



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 22 SEPTEMBER 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Mr Simon Meisenberg  
Ms Sidney Thompson

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Terry Munday  
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Tuesday, 22 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:29:14 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,  
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution Brenda J  
9 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura, Christopher Santora and our case  
09:30:34 10 manager, Maja Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Griffiths?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself Courtenay  
14 Griffiths. With me Mr Morris Anyah, Mr Silas Chekera and  
09:30:50 15 Mr Terry Munyard.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. You are still bound by your  
17 oath, Mr Taylor. Yes, go ahead, please, Mr Griffiths.

18 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

19 [On former affirmation]

09:30:58 20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, last week we concluded the evidence of a  
22 witness called on behalf of the Prosecution and I would like to  
23 move on now to another witness. The witness is TF1-337, Mustapha  
24 Mansaray, who gave evidence in open session in March of last  
09:31:24 25 year. First of all, Mr Taylor, can I begin in this way: Does  
26 the name Gisiwolo mean anything to you?

27 A. Oh, boy.

28 Q. Take your time.

29 A. No, not together, no.

1 Q. Tell me, do you know the names of any training basis set up  
2 by the RUF in Sierra Leone?

3 A. No, I don't - I've heard a few in the Court, but I don't  
4 know any of them.

09:32:16 5 Q. Help me with this then: Did you at any time coordinate  
6 with Foday Sankoh, or anybody else for that matter, the setting  
7 up of training bases in Sierra Leone?

8 A. Oh, no, no, never.

9 Q. During that period of cooperation which you accept between  
09:32:43 10 the NPFL and the RUF, were you involved in any way in the setting  
11 up of training programmes for RUF recruits in Sierra Leone?

12 A. No, I was not. And to be specific you are talking about  
13 August '91 to May of 1992. Even in Liberia, where I led the  
14 NPFL, I would have never been and was never involved in setting

09:33:08 15 up of training bases. So if I didn't do it in Liberia, of course  
16 I wouldn't be involved with it in Sierra Leone. That's not the  
17 function --

18 Q. I accept your answer, Mr Taylor, but I need to clarify all  
19 matters in this regard: Tell me, did you direct the RUF to adopt  
09:33:25 20 any particular procedures in relation to the training of new  
21 recruits in Sierra Leone?

22 A. None whatsoever. No.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, on the same point, help me, did you, for  
24 example, dictate who should and should not be recruited by the  
09:34:08 25 RUF?

26 A. No, no. Surely not, no.

27 Q. You appreciate that one of the matters on the indictment is  
28 the use of child soldiers, don't you?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Tell me, did you recommend to Foday Sankoh or indeed to any  
2 RUF commander that they should recruit so-called child soldiers?

3 A. Never did. Never. Never. Never did.

09:34:46

4 Q. Did you recommend to the RUF or direct that they set up  
5 Small Boys Units so-called or Small Girls Units?

6 A. No, not at all.

7 Q. Did you, for example, suggest that a procedure called  
8 food-finding missions be adopted by the RUF in Sierra Leone?

9 A. No, no.

09:35:15

10 Q. Now, let me come back to my initial question. Do you know  
11 of a training base in Sierra Leone called Gisiwolo?

12 A. No.

13 Q. I am looking at page 5221 of the transcript of 4 March  
14 2008. Now, I've asked you those preliminary questions,

09:35:43

15 Mr Taylor, for this reason: During the course of his testimony,  
16 that witness says that the first time he saw the  
17 commander-in-chief Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh was at the  
18 Gisiwolo training base and that Mr Sankoh introduced himself and  
19 said that he is the leader for the RUF Sierra Leone movement.

09:36:12

20 And he continued:

21 "He said, but all of us are fighting the war. We are  
22 fighting it for ourselves. He is just there as the leader. That  
23 he is just a poor photographer. He doesn't have any money to  
24 fight the war to go and buy arms and ammunition to fight the war  
09:36:31 25 in Sierra Leone, but he has a friend, a friend who is prepared to  
26 assist him to fight the war in Sierra Leone. And he said the  
27 name of his friend is Charles Dankpannah Ghankay Taylor. He said  
28 he is in Liberia. He said he is prepared to give him fighters  
29 but he is also prepared to give him ammunition to fight the war

1 in Sierra Leone, which made everybody happy and they applauded"

2 Now, did you know anything about that?

3 A. No, I did not. And quite strangely, to help the Court,  
4 there are about two falsehoods here in that statement. The name

09:37:17

5 Dankannah, the name Dankannah at the time this witness is  
6 talking about, there is no way that anyone called Foday Sankoh  
7 could have said that he had a friend called Charles Dankannah  
8 because I did not have that name at the time. That name

09:37:44

9 Dankannah, which means chief, was not given to me until after my  
10 election in 1997. So it's impossible. That chieftaincy name was  
11 an honour given to me way after this. So he's lying.

12 There is no record anywhere in the world prior to 1997 that  
13 shows me as Dankannah. Dankannah means chief. So he is lying.

09:38:14

14 Foday Sankoh could have never told him at that time he had a  
15 friend called Charles Dankannah. It's a lie, because that title  
16 came with my title as presidency as chief.

17 Number one, I said earlier in your first question about  
18 Gisiwolo, and I said I don't know it in that form, I am sure the  
19 record reflects it and somebody may come later on under

09:38:33

20 cross-examination and say, "Well, you said" - the reason why I am  
21 saying I don't know it in that form, there is a mountain, an iron  
22 ore mountain in Liberia that right now is being prospected, it's

23 called Wologizi, it's a mountain, an iron ore mountain in  
24 Liberia. So that's what I meant when I said I don't know it in

09:38:56

25 that form. Somebody reversed it. In fact the Chinese are  
26 working at Wologizi. It's a major iron ore deposit in Liberia.  
27 So that's what I meant for the record I don't know it in that  
28 form.

29 So somebody - I don't know whether it's a real base or

1 probably he was just thinking, but there is a mountain in Liberia  
2 called Wologizi. So now he has Gisiwolo. So that's what I meant  
3 into my comment.

09:39:40 4 Q. Now, the witness went on to say, and I am looking at page  
5 5251 of the transcript of 4 March 2008, that he went to Grand  
6 Cape Mount County in Liberia and he was asked why he went there  
7 and he said this:

8 "A. Yes, the soldiers and the ULIMOs were chasing us so we  
9 crossed over to Liberia. We crossed together with the  
09:40:07 10 Liberian and RUF senior fighters with whom they came. We  
11 all crossed over.

12 Q. Where did you go when you crossed over to Liberia?

13 A. In November, when I crossed over for the first time, we  
14 were at Tiene ..."

09:40:25 15 Is that the right pronunciation, Mr Taylor, T-I-E-N-E?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. "... in November.

18 Q. Did anything happen in Tiene?

19 A. Yes.

09:40:33 20 Q. What happened?

21 A. November 1991, between the third and fourth week, the  
22 Sierra Leone and ULIMO fighters kept on fighting until they  
23 crossed the border and attacked us in Tiene. In the  
24 afternoon they attacked us and we dispersed. We were  
09:40:52 25 dislodged, we started running. We followed a route that  
26 was leading to Bomi Hills."

27 Now, taking matters in stages, this is November 1991. So  
28 we are talking about seven months after the start of the  
29 incursion into Sierra Leone. Yes, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Uh-huh.

2 Q. Now, Tiene is in what part of Liberia?

3 A. Tiene is in Grand Cape Mount County.

4 Q. And is that a county which borders Sierra Leone?

09:41:29 5 A. Yes, it does.

6 Q. And is that a county near Bo Waterside?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Bearing that in mind, were you aware in November 1991 of

9 ULIMO forcing RUF and Liberian fighters into that part of

09:41:54 10 Liberia?

11 A. No, personally I was not aware. We are looking at, what,

12 about two or three months after we first make contact with the

13 RUF, because we are talking about November. So I would say it

14 would not be out of the ordinary for ULIMO to have attacked and

09:42:20 15 in hot pursuit follow someone across the border. That would not

16 be out of the ordinary for me. That's I would say possible, if

17 not even probable, but it's possible.

18 Q. Now, the route from Tiene to Bomi Hills, Mr Taylor, what

19 type of terrain does that traverse?

09:42:44 20 A. That's paved road from Tiene - well, no, let me straighten

21 that up, because - not Bomi Hills per se, because from Tiene you

22 will come on highway and you will come to Klay. Now, Klay is a

23 good - it's a good distance from Bomi Hills, and I think we have

24 demonstrated that on the map before. But from Tiene to Klay is

09:43:15 25 paved road, and from Klay to - going to Bomi, little bit of paved

26 but the rest of it is laterite road.

27 Q. Well, I would like you, please, Mr Taylor - because this is

28 a matter of some importance - to have a look, please, at the

29 defence map of Liberia.

1           Could that be put up on the screen, please.

2           Now, this is an area we've looked at before, Mr Taylor, but  
3 I would like you to help us to this extent: If we look to the  
4 left of the map, just above the key we see Robertsport; do you  
09:44:41 5 see that?

6 A.     Yes. Excuse me, I would just ask the indulgence of the  
7 Court. I came in and brought an empty something. I left it  
8 right on my table right in the cell here. If the person wouldn't  
9 mind just picking up my reading glasses? I thought it was in  
09:45:00 10 there. It's empty. It's right on the desk in there.

11           MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if one of the security guards could  
12 oblige.

13           PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, could that be possible, please, one  
14 of the security men.

09:45:24 15           MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q.     Now, Mr Taylor, is there a pen there which you could use as  
17 a pointer?

18 A.     Yes.

19 Q.     Now, we see Robertsport, don't we?

09:45:32 20 A.     Yes, that's right here.

21 Q.     Just above Robertsport, at about 11 o'clock, do you see Bo?

22 A.     Yes, right here.

23 Q.     All right, horizontally to the right of the Robertsport do  
24 you see Klay?

09:45:53 25 A.     Yes, right here.

26 Q.     Now, it may be me, but I cannot see Tiene on this map?

27 A.     No, Tiene is not on this map, but I - the general location  
28 of Tiene is the big town - right after Bo - right after Bo  
29 Waterside - that's not Bo in Sierra Leone - just about the road



1 here is Tiene, I would say around here. Tiene is right on the  
2 road. It's a big town.

3 Q. Right. So Tiene is about there. And Mr Taylor, is Bomi  
4 Hills an area or a particular location?

09:46:36 5 A. Well, the area - it's a location. Bomi Hills is a  
6 location. The area is called Tubmanburg, and that word Bomi  
7 Hills comes from the fact that there were iron ore deposits,  
8 little mountains in that and they were called hills. And so what  
9 they call those little mountains where ore were being mined, they  
09:47:11 10 called those mountains Bomi, the hills of Bomi. Okay? That's -  
11 so it's an area. But, I mean, it's a location.

12 Now, the entire area is called Tubmanburg. The county is  
13 called Bomi County, and Tubmanburg is the capital of Bomi County.

14 Q. And Bomi Hills is in Tubmanburg?

09:47:37 15 A. No, Bomi Hills is outside of Tubmanburg in Bomi County.  
16 It's the commercial area where mining was being done, the hills.

17 Q. Right. So now we get an idea of the route suggested by  
18 this witness. So that route begins somewhere to the right of Bo,  
19 does it?

09:48:03 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And it continues to Tubmanburg?

22 A. Well --

23 Q. Or to the area of Tubmanburg?

24 A. Yeah. It would - you would come - here is the road. You  
09:48:17 25 have to come here to Klay. From Klay then you go up to  
26 Tubmanburg.

27 Q. Right. Thank you very much, Mr Taylor. Now, bearing that  
28 in mind, let me establish one other fact with you before I ask  
29 you one or two specific questions about the testimony of this

1 witness. Do you know of a commander at Tiene called BZT Nya?

2 A. No, I don't know him.

3 Q. Do you know of an NPFL commander of that name?

4 A. No.

09:49:19 5 Q. Now, bearing in mind, Mr Taylor, one, the location, two,  
6 the date November 1991, this witness says this, page 5252  
7 beginning at line 9:

8 "Q. What happened when you went to Bomi Hills?

9 A. The very evening when we were in that car, when we  
09:49:46 10 arrived, we met a muster parade on and we met with some RUF  
11 junior fighters whom I knew and some senior ones too whom I  
12 knew. They said the two leaders had to come to talk to us.  
13 Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor were to come and address  
14 us. But when we arrived in the evening, it was not too  
09:50:11 15 long when Foday Sankoh arrived. I already knew him. Then  
16 I saw another vehicle which was a Nissan Patrol car. It  
17 was like a grey colour. But we were many. Somebody came  
18 from out of the vehicle and said his name was  
19 Charles Ghankay Taylor. He said he had come to address all  
09:50:36 20 of us. He said the NPFL fighters should stop treating us  
21 badly, we the RUF. He said the NPFL fighters should not  
22 treat us badly. He said they should know that we are all  
23 fighting for the same freedom. We clapped for him and he  
24 left us there and returned. We were there together with  
09:51:03 25 Sankoh and others. Our leader, Foday Sankoh, said we too  
26 were men. We should not be allowing the Liberians to be  
27 killing us, or mistreating us all the time, so he asked us  
28 to exercise some patience and fight the war. He said his  
29 friend would help him to continue the war. He would help

1 him with arms and ammunition to continue fighting the war.

2 He said his friend, Charles Taylor, would help him."

3 Now, first of all, did you attend a muster parade in Bomi  
4 Hills in November 1991 with Foday Sankoh?

09:51:53 5 A. No, I did not.

6 Q. Two, did you at or about that time travel in a grey Nissan  
7 Patrol car?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Now, I suppose it follows from my first question, but I  
09:52:15 10 will ask it nonetheless. Did you address a meeting of RUF

11 fighters in Bomi Hills in or about November 1991?

12 A. No, and I will qualify the no. November 1991 this witness  
13 talks about fighting where they are chased across the border, and  
14 let me just remind the Court - and this little map that I drew

09:52:49 15 the other day, it was for a purpose, where the President asked me  
16 if we could do a key. Look, how do I get to Bomi Hills if I am  
17 to get to Bomi Hills at all? In order to get to Bomi Hills from  
18 my side where I was, there are no roads. There are no roads to  
19 get to Bomi Hills except you drive through Monrovia. Obviously,

09:53:19 20 I cannot drive through Monrovia. The only way I would have to  
21 get to Bomi Hills is to traverse through the very forest areas  
22 that we are talking about; that is, from Gbarnga to Zorzor and  
23 going through the forest all the way to Bomi Hills. This is why

09:53:38 24 it is important to understand that the roadwork in Liberia from  
25 Monrovia, sitting in the centre - yes, we have troops on the  
26 other side. Those troops had to walk. To get to Bomi Hills you  
27 would have to either fight your way through Monrovia, or take  
28 days tracking through the forest, which was not my part of stuff  
29 as leader.

1           So for someone to say in November 1991 that war is in Bomi,  
2 ULIMO is already attacking, and Charles Taylor is going to get  
3 men and get in the bushes - I never fired a shot during the war.  
4 It's not just possible. Now, if he says that November of 1991  
09:54:17 5 Foday Sankoh went to Bomi Hills, that's possible. I will say  
6 that's possible, because by then we are already working together,  
7 November 1991, okay? And the chasing by - ULIMO chasing the RUF  
8 across the border, that's not unusual. So it would not be  
9 unusual to say it's possible that Foday Sankoh, who was a  
09:54:40 10 soldier, he was in the bush with them, went to Bomi Hills in 1991  
11 October, I would not - I am not in a position to say that he is  
12 lying. But I, Charles Taylor, would walk through the bushes to  
13 go to Bomi Hills? It just never happened. No.

14 Q.       Now, Mr Taylor, the witness continues in this vein. Having  
09:55:05 15 explained that Foday Sankoh had informed them that his friend  
16 would supply arms and ammunition to continue fighting the war, he  
17 continues at page 5253:

18           "That very evening" - so the very evening when you are  
19 supposed to have addressed them along with Foday Sankoh - "I saw  
09:55:28 20 CO BZT Nya, the same vehicle which had come with. There were RPG  
21 bombs and ammunition in it. There were other vehicles which had  
22 heavy weapons, which were anti-aircraft guns. They were in the  
23 vehicles. So we boarded the vehicle and we returned. When we  
24 got to a place that was five miles to Tiene, we were asked to  
09:55:55 25 alight the vehicle and go as ground forces, so we started  
26 walking. Three miles to Tiene we set an ambush. Around 6.00 to  
27 6.30 a.m. we got to Tiene and they told us the strategy we were  
28 to use was to be C formation and the soldiers who were to come,  
29 they were Momoh soldiers and ULIMO. We should open fire on them

1 ... when we made the C formation, that was the formation we gave  
2 to - we planned for the enemies in Tiene and at that time it was  
3 Momoh soldiers and the ULIMOs who were in Tiene. So we called  
4 them enemies, and we opened fire on them after the commanders had  
09:56:38 5 ordered us to open fire on them, and we did. We captured Tiene.  
6 That very day we advanced and we crossed the Mano River bridge,  
7 entered Gendema, that is in Sierra Leone. We advanced with those  
8 weapons at first Fairo. Two of the artillery weapons stopped  
9 there and one of the others advanced with us --"

09:57:04 10 Now, there is a number of things I want to ask you about  
11 that. Firstly, do you recall the NPFL supplying the RUF in that  
12 part of Liberia in November 1991 with that kind of weaponry?

13 A. No, no, because I don't know how they could have gotten an  
14 anti-aircraft gun in that part of country at that time. An  
09:57:39 15 anti-aircraft gun I know is not a very small piece of equipment  
16 that you can carry. To move an anti-aircraft gun, normally  
17 that's moved around - the anti-aircraft guns that we had in the  
18 NPFL, and we had some, you had to move them on trucks, huge  
19 trucks.

09:58:03 20 An anti-aircraft gun, I hope we could probably get a  
21 picture on the net for the Court. It's not a small weapon. You  
22 probably can use 20, 25 men to lift it. But that's not something  
23 that people carry around. You don't carry an anti-aircraft gun  
24 around. So how would they have gotten it from Gbarnga side to  
09:58:23 25 Bomi?

26 I can't see an anti-aircraft gun - we didn't have one.  
27 Even our forces didn't have anti-aircraft guns in that Bomi  
28 region at that time because it was impossible to get it there.  
29 So I don't know how he saw an anti - maybe he is calling a

1 different gun. If somebody says that you carry what we called a  
2 50 calibre weapon, okay, three or four men can carry that, but  
3 not an anti-aircraft gun. We didn't have one there in that area  
4 so that cannot be true.

09:58:56 5 Q. Well, let's look at this issue from another perspective  
6 then, Mr Taylor. Would you accept that it would be in the  
7 interest of the NPFL to repel an incursion by "Momoh ULIMO  
8 fighters" from Liberian soil?

9 A. Of course, of course. That's what I am saying. By October  
09:59:22 10 of 1991, the records of the Court that I have spoken of factually  
11 is that we are working with the RUF on security arrangements by  
12 October 1991. So the fact that people came across the border or  
13 even that Foday Sankoh would be in that region by October 1991, I  
14 don't know his movements, but it would not be impossible. Yes.

09:59:51 15 So at that particular time, if Momoh forces are at Tiene,  
16 which is a huge town and to be frank, if I want to approximate  
17 Tiene from the Bo Waterside, Tiene could be within three to five  
18 miles, I mean kilometres of Bo Waterside, it's a huge town. Of  
19 course it would be in our interest to expel them at all costs,  
10:00:20 20 yes.

21 Q. And so the logical question that follows is this: Did you  
22 through such self-interest provide the material described by the  
23 witness to the RUF at that point?

24 A. No, no. I would say categorically no because the material,  
10:00:38 25 as your question goes - the material that he described as an  
26 anti-aircraft gun is not possible to get there. We do have  
27 anti-aircraft guns in the NPFL, but there is no way to get it to  
28 that position because it would have to be carried on a truck and  
29 that was not possible to get it over there.

1 Q. Very well. Now, Mr Taylor, there is another matter  
2 inferred in this passage which I want to ask you about. Were you  
3 aware of such incursions by Momoh, that is Sierra Leonean forces  
4 and ULIMO, into Liberia?

10:01:21 5 A. Yes, there were frequent what we call penetrations and they  
6 were rebuffed. Yes, there were several of those.

7 Q. And were those incursions limited to ULIMO forces or were  
8 ULIMO at that time being assisted by Momoh, that is Sierra  
9 Leonean forces?

10:01:42 10 A. There were Sierra Leonean forces along with ULIMO forces  
11 that fought joint battles that entered Liberia at that time, yes.

12 Q. So are we to understand then that the picture at this time  
13 is that on the one side you have the NPFL fighting alongside or  
14 in cooperation with the RUF and on the other side ULIMO is

10:02:05 15 fighting in cooperation with the Sierra Leonean forces?

16 A. Oh, definitely, definitely. That was the whole point.  
17 That's why we agreed to work along with the RUF in the security  
18 pact because we wanted to fight the enemy in Sierra Leone that we  
19 would not have to fight them in Liberia. So, yes, that was  
10:02:34 20 there, yes, yes.

21 Q. Now, does the name Siem Kolleh mean anything to you?

22 A. No.

23 Q. That's Siem spelt S-I-E-M?

24 A. No.

10:02:59 25 Q. Now, in April 1999, Mr Taylor, remind us, what was the  
26 major event involving the RUF which was in progress?

27 A. In April of 1999, the RUF and the Government of Sierra  
28 Leone, the international community, ECOWAS, we were moving. We  
29 were organising and moving RUF fighters. I mean, representative,

1 may I speak, from Sierra Leone and Liberia onto Togo for the  
2 peace talks.

3 Q. Well, bear that in mind, the witness goes on to say this at  
4 page 5316:

10:03:49 5 "Q. Did you attend any meeting, even if not in Makeni, but  
6 during the time you were based in Makeni as IDU personnel?

7 A. Yes, I attended a muster parade.

8 Q. Where was this muster parade held?

9 A. The muster parade was held near the government hospital  
10:04:15 10 in Magburaka Town.

11 Q. When was this muster parade held, do you remember the  
12 date?

13 A. It was in 1999, around April 1999 I can remember. That  
14 was when we held the muster parade in Magburaka.

10:04:35 15 Q. What happened during this muster parade in Magburaka?

16 A. During the muster parade I saw two senior RUF officers.  
17 One of them was Morris Kallon, then the other one was Siem  
18 Kolleh. I saw Siem Kolleh with an AAC twin barrel  
19 anti-aircraft gun. He had arms and ammunition in that  
10:05:04 20 vehicle together with RPG bombs. Then Siem Kolleh told  
21 Morris Kallon that Sam Bockarie had sent those materials,  
22 he brought them from Liberia to go and fight against Denis  
23 Mingo and others."

24 Now, did you, Mr Taylor, in April 1999 provide through Sam  
10:05:32 25 Bockarie the RUF with a twin barreled anti-aircraft gun, arms and  
26 ammunition, including RPG bombs?

27 A. No, I did not. And to have had a weapon of that size it  
28 simply means we didn't disarm. For anybody to make up this kind  
29 of stuff to say that there is a twin barrel gun, and I know what



1 a twin barrel gun is, and if I had - you know, I would have  
2 probably encourage that we probably get pictures of these kind of  
3 things. Then that means that I didn't disarm during disarmament.

10:06:23 4 A twin barrel anti-aircraft gun is not a little piece of  
5 equipment and I think the Court ought to probably see a picture  
6 of one of these. It is not a little piece of equipment. This is  
7 a huge piece of equipment that is mounted and manned. In fact,  
8 once it's a twin barrel, it is fired by two men. It takes two  
9 operators to fire that weapon, two. And the base - in fact, the  
10:06:48 10 maintenance of that weapon and - it takes almost a squad, in  
11 fact. I don't know what some armies do, but my knowledge of the  
12 NPFL, that weapon was manned by a squad of ten men. That is, the  
13 loading of the rounds of that weapon, the belts, two men sit to  
14 fire, you don't stand to fire. This is not a little toy.

10:07:12 15 So in 1999 at the time this man is talking about, moving  
16 such a weapon, that means I would have - one, maybe I did not  
17 disarm, and, two, I had to get it from the United Nations that  
18 had taken all these weapons. It's a blatant, blatant lie. And  
19 this is not a little piece of equipment that you can carry  
10:07:33 20 through the bushes. This is a truck bearing piece of equipment  
21 that must be transported by truck. I am not talking about a  
22 pick-up. I mean a truck, a military truck is where you man these  
23 weapons.

24 In fact, the weapons are so heavy that they must be kept  
10:07:50 25 mobile because if you are firing from a position and you come  
26 under attack there is no way you can move it. So he is lying.  
27 He is lying. I did not have any twin barrel at this time and did  
28 not send any twin barrel. He is lying.

29 Q. So can I examine one or two other details about this,

1 please. Firstly this: In or about April 1999, did Sam Bockarie  
2 come to Liberia, to your knowledge?

3 A. No, no. In fact, Sam Bockarie did not come to Liberia at  
4 the movement of these people at this particular time. All the  
10:08:31 5 meetings that were being held in Sierra Leone with the United  
6 Nations people, Sam Bockarie manned them. The two people that  
7 came in and out and moved have been presented to this Court. Who  
8 are they? Omrie Golley and Ibrahim Bah are the two people that  
9 come through first. Sam Bockarie stays behind. After all of the

10:08:50 10 people move to Togo, Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia after the  
11 delegation is moved and during the arrival of Foday Sankoh which  
12 is later. No, no, no, he doesn't come at this April of 1999, no.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the witness goes on to say, "He" - that  
14 being Sam Bockarie - "brought them from Liberia to go and fight  
10:09:18 15 against Denis Mingo and others." So it's an internal power  
16 struggle within the RUF. Do you follow?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did you provide arms to Sam Bockarie for such a conflict?

19 A. No, no.

10:09:36 20 Q. Were you aware in April 1999 of such a conflict between Sam  
21 Bockarie and Denis Mingo also known as Superman?

22 A. No, I was not aware and I don't think the UN was aware  
23 because the movement of those people and the delegation that they  
24 put together, there was no indication on my part, and I would  
10:09:59 25 have known because this whole thing was an ECOWAS operation, and  
26 others would have known that there was a conflict. This movement  
27 went off without problems because to the best of our knowledge,  
28 we knew of no internal conflict at that time in Sierra Leone. I  
29 don't dispute that they may have had their little thing but we

1 did not know because it did not hinder the movement of the  
2 people, so it did not come to our attention.

3 Q. Well, bearing in mind the allegation, the suggestion that  
4 you were effectively running the RUF, Mr Taylor, let me ask you  
10:10:34 5 this: Were you seeking to provide Sam Bockarie with the  
6 wherewithal to put down dissension within that force you  
7 allegedly were controlling? Do you follow me?

8 A. Yes, I follow you. No, not at all, no.

9 Q. And the witness goes on, you see, at page 5317 and I  
10:11:07 10 mention this for completeness. The witness was asked this  
11 question regarding that same incident:

12 "Q. Witness, you testified earlier that Siem Kolleh told  
13 Morris Kallon that Sam Bockarie had sent those materials,  
14 meaning the arms and ammunition and the anti-aircraft gun,  
10:11:27 15 and that he brought them from Liberia. Did Siem Kolleh say  
16 where in Liberia Sam Bockarie got these materials from?

17 A. Yes, he said that in the muster parade where I was  
18 there, including RUF and AFRC members.

19 Q. What did he say about where in Liberia Sam Bockarie got  
10:11:51 20 these materials from?

21 A. Siem Kolleh told us that Sam Bockarie got these  
22 materials from" - guess who - "Charles Taylor."

23 True or false, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Totally false. Totally, totally false.

10:12:15 25 Q. Let's move on and deal with another aspect of this  
26 witness's testimony. Page 5336, line 5:

27 "Q. Witness, you testified yesterday that in July 2000 you  
28 were assigned as a secretary to Komba Gbundema. Do you  
29 recall that?

1 A. Yes, I recall that.

2 Q. You told the Court that at this time Komba Gbundema was  
3 the operational commander for the RUF?

4 A. Yes.

10:13:03 5 Q. Witness, what were your duties as secretary to Komba  
6 Gbundema?

7 A. At that time my duties were to take record of arms and  
8 ammunition, the number of fighters. The reports that were  
9 sent to Komba Gbundema from the various areas, at times he  
10 gave them to me for safekeeping. Those were my duties?

10:13:24

11 Q. What do you mean by 'reports from the various areas'?

12 A. The missions that they were going out on in areas where  
13 other commanders were. The two of us will take patrol, go  
14 there on a patrol and they will give him the report, and at  
15 times he will give the report to me for safekeeping.

10:13:49

16 Q. Witness, you have said one of your duties was to take  
17 record of arms and ammunition. Was there arms and  
18 ammunition in Makeni at that time?"

19 Remember, July 2000.

10:14:08

20 "A. At the time I was working with him we used to have  
21 arms and ammunition.

22 Q. Where did those arms and ammunition come from?

23 A. Issa Sesay brought those arms and ammunition to him to  
24 run our operations.

10:14:30

25 Q. What operations did he bring those arms and ammunition  
26 for you to run?

27 A. Well, for the time that I was with him, the arms and  
28 ammunition that Issa Sesay brought to him, Issa Sesay gave  
29 the order to Komba to attack Guinea ... At this time I was

1 at Kamakwei No 3 with Komba Gbundema when Issa Sesay,  
2 Morris Kallon and my former commander, Augustine Gbao, came  
3 and met us at Kamakwei, and we all slept in the same house.  
4 Then the following morning Komba Gbundema held a muster  
10:15:22 5 parade and Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon addressed the  
6 fighters there to go and attack the Guinean territory to  
7 oust Lansana Conte.

8 Q. Who spoke at the muster parade and said that?

9 A. Issa Sesay was the first person to talk to us. Later  
10:15:46 10 Morris Kallon addressed us, and I also saw a Guinean who  
11 also addressed us a bit.

12 Q. Witness, what did Issa Sesay say when he was addressing  
13 this muster parade?

14 A. Issa Sesay told us at the muster parade that  
10:16:05 15 ex-President Charles Taylor had given him that mission to  
16 launch an attack against Lansana Conte in Guinea.

17 Q. Witness, did he say anything else?

18 A. Yes, he said the mission that Charles Taylor had given  
19 to him, we should ensure that we accomplished it, that we  
10:16:28 20 should attack the Guinean territory, that he had given him  
21 arms and ammunition and bombs so we should launch the  
22 attack and the mission should be accomplished. According  
23 to Issa Sesay, he said it was ex-President Charles  
24 Dankpannah Ghankay Taylor who had given him the arms and  
10:16:50 25 ammunition, together with the RPG bombs to go and fight in  
26 Guinea to overthrow Lansana Conte.

27 Q. Witness, who was this Guinean who was present and also  
28 addressed the muster parade?

29 A. The first person who addressed us was called Amadu

1           Toure. Then the second one was Ibrahim Sidi ebay."

2           Now, Mr Taylor, July 2000, did you provide arms and  
3 ammunition and bombs to Issa Sesay for the RUF to launch an  
4 attack on Guinea with a view to overthrowing Lansana Conte?

10:17:35 5   A.    No, I did not. No, I did not.

6   Q.    Now, in July 2000, Mr Taylor, wasn't Liberia beset by  
7 attacks from Guinean territory by LURD?

8   A.    Yes, we were being attacked by LURD. But I was equally  
9 busy with other matters too in July 2000 that were not warlike at  
10:18:05 10 all.

11   Q.    Well, we will come back to the non-warlike actives in a  
12 moment. But would you agree that it would be in your interest to  
13 counter Lansana Conte's support for LURD by taking military  
14 action against him?

10:18:30 15   A.    Of course it would be in my interest, but why wouldn't I  
16 use Liberians also? Why would I ask RUF to launch attacks? What  
17 am I doing in Liberia?

18   Q.    Well, the obvious answer is that because they are your  
19 supporters. They're your auxiliaries. You have been running  
10:18:52 20 them, so it's said, since 1991. So that's why - that's the short  
21 answer to your question.

22   A.    Yes, but that would be total nonsense. If I wanted to  
23 launch an attack against Lansana Conte in retaliation for what  
24 he's doing, it is obvious that I would launch a major attack  
10:19:10 25 against Conte. I would not go to the RUF and say, "Send some men  
26 across the border." What am I going to be doing with the  
27 thousands of people that are available to me? That's total  
28 nonsense. Total nonsense he's talking about. If RUF had a  
29 reason on the Guinean side of the Sierra Leonean border to attack

1 Guinea, maybe it's their business. But if I wanted to retaliate  
2 against Lansana Conte, I would have used Liberians to do that and  
3 I would have had a right to do that.

4 Q. Does the name Amadu Toure mean anything to you?

10:19:44 5 A. No, I have never met him. I don't know him.

6 Q. Ibrahim Sidi ebay?

7 A. No, never met him.

8 Q. Now, you mentioned that you were involved in non-warlike  
9 activities at the time in July 2000. What were they?

10:19:57 10 A. The contact that I had with Issa Sesay, I had contact with  
11 Issa Sesay in July 2000. We invited - Issa Sesay did come to  
12 Liberia in July of 2000 to meet with Heads of State in trying to  
13 consolidate the leadership of the RUF so that ECOWAS could have  
14 someone to talk to. That's the contact that I had with Issa  
10:20:26 15 Sesay in July 2000.

16 Q. So what do you say to this proposition then, Mr Taylor:  
17 Isn't it a bit of a coincidence that this witness just happens to  
18 mention you giving arms, ammunition and bombs to Issa Sesay in  
19 July 2000, and guess what? Issa Sesay just happened to be in  
10:20:45 20 Liberia at that time?

21 A. Yeah, but there are several coincidences. In the first  
22 place, I don't know if this man is a soldier, but maybe he does  
23 know that Issa Sesay goes to Liberia in July 2000 because that's  
24 hardly something that other people do not know. Everybody in the  
10:21:02 25 RUF must know that Issa Sesay - even if they did not know before  
26 he went, after he came back they had to know because what  
27 happened? There was a major meeting held, and he brought a  
28 message after meeting me, Obasanjo, Alpha Konare, Yahya Jammeh,  
29 the Heads of State, in determining - in trying to determine the

1 Leadership of the RUF that he said he could not accept, except he  
2 went back to them. Upon going back, he informed everybody.

3 But I tell you something. You know, when these guys are  
4 speaking - and I have to do this, because it just cannot appear  
10:21:39 5 that I am saying, no, no, no, but some of these things are just  
6 not logical, what these boys are talking about. This man says he  
7 is a secretary to - what do you call it?

8 Q. Komba Gbundema.

9 A. Gbundema. A secretary, but he is taking notes of arms and  
10:21:58 10 he knows about missions. Well, the little military that I know -  
11 and I haven't taken military training - if you are a secretary in  
12 Komba Gbundema's office, what's the adjutant doing? What's the  
13 adjutant doing? If you are a secretary, you'd hardly be so - you  
14 can't be a secretary in this man's office and involved in  
10:22:21 15 military activities, then, I mean, they don't have an adjutant.

16 Because the work of the adjutant, he makes sure that he keeps the  
17 records of names and all these kinds of things.

18 So I don't know how much military this man is doing, but I  
19 am sure he knows that there is contact with Issa Sesay in 2000,  
10:22:40 20 and maybe he doesn't know what the contact is about. So in  
21 responding to both your question and your comment, it would not  
22 be unusual for these people trying to tie up their little story,  
23 but there is contact with Issa Sesay in 2000, but it is not about  
24 war; it is about peace.

10:23:00 25 Q. Does the name Komba Gbundema mean anything to you,  
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. Well, I have heard it here in this Court. I don't know  
28 him. I heard that name here. I have never met him before.  
29 Don't know him.



1 Q. Was he, to your knowledge, a senior RUF commander?

2 A. Not to my knowledge. I don't know the man, no.

3 Q. Back in the year 2000 had you heard that name?

4 A. No, I had not heard that name in 2000.

10:23:25 5 Q. Did you, for example, during those efforts in April 1999 to  
6 transfer senior RUF commanders to Lome for the peace talks, hear  
7 that name mentioned?

8 A. No, I can't recall, because I did not meet the delegation  
9 and most of the people on the delegation - I saw the list, but I  
10:23:50 10 can't even remember the names. But I did not know the  
11 individuals on the delegation coming through. I did not meet the  
12 delegation.

13 Q. Now, later in his testimony, the witness was asked this  
14 question, page 5418, line 3:

10:24:21 15 "Q. The RUF were getting arms from all sorts of places  
16 because he was not getting one supply only from one supply  
17 source, was it?

18 A. That is correct. We were not just get supply from one  
19 person or one angle. We got it from other places like the  
10:24:41 20 ECOMOG like what you mentioned. When we attacked them, we  
21 used to get arms and ammunition from them. When we would  
22 have fought with them."

23 Page 5419 line 3.

24 "What Sam Bockarie used to tell us, he only used to tell us  
10:24:59 25 about ex-President Charles Dankpannah Ghankay Taylor, but for the  
26 other people he did not tell me anything like that and he heard  
27 that from him. Maybe he told some other people ... He told us  
28 that many times. Sam Bockarie used to tell us that he got arms  
29 from ex-President Charles Dankpannah Ghankay Taylor."

1 Mr Taylor, did you ever give arms and ammunition to Sam  
2 Bockarie?

3 A. No, I didn't. Didn't give Sam Bockarie any arms or  
4 ammunition, no. Didn't have it and couldn't give it and didn't  
10:25:27 5 give it.

6 Q. Very well. I would like to leave that witness now, please,  
7 and move on to another witness.

8 Could I have a moment, please, Mr President?

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

10:26:25 10 MR GRIFFITHS: [Microphone not activated].

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am not hearing the attorney.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. I want to move on and deal with another witness: TF1-276,  
14 Abu Keita, who gave evidence in open session back in January  
10:26:40 15 2008. Now taking things in stages, what do you know about Abu  
16 Keita?

17 A. Didn't know the gentleman. Never met him in my life. I  
18 think he is also known as Mohamed Keita. I think he changed his  
19 name, but --

10:26:59 20 Q. Pause there. How do you know that?

21 A. Well, all of his friends since he testified here have said  
22 that that's the first time - but they know him as Mohamed Keita.  
23 That was a ULIMO commander that joined us after my election and  
24 that's all that I know, that he was one of the senior commanders  
10:27:23 25 that joined us after the - after my election that I brought in  
26 for - what do you call it? For peace sake and reconciliation.  
27 There was he, Sherif. There is another one called Papa Kouyate,  
28 a bunch of these people we brought in. Mohamed was one of them.

29 Q. And from which ULIMO?

1 A. ULIMO-K.

2 Q. So the Alhaji Kromah faction?

3 A. That is correct.

10:28:06 4 Q. And just so that we are clear, they had been operating, in  
5 the main, in Lofa County?

6 A. That is correct. That is correct.

7 Q. Now, when did this name first come to your attention,  
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. Which one of the names now?

10:28:25 10 Q. Well, Mohamed - well, let's start with Abu Keita. When did  
11 that name first come to your attention?

12 A. In this courtroom, when the name - well, before the  
13 courtroom because we saw the statements and then we started  
14 asking around and nobody really knew who was Abu Keita. After he  
10:28:49 15 appeared here, people recognised him and say, "Oh, but that's  
16 Mohamed Keita." But it was too late now because that  
17 information, you know, investigators could not tell us, but later  
18 on, "Oh, but that's Mohamed. When did he become Abu?" So all of  
19 his friends say, "But that's Mohamed Keita." But it was in this  
10:29:10 20 courtroom that I first heard the name Abu Keita and after his  
21 testimony from what was told me that he was Mohamed and that he  
22 had been in some trouble in Monrovia and it was explained that he  
23 had joined the Roosevelt Johnson uprising, was arrested, released  
24 and he fled the country after his release.

10:29:38 25 Q. So you say he was arrested during the Roosevelt Johnson  
26 uprising?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. When did you discover that?

29 A. We discovered that during the investigation. Following,

1 you know, his testimony here it came up that he was one of those  
2 that was arrested.

3 Q. Now, arrested during the Roosevelt Johnson incident for  
4 what?

10:30:14 5 A. Well, let's don't forget the Roosevelt Johnson situation  
6 occurred we know in 1998. This was the situation that occurred  
7 that involved - what we are talking, we're round at about  
8 September, that involved their going to the United States embassy  
9 and that whole situation. That uprising that was crushed by  
10:30:42 10 Roosevelt Johnson in what we call his attempt to try to overthrow  
11 the government there were several of the ULIMO-K people that did  
12 join in that and this is the uprising I am talking about.

13 Q. Now, you say now, Mr Taylor, that Abu Keita was a senior  
14 ULIMO personality?

10:31:09 15 A. Yes, he was a general, yes.

16 Q. He was a general?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. How is it that you knew Varmuyan Sherif at the time who was  
19 also a general, but not Abu Keita?

10:31:24 20 A. Because Varmuyan worked in the presidency and he held a  
21 position in the presidency and Varmuyan was more senior than Abu,  
22 than Mohamed.

23 Q. How do you know that?

24 A. Well, in 1996, there was a situation we have on the records  
10:31:53 25 here of the attempt on the part of the government at the time to  
26 arrest Roosevelt Johnson because of an alleged murder at the  
27 time. During that time Alhaji Kromah was on the Council of State  
28 and his senior people were there. Mohamed, let me say Mohamed -  
29 Varmuyan Sherif was brought into the mansion, into the presidency

1 at the time by Alhaji Kromah. He was one of the most senior  
2 generals brought in at the time and he worked in the SSS. That's  
3 Varmuyan Sherif.

4 So because of the six man collective presidency at the  
10:32:41 5 time, a senior position in the SSS that meant that those  
6 individuals were exposed to all of us. That's how I got to know  
7 Varmuyan Sherif was when Alhaji, myself and George Boley - and  
8 those names are all on the record, your Honour - sat on the  
9 Council of State, okay, and so that's how I got to know him at  
10:33:03 10 that particular time and he was the most senior ULIMO general  
11 that worked in the presidency. That's how I got to know him at  
12 the time.

13 Q. Now, the first thing I want to ask you about, Mr Taylor, is  
14 this: At page 1960, the transcript of 23 January 2008, the  
10:33:30 15 witness was asked this by Mr Koumjian:

16 "Q. Sir, you mentioned a Mr Tipoteh.

17 A. Yes, Togbah-Nah Tipoteh."

18 Who is that, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Dr Tipoteh was one of the founders of MOJA and a major  
10:34:02 20 political leader in Liberia, Dr Togba-Nah Tipoteh. I know him  
21 very well. In fact, he heads a political party I just don't  
22 remember, but he participated in the elections of July 1997 for  
23 the presidency.

24 Q. So he was involved as a presidential candidate, was he?

10:34:26 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Now in that context the witness was then asked this, line  
27 17, page 1960:

28 "Q. Did you witness any of the campaign for Charles Taylor  
29 during that election?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you recall any slogan that was used for  
3 Charles Taylor's campaign?

10:34:56

4 A. They had his last rally at the SKD where his supporters  
5 were using the leaflets and the slogan was, 'You killed my  
6 mother, you killed my father, I will vote for you'.

7 Q. What was the result of the election, who won?

8 A. The election at the end, when we had the voting at the  
9 end Charles Taylor won the election."

10:35:19

10 Now, let me just ask you a couple of details about that,  
11 Mr Taylor, and I don't want to delay overlong on this because we  
12 have gone through the election before. Firstly, just so that we  
13 understand, what is the SKD?

10:35:41

14 A. Oh, that's the Samuel Kanyon Doe - former President Doe,  
15 the stadium is named after him in his honour. The Samuel Kanyon  
16 Doe stadium.

17 Q. Which stadium?

18 A. When you say which stadium, what do you mean which stadium?

19 Q. Is there a stadium in Liberia which bears that name?

10:36:01

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Where is it located?

22 A. It's located in the Paynesville area of Monrovia.

23 Q. On the road going out towards RIA?

24 A. That is correct.

10:36:15

25 Q. On the left-hand side?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Now, help me, did you hold an election rally there?

28 A. Oh, yes, that was my final rally. Yes, I did.

29 Q. The final rally?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. And as best you know, Mr Taylor, who was present at that  
3 rally?

4 A. Wow. The --

10:36:35 5 Q. Was it just your supporters or what?

6 A. Well, as it turns out, I had enemies among us too. I don't  
7 know who - I must assume - well, I assume who all were there were  
8 my supporters, but now I get to know he was there and he was not.

9 But there were at least a 150,000 or more people, in fact more  
10:37:01 10 than that, that filled the entire stadium. So I can say  
11 observers from other campaigns went there and I just assumed they  
12 were all supporters, but now I know differently.

13 Q. Now, note that the witness says, Mr Taylor, "His" - that  
14 being you - "supporters were using the slogan, 'You killed my  
10:37:30 15 mother, you killed my father, I will vote for you'." Was it your  
16 supporters who had formulated that slogan?

17 A. Yes, yes.

18 Q. And just remind us, what was the origin of it?

19 A. Well, the propaganda that developed during the campaign -  
10:37:53 20 in fact all of the warring factional leaders that participated in  
21 the elections I can say were stalked by an argument coming from  
22 some of the candidates that did not participate in the revolution  
23 and they were saying, "Oh, these are killers, don't vote for  
24 them. They are killers. They are killers. They are killers.  
10:38:26 25 We are the good people and they are the bad people."

26 So Alhaji Kromah was fighting against this, George Boley  
27 was fighting against this. So, cleverly, what a lot of the  
28 supporters did and quite frankly I would say that my supporters,  
29 but equally so all of the warring factional supporters, adopted

1 this. That okay, fine. After we got to know that there was  
2 outside support coming for some of the presidential candidates,  
3 someone cleverly said, "Okay, great". This is just a short  
4 version. It actually was saying, "Yes, you say that he's a  
10:39:05 5 killer. Even if he killed my mother, even if you say he killed  
6 my father, we will still vote for him. This is the person we  
7 want." This is in essence what this whole thing - and it was cut  
8 short where they were singing, you know, the typical Liberian  
9 English, "You killed my ma, you killed my pa, but I will vote for  
10:39:25 10 you." This is what the essence of this.

11 Now, for propaganda purposes, those that wanted to make it  
12 a big deal, they tried, you know, to shorten it, but this is the  
13 essence of it, that, "Okay, whatever you guys say out there, we  
14 know what we want in Liberia. And even if it happened, this is  
10:39:46 15 the man we want." This is in essence what was going on during  
16 that process. And they may want to put it this way, but I think  
17 everybody used it, especially if you participated in the crisis.  
18 Q. Thank you. Now, moving on. Page 1962, the witness said  
19 this and I invite your comment, line 3:

10:40:15 20 "Q. Now some time after you were recalled to the AFL,  
21 did fighting break out in Monrovia?

22 A. Yes."

23 Now, Mr Taylor, "After you were recalled to the AFL", do  
24 you understand that?

10:40:32 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. So understand what is being said here. Abu Keita, Mohamed  
27 Keita, former ULIMO, is now saying that he was recalled to the  
28 AFL. Now what does that tell you?

29 A. Well, I don't know what he is talking about here, but there



1 was such a process of saying that all of the ex-fighters, once  
2 you are a fighting man, because of the restructuring process, you  
3 are all now quote unquote AFL, and then to go into training. So  
4 I can understand what he is talking about.

10:41:12 5 Q. Well, let's look at it a little deeper. ULIMO is formed in  
6 which country?

7 A. Guinea, Sierra Leone. Two countries, Guinea and Sierra  
8 Leone.

9 Q. And out of what former force primarily?

10:41:33 10 A. AFL.

11 Q. The AFL?

12 A. Yes. Abu Keita is really saying here that he is a former  
13 AFL coming back. This's what he's trying to - this is what he's  
14 projecting here.

10:41:47 15 Q. So a former AFL under which regime?

16 A. Under the Doe regime.

17 Q. So he is coming back now into the AFL, yes?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. "Q. Can you briefly explain what that was about, what that  
10:42:03 20 was about?

21 A. Fighting broke out in Camp Johnson Road because  
22 Roosevelt Johnson was appointed as minister of - as a  
23 minister in Taylor's government and then he went on sick  
24 leave. When he came back he was at Camp Johnson Road and  
10:42:21 25 then he saw Joe Wally who was a former bodyguard to the  
26 late Samuel Doe, so he was at Roosevelt Johnson's house and  
27 then his - they ordered that he was to be arrested."

28 Now, I want you to help me with one or two of those details  
29 and the reason why I want you to help me is because you have

1 already given some evidence about the Camp Johnson Road incident  
2 and I would like us now to look at it from the perspective of  
3 this witness for your comment. Do you follow me?

4 A. Yes, I do.

10:42:55 5 Q. Now, firstly, Roosevelt Johnson, a minister in Taylor's  
6 government; true or false?

7 A. That is true.

8 Q. He went on sick leave; true or false?

9 A. True.

10:43:13 10 Q. To where, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Well, it was my understanding - because there is evidence  
12 here my government provided the money. It was my understanding  
13 that this gentleman was supposed to be going to Ghana. But to my  
14 surprise, he went to more than Ghana: He went to the

10:43:34 15 United States. He went all around, and I have explained what  
16 happened afterwards.

17 Q. An then, as you complained earlier, he returned to the  
18 country clandestinely?

19 A. That is correct.

10:43:47 20 Q. "When he came back he was at Camp Johnson Road and then he  
21 saw Joe Wally." Who is Joe Wally?

22 A. That's gentleman - Joe Wally is someone that I know very  
23 well. To get a good understanding of Joe Wally - let me just  
24 take one minute. Joe Wally is one of those militants that

10:44:20 25 Liberia has known for a long time. When the PRC took over, that  
26 is the government of Samuel Kanyon Doe, Joe Wally was one of  
27 those militants that went to Ethiopia at the time for training  
28 under the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. I led evidence in  
29 this Court before that that group was sent there. It was

1 supposed - they were supposed to be doing literacy training, but  
2 I mentioned that we were informed by the Central Intelligence  
3 Agency that they were actually doing military training. And Doe  
4 ordered them back. He did not come. He went further. I think  
10:45:11 5 he went on to Cuba, did training. But to cut it short, Joe Wally  
6 was one of the principal commanders that came into the country  
7 with the famous Brigadier General Thomas Quiwonkpa that was  
8 subsequently killed by Doe. He was one of the principal  
9 commanders, and it is believed at that time that the failure of  
10:45:36 10 the regime - of the coup at that time was that he had killed the  
11 principal commander at the border before they got in town that  
12 caused the thing, the coup, to fail.

13 So Joe is an old militant that has a military background  
14 after being trained in so many different countries. He showed up  
10:45:54 15 at Roosevelt Johnson's place, and whenever at that time Joe Wally  
16 came into Liberia, we knew it was trouble. Joe Wally ends up  
17 being one of the principal commanders of LURD that finally fought  
18 in Liberia and, at my departure, became Deputy Defence Minister  
19 under the LURD ticket. So what am I saying here? I am giving  
10:46:18 20 Joe Wally's background from many, many, many years ago; Ethiopia,  
21 Cuba. He has been a militant. He was involved with Quiwonkpa.  
22 He was involved with LURD and all of that. He is somebody that I  
23 know very well.

24 Q. When you speak of an incident at the border, that he had  
10:46:36 25 killed a principal commander, who had killed who?

26 A. Well, Joe Wally is believed - General Quiwonkpa was being  
27 used, because he was popular, to overthrow Samuel Kanyon Doe. He  
28 had a commander from Nimba called Biah, I don't know the first  
29 name - that's B-I-A-H - who was a special force. He had been

1 trained in the United States and other places. In order to  
2 weaken Thomas Quiwonkpa's own position upon arrival in Monrovia,  
3 it is believed that Joe Wally killed Biah on orders from God  
4 knows who in order that when they got to Monrovia, that he would  
10:47:19 5 finally command the unit and Quiwonkpa would be removed. So it  
6 was a plot in a plot, so --

7 Q. So did you have information that this Joe Wally had at this  
8 time joined forces with Roosevelt Johnson?

9 A. Yes, we did.

10:47:45 10 Q. And where did you get that information from?

11 A. From our security forces who were on the ground, and Joe  
12 was present. Joe was not hiding. Joe was at the house with  
13 Roosevelt. It was not just - he was not hiding. He was -  
14 publicly - he made public statement to the President and all.

10:48:05 15 Q. Is it true, as Abu Keita suggests, that an order was given  
16 for Joe Wally to be arrested?

17 A. Yes, an order was given --

18 Q. On what basis?

19 A. Well, along with Roosevelt Johnson - to cut it short, this  
10:48:19 20 whole arrest was for Roosevelt Johnson and those that were a part  
21 of the conspiracy. So it was not just picking out on Joe Wally.  
22 Roosevelt Johnson and those involved with Roosevelt.

23 Q. And the witness goes on:

24 "Q. In the fighting related to the return of  
10:48:39 25 Roosevelt Johnson, who was fighting on each side?

26 A. Well, it was the SSU and the SSS.

27 Q. Okay. We have to explain to everyone here what those  
28 are. When you say the SSU, what do you mean? What is the  
29 SSU?

1 A. The SSU was a special unit formed by Charles Taylor who  
2 were responsible at the mansion and Chucky was the  
3 commander, and we had Momoh Dgi ba also, and then Benjamin  
4 Yeaten was SSS director and they went on for the operations  
10:49:17 5 at Camp Johnson Road. And their mission was to arrest  
6 Roosevelt Johnson, and then Roosevelt Johnson escaped the  
7 arrest and went to the American embassy. That caused a lot  
8 of shoot-outs. Then from there I was also arrested by one  
9 bodyguard of the SSU who was called PYJ, and he took me to  
10:49:42 10 Saw Beach and I was in detention there."

11 Now, let's just deal with some of the details there,

12 Mr Taylor. First of all, did you form a unit called the SSU?

13 A. No. When he says Chucky, he is talking about the ATU. He  
14 has made a mistake, I'm sure. There is no SSU.

10:50:05 15 Q. There is no SSU?

16 A. No. He's talking about the ATU.

17 Q. And was the ATU in existence at the time of the Camp  
18 Johnson Road incident?

19 A. They had started a very small unit. They were less than  
10:50:18 20 thirty that had been specially trained, but they were called -  
21 still called the ATU.

22 Q. And was Chucky the commander?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And what was Momoh Dgi ba's role?

10:50:28 25 A. Momoh Dgi ba was aide-de-camp.

26 Q. Was he involved with either the so-called SSU, be it SSU,  
27 or ATU or the SSS?

28 A. No. Later on in years Momoh Dgi ba takes over the command  
29 of the ATU, but at this time he is just aide-de-camp.

1 Q. And Benjamin Yeaten, you accept, was SSS director?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Now, do you know of someone called PYJ?

4 A. Yes, I know - actually, that name, PY, the boy - this is  
10:51:07 5 one - I don't know his real name. I don't know this kid's real  
6 name, but he is - that PYJ is Prince Y Johnson. He calls himself  
7 Prince Johnson after the Independent National Patriotic Front,  
8 PYJ is Prince Y Johnson. I don't know his real name. Everybody  
9 just called him - he just calls himself Prince Johnson. I know  
10:51:30 10 him.

11 Q. And is he still around?

12 A. Boy, I want to believe PYJ is around. I want to believe  
13 so.

14 Q. And what about Saw Beach? "Took me to Saw Beach". What is  
10:51:44 15 Saw Beach?

16 A. It's actually - it should not be S-A-W. It's S-A-L-T, Salt  
17 Beach. The barracks in Monrovia, that's the Barclay Training  
18 Centre, is located right on the ocean and the stockade - the  
19 military stockade is called the Salt Beach Stockade. So it's not  
10:52:13 20 S-A-W; it's S-A-L-T, like salt from the sea. Salt Beach. That's  
21 the military stockade for the military at BTC. Because he was  
22 the military, he was taken to their stockade.

23 Q. "Q. Okay, Mr Witness, thank you. I want to take this a  
24 bit more slowly. First you mentioned Chucky. Is that  
10:52:34 25 Chucky Taylor, the son of President Taylor?

26 A. The son of President Taylor, sir."

27 And then he goes on to spell Momoh Dgiba.

28 "Q. Now, you mentioned, sir, a bodyguard who arrested you.  
29 Can you just repeat that name slowly, please?

1 A. He was called PYJ.

2 Q. Just the initials; is that right?

3 A. That was the only name I know for him.

10:53:06

4 Q. Who were the forces you mentioned, the SSU and the SSS  
5 who were part of Charles Taylor's forces? Who were they  
6 fight against in that battle in Monrovia?

7 A. They were fighting against Roosevelt Johnson to arrest  
8 him.

9 Q. Where were you when you were arrested?

10:53:19

10 A. They arrested me on the street around Looking Town  
11 Cinema.

12 Q. Had you been involved in the fighting?

13 A. I was not involved in any fighting, but they said I had  
14 a meeting with Roosevelt Johnson."

10:53:35

15 Is that true or false, Mr Taylor, that he was arrested for  
16 effectively nothing?

17 A. This boy was a part of the fighting force - let me just  
18 remind this Court. The ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K are what? One group  
19 K is Mandingo; J are the Krahn's. During the war in Liberia the  
20 group that supported Samuel Doe were the Mandingos and were part  
21 of ULIMO-K. That split up between J and K happened in terms of  
22 administration, but the boys still interacted. So what this man  
23 was actually doing, this Abu Keita, Mohamed Keita, was actually  
24 fighting along with the Roosevelt Johnson forces and he escaped  
25 from the same. But let me - in fact, to say that this boy is so  
26 terrible - you just stated in - he just stated in the testimony  
27 here that he was recalled to the AFL. He is an old soldier.

10:54:27

28 Your government that recalled you to the Army is at war, and you  
29 say you are in - actually, this place, he doesn't know how to

1 pronounce it. It's not Looking. The area in Monrovia is called  
2 Logan, L-O-G-A-N. It's Logan Town. It's not Looking Town. It's  
3 Logan Town, and there's a cinema there. I know this very well.

4 Now, your government is at war and you are assigned to the  
10:55:09 5 barracks in Monrovia; why are you not fighting on the side of the  
6 government? You are supposed to be - you are several miles. He  
7 escaped from the scene. After this group entered the embassy,  
8 people that had spotted him and knew him, they tracked him and  
9 chased him. Logan Town is on an island. From where this  
10:55:28 10 fighting occurred, that's about - I would say about two to three  
11 miles from the scene. He was seen, he participated, and he was  
12 tracked and arrested. Not because he went there to visit, but  
13 because he was a part of the fighting force.

14 Q. Well, he goes on to say this:

10:55:43 15 "A. I was not involved in any fighting, but they set out a  
16 meeting with Roosevelt Johnson?

17 Q. Now, at any time prior to your arrest or in the few  
18 weeks prior to your arrest, had you met with  
19 Roosevelt Johnson?

10:55:57 20 A. Yes, I met with Roosevelt Johnson.

21 Q. Can you explain what happened at that meeting?

22 A. Roosevelt Johnson called both parties, the former  
23 ULIMO-J and those of us who were members of the former  
24 ULIMO-K. He said we should have a ceremony together  
10:56:17 25 because we fought against each other, we killed each other,  
26 and he said the war was over, so he said we should be one.  
27 That was the meeting I had with him.

28 Q. Was this before the fighting or during the fighting?

29 A. It took place before the fighting. That was why I was



1 arrested, because they said they saw me there.

2 Q. You said you were taken to the Saw Beach Prison, "

3 ... Where is Saw Beach Prison?

4 A. Saw Beach Prison is at the back of BTC.

10:57:00 5 Q. At the back of the barracks in Monrovia?

6 A. Yes, by the side of the barracks.

7 Q. And how long were you kept in Saw Beach Prison?

8 A. I was in Saw Beach Prison for one week. I said I was  
9 taken to Saw Beach. I was there for one week.

10:57:20 10 Q. When?

11 A. And I was not charged to go to Court. I was just in  
12 detention there. And later I was freed by one SSS director  
13 for operations, who was Varmuyan Sherif. He took me to  
14 Musa Cisse's house in Congo Town. Then Musa Cisse spoke to

10:57:39 15 me and he said, 'Look, Abu, you are a Mandingo, I am a  
16 Mandingo.' He said, 'The war is over.' And he said, 'If  
17 you don't want to see Taylor's government, then you are  
18 doing - you are doing that to yourself.' He said, 'We have  
19 already won the elections.' He said it is better for me to  
10:57:58 20 cooperate with them.

21 Q. Okay, why don't you just finish what you said and then  
22 I will go back and ask you some more questions about this?"

23 And it continues. Now, first of all, Musa Cisse:

24 Mandingo?

10:58:22 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Role in your government?

27 A. Chief of protocol. One of the first people that saw me  
28 every morning and last to see me go to bed, my protocol officer.

29 Q. And help me, were you aware that Varmuyan Sherif was

1 involved in the freeing of Abu Keita from the Salt Beach Prison?

2 A. Yes. I was aware. What - there is no - it's being taken  
3 here in a vacuum, no. This fighting occurs. I have for  
4 reconciliation or reconciliatory purposes brought in senior  
10:59:07 5 ULIMO-K fighters. Here Varmuyan Sheriff a senior general is  
6 working as senior director for SSS for motorcade. Musa Cisse,  
7 another Mandingo, is my chief of protocol who sees me more than  
8 almost any other person in the world. They are all shocked that  
9 Mohamed joins Roosevelt Johnson to fight against me. They meet  
10:59:35 10 with me. Musa comes to me, Varmuyan and the other senior Muslims  
11 - I mean Mandingos from around and say, "Chief, look" - in fact  
12 this Mohamed is not the only one of them in prison. There are  
13 several of them. They say, "Well, chief, okay, listen, we want  
14 you to release - to order the Ministry of Defence to release  
10:59:54 15 these people. We will sit down and talk to them because this  
16 reconciliation that you started, we don't want it to stop by  
17 this."

18 I accept because I want reconciliation and he is talking  
19 about court, he is talking nonsense because I don't know the last  
11:00:09 20 time he saw a military man that is arrested and taken to a  
21 civilian court. This man, the best that would have happened to  
22 him he would have been court-martialed. So I don't know what  
23 he's talking about. He doesn't know what he's talking about. He  
24 was arrested. He stays in the place for a week. He is not  
11:00:26 25 beaten. Nothing happens to him.

26 But because I want the process of reconciliation to  
27 continue I agree and ask the Defence Minister to have all of them  
28 released and that they would have a meeting with the senior  
29 Mandingo commanders and other elders in the country to continue

1 the process of reconciliation. So this is nothing like a little  
2 sneaky thing going on. It is with my knowledge and with my  
3 consent to continue the process of reconciliation.

4 Q. Now, what about this meeting called by Roosevelt Johnson of  
11:01:00 5 former ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K combatants, did you know about that?

6 A. No, I didn't - well, we got some information. What he was  
7 trying to do, he was trying to recruit to solicit assistance to  
8 resist. And all he was trying to do here was to encourage them,  
9 "Well, you know, before we fought, but let's stop, let's come  
11:01:20 10 together." He was looking for means to resist to overthrow the  
11 government.

12 If you were a military person, you - in fact he should have  
13 been arrested from the first day he went there. You are a  
14 military person and this is not in isolation, there is tension in  
11:01:35 15 Monrovia for at least two weeks. You know the Roosevelt Johnson  
16 people are in that area. They are armed. ECOMOG was cordoned  
17 off the area. You are a military personnel, you are not a  
18 politician, what are you doing leaving your barracks and going  
19 into an enemy area to hold discussions? He should have been  
11:01:57 20 arrested from the first minute he even put his foot there. In  
21 fact the security delayed. He had no business being there as a  
22 soldier coming from the barracks to go in there except where he  
23 was a part of what they were trying to do and eventually some two  
24 weeks later there's an attack and he is involved in the attack.

11:02:15 25 Q. Now, thank you for those details, Mr Taylor, because it  
26 adds some flesh to what we know already about this Camp Johnson  
27 Road incident and it helps to position this witness Abu Keita.  
28 So let's continue with his testimony before this Court. Page  
29 1965, line 16:

1 "Q. When you got to Musa Cisse's house, who else was  
2 present there?

3 A. I left Musa Cisse's - I was there at Musa Cisse's house  
4 when Benjamin Yeaten, the SSS director, he was called by  
11:02:53 5 Musa Cisse and then he came and then he said, 'Keita, Pa  
6 Musa has already spoken about you. So that is it, you have  
7 to cooperate.' Then I said, 'Okay, chief. I have no  
8 problem with that, sir.' I said, 'I will cooperate.'

9 Q. Okay, I just want to make sure that I understand. Is  
11:03:15 10 this still the same day that you were taken out of prison  
11 by Varmuyan Sheriff?

12 A. Yes, sir. That same day.

13 Q. When you spoke to Musa Cisse that first time at his  
14 house, who else was present?

11:03:31 15 A. Musa Cisse, Varmuyan Sheriff, Benjamin Yeaten and one  
16 other police director who was called Papa Kouyate."  
17 Know the name, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Very well, yes.

19 Q. "And Musa Cisse's - one of his brothers who was called Pa  
11:03:52 20 Morrie." Know the name, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. "He was a police officer." Mr Koumjian then assists the  
23 Court by spelling those names:

24 "Q. What happened after you met Benjamin Yeaten at Musa  
11:04:04 25 Cisse's house?

26 A. They spoke to me and said I have now become a free man  
27 and then from there they left me and I was taken back to my  
28 house.

29 Q. Did you know at that time - can you tell us what

1 position Musa Cisse had at that time?

2 A. Musa Cisse was the protocol officer of Charles Taylor  
3 and then his operations name was Ghankay Charo."

4 Does that name mean anything to you, Mr Taylor?

11:04:35 5 A. No.

6 Q. Ghankay Charo?

7 A. No, it doesn't mean anything to me, no.

8 Q. I just want to pause there for a moment to ask you about  
9 this: You note he says that he meets Benjamin Yeaten, the SSS

11:04:51 10 director, at Musa Cisse's house who says to him, "Keita, Pa Musa  
11 has already spoken about you, so that is it, you have to  
12 cooperate." "Then I said, 'Okay, chief, I have no problem with  
13 that, sir. I will cooperate'."

14 Now, Mr Taylor, let us make sure we understand what is  
11:05:16 15 being suggested here. It is being suggested Abu Keita, former  
16 ULIMO-K, attends this meeting with Roosevelt Johnson, is  
17 implicated in a plot against your government. You, as you have  
18 explained, in a spirit of reconciliation, are persuaded by Musa  
19 Cisse and other senior members of the Mandingo community to  
11:05:46 20 release these people in the hope that peace may reign. Have I  
21 got it right so far?

22 A. You have got it right.

23 Q. Now in that context, this witness appears to be suggesting  
24 that effectively he is asked to cooperate by Benjamin Yeaten.

11:06:03 25 Yes?

26 A. Uh-huh.

27 Q. Cooperate, as his later testimony suggests, in supplying  
28 arms to the RUF. Do you get that?

29 A. Uh-huh.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you order Benjamin Yeaten, your SSS  
2 director, to recruit this former ULIMO-K fighter who has already  
3 demonstrated his disloyalty to your government by attending that  
4 meeting with Roosevelt Johnson - did you ask that he become  
11:06:36 5 effectively a runner taking arms for you to the RUF? Do you  
6 follow me?

7 A. No, never did that. It would have been stupid. I mean  
8 beyond silly to do that. But let's add some more perspective to  
9 this. Papa Kouyate, who is Papa Kouyate? Papa Kouyate is a  
11:06:59 10 former ULIMO general who served as senior aide-de-camp to Alhaji  
11 Kromah, who this process of reconciliation brings into the  
12 police. Papa Kouyate is assistant director of police as an act  
13 of reconciliation. Morris Cisse - it is actually Morris Cisse -  
14 is a brother of Musa Cisse who is an experienced police officer.

11:07:32 15 In fact, he is a Canadian citizen who has served in the Canadian  
16 police and had come home. He is also an assistant director of  
17 police. This meeting that we are talking about now is the same  
18 meeting of former ULIMO senior people that are brought into  
19 government as an act of reconciliation and other elders to really  
11:07:53 20 try to make sure that we keep peace and stability.

21 Now, I would be stupid, very stupid, to have this Mohamed  
22 Keita boy, who I know now has demonstrated his disloyalty, to use  
23 him with the thousands, thousands of former NPFL people and  
24 thousands of ULIMO - the very Varmuyan Sheriff here on that day  
11:08:30 25 fought against Roosevelt Johnson. Varmuyan Sheriff.

26 And when you hear them talk about Momoh Dgiba being  
27 involved, because during this time of crisis with the limited  
28 arms, all military people that had an idea of fighting moved out.  
29 When you have national crisis like this people don't sit down and

1 say, "Oh, I am in the SSS, I can't shoot." Everybody moves out  
2 to try to put this thing under control. Varmuyan fights against  
3 Roosevelt on that day. So this is why Varmuyan was shocked that  
4 he, Mohamed, was involved on the Roosevelt Johnson side. And  
11:09:08 5 that's how the reconciliation came. So nobody in his rightful  
6 mind would want to use this man, who actually is an enemy  
7 combatant at the time, to go on "a major mission". This is total  
8 foolishness. I, Charles Taylor, would never do that.

9 Q. But, Mr Taylor, is being recruited in the presence,  
11:09:28 10 according to him, of your police director, Papa Kouyate, and also  
11 Pa Morrie, a police officer. Did you - was this meeting  
12 organised as a recruitment drive for runners in the presence of  
13 those senior police officers?

14 A. I doubt it, no. That is - no. I doubt this meeting could  
11:09:53 15 have been and was about nothing about giving him what you call a  
16 very good chastise, because all of them, Papa is there, Varmuyan,  
17 it's just really - this meeting was more of chastising him for  
18 the nonsense that he had done than any type of recruitment. It  
19 could never have been about that, no.

11:10:16 20 Q. But, Mr Taylor, he makes it quite clear, in effect, he was  
21 asked to cooperate, that is, recruited for a particular mission.  
22 Let's go on with his testimony and we will see. Page 1966,  
23 line 17:

24 "Q. Do you know what ethnicity or tribe Musa Cisse belongs  
11:10:39 25 to?

26 A. He told me he was Mandingo.

27 Q. You also mentioned Benjamin Yeaten. Did you know what  
28 position he held at that time?

29 A. At that time Benjamin Yeaten was the SSS director.

1 Q. After they took you to your house what happened?

2 A. I was there and then a week later I saw Marzah, Sampson  
3 and Jungle and they said we should go to Musa Cisse's  
4 house. And then we drove to Musa Cisse's house. From  
11:11:18 5 there we were taken back to Benjamin Yeaten's residence, at  
6 the back of the President Taylor's house down the hole.

7 Q. Okay, you mentioned someone named Marzah. Do you know  
8 another name he was known by?

9 A. That's the only name I know him by. They called him  
11:11:42 10 Marzah.

11 Q. Okay, have you ever heard of Zigzag?

12 A. Yes, that was his nickname, sir.

13 Q. You also mentioned someone named Sampson and someone  
14 named Jungle, are these two different people?

11:11:58 15 A. These are two different persons, sir.

16 Q. Can you tell us what positions at that time Marzah,  
17 Sampson and Jungle held?

18 A. Marzah was SS, Sampson was SS, a bodyguard to Benjamin  
19 Yeaten. Jungle was a bodyguard to Benjamin Yeaten."

11:12:23 20 And then he goes to explain what SS stands for:

21 "A. It's the special unit at the VIP. They were close to  
22 the President of the State.

23 Q. When you say close to the President, in what way were  
24 they close to the President, what were they to do for him?

11:12:47 25 A. The director - before you see the President you have to  
26 go through his office. He would open the door for you to  
27 see the President."

28 Shaking your head doesn't mean a great deal on the  
29 transcript, Mr Taylor. "The SS director - before you see the



1 President, you have to go through his office." True or false?

2 A. False. Totally false.

3 Q. "He would open the door for you to see the President."

4 True or false?

11:13:21 5 A. False.

6 Q. "Q. Did they have any job to do besides opening doors?"

7 Can you explain what their purpose was?

8 A. They were the SS at the - that was the only job I knew

9 Benjamin Yeaten who was in charge of the man as close

11:13:42 10 protection."

11 True or false?

12 A. I don't know what he means by the words "in charge". I

13 really don't know what he means, "was in charge of the man as

14 close protection."

11:13:56 15 Q. Well, he goes on to say this and provide an explain.

16 "Q. Okay, thank you. When you say 'close protection', now

17 I think that helps us. Can you explain what you mean by

18 'close protection'?

19 A. They were security. They always moved up and down as

11:14:12 20 VIP. Wherever you saw the President, you will see them

21 around."

22 Now, pause there, Mr Taylor. You remember who the "them"

23 are? That's Marzah, Jungle and Sampson. Whenever you were

24 moving around, were they always there?

11:14:32 25 A. No, not at all. These people were - I am not sure if --

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just pause there, please, Mr Taylor.

27 Yes, Ms Hollis.

28 MS. HOLLIS: Mr President, he is misstating what the

29 witness is talking about. The witness is talking about the SS

1 and what the SS job is. He is not saying it is always these  
2 three individuals.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, let me go back and we'll see if I am  
4 wrong about that:

11:15:01 5 Q. Remember he is being asked about three individuals, Marzah,  
6 Sampson and Jungle. And in that context he is asked this  
7 question at the top of page 1968:

8 "Q. When you say close to the President, in what way were  
9 they close to the President?

11:15:26 10 A. They were close protection.

11 Q. Can you explain what you mean by 'close protection'?

12 A. They always moved up and down as VIP. Wherever you saw  
13 the President, you will see them around."

14 Now, were they always around you, Mr Taylor?

11:15:45 15 A. Never around me, those three. Never. These were personal  
16 bodyguards to the SSS director.

17 Q. And then let's look at the next question in terms of the  
18 objection:

19 "Q. So did Sampson, Jungle and Marzah," i.e. they, "report  
11:16:05 20 to the same person?

21 A. Yes, they were bodyguards to Benjamin Yeaten."

22 Now, I ask you again, Mr Taylor, were those three men  
23 always around you; i.e. were they so-called insiders? Do you  
24 follow me?

11:16:23 25 A. Yes. Never, never, never ever were those three men close  
26 to me. And of the three men, the only one that I know was  
27 Sampson, a cousin of Benjamin Yeaten. Never. And he did not  
28 even provide - or was never around me, no, never. None of the  
29 three.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

2 MS HOLLIS: We renew the objection and we will pursue it on  
3 cross-examination, because Defence counsel conveniently ignores  
4 the proceeding language on page 1967 that directs itself to the  
11:17:00 5 SS and the role of the SS. As I said, we will pursue it on  
6 cross-examination and our view is misstating, mischaracterising  
7 the evidence.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. For this stage, your  
9 objection is noted, Ms Hollis, and your interpretation of the  
11:17:16 10 evidence can be pursued on cross-examination.

11 Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

13 Q. "A. Yes, they were bodyguards to Benjamin Yeaten, sir.

14 Q. So you said about a week after the first meeting at  
11:17:37 15 Musa Cisse's house they came and picked you up, and tell us  
16 what happened then?

17 A. Yes. We went down to Benjamin Yeaten's house. Then  
18 there was a meeting there where I saw Sam Bockarie of the  
19 RUF. I saw Eddie Kanneh. Then I saw the war council  
11:18:00 20 leader of the RUF called SB Rogers, and the adjutant of  
21 the RUF who was Rashid and Benjamin Yeaten himself, and  
22 then he asked me to join the RUF in Sierra Leone. Then I  
23 said, 'No problem, sir.' I said as long as that was an  
24 instruction from you, I said I would implement it, sir. So  
11:18:24 25 I asked him to allow me to prepare myself, and then he  
26 accepted."

27 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Remember, let us remind ourselves,  
28 this happens a week after he is released from Salt Beach Prison.  
29 What he is saying is this man, who had demonstrated disloyalty,

1 was being ordered - well, first of all, was present at a meeting  
2 with senior RUF individuals and is there told that he should join  
3 the RUF. Now, help us, Mr Taylor, at this point in time - and  
4 remind us, when was the Camp Johnson Road incident?

11:19:13 5 A. I think September, if I am not mistaken of 19 --

6 Q. Of which year?

7 A. Of 1998.

8 Q. So understand what you are saying; September 1998. Now  
9 remember, you've given evidence to this Court that's the first

11:19:30 10 time you meet with Sam Bockarie.

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. Now, help us with this. When Sam Bockarie came to Liberia  
13 on that occasion, did he come alone?

14 A. No, Sam Bockarie came with several other people. I don't  
11:19:43 15 remember all.

16 Q. Did that include Eddie Kanneh?

17 A. Yes, he came with Eddie Kanneh.

18 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that there was an elderly  
19 gentleman that accompanied him. Does the name SYB Rogers mean  
11:19:58 20 anything to you?

21 A. That can be associated with him, but I don't remember. But  
22 there was a shortish grey haired man. That's probably SB Rogers.

23 Q. So let's tie the very loose ends together, shall we. You  
24 understand what this witness Abu Keita is saying here now?

11:20:14 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. On your account, this is Bockarie's first visit to  
27 Monrovia?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. This is a week after the Camp Johnson Road incident. And

1 he's saying that, in effect, you were asking him to become a  
2 member of the RUF. Mr Taylor, is that true?

3 A. That is totally, totally, totally false.

4 Q. Well --

11:20:42 5 A. Totally false.

6 Q. Can you think of any reason why you would want to do that?

7 A. Except somebody is stupid. I mean, there is no way. And  
8 in fact, it's just that I can't remember the - I will have to  
9 recall the exact date - the exact date of the situation in

11:21:09 10 Monrovia. I know it's in September. I don't recall the date of  
11 the attack in Monrovia. Then if we look at that, then - and I  
12 will have to reflect on that - and we add two weeks, we will  
13 know - we will be able to catch this lie up tight; that is,  
14 because remember he says he stays in Salt Beach Prison for a

11:21:36 15 week, and then a week later he is called to this meeting. So he  
16 is talking precisely about two weeks after the Camp Johnson Road  
17 situation. Now, I don't recall the exact date, but if we could  
18 get that exact date and add 14 days to it, we are going to see  
19 where this puts us, and we will know as to whether this boy is  
11:22:03 20 lying about this thing. And then we can backtrack and see when  
21 Sam Bockarie came in September. So I don't know the exact date.

22 I will have to research it. But to answer your question  
23 directly, there is no way. The meeting with Sam Bockarie in  
24 September of 1998 is a very short and preliminary meeting. Sam  
11:22:29 25 Bockarie returns to Sierra Leone and in fact, when he returns in  
26 October, that's when the guesthouse is arranged. So for this man  
27 to be meeting Sam Bockarie when I am just meeting him for the  
28 first time in September 1998, I had never, ever in my life met  
29 Sam Bockarie. Because even at the time that Foday Sankoh came to

1 Gbarnga to visit, '91 August to '92 May, he never brought Sam  
2 Bockarie with him. I didn't know the young man. And in fact, I  
3 didn't even know who were the important people. Sam Bockarie did  
4 not - I mean, Foday Sankoh did not bring anyone with him. So for  
11:23:11 5 me just meeting Sam Bockarie in 1998 - I mean September, and then  
6 introducing him to an Abu Keita, Mohamed, to go and join them, is  
7 nonsensical. It's total, total nonsense. I mean, maybe he is  
8 talking about a different time, but it sure didn't happen --

9 Q. No, we are talking about a week after his arrest.

11:23:39 10 A. Oh, but according to - I may be wrong. I stand corrected  
11 on this. I think he was talking about - he was in prison for --

12 Q. A week.

13 A. Yeah. A week after his arrest would make that two weeks  
14 following the incident on Camp Johnson Road.

11:23:54 15 Q. Exactly.

16 A. Okay. So now maybe if that incident occurs - if that  
17 incident occurs any time after 15th September 1998, that would  
18 put this meeting in October. That's the point I am trying to  
19 make. So I will have to get the exact Camp Johnson Road date of  
11:24:13 20 the incident to - but I am sure in your research we will find out  
21 as to whether he is telling the truth about this being in  
22 September or whether it is in October, some two weeks later.  
23 That's the point I am trying to make.

24 Q. Yes. Page 1968:

11:24:50 25 "A. Yes, we went down to Benjamin Yeaten's house. Then  
26 there was a meeting there where I saw Sam Bockarie of the  
27 RUF, I saw Eddie Kanneh, then I saw the war council leader  
28 of the RUF called SB Rogers, and the adjutant of the RUF,  
29 who was Rashid, and Benjamin Yeaten himself, and then he

1 asked me to join the RUF in Sierra Leone. Then I said, 'No  
2 problem, sir.' I said as long as that was an instruction  
3 from you, I said I would implement it, sir. So I asked him  
4 to allow me to prepare myself, and then he accepted.

11:25:33 5 Q. Was there anyone else present at that meeting that you  
6 can recall? You mentioned Eddie Kanneh, you mentioned SB  
7 Rogers, you mentioned Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten and  
8 Mr Rashid?

9 A. Yes, there was Montgomery and Varmuyan Sherif himself  
11:25:55 10 came and met us at the meeting."

11 Mr Taylor, Montgomery is who?

12 A. Well, there is a Joseph Montgomery that I know that was  
13 Deputy Director of the Special Security Service.

14 Q. And then he goes on:

11:26:25 15 "Q. After you agreed to join the RUF, what happened then?

16 A. Then I said I should prepare myself and then we were  
17 driven from Benjamin Yeaten's house. That was the time I  
18 saw a satellite phone with Sam Bockarie, and he said it was  
19 given to him by Benjamin Yeaten."

11:26:50 20 Pause there. Are you aware of Benjamin Yeaten giving Sam  
21 Bockarie a satellite phone, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Never. No, he didn't.

23 Q. Then he is asked this question:

24 "Q. Was one person in charge of that meeting? Did one  
11:27:14 25 person seem to be the chair, the person in charge of the  
26 meeting?

27 A. It was Benjamin Yeaten who was the chair of that  
28 meeting. He was the commander of that meeting.

29 Q. Now, you said that he said you should go fight with the

1 RUF. Did he explain why he was asking you to do that or  
2 where he got that idea?

3 A. I don't have any idea other than the one he told me,  
4 that I should join the brothers.

11:27:45 5 Q. Did Benjamin Yeaten explain anything else to you when  
6 he said you should go join the RUF?

7 A. He said he wants a standby force to be in Sierra Leone,  
8 that I would be the commander of that troop to be based in  
9 Sierra Leone.

11:28:02 10 Q. Did he indicate whether you would be in command? You  
11 said the commander of that troop. What did he say about  
12 the troop that you're talking about?

13 A. He said I was going to be the commander of a troop that  
14 was going to Sierra Leone with Sam Bockarie.

11:28:23 15 Q. Do you recall if he gave a name for that unit, the  
16 troops?

17 A. He said the troop would be called the Scorpion Unit and  
18 that I would be the commander to be based with Sam Bockarie  
19 in Sierra Leone."

11:28:44 20 Scorpion Unit, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Know nothing about it, no.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be convenient point,

23 Mr President?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's a convenient time. We will

11:28:56 25 take the morning break and resume at 12 o'clock.

26 [Break taken at 11.29 a.m.]

27 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

28 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

29 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment we were looking at



1 this meeting described by the witness Abu Keita and seeking to  
2 locate it within other events which we've established were  
3 occurring at the time. Do you recall that?

4 A. Yes, I do.

12:02:06 5 Q. Now, in light of that could I please ask that part of  
6 MFI-50 be put on the overhead, please. Now, Mr Taylor, in terms  
7 of the date of the Camp Johnson Road incident, does that document  
8 assist you?

9 A. Yes.

12:02:40 10 Q. What was the date?

11 A. I see this is 19 September 1998.

12 Q. Now, that's the time of the shooting incident at the US  
13 embassy, 19 September?

14 A. Yes.

12:02:54 15 Q. On which day did the incident itself begin?

16 A. It commenced on the 18th.

17 Q. On the 18th. Right, thank you. We can put that away now,  
18 please. Now, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind that date, now help us.  
19 Keita is arrested a week afterwards, yes?

12:03:19 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. He is kept in custody for a week?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Yes? Thereafter he says he's summoned to Benjamin Yeaten's  
24 - to an address, yes?

12:03:34 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Where he's seen by Benjamin Yeaten, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And where - also present are Eddie Kanneh, SYB Rogers and  
29 others, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now you're the former maths teacher, Mr Taylor, help me.

3 Add 14 to 18, what do we get?

4 A. Add what again, 14 to 18?

12:04:03 5 Q. Yes, what do we get?

6 A. I'm afraid I --

7 Q. Add 14 days, two weeks, to 18 September?

8 A. All right. Now I see. We're talking about - we're pushing

9 into October.

12:04:18 10 Q. There's only 30 days in September, so that's 2 October,

11 isn't it?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Was Sam Bockarie in Liberia in early October 1998?

14 A. Never, no. Never, no.

12:04:39 15 Q. So this meeting that this man is allegedly talking about,

16 Mr Taylor, what do you say about it?

17 A. I say it's a lie as plainly as possible. But you know,

18 counsel, the way that these stories are put together, it's just

19 so strange. Abu Keita, Mohamed - I don't dispute that his name

12:05:08 20 is Abu, because it can be three names. But I know what we have

21 confirmed - I have confirmed it's Mohamed Keita - fights against

22 me from ULIMO, he is brought in for reconciliation. He fights

23 against me again in September of 1998. He is seen, he is

24 arrested in the act. He is released.

12:05:35 25 Here is a man and all these introductions, these names that

26 these people are calling together, Keita must know - Keita must

27 know Sam Bockarie. Keita must know the description he's given of

28 SYB Rogers as War Council chairman. He must know them. And why

29 must he know them? These are the same - these are the senior

1 ULIMO generals that are dealing with the RUF at the time of the  
2 closure of the border from Sam Bockarie under. These people are  
3 not strangers to each other. We know here that when that border  
4 was closed way back in 1992 after the RUF was cut off - and we  
12:06:30 5 cut off our relationship in May of 1992 with the RUF - we know  
6 from evidence before this Court that Sam Bockarie met with the  
7 ULIMO people and they were trading. They knew each other. And I  
8 cannot be - because I'm just seeing all of these transcripts  
9 coming in my mind, but I'm sure the team can reflect it. In 1996  
12:07:01 10 when the RUF was attacked and they came out of Zogoda in Liberia,  
11 if I am not mistaken, if it's not this Mohamed Keita was one of  
12 the generals that said that he was sent to go and help to disarm  
13 - and to disarm them in 1996 when they crossed from the Zogoda  
14 attack. These people knew each other. Here is a situation where  
12:07:30 15 this man can define titles. This is an enemy to the revolution  
16 I'm trying to bring in. He's known these people. So who had to  
17 make an introduction about Mohamed Keita and these people to Sam  
18 Bockarie?

19 And in fact, let me be very clear - I have said it - I  
12:07:51 20 invited, with the acquiescence of my colleagues from ECOWAS, Sam  
21 Bockarie to Liberia in September of 1998. That meeting that Sam  
22 Bockarie came to Liberia, the first meeting he lived at the  
23 hotel. And that was a very, very secret meeting where there was  
24 no way that an Abu Keita and even I do not even believe - except  
12:08:17 25 for their old friends Varmuyan Konneh - Sherif, excuse me. Don't  
26 let's forget again in this Court my ambassador in 1998 writes a  
27 letter and he identifies - he identifies Varmuyan Sherif as an  
28 old contact of the RUF that is stationed in Monrovia. So these  
29 people are not strangers to each other. So how come now there's

1 all this introduction? These people are old - in fact if you  
2 look at it, the ULIMO dealt with the RUF longer than we did. We  
3 had what? Seven, eight months of dealing with the RUF. They had  
4 from 1992 all the way until elections in 1997 they were dealing  
12:09:04 5 with these people. So they were closer. By far they knew them  
6 better. Then I would take Abu Keita - Abu Mohamed Keita, or  
7 Mohamed Abu Keita, whatever he calls himself, and send him on a  
8 mission to Sierra Leone when: One, these people that attacked me  
9 in Monrovia on the 18th, that it continues on the 19th, remember  
12:09:27 10 they are held up at the US embassy. They subsequently are flown  
11 out to Sierra Leone. His boss that he fought for is now flown to  
12 Freetown. And I'm supposed to be recruiting him at this  
13 particular time to go now what? To fight against his boss? So  
14 how does it work? They put their story together in such ways  
12:09:51 15 that are so deceptive until they miss the points.

16 Q. So, Mr Taylor, remind us: Who was flown to Freetown after  
17 the Camp Johnson Road incident?

18 A. Roosevelt Johnson.

19 Q. And who?

12:10:04 20 A. General Lincoln that was mentioned, his whole entourage.

21 Q. So we have a group who had been fighting against your  
22 government at Camp Johnson Road?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Of former ULIMO fighters?

12:10:19 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Who are sent to Freetown?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. So we have a situation where with American assistance we  
2 have a group of former ULIMO fighters in Sierra Leone?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. And you then send a former ULIMO general to become head of  
12:10:39 5 the Scorpion Unit in the same Sierra Leone?

6 A. Impossible. Impossible. If there is a Scorpion Unit, then  
7 it's got to be their own unit they're trying to put together,  
8 maybe to come back in --

9 Q. Who is trying to put together?

12:10:55 10 A. That the Johnson and Mohamed Keita and whole LURD. This  
11 could be that whole LURD thing coming up. Because the Scorpion  
12 that I'm hearing now, okay, is a name that is used by LURD. LURD  
13 - remember the commander, okay? There is a Scorpion Unit that  
14 comes, that fights me from LURD. So if I'm hearing Scorpion now,  
12:11:17 15 it's got to be what Mohamed Keita and them went to start putting  
16 together, because we never saw Keita after that. Never. Since  
17 he was released and left Liberia, we never saw him.

18 Q. So this Scorpion Unit then, Mr Taylor, as far as you're  
19 aware, who are they?

12:11:40 20 A. The only time I heard a Scorpion Unit that was a unit that  
21 was a part of LURD that attacked us and fought us until I left  
22 Liberia. There was a Scorpion Unit that I knew of in LURD.  
23 There was never a unit in Liberia called Scorpion. Never.

24 Q. Now let's go back, shall we, to page 1970 of the transcript  
12:12:07 25 of 23 January 2008, line 27. Having told the Court that he was  
26 sent to be commander of this Scorpion Unit which was to act as  
27 some stand-by force in Sierra Leone - now bearing that in mind,  
28 what do you understand by the term 'stand-by force', Mr Taylor?

29 A. A stand-by force as we used it in the NPFL at that time and

1 then when I became President, when I heard stand-by force, it  
2 referred to a unit that was made ready that would assist in terms  
3 of combat situations whenever they were needed. They were just  
4 ready, equipped to fight.

12:13:03 5 Q. Now, help me, Mr Taylor, because you're the one who is  
6 supposed to be running this show, why did you feel a need for a  
7 stand-by force in Sierra Leone in the autumn of 1998?

8 A. There's no reason. And to fight who, inside Sierra Leone?  
9 No, no, I didn't need one.

12:13:27 10 Q. Question, line 27:

11 "Q. Did he" - that being Benjamin Yeaten - "indicate to  
12 you what plan he had for those troops, whether there were  
13 any operations planned?"

14 A. He did not give me any details of the operations plan,  
15 sir.

16 Q. Was there any mention of any areas in Sierra Leone?

17 A. Areas, I said Sierra Leone.

18 Q. Did he indicate any particular areas of Sierra Leone  
19 such as - well, Port Loko. I'm just making up a name,  
12:14:11 20 witness.

21 A. He said we should be based in Buedu. Buedu in Kailahun  
22 District.

23 Q. And did he indicate whether they were planning any  
24 operations in any other areas?"

12:14:32 25 There was then an objection and the question was asked  
26 again:

27 "Q. Did he indicate any attacks were planned?"

28 A. No, he said I should be based in Sierra Leone with Sam  
29 Bockarie.

1 Q. Did Benjamin Yeaten tell you if he had come up with  
2 this idea or if someone else had told him to send you to  
3 Sierra Leone?

4 A. He said he had planned with the boss who is  
12:14:59 5 Charles Taylor who had given him the instruction to send me  
6 to Sierra Leone.

7 Q. Now you mentioned the RUF and you also mentioned a  
8 person who was presented named Eddie Kanneh. Who was Eddie  
9 Kanneh?

12:15:16 10 A. Eddie Kanneh is a Sierra Leonean and he was with the  
11 SLA, the Sierra Leone Army.

12 Q. The Sierra Leone Army?

13 A. Yes, the Sierra Leone Army.

14 Q. Now was he with the Sierra Leone Army with the  
12:15:33 15 Government of Sierra Leone at the time?

16 A. No."

17 So, Mr Taylor, the position is crystal clear. According to  
18 this witness, you gave an instruction to Benjamin Yeaten to send  
19 Abu Keita to Sierra Leone to command this stand-by unit called  
12:15:53 20 the Scorpion Unit. Did you?

21 A. Never did. Never. Never did.

22 Q. Now, let's move on. The witness goes on to say this -

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment please, sir? Can I  
24 just have a minute, please, Mr President? We're just trying to  
12:16:47 25 locate something:

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, remember the witness said how he saw Sam  
27 Bockarie with a satellite phone earlier, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. The witness goes on to say this, this is page 1974, line 4:

1 "Q. Did you see how Sam Bockarie got the phone?

2 A. He told me it had been given to him by the chief,  
3 Benjamin Yeaten.

12:17:55

4 Q. After this meeting at Musa Cisse's house where did you  
5 go next?

6 A. We moved - it was Benjamin Yeaten's house.

7 Q. After the meeting at Benjamin Yeaten's house where did  
8 you go next?

12:18:12

9 A. We drove to the Boulevard Hotel in Monrovia by Sinkor  
10 and then General Adam who was there --

11 First of all, Hotel Boulevard, Mr Taylor, know of it?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Sinkor, where is that?

14 A. That is correct.

12:18:27

15 Q. "Q. When you got to the hotel where did you go?

16 A. We went upstairs on the third floor where we met

17 General Ibrahim Bah at the hotel."

18 Now, bear in mind when this is happening. This is two

19 weeks after the Camp Johnson Road incident, so we're talking

12:18:45

20 about early October. Were you aware of General Ibrahim Bah's  
21 presence in Monrovia at that time?

22 A. No, not at all.

23 Q. In any event, he describes Bah being at the Hotel

24 Boulevard:

12:19:03

25 "A. We went upstairs on the third floor where we met

26 General Ibrahim Bah in the hotel.

27 Q. Was this the first time you met Ibrahim Bah?

28 A. Yes, that was the first time. I only heard the name,

29 but that was the first time to meet him in person.



1 Q. Can you describe him a bit?

2 A. He was a short, fat man. He is not tall.

3 Q. Did he have any accent?

4 A. He had the Gambian accent.

12:19:35 5 Q. Did he have any rank, did you ever learn whether he had  
6 any rank.

7 A. They called him General Ibrahim Bah. They said he was  
8 a former fighter of the NPFL.

9 Q. What was discussed in the hotel room of General Bah?

12:19:49 10 A. The discussion was how best General Bah should ensure  
11 to find a buyer for the RUF diamonds and that also General  
12 Bah should help them to get a radio communication for the  
13 RUF, something they would use for propaganda, an FM  
14 station.

12:20:07 15 Q. Okay. Can you remember who else was in the room? What  
16 do you remember now about who else was present?

17 A. It was Ibrahim Bah, Eddie Kanneh, Sam Bockarie,  
18 Benjamin Yeaten and SB Rogers and Rashid and General  
19 Ibrahim's bodyguard they called General CR and myself.

12:20:32 20 That was where I saw the first diamond with Sam Bockarie."  
21 Pause. Do you know of such a meeting, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Not at all. Not at all. I don't.

23 Q. Who is General CR?

24 A. I don't know anyone called General CR, but the name CR  
12:20:54 25 rings a bell.

26 Q. From where?

27 A. Well, this boy - I know a fellow called CR that I have not  
28 heard of for years now, but I'm not sure if this is the same  
29 person though, so I don't want to jump the gun here. I'm not

1 sure if it's the same person.

2 Q. Now, what about the suggestion that Bah was assisting the  
3 RUF with obtaining radio communication, an FM station, for  
4 propaganda purposes? Know anything about that?

12:21:47 5 A. No, I don't know, but it - don't let's forget, it's  
6 possible because, don't let's forget now, Bah knows the RUF when  
7 we go all the way back to the Ivory Coast agreement from '96.  
8 There's evidence led in this Court that Bah is with Sankoh at  
9 that particular time. But this would be interesting to watch  
12:22:13 10 because there's another witness that claims that I gave an FM  
11 station to the RUF and I had mentioned in this Court that - and  
12 that it was being helped - they were being helped by - they  
13 mentioned Hilton Fyle, a witness went through that in this Court.  
14 So it might be interesting to see the correlation here because  
12:22:38 15 now here is another witness here saying that plans are being made  
16 for an FM station. I mentioned that this FM was something like a  
17 broadcast station.

18 So - but I was not aware of this meeting. But I would  
19 mention that it would not be - in 1998, at this time, it would  
12:23:00 20 not be unusual for maybe an Ibrahim Bah to be in Liberia. He was  
21 a businessman doing business, from what I understand. But I'm  
22 not aware of him meeting Sam Bockarie at this trip because this  
23 trip that Sam Bockarie makes to Liberia in - first in September,  
24 he is not there at this time. I'm not sure if Bockarie informs  
12:23:25 25 Ibrahim or what. I have know idea of this meeting.

26 Q. But, in any event, let's continue with the account,  
27 reminding ourselves of this: "That's where I saw the first  
28 diamond with Sam Bockarie." And it continues:

29 "Q. Can you explain where you saw these diamonds?"

1 A. The diamonds were in that Boulevard Hotel in General  
2 Ibrahim Bah's room.

3 Q. You said you saw Sam Bockarie with it. Can you explain  
4 that?

12:23:57 5 A. I saw him with diamonds. He was showing the diamond to  
6 Ibrahim Bah. That was the only one - that was the only  
7 thing I saw him do with the diamond.

8 Q. Okay, to be clear then you did not see him hand the  
9 diamonds over. Is that correct?

12:24:16 10 A. Yes, I did not see him give the diamond, but I saw him  
11 show the diamond.

12 Q. Sir, are you saying one diamond or are you saying more  
13 than one?

14 A. More than one. More than one. More than ten even.

12:24:36 15 Q. After the meeting with General Bah in the Boulevard  
16 Hotel where did you go?

17 A. We were around. We went back to another hotel where  
18 Sam Bockarie was staying which they called Kadija Hotel."  
19 Do you know of that hotel, Mr Taylor?

12:24:58 20 A. No, I do not. I do not know of this hotel. As we go  
21 along, I do know of a Kadija. I see what - okay. Okay. No, I  
22 don't know of a hotel called Kadija. But as we go along, I guess  
23 this will unfold.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let us be clear about this. According to  
12:25:23 25 this witness, there's this meeting going on in this hotel, the  
26 Hotel Boulevard, where Sam Bockarie is showing diamonds to  
27 Ibrahim Bah. But hold on a second, I thought those diamonds  
28 should be coming to you, you were Sam Bockarie's boss. So what's  
29 going on, Mr Taylor?

1 A. I would have some, what I would call very - if the story is  
2 true that I'm supposed to be the boss, then I have some very  
3 disrespectful people that he will come and show diamonds to  
4 somebody without getting them to me. It's just that I'm not his  
12:26:13 5 boss, have never been. And it would not be unusual, I would say  
6 here, if Sam Bockarie is in Monrovia and, quite frankly, I would  
7 have to almost - and let me move almost. I would have to say  
8 categorically that in 1998, between September to December, I  
9 cannot see this kind of situation going on.

12:26:46 10 Now, if this witness is talking about subsequent trips that  
11 Sam Bockarie made in 1999, I have no way of verifying the  
12 authenticity, but I can say, there were only three trips that Sam  
13 Bockarie made in 1998. The first trip was of the utmost secrecy  
14 and there was no way he went anywhere to deal with anybody. So  
12:27:14 15 that's out of the question. The second trip that Sam Bockarie  
16 made, because of security concerns in October of 1998, the second  
17 trip, a guesthouse is provided. The third trip, which is  
18 November going to December, he comes through briefly and he  
19 passes on to go to meet the chairman of the OAU.

12:27:35 20 So if there's anything closely related to Sam Bockarie  
21 meeting up with Ibrahim Bah and doing their deals or different  
22 things, if there is a possibility - not even the probable - if  
23 there's a possibility, then this must be in 1999. So I would say  
24 almost categorically that this could not have happened in 1998.

12:27:58 25 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, why do you say the first trip was in the  
26 utmost secrecy?

27 A. Because that was the first - in September when Sam Bockarie  
28 comes to Liberia, I have contacted my colleagues. We all agree,  
29 okay, this is an opportunity to speak to this man for the first

1 time to see what is going on. So when he comes to Liberia he's  
2 not running all over the place meeting. It is very strict. He  
3 comes in - in fact, I sent General Menkarzon to the border. He  
4 is brought in, he's taken to the hotel, they are there with him,  
12:28:39 5 we meet, we discuss, he leaves the next day. So by "secrecy" I  
6 mean it is not announced on radio that General Bockarie came to  
7 town. This is what you call a - this is a getting - you know, a  
8 real evaluation meeting for me to be able to get back to my  
9 colleagues and say well, I met him and he looks like somebody  
12:29:04 10 that we can talk to. So by this time it is not all over the  
11 place. It is only, after I speak to them and we agree that,  
12 okay, let's follow up that he comes back. But this first  
13 meeting, it did not happen.

14 On the second meeting we are more formal. This is when  
12:29:23 15 even an official is following up on the - Tambakai Jangaba, who  
16 is the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, is following up on  
17 this meeting, but he is not meeting people and talking business.  
18 There is no way. Now I do not dispute that he knows Ibrahim Bah.  
19 He must know Bah, because if we go back to '96 we see - and don't  
12:29:47 20 let's forget there's testimony before this Court that even when  
21 the junta comes into place in - while they are in Freetown  
22 there's evidence led here that Bah visits Johnny Paul Koroma and  
23 the junta in Freetown. So there is no question about them  
24 knowing each other. But in 1998, not possible. Probably 1999.

12:30:14 25 So in answer to your question why do I say it was secret,  
26 not secret like in nobody knowing, but it was held in certain  
27 quarters in government. It did not go to the press. It did not  
28 go out - it was held at close quarters in top government circles,  
29 because this was just a get acquainted and a testing out meeting.

1 That's what I mean by secret.

2 Q. Okay. However, you see, Mr Taylor, the witness continued  
3 in this vein regarding that day when he went to the Boulevard  
4 Hotel. Remember he said he goes to the Boulevard Hotel, then he  
12:30:56 5 goes to the Kadija Hotel. Page 1976, 23 January 2008, line 10:

6 "Q. After going to the Kadija Hotel, where did you go?

7 A. I was there with them all through the day and then  
8 later I left them in the afternoon. I went to my house to  
9 return.

12:31:21 10 Q. Did you go anywhere with Sam Bockarie that day?"

11 Note: "With Sam Bockarie that day?" Early October now.

12 "A. Yes, that happened in the night when Sam Bockarie was  
13 leaving to come back to Sierra Leone, sir."

14 Bear in mind those facts. Bockarie is leaving in the night  
12:31:46 15 to return to Sierra Leone, yes?

16 "Q. Please explain what happened?

17 A. Benjamin Yeaten came, Sam Bockarie, Musa Cisse, SB  
18 Rogers, Eddie Kanneh and myself, and then we drove from the  
19 hotel to" - guess where - "White Flower, where  
12:32:12 20 Charles Taylor was at his house. Then they opened the gate  
21 for us and then we went down the left-hand side. Then they  
22 opened the door on the left-hand side. Then in the hallway  
23 of Charles Taylor's house there was a red carpet and there  
24 were large cushioned chairs there. And then Benjamin  
12:32:33 25 Yeaten asked us to wait there and then we were waiting  
26 there. And then Charles Taylor appeared. Then we all  
27 rose. Then he told us to sit down. Then Sam Bockarie  
28 said, 'I am on my way going, sir. I have come to pay my  
29 respects, sir.' Then he asked Sam Bockarie to maintain the

1 RUF, to take care of the RUF, and then Sam Bockarie said he  
2 will do everything possible. And then he said if there was  
3 any problems, Benjamin Yeaten and Musa Cisse should be  
4 immediately contacted. So from there we walked out of the  
12:33:20 5 building, sir, and Sam Bockarie left, sir.

6 Q. You said when you first got to White Flower they opened  
7 a gate. What kind of gate do you mean?

8 A. The house is on a big fence. Then there is a security  
9 gate there. They opened the security gate first for us, we  
12:33:43 10 entered the house - we entered the house, the compound, and  
11 on the left-hand side there is a step to go down. There is  
12 a hallway there and they opened the door for us. We used  
13 the parlour of Charles Taylor into the house.

14 Q. When Charles Taylor came in, how was he dressed?

12:34:05 15 A. He was in a brown suit and we all rose and stood and he  
16 said we should have seat - he said 'Sit down'.

17 Q. Did you recognise him?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Had you seen him before?

12:34:19 20 A. No.

21 Q. How did you recognise him?

22 A. Because I knew that we were taken to the President's  
23 residence and then he appeared. Then we all rose with Musa  
24 Cisse, Benjamin Yeaten.

12:34:34 25 Q. Had you seen any pictures of Charles Taylor before  
26 then?

27 A. Yes, but for me to meet him in person, that was the  
28 first time."

29 Now let's pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, you understand

1 what's being said, don't you? Now let's deal with one or two  
2 details. First of all, that happened in the night, yes?

3 A. Uh-huh.

12:35:18

4 Q. When they were leaving to come back to Sierra Leone. Now,  
5 this is Monrovia, and what do you say about leaving from Monrovia  
6 at night to drive to Sierra Leone?

7 A. Well, to leave Monrovia in the night to go to Sierra Leone,  
8 I don't see how anybody would want to do that.

9 Q. Why not?

12:35:39

10 A. Just driving through Monrovia to Gbarnga - from Monrovia to  
11 Gbarnga is four hours. From Gbarnga to Voinjama is another maybe  
12 five hours. That is nine hours. It's just too dangerous. The  
13 road is just too - I don't see why anybody would want to leave  
14 out of Liberia at night. You want to make sure that you leave so  
15 you can get through the bad road areas to get to Sierra Leone.

12:36:13

16 All the times that Sam Bockarie came to me that I know, he left  
17 in the day to go back. So I can't understand anybody leaving at  
18 night like somebody sneaking out of town. I don't understand why  
19 he would leave at night. That would not be proper, at least I  
20 can say.

12:36:38

21 Q. Then let me ask you about details. Red carpet in the  
22 hallway of White Flower?

23 A. No, there is no red carpet, and the way how he described it  
24 on the side, my house - if you meet in the parlours of my house -  
25 I just wish we had time to ask this man, because we have pictures  
26 of the parlours of my house, the parlour when I met President  
27 Carter and other people, and that's not on the side of the house.  
28 That goes through my front door and you enter into my parlour.  
29 So I don't know what he's talking about here, going on the side



1 of my house. But he sure enough didn't enter the parlour if he  
2 were even at my house.

3 But even more important - even more important than all  
4 these things, we are talking about October 1998. I am not in  
12:37:54 5 White Flower. I have not moved to my house at White Flower. I  
6 moved to White Flower on my birthday, 28 January 1999. I had not  
7 moved to White Flower. So I don't know how he could have gotten  
8 there in October of 1998 when I was not there. I was not living  
9 there. So I don't know how he got there.

12:38:17 10 Q. Now, we have some photographs of White Flower which we will  
11 look at at a later stage, Mr Taylor.

12 A. Okay.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I just make an inquiry through you,  
14 Mr President, whether the Court has received a bundle of  
12:38:36 15 photographs of White Flower?

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we have them, Mr Griffiths.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

18 Q. We'll come back to that. But in anticipation of looking at  
19 those photographs, Mr Taylor, let us look at some of the other  
12:38:55 20 details that this witness claims about White Flower beginning of  
21 October 1998, okay? So he says red carpet in the hallway. Large  
22 cushioned chairs there, yes?

23 A. There are no - you have seen pictures of my - at least  
24 inside my house. All of the things in that living room, my  
12:39:21 25 parlour, they are Louis XVI and XV and no large cushion. We have  
26 pictures inside my house. Nothing of large cushion in my  
27 parlour. None.

28 Q. According to the witness, Mr Taylor, it would appear that  
29 the sole purpose of the visit was so that Sam Bockarie could say

1 "I'm going".

2 A. That's what he's saying there. Nonsense.

3 Q. Why do you say that's nonsense?

12:40:05

4 A. Why would Sam Bockarie come to me at night to say he's  
5 going? Going where? I saw Sam Bockarie --

6 Q. Well, you were his boss, Mr Taylor, so let's alleged?

12:40:25

7 A. No, but I'm not his boss. After I have had had - and in  
8 fact, we are not talking about the same time. But those meetings  
9 with Sam Bockarie that I met him were official meetings, and  
10 after he left my presence he didn't have to come back to say "I'm  
11 going". No.

12 Q. And you said if there was any problem, Bockarie should  
13 contact Benjamin Yeaten and Musa Cisse immediately. What do you  
14 say about that?

12:40:47

15 A. That's a lie, no. Totally false.

16 Q. Now let's look at other things he said about White Flower.  
17 This description: "The house is on a big fence." Is it?

18 A. I don't know what he means by, "The house is on the big  
19 fence."

12:41:09

20 Q. But what do you understand by the word "fence"?

21 A. The fence is what you put around the house. So he says "on  
22 the fence." I don't have any house on the fence.

23 Q. Is there a fence around White Flower?

24 A. Yes, there is a huge 20-foot wall around White Flower.

12:41:30

25 Q. A wall?

26 A. A wall. Not a fence. A wall. It's a 20-foot high wall  
27 that spans about 23 - about 22 or 23 inches thick, so that's why  
28 I describe it as a wall. It's not just a fence. It is eight  
29 inches, eight-inch blocks, eight inch and reinforced in the

1 centre. In thickness it's about 22 or 23 inches. So it's a wall  
2 around the house 20 feet high.

3 Q. Then there is a security gate there. Is there?

12:42:26

4 A. Well, again, I don't know. There is a huge sliding door -  
5 gate. I don't know what he means by "security gate". There's a  
6 huge, huge door that is about two-thirds the length of this room,  
7 the gate.

8 Q. What's that, the gate?

12:42:49

9 A. The gate is about two-thirds the length of this that you  
10 have to - you roll. It's rolled away, so I don't know what he  
11 means by "open the gate". So there is a huge gate that is rolled  
12 away. But it must be open for - if people - if you're driving  
13 in, it must be open for you to get in. So I don't know what - if  
14 they drove in, he's saying opened security gate.

12:43:10

15 Q. Now, he goes on to say, "They opened the security gate for  
16 us, we entered the house, the compound." After you go through  
17 the security gate, Mr Taylor, what are you confronted with?

18 A. Are you asking me to describe - when you say confronted  
19 with, what do you --

12:43:32

20 Q. What do you find behind the security gate?

21 A. When you open the gate - and I doubt if that would happen  
22 because they wouldn't - he may be talking about a security  
23 entrance. There is a security entrance for walking in. But when  
24 you enter my front yard you would see - of course, the house is  
12:43:57 25 before you. There are at least two statues and a fountain in the  
26 front yard. That's what you would see immediately.

27 Q. And he goes on. And you understand, Mr Taylor, I'm going  
28 through these details because we're looking to examine the  
29 veracity of this witness's description. You understand that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "On the left-hand side there is a step to go down." Is  
3 there?

12:44:47

4 A. No. There is a walk down step on the right-hand side of my  
5 house when you enter.

6 Q. "There is a step to go down. There is a hallway there and  
7 they opened the door for us."

8 A. No, there is no such thing, no.

12:45:10

9 Q. "We used the parlour of Charles Taylor into the house." Do  
10 you understand that?

11 A. No, I really don't know. I really don't know what he means  
12 by this, that they used the parlour of Charles Taylor to enter  
13 the house, he says? I really don't --

12:45:30

14 Q. Where is the parlour in your house? Is it at the front,  
15 the side, the back, where?

16 A. The parlour is at the - it's situated toward the rear of  
17 the house.

18 Q. And what does it overlook?

12:45:56

19 A. It overlooks two things. The swimming pool and the tennis  
20 court are the two things you - because the parlour of the house -  
21 the house is built on a slope and the parlour is on the third  
22 floor of that slope. So when you drive into my yard you enter my  
23 front door, you are actually entering on the third floor of the  
24 building. That's the ground level, at the third floor. You

12:46:26

25 enter the foyer and then you walk through and then you enter at  
26 the parlour I mean of the house and that overlooks these other  
27 areas. So there is not - you don't go down. You enter my house,  
28 the parlour from the front door. Nobody brings a guest to his  
29 house and walk him to the back. You walk in from the front door,

1 and I'm sure the pictures will demonstrate that to this Court.

2 Q. Now, he continues: "He was in a brown suit." Now,  
3 Mr Taylor, this man is giving a lot of detail, yet you say he's  
4 lying.

12:47:09 5 A. You come to the President at night. What am I going to be  
6 in a court/ suit at night? Even if you are there, what I am  
7 going to be doing in a court suit at night to meet Sam  
8 Bockarie and --

9 Q. He said a brown suit.

12:47:25 10 A. Well, what kind of suit? What? Brown? Okay, I withdraw  
11 that court because he didn't say court in actual fact. But what  
12 kind of brown suit am I going to be in a night suit dressed up?  
13 What is it? So I don't know what he means by suit. But when I  
14 hear brown suit, I'm just assuming and I would say assume that he  
12:47:45 15 means a court suit, but that would not be at that particular  
16 time. Maybe something more relaxed, maybe a short sleeve white  
17 shirt or something sitting. I mean, I wouldn't be in a suit,  
18 dressed up, for Sam Bockarie to come to tell me, "I'm going."

19 Q. Now, he continues with the account in this way, page 1978,  
12:48:11 20 line 1:

21 "Q. After you left the house where did Sam Bockarie go?

22 A. We went to Benjamin Yeaten's house down the hole,  
23 because Benjamin Yeaten lived after his own house down the  
24 hole. That was where the bodyguards were. Then they took  
12:48:33 25 them."

26 Q. Just to clarify, what we understand is that to Benjamin  
27 Yeaten's house was down the hole, do you mean a hill? It  
28 was down a hill or what do you mean?

29 A. Yes, down the hill. Down the hill. You have to drive

1 down the hill.

2 Q. And how close was Benjamin Yeaten's house to  
3 Charles Taylor's house?

12:49:01

4 A. It's only the street that separates them. The fence of  
5 Charles Taylor is - down the street is Benjamin Yeaten's  
6 house and Montgomery's house."

7 Pause. Is that right?

12:49:18

8 A. Yes, the - yes, that's right. Well, not the description  
9 he's saying across the street. I'm saying right to two things,  
10 that Benjamin's house is down the hill and Montgomery's house,  
11 who was the deputy, is also down the hill, yes.

12 Q. What about it being only the street that separates them?

13 A. No, that's not true. Benjamin Yeaten's house is at least  
14 two blocks from my place. It's a distance from my house, yes.

12:49:39

15 Q. "Q. After you went to Benjamin Yeaten's house what  
16 happened?

17 A. That was where Sam Bockarie's bodyguards were. They  
18 took the bodyguards and they left.

19 Q. Where did you go then?

12:49:55

20 A. All of us drove to - up to Red Light. It was at Red  
21 Light that I came down from the escort pick-up where Marzah  
22 and Sampson and Jungle were.

23 Q. And where did you go?

12:50:13

24 A. I went to my house to prepare myself to take up my  
25 assignment.

26 Q. Now at that time were you living in Monrovia?

27 A. Yes, I was living in Monrovia."

28 Now, let's move on from that, Mr Taylor. So bearing in  
29 mind the picture painted by the witness, involvement in Camp

1 Johnson Road, arrest, two weeks later asked to cooperate, yes?

2 A. Uh-huh

3 Q. Then the meeting with Bah, seeing diamonds, then taken to  
4 your house, yes, before leaving. Bearing that in mind, page

12:50:52 5 1984, line 2:

6 "A. I told you that from White Flower we drove to Benjamin  
7 Yeaten's house and then he collected his bodyguards and  
8 then he was given escort to go back to Sierra Leone.

9 Q. Thank you. Do you know how Colonel Toma found out that  
12:51:18 10 Bockarie was on his way to Voinjama?"

11 Pause. Do you know a Colonel Toma?

12 A. No, I don't. I don't know him.

13 Q. "A. We got to Voinjama, it was Colonel Toma who informed  
14 us because he had a Yaesu police radio that was assigned to  
12:51:45 15 them there.

16 Q. So your understanding is that he learned by radio  
17 communication?

18 A. Yes, that was what Colonel Toma told us.

19 Q. So where did you actually meet Bockarie to switch the  
12:51:56 20 car as you described?

21 A. In Voinjama. It was at Colonel Toma's residence in the  
22 compound. The car that we drove in from Monrovia, that was  
23 the car that was used by Sam Bockarie and the other group  
24 and the car that Sam Bockarie drove in from Sierra Leone  
12:52:13 25 was given to me to go to Sierra Leone.

26 Q. So when you switched the cars did Sam Bockarie indicate  
27 where he was going? Where did he go after Voinjama?

28 A. He said he was going to see the President.

29 Q. When you say the President who do you mean?

1 A. That is Charles Taylor."

2 Now, moving on, page 1993, line 7:

3 "Q. Do you remember the next time you saw - the first time  
4 you saw Sam Bockarie after you had gone to Buedu?

12:53:11 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Where did you see him?

7 A. I saw him in Foya.

8 Q. How long after you arrived in Buedu approximately was  
9 it before Sam Bockarie came back?

12:53:27 10 A. I told you that it took a couple of weeks.

11 Q. Thank you. How did you know to go to Foya, or why did  
12 you go to Foya?

13 A. Because Issa Sesay said Bockarie was coming. He had  
14 received a radio call that we were going - we were to go to

12:53:50 15 a meeting.

16 Q. Was that you would go to meet him, I believe?

17 A. Yes, I and Issa drove.

18 Q. When you saw Bockarie did you see - was he with any  
19 vehicle or vehicles?

12:54:03 20 A. Yes, he came with two trucks, one pick-up, with  
21 ammunition and manpower.

22 Q. Can you describe the trucks that you saw Sam Bockarie  
23 with on this occasion?

24 A. It was the six style truck which the Libyan government  
12:54:21 25 gave to Charles Taylor.

26 Q. Do you recall the colour of the trucks?

27 A. Yes."

28 "Do you recall the colour of the trucks," let's pause  
29 there. Now, Mr Taylor, let's put this together again. Remember



1 the sequence I reminded you of, yes, and you remember he was  
2 being sent to Buedu to command this stand-by force with Sam  
3 Bockarie. We've gone through that, do you recall? Now, what he  
4 is saying is that a couple of weeks after he arrived in Buedu he  
12:54:57 5 goes to Foya. In which country is Foya?

6 A. Liberia.

7 Q. And when he goes to Foya he meets Sam Bockarie who has two  
8 trucks loaded with ammunition and manpower. So let's put that  
9 together. So we're talking about sometime in the middle of  
12:55:23 10 October 1998 he meets Sam Bockarie in Foya and Foya has two  
11 trucks loaded with ammunition and manpower. What do you say or  
12 know about that?

13 A. Well, I know nothing about it. But even without knowing  
14 about it, it's a blatant lie that Sam Bockarie in October of 1998  
12:55:48 15 would be in Liberia with two trucks. And by the way, the Libyans  
16 never, never gave me a truck --

17 Q. I was coming to that.

18 A. -- or trucks. So there is no such thing as a truck with  
19 Sam Bockarie in October of 1998 doing anything inside Liberia.

12:56:12 20 This is a blatant, blatant lie. It is not true. It is not true.  
21 Definitely not true. And to get some help, there was a reference  
22 in the other passage where Sam Bockarie is supposed to be coming  
23 to see the President and so that's in the passage before.

24 Q. From Voinjama, yes?

12:56:34 25 A. From Voinjama. He was supposed to be coming to see me, and  
26 so apparently now what he's saying, he waits in that area and Sam  
27 Bockarie returns.

28 Q. That appears to be what he's suggesting.

29 A. This appears to be what he is suggesting, which is total

1 nonsense, okay, that Sam Bockarie - but mind you now what - so if  
2 we look at it now, the trip that he must be describing now is the  
3 third trip, because there is a trip that he was supposed to be  
4 giving to Sam Bockarie now to go for this operation. So he's  
12:57:15 5 already - he prepares himself and he goes and, in fact, while he  
6 did not say he switched vehicle, the Prosecutor's question  
7 carries switched when he didn't say he switched vehicles in that  
8 process, but I think Koumjian said, "Switched, good." But now he  
9 goes on this mission with Sam Bockarie, so apparently he has  
12:57:36 10 returned to Liberia. You see what I'm trying to say?

11 Q. I see what you're saying, Mr Taylor.

12 A. Because remember now he meets Benjamin Yeaten at this place  
13 and he's giving this assignment.

14 Q. And Sam Bockarie's present?

12:57:54 15 A. And Sam Bockarie is present and they go, and he's saying  
16 some two weeks or so later Sam Bockarie is supposed to be in  
17 Voinjama coming to me, so that means he has gone on this  
18 mission --

19 Q. Well, he doesn't give a time for that, Mr Taylor. What he  
12:58:08 20 says is, at page 1984 --

21 A. A couple of weeks.

22 Q. -- that he switches cars with Bockarie in Voinjama --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- and Bockarie then goes on to see you, and then he's  
12:58:20 25 talking now about meeting Bockarie in Foya, which appears to be a  
26 third meeting on the face of it, when Bockarie has these two  
27 trucks.

28 A. Yeah, but after he's given to Bockarie on the first  
29 occasion - after he's given this assignment, does he go to Sierra

1 Leone, okay? Does he go with Bockarie to Sierra Leone or does he  
2 wait? Because if he goes with Bockarie to Sierra Leone and he's  
3 describing a couple of weeks later where Bockarie is in Voinjama  
4 coming to me, then it takes that Bockarie has already has gone to  
12:58:59 5 Sierra Leone and is returning. You see what I'm trying to say?

6 Q. On the face of it, yes.

7 A. So, I mean, they're trying to patch this lie together now.  
8 So we have Bockarie now leaving Liberia with this commander who  
9 is supposed to be going to set up a Scorpion Unit and now they

12:59:18 10 go. Now, he comes, so some way he meets Bockarie again in  
11 Voinjama, and Bockarie says he's coming to me, and it is  
12 apparently after Bockarie returns he comes with these trucks. So  
13 this is the way I understand it, and I need some help if this is  
14 the way it's going. So I don't understand this construct, okay?

12:59:40 15 Except where he goes to Sierra Leone and for some reason he comes  
16 back with Sam Bockarie, and then Sam Bockarie now comes back now  
17 for this other mission, and this other mission now is to pick up  
18 trucks, ammunition, and now, he says, and manpower.

19 None of that can be true, because in the first instance I  
13:00:00 20 don't have any Libyan style trucks at all. October 1998 where  
21 this miss it altogether, I don't have any weapons to give to no  
22 Sam Bockarie in October of 1998 or any other time that would  
23 carry trucks, because all these weapons - he, Mohamed Keita,  
24 knows very well of the disarmament process. So I do not know how  
13:00:27 25 he fixed this up. But maybe as we go back - as we go further now  
26 - so within the short period of time that he's released from  
27 jail, and is - this is the second encounter that he has with Sam  
28 Bockarie from this understanding. Maybe there may be a third.

29 Q. But anyway, he goes on in this vein, Mr Taylor, and I want

1 you to listen carefully. Page 2000, evidence of 23 January 2008:

2 "Q. Who came with the letter of assignment for you? Who  
3 gave you the letter of assignment?

4 A. Sam Bockarie, Sam Bockarie, General Sam Bockarie.

13:01:16 5 Q. When you say 'letter of assignment', can you explain  
6 what that was?

7 A. When I was coming to the RUF I had not been with the  
8 RUF before. I said it should be in writing that I was  
9 going to be the commander of the Scorpion with the RUF and

13:01:38 10 then he told me yes. From there we talked to Benjamin  
11 Yeaten and he told me, 'Yes, Sam Bockarie has already given  
12 you the document,' and I said, 'Yes, sir.' Then he said,  
13 'Okay, that document was signed by President Taylor,' and  
14 he said I should maintain that document very well.

13:02:06 15 Q. Okay, this is important so we're going to go over it  
16 slowly in a little detail. Did Bockarie actually give you  
17 a piece of paper that he said was the letter of assignment?

18 A. Yes, he gave me a paper, sir.

19 Q. Where were you when he gave that to you?

13:02:29 20 A. At his house, in front of his house, on the step in  
21 front of his house, sir.

22 Q. Do you know what happened to that paper? Do you have  
23 it today or what has happened to it?

24 A. I lost the paper because during the last attack in

13:02:50 25 Liberia my mother's house was burnt down. It was then that  
26 I lost that piece of paper."

27 Mr Taylor, did you give such a written, signed document to  
28 someone so that Sam Bockarie could give it to this man Abu Keita?

29 A. No, never did it. And under this - even if his mother's

1 house was standing, he would never find such a document because  
2 it never existed. It is a blatant lie. But now, counsel, I  
3 don't want us to miss this, because the way this thing is packing  
4 up we have to - let me - if I can help to unpack this lie.

13:03:49 5 Now, this letter now must be - if there is any document, it  
6 must now be around the third encounter. Because don't let's  
7 forget he gets the assignment, he goes. The second encounter is  
8 when Sam Bockarie is in Voynjama coming to me where he returns  
9 with these trucks. So apparently to see these trucks he's

13:04:15 10 supposed to be in what? Foya or some place? Now, if Sam  
11 Bockarie has a letter of assignment for him, that means that he  
12 has to give it to him either on the second trip. He meets him -  
13 because he's in Liberia. But Sam Bockarie doesn't give him this  
14 so-called letter until he gets into Sierra Leone in front of his  
13:04:37 15 house. That boy is lying. It's as blatant a lie as one can get.

16 In fact, the President of Liberia does not, would not, and  
17 could have never signed, even if there was a military assignment  
18 in or out of Liberia. Let's assume that there is this military  
19 operation. The President of Liberia does not sign assignments  
13:05:03 20 for military operation. Never. Never. The only function that  
21 the President have with signatures on that concern military  
22 personnel on commissions. Commissions. Other than that, the  
23 President of Liberia does not deal with soldiers. He doesn't.

24 And if this man was going on a military assignment, the Defence  
13:05:30 25 Minister doesn't sign. The chief of staff doesn't sign. The  
26 commander general doesn't sign. The President will jump up and  
27 sign and assign an assignment. It is a lie, that's all it is.  
28 Blatant as one can get it. Never happened then and would never  
29 happen at any time in any President's life in Liberia that they

1 would sign a military assignment for someone, even if there is  
2 such an assignment.

3 Q. Mr Taylor, tell me something. When you were President of  
4 Liberia when you came to sign documents, did you use any  
13:06:07 5 particular coloured ink?

6 A. All of my signatures, yes, I did.

7 Q. What colour was that?

8 A. Green.

9 Q. Why?

13:06:14 10 A. That's a historical thing. All Presidents before me used  
11 green. Green was used to distinguish that when the President's  
12 signature got anywhere, there would be the movement of  
13 documentation within the system from President Tubman, President  
14 Tolbert, Samuel Kanyon Doe, Charles Taylor, all - and no one else  
13:06:46 15 in the country signs in green. Only the President signs in  
16 green.

17 Q. How consistent was that?

18 A. The President always signed in green.

19 Q. Bottom of page 2000:

13:06:57 20 "Q. You indicated that you had asked for the paper. Where  
21 were you when you asked to have the order in writing?

22 A. I was already - before I left Liberia I talked about  
23 that with Benjamin Yeaten and he said that would be no  
24 problem.

13:07:13 25 Q. Then you said after you got the paper you had another  
26 conversation with Yeaten. Is that correct?

27 A. Yes, over a Yaesu radio, sir.

28 Q. Where were you speaking on the Yaesu? Where were you  
29 when you had that conversation?

1 A. At Sam Bockarie's residence in Buedu.

2 Q. Did you actually hear the voice of Benjamin Yeaten?

3 A. I spoke with Chief Benjamin Yeaten, sir, and I heard  
4 his voice, sir.

13:07:47 5 Q. Where did you understand Yeaten was when he was talking  
6 to you?

7 A. He was talking to me from Monrovia, sir.

8 Q. Thank you. What did Yeaten tell you about the paper?

9 A. He told me that it is my assignment paper and that I  
13:08:05 10 should protect it carefully and that I should not play with  
11 it because the President signed the paper and it was signed  
12 in blue pen."

13 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Never. You call the whole Republic of Liberia, there is  
13:08:26 15 not one human will tell you that the President - my presidency or  
16 before me - signed in any other colour except green. He is  
17 lying.

18 Q. "Q. You remember seeing a signature in blue pen?

19 A. Yes."

13:08:43 20 What do you say, Mr Taylor?

21 A. That's a lie. That is a lie. Never. Bring any original  
22 document from Charles Taylor, it's in green. Green.

23 Q. Now he continues:

24 "Q. When Sam Bockarie arrived, did you stay in Buedu for  
13:09:14 25 some time with the RUF there in Buedu?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Can you describe at that time what was the command  
28 structure of the RUF in Sierra Leone?

29 A. The command structure: Sam Bockarie was the commander,

1 Issa Sesay was the deputy, Denis Mingo and Morris Kallon."

2 What's your knowledge of that command structure, Mr Taylor?

3 A. No, I don't - I don't know the RUF command structure. I

4 know by this time the acting leader was Sam Bockarie. Quite

13:09:43 5 frankly, I did not know Issa Sesay at the time or what his role

6 was, but I knew Sam Bockarie was the leader.

7 Q. The witness goes on, page 2007:

8 "Q. This first meeting that Bockarie had at the house

9 after bringing the ammunition" -

13:10:18 10 You remember the ammunition brought, yes?

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. "... you mentioned some commanders, and in your answer you

13 also mentioned - you said it was an RUF meeting and you

14 mentioned Akim and Leather Boot. Akim and Leather Boot

13:10:35 15 were AFRC, they were SLAs, is that right?

16 A. Yes, but they all worked with the RUF.

17 Q. Can you explain to us, you said Bockarie said Kono was

18 strategic. Did he explain why?

19 A. He said because we needed to generate funds for the RUF

13:10:56 20 and then the only place where we can get more resources to

21 generate funds was Kono, so we could be able to do mining.

22 Q. Okay. So after the meeting at the house you said there

23 was a meeting in Bockarie's bedroom of the vanguards, is

24 that correct?

13:11:20 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. So were you allowed into that meeting? Were you

27 present for that?

28 A. No, they never allowed me to attend the meeting, sir.

29 It was only for vanguards and I'm not a vanguard.



1 Q. After the closed door vanguard meeting, was there  
2 another meeting?

3 A. That was a muster parade. It was not a meeting, where  
4 all the soldiers assembled at the military grounds before  
13:11:53 5 Kaisoko's office. That was the time he instructed Issa  
6 Sesay that this mission - that the mission is that there  
7 should be no retreat, no surrender. You should make sure  
8 you take over Kono and Makeni, and then he said President  
9 Taylor said they should be very vigilant and maintain the  
13:12:15 10 ground of the RUF during that muster parade."

11 What do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Nothing whatsoever. But there is a little twist to this.  
13 Even though this is the testimony of this witness, but this  
14 witness is speaking with such knowledge, and if I'm right, this  
13:12:50 15 witness has just entered Sierra Leone. He has not even been  
16 there for a very long time. He's talking about Akim and all  
17 these people. While one can argue that, well, he got to know  
18 this as a result of experience, but he's speaking - he's giving  
19 his testimony and speaking about a meeting as of the time that he  
13:13:15 20 arrives there, and it is with such authority that I would suggest  
21 that of one that may have had some experience with these people  
22 because he's just too familiar. And he doesn't say in his  
23 testimony that, "I meet some people in this meeting that later on  
24 I get to know one is called Akim." This man is speaking as  
13:13:41 25 though he's known these people for some time, okay.

26 And so I don't understand this kind of thing, and I would  
27 suggest that that could be true because of the long dealing with  
28 these people, and Mohamed Keita is not strange to these people.  
29 But if he's explaining a situation as of the time that it

1 happened when he's just been so-called turned over to Sam  
2 Bockarie, two weeks later or a couple of weeks later Sam Bockarie  
3 returns to Liberia and comes back with these trucks and gave him  
4 a letter of assignment, so we're talking about within a period of  
13:14:17 5 about two to three weeks you are in Sierra Leone and you have  
6 just - I mean, it's just flowing. This looks like something from  
7 experience. And I strongly suggest that I disagree that this  
8 man, okay, is just a stranger to this particular area that he  
9 must be explaining in this way. But, I mean, I know nothing  
13:14:43 10 about this.

11 But if he's there for this assignment, "You should make  
12 sure you take over Kono and Makeni," well, what's his mission  
13 then? This Scorpion Unit here, what would he be if this muster -  
14 he's not invited to these meetings, there's a muster parade and  
13:15:10 15 this muster parade is supposed to be saying, "You must take over  
16 Kono," so what's he there for? What's he there for? It just  
17 doesn't make sense.

18 Q. Well, let's look at it, because you note they are supposed  
19 to be planning a mission and the evidence continues, page 2008 --

13:15:33 20 A. And excuse me, counsel, he talks about manpower in a truck  
21 now, so maybe we might get into the contribution of this manpower  
22 that he's carrying because this mission, apparently, I don't see  
23 how he's commanding this mission but there's manpower. And if  
24 this manpower is in trucks in Liberia, it means that these are  
13:15:54 25 Liberians. Okay. Well, let's see.

26 Q. And bear in mind, Mr Taylor, that suggestion is in the  
27 context of sometime in mid to late October, Bockarie is coming  
28 from Liberia with not only ammunition --

29 A. Fighters.

1 Q. -- but fighters, right, and two months afterwards we know  
2 is the Freetown invasion. So you see the clear implication of  
3 what's being said?

4 A. That's it, yes.

13:16:25 5 Q. I want you to understand that and bear that in mind as we  
6 look at the further evidence of this individual, because he  
7 continues:

8 "Q. Sir, after this meeting was there an offensive?

9 A. Yes. That was the time we took the offensive against  
13:16:47 10 Kono and Makeni, and then myself there was an operation  
11 from Segwema, from Bunumbu to Segwema, to Jumo Kafebu, Gbava and  
12 Bendu Junction."

13 Mr Koumjian assists the Court with some spellings and then  
14 continues:

13:17:02 15 "Q. In that offensive do you know if the main town in Kono  
16 - Kono Town or Koindu Town as it is sometimes called - was  
17 taken?

18 A. Officially Kono Town was announced on Christmas Day,  
19 that Koindu has been taken over by the RUF.

13:17:24 20 Q. So that was Christmas Day 1998?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So we have an idea, about how long before Kono Town  
23 fell did Sam Bockarie come back with the 300 boxes of  
24 ammunition?"

13:17:41 25 You notice that, Mr Taylor? 300 boxes of ammunition.

26 Okay? Over the page:

27 "A. When Sam Bockarie came that was the time he said the  
28 materials has come and that was the time the offensive  
29 started.

1 Q. Thank you. We are just trying to get an idea of  
2 approximately how much time before Christmas Day, before  
3 Kono fell, did Sam Bockarie come with the ammunition. How  
4 many days or weeks or months? Can you estimate?

13:18:22 5 A. I'm unable to estimate that, sir.

6 Q. How soon after Sam Bockarie came with the ammunition  
7 did the operation start?

8 A. Just when he came with the ammunition there was no  
9 wasting time. The operation started straight. It was only  
10 the meeting that he had in Buedu. Immediately after the  
11 meeting Issa Sesay was dispatched.

13:18:36

12 Q. Where was Issa Sesay sent?

13 A. Issa Sesay was sent to Kono along with Morris Kallon  
14 and Akim.

13:18:52 15 Q. Akim the SLA?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Sir, during this offensive did you play a part in that  
18 offensive?

19 A. Yes. It was not in Kono. I was on Segwema and the  
20 various places I named, Jumo Kafebu, Bunumbu.

13:19:12

21 Q. Gbava?

22 A. Gbava. And then Sam Bockarie further instructed that  
23 if any air raid took place we should burn the place if  
24 there was any resistance.

13:19:30 25 Q. Was Sam Bockarie's order to burn down if there is any  
26 resistance, was that carried out?

27 A. Yes, yes.

28 Q. Did you see that?

29 A. Yes, myself I took part in that.

1 Q. Where did you see the burning?

2 A. We burned Bunumbu, seven houses in Bunumbu. We burned  
3 houses Segwema. We burned places in Jumo Kafebu. We did  
4 some burning in Gbava.

13:20:04 5 Q. When you mentioned seven houses in Bunumbu, how about  
6 in the other places? Was it just one house or was it many  
7 houses?

8 A. Some places we burned down ten houses, some areas  
9 seven, some areas eight.

13:20:21 10 Q. During this offensive in the Kono area - first let us  
11 make it clear, which districts of Sierra Leone were  
12 involved in that offensive?

13 A. That was Makeni. Makeni, Masingbi, Magburaka.

14 Q. Were some of these places that were attacked in  
13:20:44 15 Kailahun District?"

16 There was then an objection, and so let's go to page 2011:  
17 "Q. Do you know which districts were involved in the  
18 attack?

19 A. Like which district?

13:21:07 20 Q. During these offensives you mentioned Kono Town finally  
21 falling during this offensive.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. During these offensives did Sam Bockarie go anywhere?

24 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie travelled to Liberia.

13:21:21 25 Q. How do you know that?

26 A. Because he called Mike Lamin to come and take over, to  
27 be in charge of the ground in Buedu and then myself I  
28 escorted him to Foya where Joe Tuah came with the chopper  
29 and he went to Monrovia.

1 Q. You said he called Mike Lamin. Who do you mean called  
2 Mike Lamin?

3 A. Sam Bockarie instructed Mike Lamin to come and take  
4 charge of Buedu until he comes back from his trip.

13:21:59 5 Q. How did Sam Bockarie communicate with Mike Lamin to  
6 tell him to come to Buedu?

7 A. Over the Yaesu communication radio.

8 Q. Now you said he asked Mike Lamin to take charge in  
9 Buedu. You already told us the number two in the RUF at

13:22:15 10 that time was Issa Sesay. Do you know why he didn't ask  
11 Issa Sesay to take over?

12 A. Because Issa Sesay was already in Kono heading towards  
13 Makeni, so that was the reason why he called Mike Lamin,  
14 because he was closer to him, to take charge.

13:22:35 15 Q. You mentioned that you went with Bockarie to Foya, is  
16 that right?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. When you travelled to Foya what happened?

19 A. Joe Tuah came over the chopper that had a military  
13:22:52 20 colour and then he took Sam Bockarie to Monrovia with the  
21 chopper."

22 And he explained that means helicopter:

23 "Q. Do you know how long Sam Bockarie was in Monrovia?

24 A. He did not stay there long, sir.

13:23:11 25 Q. Did you become aware when he came back? Were you  
26 involved at all when he came back?

27 A. Yes, when he was coming he communicated and he said he  
28 was on his way coming and that he also came with a pick-up,  
29 one ash colour pick-up, a Toyota Land Cruiser, and he

1 said it was given to him by Charles Taylor.

2 Q. Thank you. Again if you can just maybe instead of  
3 saying he try to use the name. Who was it?

4 A. Sam Bockarie."

13:23:42 5 Now, let's pause there, Mr Taylor. There's a lot there  
6 that we need to deal with. Do you understand which period we're  
7 talking about?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. We're talking about late 1998, yes?

13:23:54 10 A. That is correct, yeah.

11 Q. Now, the first point I want to ask about is this: He  
12 speaks of Sam Bockarie being supplied by you with 300 boxes of  
13 ammunition. Now, you understand what this means, don't you,  
14 Mr Taylor? What he's saying is the ammunition used for this  
13:24:17 15 attack on Kono, Christmas Day, and consequently no doubt for the  
16 attack on Freetown, you provided. Do you see that?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Did you?

19 A. No, I didn't. But there is something that I missed and  
13:24:32 20 maybe I don't know it could be in the record, the question that  
21 was posed by - that was put forward by Mr Koumjian, I missed it  
22 and I apologise for this - I missed where Mohamed Keita said that  
23 Sam Bockarie had been given 300 boxes of ammunition. What I do  
24 know, I pick up, that the 300 boxes of ammunition is contained in  
13:25:11 25 Koumjian's question, because Koumjian comes out with 300, but I  
26 apologise, but I want to see where Mohamed Keita had said before  
27 the 300 number came up in Koumjian's question. I missed it. I  
28 apologise to the Court. I missed it.

29 Q. That came up at page 2008.

1 A. Let's go back. I apologise.

2 Q. It's in the question. "Did Sam Bockarie come back with the  
3 300 boxes of ammunition?"

13:25:55

4 A. That's what I'm talking about. Where did the number 300  
5 come from? I lost that.

6 Q. That comes back, Mr Taylor, to page 1994, which we dealt  
7 with earlier. Let's go back to page 1993, just to set the  
8 context to which I referred you earlier. "It was the six style  
9 truck which the Libyan government gave to Charles Taylor." You  
10 remember that?

13:26:37

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And it continues. He was asked about the colour that you  
13 described. Then:

13:26:49

14 "Q. Were you able to find out or estimate how much  
15 ammunition Sam Bockarie brought on that occasion?

16 A. He brought 300 boxes of ammunition. That was the first  
17 time he said he had such a huge quantity.

18 Q. Is that a lot of ammunition, 300 boxes?

19 A. Yes.

13:27:09

20 Q. Did the trucks continue across the border or how was  
21 the ammunition taken to Sierra Leone?

22 A. He came with men from Liberia. It was a mixture of  
23 Liberians and Sierra Leoneans, about 150 men. I was  
24 expecting they were the men that Benjamin Yeaten was  
13:27:31 25 talking about when he said I was going to - whom he said I  
26 was going to command. I was expecting that those were the  
27 men, but the men were later taken to Bunumbu, the RUF  
28 training camp. The training commander was Monica Pearson  
29 and one Colonel Morris. Those were the training commanders



1 at Bunumbu.

2 Q. Who else was with that convoy beyond Sam Bockarie and  
3 the manpower that you mentioned?

4 A. There was one police driver called Senegalese.

13:28:10 5 Q. When you say he was police, he was a police where?

6 A. He was Liberian police. He was Liberian police.

7 Q. Is that a nickname, 'Senegalese'?

8 A. That is the only name I know for him.

9 Q. Do you know where the convoy came from?

13:28:29 10 A. They said the men were taken from Camp Naama.

11 Q. What about the ammunition, do you know where the  
12 ammunition came from?

13 A. They said the ammunition was from Monrovia, sir."

14 A. Okay.

13:28:43 15 Q. So that's the context, Mr Taylor, so you understand that?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Bockarie comes with the two trucks, 150 men, a mixture of  
18 Liberians and Sierra Leoneans and 300 boxes of ammunition, okay?

19 A. Yes.

13:29:05 20 Q. So you have provided that in the late autumn of 1998, just  
21 prior to the launching of an offensive on Kono culminating in due  
22 course in the Freetown invasion, do you get it?

23 A. I've got that.

24 Q. So Abu Keita is directly implicating you in all of that?

13:29:24 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. And note in passing that also involved in that period is  
27 the burning of various villages, and you appreciate the  
28 destruction of property features in the indictment?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. So what this man is saying, Mr Taylor, is that you are  
2 responsible for the destruction and mayhem leading up to the  
3 Freetown invasion. Are you clear about that?

4 A. Very clear.

13:29:51 5 Q. What do you say?

6 A. I say this is totally false and is nonsensical, and I'm  
7 going to try to see if I can unscramble this lie a little bit  
8 because --

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I don't know if we have time to do  
13:30:06 10 that now, Mr President?

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, I think we'll take the lunch  
12 adjournment now and we will resume at 2.30.

13 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

14 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:30:26 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor. Before the lunch adjournment I had set out  
17 for your comment the scenario developed by the witness, Abu  
18 Keita, of you having sent 150 fighters, whom he was going to  
19 command, along with 300 boxes of ammunition, to Sierra Leone  
14:30:53 20 sometime in the late autumn of 1998, which ammunition and  
21 manpower was to be used initially for the attack upon Kono  
22 culminating, as events were to prove, in the attack on Freetown.  
23 Now, before lunch you told us that you were going to see if you  
24 could unscramble that lie, as you described it. Proceed then,  
14:31:18 25 please.

26 A. Well, let's see if we can get some of the information  
27 together. If I understand, the 300 boxes of ammunition supposed  
28 to be - we are talking about late - is that December? We're  
29 talking about December 1998? Am I right to assume that?

1 Q. Well, I'm not sure that we're right to assume that, because  
2 on the face of the transcript, which I have examined, it's  
3 unclear.

4 A. Okay. Well, we know now that he is saying some - in early  
14:32:01 5 October, some two weeks after this assignment, that is now by  
6 mid-October, he gets this letter of assignment. Now we have  
7 another trip, I would assume, that involved 300 boxes of  
8 ammunition and 150 soldiers. And if my recollection is correct,  
9 he mentions that they come from Naama.

14:32:34 10 Q. Yes?

11 A. That information - okay. Now --

12 Q. Well, the men come from Naama. The ammunition comes from  
13 Monrovia.

14 A. Monrovia. Fine. You know, this reminds me of, you know,  
14:32:54 15 the louder the noise of the mob the truer it's supposed to be.  
16 Now, let's look at this lie: Naama, 1998. We know from a speech  
17 that I made in December 1998, after the famous Colonel Dempsey,  
18 whose information we cannot use here, but it was contained in my  
19 statement, had reported that no training or anything had been at  
14:33:27 20 Naama and the place was apparently deserted for a long time. So  
21 I do not know how 150 men end up in Naama. So, in fact, there is  
22 no such thing going on in Naama.

23 But let's don't forget another thing. I'm supposed to be  
24 sending men, and where do those men go to? They are supposed to  
14:33:47 25 be taken to a training camp in Sierra Leone that are being  
26 trained by, he said, Monica Pearson. So these are not fighters  
27 now. These are men - these are not military people - that I'm  
28 sending into combat to prepare for this so-called Kono attack  
29 that have to now go for training with a Monica Pearson. It's a

1 lie.

2 Why would I in Liberia - assuming that I am sending men to  
3 carry on any fight, why would I take - I've got thousands of men.  
4 1998 we're talking about. The NPFL disarmed. There were over  
14:34:27 5 30,000 fighters that went through the NPFL. I'm sending 150  
6 untrained men to go to be trained by somebody called Monica  
7 Pearson. But who is supposed to be the driver? The driver, as  
8 he alleges in the statement that I heard here, is a Senegalese, a  
9 police driver, he calls it, but we've heard Senegalese here  
14:34:50 10 before. We've been told in this Court, these judges have been  
11 told, that Senegalese was one of the people that went with some  
12 30, 40 men as reinforcement during the Sierra Leonean invasion.  
13 Is he a driver or is he a soldier? So they keep mounting up this  
14 lie. It's not true that I would send unarmed - I mean, unarmed -  
14:35:14 15 untrained, untrained soldiers to go - so by the time the  
16 operation starts, where would they be? They would still be in  
17 training.

18 But beyond that, what's the function of this Scorpion Unit?  
19 As I'm going through the testimony, I have not even heard what  
14:35:30 20 this Scorpion Unit was supposed to have done. I hear him talking  
21 about he burned buildings or whatever. So what's the  
22 participation of this famous Scorpion Unit?

23 Q. Well, they went there to burn down a few villages,  
24 obviously.

14:35:43 25 A. Yeah, but they are supposed to be in a training camp, so  
26 when did they get trained that they would be able to go fight to  
27 go and burn down villages? Is he commanding this Scorpion Unit  
28 to say, "Well, my unit, the Scorpion Unit, carried out this  
29 operation"? So, I mean, these boys don't know how to lie any

1 more, okay?

2 If I want to - Charles Ghankay Taylor wants to send forces  
3 into Sierra Leone to prepare for whatever he is talking about,  
4 I'm going to send people that have to go to take training before  
14:36:08 5 they can go to fight? Wouldn't I send fighters who have  
6 experience in combat that they would have to be sent for somebody  
7 calling themselves Monica Pearson to go and train? It's a lie.

8 You know, this boy - I do not know these boys really set up  
9 for me and they are doing it well, but they are missing it. 300

14:36:28 10 boxes of ammunition. 300? Where would I as President of Liberia  
11 get that 300 boxes from when this boy knows very well that we  
12 were disarmed, and by this time, Liberia still does not have any  
13 material to even give its security personnel inside, I would have  
14 300 boxes of ammunition to give to someone in Sierra Leone? It's

14:36:57 15 a lie. And the lie does not - it does not come together because  
16 of this Naama situation. There is nobody at Naama, these  
17 untrained soldiers that are supposed to be sent to be trained for  
18 the mission. And if we look at the time involved, if we are  
19 talking about - and I'm sure the way how the reading goes from

14:37:18 20 the testimony that I just heard, it appears to be around  
21 December. Because, according to the way how it read, so these  
22 people are just not available. Then who did he command as the  
23 Scorpion Unit to carry out this destruction that he - and he is  
24 so familiar with the different towns and villages and different  
14:37:44 25 things.

26 This boy lied. It never, never happened. I never gave ^  
27 him anyone. The only thing I can put my hands on regarding this  
28 Mohamed Keita boy is that it is possible and maybe even probable  
29 that as Keita is leaving Liberia after his release from jail, he

1 picked up some of his ex-ULIMO fighters and goes along with them.  
2 This is the only way I can pick up that I could say that will  
3 make some sense. And he goes into Lofa where the ULIMO boys are,  
4 and while he is leaving the country, maybe frightened them, say,  
14:38:25 5 "If you stay here, bad things will happen," and take them along.  
6 This I see is a probability. Not even a possibility. It's a  
7 probability, because Keita and these boys would do things - if he  
8 is going to Sierra Leone, running away, afraid that he might be  
9 re-arrested or what, he probably took some people along with him.

14:38:42 10 I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, on my honour, never sent anybody  
11 called Mohamed Keita or, as the records show to this Court, Abu  
12 Keita anywhere. If I had done it then I guess I would have had  
13 to have gone to a nuthouse because it didn't make sense. This is  
14 a man that just fought against me, and there's no way I would  
14:39:03 15 take him and send him on an assignment any place and leave the  
16 thousands of loyal officers and generals that are capable of  
17 commanding, I would leave them and take an enemy soldier, okay,  
18 who really is a hostile soldier to me and send him on a major  
19 assignment. It did not happen, your Honours. It did not happen.

14:39:32 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I'm still dealing with the same period in  
21 time and I want to remind you of five facts which emerged from  
22 the testimony of this witness concerning this period in time,  
23 late 1998. Remember he talked of a meeting and said, page 208,  
24 "After the meeting there was an offensive." Yes?

14:40:02 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. "Kono was taken over on Christmas Day 1998." That's page  
27 208 - 2008, lines 24 to 26. Thirdly, "How soon after Sam  
28 Bockarie came with the ammunition --

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

1 MS HOLLIS: Could we have that reference again? I don't  
2 think it's page 208.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: 2008, I corrected myself, lines 24 to 26.

4 MS HOLLIS: Thank you.

14:40:39 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Then page 2009, this:

7 "Q. How soon after Sam Bockarie came with the ammunition  
8 did the operation start?

9 A. Immediately after the meeting Issa Sesay was  
10 dispatched."

14:40:52

11 A. Well, then, counsel --

12 Q. Pause there. Hold the thought for a minute, Mr Taylor.

13 Let me just complete the question. So meeting, offensive,

14 immediately Kono captured Christmas Day. Then this, page 2011:

14:41:12 15 "Q. During these offensive, did Sam Bockarie go anywhere?

16 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie travelled to Liberia.

17 Q. You went with Sam Bockarie to Foya. Is that right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. When you travelled to Foya what happened?

14:41:35 20 A. Joe Tuah came over with the chopper that had a military  
21 colour and then he took Sam Bockarie to Monrovia with the  
22 chopper."

23 Do you get it, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Uh-huh.

14:41:45 25 Q. So around about Christmas 1998 this man is saying Bockarie  
26 goes to Monrovia by chopper from Foya. What do you say about  
27 that?

28 A. Never happened. Never, never happened. But if I'm putting  
29 this - if I'm putting this together, as I understand it, if the

1 operation to - took off for this Kono attack occurred immediately  
2 after Sam Bockarie returned and it happened on Christmas Day, but  
3 if I'm correct, that return was, what, with the 300 boxes of AK  
4 ammunition? It was also with the manpower. Is that correct?

14:42:34 5 Because I don't want to misquote --

6 Q. That's what he said.

7 A. So that means that the men - the men that I sent went along  
8 with the ammunition, and it immediately means a day or two, so  
9 that means that somewhere a few days before Christmas. Because

14:42:51 10 he says that --

11 Q. On the fact of it.

12 A. Okay, so that means that - well, so the men go to training.

13 Because he says that these men went to training with Monica

14 Pearson, so they were not a part of this operation because they

14:43:05 15 just get there and they go into training. Or maybe I have the

16 evidence wrong and I stand corrected on this. So it just doesn't

17 hold. These 150 men with 300 boxes of AK that get there and

18 within a few days the operation starts, but these same men were

19 sent to Monica Pearson for training.

14:43:28 20 If this is the evidence you can see even how big the lie

21 is. Why would I send men? Okay, if the men are in training who

22 are you commanding then? Who are you commanding and in fact you

23 end up with Sam Bockarie up and down. This boy is lying so badly

24 that he doesn't know. Unless I missed it in the evidence as I

14:43:47 25 understood it these men then - during the Kono operation in

26 December then these men are supposed to be in training because

27 they have only arrived a few days.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, in December 1998 was Sam Bockarie in Monrovia?

29 A. Yes, in December 1998.



1 Q. What part of December 1998?

2 A. Very early December Sam Bockarie came from Burkina Faso  
3 back en route to Sierra Leone in December, yes.

4 Q. Was he back in Monrovia on or about Christmas of 1998?

14:44:27 5 A. Never. Never. Never. No, no, no. Never. From the time  
6 Sam Bockarie passed back through I did not see - he did not come  
7 to Liberia any time again in 1998. No.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let us add another level of factual context  
9 to this, please. When Bockarie left in late November 1998 to go  
14:44:59 10 to Burkina Faso, who was he going to see?

11 A. He was going to see the chairman of the Organisation of  
12 African Unity, President Blaise Compaore.

13 Q. You later discovered, you tell us, that he also went  
14 somewhere else on that trip, didn't he?

14:45:15 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Where did he go?

17 A. He went on to Libya. Based on what my protocol officer  
18 told me, yes.

19 Q. Now, putting that together with the suggestion that a huge  
14:45:30 20 quantity of ammunition, 300 boxes, arrives in Sierra Leone at or  
21 about that time, yes?

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. You see the picture, don't you, Mr Taylor?

24 A. I see. I see.

14:45:44 25 Q. Right. So what do you say to this proposition: Bockarie  
26 goes via Monrovia to Burkina Faso and Libya, obtains guarantees  
27 of a huge quantity of ammunition which arrives then and is  
28 brought through Liberia to Sierra Leone. You get the picture?

29 A. I got the picture.

1 Q. You obligingly also send along 150 fresh recruits, yes? Do  
2 you get the picture?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Right. Thereafter an attack is launched on Kono, yes?

14:46:19 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. And a couple weeks later, around about Christmas time,  
7 Bockarie finds himself back in Monrovia. That's the picture  
8 being painted. You understand that, don't you?

9 A. I do. I do.

14:46:32 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, were you the hidden hand behind all of  
11 that?

12 A. Not at all. No, no, no. And that's the picture and that's  
13 how they organised the whole situation. It never, ever, ever  
14 happened that way. I have been very, very clear. If Sam

14:46:55 15 Bockarie got ammunition out of Liberia, I am in no position to  
16 dispute that Sam Bockarie could have gotten a few boxes of  
17 ammunition out of Lofa as they had been buying.

18 In fact I don't care where it came from. 300 boxes of  
19 ammunition from Liberia is an impossibility. Nobody in Liberia  
14:47:18 20 could have put together 300 boxes of ammunition. If he got any  
21 ammunition out of Liberia at that time it had to be their little  
22 purchases in Lofa and other places that they had been carrying on  
23 with the ULIMO people for years. But there was no such thing to  
24 - when Sam Bockarie returned from Burkina Faso I was out doing  
14:47:40 25 the polio vaccination. I was not even in the city of Monrovia.  
26 He came and he went through and no information reached to me that  
27 Sam Bockarie even brought material at that time. So I can't  
28 account for that.

29 Q. Apart from the polio vaccination programme, Mr Taylor,

1 where else were you in December 1998? Can you recall?

2 A. December. I also went to Burkina Faso to the inauguration  
3 of Blaise Compaore, if I recall, to the best of my recollection.

4 Q. Anywhere else?

14:48:23 5 A. I can't recall offhand right now.

6 Q. Very well. Don't worry about it for the moment. But in  
7 any event, Mr Taylor, the evidence of this witness is that  
8 Bockarie was met at Foya by Joe Tuah. Now, who is Joe Tuah?  
9 Remind us?

14:48:43 10 A. Joe Tuah at the particular time he was I would say an  
11 assistant director of the SSS I think for administration or  
12 something like that.

13 Q. So a senior officer in your administration met him with a  
14 helicopter, yes, and took him to Monrovia?

14:49:04 15 A. Impossible:

16 Q. "Q. Do you know how long Sam Bockarie was in Monrovia?

17 A. He did not stay there too long, sir.

18 Q. Did you become aware when he came back? Were you  
19 involved at all when he came back?"

14:49:25 20 Bear in mind of course, Mr Taylor, this is Christmas.

21 "A. Yes, when he was coming he communicated and he said he  
22 was on his way coming. And then he also came with a  
23 pick-up, one ashes colour pick-up, a Toyota Land Cruiser,  
24 and he said it was given to him by Charles Taylor."

14:49:46 25 Now did you give Mr Bockarie such a Christmas present,  
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. Never did. No. Never did.

28 Q. So let's move on to another topic, shall we. Page 2019 of  
29 the transcript of 23 January 2008:

1 "Q. You've told us about Sam Bockarie having a satellite  
2 phone. Did you ever see anyone else in the RUF with a  
3 satellite phone?

4 A. Yes.

14:50:40 5 Q. Who was that?

6 A. That was Issa Sesay. After Sam Bockarie's regime.

7 Q. Do you know where Issa Sesay got the sat phone from?

8 A. He said the sat phone was given to him by Charles  
9 Taylor from Liberia."

14:50:59 10 True or false?

11 A. Well, let's see what he is talking about here now. He is  
12 saying after --

13 Q. Sam Bockarie's regime?

14 A. Yes, I gave Issa Sesay a satellite phone. Yes, I did, in  
14:51:09 15 2000.

16 Q. And then we get the full context of the suggestion being  
17 made by the witness, Mr Taylor, because he has then returned to  
18 the narrative of events after the Bockarie visit to Monrovia in  
19 December. Do you understand me?

14:51:30 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Question, page 2019 line 11:

22 "Q. Sir, after this offensive in the Kono area, did you  
23 become aware of more fighting occurring somewhere else in  
24 Sierra Leone?

14:51:43 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. What happened next?

27 A. The next operation after Kono and Makeni operations and  
28 Freetown - the next one that we fought in Liberia.

29 Q. Sorry, you mentioned Freetown, so I want to concentrate

1 on that?

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. The attack on Freetown. Where were you when the attack  
4 on Freetown was happening in January 1999?"

14:52:16 5 Over the page, page 2020 line 2:

6 "A. When the attack on Freetown happened, I was in Buedu.

7 Q. Where was Sam Bockarie?

8 A. Sam Bockarie was in Buedu. That was the time I told  
9 you that he came with these jean trousers and T-shirts and  
10 the car?"

14:52:35

11 Pause there.

12 "Q. How did you become aware of what was happening in  
13 Freetown?"

14 A. At 3 o'clock we listened to BBC Focus on Africa and one  
14:52:57 15 commander spoke from Freetown saying that they were in  
16 control of the State House. Sam Bockarie became angry. He  
17 called up Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon asking them why they  
18 should allow someone to call the BBC while he, the  
19 commander, has not called the BBC. Then from there he  
14:53:17 20 himself called the BBC when they were in Buedu. He was  
21 speaking to Robin White over the satellite phone. He shot  
22 and said we were coming around the State House but we were  
23 in Buedu."

24 Pause there, Mr Taylor, and let me ask you this: Now, you  
14:53:37 25 were supposed to have sent this man Abu Keita to command the  
26 Scorpion battalion in Sierra Leone. You appreciate that  
27 suggestion, don't you?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. And you were the one who also provided the arms, ammunition

1 and manpower for the attack on Kono which was to lead eventually  
2 to the attack on Freetown?

3 A. Uh-huh.

14:54:04

4 Q. So help me, Mr Taylor. How is it that your man in Sierra  
5 Leone happened to be in Buedu at the time when Freetown was  
6 attacked?

14:54:22

7 A. Makes him a very bad commander. It is a very terrible  
8 commander that Freetown is hundreds of miles away and he is  
9 sitting down in Buedu. But there is something here too that -  
10 this page 2020 line 4 where he talks about that during this  
11 Freetown situation he is in Buedu and Sam Bockarie comes with  
12 this T-shirt and the car. I don't know what he means by that  
13 car. 2020, I'm not sure --

14 Q. I've seen it.

14:54:45

15 A. I'm not sure if the car is the same pick-up that was  
16 supposed to have come before Christmas. Or what is he talking  
17 about here? I don't understand it because when they get ready to  
18 lie it's hard to put it together now. This car, you see, "That  
19 was the time I told you that he came with these jean trousers and  
20 T-shirt and the car." I'm not sure if this car is referring to  
21 the same car that was referred to before Christmas.

14:55:05

22 Q. I'll come back to you on that in a moment, Mr Taylor.

14:55:26

23 A. But, in any case, if Sam Bockarie had instructions from me  
24 with manpower and heeded Keita to go and command and he is  
25 sitting down in Buedu then that means he should have been  
26 court-martialed. He should have been court-martialed and that's  
27 what makes it even a lie because I never sent him as such and  
28 that he would be sitting down in Buedu while there is fighting  
29 what- I don't know how far Freetown is from Buedu. Maybe 1,000

1 miles away. And the men are supposed to be in training camp  
2 being trained by a Monica Pearson.

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, perhaps you can help me. On line 14 on  
4 page 2020 the witness said this: "He shot and said we were  
14:56:11 5 coming around the State House" - this is Bockarie in conversation  
6 with Robin White - "but we were in Buedu." What do you  
7 understand by that?

8 A. You say he shot and said?

9 Q. This is Bockarie shot and said we were coming around the  
14:56:28 10 State House but we were in fact in Buedu. What do you understand  
11 by that?

12 A. These boys are playing games like cowboys. I mean  
13 Sam Bockarie is supposed to be letting maybe Robin White hear the  
14 sound of gunfire as an impression that Sam Bockarie is in the  
14:56:45 15 Freetown area where the fighting is going on. They are really  
16 taking the heat - they are taking this thing for fun.

17 Q. And the witness continues, Mr Taylor, page 2020 line 21:  
18 "Q. Did Sam Bockarie maintain any communications with  
19 people in Freetown?

14:57:02 20 A. Yes, in Freetown.

21 Q. In and around Freetown?

22 A. He was talking to the various commanders over the Yaesu  
23 radios. He also communicated with Benjamin Yeaten and Joe  
24 Tuah over his satellite phone at night."

14:57:26 25 Then he goes on over the page, page 2021 line 11.

26 "Q. You mentioned that Bockarie was on the satellite phone  
27 with Benjamin Yeaten and Joe Tuah?

28 A. Those are the names I recall.

29 Q. Did you hear him talking to Benjamin Yeaten and Joe

1 Tuah during the Freetown fighting?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Do you know when the Freetown fighting occurred?

14:57:54 4 A. It started in January. It was on 6 January that they  
5 called from the State House saying they were in control of  
6 the State House.

7 Q. What year?

8 A. That was in 1999, sir."

9 Now, Mr Taylor, you understand the implication of that,  
14:58:07 10 don't you? That senior members of your regime were in contact  
11 with Bockarie during the Freetown invasion. Is that true or  
12 false.

13 A. I would say totally false, because they would have no  
14 reason to be in touch with Sam Bockarie during the Freetown  
14:58:29 15 invasion. None whatsoever. I would say it's false.

16 Q. But he continues. Page 2022:

17 "Q. What did Bockarie tell you? What did you hear him say  
18 to Benjamin Yeaten?

19 A. I heard Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten conversing about  
14:58:59 20 the progressive move that RUF has made. I didn't hear any  
21 instruction from Benjamin Yeaten to Bockarie to say do this  
22 or do that at the time.

23 Q. During the fighting in Freetown in the January  
24 offensive did you play any part in that? What was your  
14:59:17 25 assignment?

26 A. I told you I was assigned to Segbwema, Bunumbu just in  
27 case any wounded soldier came. I will take that wounded  
28 soldier to Buedu where he could be treated at the rear.  
29 Even Mano, I made civilians to make a hammock so they can



1 take him to Buedu."

2 Now, Mr Taylor, did you send Abu Keita to Sierra Leone to  
3 act as chief medic?

4 A. No. This general - he says he's a general. If I had sent  
14:59:53 5 him to go and carry out this operation, one would have expected  
6 that he will be at the very front line. But he is putting  
7 himself with Sam Bockarie, to the best of my understanding of  
8 this, he is putting himself close to Sam Bockarie at the time of  
9 the Freetown operation. And he's listening in to conversations  
15:00:19 10 that he's holding on the telephone or radio, whatever, okay?

11 Well, I think we also know other witnesses that we went through a  
12 few days ago that put themselves there too and have their own  
13 account of what's going on, that's supposed to be right near Sam  
14 Bockarie, radio operators that we've heard on. Now, this is  
15:00:41 15 another man who puts himself there too, which there are different  
16 accounts now of what is going on. He would be a pretty bad  
17 commander, you know, acting as a medic. And I don't know the  
18 distance between these towns in Buedu, maybe if we got to know  
19 the name - the names of the two towns that he mentioned and  
15:01:03 20 what's the proximity to Buedu, we will know as to whether he is  
21 even telling the truth whether he was in Buedu or whatever. But  
22 that shows you how inconsistent these things are.

23 Q. Yes. Now, Mr Taylor, we looked at that earlier reference  
24 to jeans and T-shirts, remember?

15:01:45 25 A. Yeah.

26 Q. On page 2020?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now, to assist you, let me explain how that developed.

29 Remember the witness saying at page 2011 that Bockarie went to

1 Liberia, was picked up in Foya by helicopter, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. At page 2013, he went on to say this:

15:02:25

4 "Q. You said the pick-up was an ash colour - the Land  
5 Cruiser was an ash colour. Did Bockarie explain why  
6 Charles Taylor gave him the pick-up?

7 A. Yes, he said because the pick-up was a new pick-up. So  
8 he would be able to move up and down faster.

15:02:44

9 Q. Did Bockarie bring anything else back with him besides  
10 the pick-up?

11 A. In the pick-up he brought some jeans trousers, some  
12 T-shirts, some medicines and bandages."

13 So it's the same trip. So the Christmas present you gave  
14 him was not just a pick-up. It was a load of jeans and T-shirts  
15 and medicines as well. What do you say to that, Mr Taylor?

15:02:58

16 A. Blatant lie. Blatant lie. He was not in Liberia any time  
17 before Christmas except for when he passed through in early  
18 December. That's not true.

15:03:17

19 Q. Now, you were mentioning earlier how bad a commander this  
20 man was because, having been sent on this mission, he ended up  
21 nowhere near Freetown. Let's go to page 2023, line 4:

22 "Q. How close to Freetown did you get?

23 A. I did not go to Freetown.

15:03:39

24 Q. Now, you mentioned one trip you took to Foya with  
25 Bockarie in a helicopter. How many trips total did you  
26 take? Is that the only time you saw a helicopter in Foya  
27 with Bockarie?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Were there other times that Bockarie went to Foya and

1 met a helicopter?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Can you tell us about those?

4 A. I told you that before he went to Monrovia the  
15:04:06 5 helicopter - Joe Tuah used to come to Foya to pick him up  
6 with the helicopter to Monrovia and during the Freetown  
7 invasion he went to Monrovia with that helicopter. He  
8 spent a day there. That was the time he came with the  
9 Toyota Land Cruiser that I told you about, the ash colour.  
15:04:28 10 The other was he carried a wounded soldier, one wounded  
11 soldier, seriously wounded. The helicopter took him from  
12 Foya to Monrovia."

13 Do you see that?

14 A. Are we talking about two pick-ups?

15:04:45 15 Q. Well, I'm sorry I can't help you, Mr Taylor.

16 A. Because there is an ash colour that comes before Christmas.  
17 Here is an ash colour now that is coming again, another pick-up  
18 --

19 Q. During the Freetown invasion.

15:04:56 20 A. -- during the Freetown invasion. So are we talking about  
21 two pick-ups?

22 Q. I can't help you. I'm just reciting from the cold black  
23 and white of the transcript what that witness told these judges.

24 A. This witness just lied. There is no such thing, and that's  
15:05:09 25 why he is so confused. He is lying. All these things are  
26 happening right before Christmas. I have people now going for  
27 training. Monica Pearson is supposed to be training them. And  
28 here he is evacuating people he said from the front. If fighting  
29 is going on in Freetown and you are in Buedu, so where is the

1 front? What front are we - because this is another point. He is  
2 supposed to be this medic, evacuating people from the front. You  
3 are in Buedu. So where are these people coming from? Is he  
4 evacuating the wounded in Freetown, near Freetown? I don't know  
15:05:41 5 the distances, but it must be a pretty long distance. So how  
6 would you be in Buedu and evacuating people from the front?

7 Q. Well, help me with something else, Mr Taylor. And I remind  
8 you, page 2023:

9 "... Joe Tuah used to come to Foya to pick him up with the  
15:06:04 10 helicopter to Monrovia and during the Freetown invasion he  
11 went to Monrovia with that helicopter. He spent a day  
12 there. That was the time he came with the Toyota Land  
13 Cruiser ..."

14 Now, tell me, was the helicopter big enough to carry a  
15:06:21 15 Toyota Land Cruiser, Mr Taylor?

16 A. No. But besides we didn't have a helicopter at the time,  
17 so imagine - I mean, this is - and, in fact, he says he stayed a  
18 short time.

19 Q. A day.

15:06:34 20 A. A day. So that means that within the span of about two  
21 weeks I have given Sam Bockarie two vehicles, one ash coloured,  
22 now this is the Land Cruiser. It never happened. Just never,  
23 ever happened. And I hope I didn't misunderstand the evidence.  
24 But it looks like two vehicles here to me, which is - and I stand  
15:07:02 25 corrected on that.

26 Q. Well, let me ask you another question in that regard. Even  
27 if you get taken by helicopter one leg of the trip and then you  
28 have to drive back from Monrovia in your new Christmas present,  
29 the Toyota Land Cruiser, could you do it in a day?

1 A. No, you can't.

2 Q. Why not?

3 A. Oh, to get through - the period that we are talking about,

4 to get through from Monrovia to Foya - Foya is almost at the

15:07:34 5 end - it would take you, in fact, maybe a full - a full day and a

6 half to get there. We're talking about, on that road, it would

7 take you nine, thirteen, about fourteen to seventeen hours of

8 driving.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, during the Freetown invasion which began on

15:07:58 10 6 January 1999, did Sam Bockarie go to Monrovia?

11 A. No. Never, ever. No.

12 Q. Did you send a helicopter with one of your senior officers,

13 Joe Tuah, to pick him up in Foya?

14 A. Never did. I didn't even have a helicopter at that time.

15:08:21 15 Q. Now, help me, Mr Taylor. You have heard before this Court,

16 have you not, testimony from witnesses, including radio

17 operators, that you were on the satellite phone to Sam Bockarie

18 during the Freetown invasion. Do you recall that?

19 A. Yes, I do.

15:08:38 20 Q. So help me, which is right: Were you on the phone to him?

21 Or was he there in person in Monrovia?

22 A. Neither.

23 Q. Which of those two accounts is right?

24 A. Neither. Neither account. He was never on the phone with

15:08:52 25 me. Neither was he in Monrovia. Neither of those accounts is

26 right. None. None.

27 Q. Now, on this page, same page 2023, line 22:

28 "Q. So when he came back during the Freetown invasion, you

29 said he went to Monrovia and he came back, did he bring

1 back any message?

2 A. The message was he should maintain the controlled areas  
3 of the RUF.

4 Q. Who was the message from?

15:09:27 5 A. He said the message had come from Charles Taylor, that  
6 he should maintain the RUF and to maintain the controlled  
7 areas of the RUF.

8 Q. Who said that the message had come from President  
9 Taylor?

15:09:43 10 A. Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie, sir. Sam Bockarie."  
11 What do you say to that, Mr Taylor?

12 A. That's a blatant lie, completely.

13 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor. Given that you're supposed to  
14 have given this order, what were the RUF-controlled areas at the  
15:10:04 15 time?

16 A. I don't even know where the RUF was controlling in Sierra  
17 Leone as far as specific areas of - I really didn't know. I knew  
18 they were in Sierra Leone, but I did not know their area of  
19 control. No, I did not know.

15:10:38 20 Q. Now, another matter. He was asked this question on page  
21 2024 at line 9, Mr Taylor:

22 "Q. When you were with the RUF did you become aware of any  
23 strategies to deal with attacks from jets?

24 A. Yes.

15:11:00 25 Q. Can you tell us about those RUF strategies?

26 A. The strategy was you should not cook during the  
27 daytime. You should not set fire during the day. You do  
28 not launder and hang the clothes on a line. You are not  
29 entitled to rear chicken in the town. You're not entitled

1 to keep a dog, because those things, when the jet discovers  
2 them they can operate.

3 Q. Was there any strategy involving radios?

15:11:34

4 A. The strategy was the monitor - Zedman monitored the  
5 radio stations from the Nigerian ECOMOG who were based in  
6 Lungi. Also Memunatu and Sita, they monitored from  
7 Monrovia. If a jet takes off from Monrovia on the RIA -  
8 because Victor Malu, who was the first commander, was  
9 staying in Monrovia - so they will call '448', so the radio  
10 operator would ring a bell and everybody would escape.

15:11:59

11 That was the only strategy that I knew about."

12 He then goes on to explain that RIA is Roberts  
13 International Airport. Now, just to break that down, Mr Taylor,  
14 were ECOMOG jets operating from Roberts International Airport?

15:12:23

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And were they making operational sorties from that airport  
17 into Sierra Leone?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Against whom?

15:12:35

20 A. Against the forces that attacked in January.

21 Q. Now, help me, Mr Taylor. So that means, based on the  
22 allegation of this Prosecution, that you were allowing your  
23 airport in Monrovia to be used to bomb your own auxiliaries, the  
24 RUF in Sierra Leone. Is that right?

15:12:59

25 A. That's what they are alleging here.

26 Q. Why were you doing that?

27 A. I guess because I'm supposed to be crazy. I don't know how  
28 they could come up with this kind of assumption. But, I mean,  
29 one would have to be nuts to be doing that, where I would be

1 permitting these people to take off, to go and bomb people that  
2 I'm supposed to be backing.

3 Q. But there's a nuance to this, Mr Taylor, because according  
4 to what the witness is saying, at the same time they were being  
15:13:34 5 alerted by people in Monrovia as to when the jets were taking  
6 off. Do you follow?

7 A. I follow.

8 Q. Now, is it possible to see from Monrovia where a jet is  
9 flying to in Sierra Leone?

15:13:52 10 A. Not at all. In fact, counsel, there's evidence before this  
11 Court that - you know, boy, they really did this to me. What?  
12 These people, I swear I don't know how they managed. Here is  
13 this name Memunatu is up again in Monrovia. When you take off  
14 from Roberts International Airport, except someone sits and  
15:14:24 15 believes that a jet fighter bomber has to pass over Monrovia to  
16 get to Sierra Leone, then you'll believe this kind of lie. But  
17 there's evidence before this Court that there was supposed to be  
18 someone at Robertsfield calling to Sierra Leone. There's  
19 evidence here from another witness that somebody at Robertsfield  
15:14:46 20 was supposed to be - I forgot the code name they used, that was  
21 supposed to be calling Sierra Leone to say that jet fighters were  
22 coming.

23 Because these people have sat down and discussed these lies  
24 so much, everybody keeps getting confused. Because when you take  
15:15:01 25 off from Roberts International Airport and we get the map to look  
26 at Kakata, if you head I would say northeastward you're going  
27 straight to Sierra Leone. Why would you have to come all the way  
28 down to Monrovia to say, "Hey, guess what happened, I'm flying",  
29 and then take off to go towards Sierra Leone when the shortest



1 distance between RIA and Sierra Leone is to go straight  
2 northeast, straight across. In fact, you have to fly from  
3 Robertsfield that is in Harbel straight over Gbarnga, Zorzor  
4 Voinjama and you're down into Sierra Leone, but have you to fly  
15:15:40 5 down to Monrovia and then go back up. It's just - because they  
6 are wondering about the details and how to put it together they  
7 mix up the lies. They mix up the lies.

8 Now when you look at this Memunatu and I do not know who  
9 they have - I'm just coming across Sita, now these are supposed  
15:15:58 10 to be people now that are monitoring from Monrovia like jet  
11 fighter bombers, even they can fly over the ocean but they must  
12 come over Monrovia and then Memunatu is supposed to be saying  
13 that any jet flying over Monrovia, these are ECOMOG jets that are  
14 going to go and bomb. It's all a pack of lies. That's what this  
15:16:20 15 is all about and it's continuing.

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall in earlier testimony that we  
17 referred to mention being made of you sending along 150 untrained  
18 men along with the 300 boxes of ammunition? Do you remember  
19 that?

15:16:37 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. I want you to listen carefully to this, please. Page 2025,  
22 line 12:

23 "Q. You talked about some men coming with Bockarie when he  
24 first arrived in Buedu after your arrival. Did you see any  
15:16:54 25 other arrivals of manpower into Sierra Leone?

26 A. Yes. Later some more men followed.

27 Q. Do you recall when that was approximately?

28 A. That was after the Freetown and Kono invasions.

29 Another 150 men came with Marzah and Sampson.

1 Q. What happened to these men?

2 A. They were dispatched into another group of the RUF."

3 What were you sending those for, Mr Taylor?

4 A. I really don't know. I really don't know. This is the  
15:17:33 5 lies - it's just a total falsehood. I'm supposed to be sending  
6 more men. The Freetown invasion is over and I'm sending more  
7 men, but to do what?

8 Q. That's what I'm asking you, Mr Taylor, because, you see,  
9 you're alleged to have sent them so I want you, the military  
10 strategist, to assist us as to why. Do you see?  
15:17:50

11 A. Uh-huh. Never sent anybody into Sierra Leone. The first  
12 time or the second time. That's a blatant falsehood.

13 Q. Now moving on. Question, line 23 page 2025:

14 "Q. Did you ever see Mr Ibrahim Bah in Sierra Leone?

15:18:20 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Where was it that you saw Mr Bah?

17 A. I saw Mr Bah in Kono with Eddie Kanneh and CR.

18 Q. Do you remember which year that was?

19 A. That was during Issa Sesay's administration, sir.

15:18:39 20 Q. Well, can you estimate which year or years it might  
21 have been?

22 A. That was in 2000, sir.

23 Q. Who was CR?

24 A. CR was the bodyguard to General Ibrahim Bah.

15:18:53 25 Q. Can you describe him?

26 A. He was slim and tall. He is Liberian.

27 Q. When you saw him in Kono, what was he doing if you  
28 know?

29 A. Ibrahim Bah and some Lebanese, four of them, they came

1 to Kono with Eddie Kanneh to Issa Sesay to get the RUF  
2 diamonds.

3 Q. Did they bring anything?

4 A. They only brought a car.

15:19:20 5 Q. Sir, you talked about Sam Bockarie being with the RUF,  
6 did he stay with the RUF the whole time you were with the  
7 RUF?"

8 But let's pause. Do you know anything about the presence  
9 of Ibrahim Bah and Eddie Kanneh in Kono with some Lebanese?

15:19:45 10 A. No.

11 Q. Now, you recall other testimony from other witnesses about  
12 white men coming to Kono to assess the mining situation, don't  
13 you?

14 A. I recall that, but I sent them. It was said that I sent  
15:20:00 15 them.

16 Q. Yes, I know. That's what I'm going to ask you. Did you  
17 send Ibrahim Bah and Eddie Kanneh on this occasion with those two  
18 Lebanese men and a car?

19 A. If there were any such people they went on their own. No,  
15:20:16 20 I did not send them. I did not send them, because even this -  
21 the only Liberian CR that I know is one little - a bad little boy  
22 called Cindor Reeves. That's the - I understand he used to  
23 drive. He was the driver for Ibrahim Bah who claimed to have  
24 been my brother-in-law which is a blatant, blatant lie. I think  
15:20:43 25 that's the same little CR here that they have been talking about.

26 Q. Cindor Reeves?

27 A. Cindor Reeves, yes, that could be him.

28 Q. He claims to be your brother-in-law, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, I've seen he has been telling people around that he

1 was my brother-in-law, he knew me very well.

2 Q. Where did you see such a claim?

15:21:18

3 A. Well, Cindor Reeves - in fact my ex-wife was contacted on  
4 the Cindor Reeves matter who used to be with Ibrahim Bah. I'm  
5 assuming that the CR is Cindor Reeves if this is the same person.

6 Q. Yes, but I'm asking when did you first encounter that name?

7 A. Well, I've been hearing the Cindor Reeves around - since my  
8 incarceration. Investigation shows that Cindor Reeves testified  
9 in the case here in The Hague against another person which --

15:21:43

10 Q. Who was that?

11 A. The Dutch man.

12 Q. Guus Kouwenhoven?

13 A. Yes. And that he was supposed to be close to me, which is  
14 not true. I think this is the same Cindor Reeves.

15:21:55

15 Q. To your recollection, Mr Taylor, of the 90 plus witnesses  
16 called by the Prosecution in this case, was Cindor Reeves one of  
17 them?

18 A. No, I haven't - I didn't - he didn't appear here, no.

19 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Do you know the spelling?

15:22:19

20 MR GRIFFITHS: C-I-N-D-O-R R-E-E-V-E-S.

21 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Do you have a brother-in-law with that name, Mr Taylor?

24 A. No.

15:22:32

25 Q. "Q. Did Sam Bockarie stay with the RUF in Sierra Leone the  
26 entire time you were in Sierra Leone?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Did he ever leave the RUF in Sierra Leone?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Do you remember about when that was?

2 A. That was after the Lome Peace Accord because he and  
3 Foday Saybana Sankoh had an argument. He said he will  
4 never disarm to the Nigerian ECOMOG until they bring a  
15:23:00 5 peacekeeping force, so Foday Sankoh ordered that he be  
6 arrested.

7 Q. Was he arrested?

8 A. No.

9 Q. What did he do?

15:23:09 10 A. He crossed over to Liberia.

11 Q. When Sam Bockarie went to Liberia who became in charge  
12 of the RUF?"

13 Now, help us, Mr Taylor. From that little nugget of  
14 information provided by the witness what's missing?

15:23:29 15 A. All the details surrounding how Sam Bockarie got to  
16 Monrovia. It's all missing because he just doesn't know  
17 anything.

18 Q. Now thereafter he is asked this at page 2027 line 19:

19 "Q. When Issa Sesay took over from Bockarie did he ever  
15:23:53 20 make any trips outside of Sierra Leone to your knowledge?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What do you know about any trips by Issa Sesay outside  
23 of Sierra Leone?

24 A. The trip was after the 8 May incident that took place  
15:24:09 25 in Freetown after we had arrested the Zambian and the  
26 Kenyan peacekeepers in Makeni.

27 Q. Which year are you speaking of now?

28 A. 2000."

29 Then the questioning continued in this vein:

1 "Q. During the time you were with the RUF did you become  
2 aware of any incidents of peacekeepers, involving  
3 peacekeepers?

4 A. Yes.

15:24:36 5 Q. Can you tell us about the first one?

6 A. The first one, after the capture of Kono the Nigerian  
7 ECOMOG were captured. Eleven peacekeepers were captured  
8 under ECOMOG. They were in Buedu in the dungeons."

9 Do you know anything about that, Mr Taylor?

15:24:55 10 A. Nothing whatsoever, no.

11 Q. "Q. When you say this was after the capture of Kono,  
12 is this after the Kono attack that you spoke about before  
13 involving Christmas Day?

14 A. Yes, after the Kono attack.

15:25:14 15 Q. Who were the peacekeepers?

16 A. They were Nigerian ECOMOG, sir.

17 Q. Who captured them?

18 A. The RUF. They were captured by General Issa.

19 Q. Was this during the time that Sam Bockarie was in  
15:25:27 20 Liberia or after that time?

21 A. At the time that Sam Bockarie was the commander in  
22 charge."

23 Pause again. Mr Taylor, does that assist you? Do you  
24 recall such an incident whilst Sam Bockarie was in charge of the

15:25:43 25 RUF?

26 A. I really don't.

27 Q. Now he continues. "The 11 peacekeepers were later released  
28 into Liberia." Do you recall that now?

29 A. No. No. The only peacekeepers that were released inside

1 Liberia were released in 2000 and there were several hundred  
2 peacekeepers. But there is an amazing thing about this witness  
3 that I think we ought to get on the record.

4 This witness is supposed to be dispatched to Sierra Leone  
15:26:19 5 now somewhere beginning October of 1998. He is still in Sierra  
6 Leone up to 2000. I haven't seen anywhere at least to this point  
7 - here is a principal commander on a major mission. He has been  
8 in there. And the two times that he lies even about a helicopter  
9 picking up Sam Bockarie, I don't know whether he reaches into  
15:26:49 10 Monrovia. Because he talks about Foya, so I don't know as to  
11 whether he reaches all the way to Monrovia. Why he doesn't go to  
12 Monrovia I don't know.

13 I haven't seen yet where - that he now - this is a general,  
14 a commander that has been sent and Benjamin Yeaten is supposed to  
15:27:08 15 be his boss and I signed the order - I don't see him yet talking  
16 to Benjamin Yeaten. I still don't see him reporting to Benjamin  
17 Yeaten or to me. You are in a country for two years on a major  
18 mission and what are you doing? You are not talking to anybody  
19 back there. You're not reporting to Benjamin. You're not  
15:27:28 20 reporting to me. What are you doing in this country for two  
21 years? You are sent there under Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie  
22 leaves in December of 1999 and you're still there and now you're  
23 working under Issa Sesay.

24 It's not - it doesn't make any sense and as you put it  
15:27:45 25 together you can even see deeper through the lie, because he was  
26 never sent there by anyone in the first place because there is no  
27 way he can exist in this place and he still doesn't talk about,  
28 "I called Benjamin Yeaten and I reported to him about the  
29 operation", or, "I called this person and reported." You are in

1 the country for two years on a major assignment now you have 300  
2 men under your command. First 150, second 150. You are talking  
3 to nobody. How did you get in the country on a major order that  
4 you are not reporting back to anybody? All these discussions are  
15:28:21 5 just supposed to be between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten.  
6 You do not report and you are still on the ground up until 2000  
7 when Issa Sesay takes over. So it simply means that you went  
8 there on your own. That's all.

9 Q. I'm still concentrating on the 11 Nigerian ECOMOG who were  
15:28:41 10 captured?

11 A. Never. Never.

12 Q. No, but he provides more detail, Mr Taylor, and it's only  
13 fair that I give you an opportunity to address this. Page 2029:

14 "A. ... In Buedu we had a hole that we dug, a big hole,  
15:28:59 15 where we put - we used ladders to put prisoners into the  
16 hole. In the RUF town they called it dungeon.

17 Q. You mentioned that these prisoners were released. Do  
18 you know what happened to lead to their release?

19 A. Yes.

15:29:16 20 Q. Can you tell the judges what you know about that?

21 A. Yes, the peacekeepers - Benjamin Yeaten and Sam  
22 Bockarie we had a meeting first at Dawa. Benjamin Yeaten  
23 told Sam Bockarie that Charles Taylor said if he releases  
24 the peacekeepers to him in Liberia and then Sam Bockarie -  
15:29:45 25 and Sam Bockarie never hesitated, but he didn't release  
26 them the same day. Benjamin Yeaten went to Foya. We drove  
27 back to Buedu. After a couple of days Sam Bockarie said he  
28 had a call from Benjamin Yeaten instructing him that it is  
29 an order from the President, Charles Taylor, to release the



1 peacekeepers and then we drove with the peacekeepers,  
2 along with Marzah, Sampson, to Foya where we met Benjamin  
3 Yeaten and Joe Tuah where the peacekeepers were handed  
4 over, the 11 ECOMOGs."

15:30:25 5 Do you recall this, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Not at all. I know of no incident. Up to the time that  
7 Sam Bockarie left, I know of no situation where 11 Nigerians were  
8 turned over to us in Liberia. Never, no.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let us not miss the nuances of this  
15:30:47 10 statement. "Charles Taylor said if he releases the peacekeepers  
11 to him in Liberia and Sam Bockarie never hesitated." You know  
12 what that implies, don't you?

13 A. Yes, that I'm ordering him to, really. That's what it  
14 implies.

15:31:04 15 Q. And he is your boy who follows your orders.

16 A. Exactly.

17 Q. What do you say about that?

18 A. That's a blatant lie because no such thing happened and Sam  
19 Bockarie never took orders from me. Never. But, you know, when  
15:31:22 20 these people are talking and destroying people, you - if we agree  
21 that I order - I can order Sam Bockarie, an order from a  
22 superior, there's not a delay. It would take him a few days  
23 before he would do it, on an order? I mean, so they are talking  
24 one way and they are forgetting what they are saying. I'm  
15:31:49 25 supposed to be ordering Sam Bockarie, but he is taking a few  
26 days. And then later on Benjamin has to call and say, "It's an  
27 order from the President." If this man is taking orders from me,  
28 on the first statement to Sam Bockarie, the people should be out  
29 of there. He is a soldier. He is supposed to know that.

1 Q. Now, it continues. Now, I'm helpfully reminded - could I  
2 have a moment, please. I'm helpfully reminded, Mr Taylor, and I  
3 offered you the opportunity to comment on this because it might  
4 prove significant in due course, another Prosecution witness,  
15:32:47 5 TF1-597, Samuel Kargbo, claims to have met Abu Keita in Buedu,  
6 Sierra Leone, in March 1998. This is page 10523 to 25 of the  
7 transcript of 22 May 2008. Note, March 1998. Now, when does  
8 Keita himself claim to have arrived in Sierra Leone?

9 A. Keita puts himself in Sierra Leone about late September,  
15:33:26 10 early October of 1998, after he's given this instruction to go on  
11 this assignment.

12 Q. But six months prior to this he's supposed to be in Buedu.

13 A. But Keita must know Buedu. These boys - the RUF and  
14 ULIMO-K had worked together for years on that border and that  
15:33:53 15 Keita boy cannot tell me that from Mendekoma to Buedu, all the  
16 years he worked there as a general he did not know that. He knew  
17 these people for years before. So I believe that witness because  
18 these boys were in and out of Sierra Leone. That's - Varmuyan  
19 had his, what, I'm not sure if his mother or father, one of them,  
15:34:19 20 one part from Sierra Leone. These boys had been knowing that  
21 place. It didn't take Charles Taylor to send them.

22 Q. Now, the witness goes on, Mr Taylor, to deal with another  
23 incident involving peacekeepers. Page 2029, beginning at line  
24 27:

15:34:37 25 "Q. Were you aware of another incident involving  
26 peacekeepers?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. When did that occur?

29 A. That happened when Sam Bockarie was no longer in

1 charge. It was General Issa Sesay.

2 Q. Do you remember which year that was?

3 A. That was in 2000, sir.

4 Q. Can you tell us what you know about that second

15:35:05 5 incident?

6 A. That was Augustine Gbao. They said they arrested three

7 SBUs in Makeni and they were forcefully taken to the

8 disarmament camp and so the Lome Peace Accord never said

9 they should force any combatants to disarm, so that brought

15:35:25 10 about the idea of us arresting the Kenyans and the

11 Zambians.

12 Q. How many peacekeepers? You said Kenyans and Zambians.

13 How many of them were arrested by the RUF?

14 A. Roughly about 500. The whole Zambian troops."

15:35:47 15 Now, do you recall this incident, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. "Q. Did Issa Sesay speak about his feelings about this  
18 incident?

19 A. Issa Sesay was the commander. But Foday Sankoh was in

15:36:03 20 Freetown when all of us the front line commanders. We

21 expected to get orders that he we should release the people

22 but we never had the orders and then Issa told us to take

23 the people to Number 11 plant in Kono.

24 Q. How long were these peacekeepers held?

15:36:22 25 A. The peacekeepers were there until the attack took place  
26 at Foday Sankoh's house in Freetown."

27 Now, we know that to be 8 May 2000.

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. "Q. Again you mentioned this was the year 2000. Do you

1 know what month it was?

2 A. That happened in May.

3 Q. What happened then with the peacekeepers after the  
4 attack on Sankoh's house?

15:36:49 5 A. We got Denis Mingo who is called Superman and Gibri I  
6 Massaquoi and one bodyguard to Foday Saybana Sankoh who was  
7 called Ray. He was the Black Guard commander. They  
8 retreated from Freetown and then we got them. We met with  
9 them Gbere Junction. That was the time they reached among  
10 us, they entered our midst and I drove them to Makeni and  
11 then they said Foday Sankoh gave them message that Issa  
12 Sesay should take charge of the RUF."

13 Now, pause again, Mr Taylor. Message from Sankoh to them  
14 that Sesay to take charge. How did that actually come about?

15:37:41 15 Where was Sankoh at the time?

16 A. During this particular time, Foday Sankoh was incarcerated  
17 into Freetown.

18 Q. He was in prison?

19 A. That is correct.

15:37:52 20 Q. Yes. And this witness is saying that somehow Sankoh at  
21 that time, despite being in custody, sent a message to say that  
22 Issa Sesay was in charge, yes?

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. So, Mr Taylor, help me. Why did you and those other two  
15:38:14 25 Presidents spend all that time ferrying letters to Freetown when  
26 all it took was for Mr Sankoh to send a message via some of his  
27 men? Why did you bother? Didn't you have enough to do?

28 A. I tell you, it's just hard what these boys try to put  
29 together. He does not know a bit of what happened. Doesn't know

1 and he is here talking and misleading everybody else. The story  
2 that is factual is - it's in written evidence. Foday Sankoh was  
3 incarcerated in Freetown. Olusegun Obasanjo, the President of  
4 Nigeria, and Alpha Oumar Konare flew to Freetown, met with Tejani  
15:39:11 5 Kabbah. They brought Foday Sankoh and Foday Sankoh gave the  
6 approval to those Heads of State that came back to Liberia to me.  
7 Issa Sesay returned to Liberia and we sat at Roberts  
8 International Airport and it was first announced at that  
9 particular time. Sankoh did not send any message to anyone in  
10 the bush over there to tell them anything. He was in jail. So  
15:39:35 11 this boy does not know what he is talking about. He does not  
12 know.

13 Q. Now, he continues:

14 "Q. After the message came from Sankoh that Issa Sesay  
15:39:54 15 should be in charge, what happened with the peacekeepers?

16 A. The peacekeepers were still under their control and we  
17 saw Marzah and Jungle. They came for Issa Sesay in Makeni.  
18 We drove to the border. They crossed into Liberia."

19 Pause. Mr Taylor, was there an occasion when you sent  
15:40:26 20 Zigzag Marzah and Jungle to Sierra Leone to fetch Issa Sesay?

21 A. No. Not at all.

22 Q. Well, according to this, at or about the time that you and  
23 President Obasanjo and President Blaise Compaore were busy trying  
24 to sort this business out --

15:40:54 25 A. Konare.

26 Q. Konare.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. -- you sent - you sent Marzah and Jungle to go and fetch  
29 Sesay.

1 A. This boy is lying. He's lying. We have to divide the  
2 times up. The first trip that Sesay makes to Liberia is around  
3 May or thereabouts to talk about the release of the UN hostages  
4 where he is told categorically that the hostages must be  
15:41:24 5 released. We have evidence here, United Nations documents where  
6 I make the point that there will be no - that the release of  
7 Foday Sankoh cannot and will not be tied to the release of the  
8 hostages. We solved the hostage problem.

9 The second time Issa Sesay comes to Liberia, he's invited.  
15:41:46 10 By the time Sesay comes, Sesay is given a telephone. He is  
11 communicated with by telephone and invited to Liberia in July  
12 2000. Sesay comes to Liberia in July 2000 and he meets several  
13 West African Presidents in my office. Obasanjo is there. Konare  
14 is there. Gnassingbe Eyadema, there. Yahya Jammeh of The  
15:42:17 15 Gambia, there. They are all there.

16 He is given another time upon leaving for the Presidents to  
17 be able to go into Freetown and exchange letters to return. He  
18 returns in August. It didn't take me to send nobody. Marzah and  
19 these boys - if I need Issa Sesay, I would probably instruct  
15:42:37 20 Benjamin Yeaten, the director of SSS, or my Minister of State to  
21 say, "Get Issa Sesay." Nobody - he knows these people's names.  
22 Nobody went for - Sesay came on official business in Liberia and  
23 it did not take no Jungle or no Marzah to go for him.

24 Q. Now, I want you to attend with care, Mr Taylor, to the  
15:42:59 25 sequence of events as described by the witness. Note: Sankoh,  
26 despite being in prison, sends a message via Superman, Gibriil  
27 Massaquoi, and a Black Guard commander called Ray. Yes?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. That's stage 1. Stage 2, Marzah and Jungle go to Sierra

1 Leone to fetch Issa Sesay in Makeni, okay. That's stage 2.

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. Then this: "We drove to the border. They crossed into  
4 Liberia. When Issa came back, he brought a satellite phone. He  
15:43:48 5 called a meeting in Makeni at the Military Police headquarters at  
6 the roundabout because we were using the old bank in Makeni."

7 Now, let's pause again. On that first occasion when Sesay  
8 came to Liberia, who met with him?

9 A. When he came to Liberia. I met with Issa Sesay when he  
15:44:11 10 came to Liberia.

11 Q. On the second occasion that he came who met with him?

12 A. I along with four other West African Presidents.

13 Q. Now remember what I asked you to note about the sequence.  
14 They have already been informed that Sesay is in charge, yes?

15:44:28 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. Jungle and Marzah then go to fetch him?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Now there is this trip when he returns with a satellite  
19 phone, yes?

15:44:38 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. "Because we were using the old bank in Makeni, so he spoke  
22 to all the commanders. He said, 'Charles Taylor said we should  
23 release the peacekeepers over to him in Liberia'."

24 Is that accurate, Mr Taylor?

15:45:02 25 A. Well, there is accuracy here that the peacekeepers should  
26 be released in Liberia because there was a problem in where they  
27 should pass, but the way how it is structured here I don't know  
28 what he is talking about, but, yes, we do say that the  
29 peacekeepers - it was a conclusion that the best route for them

1 would be to come through Liberia.

2 Q. No, no, no. "Release the peacekeepers over to him" -  
3 that's you, Charles Taylor - "in Liberia." Was that what was  
4 supposed to happen?

15:45:44 5 A. No. The peacekeepers were supposed to be released, total.  
6 I mean not - where and how was a different matter but not --

7 Q. And who was to receive them, Mr Taylor, on arrival in  
8 Liberia?

9 A. Well, the Government of Liberia officials and the United  
15:46:00 10 Nations would be there to receive them.

11 Q. And now get the sense of the full passage and the import of  
12 it.

13 "He said Charles Taylor said we should release the  
14 peacekeepers over to him in Liberia and then now he never had any  
15:46:17 15 alternative but for us to release the peacekeepers."

16 How do you understand the sentiment behind that?

17 A. He is trying to say that, well, the orders came from our  
18 top boss and we didn't have an alternative, which is a blatant  
19 lie. I was not their boss. What Issa Sesay received from me  
15:46:37 20 during that meeting was a very frank delivery of a message. The  
21 international community was outraged. It was a very foolish  
22 thing to do to take over UN peacekeepers. Release these people,  
23 because you do not know how much trouble you are in regarding  
24 taking United Nations personnel hostage. That was a very  
15:47:02 25 clear-cut message. Now how they tie up outside is their

26 business, but there was not like an order from a boss to his  
27 little boy working under him, no. I delivered a message to --

28 Q. From whom?

29 A. From the international community. That was the - I had



1 spoken to Kofi Annan. There was not one major member of the  
2 United Nations that was not upset by this matter. I mean I spoke  
3 to Annan, I spoke to many other Presidents not even in West  
4 Africa. The whole burden was on me asking me to do whatever you  
15:47:37 5 can because these people must be free. The Kenyan government,  
6 the - oh, I mean he doesn't even know what he's talking about.  
7 He doesn't know.

8 Q. Well, he claims he does, Mr Taylor --

9 A. He doesn't.

15:47:50 10 Q. -- because he continues in this vein:

11 "So we took the peacekeepers. We drove them to the border  
12 and then they were handed over to Benjamin Yeaten and then  
13 Joe Tuah again in Foya.

14 Q. When Issa Sesay came back from Liberia, you said he  
15:48:10 15 brought a satellite phone. Did he indicate where he got  
16 the satellite phone?

17 A. He said the satellite phone was issued to him by  
18 Charles Taylor and then with the satellite phone he came  
19 with 50 boxes of ammunition again."

15:48:33 20 Just so that you understand the picture, Mr Taylor, you  
21 send Marzah and Jungle to Sierra Leone to pick him up and take  
22 him to Monrovia?

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. In the midst of an international crisis around the seizure  
15:48:47 25 of 500 UN peacekeepers, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. The eyes of the world are on Liberia?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Why did you take that opportunity to load him down with 50

1 boxes of ammunition?

2 A. I never took that opportunity. It never happened. Never,  
3 never happened. One would have to be very, very - and there are  
4 other witnesses that came here and talk about where Issa Sesay  
15:49:11 5 took off from and where he landed and it was Spriggs Payne  
6 Airport to Foya. Spriggs Payne Airport to Foya. And another  
7 witness has been here to say that there was nothing on the  
8 helicopter. Here is another one here now saying there were 50  
9 boxes of ammunition.

15:49:28 10 At Spriggs Payne Airport in Monrovia during this time in  
11 question the entire international press, every diplomat in  
12 Monrovia, Spriggs Payne Airport was crowded with United Nations  
13 military personnel. The headquarters and everything was set up  
14 there. One would have to be - I don't know what kind of drugs in  
15:49:54 15 the world to take - at Spriggs Payne Airport on the Mi-2  
16 helicopter to put 50 boxes of AK.

17 In fact, oh, my dear. It's just too much. It's a blatant,  
18 blatant lie. This happens in the full view of the entire world  
19 at Spriggs Payne Airport, Foya, those soldiers are being  
15:50:16 20 transported up and down. In fact, Issa Sesay is still in  
21 Monrovia while arrangements are being made for those soldiers to  
22 be brought to the border. United Nations helicopters are  
23 involved in moving these soldiers up and down from Foya to  
24 Spriggs Payne Airport. There is no such thing as anybody getting  
15:50:39 25 not even one box of ammunition. It's a lie.

26 Q. Let's move on. Page 2047 of the transcript of 23 January  
27 2008, line 4:

28 "Q. Can you help us by letting us know when this happened,  
29 when the RUF was involved in the operation against Mosqui

1 Spray?

2 A. That was what I said. I said August 1999, sir.

3 Q. Thank you. Now you said Sam Bockarie indicated he had  
4 gotten this information, instructions you said, from  
15:51:37 5 Benjamin Yeaten. Do you know who Benjamin Yeaten reported  
6 to?

7 A. Benjamin Yeaten reported to Taylor, sir.

8 Q. Did you go and fight then in Liberia?

9 A. Yes. We fought against the LURD rebels against  
15:51:58 10 Mosquito Spray and we took over Kolahun and then we took  
11 over Voinjama. That was a successful mission for us. And  
12 then Benjamin Yeaten, Sam Bockarie and the Defence Minister  
13 Daniel Chea, they arrived on helicopter in Voinjama and  
14 then they were flown to Monrovia, sir."

15:52:25 15 Pause. August 1999, Mr Taylor. What were you up to in  
16 Monrovia, August 1999? Let me put the question differently.  
17 What commenced on 26 July, Independence Day, 1999?

18 A. By August of 1999 - in fact that month we are basically  
19 dealing with almost on a day or other day basis the destruction  
15:53:07 20 of the arms and ammunition that were taken during the war in  
21 August of 1999. We are basically destroying arms at this time.

22 Q. Now, in August do you accept that there was an incursion of  
23 LURD from Guinea?

24 A. Yes, there was a - yes.

15:53:25 25 Q. Led by whom?

26 A. '99 I'm not sure because Mosquito Spray - I'm not sure if  
27 that's the same time, that Mosquito Spray was a little earlier.  
28 I don't know who leads that operation in Voinjama. I don't  
29 remember the name of the person at that particular time who lead

1 that operation in Voinjama because they take UN personnel. I'm  
2 not sure of what he called himself at that particular time, but  
3 Mosquito Spray was an earlier incursion.

15:54:13 4 Q. Now, did you at that time in effect order that the RUF come  
5 to Liberia to fight against that LURD incursion?

6 A. Never. No. Never. Never. What would we need the RUF  
7 for? We did not need them. We tried our best and put up our  
8 resistance and in fact did expel the LURD on this particular  
9 attack in Voinjama, okay. They went and they kept coming and  
15:54:37 10 coming, but I never asked - I'm not even talking about ordering.  
11 Never even asked for any assistance at this particular time from  
12 the RUF.

13 Q. And you appreciate that from these words, "Sam Bockarie had  
14 gotten instructions from Benjamin Yeaten", who in turn reported  
15:55:02 15 to Taylor, that you in effect - that's the chain of command. You  
16 gave that instruction, that order. You understand that, don't  
17 you?

18 A. I understand that. But that never happened. That never  
19 happened.

15:55:17 20 Q. Help us, Mr Taylor. What do you understand by this: "Yes,  
21 we fought against the LURD rebels against Mosquito Spray and we"  
22 - that must refer to the RUF because remember you had instructed  
23 him to join the RUF and written him an instruction to that  
24 effect. "We took over Kolahun and then we took over Voinjama."  
15:55:45 25 Did they?

26 A. No. In fact, we did have these brief incursions but it did  
27 not last very long. Don't let's forget because if I had had such  
28 serial crisis in Liberia at that time there's something else I'm  
29 doing in August 1999. Don't forget that at the same time that

1 this matter is going on in Liberia in August of 1999 I'm busy  
2 trying to handle a matter in Sierra Leone. And don't let's  
3 forget that it is this period that at Okra Hills the West Side  
4 Boys are misbehaving where they are have taken UN and other  
15:56:26 5 hostages at Okra Hills. That's in August, okay.

6 So the situation in Voinjama is a brief situation that is  
7 handled, okay, but I would not have had my plate full over there  
8 and busy trying to get the matters settled in Sierra Leone where  
9 Johnny Paul Koroma comes to Liberia in August of 1999. So it's a  
15:56:46 10 brief situation over there that is handled, even though some  
11 months later they come, but I'm still - I'm dealing with that and  
12 still dealing with this matter that is still in Sierra Leone that  
13 brings Johnny Paul to Liberia.

14 Q. Now this:

15:57:02 15 "That was a successful mission for us and then Benjamin  
16 Yeaten, Sam Bockarie and the Defence Minister Daniel Chea, they  
17 arrived on helicopter in Voinjama and then they were flown to  
18 Monrovia."

19 Do you know anything about that, Mr Taylor?

15:57:25 20 A. No. In August of 1999? No. Sam Bockarie in fact does not  
21 come to Liberia in August of 1999. Like I said, there's a major  
22 problem over in Sierra Leone dealing with this conflict and we're  
23 busy trying to get hostages released in that month of August.  
24 Sam Bockarie doesn't come to Liberia.

15:57:46 25 Q. When does he come?

26 A. Sam Bockarie, in 1999 he comes in I think November.  
27 December once and then - he comes twice. In fact three times.  
28 He comes in November. We discuss with Foday Sankoh on  
29 disarmament, okay. There is no agreement. He goes.

1 He comes back late December, okay, where he meets me and  
2 Obasanjo and we have United Nations documents here before this  
3 Court where a decision is taken in December on that second visit  
4 that if Sam Bockarie does not submit to that process Obasanjo  
15:58:33 5 will decide that he will be held in Liberia. That's the second.

6 The third time he comes is when he stays, okay. So in  
7 answer to your question there are three times; November and twice  
8 in December he comes. August he does not come.

9 Q. Help me, Mr Taylor. Sorry to interrupt you. Foday Sankoh  
15:58:51 10 does come to Liberia in or about the middle of 1999, doesn't he?

11 A. Oh, yes. He comes - he comes in September.

12 Q. When he comes in September, does Sam Bockarie come to  
13 Liberia at that time?

14 A. Yes, yes, yes, he - yeah, he comes to Liberia and he gives  
15:59:09 15 a report, yes. He does come in September, yes.

16 Q. Was he there in August?

17 A. No, he was not there in August. He was not in Liberia in  
18 August.

19 Q. Now, help me with this if you can: You note that the  
15:59:24 20 sentence reads, "Benjamin Yeaten, Sam Bockarie and the Defence  
21 Minister Daniel Chea arrived on helicopter in Voinjama." Do you  
22 have any idea where they could have arrived from, Mr Taylor?

23 A. No. If they arrived in Voinjama via helicopter, the only  
24 place the Defence Minister would be coming from would be  
15:59:51 25 Monrovia.

26 Q. But then it goes on, "And then they were flown to  
27 Monrovia."

28 A. Where did the helicopter come from?

29 Q. Well, I was wondering.

1 A. No. I mean --

2 Q. Maybe you could help us.

3 A. Well, that's a part of the confusion when they don't know  
4 they talk - if Daniel Chea, the Defence Minister, was coming to  
16:00:10 5 Voinjama that means he flew on this helicopter. An Mi-2, again,  
6 is a small helicopter. And when you - there's no refuelling  
7 station anywhere between Monrovia and Voinjama. If that little  
8 Mi-2 filled up in Monrovia and flew to Voinjama, it would have to  
9 fly back to Monrovia. It couldn't go to many other places  
16:00:30 10 because there is no refuelling. It's a small - an Mi-2 is a  
11 small helicopter, very small helicopter. So you can't say that  
12 he came from Monrovia then he flew to Monrovia. Well, okay, well  
13 he flew back to Monrovia, but where would Sam Bockarie be coming  
14 from? Then that means that - then the helicopter had to pick up  
16:00:49 15 Sam Bockarie from Monrovia, which is not true.

16 Q. Line 19, page 2047:

17 "Q. In that operation in Liberia which RUF commanders were  
18 involved?

19 A. That is what I'm saying. It was Issa Sesay, Morris  
16:01:18 20 Kallon, and then the overall commander was Sam Bockarie who  
21 was based at Foya."

22 In which country is Foya, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Foya is in Liberia.

24 Q. Was there a time in 1999 when Sam Bockarie was based at  
16:01:37 25 Foya?

26 A. Sam Bockarie was never, never, ever based at Foya. Never,  
27 ever.

28 Q. Now, on that note, Mr Taylor, prior to December 1999 going  
29 into 2000, had you received any complaints from either the Sierra

1 Leonean government or, indeed, the international community about  
2 the destabilising presence of Sam Bockarie and a bunch of Sierra  
3 Leoneans based on Liberian soil at Foya?

4 A. No.

16:02:28 5 Q. Do you follow me?

6 A. No, not at all.

7 Q. Now, you did receive such complaints after he moved to  
8 Monrovia, did you not?

9 A. Yes, I did.

16:02:36 10 Q. Prior to that, had you received any such complaint?

11 A. None whatsoever.

12 Q. "Q. Were there other units besides RUF that were fighting  
13 together against Mosquito Spray?

14 A. Yes, they were the AFL whom I told that you their  
16:03:05 15 commander was Colonel Stanley."

16 Do you know him?

17 A. No, I don't know him.

18 Q. "The battalion commander in Foya and the police and the  
19 ATU. We all did the operation to clear off Mosquito Spray  
16:03:21 20 from Kolahun and Voi njama.

21 Q. I don't believe we have discussed the ATU before. Can  
22 you tell the judges what the ATU unit is?

23 A. From the SSU, when the SSU was dissolved, they formed  
24 the ATU which were the special mansion guards assigned to  
16:03:44 25 Charles Taylor at the mansion.

26 Q. So it's the same as the SSU just the name changed. Is  
27 that correct?

28 A. Yes, to ATU.

29 Q. So all of these units that were involved, the AFL, the



1 ATU, the RUF, was there any overall commander?

2 A. The overall commander we had was Benjamin Yeaten. He  
3 was the field supervisor for us."

4 He is then asked this, page 2048:

16:04:25 5 "Q. I am finished now asking you about Mosquito Spray and  
6 I am asking you were you involved in any other operations  
7 outside of the borders of the Sierra Leone with the RUF?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. What was the next one?

16:04:44 10 A. The next one, after releasing the peacekeepers, which  
11 were the Zambians and the Kenyans, when Issa Sesay came  
12 with the 50 boxes of ammunition, we moved from Makeni to  
13 Kamakwie and then the commanders who was in Kokuima, who  
14 was called Colonel Komba Gbundema, he was the commander in  
16:05:10 15 Kamakwie and then we used the Kabbah ferry. We went to  
16 Madina Wola. We attacked Madina Wola in Guinea and then in  
17 that attack we incurred more casualties.

18 Q. Okay. What year did this occur? You said it was the  
19 time of the peacekeepers in Makeni that were taken captive.

16:05:32 20 A. That was 2000.

21 Q. In that operation after you crossed the river you were  
22 inside then Guinea?

23 A. Yes. We attacked Madina Wola on a Sunday.

24 Q. Who were you fighting against in that operation?

16:05:48 25 A. In that operation we were fighting against the Guinean  
26 army.

27 Q. Who was commanding RUF forces?

28 A. It was Short Bai Bureh."

29 Pause there. Now, just so that we understand Mr Taylor,

1 Keita is saying, August 1999 you give an order for the RUF to  
2 fight alongside the AFL and the ATU against LURD in Lofa, yes?

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. And successfully they managed to push LURD out of Kolahun  
16:06:34 5 and Voinjama, yes?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. You understand that? What the witness is now saying is  
8 that a year later, after the release of the peacekeepers, the 500  
9 peacekeepers, in May of 2000, you once again employed the

16:06:47 10 services of the RUF by sending them into Guinea. Do you  
11 understand that? And remember reference being made to that  
12 earlier today. Remember?

13 A. Uh-huh.

14 Q. It's the second time today, is it not, that we've heard  
16:07:05 15 that name, Colonel Komba Gbundema, yes, and this operation, yes?  
16 Now, Mr Taylor, to add flavour to the account you will note that  
17 this coincides with you sending 50 boxes of ammunition back from  
18 Monrovia with Issa Sesay. Do you get the picture?

19 A. Yes, I do.

16:07:29 20 Q. Mr Taylor, were you providing ammunition to the RUF at that  
21 stage to, in effect, fight your battles?

22 A. No. No.

23 Q. To overthrow Lansana Conte, as was suggested by another  
24 witness we looked at today?

16:07:49 25 A. No, not at all. Not at all.

26 Q. On the same issue:

27 "Q. Were you told why RUF was going to Guinea attacking  
28 Guinea at that time?

29 A. Issa Sesay said Charles Taylor informed him that we

1 should give him grounds in Guinea so that the time for the  
2 disarmament into Sierra Leone, some of arms we had would be  
3 crossed over into Guinea for safekeeping."

4 Do you understand that?

16:08:42 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. What is being suggested, Mr Taylor, by this witness is that  
7 you're providing arms to the RU, not as suggested by the other  
8 witness this morning, to overthrow Lansana Conte, but, rather,  
9 you want the RUF to set up storage of arms and ammunition in  
10 Guinea. Do you understand that?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. Why would you want to do that, Mr Taylor?

13 A. I guess - I guess they think I'm stupid. So I think  
14 anything goes. But no such thing happened. Why would I attack  
15 Guinea for safekeeping of arms when every - the arms that they  
16 have been buying from Lofa County, from ULIMO, how did ULIMO keep  
17 them? Every guerilla knows how to store arms. All the forest on  
18 the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia, just as ULIMO hid  
19 arms in the forest in Liberia that ECOMOG could not find and they  
16:09:25 20 eventually sell to the RUF, what now must it be different that  
21 now when it comes to the RUF, we have to invade a country to gain  
22 territory to save arms? It didn't happen. But I guess that's  
23 the nature of this case, to invade another country just for the  
24 purpose of safekeeping arms.

16:09:52 25 Q. "Q. What were the results of that operation?

26 A. In the operation we attacked Madina Wola. We fought  
27 over Madina Wola and then we even killed one of the Guinean  
28 commanders who was called Colonel Kanigba Bangura. We  
29 captured his car, one Nissan patrol jeep, and the commander

1 of the mission himself, we used him and we captured 2  
2 millimetre weapons that used electronics current batteries.

3 Q. Did you suffer many casualties among the RUF?

4 A. We had more casualties. That was the reason why we  
16:11:16 5 didn't make it up in the operation. We decided to come  
6 back because the Guineans were using the military  
7 helicopter and the jets to bombard the borderline.

8 Q. After you returned to Sierra Leone; is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

16:11:34 10 Q. What was the next operation you took part in with RUF  
11 outside the borders of Sierra Leone?

12 A. The next operation was Denis Mingo alias Superman.  
13 When we moved from Kono we attacked Guinea closer to  
14 Kissidou. We went in between Kissidou and Gueckedou and  
16:12:24 15 then they had a refugee camp there where both Liberians and  
16 Sierra Leoneans were based. They called it Toma refugee  
17 camp and Yende refugee camp.

18 Q. Now, sir, during the operation you mentioned against  
19 Gueckedou, do you know if Issa Sesay went anywhere?

16:12:48 20 A. Yes, Issa Sesay and Benjamin Yeaten left us and went to  
21 Monrovia.

22 Q. Do you know what they went there to do?

23 A. Actually, I was on the front line but they left us,  
24 boarded a helicopter Foya to Monrovia, the helicopter.

16:13:10 25 Q. Did they ever tell you who they saw in Monrovia?

26 A. When they came they told us they saw Charles Taylor.

27 Q. In these operations that you've talked about and  
28 discussed in Guinea and against the LURD in Liberia, where  
29 did RUF get its ammunition?

1 A. They were supplied directly by Benjamin Yeaten."

2 We need to pause again and examine certain aspects of that,  
3 Mr Taylor. This is the third operation described by the witness  
4 where the RUF are being used, in effect, as auxiliaries by the  
16:14:00 5 Liberian government. Do you understand that.

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. On this occasion this is an operation involving Denis  
8 Mingo, alias Superman, and on this occasion the incursion takes  
9 place between Kissidou and Gueckedou. Now where are those two  
16:14:26 10 places, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Gueckedou - I know there's a Gueckedou in Guinea. Kissidou  
12 is Guinea. These are not Liberian towns. All the dous and dous,  
13 that's Guinea.

14 Q. Can I trouble you, Mr Taylor, to have a look at a map  
16:14:49 15 again, please. I'm sorry to do this because I know you're having  
16 difficulty getting up. Now, Mr Taylor, if we can do this  
17 quickly. If we look along the top border of the map we see 10  
18 degrees, don't we?

19 A. Uh-huh.

16:15:23 20 Q. Just below 10 degrees we see Gueckedou. Can you help us as  
21 to where Kissidou is, and I ask for a good reason? Is Kissidou  
22 to the left or to the right of Gueckedou as we look at the map?

23 A. I would think it's more to the left. They normally call -  
24 the way how I know how they call it is Gueckedou. Like G-U-E  
16:15:54 25 with that accent and I'm not sure if that's accent grave or  
26 accent aigu. But they call it Gueckedou and I think Kissidou  
27 would be I think to the left of Gueckedou. I would - I would  
28 think really.

29 Q. Yes, could I disturb you briefly, Mr Taylor, to ask you to

1 go back to your seat. The reason why I asked you about the  
2 geographical location Mr Taylor, is this, and I seek your  
3 assistance. Page 2055. Now, remember the incursion takes place  
4 in the location you've just identified, yes?

16:16:58 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. Now, the witness says this:

7 "Q. During the operation you mentioned against Gueckedou,  
8 do you know if Issa Sesay went anywhere?

9 A. Issa Sesay and Benjamin Yeaten left us and went to  
16:17:20 10 Monrovia.

11 Q. Do you know what they went there to do?

12 A. Actually, I was on the front line but they left us,  
13 boarded a helicopter from Foya to Monrovia, the  
14 helicopter."

16:17:37 15 Now, Mr Taylor, on the face of it that suggests Yeaten is  
16 with RUF forces, yes, on the front line in Guinea where he leaves  
17 Abu Keita and then comes back to Foya to travel by helicopter to  
18 Monrovia. Do you follow? Do you follow?

19 A. I follow.

16:18:03 20 Q. Now help me. As far as you're aware, was Benjamin Yeaten  
21 at this time on Guinean soil?

22 A. No. And from Foya to the border, I mean assuming - let's  
23 just assume that it is true. My question would be how would this  
24 Mohamed Keita know? Because from Foya to the border it's a  
16:18:35 25 distance. To Gueckedou it's a long distance. I mean we're  
26 talking about - how would he know what is going on in Liberia  
27 that he can say this person went and the other person - how would  
28 they - how would he know? This is really - there is no way -  
29 even if one were to assume that Benjamin Yeaten was on a

1 helicopter from Foya to Monrovia, this man would not know.

2 But Benjamin Yeaten is not in Guinea because Gueckedou is  
3 not right on the border. Let's not forget these borders towns  
4 that we talk about on the Guinean-Sierra Leonean side, the  
16:19:24 5 distance from the borders are a little far. Simply because you  
6 have forest regions along these borders. So they are not just  
7 like you say here is the borderline and I'm right here. So let's  
8 say, for example, from Foya to the border with Guinea we're  
9 talking about maybe 10, 15, 20 miles. It's a long distance,

16:19:53 10 okay. And in that particular area there's only one entry - one  
11 entry, one by road from inside Liberia to Guinea on that side and  
12 that's through Voinjama which is further down. So it cannot be  
13 true that there was supposed to be Issa Sesay and Benjamin on the  
14 helicopter going to Monrovia coming from their operation in  
16:20:21 15 Gueckedou, no. Benjamin is not on Guinean soil, no.

16 Q. Now the witness continues, page 2063. Remember Superman,  
17 Denis Mingo Superman, went on this mission:

18 "Q. What happened to Superman then?

19 A. Then Superman - Benjamin Yeaten asked Superman that  
16:20:43 20 Charles Taylor wanted to see him in Monrovia.

21 Q. What did Superman say?

22 A. Then Superman said he had no option. He said he will  
23 go. Then Benjamin Yeaten said he shouldn't take along  
24 bodyguards. He should only take one bodyguard along."

16:21:04 25 Now do you recall what happened to Superman, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. What happened to Superman?

28 A. Well, we were told here that Superman was driven from a  
29 military base in the bush, what they call this place, to Monrovia

1 and he was killed along the way near Bomi Hills by road. That's  
2 what we were told here by another witness, that Superman was  
3 killed.

16:21:41 4 Well, now I'm hearing that he is told now in Foya, okay,  
5 about going to Monrovia, and I'm not sure if he goes by  
6 helicopter, but we get a different story from another witness of  
7 where Superman was at the time.

8 Q. Don't miss the nuance though, Mr Taylor. "Benjamin Yeaten  
9 said he shouldn't take along bodyguards. He should only take one  
16:22:01 10 bodyguard along." Do you get it?

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. What do you understand by that?

13 A. Oh, that he is taking him to destroy him. This is --

14 Q. He is being set up?

16:22:12 15 A. Yes, that is what he is suggesting.

16 Q. On your orders?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What do you say about that?

19 A. Blatant, blatant lie. But that's why I say it contrasts  
16:22:20 20 sharply with another witness's account of the Superman story.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's move on because I'm hopeful that we  
22 can conclude Mr Keita today. Page 2111. Now, remember the  
23 earlier diamond incident at the Boulevard Hotel involving Ibrahim  
24 Bah?

16:22:49 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. "Q. From Yeaten's house you told us you went to the  
27 Boulevard Hotel, is that fair to say?"

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. At the Boulevard Hotel amongst other people you said



1           you met Ibrahim Bah, true?

2           A. Yes.

3           Q. And that was the first time you had met Ibrahim Bah?

4           A. Yes."

16:23:12 5           And he goes on to accept that he recalls discussion about  
6 how to buy diamonds from the RUF and how he went later to the  
7 Kadija Hotel where Sam Bockarie often stayed and at that hotel,  
8 the Kadija, he was shown some diamonds by Bockarie and then he  
9 goes on:

16:23:33 10          "Q. On the same day you said you went to White Flower  
11 later in the evening, true?

12          A. Yes."

13          And he goes on to describe, do you remember, Bockarie going  
14 to pay his last respects to you before leaving? You remember  
15 that?

16:23:49 15          that?  
16          A. Uh-huh.

17          Q. And then he concludes. So in the course of a day, one day  
18 in 1998, he met Benjamin Yeaten for the first time, Bockarie for  
19 the first time, Ibrahim Bah for the first time, and the President  
16:24:08 20 of Liberia for the first time. All in one day. Mr Taylor, this  
21 was the man just recently arrested after the Camp Johnson Road  
22 incident. What do you say about the evidence of Abu Keita,  
23 Mr Taylor?

24          A. I think Abu Keita's evidence is a blatant fabrication.

16:24:29 25          Blatant, blatant, blatant and intentional fabrication. I think  
26 he designed this.

27          Q. Now, Mr Taylor, logic suggests that someone usually has a  
28 motive to lie, so what do you suggest is Abu Keita's motive?

29          A. Frankly, I tell you what, it's hard to put my hand on it

1 but I'll put it this way: These boys, this little Mohamed Keita  
2 boy got dragged into all of this by Varmuyan Sherif. This is  
3 Varmuyan's little boy and once Varmuyan got involved in this  
4 thing we hear lies, he dragged this boy in this thing, because  
16:25:15 5 Abu Keita is really nowhere. I think he was just - I think he  
6 followed instructions from Varmuyan Sherif. I think this is more  
7 of Varmuyan's action. In trying to build his case he dragged  
8 this little boy into it. That's what I can put my hands on.

9 So his motive is really I would just say following - trying  
16:25:41 10 to be equal to his big brother Varmuyan. Because Varmuyan  
11 controls this boy. Abu Keita got involved in this because of  
12 Varmuyan's own set of lies and he buttressed it by calling in  
13 this boy. But I'm sure there will be - he called a lot of names  
14 here. There's a lot of names that he went through here. He  
16:26:02 15 talked about a lot of people here and if God is good to us a lot  
16 of these people maybe we'll hear from and hear their side of the  
17 story. But this is Varmuyan Sherif's doing with this little boy  
18 Abu Keita.

19 Q. Mr Taylor, you'll recall the witness speaking of two lots  
16:26:21 20 of 150 men being sent by you to Sierra Leone?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. The first lot in the late autumn of 1998, the second lot  
23 after the Freetown invasion?

24 A. That is correct.

16:26:39 25 Q. In light of that he was asked at page 2138 line 11:

26 "Q. So were you a general in the RUF and it would be fair  
27 to say you had no troops under your direct command, would  
28 it not?

29 A. Yes."

1           No troops under his command. Do you understand that  
2 answer, Mr Taylor?

3           A.     But he should have had 300 plus men or more. So this is a  
4 terrible general. He ought to be court-martialed and probably  
16:27:09 5 shot. I mean here is a general who carries 300 men out of  
6 Liberia that he says he went [overlapping speakers] --

7           Q.     No, wrong. No, wrong. He doesn't carry them. You send  
8 them to him?

9           A.     I send them, yes, you know. He is given 300 lives as a  
16:27:25 10 general to go into another country to fight and he doesn't  
11 account for them, he doesn't know anything and they are not under  
12 his command. What is that? What is that? Because it doesn't  
13 happen, that's why he can't get it together. He forgot. He  
14 forgot that he said 300 men. He forgot that he had been given  
16:27:47 15 300 men and even forgot that they were supposed to be called the  
16 Scorpion Unit. So what happened to his Scorpion Unit like I said  
17 before that he does not call back to report, "Guess what  
18 happened. Operation is fine. The men - I lost this. Missing in  
19 action. Dead in action." Nothing. No report to Benjamin Yeaten  
16:28:09 20 or to me.

21           Q.     That's all I ask about him, Mr Taylor. I note the time,  
22 Mr President. Would that be a convenient point?

23           PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We're going to adjourn now,  
24 Mr Taylor. I'll remind you there's an order that you are not to  
16:28:27 25 discuss your evidence. We'll adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow  
26 morning.

27                                 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.  
28 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 23 September  
29 2009 at 9.30 a.m.]

## I N D E X

### WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

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