that you had tried to
22 get the Doe regime to accept Jackson F Doe as President but that
23 you were unsuccessful in doing that?

24 A. Yes, what's your question.

15:27:48 25 Q. Do you recall telling the judges?

26 A. If it's in the records, yes.

27 Q. That is what you meant by that; that you had tried to get
28 Jackson F Doe accepted as President?

29 A. I said I had tried?

1 Q. You, the NPFL, but you. It says here, "Having exhausted
2 every possible avenue of reason and having seen every effort to
3 peacefully effect a change of government by constitutional means
4 crushed." Do you remember saying that what you meant there was
15:28:17 5 that you, either you individually or collectively the NPFL, had
6 tried to get the Doe regime to accept Jackson F Doe as President?

7 A. But, counsel, please help me. I mean, the transcript uses
8 "you" or I say "we". What is my evidence?

9 Q. Let's take a look at that and perhaps that will help us
15:28:40 10 all. 16 July 2009.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. That would be page 24633 to page 24636 where this is
13 discussed. You are talking about these statements - this
14 statement, and if we could move down the page please. It's dated
15:29:25 15 1 January 1990 and it's headed "Statement by Charles Ghankay
16 Taylor". So we're talking about this statement, yes, Mr Taylor,
17 this statement we have before us, 1 January 1990?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And if we could move on to the next page, please, and if we
15:29:49 20 could keep going so that we move down to the language of the
21 fourth paragraph. If we could stop there. In fact, if we could
22 go back up a bit, please, where you are talking about the bloody
23 military coup, ten years of oppression, and then they ask whose
24 assessment that is. And then we go down about October 1985, the
15:30:35 25 Liberian people turning out in massive numbers at the polls
26 seeing the electoral process subverted, and then you are asked to
27 what you are adverting there, and you say that you explained to
28 the Court yesterday the elections held in Liberia in 1985:

29 "A vast majority of the citizens believed that the

1 elections was won by I mentioned on yesterday Jackson Doe, N Doe,
2 but Samuel Doe claimed to have won with a margin of 50.9
3 per cent."

15:31:22 4 If we could go on, please, to the next page. Here we have,
5 starting at line 11, please, the fourth paragraph, "Having
6 exhausted every possible avenue of reason ..." Then the
7 question: "It says on the first line of that paragraph, having
8 exhausted every possible avenue of reason. What were they?"

15:31:51 9 A. Not just Charles Taylor but the Liberian people had
10 asked Doe to step aside and turn the Presidency over to the
11 individual that, for the most part, even the international
12 community agreed had won the election. That was Jackson F
13 Doe."

15:32:13 14 So this language in the first part of paragraph 4 you
15 explain was that, not just you but the Liberian people had tried
16 to get Master Sergeant Doe to step down and turn the presidency
17 over to Jackson Doe. Correct, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes. And you have to understand the context of your
19 question being asked. When I said not just me, I'm not in
15:32:38 20 Liberia in 1985, so I'm saying not just me. I'm outside, but I'm
21 also considering what is going on. But the Liberian people are
22 also interested. Yes. That's my - that's my evidence here.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when you prefaced your statement that the
24 National Patriotic Front under the leadership of Charles Ghankay
15:33:12 25 Taylor feel it is your right and bounded duty to rid the people
26 of Liberia of this cancerous despotism by whatever means at our
27 disposal, you prefaced that on the fact that you had exhausted
28 every possible avenue of reason and had seen every effort to
29 peacefully effect a change of governance by constitutional means

1 crushed. And one of those explanations as to what you were
2 trying to do was that you were trying to get Jackson Doe -
3 Jackson F Doe to take the presidency?

15:33:54 4 A. No, no, no. No, you're - no, I can't accept the
5 proposition as you put it. I'm not in Liberia in 1985. I'm in a
6 diaspora, but I have interests. But in 1985, for the benefit of
7 the Court, there's a National Patriotic Front. Our front is the
8 second front. So what is being - they do not - if you look at
9 this letter in the context of talking about it in 1990, I'm
15:34:16 10 giving a history of what led to it, including myself.

11 Q. The point that we have looked at here is when you said
12 "having exhausted every possible avenue of reason".

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. That you were talking about the attempts to get Jackson F
15:34:33 15 Doe instated as President of Liberia, correct?

16 A. No, no, no. At the time that this document, the National
17 Patriotic Front here, this is in 1990, okay, but you are
18 referring - this document does not say here that the National
19 Patriotic Front under me in 1985 is trying to get Jackson Doe in.
15:34:55 20 It's the National Patriotic Front that comes up at that time
21 under General Quiwonkpa that resists. They are two different
22 things.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm simply going back to your evidence where
24 your Defence counsel asked you about this language, so perhaps we
15:35:08 25 could look again at the transcript. And if we could go to the
26 top of that page so I can see what page we're on here, please.
27 We're on page 24635, and at line 11 we have your counsel reading
28 paragraph 4. And if we go down from there, beginning at line 19,
29 we have your counsel saying:

1 "Before we come to the objectives, however, help us with
2 this please: It says on the first line of that paragraph,
3 having exhausted every possible avenue of reason. What
4 were they?"

15:35:54 5 And then this is your answer:

6 "A. Not just Charles Taylor but the Liberian people had
7 asked Doe to step aside and turn the presidency over to the
8 individual that, for the most part, even the international
9 community agreed had won with the election. That was
10 Jackson Doe."

15:36:15

11 So, Mr Taylor, you are saying here not just yourself but
12 the Liberian people had asked Doe to step aside and give the
13 presidency to Jackson Doe.

14 A. That is correct, yes.

15:36:28

15 Q. You say, "These arguments continued for a long time."

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. "He did not and then you had the incoming just barely one
18 month after the elections in November, General Quiwonkpa launches
19 this attack."

15:36:43

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. "He is crushed brutally. We again call for Doe to step
22 down. Jackson Doe is still here. He does not, so for us these
23 were the reasonable things that we had done."

24 So you've asked Master Sergeant Doe to step down. You've
15:37:13 25 asked him to make Jackson Doe the President and he has not done
26 that. Correct, Mr Taylor?

27 A. No, no, no, no. The way how you put it --

28 Q. Well, I'm not going to argue over the plain language,
29 Mr Taylor.

1 A. No, no, no. I'm not going to argue about that. The 1985
2 operation, I've told the Court on records here, even though I'm
3 not there, I'm in touch with General Quiwonkpa. So I'm a part of
4 the process. So in this statement of 1990, I'm saying that even
15:37:44 5 - this is one of the reasons that the Liberian people before,
6 including myself, because I'm a part of General Quiwonkpa, I have
7 told this Court that General Quiwonkpa was in touch with me
8 before he came to West Africa. Okay? I'm not there for this
9 thing in 1985.

15:38:01 10 Q. I'm not saying you are, Mr Taylor.

11 A. But in following it up in 1990, all I'm doing is giving a
12 historical perspective in adding on to one of the causes. Here
13 is the situation in 1985 where Jackson Doe is not given the
14 presidency and continuing on. That's what I'm doing.

15:38:19 15 Q. Mr Taylor, Jackson F Doe, who is the one seen by most
16 Liberians to have won the elections, after Master Sergeant Doe is
17 killed in September 1991, you could have made Jackson F Doe the
18 President, could you not, Mr Taylor?

19 A. No, the circumstances at the time was different. No, I
15:38:45 20 could not.

21 Q. And that would have been acting according to the will of
22 the people of Liberia, wouldn't it, Mr Taylor?

23 A. No, no, I would disagree with you as you put it. We're
24 talking about many years after that situation, political
15:39:02 25 situation, social situation. We were not an army for Jackson
26 Doe, so I would disagree.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, Jackson F Doe was still alive in September 1991,
28 wasn't he?

29 A. To the best of my recollection, he was in Monrovia and I -

1 but we were not an army for Jackson Doe. We did not launch the
2 revolution to put Jackson Doe in the presidency. We put it in --

3 Q. Indeed you did not, did you, Mr Taylor? You didn't launch
4 it to put Mr Jackson Doe in the presidency, did you?

15:39:31 5 A. We were not Jackson Doe's army.

6 Q. But if you were acting to meet the will of the Liberian
7 people, you could have made Jackson F Doe the President in 1991.
8 Couldn't you?

9 A. No, that question is one that suggests something that I
15:39:49 10 think I would consider an unfair question. The Liberian people
11 did not vote in 1995 and say, "At whatever cost in some future
12 years, Jackson Doe must take the presidency." So that question
13 is erroneous.

14 Q. Indeed, Mr Taylor, if you had put Jackson F Doe in the
15:40:12 15 presidency in 1991, he would have been supported by these people
16 in Liberia who thought he had won the election, wouldn't he?

17 A. Well, I don't have a crystal ball. I can't answer that
18 question. That's speculative.

19 Q. He was still a very popular figure in 1991, wasn't he?

15:40:30 20 A. I have no idea if Jackson Doe was a popular figure in 1991.
21 I have no idea.

22 Q. He was still a very respected figure in 1991 by the great
23 majority of Liberians, wasn't he, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Well, I wouldn't make - I wouldn't make a blanket statement
15:40:45 25 like that. I would say that Jackson Doe was a respected figure.
26 Now, as to whether he was respected by a vast majority of
27 Liberian people, I can't say that.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, this paragraph 4 that attempts to explain why
29 you and the National Patriotic Front felt that it was your right

1 and bounded duty to rid the people of Liberia of the despotism by
2 whatever means at your disposal wasn't really a true statement,
3 was it, Mr Taylor? You wanted to rid Liberia of Master Sergeant
4 Doe because you wanted to be in power in Liberia?

15:41:28 5 A. Counsel, well, you can draw your own conclusion. I
6 disagree.

7 Q. Mr Taylor, had you, after Master Sergeant Doe's death in
8 1991, made Jackson F Doe President, then your years of civil war
9 wouldn't have occurred, would they?

15:41:50 10 A. I don't know the basis of your conclusion. Maybe from some
11 expertise, but I'll disagree with your conclusion or your
12 assumptions, your speculations. I cannot comment on
13 speculations. We have serious disagreement with that.

14 Q. Mr Taylor, this statement is basically a public relations
15:42:14 15 effort on your part at the beginning of your attack on Liberia,
16 isn't it?

17 A. Well, to be very, very fair, it is a part of a public
18 relations campaign, but it's more than that. Not just that. It
19 is proper to identify to the world immediately upon setting out
15:42:37 20 with such a situation to identify to the world exactly who you
21 are and what you are doing. So, yes, there are some public
22 relations values in it, but that was not the objective.

23 Q. And it was basically a propaganda statement on your part,
24 wasn't it, Mr Taylor?

15:42:54 25 A. That I totally reject.

26 Q. If we look down at the objectives and we look at paragraph
27 4, saying that "the National Patriotic Front is not beholden to
28 any foreign group or power," Mr Taylor, you included this
29 language because you wanted to win over the United States. Isn't

1 that correct?

2 A. Well, you've asked me two questions. I will take them in
3 part. Did I want --

4 Q. I'm not asking two questions.

15:43:27 5 A. Well, then please --

6 Q. I'm saying - I'm reading you, Mr Taylor, number 4 of the
7 objectives: "The National Patriotic Front is not beholden to any
8 foreign group or power." That is what is written in there.

9 A. Yes.

15:43:43 10 Q. And you wrote in there.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Because you wanted to win over the United States. Isn't
13 that correct?

14 A. No, not just - well, that's what I'm trying to say. I
15:43:52 15 withdraw that. I look at this in two parts, but I'll respond to
16 your question. Did I want to win over the United States? It was
17 important. Yes, I wanted to win over the United States. Is it
18 factual that we were not beholden? We were not beholden to any
19 power.

15:44:10 20 Q. You were not beholden to any power, but you were being
21 assisted by foreign powers at that time, were you not, Mr Taylor?

22 A. To an extent, yes, but we're not beholden to them.

23 Q. And that included Libya?

24 A. Libya had trained us.

15:44:22 25 Q. Burkina Faso?

26 A. But we were not beholden to them.

27 Q. And you were also receiving assistance at that time from
28 Ivory Coast. Isn't that correct, Mr Taylor?

29 A. No, I never received any assistance from La Cote d'Ivoire.

1 Q. And the assistance from La Cote d'Ivoire included giving
2 you the right to travel through that country freely. Isn't that
3 right?

4 A. Well, in earnesty, at some later state. Now, if we divide
15:44:54 5 it into time, at the beginning of this situation La Cote d'Ivoire
6 made every, every attempt to have any Liberian crossing into
7 Liberia from La Cote d'Ivoire arrested, so I would say that. At
8 some later stage about I would say - about a year or so later,
9 once we started talking in peace, we were given access to move in
15:45:22 10 La Cote d'Ivoire.

11 Q. And you were given access to move and to take arms and war
12 materials through Cote d'Ivoire to Liberia. That's correct, is
13 it not?

14 A. No, the Ivorian government never, ever - I will not lie on
15:45:36 15 the late President Houphouet-Boigny. Never, ever authorised the
16 movement of arms and ammunition through La Cote d'Ivoire.

17 Q. It's correct, is it not, that subordinates within his
18 government did allow to you to do that?

19 A. Initially one gentleman - and this was all private. That's
15:45:54 20 why we must distinguish. I said the Ivorian government never
21 did. Because of the tribal links between the Yacoubas and the
22 Gios in Liberia on at least one occasion during the early part of
23 1990 we were able to sneak things through La Cote d'Ivoire.

24 Q. And those things were arms and war materials, isn't that
15:46:19 25 correct?

26 A. Well, that's too general. I can be specific. There were
27 some communication and small amounts of ammunition that had been
28 given by Burkina Faso at the time, communication equipment.

29 Q. And this use of La Cote d'Ivoire as a traverse for these

1 arms and war materiels, that continued for many years, isn't that
2 right, Mr Taylor?

3 A. That is not correct. Again I did not said arms, I said
4 ammunition. But that's - no, it did not continue and it did not
15:46:55 5 really start.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry to interrupt, but I see the
7 LiveNote transcript wrongly misspells Yacoubas as Yekepas. I
8 hope this is picked up later.

9 THE WITNESS: It's Yacouba.

15:47:11 10 MS HOLLIS:

11 Q. Mr Taylor, you are talking about Yacouba, yes?

12 A. Yes, the tribe.

13 Q. Y-A-C-O-U-B-A?

14 A. I would say that's about right, counsel.

15:47:18 15 Q. Do you have a different spelling, Mr Taylor?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Because I may be wrong.

18 A. No, I will accept yours for now, yes.

19 Q. Mr Taylor, these war materiels that traversed Ivory Coast
15:47:36 20 to your NPFL, some of them came from Libya, isn't that correct?

21 A. No, I don't know where they came from. They came from
22 Burkina Faso. Where they bought them from, I don't know. But
23 the initial stage, we got material from Burkina Faso.

24 Q. Indeed, that materiel did include arms, did it not,
15:47:58 25 Mr Taylor?

26 A. No, ammunition and communication equipment.

27 Q. And throughout your time as the leader of the NPFL, you
28 continued to use Ivory Coast as a conduit for the movement of
29 arms and war materiel to your NPFL, isn't that right?

1 A. No, I wouldn't say that is correct.

2 Q. And Robert Guei was involved very early on in this movement
3 of arms and war materiel to you from Ivory Coast. Isn't that
4 correct?

15:48:34 5 A. Totally incorrect. Totally incorrect.

6 Q. And indeed, Mr Taylor, later on, after you were President,
7 Robert Guei continued to be a conduit for your ability to bring
8 arms from outside of Liberia. Isn't that correct?

9 A. Totally, totally incorrect. Totally incorrect.

15:48:53 10 Q. Mr Taylor, we see here, "January 1, 1990, the National
11 Patriotic Front." When do you say that this became known as the
12 National Patriotic Front for Liberia?

13 A. I'm not sure I understand.

14 Q. Well, we have National Patriotic Front, NPF. Is that being
15:49:23 15 used as the same as NPFL?

16 A. NPFL, the L is Liberia, the National Patriotic Front of
17 Liberia, but when you put the acronym you say NPFL.

18 Q. So this means the same thing, NPFL?

19 A. That is correct.

15:49:35 20 Q. When you are talking about National Patriotic Front?

21 A. Of Liberia, that is correct.

22 Q. Thank you, Mr Taylor. Now if we could also look at MFI-6,
23 please, which was the analytic chronology. This was DCT-43,
24 which was tab 3 in the binder of additional documents for week

15:50:21 25 30. If we could put the first page of that document up, please.

26 Mr Taylor, as we look at the top of this page, it appears that

27 there was a line or there was something at the very top above

28 "Preface." Do you see the markings there where there is a heavy

29 black line to the left and then what appears to be a broken line?

1 Do you know what is the cause of that?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Was there some other language above that?

4 A. I can't say, counsel. The photocopy makes it unclear. I

15:51:17 5 don't want to speculate.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, do you remember this document?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. And do you remember its creation?

9 A. This document, I don't remember its creation. But it was

15:51:43 10 used in the West African sub-region.

11 Q. There's "ITIPs-" looks like "IA", what does that mean?

12 A. I really don't know. It could be some code. I really

13 don't know.

14 Q. And then there is "/11/94/01". What does that indicate?

15:52:05 15 A. I really don't know, counsel.

16 Q. It also appears that there was in the upper right-hand

17 corner, a circle it appears with some numbers in the circle. I

18 can make them out quite. It looks like the middle one is 9. Do

19 you know what those numbers are?

15:52:22 20 A. No, I don't. This could be probably some - let me not

21 speculate.

22 Q. Who actually wrote this document?

23 A. I said we looked at it and see. It looks like an ECOWAS

24 document.

15:52:56 25 Q. You don't have any direct knowledge of who wrote this

26 document, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Not precisely. The name of the individual, no. Maybe if

28 we look at some other pages we'll be able to tell. But we had

29 this document - I had this document so which means that it had to

1 be some official document. I don't know what happened to the
2 other pages.

3 Q. And it sets out the three texts to be derived from it in
4 this first paragraph:

15:53:29 5 "The sections titled 'Introduction' and 'Descriptions of
6 the humanitarian conflict situation in Liberia' constitute one
7 text, a background text on the ECOWAS peace plan. This text
8 comprises paragraphs 1 through 18 and is entitled 'Humanitarian
9 conflict situation on the eve of the Banjul ECOWAS meeting in
10 1990'."

11 Do you have any idea who wrote this preface, Mr Taylor?

12 A. No, I don't.

13 Q. And then it indicates that:

14 "The second text is the analytic chronology of various
15:54:04 15 proposals, ideals and activities which were developed or
16 partially implemented within the framework of Yamoussoukro and
17 Cotonou Accords."

18 Then it talks about the third text which it says presents
19 ITIP/IA suggestions for ways forward:

15:54:26 20 "It is a text that can be appreciated against the
21 background of either of the first two texts. The entire document
22 will be useful for non-governmental organisations interested in
23 the peace process in Liberia. The third text is titled 'Analysis
24 and proposals for advancing the peace efforts in Liberia'."

15:54:52 25 Mr Taylor, do you know these three different sections, if
26 you will, of this document - do you know were they written by the
27 same person or people?

28 A. Oh, I don't - I would presume that they are written by the
29 same people because one - this looks like something that is work

1 being done by a group, at least an organisation.

2 Q. But you don't know if it's the same or different people?

3 A. I don't know.

4 Q. And, Mr Taylor, if we look at page 4, which is entitled
15:55:30 5 "Introduction", and if we look at paragraph 4, "The structure of
6 this policy review paper is as follows." Do you have any idea
7 who prepared the policy review paper?

8 A. No, I don't know who prepared the policy review paper.

9 Q. Mr Taylor, if we look at page 6, "Description of the
15:56:10 10 humanit arian conflict situation in Liberia on the eve of the
11 Banjul ECOWAS meeting in 1990," and we see paragraph 5. And we
12 see:

13 "While pressures for change in the conduct and governance
14 of President Doe's government had been mounting in the years
15:56:36 15 preceding the invasion of Liberia by the forces of the National
16 Patriotic Front of Liberia in 1989, the mounting of that invasion
17 marked the shift of the struggle of state power contestation in
18 Liberia from constitutional politics to that of national security
19 politics."

15:56:59 20 Mr Taylor, do you have any idea who was writing this
21 description?

22 A. The think I word there, counsel, I may have misheard you, I
23 think it's "constit u tional ist poli cies".

24 Q. "State power contestation in Liberia from constitutional ist
15:57:17 25 poli tics to that of national security poli tics." If I misread
26 that, I apologise. You say you have no idea who was writing
27 this?

28 A. This organisation appears to be very professional. I
29 really don't know who wrote that.

1 Q. But you've had no contacts or you haven't heard of ITIP-IA?

2 A. No, I can't recall this acronym. No, I can't recall it,
3 but it looks very professional to me and it was used widely.

15:57:53

4 Q. Mr Taylor, do you recall when you first received this
5 document?

6 A. Oh, as to the year, I don't recall when I first received
7 this document.

8 Q. Do you recall any events that were occurring about the time
9 you first received this document, to help place it?

15:58:18

10 A. Not particularly.

11 Q. Were you, do you recall, a member of the Council of State
12 by the time you received this document?

13 A. Your question is do I remember any members of the Council
14 of State?

15:58:33

15 Q. No, do you remember if you were a member of the Council of
16 State at the time you first received this document?

17 A. Oh, counsel, I'm sorry, I can't recall if I was a member of
18 the Council of State. I really can't recall.

15:58:57

19 Q. Mr Taylor, was this document among the documents that you
20 had placed in your archive before you left Liberia?

21 A. This could be - remember the archives are three sets of
22 documents. I'm not sure if this is from one of those sets. I've
23 got documents that I put together, I've got documents that other
24 people put together. This could be from one of the groups. I'm
15:59:19 25 not too certain.

26 Q. But you have no recollection as to whether this document
27 was part of the archive you had put together before you left.
28 You have no recollection as to whether that's true?

29 A. It could very well have been, but - it could very well have

1 been.

2 Q. Mr Taylor, you said that you have three sets of documents:
3 Documents you put together - and, Mr Taylor, these were the
4 documents you had put together before you left Liberia. I think
15:59:53 5 you've told the Court about that, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And then you indicated that you had documents that other
8 people put together. Who were these other people who put
9 together documents?

16:00:05 10 A. Oh, former ministers and other aides to me at the time.

11 Q. When did they do that?

12 A. Way back when I was in office, too. Minister - and even
13 some of those documents were given - when I went into exile, I
14 received some additional documents from them.

16:00:30 15 Q. So the documents that were put together by the ministers,
16 who decided what documents that they would select and put
17 together?

18 A. Oh, these are professionals. In fact, I could remember I
19 got a lot of documents from the then Ministry of Information. I
16:00:54 20 got documents from the Minister of State. So they made their
21 decisions on what they felt was very important.

22 Q. Then they gave you these documents before you left Liberia?

23 A. Some of them before; some after.

24 Q. And when they gave you the documents after, you were where
16:01:13 25 when they gave you those documents?

26 A. Nigeria.

27 Q. And they brought the documents to you?

28 A. Their documents, they were sent to me. My share of
29 documents were stored in Monrovia, okay. But while I was out,

1 those individuals that felt that there was something important
2 that they wanted me to see, they sent it to me. But my documents
3 that I put together, before I left Liberia, I left them stored
4 with a relative in Liberia.

16:01:43 5 Q. And, Mr Taylor, these documents that were sent to you while
6 you were in Nigeria, they were sent to you by whom?

7 A. I've told you. The Minister of Information provided
8 documents for me. It was the --

9 Q. Even while you were in Nigeria?

16:02:00 10 A. Yeah, he was then former Minister of Information, yes.

11 Q. And any other individuals provide you documents while you
12 were in Nigeria?

13 A. Yes, I mentioned to you. I said the former Minister of
14 State also did.

16:02:12 15 Q. Any others other than those two?

16 A. Oh, I don't - no, not that I recall right now.

17 Q. And the Minister of Information that was providing you
18 these documents, who was that?

19 A. Mr Goodridge. Reginald Goodridge.

16:02:28 20 Q. The Minister of State who was providing you these
21 documents, who was that?

22 A. Jonathan Taylor.

23 Q. And were you giving any direction as to how these documents
24 should be selected?

16:02:38 25 A. No, no, no. No.

26 Q. And these documents that were sent to you while you were in
27 Nigeria, did you - what did you do with those documents?

28 A. Oh, those documents are - I maintained some of them in
29 Nigeria. Upon my being arrested, I had those documents sent back

1 down to Monrovia.

2 Q. And to whom did you have them sent in Monrovia?

3 A. To the individuals that were keeping the first set of
4 documents that I left with them.

16:03:11 5 Q. And who was that?

6 A. It was a younger cousin of mine called Bracewell, John.

7 Q. And, Mr Taylor, there were also documents that were
8 collected by your Defence team. Isn't that correct?

9 A. Yes, investigators. That's the third set. Investigators
16:03:37 10 collected documents.

11 Q. And beginning when, do you know, did investigators collect
12 documents?

13 A. I would say almost from the very beginning of my arrest in
14 - what is it? 2006.

16:03:53 15 Q. And do you know where those documents were kept?

16 A. Well, I don't know where the Defence material - where they
17 kept their material?

18 Q. The investigators, the members of your Defence who
19 collected these materials, do you know where they kept them?

16:04:17 20 A. I have no idea. I would assume at the - first the Sierra
21 Leone Defence office in Freetown, and then I would assume here in
22 The Hague. The material that was collected by the second team,
23 if any, would be kept by them in their offices, I would assume.
24 I don't know.

16:04:41 25 Q. Thank you, Mr Taylor. If we could please look at MFI-198,
26 please. That is DCT-135. If we could see the first page of this
27 document. You see, Mr Taylor, it is entitled "Motive and
28 opportunity for UN panel of experts recommended sanctions against
29 Liberia". And if we look at the last page of the document, at

1 least my last page appears to be a blank page with some smudging
2 on the bottom. Is that the - and then if we look at the page
3 before that, page 19, this appears to be the last page of text,
4 and, at least on my copy, there is no signature of any kind.

16:07:10 5 Correct, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Could you go again?

7 Q. There is no signature of any kind on page 19, is there?

8 A. I can't see the end of the page. I'm trying to get it up.

9 Q. Could you move that down?

16:07:26 10 A. I don't see any signature on this page.

11 Q. And, Mr Taylor, if we go back to page 1.

12 A. But a document like this, counsel, would not carry a
13 signature though.

14 Q. If we go back to page 1, please. And if we could look at
16:07:45 15 that page there, there is not a signature on this page either;
16 yes, Mr Taylor?

17 A. No, there is not one there.

18 Q. Who prepared this document?

19 A. This document was prepared again by national security
16:07:59 20 staff.

21 Q. Who was it who prepared it; do you know?

22 A. I don't know the individual, but the national security
23 council staff would prepare such a - this is - you know, this is
24 an official government document, so it would not necessarily
16:08:14 25 carry a signature, but this is an official government document.

26 Q. Is there another copy of this that would have any official
27 government letterhead or anything on the top?

28 A. No, this is the - this is the copy.

29 Q. And you said that your national security council staff

1 prepared this. Who directed them to do so?

2 A. Oh, it would be I guess with my authorisation, with my
3 approval.

16:08:47

4 Q. Was it with your authorisation and approval? Or did you
5 direct that it be done?

6 A. Well, it's with my - it's with my authorisation and
7 approval. I mean, it is based on our determination that such a
8 document should be done, so I decided that I would approve it and
9 get it done.

16:09:04

10 Q. When you say "approve it", do you mean that you yourself
11 directed that it be created?

12 A. I would approve the creation of such a document as
13 recommended by the council.

16:09:19

14 Q. Who recommended - who was it who recommended to you that
15 this document be created?

16 A. It would be the council. The national security adviser
17 would bring a recommendation based on the prevailing situation
18 and say that it is the view of the council that a response be
19 made to the prevailing situation, and then I would say, well,
20 then go ahead and prepare the response.

16:09:40

21 Q. And when was this document prepared?

22 A. This document, I would put it to - I would put it to around
23 19 - I would put it about '98 or thereabouts.

24 Q. Do you have a specific recollection of when it was
25 prepared, Mr Taylor?

16:10:08

26 A. Well, you know, as I'm looking at the document, yes, I
27 would say this is - this is about - I can see here, Clinton is
28 still in office, so it's about 1998. It's all of the crisis
29 going on and the accusations and crisis and machinations, so I

1 would put this is to about '98.

2 Q. And at that time when this document was prepared, who was
3 your national security adviser?

16:10:50

4 A. 1998, if I recall, it was Lewis Brown. If I recall
5 properly.

6 Q. And do you recall any of the members of your national
7 security council at that time?

8 A. Whoever was Defence Minister, Foreign Minister, National
9 Security Minister, all of those individuals were on the council.

16:11:06

10 Q. Who would have been your Foreign Minister at that time?

11 A. Monie Captan was Foreign Minister.

12 Q. And when you say National Security Minister, do you mean
13 your national security adviser?

16:11:21

14 A. No, no, no. In Liberia there is a Ministry of National
15 Security and there is a national security adviser.

16 Q. Who was your Minister of National Security at the time that
17 this document was prepared?

18 A. My recollection, that would have been General Philip Kamah,
19 to the best of my recollection.

16:11:46

20 Q. Can you help us with the last name, please?

21 A. Kamah, I think that's K-A-M-A - let's add an H. Kamah. We
22 can probably correct it. General Philip Kamah.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, had he been a member of your NPFL?

16:12:07

24 A. No, no, no. General Philip Kamah was one of those - he was
25 the chief of staff of the armed forces of Liberia during one part
26 of the war.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, after this had been prepared, did you review it
28 for final approval?

29 A. I would say yes.

1 Q. Do you have a recollection of that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr Taylor. If we could please look at MFI-230.

4 This is DCT-278. And we see "Economic Community of West African

16:13:54 5 States, Sixth Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the

6 Committee of Five on Sierra Leone".

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. "Conakry, 22-23 October, 1997, communique". It indicates

9 that a meeting was held by the Ministerial Committee of Five on

16:14:11 10 Sierra Leone, 22-23 October 1997. Then in paragraph 2:

11 "In continuation of the negotiations initiated in Abidjan
12 on 17 and 18 July 1997 and 29 and 30 July, 1997, the committee
13 held discussions with an enlarged delegation of Major Johnny Paul
14 Koroma."

16:14:38 15 Mr Taylor, were you part of those discussions?

16 A. No. Not at all.

17 Q. And did you have a representative at those discussions?

18 A. No, I did not have a representative at those discussions.

19 We're talking about --

16:15:00 20 Q. October 1997.

21 A. Oh, yes. I thought you were talking about the meeting of
22 July 1997.

23 Q. No, I'm sorry.

24 A. No, no.

16:15:06 25 Q. Well, first of all, yes. Those discussions in July of
26 course you would not have been a part of?

27 A. No, I would not have been and was not.

28 Q. This meeting that took place 22 and 23 October, were you at
29 that meeting yourself?

1 A. No, no, no. No, there was - this is the Foreign Ministers
2 meeting. My Minister of Foreign Affairs was there.

3 Q. That would have been Monie Captan?

4 A. That is correct.

16:15:29 5 Q. Then it indicates:

6 "The meeting reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone since
7 the breakdown of negotiations between the Committee of Five and
8 the representatives of the junta since 30 July 1997."

9 Then it recalls ECOWAS decisions and it recalls resolution
16:15:54 10 1132 placing an embargo on Sierra Leone.

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. Then number 4 indicates that the Committee of Five and the
13 junta's delegation agreed to accelerate efforts towards the
14 peaceful resolution of Sierra Leonean crisis. And indicated that
16:16:17 15 the peace plan for Sierra Leone was adopted and a timetable for
16 its implementation over a six-month period with effect from 23
17 October 1997, recognised that Corporal Foday Sankoh continued to
18 play an active role. And then in number 7 it also indicated
19 Corporal Foday Sankoh is expected to return to his country to
16:16:46 20 make his contribution to the peace process. Can you explain that
21 for us, please? When it says Corporal Foday Sankoh is expected
22 to return to his country, was there a plan in place at that time
23 for Foday Sankoh to return to Sierra Leone in October 1997?

24 A. Yes.

16:17:14 25 Q. And he was to return to his country to make his
26 contribution to the peace process. So what conditions, if any,
27 were to be placed on Foday Sankoh's return to Sierra Leone?

28 A. Well, the only condition that I can recollect right now,
29 again the peace plan we're talking about, for the benefit of the

1 Court, we're now talking about the 1996 agreement that have been
2 signed between President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh in La Cote
3 d'Ivoire. So the condition from my understanding is that they
4 would accept to implement the 1996 agreement and that he would be
16:17:59 5 sent - let's look at the period now. Foday Sankoh, we know where
6 he is at this particular time in October 1997.

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's look back up at number 5 because they
8 are talking about the Committee of Five and representatives of
9 Major Johnny Paul Koroma adopting an ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra
16:18:20 10 Leone and a timetable for its implementation over a six-month
11 period with effect from 23 October 1997?

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. Then in paragraph number 7 they talk about the ECOWAS peace
14 plan for Sierra Leone.

16:18:35 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Then in 6 there is an indication that he is expected to
17 return to his country. And when it says expected to return to
18 his country, had there been negotiations underway with the junta
19 for Foday Sankoh to return to Sierra Leone?

16:18:58 20 A. Well, I remember yes, because Foday Sankoh is an official.
21 His named as, to the best of my recollection, as Vice-President
22 or the number two man in the junta, but he is not there to take
23 his seat. So, yes.

24 Q. And were your representatives part of this decision making
16:19:23 25 about him returning to Sierra Leone?

26 A. Well, the Foreign Ministers had gone through this and my
27 representative was there, so we were part of that process, yes.

28 Q. So it was expected that he would be returning to Sierra
29 Leone and he would be able to take up his role as the

1 Vice-President or the vice chairman under the junta?

2 A. No, counsel that's not what I'm saying, counsel, no.

3 That's not what I'm saying. I think I am responding to your
4 question. You wanted to find out if Foday Sankoh would return

16:19:57 5 and I'm trying to - I was trying to lay for the Court that there
6 was no real threat to Foday Sankoh because when the junta took
7 over he was named as Vice-President. So I was responding to your
8 question.

9 Q. You had indicated because, "Foday Sankoh is an official"?

16:20:10 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. "To the best of my recollection as the Vice-President or
12 the number two man in the junta, but he is not there to take his
13 seat"?

14 A. That is correct.

16:20:23 15 Q. So my question is this expectation of him to return to his
16 country, was it the expectation he would return to Sierra Leone
17 and take his seat in the junta government?

18 A. Well, I think the language that they use here in the text,
19 I like that language too, is more like to participate in the
16:20:45 20 peace process, okay. To play an active role in the peace
21 process. That's the objective that I want to stick with. That
22 was the whole objective.

23 Q. My question is this, and maybe you don't know, but "was
24 expected he would return to his country", was it expected he
16:21:02 25 would return to his country and take his position in the junta
26 government?

27 A. I could only assume that this would be the case. Once he
28 returns to Sierra Leone the junta is still in power. They are
29 given a time frame agreement by ECOWAS that they must renege -

1 let me not say renege, that they must leave power. So by coming
2 into Sierra Leone all would be expecting that Foday Sankoh would
3 take his position and then continue along with the junta and
4 implement the agreement to relinquish power in line with what
16:21:42 5 ECOWAS and they have agreed. This is my - this is the best I can
6 put on it.

7 Q. And of course had you a representative who was reporting
8 back to you on these matters. Yes, Mr Taylor?

9 A. My Foreign Minister was there. And that's why you have
16:22:02 10 this communique, yes.

11 Q. If we look at number 7, "The ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra
12 Leone provides for", and if we look at the second bullet point
13 from the bottom, "Immunities and guarantees to the leaders of the
14 May 25, 1997 coup d'etat." What does this refer to, immunities
16:22:25 15 and guarantees? What is that?

16 A. Making sure that - just what it says, immunities. I'm sure
17 they're talking about legal immunities and guarantees that they
18 would not be held responsible for staging a coup d'etat against
19 the constituted government. This is my interpretation of that.

16:22:52 20 Q. And, Mr Taylor, if we look at the second page of this
21 communique, and if we look at paragraph 11:

22 "The meeting expressed its appreciation to the UN and the
23 OAU for their cooperation with ECOWAS and appealed to them for
24 material, logistic and financial support to ECOMOG to enable it
16:23:34 25 to carry out the mandate given by the authority of the Heads of
26 State and Government and the United Nations Security Council."

27 So again, Mr Taylor, we have appeals for logistics and
28 financial support and material for ECOMOG to carry out its
29 duties, correct?

1 A. To carry out its duties in Sierra Leone for this time, yes.

2 Q. Yes?

3 A. Yes.

16:24:09

4 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, at this meeting in October 1997 where your
5 Foreign Minister attended, did your Foreign Minister tell the
6 other attendees at this meeting of the Sierra Leonean delegation
7 that had come to your country in August 1997?

8 A. No. But in fact, I did not say that a delegation had come
9 to Liberia in August 1997.

16:24:30

10 Q. Mr Taylor, I believe you have testified before that a
11 delegation did come and you refused to see them?

12 A. Well, if we go back to - no, I don't think he told them. I
13 did not get any report from him that he had told them. He could
14 have, but I didn't get any report.

16:24:56

15 Q. Did you direct him to tell them about this?

16 A. No, I did not direct him to tell them.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, if it would be of assistance, when we begin
18 again on Monday I'll have the reference for you to your prior
19 testimony about this group coming from Sierra Leone to Liberia.

16:25:16

20 A. I agree they came to - I agree that they came.

21 Q. All right, they came?

22 A. Yeah, I agree that they came.

23 Q. It was the word "delegation" that you disagreed with?

24 A. I'm not - maybe we're mixed up here.

16:25:32

25 Q. If you look at page 153, on mine it's line 12:

26 "No, but in fact I did not say that a delegation had come
27 to Liberia in August 1997."

28 A. I guess the way how the questions came when, you talk about
29 a delegation, you know, it was not a question as to whether the

1 junta had sent a delegation. That was not your - the way you
2 just threw it in and --

3 Q. But we are in agreement that in August 1997 a delegation
4 from the junta came to Liberia?

16:26:08 5 A. Or thereabouts.

6 Q. And you have told the Court you refused to see them?

7 A. Oh, definitely. That's true.

8 Q. Thank you for that, Mr Taylor. Madam President, how much
9 time do you show that we have?

16:26:40 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: We have five minutes.

11 MS HOLLIS:

12 Q. If we could look at MFI-234, please, which was DCT-270. We
13 see that this is, "United Nations Security Council S/RES/1156
14 (1998), 16 March 1998, resolution 1156 (1998) adopted by the
15 Security Council at its 3861st meeting on 16 March 1998":

16 "The Security Council recalling its resolution 1132 (1997)
17 of 8 October 1997 and the relevant statements of its President,
18 taking note of the letter from the charge d'affaires AI of the
19 permanent mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations to the
16:27:38 20 President of the Security Council of 9 March 1998 (S/1998/215)
21 acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

22 1. Welcomes the return to Sierra Leone of its
23 democratically elected President on 10 March 1998;

24 2. Decides to terminate, with immediate effect, the
16:28:34 25 prohibitions on the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum
26 and petroleum products referred to in paragraph 6 of resolution
27 1132 (1997);

28 3. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to make
29 proposals concerning the role of the United Nations and its

1 future presence in Sierra Leone;

2 4. Decides to review the other prohibitions referred to in
3 resolution 1132 (1997) in accordance with paragraph 17 of that
4 resolution and in light of developments and further discussion

16:29:17 5 with the Government of Sierra Leone;

6 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter."

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Mr Taylor, in this paragraph 4, "Decides to review the
9 other prohibitions referred to in the resolution", that includes
10 the arms embargo on Sierra Leone, does it not?

16:29:34

11 A. I don't want to speculate, counsel. I would have to see
12 resolution 1132, please. I don't want to speculate. I would not
13 lie that I remember all of it, counsel, of 1132.

14 Q. Mr Taylor, as we look at this resolution 1156, 16 March
15 1998, we find nowhere in this resolution a condemnation of the
16 ECOMOG intervention, do we?

16:29:55

17 A. No, but that was not the context of the presentation of
18 this document. This document --

19 Q. Mr Taylor, my question was very simple. First of all
20 answer my question.

16:30:16

21 A. What's your question?

22 Q. We find nowhere in this document a condemnation of the
23 ECOMOG intervention, do we?

24 A. No, we do not see it in this document, no.

16:30:27

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, we'll have to leave it at
26 that. The tape has run out. Perhaps you could pick up on Monday
27 where this is concerned.

28 Tomorrow being Friday, the day when we do other work, the
29 proceedings are adjourned to Monday, 25 January at 9.30 a.m.

1 Mr Taylor, I beg your pardon. I take the opportunity to
2 remind you of the Court's standing order not to discuss your
3 evidence, please.

4 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.

16:31:44 5 to be reconvened on Monday, 25 January 2010 at
6 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

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CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS HOLLIS	33799