



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 23 SEPTEMBER 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg
Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Wednesday, 23 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:31:20 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we'll take appearances, please.

6 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
7 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J
8 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura, Christopher Santora and the case
9 manager Maja Dimitrova.

09:31:40 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours.
12 For the Defence today myself Courtenay Griffiths, with me
13 Mr Morris Anyah and Mr Terry Munyard of counsel and we're joined
14 today by Ms Priyanka Reddy, who has been with us before.

09:32:00 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. Mr Taylor, I'll
16 remind you once again you're still bound to tell the truth. Yes,
17 please go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

18 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

19 [On former affirmation]

09:32:10 20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

21 Q. Mr Taylor, we're moving on to another witness today. Now
22 the witness we're dealing with gave evidence in closed session.
23 Consequently I don't want you to mention any name. Now this was
24 an individual whose name you wrote down on a piece of paper. Do
09:32:31 25 you recall?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. Now can we begin in this way, please: Where is Benghazi,
28 Mr Taylor?

29 A. Benghazi is on I would say the coastal area of Libya.

1 That's outside of the capital on the sea, the Red Sea.

2 Q. Is it near to Tajura?

3 A. No, Benghazi could be I would say about 500 or more miles
4 from Tajura.

09:33:23 5 Q. Did you ever have any fighters training in Benghazi?

6 A. None whatsoever.

7 Q. On 25 January of 2008 someone told this Court at page 2212
8 of the transcript that he was told by Foday Sankoh that Foday
9 Sankoh met you in Benghazi and that you had some of your fighters
09:33:57 10 there and you were the leader of those fighters; that you were
11 actually not there most of the time during the training but he,
12 Foday Sankoh, met him first in Benghazi. What do you say about
13 that?

14 A. I say it's a blatant falsehood. I have never - I have been
09:34:19 15 to Libya many, many times and I've said that Gaddafi is a very
16 good friend of mine. I don't deny that. I have never, ever
17 whether during training time, whether after training time,
18 whether during my presidency, I have never set foot in Benghazi,
19 so he lied. Simple and true.

09:34:38 20 Q. Well, let's take the matter to another level then,
21 Mr Taylor. Did you meet Sankoh in Libya, period?

22 A. Never met Foday Sankoh in Libya. Never.

23 Q. Can you see any reason why Foday Sankoh might have told
24 someone that he met you in Benghazi?

09:35:01 25 A. Well, the question is if he actually told someone or they
26 have [indiscernible] lies that they have brought to this Court.
27 I don't think Foday Sankoh could have said that, because it never
28 happened and I don't believe the lies that they've brought here.
29 I don't think Sankoh told him, so it's not a matter of why would

1 he say so. I don't think he did.

2 Q. Now, that proposition, Mr Taylor, that you were not there
3 most of the time during the training, is that correct?

4 A. Yes, that is - I did not spend a lot of time in Libya. I
09:35:38 5 went there, visited my people, went to the Mataba, out. Yes, I
6 didn't spend a lot of time in Libya. The longest I could have
7 spent in Libya at any one time could have been maybe two weeks
8 and then out. No more.

9 Q. So where this individual claims that he was told that you
09:36:00 10 were not there most of the time, that proposition you accept, do
11 you?

12 A. Well, at that part of the proposition. But the proposition
13 that I do not accept, he is saying that Foday Sankoh told him.
14 Now, if I he said that he heard from some other sources, I accept
09:36:24 15 the proposition. I do not accept the proposition in its entirety
16 that Foday Sankoh told him. I don't believe it, because I don't
17 think Foday Sankoh did. But I accept the proposition that I did
18 not stay in Libya a very long time, but he could have heard that
19 from other sources.

09:36:39 20 Q. So help us, would Sankoh have known that you were not there
21 all of the time?

22 A. Yes, I think he would have known I was not there all of the
23 time.

24 Q. How would he have known that?

09:36:55 25 A. Maybe from his leader, Ali Kabbah. He could have also
26 known that from Liberians that trained in Tajura. Discussions
27 between and amongst individuals in the camp: "Oh, is your chief
28 here?" "No, he came, but he's gone." That's the basic way these
29 guys get information.

1 Q. Okay, let's move on. What do you say to this, an answer
2 given by this individual. He - no, I think it's best if I pose
3 the question:

09:37:42

4 "Q. What, if anything, did Foday Sankoh tell you about
5 Burkina Faso?

6 A. Well, there were - he came along with his own men and
7 the Liberians, some of them that were in Libya. There was
8 also training in Burkina Faso. Some of the Special Forces
9 were there and he was there as well, Mr Sankoh."

09:38:11

10 Was there training in Burkina Faso?

11 A. Never. Not one militant of mine did not even a day's
12 training in Burkina Faso. Never, ever, no.

13 Q. Did you train with Sierra Leoneans in Burkina Faso?

14 A. No.

09:38:31

15 Q. Were you in Burkina Faso with Sierra Leoneans, whether you
16 were training or not?

17 A. No. No.

18 Q. Was Foday Sankoh with you in Burkina Faso?

19 A. No. Never saw him, never knew him, no.

09:38:57

20 Q. Now, the same individual went on to say this - and I'm
21 looking at page 2212 of the transcript of 25 January 2008. He
22 says, this man, that he was at Camp Naama until about February
23 1991, and he goes on to say that in March 1991 the RUF began
24 armed operations into Sierra Leone. Well, he was asked this
25 question:

26 "Q. In March 1991 the RUF began armed operations into
27 Sierra Leone. Prior to these armed operations did you go
28 into Sierra Leone?

29 A. Yes."

1 Now, Mr Taylor, this man claims to have been sent on a
2 reconnaissance mission into --

3 MS HOLLIS: We are getting into areas in public session
4 that were not public and we're getting into areas that are
09:40:12 5 identifying. Now, certainly the Prosecution is not saying, has
6 never said, there's no opportunity for this accused to address
7 them, but they should not be addressed in public because it's
8 undermining the protections afforded this witness.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: You do seem to be getting down to more
09:40:31 10 personal particulars of this witness, Mr Griffiths. Is there any
11 way you can phrase these questions more generally?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: So far as the testimony of the witness is
13 concerned, Mr President, the witness accepts that a number of
14 individuals were sent into Sierra Leone prior to the initial
09:40:55 15 invasion. So, to my mind, that proposition by itself doesn't
16 really identify the individual. But I can put it in more general
17 terms:

18 Q. Mr Taylor, did you organise a prior reconnaissance mission
19 into Sierra Leone before the invasion in March of 1991?

09:41:25 20 A. No, I did not, and it has to be no because I did not know
21 of any prior invasion into Sierra Leone, so I did not.

22 Q. Now, following this reconnaissance mission it is said that
23 this individual went to Voinjama and in Voinjama he met up with
24 Foday Sankoh who was in a convoy with you. What do you say about
09:42:35 25 that, Mr Taylor? So we're talking about February of 1991.

26 You're in Voinjama with Foday Sankoh when you met up with these
27 individuals who had been on a reconnaissance mission in Sierra
28 Leone. Do you follow me?

29 A. I follow you. That's a lie. Prior to July of the year he

1 mentioned there I did not go into Gbarnga until about July of
2 [overlapping speakers] --

3 Q. No, we're talking about Voinjama, not Gbarnga.

4 A. That's what I'm saying. So I could not have gone to
09:43:15 5 Voinjama. Voinjama was considered a very, very dangerous area at
6 the time. I had not even gone from Kakata to Gbarnga, so it's
7 impossible for me to have gone all the way to Voinjama. I had
8 not even moved to Gbarnga by that particular time.

9 Q. We're talking about February 1991.

09:43:36 10 A. That's what I'm talking about. That's exactly what I'm
11 talking about.

12 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Taylor, you mentioned something that
13 was not captured on the transcript. You said you did not go into
14 Gbarnga until about July of when?

09:43:51 15 THE WITNESS: 1991. So there's no way you can get into
16 Voinjama accept you go through Gbarnga. So the point I am
17 making, I was never in Gbarnga in February 1991 because I had not
18 even gone to - I was never in Voinjama in February 1991 because I
19 had not even reached to Gbarnga yet, okay. So how would I be
09:44:12 20 able to get the Voinjama? There's no way you can get to Voinjama
21 accept you go through Gbarnga. I had not reached to Gbarnga.

22 As I explained to this Court, I came from Gborplay, I came
23 all the way through Buchanan and into Harbel and Kakata, and I'm
24 saying that the forces had to begin fighting back upcountry. I
09:44:31 25 never went there. So it is totally - maybe he saw a ghost of
26 someone looking like Charles Taylor. There is no way I would
27 have been in the forest of Liberia, Voinjama, in February 1991.
28 That's a lie.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. But this individual claims that you were heading in a
2 convoy with Foday Sankoh on the night that individual returned to
3 Liberia and that he entered a car and was told that they were en
4 route to Voinjama with Mr Taylor and that they were going to
09:45:14 5 Voinjama in order to discuss the operational plan for the
6 invasion of Sierra Leone the following morning. What do you say
7 to that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. I say that's a blatant lie, and I don't know what he means
9 by car. I do not know what he means by car, but in our part of
09:45:33 10 the world a car is what - how would you describe it here? Like a
11 sedan, something of that nature. I don't see what human on earth
12 could - anyone that knows Liberia during that particular time and
13 the area of the country to say a car is on that road, it's
14 impossible. That road was only suited for four-wheel drive
09:46:02 15 vehicles: Jeeps, pick-ups and trucks. So I don't know his
16 interpretation of a car as I understand car, but unless he came
17 from a different planet, there's no way even a car could have
18 been on that road with anybody. This is a road that is - only
19 four-wheel drive vehicles can get there. A car would never make
09:46:23 20 it a tenth of a mile, so he is lying. There was no way I was in
21 any convoy on the road. He made that up. It's a lie. If I had
22 been on that road I would say I was on that road. I was never on
23 that road in February or March or April or May or June or July of
24 1991, ever, no. He lied.

09:46:49 25 Q. Does the name Joseph Brown mean anything to you, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Joseph Brown? Well, it all depends on - okay, well, Joseph
27 Brown means something to me now.

28 Q. All right. Well, what does Joseph Brown mean to you now?

29 A. Well, you see, that's the whole point now because to talk

1 about Joseph Brown, we may have to go into - you know, when I
2 hear counsel on the other side talking about open or closed
3 session, because to deal with some of these matters I don't want
4 to be hindered in dealing with some of the details of these
09:47:36 5 matters because of the open or closed nature of these sessions
6 and I don't think that we should permit the protection of
7 witnesses - if we have to into closed session with some of these
8 witnesses, I want to be able to defend myself here, so I don't
9 care about open or closed if their protection is at stake because
09:47:54 10 to talk about Joseph Brown, as I know Joseph Brown now, would be
11 inappropriate in open session because, you know, I know what
12 Joseph Brown means to us now. And I have to tell the Court, but
13 I would not tell the Court except it's in closed session.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, are you saying that if you
09:48:08 15 discuss anything about Joseph Brown it's going to reveal the
16 identity of this witness that Mr Griffiths is asking you about?

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour. If I got into Joseph Brown
18 it will reveal the identity of the testimony that we are on now
19 because I say I know Joseph Brown now, but I didn't know him
09:48:30 20 before but I know him now. And I don't want to hide from the
21 Court if we were in a closed session what I mean by that, but, I
22 mean, I know Joseph Brown, but I know him now but not - at the
23 period in question, I didn't know a Joseph Brown.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm not quite sure what's
09:48:52 25 going to come from here on in because I don't know the questions
26 you're going to ask, but I'll leave it to you. If you're going
27 to ask questions that will reveal the identity of the witness,
28 then we'll need to go into private session.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I think we will have to go into

1 private session to deal with this aspect.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Those members of the public
3 listening to the trial, in order to protect the identity of a
4 witness who is the subject of a protective measures order of this
09:49:31 5 Court we're now going to have to go into a private session. What
6 that means is that the public can continue to watch the
7 proceedings, but you won't be able to hear what is being said.

8 Any idea how long the private session would last?

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't think it will last very long.

09:49:52 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. The private session won't
11 last for too long.

12 Madam Court Manager, if you'll put this Court into private
13 session, please.

14 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of
15 the transcript, pages 29449 to 29452, was
16 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as
17 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

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1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we're in open session.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we're now in open session. Go
4 ahead, Mr Griffith.

09:57:10

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this individual claims that on the day
7 after his arrival in Voinjama there was a meeting at the house of
8 the 2nd Battalion commander of Voinjama, a Special Forces
9 commando of Mr Taylor called Anthony Mekunagbe. Now before we go
10 any further, was Anthony Mekunagbe Special Forces?

09:57:35

11 A. Yes, he was.

12 Q. So he trained in Libya?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. He's somebody you know?

09:57:49

15 A. Very well, yes.

16 Q. Was he based in Voinjama?

17 A. Yes, both - well, both in Voinjama and Gbarnga at the time,
18 yes.

19 Q. Why do you say both in Voinjama and Gbarnga?

09:58:02

20 A. Because I have mentioned to this Court he was a regional
21 commander. He had a headquarter in Gbarnga, because I had not
22 moved there yet, and he had his second headquarter in Voinjama.
23 So he was in charge of the whole region of Bong and Lofa
24 Counties.

09:58:22

25 Q. And to your knowledge, did he have a home in Voinjama?

26 A. Well, no, I don't know. I know he had a house, but I'm not
27 aware that he had a home in Voinjama.

28 Q. Very well. Let's stick to house. Now, it is claimed that
29 when this individual arrived at that house, that Sankoh was in

1 the living room --

2 MS HOLLIS: Your Honours, this is closed session testimony.
3 This now is going into details that are not discrete. They will
4 not be considered in isolation, they will be considered together.

09:59:14

5 Typically, we would have to be in closed or private session.
6 There was a special procedure that was set out to allow this to
7 continue to be public, but not so that it could be abused by
8 putting in details that in the aggregate will identify this
9 witness. Now, if these matters need to be gone into, they should
10 be gone into at a minimum in private session.

09:59:31

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, could you phrase the
12 question so as to leave out the individual and simply be a bit
13 more general. For instance, I don't know what the rest of the
14 question was, but perhaps you could say is it possible Sankoh
15 could have been at a house in that place at such and such a time?
16 Or if you think that that's going to detract from the quality of
17 the answer, then we'll go back into private session.

09:59:51

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, the difficulty, Mr President, is this:
19 I am as anxious as anyone that these proceedings should be
20 public, because publicity is important in terms of providing
21 justice. But in terms of the particular objection being made,
22 we're talking about a situation where a number of individuals
23 were present at this meeting, and it seems difficult to
24 understand why the Prosecution are being so sensitive about this
25 particular aspect of the testimony, given that it's a feature of
26 their case that such a meeting took place at which this defendant
27 was present, and it's vital that the defendant have an
28 opportunity of dealing with what is a salient aspect of the
29 Prosecution case. But I am prepared to deal with the matter in

10:00:10

10:00:37

1 more general terms in order to facilitate these proceedings
2 continuing in public, because I'm anxious that the public be able
3 to follow this.

10:01:21 4 Q. So let me pose it in this way, Mr Taylor: Did you attend a
5 meeting at the home of Anthony Mekuagbe sometime in late
6 February 1991 in order to plan the invasion of Sierra Leone?

7 A. No, I did not attend any meeting at the home of Anthony
8 Mekuagbe, one of my regional commanders, to plan any attack on
9 Sierra Leone. And the answer is no because I was never, ever in
10:01:53 10 that entire region in the period in question. Impossible. Even
11 if one assumed that such a meeting took place that I would have
12 been present, at least one must know that I would have been
13 present with other senior members of the armed forces, which is
14 not had the case in this testimony. It never happened.

10:02:17 15 Q. Well, it is said that you were there in the living room
16 flanked by senior officers of the NPFL?

17 A. That is not correct. That is a blatant lie.

18 Q. And it's further said that you were hovering over a shell
19 map of Sierra Leone?

10:02:41 20 A. Equally a lie.

21 Q. And that you were there discussing, hovering as you were
22 over the shell map, the plans for the invasion?

23 A. Blatantly a lie. Blatantly untrue,

24 Q. Specifically, that you were discussing the operation to
10:03:05 25 attack Sierra Leone and that you were wearing a red T-shirt and
26 American camouflage trousers along with your senior Special
27 Forces personnel?

28 A. A total lie I'm in a red T-shirt and camouflage trousers.

29 Q. A red T-shirt and American camouflage trousers, Mr Taylor?

1 A. That is a lie.

2 Q. Now, did Foday Sankoh introduce you to anyone at such a
3 meeting, Mr Taylor?

10:03:58

4 A. He could not have. I was not at such a meeting, so he did
5 not and could not have, no.

6 Q. Did he introduce you to any Sierra Leonean?

7 A. No.

8 Q. As a member of the NPFL?

10:04:18

9 A. No. And even if we go to the period that I have told this
10 Court and the whole world that I had association with Foday
11 Sankoh between '91 and '92, Foday Sankoh never introduced anybody
12 to me. Even during those months that Foday Sankoh came in and
13 out of this place, all of these so-called people, not one of them
14 did Foday Sankoh bring to me. Between August '91 and even May

10:04:44

15 '92 when I say he came, we met, we discussed, he travelled in and
16 out and I gave him a house, he still did not introduce anyone to
17 me even at that time. From the big names that we've heard like
18 Mohamed Tarawalli, I never knew them. Never. The Sam Bockarie,
19 none of them. So I could not have been introduced to anyone at
20 the time that I did not even know him, no.

10:05:04

21 Q. Mr Taylor, was there a 1st Battalion of the NPFL?

22 A. Yes, there was a 1st Battalion of the NPFL.

23 Q. And in terms of that description 1st Battalion, was it
24 linked to any particular area, individual or what?

10:05:30

25 A. Well, the NPFL - all - you know, these guys come and
26 generalise. All armies have 1st Battalions. So you come and say
27 the 1st Battalion of the NPFL. Of course in every division of
28 the - in fact, there more than one 1st Battalion, so it depends
29 on what this person means. In the army division there's a 1st

1 Battalion. In the marine division there is also a 1st Battalion
2 marine. So I don't know what battalion he's talking about. But
3 it's not associated with individuals, because commanders change.
4 But there were, I would say, at least three or four 1st
10:06:09 5 Battalions in different divisions.

6 Q. Now, it is said, Mr Taylor, that you dominated this
7 meeting?

8 A. How would I dominate a meeting that I never attended? I
9 was not at any meeting with these people. And trying to show me
10:06:45 10 as the big boss and all that kind of stuff, I was not at a
11 meeting. I have told this Court I have never even done military
12 training. I depended on my generals to come up with plans and
13 justify them, and then as leader of the NPFL, that's how - how
14 would I be dominating a meeting that I have never done a military
10:07:09 15 training in my life before? It never happened. It's a lie. I
16 didn't dominate any meeting because I was not at the meeting.

17 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, that's not what's being said. Because
18 what's being said is that despite the intelligence which had been
19 gained from a reconnaissance operation which had taken place, you
10:07:40 20 nonetheless demanded that your plan be followed. Because what is
21 being suggested is that Sankoh, a former member of the Sierra
22 Leonean military, wanted to follow a particular plan without
23 engaging the army at Daru on the border, but you had your own
24 ideas and you impressed those ideas on the meeting. That's
10:08:12 25 what's being said. What do you say about that?

26 A. I say it's a lie. I never was present at any of their
27 meetings.

28 Q. Because, you see, what is said is Sankoh was an SLA officer
29 before, and he resided in Daru for quite a long time and he knew

1 the terrain, and that Sankoh had been told that a particular
2 route could be taken safely by the fighters, but you said no,
3 that you had your own predetermined alternative route. What do
4 you say about that, Mr Taylor?

10:08:51 5 A. It's a lie.

6 Q. And that you suggested a simultaneous attack on Kailahun
7 and Pujehun. You were the military strategist in that meeting
8 who decided on the plan to invade Sierra Leone. That's what's
9 being suggested, Mr Taylor?

10:09:17 10 A. Well, that's a lie and there's many other - I'm sure as we
11 go through this I will point out many other lies that this
12 witness told regarding his recruitment, how he was recruited,
13 where he met Foday Sankoh first, where he didn't meet him. As I
14 listened to that testimony as I sat in this Court, there were
10:09:37 15 many lies. And as we go through it, I'm sure we'll point to
16 other lies that he told about places that he met Sankoh, where he
17 didn't or did. Its all a lie. He never - I was never present
18 there. I did not hover or sit over any map. I never discussed
19 any strategies or plans with Sankoh because I was not there, and
10:09:56 20 whatever he said along those lines are all blatant lies. That's
21 all they are.

22 Q. Well, I'm sorry, Mr Taylor, but I have to go through it.

23 A. I understand that.

24 Q. I have to give you an opportunity of dealing with these
10:10:10 25 suggestions. Because what is suggested is that you came up with
26 a plan which involved three attacks on Sierra Leone: The first
27 was through Voinjama, Foya, and that route was to lead to an
28 attack on Koindu; the second was from Vahun to Bomaru, and that
29 would lead to an attack in Kailahun District; and then finally an

1 attack in Pujehun District aimed at Zimmi. You are said to be
2 the architect of that plan, Mr Taylor. It's quite specific.
3 You're there in your red T-shirt and camouflage trousers, sitting
4 over a shell map, surrounded by your senior officers, planning
10:11:15 5 the route, dominating the meeting. Do you understand?

6 A. I do. That's a lie. But I can see that the witness is
7 very informed. He's very well informed, as we all know, and I'm
8 sure he's using his own expertise to build up this lie because we
9 know who the witness is and I listened to him and his oratory and
10:11:46 10 all that kind of stuff. He's lying. I was not planning anything
11 with anybody, and I'm sure he's using his own knowledge of his
12 area because it just never happened. I don't care how he turns
13 it. I was not present at any meeting. I did not plan with
14 anybody. I did not engage anyone. I did not conspire with
10:12:07 15 anyone, knew nothing about that situation that was developing
16 that they had put together with Anthony Mekunagbe. Had nothing
17 to do with it whatsoever, no.

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, prior to February of 1991, had you been to
19 Sierra Leone?

10:12:28 20 A. No, I had - all through my growing up days I had never,
21 never been to Sierra Leone.

22 Q. What about on that occasion when you went to meet with
23 Momoh?

24 A. Okay, Freetown, I went to Freetown, yes. Flew in, flew
10:12:47 25 out.

26 Q. Had you been to any other part of Sierra Leone apart from
27 Freetown?

28 A. No other part of Sierra Leone. No other part. Flew into
29 the airport and flew out.

1 Q. Did you know, for example, the terrain in Kailahun
2 District?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Or in Pujehun District?

10:13:09 5 A. No.

6 Q. Did you know where army barracks were located?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Did you know where the army of Sierra Leone were deployed?

9 A. No, no.

10:13:28 10 Q. Now, who is Sam Larto, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Sam Larto was one of my Special Forces.

12 Q. Was there any link between Sam Larto and Anthony Mekuagbe?

13 A. Yes, they were like brothers.

14 Q. Because it is said that Larto was present at this meeting.

10:14:03 15 Does that surprise you?

16 A. No, it does not surprise me.

17 Q. Why not?

18 A. Well, Larto was very close to Mekuagbe and Larto was one
19 of those that got executed too now, so Larto was very close to --

10:14:18 20 Q. Executed when?

21 A. During the same period. He came up with another situation
22 where he had murdered several civilians and he was tried and
23 executed. But he was associated with Mekuagbe and Varney.

24 Q. And who?

10:14:39 25 A. Oliver Varney.

26 Q. Michael Peagar, who is he?

27 A. No, the pronunciation is, I think, Paygar.

28 Q. Paygar?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Who is he?

2 A. Michael Paygar was Special Forces and commander of the
3 Executive Mansion Guard unit.

10:15:17

4 Q. Yes, he is described as the Executive Mansion guard
5 battalion commander, yes?

6 A. Yes, Special Forces, Michael Paygar, yes.

7 Q. In a previous life, what was Anthony Mekunagbe's
8 employment?

10:15:41

9 A. Anthony Mekunagbe was a former police officer. He had
10 worked with the Liberian National Police.

11 Q. And was he commander of the 2nd Battalion of the NPFL?

12 A. Camp Naama area, that could have been the 2nd Battalion
13 area because the location of the country determined where the
14 battalion was located. That could have been the 2nd Battalion
15 area. It was called a battalion, but that was a divisional area,
16 yeah.

10:16:18

17 Q. At this time, Mr Taylor, in February 1991, was there a unit
18 within the NPFL called the Strike Force unit?

10:16:51

19 A. Yes, there was developing - I would say developing a Strike
20 Force unit, yes.

21 Q. Who was the commander of that unit?

22 A. These commanders changed so much. At the time of the -
23 there were several there. I know John Teah was commander at one
24 time. We also - '91, February, I really can't recall
25 specifically who was the commander at that time, because they
26 changed battalion commanders frequently, so I don't quite recall.

10:17:22

27 Q. Well, help me with this: In February 1991, can you recall
28 now what Sam Tuah's role was within the NPFL?

29 A. Sam Tuah could have very well - like I said, the unit was

1 developing. Sam Tuah was not a Special Force, so a developing
2 unit like that, he very well could have been given a task.
3 February 1991, I can't be too certain, because if this is a new
4 unit it would be commanded by a Special Force. He could play a
10:18:31 5 major role in it, but I don't think he would be in command
6 position because all new commanders - all new areas were
7 commanded by Special Forces. So I would think that he would be
8 associated maybe in the deputy role and later takes command, but
9 by this early stage, I would say that he was - he could not have
10:18:57 10 been the commander of that unit, of the Strike Force unit
11 immediately.

12 Q. Does the name Charles Timber mean anything to you?

13 A. These are all junior commandos. These are not Special
14 Forces. I know of Charles Timber, yes.

10:19:17 15 Q. Do you recall a situation where Charles Timber was a deputy
16 to Sam Tuah?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. When was that?

19 A. This was the time I would say about August/September of
10:19:42 20 1991. The unit that was sent - the special operations unit that
21 was sent to the borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone to protect,
22 that unit that ended up finally in that Top 20, Top 40 fight, Sam
23 Tuah commanded that unit; Charles Timber was there. That's the
24 unit.

10:20:04 25 Q. Charles Timber was there in what role?

26 A. As deputy to Sam Tuah at the time.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help me, when did Dr Manneh come to
28 Liberia?

29 A. In or around April of 1990.

1 Q. Of 1990, yes?

2 A. That's correct. 1990, yes.

3 Q. And was Dr Manneh a military strategist?

4 A. Not to my knowledge, no. I don't think - like myself,

10:20:51 5 Manneh did not do military training. He's more of an academic
6 than anything else, no. Manneh, not to my knowledge. Throughout
7 my years of knowing him and my discussions, he led a revolution,
8 but I don't think he had never done any, and I stand corrected on
9 this, but he never discussed that with me.

10:21:17 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I'm sorry, but I think we may
11 be constrained to go into private session because I cannot deal
12 with the detail of the testimony of this witness without - and
13 give the witness an opportunity of properly putting his account
14 before the Court unless we go into private session. I'm sorry.

10:21:37 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We'll do that, Mr Griffiths.
16 How long do you estimate the private session would be? I'm not
17 trying to put any limitations on you.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: No, not at all. I think at the very least
19 we're going to be in private session for about an hour or so
10:21:51 20 until the morning break.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, members of the public,
22 in order to protect the identity of a witness whose evidence is
23 now being discussed, we're going to have to go into private
24 session. I repeat that the public will be able to see the
10:22:09 25 proceedings but not hear the proceedings.

26 Court Manager, could you please put the Court into private
27 session.

28 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of
29 the transcript, pages 29464 to 29497, was

1 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as
2 the proceeding was heard in private session.]
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1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we're in open session.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:02:36

4 Q. Mr Taylor, I would now like to show you, please, exhibit
5 number P-54. Now, Mr Taylor, the particular testimony we're
6 looking at now included reference to this diagram which is said
7 to reflect the NPFL command structure at the time of the Sierra
8 Leonean invasion. Do you follow me?

9 A. Yes.

12:03:36

10 Q. And you will note that you're in charge. Do you see that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And then beneath you we have the Executive Mansion Guard
13 commanded by Michael Paygar, the battlefield commander Isaac
14 Musa; is that correct?

12:04:04

15 A. Well, he is called the general officer commanding. I don't
16 know where he got battlefield from, no.

17 Q. And then we have military advisers which include
18 Foday Sankoh and Dr Manneh, yes?

19 A. Yes.

12:04:24

20 Q. And beneath that, as we see, we have the Strike Force unit
21 commanded by Sam Tuah and Charles Timber, the Ghankay Tigers,
22 Mr Taylor?

23 A. Know nothing about them.

12:04:51

24 Q. And then we have the battle group commander as Sam Larto,
25 beneath whom we have the 1st Battalion, the 2nd Battalion, the
26 6th Battalion and other battalion commanders. Note, under 1st
27 Battalion commander, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind this is supposed
28 to reflect the situation as of - towards the end of March 1991,
29 do you understand what is meant by combat battalion capture

1 Monrovia?

2 A. I really don't know what this witness was talking about
3 here. I really, really do not know what he means.

12:05:44

4 Q. As far as you're aware, in March 1991, had the NPFL
5 captured Monrovia?

6 A. No. Not only had we not captured Monrovia in March 1991,
7 the NPFL never captured Monrovia at any time. No.

12:06:22

8 Q. Then we see right at the bottom a number of names in two
9 boxes. Now, Mr Taylor, help us. Does this diagram represent any
10 kind of reality to you?

11 A. Well, the way how - you know, the way the question comes,
12 counsel, I may need some help when you talk about - when you say
13 "any kind of reality", yes. Some kind of reality, but, I mean --

12:06:48

14 Q. All right. Tell us the "some" part and then we'll look at
15 the "none" part later.

16 A. This chart does not represent - there are two points:
17 Charles Taylor is the leader of the NPFL; that's factual. The
18 next factual thing on this is about Michael Paygar being the -
19 Michael Paygar commands the Executive Mansion Guard battalion.

12:07:11

20 Oliver Varney is responsible for 6th Battalion. Like I said, I'm
21 not sure if the 2nd Battalion is in that area, but Naama, Anthony
22 Mekunagbe is responsible.

12:07:33

23 But now when we come to reality, these people and these
24 battalions must be known by this witness because these are the
25 people that he and his boss are dealing with. So reality for me
26 here is objective. That's why I say, when you begin to mix facts
27 up with lies, it takes a longer time to unscramble it. So he
28 knows these people. There is a 6th Battalion commanded by Oliver
29 Varney. There is a Mekunagbe. There is a Michael Paygar. There

1 is a Charles Taylor, okay. But when you mix it up in this way,
2 if you look at the chart, for me, I'll throw this entire chart
3 out because it does not represent if we're looking at - you know,
4 10 per cent is a score, but one would look at 90 per cent as a
12:08:14 5 better score than 10. So I will give this whole nonsense here 10
6 per cent because it doesn't represent - there is none of this -
7 all this lie, this is somebody with a military background that
8 drew up with him this lie, but it does not represent - the
9 percentage of facts in it, for me, it does not represent the
12:08:34 10 reality in line with your question. So that's why I'm saying
11 it's subjective.

12 Q. In any event, someone went on to say that this diagram
13 accurately reflects the NPFL command structure, vis-a-vis the
14 RUF, at the time the invasion of Sierra Leone was planned.

12:08:57 15 A. Total nonsense. Total unadulterated nonsense. It does not
16 represent the NPFL that I was in charge of. Maybe what they -
17 their RUF, but this does not represent the NPFL that I was the
18 leader of. That's total nonsense.

19 Q. And someone was later asked: You will see on that diagram
12:09:22 20 a box titled Ghankay Tigers (SBUs):

21 "Q. ... What was that unit?

22 A. This was the Small Boy Unit that were part of the
23 Executive Mansion Guard. This Small Boys Unit that were
24 part of the Executive Mansion Guard.

12:09:44 25 Q. And to your knowledge was this Small Boy Unit involved
26 in the initial attack on Sierra Leone?

27 A. Yes, some of them were involved."

28 What do you say to that, Mr Taylor?

29 A. It's a lie. It's a lie. It's a lie. It's a lie.

1 Q. You understand what the person is saying, that small boys
2 attached to your Executive Mansion Guard were sent by you to
3 Sierra Leone to fight. You do understand that, don't you?

4 A. Yes, I hear what you are saying.

12:10:20 5 Q. And that they carried the name the Ghankay Tigers. Now,
6 Ghankay is part of your name, isn't it?

7 A. Counsel, this is - yes, that's my name but this is not
8 true. Ghankay is my name. Somebody takes my name and puts it -
9 some group calling itself Ghankay Tigers then the other day we
12:10:41 10 heard about the Scorpion unit now we have the Tigers unit. These
11 are all made up stories. All made up. All made up. The
12 Scorpion unit was yesterday. Somebody was leading a Scorpion
13 unit that never existed. Now we've got the Tigers unit. Maybe
14 somebody else will come up with another unit. Just as they go
12:11:06 15 along they make up.

16 Q. In any event, that person - we can remove the diagram now,
17 please. Were Dr Manneh and Sankoh military advisers to you,
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. Never. Never. Dr Manneh came to me in around April of
12:11:48 20 1990. Dr Manneh was not involved in any military operation or
21 advising me militarily. Dr Manneh moved in different parts of
22 the liberated territory at that time, really teaching and
23 speaking to groups about the aims and objectives of the
24 revolution, advising them, making sure that the structures of
12:12:15 25 government - because we never dismantled the civilian structure
26 during that time. And he travelled up and down as an academic
27 dealing with these matters. Never talked military with me, no.
28 That's not true.

29 Q. What about Foday Sankoh then?

1 A. No. Even at the time - even at the time that Foday Sankoh
2 - Foday Sankoh and I discussed military at the time that we came
3 together, but that military was about the security of the border
4 and what our people were supposed to be doing over there. That's
12:12:59 5 the type of military we discussed, of how to keep the ULIMO
6 people from infiltrating. That was the time and I'm talking
7 about 1991 - late 1991, August or thereabouts, during that time.
8 But Foday Sankoh was never a military adviser to me at all. No.

9 Q. Now, this person was asked this question:

12:13:34 10 "Q. Now this invasion of Sierra Leone, what was
11 Foday Sankoh's role in the invasion?

12 A. Well, Sankoh at the time was the leader of the RUF who"
13 - incidentally - "took instructions from the NPFL
14 leadership.

12:13:52 15 Q. So what part did he actually play in this initial
16 invasion of Sierra Leone?

17 A. Well, I mean he was there most of the time in giving
18 moral support to the fighters and he frequented the various
19 command posts for himself but he didn't really at that
12:14:11 20 point in time have any command and control over the
21 fighters as what and what was being done on the ground."
22 Do you understand that, Mr Taylor? You're in charge.

23 A. Yes, that's what they are trying to portray but that's what
24 led them through all of this disinformation in this whole
12:14:38 25 indictment. They had dreamed up their own scheme according to
26 their own mood and they just fill it in. Foday Sankoh - I have
27 sent in, what this witness says, first hundreds and then followed
28 by thousands and now here I am, Foday Sankoh is in other words a
29 figurehead and I am the boss. It's a blatant, blatant lie.

1 Blatant lie.

2 Q. "Q. Now at the time of the this initial invasion where was
3 Foday Sankoh based?

4 A. He was based in Gbarnga."

12:15:21 5 This is in March 1991, Mr Taylor. At that time were you
6 based in Gbarnga?

7 A. No, I was not even in Gbarnga yet. I was not even in
8 Gbarnga at that time. I was living in Harbel.

9 Q. "Q. And what was located in Gbarnga?

12:15:36 10 A. Mr Taylor and the Executive Mansion were located in
11 Gbarnga. That was their headquarters and I mean he was
12 based there as well."

13 What do you say, Mr Taylor?

14 A. That's not true. I get based in Gbarnga later on. I moved
12:15:56 15 to Gbarnga after the building that was being used by the what we
16 call superintendent, but it's called governors in other places,
17 was in fact destroyed during a little bit of fighting. After we
18 decided - the NPFL decided that we would organise what we called
19 the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government, that's
12:16:19 20 that NPRAG, we decided that we would fix that place and after
21 several debates - some people were debating use Buchanan as the
22 headquarters, some people said let's move to Gbarnga. We started
23 doing some repairs and work in Gbarnga and I didn't move to
24 Gbarnga until about July of 1991 before I moved my headquarters,
12:16:47 25 our assembly of the Parliament moved also to Gbarnga, but that
26 was in July of 1991. I had nothing to do with Gbarnga before
27 then.

28 Q. "Q. Where did you actually fight during this invasion?

29 A. I fought along with Timber at Bomaru, that is Kailahun

1 District, and the next morning I went to Bomi Hills and I
2 link up with Oliver Varney and One Man One. So I spent
3 most of the time in Bomi, in Pujehun District.

12:17:24

4 Q. Now you said to went to Bomi Hills. Is there another
5 name for Bomi Hills?

6 A. Tubmanburg."

7 Now you agree with that, don't you, Mr Taylor; another name
8 for Bomi Hills is Tubmanburg?

9 A. Yes, you can say that, yeah.

12:17:36

10 Q. Now help us with this though, Mr Taylor:

11 "I fought along with Timber at Bomaru, that is Kailahun
12 District, and the next morning I went to Bomi Hills."

13 Can you get from Kailahun to Bomi Hills to be there for the
14 next morning?

12:18:01

15 A. I don't know the distances but we may have to look on the
16 map for that. I don't know Sierra Leone. I don't know the
17 distances what we're talking about. I really don't. I really
18 don't know. If it's close by it's possible, but I don't know the
19 distance. I don't know the distances.

12:18:24

20 Q. Tubmanburg is near?

21 A. Tubmanburg is all the way near Cape Mount County. That's
22 going west towards the ocean.

23 Q. And Kailahun borders Lofa County?

12:18:39

24 A. No, then it would not be possible. Then it would not be
25 possible by the next morning. How do you get there? There are
26 no roads. There are no - how would he get there? There are no
27 highways, there are no roads. So if you're in if you say Lofa
28 County area to come all the way down to Bomi - no, no, no, no,
29 no, no. Because you're walking. It would take you a few days.

1 It's not possible.

2 Q. But the next morning, line 6, page 2226?

3 A. That's not - that's a part of the whole lie. It's not

4 possible to leave from - if you say - I don't have them but I

12:19:14 5 take your word it's true. If you say Kailahun is up around the

6 Lofa County area, but where would he pass? Because inside Sierra

7 Leone most of the areas are being government forces, okay. On

8 the Liberian side that means he would have to come from

9 Mendekoma, Foya. He would have to travel down through the entire

12:19:39 10 length of the Gola, the Kpelle Forest, come through all the way

11 through Vahun, down Sawmill to get down to Bomi. Walking, which

12 would be the only way that it would happen, it would take a good

13 three days of walk. We're talking about more than 1,000

14 kilometres coming down from Mendekoma down to Bomi Hills. If you

12:20:08 15 look I would say about more than 1,000 kilometres. He can't do

16 it overnight.

17 Q. One Man One, Mr Taylor, I've asked you before, who is it?

18 A. I don't know One Man One.

19 Q. Did Oliver Varney have a deputy called One Man One to your

12:20:25 20 knowledge?

21 A. No, not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge. And just to

22 speak generally about it, and I think even I can say specifically

23 about it, at that time in the NPFL because this - I do not know

24 who is he referring to One Man One, but it would have to be a

12:20:47 25 Special Force. The Special Forces - if Oliver Varney is

26 commander, his deputy must be another Special Forces. So it's

27 not a junior person. And I do not know if there's a Special

28 Forces that they called One Man One that I do not know, but if

29 this One Man One is other than a Special Force, and I would want

1 to believe if the person - let me slow down before I - I'll slow
2 down. If One Man One is not a - if he's a Special Force I would
3 suggest that he would have said - I don't want to say I'm
4 misrepresenting what the witness said. I guess he would have
12:21:29 5 said and another Special Force.

6 But it is highly unlikely that anyone other than a Special
7 Force would be the immediate deputy to a commander at that time.
8 All the senior command positions were held by Special Forces. No
9 one other than the Special Forces. Battalion commanders, even as
12:21:48 10 low as some company commanders were Special Forces. So this One
11 Man One, I don't know him. I don't know him.

12 I tell you, maybe to help the Court a little bit, this
13 expression One Man One, I'm not sure if they are calling it a
14 person. I know the expression One Man One. Now if this will
12:22:16 15 help, what the expression was, the One Man One was an expression
16 that was used in describing a weapon. The Americans had an old
17 rifle called the M1. It took about, oh, if I'm not right, three
18 or maybe six rounds. It's called an M1 rifle and it was not
19 those type of automatic things that you can fire and fire. So
12:22:59 20 the Special Forces used to like the M1 because it fired at a
21 longer distance. And they used to say that for every one shot,
22 it will be one man.

23 So maybe if this would help, I don't know of a person
24 called but there's an expression used describing a weapon called
12:23:20 25 the M1, okay. It's a very old type American rifle called the M1.
26 I don't know if maybe we can get a picture of it or anybody may
27 help in the future but it's called an M1. That's what I know
28 that expression to mean, but not a person. I know it as an
29 expression describing a weapon as for every one round there

1 should be one man. They call the weapon my One Man One. So
2 that's what I know about that weapon.

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, were you aware of any mining being
4 conducted by Oliver Varney in the area of Zimmi in Sierra Leone?

12:23:58 5 A. No, I was not aware. And that would have been very
6 shocking because where Oliver Varney was commanding, Bomi Hills
7 and Cape Mount, that's the diamond belt in Liberia. So I don't
8 see how, all of the places we've talked about, we've heard about
9 Lofa bridge, that's the diamond belt. And why would he lead -
12:24:18 10 that's the diamond - that's one of the principal diamond regions
11 even according to the map. Why would he leave it and go to
12 Zimmi? But I was not aware. And if I had heard it, he would
13 never have been commander there any more because he was not sent
14 there to mine, even in Bomi.

12:24:37 15 Q. Did he provide you with any diamonds, Mr Taylor?

16 A. No, no, no, no, no. Why would Oliver bring me diamonds?
17 No.

18 Q. Yes. Can we have a look at another document, please,
19 Mr Taylor? Another diagram, I should say. Now, Mr Taylor, this
12:25:44 20 diagram is said to reflect the command structure of the RUF
21 between March to June 1991.

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. Now, you see once again you're at the top.

24 A. Yes.

12:26:04 25 Q. Yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And then we see that somewhere floating in the middle is
28 the leader, Foday Sankoh, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, we're told that Sankoh received a briefing from
2 Mansaray and Tarawalli during the initial invasion. Do you know
3 anything about that?

4 A. Nothing whatsoever.

12:26:46 5 Q. And that Mansaray, that's Rashid Mansaray, took orders from
6 One Man One based in Zimmi. Know anything about that?

7 A. Know nothing about it.

8 Q. Now, does this diagram reflect anything that - within your
9 knowledge, Mr Taylor?

12:27:11 10 A. No. But, I mean, could we bring it together so we can see
11 the whole thing so we can point out this map?

12 Q. I think that's the best we can do, Mr Taylor. What do you
13 say?

14 A. Yes. Now, the first diagram that we saw reflected the
12:27:48 15 position as of March. This now is as of March to June? I can't
16 see that, but I remember. I thought you said March to June.

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. So that means the entire - if this is a reflection of the
19 command - the command structure in the NPFL, the RUF command
12:28:14 20 structure after the invasion of Sierra Leone and by indication is
21 also the NPFL command structure, so that means that within two
22 and a half, three months there have been a total - a total change
23 of the structure.

24 Q. Well, perhaps what we ought to do in light of that answer,
12:28:32 25 Mr Taylor, is to bring the other one back so that we can see how
26 the change has come about.

27 A. Revolutionary change in the command structure.

28 Q. Because you will note that in the second diagram the
29 military advisers have gone.

1 A. Gone, yes.

2 Q. The Executive Mansion Guard has gone.

3 A. Gone.

4 Q. The Ghankay Tigers have gone. And help me, because you've
12:29:16 5 got it in front of you, Mr Taylor, who else is gone?

6 A. But that's what I need to see. That's what I - because - I
7 mean, this - this type of revolutionary structure or change of a
8 military structure means that something significant took place.

9 Now, I do not know how, like I was about to point out --

12:29:36 10 Q. Well, please do.

11 A. -- the advisers, just like you say --

12 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, perhaps it might be easier if you just
13 momentarily change seats. Hold the other diagram in your hand
14 and just tell us from your viewpoint how things have changed.

12:29:58 15 First of all, that diagram on the overhead, how is it entitled?

16 A. This is the NPFL command structure here --

17 Q. 1990 to 1991?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Yes?

12:30:14 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. And then we have the structure - command structure after
22 the invasion March-June 1991.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So help us, what's changed?

12:30:31 25 A. You have the - the advisers are gone. You also have, like
26 you say, the Strike Force unit and the Ghankay Tigers in this -
27 the first diagram are attached to the Executive Mansion Guard
28 command. So if we look on this map, we can see here that now we
29 have the 6th Battalion change is connected directly to Larto as

1 battle group commander and the --

2 Q. So --

3 A. I mean, if this is a reflection of the NPFL and RUF
4 command, I would ask the question: What's happening to all these
12:31:18 5 other units? Why have they been dissolved and they are gone?

6 Because when you look at the structure, it means that these have
7 already been, what, disbanded or what? I don't understand. So
8 this is not a reflection of the NPFL, because even to assume that
9 this is the case, we just see this is a significant, significant
12:31:42 10 change over a very short period of time, which would not - I
11 mean, so this does not reflect anything.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

13 MS HOLLIS: Yes, Mr President, we're getting into an awful
14 lot of discussion when what was left out in the description of
12:31:59 15 the second diagram was RUF command structure, not NPFL. NPFL
16 doesn't show on the second diagram. So perhaps with that in mind
17 it would assist the witness.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That's the difference pointed out
19 in the diagrams.

12:32:20 20 THE WITNESS: Yeah, but it does not assist me,
21 Mr President, with due respect to the counsel, because this
22 second diagram has Taylor, Isaac Musa, Sam Larto, Sam Tuah.
23 These are all Liberian commanders. So it does not assist me,
24 with all respect.

12:32:38 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Have a look at the first one again, Mr Taylor. Do you see
27 some RUF members at the bottom of that one? The first diagram.

28 A. The first diagram, there are RUF members all the way at the
29 bottom as members, members, members, coming all down.

1 Q. Right. Were they all members of the NPFL --

2 A. Never.

3 Q. -- as suggested by my learned friend?

4 A. Never.

12:32:58 5 Q. So that we you should distinguish between the two --

6 MS HOLLIS: I didn't say that.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: I didn't hear Ms Hollis say that.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Well, were those people part of the NPFL command structure,

12:33:13 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. They were never a part of the NPFL command structure.

12 That's why I said, this should not even be a part of this first
13 map that was presented and that's why I say, in reality, this map
14 really means nothing to me. But if this second map, which the

12:33:27 15 learned counsel is right, mentions RUF command structure at the
16 time, but in reality, when you look at the map, the map is really
17 giving all of the senior commanders here are supposed - are NPFL
18 commanders. So, in reality, what they are saying about this map,
19 this map is supposed to be indicating here that the entire
12:33:49 20 command and control of the RUF at this time is being handled by
21 all senior NPFL individuals. That's what I disagree with.

22 Q. Precisely.

23 A. So while it reflects at the top RUF command structure, the
24 bottom shows that this is an NPFL command and control situation.

12:34:10 25 That's what I disagree with.

26 Q. Let's put those two diagrams away, shall we. Now,

27 Mr Taylor, I want to remind you now of some testimony, page 2231:

28 "Q. ... Now, this attack on Sierra Leone, where did the
29 fighters get their arms and ammunition?"

1 A. The arms and ammunition were provided by the NPFL,
2 initially around the 20th before the invasion. When
3 Mr Taylor went to Voinjama from Gbarnga with Sam Tuah ...
4 with Sam Tuah and Sam Larto, those arms and ammunition were
12:35:18 5 in the truck of Mr - Special Forces commander Sam Larto was
6 the battle group. They provided the ammunition.

7 Q. You say on the 20th, the 20th of what month?

8 A. The 20th of March."

9 So do you understand, Mr Taylor?

12:35:36 10 A. Uh-huh.

11 Q. Three days before the invasion arms were provided by the
12 NPFL. Do you know anything about that?

13 A. Know nothing. Know nothing about it. And I think the
14 generalisation of this NPFL, I would not quarrel if he said that
12:35:55 15 three days before the invasion he got arms from Larto and
16 Mekunagbe. I don't have a quarrel with it. I don't know whether
17 it's true or not. But what I do know, if we continue using this
18 I would almost call it a phrase, where he says the acronym, or
19 whatever, NPFL, when we're speaking about the NPFL, I would - one
12:36:24 20 would want to assume that you are speaking about the leadership
21 of the NPFL, okay? Now, I would say, categorically, that's not
22 true.

23 Now, as to whether individuals in the NPFL at that time,
24 these commanders that we subsequently find out were involved that
12:36:40 25 are subsequently punished, okay, because of another situation, I
26 would say, categorically, I can't confirm or deny what he is
27 saying, but I know if you speak about the NPFL that I am the
28 leader of and my senior commanders are like my Defence Minister
29 Tom Womeiyu, we, as the NPFL, do not give this group any arms or

1 ammunition and we are not aware of any operation of such going
2 on.

3 Q. But this individual continues by saying this:

12:37:18

4 "Q. Where did you receive the other supplies you used in
5 this initial invasion?

6 A. We received support supplies from the two battalions of
7 the NPFL, the 6th Battalion that were based in Bomi Hills
8 under the command of Oliver Varney, as well as the 2nd
9 Battalion that were based in Voinjama under the command of
10 Mekunagbe."

12:37:41

11 So what do you say to that, Mr Taylor, based on your last
12 answer?

13 A. Well, like I say, he has pointed out now who he got them
14 from, and that's if, you know, if somebody wants to say, "Oh, two
15 commanders? That's the NPFL," I can't stop them from their
16 assumptions. But the leadership, the command of the NPFL, I as
17 the leader had no idea that these people were pulling this thing
18 off at those two battalions and I get to find out later, and we
19 all know what happens to them. And I'm not suggesting that it
20 was - that was the cause of what happened to them, but the
21 conspiracy involved in what they were doing led to their end.

12:37:56

12:38:19

22 Q. Now, this individual went on to suggest, Mr Taylor, that at
23 a fairly early stage there were complaints being made about
24 harassment, raping, et cetera, being carried on by Liberians in
25 Sierra Leone. Was any such thing brought to your notice in 1991?

12:38:55

26 A. No. No such thing. Because - and, in fact - in fact, in
27 Liberia, 1990, going into the period in question, 1991, the rules
28 were very strict. And if such nonsense were going on in Sierra
29 Leone by Oliver Varney, then they could only do such a thing

1 because of their own designs and what they were carrying on.
2 That was not acceptable in NPFL area. If you raped, as a
3 soldier, you were dealt with at the harshest level of punishment
4 in the NPFL. Anyone will tell, we did not tolerate that. So
12:39:46 5 when they did their design and were kings in Sierra Leone, what
6 happened, they put this design together and it backfired on them,
7 and that's why they felt that they were kings on the other side
8 doing what they could not have done in Liberia, unfortunately.

9 Q. But this person went on to say:

12:40:06 10 "Q. Now, you indicated I believe that Foday Sankoh
11 complained. Do you know to whom he complained?

12 A. Yes. He similar did complain to Oliver Varney and in
13 fact he told me that he was on his way to Gbarnga to raise
14 the issue with Mr Taylor about the misbehaviour of
12:40:25 15 Mr Taylor's fighters in Pujehun District."

16 Know anything about that?

17 A. No, I guess he has got the time mixed up. Again sometimes
18 they miss it. Foday Sankoh did complain to me in 1992 - early
19 1992 - about some of these problems that our men - our special
12:40:54 20 operations people had been doing in Sierra Leone before the clash
21 between the two forces. I'm not sure if he is talking about this
22 time. If he tries to bring it any time earlier that's not true,
23 because Foday Sankoh and I were not communicating at the period
24 in question. That's totally not true.

12:41:17 25 Q. But this person claims that this kind of behaviour led to
26 several firefights between the RUF and the NPFL, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Well, yes there were firefights but then again that's why
28 I'm saying I don't know what time he is talking about, because
29 there were firefights between the NPFL and the RUF but this was

1 in 1992 and the firefights that I'm aware of that occurred, there
2 was Top 20, Top 40, Top - there were three operations that were
3 carried out involving firefight between the RUF and the NPFL that
4 I know of and this occurred in 1992 around about May. Before the
12:42:01 5 break-up this is what happened.

6 So if he is talking about these firefights, I would say
7 that he's probably got the wrong period in question. So he maybe
8 - and I'm only saying, this is not his testimony - I'm saying
9 that he's got the time mixed up because there were firefights.
12:42:19 10 Now, you've got a fact, firefight, placed at a wrong time, okay.
11 That's all I can put it to.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I'll ask you this question in general terms
13 for a good reason: Were you aware of any senior RUF personnel
14 arrested and detained by Oliver Varney in Liberia?

12:42:48 15 A. No, I'm not aware. I'm not aware of that. Not aware.

16 Q. Are you aware of any RUF personnel imprisoned for killing
17 NPFL fighters or executing them?

18 A. No. No. That was never brought to my attention. No, I'm
19 not aware of that. Because when this firefight occurred, it
12:43:21 20 occurred in Sierra Leone and we withdrew our people. So except
21 maybe somebody was arrested in Sierra Leone before that time in
22 early 1992, but I never received any report of the arrest of
23 anyone or incarceration on either side. No, I'm not aware of
24 that.

12:43:46 25 Q. Now, it is said, Mr Taylor, that there was an occasion when
26 Oliver Varney said that RUF personnel had no right to detain NPFL
27 fighters because they are not under the command of the RUF and
28 that the NPFL boys were not being paid and so they should pay
29 themselves?

1 A. I've never heard of that. I've never - that kind of
2 situation did not get to me, no. And I don't know. But you
3 know, when you conspire and you do what you did, I can see how -
4 how authoritative Oliver wanted to be because I guess he had them
12:44:57 5 really tight because he had committed himself in such a way and I
6 guess he could dictate terms. So I have no idea of what is going
7 on with them at this particular time. So, quite frankly, it very
8 well could have happened amongst them but I really don't know.
9 And if it had been serious and it was intended for us I guess it
12:45:22 10 would have come through the structure and I would have heard
11 about it. But I never heard of this. Never.

12 Q. But you understand what that's a precursor of, don't you?
13 They should pay themselves. You get it?

14 A. Uh-huh.

12:45:42 15 Q. Because later there's an Operation Pay Yourself in Sierra
16 Leone?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. So, according to this testimony, this looks like a phrase
19 which originated with one of your generals, Mr Taylor. You get
12:45:58 20 it?

21 A. Yes. I understand that.

22 Q. So what are you saying about that?

23 A. That's totally, totally, totally - I know nothing about it
24 and I don't think that Oliver in dealing with his man
12:46:16 25 Foday Sankoh would have wanted to do that. But I really don't
26 know what's going on inside there, Sierra Leone, at the time. I
27 have no clue whatsoever. I have no clue. Because Oliver knows
28 that looting in NPFL area is not permitted. That's why in the
29 NPFL area all businesses, schools, everything remained open.

1 That's just not tolerated. We provided food for our people,
2 free. We provided everything. Our soldiers, yes, they were not
3 paid, but we supported our soldiers.

12:47:13

4 Q. Now, this person went on to say that you executed most of
5 the commanders:

6 "He at one point in time ordered the execution of people
7 like Oliver Varney, Sam Larto, Anthony Mekunagbe, you know."

8 That is, you did that, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Well, what he didn't choose to do was to tell why.

12:47:33

10 MS HOLLIS: Can we have a page reference, please?

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Page 2243, lines 2 to 7:

12 Q. What were you saying Mr Taylor?

12:47:58

13 A. That's the whole point. In fact these men were
14 court-martialed, they were tried and executed. But he comes up
15 and he only says so they know on the other side that these people
16 - the are people that they were dealing with that are were
17 conspiring to kill me and destroy the NPFL finally got caught and
18 court-martialed, tried and executed and now he --

19 Q. Let's just have another look at the second diagram, please.
20 Yes, that one.

12:48:32

21 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: These diagrams have, I think, exhibit
22 numbers. It would help if we could capture the numbers.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes. This is exhibit - I don't have the
24 cover sheet so I cannot assist.

12:49:23

25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Apparently it's P-55. Exhibit P-55.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, looking at this diagram, according to the
28 witness Sam Larto, Oliver Varney, Anthony Mekunagbe are all
29 executed, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, we don't see Anthony Mekunagbe on that diagram, but
3 maybe if we looked at the other exhibit, the exhibit P-54, just
4 to illustrate the point, Mr Taylor. Looking at this diagram,
12:50:22 5 yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. We see Sam Larto as the battle group commander in the
8 middle?

9 A. Yes.

12:50:31 10 Q. According to this individual, he's executed?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Anthony Mekunagbe is executed?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Oliver Varney is executed, yes?

12:50:42 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Three key figures in the invasion of Sierra Leone are all
17 executed by you. Why?

18 A. Well, he misses the fourth. Sam Tuah is also executed.

19 Q. Right?

12:51:02 20 A. Because in their plan, they put together a group called

21 Black Kadaffa, an anti-NPFL group, later on to kill me and
22 destroy the leadership of the NPFL. They were arrested and

23 that's what I keep telling this Court. It was at that

24 investigation that it comes out that they were involved with

12:51:31 25 Foday Sankoh. That's why they are killed, Black Kadaffa. The

26 entire NPFL group that involved Sierra Leoneans and Liberians

27 that they brought across the border and ended up in the Bong

28 Mines area to destroy us. That's why they were arrested and they

29 were tried. They were tried. One of them was not executed.

1 That was Anthony Mekunagbe. He died in prison during that time.
2 But he was not executed, but he was being held for that reason.

3 Q. But effectively four key figures in this hierarchy, yes?

4 A. Yes.

12:52:11 5 Q. End up either dying or being executed by you?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Yes, let's put that away, please.

8 A. I'm not sure, counsel, when you say "executed by you", I
9 mean, maybe - I don't know. They were - when you say "executed
12:52:53 10 by you" it's almost like I'm pulling the trigger. I'm not sure
11 if that's - I know that's not what you mean.

12 Q. I didn't intend it to mean that way, Mr Taylor, but - all
13 right. Well, you explain. You tidy up my --

14 A. No, no.

12:53:06 15 Q. You tidy up my words.

16 A. No, no, no. I'm sure, but I'm just talking about the
17 records because later on maybe the other side could say, "Well,
18 you killed these people." Well, I mean they were executed on my
19 approval to me would sound - because of the legal implication of
12:53:34 20 "you executed".

21 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: You are saying that they were executed
22 with your approval?

23 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, Mr Taylor, was there any due
12:53:49 25 process?

26 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour, that's what I said. They
27 were tried and execution was the recommendation. I approved the
28 order from the tribunal. I approved the - what do you call it?
29 The result of the tribunal and their recommendation. I approved

1 it, yes.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Mr Taylor, as far as you're aware, did you have a protocol
4 called Musa Cisse based in La Cote d'Ivoire?

12:55:21 5 A. Based on your question, no.

6 Q. Is there an alternative explanation beyond my question?

7 A. Well, at the time Musa Cisse was living in La Cote
8 d'Ivoire. He was not my protocol officer. So the question was:
9 Did I have a protocol officer living there? I would say, no.

12:55:47 10 But we all know in the Court that Musa Cisse subsequently becomes
11 a protocol officer, but at the time, that's why I have to say --

12 Q. At which time?

13 A. At the time of your question you're saying did I have a
14 protocol officer living in La Cote d'Ivoire, and I said no.

12:56:03 15 Q. Okay.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I apologise, Mr President, but I think I may
17 need to go into private session again, sadly, to deal with some
18 matters.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Mr Griffiths, are you able to
12:56:18 20 give any estimation of the time that will take?

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm hopeful that we can conclude this before
22 lunch.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Thank you.

24 Well, those members of the public, it is now necessary to
12:56:32 25 go into a private session to protect the identity of a witness
26 who is subject of a protective measures order of this Court.
27 That means, as I've said before, that the public will be able to
28 continue to see the proceedings but will not hear the
29 proceedings.

1 Court manager, could you please put the Court into private
2 session?

3 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of
4 the transcript, pages 29522 to 29537, was
5 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as
6 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

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1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Court is in open session. Go ahead,

14:33:46 5 Mr Griffiths.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we commence can I just say there is a
7 change in representation on this side, Mr Munyard has left us.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Thank you.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:33:55 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, before we adjourned for lunch I was talking
11 about a meeting with one Ibrahim Bah in Ivory Coast. Do you
12 recall that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now this individual goes on, page 2291:

14:34:18 15 "Q. How did you happen to meet with him" - that's Ibrahim
16 Bah - "in Abidjan?"

17 A. He went and met me in Abidjan. He came from Burkina
18 Faso, where he was residing he told me and he came to see
19 Mr Kallon, an old man who was an adviser to Sankoh."

14:34:39 20 Do you know this Mr Kallon, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, I don't.

22 Q. "... Mr Kallon was staying at Sankoh's residence so Bah
23 came to pay him a visit so he met me there.

24 Q. And what was Ibrahim Bah's position at the time?

14:34:54 25 A. He told me he was an adviser to Mr Sankoh. I told him
26 that I had heard about him before but that was the first
27 time for me to meet him, because he explained to me that he
28 too had heard of me and he was one time fighting with NPFL
29 and he was one of the military advisers to Mr Taylor but he

1 was currently in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso."

2 Was Bah in a military adviser to you, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Never. He fought in Liberia with - for his - with his
4 leader, but never a military adviser and he was not even a senior
14:35:36 5 officer at the time.

6 Q. Now, further mention is made of Mr Bah in another context
7 and I am going now to page 2313 of the transcript of 28 January
8 2008 and it goes in this way, this answer:

9 "A. At sometime later, Sam Bockarie came from Kenema and I
14:36:15 10 met with him at his residence and we went to Johnny Paul
11 Koroma. By then Johnny Paul Koroma already had the
12 product, the required quantity of diamonds and they had the
13 money. And I was with Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma
14 and Johnny Paul Koroma handed over the diamond to Sam
14:36:36 15 Bockarie and Sam Bockarie in turn gave it to Mr Ibrahim Bah
16 and they were supposed to leave for Monrovia. I left them
17 and went to my office.

18 Q. How do you know that Sam Bockarie turned over the
19 diamonds to Ibrahim Bah?

14:36:53 20 A. He did that in my presence, I was there. He did it in
21 the presence of Johnny Paul Koroma in the office. Johnny
22 Paul Koroma did not directly give him the diamond. He gave
23 it to Sam Bockarie and Sam Bockarie said, 'Mr Bah, this is
24 the quantity of diamonds that you requested for.' So he
14:37:14 25 gave it to Mr Bah in front of Johnny Paul Koroma in Johnny
26 Paul Koroma's office at Johnny Paul Koroma's residence.

27 Q. And what about the \$90,000?

28 A. That too was there. I mean he had the money with him
29 and Major Johnny Paul Koroma also handed over the diamond

1 money to them, to two of them.

2 Q. And then to your knowledge, what did Ibrahim Bah do
3 after receiving the diamonds and the money?

4 A. Well, Ibrahim Bah left Freetown along with Mosquito,
14:37:51 5 Sam Bockarie. Later Sam Bockarie, I understand from Issa,
6 went to Kenema and Ibrahim Bah left Freetown for Monrovia.
7 And later, sometime in October he came back. But he came
8 with a flight with arms and ammunition, Magburaka shipment.
9 That's in October. He did not come to Freetown anyway.

14:38:15 10 They brought the flight, the flight landed at Magburaka
11 airport and they had a problem with ECOMOG contingent
12 because there was an intelligence report that they were
13 going to bring this shipment. So Issa told me that evening
14 that they were going to Magburaka to collect the shipment.

14:38:34 15 He and Kallon went and when they went to Magburaka the
16 cargo landed and off-load the materials. Issa Sesay was
17 supposed to be on board with another fellow called Fonti
18 Kanu to go for a second flight but they had a
19 misunderstanding and he did not go. And by the time the
14:38:54 20 cargo flight left ten minutes - just ten minutes after they

21 left the airport, the Nigerian Alpha Jets arrived at that
22 point in time and they assaulted the airfield and they
23 dropped some bombs around the area and they destroyed the
24 tarmac. But they couldn't actually destroy the materials,
14:39:11 25 the arms and ammunition that they brought in. So that
26 flight never came back again. They managed to come to
27 Freetown with all the supplies that were deposited.

28 Q. Now, if I could stop you there for a moment, so were
29 you present at Magburaka when this flight came?

1 A. I was not present in Magburaka."

2 Now, Mr Taylor, that shipment, October 1997, did that have
3 anything to do with you?

4 A. Nothing whatsoever.

14:39:51 5 Q. A shipment of arms into an airfield in Magburaka near
6 Makeni in Sierra Leone, were you involved in any way with that?

7 A. None whatsoever. No.

8 Q. Now, that was in October 1997, Mr Taylor. Prior to that do
9 you recall receiving a letter from Johnny Paul Koroma requesting
14:40:21 10 assistance?

11 A. Yes, Johnny Paul Koroma had written.

12 Q. And thereafter he sent a delegation to come and see you?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Whom you refused to see?

14:40:35 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And then we have this shipment into Magburaka in October
17 1997?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, were you aware of Ibrahim Bah's presence in Monrovia
14:40:53 20 in relation to such a shipment?

21 A. No, no. And even if Ibrahim Bah was in Monrovia, such a
22 shipment could not have originated from Liberia. It could not
23 have originated from Liberia. October 1997, that's about two -
24 close to three months after my election as President. No change
14:41:25 25 in Liberia. Everybody in position. ECOMOG, everybody.

26 Everybody is on the ground. I don't have weapons, I don't have
27 an aircraft. If an aircraft flew in, it came from outside of
28 Liberia. I knew nothing whatsoever about it. Nothing. No.

29 Q. What about the name Fonti Kanu, Mr Taylor. Do you know

1 such an individual?

2 A. No, never known, never met him, no. But how did - this
3 particular situation from what I am talking about, from what you
4 are mentioning here, this is happening in Freetown while Johnny
14:42:16 5 Paul Koroma is still in office.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. So that means that if we look at the time, so we are
8 talking about - if the arms came in in October, I don't know when
9 these arrangements are made, but we are talking about two months
14:42:32 10 after I'm in office that they made these arrangements. But at
11 the beginning of your reading, the 19, we see Bah is in Abidjan
12 with Foday Sankoh and this group in 1996 also. So I can see the
13 connection here, how Bah would get into Sierra Leone for them to
14 raise money for him to go. But he did not come from Liberia. No
14:43:01 15 aircraft was in Liberia. We didn't have the weapons. It just
16 didn't happen.

17 Q. Now, just to complete the saga, Mr Taylor, the witness went
18 on at page 2316:

19 "Q. Do you know what was done with these arms and
14:43:22 20 ammunition that were brought back to Cockerill military
21 headquarters?

22 A. Yeah. The arms and ammunition that were brought to
23 Cockerill, some of them were deposited at the arms dump at
24 Cockerill and the G4 in charge and some of them went to
14:43:39 25 the residence of Johnny Paul Koroma. And most - the rest
26 were given to Issa Sesay for the RUF and they were taken to
27 Kenema. On one occasion
28 {Redacted}

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

1 MS HOLLIS: I think we are getting a detail that was very
2 specific, and again I am very concerned that this is closed
3 session testimony, and this type of detail should not be in
4 public session.

14:44:10 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could you rephrase that question. I
6 think it is getting to personal details of the witness.

7 MS HOLLIS: And your Honour, could I ask that "I personally
8 took", that that language be redacted?

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, firstly, I do think
14:44:44 10 that that sentence starting "I personally took" could be linked
11 up with the witness's identity, so I am going to make an order to
12 redact that, Mr Griffiths. But I understand the difficulties you
13 are in and I just want to know: Do you think you need to go back
14 into private session or --

14:45:11 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I think we may have to go back into private
16 session, Mr President.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, prior to going into
18 private session, I will order that the words beginning at page
19 117, line 21 on my computer, but the words read, "I personally
14:45:49 20 took one of the", et cetera, down to the end of that sentence, I
21 order they be redacted and anyone in the public - any member of
22 the public who has heard those words, I order not to repeat the
23 words outside of the Court.

24 We are going to go back into private session. Once more,
14:46:12 25 this is to protect the identity of a witness who is the subject
26 of a protective measures order of this Court, and the public will
27 be able to see the proceedings, but not hear them.

28 Court manager, could you please put the Court in private
29 session.

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[At this point in the proceedings, a portion of the transcript, pages 29544 to 29593, was extracted and sealed under separate cover, as the proceeding was heard in private session.]

1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Taylor, we are going to
4 adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9.30. I will remind you of the
16:29:50 5 order not to discuss your evidence. We will adjourn. Thank you.

6 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.

7 to be reconvened on Thursday, 24 September 2009
8 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	29440
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	29440