



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 24 AUGUST 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Mr William Romans  
Ms Doreen Kiggundu

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Monday, 24 August 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:26:23 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,  
6 please.

7 MR BANGURA: For the Prosecution this morning, myself  
8 Mohamed A Bangura, Christopher Santora and the case manager Maja  
9 Dimitrova. Your Honours, I should mention that lead counsel  
09:32:52 10 Ms Brenda Hollis is unavoidably absent today. She is not keeping  
11 well. Nonetheless the Prosecution is in a position to go on.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Bangura. We're sorry to  
13 hear Ms Hollis is ill, but we have your assurance that the  
14 Prosecution is ready to continue anyway; is that correct?

09:33:13 15 MR BANGURA: Yes, thank you.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
18 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay  
19 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah and Mr Silas Chekera and  
09:33:28 20 returning today Mr Liam Loughlin. Can we also extend our best  
21 wishes to Ms Hollis and hope that she has a speedy recovery.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. Mr Taylor,  
23 once more I remind you that you are still bound to tell the truth  
24 in accordance with the declaration that you've taken before the  
09:33:51 25 Court.

26 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

27 [On former affirmation]

28 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

29 Q. Mr Taylor, Thursday last when we concluded we were looking

1 at a number of photographs. I would like us to continue with  
2 that process today, but because it's a somewhat tedious process  
3 what we will do is we'll look at them for about an hour or so and  
4 then go back and conclude the events in the year 2000, okay?

09:34:24 5 So can we look, please, at the photograph in file 4 of 4  
6 for week 33 behind divider 167. Mr Taylor, I wonder if you would  
7 mind moving seats, please. It will be more convenient and save  
8 time. Now, Mr Taylor, who can we see in this photograph?

9 A. The gentleman that I'm embracing there is the President  
09:36:02 10 elect of La Cote d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo.

11 Q. Laurent?

12 A. Gbagbo. That's in the record already.

13 Q. And what's the occasion?

14 A. There begins a process of problems around about  
09:36:34 15 October/November 2000. I go down there to meet with him to see  
16 how much we can do to help to resolve the problems that are  
17 beginning to come up in La Cote d'Ivoire.

18 Q. So help us with a date for this?

19 A. I'll put this to around 2000. About --

09:36:57 20 Q. What month?

21 A. I'll put this probably to around October - I'll put  
22 November 2000. I'll put it to around November 2000.

23 Q. So this is November 2000 and where in the Cote d'Ivoire is  
24 it?

09:37:16 25 A. This is at Abidjan and this is at the airport at Abidjan.

26 Q. And is there anybody else of note in this photograph?

27 A. Yes, the gentleman right here is my chief of protocol at  
28 the Executive Mansion, Honourable Musa Cisse.

29 Q. Who is the Mediterranean looking gentleman with the blue

1 shirt and blue striped tie?

2 A. I don't know him. He is with Gbagbo.

3 Q. So that's 2000 November at Abidjan airport?

4 A. Yes.

09:38:07 5 Q. And what was the purpose of your visit?

6 A. This is after - I think shortly after the elections. There  
7 are problems. Gbagbo is elected. We have major problems. The  
8 outgoing man, Robert Guei, that name is mentioned already, is  
9 killed. There is confusion. Some countries are prepared not to

09:38:35 10 accept the results of the elections. So I run over to Nigeria,

11 speak to the leadership there, get in touch with the chairman of  
12 ECOWAS, Alpha Konare, and then he and both Obasanjo agree with me  
13 that I should run down there to see what we can do to begin to  
14 bring the problem under control and I run there - I get there at

09:39:09 15 night really.

16 Q. We'll come and deal with that situation in a bit more  
17 detail with reference to some documents later. But can we go  
18 over the page, please, DP88. Now, where is this, Mr Taylor?

19 A. This is a little later year. This is again in Togo. Let  
09:39:39 20 me - let me be sure about this. I'm looking at the carpet on the  
21 floor. This is - no, this is Abidjan. This is Abidjan.

22 Q. Is this the same trip that you made?

23 A. No, this is a different - this is a different trip.

24 Q. This is a different visit to Abidjan, yes?

09:40:02 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. And in what year?

27 A. This is later. I will put this to around 2002. I'll put  
28 this to around 2002.

29 Q. Okay. In light of that, Mr Taylor, can I pause for a

1 minute. Can I mark then, please, Mr President, DP87 as MFI-178,  
2 please.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photo, DP87, is marked for  
4 identification MFI-178.

09:40:42 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, returning to the photograph on the screen,  
7 yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Different trip to Abidjan in the year 2000, okay?

09:40:51 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. 2002?

12 A. Around 2002.

13 Q. Sorry, 2002. Now, the gentleman to your left nearest the  
14 door, who is that?

09:41:05 15 A. Right here?

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. This is my good friend, the President of Senegal, Abdoulaye  
18 Wade.

19 Q. Right. Who is the gentleman sitting next to his left?

09:41:41 20 A. That's - this is President Obasanjo.

21 Q. And the gentleman to his left?

22 A. This is John Kufuor, the then President of Ghana.

23 Q. And the gentleman in the light grey suit to the right of  
24 the photograph?

09:42:30 25 A. This is Laurent Gbagbo, again, the President of the Cote  
26 d'Ivoire.

27 Q. The person to his left who we only partially see, do you  
28 have any idea who that is?

29 A. No, I can't remember. Maybe on a bigger photo, because

1 this is a Head of State and this is another Head of State because  
2 this - they are all Head of State here in this room talking, so  
3 maybe on a wider photo we'll see their faces.

09:43:24 4 Q. Now, before we move on, two things: Firstly, the gentleman  
5 in the blue shirt in the right-hand corner, who is that?

6 A. I don't know his name, but he is an interpreter.

7 Q. He is an interpreter?

8 A. That is correct.

09:43:40 9 Q. Now, just help us with this, Mr Taylor, which is my second  
10 question: The kind of arrangement we see here with you

11 Presidents sitting around in a room like this, okay, who else  
12 would be in the room with you?

13 A. Except for the interpreter, we would not have anyone else  
14 in there.

09:44:04 15 Q. And so, effectively, there would be private discussions  
16 face-to-face, would it?

17 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely.

18 Q. With just interpreters there. What about security?

09:44:16 19 A. No, no, no. Everybody is outside of the room. There is no  
20 one in the room, no, no, no.

21 Q. So the security on an occasion like this would stay outside  
22 the room?

09:44:30 23 A. Yes, where the Heads of State are sitting like this on a  
24 private tete-a-tete, the securities would be outside and only the  
25 Heads of State inside.

26 Q. Right. The next question is this: What's this occasion?

27 A. The civil crisis in la Cote d'Ivoire is heating up a little  
28 bit and this is an occasion where we are discussing the war  
29 between the Ivorian government and the rebel group in la Cote

1 d'Ivoire that is being controlled by a gentleman called Guillaume  
2 Soro. In fact, he is presently prime minister of La Cote  
3 d'Ivoire, so it wouldn't be hard to locate the spelling of that  
4 name.

09:45:14 5 Q. Okay. And the discussions were on what topic?

6 A. The war in La Cote d'Ivoire, how to bring about a cessation  
7 of hostilities between the government and the rebel group in La  
8 Cote d'Ivoire.

9 Q. Now, the spelling is G-U-I-L-L-A-U-M-E, S-O-R-O.

09:45:53 10 Now, can we just glance at the next photograph for a  
11 minute. Which occasion is this, Mr Taylor?

12 A. This is an arrival in La Cote d'Ivoire. I will put this to  
13 a little later too. This could be around 2002 also.

14 Q. Is it the same meeting as the previous one?

09:46:19 15 A. Yes, I would say that. We arrived at different sequence.  
16 This is my arrival here, yes.

17 Q. Right. So it's the same occasion as the previous  
18 photograph, yes?

19 A. Yes.

09:46:30 20 Q. So this is in 2002, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So we can put then Abidjan --

23 A. Airport.

24 Q. -- 2002 airport, yes?

09:46:45 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. And this is you arriving?

27 A. That is correct.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm just a little confused here. I  
29 thought Mr Taylor said this was arrival at La Cote d'Ivoire, not

1 Abidjan airport.

2 THE WITNESS: Okay, if I can - well, Cote d'Ivoire is the  
3 country, your Honour. Abidjan is the capital. This is Abidjan  
4 airport in Cote d'Ivoire.

09:47:18 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is Abidjan in Cote d'Ivoire?

6 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honour. Abidjan is the  
7 capital of La Cote d'Ivoire, your Honour.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you. I straightened  
9 out. I had something written incorrectly down here,

09:47:53 10 Mr Griffiths. I understand now.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the gentleman to the right appears to be  
13 wearing the same suit as Laurent Gbagbo in the previous  
14 photograph.

09:48:06 15 A. That is correct. That's him right there.

16 Q. And if you look carefully, you seem to be wearing the same  
17 suit and tie as well in the previous photograph.

18 A. Yes, that's what I'm saying. This is just an arrival and  
19 the other photograph is being seated.

09:48:19 20 Q. Right.

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. So the gentleman to the right is President Laurent Gbagbo?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And the other gentleman ushering the little girl I think,  
09:48:34 25 who is that?

26 A. This is an Ivorian protocol officer.

27 Q. Right. Yes. Now, that's DP89. Can we just flick over the  
28 page. DP90. Is this the same occasion?

29 A. That is correct, it is the same occasion.



1 Q. Okay. Right. So let's flick over then and have a look at  
2 this one. So this is DP90. Now - no, you need to go back one.  
3 No, you've got it in your hand. 90. Okay. Mr Taylor, just take  
4 it from left to right for us, please, and indicate who is who.

09:50:16 5 A. Again, this is the President of Ghana, John Kufuor. This  
6 is an Ivorian official standing in the back of us. I'm here.  
7 This is Laurent Gbagbo. We are standing - again, this is still  
8 at the - we are at the airport. We're just standing outside.  
9 Maybe somebody is leaving and we're seeing them off, but these  
09:50:47 10 are just the three Heads of State here.

11 Q. And what about the gentleman to the right of John Kufuor?

12 A. I don't - he is probably a minister or something. I don't  
13 know him.

14 Q. And what about the head we see just to the right of your  
09:51:08 15 head?

16 A. This is my aide-de-camp. This is Momo Dgiba, my  
17 aide-de-camp.

18 Q. Can you recall how long you stayed in La Cote d'Ivoire on  
19 that occasion, Mr Taylor?

09:51:44 20 A. No, it was a very short - it was a very short trip. It was  
21 a very short trip. Maybe just a few hours.

22 Q. Okay. Over the page, please.

23 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Is it possible to give us a month in  
24 2002?

09:52:05 25 THE WITNESS: It's a little difficult, your Honour. This  
26 is about the last - I will put it to about the last quarter of  
27 2002. That's as close as I can get, because there were a series  
28 of meetings. We were coming from Togo. We stopped into here. I  
29 will put it to about the last quarter of 2002.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Okay. So that's 90, Mr Taylor. 91, is this the same  
3 occasion?

09:52:45

4 A. Same occasion with the same people just standing up, just a  
5 different angle.

6 Q. Okay. So we won't dwell overly long on that one. That's  
7 DP91. Yes, over the page, please. Same occasion?

8 A. Yes. Yes, either John Kufuor or I were leaving. We're  
9 leaving at this time.

09:53:27

10 Q. Now, we see some additional faces, in particular a  
11 gentleman wearing spectacles and a black and white tie. Who is  
12 that?

13 A. I don't know him. He is probably one senior official. I  
14 don't know him.

09:53:41

15 Q. Let's not dwell overly long on this, then. Over the page  
16 to 93. Is this the same occasion?

17 A. This is - no, a little different occasion. This is in  
18 Togo.

19 Q. Okay. Let's pause then.

09:54:13

20 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I ask that DP89, 90, 91  
21 and 92 be marked for identification respectively MFI-178A, B -  
22 hold on one second. Now, we started at DP88, didn't we?

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: We've already marked DP - no, I'm sorry,  
24 you're quite right, Mr Griffiths. Yes, it starts at DP88.

09:54:58

25 MR GRIFFITHS: I think we do, because 87 was the 2000 trip  
26 and DP88 is the start of the 2002 trip. So DP88 is MFI-179A;  
27 DP89, MFI-179B; DP90, MFI-179C; DP91, 179D; finally DP92,  
28 MFI-179E.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those photographs are marked

1 respectively MFI-179A to E.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, can we look finally at DP93, please, Mr Taylor. This  
4 is in Togo, yes?

09:56:04 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. First of all, can you help us with a date?

7 A. I will put this to about the beginning of 2003. I will put  
8 this to about 2003.

9 Q. And what's the occasion?

09:56:32 10 A. Again this is the Ivorian crisis. We have a meeting  
11 between the Government of La Cote d'Ivoire and the rebel leader  
12 Guillaume Soro. I think this is actually in Kara, Togo, the  
13 hometown of the late President Eyadema.

14 Q. What's the name of the place?

09:56:55 15 A. I think it's Kara. I will just spell it as K-A-R-A. I  
16 think it's Kara.

17 Q. In Togo?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And it's the hometown of whom?

09:57:04 20 A. The late President of Togo, Gnassingbe Eyadema.

21 Q. Right. And it's a meeting between who?

22 A. The President of La Cote d'Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo and the  
23 rebel leader Guillaume Soro.

24 Q. Now, having got that in place, who do we see in the  
09:57:26 25 photograph?

26 A. The gentleman here is Guillaume Soro. This is Guillaume  
27 Soro right here.

28 Q. So he is the rebel leader?

29 A. That is correct. The then rebel leader. He is Prime

1 Minister now.

2 Q. Have we had a spelling for that name?

3 A. Yes, we just did.

4 Q. Oh, yes. And the gentleman in the yellow?

09:57:51 5 A. Quite frankly, I don't recall these two gentlemen. These  
6 are senior AU and ECOWAS officials. I don't recall their names.  
7 The officials change so frequently I do not recall their names,  
8 but these are ECOWAS and AU officials.

9 Q. Did you attend this meeting?

09:58:11 10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. Why?

12 A. Well, from the time the problem in La Cote d'Ivoire started  
13 all the way back in 2000, or thereabouts, I was involved in a lot  
14 of the mediation because La Cote d'Ivoire is right on my border  
09:58:31 15 and I did not want another Sierra Leonean situation creeping up  
16 on the other side. So I was greatly involved. I knew Robert  
17 Guei very well and even when Gbagbo came in first we got very  
18 well acquainted, so in trying to help to keep my side of the  
19 border, because the border between Liberia and La Cote d'Ivoire  
09:58:58 20 is as long as or longer than the border between Liberia and  
21 Sierra Leone, and because again of the historic ties, the Dans,  
22 the Krahn's, the Grebos, these are names I'm sure we'll get into a  
23 little later, we wanted to make sure that we were involved from  
24 the very beginning to keep off - to stave off any more  
09:59:25 25 Sierra Leone type accusations, so we were invited to get involved  
26 at the very onset.

27 Q. Now, that DP93. Just have a look at the next photograph,  
28 please, so we can locate the occasion. Is this the same  
29 occasion?

1 A. This is again the occasion back in 2002. I can see I'm  
2 leaving probably. I'm going out now. But this is back later to  
3 the - late 2000. Look at the suit. I'm still in the same suit.

10:00:06

4 Q. Now if we just pause for a moment though, Mr Taylor, the  
5 gentleman to your left in that photograph, yes?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. Go back to DP93. Is it the same gentleman to the right in  
8 that photograph?

9 A. That's the same gentleman, yeah. That's the same.

10:00:25

10 Q. Bearing that fact in mind let's go back to DP94. Which  
11 occasion is this?

12 A. This is the same occasion I'm saying that in late 2002 I'm  
13 - it looks like I'm either leaving or - to go or coming in,  
14 because I'm on the red carpet here.

10:00:48

15 Q. To where?

16 A. This is still la Cote d'Ivoire. This is now Abidjan. It  
17 is different from the Togolese one.

18 Q. So DP93 is a different occasion altogether?

19 A. That is correct. That's Togo. This is back in Abidjan.

10:01:05

20 MR GRIFFITHS: So therefore can we mark DP93 as MFI-180,  
21 please.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the photograph DP93 is marked  
23 MFI-180 for identification.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:01:26

25 Q. So 94, now, Mr Taylor, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. We're back in Cote d'Ivoire in late 2002, are we?

28 A. I'm saying that the Togolese pictures starts in 2002. This  
29 is the last quarter of 2002 but we're in Abidjan, yes.

1 Q. Okay. Mr Anyah helpfully reminds me. If this is the same  
2 occasion as 2002, Mr Taylor, yes?

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. That's what you're telling us?

10:02:31 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm going to ask that this one be marked  
7 with the preceding MFI number. So this would become MFI-179F.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the photograph DP94 is now marked  
9 MFI-179F.

10:03:41 10 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

11 Q. Now, it would have been helpful had these photographs been  
12 arranged according to groups, but anyway we'll struggle on. Over  
13 the page, please, 95, Mr Taylor?

14 A. 95 is back again. This is now 2003. This is the same  
10:04:07 15 photo we just saw, just a different angle.

16 Q. This is the same occasion as DP93?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. That we looked at, yes?

19 A. Yes. This is Guillaume Soro right here and the other two  
10:04:22 20 African diplomats.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Mr President, I apologise for this.  
22 It's totally my fault.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: What makes it even more confusing is that  
24 one of the participants in the photos, although they are  
10:04:49 25 different occasions, he appears to have exactly the same suit and  
26 tie on, even though they are months apart, so it's very  
27 confusing.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I totally agree. And it doesn't help that  
29 we didn't organise these photographs in a different order, but

1 that's our fault. So DP95, Mr Taylor, is the same occasion as  
2 DP93. For that reason, Mr President, can I ask that we rename  
3 DP93 MFI-180A and that DP95 now becomes MFI-180B.

10:05:42

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, photograph DP93 is marked for  
5 identification MFI-180A and photograph DP95 is marked for  
6 identification MFI-180B.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

10:06:04

8 Q. Let's go over and have a look at the next photograph,  
9 please, Mr Taylor. Now I think everybody recognises who is in  
10 the photograph, but just confirm it for us. Who is the gentleman  
11 sitting on the settee with you?

12 A. This is the Secretary-General Kofi Annan. That's me.

13 Q. And where are you?

10:06:22

14 A. This is at my house at White Flower. This is my living  
15 room.

16 Q. So this is White Flower, Monrovia?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Can you help us with a date?

10:07:05

19 A. I would put this to around - I'll tell you I don't want to  
20 mislead the Court here. This could be around - I'll put this to  
21 1999. I'll put this to around late 1999.

22 Q. Why do you say that?

10:07:54

23 A. Following the meeting - we had a meeting in Nigeria where  
24 we first met and then he comes to Liberia in late 1999. I will  
25 stand corrected, but I would think it's late 1999 when the  
26 Secretary-General came to Liberia.

27 Q. Over the page. Is this the same occasion?

28 A. Yes, this is the same occasion.

29 Q. And where are you in this photograph?

1 A. This is in front of the Executive Mansion. Just at the  
2 front entrance of the Executive Mansion.

3 Q. And just so that we're clear, Mr Taylor, the Executive  
4 Mansion is quite separate and distinct from White Flower?

10:08:41 5 A. That is correct. The Executive Mansion is the official  
6 residence of the President. White Flower are the different areas  
7 where the President resides at different times.

8 Q. And whilst we're on this topic, I would like your  
9 assistance with something else, please.

10:09:14 10 Can I just pause to mention this, Mr President: We have  
11 now available maps of Monrovia, so it might be helpful if we  
12 distribute them now and just have a look at one or two locations.  
13 I think the Prosecution had one before. It's not that I'm being  
14 mean, but we may need one for marking purposes. That's the only  
10:10:23 15 reason why.

16 Now, Mr Taylor, can we just pause for a minute and just get  
17 one or two bearings around Monrovia, yes?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. So I'm going to be asked to be put on the screen, please -  
10:11:26 20 now that we have this map, I wonder if we could reduce it so that  
21 everything is visible. Okay. Now, let's start in the bottom  
22 right-hand corner. You see there's an arrow saying  
23 "international airport"?

24 A. Yes.

10:11:47 25 Q. Which international airport is that?

26 A. Well, the arrow is pointing toward - going away, so I'm  
27 sure they will be referring to Roberts International Airport.

28 Q. Right. Now, just pause there. How far is Roberts  
29 International Airport from the point where this arrow appears on



1 the map?

2 A. I would say 25, not more than 35 miles from that point.

3 Q. Now, we see that that arrow is on a road called Tubman  
4 Avenue?

10:12:32 5 A. Yes. That is not to be confused - this is the same as in  
6 some - in some evidence led here, it's referred to as boulevard.  
7 It's the same thing. It's the same thing.

8 Q. Whilst we're on that topic, Mr Taylor, if we continue on  
9 that road to the left, you see it's named Tubman Boulevard, the  
10:12:56 10 same road.

11 A. It's the same. It's the same. Just certain sections, we  
12 call it avenue. I do not know why they confused it this way, but  
13 it's generally called Tubman Boulevard more than Tubman Avenue.

14 Q. Okay. And as we can see, it's that same - it appears to be  
10:13:16 15 the same road that goes to the airport and it continues on past  
16 Capitol Hill and it appears to become Broad Street. Is that  
17 right?

18 A. Yes. Yes.

19 Q. Okay. Now, let's just get one or two landmarks now. Where  
10:13:42 20 we see Payne airport terminal, we're still in the bottom  
21 right-hand corner, what are we talking about there?

22 A. Here we are talking about Spriggs Payne airport. We've  
23 talked about that before here.

24 Q. So that's actually Spriggs Payne airport that's being  
10:13:59 25 referred to?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. So that airport, is it in Monrovia?

28 A. Right in Monrovia. It is appearing a little distant, but  
29 it's right in Monrovia. It's expanded here, but from this

1 airport to the centre of town, I will put it to no more than 2  
2 miles.

3 Q. Right. Now, we see in that same location the Cameroon  
4 embassy and the Sierra Leone embassy.

10:14:36 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. Now, help us, the Nigerian embassy, where is that? What  
7 road is it on?

8 A. Well, the Nigerian embassy is on Tubman Boulevard also.  
9 Let me just see if I can use my good senses here to see. The

10:15:13 10 Nigerian embassy will be somewhere along here, within this  
11 section right here. It's not very far from the airport.

12 Q. All right.

13 A. Let me see. No, wait a minute. I stand corrected on that  
14 one, because from the Nigerian embassy, you have to drive back

10:15:40 15 toward Monrovia to come to the airport. So that would put the  
16 Nigerian embassy somewhere up here, not too far from the  
17 Sierra Leonean embassy. Around here.

18 Q. So the Nigerian embassy is in that general area?

19 A. That is correct.

10:15:54 20 Q. Yes?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Now, where is White Flower?

23 A. White Flower is - again, it's in Congo Town. White Flower  
24 will be somewhere up around here. I will put it to further up

10:16:19 25 around here.

26 Q. And is White Flower on Tubman Avenue or boulevard?

27 A. Yes, they branch off. It's on the same main boulevard,  
28 yes.

29 Q. How far is White Flower from the Nigerian embassy?

1 A. About a half to three quarters of a mile.

2 Q. And whilst we're at it, where was this RUF guesthouse we've  
3 heard so much about?

10:17:03

4 A. The RUF guesthouse - you know, the way how they did this  
5 map is a little - the Nigerian embassy is somewhere around here.  
6 The RUF guesthouse is right next to the Nigerian embassy. Not -  
7 I wouldn't put it to more than 2000 metres. So it's right next  
8 to the Nigerian embassy fence.

9 Q. And how far --

10:17:22

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: 2,000 metres doesn't put it right next to  
11 the embassy.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. 2,000 metres is 2,000 metres.

10:17:36

14 A. Okay. But your metres - okay, let me bring it back in to  
15 what we did in school. I will put it to, what, about the - about  
16 two lengths of a football field. That will be about what? 200  
17 feet. Not metres. Let me take out the metres.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are talking 200 rather than 2,000?

19 THE WITNESS: Yeah, about 200. I said 2,000 metres?

10:18:02

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: You said 2,000 metres.

21 THE WITNESS: No, about 200 metres. Not very far. You can  
22 stand at the embassy and yell down and the guys will hear it at  
23 the guesthouse.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:18:21

25 Q. So, bearing that in mind, Mr Taylor, how far was the RUF  
26 guesthouse from the Sierra Leone embassy we see on the map?

27 A. From the RUF guesthouse, driving back toward Monrovia, I  
28 would put it to about - I would say about close to half a mile.

29 Not very - not very long. The map is stretched out in a way, but

1 these distances are very short. They are very short. It's not  
2 very, very far.

3 Q. So just so that we're clear about this, so the guesthouse  
4 is about three quarters of a mile from the Sierra Leone embassy,  
10:19:07 5 you say?

6 A. That is correct. They are all located in this section of  
7 the map here, because the guesthouse is so. You have to drive  
8 toward Monrovia to get to the embassy. The Nigerian embassy is  
9 right here. The guesthouse is here. There is the Sierra Leonean  
10:19:23 10 embassy just about here. They are all on a line, really. On the  
11 same Tubman Boulevard going on a line.

12 Q. Right. So that's where the guesthouse was?

13 A. Uh-huh.

14 Q. Right? And so how far would the guesthouse be from White  
10:19:42 15 Flower, say?

16 A. We're further up. The guesthouse would be about - going  
17 towards the international airport, so I would say about a mile  
18 going to Congo Town.

19 Q. So it's a mile from White Flower, three quarters of a mile  
10:19:58 20 from the Sierra Leonean embassy, 200 metres or so from the  
21 Nigerian embassy?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And are all these locations on Tubman Boulevard?

24 A. All of them are on Tubman Boulevard. Right on the  
10:20:15 25 boulevard.

26 Q. Okay. Now, whilst we're on the topic of the guesthouse,  
27 you mentioned setting up Sam Bockarie in a compound. Can we see  
28 the location of that compound on this map?

29 A. No, that would be way up here. No, that's --

- 1 Q. Way up where?
- 2 A. That would be off the map.
- 3 Q. Off the map to - in which direction?
- 4 A. In this direction.
- 10:20:40 5 Q. So off the map to the right?
- 6 A. That is correct.
- 7 Q. Okay. So if we were to put an arrow next to the arrow
- 8 pointing to the international airport, yes?
- 9 A. Uh-huh.
- 10:20:55 10 Q. Sam Bockarie's compound would be in that direction; do I
- 11 understand you correctly?
- 12 A. Yes, it will be - yes, that will be in this direction.
- 13 Q. Right. And so help me then with this: How far would that
- 14 compound be from the RUF guesthouse?
- 10:21:12 15 A. Oh, that would be about - I would say a mile and a half,
- 16 because from the RUF guesthouse to my house is about a mile.
- 17 Sam Bockarie is about a half a mile or so from my - from White
- 18 Flower going towards this direction. So I would put it to about
- 19 a mile and a half.
- 10:21:34 20 Q. A mile and a half in that direction?
- 21 A. Uh-huh.
- 22 Q. And help me, what area was his compound in? What's that
- 23 area called, if it has a name?
- 24 A. Paynesville. That would be Paynesville.
- 10:21:47 25 Q. How do you spell Paynesville?
- 26 A. P-A-Y-N-E-S, Paynes; ville, V-I-L-L-E.
- 27 Q. And is that compound on that road going to the
- 28 international airport?
- 29 A. No, not - not exactly on the road, no. You will have to

1 get off the boulevard and drive in to Paynesville area. I would  
2 say from on the main boulevard, it may have been - oh, I would  
3 say a couple hundred yards or more from the boulevard in. You  
4 had to drive off the boulevard in to get to the compound.

10:22:47 5 Q. Right. Okay. Now, whilst we're at this, if we continue  
6 along Tubman Avenue, it becomes Tubman Boulevard as we see, and  
7 then it passes City Hall, the University of Liberia, up to  
8 Capitol Hill, and then we see the Executive Mansion marked, yes?

9 A. That is correct.

10:23:33 10 Q. And then if we continue on, we see Camp Johnson Road, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Now, the Camp Johnson Road incident, Mr Taylor, in  
13 September of 1998, is that the location we're talking about?

14 A. That is correct, yes.

10:23:51 15 Q. And maps can be - well, we can use the key. Camp Johnson  
16 Road is what - according to the key - is about half a kilometre  
17 from the Executive Mansion?

18 A. Well, I don't think we can put it that way. To better  
19 understand it, Camp Johnson Road, if you see here, it runs up  
10:24:22 20 here into Capitol Hill where you find the Executive Mansion and  
21 the capital right here. So the road extends all the way up here,  
22 and the Executive Mansion, if you look at it, it's actually on  
23 Camp Johnson Road that comes up the hill. So it's the same road  
24 that ends at this intersection. The road ends into the boulevard  
10:24:48 25 here, okay?

26 Q. Okay.

27 A. So this is Camp Johnson Road. Now, if you want to describe  
28 the - what you would say half a kilometre from Roosevelt  
29 Johnson's residency, I would agree, but not the road itself.

1 Q. I was just merely measuring from the end of the word "road"  
2 in Camp Johnson Road to Executive Mansion using the key at the  
3 bottom.

4 A. I see here. But - well, I think I have explained this.

10:25:19 5 The Executive Mansion is on this end of Camp Johnson Road as it  
6 comes up the hill.

7 Q. Right. Okay.

8 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, you spoke of the Camp  
9 Johnson Road incident. Is that on Camp Johnson Road or at the  
10:25:36 10 American embassy?

11 THE WITNESS: It started at Camp Johnson Road. The  
12 incident started there and ended at the embassy, your Honour.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Now, we see where those embassies are located. If we look  
10:25:55 15 beyond the word "Barclay Training Centre" in bold?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. To the left we see UNDP offices, United States embassy,  
18 United Kingdom embassy and French embassy, yes?

19 A. Yes, that's up here, yes.

10:26:13 20 Q. And, as you indicated, the Camp Johnson Road incident began  
21 in Camp Johnson Road and ended at the United States embassy?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Right. Now, the Barclay Training Centre you mentioned last  
24 week when we were looking at photographs, Mr Taylor. That's  
10:26:35 25 where the burning of the arms took place?

26 A. That is correct, right here, yes.

27 Q. On Independence Day?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Now, whilst we're looking at the map, there's another

1 matter I want to ask you about and it's this - well, two matters.  
2 First of all, during the Liberian civil war, Mr Taylor, when the  
3 NPFL had advanced into Monrovia, how far did they get?

4 A. Right here. The University of Liberia on this side.

10:27:16 5 Q. So, help me. Just using that marker, just outline the  
6 parts of Monrovia which you didn't manage to capture - which you  
7 didn't occupy at that point?

8 A. Do you actually want me to mark on this map or just point?

9 Q. No, just trace around it so we know the area?

10:27:41 10 A. We were encamped here on the campus of the University of  
11 Liberia looking just a couple hundred yards at the mansion right  
12 here. We were asked by the then Assistant Secretary of State for  
13 African Affairs, Herman Cohen, not to enter the city. So as of  
14 this point going this way we did not enter the city on this side.

10:28:05 15 But the map doesn't show here because of the question you asked,  
16 but on the other side of town we had also encircled Monrovia all  
17 the way up at an area called Tubman Bridge. You don't see that  
18 here. So the entire city that you - actually this is the centre  
19 of Monrovia right here. Broad Street is downtown, so to speak,  
10:28:37 20 Monrovia.

21 Now, we had come all the way outside of here where you see  
22 Riverview section here there's a place called Tubman Bridge. We  
23 had encircle here, encircled all the way around all the way into  
24 the campus of the university. So the only part of Liberia in  
10:28:55 25 general that we had not taken was the centre of Monrovia. That  
26 is from the Executive Mansion, these embassy compounds. The  
27 section of the map that you see here is the only section that we  
28 had not taken.

29 Q. Well, what I am going then, Mr Taylor, is that you do use



1 that marker and outline on the map the area not occupied by the  
2 NPFL?

3 A. I will draw a line here and I will draw a line here.

10:29:45

4 Q. I want you to mark around the outline of the area that  
5 wasn't captured.

6 A. Yes. This was the only part of the republic that we had  
7 not captured.

8 Q. Now, help us. Who then occupied that part of Monrovia at  
9 that time?

10:30:12

10 A. Still the Armed Forces of Liberia with Samuel Doe for some  
11 time until he was killed later on, but that was just the foreign  
12 embassies and the Armed Forces of Liberia with President Doe  
13 occupied them, but the rest of the country we had captured.

10:30:43

14 Q. What I would like you to do now, please, Mr Taylor, is just  
15 to - first of all, do you have a pen there?

16 A. He can get one, I'm sure.

17 Q. Whilst we're engaged on this exercise we might as well  
18 complete the process, then get you to sign and date this map,  
19 okay. Just could you put in an arrow in the bottom right-hand  
20 corner indicating the direction you would have to travel to get  
21 to Sam Bockarie's compound. Do you follow me?

10:31:09

22 A. Yes, from which direction you want the arrow to point to?

23 Q. Towards Sam Bockarie's compound?

10:31:36

24 A. Well, let's do it from two points then because we'll have  
25 to establish from where we are taking off from. So let's say  
26 let's take off from this point. We'll call this Tubman  
27 Boulevard. And Sam Bockarie's - now, Sam Bockarie you will have  
28 to come into this place here. I would put this X here as - where  
29 the X is, yes.

1 Q. And also, whilst we're at it, can you just indicate where  
2 you say the RUF compound was, if it's on the map?

3 A. You say the RUF compound.

4 Q. Sorry, the RUF guesthouse.

10:32:52 5 A. Okay, the RUF guesthouse. Now, the RUF guesthouse would be  
6 - I would put it to about here. I'll just call this A. Can I  
7 just --

8 Q. Put a key to the right. A then equals - in the white  
9 column to the right, Mr Taylor, just put an A there and put "RUF  
10:33:36 10 compound". Then we'll put a B for the Nigerian embassy, and  
11 hopefully a C for White Flower. Do you follow me?

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. Now, a B for the Nigerian embassy, please. And finally, a  
14 C for White Flower, please?

10:34:22 15 A. This map is a terrible map, quite frankly, but anyway.

16 Q. I want us to be clear about this, Mr Taylor. You made an  
17 earlier marking, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Have you scribbled it out?

10:35:19 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. So now we have an idea where those locations are.  
22 Right. Could you put today's date, please, on that map, 24  
23 August 2009, and then could you sign it, please.

24 Mr Taylor, before we leave this map, it's been helpfully  
10:36:08 25 indicated to me that you've put on the key "RUF compound". You  
26 corrected me earlier and said "guesthouse". Which is it? Maybe  
27 I misled you.

28 A. It's actually guesthouse.

29 Q. Okay. Have you signed this?

1 A. Yes, I have.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, Mr President, I think we're up to  
3 MFI-181.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is correct.

10:36:43 5 MR GRIFFITHS: So could I ask that that map of Monrovia  
6 marked by the accused be marked for identification MFI-181.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: That map is marked for identification  
8 MFI-181.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:37:08 10 Q. Can we return then, please, to DP97. So you've already  
11 explained this is a visit by Kofi Annan in late 1999 and --

12 A. On reflection, I think I would have to correct the records  
13 here. This is in 1999, but this is in July of 1999, on  
14 reflection. This is in July of 1999 that --

10:37:51 15 Q. Why do you say July?

16 A. Because right after we signed the Lome agreement I rushed  
17 to Monrovia to receive Annan. So this is around that time.

18 Q. Because we may recall from the documentation we looked at  
19 that you returned to Monrovia the day after the Lome agreement  
10:38:19 20 was signed to meet with Kofi Annan?

21 A. In fact I meet him on 8 July, after reflection. I meet him  
22 on - we signed the agreement on the 7th and I receive him on the  
23 8th. Yes, about 8 July.

24 Q. So are you saying this photograph is 8 July 1999?

10:38:41 25 A. Yes, I can - you know, sometime I'm always - I'm always  
26 mindful because these things have happened so long. I'm sure  
27 this is right after the Lome meeting. It has to be on the 8th.  
28 Okay, yes, I'm just about 100 per cent certain that this is 8  
29 July.

1 Q. Right. Can we just flick behind 178, please, only for the  
2 purposes of inquiring whether this is a different occasion?

3 A. Yes, this is.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Just take it off the screen for the  
10:39:35 5 minute, please, so that I can deal with the logistics.

6 I ask then, please, that DP96 and 97 be marked for  
7 identification MFI-182A and B, please.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those photos are marked respectively  
9 MFI-182A and 182B.

10:40:08 10 Just while we're on those photos, Mr Taylor, I think I know  
11 the answer to this, but just for the record. Photograph DP97  
12 that you just looked at, you said, took place on 8 July 1999.

13 THE WITNESS: Yes.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Now, does that apply to the previous  
10:40:26 15 photograph as well, DP96? Was that on the same day or a  
16 different day?

17 THE WITNESS: Oh, that - that's about the same day, but  
18 maybe at a different time of the day, because normally - in the  
19 other photograph, I'm sure I had changed. We meet at the  
10:40:47 20 Executive Mansion and then we go to my residence for lunch, and  
21 so it's the same day, your Honour.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Mr Taylor, let's look, then, please, at the next  
10:41:06 25 photograph, DP98. What are we looking at here?

26 A. This is me visiting The Gambia with my brother Yahya AJJ  
27 Jammeh.

28 Q. I'm sure the answer to this is obvious, but who is the  
29 gentleman sitting to your - standing to your left?

1 A. That's the President of The Gambia, Yahya AJJ Jammeh.

2 Q. What's happening at this point? Again, it may be obvious,  
3 but help us.

10:42:11

4 A. This is just a brief visit. I'm visiting him in The  
5 Gambia. This is a brief stopover. It's a courtesy stopover.

6 Q. Which year?

7 A. This is a little earlier. I will put this to about '98.

8 Q. Can you help us with a month?

9 A. This is - this has got to be late September or October.

10:42:38

10 I'm en route from my visit to France and I stopped into

11 Mauritania and The Gambia.

12 Q. So this is September '98?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. September/October '98?

10:42:51

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And help us, looking at the military men behind who appear  
17 to be saluting, what's actually happening at this point?

18 A. This is the reception at the airport receiving the honour  
19 guard, and I can see here, at this point, based on what's going

10:43:11

20 on, the anthems are being played, the national anthems of the two  
21 countries.

22 Q. And apart from yourself and the Gambian President, are  
23 there any other identities you can help us with in the  
24 photograph?

10:43:27

25 A. No, I can't. These are all - most of the faces are all  
26 Gambians.

27 Q. Now, if we can just go through the same exercise. Let's  
28 just flick behind 179. We're just seeking to identify in order  
29 to group the photographs together. 99, is this the same or a

1 different occasion?

2 A. This is about the same occasion.

3 Q. This is the same occasion?

4 A. Yes.

10:43:57 5 Q. And, in fact, if one looks, he appears to be wearing the  
6 same robes.

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. So this is October - September/October 1998, yes?

9 A. Yes, more - yeah.

10:44:12 10 Q. And what's actually happening in this photograph?

11 A. This appears to be the exchange of maybe a brief communique  
12 issued at the end of the visit. We're just exchanging papers  
13 here.

14 Q. Okay. So that's DP99. Same occasion as '98?

10:44:36 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. Same exercise. Just flick behind 180, please. Is this the  
17 same occasion?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Yes. So DP100 is the same visit to The Gambia in  
10:44:59 20 September/October 1998, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, can you help us with any additional identities on this  
23 photograph?

24 A. Yes. The gentleman right here --

10:45:15 25 Q. Yes?

26 A. -- is a senior Liberian Secret Service personnel, Ocebio  
27 Dehme. That's O-C-E-B-I-O, and Dehme - it's been spelt  
28 differently here - is D-E-H-M-E. He is the chief of protective  
29 security. He is the main guy responsible for the security of the

1 President. The CP is chief of protective security.

2 Q. Is that separate from the SSS?

3 A. That's the SSS. You know, when people are explaining some  
4 of these things here - and maybe since the question comes, the  
10:46:04 5 Court ought to know. You've heard a witness came here who was an  
6 assistant director. Those titles have got nothing to do with who  
7 is directly responsible for the security of the President at the  
8 time. Even the SSS director, who at that time was Benjamin  
9 Yeaten, is not - his primary responsibility, yes, he is in charge  
10:46:27 10 of the Secret Service, but the security personnel who is directly  
11 responsible on a day-to-day for the immediate protection of the  
12 President is called the chief of protective security, the CPS,  
13 and this is the guy.

14 So every one that is around - every Secret Service  
10:46:48 15 personnel around the President who guards him 24 hours a day,  
16 it's the responsibility of the CPS. So you may be an assistant  
17 director, but it does not give you that right to be around the  
18 President at a particular time. So there are directors that will  
19 not approach the President on certain occasions. So I think it's  
10:47:09 20 very good to know. So this is the guy responsible.

21 Q. On that note, was Varmuyan Sheriff a member of the CPS?

22 A. No, no, no. He was assistant director responsible for  
23 motorcade, which are the cars - which have got nothing to do with  
24 protective security.

10:47:35 25 Q. Just explain what protective security is.

26 A. There are Secret Service personnel that move with the  
27 President. They have what they call shells. You have the outer  
28 shell, like S-H-E-L-L, shell. You have the middle shell and then  
29 you have the inner shell. That is, at any given time around the

1 President, maybe - in the inner shell could be as many as 20 or  
2 24 personnel. These individuals are probably - if it's in a big  
3 hall, they are in that hall. They are right within a few feet of  
4 the President. That's his responsibility. And who is there at  
10:48:37 5 that time, that's his responsibility. It's not even --

6 Q. Whose responsibility?

7 A. The guy I'm pointing to here, Ocebio Dehme. I've called  
8 the name before, Ocebio Dehme.

9 Q. He is responsible for what?

10:48:47 10 A. The inner protection of the President. The inner shell  
11 that protects the President, it's his responsibility.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. It is not the responsibility of the director of SSS, of the  
14 Secret Service, who is responsible for that. He may be in a  
10:49:01 15 different place, but this guy is - if anything happens out there  
16 to the President while the President is moving - I don't care  
17 whether it's me or any other President, because most of these  
18 systems are used by all Heads of State - the first person that  
19 will be questioned will be the CPS, the chief of protective  
10:49:23 20 security. It is his responsibility. So this is one of the most  
21 important positions in the Secret Service, the chief of  
22 protective security. He decides assignment, who will be next to  
23 the President, when, where in the building, that whole posting is  
24 done by the CPS.

10:49:40 25 Q. And then you spoke of a middle shell. Who is responsible  
26 for that?

27 A. The middle shell will then be the responsibility of, let's  
28 say, the assistant director for Special Security Services. He  
29 may be in charge of the outer shell and that middle shell. And



1 what do I mean by middle? You may be in this building, outside  
2 of these doors or maybe downstairs at the entrances and all,  
3 these are the middle people that are there. And in most cases,  
4 their assignment will only be that. They may wear a different  
10:50:25 5 colour of maybe tie or they may wear a pin that will identify  
6 them. Their responsibility is to secure the inner building.

7 Then you have the outer shell that will be outside of the  
8 building, maybe as far as maybe a quarter of a mile from the  
9 building where the President is, there will be Secret Service  
10:50:46 10 personnel. They will mix up with the police and different  
11 things. That's a different operational phase.

12 But that inner shell - and it's important who comes around  
13 the President - everyone in that inner shell is armed. He is  
14 armed. And so you want to be sure who comes around the President  
10:51:04 15 with an arm, and that is a very principal responsibility.

16 Q. Okay. Thanks for that. Right. So returning to the  
17 photograph, we're still in The Gambia?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Let's just flick over to 101 to see if we're still in the  
10:51:22 20 same place or not. Are we still in the same place?

21 A. Yes, we are. This is - again, I can tell, this is arrival.  
22 I'm inspecting the honour guard.

23 Q. Right. So let's move on to the next one then. 102, same  
24 occasion?

10:51:49 25 A. Yes, same occasion.

26 Q. Right. And can you help us with any additional identities?

27 A. Yes. And even on the other photo, this face - the photo  
28 just removed, this is one of my other aide-de-camps. He is  
29 General Edwin Charles.

1 Q. Okay. Let's go back to 101 then so that we can just get  
2 this clear. Who are you talking about?

3 A. The general right here. This is my aide-de-camp, General  
4 Edwin Charles. The face is clearer here.

10:52:39 5 Q. Anybody else you can help us with in that photograph,  
6 whilst it's on the screen?

7 A. No. No one else. And maybe it's important, counsel, for  
8 the - because this is about the third name that has come up for  
9 the judges as aide-de-camps, and so this is the third name. So  
10:53:00 10 there's not just one aide-de-camp.

11 Q. How many are there?

12 A. There are - we have a total of about seven aide-de-camps,  
13 and depending on where I'm going, one may function. So we've  
14 known General Dgi ba. We've known Musa N'jie. Now, this is Edwin  
10:53:24 15 Charles. It doesn't mean that the other aide-de-camps do not  
16 exist, but they are not on this assignment.

17 Q. Okay. Whilst we are on that topic, just to clarify matters  
18 for future reference, are you in a position to give us the names  
19 of all your aide-de-camps?

10:53:43 20 A. Let me - I can - I may miss some as they come, but I can  
21 give --

22 Q. Well, just give us an idea. Just remind us of as many as  
23 you can.

24 A. Okay. You had the senior aide-de-camp, Momo Dgi ba. That's  
10:53:57 25 on the records. You also had Musa N'jie. Now you have General  
26 Edwin Charles. You had General Lady Betty Musa. B-E-T-T-Y, and  
27 the last name is - sometimes some people spell it M-U-S-A or  
28 M-O-U-S-S-A. Betty Musa. You had General Esther Dahn. That's  
29 D-A-H-N. And you also had another one called General Marie

1 Passawe. That's P-A-S-S-A-W-E. And you had another one, General  
2 Mary Yealu, Y-E-A-L-U. These are the ones I can remember. We  
3 had about four women that were brigadiers that were  
4 ai de-de-camps.

10:55:07 5 Q. Okay. Good. Right. So we've dealt with 101. We've dealt  
6 with 102. Let's just quickly look at 103 to help us with the  
7 occasion. Same occasion or not?

8 A. No, no, no. This --

9 Q. Well, just limit it to that for now, for this reason.

10:55:24 10 A. This occasion is a different year. You want to know the  
11 year?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: We'll come to the details in a moment  
13 because what I'm going to do now is ask, please, that DP98 to 102  
14 be marked for identification respectively MFI-183A through E.

10:55:49 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those photographs are marked  
16 accordingly.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

18 Q. Now let's go to the photograph, Mr Taylor. Now, what  
19 occasion is this?

10:56:05 20 A. This is in 2000. This is 2000.

21 Q. Where?

22 A. This is at the Roberts International Airport in 2000.

23 Q. When in 2000?

24 A. This is August 2000.

10:56:25 25 Q. Who's in the photograph?

26 A. I tell you, if my recollection is correct - and I hope this  
27 is - this gentleman here, to the best of my recollection, is  
28 Gibriil Massaquoi, the RUF spokesman, if I'm not wrong. He looks  
29 like - this is Gibriil Massaquoi.

1 Q. And what is the occasion?

2 A. This is the occasion of Issa Sesay being named as leader of  
3 the RUF at Roberts International Airport. He is apparently doing  
4 an interview with the television station.

10:57:36 5 Q. All right. So this is the appointment of Issa Sesay as  
6 interim leader of the RUF?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Let's just quickly look at DP104. Mr Taylor, is that a  
9 different occasion, or what?

10:58:27 10 A. Yeah, totally different occasion.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask then, please, that DP103,  
12 photograph of Gibril Massaquoi at Roberts International Airport  
13 in August 2000, be marked for identification MFI-184, please.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, marked MFI-184.

10:59:12 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, DP104, what are we looking at?

17 A. This is in my office at the Executive Mansion, the office  
18 of the President.

19 Q. Yes?

10:59:28 20 A. This has been a long time. The lady here is the special  
21 representative. I cannot recall this lady. The special  
22 representative of UNICEF. UNICEF appoints from time to time  
23 special ambassadors. Sometimes for UNICEF, sometimes for UNHCR.  
24 There's a Japanese star that is now the reigning UNICEF

11:00:00 25 representative that visits me. This is the UNICEF representative  
26 in Liberia and she visits me on her tour of West Africa.

27 Q. Can you help us with a date?

28 A. I would put this to about 2001.

29 Q. And a month?

1 A. No, I can't help. There are hundreds of these things going  
2 on, counsel. I'm sorry, I really can't help the Court further.

3 Q. Okay. Let's just quickly flick and look at 105. Looks  
4 like the same occasion?

11:00:44 5 A. That is correct, yes. That is correct.

6 Q. 186, same occasion?

7 A. You mean 106?

8 Q. 106.

9 A. Okay. Yes, same occasion.

11:01:04 10 Q. Okay. Quickly look at 107. Different occasion?

11 A. Different. Totally different.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I ask, please, that DP104,  
13 105 and 106 be marked for identification MFI-185A through C?

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those photographs are marked  
11:01:36 15 accordingly.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

17 Q. Let's now look, then, at 107. First of all, where are we  
18 in this photograph?

19 A. We are in Nigeria. Abuja, Nigeria.

11:02:13 20 Q. And where in Abuja?

21 A. At the airport. This is the airport.

22 Q. So this is Abuja airport in Nigeria, yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And, help us, date?

11:02:39 25 A. This is one of those meetings in 1998 in Nigeria. I can't  
26 get any more specific because I made several trips in 1998 to  
27 Abuja.

28 Q. And, help us, who else is in the photograph?

29 A. I don't know - this is a Nigerian minister but this is my

1 protocol officer here. I can see Musa Cisse here and this is my  
2 aide-de-camp on this trip again is General Charles.

3 Q. Edwin Charles?

4 A. That is correct.

11:03:30 5 Q. But the gentleman to your right, you can't assist us?

6 A. Him? No.

7 Q. Okay. Quick look at 108. Same occasion?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. 109, same occasion?

11:03:55 10 A. Yes, this is the arrival.

11 Q. And since you are arriving maybe you can help us with a few  
12 identities. Who is the gentleman behind you with the shaven  
13 head?

14 A. Right here is the assistant director for operations of the  
11:04:25 15 SSS, Yanks Smythe.

16 Q. Pause. What nationality is he?

17 A. Well, he is of Gambian origin, but he is a Liberian  
18 citizen.

19 Q. How does he come to be a Liberian citizen?

11:04:56 20 A. Yanks is one of the individuals that come to Liberia with  
21 Dr Manneh, who we call Kukoi Samba Sanyang, and he is naturalised  
22 as a Liberian citizen and he is still there. He was even made  
23 ambassador. That's him.

24 Q. Ambassador to where?

11:05:17 25 A. To Libya subsequently.

26 Q. So he was subsequently Libyan ambassador?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, who else can you help us with?

29 A. This is General Charles. The gentleman right here is the

1 speaker of the House of Representatives. We came across that  
2 name here before, Yundueh Monorkomna. That's spelled in the  
3 records. If I try it now I will spoil it, but it's in the  
4 records. Yundueh Monorkomna, that name has come up.

11:06:02 5 Q. Anybody else?

6 A. No, I can't make out these - this lady here. These are all  
7 Liberian personnel coming out, but you can see the security  
8 people come right behind me before even the speaker, so I can't  
9 make out anybody here.

11:06:23 10 Q. Whilst we're on the photograph, Mr Taylor, who provides the  
11 aircraft?

12 A. We can't see the full aircraft, but, judging from here, it  
13 looks like a Nigerian aircraft. I'm just stretching it and maybe  
14 I could be called to question, but this stripe - the green eagle  
11:06:47 15 - normally those of us that did not have the means to be moving  
16 up and down, we didn't have the money, we would - let's say on a  
17 trip like this I would ask my colleague and he would send an  
18 aircraft to pick me up.

19 Q. Right. 110, same occasion?

11:07:10 20 A. Yes, that is correct. This is receiving the honour guard.

21 Q. And who is standing to your left?

22 A. This is a minister. This is a minister of the Nigerian  
23 government. Don't know. He just comes to receive me.

24 Q. Okay. Let's not delay. Over the page. Is this the same  
11:07:32 25 occasion?

26 A. No, this looks like another occasion.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Can I ask, please, that DP107 through  
28 to DP110 be marked for identification respectively MFI-186A  
29 through to D.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those photographs are so marked.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

3 Q. Right. DP111, Mr Taylor?

11:08:28

4 A. This is Obasanjo - President Obasanjo here visiting with  
5 me.

6 Q. Where?

7 A. In Monrovia at Roberts International Airport.

8 Q. How do you know it's Roberts International Airport?

11:08:43

9 A. That's the only international airport in Liberia and so all  
10 Presidents arrive there. That's me. You can't see my face here.

11 Q. Okay. Date, please?

12 A. Oh, the --

13 Q. If you don't recall, Mr Taylor, just say so?

11:09:23

14 A. I don't and I don't want to mislead the Court. That's the  
15 wrong thing to do. There were so many trips between '99, 2000  
16 and 2001, I can't put my finger on the exact one because this  
17 could be anywhere. I mean, Obasanjo may have visited Liberia  
18 four or five times a year. I really can't help and I don't want  
19 to mislead the Court here, but this is one of those - you can see  
20 it's a goodwill visit. When you see smiles it's always a  
21 goodwill visit.

11:09:51

22 Q. You might not be able to assist us with the date, but can  
23 you assist us with any of the other identities to be seen in that  
24 photograph?

11:10:04

25 A. Here is the - is my chief of protocol, Musa Cisse. This is  
26 the Nigerian chief of protocol here. This is a Liberian Secret  
27 Service personnel. I don't know his name, but I know the face  
28 because of those that circled around me, but I don't know his  
29 name.



1 Q. Mr Taylor, whilst we're on this topic, just help us,  
2 because we've heard this term "chief of protocol" on a number of  
3 occasions. What does a chief of protocol do?

4 A. Well, putting it bluntly, the chief of protocol is the  
11:10:46 5 hands and feet of the President. No one sees the President  
6 unless he goes through the protocol officer. He is responsible  
7 for ushering guests into the presence of President, taking that  
8 person away, practically determining who sees the President, and  
9 even the timing, who comes in, how much time is spent in there.  
11:11:14 10 He is practically - in fact, there are some funny things that  
11 happen when Presidents are receiving people that the chief of  
12 protocol also handles and the President may not know someone at  
13 all that may be coming on the line of reception, the protocol  
14 officer must practically know who the President is about to meet,  
11:11:41 15 and just in case he cannot remember, would have to remind him,  
16 "This is Honourable this or Excellency this and that." So the  
17 scheduling, the ushering in and out of the presence of the  
18 President, where the President sits, everything is controlled by  
19 protocol. Everything.

11:12:00 20 Q. Now, help us. Can somebody come and see you without going  
21 through the chief of protocol?

22 A. Very, very rarely would that happen. But it is possible.  
23 But there's a very, very slim possibility that the protocol  
24 officer will not know who is coming. Very slim. But it's  
11:12:27 25 possible.

26 Q. And remind me, what's the title again of someone like Edwin  
27 Charles?

28 A. Well, Edwin Charles is an aide-de-camp.

29 Q. And what does an aide-de-camp do?

1 A. The aide-de-camp is responsible for the military escorts of  
2 the President, inspection of honour guards. There are times that  
3 he may - let's say the door, the aide-de-camp is responsible for  
4 the door leading into where the President is.

11:13:17 5 Q. What do you mean the door?

6 A. A door. Who opens that door. The opening and closing of  
7 the door is controlled by the aide-de-camp, the military man. He  
8 is the military man. So, for example, once the protocol officer  
9 comes with somebody, it is the aide-de-camp that opens that door  
10 that will permit that person to enter.

11:13:35

11 Q. Now, the reason I'm asking you about what might appear to  
12 be totally unrelated detail is this, Mr Taylor: For somebody to  
13 come to see you, for example, to take orders to carry arms to  
14 Sierra Leone, yes, what's the procedure they would have to go  
15 through, bearing in mind these individuals you've just described?

11:13:58

16 A. In the first place, they would not come to me to ask for  
17 such a thing because that would be the responsibility of the  
18 Defence people. I mean, the President does not control arms,  
19 okay? So very rarely would anybody come to the President to talk  
20 about arms. If anybody would come to the President to talk about  
21 arms, it would be the defence minister, okay? So if that person  
22 does not come to me, it means that I do not know that there are  
23 movement of arms or anything.

11:14:23

24 Q. Fine. Now that you've clarified that, in order for someone  
25 to come to see you, how many people would get to know?

11:14:42

26 A. The chief of protocol would know. The aide-de-camp would  
27 know or whoever is on duty. And in most cases, the director -  
28 the chief of protective security would know, the CPS, and in most  
29 cases the director would be informed.

1 Q. Okay. So can I take it, then, that any of those  
2 individuals would be in a position to confirm or deny who came to  
3 see you?

4 A. Oh, definitely. Oh, definitely. Definitely. And just to  
11:15:31 5 clarify for the future, it depends now on not just - I don't  
6 think we should get stuck on names. It's better to get stuck on  
7 positions because, for example, it depend on which aide-de-camp  
8 is on duty. That aide-de-camp would know. It depends on which  
9 protocol officer is on duty. Musa Cisse, for example, is the  
11:15:55 10 chief of protocol, but he is not the only protocol officer.

11 There are other protocol officers. And depending on who - but  
12 the protocol - so instead of names, the position. Protocol,  
13 aide-de-camp, CPS, director would - one of these categories would  
14 - or all would know.

11:16:16 15 Q. Okay. Right. Flick behind over to the next photograph,  
16 112. Same occasion?

17 A. Let me see. There's Obasanjo here. Yes, it's the same  
18 occasion at Roberts International Airport.

19 Q. Now, in photograph 112, where are you?

11:16:40 20 A. Roberts International Airport.

21 Q. Now, the fact that you're at - how do you know that this is  
22 Robert International Airport?

23 A. This is my Presidential Lounge here, yes.

24 Q. This is the Presidential Lounge?

11:16:58 25 A. Yes. And Obasanjo is visiting me, and that is easy to  
26 tell.

27 Q. And 113? Looks like the same occasion.

28 A. That is correct, yes.

29 Q. Is 114 the same occasion?

1 A. 114 looks like a different occasion, because this is not  
2 Obasanjo now.

3 Q. I know it's not Obasanjo. Who is it in this photograph?

4 A. This is the President of Mali, Alpha Konare.

11:17:48 5 Q. Now, 111 to 11 - no. 112 to 114, they are all in the  
6 Presidential lounge at Roberts International Airfield, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, putting all of that together, does it help you as to  
9 who occasion this might be?

11:18:13 10 A. I would put this occasion to not later than about August  
11 2000.

12 Q. Why August 2000?

13 A. Because this appears to be the arrival of Alpha and  
14 Obasanjo for this Issa Sesay situation.

11:18:40 15 Q. Okay.

16 A. The two of them come in at the airport.

17 Q. All right. So, let's go back, then, starting at 111, okay,  
18 to 114. Are you telling us that all these photographs relate to  
19 the Issa Sesay appointment as interim leader?

11:19:07 20 A. Yes. I do not know what --

21 Q. Maybe you would like to remind yourself of each of the  
22 photographs, Mr Taylor.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Have a look at 111 through to 114. Take your time. We  
11:19:20 25 don't want to rush this. Just go through them. Now that you've  
26 had a chance to remind yourself, Mr Taylor, what is this  
27 occasion?

28 A. This is the 2000 arrival - August 2000 of Obasanjo and  
29 Konare, and we may have to add the other picture of Massaquoi,

1 because if you look at the chairs, even - it's the same chairs of  
2 Gibriil Massaquoi. This is August 2000.

3 Q. Let's go back. Let's take our time. That's MFI-184,  
4 DP103. Let's just flick back. DP103 is behind divider 183.  
5 Yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And what you are saying, that's the same settee?

8 A. That's the same time. Yes, it's a bigger room. And after  
9 we leave, if you look at the chairs, if that's the same, the  
11:21:01 10 chair is the same. This is in the Presidential lounge. Yes,  
11 it's the same occasion of August - yes, the same occasion of  
12 August 2000. This is inside the lounge.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, do you change settees on every  
14 different occasion?

11:21:15 15 THE WITNESS: No, no, no. The Presidential - this is in  
16 the guest lounge at the airport.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: What I'm saying is, what is the  
18 significance of you're saying "this is the same occasion because  
19 it's the same settee"?

11:21:35 20 THE WITNESS: No, I don't think we should get stuck on  
21 that, your Honour. I'm just describing the settee as a side  
22 issue. It is the same occasion. I think that's the point I'm  
23 making. It's the same occasion because this is Gibriil and that's  
24 August 2000.

11:21:57 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Now, let's quickly look at DP115 to see if we're talking  
27 about the same occasion. Is this the same occasion, Mr Taylor?

28 A. This looks like Alpha leaving, yes.

29 Q. Is it the same occasion?

1 A. Yes, it is the same occasion.

2 Q. That's DP105. And just to confirm, that's Alpha Konare,  
3 the President of Mali, yes?

4 A. That is correct.

11:22:41 5 Q. And Edwin Charles, your --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Gentleman to his left?

8 A. This is Charles Kollie, the commander of this - of the  
9 Secret Service contingent on this day.

11:23:02 10 Q. Kollie?

11 A. Charles Kollie. That's spelt K-O-L-L-I-E.

12 Q. And he is Secret Service?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Anybody else you can help us with? What about the female?

11:23:21 15 A. She is Liberian. She is Liberian. She is the deputy  
16 minister for interior. Her name is Nina, N-I-N-A; McGill,  
17 M-C-G-I-L-L. Nina McGill. She is the deputy minister of  
18 interior.

19 Q. Okay. That's 115. 116, same occasion?

11:24:15 20 A. Yes. Yes. Yes.

21 Q. And same identities in the background?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. That's 116. 117, same occasion?

24 A. Yes, we're just - this is in the Presidential lounge.  
11:24:43 25 We're sharing a joke, yes.

26 Q. All right. Let's flick over to 118 just to determine if  
27 we're talking about the same occasion or not.

28 A. No.

29 Q. Different occasion?

1 A. Different occasion.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, in light of the witness's  
3 evidence that this is the same occasion as the Gibriil Massaquoi  
4 situation - photograph, MFI-184, can I ask, please, that the  
11:25:11 5 Massaquoi photograph DP103 becomes MFI-184A and then these  
6 photographs we've just looked at, DP111 through to 116, become  
7 MFI-184B through to G.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the photo of Gibriil Massaquoi,  
9 DP103, will be remarked for identification as MFI-184A and the  
11:26:45 10 photos DP111 through to DP116 - through to 117, isn't it?

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Through to - yes, it's 117.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: You've asked that they be marked through  
13 to G. Shouldn't it be through to H?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Through to H. Because when I initially said  
11:27:32 15 that, I had forgotten that we had got as far as 117.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: The photographs DP111 to 117 will be  
17 marked MFI-184B through to MFI-184H respectively.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

19 Q. Now, DP118, Mr Taylor. What are we looking at here?

11:28:09 20 A. These are me along with two other Presidents.

21 Q. Easily recognisable, but nonetheless help us. Who are  
22 they?

23 A. This is former Ghani an President Jerry John Rawlings and  
24 this is Thabo here. Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of  
11:28:41 25 South Africa.

26 Q. What's the occasion?

27 A. I will put this to - I will put this to the - probably the  
28 ECOWAS Silver Jubilee. I would have to check that. I think that  
29 comes somewhere maybe in 2000 or thereabouts. Because once I see

1 another Head of State from a different region there were several  
2 people that came. This looks like that time.

3 Q. So you are suggesting that this is the year 2000?

11:29:25

4 A. Counsel, 2000 - I could put this to the Silver Jubilee so I  
5 think it's around 2000.

6 Q. So ECOWAS Silver Jubilee, yes?

7 A. Or thereabouts, yes. With Thabo here, I'm sure.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're getting close to the end of the  
9 tape.

11:29:48

10 MR GRIFFITHS: I was just about to say we ought to pause.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is a convenient time?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: As good as any.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. We'll take the morning  
14 adjournment and resume at 12 o'clock.

11:30:00

15 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

16 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue, Mr Griffiths.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:00:43

19 Q. Mr Taylor, let's look at a couple more photographs, but  
20 thereafter, I don't know about you, but I'd like a break from the  
21 photographs, so we'll look at something else and come back to  
22 them later, okay?

23 A. Okay.

12:01:20

24 Q. Photograph - we'd reached DP118. Yes. ECOWAS Silver  
25 Jubilee, yes, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Over the page to DP119. Same occasion?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Over the page, DP120. Same or different occasion?



1 A. This is a different occasion.

2 Q. Pause then.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, Mr President, that DP118  
4 and 119 be marked for identification MFI-187A and B.

12:02:06 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Those photographs are marked MFI-187A and  
6 B respectively.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

8 Q. Now, DP120, Mr Taylor, what is that?

9 A. I would put this back to - this is related to the burning  
12:02:33 10 of the arms.

11 Q. How do you know?

12 A. This is the Barclay Training Centre. This is the Barclay  
13 Training Centre in Monrovia, BTC. This is the grandstand, and  
14 this is the occasion.

12:02:52 15 Q. Okay. Now, let's just pause. There's you, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Alpha Konare in the white suit?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Obasanjo to your right?

12:03:05 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Who is the gentleman to Obasanjo's right?

22 A. This is Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

23 Q. So it's Kabbah, Obasanjo, yourself and Konare?

24 A. That is correct.

12:03:28 25 Q. And you say the occasion is the burning of the arms, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Barclay Training Centre?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Year?

1 A. This would be '99.

2 Q. Okay. That's DP1 - before we move on, can you assist us  
3 with any other identities?

4 A. No. Not really, no.

12:04:00 5 Q. Okay. Can we go over to DP121, please. Where's that,  
6 Mr Taylor?

7 A. That's the same occasion, the burning of the arms. We are  
8 now standing, and we probably can see more individuals here now,  
9 but this is the same BTC.

12:04:26 10 Q. Right. Tell us which individuals we can see. Let's start  
11 with the gentleman just to the right of the flag in the black  
12 dickey bow?

13 A. That's the Liberian defence minister, Daniel Chea. That's  
14 spelt C-H-E-A. Daniel Chea.

12:04:56 15 Q. And he is the defence minister?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Who is next to him?

18 A. This is still President Kabbah.

19 Q. Obasanjo?

12:05:15 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Yourself?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Konare?

24 A. That is correct.

12:05:24 25 Q. Who is the gentleman to the left of Konare?

26 A. Oh, boy. I don't - I don't remember, but he is - I don't  
27 remember these names. I don't remember these two names, but  
28 these are representing their governments. I don't remember their  
29 two names.

1 Q. Okay. Can you remember which governments they were  
2 representing?

3 A. No, I can't. I will get them mixed up. I know one of  
4 them - this could be - I don't want to mislead the Court. One is  
12:06:11 5 --

6 Q. If you don't know, Mr Taylor, I'd rather you say you don't  
7 know.

8 A. Yes. I don't. I don't.

9 Q. Okay, fine. Anything else of note from that photograph?

12:06:22 10 A. No, nothing really. Most of these - we've identified  
11 aide-de-camp Dgi ba, Momo Dgi ba here. That's about all of any  
12 significance. That's all.

13 Q. Fine. Thanks. Over the page, DP122. Same or different  
14 occasion?

12:06:41 15 A. It's the same occasion. I'm addressing the rally. It's  
16 the same occasion.

17 Q. And is that Momo Dgi ba behind you?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Over the page. Different occasion, yes?

12:07:08 20 A. This is a different occasion, yes.

21 Q. All right. I'll tell you what we'll do, let's leave DP123  
22 for now, okay.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: And can I ask, please, that DP120, 121 and  
24 122, depicting scenes in 1999 when arms were burnt in Liberia, be  
12:07:36 25 marked for identification MFI-188A, B and C, please.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those photographs are marked  
27 accordingly.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's put the photographs away for the

1 minute. Let's take a break from photographs and have a look at  
2 something else.

3 Now, in terms of the chronology of events, we had reached,  
4 had we not, on Thursday, the back end of the year 2000. Is that  
12:08:22 5 right? Do you recall?

6 A. Yes, about there, yeah.

7 Q. In fact, the last document we looked at was a response to a  
8 letter from you which comes from the Secretary-General of the  
9 United Nations, Kofi Annan, dated 19 October 2000. Do you recall  
12:08:47 10 that?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. Now, whilst we were looking at the photographs, you  
13 mentioned that some of the photographs depicted you attending  
14 meetings in La Cote d'Ivoire regarding difficulties in the Ivory  
12:09:17 15 Coast, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And you gave us an initial outline of what those  
18 difficulties were, yes?

19 A. Yes.

12:09:29 20 Q. Now, why were these developments in the Cote d'Ivoire of  
21 interest to you, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Well, La Cote d'Ivoire is a neighbour. We have at least  
23 four of the principal tribes in Liberia are directly connected to  
24 La Cote d'Ivoire, and to name them, you have the Gios that we  
12:09:56 25 call the Dan. In La Cote d'Ivoire, right across the border, they  
26 call them Yakubas. They speak the same language. You also have  
27 the Krahn that are in the southeastern part of Liberia. They are  
28 also connected to La Cote d'Ivoire, and it is believed even the  
29 present President of La Cote d'Ivoire is from a tribe that is

1 somewhat connected to the Krahns. Then you have further east,  
2 you have the Grebos. They also have their connection in La Cote  
3 d'Ivoire. So there's a long border and tribes.

4 With the upcoming problem in La Cote d'Ivoire, we thought  
12:10:45 5 to take the initiative immediately because Robert Guei, that had  
6 come to power in La Cote d'Ivoire by overthrowing former  
7 President Konan Bedie - and these are all in the records, we've  
8 spoken about them - is Gio, which is the same Dan in Liberia, and  
9 in fact, some of his family members are senior military people in  
12:11:19 10 Liberia. Because of the tribal connection, they are related. So  
11 I now see a problem developing in La Cote d'Ivoire that will  
12 again get Liberia or Liberians involved with - we've called them  
13 ex-combatants. We've called them non-state actors. And right  
14 away we seized the initiative by trying to get involved to stem  
12:11:42 15 this natural flow that could happen because of the family  
16 background in La Cote d'Ivoire.

17 Q. Now, in the late autumn of the year 2000 was there any  
18 particular event planned to take place in the Cote d'Ivoire?

19 A. Yes.

12:12:04 20 Q. What's that?

21 A. They had scheduled elections, and this was the military  
22 government under Robert Guei. They had planned elections, and he  
23 was competing against Laurent Gbagbo and there was - you know,  
24 all the countries in the region, people were taking sides.

12:12:28 25 Earlier I think it's been mentioned that President Wade had - was  
26 appointed principal mediator in the beginning of this and a  
27 decision, unfortunately - and I use the word "unfortunately"  
28 because it was unfortunate it happened, taken that the OAU would  
29 not - AU would not send observers to the elections, and I felt

1 that it was a major mistake. I was opposed to the AU not sending  
2 election observers and I felt that if they wanted for the  
3 elections to be taken seriously and credible, that it was proper  
4 for the AU to send observers to the elections, and so I did a  
12:13:23 5 press release dealing with that during that particular period.

6 Q. Yes. Could we look at binder 2 of 4, week 33, behind  
7 divider 99, please. Do you recognise this document, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. What is it?

12:14:44 10 A. This is the official press statement released by the  
11 Government of Liberia in dealing with this particular situation  
12 with the OAU at that time.

13 Q. Now, we see that it's dated 20 October 2000 and it's issued  
14 by the Republic of Liberia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

12:15:18 15 "The Government of Liberia calls upon the secretariat of  
16 the Organisation of African Unity to send election observers to  
17 monitor the Ivorian elections scheduled to be held on 22 October  
18 2000. The failure of the OAU secretariat to send election  
19 observers to monitor the presidential elections in Cote d'Ivoire  
12:15:43 20 would be counterproductive to the restoration of constitutional  
21 rule in that country. The OAU, being an association of sovereign  
22 states, must respect the wishes of the people of its member  
23 states and refrain from interference in the internal affairs of  
24 member states, especially in determining legal eligibility of  
12:16:07 25 presidential candidates.

26 The Government of Liberia rejects the alleged decision made  
27 by African foreign ministers at a meeting on the fringe of last  
28 week's Chinese-African summit in Beijing not to send OAU election  
29 observers to monitor elections in Cote d'Ivoire. The meeting

1 could not be considered as a statutory OAU meeting as there was  
2 no notice or agenda sent out to member states, and therefore  
3 decisions taken at that meeting lacked any legal basis.

12:16:48 4 Cote d'Ivoire, a member of the OAU, deserves any and all  
5 assistance in its efforts to return to constitutional and  
6 democratic rule. The OAU is obliged to lend its support to this  
7 process and cannot afford to isolate itself from such an  
8 important process. The failure of the OAU to be present at the  
9 Ivorian elections will undermine our influence and relevance as a  
10 regional organisation with the people of Cote d'Ivoire."

12:17:09 11 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Why couldn't ECOWAS send  
12 observers?

13 A. ECOWAS did send observers, but the mother organisation then  
14 was the OAU, and so the absence of the OAU would have meant that  
12:17:33 15 that process would have been called into question. So we felt  
16 that it was necessary to do so, and in fact the decision that had  
17 been taken, like I say here, was not legal because of the  
18 political and diplomatic concerns at the time with this - with  
19 the Afrique - the Chinese-African summit. There was some member  
12:17:59 20 states that did not have a diplomatic relationship with China at  
21 the time - the People's Republic of China - and so a lot of  
22 states were not present. And for a few foreign ministers to meet  
23 and take a major decision that will come into the lap of the OAU  
24 anyway - because whenever we got stuck, all of the regional  
12:18:20 25 organisations, whether we're talking about SADC, or we're talking  
26 about ECOWAS, or we talk about the northern part of Africa, these  
27 problems end up in the lap of the OAU. So why not seize the  
28 opportunity then? We just felt that it was improper.

29 Q. Now, the elections were due to take place on 22 October?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Did they go ahead on that date?

3 A. The elections took place. The election took place.

4 Q. And what happened in the aftermath of that election?

12:18:56 5 A. Major difficulties.

6 Q. Such as?

7 A. Well, Gbagbo claimed to have won. Guei Robert claimed he  
8 won, but after some intervention Gbagbo was left to assume the  
9 presidency and not too long after that there was a major

12:19:22 10 shoot-out in the capital, and Guei Robert got killed. And so  
11 that is what really provoked the whole war in Cote d'Ivoire  
12 following the death of Robert Guei.

13 Q. Okay. Now this deteriorating situation in Cote d'Ivoire,  
14 was it of concern to you?

12:19:46 15 A. Definitely. Definitely.

16 Q. Now pause there. Mr Taylor, I'm asking you about this for  
17 this reason: Whilst this is going on on one border, what's  
18 happening on the border with - in Sierra Leone at this time?

19 A. We're talking about October 2000. October 2000 we are  
12:20:10 20 trying to - the main argument on the table, to the best of my  
21 recollection, is trying to get a ceasefire agreement signed  
22 between Issa Sesay and the Kabbah government around this time,  
23 October.

24 Q. Okay. So on the one side there is that going on, and on  
12:20:36 25 the other side in Cote d'Ivoire there's this deteriorating  
26 situation you've told us about?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now, in response to this deteriorating situation, did the  
29 Liberian government take any steps?



1 A. Yes, we come up with a second very tough release to  
2 reassure - or, may I say, assure - Gbagbo that we would do  
3 everything that we can. I'm very conscious of the Sierra Leonean  
4 situation, that we should begin to work together immediately to  
12:21:10 5 doing everything that we can that we do not have a Sierra Leonean  
6 situation creeping up on the Ivorian side where Liberians begin  
7 to pour in, join the conflict, and then it comes back to "Taylor  
8 sent them". So we do a release and we begin to work with them  
9 immediately.

12:21:27 10 Q. Have a look behind divider 100, please.

11 Before we move on can I ask, please, that that last press  
12 statement issued by the Liberian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
13 dated 20 October 2000 on forthcoming elections in Cote d'Ivoire  
14 be marked for identification MFI-189, please.

12:21:53 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-189.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, so we come to this press release. You see  
18 again it's issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, yes?

19 A. Yes.

12:22:12 20 Q. And it's dated 26 October 2000:

21 "The Government of Liberia is deeply concerned with recent  
22 political developments in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire and calls  
23 upon all Ivorians to exercise restraint in the current crisis and  
24 to avoid the path of violence as a means of resolving their  
12:22:35 25 differences. Liberian-Ivorian relations is not based upon  
26 individuals, but upon the mutual interest of the Liberian and  
27 Ivorian people, who are forever bonded by fraternal links.  
28 Liberia, in the context of ECOWAS and the international  
29 community, will actively support the objectives of stability and

1 a process whereby the will of the Ivorian people will prevail.

2 The Government of Liberia wishes to assure the Ivorian  
3 authorities that no Liberian military personnel is present in  
4 Cote d'Ivoire and that Liberia has no intention of sending any

12:23:18 5 troops to Cote d'Ivoire."

6 Let us pause there. Why were you having to assure the  
7 Ivorian authorities of that, Mr Taylor? Had there been  
8 suggestions that Liberian troops were indeed in the Cote  
9 d'Ivoire?

12:23:38 10 A. There were suggestions that Liberian troops would probably  
11 go to la Cote d'Ivoire.

12 Q. Who was making that suggestion?

13 A. The rumour mills in the press. Robert Guei - General  
14 Robert Guei, that is defeated by President Gbagbo, is Gio. The  
12:24:02 15 very - the problem that we are having in Liberia, if you look at  
16 even the Special Forces that were trained in Libya - we've talked  
17 about that here before, about almost 70 to 80 per cent of them  
18 were Gios. In the Armed Forces of Liberia and the security  
19 forces in Liberia, most of them - I would almost say as of that  
12:24:28 20 one tribe at that time we had about maybe 40 to 50 per cent could  
21 have been Gio.

22 Now, Robert Guei, who is the former President now, the  
23 gentleman who overthrew Konan Bedie, has relatives in Liberia  
24 that are part of the Liberian security force. Gbagbo knows this.  
12:24:53 25 And because the Gio, that Dan-Mahn tribe formed, I would say, the  
26 second largest tribal section in Liberia, rumours begin to flow  
27 that because of the situation with Robert Guei, that the Gios in  
28 Liberia will converge on Cote d'Ivoire in support of Robert Guei  
29 militarily. So this is now posing a major challenge for me in

1 trying to assure the Liberian authorities that no such thing  
2 would happen. This is the scenario.

3 Q. "... and that Liberia has no intention of sending any  
4 troops to Cote d'Ivoire. The Government of Liberia is unaware of  
12:25:38 5 any Liberians engaged in mercenary activities in Cote d'Ivoire  
6 and calls on the Ivorian authorities to arrest and prosecute any  
7 Liberian found engaged in mercenarism in Cote d'Ivoire. Liberia  
8 will not interfere in the internal affairs of the sister Republic  
9 of Cote d'Ivoire.

12:25:59 10 The Government of Liberia expresses its gratitude to the  
11 Ivorian people for the kind, brotherly assistance rendered to  
12 Liberians during the Liberian civil war and for continuing to  
13 host Liberian refugees in the true tradition of African  
14 brotherhood. The Government of Liberia cherishes its  
12:26:19 15 longstanding relationship with the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire and  
16 will work to strengthen that relationship in the spirit of peace  
17 and stability."

18 Now, Mr Taylor, pausing there, "The Government of Liberia  
19 is unaware of any Liberians engaged in mercenary activities in  
12:26:36 20 Cote d'Ivoire." Now, the point has been made on more than one  
21 occasion about such regional conflicts, in effect, acting as a  
22 magnet, attracting ex-combatants from the region, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, you're here expressing concern that Liberians might  
12:27:00 25 become involved in that?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Now, help us - and this is the third reason why we're  
28 looking at this - in due course, you are aware that Sam Bockarie  
29 gets sucked into this conflict, aren't you?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Because having begun in 2000, for how long does this  
3 conflict in Cote d'Ivoire continue for?

12:27:44

4 A. Well, I can say - you are asking "continue for". In a way,  
5 that problem is somewhat under control, but it's not totally  
6 resolved until today. So - but we can qualify it. We have had  
7 relative calm in la Cote d'Ivoire over the past two years, and I  
8 think they should be heading for elections soon because  
9 eventually what happens, the rebel leader becomes the Prime  
10 Minister who - he is still Prime Minister today. Soro is Prime  
11 Minister. And so that's what I mean when I say - when you say -  
12 we have a lull in everything, but it is still a little festering  
13 situation that we hope never comes up again.

12:28:08

14 Q. We'll come back to the Sam Bockarie involvement in that  
15 process in due course.

12:28:31

16 Now, could I ask, please, that that press statement issued  
17 by the Liberian ministry of foreign affairs, dated 26 October  
18 2000, on the deteriorating situation in the Cote d'Ivoire be  
19 marked for identification MFI-190, please.

12:28:55

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI-190.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now, let's go back to Sierra Leone now, Mr Taylor. Now,  
23 you mentioned earlier that there were discussions ongoing about a  
24 ceasefire in Sierra Leone.

12:29:13

25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. A ceasefire between whom?

27 A. A ceasefire between the new leader of the RUF, Issa Sesay,  
28 and the Government of Sierra Leone under President Kabbah.

29 Q. Is there in due course such a ceasefire agreed?

1 A. Yes, a ceasefire is signed just about this time of  
2 October/November. So they do sign a ceasefire.

3 Q. And were you involved in any way in the achievement of  
4 that?

12:29:50 5 A. Well, yes. In a way, yes. We encouraged it. We pushed  
6 it. Remember, I had written several letters urging the  
7 international community to take advantage of the window of  
8 opportunity. To that extent, we urged them to get this process  
9 going, and finally they do.

12:30:12 10 Q. Now, at this stage, we're talking about November 2000,  
11 which forces are present in Sierra Leone?

12 A. You do have - the British are there by now and you have the  
13 UN forces backed by the member states of ECOMOG that contribute  
14 to UNAMSIL.

12:30:44 15 Q. Who else?

16 A. Well, as a group, that's what's on the ground. As far as  
17 participation, that's a different thing, but these are the two  
18 main groups. Now, you have ECOMOG, you have UNAMSIL and you have  
19 the British.

12:31:01 20 Q. And are the British there under the banner of the United  
21 Nations?

22 A. No, no, no, no, no. The British decide that they are not  
23 going to be under the UN. They come on their own as a separate  
24 entity without UN participation.

12:31:21 25 Q. So who is directing their operations?

26 A. They have their own commander, a British officer commands.  
27 They have nothing to do with ECOMOG or the UN. They are under  
28 British direct command.

29 Q. And what are they doing in Sierra Leone at this time?

1 A. Well, they are - I would just put it to, securing Sierra  
2 Leone - I mean, British interests. They come in with the troops.  
3 They bring a major military operation on the ground, and their  
4 claim is that they are there to help to stabilise the situation.

12:32:07 5 Q. And what was your view as to such an armed British presence  
6 in Sierra Leone?

7 A. Quite frankly, I was opposed to it because I felt that, in  
8 fact, Britain was acting in a way that was not in the best  
9 interest of Liberia. For example, we were looking at the amount  
12:32:38 10 of arms that had been brought in. We had raised that issue.

11 They had assured us, in a letter that has been exhibited here,  
12 that those arms would not be used against Liberia. We were not  
13 convinced because we knew of the calibre of people that were  
14 receiving the arms and, quite frankly, we were taken aback. Some  
12:33:05 15 member states of ECOWAS - and I want to speak mostly for  
16 Liberia - we were concerned that this glory, so to speak, that  
17 ECOWAS was looking forward to, having achieved peace in Liberia,  
18 would be lost because the British were now becoming very, very,  
19 very, very intrusive.

12:33:31 20 In fact, to some of us, they were more concerned about  
21 containing Nigeria than really for peace. And so I criticised it  
22 publicly. I publicly state that I felt that they were trying to  
23 re-colonise Sierra Leone. So, in short, I was not very happy  
24 with the whole presence of Britain, because Britain is a  
12:34:00 25 permanent member of the Security Council. They have backed  
26 resolutions calling for the deployment of United Nations forces  
27 in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL. So it made sense that if Britain had  
28 any other intention of just for peace instead of her personal  
29 interests, she would have deployed her forces along with UNAMSIL.

1 You on the Security Council, you pass a resolution authorising  
2 blue helmets and then you do not participate, you send your own  
3 force? So, for us, there were - I mean, for some of us, there  
4 were other concerns that we felt that Britain had that she was  
12:34:36 5 not speaking about. So, really, I was unhappy and I made that  
6 very open and clear.

7 Q. And what was the size of the British force in Sierra Leone?  
8 Can you help us?

9 A. No, not directly. Most militaries will not even tell you.  
12:34:51 10 They may tell you one thing - I really can't help. But for the  
11 operation that Britain carried out in Sierra Leone - and I'm  
12 speaking not from what I know about the size of their unit, but  
13 the type of operation and the scope of the operation which  
14 included a semi-battle group deployed off the Sierra Leonean  
12:35:16 15 coast and the men on the ground, that they could not, from a  
16 military perspective, and this is personal, they had to operate  
17 on at least a battalion plus level, and that could be in excess  
18 of 500 men for the entire operation.

19 Q. And what are you talking about "deployed off the Sierra  
12:35:36 20 Leonean coast"?

21 A. They had a naval gunboat deployed off the Sierra Leonean  
22 coast that backed up, I think - it was a ship with helicopters  
23 attached to it. So that size of military operation would include  
24 a lot of people, and that's why I'm saying in excess of a  
12:36:01 25 battalion size. I would put it to maybe a couple of thousand men  
26 because of the size; the navy and land based forces that they  
27 had.

28 Q. Now, did you consider that the British presence in Sierra  
29 Leone would assist the peace process?

1 A. Quite frankly, we were concerned that - and hopeful.  
2 Concerned and hopeful. We were hopeful that it would help the  
3 peace process because, quite frankly, we all wanted peace. But I  
4 have already stated my concerns, and my concerns were more of a  
12:36:41 5 national type concern. But we were hopeful that in the final  
6 analysis it would bring peace dividends.

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you've already mentioned that at or about  
8 this time there were negotiations going on between Issa Sesay and  
9 the Kabbah government with a view to establishing a ceasefire.

12:37:08 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Now, did your involvement, as you suggest there was, in  
12 this process involve you communicating with Issa Sesay?

13 A. If not directly, through my envoys, but there was contact.  
14 I would put it to contact with Issa Sesay at the time, yes.

12:37:49 15 Q. And did that contact involve personal visits by Sesay to  
16 Monrovia?

17 A. No.

18 Q. At this time?

19 A. No, not at this time, it didn't. Sesay had just left  
12:38:04 20 Monrovia in August. He could have come back if there was a tight  
21 spot, but we're talking about here October/November. Unless  
22 there was a real serious problem, I don't recall Sesay having to  
23 come back to talk to me about the ceasefire, no. This was done -  
24 as I said that during this period, Issa - and I must state again,  
12:38:38 25 Issa was very, very, very receptive to the whole peace process.  
26 I must say, this young man was very anxious to get things going,  
27 and he established direct links with Kabbah, direct links with  
28 Obasanjo, Konare.

29 So I don't - he probably, at this time - I don't recall him



1 having to come to talk about the ceasefire because he had raised  
2 this issue in August when he speak to Konare, myself and Obasanjo  
3 when he proposed that he was prepared for the ceasefire, he was  
4 prepared to turn the arms over. So I don't think he needed any  
12:39:18 5 extra and did not get, may I say, any extra pressure from me on  
6 the ceasefire.

7 Q. There's a little detail that I omitted to deal with earlier  
8 regarding that British presence in Sierra Leone. Can you help us  
9 with this, Mr Taylor, where in Sierra Leone was that British  
12:39:40 10 force deployed?

11 A. To the best of my knowledge, they were in Freetown, except  
12 for I know they had a clash with the West Side Boys around Okra  
13 Hills, but I think they were deployed basically in the Freetown  
14 sector.

12:39:59 15 Q. Do you know if they had any - the British force had any  
16 capability to, for example, detect the movement of arms into  
17 Sierra Leone?

18 A. I would hope so. I would - in fact, I would suppose so,  
19 because normally - and why do I say this? The level of British  
12:40:32 20 deployment for Sierra Leone was at a major military level. So  
21 what would that entail? It would entail reconnaissance. In  
22 fact, there were a lot of air reconnaissance that were conducted  
23 by both the British and the Americans, and I in fact remember  
24 filing an official complaint to the United States embassy about  
12:40:56 25 United States surveillance aircraft zooming over Liberia without  
26 our consent. The British did not fly as much over Liberia, but  
27 the Americans did. They flew regular, regular high altitude low  
28 zooming flight. It was very annoying. You would just hear these  
29 zoom, these aircrafts high and way over the clouds. The British

1 also - for that level of deployment it is our understanding from  
2 our military and intelligence people that there was a dedicated  
3 satellite link for that region at the time. Directly from space  
4 there was a dedicated link on the Liberian-Sierra Leone  
12:41:48 5 situation.

6 So with that information now, answering your question  
7 directly, I would say that with that satellite link they would  
8 have the capacity to observe movements across the border,  
9 especially if it involved trucks or vehicles. Personnel I'm not  
12:42:08 10 too sure, but trucks they would be able to pick up. They also  
11 would have the capacity - this is 100 per cent. I'm 100 per cent  
12 sure they would have the capacity to monitor all transmissions of  
13 radio, telephone and whatnot within that entire area and probably  
14 beyond Liberia and beyond. So that capacity would be there  
12:42:43 15 because they had, like I say, a major ship or ships off shore.  
16 So in answer to your question I would say yes, because of those  
17 reasons.

18 Q. Now, was the ceasefire in due course agreed?

19 A. Yes, they agreed on the ceasefire.

12:43:02 20 Q. And can you recall or assist us with the terms of that  
21 agreement?

22 A. Well, basically not all of the details. Basically, they  
23 agreed to stop fighting and return to the agreement of 7 July.

24 Q. 7 July which year?

12:43:25 25 A. 1999.

26 Q. That being?

27 A. The Lome agreement. To adhere to the Lome agreement  
28 because that was the whole point; that they would adhere to the  
29 Lome agreement and that the disarmament and demobilisation

1 process should continue. This was basically what they were  
2 talking about.

3 Q. And so by the end of 2000 there is this ceasefire agreement  
4 in place?

12:43:55 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Now, so far as the situation in Liberia is concerned at  
7 that time, Mr Taylor, are there still these accusations of  
8 Liberian involvement in the situation in Sierra Leone?

9 A. They never end. Yes, there are. They never end.

12:44:25 10 Q. And towards the end of the year 2000 do those accusations  
11 take any particular form?

12 A. Well, we begin to see some actions. The United Nations  
13 appoints a panel of experts, after we've requested it over some  
14 time, to look at the problem in the West African sub-region. The  
15 panel of experts go out - come out, do some work, and then file a  
16 report that comes out late during the year detailing their  
17 assessment of what they felt the problem could have been.

18 Q. Okay. Let's break that down. Firstly, who appoints this  
19 panel of experts?

12:45:31 20 A. The Security Council.

21 Q. Secondly, when was it appointed, roughly?

22 A. I would say by the third quarter of 2000.

23 Q. Do they in due course produce a report?

24 A. Yes, they do. They do produce a report.

12:45:57 25 Q. When is that report published?

26 A. A little later in 2000. I would say about  
27 November/December 2000 they publish a report on the entire crisis  
28 as they see it.

29 Q. And help us, did that panel of experts visit Liberia?

1 A. Yes, they did.

2 Q. Did they meet with you?

3 A. Yes. Yes, I met with the panel.

4 Q. Now, what was your view about the panel?

12:46:37 5 A. Well, we expected that the panel would do a good job, but  
6 before the panel came out our envoy in New York had alerted us to  
7 the way that the deck was being stacked. You know, I tell you  
8 what - and I'm going to say this for the Court because - but, I  
9 mean, people out there, little countries that are going to be  
12:47:08 10 listening to this know exactly what I'm talking about. These  
11 panels that come out from the United Nations are appointed by the  
12 Secretary-General recommending, but mostly they will include  
13 major countries. We got to understand that certain individuals  
14 were being appointed on the panel that we objected to, but it  
12:47:35 15 didn't go very far.

16 Precisely the very gentleman that testified in this Court  
17 had done early in 2000, a gentleman by the name of Ian Smillie -  
18 Smillie had done what I will call a research document and may I  
19 mention with research documents, depending on who you hire, you  
12:48:02 20 can get a research group to produce whatever you want. You just  
21 tell them what you want the end result to be, and they can find  
22 any number of proofs to prove whatever point. Ian Smillie had  
23 done a document called The Heart of the Matter.

24 Q. When?

12:48:19 25 A. Early 2000. He, along with a Sierra Leonean and another  
26 gentleman, there was a study done in Canada by them financed by a  
27 particular interest group.

28 Q. Which interest group?

29 A. I am not too - but I know the Canadian government also

1 helped, but there were other interests groups, so many of them  
2 that participate from time to time. That Heart of the Matter,  
3 which was more like an academic white paper, concluded that the  
4 war in Sierra Leone was about diamonds and that Liberia being  
12:48:58 5 involved, according to Smillie, was because of diamonds. So when  
6 we heard that Ian Smillie was being put on a UN panel of experts,  
7 we objected. We see that right away Smillie, who had carried  
8 himself off as an academic, was not really an academic in our  
9 opinion and, being paid to do a white paper now being placed on a  
12:49:26 10 UN panel, that a bias had already been created. And he was  
11 coming on that UN panel as the expert, just as he came in this  
12 Court as an expert. And we felt that this was an academic white  
13 paper that had been done by two or three - in fact, Smillie alone  
14 didn't do the document, okay, and that Smillie had formed a bias,  
12:49:50 15 and coming on that committee as an expert would be a problem for  
16 Liberia and recommended to the Secretary-General that Smillie not  
17 be put on the panel.

18 But he was placed on the panel as the diamond expert, and  
19 so we objected. And we wrote, alerting the Secretary-General  
12:50:07 20 that we suspected that there would be some things that would be  
21 uncomfortable for Liberia, and we wanted to lay the cards on the  
22 table immediately. We tried to refrain in our public documents  
23 from the Smillie situation, but this was our concern, Ian  
24 Smillie.

12:50:27 25 Q. And you say you wrote alerting the Secretary-General?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Is that right?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. On this particular issue?

1 A. Yes, on what we felt would be a bias in that report because  
2 the deck was being stacked against Liberia.

3 Q. Have a look behind divider 101, please. What do you see  
4 behind that divider, Mr Taylor?

12:51:05 5 A. This is the document that I wrote to the Secretary-General.

6 Q. What's the date of it?

7 A. 12 December 2000.

8 Q. And as we can see, it is signed by you?

9 A. That is correct.

12:51:19 10 Q. "Mr Secretary-General, I am pleased to present my  
11 compliments and to refer to Security Council resolution 1171  
12 (1998) wherein a panel of experts was mandated to visit Sierra  
13 Leone and other countries as appropriate to collect information  
14 on possible violations of the measures imposed by said  
12:51:50 15 resolution."

16 Now, remind us. Resolution 1171 was to what effect?

17 A. Provided for the appointment of a panel of experts to see  
18 if the UN resolution that was passed putting a ban on diamond  
19 trade and all of this, as to whether they were being followed.

12:52:16 20 Q. Okay:

21 "The Government of the Republic of Liberia welcomes the  
22 concept and remains in full support of the mandate of the panel.  
23 The government, however, is aware that some prominent members of  
24 the United Nations Security Council have mounted intense pressure  
12:52:39 25 on members of the panel in order to undermine the objectivity of  
26 the report."

27 Pause. Where did you get that from?

28 A. We had been advised by our representative at the United  
29 Nations that this man was on it, and we had problems with Smillie

1 from the day Smillie published that report in early - you know,  
2 we knew that we were up for trouble and we had been - in fact, we  
3 responded to the Heart of the Matter, and so we're just telling  
4 him that - look, your Honours, when it comes to the UN, there's  
12:53:24 5 no government in the world - we all understand how it works. We  
6 understand how it works. You have - and that's why the UN  
7 remains not a legal, but a political organisations. You have  
8 interests. Key to United Nations operation is interests. Member  
9 states exert their interest depending on how they want to go. If  
12:53:51 10 you look at even how - you read the history of the United Nations  
11 and the function of the Security Council, I don't need to tell  
12 anybody that compromises are sought on resolutions. Wordings and  
13 phrases and interests, that's how it works. That's how the  
14 United Nations works: Interests.

12:54:07 15 And we have a situation here where, if you can get to some  
16 of the big countries to recommend certain names, they get on some  
17 of these panels. If you cannot break through, you don't get them  
18 in. So in most cases the appointments of these - while it is the  
19 Secretary-General, but everybody knows that the Secretary-General  
12:54:26 20 doesn't run the United Nations. The United Nations - the  
21 Secretary-General works - his dictates come from the Security  
22 Council. So you have to try to get to one of these big countries  
23 to get any meaningful contribution as a little country in the  
24 United Nations. That's how it works.

12:54:43 25 So as soon as we see appointments being made from big  
26 countries, right away you have to raise the alarm. If not, you  
27 get smothered. And this - we were trying to raise the alarm  
28 that: Look, there are some people you guys are putting on this  
29 that we don't think we will be able to be objective, and we were

1 referring to Smillie.

2 Q. Now, when you say that - "some prominent members of the  
3 United Nations Security Council", who are you talking about?

4 A. The active - well, I don't want to get into trouble with  
12:55:16 5 the Security Council for this, but the five permanent members of  
6 the United Nations. Britain and America are the most active two.  
7 The others work very hard, but the most active under these  
8 conditions, especially - when you're talking about Sierra Leone,  
9 let's face it, all Commonwealth countries - Britain would take  
12:55:42 10 the lead in dealing with Commonwealth countries. When you talk  
11 about Francophone countries, you would expect that France would  
12 take the lead on the Council, and the Council will probably lean  
13 to France for its recommendations and objectivity. This is how  
14 it works. In the case of Liberia, as soon as Liberia came before  
12:56:01 15 the Council, Liberia was supposed to be America's problem. And  
16 so whatever America said about Liberia, nobody questioned it. So  
17 it's almost like all of these little countries throughout the  
18 world will form little blocks and everybody tries to get a  
19 godfather. That's what it amounts to. If you've got a strong  
12:56:21 20 member - if you have a very strong voice on the Security Council  
21 among the permanent members, you can accomplish a lot.

22 Let's qualify that. If you look at some of the resolutions  
23 that have come before the council on North Korea, China have had  
24 to mellow it. If you look at some of the resolutions that have  
12:56:46 25 had to come across the council because of Iran, you will see  
26 Russia will mellow it a little bit. If you come across some of  
27 the resolutions that have had to come before the council on  
28 dealing with the Great Lakes region, you will find a combination  
29 - sometimes France or the United States, depending on the



1 interests of the powerful members of the Security Council, you  
2 can get a lot accomplished. And this is factual. Whether they  
3 want to say so or not, but that's how it works.

4 Q. "Should this trend continue, you will,

12:57:21 5 Mr Secretary-General, undoubtedly understand our concern and the  
6 difficulty Liberia would have with a report that may seem to lack  
7 complete objectivity, neutrality and fairness.

8 I request that this document be circulated amongst the  
9 members of the United Nations Security Council as an official  
10 document of the council."

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, was it so circulated?

13 A. I'm sure they did, yes. Normally, these letters would get  
14 circulated, yes. And there's a reason for asking for it to be  
12:58:00 15 circulated, because we wanted the permanent members to know that  
16 something was up that we did not understand and that we would  
17 object to. So we circulated it. So those that were making the  
18 appointments would be on notice that we had problems with some of  
19 their appointments.

12:58:14 20 Q. Yes. So the report in due course comes out, does it?

21 A. It does.

22 Q. And does it make reference to Liberia?

23 A. Definitely. It deals with Liberia.

24 Q. And as a consequence, does the Liberian government do  
12:58:43 25 anything in response?

26 A. Immediately the report comes out, we respond immediately  
27 because - and deal with all of the issues raised in the report  
28 and point out to them immediately the errors and suggested where  
29 it could be corrected. We respond immediately.

1 Q. Now, we will come to that in due course.

2 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, sorry to interrupt. This  
3 letter speaks of this phrase: "Prominent members of the United  
4 Nations Security Council have mounted intense pressure on members  
12:59:40 5 of the panel." And when you asked the witness, he gave us a  
6 somewhat longish answer in which, in my view, the answer did get  
7 lost a bit. What kind of pressure and on who was this pressure  
8 being mounted exactly?

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

10 Q. Well, let's break it down into three. Who is bringing the  
11 "pressure", what's the nature of the pressure and on whom is that  
12 pressure being applied?

13 A. Britain and America are bringing the pressure. We know  
14 that the pressure is coming on Smillie because of the interest of  
13:00:26 15 Britain with Sierra Leone. And, again, I just want to mention,  
16 without going long, your Honour, we are not dealing with facts  
17 here that you can say, "John Brown told me." You have the  
18 diplomat at the United Nations and they tell you, "Within the  
19 corridors we are hearing that they're applying pressure." So I  
13:00:52 20 alert them that we know. This is nothing that I can say - I know  
21 the two countries. The countries are Britain and America.

22 Now, to say that there is something that - from a legal  
23 perspective, no. This is still - we have to look at it from a  
24 diplomatic perspective, and this is why in this letter we deal  
13:01:13 25 with it diplomatically without naming names, because we would not  
26 be able - like we are in a court of law now - to - what do you  
27 call it in law - to substantiate this fact, but we're talking  
28 diplomacy here. We know in the corridors of the UN, this is  
29 happening. Our ambassador there, that's his job, to inform us.

1 So we write this open general thing to the council, that you will  
2 not put anybody into trouble and say, "Look, some of your members  
3 are doing this and we are aware." So this is as best I can help  
4 the Court.

13:01:51 5 Q. And note also --

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before you leave that, Mr Taylor,  
7 what do you mean - you started off your answer saying, "Britain  
8 and America are bringing the pressure. We know that the pressure  
9 is coming on Smillie."

13:02:06 10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Did you mean to say Smillie is being  
12 pressured by Britain and America?

13 THE WITNESS: Ian Smillie. We are sure on Smillie because  
14 he's appointed on the recommendation, and our ambassador informs  
15 us that Smillie is under pressure. We know that, okay.

16 On the issue that when I say that we know that Britain and  
17 America - to remind the Court, don't let's forget, prior to this  
18 panel's report, remember, the United States delegation - there is  
19 a Security Council delegation that has come to Liberia to see me.  
13:02:43 20 They've already said, if you listen to Sir Jeremy Greenstock's  
21 statement that appeared before the Court, Greenstock, who is the  
22 head of this group, is saying that "you are doing this and we  
23 want Liberia to stop." If you look at Sandy Berger's letter, the  
24 national security adviser of the United States in his response to  
13:03:08 25 my letter that I wrote to President Clinton, says that,  
26 emphatically, without any evidence, "You are doing this."

27 So I'm confronted with these people that have already made  
28 these allegations even before the panel report is out, and on  
29 that panel are people that they've put on the panel. So I'm in a

1 little squeeze here where I begin to say, "Well, we know that  
2 these people are under pressure. You're putting people under  
3 pressure because of all the allegations."

4 And the fact of the matter is, your Honours, when you find  
13:03:39 5 Britain publicly saying that "you are involved in diamonds and  
6 arms movement across the border," the United States has made that  
7 clear through Under-Secretary Pickering and the Security Council  
8 delegation. So you have already prejudiced the report because  
9 the - and no report is coming out of the United Nations  
10 thereafter to say what the permanent members are saying is not  
11 true. So that's the quandary I'm in.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, note, members, plural, of the panel.

14 You've only mentioned Ian Smillie. So who else was being put  
13:04:16 15 under pressure?

16 A. It was our understanding - and, again, this is not - I  
17 don't have any proof. There was an Indian gentleman on the panel  
18 responsible for arms. The expert on arms or arm movement, an  
19 Indian gentleman, we understand, was also being pressurised on  
13:04:38 20 the panel. I would have to get to know his name, but there was  
21 an Indian gentleman on the panel. His expertise was on arms and  
22 arms movement, security movement.

23 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, to answer that last - the  
24 third limb that you proposed of your question, the pressure was  
13:05:02 25 to preempt the results of the report or what was the pressure?

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I was coming to that. Can I ask one  
27 further question to see if I can elicit some assistance on that:

28 Q. What do you say these members on the panel were under  
29 pressure to do what?

1 A. I would say to prejudice the report, yes, directly.

2 Q. Prejudice the report in what way?

3 A. By not changing the opinion that these two countries had  
4 already established and the governments by directly accusing

13:05:36 5 Liberia that Liberia was involved in diamond smuggling and  
6 gun-running. They were prejudiced - I mean, they were pressured  
7 not to change that opinion.

8 Q. So the prejudice would adhere to whom?

9 A. That opinion that had been formulated by the two  
10 governments.

13:05:52 11 Q. Adhere to whom? Who would be prejudiced thereby? I don't  
12 know if you understand my question, Mr Taylor.

13 A. No. You need to clarify that for me.

14 Q. This letter is stating that pressure is being placed on  
13:06:14 15 members of the panel, whom you've identified, to do something to  
16 the prejudice of somebody else, and it's that somebody else who  
17 I'm seeking to identify. Who is going to be prejudiced by --

18 A. Me and my government.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't know if that assists.

13:06:43 20 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: [Microphone not activated].

21 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, your Honour. Okay. That's okay.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Did you want to say something, Mr Taylor?

24 A. No, I don't need to - I don't need to bore the judges with  
13:07:05 25 any more. I was going to try to explain to the judges the way

26 how these organisations work. They are very different from the  
27 legal way that you and I would look at it. The United Nations -

28 it would take a whole day and we don't have the time - it doesn't  
29 work like normal organisations. The United Nations is a

1 different animal in how it functions. And when governments get  
2 to learn how they function - we have some examples where - if you  
3 look, for example, in understanding what I'm talking about,  
4 because I have mentioned to this Court, if you tell me and say,  
13:07:53 5 "Mr Taylor, present proof," my only proof is the report that my  
6 ambassador diplomatically alerts us, but we know these little  
7 chuckles are going on.

8 Let's take an example of how the UN works. Let's take the  
9 example of the imposition of a travel ban or even in my own case  
13:08:20 10 where the United Nations would say to any leader or any country  
11 or anybody, for example, "You cannot travel. There's a travel  
12 ban on a person in the country," the United Nations does not have  
13 to answer to even the state as to why somebody cannot travel even  
14 though that person by law in his own country, okay, is not banned  
13:08:44 15 by any laws in that country, okay. And some of these resolutions  
16 are written and they override certain things in countries. So  
17 the United Nations does not have to provide the type of legal  
18 truth - the legal basis of truth before it takes actions. It can  
19 take action based on its own perception of things. And so people  
13:09:06 20 have to be careful in understanding that.

21 Let's say, even my case where you have, okay, bank accounts  
22 are frozen around the world because of allegedly taking money  
23 from Liberia, but the Liberian government does not have to bring  
24 a charge against me to say, "Well, President Taylor absconded  
13:09:32 25 with money." The United Nations has taken that decision even  
26 when there is no formal charge in any of court of Liberia or even  
27 the Liberian government alleging that there is evidence of a  
28 crime. So the United Nations works a little differently.

29 So some of these documentations that are done are done,

1 whether it's a resolution imposing sanctions against any member  
2 state, when there is sufficient, I would call, probable cause,  
3 the United Nations Security Council can take actions without  
4 legal grounds, so to speak, because the United Nations is not a  
13:10:13 5 legal organisation, it's a political one. I would just stop at  
6 that. I don't want to hold up the --

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Before we move on to other matters though, Mr Taylor, you  
9 mentioned that the second individual who was being pressured was  
13:10:33 10 an Indian gentleman, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Let's see if we can assist the Court as to that person's  
13 identity. Please have a look at Prosecution exhibit P-18, which  
14 is the panel of experts' report - and for now we're merely  
13:10:55 15 seeking to establish that identity - and let's look at that part  
16 of the report which establishes the identity of the panel  
17 members; yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And we see that the chairman is a Martin Chungong Ayafor,  
13:11:33 20 yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. There's also Atabou Bodi an, a Johan Pel eman, a Harji t Singh  
23 Sandhu?

24 A. That's the Indian.

13:11:55 25 Q. And Ian Smillie. Which one were you talking about the  
26 Indian gentleman?

27 A. Singh Sandhu.

28 Q. Okay, let's put that document away for now, please, but we  
29 will be coming back to it in due course.

1 Before we move on can I ask, please, that that letter from  
2 President Taylor, as he then was, to Kofi Annan be marked for  
3 identification - dated 12 December 2000 be marked for  
4 identification MFI-191.

13:12:47 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI-191.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, apart from this panel of experts' report to  
8 which we have been referring, are there any other significant  
9 developments at the end of the year 2000?

13:13:24 10 A. Yes, there is a publication that is done I think that is  
11 very important during my time at that time that - recounting the  
12 Liberian problem by the former Assistant Secretary of State for  
13 African Affairs. He does a little bit of justice by trying to  
14 recount all of the activities of the Liberian civil war and his  
13:13:59 15 own country, the United States, at that time, their own  
16 participation, opportunities, and lost opportunities in dealing  
17 with the Liberian civil crisis up until 2000.

18 Q. And who does that?

19 A. The Assistant Secretary of State For African Affairs,  
13:14:17 20 Herman Cohen.

21 Q. And he does thought in what form?

22 A. He publishes a book. It's called Intervening in Africa,  
23 and he deals with the entire continent. A very telling book  
24 about the interventionist policies, so to speak. And in fact, he  
13:14:45 25 criticises his own government sometimes for some of their  
26 missteps. But we find it very interesting because he devotes an  
27 entire chapter on Liberia, his meeting me, coming in during the  
28 war, and some of the very issues that are being contested before  
29 this Court. He deals with them in the book, and that is the



1 issue of the ceasefire, not taking Monrovia, the coming in of  
2 ECOMOG, and all of these issues. In fact, a lot of the issues  
3 that are contested here, he deals with them in his book.

13:15:34 4 Q. Okay. Let's have a look behind divider 102, please. Is  
5 this the book you're talking about, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes, this is the cover, yes. Herman Cohen, yes.

7 Q. And we see that it's entitled "Intervening in Africa,  
8 Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent".

9 A. That is correct.

13:16:00 10 Q. And when we turn over the page - no, let's go over to the  
11 next page. If we look just above the second ring, we see that  
12 this publication is dated 2000, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And let's go over the page again, please, to the contents  
13:16:45 15 page, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And we see that the book deals with various parts of the  
18 continent, but for our part we're merely interested in chapter 5,  
19 "Liberia: A Bold Plan Hijacked", yes?

13:17:16 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Let's go over the page then, please. Now, we're not going  
22 to go through all of this in detail, Mr Taylor. We just want to  
23 look at the pertinent parts, okay? But just to set the scene,  
24 let's have a look at the first couple of pages so we get an idea  
13:17:40 25 of the background against which this American diplomat is  
26 speaking:

27 "In a technical sense, Liberia's civil war began on 24  
28 December 1989, when 100 armed insurgents of the National  
29 Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) crossed into Nimba County from

1 neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire."

2 Can we pause a moment. Do you agree with that figure, 100?

3 A. No, I don't agree.

4 Q. How many do you say?

13:18:20 5 A. I would say we were less than 100 on that entry date.

6 Q. Less than 100, okay:

7 "In a larger sense the war began on 12 April 1980, when 17

8 inebriated non-commissioned officers of the Armed Forces of

9 Liberia invaded the presidential palace and assassinated

13:19:04 10 President William R Tolbert Junior. These same soldiers then

11 took power by establishing a People's Redemption Council with

12 Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe as chairman and Head of State."

13 Now, would you agree with that analysis, that in a larger

14 sense the war began on 12 April 1980?

13:19:39 15 A. I would say - really, I would disagree with him on this.

16 We Liberians, and those of us that consider ourselves a part of

17 the academic community, look at a date earlier than this. So

18 this would not be a big fuss, but --

19 Q. Which earlier date would you go for?

13:20:03 20 A. I would put the crisis all the way back to 1955, way back,

21 far from this. 1955.

22 Q. Why '55?

23 A. 1955 was the first real revolt against the Tolbert

24 administration, the first real challenge to governance where

13:20:37 25 people were arrested and killed for that challenge, and things

26 were never the same after that. So some of us prefer '55.

27 Q. "Military coups were not unusual in Africa between 1965 and

28 1985. What made this particular coup significant was that the

29 leaders were from the tribal or country people of Liberia, those

1 of indigenous stock who make up 95 per cent of the population.  
2 President Tolbert's death effectively ended 133 years of minority  
3 rule by Americo-Liberians, descendants of the freed American  
4 slaves who settled on the Liberian coast between 1816 and 1847.

13:21:26 5 In the eyes of many Liberians, the rise of the 'country people'  
6 marked the beginning of a new era of majority rule. Thus,  
7 although Doe and his lieutenants were cruel, crude killers, their  
8 regime was popular with the masses. Naturally, the  
9 Americo-Liberian community did not welcome the coup. Many fled  
13:21:48 10 to exile in the United States, where they constituted a political  
11 lobby opposed to any US support for the regime.

12 Among the political elite murdered by Doe's regime was AP  
13 Tolbert, the late President's son. Because his wife Daisy was  
14 the adopted daughter of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Tolbert  
13:22:10 15 had attained protection in the Cote d'Ivoire embassy, whose  
16 ambassador placed him in the French embassy for safekeeping.  
17 Houphouet sent a delegation to Doe, who granted Houphouet's  
18 request to guarantee Tolbert's safety. During Doe's absence  
19 abroad, however, his henchmen discovered Tolbert's hiding place.  
13:22:33 20 In violation of international law, they invaded the French  
21 embassy, captured Tolbert, and executed him shortly thereafter.  
22 The action deeply angered Houphouet, who would not easily forget  
23 or forgive. He would get his revenge."

24 What was his revenge, Mr Taylor?

13:22:54 25 A. I don't know what Herman is referring to here.

26 Q. Okay:

27 "After a year in power, Doe had eliminated most of the  
28 serious rivals and opted for a traditional Liberian pro-American  
29 posture. He had closed the Libyan's People's Bureau and

1 established diplomatic ties with Israel, leading the outgoing  
2 Carter administration and the incoming Reagan administration to  
3 reconfirm the traditional US-Liberian special relationship. In  
4 1982, Reagan offered Doe an official visit to Washington, where  
13:23:33 5 he urged Doe to end all political executions. Doe readily  
6 agreed, since most Liberians who might be a threat were now dead  
7 or living in exile.

8 During 1980-85, US economic and military assistance  
9 increased substantially. During the 1982 official visit, Doe  
13:23:55 10 granted special military deployment rights to the US military,  
11 enabling it henceforth to use Robertsfield International Airport  
12 and the port of Monrovia with only 24 hours advance notice.  
13 Having once received commando training from a visiting team of US  
14 Green Berets, Doe felt comfortable with the American military,  
13:24:20 15 the only external influences he had never known.

16 Doe's major problems were domestic, not foreign. The  
17 overthrow of the minority Americo-Liberian rule alienated the  
18 country's most influential group. In addition, during his first  
19 few years in office, Doe's tribal favouritism alienated the rest  
13:24:43 20 of the population. His Krahn tribe, about 7 per cent of the  
21 population, monopolised power and resources with the help of some  
22 corrupt Americo-Liberians. The Krahns also gained control of the  
23 army, especially the Israeli-trained presidential guard, giving  
24 them unchecked power. Within five years, the Doe regime went  
13:25:07 25 from the embodiment of indigenous majority rule to an oppressive  
26 government dominated by Liberia's most backward ethnic group."

27 Was that true?

28 A. You can say yeah, there's a lot of truth to that.

29 Q. "The other tribal people now regretted the ouster of the

1 American Liberians in 1980.

2 In a presidential election held in October 1985, the deeply  
3 unpopular Doe was defeated in the general voting in the view of  
4 most observers. Since he controlled the election machinery,

13:25:45

5 however, Doe declared himself the winner with a convenient 50.9

6 per cent of the vote. The US government accepted the result with  
7 a lukewarm endorsement, causing dismay in the congress and  
8 marking the start of a steady decline in US-Liberian relations.

9 With the Cold War still dominant in 1985, however, the Reagan  
10 administration was determined to keep Liberia as a close ally.

13:26:11

11 In 1986, for example, the United States began sending military  
12 equipment to the anti-communist UNITA rebels in Angola, using  
13 Robertsfield in Liberia and Kinshasa airport in Zaire to refuel  
14 our aircraft. That project alone justified good relations with

13:26:40

15 both the Doe and Mobutu regimes, neither of which enjoyed much  
16 support within the congress.

17 In January 1987, within a few days of my arrival at the  
18 national security council staff as senior director for African  
19 affairs, I accompanied Secretary of State George Shultz on his  
20 first trip to Africa. His truly interagency entourage included  
21 assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, US Agency for  
22 International Development Administrator Peter McPherson and  
23 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence James L Woods.

13:27:08

24 Doe's management was so bad that Liberia's arrears on loan  
25 payments to the United States were mounting to the point where  
26 legislation mandated that aid be suspended. In addition, human  
27 rights abuses gave ample ammunition to the anti-Doe lobby in the  
28 United States pressing for reductions in military assistance."

13:27:35

29 Then it was supposed that a team of financial experts be

1 assigned to work with the Liberians for two years to get their  
2 books and procedures in order.

3 Now, Mr Taylor, were you still a member of the government  
4 at that time when this team of retired financial experts was  
13:28:14 5 assigned?

6 A. No, I had left the country at this time.

7 Q. And then we see that that, if Doe agreed to that, USAID  
8 would release \$10 million in economic support assistance waiting  
9 in the Liberia pipeline.

13:28:43 10 MR GRIFFITHS: I notice the time, Mr President.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. I think we'll adjourn for lunch now  
12 and we'll resume at 2.30.

13 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

14 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:29:23 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, continue, please, Mr Griffiths.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please, your Honours:

17 Q. Mr Taylor, we had reached page 128, the penultimate  
18 complete paragraph. I want us to omit, please, the next few  
19 paragraphs and go over the page, and let's pick it up in the  
14:31:58 20 middle of the page, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. "In January 1989, when the Bush administration came into  
23 office, and a full eleven months before the start of the civil  
24 war, Liberia was already a cause for concern. It was the subject  
14:32:18 25 of my first interagency Africa policy coordinating committee  
26 meeting as assistant secretary on 19 May 1989. Growing  
27 Congressional disenchantment with Doe threatened to undermine our  
28 rights to three US national security facilities near Monrovia."

29 Now, this is important:

1 "A large diplomatic and intelligence communications relay  
2 station comprising two 500-acre antenna fields and several  
3 buildings serviced 15 American Embassies in Africa."

4 Were you aware of that facility?

14:33:10 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. "The Voice of America had a 1600-acre relay station  
7 transmitting 75 daily broadcasts to Africa."

8 Were you aware of that?

9 A. Yes.

14:33:23 10 Q. "The US Coast Guard operated an 'Omega' maritime  
11 navigational tracking station, one of only six worldwide  
12 essential for airplane and ship navigation. In addition, the US  
13 military had unlimited access to Robertsfield Airport, which we  
14 used for twelve flights per month in support of activities  
14:33:50 15 throughout Africa. In return for these facilities, we paid a  
16 ridiculously small rent of \$100,000 per year. Meanwhile, the  
17 Congress was eliminating bilateral aid."

18 Now, Mr Taylor, let's just pause for a minute, please, for  
19 this reason: Secretary Cohen is speaking in that last paragraph  
14:34:17 20 about the use of Robertsfield International Airport. Can we just  
21 go back to the previous page for a moment, please, and see the  
22 uses to which that airfield was being put. You see the top  
23 paragraph?

24 A. Yes.

14:34:34 25 Q. "For example, the United States began sending military  
26 equipment to the anti-communist UNITA rebels in Angola using  
27 Robertsfield in Liberia and Kinshasa Airport in Zaire to refuel  
28 our aircraft."

29 Now, UNITA rebels, who led them?

1 A. Savimbi. The late Savimbi led UNITA.

2 Q. Did you know him?

3 A. Yes, I knew him. I knew Savimbi.

4 Q. Where did you meet him?

14:35:05 5 A. Oh, Savimbi - in La Cote d'Ivoire. We became very good  
6 friends from La Cote d'Ivoire.

7 Q. When?

8 A. I would put it back to about 1990.

9 Q. 1990?

14:35:24 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So this was after, was it, the commencement of your  
12 revolution in Liberia?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And how did you come to meet Savimbi?

14:35:35 15 A. Savimbi was considered almost like a son to the late  
16 President Houphouet-Boigny.

17 Q. Were you aware that the United States were using  
18 Robertsfield Airport to supply arms to UNITA?

19 A. Yes.

14:35:51 20 Q. How did you come by that knowledge?

21 A. Well, this started some time before then. During the  
22 Tolbert administration, we got to know that.

23 Q. Right. Let's go over the page to 130, please:

24 "NPFL makes its entry. Our embassy in Monrovia believed  
14:36:30 25 the Liberian military could easily deal with the Christmas Eve  
26 1989 incursion in Nimba County by the National Patriotic Front of  
27 Liberia. The Liberian army had, after all, defeated an attempted  
28 coup following the 1985 election by its former commander,  
29 Brigadier General Thomas Quiwonkpa and had already rounded up and



1 killed several groups of infiltrators associated with the NPFL  
2 incursion.

3 Buoyed by past successes against coups and infiltrators,  
4 the Armed Forces of Liberia set out to suppress the incursion,  
14:37:12 5 with little concern for tactics or for the nature of the threat.  
6 When they suffered their first deadly ambush, they discovered  
7 they were facing dangerous guerrillas. Instead of regrouping to  
8 devise an appropriate response, however, they punished the  
9 civilian population for harbouring the guerrillas. The result  
14:37:33 10 was predictable. Tens of thousands of Liberians abandoned their  
11 homes and moved to Liberia's large cities as internally displaced  
12 persons or crossed into Guinea or Cote d'Ivoire as refugees.  
13 Furthermore, the AFL's scorched-earth policy in Nimba County's  
14 fertile agricultural areas caused severe food shortages across  
14:38:02 15 Liberia.

16 By the fall of 1989 we had lost patience with Doe for  
17 refusing to cooperate with the financial advisory group. In  
18 January 1990, nonetheless, we leaned towards helping him with the  
19 Nimba County crisis. Although we knew little of the rebels'  
14:38:22 20 composition, leadership and aims, we saw credible reports of  
21 Libyan sponsorship. The rapid buildup of refugees and displaced  
22 persons particularly troubled us.

23 Reports of Armed Forces of Liberia human rights violations  
24 against civilians provoked our first public reaction. The NPFL  
14:38:50 25 rebels were killing members of Doe's Krahn tribe, but behaved  
26 well towards other ethnic groups. Doe in turn sent in his Krahn  
27 troops, who specialised in pillaging, killing, and extortion.  
28 Like every other AFL activity, the war in Nimba County had become  
29 a business. The Gio majority ethnic group in Nimba County

1 suffered greatly, thereby furnishing many new recruits for the  
2 NPFL. Gaining momentum between January and April 1990, the NPFL  
3 retaliated for the killing of Gios by Krahn soldiers with  
4 indiscriminate massacres of Krahns. An ethnic war was in full  
14:39:38 5 force."

6 Pause there. Do you accept that, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes. But - that's true, counsel, but I think maybe I ought  
8 to add a little something here to put this in context. It is  
9 important to note that in terms of individuals that were leaving  
14:40:02 10 the country in large amounts, it is very strange that Cohen did  
11 not mention Sierra Leone, because Sierra Leone was one of the  
12 major areas, and that is what resulted into this massive Liberian  
13 group of ex-soldiers. The direction that the people fled from -  
14 we are coming from the southeastern part of Liberia, and so the  
14:40:28 15 fleeing - I think he gets it wrong at one point here. The  
16 fleeing is not mostly into La Cote d'Ivoire. It is the  
17 northeastern sector which should be what? The north should be  
18 Sierra Leone and Guinea. This would account for all of the  
19 Liberians that go into Sierra Leone that finally come back out as  
14:40:49 20 ULIMO, as we have explained to this Court before.

21 Now, on this other part of what he is talking about about  
22 the ethnic killing, this is what I tried to explain in my earlier  
23 testimony, I think during the first week. Number one, it must be  
24 emphasised - and he gets this right - there is really hardly any,  
14:41:17 25 if any, forced recruitment of individuals fighting in Liberia.  
26 The activities of Doe - his reaction toward this incursion really  
27 forced people to voluntarily come to fight, okay? So we do not  
28 have to recruit people. People voluntarily walk in and join the  
29 NPFL. This is what makes the NPFL very, very successful.

1 Now, there is this ethnic part of it too, and this goes  
2 back to what the Prosecution talks about where it tries to - in  
3 trying to tie Liberia, the NPFL, so to speak, with the RUF, they  
4 try to say that the RUF is supposed to be carrying out activities  
14:42:08 5 because of this connection with the NPFL in what they see  
6 regarding child soldiers and all this kind of stuff, and there is  
7 no connection. There is an ethnic side of this war in Liberia  
8 that we try our best to bring under control.

9 I mentioned these Special Forces in my earlier testimony a  
14:42:29 10 few weeks back. These Special Forces are trained and they are  
11 deployed in different areas of the country. So to a great  
12 extent, there are a lot of things going on that the leadership -  
13 I mean, I am not on the scene, but each person is operating  
14 under - with a certain amount of authority and control, that  
14:42:51 15 decisions are taken out there that don't necessarily have to get  
16 back to headquarters, and I thought to emphasise this.

17 So where he mentions the ethnic side of it, there is truth  
18 to that, that this old grudge where the Gios now, some of them  
19 feeling that the Krahn's have been doing all these things, go  
14:43:13 20 after Krahn's, and as we find out, there are so many cases where  
21 we have to take strong disciplinary actions against people. But  
22 there is this hatred and ethnic side to it, because some of the  
23 people that joined us to fight are not joining to fight as  
24 ordinary soldiers; they are only joining to fight to maybe go and  
14:43:34 25 revenge at some point, and when we find out, and we deal with it.

26 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, the thrust of my question is this: If you  
27 knew that was going on, what did you do to prevent it?

28 A. I just mentioned. I said as we found out we dealt with it  
29 very seriously. That's what I just mentioned, okay. When we got

1 to know that some people only joined because they wanted to go  
2 and cause trouble, we dealt with them. And a lot of these  
3 problems that you see that came before this Court where the  
4 Prosecution talk about these trials and these executions, it was  
14:44:09 5 because of those. When you saw us executing senior Special  
6 Forces, that was because of this kind of activity.

7 Q. Now, there is mention of the US Ambassador Bishop and the  
8 US sending two US army officers from the embassy's military  
9 assistance group to Nimba on 2 January to work with the AFL and  
14:44:39 10 then let's jump on:

11 "In addition to its scorched-earth policy, Doe's cadre  
12 embarked on a major expansion of the army. Rapid recruitment  
13 sucked in thousands of unscreened youths, prison graduates, drug  
14 dealers and previously expelled military delinquents. Expanding  
14:45:04 15 expenditure for equipment, arms, uniforms and the like, created  
16 new opportunities for corruption, thereby not only wasting money  
17 but also increasing repression and extortion against innocent  
18 Liberians.

19 The Americo-Liberian Lobby accused us of providing  
14:45:25 20 counterinsurgency advice to the AFL. They and other anti-Doe  
21 Liberians apparently viewed the NPFL as freedom fighters with a  
22 legitimate objective. In their eyes, our attempts to work with  
23 Doe's AFL, regardless of our stated motives, constituted an  
24 effort to preserve an illegitimate regime."

14:45:47 25 He then goes on to mention writing to Doe:

26 "I hoped I might have some residual credibility as the  
27 designated commencement speaker for Doe's college graduation. In  
28 my letter I urged Doe to promote reconciliation, protect  
29 civilians, assure the safe return of refugees, halt the killing

1 of civilians and stop expanding the army. True to his genius for  
2 alienating US officials, Doe could not find time to receive  
3 Clark. At that point, therefore, we stopped delivery of the  
4 remaining \$4 million worth of military assistance.

14:46:29 5 At the end of March 190 we failed a full-fledged civil war  
6 in Liberia. For Doe and his cronies the fighting was a game of  
7 cops and robbers that opened opportunities for additional  
8 extortion and theft. They were totally unaware of the likely  
9 grave consequences of their action. As the US Ambassador Jim  
14:46:55 10 Bishop stated in a telegram dated 26 March: 'The rebellion in  
11 Nimba is a low intensity conflict, but it is one the government  
12 is currently losing. Doe's repressive approach is only swelling  
13 the ranks of the rebels'."

14 In the next heading is "Who is Charles Taylor and what is  
14:47:25 15 the NPFL?" They recount in the second paragraph under that  
16 heading, if you look, Mr Taylor, the fact that you had been  
17 accused of theft of \$900,000 and how you had escaped from US  
18 prison, before escaping to Burkina Faso, yes?

19 A. Yes.

14:47:58 20 Q. And let's pick it up after that:

21 "Our intelligence reported that between January and March  
22 1990 that Taylor and some of his fighters trained in Libya and  
23 had links with Liberian exiles in Cote d'Ivoire."

24 Was that true - is all of that true?

14:48:18 25 A. Yes, but they had these reports earlier. Remember he said  
26 that Doe had captured some of our people, infiltrators, and  
27 killed them in Monrovia, but they interviewed them so they had  
28 the intelligence before here.

29 Q. "The army of Burkina Faso supplied staging areas", is that

1 true?

2 A. Staging areas, well, yeah, okay.

3 Q. "Weapons depots"?

4 A. No.

14:48:48 5 Q. "Training facilities"?

6 A. No. There was no training of my forces done in Burkina

7 Faso whatsoever. They were all trained in Libya.

8 Q. In Po?

9 A. No, none whatsoever.

14:49:01 10 Q. Were you based at all in Po?

11 A. Not at all, no.

12 Q. "The American embassy in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, heard from

13 residents near the Liberian frontier that Taylor's rebels

14 regularly crossed and recrossed the border unhindered."

14:49:23 15 Is that true?

16 A. Yes, to some extent, yes.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's be quite blunt about this. You

18 recall that earlier Mr Cohen mentioned Houphouet-Boigny being

19 quite angry that his son-in-law had been executed by Doe, yes?

14:49:52 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. As a result of that, going back to where we've reached,

22 were you receiving favours from the government of the

23 Cote d'Ivoire?

24 A. No, no, not in the initial stages, no. At this time, we

14:50:08 25 are talking about March of 1990, I have presented evidence here

26 before this Court, this time La Cote d'Ivoire is not involved

27 with me. In fact, I am still hiding in the town I had mentioned

28 here before this Court. I am still hiding around, trying to get

29 into Liberia. La Cote d'Ivoire at this time is not involved with

1 me at all.

2 Q. But what about this observation being made by Mr Cohen that  
3 your rebels were crossing and recrossing the border unhindered.  
4 That's assistance, isn't it?

14:50:50 5 A. No, no, no.

6 Q. So what is it then?

7 A. What Cohen doesn't realise here is that the people that are  
8 crossing are the people from the general area. Like I say, the  
9 Gios in Liberia going back into la Cote d'Ivoire without a gun,  
10 he is speaking Gio, nobody knows whether or not - maybe from the  
11 American intelligence they figured this, but they were not as he  
12 wants to put it here. People were going and crossing that border  
13 regularly, but without arms and all this kind of thing. And they  
14 just look at everybody as rebels.

14:51:26 15 Q. Let's go on: "The American embassy in Ouagadougou, Burkina  
16 Faso, reported Liberian cargo planes unloading there at night and  
17 Liberians retrieving military supplies in vehicles that had  
18 transited Cote d'Ivoire."

19 True?

14:51:49 20 A. No, that's not true. That's not true.

21 Q. Mr Taylor, the clear suggestion there is that you were  
22 receiving arms from the Libyans via Ouagadougou. Is that true or  
23 false?

24 A. That is false. In fact, that's the whole Cold War  
14:52:13 25 mentality that he is conveying here that as soon as they found  
26 out - he is trying to justify the military assistance still being  
27 given to Doe at that time. And even we had not commented  
28 earlier, where you read where two Americans are supposed to go up  
29 to Nimba to provide the military assistance, they were providing

1 at that particular time military assistance in terms of arm,  
2 armament and actual personnel on the ground. And he is  
3 mentioning too here there were more than two.

4 Now we have never disclaimed the fact that we were trained  
14:52:51 5 in Libya, but the period in question here, Libya had not provided  
6 any arms. Remember, I had mention today this Court I don't  
7 finally enter Liberia until about April when things are still  
8 very tough. This period in question, this is not intelligence.  
9 This is simple information and it's just at the level of  
14:53:13 10 information. It's totally, totally wrong. And if their  
11 decisions were guided by this kind of information, I can see why  
12 they made some missteps.

13 Q. "Expatriates in contact with Taylor reported a force of  
14 1,000 well-armed commandos operating from a base just inside Cote  
14:53:38 15 d'Ivoire."

16 True or false?

17 A. Total nonsense. False. Totally false. Never operated.  
18 We went from day one of the attack, the men stayed in Liberia.  
19 They never operated out of La Cote d'Ivoire. Never.

14:53:53 20 Q. "Taylor used a satellite telephone to contact any place in  
21 the world." Did you have one?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Where did you get it from?

24 A. We bought that phone from the United States, but at that  
14:54:08 25 time the satellite telephones were just coming out. That was a  
26 huge - a very, very huge, probably almost the size of these two  
27 trays combined. These were very huge and bulky. Not like you  
28 have today. They had just come out at that particular time.  
29 Yes, we bought one. If I just tell the price at that time was



1 about \$35,000 for one. It was just new technology coming out and  
2 it was very expensive.

3 Q. When you say it was the size of the two trays, are you  
4 talking about the trolleys?

14:54:47 5 A. Yeah, these trolleys here. I mean the base unit where they  
6 had the equipment and different things was about the size and  
7 then the top. Huge, huge set up. I mean it's about, what, a  
8 thousand times smaller now, but at that time they were big.

9 Q. And he goes on: "Our first high level NPFL contact came  
14:55:08 10 from Tom Woveiyu." Now, remember we looked at the statement that  
11 he had made, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "... his minister of defence who called the Bureau of  
14 African Affairs in January 1990 from his roofing company Newark,  
14:55:27 15 New Jersey. Woveiyu assured us the NPFL insurgency aimed only to  
16 depose Doe, after which they would install democracy. Taylor  
17 himself called to say the same thing, assuring us he meant no  
18 harm to US citizens or installations. In his first conversation  
19 with me, Taylor claimed no political ambition except evicting  
14:55:53 20 Doe."

21 Did you say that to Mr Cohen?

22 A. Not in those exact words, but to a great extent yes.

23 Q. No political ambitions, Mr Taylor?

24 A. That's what I mean when I said not in those exact words. I  
14:56:06 25 told him that I had no interest in hanging onto power and that we  
26 would submit after the process to a democratic election.

27 Q. "What Taylor told us, however, was not what he told others,  
28 especially media interviewers. In April 1990, for example, he  
29 told the Financial Times he would capture Monrovia, depose Doe

1 and rule by decree for five years to prepare for democratic  
2 elections. "

3 True?

4 A. Yes, I think I spoke to the Times, yes.

14:56:41 5 Q. Did you tell them that?

6 A. Yes, I told the Times that we would turn over in five  
7 years, yes.

8 Q. Yes, and rule by decree in the interim?

9 A. Yes, before you have a democratic election the only thing  
14:56:56 10 you can do is to rule by decree.

11 Q. "Worried by his Libyan connections, we were not yet ready  
12 to embrace Taylor during the first few months of 1990. In March  
13 1990, NPFL representatives approached our embassy in Abidjan in  
14 search of a formal dialogue. The State Department, however, in  
14:57:20 15 reply to the embassy's request for guidance asserted: 'The USG  
16 has no interest in dignifying Taylor's Libyan supported group by  
17 engaging in contacts that could later be flaunted, thereby  
18 causing further complications in our already troubled relations  
19 with the Doe regime'."

14:57:42 20 Now, pause there, Mr Taylor. That reluctance to engage  
21 with you on the part of the US government and their embassy in  
22 Abidjan, did that remain?

23 A. No, it surely didn't.

24 Q. How did it change?

14:57:59 25 A. We established very good contacts with them. They were  
26 saying --

27 Q. With whom?

28 A. We are talking about the American embassy, with the US  
29 embassy.

1 Q. In?

2 A. In Abidjan. And this whole talk here, this is his side,  
3 but it changed. It changed, and we sought and obtained  
4 cooperation with them at that level.

14:58:26 5 Q. What kind of cooperation?

6 A. In terms of intelligence, in terms of communication, in  
7 terms of diplomatic contact.

8 Q. Let's take each in turn. In terms of intelligence, what do  
9 you mean by that?

14:58:49 10 A. Well, our - I, in particular, was - once contact is  
11 established with principal individuals like myself at the time,  
12 if there is a threat to life to you as the leader, you are  
13 informed.

14 Q. Who by?

14:59:17 15 A. By the parties that we are talking about, the CIA. You are  
16 informed that - without getting into specifics, that there is an  
17 imminent threat, and then - that level of cooperation. In turn,  
18 we also protected US citizens that were still caught up in part  
19 of our area in Liberia.

14:59:40 20 Q. Now, the second form of cooperation you listed is  
21 communications. What do you mean by that?

22 A. We were given some very high-powered technical radios.

23 Q. By whom?

24 A. By the embassy, by the CIA, at the time that we used for  
15:00:05 25 rapid communication that we could call almost anywhere in the  
26 world and get to anybody that we wanted to get to on the ground.

27 Q. Yes. Let's go back to page 133 and pick it up:

28 "By the end of March 1990, security had deteriorated so  
29 much that the need to protect our expensive and irreplaceable

1 facilities led us towards a dialogue with Taylor, the Libyan  
2 connection notwithstanding. Meanwhile, in the presidential  
3 palace, chairman Doe slowly began fading into his own alcohol -  
4 and drug-induced fantasy land."

15:01:11 5           Would you agree with that timing, Mr Taylor, that by the  
6 end of March 1990, there had been this - the opening of this  
7 dialogue.

8 A.     Yeah, but remember here he speaks right up what we just got  
9 through with about March and then this is a little diplomatic -  
15:01:30 10 yeah, the beginning of March and the end of March. There is very  
11 little distance between the two, and that's why I just explained  
12 that cooperations actually - in fact, cooperations started, and  
13 he is explaining here one of the principal reasons too. Those  
14 facilities that were described earlier, three facilities, you  
15:01:50 15 remember what they were?

16 Q.     Voice of America, the Omega, and so on?

17 A.     That is correct. Those were principal, principal,  
18 principal, installations. And here you have an advancing rebel  
19 force, you want to make sure that those installations are not  
15:02:08 20 destroyed. So it was also - even though we had no intentions of  
21 doing so, but it was in the interest of the United States  
22 intelligence community to make sure that those installations were  
23 not destroyed. When you see two 500 antenna bases, that shows  
24 that what? That's communication. Intercepts, sending out, all  
15:02:34 25 of these were very major. The Omega station, as I reiterated  
26 here before, I think either the first or second week, the Omega  
27 station were one of just a few towers around the world that  
28 guided submarine fleets around the world. That was before  
29 satellite navigation came into being. So that was extremely

1 important.

2 So we at a particular time developed full contacts to  
3 protect those installations upon getting them, and we got  
4 something in return, and that's what I described as communication  
15:03:12 5 and other things.

6 Q. So basically, Mr Taylor, you made it deal with the  
7 Americans, didn't you?

8 A. Basically, yes.

9 Q. We will protect those facilities in return for your  
15:03:22 10 assistance?

11 A. Well, yes, you can call it that, yes. That was not a  
12 threat now. We did not blackmail them. But yes, we got  
13 something in return.

14 Q. Skip the next paragraph:

15:03:38 15 "In Liberia we face the fast-breaking situation. Although  
16 we did not contemplate evacuating American embassy personnel in  
17 extremis in March 1990, the Doe regime was crumbling and the NPFL  
18 seemed about to move into a most threatening position. We no  
19 longer believed the AFL could handle the threat and we lacked the  
15:04:02 20 luxury of time."

21 Over the page, please. Let's just jump the first few  
22 lines:

23 "A planned major uprising in December failed with the  
24 capture of NPFL infiltrators. In January and February, NPFL  
15:04:31 25 rebels engaged in small-scale ambushes. AFL atrocities in  
26 retaliation led Gio ethnics to flock to the rebels' side. In  
27 March the rebels began large-scale attacks designed to inflict  
28 maximum casualties on the AFL. Rebel forces consisted of 200  
29 original insurgents trained in Libya, 500 new recruits trained

1 inside Liberia, and 1000 Gio followers carrying shotguns."

2 Is that right?

3 A. Yes.

15:05:17 4 Q. "After that grim briefing, I asked the three agencies  
5 owning facilities in Liberia to update us on their outlook and  
6 needs. All three reconfirmed their statements of May 1989 that  
7 the facilities were vital or critical. The Voice of America told  
8 us of major plans to refurbish their relay station in fiscal year  
9 1992.

15:05:41 10 The CIA, which operated the ATO, African Telecommunications  
11 Office, diplomatic relay station, said the two sites could not be  
12 replaced in kind before 1994, when satellites would take over.  
13 The Coast Guard emphasised the need to keep its Omega  
14 navigational station in operation until at least 1994 as a vital  
15:06:10 15 component of Atlantic ocean ship and aircraft transit."

16 Miss the next paragraph:

17 "But the majority emphasised distancing ourselves from  
18 Doe's human rights abuses. We were unable to shore up Doe  
19 because the human rights situation in Nimba county was so  
15:06:33 20 horrible and the Americo-Liberian lobby made sure everybody knew  
21 it. We had no choice but to keep him at arm's length, making it  
22 hard for us to be mediators."

23 And then he sums up the position:

24 "The United States cannot, and should not, be passive in  
15:06:54 25 Liberia. The historical ties, the close relationships, the need  
26 to help the refugees and Congressional pressure made it important  
27 that we be active.

28 We must disassociate ourselves from the worsening military  
29 repression.

1           We must continue to safeguard our three important  
2 installations.

3           And we should develop contingency plans to evacuate up to  
4 5000 American citizens."

15:07:26 5           And then he says that:

6           "The period 15 April to 15 June was busy with several  
7 initiatives on several fronts. Doe's military situation  
8 deteriorated rapidly, although he refused to acknowledge it.

9 From mid April to July the rebels broke out of Nimba County,  
15:07:47 10 captured Buchanan, Liberia's major minerals and timber port, took  
11 Roberts International Airport, and placed Monrovia itself under  
12 siege. Rebel advances were attributable more to AFL desertions  
13 and refusal to fight than to rebel military prowess.

14           Throughout this period, Doe spent most of his time seeking  
15:08:14 15 arms from neighbours and friends. On 13 April, ignoring our  
16 suspension of military aid, Doe asked our charge de affairs,  
17 Dennis Jett, for rifles and ammunition to equip 3000 new  
18 recruits. He told Jett that we should view the crisis as a  
19 Libyan plan to undermine America's friends worldwide. Running  
15:08:36 20 out of both credit and friends, Doe received his last arms  
21 delivery from Romania in May.

22           Especially ominous was the outbreak of ethnic killings in  
23 Monrovia. Krahn military massacred hundreds of Gio prisoners in  
24 camps near the capital. Anyone from Nimba County was fair game  
15:09:02 25 for retaliation."

26           Over the page, please, second paragraph:

27           "Failing to make any headway with Doe, Liberian politicians  
28 looked to us forcefully to convince both Doe and Taylor that a  
29 solution lay in a free election monitored and guaranteed by the

1 United States. To make sure the politicians understood his  
2 intentions, Doe told the press on 25 April that he would never  
3 negotiate with Taylor. Only a military solution was acceptable  
4 to him. Nevertheless, in a gesture to the opposition, he  
15:09:45 5 proposed sending an all party delegation to Washington to  
6 encourage the United States to play an active role."

7 Now, we are talking about April 1990 at this stage,  
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. Uh-huh.

15:09:58 10 Q. So we are talking about four months or so after this  
11 episode began. Were you willing at that stage to promote or  
12 accept elections supervised by the U.S. Government?

13 A. At that stage, no, we were not prepared to - we were not  
14 prepared to do that. Because the United States had - in a way  
15:10:23 15 while they were playing, we felt that - just as Cohen is saying  
16 here, and I agree with him - they could not be seen as mediators.  
17 While they were dealing with us, on the one hand, helping with  
18 the areas of communication, intelligence that we were talking  
19 about; on the other hand, they were supplying Doe with arms and  
15:10:45 20 ammunition. So they were playing two sides at the same game.

21 And so we felt that the only thing that we could accept at that  
22 particular time, probably some mediation involving the OAU. But  
23 we would not have accepted the US as just mediator at the time.

24 But it's interesting to note something here that we will be  
15:11:12 25 confronted with later, is this issue of Doe contacting his  
26 friends to get weapons, and this is what brings the conflict.  
27 Because one of the principal friends involved here is Babangida  
28 in Nigeria. That's that reference that will later on cause us to  
29 resist ECOMOG when they come into the country.



1

2 Q. Let's look at that. Go over the page to page 137. Let's  
3 skip the first few lines and just take look at the bullet points  
4 and see what they say.

15:11:46 5 "According to military analysts, Doe could be defeated  
6 militarily.

7 Secondly, Doe was out of touch with reality in his  
8 determination to pursue a military victory. His troops refused  
9 to fight and continued to fall back towards Monrovia. Doe  
10 assumed we would come to his rescue because of the special  
11 US-Liberian relationship and Taylor's Libyan connection.

12 Doe had no friends left in West Africa. His visits to  
13 Togo, Guinea and Nigeria had yielded no support. The Nigerians  
14 told us they were upset by his unwelcome visit. Togolese  
15 President Gnassingbe Eyadema told us that all heads of state in  
16 West Africa either hated Doe or considered him an embarrassment.

17 Doe lacked money for arms, having drained the  
18 government-owned companies of their cash.

19 Doe retained the loyalty of 1000 Special Forces troops  
15:12:55 20 guarding the palace. As the war progressed, it appeared  
21 increasingly that he was preparing to make a stand within  
22 Monrovia itself.

23 Until late May, Taylor seemed well disposed towards the US  
24 presence and US assets. American businesses continued to operate  
15:13:16 25 in NPFL-occupied areas."

26 Is that true?

27 A. That is true. We did not trouble the people or their  
28 business.

29 Q. Because by this time you controlled Roberts International

1 Airfield, didn't you?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And right next door to that airport is what?

4 A. Firestone rubber plantation.

15:13:40 5 Q. And how big is that?

6 A. We are talking about some 350,000 acres of rubber.

7 Q. And that company was allowed to operate within NPFL  
8 territory?

9 A. Yes.

15:13:56 10 Q. What did you get out of it?

11 A. Well, nothing, really. Later they left and the rubber we  
12 sold for income.

13 Q. But was any kind of tax imposed on the company by the NPFL  
14 while it was operating within your territory?

15:14:13 15 A. No, we did not impose any tax. We did not solicit any  
16 monies from them. The taxes - the only thing we told them was  
17 that the taxes that they had been paying to the Government of  
18 Liberia, because the Government of Liberia was no longer there,  
19 the new government was the NPFL and they would pay the taxes to  
15:14:37 20 the NPFL.

21 Q. Okay.

22 "The NPFL could not accept any political scenario in which  
23 Doe remained in power even for a short period.

24 Charles Taylor professed a commitment to democracy.

15:14:52 25 On the basis of the foregoing, we concluded that a solution  
26 would have to begin with Doe's departure to a comfortable exile.  
27 His wife and children had already gone to London on an extended  
28 holiday. With Doe gone, the Liberian political factions could  
29 negotiate a democratic transition with Charles Taylor in a round

1 table setting."

2 Let's go over the page, please. Middle of the page:

3 "At the beginning of May 1990 our tactical position was to  
4 encourage all American citizens to leave Liberia.

15:15:40 5 Seek presidential approval for the deployment of a naval  
6 force to Liberian waters to help evacuate our citizens?

7 Begin a negotiating process via the all parties high level  
8 mission coming to Washington the first week of May.

9 Begin preparing Doe psychologically for a high level  
15:16:01 10 suggestion that he go into permanent exile.

11 Set up contacts with Taylor to assure protection for US  
12 facilities and encourage a negotiated democratic transition via  
13 all parties interim government in which Taylor's power would be  
14 diluted."

15:16:21 15 Let's go to the last paragraph:

16 "May 1990 was a threshold month for our involvement in  
17 Liberia. The first glimmer of negotiations between the Doe  
18 regime and the NPFL began under our auspices. We began trying to  
19 get Doe used to the idea of going into exile; and overall US  
15:16:42 20 policy on Liberia was addressed for the first time at a level  
21 higher than the PCC on Africa, namely, the deputies committee of  
22 the National Security Council.

23 On 2 May the all parties delegation from Liberia arrived in  
24 Washington, headed by Winston Tubman. A practicing lawyer,  
15:17:06 25 former foreign minister and nephew of the late President William  
26 VS Tubman."

27 Let's ignore the rest of that page. Let's just pick it up  
28 on page 140, three paragraphs down:

29 "En route to Washington to meet with Tubman, Tom Woveiyu

1 was quite open with officers at our embassy in Abidjan about the  
2 NPFL's war aims. Woveiyu was not in the mood for a real  
3 negotiation. As far as he was concerned Doe was 'dead meat'.  
4 The best thing we could do was convince Doe to depart and allow  
15:18:05 5 Taylor to take over while the economy and infrastructure was  
6 still intact. Woveiyu reassured us that Taylor and would  
7 safeguard US lives and property and would install a democracy.  
8 At one point he said, 'I know you won't believe me, but this is  
9 what Charles Taylor wants. If once all this is over he could be  
10 assured that a stable democratic system could be installed in  
11 Liberia, and the future leadership changes could take place  
12 without bloodshed, he would be only too happy to step down'."

13 Is that true?

14 A. That is true.

15:18:39 15 Q. "Woveiyu made two additional comments of interest.  
16 Liberians, he said, the NPFL included, considered the  
17 United States to be the father of Liberia. As father, the  
18 United States had the power to end the conflict by disciplining  
19 its children. Secondly, the NPFL became convinced it could  
15:19:05 20 defeat Doe as soon as we announced the suspension of military  
21 assistance. This was a reminder of the occasional unintended  
22 side effects of US decisions."

23 And then just for completeness:

24 "Talks between Doe's delegation and Woveiyu did not take  
15:19:27 25 place. Woveiyu received last minute orders from Taylor not to  
26 sit with Doe's representatives."

27 Is that true?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Why?

1 A. Because we knew that they were not serious about  
2 negotiating. All Doe wanted was to remain in power, and we said,  
3 no, that we would even accept an interim government, but he could  
4 not sit there because we knew that if Doe stayed for even a day,  
15:19:58 5 that he would have commenced a complete reign of terror as he had  
6 done before and we did not want that.

7 Q. Over the page, please, page 141. No, we are on page 141.  
8 Third paragraph from the bottom: "Also during May, we were  
9 treated to a number of direct telephone calls from both Doe and  
15:20:22 10 Taylor." True?

11 A. Yes, I called, yes.

12 Q. "When Doe called, I pushed him hard on advancing the  
13 elections to 1990 to challenge the NPFL's commitment to  
14 democracy. Doe retreated behind the constitution, claiming it  
15:20:37 15 did not permit an election prior to the prescribed October 1991  
16 date. On the other hand, moving it up three to six months might  
17 be possible.

18 Charles Taylor called to reiterate his pledge to protect US  
19 assets. I called his attention to the three communications sites  
15:20:57 20 that were full of displaced Liberians trying to escape the war.  
21 He assured me his people would do no damage and would leave all  
22 property intact. He also reiterated that he had no personal  
23 ambitions. 'My only ambition is to get rid of Doe'."

24 Over the page. I want us to skip page 142 and 143 and jump  
15:21:29 25 ahead to page 144, please, third paragraph on that page:

26 "Our thinking about Liberia's political future was also  
27 taking shape. We had already proposed a constitutionally viable  
28 scheme to both sides. In effect, Doe would resign in favour of  
29 Vice-President Harry Moniba, who would appoint Charles Taylor as

1 the new Vice-President and then himself resign. Taylor would  
2 become President of Liberia but would have to organise an  
3 election in October 1991 pursuant to the constitution.  
4 Government and civil society groups, such as the Liberian Council  
15:22:23 5 of Churches, expressed interest in the scheme as a constitutional  
6 way out. The NPFL was less enthusiastic about the October 1991  
7 election deadline, but we were slowly persuading Taylor of the  
8 importance of constitutional respectability. Doe's departure and  
9 Taylor's coming to power were the heart of our policy. The  
15:22:47 10 biggest impediment to this scenario was Doe's refusal to leave.  
11 Hence, it was increasingly urgent to send a high level envoy."

12 Now, Mr Taylor, were you party to those discussions?

13 A. Yes, but we were not agreeable. You know, this - you know,  
14 just before we pass this I must - these are some of the problems  
15:23:15 15 that we have in some of these policy decisions that are  
16 taken that affect little countries all around the world and  
17 affected us.

18 You come with a proposal that Doe would step down, his  
19 Vice-President would take over, name me as Vice-President and he  
15:23:36 20 would step down and I would become President and in a few months  
21 go to elections. And when you get stuck with these policies from  
22 Washington you're stuck. How, you are coming from a major civil  
23 war, you are in the midst of a civil war, the entire country  
24 engulfed in a war, and you want an election in two or three  
15:23:58 25 months. It's not possible. That's why we have had so many of  
26 these problems. And you are so bent and persuaded to pursue  
27 these policies and they cause a lot of missteps.

28 So we were not in agreement with this short time because,  
29 what, just the time it takes to disarm the people and get them

1 ready for an electoral process, we felt that this was too short.  
2 So while we were part of these discussions, we were not in  
3 agreement with them.

4 Q. "On 5 June we were jolted by an ice cold bureaucratic  
15:24:39 5 shower. Deputy Secretary Larry Eagleburger received word from  
6 the National Security Council that the President had decided the  
7 United States would not take charge of the Liberian problem and I  
8 should not, therefore, travel to Monrovia to escort Doe into  
9 exile. We would confine our efforts to the protection of  
10 Americans. Needless to say, at the PCC level we were dismayed  
11 because our diplomatic efforts had just begun to gain momentum.  
12 Liberians with guns were listening and taking us seriously."

13 Mr Taylor, had the United States not decided to take  
14 charge - if they had decided to take charge of the problem at  
15:25:35 15 that stage, would you have been willing to lay down your arms and  
16 negotiate?

17 A. Yes, yes, if they had come in as they were talking. Yes,  
18 there was some disagreements with times and dates, but we took  
19 the negotiations seriously and this is one of the things I called  
15:25:53 20 missteps on the part of the United States that prolonged the war  
21 in Liberia. We were prepared and we were just fine tuning it,  
22 whether it is six months or eight months or one year, we needed  
23 time to put the country back to some normalcy and then go to  
24 elections, instead of the just fast thing. And then all of a  
15:26:14 25 sudden they pulled back.

26 We get to know that, well, it's not our problem. It's your  
27 problem. I got to know this after Cohen published this book, but  
28 at that time we were told, well, the United States cannot make  
29 this problem a Liberian problem, and so we are going to - we have

1 orders now to step back a little bit. But the details we did not  
2 know. And we were shocked ourselves. But why do you want to  
3 step back? You have the ability, you have the goodwill in  
4 Liberia to stop this war. Nobody wanted to fight.

15:26:55 5 Q. Over the page, please, just a few lines from this page:

6 "That the Marines were sitting in the Atlantic Ocean 15  
7 miles from Monrovia the first week in June not engaged in any  
8 activity in Liberia graphically illustrated our decision not to  
9 address the conflict. By this point, the rebels had entered the  
10 Firestone rubber plantation near Robertsfield, indicating that  
11 Monrovia itself was threatened."

12 Go over the page, please. Second paragraph:

13 "As June gave way to July, the plight of the Monrovia  
14 population steadily worsened. Food, fuel and water were in short  
15 supply, and displaced people kept arriving. We also received  
16 disturbing information about the NPFL. In April, after the AFL  
17 had won a rare combat victory over the NPFL, Taylor insisted on  
18 summary justice against his commanders who had lost the battle  
19 and executed them."

15:28:15 20 Did you?

21 A. No, that was not true.

22 Q. "This produced a split with a breakaway group under the  
23 leadership of Lieutenant Prince Yeduo Johnson forming the  
24 Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)."

15:28:36 25 Mr Taylor, you told us in previous testimony about your  
26 attempts to apprehend Prince Johnson?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Had you apprehended him, what would you have done to him?

29 A. I would have put him on trial, and the decision of the



1 Tribunal would have decided that because we had a court martial  
2 board. Now, where I disagree with Cohen here, Prince Johnson had  
3 broken away and was on the run before April 1990. When I entered  
4 Liberia - and I have mentioned that in my testimony - in  
15:29:17 5 Gborplay, Prince Johnson was already on the run. So what he is  
6 saying here now, we are talking about way down after July, that  
7 is totally incorrect. Prince Johnson was already operating as an  
8 Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

9 Q. "The emergence of the INPFL turned the war into a three-way  
15:29:40 10 fight with each side battling the other two. In addition, we  
11 received horrible news from Buchanan, where NPFL forces were  
12 killing any Krahn or Mandingo ethnic they captured, including  
13 women and children."

14 Is that true?

15:29:53 15 A. That is true. And that's - now, he's got the story upside  
16 down. That's what led to the court martial and execution of  
17 officers, because of this terrible thing that they did - that  
18 they started doing in Buchanan. The court martial board went  
19 into place, and those that were responsible just for the wanton  
15:30:15 20 killing of people, they were tried, found guilty, and yes. The  
21 execution was not because of the breakaway of Prince Johnson.  
22 Prince Johnson had broken away. But executions occurred because  
23 of the killings of civilians in Buchanan.

24 Q. "As he tightened the noose on Monrovia, Taylor made  
15:30:32 25 additional errors of judgement beyond these. Thousands of  
26 citizens from neighbouring West African countries trapped behind  
27 Taylor's lines depended for their safety on Taylor's protection.  
28 Most were English speakers from Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone.  
29 Taylor's main backers in the West African sub-region were

1 Francophone Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, which facilitated the  
2 transit of arms to NPFL fighters. Taylor perceived that Doe  
3 enjoyed sympathy in Nigeria and Ghana, where younger military  
4 officers had also taken power through coups. He was particularly  
15:31:19 5 suspicious of General Ibrahim Babangida, President of Nigeria,  
6 who had been close to Doe during the 1980s. Taylor's decision to  
7 keep the West Africans hostage to dissuade Nigeria and others  
8 from intervening on Doe's behalf proved a serious lapse of  
9 judgement."

15:31:43 10 Did you keep them hostage?

11 A. No, we did not keep them hostage.

12 Q. Did you not detain them?

13 A. Yes, we detained West Africans at that time, got their  
14 proper identity. Yes, we did that.

15:31:56 15 Q. Why?

16 A. Because the Nigerians - and he is wrong about Nigerians not  
17 helping Doe. Nigeria helped Doe; Babangida helped Doe. And at  
18 this particular time they are preparing - in fact, Cohen has it a  
19 little wrong here as far as time. I disagree with this part,  
15:32:18 20 because this is happening after the arrival of ECOMOG, not  
21 before. There is no tampering with any - after ECOMOG arrives,  
22 mostly comprising Nigerians and Ghanaians, and the manner in  
23 which the bombardment was going out, it appeared that they had  
24 infiltrated intelligence individual into our areas. Because the  
15:32:42 25 bombings were, even though not precise, but they were in areas  
26 that - ordinarily flying over the forest, you would not know  
27 what's under there. So we then figured out that there was  
28 something going on, and we detained them and moved them from  
29 certain areas to make sure.

1 Now, I disagree with the time here. This is after ECOMOG  
2 comes and not before ECOMOG comes.

3 Q. "Needless to say, as soon as it became clear that at least  
4 3000 Nigerians and thousands of other West Africans were being  
15:33:17 5 detained in Liberia, the neighbouring governments became alarmed.  
6 Concern for their nationals grew into concern for the stability  
7 of the entire sub-region, which faced arms proliferation and  
8 floods of refugees. Liberia's neighbours, under the umbrella of  
9 the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, decided to  
15:33:42 10 take on the Liberian question in May-June 1990. That decision  
11 was the exact opposite of what Taylor had hoped for.

12 By the first week of July 1990, the NPFL had cut off  
13 Monrovia except by sea and the road northwest of Sierra Leone.  
14 Several Krahn generals had already abandoned Doe and left the  
15:34:08 15 country. Monrovia was in danger of a sanitary and nutritional  
16 crisis, because thousands of displaced people flocked into the  
17 city as the flow of humanitarian assistance dwindled. We feared  
18 a catastrophe if there was a pitched battle for the city.  
19 Although they normally tended to avoid combat, the Krahns in  
15:34:32 20 Monrovia had no choice but to fight to the death. Krahn troops  
21 knew that if captured, they would be killed. The impact on the  
22 city could be devastating."

23 Mr Taylor, was it your intention at that stage, had you  
24 decided to capture Monrovia, to massacre all Krahns?

15:34:57 25 A. No, no, no. No, no. I would not have even killed Doe.  
26 No, no.

27 Q. "In one of my many telephone chats, I acknowledge to  
28 Charles Taylor that victory was in his grasp and suggested that  
29 it would be better for everyone if a battle for Monrovia could be

1 avoided."

2 Stop there. Do you remember that New African article we  
3 looked at, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes.

15:35:26 5 Q. Where you said that one of your biggest regrets was that  
6 you had listened to Howard Cohen on this point. Do you remember?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. That you should have gone on there and then and captured  
9 Monrovia?

15:35:41 10 A. Quickly, yes. It would have ended the war.

11 Q. "It would be better for everyone if a battle for Monrovia  
12 could be avoided."

13 Now, help me, how regularly were you speaking to Herman  
14 Cohen at this time?

15:35:56 15 A. Oh, I would say at least once or twice a month. And if I  
16 were not - we were in regular contact with State.

17 Q. "I said the way to achieve that was to give the Krahn an  
18 overland escape route. If he agreed, then the road to  
19 Sierra Leone should be left open. Taylor inferred from our  
15:36:26 20 conversation that we expected an NPFL victory. He was thus  
21 conciliatory and promised to keep the road to Sierra Leone open."

22 Did you?

23 A. Oh, yes, I did.

24 Q. "The NPFL nevertheless attacked Monrovia on 2 July for the  
15:36:43 25 first time, and on 5 July Taylor predicted Monrovia's fall within  
26 a few weeks. The escape route for the Krahn was never open."

27 I thought you said a couple of minutes ago it was?

28 A. It was open. It was open. I disagree with him here. It  
29 was open, and these are some of - it was left open to

1 Sierra Leone and they reneged on their promise. He doesn't cover  
2 the whole thing here, but if you want me to comment now, I can.  
3 But I will leave it.

4 Q. No, please do.

15:37:19 5 A. Okay. The road was open, and in fact we did not attack  
6 Monrovia. We went all the way to the college campus of the  
7 University of Liberia and encamped there. This was when these  
8 discussions were going on. Now, if you look at the University of  
9 Liberia where we pointed out today on that map, it is - you are  
15:37:45 10 looking at the - you can clap your hand and somebody at the  
11 Mansion would see you. That was the only pressure we put on  
12 Monrovia. We did leave the road to Freetown open, and that is  
13 what caused a lot of the people to leave Monrovia. So he is - I  
14 disagree with him on that particular point.

15:38:03 15 Q. But interestingly, he goes on to say this:

16 "Both our desire to keep open the road to Sierra Leone and  
17 Taylor's hope to conquer Monrovia quickly were dashed in  
18 mid-July, when Prince Johnson's INPFL fighters suddenly appeared  
19 on Bushrod Island west of Monrovia, effectively sealing the road  
15:38:26 20 to Sierra Leone."

21 So, Mr Taylor, who closed the road to Sierra Leone?

22 A. Prince Johnson. Prince Johnson did.

23 Q. "Suddenly Taylor had to worry about two armed adversaries  
24 instead of one.

15:38:39 25 Liberia was high on the agenda when the ECOWAS Heads of  
26 State gathered in Banjul, The Gambia, in May 1990 for their  
27 annual summit. Normally Africans were unaccustomed to discussing  
28 such strictly internal problems. In the Liberia case, however,  
29 they determined that the state had effectively collapsed. In

1 addition, the war was creating refugee flows, arms trafficking,  
2 and growing banditry and lawlessness. They reacted by calling  
3 for an immediate ceasefire and establishing an ad hoc mediation  
4 committee mandated to contact both sides to work for a compromise.

15:39:24 5 The mediation committee, which included both Nigeria and  
6 Cote d'Ivoire, contacted various factions in mid June, picking up  
7 the mediation burden where the United States had left off. After  
8 the failure of the Sierra Leone talks in June, the committee  
9 tried to schedule a second session under ECOWAS auspices. In  
10 their informal phone discussions with Doe and Taylor, they had  
11 reached the point where Doe was willing to resign, but only if  
12 Taylor would not take over immediately."

13 Is that true?

14 A. No, that is not true. That is not true. This - I disagree  
15 with it 100 per cent. That is not true.

16 Q. "On 2 July, Doe actually did offer to resign if the NPFL  
17 and ECOWAS would guarantee his personal safety and prevent  
18 retribution against his fellow Krahn, but by this time, sensing  
19 military victory, Taylor hardened his terms. He insisted on  
20 taking power, guaranteeing only that Doe could leave Liberia  
21 safely."

22 Did you?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "The second negotiating session in Freetown was scheduled  
15:40:45 25 for 12 July. My statement to a PCC meeting the same day showed  
26 how distant we had become from the crisis.

27 Our role in these talks is one of interested observer. We  
28 are not providing facilities as we did last time, and we are not  
29 providing a solution to the conflict. 'The Sierra Leone

1 government is providing the site and ECOWAS is providing the  
2 mediators.'

3 That statement reflected the thinking of a loyal civil  
4 servant who wanted to make sure the bureaucracy followed policy  
15:41:20 5 guidance from on high that we will not take charge of the  
6 Liberian problem. It was a lot easier to assume this posture at  
7 that moment because only 500 American citizens remained in  
8 Liberia, a hard core who refused all embassy advice to depart.  
9 Because of them, however, our naval force also remained.

15:41:46 10 The mediating team for the Freetown talks was led by ECOWAS  
11 Secretary-General Dr Abbas Bundu, a Sierra Leonean. His approach  
12 appeared imminently fair and reasonable. Doe should resign in  
13 favour of a coalition interim government that would take Liberia  
14 through a transition to an election. No Liberian should have a  
15:42:08 15 claim to power unless he had popular support as expressed in an  
16 election. Doe liked the proposal, because it would protect both  
17 himself and the Krahn ethnic group from reprisal. Taylor,  
18 however, thought it robbed him unreasonably of the fruits of  
19 victory."

15:42:28 20 Did you feel that?

21 A. Yes, but, you know, this whole thing is so backed up the  
22 wrong way. The period that Herman Cohen is speaking about here,  
23 ECOMOG is on the ground. ECOMOG is on the ground. You are  
24 handing me, you know, a sword with both blades sharp. ECOMOG is  
15:42:53 25 on the ground, the Nigerians have been supporting Doe throughout  
26 this particular period. They are there protecting Doe. They are  
27 in the city. The very Prince Johnson you talked here earlier  
28 that cut off the road, Prince Johnson was being assisted by the  
29 United States embassy in Monrovia playing another game. We have

1 pictures of Prince Johnson talking to the US embassy people. In  
2 fact, video clips on that.

3 So you have got Prince Johnson in Monrovia. You have asked  
4 us not to storm the city. We have not stormed the city. You  
15:43:29 5 have said to us we should keep the road open to Sierra Leone. We  
6 do. You encourage and bring Prince Johnson into town, he closes  
7 the road. You bring ECOMOG into the country to rob us of victory  
8 and you are saying, "Well, why don't you accept this?"

9 We knew then that they were playing on all sides. In the  
15:43:50 10 meantime you are playing with us. We were occupying now these  
11 facilities, so they were playing, what, four, five handed games  
12 at the same time. So they were not very serious. So we said,  
13 "No, we are not going to accept these games. We will accept  
14 nothing, except first of all let Doe leave." Because if you  
15:44:12 15 recall, and the records are there, Doe is captured when he is  
16 about to leave in the presence of who? Of ECOMOG.

17 So this period that Herman Cohen is talking about, ECOMOG  
18 is already on the ground. We cannot have victory when the whole  
19 purpose of ECOMOG in Liberia at the time is to prevent an NPFL  
15:44:35 20 victory. So we cannot accept this. So he has got it all mixed  
21 up here, and, you know -

22 Q. "Taylor, however, thought it robbed him unreasonably of the  
23 fruits of victory. His NPFL movement controlled most of Liberia  
24 and he refused to be deprived of power. His only concession was  
15:44:59 25 to accept an interim government with a deadline for the election  
26 provided he was named interim President. Under the ECOWAS  
27 proposal, the interim President would have been a neutral person,  
28 ineligible to run for re-election. Taylor was saying, in effect,  
29 'I have won the war. I want power. Democracy will come, but



1 only under my control'."

2 Was that your sentiments?

3 A. No, those were his own sentiments. These were not my  
4 sentiments. When somebody says - what I wanted to do, after  
15:45:35 5 leading a successful revolution I wanted to make sure that the  
6 path to democracy was ensured and I said I would not even contest  
7 the election. But I could not afford to see things fall apart  
8 with all of the lives of our people gone, for only somebody to  
9 come and change the equation again.

15:45:56 10 I mean, I had told him. I had said, well, look - just as  
11 he says here he is correct. I would not contest the election.  
12 But the interim governance, I fought through the bushes and these  
13 young people died in that country for a purpose. Not for  
14 somebody to come and change it. We would make sure that all of  
15:46:16 15 the framework for democracy had been put into place, that process  
16 would be - that I would oversee it and I would not contest. I  
17 think that most countries - in fact we were talking to more than  
18 the United States, other western countries thought that this was  
19 a reasonable move, that I would go through this and not contest  
15:46:36 20 power, but make sure that all tenets of democracy were put into  
21 place. And I was determined that that would happen.

22 Q. "To Taylor, the ECOWAS refusal to name him interim  
23 President proved that Nigeria hated him and secretly supported  
24 Doe, a conclusion bolstered by the ECOWAS secretariat's location  
15:47:01 25 in Nigeria. The view of Cote d'Ivoire President  
26 Houphouet-Boigny, a major NPFL supporter, that ECOWAS was a  
27 vehicle for Nigerian domination for the sub-region encouraged  
28 Taylor's jaundiced view of Nigeria."

29 Mr Taylor, did you hate Nigeria?

1 A. No, I did not hate Nigeria, but --

2 Q. Were you suspicious of them?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. For what reason?

15:47:30 5 A. My suspicions were along the same line of suspicions later  
6 on that the British adopted regarding Sierra Leone. We wanted a  
7 strong Nigeria in West Africa, but we did not - I did not want a  
8 dominating Nigeria in West Africa. I will put it that way.

9 Q. "After one week, the talks broke up in deadlock on 19 July.  
15:47:58 10 Accordingly, Taylor kept the Nigerian citizens trapped behind his  
11 lines as hostages to deter a Nigerian intervention."

12 Did you do that?

13 A. No, that's not true. That's not true.

14 Q. But there were Nigerian detainees behind your lines,  
15:48:14 15 weren't there?

16 A. But that is after the Nigerians came. He is talking here  
17 about in order to deter Nigerian intervention. These people are  
18 detained after Nigeria is there. So this is incorrect.

19 Q. "During July, fighting inside Monrovia became particularly  
15:48:31 20 intense. Bullets passed close to the embassy, requiring an  
21 increased in the number of marines. Much of the combat was  
22 between Prince Johnson's INPFL and the AFL, with the NPFL waiting  
23 outside Monrovia for the two enemy groups to tear each other  
24 apart. Increased tension incited the AFL to attack a Lutheran  
15:48:57 25 church sheltering hundreds of the displaced from Nimba County.  
26 About 200 were massacred. If Taylor captured the city, we knew  
27 that retribution would be horrific."

28 Break that down. That massacre, Mr Taylor, did it have any  
29 personal consequences for you?

1 A. Yes, my father - my father was amongst the 200 that were  
2 massacred at the Lutheran church.

3 Q. And the conclusion which the writer reaches that, "If  
4 Taylor captured the city we knew that retribution would be  
15:49:33 5 horri fic", did you want retribution for what happened to your  
6 father?

7 A. No, no. That's the funny thing about some of these  
8 American decisions. No such thing. We had come throughout the  
9 war, infrastructure intact across the board. Whether you were  
15:49:53 10 foreign or domestic companies we never touched them. Our people  
11 were disciplined. We had behind our lines Krahn s and Mandingos  
12 that were in our territory. We never troubled them.

13 I don't know how he could have come with this assertion  
14 that if Taylor had captured the city - there were Krahn s living  
15:50:14 15 all through Liberia and Mandingos. We had taken strong actions  
16 to protect them. Why would he feel here that the capture of  
17 Monrovia would lead to retribution? No, I disagree with him 100  
18 per cent. No, no, no.

19 Q. "The church massacre increased urban fighting and growing  
15:50:32 20 food shortages finally persuaded the remaining Americans to  
21 depart. MARG helicopters with armed marines flew to an assembly  
22 point inside Monrovia to lift the evacuees to the ships and then  
23 on to Freetown. To assure a peaceful evacuation, the deputy  
24 chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral David Jeremiah,  
15:50:55 25 called Taylor requesting there should be no shooting."

26 Do you recall that?

27 A. Yes. Yes, I do.

28 Q. "US embassy personnel did the same with the AFL and Prince  
29 Johnson, who had become a regular visitor to the chancery" - what

1 is the chancery?

2 A. Well, you have two words, you have the embassy. The  
3 embassy actually is --

4 Q. Which embassy?

15:51:24 5 A. I am coming now. The word that you asked about, chancery  
6 now. There are two words that come into play. The embassy, as  
7 used in diplomatic terms is where the ambassador resides. The  
8 chancery are the offices.

9 Q. So which chancery is he talking about here?

15:51:44 10 A. The United States chancery in Monrovia.

11 Q. Right, so Prince Johnson had become a regular visitor to  
12 the chancery?

13 A. Uh-huh.

14 Q. And you were saying something about Prince Johnson being on  
15:51:58 15 phone earlier. To whom?

16 A. Well, not phone. Radio. He was with them regularly. Now  
17 this is diplomatic. He was with them 24 hours. He describes it  
18 here as a regular visitor. He was moving up and down with US  
19 marines in town, in and out of the chancery.

15:52:18 20 Q. "The evacuation of 2,500 people including US citizens and  
21 their non-citizen dependants was completed in peaceful conditions  
22 during the first week of August.

23 America's successful military evacuation did not relieve  
24 the tension for the West African governments whose nationals  
15:52:40 25 remained trapped, especially the Nigerians whose citizens were  
26 deliberately detained. The flow of refugees into Guinea,  
27 Cote d'Ivoire and beyond to Ghana and Sierra Leone continued.  
28 The ECOWAS mediation committee went back to the drawing board,  
29 meeting at the Heads of State level in Banjul on 6 and 7 August.

1 Agreeing that an external military force was needed to rescue  
2 West African citizens, restore stability, and assure a democratic  
3 transition, they decided to send a force of 2,500 troops taken  
4 from the armies of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and The  
15:53:25 5 Gambia. The commander was a Ghanaian general but the majority of  
6 the troops were Nigerian. The force was baptised ECOWAS  
7 monitoring group, or ECOMOG for short.

8 To establish an interim regime, a national conference of  
9 Liberian political parties and civil society would select the  
15:53:48 10 government and its interim leader, who would be ineligible to run  
11 for President. His exclusion as head of the interim government  
12 and ECOMOG's domination by Nigerians convinced Taylor he would be  
13 the loser. He therefore objected strongly and noisily, warning  
14 the Nigerians not to come in. Taylor's detention of their  
15:54:12 15 citizens and protests against their alleged support for Doe  
16 convinced the Nigerians they had no option but to intervene."

17 What are you saying, Mr Taylor?

18 A. This is - you know, as I am going through this I can see  
19 how people suffer. Bad information, misinformation,  
15:54:40 20 disinformation and terrible decisions. What Herman Cohen does  
21 not say here that he should say, the chairman of the ECOWAS at  
22 the time is a gentleman called Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara and  
23 finding out that Kukoi Samba Sanyang, who had tried to overthrow  
24 him, was in Liberia, advanced the notion in West Africa that we  
15:55:12 25 wanted to destabilise the whole region and they had to bring to  
26 under control. This is the reason why ECOMOG came. Because it  
27 would be stupid for anybody to say, "We are going to send in  
28 2,500 people to go into a war, we're going to release people with  
29 bullets to release people." This is not true. And this is the

1 misguided statement that cause policies that affect people.

2 Okay.

3 This thing started with this notion of destabilising West  
4 Africa, that we have to stop it. Because most of the leaders in  
15:55:45 5 West Africa at the time were military people, they saw this, a  
6 civilian removing Doe - including Doe was a military man. In  
7 Ghana you have Rawlings. In Nigeria you have Babangida. In  
8 Guinea you had Lansana Conte. You had all of these military  
9 people that wanted to keep Doe, another military man, in power,  
15:56:06 10 backed by Nigeria who had 95 per cent of the troops on the  
11 ground. What did they expect me do? Not to accept this type of  
12 thing.

13 So his whole analysis here, if this is the type of analysis  
14 that went in some of the decisions, I can see why things never  
15:56:22 15 worked. This is flawed, okay. Flawed.

16 Q. "Ambassador de Vos and others were sceptical about the  
17 prospects of ECOMOG success because the NPFL was so heavily  
18 armed. In the State Department, however, we saw the ECOMOG  
19 operation as the only hope for ending Liberia's downward slide  
15:56:53 20 into anarchy and expressed our support. The plan was well  
21 conceived and had the extra merit of involving Africans working  
22 to solve an African problem. Within the ECOWAS mediation  
23 committee, however, one major ominous problem arose.  
24 Cote d'Ivoire registered a vigorous dissent to the intervention,  
15:57:17 25 arguing that the committee lacked jurisdiction to send troops to  
26 a member country. Only a full plenary of ECOWAS Heads of State  
27 had that power. Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea, a majority in the  
28 committee, disregarded the Ivorian objection and proceeded with  
29 the deployment. That left the Ivorians alienated, furious and

1 determined to continue transferring arms to the NPFL. If Taylor  
2 wanted to fight ECOMOG, he would get help."

3 Did you?

4 A. No. I would say categorically I a Cote d'Ivoire, from  
15:57:52 5 beginning to end, never, never - Houphouet-Boigny never gave any  
6 arms or ammunition to the NPFL. Never. Never.

7 Q. "ECOWAS established a \$50 million emergency fund to finance  
8 ECOMOG and requested assistance from donor countries, including  
9 the United States. We debated this request in the PCC, where  
10 military representatives expressed concern that a US contribution  
11 would lead to follow-on requests for direct military support.

12 The PCC decided it was a risk worth taking and recommended that  
13 the United States contribute. Endorsement by the Organisation of  
14 African Unity gave the operation added legitimacy. Acceptance of  
15:58:46 15 the PCC recommendation produced only an initial contribution of a  
16 symbolic \$3.3 million, but it showed solidarity with an important  
17 African initiative.

18 As agreed by the participating heads of government, two  
19 ships of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force landed troops at the Port  
15:59:06 20 of Monrovia on 24 August and secured the port and central city.

21 The landing had the important immediate effect of opening the  
22 besieged city to humanitarian relief, thereby rescuing thousands  
23 of hungry people from literally starving. It also prevented  
24 further AFL atrocities like the Lutheran Church massacre. The  
15:59:33 25 ECOMOG operation's one negative impact was that it preserved the  
26 AFL as a military establishment, a factor that was later to  
27 complicate efforts for a lasting solution.

28 ECOWAS sponsored an all Liberia conference in Banjul during  
29 the period 27 August-1 September. The conference chose an

1 interim government and appointed Dr Amos Sawyer President. The  
2 NPFL boycotted the conference, warning that the interim  
3 government would be unable to fulfil its mission. In any event,  
4 security conditions inside Monrovia were not yet conducive to the  
16:00:18 5 arrival of the interim government, and the problem of its  
6 legitimacy remained moot.

7 By August, ECOMOG had expanded its perimeter and captured  
8 the in-town Spriggs Payne Airport with only token resistance from  
9 the NPFL. It also freed the hostages, but ECOMOG had been  
16:00:44 10 required to use lethal force and had taken casualties. The  
11 emergency humanitarian situation in Monrovia had been alleviated,  
12 for which we were thankful, yet the outcome for a peaceful  
13 transition was not bright. Worse, the continued arms flows to  
14 Taylor from Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire further widened the  
16:01:06 15 ECOWAS split."

16 Are you still maintaining, Mr Taylor, that you didn't  
17 receive arms from Burkina Faso through Cote d'Ivoire?

18 A. Well, that was not the question. The question that I  
19 responded to was la Cote d'Ivoire giving me arms. I never  
16:01:26 20 received any arms. I have not denied that we received some  
21 assistance later from Burkina Faso, yes.

22 Q. And did that assistance come through Cote d'Ivoire?

23 A. It came through Cote d'Ivoire, but it was not Cote d'Ivoire  
24 giving it.

16:01:46 25 Q. "The United States takes a back seat" speaks for itself,  
26 and if we look at the first couple of lines of the second  
27 paragraph under that:

28 "As of the end of August 1990, the United States was  
29 essentially relegated to a secondary role. The small financial



1 contribution we proposed to make to ECOWAS was insufficient to  
2 give us a major voice in West African policy."

3 Over the page, second paragraph:

4 "On 9 September, Doe made a fatal mistake. He accepted  
16:02:35 5 Prince Johnson's invitation to meet on neutral territory in  
6 ECOMOG headquarters ostensibly to forge an alliance against  
7 Taylor, but it was a trap. With the ECOMOG people looking the  
8 other way, Prince Johnson seized and tortured Doe, then let him  
9 bleed to death from his wounds.

16:02:59 10 Doe's death did not end the crisis. Far from it. Taylor  
11 had also received a significant amount of new military supplies,  
12 guaranteeing that the fighting would not end soon. As noted in a  
13 document I prepared for the PCC meeting on 4 September, the  
14 arrival of military supplies for Taylor's force seems to have  
16:03:24 15 improved its fighting ability. Burkina Faso shows no sign of  
16 withholding support for Taylor. Quite the contrary.

17 Having saved their nationals, the ECOMOG governments could  
18 reasonably start thinking about pulling out to avoid additional  
19 expense. Taylor knew this and probably thought he could wait  
16:03:53 20 ECOMOG out. He also knew from the national conference held in  
21 Banjul on 27 August, and the all parties negotiations in Freetown  
22 on 12 June, that he would be in minority position in any normal  
23 political process. All the unarmed political factions were  
24 terrified of Taylor. In short, his incentive for cooperating in  
16:04:17 25 a transitional process under an ECOMOG umbrella was minimal. He  
26 had conquered most of Liberia by military force and was not about  
27 to yield at the negotiating table what he had won in battle."

28 Is that assessment a reasonable one, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Totally wrong. This is not right. What Cohen does not

1 explain here, we did not boycott the meeting. We were there. I  
2 sent - Tom Womeiyu and Counsellor Lavalie Supuwood told this very  
3 co-counsel on my team - told the Banjul they were arrested at the  
4 airport and incarcerated and kept from going into town. And  
16:05:04 5 subsequent to that, the President of the Gambia right now who was  
6 chief of the security at the airport, Yahya Jammeh, subsequently  
7 told me this: "You know, why I have been sympathetic to you is  
8 because when your two delegates came, we arrested them at the  
9 airport", okay? That's what he fails to state. How many people  
16:05:24 10 were at this conference? 24 Liberians gathered in The Gambia  
11 kept our people out and selected - I don't call that elected -  
12 and selected a President. So Cohen, I think, is grabbing for  
13 straws here, but he has it wrong. It's not as he is explaining  
14 it here. And, really, we were there, and he did not expect us to  
16:05:47 15 accept this process that they had arranged for us. In fact, they  
16 invite the only two persons from the whole NPFL, in fact, all of  
17 our people, including Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who was still with  
18 us in the States, all of us. It was a decision of the NPFL to  
19 send someone there and that we would submit to a process because  
16:06:13 20 we were told - we expected to have been made the leader of the  
21 interim government, only to get there and then stop our people,  
22 arrest them, send them back, and put somebody that we refused to  
23 accept.  
24 Q. "For their part, the ECOMOG governments and their military  
16:06:33 25 commanders in Liberia could not have been nicer to Taylor.  
26 Disregarding his insults, they constantly referred to him as a  
27 key leader with a major role in the transition. They could not,  
28 however, meet his non-negotiable demand that he be installed as  
29 President, whether interim or permanent."

1 Under the heading "United States jumps back in  
2 temporarily", four lines down from that heading:

3 "Taylor was advancing towards central Monrovia. Bullets  
4 were flying around our embassy and civilian suffering was  
16:07:11 5 increasing. ECOMOG appeared unable to cope with the NPFL. As  
6 criticism of our inaction mounted, the National Security Council  
7 decided to increase the US profile by sending me on a  
8 fact-finding mission to West Africa just to show we cared with my  
9 executive assistant, Carl Hoffman. I left Rome on September 15  
16:07:36 10 in an air force jet bound for Sierra Leone, Liberia,  
11 Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana and Burkina Faso. Deputy Assistant  
12 Secretary Jim Woods from Defence joined us in Abidjan.

13 Arriving in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on September 17, we  
14 were immediately transferred to a navy helicopter and flown to  
16:08:00 15 Monrovia, landing in the embassy compound on Mamba Point. The  
16 helicopter was surrounded by heavily armed marines, who escorted  
17 us to the Chancery. Other marines were in fortified elevated  
18 guard posts that gave them the capability of shooting at  
19 potential attackers at fairly long range. Gunfire sounded  
16:08:25 20 frequently. Briefings by various agency representatives  
21 indicated that ECOMOG would have to become much stronger if it  
22 intended to neutralise Taylor and start a political transition.  
23 Embassy morale was high, as it usually is when there is danger.

24 After Monrovia, we made lightning visits to the Presidents  
16:08:46 25 of Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Ghana. President Felix  
26 Houphouet-Boigny in Abidjan said his country was the main victim  
27 of the Liberian war, having received well over 100,000 refugees.  
28 As for alleged Ivorian help to the NPFL, Houphouet brushed aside  
29 the accusation, saying 'I have never even met Taylor.'"

1 Pause. At this stage, Mr Taylor, had you met him?

2 A. We are talking about September --

3 Q. 1990?

16:09:28

4 A. -- 1990. No, we had not met. We met before the end of  
5 '90, but we had not met yet.

6 Q. "His defence minister, however, acknowledged that supplies  
7 for the NPFL transited Cote d'Ivoire because the Ivorians did not  
8 have the capability of stopping the flow, not because of  
9 complicity.

16:09:47

10 President Ibrahim Babangida and Jerry Rawlings, of Nigeria  
11 and Ghana respectively, told us that they had increased ECOMOG's  
12 troop strength and believed the NPFL would soon be under control.  
13 Taylor would have no choice but to negotiate. They both asked us  
14 to put pressure on Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso to stop arming  
15 the NPFL. The bottom line for these two major troop contributors  
16 to ECOMOG was their determination to stay as long as necessary to  
17 bring about a negotiated political solution. An overnight stop  
18 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, we actually saw Libyan aircraft on  
19 the airport runway. The embassy confirmed that arms for the NPFL  
20 had arrived in these planes.

16:10:43

21 On 20 September, in the most interesting experience of the  
22 mission, we flew to the northern Cote d'Ivoire airport at Man.  
23 There, joined by our ambassador in Abidjan, Kenneth Brown, we  
24 boarded four wheel drive vehicles and crossed ten miles into  
25 Liberia to meet with Charles Taylor. The most striking and  
26 frightening aspect of Taylor's forest hideaway was the  
27 overwhelming presence of heavily armed 14- to 16-year-old boys."

16:11:04

28 Is that true?

29 A. That is totally false. You see, why - that's why I asked

1 you a question before: Why aren't they 13 to 14 years old? Or  
2 why aren't they 17 to 18 years old? Herman Cohen did not  
3 interview anybody, and these are some of the mistakes, and people  
4 get hurt by this. 14 to 16, how would Herman Cohen come in the  
16:11:48 5 bush and recognise, without talking to anybody, that somebody is  
6 14 or somebody is 17? This is total nonsense. Herman Cohen did  
7 not know who these people were or their ages. Surely, they were  
8 not Americans, so he cannot determine that.

9 So if he can say they were 14 to 16, it's possible they  
16:12:11 10 could have been 13 to 15. It's possible they could have been 16  
11 to 19. So how can he get up - at least it would be reasonable if  
12 he says here, "We saw people that appeared relatively young."

13 But you can't come up with - these things stick into people's  
14 minds and records, and this is where you begin to find out years  
16:12:32 15 later: Oh, child soldiers, child soldiers. How can you determine  
16 just by looking at people their ages? This is total nonsense.

17 Q. "The discussion went over familiar ground. Even though Doe  
18 was no longer alive, Taylor could not trust the Nigerians. They  
19 had supported Doe and they hated him. They were determined to  
16:12:56 20 prevent him from ruling Liberia. I told Taylor that on the basis  
21 of my talks to with Babangida and Rawlings, I was persuaded that  
22 ECOMOG was there to stay and he should find a way to negotiate.

23 Taylor responded that any such negotiations would require  
24 both the assistance and guarantees of the United States.

16:13:19 25 Otherwise, he could not participate. If the United States would  
26 send troops to Liberia, he would surrender the NPFL to them.  
27 Picking up on his pro-American statement, I asked Taylor if he  
28 would be willing to accept a ceasefire if we could persuade  
29 ECOMOG to go along. He immediately said yes."

1 Was that the gist of the conversation, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes, that was about the gist of it. I really wanted to get  
3 them involved.

4 Q. Why?

16:13:49 5 A. Because I was going to be sure then that the process - I  
6 would have expected that once they said something that they would  
7 mean it and that the process would be one that we could, you  
8 know, what we say, literally put our teeth into. Because I knew,  
9 and all of our people knew, factually, that Nigeria had been  
16:14:16 10 supporting Doe. Ghana had not been supporting Doe, so Ghana was  
11 an unwilling partner in this. But Ghana had not supported Doe.  
12 So Babangida at that time used Ghana to just be that second tier  
13 of their policy that they wanted to do in keeping Doe in power.

14 So I was not prepared to accept this. I said to the  
16:14:43 15 Americans very clearly, "Great, if you people guarantee this" -  
16 and they didn't want to guarantee it. I said, "If you guarantee  
17 this process, we are prepared to go along. If you are not  
18 prepared to guarantee it, then we are not going to go along"  
19 because then that would be a signal to me that even the Americans  
16:14:59 20 were not serious. If you want peace and everything, guarantee  
21 the process.

22 Q. "Upon returning to Abidjan we quickly got word to Monrovia.  
23 ECOMOG agreed and informal ceasefire went into effect. When it  
24 was announced, an NPFL spokesman said, 'With the United States  
16:15:25 25 involved, we can have peace'. The implication of the American  
26 brokered ceasefire was that we would continue the process as  
27 mediators. Taylor, at least, saw it that way. The ECOMOG  
28 governments did not seem to mind an American brokering role  
29 either, although they considered themselves neutral parties too.

1           Unfortunately, US policy promptly defaulted to the position  
2 prior to my fact-finding mission. My US brokered ceasefire was  
3 disowned at the national security committee level which correctly  
4 saw it as a slippery slope to full involvement or taking charge  
16:16:10 5 of Liberia. Needless to say, while my superiors in the State  
6 Department were quietly smirking, the folks over in the National  
7 Security Council, especially Deputy National Security Adviser Bob  
8 Gates, were furious at me for going beyond my mandate. Thus was  
9 the second favourable window of opportunity slammed shut by the  
16:16:34 10 National Security Council.

11           With the United States once again abdicating a leadership  
12 role, the situation continued to degrade. Trying to take  
13 advantage of the informal ceasefire, ECOMOG called for political  
14 negotiations in Freetown on 27 September, but Taylor refused to  
16:16:56 15 attend, apparently because of the US absence. With no peace  
16 talks, ECOMOG had to undertake a limited military offensive,  
17 because NPFL lines were too close to the port. Their guns could  
18 hit any part of the ECOMOG contingent. Consequently, ECOMOG,  
19 with the help of Prince Johnson's INPFL, spent most of October  
16:17:20 20 pushing the NPFL away from Monrovia to a security arc, placing  
21 the city beyond artillery range.

22           In the summer of 1990, our very able Liberia task force  
23 director Jim Bishop left to take up his post as ambassador in  
24 Somalia. Replacing him was another African veteran, Ambassador  
16:17:56 25 Donald Petterson. In early October I sent Petterson to West  
26 Africa on a tour depicted as a follow-up to September trip. I  
27 gave him a letter imploring President Houphouet-Boigny to do  
28 something about Liberia. By this time, Houphouet surely  
29 understood that his protege Charles Taylor could not gain power

1 without ECOMOG cooperation.

2 Petterson told Taylor himself that it was unrealistic to  
3 expect ECOMOG to fade away and he should therefore accept  
4 negotiations. Taylor was adamant. He would speak to anyone

16:18:33 5 about peace, but not to ECOMOG."

6 Did you say that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Why?

9 A. Well, ECOMOG was involved in the war, so how do you speak  
16:18:44 10 to them? I said all along I really wanted people who could cause  
11 peace to happen. Here is the United States, backing out, backing  
12 out, backing up. You come to Africa. You make a decision. You  
13 get our commitment. You go back and you say your National  
14 Security Council says you went beyond the mandate. So you want  
16:19:04 15 us to talk to people who are not capable of being neutral.

16 So they are all just playing games with us. And a lot of  
17 these things here could have stopped a long time had they stuck  
18 with the policy that we just agreed upon. So I said no, the  
19 fight in Liberia is with ECOMOG now because ECOMOG has taken  
16:19:23 20 sides. So we want to talk to neutral people.

21 Q. "Petterson told Taylor himself that it was unrealistic to  
22 expect ECOMOG to fade away and he should therefore accept  
23 negotiations. Taylor was adamant. He would speak to anyone  
24 about peace, but not to ECOMOG. Houphouet's response to my  
16:19:49 25 letter was to call an ECOWAS summit conference for 15 October  
26 1990 in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire. The Anglophone countries in  
27 Guinea saw Houphouet's move as a ploy to discredit ECOMOG and  
28 therefore boycotted the conference, thereby aborting it.

29 Houphouet later said that he had called the meeting only at



1 the request of the United States. Increasingly the war was  
2 becoming a surrogate fight between Cote d'Ivoire/Burkina and  
3 Nigeria/Ghana. In any event, Houphouet, now partially pregnant,  
4 as it were, was beginning to take responsibility for the problems  
16:20:32 5 he himself had helped create. At that particular time, however,  
6 we had a good reason for taking a soft line with Houphouet.  
7 Cote d'Ivoire was one of three African nations then on the UN  
8 Security Council. The United States was counting on them to  
9 support a war against Iraq, making it impossible for us to get  
16:20:57 10 tough with them over Libya. They were under Secretary Baker's  
11 protection."

12 What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor? I see you  
13 shaking your head.

14 A. Interest. We talk about these interests all the time. The  
16:21:18 15 United States' interest in getting a resolution against Iraq  
16 stopped them from making a very important - from taking a very  
17 important decision in helping to stop the war in Liberia, because  
18 they felt they couldn't pressurise three non-permanent members on  
19 the Security Council. That's how it works. That's why I say  
16:21:37 20 that's not law now. That's strictly politics.

21 And we were dying and yearning for peace, agreeing to  
22 ceasefires and all and the decision has got nothing to do with  
23 people dying in Liberia. It has to do with we want to go to  
24 Iraq, so let's leave them alone for now. So it's just - it's  
16:21:58 25 terrible.

26 Q. Let's just jump a few paragraphs and go to the penultimate  
27 paragraph on that page:

28 "For most of 1991, what seemed like an endless series of  
29 peace conferences took place in several African capitals under

1 the ECOWAS umbrella. There were so many conferences that we  
2 started numbering them (Yamoussoukro I, II, III. Banjul I and II  
3 and so on). The results were all the same. There was always to  
4 be a ceasefire agreement followed by the formation of an all  
16:22:37 5 parties interim government and an election under international  
6 supervision. Beforehand, the armies were to encamp their troops  
7 and disarm to ECOMOG.

8 Charles Taylor came to most of the meetings and signed the  
9 final documents. The trouble always came later when he found  
16:22:55 10 excuses for reneging."

11 True?

12 A. This is not true.

13 Q. "His bottom-line demand was always the same. He must be  
14 the interim President." True?

16:23:09 15 A. Yes, very true.

16 Q. Why you?

17 A. Because I felt that the NPFL, after having captured the  
18 whole country, after having said that we were not really  
19 interested in power, that I would not contest a democratic  
16:23:30 20 election, I wanted to make sure that I guaranteed that return to  
21 democracy and put in all of the framework required for that.

22 That other than that, it would not have been accomplished and I  
23 wanted to make sure. You want it, I will not run, but I will be  
24 the interim President and make sure that we put in everything  
16:23:50 25 that was needed for the democratic process.

26 Q. Over the page:

27 "Between October 1990 and September 1991, the United States  
28 remained relatively passive in Liberia. Though we took no  
29 responsibility for anything beyond relief, we presumed we had a

1 right to look over everyone's shoulder and criticise. If our  
2 historic relationship with Liberia meant anything, we thought, it  
3 gave us the right to tell everybody else what to do. At one  
4 point we even considered bringing the Liberia issue to the UN  
16:24:32 5 Security Council. We asked the Soviets to be our stalking horse  
6 for informal consultations. They even came back to say that Cote  
7 d'Ivoire, one of the three African members on the council, was  
8 adamantly opposed and had enough support among the non-aligned  
9 members to keep Liberia off the agenda. So much for superpower  
16:24:58 10 hegemony.

11 In June 1991, I encountered Burkina Faso President Blaise  
12 Compaore in Abidjan. We talked about Liberia and I asked him  
13 about Burkina's arms supply to Taylor. Compaore said he had  
14 decided to support Taylor in 1989 because he found the Doe regime  
16:25:24 15 in Liberia hopelessly repressive and corrupt. At the time,  
16 getting rid of Doe seemed a good deed, but the operation had  
17 turned hideously wrong. Regrettably, instead of entering a new  
18 era, Liberia had become a disaster. Left unsaid was Compaore's  
19 commitment to continue aiding Taylor until final victory.  
16:25:47 20 Despite my urging, he had invested too much to stop in  
21 midstream."

22 What do you say about that observation, Mr Taylor?

23 A. That's not totally right.

24 Q. But did you not remain - did Blaise Compaore not remain a  
16:26:06 25 supporter of yours?

26 A. Yes, but not to the extent that he is talking about, no.  
27 Once Roberts International Airport fell in our hands, we were  
28 able to get what we wanted during that time. So it did not take  
29 Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso helped during the initial stages, I

1 would say throughout this period of 1990, but once we took the  
2 airport we were able to get material.

3 Q. From where?

4 A. You buy material - we got in some material from - the first  
16:26:44 5 set of material we got in - we got a small amount from Burkina  
6 that came in. We got some from Libya. At that particular time,  
7 about one or so flight. And then we bought some weapons out of  
8 Lebanon. Most of the weapons we bought out of Lebanon at the  
9 time.

16:27:11 10 Q. Last paragraph:

11 "In September 1991, the third Yamoussoukro peace conference  
12 whetted our appetite for renewed involvement. For a change,  
13 Taylor was cooperating, negotiating diligently with interim  
14 President Amos Sawyer on the composition of an electoral  
16:27:32 15 commission and supreme court. Moreover, everyone took seriously  
16 Taylor's apprehensions about disarming to the Nigerians, whom he  
17 considered biased. Thus there was serious talk about  
18 reconfiguring ECOMOG to include troops from countries not  
19 previously implicated in Liberia, such as Senegal and  
16:27:57 20 Guinea-Bissau. Taylor himself said, 'Send me the Senegalese  
21 troops and I will be happy to disarm to them, because they are  
22 trustworthy'."

23 Did you say that?

24 A. Yes, I did.

16:28:11 25 Q. "President Bush's strong personal relationship with  
26 President Abdou Diouf of Senegal was pivotal to our possible  
27 contribution to a new Liberian peace process. Secretary Baker  
28 told me in early 1989 that Bush considered Diouf one of Africa's  
29 most reasonable and intelligent statesmen. The two had seen a

1 lot of each other during Bush's many visits to Africa as  
2 Vice-President. Diouf was, therefore, one of the few Africans  
3 Bush invited for a state visit. I was also friendly with Diouf,  
4 having been American ambassador during 1977-1980."

16:29:00 5 It goes on to talk about the Americans agreeing to finance  
6 such an involvement. Over the page, second paragraph:

7 Consequence of that was:

8 "That the Senegal lease deployment took place in November  
9 1991 over the objections of the French military, jealous of  
16:29:27 10 US-Senegalese collaboration. The French also knew that the  
11 operation would place Senegal in direct opposition to the  
12 pro-Taylor policy of Cote d'Ivoire, France's other important  
13 regional client. Although hopeful, we had our own doubts,  
14 reflected in a State Department message to Embassy Monrovia:

16:29:51 15 'If Taylor balks once Senegalese troops have been deployed  
16 at his request, we shall consider appropriate US responses, which  
17 could include public censure, formal recognition of IGNU' --

18 What's IGNU, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That's IGNU, the Interim Government of National Unity.

16:30:15 20 Q. "... presentation of Ambassador Peter de Vos's  
21 credentials, jawboning of US companies against doing business in  
22 Taylor land, and consideration of appropriate sanctions against  
23 such firms. Senegalese troops' --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's getting on to the end of the tape  
16:30:34 25 now.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. I will pause there. Shame we  
27 couldn't finish the last few pages.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

29 Mr Taylor, just before we adjourn, I will remind you that

1 you are ordered not to discuss your evidence with any other  
2 person.

3 We will adjourn now until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

4 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.

16:31:09 5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 25 August 2009 at  
6 9.30 a.m.]

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## I N D E X

### WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	27399
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	27399