



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

FRIDAY, 23 APRIL 2010  
9.34 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding  
Justice Richard Lussick  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Mr Nicholas Koumjian  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Ms Kathryn Howarth  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Terry Munyard  
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Friday, 23 April 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.]

09:28:07 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MR BANGURA: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours  
8 and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this morning, myself  
9 Mohamed A Bangura, Kathryn Howarth and Maja Dimitrova. Thank  
09:34:17 10 you.

11 MR ANYAH: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,  
12 your Honours. Good morning, counsel opposite. Appearing for the  
13 Defence this morning are Terry Munyard, Morris Anyah and Michael  
14 Herz.

09:34:30 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr George, this morning you  
16 continue with your testimony and I would like to remind you of  
17 your oath to tell the truth; it's still binding on you.

18 WITNESS: DCT-062 [On former oath]

19 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR ANYAH: [Continued]

09:34:51 20 Q. Good morning, Mr George. Yesterday afternoon before court  
21 adjourned we were considering the events surrounding the 1996  
22 elections in Sierra Leone, in particular at about 4.30 yesterday  
23 you were telling us about your lack of knowledge about any  
24 reports that Morris Kallon made to Foday Sankoh regarding an  
09:35:23 25 attack on Kenema. Do you remember our discussions yesterday  
26 afternoon, Mr George?

27 A. Yes, that was the discussion at which we stopped yesterday.

28 Q. And you also recall that yesterday in connection with the  
29 topic of Operation Stop Election and this report by

1 Morris Kallon, I was reading the transcripts of the evidence of  
2 Augustine Mallah. Do you remember that?

3 A. Yes, I remember that.

4 Q. This morning I want to continue with the evidence of  
09:36:06 5 Mr Mallah. This is the transcript from 12 November 2008. For  
6 purposes of this morning I would like to start at page 20109.  
7 Mr George, I will read to you more evidence that was heard from  
8 Augustine Mallah and I will ask for your comments. Line 14 on  
9 that page, Mr Mallah was asked a question:

09:36:45 10 "Q. During the time you were at Zogoda with Foday Sankoh,  
11 '94 to sometime in '96, were you aware of any  
12 communications Foday Sankoh had outside of Sierra Leone?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And what were those communications?

09:37:14 15 A. The communication, because I myself had access to Foday  
16 Sankoh at any time, at any hour, as a strike force  
17 commander, so I was there when a radio man came to call  
18 Foday Sankoh. He said they wanted to talk to him.

19 Q. Who wanted to talk to him?

09:37:43 20 A. Charles Taylor. I myself will be there where we would  
21 take Foday Sankoh and we would sit by just like that white  
22 man there, sitting down, and we will be here whilst they  
23 are talking. That used to take place for over a day, every  
24 day, or some time once or twice a day. We used to see him  
09:38:11 25 asking and they would greet each other. He would ask for  
26 Foday Sankoh. He would inquire about Foday Sankoh's  
27 health. Foday Sankoh too would respond in the same way to  
28 Charles Taylor. Foday Sankoh would explain about his  
29 health, or explain about some security operations,

1 everything. I used to hear those when I was there at  
2 Zogoda with him."

3 Let's pause. Mr George, you told us you were assigned to  
4 Ngolahun Vaama starting in 1994. You recall telling us that  
09:38:55 5 yesterday?

6 A. Yes, that's my statement.

7 Q. You recall telling us at page 39717 of yesterday's  
8 transcript that you were in Ngolahun Vaama in 1994, 1995 and  
9 1996? Do you recall telling us that?

09:39:21 10 A. Yes, I remember all those statements.

11 Q. Do you recall also telling us that during that period of  
12 time while you were at Ngolahun Vaama, and this is also at the  
13 same page I just gave from yesterday's transcript, page 39717,  
14 you recall telling us that you would go to Zogoda from time to  
09:39:41 15 time from Ngolahun Vaama to make reports to those in Zogoda?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Lastly, do you remember telling us that at Ngolahun Vaama  
18 you had radio communication equipment and that Daf was your radio  
19 man?

09:40:04 20 A. Yes, that was my radio operator in Ngolahun Vaama.

21 Q. How far from Zogoda was Ngolahun Vaama or is Ngolahun  
22 Vaama?

23 A. It's a long distance because it's a forest, you walk  
24 through the forest.

09:40:28 25 Q. With the benefit of your radio communication equipment,  
26 were you able, when you were at Ngolahun Vaama, to monitor radio  
27 communications between those in Zogoda and elsewhere?

28 A. When Foday Sankoh used to talk to various commanders,  
29 especially Zino, that is CO Mohamed, we monitored the

1 conversation.

2 Q. And that being the case, it was the fact that there were  
3 radio communication equipment in Zogoda at that time, yes?

09:41:15

4 A. Yes, he had his radio communication in Zogoda and we also  
5 had ours at the front line where we were.

6 Q. Do you know who were some of the radio communication staff  
7 or men working for Foday Sankoh in Zogoda?

09:41:43

8 A. Yes. I called Zedman. Zedman was the most senior man in  
9 Zogoda that I remember. Although he had some other junior men  
10 under him, but Zedman is the main - the major person that I  
11 remember who was his radio communicator at Zogoda.

12 Q. Did you just mention the name of any other radio operators  
13 besides Zedman? Who else were radio operators working with  
14 Zedman in Zogoda, if you know?

09:42:09

15 A. There were people who were radio men there, but it's a long  
16 time now. I have forgotten the names of most of them except for  
17 those who were assigned with me at my assignment grounds. For  
18 those, I can remember their names.

09:42:30

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, can I remind you of the  
20 arrange that you are to speak a little slower than you normally  
21 would speak.

22 THE WITNESS: Okay. Sorry, ma'am.

23 MR ANYAH:

09:42:39

24 Q. Now, you heard what I read from the evidence of Augustine  
25 Mallah. While you were at Ngolahun Vaama, and in light of your  
26 statement that you would monitor conversations Foday Sankoh had  
27 on the radio, did you ever hear any conversation between Foday  
28 Sankoh and Charles Taylor?

29 A. To be very frank, no, I never monitored Foday Sankoh and

1 Charles Taylor talking over the radio.

2 Q. Your radio man, Daf, tell you that he ever heard of a radio  
3 communication between Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh when you  
4 were in Ngolahun Vaama?

09:43:21 5 A. No. He only used to brief me on operations around our  
6 controlled territories.

7 Q. Did you know of the person who we referred to yesterday as  
8 OG being a strike force commander in Zogoda?

9 A. They had a strike force at Zogoda, but I did not know him  
09:43:51 10 to be a commander of the strike force. But of course he was a  
11 member of the strike force.

12 Q. So when he said in the transcript I have just read that  
13 because I myself had access to Foday Sankoh at any time, at any  
14 hour as a strike force commander, the reference there to himself  
09:44:15 15 being a strike force commander, is that true, to your knowledge,  
16 or is that false?

17 A. To my thinking, I believe he was a strike force member, but  
18 he was not a strike force commander.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Shall we go to page 20111 of the  
09:44:48 20 same transcript from 12 November 2008. Mr Mallah's evidence  
21 continues. A question was posed on that page at line 20 to  
22 Mr Mallah:

23 "Q. Mr Witness, you have said that you remained at Zogoda  
24 until Zogoda was overrun. What happened when Zogoda was  
09:45:14 25 overrun?

26 A. Well, after that, while Pa Sankoh had gone to the Ivory  
27 Coast and left CO Mohamed Zino to take over, the Kamajors  
28 and the Sierra Leone soldiers attacked the RUF there and  
29 Zogoda came under some suppression. We hadn't enough

1 ammunition to fight the Kamajors and the Sierra Leone  
2 soldiers. So CO Mohamed contacted Foday Sankoh. Foday  
3 Sankoh ordered him that the armed group that was in Zogoda  
4 should be divided into two. CO Mohamed should take one  
09:45:58 5 group to Kailahun for us to defend the place where we had  
6 before we opened Zogoda. The other group should be taken  
7 by Mike Lamin to Pujehun District. So that was how it  
8 happened."

9 Let's pause there. Mr George, were you still at Ngolahun  
09:46:25 10 Vaama when Zogoda was overrun?

11 A. Yes, I was in Ngolahun Vaama when Zogoda was overrun.

12 Q. At that time when Zogoda was overrun, do you agree with the  
13 sentiments expressed by Augustine Mallah that the RUF did not  
14 have enough ammunition at that time?

09:46:52 15 A. Oh, yes, I agree with him. It's true. The Kamajors and  
16 the Sierra Leone Army overran us because of ammunition; that's  
17 true.

18 Q. Were you affected in any way after Zogoda was overrun, that  
19 is, those of you who were at Ngolahun Vaama?

09:47:14 20 A. Yes, I was affected, because in fact they started hitting  
21 from my back. So I was in the front and I was affected, but I  
22 managed to get to Jui Koya close to Zogoda.

23 Q. And when you got to Jui Koya, did you go somewhere else or  
24 did you remain there?

09:47:39 25 A. From Jui Koya, because of the population that was there and  
26 there was no ammunition, there was no understanding, everybody  
27 went their own way. It's true that Mike Lamin went to Pujehun,  
28 yes. But for me, I went to the Northern Jungle together with  
29 Manawai and few men because it was not easy on us. Some other

1 people crossed into Kailahun for defensive purposes.

2 Q. Those that crossed to Kailahun, was it the case that they  
3 were led by CO Mohamed?

09:48:29

4 A. That was the time we lost CO Mohamed. That was the time he  
5 got missing, and up to this moment we don't know his whereabouts.  
6 He never reached Kailahun. He was captured by enemies and he was  
7 killed. That was how Foday Sankoh gave the command structure to  
8 Sam Bockarie.

09:48:48

9 Q. When you went to the Northern Jungle, you said together  
10 with Manawai and a few men, who was the commander of your group?

11 A. The commander we met there was Superman. Superman was on  
12 the ground. Isaac Mongor was there and some other officers.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, it would be helpful to have  
14 some time frames for some of these movements as you go along.

09:49:19

15 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President:

16 Q. Mr George, what year was Zogoda overrun by the enemy?

17 A. In 1996.

18 Q. In what year did you, Manawai, and others go to the  
19 Northern Jungle?

09:49:40

20 A. It was in that same 1996, because Manawai and I were  
21 assigned together. We were assigned on the same operation.

22 Q. Was it the early part of the year, the middle part, or the  
23 later part of the year?

24 A. It was the middle part. It was the middle part.

09:50:01

25 Q. Where was Foday Sankoh at the time Zogoda was overrun?

26 A. At that time Foday Sankoh went on the peace talks in  
27 Abidjan.

28 Q. So you are now at the Northern Jungle with Dennis Mingo,  
29 Isaac Mongor, Manawai and others. What happened to those of you

1 at the Northern Jungle?

2 A. That was the same thing. We did not have ammunition, but  
3 there we were in a Jungle. We stayed in the jungle. We put up  
4 defensive where we were until we were called out in 1997 to join  
09:50:41 5 the AFRC.

6 Q. Are you saying that from the middle part of 1996 to the  
7 time when you were called to join the AFRC in 1997 you were in  
8 the Northern Jungle?

9 A. We were still in the Northern Jungle, because where we were  
09:51:01 10 was far off from the Kailahun District.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, there is a name that appears  
12 like "Manawa" in the LiveNote transcript and I think this is not  
13 what the witness is saying. I don't know if this individual is -  
14 already has their name spelt on the record, but I think you  
09:51:22 15 should address it. It's consistently "Manawa."

16 MR ANYAH: The name is "Manawai", which is M-A-N-A-W-A-I,  
17 and that name is in the record. It's in the transcript. There  
18 was, in respect of that name, issued an errata sheet by the  
19 former supervisor of the stenographers, Michael Laidlaw, and this  
20 errata was issued on 13 November 2008 correcting the spelling of  
21 the name from Manawa to Manawai, and a second errata was - well,  
22 that's the relevant errata that was issued. So the spelling  
23 that's on the record is M-A-N-A-W-A-I.

24 Mr Munyard has corrected me. A single one is called an  
25 erratum, he tells me, and the plural is errata. Thank you,  
26 Mr Munyard:

27 Q. Now, Mr George, the question had to do with the period of  
28 time you spent at the Northern Jungle. Was it the case that for  
29 almost a year, 1996 into 1997 when you were called to join the

1 AFRC, you were at the Northern Jungle?

2 A. Well, because that was where I met Superman, Isaac Mongor  
3 and other soldiers, they were based there. They were all in the  
4 jungle whilst we were at Zogoda.

09:53:02 5 Q. Yes, I appreciate your response. I am trying to understand  
6 the time frame. A few minutes ago you told us Zogoda was overrun  
7 around the middle part of 1996, and you said that was when you  
8 went to the Northern Jungle. Now I am trying to find out how  
9 long as in weeks, months, or years, you spent at the Northern  
09:53:23 10 Jungle. Is it the case that you were at the Northern Jungle  
11 until you were called to join the AFRC in 1997?

12 A. That was just what I said. I said, yes, I was there until  
13 the time AFRC called us to join them in 1997.

14 Q. During that entire period of time, what was the state or  
09:53:50 15 status of the RUF ammunition supply?

16 A. In fact, during that time I am talking about we never used  
17 to go on offensive, because the ammunition we had we could not  
18 carry an offensive. We only had it on us in the jungle where we  
19 were based until, by the grace of God, the AFRC called us to join  
09:54:17 20 them.

21 Q. When you were at the Northern Jungle, did you and the  
22 others there have radio communication equipment?

23 A. Yes. All the jungles had radio communications. We  
24 communicated with one another.

09:54:37 25 Q. Why could you and the others not have radioed for  
26 ammunition to be sent to you from Kailahun or somewhere else in  
27 Sierra Leone?

28 A. Even the Kailahun you are talking about, they did not have  
29 ammunition there. They only had ammunition for defensive.

1 Things were bad.

2 Q. Were there any RUF members based in Buedu at the time?

3 A. Yes, Buedu was occupied by the RUF soldiers, Pendembu,  
4 Koindu.

09:55:21 5 Q. Why couldn't you ask through the radio for ammunition to be  
6 sent to you at the Northern Jungle from Koindu - I think you said  
7 Koindu?

8 A. Yes, Koindu.

9 Q. Why didn't you ask for those in Koindu to send you  
09:55:41 10 ammunition when you were at the Northern Jungle?

11 A. In the first place, from Koindu to where I am talking about  
12 is a long distance. And then they would not have allowed the  
13 little ammunition they had with them just to put up defensive for  
14 themselves to send it to us to the Northern Jungle. Who would  
09:56:02 15 have carried it, in fact?

16 Q. Did they have enough ammunition in Koindu at the time, 1996  
17 into 1997?

18 A. Well, I can't tell whether they had an ammo dump because I  
19 was not there.

09:56:21 20 Q. That's fair enough. During the time period when you were  
21 in the Northern Jungle, was there any radio communication contact  
22 with anyone in Liberia?

23 A. No. We never had radio communication with anyone in  
24 Liberia. If we had radio communication with someone in Liberia -  
09:56:41 25 I mean, like, they're saying that we were getting support from  
26 Liberia - I think they would have helped us with support. They  
27 would have helped us with ammunition so that we would have been  
28 able to carry out our mission.

29 Q. Are you saying you were not receiving support from Liberia

1 during this time?

2 A. I am telling you we were not receiving any support from  
3 Liberia, nor Burkina Faso, and not even Libya.

09:57:23

4 Q. What year and - well, what month in 1997 were you called to  
5 join the AFRC?

6 A. It was in 1997 when Isaac Mongor called for a formation.  
7 They told us that Foday Sankoh said we should join Johnny Paul  
8 Koroma, the AFRC, to join together and form the People's Army.  
9 The kind of way we were happy, the kind of joy that we had around  
10 us, I can't even remember the particular date, the particular  
11 time.

09:57:51

12 Q. Who, when you refer to the AFRC, are you referring to?

13 A. I am talking about the Johnny Paul Koroma regime.

09:58:19

14 Q. Now, this Court, Mr George, has found some events to be  
15 factual. That is, the Court has admitted for purposes of this  
16 trial that these events are facts that happened. One of those  
17 that the Court has said happened is that the Court said, and this  
18 is from CMS 227, from 26 April 2007, these are admitted facts and  
19 law that were entered into by the parties here present, number 17  
20 reads: "The AFRC seized power from the elected government of the  
21 Republic of Sierra Leone via a coup d'etat on 25 May 1999."

09:58:55

22 Mr George, this Court has found it to be a fact that on 25  
23 May 1997, the AFRC, through a coup d'etat, took power in Sierra  
24 Leone. Having heard that, do you agree that it was sometime in  
25 May or after May 1997 that you were called to join the AFRC?

09:59:27

26 A. I don't want to lie to you. I said I do not remember the  
27 month. I cannot tell you whether it was in June, August or  
28 September, because of the suffering that we were going through.  
29 My brother, if you were there, if only someone went and told you,

1 say, come out of this bush, you would be happy.

2 Q. Was it in the early part of the year, the middle part or  
3 the late part of the year 1997 that you joined the AFRC?

10:00:18

4 A. I remember going to Bo in the dry season, during the dry  
5 season. It was not during rainy season.

6 Q. And what months in Sierra Leone make up the dry season?

7 A. We have January, February, March, April, those are mostly  
8 dry season. Even in Liberia.

9 Q. So it was one of those months in 1997 that you went to Bo?

10:00:44

10 A. Yes, I can remember, during the dry season.

11 Q. Now, you were telling us about a formation. You said:

12 "It was in 1997 when Isaac Mongor called a formation. They  
13 told us that Foday Sankoh said we should join Johnny Paul Koroma,  
14 the AFRC, to join together and form the People's Army."

10:01:10

15 Did Isaac Mongor say where Foday Sankoh was when he asked  
16 the RUF to join Johnny Paul Koroma and the AFRC?

17 A. Even me sitting here, I knew where Foday Sankoh was.

18 Q. Please tell us, where was he at the time?

19 A. Foday Sankoh was in Nigeria. He was arrested in Nigeria.

10:01:36

20 That was where he was. And passed the instruction to Isaac  
21 Mongor junior.

22 Q. Do you know how he gave that instruction? Was it by  
23 letter? Was it through a courier, a person? Do you know how  
24 Foday Sankoh gave that instruction while he was in Nigeria?

10:02:00

25 A. I never saw a strange person in the zoebush who brought  
26 letters, but I believe it was through communication.

27 Q. So you don't know how?

28 A. I don't know how.

29 Q. You mentioned going to Bo. How is it that you came to go

1 to Bo after this information was received from Foday Sankoh?

2 A. After we receiving the information, they called a meeting  
3 and it was during that meeting that they briefed all the RUF  
4 soldiers who were based in the Northern Jungle. Isaac told us  
10:02:49 5 that we should join the AFRC government to form one group, one  
6 force, by the name of People's Army.

7 From there, the following day, we packed up our things and  
8 we took a journey to get on the tarmac road to a town where we  
9 were to meet the receiving team that was coming to receive us.

10:03:25 10 Isaac Mongor was the first man who left with 200 men and the  
11 rest, the first men just moved together with him to make sure  
12 whether that was true.

13 So we went, we were in ambush. We were observing the  
14 activities. We saw the soldiers coming in vehicles, trucks.

10:03:51 15 They put on their communication set. They contacted Isaac Mongor  
16 to ask about his location and he told them he was close to them.  
17 But then they said, "Come up. It is time for us to join  
18 together." And he said, "You said Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday  
19 Sankoh have already discussed for us to join and form one army."

10:04:23 20 And he said, "Praise God, that should be the People's Army." And  
21 he said we should not be afraid, "We are not here to harm you  
22 guys, so you can tell your men to come up, to come out of the  
23 bush." Isaac walked with few men on the tarmac road and they met  
24 - they met the soldiers in the trucks and the trucks were parked  
10:04:49 25 by the tarmac road. And that was how we were briefed to join the  
26 line.

27 When we joined them, they called for the other people to  
28 come from out of the bush and Superman came up with the other  
29 troops. Morris Kallon came out. And the groups were divided and

1 some groups were going to Freetown and some were going to Bo and  
2 that was how I found myself in Bo.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr George. There are a few clarifications  
4 regarding the answer you just gave I wish to pursue. Let's  
10:05:32 5 consider some of what you've said. You said that after you and  
6 the others had a meeting in the Northern Jungle, on the following  
7 day you parked your things and you undertook a journey and you  
8 said you saw some soldiers coming in vehicles and trucks and this  
9 happened on some kind of tarmac road where Isaac Mongor met those  
10:06:02 10 soldiers. The soldiers who were coming in vehicles and trucks,  
11 to which group did they belong?

12 A. They were from the Sierra Leone Army. They were the AFRC  
13 boys. They came in joy to us. And we too were very happy  
14 because of the situation we found ourselves in at that particular  
10:06:25 15 time.

16 Q. You also said after Isaac Mongor and them spoke, that they  
17 called for the other people to come from out of the bush and  
18 Superman came with the other troops and Morris Kallon also came.  
19 These other people that were called from the bush, were they RUF  
10:06:49 20 or AFRC?

21 A. Those were the remaining RUF men, because not all the  
22 troops came together. Because in guerilla tactics your enemy  
23 cannot just call on you because of - because you have had  
24 interviews with him and then you just tote all your loads and go.  
10:07:13 25 So we left some men in our zoebush. Isaac Mongor initially came  
26 with about 200 men.

27 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
28 to slow down.

29 MR ANYAH:

1 Q. Mr George, we were following your answer, then you sped up  
2 a little bit too much for the interpreter to follow. You were  
3 saying that the enemy cannot just call on you and, because you  
4 have interviews with him, then you tote all your loads and go.  
10:07:45 5 And then you said, "So we left some men in the zoebush." And  
6 then you went on to say Isaac Mongor initially came with about  
7 two something. Is this the 200 men you referred to before in  
8 your evidence?

9 A. Yes, I said 200 men.

10:08:02 10 Q. Yes. Carry on from there. Initially Isaac Mongor came  
11 with the 200 men, and then what else did you want to tell us?

12 A. After Isaac Mongor had come with the 200 men - because the  
13 question was whether they were AFRC or RUF soldiers. After Isaac  
14 Mongor had brought the 200 men and we wanted to ensure that, yes,  
10:08:33 15 it's true, and we needed to join these guys to form one army  
16 because by then Morris Kallon, Superman, they too brought the  
17 other groups from the bush to join us on the tarmac road.

18 Q. Very well. Mr George, just watch the pace again. Slow  
19 down as you go along. We are grateful for the response. Now,  
10:08:56 20 you said the groups were divided and some groups were going to  
21 Freetown and some were going to Bo and you went with the group  
22 going to Bo, yes?

23 A. Exactly so.

24 Q. Who was the commander of the group going to Bo?

10:09:18 25 A. The commander in charge was Morris Kallon.

26 Q. Was it only RUF members that were under his command at this  
27 time as you went to Bo?

28 A. Only RUF members. That was the first time for us to join  
29 the AFRC. It was only RUF members that were going to Bo and

1 there were soldiers already assigned in Bo that we were supposed  
2 to go and mix with.

3 Q. The soldiers in Bo you are referring to, are those AFRC  
4 soldiers?

10:09:53 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. The group that went towards Freetown, who was the commander  
7 of that group?

8 A. Isaac Mongor was the commander.

9 Q. Did he have only RUF members under his command in that  
10:10:10 10 group as they went to Freetown?

11 A. They were all RUF soldiers with him.

12 Q. Do you know whether Mongor and the others eventually  
13 reached Freetown?

14 A. Yes, they arrived in Freetown, because we had access to the  
10:10:33 15 communication that the men had. So they reached Freetown safely.  
16 There was no problem.

17 Q. Was Isaac Mongor the most senior RUF commander in Freetown  
18 when the AFRC was there?

19 A. Isaac Mongor, his going to Freetown was through an escort.  
10:10:56 20 But the most senior man was Issa Sesay, and he was deputised by  
21 Dennis Mingo.

22 Q. Where was Mike Lamin at this time?

23 A. Mike Lamin was in Freetown. He went to Liberia during the  
24 retreat in '96 and later he found himself back. When they called  
10:11:24 25 upon the RUF I saw him. I saw him at Mile 91 in 1997. That was  
26 where I met him since the time we retreated in Zogoda.

27 Q. You said Mike Lamin was in Freetown. The record then has  
28 you as saying he went to Liberia during the retreat in '96 and  
29 later he found himself back when they called upon the RUF.

1 Mr George, help me clarify this: When the record says Mike Lamin  
2 went to Liberia during the retreat, what retreat is that?

3 A. I am talking about the '96 retreat.

10:12:20

4 Q. Was there a retreat into Liberia in 1996, the time or the  
5 year Zogoda was overrun?

6 A. I am talking about the time Zogoda was overrun. That was  
7 the time he retreated, and he crossed the border and went into  
8 Liberia.

10:12:38

9 Q. Did Mike Lamin go alone when he retreated, or did he  
10 retreat with other RUF members?

11 A. He went with a large group. In fact, Monica Pearson was  
12 among. By then she was pregnant. So he went with a large group.

13 Q. Do you know the approximate number of RUF that retreated  
14 into Liberia?

10:12:59

15 A. I can't tell the total. There were civilians, children,  
16 men, and RUF soldiers. There were many.

17 Q. Do you know for how long they stayed in Liberia, those that  
18 retreated into Liberia?

10:13:28

19 A. Well, I can't tell whether they spent two months or three  
20 months, but I only saw Mike Lamin back in Sierra Leone. I saw  
21 Monica back in Sierra Leone in 1997. I saw Monica in Kenema  
22 where Sam Bockarie was based. Yes, I can remember that.

23 Q. This retreat into Liberia, do you know what parts of  
24 Liberia they retreated to, what county or town?

10:14:06

25 A. Let me make this very easy. According to them, after the  
26 retreat they first got into Grand Cape Mount County where ULIMO  
27 was controlling. And when I am talking about ULIMO, I am talking  
28 about Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO. They were controlling the border  
29 all the way to Lofa, Bopolu, yes.

1 Q. You said you were referring to Alhaji Kromah as ULIMO. Was  
2 there another ULIMO besides Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO?

3 A. Yes, we learnt that they had two ULIMO groups. They had  
4 ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K.

10:15:00 5 Q. You also said that they were controlling the border all the  
6 way to Lofa, Bopolu --

7 A. Lofa bridge.

8 Q. What counties were they controlling in Liberia at that  
9 time?

10:15:18 10 A. Grand Cape Mount County and part of Lofa County.

11 Q. And what year was this?

12 A. It was in the same 1997 that I am talking about. '96 to  
13 '97.

14 Q. You said you saw Monica Pearson in Kenema where Sam  
10:15:43 15 Bockarie was based. Did you find out how it is that they came  
16 back from Liberia into Sierra Leone?

17 A. In fact, when they crossed, according to them, the  
18 international community told Alhaji Kromah to be careful with  
19 those men who crossed - the RUF who crossed. He said they should  
10:16:11 20 not be harassed, and they were provided - the ECOMOG troops in  
21 Bopolu, those who were based there, they were encamped there.

22 The ICRC was issuing supplies of food, and from there a note was  
23 sent to them by Sam Bockarie that they should go back to Sierra  
24 Leone to join - to rejoin the movement because the AFRC and the  
10:16:45 25 RUF are now one force. That was what I heard from most of them  
26 who came back.

27 Q. The group ICRC that you referred to that was issuing  
28 supplies and food to Monica Pearson and others, was this an  
29 international group, to your knowledge?

1 A. Yes, it was an international group.

2 Q. Did Monica Pearson tell you whether they received any  
3 assistance from the Liberian government officials when they found  
4 themselves in the territory of Alhaji Kromah in Liberia?

10:17:36 5 A. No, no. They did not tell me anything about that. They  
6 only told me that they were based at Bopolu and ECOMOG was  
7 deployed there, they were guarding them in case of any  
8 harassment, and the ICRC was supplying them with rations. That's  
9 what I was told.

10:17:56 10 Q. Do you know whether those who retreated to Liberia and  
11 returned to Sierra Leone returned with any arms or ammunition  
12 from Liberia as they returned into Sierra Leone?

13 A. I never saw even a pistol with all of them who crossed back  
14 into Sierra Leone.

10:18:18 15 Q. But did they tell you whether they brought anything like  
16 arms or ammunition from Liberia?

17 A. No, no.

18 Q. Now, you find yourself in Bo. You have told us that Sam  
19 Bockarie, Monica Pearson are in Kenema. You have told us that  
10:18:38 20 Isaac Mongor, Issa Sesay, Dennis Mingo and others were in  
21 Freetown. In Bo, was Morris Kallon your commander?

22 A. Yes, Morris Kallon was my commander. He was the senior man  
23 on the ground for the RUF soldiers.

24 Q. Who else was a senior RUF member on the ground in Bo when  
10:19:10 25 you were there being commanded by Morris Kallon?

26 A. I was there as the second senior man to Morris Kallon  
27 because I was the second vanguard to him. Next to me was Bai  
28 Bureh - the Short Bai Bureh.

29 Q. How long did you say in Bo?

1 A. I said in Bo until the intervention, when we were pushed  
2 out of Bo.

3 Q. Who pushed you out of Bo?

4 A. Both the ECOMOG and Kamajors.

10:19:56 5 Q. When you say "intervention", does that word have a  
6 particular meaning or significance in the context of Sierra Leone  
7 during this time period?

8 A. Yes. For me, it's meaningful because it was the ECOMOG - I  
9 think it was an arrangement between Kabbah and the ECOMOG to come  
10:20:23 10 and push us out of the various places that we were in combat. So  
11 it was again another wonderful day for the junta.

12 Q. You said, "It was again another wonderful day for the  
13 junta." The junta you are referring to there is who or what?

14 A. The junta is the combined force. The combined force, the  
10:21:06 15 AFRC/RUF soldiers. They comprised the junta, who were called the  
16 People's Army. That is the combined force I am referring to.

17 Q. Very well. You mentioned previously that you met Mike  
18 Lamin at Mile 91. Was that during the time period when you were  
19 pushed out of Bo?

10:21:39 20 A. Yes, it was the time they pushed us out of Bo when they  
21 came from Freetown and they met us at Mile 91.

22 Q. Those who came from Freetown included whom?

23 A. I saw Mike Lamin, I saw Base Marine - Jonathan Parker.  
24 That is Base Marine. I saw Kolo Moriba and other soldiers, but  
10:22:12 25 those are the senior officers that I remember.

26 Q. Was Issa Sesay among those who came from Freetown to  
27 Mile 91?

28 A. Sorry, yes. Issa Sesay was amongst them, yes.

29 Q. How about Isaac Mongor?

1 A. No, no. I did not set eyes on Isaac Mongor.

2 Q. Why had they left Freetown to Mile 91?

3 A. Because as the incident was going on, whilst we were being  
4 attacked by the men, we sent a report about things we were faced  
10:22:53 5 with on the ground. And when we retreated to Mile 91, they came  
6 and met us so that we could reorganise ourselves to go back on  
7 the offensive in Bo. That was the purpose he came for.

8 Q. Do you know whether those who were in Freetown who came to  
9 Mile 91 could have stayed in Freetown if they wanted to; that is,  
10:23:20 10 were they in control in Freetown before they left to join near  
11 Mile 91?

12 A. Yes. Because we were the first people they started hitting  
13 before they were hit.

14 Q. Who was hit, to use your phrase, after you and your group  
10:23:43 15 were attacked by the Kamajors and ECOMOG?

16 A. Who was hit during the attack, you mean?

17 Q. Did the People's Army, this combined force of AFRC and RUF,  
18 maintain control of Freetown while you were at Mile 91? Did they  
19 continue to have control of Freetown at that time?

10:24:16 20 A. They had control over Freetown, but there was rumour going  
21 on that ECOMOG had plans to attack them in Freetown.

22 Q. Did ECOMOG in fact attack them in Freetown?

23 A. Yes. ECOMOG pushed them out of the city.

24 Q. When ECOMOG pushed them out of the city, where did they go  
10:24:39 25 to?

26 A. All of us met in Makeni.

27 Q. And from Makeni where did you go?

28 A. We were again heading to Kono with Johnny Paul Koroma.

29 Every one of us, we were now going to Kono. That was going to be

1 the last point. Maybe after that we decided to go into the bush  
2 again.

3 Q. You have mentioned Johnny Paul Koroma. You have mentioned  
4 Makeni. Was Issa Sesay in Makeni at the time?

10:25:17 5 A. All the RUF staff were in Makeni. The only person who was  
6 not in Makeni was Sam Bockarie. He had already made his way to  
7 Kailahun with the group that was in Kenema. They retreated to  
8 Kailahun.

9 Q. Thank you, Mr George. From Makeni you said we were now  
10:25:42 10 going to Kono. Did you in fact go to Kono?

11 A. Surely that was our target, because it was the only big  
12 town that we knew that if we got rid of there, we will be able to  
13 get connection with the men from - in Kailahun. So that was the  
14 only big town that was left to us.

10:26:09 15 Q. When you got to Kono Town, who was in command of these  
16 troops who had retreated from Makeni to Kono?

17 A. Um, I cannot tell whether there was actually a special  
18 commander, but everybody fought hard to get to Kono because that  
19 was now a joint force. From Bo, Freetown, there were a lot of  
10:26:37 20 commanders, SLA generals, colonels, so we had a lot of officers.  
21 So our target was to get to Kono, and that was the most important  
22 thing for us. That was our main focus.

23 Q. What month and what year did you arrive in Kono with the  
24 troops who had retreated from Makeni?

10:27:02 25 A. We arrived in Kono in 1997.

26 Q. The same year that you formed the People's Army?

27 A. No, let me think. Let me think. Because, you see, as we  
28 are giving this information here, it's not something we kept  
29 records of. We don't have documents to the effect. It's a long

1 time ago, so it's difficult. We have to think before we give the  
2 actual story.

3 It was in 1998 because I remember when we talk about the  
4 Black December when they got their operation, that intervention  
10:28:06 5 was in December, if I am not mistaken.

6 Q. Very well. So you are in Kono in 1998. You are a joint  
7 group, AFRC and RUF. Sam Bockarie you say is in Kailahun Town  
8 having gone there with the group that came from Kenema.

9 Mr George, what was your rank and assignment when you were in  
10:28:33 10 Kono in 1998?

11 A. First I told you that when I was in Ngolahun Vaama in 1994  
12 I was a lieutenant. In '96, when we were called upon, I was  
13 promoted to a captain and I maintained that position as captain  
14 as a front line officer fighting at the front until 19 - how do  
10:29:08 15 we call it? Until 1998, '99. 2000, I was promoted to a colonel.  
16 I was still maintaining my captain rank in Kono.

17 Q. So is it the case that from 1996 when you were made a  
18 captain until your promotion to colonel in 2000 you remained at  
19 the same rank of captain?

10:29:40 20 A. From '94 I was a lieutenant. When they called us out, when  
21 the AFRC called us, we joined them, I was promoted to a captain  
22 and I maintained that position as captain from '97, '98, '99,  
23 2000, before I had another rank, that was colonel.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr George. In Kono, while a captain in 1998,  
10:30:06 25 did you have a particular assignment?

26 A. Yes, I had an assignment.

27 Q. And what was your assignment after your retreat from Makeni  
28 to Kono?

29 A. Bai Bureh and I were assigned at Bumpe.

1 Q. The Bai Bureh you just referred to, is it the Short Bai  
2 Bureh or another Bai Bureh?

3 A. That is the Short Bai Bureh. The one I was assigned with  
4 to Morris Kallon, that is the one I am talking about.

10:30:43 5 Q. How far from Kono Town is Bumpe?

6 A. If I am not mistaken, from Bumpe to Kono it could be about  
7 seven or ten minutes' drive. Excuse me, and the Bumpe I am  
8 talking about is the road that leads to Tongo, that was my  
9 assignment, to ensure that from Njaiama Nimi koro, Tongo, those  
10:31:15 10 areas should be my assignment from Bumpe.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr George. The others who came with you from  
12 Makeni to Kono, the RUF and AFRC, did they remain in Kono when  
13 you went to Bumpe? I am speaking of Kono Town.

14 A. We remained in Kono and other people were on assignment and  
10:31:44 15 at that time Johnny Paul was with us and we were finding ways how  
16 to get to Kailahun. And it was not again another easy task with  
17 the encounters with the Kamajors. There was a place called  
18 Gandorhun we had Bandajuma, yes. That was - those were serious  
19 targets for us. So we had to be faced with that target before  
10:32:08 20 Johnny Paul Koroma could be taken to Kailahun. So some other  
21 people were on the target there whilst engaging the enemies and I  
22 was assigned at Bumpe. That is Bai Bureh and I.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Remember to go slowly as you give  
24 your evidence. You have told us that, "Johnny Paul Koroma was  
10:32:33 25 with us and we were finding ways to get to Kailahun." Did he,  
26 Johnny Paul Koroma, go to Kailahun?

27 A. Yes, Johnny Paul Koroma went to Kailahun. We tried by all  
28 possible means for him to get to Kailahun.

29 Q. And was Sam Bockarie in Kailahun when Johnny Paul Koroma

1 went to Kailahun?

2 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie was based in Kailahun.

3 Q. Between the two of them, Johnny Paul Koroma and Sam  
4 Bockarie, who was above whom in the command structure at the  
10:33:17 5 time?

6 A. You see, let me be very frank with you, I won't mind  
7 because I was fighting for the RUF or what have you. There was a  
8 power greed, that was where the misunderstanding came from. You  
9 know, we have to say the truth. The way Johnny Paul Koroma  
10:33:38 10 called us to join them whilst we were suffering, when we were  
11 thrown back into the bush and they said they were all cooperating  
12 together, there was a power greed. Mosquito never wanted to take  
13 command from Johnny Paul Koroma and Johnny Paul Koroma never  
14 wanted to take instructions from Mosquito. So that was a problem  
10:33:59 15 between the RUF and the AFRC.

16 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Anyah, I understood the interpretation  
17 to be power greed as in greedy but I see it's not recorded that  
18 way.

19 MR ANYAH: Yes, Justice Doherty, it is recorded as power  
10:34:25 20 grade:

21 Q. Mr George, you've heard the question from Justice Doherty.  
22 What did you say, is it power greed?

23 A. What I'm talking about is they were fighting for power, who  
24 was to become the leader. That's what I mean, power greed.

10:34:44 25 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Who eventually became the leader  
26 after this power struggle?

27 A. We were finally taking instructions from Sam Bockarie.

28 Q. What happened to Johnny Paul Koroma?

29 A. Johnny Paul Koroma was set aside.

1 Q. When you were in Bumpo where was Issa Sesay?

2 A. Everyone who was in Kono was with Dennis Mingo and other  
3 senior officers, everyone who was based in Kono at the time  
4 ECOMOG had not flushed us out of Kono.

10:35:32 5 Q. When Issa Sesay was there with Dennis Mingo was there any  
6 diamond mining activity taking place in Kono?

7 A. No, at that time, no, there was no diamond mining going on  
8 in Kono. I mean '98 there was no diamond mining going on in  
9 Kono.

10:35:56 10 Q. Were the RUF able to maintain Kono for the remaining part  
11 of 1998?

12 A. No, they pushed us out again and we went into the bush.

13 Q. Who pushed you out from Kono?

14 A. ECOMOG and the Kamajors.

10:36:18 15 Q. Do you know what month in 1998 the RUF was pushed out of  
16 Kono?

17 A. No.

18 Q. When they were pushed out of Kono you said they went into  
19 the bush. The bush that they went into, what was the nearest big  
10:36:38 20 town close to this bush?

21 A. We went into the bush. I mean not ECOMOG. We went into  
22 the bush, the surrounding villages, and we created a jungle  
23 around the Kono township. That's what I mean.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr George. We are following you. You created a  
10:37:00 25 jungle around the Kono township. Were you yourself in that  
26 jungle in 1998 after ECOMOG and the Kamajors pushed the RUF out  
27 of Kono?

28 A. Yes, I was in Kono. I was in the jungle around Kono.

29 Q. Were any steps or efforts made by the RUF to fight their

1 way out of the jungle and to retake Kono?

2 A. That plan came later, but at the time we were in the jungle  
3 we forgot about them. So an enemy cannot just hit you and you  
4 respond. So we gave them time to forget and then overrun them.

10:37:49 5 That was how we used to fight.

6 Q. How much time did you spend in the jungle before you began  
7 to take steps to retake Kono?

8 A. We were in the jungle mid-August, almost - we re-attacked  
9 in December 1998. In December, yes. Because I can remember we  
10:38:17 10 spent Christmas, '98 Christmas, in Kono after we had captured  
11 Kono.

12 Q. Very well. Before you re-attacked, did you make any plans  
13 regarding how to go about this attack? Did you have meetings?  
14 Did you exchange information? What plans, if any, did you make

10:38:41 15 before attacking Kono?

16 A. In the first place, the first plan was how to set up a  
17 defensive around Kono. That was the first plan. Before even  
18 thinking about re-attacking Kono, that was the first plan we had;  
19 how to set up a defensive and protect the civilians that we had  
10:39:11 20 brought out of the town. That was the first plan we had.

21 Q. How was this plan generated? How was it put together?  
22 Which people in the RUF put it together and how did you know  
23 about it?

24 A. I was senior man in the RUF. It's not because I am small  
10:39:35 25 in stature. All important agreements or arrangements I always  
26 took part in. There were other officers like Kailondo, Boston  
27 Flomo, Superman, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Leather Boot, Akim.  
28 You know, we had some other people who joined us. So it was a  
29 joint forum. We had to share ideas as to how to tackle

1 situations.

2 JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Anyah, just so that I am following this  
3 evidence I would like to ask the witness a question.

4 Mr Witness, you just said you were a senior man in the RUF,  
10:40:26 5 but in 1998 up to 2000 you were just a captain, weren't you?

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was a captain, but I was a vanguard.

7 JUDGE LUSSICK: Go ahead, Mr Anyah.

8 MR ANYAH:

9 Q. When you say you were a vanguard, were those in the RUF who  
10:40:51 10 were vanguards held to a certain type of status?

11 A. All vanguards were senior officers. Regardless of your  
12 rank, you were a senior officer. Any important meeting would  
13 involve you. Whether you were small or not, you would be  
14 contacted.

10:41:15 15 Q. You said a few minutes ago that it was a joint forum, you  
16 had to share ideas as to how to tackle the situations. This  
17 forum, are you referring to a meeting or meetings, Mr George?

18 A. Meeting. How to meet and arrange.

19 Q. I want to talk about this meeting or meetings you are  
10:41:42 20 talking about. You have told us you were in the Kono jungle.  
21 You told us that there was a re-attack on Kono in December 1998.  
22 You are now telling us that there were meetings where you shared  
23 ideas. Tell us about these meetings. When was the first one?  
24 Where did you have it?

10:42:04 25 A. We have a town called Jagbwema Fiama in Kono. Before you  
26 get to Jagbwema Fiama there is a town there but I can't remember  
27 the name, but the name we called it was Superman Ground. That  
28 was where we had the meeting.

29 Q. Now, Mr George, you said you had a meeting at Superman

1 Ground. Who was present for this meeting at Superman Ground?

2 A. Issa was at that meeting, Dennis Mingo, Morris Kallon,  
3 myself, Boston Flomo with Big Daddy. We were many. We were many  
4 at that meeting. All the commanders, even down to the fighters,  
10:43:36 5 they shared in that meeting.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr George. This place Superman Ground, was it  
7 in the Kono bush, or was it in another part of Kono District?  
8 Sorry, let me rephrase that. The Kono Jungle where you were at  
9 that you referred to previously, is that where the Superman  
10:44:01 10 Ground is? Or is it in another part of the Kono District?

11 A. It's the same Kono within the Kono Township. That was  
12 where we had the Superman Ground going towards Jagbwema Fiama.  
13 That Jagbwema Fiama is a town leading to the Guinea border.

14 Q. What was discussed at this meeting in relation to attacking  
10:44:31 15 Kono?

16 A. The meeting was held, and it was meant to discuss how to  
17 capture Kono, and I told you that the first plan was to how to  
18 set up a defensive; secondly, how best we can maintain our  
19 civilians. That was the first meeting. And the second meeting  
10:45:09 20 that was in '98 was to capture Kono. That too was held at the  
21 same Superman Ground. That was a large meeting that we held  
22 before capturing Kono.

23 Q. Besides those two meetings - incidentally, was Sam Bockarie  
24 in attendance at either of those two meetings?

10:45:34 25 A. Sam Bockarie was the boss. He was based in Buedu, but  
26 whatever was going on, they would furnish him with information.  
27 Issa furnished him and --

28 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat the second  
29 name of the person who furnished him?

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, you spoke of Issa furnishing  
2 him. What was the second person? Who was the second person that  
3 you mentioned apart from Issa?

4           MR ANYAH: Perhaps I can inquire:

10:46:12 5 Q. Mr George, when you say "Issa furnished him", what do you  
6 mean? Issa was furnishing what to whom?

7 A. Issa Sesay was furnishing Sam Bockarie about all plans and  
8 information that we wanted to implement.

9 Q. When you say "furnishing", do you mean he was telling him  
10:46:36 10 about it?

11 A. Yes, he was telling him about how we planned to attack or  
12 how we were planning to do so and so. That's what I mean.

13 Q. During this time when these meetings were taking place, did  
14 you receive any instructions from Sam Bockarie regarding  
10:47:05 15 re-taking Kono?

16 A. Yes. That instruction was there, because that was the only  
17 target we had. That was our major plan, in fact. Whether you  
18 had instruction or not, those of us who were on the ground,  
19 sometimes we do make moves to take chances.

10:47:30 20 Q. Was there ever a meeting held near the Dawa crossing point  
21 regarding the re-take of Kono?

22 A. Exactly so.

23 Q. But you just told us there were meetings at Superman  
24 Ground, one and two. Is this a third meeting regarding Kono at  
10:47:54 25 the Dawa crossing point?

26 A. The meeting at Dawa crossing point was headed by Sam  
27 Bockarie. That was the first meeting he ever called. The  
28 meetings which were held in the Kono Jungle was among we, the  
29 commanders who were in the Kono Jungle, and it was meant to

1 discuss how to maintain the ground.

2 Q. Well, let's talk about this meeting Sam Bockarie held. You  
3 said it was the first meeting he ever called. Was it before the  
4 two meetings at Superman Ground, or was it after those two  
10:48:37 5 meetings?

6 A. After all our two meetings at Superman Grounds, that was  
7 the time that he called the meeting - the general meeting. The  
8 general meeting was held in Kailahun - I mean, in Buedu at  
9 Waterworks.

10:48:57 10 Q. Now, this is the third meeting, you said, held in Kailahun.  
11 That is Kailahun District, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You referred to a place called Waterworks. Is that a place  
14 that is different from the Dawa crossing point, or are they one  
10:49:15 15 and the same area?

16 A. Dawa crossing point is far off, but it's the same road from  
17 Buedu Town to Waterworks, it's just like from here and outside.  
18 But Dawa crossing point is far away.

19 Q. We have now talked about three meetings, maybe four, and I  
10:49:37 20 want to clarify. You have mentioned two meetings amongst  
21 commanders at Superman Ground; you have mentioned a general  
22 meeting called by Sam Bockarie in Buedu, Kailahun District, in  
23 the vicinity of a place called Waterworks. Was there a fourth  
24 meeting held at the Dawa crossing point in relation to the  
10:50:01 25 re-taking of Kono?

26 A. The fourth meeting we had was in Kono for the recapture of  
27 Kono.

28 Q. Well, let's talk about the Waterworks meeting. Sam  
29 Bockarie called this meeting. Did you go for that meeting?

1 A. I went there. I was not the only person who went. We were  
2 many who went.

3 Q. Who were some of the senior RUF commanders present at that  
4 meeting?

10:50:35 5 A. John Vincent, some AFRC soldiers like Leather Boot, Akim,  
6 Superman, Issa Sesay. A lot of commanders went. Because all the  
7 commanders wouldn't leave their front line, some stayed behind to  
8 maintain the situation.

9 Q. What happened at the meeting?

10:51:15 10 A. Sam Bockarie called this meeting. We all assembled there.  
11 We passed the night, and the following morning we went to  
12 Waterworks on the road leading to Dawa crossing point. The  
13 purpose of this meeting was how to re-attack Kono.

14 Q. Why did you and the others in the RUF want to re-attack  
10:51:58 15 Kono? Why?

16 A. We wanted to be based in the town, and we were based there  
17 before and we were dislodged, so we want to recapture there. It  
18 wasn't just Kono. We wanted to advance as far as Makeni and  
19 Lunsar.

10:52:20 20 Q. Very well. What was the significance of Kono? You wanted  
21 to be based there, but was Kono of some particular significance  
22 or importance?

23 A. Kono, as people know, is a mining area. When you talk  
24 about capturing Kono, people would only think that you want to  
10:52:54 25 mine diamond. But Kono was a target ahead of us. We cannot jump  
26 over Kono and go to Makeni. We had to start from Kono to  
27 establish a base before we spread out. That was the more reason  
28 why we wanted to capture Kono first.

29 Q. You said you also wanted to advance as far as Makeni and

1 Lunsar. What was the purpose of advancing to both of those  
2 places?

3 A. We wanted to gain grounds. We controlled the ground before  
4 and we were pushed out, so we needed to regain it from the enemy.

10:53:35 5 That was what we were fighting for.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Was an attack on Freetown discussed  
7 at this Waterworks meeting?

8 A. No, no, no, no.

9 Q. Where were you to get the arms or ammunition - well, arms  
10:53:55 10 and ammunition - to re-take Kono? Was that discussed at this  
11 meeting?

12 A. I said it was one of the most important things for the  
13 meeting. What we were to do to capture Kono, where would we get  
14 the arms and ammunition from to capture Kono? Because we had a  
10:54:17 15 lot of arms. We had captured from it from the enemy, but we  
16 needed ammunition. That was the most important part of the  
17 meeting.

18 Q. And what was said in relation to ammunition that was to be  
19 used to re-take Kono during the meeting?

10:54:37 20 A. During the meeting I met a guy - we met a guy. It was not  
21 me alone, because it was a meeting called by Mosquito. He was  
22 called Abu Keita, a former general for ULIMO or Alhaji Kromah's  
23 general. We met him at that meeting.

24 Q. Meeting this fellow Abu Keita at that meeting at the  
10:55:09 25 Waterworks, had you met him before whilst serving with the RUF  
26 from 1991?

27 A. That was my first time of meeting him, because he never  
28 fought for my unit, so I did not know him. I was not used to  
29 him. It was at that meeting that I got to know him and other

1 officers that he took along with him.

2 Q. What is the nationality of this person Abu Keita?

3 A. Abu Keita is a Mandingo man from Liberia.

4 Q. You said he was a former general for ULIMO, that is, Alhaji  
10:55:53 5 Kromah's ULIMO. When you met him at the Waterworks in 1998, do  
6 you know if he was attached or connected with any group, whether  
7 in Liberia or Sierra Leone?

8 A. When we met him at that meeting, he was introduced to us by  
9 Sam Bockarie.

10:56:22 10 Q. What did Bockarie say about the person he was introducing,  
11 Abu Keita?

12 A. Sam Bockarie told us that the operation to recapture Kono,  
13 that the ammunition for that was got from Abu Keita.

14 Q. Did he say what kind of ammunition this was?

10:56:57 15 A. Yes. He told us how many boxes Abu Keita had brought to  
16 him. How many boxes of RPG. He told us everything.

17 Q. Well, please tell us. What amount of ammunition and types  
18 of ammunition did Abu Keita bring to Sam Bockarie?

19 A. Abu Keita brought 20 boxes of AK in Buedu.

10:57:42 20 Q. 20 boxes of AK. Is this a weapon? Is this ammunition? 20  
21 boxes of AK what?

22 A. 20 boxes of AK rounds, AK bullets, let's put it that way.

23 Q. Besides the 20 boxes of AK bullets, was there any other  
24 form of ammunition brought by Abu Keita to Sam Bockarie in Buedu?

10:58:08 25 A. Yes. He also brought five boxes of RPG rockets.

26 Q. Was that all he brought?

27 A. Yes. That's what I know about.

28 Q. The 20 boxes of AK rounds and five boxes of RPG rockets,  
29 were those a significant or large amount of ammunition at that

1 time for the RUF?

2 A. The place that we were at that time, the situation in which  
3 we were, to have gotten that 20 boxes of AK, it was plenty for  
4 us. Those 20 boxes can give us how many rounds of AKs? Yes,  
10:59:06 5 because we trusted ourselves.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Did you find out from where Abu  
7 Keita got these ammunitions?

8 A. I told you initially that Abu Keita was a general for  
9 ULIMO. There was no need for me to ask him. He controlled - he  
10:59:25 10 was in control of men. He controlled - he was in control of an  
11 area.

12 Q. My question is not whether you had a need to ask him. Did  
13 you hear from somebody, such as Sam Bockarie or any other person  
14 there, where this man got these ammunitions from?

10:59:45 15 A. This ammunition he had gotten from Liberia where he was  
16 commanding at the Lofa bridge. He was the commander at the Lofa  
17 bridge according to Sam Bockarie. When the election took place  
18 in Liberia in 1997, ULIMO lost that election, and they were  
19 keeping this ammunition to re-attack.

11:00:16 20 Q. Are you saying that the ammunition was ULIMO ammunition?

21 A. Exactly so. That particular ammunition that he carried was  
22 from ULIMO. He was a commander for ULIMO and he took that  
23 ammunition along after the elections in Liberia in 1997, after  
24 they had lost the election. And there was something called  
11:00:41 25 research and this research was conducted by ECOMOG to look out  
26 for arms and ammunition at the various points. So he was afraid  
27 and he took the ammunition and brought it to us for sale.

28 Q. Did you yourself ever see this ammunition that you are  
29 referring to brought by Abu Keita?

1 A. I saw the ammunition. It was the ammunition that we used  
2 to recapture Kono.

3 Q. Where did you see it? Was it at the Waterworks meeting or  
4 somewhere else?

11:01:19 5 A. I saw the ammunition in Sam Bockarie's house. From there,  
6 when they took it to us again in the Kono Jungle, I saw it there  
7 again. We opened it. We used it. I mean, I know about it.

8 Q. Sam Bockarie's house, was this in Buedu?

9 A. Yes, in Buedu, Dawa Road. That was where he stayed.

11:01:46 10 Q. At this meeting at the Waterworks where you first saw Abu  
11 Keita, were there any other new faces that you were seeing for  
12 the first time at the meeting?

13 A. Yes. I saw different faces. I can remember the two  
14 commanders, the two senior officers who came with Abu Keita. I  
11:02:12 15 can remember them. I know their names.

16 Q. And who are those people? What are their names?

17 A. One of them is called Jungle. Give me some time. Let me  
18 call the other guy's name. The other one's name was Leo.  
19 Colonel Leo and Colonel Jungle. They are all from the Mandingo  
11:02:53 20 ethnic group.

21 Q. Did you know either of them before that day to have been  
22 members of the RUF?

23 A. Since I was fighting with the RUF that was my first time of  
24 seeing them in the RUF territory.

11:03:09 25 Q. During the meeting at the Waterworks, did Sam Bockarie say  
26 anything about receiving instructions from Charles Taylor to  
27 attack Kono?

28 A. Sam Bockarie never told us anything in relation to  
29 Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor had his own problem to solve. He

1 never told us anything about Charles Taylor giving us ammunition  
2 or sending us ammunition to recapture, no.

3 Q. What do you mean by Charles Taylor had his own problems?  
4 What problems are you referring to?

11:03:50 5 A. The man was in control of his country --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly take his  
7 answer again slowly.

8 MR ANYAH:

9 Q. Mr George, you must slow down. We were following you and  
11:04:09 10 we lost you at some point because of how fast you were going.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you repeat your entire answer? Can  
12 you explain the kind of problems you are referring to that  
13 Charles Taylor had, please?

14 THE WITNESS: What I mean about Charles Taylor having his  
11:04:23 15 own problem, he was elected in Liberia in 1997. He was not  
16 fighting. There was no war going on in 1997. How could he have  
17 given us instruction? How could he have given us ammunition?  
18 That's what I'm saying.

19 MR ANYAH:

11:04:40 20 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Now, you saw the ammunition that Abu  
21 Keita brought in Buedu. You saw it again when you were in the  
22 jungle. You told us you took part in the attack on Kono. Can  
23 you tell us how this attack unfolded, starting with who was the  
24 commander for the attack?

11:05:09 25 A. When we talk about Kono, Kono is not a village to say that  
26 you would only have one commander. We had various front line  
27 commanders, but we had one command structure.

28 Q. Who were some of the front line commanders for this attack  
29 on Kono?

1 A. Boston Flomo, alias Rambo.

2 Q. Was he the only one or were there others, I am speaking of  
3 commanders?

4 A. I want to give you time so that I can call out the names.

11:05:57 5 I don't want to start talking and you tell me I'm talking fast.

6 Kailondo, alias Vanicious Vandil, but Kailondo was his nickname.

7 Tikeke.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, that was alias who? Kailondo was

9 alias who?

11:06:18 10 THE WITNESS: Vanicious Varney, alias Kailondo. That's his

11 full name. But the name that he was using in Sierra Leone as a

12 fighter is Kailondo. That was his fighting name.

13 MR ANYAH:

14 Q. Mr George, did you say Vanicious or did you say Valicious?

11:06:46 15 What did you say?

16 A. Vanicious K Varney.

17 Q. I believe that's on the record already, Vanicious Varney.

18 Mr George, you mentioned some names, Boston Flomo, Vanicious

19 Varney, Tikeke. This T, is that the first initial of this

11:07:14 20 person's name?

21 A. Yes. They called him Tikeke. I think it should be a Mende

22 name.

23 MR ANYAH: Madam President, I am not sure how to spell it.

24 I would spell it K-E-K-E, but maybe the interpreters can assist

11:07:39 25 us?

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, do you have a different

27 spelling of the name Keke?

28 THE INTERPRETER: Well, to my mind it should be a single

29 name Tikeke, T-I-K-E-K-E. It's not an initial T and Keke. It's

1 a Mende name for my father, or their father.

2 MR ANYAH: Very well:

3 Q. Mr George, Boston Flomo, Vanicious Varney, also know as  
4 Kailondo, and Tikeke. Who else were some of the front line  
11:08:22 5 commanders for the attack on Kono in December 1998?

6 A. We had Akim. Superman, I mean Dennis Mingo.

7 Q. Anybody else?

8 A. Morris Kallon. Issa Sesay. And the soldiers they were in  
9 control of.

11:09:06 10 Q. Amongst those various front line commanders who was the  
11 overall person in the command structure that was at the top?

12 A. The senior officer among them was Issa Sesay.

13 Q. You told us you took part in this attack on Kono. Tell us  
14 what happened, as in how long the attack took and who you were  
11:09:31 15 fighting.

16 A. I was fighting against ECOMOG and the Kamajors who were  
17 based in Kono.

18 Q. Were you successful in your attack on Kono?

19 A. Oh, yes. We overran them.

11:10:05 20 Q. How long did it take you to overrun them?

21 A. We fought from the evening hours to the following morning  
22 around 8 o'clock before we could capture Kono.

23 Q. When you captured Kono, how long were you based in Kono?

24 A. I based there in 2002 after the election. We were still  
11:10:46 25 controlling the ground until disarmament, election, when the  
26 government took over the ground.

27 Q. So you're telling us from December 1998 when the RUF  
28 captured Kono, the RUF continued to maintain Kono until  
29 disarmament in the year 2002. Is that what you're telling us,

1 Mr George?

2 A. Exactly so.

3 Q. Let's consider that period of time now, 1998, after Kono  
4 has been recaptured, through 2002, the disarmament. Immediately  
11:11:22 5 following the recapturing of Kono, what was your assignment?

6 A. After capturing Kono - Kono was not the only ground that we  
7 targeted. We had places like Tongo, Makeni, Lunsar. If it was  
8 possible for us to have captured Freetown, we would have captured  
9 Freetown.

11:11:50 10 Q. Is it the case then that some RUF remained in Kono after it  
11 was recaptured while others went to these other places, Makeni,  
12 Lunsar and Tongo?

13 A. Kono - the RUF soldiers maintained Kono. After Kailahun,  
14 Kono was a base for RUF soldiers. Whilst others were taking the  
11:12:18 15 route to Tongo, other men were advancing to Makeni. That was how  
16 we planned it.

17 Q. Did you stay it in Kono, or did you join some of those  
18 others who were going to either Tongo or Makeni?

19 A. Oh, yes I found my way to Tongo with Akim.

11:12:39 20 Q. And what was your assignment at that time with Akim?

21 A. My assignment with Akim was as an adviser. Excuse me, Base  
22 Marine was also with us. Let me not leave his name out.

23 Q. Very well. You were with Akim, you were with Base Marine,  
24 you were serving as an adviser to Akim. Did --

11:13:08 25 A. And also Vanicious Varney.

26 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Did all of you make your way to  
27 Tongo? Did you get to Tongo?

28 A. We got to Tongo. We attacked Tongo and we captured Tongo  
29 and we based there.

1 Q. What year were you based in Tongo?

2 A. I told you earlier that we spent Christmas in - we spent  
3 December Christmas in Kono. In '99 we were in Tongo.

11:13:58

4 Q. Between the time when you were in Kono in December 1998  
5 through into 1999 when you were in Tongo, did you hear about  
6 anything happening in Freetown?

7 A. Yes, I heard about it, but I was not there.

8 Q. What did you hear in relation to Freetown?

11:14:30

9 A. I heard about attacking Freetown from the SLAs, SAJ Musa  
10 and his group. But unfortunately, SAJ Musa died on the highway  
11 and another person took over as a commander and they entered  
12 Freetown. But I was not there, so I can't say much about that.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Just remember to take your time.  
14 Slow down as you speak so we can keep up with the interpretation.

11:14:50

15 Your statements a few minutes ago was that you heard about  
16 attacking Freetown from the SLAs, SAJ Musa and his group. Who  
17 was SAJ Musa?

18 A. SAJ Musa was a senior officer for the SLA.

19 Q. [Microphone not activated]?

11:15:23

20 A. They are the national army for Sierra Leone.

21 Q. I have heard this - I have seen this notation "Microphone  
22 not activated" --

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't know what is going on, Madam  
24 Court Officer, I think it is the switching on and off between the  
25 interpreters. Someone is not switching on, you know, in time, or  
26 switching off in time, as a result of which part of the record  
27 goes missing. I hope you can address this.

28 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we will address this during the  
29 break.

1 MR ANYAH:

2 Q. Mr George, the question I had asked you - and it might seem  
3 as a silly question, but I will just ask it again: Who are the  
4 SLAs? And you said they were the national army for Sierra Leone.

11:16:12 5 Now, you said you don't know much about this attack on Freetown  
6 by SAJ Musa, but you also said unfortunately SAJ Musa died on the  
7 highway, and another person took over as commander and they  
8 entered Freetown. Do you know who took over as commander when  
9 SAJ Musa died?

11:16:36 10 A. Not really. I can't tell lies to you. I don't want to be  
11 saying they said, they said, they said. I wouldn't be giving the  
12 right information. I want to say what I know and what I saw.

13 Q. That's fair enough. We certainly want you to give the  
14 Court the right information. But one other question about this  
11:17:01 15 whole episode. You were in the RUF at the time. You have told  
16 us about the meeting at the Waterworks where there was discussion  
17 about re-taking Kono, advancing to Makeni, advancing as far as  
18 Lunsar. Did you ever hear of the RUF participating in this  
19 attack on Freetown between December 1998 into January 1999?

11:17:27 20 A. No, RUF never took part. Because as I told you about the  
21 power greed, there was a group of SLAs that were based in a  
22 separate area from the RUF. They found themselves into Freetown  
23 while RUF was still in Kono and Makeni. That's what I know  
24 about. RUF never took part in that operation. If RUF took part  
11:17:55 25 in that operation, really, that's not to my knowledge.

26 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Let's go back to you in Tongo with  
27 Akim, Base Marine, Vanicious Varney. What were you, them, and  
28 others belonging to the RUF doing in Tongo at the time?

29 A. Please repeat your question.

1 Q. When you captured Tongo with Akim, Base Marine, Vanicious  
2 Varney, was there any sort of mining taking place in Tongo at the  
3 time?

4 A. No, no, there was no mining activity going on.

11:18:45 5 Q. How long did you stay in Tongo for?

6 A. We stayed in Tongo till after the elections, yes. In  
7 Kono - after the elections, the government took over Kono, took  
8 over all the country, and everybody started normal life.

9 Q. Yes, my question was: How long did you stay in Tongo for?  
11:19:13 10 and you said you said in Tongo until after elections. When was  
11 after elections, what year?

12 A. You are talking about myself, or how long RUF stayed in  
13 Tongo?

14 Q. I am talking about you, Martin George. How long did you  
11:19:33 15 yourself stay in Tongo?

16 A. I never spent a year in Tongo. I was in Tongo with Akim,  
17 and then we received an instruction from Sam Bockarie that we  
18 should attack Kenema. We went to Kenema and we couldn't make it.  
19 On our way back, we received another instruction that we should  
11:20:07 20 go to Mano Junction. We went to Mano Junction and we did not  
21 succeed because there was a heavy ECOMOG presence there, so we  
22 couldn't make it and the order changed that we should go back to  
23 our same main ground in Tongo. When we got to Tongo, I asked my  
24 boss Akim for a pass that I wanted to go to Kono to see my  
11:20:36 25 children. Then he granted me the pass. That was how I left  
26 Tongo and went to Kono.

27 Q. Thank you, Mr George. When you started your response you  
28 said "I never spent a year in Tongo", and you finished by telling  
29 us how you received a pass from your boss Akim to go to Kono to

1 see your children. Now, how many months did you spend in Tongo  
2 in 1999?

3 A. I was in Tongo for three months.

4 Q. When you went to Kono to see your children after having  
11:21:29 5 received the pass, were you still a member of the RUF at that  
6 time?

7 A. Oh, yes, I was a full member of the RUF.

8 Q. And after - incidentally, did you get to see your family  
9 when you went to Kono?

11:21:50 10 A. Yes, I met them and I was with them.

11 JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Anyah, what does the witness mean by "a  
12 full member of the RUF"? Did they have associate members?

13 MR ANYAH:

14 Q. Mr George, you've heard Justice Lussick's question. My  
11:22:08 15 question was, were "You still a member of the RUF at the time you  
16 went to Kono to see your children?" You said, "Yes, I was a full  
17 member of the RUF." Can you elaborate? What you do you mean,  
18 you were a full member?

19 A. That means I was a member of the RUF from the base as a  
11:22:29 20 vanguard where I was trained for the RUF, and when I was still  
21 fighting for the RUF I was still a member of the RUF. I never  
22 left RUF to joined any party outside. That's what I mean.

23 Q. Very well. After you saw your family, did you take up any  
24 assignment for the RUF?

11:22:53 25 A. Yes. It was at that time that I was assigned to Kono as a  
26 brigade commander. That's the time I started taking up  
27 responsibility by controlling a large group of men.

28 Q. Who gave you this assignment as brigade commander?

29 A. The assignment was given to me by Issa Sesay and it was

1 approved by Sam Bockarie.

2 Q. What year were you given this assignment as brigade  
3 commander?

4 A. It was in that same 1999 in the same month of March. I was  
11:23:42 5 given that assignment when I came from Tongo.

6 Q. What was your rank at that time?

7 A. I said colonel. It was colonel.

8 Q. So you are a brigade commander in Kono; you are a colonel;  
9 it's March 1999. How many RUF fighters did you command? How  
11:24:10 10 many were under your command?

11 A. In the first place, a brigade controls four battalions. In  
12 these battalions, each battalion controls four companies, and  
13 those four companies, one company comprises 248 men. So --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he take his calculation  
11:24:45 15 slowly again.

16 MR ANYAH:

17 Q. Mr George, you were trying to explain for us the  
18 constituent make-up of battalions companies and the like. You  
19 said that a brigade has four battalions, yes?

11:24:59 20 A. Yes, yes.

21 Q. And each battalion is made up of four companies, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. How many fighters make up each company?

24 A. 248.

11:25:19 25 Q. How many battalions did you have under your command when  
26 you were brigade commander?

27 A. I was controlling four battalions.

28 Q. Did you have approximately 4,000 fighters under your  
29 control when you were in - well, I see some questions arising,

1 perhaps, from the Bench. Let me try the math this way:

2 Mr George, if each company has about 248 men, four such companies  
3 will come close to a thousand men; do you agree?

11:26:13

4 A. If the figure is right, yes, 248 times four. You can check  
5 it.

6 Q. And if each battalion is made up of four companies, then  
7 each battalion would have about a thousand men, yes? Mr George,  
8 I don't wish to put words in your mouth. Is that the case? How  
9 many men, fighters, make up each battalion?

11:26:43

10 A. That's what I am telling you. You can times the four  
11 companies to a battalion. When you know the figure, you would  
12 know how many men are in a battalion. Because I don't have a  
13 calculator to calculate it, that's what I said, that you should  
14 do it for me and know the figure. Four companies make a

11:27:05

15 battalion, and those four companies, you check the manpower and  
16 times it by the battalion, and then you would know the figure.

17 JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Anyah, I have been trying to follow the  
18 time frames here just so that the evidence is clear to me.

19 MR ANYAH: Yes, your Honour.

11:27:21

20 JUDGE LUSSICK: Now, I note the evidence just given by this  
21 witness. He says he was a colonel in March 1999. Now, the  
22 previous evidence was that he was not promoted to a colonel until  
23 2000. And I am going back to the transcript at page 28, line 24  
24 onwards where you asked him, so is it the case that from 1996  
25 when you were made a captain until your promotion to colonel in  
26 2000 you remained at the same rank of captain, and the witness  
27 answered:

11:27:50

28 "From '94 I was a lieutenant. When they called us out,  
29 when the AFRC called us, we joined them, I was promoted to a

1 captain and I maintained that position as captain from '97, '98,  
2 '99, 2000. 2000, before I had another rank, that was colonel."  
3 And now we have him commanding four battalions in March 1999. I  
4 can't reconcile that with his previous evidence.

11:28:32 5 MR ANYAH: Your Honour, I picked up the same discrepancy,  
6 if you will, in the evidence. You are entirely right. That was  
7 the response given by the witness previously and I will attempt  
8 to clarify. I also know that we are almost out of time, but  
9 perhaps I can continue until we are out of time.

11:28:52 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Before we break we were doing that  
11 mathematics, which according to my calculator, that is, four  
12 battalions comprising four companies, each company comprising 248  
13 personnel gives a figure of 3,968.

14 MR ANYAH: I have 992 for each battalion and I suppose  
11:29:19 15 multiplying that by four will equal exactly what Madam President  
16 has said, 3,968.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: So is that what the witness was  
18 commanding, thereabouts?

19 MR ANYAH: I will pursue both issues with the witness:  
11:29:34 20 Q. Now, Mr George, starting with Justice Lussick's  
21 observations. You told us a few minutes ago when I asked you  
22 questions about your rank, you said you were first made a  
23 lieutenant in 1994 and at some point you were made a captain, and  
24 you specified a period of time when you remained a captain. You  
11:29:54 25 said you were a captain from 1997 until the year 2000. A few  
26 minutes ago in relation to your appointment as brigade commander  
27 in Kono, you said the appointment was in March 1999 and your rank  
28 was colonel. So the question is this: What year did you become  
29 a colonel?

1 A. I am telling you what I know. I served as a brigade  
2 commander in 1999. I was promoted to a colonel. From the time  
3 that we retreated from the bush in Freetown and we got to Kono,  
4 in that first meeting - it was a rank, but I did not put there.  
11:30:46 5 So I am just cutting it short. I was recommended to become a  
6 major when I captured Tongo. I think if you check my something  
7 you will see it. You cannot just move from captain and become a  
8 colonel. You go by steps. I know that. From captain you go to  
9 major before becoming a colonel.

11:31:05 10 MR ANYAH: Can I proceed this after the break?

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly. We are going to take the  
12 mid-morning break. We'll reconvene at 12 o'clock.

13 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

14 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

12:02:54 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Bangura, you're on your feet.

16 MR BANGURA: May it please, Madam President, your Honours.  
17 I wish to announce a change in representation. We've been joined  
18 by Mr Nicholas Koumjian on the Prosecution side.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. That's noted. Mr Anyah?

12:03:17 20 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

21 Q. Mr George, before the Court adjourned at 11.30 we were  
22 considering the question of when it was that you were promoted to  
23 the rank of colonel. Do you recall that?

24 A. Yes, I remember.

12:03:39 25 Q. Now let's have a brief overview of your various promotions.  
26 And we shall do so quickly, but with enough care to advise these  
27 justices of what rank you had during what period of time. Is it  
28 correct that in 1994 you were made a lieutenant?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. You've mentioned this morning that you were promoted to the  
2 rank of captain. In what year were you promoted to the rank of  
3 captain?

4 A. We are talking about 1997 when we joined the soldiers in  
12:04:20 5 Freetown.

6 Q. So you were promoted to captain in 1997?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Before the break, one of the responses you gave was to this  
9 effect. You said, "I am just cutting it short. I was  
12:04:41 10 recommended as major when I captured Tongo." You were  
11 recommended as major when you captured Tongo. Is that when you  
12 were with Akim?

13 A. Before we went for the meeting in Buedu for the attack on  
14 Kono, some officers were promoted before the Kono operation. And  
12:05:13 15 as I was capturing, I had my promotion where I was based at  
16 Woama. That was before the Kono operation.

17 Q. You say at the meeting in Buedu. You're referring to the  
18 Waterworks meeting, yes?

19 A. Yes, that was the meeting that Mosquito convened.

12:05:37 20 Q. Did you receive a promotion during that meeting?

21 A. I received promotion with other people - a promotion paper.

22 Q. To what rank were you promoted?

23 A. I was promoted to a major, and Vanicious Varney was  
24 promoted to lieutenant colonel when he was serving as battalion  
12:06:04 25 commander. I brought his promotion paper. Major Ambush  
26 Commander, Amara Ambush Commander.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, were these promotions by - the  
28 ones in 1997, were they promotions by the RUF, or promotions by  
29 the junta?

1 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President, I will clarify. But let  
2 me ascertain the year first, because that might assist:

3 Q. The promotion to captain in 1997, Mr George, was that by  
4 the RUF?

12:06:45 5 A. It was the RUF. The AFRC or Johnny Paul Koroma never  
6 promoted me. All promotions I got was from Sam Bockarie through  
7 Issa Sesay.

8 Q. Remind us again of when the meeting at the Waterworks took  
9 place. I'm referring to the year.

12:07:11 10 A. The meeting at the Waterworks? It was held in 1998 at  
11 Waterworks. That was where we had the last meeting with Mosquito  
12 on how we should attack Kono.

13 Q. And was it during that meeting you received a slip of paper  
14 promoting you to major?

12:07:35 15 A. Yes, I was not the only person. Even Vincent had a  
16 promotion.

17 Q. Mr George, we appreciate that, but let's set aside Vincent  
18 for a second. Let's side aside Vanicious Varney and others.

19 We're just focusing on you: Martin George. When you received  
12:07:56 20 this paper promoting you to major, was that rank to take effect  
21 from the date of that meeting, or was it to take effect sometime  
22 in the future?

23 A. The day they gave me the promotion was the day that I was  
24 supposed to exercise that promotion. It was not after that. The  
12:08:17 25 same day I received my major rank was the same day I started  
26 exercising my major rank.

27 Q. What was your rank after being promoted to major? Your  
28 next rank, what was it?

29 A. I said I was a captain in 1997. That was what I said.

1 When we left the city, I was a captain.

12:09:00 2 Q. Okay, that was the rank you had before the Waterworks  
3 meeting. You then go to the meeting, you receive a slip of paper  
4 promoting you to major. After major, did you attain any higher  
5 rank than major?

6 A. After the major rank, when I came from Tongo I was serving  
7 as adviser to Akim. And when I came back to Kono, that was the  
8 time I was recommended to take over the brigade as a colonel.

12:09:25 9 Q. Very well. Mr George, just bear with us. We're following  
10 you. We're not questioning you as far as the facts of what  
11 you're saying.

12 You're now in Kono; you're a brigade commander; you're a  
13 colonel. You told us it was in 1999, and you remember one of the  
14 issues we were trying to ascertain before the break was how many  
12:09:46 15 persons or fighters were under your command as a brigade  
16 commander. Now, you said each company had 248 fighters. You  
17 said four companies made a battalion. You said you were in  
18 charge of four battalions. Is all of that right, Mr George?

19 A. Yes, it's correct. And I know I had the position, so I  
12:10:21 20 cannot lie here to say that I did, when I did not.

21 Q. When we did the math, the President of the Court assisted  
22 us. Adding those figures, it totalled 3,968 persons. Does that  
23 sound right to you, Mr George? Was that the number of persons  
24 that were under your command when you were a brigade commander in  
12:10:49 25 Kono in 1999?

26 A. That is the full manpower of the brigade. The --

27 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be  
28 advised to slow down and repeat what he said.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Firstly, Mr Witness, we have now gone

1 beyond the mathematics. The question on the table before you is  
2 whether you commanded 3,968 persons. This is now the question.  
3 It's either a yes or a no --

12:11:35 4 THE WITNESS: Yes, that was the manpower that I controlled  
5 as a brigade commander.

6 MR ANYAH:

7 Q. Who did you replace as brigade commander in Kono?

8 A. I replaced The Big.

9 Q. What is that person's name? You referred to a Big?

12:12:00 10 A. That is the name I know, The Big. He was in charge of the  
11 Kono brigade and he was being deputised by Gasimu.

12 Q. Do you know somebody named Banyah?

13 A. Yes, it was Banyah who replaced me. He took over the  
14 brigade when my assignment was changed.

12:12:31 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, is "The Big" a name?

16 MR ANYAH:

17 Q. Mr George, this person, The Big, is that their full name or  
18 real name, or is that a nickname?

19 A. It could be a nickname, because I don't know his full name.

12:12:52 20 But people knew him to be The Big in Kono whilst he was serving  
21 there, and as I am explaining now, other people who know the  
22 story, they would know that is Martin who is speaking now.

23 Q. Very well. Where was Base Marine when you were assigned as  
24 brigade commander in Kono?

12:13:22 25 A. Base Marine was in Tongo. When we went on the Kenema  
26 attack he was injured, and he was taken to Buedu for treatment.

27 Q. Was Base Marine, also known as Jonathan Parker, even under  
28 your command when you were a brigade commander in Kono?

29 A. Yes. Jonathan, that is his name, that is his full name.

1 It was later that he took that name in Masingbi, like I said,  
2 Sherif, Sherif Parker.

3 Q. What I wish to know is, did he at some point come under  
4 your command in Kono? We know his name now. When you were  
12:14:08 5 brigade commander in Kono, did he come under your command,  
6 Mr George?

7 A. Yes. I remember one time when he left Kailahun from the  
8 sick - from his sick bed, he came to me from - to Kono and he  
9 told me he wanted to go back to Kailahun. And I told him that,  
12:14:31 10 "It's not always that I will get food to send for you in  
11 Kailahun, but what I will do for you is, I will give you an  
12 assignment area so that you will be able to manage your own life  
13 also." So that was how I sent him to Masingbi.

14 Q. What was Jonathan Parker's rank when you sent him on  
12:14:54 15 assignment to Masingbi?

16 A. Jonathan Parker had already had his rank from - because he  
17 was already recommended by Sam Bockarie as major. When he went  
18 to Masingbi, he went there as a major. I did not give him the  
19 rank.

12:15:12 20 Q. How old, if you know, was Jonathan Parker, also known as  
21 Base Marine, by the time he reached the rank of major in the RUF?

22 A. No, I can't tell. I was not that particular about his age.  
23 But I knew the age he was when he was at the base.

24 Q. Was he still a young man in 19 - well, let me ask you this:  
12:15:46 25 Was it in the year 1999 he was made a major in the RUF?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And you said you knew him when you were at Crab Hole in  
28 1991 to be how old?

29 A. I said he could have been between nine to ten years old, if

1 I am not mistaken. I think I said that in my statement, nine to  
2 ten years.

3 Q. By 1999, when he was made a major, do you know whether he  
4 had engaged in any fighting on behalf of the RUF?

12:16:26 5 A. I said he engaged in fighting in 1997 at the Sewafe Bridge.  
6 That was the time he first faced battle. And after there, he  
7 still continued battling.

8 Q. Thank you, Mr George. That is helpful. Now, your time in  
9 Kono as brigade commander, was there any diamond mining taking  
12:16:52 10 place in Kono while you were brigade commander there?

11 A. Diamond mining was organised.

12 Q. Who organised it?

13 A. Issa Sesay organised it and he formed a unit to take care  
14 of the diamond mining and I was focused on my front line, but he  
12:17:21 15 had people who were in charge of that.

16 Q. Do you remember the names of those who were in charge of  
17 diamond mining in Kono?

18 A. Yes, I remember them because they were part of my brigade.  
19 I remember Kennedy.

12:17:41 20 Q. Anyone else?

21 A. Peleto, Amara Peleto. Major Alpha. Abdul, Pa Abdul.  
22 Those were the people in charge of mining activities.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Amongst these names you've given us,  
24 Peleto, you also mentioned Kennedy, Pa Abdul and Major Alpha, who  
12:18:12 25 was the most senior person amongst them?

26 A. The most senior person was Kennedy. He was the most senior  
27 person.

28 Q. The Kennedy you just mentioned, is that the same person you  
29 mentioned previously in relation to diamond mining elsewhere in

1 Sierra Leone?

2 A. Yes, that is the same Kennedy I'm referring to.

3 Q. Were diamonds recovered when they were mined for by the RUF  
4 when you were brigade commander in Kono?

12:18:46 5 A. They were getting diamonds from the various sites, but I  
6 can't tell - I don't know how many carats. I don't know how many  
7 pieces because that was not my area of operation.

8 Q. Do you know who was doing the mining for the diamonds? Was  
9 it exclusively done by RUF members or were civilians also asked  
12:19:14 10 to mine for diamonds?

11 A. Civilians were mobilised to dig for the diamonds.

12 Q. Do you know to whom the diamonds that were recovered were  
13 given?

14 A. Yes. The commander in charge, Issa Sesay, he was the one  
12:19:40 15 who received the diamonds. I mean in Kono. He was in charge in  
16 Kono. He was receiving the diamonds from the various sites. He  
17 received them from Kennedy.

18 Q. Do you know what Issa Sesay did with the diamonds that he  
19 received from Kennedy?

12:20:02 20 A. Issa Sesay had his own board to whom he reported. At any  
21 time they gave him a parcel, he would - and according to him, he  
22 said he reported - presented those diamonds to Sam Bockarie.

23 Q. Where was Sam Bockarie based at this time?

24 A. Sam Bockarie was still based in Buedu.

12:20:30 25 Q. Have you ever heard of the name Benjamin Yeaten?

26 A. Say that again.

27 Q. Yes. Have you ever heard of the name Benjamin Yeaten?

28 A. No.

29 Q. When you were brigade commander in Kono, did somebody named

1 Benjamin Yeaten pay a visit to the RUF in Kono?

2 A. No, not to my knowledge.

3 Q. When you were brigade commander in Kono, did the RUF have  
4 radio communication contact with anybody in Liberia named

12:21:12 5 Benjamin Yeaten?

6 A. We never had radio communication with anybody in Liberia by  
7 the name of Benjamin Yeaten.

8 Q. Do you know whether any of the diamonds recovered by the  
9 RUF when you were brigade commander in Kono were sent to somebody  
10 named Benjamin Yeaten in Liberia?

12:21:41

11 A. I am saying, no, never. All I know, all diamonds were  
12 given to Issa and from Issa to Sam Bockarie. But I never heard  
13 that a particular set of diamonds packed were sent for that  
14 particular person whose name you are calling.

12:22:06

15 Q. How about Charles Taylor? Did you ever hear anyone say  
16 diamonds that were recovered by the RUF in Kono, when you were  
17 brigade commander there, were being sent to Charles Taylor in  
18 Liberia?

12:22:30

19 A. Never. Nobody ever told me that they were taking diamonds  
20 to Charles Taylor for arms or ammunition or food or what have  
21 you. All I knew was that I was focused on my front line and the  
22 miners were focused on their mining. I did not have anything to  
23 do with the mining activities. I only had business with my front  
24 line.

12:22:49

25 Q. Mr George, when you were based in Kono in 1999 where was  
26 Foday Sankoh?

27 A. In 1999, if my memory serves me right, I think Foday Sankoh  
28 was at first in Nigeria and he was later transferred to Freetown,  
29 yes.

1 Q. Was Foday Sankoh a free person at that time in 1999?

2 A. Say that again.

3 Q. Was Foday Sankoh a free person, that is, somebody not in  
4 custody, prison or jail, in 1999 when you were brigade commander  
12:23:47 5 in Kono?

6 A. Well, I can't say he was a free person, because if he was  
7 free he would have come to us. He was not with us. He was still  
8 in the hands of the people.

9 Q. Still in the hands of which people?

12:24:06 10 A. The people who arrested him, like the Nigerians. We knew  
11 that he was with them. And from there, they turned him over to  
12 the Tejan Kabbah government. So he was not with us.

13 Q. At any time in that 1999, did you have communication  
14 contact with Foday Sankoh, you yourself, Martin George?

12:24:35 15 A. The only time I saw Foday Sankoh was in Magburaka and that  
16 was in 2000 when Banya took over the brigade. It was in 2000  
17 when he left Freetown to come and talk to us. That was when we  
18 had the infighting, when the late Van Damme was killed in Makeni.  
19 That was the time I saw Foday Sankoh in Magburaka talking to us,  
12:25:04 20 in 2000. From '96 to 2000, it was in Magburaka that I set eyes  
21 on Foday Sankoh.

22 Q. Very well. Have you heard of the Lome Peace Accord that  
23 was signed between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone?

24 A. Yes, I heard about it and it was working.

12:25:31 25 Q. Do you know when that accord was signed, the year?

26 A. No, I don't recall the year, but I know about the Lome  
27 Peace Accord and it was working. The UN were based at various  
28 points in 2000.

29 Q. Do you know whether Foday Sankoh was given any positions in

1 the Government of Sierra Leone after the Lome Peace Accord was  
2 signed?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What do you know about that?

12:26:09 5 A. What I know about that is that they said he was now taking  
6 care of the mineral resources, if I'm not mistaken, because he  
7 was in control of all the strategic points, the mining points,  
8 Tongo and Kono, he was in control, so I think that was why he was  
9 given that promotion.

12:26:34 10 Q. Where was he based when he was given this promotion? Which  
11 part of Sierra Leone was his base?

12 A. In fact, when he left Nigeria and came to Freetown, he was  
13 based in Freetown on Spur Road. That was where I met him in  
14 2000. That was where I met him and that was where I left him and  
15 I went back to Kono.

12:27:01 16 Q. Okay. Let's consider what you've just said, and you also  
17 said something earlier that I wish to revisit. We'll do it one  
18 at a time. We'll come to your visit to Freetown and Foday Sankoh  
19 at Spur Road. A few minutes ago you said, "The only time I saw  
12:27:22 20 Foday Sankoh was in Magburaka in the year 2000 when Banya took  
21 over the brigade." Let's consider that. The brigade you're  
22 referring to, is it the brigade you were in charge of in Kono  
23 starting in 1999?

24 A. Yes.

12:27:40 25 Q. What year did Banya take over from you as brigade  
26 commander?

27 A. I left the brigade in 2000. Banya took over in February  
28 2000.

29 Q. How is it that you went to Magburaka? For what purpose did

1 you go to Magburaka?

2 A. Magburaka was a ground for every one of us. RUF soldiers  
3 were based there. I had right to patrol any part of the  
4 RUF-controlled territories. I had that full right at that time.

12:28:25 5 So that prompted me to go and visit the other brothers and  
6 friends that I had in Makeni and Magburaka.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Just remember to speak slowly. We  
8 are following you. So you went to visit RUF friends and  
9 colleagues in Magburaka and Makeni and you met Foday Sankoh

12:28:46 10 there. What was Foday Sankoh's purpose in being in Magburaka at  
11 that time? What did he come to do there?

12 A. Foday Sankoh entered Magburaka. At first he entered  
13 Makeni. When he heard about the infighting that took place, he  
14 was not pleased. He came to find out what actually brought about  
12:29:16 15 the infighting. That was what brought him to Makeni and  
16 Magburaka.

17 Q. What infighting? What does "infighting" mean? Can you  
18 tell us what you mean by "infighting that took place"?

19 A. When I am talking about infighting, there was an infighting  
12:29:36 20 amongst us, we, the RUF soldiers. It happened this way: There  
21 was an instruction given to Boston Flomo and some other soldiers  
22 to go and arrest Superman and Gibril Massaquoi. And Gibril  
23 Massaquoi and Superman were both based at Lunsar, and at the same  
24 time Superman had his own self based in Makeni. I was not

12:30:12 25 there - I was in Kono - but they left. They went, they saw  
26 Superman and Gibril, according to what I heard. When they saw  
27 Superman and Gibril, they told him that - they told them that  
28 they were under arrest. And Gibril said, "If Issa wanted to see  
29 me, he shouldn't send a team to arrest me. He should either

1 invite me, we will go and discuss what he wanted us to discuss."  
2 And that was the same thing that Superman too said. And then  
3 Superman said, "Okay. If that is the case, Gibril, we shouldn't  
4 go anywhere. If Issa wanted to see us, at least he should send a  
12:31:00 5 proper order. But he shouldn't send men to come and have  
6 confrontation with us." So Van Damme and the group that he  
7 carried, they wanted to force issues. So there was an outbreak  
8 of riots and he said they are --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
12:31:25 10 to slow down.

11 MR ANYAH:

12 Q. Mr George, you were saying something about Van Damme and  
13 the group that he carried. Continue from there and just go  
14 slowly.

12:31:35 15 A. I said the group that Van Damme, Boston Flomo, took with  
16 him to go and arrest Superman and Gibril Massaquoi, they escaped  
17 from Lunsar because of the outbreak of chaos that took place  
18 because the manpower he took with him was not enough. The  
19 Superman and Gibril Massaquoi group overran them, so most of them  
12:32:08 20 escaped.

21 Q. Let's pause there. Let me ask you questions. The manpower  
22 was not enough; are you referring to the manpower taken by Boston  
23 Flomo, also known as Van Damme?

24 A. Exactly so. That is what I am talking about.

12:32:26 25 Q. Let's pause. This infighting you started out explaining to  
26 us occurred, and you said there was an instruction given to  
27 Boston Flomo and soldiers to go and arrest Superman and Gibril  
28 Massaquoi. Did that instruction come from Issa Sesay?

29 A. The instruction came from Issa Sesay.

1 Q. Why was it necessary, if you know, to have those two  
2 persons arrested? What did they do to Issa Sesay?

3 A. That was the same thing I said about at the earlier stage.  
4 It had to do with this same power issue. This person wanted to  
12:33:08 5 be the boss and that wanted to be the boss, nobody should say  
6 "yes, sir" to the order. So that was what brought about that.  
7 According to Issa, Gibri I Massaquoi and Superman should be based  
8 in Makeni. They shouldn't be based out of Makeni.

9 Q. Very well. Initially earlier on in your response you said  
12:33:42 10 Superman himself was based in Makeni. And in respect of both  
11 Superman and Gibri I Massaquoi, you said Massaquoi and Superman  
12 were both based in Lunsar. At the time of this infighting just  
13 clarify for us - Mr George, just hold on. Let me finish. Let  
14 the interpreter also finish. One second. Clarify for us first  
12:34:07 15 where Superman was based at the time of this infighting; was it  
16 Makeni or Lunsar?

17 A. I said Superman had his - one of his base in Lunsar where  
18 he and Gibri I Massaquoi were based, but he had his self base in  
19 Makeni. He spent some time in Lunsar and he would spend some  
12:34:36 20 time in Makeni. But it was in Lunsar that they went to attack  
21 them when Rambo and the few manpower that he took with him went  
22 to arrest them.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr George. That helps. Now, Boston Flomo, also  
24 known as Van Damme, is he the same person you referred to as  
12:34:55 25 Rambo?

26 A. That is the same person that I have been referring to as  
27 Rambo and later Van Damme. I told you that initially he was  
28 using the name Rambo. His actual name is Boston Flomo, but it  
29 was later that he started using the name Van Damme.

1 Q. Where was Sam Bockarie when Issa Sesay gave this  
2 instruction for these two persons to be arrested, Superman and  
3 Gibril Massaquoi?

12:35:37 4 A. Sam Bockarie was in Buedu. There was nothing Issa did  
5 without the knowledge of Sam Bockarie, so I knew that it was a  
6 connected thing between both of them. If Sam Bockarie did not  
7 agree, Issa Sesay wouldn't have carried out that action. You see  
8 the point?

9 Q. Mr George, you said this happened in the year 2000, is it?

12:36:00 10 A. The infighting? Yes, the infighting, I am talking about  
11 2000.

12 Q. Was Sam Bockarie still a member of the RUF in 2000?

13 A. Sam Bockarie was still a member of RUF. It was later in  
14 2000 that Sam Bockarie left the RUF, if my memory serves me  
12:36:30 15 right.

16 Q. Very well. You mentioned earlier on that this fellow Van  
17 Damme died right before or around the time Foday Sankoh spoke to  
18 you and others in Magburaka. Was it in relation to this order to  
19 arrest Superman and Gibril Massaquoi that Van Damme died?

12:37:01 20 A. I said earlier that it was as a result of the death of Van  
21 Damme, because it was - because of the infighting that we had in  
22 2000, that was what brought Foday Sankoh to Makeni and Magburaka.  
23 Van Damme died before Foday Sankoh entered Makeni and Magburaka.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr George.

12:37:29 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: That doesn't answer your question.  
26 Perhaps you should ask more clearly. Maybe something was lost in  
27 the interpretation.

28 MR ANYAH: I will. Thank you, Madam President:

29 Q. Mr George, let me read your answer again. Now, my question

1 was this: Essentially, I'm trying to ascertain when Van Damme  
2 died. Did he die before Foday Sankoh came to Magburaka to speak  
3 to you and others?

12:38:10 4 A. That is what I'm saying. I said yes, Van Damme died before  
5 Foday Sankoh came. He was still in Freetown. That was just what  
6 I said.

7 Q. The second part of the question was under what  
8 circumstances did he die? Was it connected to the order to  
9 arrest Superman and Gibril Massaquoi?

12:38:28 10 A. It was the same order that connects the arrest of Gibril  
11 Massaquoi and Super. When they went to arrest Gibril Massaquoi  
12 and Super and they failed, Super and Gibril too left with their  
13 troops to Makeni. When they entered Makeni, Van Damme came from  
14 Mile 91, according to the story, and he was lying in front of his  
12:39:01 15 house sleeping when Super and Gibril Massaquoi entered Makeni.

16 They rushed into Van Damme's house with their manpower, and they  
17 met Van Damme lying down on the sponge in front of his house and  
18 an argument broke out. They did not shoot at Van Damme. I  
19 learned that he was stabbed with a knife. But Superman later  
12:39:33 20 denied; that he was not responsible for the killing.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr George.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps what the witness meant,  
23 Mr Interpreter, was he denied that he was responsible for the  
24 killing.

12:39:53 25 THE WITNESS: Superman denied that he was responsible for  
26 Van Damme's death.

27 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

28 Q. Mr George, we have you in Magburaka listening to Foday  
29 Sankoh speak or talk, and you said earlier that at some point you

1 went to see him at Spur Road in Freetown. In what year and in  
2 what month did you go to Freetown to see Foday Sankoh?

3 A. I went to Freetown in February with Peter Vandj who was --

4 Q. [Overlapping speakers]

12:40:45 5 A. -- 2000.

6 Q. Yes, carry on.

7 A. A message was sent from Foday Sankoh to Issa Sesay that I  
8 should go to Freetown. I then went with Peter Vandj --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
12:41:06 10 to repeat the last thing he said.

11 MR ANYAH:

12 Q. Mr George, the interpreter would like some clarification.  
13 You said you went with Peter Varney. Is it Varney or Vandj?

14 A. Peter Vandj. Peter Vandj. He is a Mende. He is a Mende  
12:41:25 15 man. That is a Mende name. He is not Varney. I am not talking  
16 about Vanicious Varney. I'm talking about Peter Vandj. That is  
17 a Mende name. He is a Mende man.

18 Q. Okay. Who else besides Peter Vandj did you go to Freetown  
19 with?

12:41:41 20 A. I went with another guy who was called Eagle. That was his  
21 popular name, Eagle, in the RUF. That was the most popular name  
22 by which he was called. Eagle and I travelled to Freetown.

23 Q. How is it that you came to go to Freetown? Were you  
24 requested to go to Freetown? Were you just going on your own  
12:42:06 25 volition? What was your purpose in going to Freetown?

26 A. I said Foday Sankoh sent instruction to Issa Sesay that I  
27 should report to Freetown. I did not just go on my own; I was  
28 being sent for.

29 Q. Thank you, Mr George. When you got to Freetown, what

1 happened?

12:43:03 2 A. When I got to Freetown, I met with Foday Sankoh at  
3 Spur Road. And at first I briefed him about the ground that I am  
4 coming from. The first thing I told him was, "Pa Sankoh, since  
5 '96 you left us and we did not see you until the time we saw you  
6 in Makeni and Magburaka and I am from Kono. The civilians in  
7 Kono, they want you to go and talk to them and inform them about  
8 what is actually going on so that you will be able to explain to  
9 them the things that are actually going on about the war, because  
12:43:32 10 it's long time they have not seen you." That was my first  
11 request I made of him.

12 Q. At this time you were speaking to Foday Sankoh in Freetown,  
13 was he a member or part of the Sierra Leonean government?

14 A. Yes. I said yes. At that time he and Tejan Kabbah were  
12:43:58 15 working hand in glove. Johnny Paul Koroma too. All of them,  
16 they were just moving around the town, moving from here to there.

17 Q. And what did Sankoh say, if anything, in response to what  
18 you told him?

19 A. He told me yes. He said, "I will go to Kono." And,  
12:44:19 20 indeed, he went to Kono.

21 Q. Did he go to Kono immediately after your visit with him?

22 A. After I had visited him, Gibriil Massaquoi was instructed to  
23 give me 300 bags of rice to take them to Kono for the soldiers  
24 who were based there, including salt, Maggi and some other  
12:44:49 25 provisions. And it was after that, a week after that, that he  
26 went to Kono.

27 Q. That who went to Kono? Foday Sankoh?

28 A. Foday Sankoh went to Kono.

29 Q. How long did you spend in Freetown when you went to see

1 Foday Sankoh?

2 A. Actually, I spent ten days in Freetown.

3 Q. Were any UN observers or forces present in Freetown in the  
4 ten days you were there?

12:45:22 5 A. In fact, it was ECOMOG that was keeping guard on Foday  
6 Sankoh in his compound. There were no RUF soldiers there  
7 guarding him with arms. He was being guarded by ECOMOG soldiers  
8 at the time I am talking about.

9 Q. Yes, besides ECOMOG, my question was about United Nations,  
12:45:43 10 UN. Were there any UN observers or forces present in Freetown in  
11 the ten days you were there when you went to visit Foday Sankoh?

12 A. Let me tell you, I was not walking around. From where I  
13 used to sleep with Peter Vandi, I will go to Spur Road. I spend  
14 the whole day there and from there I would go back to where I was  
12:46:09 15 lodged. I was not moving about in the city because I did not - I  
16 was not familiar to the city. That was my first time being  
17 there. I don't want to lie to you.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Was Sam Bockarie still a member of  
19 the RUF at the time you met with Foday Sankoh in Freetown?

12:46:29 20 A. Thank you very much. When the instruction was given to  
21 Gibril for me to receive the rice, that was the time I knew that  
22 there was a misunderstanding between Foday Sankoh and Sam  
23 Bockarie.

24 Q. How did you learn of this misunderstanding?

12:46:55 25 A. Foday Sankoh had a set - a radio set where he was based and  
26 it happened this way: Sam Bockarie arrested some white people, I  
27 think some NGOs, because I was in Freetown and I got the story  
28 from the old man. And Sam Bockarie was asked to release those  
29 people whom he had arrested. He refused bitterly. He told Foday

1 Sankoh bitterly, he said no. He said Foday Sankoh should leave  
2 Freetown and come and establish a base either in Kailahun or  
3 Buedu and he refused too. So he said he should just forget -  
4 leave him alone.

12:47:43 5 Q. Who refused to go establish a base in Kailahun or Buedu?

6 A. I am talking about Sankoh. Sam Bockarie suggested that  
7 Sankoh should not sit in the middle of his enemies because he  
8 considered Kabbah and his soldiers as enemies. He said he was  
9 just from jail in Nigeria and he went and settled in Freetown and  
10 by rights he was supposed to go and establish his headquarters in  
11 our own zones. But Foday Sankoh said no, he was going to be  
12 based in the city, and Sam Bockarie did not like the idea, so  
13 that was where the misunderstanding came from. So he refused  
14 releasing the people he had arrested.

12:48:26 15 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Just remember to go slowly. These  
16 persons that you say Sam Bockarie arrested, do you know who they  
17 were?

18 A. They were NGO workers.

19 Q. Do you know how this misunderstanding between Sam Bockarie  
12:48:49 20 and Foday Sankoh was resolved? How was it settled?

21 A. After receiving the rice, I was given some ECOMOG to escort  
22 me to Kono and that was from the ECOMOG commander. So we drove  
23 down to Kono with the rice and I went to Issa directly together  
24 with the ECOMOG and the food that I was taking to Kono. I gave  
12:49:25 25 him the rice that Foday Sankoh sent for the soldiers on the  
26 ground. I showed him the strangers that I took to the ground,  
27 the ECOMOG, and he received us with --

28 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the witness was not very  
29 clear in that area.

1 MR ANYAH:

2 Q. Mr George, let's pause for a second. You showed Issa Sesay  
3 the strangers that you took with you, you were referring to the  
4 ECOMOG, and you said he received all of you. Continue from  
12:49:58 5 there, please.

6 A. After he received the strangers, I was instructed to take  
7 the rice to Ngaiya, a place called Ngaiya.

8 Q. Mr George, can I stop you there for a second. We will come  
9 back to it. You were instructed to take the rice to a place  
12:50:21 10 called Ngaiya. The question I asked you before you started  
11 explaining how you took the rice to Kono, I asked you how the  
12 misunderstanding between Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie was  
13 resolved, how was it settled. You've now taken us with the rice  
14 to Kono and you're now going towards Ngaiya. Can you ask that  
12:50:46 15 question first: How was that misunderstanding settled?

16 A. But before the settlement, I think I need to explain. I  
17 did not stay in Freetown until it was settled. Certain things  
18 happened before that, so I cannot just leave those things out to  
19 say they said this or they did that, so I have to clarify things.  
12:51:10 20 I have to explain the things that happened before that took  
21 place. So am I allowed to explain?

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: As long as you speak slowly. If you  
23 start speaking, running, running, we will not understand what  
24 you're saying, you see? If you listen to the way your lawyer is  
12:51:27 25 speaking, he is speaking slowly so that whatever he's saying is  
26 being written. You should do the same, please.

27 THE WITNESS: Okay.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Now, please continue, Mr Anyah.

29 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

1 Q. Mr George, you were explaining how you got to Issa Sesay  
2 with the rice and he welcomed you. Slowly now can you continue  
3 with your evidence.

4 A. The first question you asked me was how the matter was  
12:52:00 5 resolved. The matter was never resolved until Sam Bockarie  
6 finally left the RUF. If there is any further question that will  
7 come up from that point, then I know what explanation I will  
8 give.

9 Q. Okay. You said the matter was not resolved until Sam  
12:52:21 10 Bockarie left. When did Sam Bockarie leave the RUF, if you  
11 remember?

12 A. Sam Bockarie left the RUF in the same 2000.

13 Q. To where did he go after he left the RUF, if you know?

14 A. He crossed into Liberia and I was in Sierra Leone.

12:52:47 15 Q. Did he go alone to Liberia, to your knowledge, or did he go  
16 with others?

17 A. What I understood was that he went with some men.

18 Q. The men that he went with, were they members of the RUF?

19 A. Yes.

12:53:09 20 Q. Do you know whether he crossed into Liberia with his family  
21 when he left Sierra Leone?

22 A. Yes. I was told that he crossed into Liberia.

23 Q. With his family?

24 A. With his family.

12:53:31 25 Q. Now, do you know why it was the case that he had to leave  
26 Sierra Leone?

27 A. It was the same case of disobedience to the leadership of  
28 Foday Sankoh, because he did not want to agree with what Foday  
29 Sankoh told him, so that was where the misunderstanding came

1 from.

2 Q. Mr George, do you remember what month and year you took the  
3 rice to Issa Sesay in Kono?

12:54:17

4 A. I can't remember the month, but I think it was in that same  
5 month that I went because I only spent ten days there. I never  
6 spent a month in Freetown. I only spent ten days there.

7 Q. Is it in the early part of 2000 that you went back with the  
8 rice to Kono?

12:54:41

9 A. The same month I left Kono and went to Freetown, that was  
10 the same month that I brought the rice. I have just forgotten  
11 that particular month.

12 Q. Very well. What was your rank and assignment when you made  
13 this trip to Freetown after you had been replaced by Banya as  
14 brigade commander in Kono?

12:55:12

15 A. First of all, when I went to Freetown, they had a joint  
16 team. If there were two men from RUF and two men from the  
17 Kamajors. That was the first disarmament. If they wanted to go  
18 and disarm the Kamajor group, two representatives of the RUF  
19 should be with the UN to monitor the activities, how the  
20 disarmament was going on. And when I went to Freetown, I was  
21 part of that group. I was still serving as a colonel. I still  
22 carried my rank.

12:55:44

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, the witness said earlier, I  
24 think at page 75, with regard to the time frame, he said he went  
25 to Freetown in February of 2000.

12:56:07

26 MR ANYAH: Yes, I recall that.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: And so I would imagine he's saying in the  
28 same month of February 2000 he got the bags of rice and returned  
29 to Kono. Yes?

1 THE WITNESS: Yes.

2 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

3 Q. Now, you're a colonel. You spoke of the first disarmament  
4 around the time you went to Freetown. You spoke of the Kamajors  
12:56:36 5 as well. And I had asked you about your rank and assignment.

6 Now, after the trip to Freetown, you're now back at Kono with

7 Issa Sesay. You are still a colonel, yes?

8 A. Yes, I still maintained my rank.

9 Q. What assignment did you receive, if any, after you handed  
12:57:08 10 the bags of rice to Issa Sesay?

11 A. I said after presenting the bags of rice to Issa Sesay,  
12 there was a joint team to join the UN, that is, two  
13 representatives from the Kamajors and two representatives from  
14 the RUF. And if the UN were going to disarm somewhere, those two  
12:57:32 15 groups would join together. If they were going to the Kamajor  
16 areas to disarm, the RUF will be there so that they will know how  
17 many weapons are being disarmed. If it was the RUF area, two  
18 representatives from the Kamajors will come and join this team  
19 and they will go so as for them to know how many weapons the RUF  
12:57:54 20 were disarmed with.

21 Q. Were you assigned as an RUF representative to monitor the  
22 disarmament of Kamajors? Is that what you're trying to tell us?

23 A. I was assigned with the UN as representative from the RUF  
24 to monitor the disarmament programme between the two sides.

12:58:17 25 Q. Thank you, Mr George. That's helpful. How long did you  
26 have this assignment for?

27 A. When Issa and I and Foday Sankoh got to Segbwema, the first  
28 day they were disarming our men in Segbwema I was there with a  
29 team. Issa Sesay was there, Foday Sankoh was there and the

1 disarmament went on. From there after the disarmament Foday  
2 Sankoh was going back. He told Issa that I should go to Kailahun  
3 to change - to replace Rogers, Momoh Rogers, because he was sick  
4 and he needed treatment. That was how I left the unit and - how  
12:59:19 5 do they call him? Eagle. Eagle replaced me and I went to  
6 Kailahun to take up another assignment.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr George. We understand how you now replaced  
8 Momoh Rogers in Kailahun. I had asked about the length of time,  
9 that is, how many months, weeks or days, you were this monitor  
12:59:49 10 for the disarmament programme with the United Nations. Do you  
11 remember how many months you served in that capacity as an RUF  
12 representative with the UN to monitor disarmament?

13 A. I did not even serve for a month and I was replaced. I was  
14 asked to go and replace Momoh Rogers in Kailahun because they  
13:00:14 15 said he needed treatment.

16 Q. What year was that when you were assigned to Kailahun to  
17 replace Momoh Rogers?

18 A. It was in the same 2000. Momoh Rogers left Kailahun in  
19 2000 and he went to Freetown.

13:00:35 20 Q. What was your title or rank when you went to take over from  
21 Momoh Rogers?

22 A. Momoh Rogers was serving in Kailahun as the CSO, security  
23 commander, as a colonel. And likewise me, I was a colonel and I  
24 went to take over as CSO, the security commander.

13:01:02 25 Q. How many persons did you have under your command as CSO or  
26 security commander?

27 A. There as CSO I had a brigade under my control, but it was  
28 controlled by someone else. I was not the commander. I was just  
29 a security commander. They had their brigade commander.

1 Q. Who was the brigade commander when you were CSO in Kailahun  
2 in 2000?

3 A. The brigade commander was Sam Kolleh. He was the brigade  
4 commander, and he was based in Pendembu and I was based in  
13:01:59 5 Kailahun.

6 Q. What nationality is Sam Kolleh?

7 A. Sam Kolleh is from Liberia. He is a vanguard.

8 Q. Were there any ECOMOG or UN forces present in Kailahun  
9 during the period of time when you served as CSO or security  
13:02:30 10 commander?

11 A. Yes, the UN was there. The UN was based there. About two  
12 companies were based there.

13 Q. What was the size of the UN contingent? Was the size of a  
14 UN company the same as you just told us earlier this morning,  
13:02:50 15 about --

16 A. The same, 248. The same 248 for each company.

17 Q. Mr George, just remember to slow down. I know you can also  
18 understand some English perhaps, but wait for the interpreter to  
19 finish. You said there were about two UN companies based there  
13:03:12 20 in Kailahun. Do you know the nationalities of those UN service  
21 personnel?

22 A. They were Indians. They were from the Indian contingent.  
23 They were Indian troops who were based in Kailahun.

24 Q. Where was Issa Sesay based at the time you were security  
13:03:33 25 commander in Kailahun?

26 A. Issa Sesay was based - he was based between Makeni, Kono -  
27 Makeni and Kono. He would come and spend some time in Makeni and  
28 later go and spend some time in Kono, so just like that.

29 Q. What relationship did the RUF under your command in

1 Kailahun have with these UN peacekeepers? Well, let me withdraw  
2 the word "peacekeepers", because I don't believe you have said  
3 that. You said it was the Indian contingent. What sort of  
4 relationship did you, as security commander, have with the Indian  
13:04:36 5 contingent from the UN in Kailahun?

6 A. When I got there I did not have any problems with them, and  
7 they did not have no problems with me. But it came a time when  
8 problem erupted between the Kenyan troops and the RUF. By then  
9 fighting broke out, and it was from there that they started  
13:04:57 10 having problems with me and I too started having problems with  
11 them.

12 Q. We will come back to this problem you say that arose  
13 between the Kenyan troops and the RUF. You mentioned earlier the  
14 first disarmament. The period of time when you were in Kailahun,  
13:05:21 15 was that when there was disarmament in Sierra Leone?

16 A. Yes, that was the first peace that I was talking about  
17 before Jetley - no, how do they call him - Opande came and they  
18 finished it.

19 Q. Who is Opande?

13:05:49 20 A. Daniel Opande was the one who was in charge of the  
21 disarmament process in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

22 Q. Was he a civilian or was he a military person?

23 A. He was the peacekeeping force commander, and I believe he  
24 was a military man.

13:06:10 25 Q. Do you know when, as in what year, the first disarmament  
26 started in Sierra Leone?

27 A. No, I don't remember.

28 Q. Was it - well, you've told us it was during the time you  
29 were in Kailahun as security commander. Now, this - I'm sorry,

1 you wanted to say something, Mr George?

2 A. Yes. I said I was given assignment to go and take care of  
3 Kailahun, to take command from Momoh Rogers. The first  
4 disarmament process happened when Foday Sankoh left Freetown and  
13:07:05 5 came to Segbwema for the first disarmament, and it was in  
6 Segbwema that the disarmament took place. And from there they  
7 sent me to Kailahun, and they replaced me with Eagle.

8 Q. Okay. When Foday Sankoh and you were in Segbwema when  
9 there was the first disarmament - you've now told us that was  
13:07:31 10 before you went to Kailahun - do you remember the year you were  
11 in Segbwema?

12 A. It was in 2000 that I was in Segbwema. And after that  
13 disarmament, there was no other disarmament that took place then  
14 until Opande did the last disarmament.

13:07:49 15 Q. Very well. The last disarmament, had it happened - had it  
16 started to happen when you were security commander in Kailahun?

17 A. No. The last disarmament started, I think, in 2001, if my  
18 memory serves me right. By then I had left Kailahun. And it was  
19 in late 2000 when Sam Kolleh changed me from my command and I  
13:08:26 20 went back to Kono as an ordinary man, and I was there till that  
21 disarmament.

22 Q. Very well. You've just told us Sam Kolleh replaced you.  
23 The word you used was "changed me from my command". Are you  
24 saying that Sam Kolleh took over from you as security commander  
13:08:50 25 in Kono?

26 A. Not Kono.

27 Q. Sorry, Kailahun?

28 A. Yes. He took over command from me in Kailahun to become  
29 the security commander.

1 Q. And you said that took place in late 2000, yes?

2 A. Exactly so.

3 Q. Now, let us talk about your time as security commander in  
4 Kailahun from sometime in early 2000 to late 2000, when you were  
13:09:24 5 replaced by Sam Kollah. You told us that your relationship with  
6 the Indian contingent of the UN there was fine until there was a  
7 problem between the RUF and Kenyan troops. What was the nature  
8 of this problem between the RUF and Kenyan troops?

9 A. The problem did not start between the Indian troops and me.  
13:09:56 10 I said the problem started between the RUF and the Kenyan troops,  
11 the Kenyans who were assigned in the north. The Kenyans who were  
12 assigned in the north had problem with the RUF soldiers who were  
13 assigned in the north. That was where the problem started, and  
14 that was what I said.

13:10:11 15 Q. Yes, that is what you said. Now, when you say "the north",  
16 was there a town in the north where this problem was happening?

17 A. Magburaka, Makeni.

18 Q. What was the nature of this problem? What was the problems  
19 that happened between Kenyan troops and the RUF in Magburaka and  
13:10:39 20 Makeni in 2000?

21 A. I was in Kailahun, and I received a message from Issa Sesay  
22 informing all front lines that the Kenyan UN who were deployed in  
23 Magburaka and Makeni were disarming the RUF soldiers by force  
24 without the knowledge of the RUF commanders.

13:11:23 25 Q. Yes, carry on.

26 A. So and he said as he was speaking, he said they had already  
27 disarmed five of the RUF soldiers and he said they were presently  
28 in the hands of the UN in Makeni. So when they went to request  
29 from those people --

1 Q. Mr George, there is something on the record I want to stop  
2 you now to see if we can correct. The record reads you as saying  
3 that you received a message from Issa Sesay to all front line  
4 commanders that the Kenyan UN troops who were deployed in  
13:12:17 5 Magburaka and Makeni were disarming the RUF soldiers by force.  
6 Now, your response continued by you saying:

7 "So he said as he was speaking, he said they had already  
8 disarmed five of the RUF soldiers and he said they were presently  
9 in the hands of the UN in Makeni."

13:12:41 10 So carry on from there. Who disarmed the RUF soldiers?

11 A. I am talking about the UN who were based in Makeni. We are  
12 now talking about the UN. We are not talking about government  
13 troops any more. We are now talking about the UN.

14 Q. I understand. Continue with your response. This is the  
13:13:04 15 message from Issa Sesay. Carry on.

16 A. So later in the evening, Augustine Gbao, Morris Kallon and  
17 other soldiers went to Makeni, to the UN base in Makeni, and I  
18 was still in Kailahun, but I was monitoring the activities of our  
19 men, I was monitoring the activities of the UN. So Morris  
13:13:47 20 Kallon, Augustine Gbao and others went to the UN base requesting  
21 the release of the five men who had been disarmed. From there,  
22 according to Morris Kallon, fighting broke out from amongst them.  
23 And we were still peaceful with our own UN men in Kailahun. We  
24 did not have problems. We were doing things in common. And  
13:14:17 25 after two days, the fighting escalated and it became serious.

26 Q. Mr George, sorry to interrupt you, but let me just ask a  
27 few questions. You said that according to Morris Kallon fighting  
28 broke out from amongst them. The fighting that broke out was  
29 between whom and whom?

1 A. It was between the UN and the RUF soldiers.

2 Q. And then continuing you said, "We were still peaceful with  
3 our own UN men in Kailahun." Are you referring to the Indian UN  
4 contingent in Kailahun?

13:15:08 5 A. Exactly so. That is what I am talking about.

6 Q. Now, when the fighting escalated, because your last  
7 response before I interrupted you was, "And after two days the  
8 fighting escalated and it became serious", when the fighting  
9 escalated, are you referring to the fighting that was taking  
10 place in Makeni?

13:15:31

11 A. The fighting in Makeni and Magburaka. The UN were not just  
12 based in Makeni. They were based in Magburaka and Makeni. So  
13 those two places, there was serious fighting going on there.  
14 After two days Issa sent me a message.

13:15:52

15 Q. What was the nature of the message you were sent by Issa  
16 Sesay?

17 A. I was at my house when he sent message to my senior  
18 command, Kawa, and it was Kawa who received the message and he  
19 called me and I went to the radio room. He read the message and  
20 he was saying that I should arrest the UN whom I had in Kailahun.

13:16:15

21 Q. Mr George, we understood what you just said. This Kawa  
22 fellow, is it the same Kawa you referred to previously as being  
23 your signal commander in a previous assignment?

24 A. When I took over command in Kailahun, that is the same Kawa  
25 man that I am referring to. Daf was my signal man when we were  
26 in Ngolahun Vaama. The second person was Kawa, my signal man in  
27 Kailahun, where all the UN activities took place. He was the  
28 signals commander.

13:16:43

29 Q. Thank you. And just remember to go slowly. You are now

1 telling us about the other message from Issa Sesay relayed to you  
2 from Kawa. Kawa read the message to you and you said the message  
3 asked you to arrest the UN that you had in Kailahun. Now, can  
4 you continue from there?

13:17:27 5 A. I read the message. But what I did was, I called the  
6 various commanders with whom I was sharing orders and I showed  
7 them the message, and that included Jonathan Kposowa because he  
8 was still on the ground with me in Kailahun. And there was  
9 another old man called Pa Binda. Jonathan Kposowa was my general  
13:17:59 10 adjutant. He was still with me. Pa Binda was my adviser and  
11 other commanders who were assigned under me, like Tom Sandy. Tom  
12 Sandy, he too was assigned under me. I showed them the message.

13 Q. Just a minute. We will continue. This Jonathan Kposowa,  
14 is that the same person that was with you at Crab Hole?

13:18:25 15 A. Exactly so. That is the same person I'm still talking  
16 about.

17 Q. What was Kposowa's rank at the time you say he was your  
18 general adjutant?

19 A. Kposowa was a colonel, just like me.

13:18:41 20 Q. What was his responsibility or function? What did a  
21 general adjutant do in the RUF?

22 A. Normally I told you that from the base he was responsible  
23 for the taking of records on the activities of the recruits. And  
24 even when we got to Zogoda, he was still the general adjutant to  
13:19:04 25 Foday Sankoh. He was taking records, doing the writings, writing  
26 of letters, so he was in charge.

27 Q. You mentioned Tom Sandy as being one of the commanders  
28 assigned under you. What were the responsibilities of Tom Sandy  
29 in Kailahun when you were there as chief security commander?

1 A. Tom Sandy was the MP commander. He was the MP commander,  
2 the reinforcement commander. They called it the MP and the MP  
3 was a unit on its own. He was the commander for that particular  
4 unit.

13:19:50 5 Q. And MP, does it have the same meaning it had at Crab Hole,  
6 Military Police?

7 A. Exactly so.

8 Q. The person you mentioned as your adviser, Pa Binda, was  
9 that person a civilian or a member of the RUF?

13:20:08 10 A. He was member of RUF.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do we have a spelling of that person on  
12 the record?

13 MR ANYAH: Phonetically I will spell it B-I-N-D-A:

14 Q. Mr George, you were at a point where you were telling us  
13:20:58 15 that you showed them the message. You were referring to  
16 Pa Binda; your general adjutant Jonathan Kposowa, and persons  
17 like Tom Sandy. What did you discuss with them when you showed  
18 them the message you received from Issa Sesay. And let's go  
19 slowly. Just take it slow for us. What did you discuss at that  
13:21:16 20 point?

21 A. I showed them the message. I wanted to get their views and  
22 I told them that this was the instruction given to me and all of  
23 us were working together, so what are we going to do? They gave  
24 their views. Some said, "Oh, let's go and attack them", this and  
13:21:45 25 that. But looking at the attacking of them, yes, you can attack  
26 them, that is one thing, but look at the position of the men you  
27 are supposed to attack. That should be another thing. After  
28 some of them said, "Oh, let's go and attack", I said, "Okay, what  
29 we should do here" --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the witness is not clear  
2 there.

3 MR ANYAH:

4 Q. Mr George, let's review what you just said. You said some  
13:22:11 5 of them said you should attack. Are you referring to some of the  
6 persons in the RUF you showed the message?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And the persons they said you should attack, are you  
9 referring to the Indian UN contingent in Kailahun Town?

13:22:30 10 A. Exactly so.

11 Q. In response to them suggesting that you should attack you  
12 said you told them to review something. Can you carry on from  
13 there. What did you say in response to the suggestion that you  
14 should go and attack this UN contingent?

13:22:51 15 A. After they brought up their suggestions --

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, firstly you are not listening  
17 to the interpretation obviously. Secondly, you're still rushing.  
18 Now do two things: Listen to the interpretation and then slow  
19 down as you're giving your evidence, please. Now repeat your  
13:23:12 20 answer.

21 MR ANYAH:

22 Q. Mr George, you're the CSO, you've showed them the message,  
23 they've said you should go and attack, you had a response for  
24 them. Take us through what you told them, and just do it slowly.

13:23:29 25 A. I said I told them to go and relax, they should go to bed.  
26 I said the following day I will know what to do.

27 Q. What happened on the following day?

28 A. The following day - but even before that happened the two  
29 commanders, Major Puni a and Major Nair, they came to me.

1 Q. Two commanders, Major Puni a and Major Nai r?

2 A. Nai r, yes.

3 Q. Were these RUF members?

4 A. They were UN commanders, the company commanders. The two  
13:24:17 5 company commanders, Major Nai r and Major Puni a.

6 Q. Were they part of the Indi an UN contingent in Kailahun that  
7 you referred to before?

8 A. Yes, they were the two company commanders, the two senior  
9 officers.

13:24:33 10 Q. You said before, the follo wing day the two company  
11 commanders came to you. Why did they come to you?

12 A. They came to me with an intention of disarmament first in  
13 Kailahun. They said they wanted me as the commander to disarm  
14 first. They said I should be the first person to disarm. And  
13:25:04 15 before - and that this I am saying happened before I received the  
16 message for me to arrest them.

17 Q. I will let you carry on with your answer but I need to ask  
18 a few questions. You just said that these two commanders, Puni a  
19 and Nai r, came to you before you received the message to arrest  
13:25:27 20 them. Are you saying these two persons came to pay you a visit  
21 and asked you to disarm before Kawa received the message from  
22 Issa Sesay asking you to arrest the UN contingent?

23 A. Yes. Before they used to go to town, they would visit me,  
24 we sit together, I never had problems with them and they too  
13:25:54 25 never had problems with me.

26 Q. Who used to visit you and not have problems with you  
27 before?

28 A. The two commanders, Major Puni a and Major Nai r. They used  
29 to visit me. They visit me.

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, the question was not answered,  
2 the first question that you asked. Which came first, their  
3 coming to disarm the witness or the message from Issa Sesay?  
4 That question has been left hanging.

13:26:27

5           MR ANYAH:

6 Q. Mr George, can you help us. You were telling us now of  
7 several visits by Punia and Nair. Let's break them down. The  
8 President wants to know the visit they came to ask you to disarm,  
9 did that happen before your signal man Kawa read you this message  
10 from Issa Sesay to arrest the Indian contingent?

13:26:50

11 A. I said yes, those people came to me first before I received  
12 the instruction from Issa to arrest them. They came to me to  
13 disarm me first, me being the commander in charge in Kailahun,  
14 and I had said yes.

13:27:18

15 Q. Second question: How many days or weeks or months passed  
16 from the day they came to ask you to disarm until the day you  
17 received the instruction from Issa Sesay? How much time passed  
18 between those two events?

13:27:40

19 A. It was a week. Just a week. Just a week passed and I  
20 received instruction.

21 Q. You were telling us of other visits by Punia and Nair to  
22 you and you said you had no problems with them. Those visits  
23 that you used to make to you, were those visits before they came  
24 to ask you to disarm?

13:28:04

25 A. These visits were before. It was before they asked me to  
26 disarm. Because we used to mingle with them. We were all on  
27 that same ground. They used to visit me, we sit and discuss.

28           PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, when the witness says, "They  
29 came to me to disarm me first, me being the commander in charge

1 of Kailahun, and I said yes," does that mean he disarmed at that  
2 stage?

3 MR ANYAH:

4 Q. Mr George, when they came to disarm you first as the  
13:28:41 5 commander, did you disarm?

6 A. I never disarmed. The reason why I said yes, I am  
7 ascertaining what I had said before, because I had said it  
8 before. They came to me with the suggestion, but I did not  
9 disarm. I disagreed.

13:28:59 10 Q. Very well. You said that you used to mingle with them  
11 before. "We were all on the same ground." Did you have a  
12 separate base from them, or were all of you based together in the  
13 same place in Kailahun?

14 A. We were based in Kailahun, but they had a separate base.

13:29:28 15 Q. Did you have any social activities that you did with them  
16 when all of you were based in Kailahun in separate bases?

17 A. Yes. I remember that at one time we had a volleyball match  
18 with them.

19 Q. Okay. We now move forward, and they come and they ask you  
13:29:51 20 to disarm, and you refuse to disarm, and then you say a week  
21 later a message comes from Issa Sesay to arrest them. You show  
22 your commanders the message, you tell them to go and rest until  
23 the next day. Before the next day comes, Punia and Nair come and  
24 pay you a visit. Can you tell us what happens when those two  
13:30:15 25 come and pay you a visit after you receive the message from Issa  
26 Sesay to arrest them?

27 A. Please go over that again. Let me see it. Because there  
28 is something in there that I have not actually understood.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think this is a good time to take a

1 break and return with fresher minds to this evidence at 2.30.

2 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

3 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Anyah, we'll

14:33:20 5 continue.

6 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President. Madam President,  
7 there's a change of appearance on the Defence bar. Michael Herz  
8 has left us and it remains Mr Munyard and myself:

9 Q. Mr George, before the luncheon adjournment we were

14:33:39 10 considering a visit that was paid to you by two members of the  
11 Indian contingent of UN forces in Kailahun Town, Majors Punia and  
12 Nair. You told us that Punia and Nair paid you a visit shortly  
13 after you had received a message from Issa Sesay ordering you to  
14 arrest the UN contingent in Kailahun.

14:34:04 15 Now, can you continue from there and tell us what happened  
16 after you held a meeting with your commanders, including persons  
17 like Jonathan Kposowa, and you told them to go away for the  
18 evening and to come back on the following day. Can you tell us  
19 what happened?

14:34:29 20 A. They came back the following day. I mean the following - I  
21 mean the following morning I called Kposowa. I told him to write  
22 to the two commanders of the UN who were based in Kailahun.

23 Q. Can I stop you there. The two commanders that you asked  
24 Kposowa to write to, what were their names?

14:35:00 25 A. He wrote to Punia, Major Nair, and other commanders, but it  
26 was only Major Nair and Major Punia whose names I can remember.

27 Q. Now, before we get to this point where Kposowa writes to  
28 those two majors, from the time you received the message from  
29 Issa Sesay, the message or order to arrest them, did those two

1 commanders come and pay you a visit at your base?

2 A. After they had come - it was after they had come before I  
3 received the message. They used to visit me and return.

14:35:59

4 Q. We know they used to pay you visits before you received the  
5 message. We know that. After you received the message, did they  
6 pay you a visit at your base?

7 A. No, they did not pay me visits.

8 Q. Okay. Carry on from --

14:36:21

9 JUDGE DOHERTY: Sorry, Mr Anyah, I don't wish to be  
10 pedantic, but visits and a specific visit relating to that  
11 incident I feel are different, so I just want to make sure that  
12 we're talking specific rather than general.

13 MR ANYAH: Yes. Thank you, Justice Doherty, we will pursue  
14 it further with the witness.

14:36:37

15 Q. Mr George, after you received the radio message from Issa  
16 Sesay instructing you to arrest the UN Indian contingent in  
17 Kailahun, did either of these two majors, Punia or Nair, pay you  
18 a visit, come and see you one time at your base?

14:37:10

19 A. I said before receiving the instruction they used to visit  
20 me.

21 Q. And how about after you received the instruction? Did they  
22 continue to visit you at your base?

23 A. After I had received the instruction, they were not  
24 visiting me at my house at the base.

14:37:32

25 Q. Now, we were at the point where you said Jonathan Kposowa  
26 was writing a letter to these two majors. Who asked Kposowa to  
27 write the letter?

28 A. I told Kposowa to write the letter.

29 Q. What was your purpose for writing the letter?

- 1 A. My purpose was after I had received the instruction I  
2 couldn't just walk on them like that. They were military  
3 personnel like me. In order to capture them, I had to use  
4 military strategies. That was my purpose of writing the letter  
14:38:21 5 to them, so that I can invite them in a meeting, then have them  
6 arrested.
- 7 Q. Was the letter written on your behalf by Jonathan Kposowa?
- 8 A. Say that again.
- 9 Q. Was the letter written by Kposowa as you requested?
- 14:38:41 10 A. I told them that I wanted to see them in a meeting. I told  
11 them I wanted to answer them. They had asked me to disarm, so I  
12 told them that I wanted to answer them. That is what I told  
13 Kposowa it write in the letter.
- 14 Q. Yes, did he write the letter and did you and Kposowa send  
14:39:06 15 it to these majors?
- 16 A. Kposowa wrote the letter and he himself took the letter to  
17 the various commanders to whom he had written.
- 18 Q. Was it just Majors Punia and Nair that the letter was  
19 addressed to or were there other people the letter was addressed  
14:39:29 20 to?
- 21 A. There were other commanders apart from Major Punia and  
22 Major Nair, but because they were the two senior officers they  
23 are the ones I focused on. But they brought bodyguards as well,  
24 so that summed them up to eleven of those whom I arrested.
- 14:39:51 25 Q. Okay, we'll get to your arrest of these eleven persons.  
26 The issue now - and just help us - is how many people was that  
27 letter addressed to? Was it two people? Was it more than two  
28 people? How many people did you send the letter to?
- 29 A. The letter was sent to the various commanders. I think

1 there were about nine in number with some bodyguards making them  
2 eleven.

3 Q. These commanders that the letter was sent to, were they  
4 members of the UN contingent in Kailahun at the time?

14:40:32 5 A. Yes, they were members.

6 Q. Did they react or respond to the letter when they received  
7 it?

8 A. They were happy to come because they wanted me to disarm.  
9 So they were happy when they got the message.

14:40:49 10 Q. How many people came to you after receiving this letter?

11 A. I said eleven in number.

12 Q. Were you at your house or base when they came to you?

13 A. I was at my house when they came for the meeting right in  
14 Kailahun Town itself.

14:41:12 15 Q. What happened when they came for this meeting?

16 A. When they came for the meeting, we went to the meeting  
17 place in the hall and I told them why I had called them. I told  
18 them, I said, "Well, Major Puni a, Major Nair," I said, "I am very  
19 sorry to tell you guys that you are under arrest because of the  
14:41:53 20 situation that was going on in the north. And I don't want you  
21 to assist here, so I'm arresting you guys until we see what the  
22 situation would look like." That was what I told them.

23 MR ANYAH: Madam President, I notice that the question I  
24 posed before that answer was not reflected on the record but the  
14:42:16 25 answer of the witness is, and that question was: What happened  
26 at the meeting, if I remember correctly.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're having the same problem that we had  
28 before the lunch break where somebody doesn't switch their  
29 microphones when they should. That is why some questions are not

1 being reflected. I did ask Madam Court Officer to deal with it.  
2 I don't know what happened.

3 MS IRURA: Your Honour, I did inform the chief of the  
4 interpretation section and apparently the explanation is that  
14:42:51 5 sometimes the microphone may be on because they are expecting the  
6 witness to continue to speak and then counsel then responds and  
7 by the time - and then a small portion may be lost. So if  
8 counsel could wait, a pause after the answer before responding.  
9 That was the explanation that was advanced.

14:43:16 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Overlapping speakers]. I don't think  
11 that is a valid excuse, really. I mean, counsel has to have some  
12 kind of control over his case. It's not - the interpreters are  
13 not in control here. Counsel knows when to come in, when to ask  
14 for a clarification. The interpreters simply have to go with the  
14:43:34 15 flow and to pull up to speed.

16 Please continue, Mr Anyah.

17 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

18 Q. Mr George, you were telling us what you told these UN  
19 representatives that came for the meeting. You told us  
14:43:55 20 previously they totalled 11 in number. Now, after you told them  
21 in your words that "I'm arresting you guys until we see what the  
22 situation would look like," what was their response, if any?

23 A. They had nothing to say because they were not expecting  
24 that.

14:44:23 25 Q. The situation that you referred to that was going on in the  
26 north, in which part of Sierra Leone was that situation going on?

27 A. I said Magburaka and Makeni.

28 Q. Did you in fact arrest these 11 members of the UN  
29 contingent in Kailahun?

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. Can you give us a time frame for when this arrest took  
3 place? What month and what year?

4 A. I can't remember the month, but I arrested them in  
14:45:13 5 Kailahun. I can remember that, but I can't remember the month.  
6 It's taken some time now. I'm saying this thing - you know, some  
7 of us are smart, but it was never recorded.

8 Q. Was it in the year 2000?

9 A. In the year 2000.

14:45:31 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think the witness said he can't  
11 remember the month although the record shows the opposite. I  
12 hope they will pick it up.

13 MR ANYAH:

14 Q. Mr George, how long did they remain under arrest?

14:45:50 15 A. I kept them for two weeks.

16 Q. Where did you keep them?

17 A. They were in one town near Kailahun called Giema. Giema.  
18 Giema.

19 Q. Was Issa Sesay aware of the fact that you had arrested 11  
14:46:19 20 UN members?

21 A. Yes, I told him. I said, instead of attacking - I was not  
22 able to attack, but I arrested them and they were with me. And  
23 he said I should keep them.

24 Q. What response, if any, was the UN's after you took these  
14:46:43 25 persons under arrest?

26 A. He didn't give me any response. I told them I didn't want  
27 fighting. They should advise their men not to attack because if  
28 they do, it wouldn't be good for them.

29 Q. It wouldn't be good for whom?

1 A. For the UN. The commanders whom I had arrested, I told  
2 them to advise their men that they were on the base until we can  
3 find out what the situation was, but if they attacked my  
4 position, it won't be good.

14:47:21 5 Q. What did Issa Sesay say after you told him that you had  
6 arrested these men?

7 A. His answer was I should hold on to them.

8 Q. Under what sort of conditions did you keep them under  
9 arrest in this place called Giema?

14:47:49 10 A. I kept them in Giema. They were not punished. Although I  
11 restricted their movement. But they were eating. But I had one  
12 other officer who used to take their food to them by the name of  
13 Captain Sunie. He was the liaison officer between us. Whatever  
14 they needed, he will go to the base and collect it for them.

14:48:15 15 Q. Captain Sunie?

16 A. Sunie.

17 Q. Was he part the RUF or was he part of the UN contingent?

18 A. He was part of the UN contingent.

19 Q. And he was a liaison officer between whom and whom?

14:48:41 20 A. Him and the RUF soldiers, because he was dealing with me  
21 more specially.

22 Q. You said that you gave the persons who were arrested food.  
23 You said that you restricted their movement, but was it the case  
24 that they were not free to leave?

14:49:06 25 A. They were not free to move around because, in the first  
26 place, I didn't want - the thing that I was afraid of, not to  
27 attack them, just in case my boys see them and they attacked  
28 them. That was what I was afraid of. That was why I restricted  
29 their movement.

1 Q. Was there news coverage or publicity about the arrest of  
2 these Indian UN contingent by you and your RUF colleagues in  
3 Kailahun?

14:49:50

4 A. Yes, it was news. And it never went down well with the  
5 civilians.

6 Q. What never went down well with what civilians?

7 A. The arrest of the UN in Kailahun Township, it did not go  
8 down well with the civilians.

9 Q. What happened after they were in custody for two weeks?

14:50:10

10 A. It was at one time that we called on the civilians where I  
11 had kept them for a meeting. I went there and the civilians told  
12 me that I should release them because they did not want any  
13 problem in their district. Then I went back to Kailahun.

14 Q. And what did you do after meeting with the civilians?

14:50:49

15 A. When I went back to Kailahun, I was still under pressure to  
16 release those people. So at one point in time I called Kposowa  
17 and other people and I told them that was what the civilians were  
18 saying, that they didn't want problem. So I was releasing the  
19 people. The 11 people whom I had captured, I was going to  
20 release them to go back to their camp where they had come from.

14:51:13

21 I released them in Kailahun and they went back to their men where  
22 they were based.

23 Q. Did you release all 11 of them?

24 A. All 11 of them were released and they went back to their  
25 base.

14:51:32

26 Q. Was Issa Sesay aware of your intention to release them  
27 before you released them?

28 A. When he heard the information, in fact, he called me over  
29 the signal. He asked for the 11 men whom I had arrested and I

1 told him that I had already released them because the civilians  
2 were pressurising me and he became angry, and he said when he  
3 comes from Kono to Kailahun he would want to see those people and  
4 these people had already gone to their base. I wouldn't go there  
14:52:11 5 to arrest them any longer.

6 Q. Did he know you were going to release them before you  
7 released them?

8 A. Whether he knew?

9 Q. Yes. Did Issa Sesay know, that is, did someone tell him or  
14:52:29 10 was there a way he knew that you were going to release them  
11 before you released them?

12 A. After I had released them, he got the information that I  
13 had released the 11 UN that I captured - I mean, that I arrested.  
14 So from there he called me in the signal room and asked me for  
14:52:51 15 those 11 men and I told him they were under my command. And I  
16 told him that I had released those people because the civilians  
17 had told me to release them because they didn't want any problem  
18 in our district. So he became angry and he told me that when he  
19 comes to Kailahun he would want to see the 11 UN that I've spoken  
14:53:12 20 about.

21 Q. Mr George, I understand your response, but the question, if  
22 you listen closely, was not what Issa Sesay did after you  
23 released them. The question was, before you released those men,  
24 did Issa Sesay know; before you set them free, did he know you  
14:53:30 25 were going to set them free?

26 A. I said, no, I did not inform him. I did it before I  
27 informed him.

28 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Now, these UN members that you  
29 arrested and detained for two weeks, were they the only ones

1 during that period of time in 2000 that were arrested by the RUF  
2 in Sierra Leone?

3 A. As I told you earlier, the incident happened from Makeni to  
4 Magburaka. There were a lot of UN who were arrested by Issa and  
14:54:15 5 other people in Makeni and Magburaka.

6 Q. Do you know from which contingent or countries some of  
7 those other UNs that were arrested in Makeni or Magburaka came?

8 A. Yes. I can remember most of them were Kenyans, although  
9 they had some white among them, but they were not many. They  
14:54:39 10 were from the Kenyan contingent.

11 Q. Did the arrest of those Kenyan UN members take place also  
12 in the year 2000?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you know what happened to those that were arrested in  
14:54:57 15 Makeni or Magburaka? I'm referring to the Kenyan members of the  
16 UN.

17 A. Those who were arrested in Magburaka and Makeni, Issa took  
18 them to Liberia.

19 Q. Do you know why he took them to Liberia?

14:55:19 20 A. No. He never disclosed anything to me.

21 Q. After you released the Indian UN members, did you suffer  
22 any penalties or punishment from Issa Sesay by virtue of having  
23 released them?

24 A. Yes. Just after I had released those people, the next  
14:55:50 25 thing was my assignment. He told me to leave Kailahun and return  
26 to Kono.

27 Q. When you left Kailahun, did you go to Kono?

28 A. Yes, I went to Kono. I went back to Kono and that was  
29 where I was.

1 Q. What was your assignment when you went to Kono?

2 A. When I went to Kono, I was not taking part in any  
3 assignment. I was just on the ground as an officer.

4 Q. Was that a form of punishment, given the position that you  
14:56:37 5 had held in Kailahun as chief security officer before going to  
6 Kono?

7 A. Yes, I took it to be a punishment because he had said that  
8 what I did was without his consent, I had done it on my own. And  
9 before that, at one time he went to Pendembu and he sent for me  
14:57:03 10 from Kailahun. That was the day that the car that I was using,  
11 had it not been giving me hard times - difficulties, if I had met  
12 him there he would have flogged me seriously. But the car that I  
13 was using was giving me problems. That was why I did not receive  
14 the beating, because he actually had gone there to give me some  
14:57:25 15 beating.

16 Q. And the "he" you are referring to, is that Issa Sesay?

17 A. I am talking about Issa. Issa Sesay.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Who was the RUF commander in Kono  
19 when you returned there?

14:57:44 20 A. Before going - let me clarify something first. After I had  
21 released the Indians, it was an operation that the UN put  
22 together to go and release - to go and release their men in  
23 Kailahun after I had released them from where I had kept them,  
24 but their movement was still restricted even after I had released  
14:58:19 25 them. So Jetley, who was the UN force commander, he said he  
26 wanted a rescue mission. He called for more manpower in Daru,  
27 more than 1,000 with some sophisticated weapons, and they came on  
28 the rescue mission. It was on a Friday in that same 2000. I was  
29 still busy in Kailahun.

1           That morning I saw the movement and I knew something was  
2 going to happen. I called Kposowa, I called Pa Binda and I told  
3 them I had seen something, the movement of the people was not  
4 satisfying to me and that everybody should be careful. Kposowa,  
14:59:28 5 Pa Binda said they were going to ask the UN what was going on.  
6 On their way going, I only heard the sound of a rocket in the  
7 town. They had launched an attack. At the same time where the  
8 other troops were advancing were based - they were advancing to  
9 Pendembu. The men on our own ground were not enough and where  
15:00:04 10 they were based I couldn't have been able to challenge them.  
11 They had the advantage over me.

12 Q.   Mr George, let's clarify some of the things you've said.  
13 I'm sorry to interrupt you, but it's better we do it now. You  
14 said after you released these UN representatives their movement  
15:00:21 15 was still restricted. How was their movement still restricted  
16 after you had released them?

17 A.   After I had released them, the place where they were, their  
18 movement was restricted because they were in a camp. Their  
19 movement was only within the camp. They were not coming to town.  
15:00:43 20 Their activities were limited only where they were based. They  
21 were not coming to the township of Kailahun. That's what I meant  
22 by their movement was restricted.

23 Q.   You've mentioned Jetley as the UN force commander. Do you  
24 know from which country Jetley came?

15:01:04 25 A.   Jetley was an Indian man. He was a commander for all the  
26 peacekeepers.

27 Q.   You mentioned a rescue mission, more than 1,000 manpower in  
28 Daru with sophisticated weapons. Who was going to carry out this  
29 rescue mission?

1 A. It was the UN that was carrying out the rescue mission  
2 against the RUF in Kailahun.

3 Q. You've mentioned that they launched an attack. The same  
4 time where the other troops were advancing were based, they were  
15:01:42 5 advancing to Pendembu. Let's consider that in bits and pieces.  
6 Who launched an attack?

7 A. I said the UN launched an attack on us in Kailahun.

8 Q. Your reference to Pendembu previously was in connection  
9 with what, that attack or another attack?

15:02:08 10 A. It was in connection with the same day that the troops who  
11 were attacking in Kailahun that the troops who were Daru were  
12 advancing towards Pendembu to receive the ones who were in  
13 Kailahun.

14 Q. The troops that were advancing to Pendembu, were they RUF  
15:02:30 15 or were they UN troops?

16 A. I said UN.

17 Q. So the UN was advancing to Kailahun and Pendembu at the  
18 same time. Is that what you're telling us?

19 A. The UN were advancing to Pendembu whilst the others in  
15:02:49 20 Kailahun were advancing towards Pendembu to meet the other men  
21 who were coming to receive them.

22 Q. Very well. And the people moving from Kailahun to Pendembu  
23 to meet the UN that was advancing to Pendembu, those were also UN  
24 members, yes?

15:03:08 25 A. Yes, they were all UN members.

26 Q. Carry on. What happened after the UN launched these  
27 attacks - or this attack?

28 A. After the UN had launched this attack in Kailahun, I called  
29 the few men whom I had with me in the town and I said,

1 "Gentlemen, the place that we are based now, we cannot engage  
2 those men." I looked at the position of the men. "Let us leave  
3 them - leave their base and go on the road. On the way going  
4 towards Pendembu we can jump behind them, but the suppressive  
15:04:00 5 firing on top of that hill" - you know, where they were based,  
6 Kailahun is down the hill and where they were based is on top of  
7 the hill, so any bullet from there is going to be dangerous and  
8 if we challenged them they will burn down the town like what they  
9 did in Pendembu, so I thought it wise and said no, we should not  
15:04:22 10 engage them there. We left them and they came down. They took  
11 the road to Pendembu. Then we jumped behind them, engaging them.

12 We continued engaging them until we got to one town called  
13 Giehun. The troop that had left Daru was already in Pendembu.  
14 They deployed and some advanced to Giehun to receive the troops  
15:04:51 15 that were coming from Kailahun. We were there when the troops  
16 that came from Pendembu met with the team from Kailahun and they  
17 all advanced and went to Pendembu. When they got to Pendembu --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he just take the last  
19 bit of his answer.

15:05:17 20 MR ANYAH:

21 Q. Mr George, you've told us how one set of UN troops came  
22 from Kailahun towards Giehun, another set came from Daru and  
23 joined the other group that came from Kailahun and you said they  
24 then advanced and went to Pendembu. You then started saying  
15:05:43 25 something that happened after they went and got to Pendembu. Can  
26 you continue from there?

27 A. First in my statement I said there were two companies based  
28 in Kailahun. Secondly, I said Jetley put a rescue mission  
29 together. He mobilised troops from Freetown to Daru to advance

1 to Pendembu. When they advanced to Pendembu they divided the  
2 group. Some stayed in Pendembu while others advanced to Giehun  
3 to receive the men who were coming from Kailahun. That was what  
4 I said.

15:06:29 5 Q. Thank you. I understand the distinction. Did you continue  
6 to engage these UN troops? And by engage, I mean fight them?

7 A. Yes, we were fighting - we engaged each other, it was not  
8 just me attacking them, until they got to Giehun where they met  
9 with their other troops from Pendembu who had come to receive  
10 them.

11 Q. How was this fighting resolved, Mr George? How did it end?

12 A. The fighting ended badly, especially when they were getting  
13 to Pendembu. The first thing they did, they went to the hospital  
14 where we had our wounded soldiers.

15:07:20 15 Q. Just remember to slow down now. Somebody went to the  
16 hospital where you had your wounded soldiers. The persons who  
17 went to the hospital, were they UN members?

18 A. UN members advanced to the RUF hospital in Pendembu.

19 Q. What happened when they advanced to the hospital in  
15:07:43 20 Pendembu?

21 A. When they advanced to the hospital the wounded soldiers  
22 whom they met in the hospital, about eleven of them, they  
23 executed every one of them. The UN executed every one of them.

24 Then there was another house where they met civilians after they  
15:08:07 25 had entered the town. When the civilians came out to call for  
26 peace, they were executed. They burnt down some village - I mean  
27 some houses and damaged a lot of things. Then they pulled out  
28 and went back to Daru. From there, the UN that was based in  
29 Kailahun were now based in Mile 91. That was how the UN left

1 Kailahun to Daru onward to Mile 91.

2 Q. A few questions, Mr George. You told us that the UN was  
3 the one that executed the eleven soldiers that were wounded and  
4 in the hospital. Who executed the civilians that you just  
15:08:59 5 referred to?

6 A. The same UN. It was not something that is hidden. Even  
7 those in Pendembu know the story. If they hear me saying it now  
8 they will know exactly what I mean.

9 Q. Who burnt down some of the villages that you referred to?

15:09:19 10 A. The UN. The UN did that in Pendembu. People know this.  
11 The civilians know. Up until now they know. If I am not  
12 mistaken they have started rebuilding. They destroyed with their  
13 armoured cars - armoured tanks. If you were there at that time  
14 and you saw the people destroying you would feel sorry for the  
15:09:45 15 civilians.

16 Q. Mr George, was it after this destruction in Pendembu that  
17 you went and based in Kono?

18 A. It was after the rescue mission that I went back to Kono.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, is it possible to have a time  
15:10:15 20 frame for this UN attack on the civilian population? Secondly,  
21 could we have some of the names of the villages that the witness  
22 is referring to, if possible.

23 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President:

24 Q. Mr George, you said, "They burnt down some village - I mean  
15:10:30 25 some houses and damaged a lot of things." This is at page 117,  
26 my lines 8 and 9, using a 12 point font, of the LiveNote. What  
27 village was burnt down, Mr George, if you know?

28 A. Firstly, let's talk about the killing of human beings  
29 before going to the village or villages.

1 Q. Mr George, no, let's talk about the village. What name is  
2 the name of the village that was burnt down? That's what the  
3 Court wants to know.

4 A. I would describe the village on the highway going to Daru  
15:11:17 5 but I have forgotten its name. Then the destruction in Pendembu,  
6 it's there.

7 Q. Very well. We understand you can't remember the name. You  
8 said --

9 A. Yes.

15:11:29 10 Q. You said the village is on the highway going to Daru.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Does that highway have a name?

13 A. Yes. From Pendembu you're going to Daru. From Pendembu  
14 you drive to Daru. The first bridge after Pendembu, there was a  
15:11:48 15 small village there. From Pendembu going towards Daru, there was  
16 a small village on the road. It was burnt down. Then in  
17 Pendembu Town itself, some houses were destroyed. More than  
18 four, five, six houses were destroyed in Pendembu Town itself.  
19 Even today people can attest to that if they hear me saying it.  
15:12:11 20 They know the story very well.

21 Q. Mr George, what year and month did these destructions take  
22 place?

23 A. That was in 2000 - going towards the end of 2000. But all  
24 these things that I'm telling you, the month will give me  
15:12:28 25 difficulties, but I can remember the year, the time within the  
26 year. It was going down to 1991 - I mean, 2001, down. It  
27 happened in 2000 going down to 2001. It's the month that would  
28 cause me difficulties because I was under pressure. I'm just  
29 doing it because I can remember things.

1 Q. That's helpful, Mr George. This village on the highway  
2 going to Daru, in which district of Sierra Leone is it?

3 A. It's the same Kailahun District. It was just a mile from  
4 Pendembu. It's the same district.

15:13:14 5 Q. Now, you said after these events you went to Kono, you were  
6 based in Kono. And the question I asked you that led to the  
7 several previous answers you gave was: Who was your commander in  
8 Kono? So who was the commander you were under when you went to  
9 Kono?

15:13:39 10 A. I was still under Issa's command, but the commander in Kono  
11 was one of Issa's bodyguards by the name of Intelligent. He was  
12 the brigade commander by then.

13 Q. Intelligent, is that a nickname or the person's --

14 A. That was his nickname and that was his popular name. Up to  
15:14:03 15 now he is using that name, Intelligent. He was a bodyguard to  
16 Issa Sesay.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat the last bit  
18 of his answer.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, can you repeat the last part  
15:14:16 20 of your answer? You said, this person, Intelligent, he was a  
21 bodyguard to Issa Sesay, and then you said something after that.

22 THE WITNESS: I said I was under Issa's command, but in  
23 Kono, Intelligent was the brigade commander. He was a bodyguard  
24 to Issa. He replaced Banyan in command because Banyan was the  
15:14:52 25 brigade commander. They removed him and put Intelligent there,  
26 so it was Intelligent who replaced Banyan. That was what I said.  
27 Because Banyan replaced me and Intelligent replaced Banyan and took  
28 over.

29 Q. Thank you, Mr George. For how long did you remain assigned

1 in Kono?

2 A. I was in Kono from - I entered Kono '91 - I mean, 2001.  
3 After all the UN disturbances that happened, I disarmed. I went  
4 to Magburaka. I voted in 2000. After we had lost the election,  
15:15:43 5 I went back to Kono as a neutral man. I was not part of the RUF  
6 - there was no RUF activity at that time because Tejan Kabbah had  
7 already won the elections.

8 Q. What year was that when there was no longer RUF activity  
9 and Tejan Kabbah had won the elections? What year was that?

15:16:11 10 A. We're talking about 2002.

11 Q. When you say you voted, did you vote for a particular party  
12 during the elections?

13 A. Oh, yes. I voted for my party.

14 Q. What was your party?

15:16:29 15 A. The RUF.

16 Q. Was the party's name RUF or did it have another name?

17 A. Yes, we still had that name. I think RUF. We had a party  
18 office in Magburaka.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr George. After there was no longer RUF  
15:16:52 20 activity, did you remain in Sierra Leone?

21 A. Yes. I remained in Sierra Leone until 2005, April 7. Then  
22 I found myself in Liberia.

23 Q. When you say you found yourself in Liberia in April 2005,  
24 how did you get to Liberia from Sierra Leone?

15:17:14 25 A. From Magburaka, I got into a taxi, and before coming, I did  
26 not hide. I left Base Marine and others there and I told them  
27 that it was necessary for me to return home now. I went to my  
28 old friends that I had in Magburaka. I went to Makeni, boarded a  
29 bus, went through Yele to Bo. From Bo, I passed the night in

1 Kenema, and the following day I boarded another bus and I went  
2 straight to the Bo Waterside border. I crossed over the Mano  
3 River Union bridge safely into Liberia.

15:18:07 4 Q. So it was your own choice to go back to Liberia. You were  
5 not forced back to Liberia.

6 A. Nobody forced me to go back, but I found it necessary to  
7 return to see my people.

8 MR ANYAH: Madam President, there's a place mentioned by  
9 the witness. I think he said it was Yele and I am not sure of  
15:18:24 10 the spelling and I don't believe it's been on the record before.  
11 Phonetically I suspect it would be spelt Y-I-E-L-E-H, unless the  
12 interpreters know the proper spelling for that place.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, [microphone not  
14 activated]. Mr Interpreter, do you know how this word is spelt?

15:18:53 15 THE INTERPRETER: Yes. It's Y-E-L-E.

16 MR ANYAH:

17 Q. Mr George, during the trial process in this case there have  
18 been witnesses that have come here and made mention of a certain  
19 Martin George and I want us to consider some of what has been  
15:19:20 20 said about somebody named Martin George in this trial. But  
21 before we do so, I want to ask you about another Martin George.  
22 Do you know or have you ever heard of somebody named Martin  
23 George who served as a member of the government of President  
24 Taylor in Liberia?

15:19:50 25 A. Martin George? I was the only Martin George in the RUF  
26 from 1991. And when I joined the RUF in 1991, I went back to  
27 Liberia in 2005, April 7.

28 Q. So from 1991 until you left the RUF in, you said, 2002, is  
29 it the case that you were the only person with the name Martin

1 George in the RUF?

2 A. I was the only person that had the name Martin George.  
3 They had Martin, but that Martin was not George. He was a Sierra  
4 Leonean by the name of Martin, but his last name was not George.

15:20:37 5 I was the only Martin George that I know about in the RUF.

6 Q. At any point in time, were you the Liberian ambassador to  
7 Nigeria?

8 A. No, sir. No. I don't even know about that post. Never.

9 Q. Very well. Were you at any point in time Deputy Minister  
15:21:10 10 of State for Liberia?

11 A. No. I never served in Charles Taylor's government. All my  
12 activity was in Sierra Leone, from 1991 to 2005, April, when I  
13 returned.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Now, let's consider the first  
15:21:29 15 transcript I wish to review with you. This is from 16 January  
16 2008. Mr George, just listen to what this witness had to say  
17 about a certain Martin George.

18 Incidentally, I should ask you this: Do you know somebody  
19 by the name of Dennis Koker?

15:21:56 20 A. Dennis Koker? Maybe I know him. Maybe I know him.

21 Q. What do you mean maybe you may know him? Do you know him  
22 or do you not know him?

23 A. I don't know. That's why I said maybe. I do not  
24 understand the name. I don't know that name. You know we were  
15:22:15 25 plenty. When you called OG name, if I knew him, I said, yes, I  
26 know OG.

27 Q. Are you suspecting that you may have heard that name in the  
28 RUF?

29 A. Which of the names?

1 Q. The name Dennis Koker.

2 A. Yes, I can remember that name, but I can't picture the  
3 person. I can remember hearing that name.

4 Q. Very well. Transcript of 16 January, page 1399.

15:22:56 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: The year? This year?

6 MR ANYAH: 2008. 16 January 2008, second week of the  
7 trial, page 1399, starting at line 19:

8 Q. Mr George, listen to what I will read. The question was  
9 asked of Mr Koker:

15:23:20 10 "Q. Mr Koker, my question is this: When you were  
11 describing these responsibilities that you had, were you  
12 referring to you, yourself only, or were you referring to  
13 the MP office at which you worked?

14 A. I was referring to the MP office's work.

15:23:46 15 Q. Thank you. Now, the next question I have for you: In  
16 response to Defence counsel, when he was cross-examining  
17 you, he asked you about an individual named Martin George.  
18 Do you know who Martin George is?

19 A. Yes.

15:24:11 20 Q. What was his position?

21 A. He was a colonel. He was a commander for the entire  
22 Kailahun, the Kailahun area. He was the RUF commander  
23 based in Kailahun Town.

24 Q. Yesterday during cross-examination you testified that  
15:24:44 25 Liberian English was used frequently at the border between  
26 Sierra Leone and Liberia. Who spoke Liberian English?

27 A. The Liberians and some of our brothers. They had been  
28 changed. Even Martin George spoke Liberian in Kailahun in  
29 our presence."

1 Let's pause there. Mr George, this witness said you were  
2 the commander for the entire Kailahun, the Kailahun area, you  
3 were based in Kailahun Town. Does that sound right to you?

15:25:32

4 A. Yes, it sounds right because I was based in Kailahun as a  
5 commander, like I have said.

6 Q. The witness says that Liberian English was used frequently  
7 at the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Does that sound  
8 right to you?

15:25:53

9 A. Between Liberian border and Sierra Leone? I was not  
10 assigned to the border. I had my battalion commander in Koindu  
11 that was assigned to the border. I did not go to the border. I  
12 was staying in Kailahun. If it's Liberian English, yes, I was  
13 Liberian when I joined the RUF and Sam too was a Liberian, so  
14 that is why we spoke Liberian English. There were other  
15 Liberians who were in Kono when I was serving in Kailahun. They  
16 used to come. Like Big Daddy, Morrison. All of them were  
17 Liberians. So when we were together we spoke our Liberian  
18 English to remember - you know, to crack jokes.

15:26:22

19 Q. The Sam you referred to, what is his last name? You just  
20 said now somebody Sam spoke Liberian English with you. What is  
21 that person's last name?

15:26:41

22 A. I am talking about Sam Kolléh.

23 Q. Now, continuing at line 10. A question is posed of  
24 Mr Koker:

15:27:10

25 "Q. During this morning's cross-examination from Defence  
26 counsel you were being asked about how you knew arms came  
27 from Liberia and you were being asked about your prior  
28 statements and the testimony you gave in this Court ...  
29 The language that was being spoken by those that were

1 bringing the materials; you said yesterday in court that  
2 because of the dress of the particular individuals and the  
3 word 'NPFL Navy Rangers' on yellow polo shirts ... because  
4 of conversations and talking to the Liberians that came to  
15:27:57 5 Buedu; you said in this Court, and also in prior  
6 statements, from the direction which the vehicles came into  
7 Buedu ... From a conversation you had with Tom Sandy; and  
8 you said ... from your intelligence. Are these all the  
9 reasons you know that these arms came from Liberia?

15:28:25 10 A. Yes".

11 Mr George, during the time you served with the RUF, did you  
12 ever see any person bringing arms to the RUF wearing yellow polo  
13 shirts with the words "NPFL Navy Rangers" written on them?

14 A. No. When I was serving as a commander, no, I never saw  
15:28:56 15 anybody bringing arms. We had a lot of arms. RUF was not  
16 lacking in arms.

17 Q. How about ammunition? Did you see anyone bringing  
18 ammunition wearing a polo shirt with the words "NPFL Navy  
19 Rangers"?

15:29:14 20 A. Nobody ever took ammunition to Kailahun when I was serving  
21 there as commander. I never saw any NPFL T-shirt in Kailahun  
22 whilst I was serving there. No.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr George. May Mr George be shown Prosecution  
24 exhibit P-96, please. Perhaps I should ask you a question while  
15:30:12 25 the exhibit is being pulled. Mr George, during the period of  
26 time when you were with the RUF, did you ever become aware of any  
27 intelligence reports or information that said ammunition was  
28 being sent from Liberia to the RUF?

29 A. Please repeat your question.

1 Q. Yes. During the time you were with the RUF, did you ever  
2 hear of any intelligence reports which said that ammunition was  
3 coming over from Liberia to you in the RUF in Sierra Leone?

4 A. I keep saying no. When I was serving in Kailahun as a  
15:30:59 5 commander, I never received a single barrel round, not AK round,  
6 a single barrel round from Charles Taylor or the NPFL to the RUF.  
7 No.

8 Q. What about when you were not serving in Kailahun? When you  
9 were serving elsewhere in the RUF, did you ever hear of reports  
15:31:18 10 of others, not yourself, that were receiving ammunition from  
11 Liberia?

12 A. Nobody ever told me that they were sending you people  
13 ammunition by truck or what have you. Nobody sent me ammunition  
14 from Charles Taylor. I never saw that movement.

15:31:43 15 Q. Mr George, can you look at Prosecution exhibit 96. And I  
16 had asked you when you started your evidence two days ago whether  
17 you could read and write and you said not very well. Are you  
18 comfortable reading that document, Mr George? Or do you want it  
19 displayed and have me take you through it?

15:32:05 20 A. When you read it, read it for me and I will understand it.  
21 What I know about any document - whether I know it or not, if I  
22 know I'll say yes. If I don't know, I won't know how to answer  
23 it.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, do you wish for the witness to  
15:32:33 25 first look at the original document and tell the Court, if he  
26 knows, what it is and then for you to take him through it?

27 MR ANYAH: Yes. That's fair enough:

28 Q. Mr George, can you look at the document being given to you  
29 by the Court Officer. Look at it, open it, review it, look at

1 the cover and the back and when you are done let us know.

2 While the witness is doing that, for the benefit of others  
3 could the transcript from 11 April 2008 be pulled up starting at  
4 page 7372.

15:33:46 5 A. Yes, I have seen the document. I have seen a lot of names.  
6 My name appears in that document.

7 Q. Mr George, have you seen that document before today?

8 A. It's only in this Court that I am seeing this document.

9 MR ANYAH: Madam Court Officer, can you show us the first  
15:35:05 10 page first, the cover page. Thank you:

11 Q. Mr George, you see the cover. It says "composition book".  
12 Where there's a slot for a name it says "monitoring book"?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, can I stop you. I would like  
14 to know if the witness knows what this document is first before  
15:35:34 15 you read to him what it is.

16 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President. That's fair enough:

17 Q. Mr George, do you know what this document is?

18 A. I have just seen this book with my name in it. It looks  
19 strange to me. I don't know what it is about, except if you read  
15:35:51 20 it to me maybe I'll get some idea out of it.

21 Q. It says on the cover, "Composition book, monitoring book,  
22 signal unit, out of bound to everyone except operator." That  
23 appears to be what's on the cover of the book. Now, a witness  
24 came and spoke about this book for this Court.

15:36:20 25 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, just a point of note. I think  
26 it says "monitoring" book, not monitoring.

27 MR ANYAH: Counsel is correct.

28 JUDGE LUSSICK: And it also says "out of bands", not "out  
29 of bounds". So they are your words, Mr Anyah.

1 MR ANYAH: Yes, that is also correct. Let me try again.  
2 "Monitoring book, signal unit, out of band to" what looks like  
3 "every" but that's not clear "one except" and what looks like  
4 "operator." That appears to be what's on the cover of the book:

15:37:07 5 Q. Mr George, a witness came here and testified about this  
6 book. I asked for a page of the transcript to be brought up at  
7 page 3772 on April 11, 2008. That witness said that this book  
8 was a code book - an RUF code book. The witness was asked:

9 "Q. What would you call it, Mr Witness, code book or  
10 operational book, or message book, which one?

11 A. This one is said to be a code book.

12 Q. And that's on the basis of what you've said an RUF code  
13 book, right?

14 A. Yes".

15:37:54 15 So a witness has told us that this is an RUF code book.  
16 Now, we open the book and we see some entries in the book. We  
17 will use the pagination that's in red. Do you see, Mr George, at  
18 the top there are numbers in red, eight digits. The one on the  
19 left side of the overhead projector ends in 9992. On the right  
15:38:35 20 side it's 9993. If we flip the pages from 9993 to the next page  
21 we see some more entries and if we turn to the following page we  
22 see even more entries. Mr George, do you see the page that ends  
23 with the number 9995? Do you see that?

24 A. I am seeing that page.

15:39:17 25 Q. At the top do you see there is there written the phrase  
26 "send reinforcement team" and then to its right are initials or  
27 an acronym that reads "Z2B"? Do you see that, Mr George?

28 A. I am seeing "Z2B" here.

29 Q. If you go down two lines from what I've just read, you see

1 tick marks as if to say that space should be filled with "send  
2 reinforcement" and then you see the word "platoon." Do you see  
3 that, Mr George?

4 A. I am seeing it.

15:40:14 5 Q. And next to "platoon" do you see acronym or code that reads  
6 "Z4D"? Do you see that, Mr George?

7 A. I am seeing everything here.

8 Q. Now, let's turn the pages and let's go to the page that  
9 ends with ERN number 0009. In fact, let's start with the page  
15:40:56 10 ending with 0008. Yes, that's the page. If we go down to the  
11 bottom of that page, there is there written "part 06". Do you  
12 see that, Mr George?

13 A. I am seeing it. I am seeing everything.

14 Q. And if we scroll down a bit, we see some names written  
15:41:37 15 below "part 06". Do you see where it says "the leader"? Then  
16 there's a word I cannot discern. And then to the far right of  
17 the page are written the letters "YRZ". Do you see that,  
18 Mr George?

19 A. Yes, I'm seeing it.

15:42:01 20 Q. Below the "the leader", do you see where it says "Gen IH  
21 Sesay" and to the right of Sesay at the side of the page you have  
22 the letters "YRK"? Do you see that, Mr George?

23 A. I am seeing it.

24 Q. See below "Sesay" is the short form for brigadier, "Brig  
15:42:30 25 Morris Kallon" and at the right side of the page is "YRV." Do  
26 you see that, Mr George?

27 A. Yes, everything here.

28 Q. If we look at the transcript from 11 April 2008, page 7381,  
29 the witness who was going through this code book with the lawyer

1 in Court was asked this question:

2 "Q. I believe it was yesterday you elaborated and you said  
3 these code names - I'm sorry. You said these codes came  
4 into being both yesterday and the day before" --

15:43:17 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: What line are you reading from?

6 MR ANYAH: Okay. I'm reading from the transcript. I'm  
7 reading at line 19 of the transcript of 11 April 2008, and the  
8 page is 7381:

9 Q. This document was being reviewed with that witness before  
15:43:38 10 this Court. At line 19 a question was posed to that witness:

11 "Q. Indeed I believe it was yesterday you elaborated and  
12 you said these codes came into being - both yesterday and  
13 the day before you said when General Issa Sesay became head  
14 of the RUF, right?

15:44:00 15 A. Yes."

16 Mr George, the witness told this Court that these codes  
17 came into being when Issa Sesay became the head of the RUF. Do  
18 you follow me?

19 A. I am getting you. I am getting you very well.

15:44:21 20 Q. Shall we go to the next page? No, the page that's next to  
21 the one we just looked at. Yes, 0009. Mr George, if you count  
22 three lines from the top, the first line has the words "Colonel  
23 Gibril Massaquoi" written on it. Below "Massaquoi" is written  
24 "Colonel Momoh Rogers" and below "Momoh Rogers", do you see your  
15:44:58 25 name there, Mr George?

26 A. Yes, I have seen my name here.

27 Q. Martin George. And to the far right of your name, do you  
28 see the letters "YRK"?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Mr George, did you ever have a code name in the RUF that  
2 goes by those letters YRK?

3 A. This particular message book in front of me, I'm really  
4 surprised about it. My name that I used, apart from my Martin  
15:45:38 5 George, is Mao Mao. And when my signal commander in Kailahun,  
6 Kawa, was bringing my message, the letter that I see there is -  
7 or was MM. But saying why is it that, it's really surprising to  
8 me.

9 Q. So the answer to my question is what? Were you ever known  
15:46:07 10 by those letters, YRK, when you were in the RUF?

11 A. No. The only letters they knew me for, double mark, that  
12 is, MM, Mao Mao. Double mark. They just got it so, double mark.  
13 Even the signal men I had in Kailahun, when they are giving my  
14 message - when they are bringing my message you will see MM.  
15:46:32 15 Double mark.

16 Q. Is it possible that you had a radio code name that you did  
17 not know about when you were in the RUF?

18 A. It's not possible. I chose my own code like my Mao Mao  
19 name. It was not Foday Sankoh who gave me. I chose that name  
15:46:50 20 and it was approved by him and it went to the signal. No  
21 signaller gave me a name unknown to me.

22 Q. If we look at the previous page and the reference to Issa  
23 Sesay, did you ever know Issa Sesay to have a code name, that is,  
24 a radio code name, of YRK after he became head of the RUF?

15:47:17 25 A. Issa Sesay had a code name, but it's not YRK. I've just  
26 forgotten. Issa had a code name. This particular document, I do  
27 not know where they got it from. I can see my name on this  
28 document showing different letters against my name. It surprises  
29 me. What I know, I was MM, double mark. Now I'm seeing YRK.

1 It's surprising to me.

2 Q. If we go to the page where your name appears against and we  
3 count a few lines down, six lines down, do you see "General Sam  
4 Bockarie" written there?

15:48:03 5 A. Yes, I am seeing it.

6 Q. Do you see the initials to the far right of the page "YRW"  
7 written there?

8 A. I'm seeing all these YYs and WWs. I'm seeing them.

9 Q. When Issa Sesay took over the leadership of the RUF, was  
15:48:24 10 Sam Bockarie still a member of the RUF?

11 A. When Issa took over full command, Sam Bockarie was nobody.  
12 He was nowhere to be seen. He had already gone. It was only  
13 Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Superman whom we were taking  
14 instructions from. Issa Sesay was the senior man.

15:48:59 15 Q. Before Sam Bockarie left the RUF, did you ever know him to  
16 have the radio code name of YRW?

17 A. I said the YYs and WWs is surprising to me. I don't know  
18 about this. He had a code name, but not this YY. No commander  
19 would just have YY, YY. Tell me, what does the "Y" stand for?

15:49:26 20 What does the "R" stand for? What does the "W" stand for? For  
21 me Martin George or my Mao Mao, I know - I know about MM. Double  
22 mark. Double mark. For JR, for instance, if you want to cut it  
23 short, Julia Romeo. Julia Romeo, JR. Very simple. But I'm  
24 seeing a lot of RR here. I don't know what it actually means.

15:49:56 25 This is my first time I've seen this book. They just wrote my  
26 name here so that they can take chances. I don't know about this  
27 book.

28 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Thank you, Madam Court Officer. I'm  
29 done with that exhibit. May we have pulled up the transcript for

1 11 June 2008 starting at page 11540, line 18.

2 Mr George, this is the evidence of another witness given to  
3 this Court in June 2008. I will read some of it to you and I  
4 will ask for your comments. Line 18, a question was asked of  
15:51:04 5 that witness:

6 "Q. What force or forces controlled Kono at that time  
7 after the signing of the Lome Accord?

8 A. It was the SLA/RUF, or RUF/SLA. We were in control of  
9 Kono and it was there that Issa himself had established his  
15:51:31 10 base after he left Makeni and at that time the commander  
11 was a vanguard called Colonel Martin George. He was the  
12 brigade commander.

13 Q. Did Issa Sesay stay in Kono, or did he go anywhere  
14 after that, after you arrived?

15 A. Well, he stayed in Kono observing all the diamond  
16 mining. What I meant by that, I meant the government  
17 diamond mining while he was in Kono. He continued to be  
18 there until the very last time I saw Sam Bockarie. He came  
19 there with two Arabs that I can recall had gone to Benjamin  
15:52:32 20 Yeachen on that day who separated those diamonds. They  
21 came to Kono to visit us. That was the very last time I  
22 saw Mosquito.

23 Q. The question was about Issa Sesay. Did Issa Sesay  
24 eventually leave Kono to go somewhere?

15:53:02 25 A. Well, the only time Issa Sesay left Kono was when  
26 Mosquito Spray cut off our supply route. That was the -  
27 when they attacked Foya, Lofa County. When that attack  
28 occurred, it was when Sam Bockarie sent a message that all  
29 the fighters that we had in Kono should organise themselves

1 and Issa should get a reinforcement from those men so we  
2 should come and capture and clear the ULIMO off from Foya.  
3 That was an order he had received from President Charles  
4 Taylor. That was the only time Issa moved with troops."

15:53:55 5 Let's pause there. Mr George, you heard what I just read.

6 This witness says that the brigade commander of Kono was a  
7 vanguard called Colonel Martin George. Do you agree with that?

8 A. Oh, yes, I said it, that I was brigade commander. Maybe  
9 other people did not believe it.

15:54:24 10 Q. He said Issa Sesay was there when you were brigade  
11 commander observing all the diamond mining. He called it  
12 government diamond mining. Do you agree with that?

13 A. Issa was based in Kono, but I have told you that we had a  
14 committee that was set up for mining. We had people in charge of  
15 this mining. Issa had a base in Makeni and in Kono. When Issa  
16 comes to Kono, he did not go there to monitor mining activities.  
17 He went - he had people there who were taking care of mining  
18 activities. He goes there to administer, spend time and go back  
19 to Makeni. He spends time in Makeni because he was in charge

15:54:49 20 whilst Mosquito was in Buedu, so he had the full right to patrol  
21 those various assignment areas.

22 Q. You heard me read the witness's response to a question  
23 whether Issa Sesay left Kono at some point in time. You heard  
24 the witness's response. The witness first started speaking about  
15:55:31 25 Sam Bockarie before speaking about Issa Sesay. What the witness  
26 said about Sam Bockarie was that the last time that witness saw  
27 Sam Bockarie in Kono was when Sam Bockarie came there with two  
28 Arabs who had gone to somebody called Benjamin Yeachen who  
29 separated diamonds. The person says they came to Kono to visit

1 them. That was the last time he saw Mosquito. I asked you about  
2 the name Benjamin Yeaten this morning. Have you ever heard of  
3 somebody called Benjamin Yeachen?

4 A. I said no. I don't know him and I never heard of him when  
15:56:18 5 I was serving as brigade commander in Kono.

6 Q. When you were serving as brigade commander in Kono, was  
7 there ever a time when two Arabs came to Kono in the company of  
8 Sam Bockarie in connection with diamonds?

9 A. In fact, when I was serving as brigade commander in Kono  
15:56:44 10 Sam Bockarie never fought in Kono. If anybody told you that Sam  
11 Bockarie went to Kono under my regime that person must be telling  
12 a black lie. I was the commander in charge, Sam Bockarie never  
13 went to Kono up to the time I left Kono brigade. Sam Bockarie  
14 never entered Kono with any Arab.

15:57:06 15 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Have you heard the name Mosquito  
16 Spray before?

17 A. The only name I know about is our own Mosquito. That is  
18 Sam Bockarie. If they had any Mosquito Spray then I don't really  
19 know about it. I don't really know about him. I only knew about  
15:57:29 20 our own Mosquito, Sam Bockarie.

21 Q. Do you remember what I just read about what this witness  
22 said about Issa Sesay leaving Kono to go somewhere else. The  
23 witness said that Issa Sesay left Kono when Mosquito Spray cut  
24 off the RUF's supply route. Do you remember an episode when you  
15:57:55 25 were brigade commander in Kono involving a Mosquito Spray who cut  
26 off the RUF supply route?

27 A. In fact, RUF never had a supply route in Liberia. The  
28 movement was called self-reliant struggle. We never had a supply  
29 route in Liberia. You're talking about Issa carrying manpower to

1 Buedu to go and find Mosquito to Spray. How on earth can Issa be a  
2 commander taking care of Kono and Magburaka and the other areas  
3 and instruct him to carry manpower to go and fight? You see?  
4 No.

15:58:43 5 When I was serving as brigade commander in Kono, no, Issa  
6 never asked me for manpower, because Issa would not take manpower  
7 without me knowing. I had my brigade. I knew the strength of my  
8 brigade. Before doing something he needed to consult me.  
9 Although he was the commander but he needed to consult me because  
15:59:03 10 I owned the brigade. Issa never asked me for manpower or took  
11 manpower from my brigade to go and fight. And Issa never - Issa  
12 used to go to Kailahun to Mosquito but he never went with  
13 manpower.

14 Q. Mr George, the place where this witness says Issa went to  
15:59:22 15 is not Buedu or Kailahun. He said they went and attacked Foya in  
16 Lofa County. Do you know which country Foya is in?

17 A. Yes, Foya is in Liberia. But that's what I'm saying. How  
18 could Issa leave his own assignment ground because there's only  
19 two of - the two of them that were controlling. Apart from him  
15:59:48 20 it is Mosquito. How could Mosquito send an instruction to him in  
21 Kono?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly take this  
23 last bit of his answer slowly.

24 MR ANYAH:

15:59:59 25 Q. Mr George, you were saying how could Mosquito send an  
26 instruction to Kono. Can you carry on from there?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, I thought the instruction  
28 allegedly came from Charles Taylor? What was the instruction -  
29 the instruction in the transcript that you just read.

1 MR ANYAH: It was from Sam Bockarie but also he ultimately  
2 said the order came from Charles Taylor, but let me read it again  
3 to avoid confusion:

4 Q. Mr George, let me read what that witness said again, this  
16:00:36 5 portion, line 4, page 11541, 11 June 2008. The question was:

6 "Q. The question was about Issa Sesay. Did Issa Sesay  
7 eventually leave Kono to go somewhere?

8 A. Well, the only time Issa Sesay left Kono was when  
9 Mosquito Spray cut off our supply route. That was the -  
16:01:04 10 when they attacked Foya, Lofa County. When that attack  
11 occurred, it was when Sam Bockarie sent a message that all  
12 the fighters that we had in Kono should organise themselves  
13 and Issa Sesay should get a reinforcement from those men so  
14 we should come and capture and clear the ULIMO off from

16:01:25 15 Foya. That was an order he had received from President  
16 Charles Taylor. That was the only time Issa moved with  
17 troops.

18 Q. Sir, you mentioned Mosquito Spray. Do you know who  
19 Mosquito Spray is?

16:01:49 20 A. Although I don't know him or I did not see him, he was  
21 a ULIMO. He was the commander of the LURD rebels. They  
22 were the ones who cut off our supply route - our supply  
23 route in Foya - because everything came from Liberia for  
24 us. So Mosquito Spray came - Mosquito Spray and others  
16:02:19 25 came and cut off our supply route and that created a  
26 problem for us. That was why Issa put men together to go  
27 and clear that supply route."

28 Let's pause. Mr George, what this witness told the Court  
29 was that an order came from the President of Liberia, Charles

1 Taylor. That order somehow got to Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie  
2 then sent a message that fighters in Kono should organise  
3 themselves and that Issa Sesay should get reinforcements from  
4 those fighters in Kono to go and clear - the person referred to -  
16:03:03 5 ULIMO and also LURD rebels from Foya. Let's pause there. Let's  
6 consider that. When you were brigade commander in Kono, did you  
7 ever hear of Charles Taylor sending any orders to Sam Bockarie.  
8 A. I said no. I never heard about Charles Taylor sending  
9 orders to Sam Bockarie or Bockarie sending instructions to Issa  
16:03:31 10 Sesay to collect manpower from my brigade in Kono.  
11 Q. Were you aware when you were brigade commander in Kono of  
12 any fighting taking place in Foya, Liberia, between Liberian  
13 government forces and either ULIMO or LURD?  
14 A. I heard it. You know, everything that happened used to be  
16:03:58 15 over the BBC. I was in Kono and I was concentrating on my front  
16 line. I never had problems with Liberian issues because I had my  
17 own issues.  
18 Q. Who were the Liberians fighting; was it ULIMO or was it  
19 LURD when you were in Kono as brigade commander?  
16:04:15 20 A. I heard about ULIMO. But for Issa to take manpower from  
21 Kono and carry them, I'm sitting on my grave, I can't tell lies  
22 to anybody. I need not make anybody feel happy. I never saw  
23 that in my life when I was in Kono.  
24 Q. The witness told this Court, and I just read it a few  
16:04:41 25 minutes ago, he said, or she said, "Because everything came from  
26 Liberia for us." This is in reference to the supply route being  
27 cut off. Was it the case, Mr George, when you were brigade  
28 commander in Kono, that supplies that you and your fighters had,  
29 everything, all of it, came from Liberia?

1 A. In fact, I never heard - sorry, I never had supply route in  
2 Liberia. The only supply route I had was from Kono to Buedu.  
3 That was my route. I had no road in Liberia, so I didn't have  
4 any supply route.

16:05:24 5 Q. Carrying on with the transcript. I believe I stopped at  
6 line 24. On that same page, 11541, the witness was asked this  
7 question:

8 "Q. How long was - first of all, just to be clear, when  
9 Issa Sesay left Kono because of the Mosquito Spray attack,  
16:05:44 10 was that before or after the Lome Peace Accord was signed?

11 A. That was after the Lome Peace Accord was signed."

12 So this witness is saying that after the Lome Peace Accord  
13 was signed is when all of these events happened. Now, this Court  
14 has found as a fact - Mr George, this is one of those things the  
16:06:10 15 Court has said is not in dispute - the date on which this Lome  
16 Peace Accord was signed. Your Honours, this is again CMS 227,  
17 admitted facts and Law number 32. Mr George, the Court said or  
18 found:

19 "On 7 July 1999 the Government of Sierra Leone signed a  
16:06:33 20 peace agreement with the RUF in Lome, Togo (Lome Peace  
21 Agreement)."

22 So the Court is saying 7 July 1999 was when this agreement  
23 was signed. This witness said that these events I've been  
24 reading about to you happened after July 1999, sometime after  
16:06:57 25 that. Continuing from the witness's evidence at line 28 a  
26 question was asked:

27 "Q. Do you recall for approximately how long Issa Sesay -  
28 well, first let me ask you did Issa Sesay return to Kono  
29 after leaving on the Mosquito Spray operation?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. About how long after he left did he return?

3 A. Approximately two weeks.

4 Q. Did he come back by himself, or with anyone else?

16:07:39 5 A. Well, when Issa Sesay returned I can recall that he  
6 brought the twin barrel that was at Mosquito's headquarters  
7 - the twin barrel. That was what we used to defend the  
8 headquarters from the Alpha Jet. He brought it back  
9 together with some more men, including Captain American and  
16:08:10 10 his troops. Captain American was an SLA and his troops, he  
11 brought them back to Kono and they met us.

12 Q. Were there any other persons that you recognised with  
13 Issa Sesay when he returned to Kono?

14 A. Yes, he had reinforcement, his men and some of the  
16:08:29 15 fighters who were in Buedu, together with some SS men who  
16 he brought from Foya. He crossed over with them to Kono.  
17 They met us at the base."

18 Mr George, let's consider that response by this witness.

19 The witness said Issa Sesay left Kono, went for this Mosquito  
16:08:51 20 Spray operation and was gone for about two weeks. When Issa  
21 Sesay came back, he came back with a twin barrel that he got from  
22 Mosquito's headquarters. Do you recall any of these events  
23 happening when you were brigade commander in Kono, Mr George?

24 A. When I was serving as the brigade commander, I'm still  
16:09:21 25 saying it, I never saw Issa coming from Liberia with other  
26 manpower to Kono with a twin barrel from Buedu. Buedu had twin  
27 barrel. We had twin barrel across, Kono and Makeni. Issa can't  
28 - cannot take twin barrel from Buedu. Where would he pass  
29 through when enemies were staying at Daru. There was no ferry.

1 Where would he pass through to take this weapon to Kono? So  
2 really I do not know where he got his own whatnot from. It never  
3 happened during my regime.

16:10:08 4 Q. What about this name that the person mentioned, Captain  
5 American and his troops, an SLA and his troops. When you were a  
6 brigade commander in Kono, did you ever see or hear of somebody  
7 called Captain American?

8 A. No, when I was serving as a brigade commander I knew about  
9 Banya, Hector, Alpha - MP Alpha. They were the SLA officers that  
16:10:35 10 I had with my in my brigade. I knew Junior who was serving as  
11 battalion commander in Jagbwema Fiamama. I knew the men whom I was  
12 dealing with from the SLA during my regime.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Those names you just mentioned MP  
14 Alpha, you said somebody called Junior, somebody called Banya,  
16:11:05 15 somebody called Hector, were they all SLA officers when you were  
16 brigade commander in Kono?

17 A. Yes. Every one of them was SLA and we're sharing power.  
18 When an SLA colonel was battalion commander, an RUF would be his  
19 deputy. That was how we were changing the shifts in Kono when I  
16:11:27 20 was serving as brigade commander.

21 Q. You heard the witness from what I read say that Issa Sesay  
22 returned to Kono with reinforcement, his men, that is, Issa's  
23 men, and some of the fighters who were in Buedu and that they  
24 came together with some SS men whom Issa had brought from Foya.  
16:11:51 25 Do you know what the reference there is to SS men? Who are these  
26 people, Mr George?

27 A. Well, I don't actually know what he is talking about, SS.  
28 I did not see any NPFL soldiers or Charles Taylor's soldiers in  
29 my ground of assignment in Kono. Maybe he met them elsewhere,

1 but not in Kono. Not in my ground. I did not see any of them.

2 Q. Going to line 22 of that page, the question was asked of  
3 that witness:

16:12:31

4 "Q. Do you recall any of the SS men? Do you know their  
5 names?

6 A. I can recall like Captain Denis. I can also recall  
7 the men I told you that they were always with us  
8 representing Liberia, like Colonel Jungle, he was one of  
9 the men, and one Colonel - he too was from Liberia and he  
10 was called Colonel Martin. I can recall those but his  
11 nickname was Lion. He too came along with Issa in Kono."

16:12:59

12 Let's pause. Now, this witness is saying, Mr George, that  
13 he could recall somebody called a Captain Denis, that this  
14 Captain Denis was one of these SS men. Somebody named Colonel  
15 Jungle was one of those representing Liberia with the RUF. Now,  
16 did you know a Captain Denis, a Liberian that was an SS man when  
17 you were brigade commander in Kono?

16:13:28

18 A. No. The only Denis I know was an RUF man, an RUF soldier.  
19 He was based in Pendembu. He was a Mende by tribe. And then the  
20 Jungle you are talking about, maybe is a different Jungle. But  
21 the Jungle I know that was in Kono with me is the Jungle that  
22 came along with Abu Keita when they brought ammunition for us to  
23 use. I said that in my statement, that he came with one Jungle  
24 and he came with one other commander, one Colonel Leo. Yes, I  
25 can remember those guys. But to say they brought another Jungle,  
26 no. I only know about these two guys that Abu Keita brought with  
27 him, the Colonel Jungle for Abu Keita or Colonel Leo that he  
28 brought with him the time he brought those ammunition. Finish.

16:13:59

16:14:19

29 Q. Did you know somebody by the name of Colonel Martin whose

1 name or nickname was Lion?

2 A. I knew one SLA Martin. We had one SLA Martin, but I've  
3 forgotten the last name. He was black. That's the only Martin I  
4 know about. And as I'm talking now, some SLA can attest to it if  
16:15:11 5 they hear me talking. He was with us in Kono, Buedu, Makeni.  
6 Yes, I know one Martin.

7 Q. Was his nickname Lion, the Martin that you are referring  
8 to?

9 A. No. I did not know him by that nickname. I only knew his  
16:15:34 10 Martin name.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, the Leo that the witness says  
12 he knew, is this same as Lion?

13 MR ANYAH:

14 Q. Mr George, can you answer that? The Leo you referred to  
16:15:57 15 who you said Abu Keita brought with Colonel Jungle or with Jungle  
16 to this meeting at the Waterworks, is that person also known as  
17 Lion?

18 A. I said no. We were talking about the last name, Martin's  
19 last name Lion. I said no. I only knew Martin - his name Martin  
16:16:21 20 and I told you he was an SLA. That was what I said.

21 Q. Lion is said to be the nickname of this Colonel Martin.  
22 Now, the SLA you knew as Martin, was his nickname Lion?

23 A. I said no. I did not know him by that name. I only knew  
24 his Martin name. He was never been called Martin in my presence,  
16:16:45 25 no.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, that is not the question I  
27 asked. The witness stated a few lines ago that he was aware of a  
28 Colonel Jungle who came with Abu Keita and --

29 THE WITNESS: Leo.

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Now, the question I asked was: Was this  
2 Colonel Leo also known as Lion? It has nothing to do with  
3 Martin. I just said was this Leo also known as Lion.

4           MR ANYAH:

16:17:18 5           Q. Mr George, can you answer that?

6           A. Yes, I can answer it. I did not get the question clear.

7           No. Leo never had a nickname as Lion, ma'am.

8           Q. Now, Mr George, continuing with the witness's answer. Same  
9 page, line 29, the last question on that page, page 11542:

16:17:44 10           "Q. Now, Mr Witness, you've talked to us about some  
11 operations you were involved in in Sierra Leone after  
12 returning from Liberia. During any of those operations do  
13 you know whether or not any of the ammunition that you had  
14 picked out, or ammunition of that type that you had picked  
16:18:09 15 out, in Burkina Faso was used?

16           A. Like the RPG bombs and the twin barrel ammunition, he  
17 brought some more together with the twin barrels. And the  
18 tanks, because there was a tank in Kono, he brought  
19 ammunition for that one too. I can recall that.

16:18:46 20           Q. Who are you saying brought the ammunition?

21           A. It was Issa Sesay. He brought the ammunition and some  
22 more 7.62 millimetre NATO and Warsaw type because after the  
23 ceasefire - when the ceasefire was in place already ECOMOG  
24 was not fighting, so there was no way we could get  
16:19:10 25 ammunition from ECOMOG, so he brought some more of those  
26 from Buedu."

27           Mr George, you've heard what I've just read. Page 11543,  
28 the witness is saying that the RUF at some point got ammunition  
29 from Burkina Faso. They had picked out ammunition from Burkina

1 Faso. Are you aware of the RUF obtaining ammunition from Burkina  
2 Faso when you were a member of the RUF?

3 A. That's - it's my first time hearing this news about Burkina  
4 Faso. If Sam Bockarie had that contact, why then was he making  
16:19:58 5 us suffer? This is my first time hearing about Burkina Faso.

6 Q. What about a tank? Did you have a tank in Kono when you  
7 were brigade commander?

8 A. Yes, I had that tank in Kono and I escorted it to Magburaka  
9 to Morris Kallon. We captured it from the ECOMOG.

16:20:24 10 Q. Did Issa Sesay at any time bring ammunition for that tank  
11 to Kono?

12 A. No. The tank was captured in Kono. I don't remember them  
13 carrying the tank up to Buedu and bringing it back to Kono, no.  
14 The tank was captured right in Kono. If they had rockets for it,

16:20:58 15 I know that it should have been in Kono. It's not Buedu. You  
16 cannot get the tank in Kono and then get the rockets from around  
17 Jamaica. No.

18 Q. Did you say Jamaica? I just heard --

19 A. Buedu. Buedu.

16:21:16 20 Q. It might be getting late in the afternoon and perhaps some  
21 of us are hearing things now.

22 JUDGE DOHERTY: [Microphone not activated].

23 MR ANYAH: Very well. I'm sane at this point still:

24 Q. Now, Mr George, continuing with the witness's evidence, you  
16:21:34 25 heard me read about a 7.62 millimetre NATO and Warsaw type. Do  
26 you know what type of ammunition or artillery that is?

27 A. Well, he's talking about - say that again, because we had  
28 82 millimetres, 106, et cetera, et cetera. So please read that  
29 again. Say that over again.

1 Q. Yes. The words used by the witness, he said, "He brought  
2 the ammunition and some more 7.62 millimetre NATO and Warsaw  
3 type." What does that mean to you, this 7.62 millimetre NATO and  
4 Warsaw type? Is it a gun? Is it an artillery round. What is  
16:22:28 5 it, if you know?

6 A. Well, the one I know about that we had was 86 millimetres.  
7 We captured it from Jojoi ma, far away Jojoi ma. That was  
8 86 millimetres. But the one he is talking about, actually, is  
9 not to my knowledge.

16:22:50 10 Q. Very well. Line 22 of the witness's evidence there was a  
11 question asked. This is still 11 June 2008's transcript:

12 "Q. Mr Witness, you said Issa Sesay brought ammunition.  
13 First, where did you see Issa Sesay with the ammunition?

14 A. Issa Sesay took them from Buedu. After they had  
16:23:17 15 cleared Mosquito Spray and the route, Issa Sesay brought  
16 the ammunition, together with the twin barrel which  
17 Mosquito was using to defend his headquarters from the  
18 Alpha Jet, and brought them to Kono, together with some  
19 more manpower and they met us in Kono.

16:23:36 20 Q. Earlier you spoke about some fighting at - I believe it  
21 was Mano Junction. In that operation you talked about some  
22 tank fire; is that correct?

23 A. Yes, my Lord. It was the tanks that I told you about,  
24 the Panhard.

16:24:02 25 Q. The type of shells you described two different types  
26 piercing and explosive.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Had you ever seen that type of ammunition in Liberia?

29 A. It was only at that time when we brought them from

1 Burkina. I told you that we wanted to make use of those  
2 tanks that we had captured from ECOMOG."

3 Why are you shaking your head, Mr George?

4 A. I'm feeling my head.

16:24:39 5 Q. Are you feeling unwell?

6 A. My head is just - it's not that much. I'm feeling a little  
7 bit of pain.

8 Q. Are you able to continue for five more minutes?

9 A. Yes. Oh, yes. Even 30 minutes I can withstand.

16:24:58 10 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Let us know if you feel more  
11 discomfort. I will make the relevant applications --

12 A. No, no. Let's go on.

13 Q. So the question at line 8 to that witness was:

14 "Q. Had you ever seen that type of ammunition in Liberia?

16:25:17 15 A. It was only at that time when we brought them from  
16 Burkina. I told you that we wanted to make use of those  
17 tanks that we had captured from ECOMOG. It was only the  
18 tanks without the ammunition. It was at that time that I  
19 saw it. But when I came in, I only saw the ammunitions  
16:25:34 20 again when we left Segbwema and tried to hit Mano Junction.  
21 We used it again to hit Daru Barracks, but we were  
22 unsuccessful."

23 Let's pause there. Mr George, this witness is saying that  
24 a particular type of ammunition was brought from Burkina. You've  
16:25:59 25 spoken previously about Burkina, but now the question pertains to  
26 this type of ammunition. It is referred to as a type of shell  
27 that's piercing and explosive. Did you know the RUF to have  
28 those types of ammunition, shells that were piercing and  
29 explosive?

1 A. No, he is talking about Segbwema and I was in Kono, so  
2 really I cannot say I knew about it, and really I don't know  
3 about that kind of ammunition he is talking about because I was  
4 based in Kono. The tank was under my control, that I know about  
16:26:38 5 it because it was with me in Kono. But that one he is talking  
6 about that took place in Segbwema, that one I don't know about.

7 Q. That's fair enough. The tanks that were under your  
8 control, did you have ammunition for them or did you not have  
9 ammunition?

16:26:57 10 A. We had ammunition for it, because it was used by ECOMOG and  
11 we captured it from ECOMOG and we had bombs for that particular  
12 armoured car I'm talking about. I said I moved with it up to  
13 Magburaka and I turned it over to Kallon. It had bombs in it.  
14 Four at the front, four up, four down, and spare bombs. That was

16:27:24 15 when I got in the armoured car. I saw it. And I took it right  
16 to Magburaka township and I handed it over to Morris Kallon.

17 Q. Was it one tank or was it more than one tank?

18 A. I had one with me in Kono.

19 Q. When you had the one tank in Kono did the RUF anywhere else  
16:27:48 20 in Sierra Leone have a tank, to your knowledge?

21 A. Yes, they had another tank in Makeni.

22 Q. Now, line 19. A question was asked of the witness same  
23 page, 11544, 11 June 2008 transcript:

24 "Q. My question was when did you leave Kono?

16:28:17 25 A. That was the time Issa Sesay had come from Buedu, as I  
26 am saying. He came from Buedu and said that now the SLA  
27 who are in Makeni do not listen to Papay Sankoh's order,  
28 because he said because they said Foday Sankoh had told  
29 them that they should send former President Momoh to Buedu

1 at Mosquito's place, but Brigadier Mani and the other SLAs  
2 who were there had refused to do that, so we should  
3 organise ourselves and so we would go and dislodge them  
4 from Makeni.

16:28:51 5 I advised him that, 'General, now that all of us have been  
6 fighting together as one, I think we should resolve this  
7 thing amicably', because I was the IO commander and that  
8 was my duty."

9 Do you know what an IO commander is, Mr George?

16:29:17 10 A. IO. IO commander, I take that to be intelligence officer.  
11 They send reports against any commander upon their advice.

12 Q. Now, Mr George, I don't want you to mention any names that  
13 come to mind - to your mind regarding the IO commander, but just  
14 listen to the last part of the witness's response. The witness  
16:29:51 15 said:

16 "Because I was the IO commander and that was my duty. But  
17 he said I was not to dictate to him what he should do, so he  
18 ended up organising men and they went and hit Makeni and they  
19 dislodged the SLAs in Makeni. As a result of that I had a fear,  
16:30:10 20 because I was an SLA and I was in Kono with Colonel Martin George  
21 and others, so it was that fear that made me to go through  
22 Magburaka and I went to 91 where ECOMOG was and I surrendered  
23 myself and my weapon and my grenades that were in my possession."

24 Mr George, your name is mentioned here again, Colonel  
16:30:42 25 Martin George. Now, this person says they were with you and  
26 others in Kono. The question is asked of the person on line 10:

27 "Q. Mr Witness, do you remember approximately what month  
28 and year that was?

29 A. It was at the end of 1999. The end of 1999."



## I N D E X

### WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

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