



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 25 AUGUST 2009
9.33 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr William Romans
Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Terry Munyard
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Tuesday, 25 August 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.]

09:34:22 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,
6 please.

7 MR BANGURA: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours, and
8 counsel opposite. Mr President, this morning for the Prosecution
9 are myself, Mohamed A Bangura, Mr Christopher Santora and our
09:34:44 10 case manager, Ms Maja Dimitrova. Thank you.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Bangura.

12 Yes, Mr Griffiths.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
14 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself, Courtenay
09:34:55 15 Griffiths, assisted by Mr Morris Anyah and Mr Terry Munyard, and
16 with us again today is Mr Liam Loughlin.

17 Mr President, can I say for the record that it's at my
18 request that we are starting a few minutes late this morning. I
19 communicated that request through the Court officers, and can I
09:35:14 20 express my gratitude to the Court for that indulgence.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

22 Mr Taylor, just before you are asked any further questions,
23 I will remind you that you're bound by your declaration to tell
24 the truth.

25 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

26 [On former affirmation]

27 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

28 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday we spent a little time going through a
29 chapter of a book written by Herman J Cohen, Intervening in

1 Africa, and I'd like us, please, to return to that chapter in
2 order to conclude it. And we're in binder 2 of 4 for week 33
3 behind divider 102. Could we go, please, to page 159. Do you
4 have it, Mr Taylor?

09:36:48 5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. Now, we'd reached that section where there was discussion
7 about the deployment of Senegalese troops in Liberia because it
8 was felt that they would give a greater appearance of neutrality.
9 Is that correct, Mr Taylor?

09:37:12 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. And if we just pick it up in the third paragraph on that
12 page:

13 "It Taylor balks once Senegalese forces have been deployed
14 at his request, we will consider appropriate US responses, which
09:37:32 15 could include public censure, formal recognition of IGNU,
16 presentation of Ambassador de Vos's credentials, jawboning of US
17 companies against doing business in Taylorland and consideration
18 of appropriate sanctions against such firms."

19 Can I pause there. What does the word "jawboning" mean in
09:38:02 20 that context, Mr Taylor? It's not a phrase I'm accustomed to.

21 A. That's just the way around harass. That's just maybe
22 synonymous with a type of harassment, where you would say
23 probably unfavourable things about them, about those companies
24 and make them appear as being less worthy of the things that
09:38:23 25 they're claiming and probably stepping on some of their attempts
26 to get bank loans to do business in the country. That's really
27 tantamount to harassment I would call it.

28 Q. Okay:

29 "Senegalese troops moved into NPFL-controlled territory

1 slowly, although some roads were opened and some progress
2 registered. A Liberia policy review meeting on 22 January 1992,
3 chaired by Len Robinson, expressed disappointment with the slow
4 progress. Some participants wanted to declare that Taylor was
09:39:05 5 stalling, but Peter de Vos counseled patience. Nevertheless,
6 talks of ways to pressure Taylor was quite lively as disillusion
7 returned.

8 The breaking point for ECOWAS, the Senegalese and the
9 United States came in May 1992 when six Senegalese soldiers on
09:39:33 10 patrol in NPFL-controlled territory were deliberately killed in a
11 village called Vanum."

12 Do you recall that incident, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, but this is - he's wrong about - this is - I think
14 that should have been Vahun. I recall the incident.

09:39:53 15 Q. And were there six Senegalese soldiers killed?

16 A. Yes, there were six Senegalese soldiers killed.

17 Q. In what circumstance?

18 A. Vahun, if you look at the map, Vahun is way to the northern
19 end of Liberia on the Sierra Leonean border. It's in the midst
09:40:16 20 of the forest. Actually, there was still some insurgency
21 activities going on in the area. And, quite frankly, we do not
22 even know for real - even though it was in our area, we took
23 responsibility and tried to sort out who did it, but we still
24 believed that this could have been by an insurgent, a ULIMO
09:40:40 25 attack on the Senegalese forces to force us into this particular
26 problem.

27 Q. "Captured after discovering an NPFL arms cache illegal
28 under the Yamoussoukro III agreement, they were brutally
29 executed. This act confirmed what we had already deduced.

1 Taylor had gone back to his old ways, toughing it out in the
2 bush, in the expectation that everyone else would get tired and
3 leave. After promising to cooperate if the Senegalese would
4 provide neutral peacekeeping service, Taylor's deliberate killing
5 of Senegalese soldiers was the last straw."

6 You will see there, Mr Taylor, it is being suggested that
7 there was nothing accidental about the death of those men. It
8 was quite deliberate.

9 A. No, it's not true. That was not true. They had already
09:41:36 10 made up their minds. That was not true. We really wanted to
11 work with these people. We avoided them. That was not true, and
12 that's why we still believe that it was ULIMO that did this.
13 There was no arrest. There was an ambush of these people.

14 Q. "By the end of 1992, the overall environment in Liberia had
09:41:57 15 changed drastically. ECOWAS began discussing sanctions against
16 Taylor. Facing protracted war, ECOMOG distributed arms to the
17 IGNU, ULIMO and AFL."

18 Did you know about that, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes, but - yes, I knew about this, but this is exactly what
09:42:20 20 Herman Cohen speaks about in the first paragraph that you read.
21 This was a plan that they had made, a formal recognition of IGNU.
22 IGNU is the Interim Government of National Unity.

23 Q. Is this the government headed by Amos Sawyer?

24 A. That is correct, that had been selected in The Gambia. We
09:42:45 25 had people there. So that's one threat that they're carrying
26 out. Even the presentation of the letters of credence to IGNU
27 was also pre-planned, so this whole process, I want to believe,
28 was provoked by the United States at that time because of their
29 policy. And they are making it appear as if this is ECOMOG, but

1 these - ECOMOG would not - in fact, not ECOMOG. The West African
2 countries would not have done that except it had been
3 deliberately pushed by this decision that had been taken in
4 Washington. This is what is going on.

09:43:23 5 Q. "The AFL received back all of the arms ECOMOG had
6 confiscated in 1990. For its part, the NPFL was resupplied
7 massively by air through Robertsfield airfield."

8 Do you accept that?

9 A. No, not massively. We did receive some supplies, yes.

09:43:45 10 Q. Through Robertsfield airfield?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. "The Gaddafi spigot remained wide open, and the transit
13 points through Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire continued to be
14 available. Taylor received sufficient arms to launch a major,
09:44:08 15 quite damaging offensive on 15 October 1992. He came dangerously
16 close to Monrovia but was pushed back. The net effect was to
17 persuade Nigeria and Ghana to escalate their military effort and
18 prolong the stalemate."

19 Did you launch such an offensive in October 1992,
09:44:32 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. October 1992, yes. That's after we got fed up. This is
22 the famous Octopus that --

23 Q. Octopus?

24 A. This has to be - October 1992, that's Operation Octopus.

09:44:51 25 Q. Operation Octopus. And what was the objective of Operation
26 Octopus?

27 A. When you see how these people write, it can be very, very
28 terrible. Herman Cohen writes this as if the NPFL armed, and as
29 a result of the NPFL arming, ECOMOG had to give arms back to the

1 AFL, gave arms to IGNU and ULIMO and all of these. It's the
2 reverse of that.

3 After they pulled this prank by re-arming all of those that
4 were fighting us, the AFL, they armed the IGNU government, they
09:45:32 5 then armed ULIMO, we then decided that this was it and that we
6 were not going to permit them to actually get deployed in
7 theatre, we were going to end this war, and we launched an attack
8 to end the war, yes.

9 Q. And the objective --

09:45:49 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Who re-armed these groups?

11 THE WITNESS: As it's being said here in this document,
12 your Honour, ECOMOG armed all of those that had been fighting us.
13 If you look in that paragraph, they re-armed ULIMO, they re-armed
14 the AFL, all the arms that they had taken from the AFL, they gave
09:46:12 15 them back, and the so-called IGNU government through a force that
16 they called the Black Beret that had been trained in Guinea for
17 their government. Everyone was armed. And the whole point was,
18 now we're going to push Taylor out. So we decided that we will
19 end the war and we launched Operation Octopus to take Monrovia.

09:46:33 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. But it didn't succeed.

22 A. Well, we did not succeed because we declared a ceasefire,
23 but we retook most of the areas that had been taken from us by
24 ECOMOG under the claim earlier in this document, on yesterday,
09:46:47 25 you read where they said that they had pushed us out of artillery
26 range, we recaptured those positions. And then this is what
27 actually forced the negotiations for the setting up of a
28 Government of National Unity in Cotonou.

29 Q. "In November 1992 ECOWAS took the Liberia issue to the

1 United Nations Security Council, where it obtained endorsements
2 for its mission and an arms embargo on Taylor. In addition, the
3 council agreed to sponsor deployment of non-ECOWAS peacekeepers,
4 namely, from Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, to entice Taylor into
09:47:34 5 cooperating. The three African Security Council members took the
6 lead in this flurry of activity.

7 On 24 February 1993, soon after taking office, President
8 Clinton signed a directive calling for a Liberia policy review by
9 the now renamed Interagency Working Group (IWG). This last
09:48:00 10 interagency policy review meeting, over which I presided, the
11 first IWG on Liberia, noted that the United States had spent \$203
12 million for Liberian relief over three years, and \$28.65 million
13 for peacekeeping. The ECOMOG operation had cost over \$500
14 million, most of which was provided by Nigeria. The IWG
09:48:30 15 concluded that the forces of ECOMOG and the armed factions of AFL
16 and ULIMO were together stronger than the NPFL, but not strong
17 enough to defeat it. Continued stalemate could thus be expected.
18 Taylor apparently expected a new elected civilian regime in
19 Nigeria in June 1993 to pull out of Liberia, thereby handing
09:48:55 20 victory to the NPFL by default."

21 Did you have that expectation, Mr Taylor?

22 A. No, I did not. I did not. I think that we knew that
23 Nigeria was committed to staying in for peace. No, this is
24 wrong.

09:49:10 25 Q. "In those circumstances, the United States had no
26 alternative but to continue supporting ECOWAS."

27 This was his last involvement in Liberia policy before he
28 was replaced.

29 "A military coup in August 1993 aborted the expected

1 transition to a civilian democratic regime in Nigeria, dashing
2 Taylor's hopes for a Nigerian pull-out. Negotiations and war
3 continued until mid-1992, when fatigue finally overtook all the
4 parties."

09:49:49 5 That military coup in August 1993, Mr Taylor, who did it
6 bring to power in Nigeria?

7 A. 1993, that would be - that could be Abacha. That could be
8 Abacha.

9 Q. Sani Abacha?

09:50:12 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. "On 21 April 1996, a high-level US delegation, headed by
12 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary William Twaddell, arrived in
13 Monrovia to lend its good offices to efforts to revive previous
14 accords. Twaddell carried with him a conditional promise to

09:50:36 15 provide \$30 million in US assistance as an incentive to the
16 parties to resume the transition. This was the first such

17 official act of diplomatic intervention by the United States
18 since the Senegalese project four years earlier. The lure of
19 America's historical tie to Liberia had proved irresistible to

09:51:03 20 the Clintonites, unlike Bush's people. The impact was dramatic.

21 The transition was resumed, leading to a presidential election in
22 July 1997, considered cleanly run and basically free and fair.

23 The winner was none other than Charles Taylor, the man we had
24 wanted to install as President in 1990."

09:51:34 25 Now, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind what the writer says then,

26 that they had wanted to install you in 1990, yet the war

27 continued on until July 1997, how do you view those years between
28 1990 and '97 from the viewpoint of a Liberian?

29 A. Mixed signals. It's like seeing a beautiful woman; you

1 want her and you never approach her and expect that you're going
2 to fall in love together. I mean, they just had missteps. We
3 were never - there was nothing that the Americans did. We had
4 gone after the Americans. Remember, from the day we launched the
09:52:16 5 revolution we had Tom Woweiyu write. That is exhibited here on
6 the record. I spoke, and he said here in his book to them many,
7 many times. He came to me, I said, "Listen, if you guys get
8 involved, we'll surrender to the United States forces. We want
9 this war to come to an end. We will preside over the transition.
09:52:37 10 I will not run for the presidency. I want to make sure that the
11 process is put into place."

12 But behind these talks always you find this confusion of
13 information, intelligence reports, and sometimes disinformation
14 is repeated so many times that you never understand what the real
09:53:03 15 American policy is. Now, quite frankly, I never understood that
16 they were interested in me becoming President in the early 1990s.
17 Never understood it that way. Every time we met there was always
18 some ambiguity - total ambiguity from time to time.

19 Now, it's shocking to hear the man responsible for Africa
09:53:25 20 policy saying that. From a Liberian perspective, we felt that
21 the United States really didn't want to be bothered with the
22 internal problem and just ceded their activities off to ECOWAS
23 that had put in place a policy based on Jawara - that's
24 President's Jawara's own influence as ECOWAS chairman at the time
09:53:53 25 that this uprising in Liberia was put in place to destabilise
26 West Africa. Kari ba Jawara caused this whole misinformation
27 about what the real objective of the NPFL was. When you tie that
28 to the Cold War mentality that, Oh, Libya helped them, I don't
29 think that the United States - and I would disagree with Herman

1 Cohen here - I do not think, when the United States got to find
2 out that we had been trained by Libya, was interested in seeing
3 me take power. I disagree with him, and I think they know that.
4 Even the gentleman mentioned here, Len Robinson - I have talked
09:54:35 5 about Len Robinson in this Court. In that famous meeting, the
6 pictures were exhibited in this Court where we went to Senegal
7 and I met then President Abdou Diouf. We met Len Robinson in
8 Dakar and Len Robinson, I have mentioned to this Court, asked me,
9 "Why didn't you just make Monrovia at the beginning?" I said,
09:54:58 10 "Well, Herman Cohen came and asked me not to do it." And Len
11 Robinson said to me, "You should not have listened to him." So
12 these kinds of mixed signals, as a Liberian, based on your
13 question, I do not think we had any clear indication that the
14 Americans wanted: One, an end to this; or either, on the second
09:55:15 15 hand, that Charles Taylor, who had been formally trained by the
16 Libyans, so to speak, or having his men trained, would take over
17 the leadership. The signals were just not clear. I would
18 disagree.

19 Q. And then it continues:

09:55:32 20 "Post-mortem: Could Liberia have been spared? The
21 May-June 1990 decision that the United States would not play a
22 leading role in peacemaking in Liberia was a big mistake. If we
23 had been allowed to pursue the plan adopted in the interagency
24 process to persuade Doe to go into exile, thus opening the door
09:55:54 25 for Taylor to take power, years of devastating civil war might
26 have been prevented. And without the collateral need for ECOWAS
27 peacekeeping, a Francophone-Anglophone surrogate war could also
28 have been prevented.

29 As the civil war continued year after year, Liberia became

1 increasingly brutalised, hugely escalating human hardship."

2 Do you agree with that assessment, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes, I do. I do.

09:56:30

4 Q. You agree that the war had the consequence of brutalising
5 the Liberian people?

09:56:53

6 A. Well, if you look here, I think this is really - he's
7 speaking figuratively here when he says "Liberia became
8 increasingly brutalised". I think this figure of speech I would
9 agree with, not in terms of just personal. The whole nation as a
10 nation state, whether it is political, economic, this is how I
11 read this figure of speech here as the country, which will
12 include to a part the people, but the entire infrastructure,
13 everything, I think, is how I would read this, and I would agree
14 with that.

09:57:06

15 Q. Well, we'll come to deal with the infrastructure in the
16 next paragraph:

09:57:27

17 "Had Taylor been allowed to take power in 1990, would he
18 have been the same spoiler he became in his role of warlord?" he
19 asks rhetorically. "That is difficult to say, but the
20 destruction of Liberia would have been avoided, and Taylor might
21 have been more open to constructive external influence.

09:57:51

22 In 1993, Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft,
23 told journalist Reed Kramer that he had feared a permanent US
24 burden in Liberia if we had taken responsibility in 1990 for a
25 change of regime. In other words, he thought US troops would
26 have been needed indefinitely as peacekeepers. That was not
27 evident at the time, nor did it ever become evident in later
28 years. I regret that Robert Gates, as chairman of the National
29 Security Council's Deputies Committee, did not engage in dialogue

1 on this subject within the committee. If he had, I believe we
2 could have reached consensus on a limited, low-cost diplomatic
3 operation. Had the change in regime not succeeded in stabilising
4 Liberia, a UN peacekeeping option would probably have been
09:58:36 5 feasible. Although ECOWAS committed the troops, which remained
6 bogged down in Liberia until the 1997 elections, the United
7 States did not get off cheaply. As so often happens, failure to
8 practice less costly conflict prevention resulted in US
9 humanitarian relief expenditures of several hundred millions of
09:59:01 10 dollars. But as some congressional staffers kept telling us,
11 humanitarian relief is a different budgetary line item.

12 Another key element in the US policy process on Liberia was
13 the failure of those agencies having expensive, and supposedly
14 indispensable, facilities in Liberia - the CIA, USIA and the
09:59:35 15 Defence Department for the Coast Guard - to speak up in favour of
16 an aggressive policy. If they had protested the White House's
17 decision, the diplomatic intervention option might have carried
18 greater weight. Their refusal to defend their own agency
19 interests constituted a death blow to any but a passive US
10:00:01 20 voice."

21 Now, pausing there. Mr Taylor, is the Robert Gates
22 referred to there the same Robert.

23 Gates who is now the Secretary of Defence in the United
24 States?

10:00:17 25 A. That is correct. It's the same Bob Gates, yes.

26 Q. "Once we decided not to take the lead and the ECOMOG forces
27 had intervened, our policy of support for the West Africans' own
28 effort was correct. Our contributions to ECOWAS peacekeeping
29 were modest, but we carried the major burden of significant

1 humanitarian assistance. Our financial support for the
2 Senegalese troop deployment in 1991-92 was a major contribution
3 to the peace effort, but served only to prove that Taylor was
4 unwilling to cooperate with any process that did not guarantee
10:00:58 5 him power in advance."

6 Do you accept that?

7 A. I do not. I disagree. I disagree with him. That was --

8 Q. But, Mr Taylor, why launch that war if you did not want to
9 take power?

10:01:15 10 A. But that's not what he's saying. We launched the war
11 because we wanted to take power, but we did not want to take
12 power in an illegitimate fashion. Our whole point was to launch
13 the revolution, hold over and go into democratic elections. We
14 were not looking for a military junta. I was never a military

10:01:42 15 man. The principal people, Defence Minister Tom Womeiyu, were
16 not military, and so what we tried to do from day one, what most
17 of these little revolutions that are unguided do not do, we set
18 out from day one what our objectives were. So this was not a
19 matter of a power grab. We went in with a revolution. This was

10:02:07 20 not a coup d'etat. And the whole process was to lay the
21 framework, okay, for a democratic transition. This was it. And
22 we even said that after that time we would not participate. I
23 think you hardly find that anywhere in the world right now.

24 Q. "When it became clear that Taylor considered ECOMOG an
10:02:34 25 adversary rather than a peacemaker, we might have played the role
26 of honest broker and mediator. But even that possibility was
27 aborted by the National Security Council after my brief effort to
28 broker a ceasefire in September 1990. We could have done a
29 better job in the use of pressure and publicity designed to

1 embarrass Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire into cutting off the
2 arms flow to Taylor. The need for Cote d'Ivoire's vote in the
3 United States Security Council against Iraq was a deterrent until
4 the end of 1990, but we had no need for reticence towards Burkina
10:03:17 5 Faso.

6 The chilling effect of a White House stop order penetrates
7 deeply. In Liberia, we thus remained on the sidelines, making
8 gratuitous comments to the main players, refusing responsibility
9 and speculating on what might have been."

10:03:43 10 Now, Mr Taylor, we've come to the end of that chapter on
11 Liberia. Now, not everything in that chapter is flattering to
12 you, is it?

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 Q. But, in general terms, how do you view Mr Cohen's review of
10:04:02 15 events during the Liberian civil war? In general terms.

16 A. Yes. Even now, even from the first day that I read this
17 thing, it just - I marvelled at some of the processes used by
18 these people that cause a lot of problems to little countries and
19 probably little regions of the world. I mean, it makes you
10:04:40 20 scared to see - this was the man responsible for Africa, and a
21 lot of these things I really got to know when I read the book.

22 And it was chilling for me to see that a lot of things go on
23 behind the scenes that you do not know, decisions are taken, and
24 sometimes these decisions are not taken based on the natural fact
10:05:03 25 of the matter but maybe on - maybe who dominates the meeting at
26 that time. Because you meet these people, you discuss with them
27 and then you hear something come and you wonder, "But, wait a
28 minute, how did they come up with that?" So, for me, this was
29 chilling.

1 As it is, even right now, to see all the lost opportunities
2 that they had, and then you begin to wonder about 20/20 hindsight
3 that what else happened to Liberia? What else happened to other
4 countries that - we get to know this now, after the fact. But at
10:05:39 5 the time, thousands of Liberians died, when this war could have
6 been ended almost in 1990, the very first year. After we moved
7 in, we begged them. We said, "Come in. You are our biggest
8 ally." For me, still, it's a chilling effect.

9 As he describes it here, it's a chilling effect on Liberia.

10:06:04 10 And me, as one that was involved with that crisis that did
11 everything to stop it and could not stop it and became vilified
12 somewhere along the way - even Herman Cohen doesn't speak here
13 about our meeting when we met when he came into the bush to me in
14 Liberia and he said to me, "When you take Roberts International
10:06:27 15 Airport, this is going to be a sign that Doe is finished, we will
16 encourage him to leave." To a great extent, he did.

17 And when Doe left and got to the Freeport, when ECOMOG had
18 arrived, and was killed, a lot of people - it scared me. A lot
19 of us felt that Doe was killed to make way for the interim
10:06:50 20 government that had been agreed upon in The Gambia, because he
21 was killed being guarded by, what, by ECOMOG. Doe was killed -
22 he was captured by Prince Johnson - while he was being guarded by
23 ECOMOG in the Freeport. So you expect us to trust ECOMOG when
24 ECOMOG has seen the President - he was still President - killed
10:07:13 25 at that particular time when they were guarding him?

26 So it's - I mean, in short, counsel, it's still chilling
27 for me. And I think as Liberians get to know the
28 behind-the-scene decisions that were taken during that period
29 have a lot to wonder about.

1 Q. Very well. Mr Taylor, I'm hoping that we can soon close
2 the book so far as events in Liberia are concerned. There are
3 one or two other loose ends that we need to tie up, but for the
4 most part, I hope that we can now move on and concentrate on
10:07:53 5 issues more directly relevant to the indictment.

6 A. Yes.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before I move on, however, can I ask,
8 please, that that chapter from Herman Cohen's book, "Intervening
9 in Africa, Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent", be
10:08:16 10 marked for identification MFI-192.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-192.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now, we're at the end of the year 2000, Mr Taylor. We have
14 three more years to go, in effect, but I want us now to take on,
10:08:46 15 head on, another issue. Now, you told us that - we discussed
16 yesterday briefly the panel of experts report set up at the
17 request of the United Nations. Do you recall that?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. And that report of the panel of experts was adopted on 20
10:09:24 20 December in the year 2000. Do you recall that?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Now, I have here exhibit P-18, which we looked at briefly
23 yesterday in terms of the members of the panel. I would like us
24 now to go back, please, to this document. What I'd like us to do
10:10:15 25 is, can we first of all go to the contents page. Now, Mr Taylor,
26 you see that after dealing with one or two preliminary matters in
27 the first 15 pages, the first substantial heading is diamonds,
28 "Sierra Leone diamonds". Do you see that?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. Now, we have not in this Court spent any great deal of time
2 looking at this document. I would like us now to do exactly
3 that. Could we go, please, to page 16.

4 Yes, I think we can put away this volume for now.

10:11:35 5 Yes, can we go to page 16, please. Now, in due course,
6 Mr Taylor, it's right, isn't it, as you mentioned yesterday, that
7 your government made a response to this document?

8 A. That is correct, we did.

9 Q. What aspect of this report particularly troubled your
10:12:12 10 government?

11 A. Some of the conclusions reached based on the information
12 that they had presented led us to believing that there was
13 basically something wrong, because the issue had never been that
14 diamonds had been sold on the world market under the general
10:12:42 15 framework as being Liberian diamonds. It is also stated in this
16 report that they realised that diamonds had come from other areas
17 and under a particular registry. With that information, the
18 conclusion reached, that my government should have known and was
19 responsible, was a little off for us. We couldn't understand how
10:13:04 20 that panel could have come up with such decision. So it was
21 troubling for us.

22 Q. Okay. Let's tackle this head on then:

23 "Sierra Leone diamonds. Background. Each year, over 250
24 million carats of diamonds are mined worldwide. Even in its peak
10:13:25 25 years of production during the 1960s, Sierra Leone never produced
26 more than 2 million carats annually. But a high proportion of
27 Sierra Leone's diamonds are gemstones of very high quality and
28 value and they are much sought after. During the 1970s and
29 1980s, the Sierra Leone diamond industry fell prey to corruption

1 and mismanagement and many of the country's diamonds were
2 exported illegally."

3 Pause there. Now, during the '70s and '80s, Mr Taylor,
4 where were you?

10:14:02 5 A. I was in the United States most of this time.

6 Q. Despite that location, were you aware of any Liberian
7 involvement in those years in that illegal trade in diamonds
8 emanating from Sierra Leone?

9 A. Well, illegal is one thing. I think to put it into
10:14:34 10 context, diamonds now as they're being considered worldwide is a
11 major issue. At the period in question, we're talking about the
12 '70s and the '80s and even during the '60s, and to a great extent
13 I may even say today, the movement of diamonds across these
14 borders is not considered illegal. Never was at that particular
10:15:04 15 time. Liberia was a centre for the purchase of diamonds through
16 de Beers in the presence of the United States dollar. Sierra
17 Leoneans came across the border without being hampered to buy
18 diamonds and to sell diamonds into Liberia. Guineans came, from
19 all over.

10:15:27 20 So the matter of the "illegal trade of diamonds" was never
21 considered until in recent years after the crisis erupted. So it
22 was very well known, it was public knowledge that diamonds were
23 being moved between these nations. The Gambia, Mali, Senegal,
24 Ghana, la Cote d'Ivoire, all of these countries, the movement of
10:15:55 25 diamonds in the West African region was not "considered illegal".
26 So it was very well known by everybody.

27 Q. Very well:

28 "Between 1992 and 1996, average annual exports were less
29 than 200,000 carats and the per carat value was significantly

1 less than the country's known run of mine average. Not only were
2 the bulk of the country's diamonds being smuggled out, but the
3 emphasis in smuggling seemed to be on higher value diamonds.

4 Between 1997 and 1999, the situation worsened because of
10:16:47 5 the war. In those three years, a total of only 36,384 carats
6 were exported officially.

7 The Revolutionary United Front initiated the war in 1991.
8 Until 1995, RUF diamond mining and digging was probably done on a
9 sporadic and individual basis. By 1995, however, the RUF and its
10:17:16 10 patrons were clearly taking a much greater interest in the
11 diamond fields of Kono District and had to be removed forcefully
12 at that time by the private military company Executive Outcomes.
13 From then on, the RUF interest in diamonds became more focused,
14 especially with the 1997 imprisonment of Foday Sankoh in Nigeria.

10:17:41 15 During his imprisonment and subsequently, the diamond areas of
16 Kono and Tongo Field became a primary military focus of the RUF,
17 and diamond mining became a major fundraising exercise."

18 Let us pause there and let us remind ourselves of
19 something. Now, do you recall, Mr Taylor - and I don't ask
10:18:19 20 everyone to turn it up but I'll remind everyone - in the
21 documents disclosed for week 30, behind divider 5 is that letter
22 from Foday Sankoh to Brother Mohamed Talibi dated 4 December 1996
23 and in the very last paragraph of that:

24 "When I went in last week, I was able to organise serious
10:18:46 25 mining operations in precious metals, which I believe will help
26 us to generate the needed foreign exchange for our mission."

27 That's written in December 1996 and we go back to that paragraph
28 now and we see:

29 "... diamonds became more focused, especially with the 1997

1 imprisonment of Foday Sankoh in Nigeria. This finding is
2 supported by the tenacious military hold that the RUF has
3 maintained on Kono District and Tongo Field, the two most
4 valuable diamonds areas in Sierra Leone. It is borne out in the
10:19:33 5 written and oral testimony of current and past RUF leaders. It
6 is supported by the testimony of chiefs and elders from Kono
7 District, who are in daily communication with travellers from
8 their areas. It is borne out in written reports made by RUF
9 field commanders to Foday Sankoh, and it is supported by current
10:19:56 10 internal communications between RUF leaders inside Sierra Leone
11 and between RUF leaders in Sierra Leone and in Liberia."

12 Pause there. Mr Taylor, "current internal communication".
13 Remember, this report is being written in the year 2000, yes?

14 A. Yes.

10:20:22 15 Q. In the year 2000 is there still an RUF guesthouse in
16 Monrovia?

17 A. Yes, in 2000 there is.

18 Q. Now, it's speaking here, "... is supported by current
19 internal communications". Have you ever been shown or heard of
10:20:45 20 any evidence to support that?

21 A. No, I haven't seen it, no. Internal communication between
22 RUF leaders in - no. I haven't seen those, no.

23 Q. Have you been shown any radio intercept?

24 A. No.

10:21:00 25 Q. Any transcript of a conversation?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Any letter?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Any document --

1 A. No.

2 Q. -- to confirm that?

3 A. No, I haven't seen. None.

4 Q. "At first, RUF fighters did their own mining or used forced
10:21:19 5 labour. More recently they have developed a modified form of
6 forced labour, allowing local diggers to keep a certain amount of
7 what they find. One system is to make a group of diggers work
8 for the RUF for four days and allow them to work for themselves
9 for two and one day off. More common is what is known as the
10:21:42 10 two-pile system in which diggers create one pile of
11 diamondiferous gravel for the RUF and another for themselves.
12 The idea is that diggers can then retain what they find in their
13 own pile, although all the washing is watched and any sizable
14 diamond found in a digger's pile are also taken by the RUF.

10:22:07 15 Once the Kono diamond fields were secured by the RUF, they
16 created a mining unit under Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy. The RUF
17 have since organised something they refer to today as the RUF
18 Mining Limited. As of October 2000, the chairman was Lieutenant
19 Colonel Abdul Razak and the deputy chairman was Lieutenant
10:22:37 20 Colonel Victor."

21 Pause there. Mr Taylor, are you aware of any of those
22 named individuals?

23 A. No, I'm not aware of them.

24 Q. Have you ever had any contact with any of those named
10:22:48 25 individuals?

26 A. No, I haven't.

27 Q. Specifically I'm referring to Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy,
28 Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Razak and Lieutenant Colonel Victor?

29 A. No, I've no contacts and I don't know them, no.

1 Q. "In addition to being a source of revenue, diamonds have
2 also been a source of constant friction and confusion within the
3 RUF. In 1999 Sam Mosquito Bockarie, a former diamond digger who
4 became the RUF's battle group commander and high command,
10:23:25 5 complained to Foday Sankoh that during the AFRC/RUF marriage in
6 1997, Denis Mingo had sold a diamond to a Lebanese businessman.
7 A portion of the proceeds had gone to the AFRC government and the
8 balance, 9 million, was intended for the RUF. Instead, however,
9 Superman embezzled the money, according to Bockarie."

10:24:04 10 Now let's pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall where
11 that particular reference comes from?

12 A. I heard that in a testimony here, to the best of my
13 knowledge. I'm not sure which Prosecution witness said that.

14 Q. Do you recall us going through a salute report prepared by
10:24:25 15 Sam Bockarie for Foday Sankoh?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You recall that salute report? Do you recall reference
10:24:38 20 being made to that dispute in that report?

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 Q. "Late in 1998, after the AFRC had been forced out of
23 Freetown by ECOMOG, RUF forces, led by Issa Sesay, and under
24 orders from Sam Bockarie (then referred to as chief of defence
10:24:56 25 staff for both the RUF and the AFRC) undertook a mission to move
26 former AFRC chairman Johnny Paul Koroma to the safety of RUF
27 headquarters in Buedu. While they were there, Sesay discovered
28 that Koroma was in possession of a parcel of diamonds and that he
29 was planning to escape to Ghana with his family. Sesay and

1 Brigadier Mike Lamin confronted Koroma, finding it hard to
2 believe that while they were trying to regroup, Koroma would keep
3 diamonds for his own use and flee, leaving them with a problem he
4 had created. The diamonds were subsequently handed over to the
10:25:39 5 RUF leadership. According to internal RUF reports, the diamonds
6 were then given to Ibrahim Bah and Sister Memuna and taken to
7 Liberian President Charles Taylor."

8 Pause. Did that happen, Mr Taylor?

9 A. That never happened. That never happened.

10:26:03 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, reference is made there to internal RUF
11 reports. Have you seen an internal RUF report which states that?

12 A. No, I have not seen any internal RUF reports that state
13 that Ibrahim Bah brought me diamonds along with a Memuna, no. I
14 have not.

10:26:25 15 Q. Now, you remember the salute report from Sam Bockarie,
16 don't you?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. And it would appear logical from the content of this report
19 that whoever wrote it had access to that salute report. That
10:26:44 20 seems logical, doesn't it?

21 A. Yes, of course.

22 Q. So help us, where is the - have you seen any documents to
23 support this part about Ibrahim Bah bringing you diamonds?

24 A. No. I have seen no documents. And even if we look at
10:27:00 25 beyond that report, I don't recall any evidence presented here
26 yet that even mentions this issue of Bah bringing diamonds that
27 were taken from Johnny Paul Koroma to me.

28 Q. "The name of Ibrahim Bah arises frequently in the RUF
29 diamond story. He is said to be a Burkinabe military officer.

1 He is also known as Ibrahima Balde and Balde Ibrahima. He was a
2 key player in the RUF/AFRC axis and has been instrumental in the
3 movement of RUF diamonds from Sierra Leone into Liberia and from
4 there to Burkina Faso."

10:27:50 5 Pause again. Mr Taylor, do you know Ibrahim Bah?

6 A. I know Ibrahim Bah, yes.

7 Q. When did you first meet Ibrahim Bah?

8 A. I first met Ibrahim Bah back in 1990.

9 Q. In what circumstances?

10:28:09 10 A. Bah was one of the men that came along with Dr Manneh,
11 known as Kukoi Samba Sanyang, to Liberia.

12 Q. From where does Bah originate to your knowledge?

13 A. To my knowledge Bah is Senegalese.

14 Q. Now, having met him in 1990, how much contact did you have
10:28:33 15 with him thereafter?

16 A. Very little. Bah was one of the regular security personnel
17 and was not assigned directly with me. Some of his brothers
18 were - his Senegalese and Gambian brothers were, but he was not
19 someone that frequented around me. But I got to know most of the
10:29:02 20 Gambians because they could come around freely and they were -
21 when I say the Gambians, we just look at them together as the
22 Gambians. But there were a couple of them that were Senegalese,
23 and he's one of them.

24 Q. Yes. Did you have any particular association with Bah
10:29:20 25 during the course of the Liberian civil war?

26 A. No, not directly, no.

27 Q. After you became President, to your knowledge did Bah
28 remain in Liberia?

29 A. Well, Bah - after I became President, I heard that Bah came

1 into Liberia a few times. But Bah had left Liberia back --

2 Q. When?

3 A. In 1994. Early 1994 Bah had left Liberia along - and
4 Dr Manneh also left - with some of them. And so when I'd heard
10:30:07 5 that some of the Gambians had come, I heard that Bah came in and
6 went as a businessman in Liberia.

7 Q. Could you pause for a moment. Could I have a moment,
8 please. Now, Mr Taylor, did you have at any time a business
9 relationship with Ibrahim Bah?

10:30:56 10 A. Never, ever. Never. Never.

11 Q. You do appreciate, don't you, that Ibrahim Bah is named as
12 one of your co-conspirators by the Prosecution? You know that,
13 don't you?

14 A. Yes, I do.

10:31:18 15 Q. Have you at any time collaborated with Ibrahim Bah in the
16 sale of diamonds which you knew to have originated in Sierra
17 Leone?

18 A. I have not associated with Ibrahim Bah in the sale of any
19 kind of diamonds, whether from Sierra Leone or Liberia or any
10:31:40 20 kind. There's never been a business relationship with Bah and
21 myself. Never.

22 Q. "Issa Sesay, the current RUF leader, has had his own
23 problems with diamonds. Late in 1998, Captain Michael Coomber of
24 the RUF mining unit brought a parcel of diamonds from Kono to the
10:32:11 25 RUF headquarters at Buedu. Sam Bockarie gave the diamonds to
26 Sesay who took them to Liberia where he was to meet Ibrahim Bah.
27 Together they were then to meet a business associate of Foday
28 Sankoh to make arrangements for the procurement of military
29 equipment. Sesay lost the diamonds somewhere in Liberia,

1 claiming he had accidentally dropped the parcel in the mud. This
2 led to a major contretemps between Sesay and Bockarie, although
3 Sesay was eventually forgiven."

4 Now, Mr Taylor, were you aware, as suggested in that
10:33:01 5 paragraph, that diamond dealings were taking place in Monrovia
6 involving, as here, senior members of the RUF and Ibrahim Bah and
7 other parties? Did you know of that?

8 A. No, I did not.

9 Q. I'm going to ask you quite bluntly. Was the RUF guesthouse
10:33:24 10 a cover for these kinds of business activities?

11 A. No. No. And if I had known that they were conducting
12 these kinds of activities, we would have shut it down. It was
13 put there for the peace process. Diplomats went to that place.
14 Other interested parties went there. I had no idea that they
10:33:47 15 were using that as a business place. It was not intended for
16 that and would have been shut down if I had found out.

17 Q. "Denis Superman Mingo, however, still smarting over the
18 allegation that he had embezzled 9 million leones from a 1997
19 diamond sale, played on Sesay's loss, fomenting contention within
10:34:16 20 the RUF ranks. In October 1999, he wrote to Foday Sankoh from
21 Liberia, warning him that Sam Bockarie could not be trusted and
22 that Sankoh's life was in danger. He also said that Bockarie and
23 his men had been squandering funds from diamond sales and that
24 Bockarie had bought a house in Liberia and one in France."

10:34:41 25 Pause. To your knowledge, Mr Taylor, did Sam Bockarie
26 purchase property in Liberia?

27 A. No.

28 Q. The accommodation in which he lived when he came to Liberia
29 in December 1999, who provided it?

1 A. The Liberian government provided that.

2 Q. Are you aware of Sam Bockarie having or owning property in
3 France?

4 A. No, I'm not.

10:35:12 5 Q. "Shortly thereafter, a military confrontation occurred
6 between forces loyal to Foday Sankoh and those loyal to Sam
7 Bockarie. Several combatants were killed. Sam Bockarie
8 subsequently went into exile in Liberia, where he remains close
9 to President Charles Taylor."

10:35:34 10 What do you say about that?

11 A. Well, this should tell - this is a UN panel, right? This
12 is a UN panel writing this kind of report and it's disgraceful
13 because this panel and its expertise should have done their
14 homework and they would have known how Sam Bockarie ended up in
10:36:00 15 Liberia. It simply tells you - and these are some of the reasons
16 why we really attacked this report. Now, this is what you call
17 disinformation. There was not a clash where people got killed
18 that led to Sam Bockarie running into exile. This coming of Sam
19 Bockarie into exile was calculated, it was well organised and
10:36:29 20 done with the full acquiescence of ECOWAS to remove Sam Bockarie.
21 So somebody reading this report from a UN panel would think that
22 they should know better.

23 Q. Well, pause there, Mr Taylor. That's one aspect of the
24 point being made in that paragraph, but there is second aspect to
10:36:45 25 it. "Where he remains close to President Charles Taylor," what
26 do you say about that?

27 A. Total nonsense. They are suggesting that there is this -
28 that we are comrades. Sam Bockarie was not a comrade of mine.
29 He was just a young man that I viewed as someone that we could

1 work with for peace but not close to President Taylor. This is -
2 here there is an inference that he's inferring here that, what,
3 business dealer, we're working together, and they should know
4 better than that. And this is why when we wrote that letter -
10:37:26 5 remember, we wrote the letter asking for it to be exhibited by
6 the Security Council saying that, "Wait a minute. We are
7 understanding from our diplomat something funny about this
8 panel." And these are some of the things they wrote. This is
9 total nonsense because they should have known the process if they
10:37:50 10 had, one, asked and if they had accepted from ECOWAS leaders the
11 true story to how Sam Bockarie finally came to Liberia and
12 knowing that he was "close" to Taylor.

13 Q. Let's look at the next paragraph, 77:

14 "Diamonds continue to cause friction. In September 2000" -
10:38:12 15 now, pause. That date is significant for this reason: In August
16 of 2000 was when Sesay is appointed interim leader.

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. "... a dispute arose between Lieutenant Colonel Victor, the
19 deputy chairman of RUF Mining Limited, and some of his
10:38:34 20 associates. Major Bob Vandy, Staff Captain Koroma and Major
21 Morry Gebaru, RUF mining chairman Abdul Razak undertook an
22 investigation which uncovered stories of diamond embezzlement by
23 Captain Prince Khan and others who were in conflict with the
24 deputy chairman, including Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Sherri f.
10:39:04 25 This in turn raised the concern of Issa Sesay who was at the time
26 carrying out a wider investigation into all RUF financial affairs
27 in Liberia."

28 Now, pause there. Were you aware of such an investigation
29 by Issa Sesay?

1 A. No, I was not aware. I was not aware.

2 Q. Now, this is someone who had been in company with you and
3 other Presidents in August 2000. You recall that, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes, I do.

10:39:54 5 Q. And he had been put into the position of interim leader of
6 the RUF in order that ECOWAS, you tell us, could have a point of
7 contact with the RUF. Is that right?

8 A. That is right.

9 Q. As a consequence, it was, therefore, important for you and
10:40:20 10 other leaders to keep in touch with him.

11 A. That's right, yes.

12 Q. Now, help us, bearing all of that mind, bearing also in
13 mind the closeness of the dates, were you aware of this kind of
14 financial activity?

10:40:32 15 A. No, and I don't think this panel was aware either, because
16 if we look at the evidence here, which is factual, Issa Sesay is
17 in Liberia when? In May. The hostages are released. Issa Sesay
18 returns to Liberia in July. He meets the Heads of State. They
19 take this letter to Foday Sankoh. He returns in August. He's
10:41:01 20 made leader.

21 I don't know what kind of foothold Issa Sesay had in
22 Liberia when he just had become interim leader as of late August.
23 So I don't even think they know what they're talking about.

24 That's the best I can say about this, because Issa Sesay, up
10:41:21 25 until August, late August when he became leader of the RUF, made
26 it very clear that his leader was Foday Sankoh and could not
27 accept the leadership unless and until Foday Sankoh approved. So
28 how could he undertake such an investigation without the
29 authorisation of Foday Sankoh before he becomes leader in late

1 August and they are talking about September? So I don't know
2 where they got this from. It doesn't make sense.

3 Q. "Estimated volume of diamonds mined by the RUF.

4 Estimates of the volume of diamonds mined by the RUF vary
10:41:57 5 widely from as little as \$25 million per annum to as much as \$125
6 million. De Beers has estimated that the total was likely \$70
7 million in 1999. Part of the difficulty in estimating what is
8 available to the RUF is the fact that years of illicit mining and
9 export have served to reduce all official historical production
10:42:29 10 figures, providing no reliable statistics for at least two
11 decades on what has actually been mined in Sierra Leone. In the
12 late 1960s, Sierra Leone exported 2 million carats per annum.
13 The RUF holds the richest diamond areas in the country. If 1999
14 RUF production was one eighth of Sierra Leonean's best year (that
10:42:57 15 is 250,000 carats), the value would be upwards of \$50 million.
16 If it was half of the official average exports in the early 1990s
17 (that is 100,000 carats), it would be in the neighbourhood of \$20
18 million.

19 There are arguments in favour of lower estimates. The RUF
10:43:22 20 does not have access to heavy equipment and is thus limited to
21 artisanal mining. Many former RUF combatants today live very
22 modest lives and say they never saw diamonds. Arguments
23 favouring higher estimates include the fact that the RUF has been
24 able to support 3,500 to 5,000 armed combatants and as many camp
10:44:00 25 followers for several years, and internal RUF communications
26 regularly refer to the importance of diamonds. Knowledgeable
27 diamondaires believe that a very high proportion of the diamonds
28 being exported from The Gambia (which mines no diamonds of its
29 own) originate in Sierra Leone, some travelling there via a third

1 country such as Liberia. Imports into Belgium of Gambian rough
2 averaged over \$100 million per annum between 1996 and 1999.

3 While the total generated by the RUF, whether it is \$25
4 million, \$70 million or \$125 million, is very small in relation
10:44:52 5 to the global annual output of diamonds, it nevertheless
6 represents a major and primary source of income to the RUF and is
7 more than enough to support its military effort."

8 Now this:

9 "How the RUF moved diamonds out of Sierra Leone. Diamonds
10:45:21 10 have always been smuggled out of Sierra Leone, the bulk through
11 Liberia. This historical fact is not in dispute."

12 Pause. You don't dispute that, do you, Mr Taylor? Or do
13 you?

14 A. Well, I don't dispute the fact that diamonds are smuggled
10:45:40 15 through Liberia. But when we get into the specific term as "the
16 bulk", because if you look at Guinea, diamonds go a lot through
17 Guinea and if we look at the previous statement that you read, if
18 The Gambia that produces no diamonds is doing 100 million a year,
19 how do the diamonds get into The Gambia? They go through Guinea,
10:46:04 20 because the shortcut - what some of these people don't know.

21 When you come from The Gambia you enter Guinea-Bissau, you enter
22 Guinea, you enter Sierra Leone. So some people did not travel by
23 air. You don't have to necessarily travel by aircraft to come
24 from some of these countries into West Africa. People drive,
10:46:31 25 cross borders, cross borders. So the easiest point, if you're
26 talking about diamonds travelling during this particular time -
27 and let's just put it in focus for the Court. You don't have -
28 the diamonds being obtained in that Kono region, for example, of
29 Sierra Leone, there are no aircrafts that fly between Monrovia

1 and, let's say, the Banjul. There are regular flights out of
2 Conakry. So it is easier to come out of Sierra Leone, go into
3 Guinea, and fly and go on to The Gambia. So to say the bulk - I
4 would have a problem with bulk. That's not to dispute the fact
10:47:22 5 that a lot of diamonds go through Liberia, but I think they would
6 have been fairer if they had said - also added Guinea here. I do
7 not know why they intended to obscure Guinea, where a lot of
8 diamonds go through Guinea from Sierra Leone, because the diamond
9 mines are also closer to the Guinean border also.

10:47:41 10 Q. Mr Taylor, just a matter of geography, in which direction
11 do you have to travel from Sierra Leone to get to The Gambia?

12 A. You are travelling --

13 Q. Is it north, south, east or west?

14 A. I would say from Sierra Leone you are travelling northeast.

10:48:12 15 Yeah, about northeast.

16 Q. And help me, is Liberia, or is it not, south of Sierra
17 Leone?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So that, as suggested in that earlier paragraph, for
10:48:30 20 diamonds to go from Sierra Leone to Liberia and then to The
21 Gambia, it has to go south in order then to go north or
22 northeast. Is that right?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Now, you're suggesting, are you, that there is an easier
10:48:52 25 route from Sierra Leone to The Gambia. Is that right?

26 A. Probably not easier. There is an alternative route, I
27 would say, and this is not the air route; that is, people drive.
28 They drive from Sierra Leone into Guinea; from Guinea they go
29 straight into Guinea-Bissau; from Guinea-Bissau you drive into

1 The Gambia. They do that all the time.

2 Q. Now let's go back to this:

3 "There have been a variety of reasons for smuggling: To
4 avoid taxes; to avoid the higher cost of corruption in one
10:49:31 5 country over another; to gain access to hard currency; to launder
6 money. Historically, Liberia was the route of choice primarily
7 because of its use of the United States dollar as its official
8 currency. Other diamonds found their way to Guinea, where they
9 would more likely have been traded for rice and other foodstuffs.
10:49:58 10 And diamonds also travelled further afield to other countries in
11 the region, carried by Mandingo and Senegalese traders known as
12 Marakas.

13 Some RUF diamonds have been traded Guinea. There are
14 reports of one-off deals in which RUF commanders have traded
10:50:22 15 diamonds for supplies, and sometimes for weapons, dealing with
16 individual, midlevel Guinean military officers acting on their
17 own account. One such arrangement in mid-2000 is said to have
18 gone sour, resulting in an RUF attack on the Guinean border town
19 of Pamelap, when promised Guinean supplies were not forthcoming.
10:50:44 20 There is no evidence, however, of any official Guinean collusion
21 in such trade.

22 A certain volume of RUF diamonds are being traded in Kenema
23 and elsewhere in Sierra Leone. It is an open secret that RUF
24 traders bring diamonds to Kenema from Tongo Field, only 28 miles
10:51:14 25 away, on a regular basis and exchange them for food and other
26 supplies. This would account for the continued presence in
27 Kenema of more than 40 separate diamond dealers, many of them
28 Lebanese, even though their main source of supply has officially
29 been out of reach for several years. It is possible that these

1 diamonds could enter the official export system if there is a
2 lack of probity and vigilance in the Government Gold and Diamond
3 Office, the Ministry of Mineral Resources and its branches.

4 It is more likely, however, that these diamonds are being
10:51:52 5 smuggled out to neighbouring countries. Many of Sierra Leone's
6 diamond dealers are also major importers of food and consumer
7 goods. The steep markup on these goods yields high profits,
8 which require a hard currency or its equivalent in order to be
9 repatriated. Diamonds serve this purpose. Many prominent
10:52:19 10 exporters from Sierra Leone are also exporters of diamonds from
11 The Gambia, a country that produces no diamonds at all.

12 As noted in paragraphs 67 through 77, however, the bulk of
13 the RUF trade in diamonds leaves Sierra Leone through Liberia.
14 The diamonds are carried by RUF commanders and trusted Liberian
10:52:42 15 couriers to Foya, Kama, or Voinjama and then to Monrovia.

16 A Liberian is said to be President Taylor's representative
17 in Kono, with a mandate to supervise diamond operations."

18 Who is that person?

19 A. I don't even know what these people are talking about. And
10:53:06 20 even evidence led before this Court, no one has said that
21 Mr Taylor had a representative. This is - don't know who they
22 are talking about. Never had any representative anywhere. But
23 it's interesting here to see how you can play with words. The
24 Gambia, they say, have no diamonds. Diamonds are smuggled
10:53:38 25 through Guinea, they say here emphatically without the complicity
26 of the Guinean government. The diamonds go through The Gambia,
27 The Gambia is exporting \$100 million worth of diamonds without
28 the complicity of the Gambian government. We accept that
29 diamonds do come through Liberia because of the dollar, but it

1 has to be with Charles Taylor's complicity. So, I mean, you
2 know, this kind of thinking, you can see the type of bias that
3 I'm talking about. Every other country where diamonds are being
4 illegally smuggled through, it's being done without the
10:54:12 5 complicity of the leadership of that country. But you have a
6 little rat in Liberia called Charles Taylor that is stealing
7 diamonds, now - so why would Guinea, okay - why would there to be
8 no complicity of the Guinean government? And I do not claim they
9 were. But it has to be specifically Taylor must be doing it
10:54:34 10 because he is really that little whatever you want to call him,
11 maybe a little ragamuffin that we want to get in Liberia that
12 must be stealing diamonds. But the millions of dollars of
13 diamonds going through other West African countries, oh, their
14 leaders know nothing about it.

10:54:58 15 Q. Then this:
16 "On the RUF side during much of 1998, Denis Superman Mingo
17 was in charge of the diamond operations in Kono."

18 Pause. What nationality was Superman?

19 A. I'm told that Superman was a Liberian.

10:55:20 20 Q. And just pausing for a moment. Did you know him?

21 A. Not personally, no.

22 Q. Have you ever met him?

23 A. No. Never met Superman.

24 Q. Spoken to him on the radio?

10:55:30 25 A. No.

26 Q. Was he, for example, your supposed representative in Kono?

27 A. No. No. Don't even know how Superman got over for. Heard
28 of the name Superman, but didn't know how he got there.

29 Q. "He regularly took diamonds to the RUF headquarters at

1 Buedu, and from there they were transferred to Liberia. At
2 various times diamonds were taken to Monrovia by Eddie Kanneh,
3 Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay."

4 Pause. What's your knowledge of that?

10:56:11 5 A. I have no knowledge of this whatsoever.

6 Q. Let's take each in turn. Have you ever met Eddie Kanneh?

7 A. Yes, I have met Eddie Kanneh.

8 Q. When and where?

9 A. Eddie Kanneh was on the delegation with Sam Bockarie when
10:56:32 10 they came to Liberia in 1998. He was a part of that delegation.
11 I know the name. If I saw him right now I would have difficulty
12 in remembering if this is the guy. But I have met him before,
13 yes.

14 Q. Was it to your knowledge that Sam Bockarie brought diamonds
10:56:59 15 to Liberia?

16 A. No. I had no knowledge of the fact that Sam Bockarie
17 brought diamonds to Liberia.

18 Q. Whilst we're on this topic of particular individuals,
19 Mr Taylor, when in April/May of 1999 RUF representatives were
10:57:23 20 being airlifted through Liberia to Lome for the peace talks, yes?
21 Do you recall there was reference to Ibrahim Bah and another
22 gentleman being amongst the initial representatives in Liberia,
23 Omrie Golley being to the other?

24 A. Yes, yes.

10:57:51 25 Q. Do you remember that?

26 A. Yes, the first two, yes.

27 Q. At that time did you meet Bah and Golley?

28 A. Yes, I did meet them, the initial delegation. Yes, I did.

29 Q. And Bah was there as a representative of whom?

1 A. Bah was representing the RUF and Foday Sankoh at that time,
2 from our understanding.

3 Q. So was that the capacity in which Bah was in Monrovia at
4 that time?

10:58:28 5 A. That's the capacity that I understood and I - and the
6 United Nations officials that received them and transported them,
7 all of us understood that Bah - General Bah represented the RUF,
8 yes.

9 Q. Now, speaking of Eddie Kanneh, do you recall that letter
10:58:57 10 from your ambassador in Guinea?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. In August 1998, yes?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. Prior to that date had you met Eddie Kanneh?

10:59:12 15 A. No, no. I had not met Eddie Kanneh.

16 Q. So can you help us as to when it was you did meet him?

17 A. Eddie Kanneh came along in September with Sam Bockarie. In
18 September 1998.

19 Q. And did you meet him again thereafter?

10:59:35 20 A. Yes, I met Eddie Kanneh as a part of another delegation in
21 one of those talks. That's why when you hear me say I've met
22 him, but I wouldn't remember him very well. But maybe upon clear
23 looking I would recognise him, but I did meet him subsequently.

24 Q. "As noted in paragraphs 71 to 77, there have been frequent
11:00:05 25 disputes over the diamonds, and RUF couriers travel in fear of
26 being robbed by rogue Liberian NPFL (National Patriotic Front of
27 Liberia) fighters."

28 Pause there. The date mentioned in that paragraph 86,
29 Mr Taylor, is 1998. In 1998 did the NPFL still exist?

1 A. No, no.

2 Q. "At RUF headquarters in Buedu, concerns have occasionally
3 arisen that diamonds said to be held in safekeeping by President
4 Taylor might actually have been sold."

11:00:52 5 Did you hold diamonds for safekeeping, Mr Taylor?

6 A. No, I did not.

7 Q. Were you holding diamonds, for example, pending the release
8 of Foday Sankoh?

9 A. No, I was not holding diamonds pending anybody's release.

11:01:13 10 No.

11 Q. Were you, in effect, the replacement Papay during Foday
12 Sankoh's sojourn in prison in either Nigeria or Sierra Leone?

13 A. No, not at all. Not at all.

14 Q. "On one occasion in 1998 Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia to
11:01:40 15 see Taylor about this concern, and when he returned he reported
16 that he had seen the diamonds."

17 Is that true?

18 A. That is not true. That is not true. Absolutely not true
19 and --

11:01:59 20 Q. But you did see Sam Bockarie in 1998, didn't you?

21 A. Yes, I did see Sam Bockarie in 1998 and this - they don't
22 state the time, but I see Sam Bockarie in 1998 for the first time
23 in my entire life in September of 1998. Now, they just put here
24 he came to Liberia in 1998 and it just remains ambiguous. But I
11:02:26 25 first meet Sam Bockarie in September of 1998 and Sam Bockarie did
26 not come to discuss diamonds with me. Sam Bockarie, upon asking
27 to come to see me in August through my ambassador, I invited him
28 over and there were no discussions about diamonds. None.

29 Q. "Because of time constraints, the panel could not go into

1 the details of ways and means through which RUF diamonds are
2 moved out of Liberia. However, there is sufficient evidence to
3 prove that this trade cannot be conducted in Liberia without the
4 permission and the involvement of government officials at the
11:03:06 5 highest levels."

6 Let's pause there and examine that in a little more detail.
7 Now, firstly, Mr Taylor, you have in the past conceded, have you
8 not, that corruption was rife in the Liberian government? You
9 conceded that, do you recall?

11:03:32 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, is it the case - and I want you to listen carefully to
12 my question - is it the case that diamond business could not go
13 on in Monrovia without official involvement? Do you recall me?

14 A. I follow you.

11:03:52 15 Q. What, in effect, I'm asking is this: Was the nature of the
16 trade in those small stones such that there had to be government
17 involvement? Do you follow me?

18 A. I follow you.

19 Q. And what's your answer?

11:04:10 20 A. The nature of the trade was of such that did not then and
21 now require any government involvement. Not just in Liberia but
22 any of these countries. Who's buying diamonds? Who's buying
23 diamonds in those countries? Lebanese. Tourists in The Gambia.
24 Why do you have these diamonds? Tourists buy diamonds, okay.

11:04:37 25 They do not require government intervention or official
26 intervention at any level. None whatsoever, then and now.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, there's another question. That may be the
28 factual position, but can you say today that there was no
29 Liberian government involvement in the movement of diamonds

1 through Monrovia?

2 A. None.

3 Q. Can you say that there was none?

11:05:18

4 A. I can say that, without stupor, without even blinking,
5 there was none. It was not required. There was none. None.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, I must press you on this because it's a point of
7 some significance. How would you know?

11:05:45

8 A. Because a similar question like this came the other day.
9 Look, to move diamonds out of these countries - how did the
10 diamonds, for example, leave Guinea? Did they require a
11 certificate? No. How did the diamonds leave The Gambia? People
12 come in - we did not then and not until the Kimberley Process,
13 there's been no official system in most of these countries of
14 dealing with the movement of diamonds.

11:06:22

15 I, being a trained economist, realised that the Liberian
16 government, Sierra Leonean government and all governments are
17 losing millions of dollars in revenue. There is no system.
18 There was no system set up, regrettably so, to deal with diamonds
19 as a commodity as we know it, and we tried to put that
20 educational process into place first to even look at the capacity
21 to collect taxes from such a thing. There's no mechanism set up
22 for that. None. Okay.

11:06:45

23 So this matter of diamonds, a man goes into the field, he
24 mines a diamond, he brings it, he sells it to a tourist or a
25 Lebanese national, a businessman in Liberia, they go out to
26 Belgium, they use shell companies, you know, to transact their
27 businesses, there is no requirement, there's no system,
28 regrettably so, set up. We regretted it at the time that we were
29 trying to put it in. It does not require that sophisticated

11:07:08

1 mechanism of certification and tax collection that all of us
2 would want to think of an economist. I would think that way. It
3 just didn't happen then. It doesn't happen now.

4 What is the Kimberley Process that is being put into place
11:07:51 5 in Liberia now? The Kimberley Process is one that requires that
6 people should register, go - if you can buy the diamonds in the
7 field, the brokers must go to the bank and they must then report
8 the amount. It is calculated, government taxes are taken out,
9 the diamonds are - the packages are sealed and they are shipped
11:08:09 10 out. That's the process that will work. But that process was
11 not in place, neither was any other process put in place and
12 millions of dollars are lost on all sides because of the
13 inability to collect taxes. So that's my answer.

14 Q. Mr Taylor, are you in a position to categorically say that
11:08:33 15 there weren't even isolated incidents of government official
16 involvement in the diamond business?

17 A. No. As far as government official involvement in giving
18 out what we call rights to mine, there is some Liberian
19 government involvement in giving out rights to mine.

11:08:59 20 Q. That's not what I'm talking about.

21 A. Beyond that, no.

22 Q. Let me ask a different question then. Can you
23 categorically say that individual employees of the Liberian
24 government were not involved?

11:09:17 25 A. No, I cannot say that categorically.

26 Q. But if such did occur, was it with your knowledge and
27 consent?

28 A. No. It was without even official knowledge and consent at
29 any level, ministerial or not. It was not the official policy of

1 the government at that time to pursue diamonds. So I would even
2 say, as an official policy, regardless of me, as an official
3 policy, no.

4 Q. Okay. Let's go back to the text:

11:09:50 5 "This trade cannot be conducted in Liberia without the
6 permission, involvement of government officials at the highest
7 level. In Liberia, uncorroborated stories refer to high level
8 go-betweens, senior government officials and financial
9 transactions made in Burkina Faso, South Africa, the United
11:10:17 10 States and Lebanon. This subject is covered from a different
11 perspective in the Liberia case study below.

12 Liberian officials thrive on their country's reputation for
13 weak administration, its crippled infrastructure and its 'porous
14 border'."

11:10:41 15 Would you agree with that description?

16 A. I actually feel insulted by this description.

17 Q. Why?

18 A. When you put some - single out Liberian officials as
19 thriving on a reputation for weak administration and crippled
11:11:01 20 infrastructure and porous borders, yet you know we're coming out
21 of a war, there is a situation, but if this is true for Liberia,
22 then this must be true also for the very country of Sierra Leone
23 that you're talking about. So this is very, very insulting
24 language, as far as I'm concerned. I disagree.

11:11:19 25 Q. So let me ask you directly. Was the administration weak?

26 A. Well, I would not want to deal with this. If you break it
27 up in that way, anyone coming out of a war would have a weak
28 administration. Anybody coming out of a war, you will have a
29 crippling infrastructure. Liberia has porous borders. But the

1 context here, the context here goes beyond the break up. The
2 context here is intended in a way that I would have to disagree
3 contextually, not in terms of the factual nature of this. I
4 think the context here is mischievous and insulting, okay. This
11:12:13 5 is trying to say, because of these factors, you can expect these
6 illegal activities. So I would not agree with this statement,
7 and I wouldn't deal with it in that way.

8 Q. Very well. Let's go on then with the paragraph:

9 "In fact, however, very little trade, whether formal or
11:12:29 10 informal, takes place without the knowledge and involvement of
11 key government officials."

12 True or false?

13 A. Totally false.

14 Q. "This is true of all imports. And where exports are
11:12:44 15 concerned, it is especially true of diamonds and timber.

16 Liberia's own official diamond exports were said to be only 8,500
17 carats in 1999, valued at \$900,000. Liberia's Minister of Lands,
18 Mines and Energy estimates that this represents only 20 per cent
19 of what is actually leaving the country, and the Ministry of
11:13:13 20 Revenue suggests that it might be as little at 10 per cent of the
21 total."

22 Would you agree with that?

23 A. Yes, I would agree with that.

24 Q. Now, did the Liberian government, Mr Taylor, have an
11:13:33 25 interest in allowing 80 per cent of the export - well, 90 per
26 cent of the diamonds leaving the country to leave without the
27 knowledge of the Ministry of Revenue?

28 A. It would be foolish to even countenance that. So you know
29 that there's a problem.

1 Q. But why, explain to us?

2 A. Which government wants to lose 80 or 90 per cent of its
3 revenues? But we don't have any control over it.

11:14:08

4 Q. "In a country where most of the diamond traders are
5 foreigners and where the movement of foreigners, money and
6 supplies is as carefully watched as is the case of Liberia, it is
7 not conceivable that so much of Liberia's own diamond production
8 could avoid the detection of government, nor is it conceivable
9 that the significantly greater volumes of high value Sierra Leone
10 diamonds moving through Liberia could avoid detection by
11 government."

11:14:34

12 Do you agree with that proposition?

13 A. No, and this proposition is so foolish. It's so foolish.

11:15:03

14 You know, we go back to - yes, I can see. Let's take the border
15 between the United States and Mexico where they're even building
16 a fence. Why can't they stop the drugs coming out of Mexico?
17 These things are bulky, okay. They can't stop the drugs come
18 out, with billions of dollars being spent on the US-Mexico
19 border, building a fence and all. But little Liberia in a forest
20 of West Africa with a little stone must be able to be detected.

11:15:25

21 I mean this is preposterous. Preposterous I'm saying. And
22 this is what really hurts, because the impossible is said and
23 it's fashioned by a committee like this that really poisons the
24 mind of everyone reading this. You will say, "Oh, these guys
25 know what they're talking about."

11:15:51

26 If you can't stop drugs from coming from Mexico on your
27 border with sniffer dogs, aircrafts, thousands of people, and
28 you're telling Liberia that if a little rock in somebody's
29 stomach probably leaves Liberia that at the highest level they

1 must know. Because they're a bunch of crooks and robbers in
2 Liberia they must know. It's insulting and very annoying.

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, on that note, help me. This panel of
4 experts, how much time did they actually spend in Liberia when
11:16:25 5 they visited?

6 A. They may have been around there - I would not be able to
7 say precisely, I know I met them briefly, but they could not have
8 stayed in Liberia for more than a week.

9 Q. And help me, when they came to Liberia where were they
11:16:43 10 based?

11 A. Right in Monrovia. These guys were right in Monrovia.
12 They did not go around. They interviewed people who they wanted
13 to interview. They did not travel into the mines of Liberia to
14 talk to the people, no.

11:17:05 15 Q. Let's go to section E, "Foday Sankoh's post-Lome diamond
16 business":

17 "The Lome Peace Agreement appointed Foday Sankoh chairman
18 of a Commission For the Management of Strategic Mineral
19 Resources. Between the time Foday Sankoh returned to Sierra
11:17:24 20 Leone late in 1999 and the resumption of hostilities in May 2000,
21 members of the commission never actually met and the commission
22 did not function. During his time in Freetown, Foday Sankoh
23 spent money lavishly, although he had no obvious source of
24 income. He imported vehicles, satellite phones and other
11:17:48 25 expensive equipment.

26 In 1999, before Foday Sankoh's appearance in Freetown, Sam
27 Bockarie wrote a 'To whom it may concern' letter on RUF
28 stationery appointing Mohamed Hijazi, a long-time diamond miner
29 and dealer, as the RUF's agent to negotiate with any person or

1 company within or outside Sierra Leone for the prospecting,
2 mining, buying and selling of diamonds."

3 Do you recall that document?

4 A. Vaguely. Vaguely.

11:18:43 5 Q. "After his arrival in Freetown, Foday Sankoh signed
6 numerous agreements with international business firms and
7 solicited financial favours from others making inquiries in his
8 own name, in the name of the commission, and in the name of the
9 RUF. His own business files, found in his office after the May
11:19:05 10 2000 resumption of hostilities, contain correspondence relating
11 to business opportunities he was actively promoting.

12 In November 1999, for example, Foday Sankoh received a
13 visit from Chudi Izegbu, President of the Integrated Group of
14 Companies based in McLean, Virginia. Izegbu had chartered an
11:19:38 15 aircraft to Freetown from Abidjan, and together he and Sankoh
16 discussed a range of investment possibilities for the Integrated
17 Group, which includes a company called Integrated Mining
18 registered in the Cayman Islands. They discussed possible
19 investments in civilian aircraft services, petroleum imports, and
11:19:58 20 a major investment in the Koidu diamond kimberlites.

21 Subsequently, Izegbu and Sankoh exchanged correspondence about
22 negotiations and discussions currently going on in the interests
23 of the RUF and they exchanged text messages in a code which
24 would allow them to disguise names, words like 'diamonds' and
11:20:24 25 'gold' and expressions such 'as everything is okay' and 'things
26 are bad'. In December 1999, Sankoh ordered 14 vehicles from
27 Izegbu with the logo of the RUF party painted on the side of
28 each."

29 Now, let's pause again, Mr Taylor. Part of the discussions

1 which took place in Lome were aimed at transforming the RUF into
2 a political party?

3 A. That is correct.

11:21:10

4 Q. And help us, was any assistance provided to them by ECOWAS
5 for that purpose?

6 A. Well, the way the question is asked, I will say no.

7 Q. Was any financial assistance at all provided to them --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- by anyone?

11:21:33

10 A. Yeah, member states. Member states. A few states
11 contributed in getting them ready for party status, yes.

12 Q. Now, just pause for a minute. The Integrated Group of
13 Companies based in McLean, Virginia. Help me, Mr Taylor, where
14 are the CIA's headquarters in the United States?

11:22:05

15 A. I think it's Langley. Langley, Virginia.

16 Q. "In March, 2000 Damian Gagnon of the US company Lazare
17 Kaplan International visited Foday Sankoh, and in a subsequent
18 letter to Sankoh LKI Chairman Maurice Templesman said that Gagnon
19 had reported a commonality of views between you and this company
20 on the possibilities of LKI re-entering the Sierra Leone diamond
21 business in a manner beneficial to all the people of that country
22 as well as our company.

11:22:29

23 Much of the correspondence suggests that Sankoh was
24 encouraging a wide variety of potential investors, many thinking
25 they would reap exclusive benefits from the same things. One
26 much circulated April 2000 letter from Michel to the leader talks
27 about how Sankoh should try to get all of the diamonds mined in
28 Kono rather than the 10 per cent which the author said was the
29 case, the rest being filtered off to Liberia. Michel proposed

1 that his Belgian partner Charles could hire a private jet to take
2 the diamonds out directly from Kono, avoiding the Lebanese and
3 Monrovia. 'We cannot trust these people,' he wrote."

4 Let us pause there. Mr Taylor, do you know about the
11:23:40 5 existence of such a letter?

6 A. Yes, I know about the existence of such a letter, yes.

7 Q. A letter from Michel?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. To the leader, yes?

11:23:51 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. In which a Charles is mentioned?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Now, we're going to come back to that document. But given
14 where we've now reached with this report, I think it might be
11:24:14 15 helpful if we pause for a moment to look at the Michel letter.

16 Now, the Michel letter is to be found behind divider 142 in
17 volume 4 of 4 for week 33. Now, we're definitely coming back to
18 deal with this document in another context, but let's just pause
19 for now and have a look at the letter. 4 of 4 behind divider
11:24:53 20 142. Let's make a start on it, even if we can't conclude it
21 before the break. Now, this is a sequence of emails found at
22 Foday Sankoh's address after his arrest in May 2000.

23 "To: The leader. From: Michel.

24 Good morning. I am back in Washington. I got your fax on
11:26:06 25 Thursday, and I will go to the embassy of Sierra Leone this
26 Monday morning for this visa. As soon as I will get the visa, I
27 will fly to Freetown to meet you.

28 Dear Foday, let me take a few minutes of your time to
29 explain to what happened last week in Antwerp.

1 As you already know, I met my partner. You met his
2 employee in Freetown ten days ago. My partner is now decided to
3 work with us without any restriction. As I told you already,
4 with him involved in the picture money is not an issue any more.

11:26:48 5 Important: The American during the meetings in Freetown
6 offered him to open a buying office in Sierra Leone. They would
7 like to see three buying offices working in Sierra Leone.
8 However, as my partner told me last week, all this could take X
9 weeks or months.

11:27:08 10 You do not have any time to waste any more, neither do I.
11 This is what we suggest. He will come with me to see you next
12 week. We will bring with us what you know.

13 Dear Foday, this meeting is very important. If Charles (my
14 partner) meets you and gets the confirmation of what I told him
11:27:32 15 already, based on our agreement, he will be ahead full speed
16 immediately.

17 The problem: At this time, and after one year of efforts,
18 I did not get anything, yet you and I know it. But what is done
19 is done. Let's forget it and move forward.

11:27:50 20 With Charles we can buy - I am not talking about received
21 for free - the 10 per cent going to Freetown, but also the
22 remaining 90 per cent in Kono.

23 In short, if we put together what we have, yourself,
24 Charles and myself, we can start immediately what we were
11:28:12 25 supposed to start months ago, and all of us would finally make
26 money instead of losing money every day.

27 At this time, you and I are the big losers. I don't know
28 about you, but as far as I'm concerned, I'm tired of it.

29 What we have to solve:

1 1. How will you convince the people in charge in Kono to
2 bring everything to you instead of 10 per cent and it is not
3 possible how are you going to convince them to sell those 90 per
4 cent to us instead of keeping it or selling it to the Lebanese or
11:28:47 5 whoever?

6 2. The other point, if we can buy it, how are we going to
7 ship it outside? Through Freetown is probably out of the
8 question. Through Monrovia is not safe either. We cannot trust
9 those people.

11:29:03 10 Charles has the financial ability to do anything, a private
11 jet from Belgium to Kono, or to Monrovia, or to Freetown, or any
12 other solution.

13 With Charles, we can do whatever is possible. It is now up
14 to you and me to find the solution.

11:29:24 15 Foday, what I'm saying is this: The money, if finally on
16 the table, you make sure that the merchandise is available one
17 way or another, and all of us will be okay.

18 At the minute, the commission will be in place and we will
19 have the final contract. Everything will be easier for us, but
11:29:43 20 please let's do something in the meantime.

21 The ambassador of Sierra Leone went to see Charles's father
22 in Antwerp yesterday."

23 Pause. Mr Taylor, remember, this letter is dated May 2000?

24 A. That is correct.

11:30:06 25 Q. Was your father in Antwerp in May 2000?

26 A. No, my father was dead way before 2000.

27 Q. "Don't forget he is the President of the association for
28 all the diamond buyers in Antwerp".

29 Was your father ever the President of the association for

1 all the diamond buyers in Antwerp?

2 A. No, my father never travelled in his life to Europe.

3 Q. "Following our advice, Charles's father told the ambassador
4 that Antwerp was not ready to do anything until the commission is
11:30:46 5 in place. Charles is already preparing the equipment you
6 requested last week."

7 Wait until after the break and we'll come back to this.

8 Okay, Mr Taylor?

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we'll take a break until 12 o'clock.

11:31:02 10 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

11 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honours, can I make this inquiry before
13 we recommence. I don't know about your Honours, but for me
14 personally, I prefer to work with paper and I wonder if you would
12:02:05 15 assisted by a hard copy of this report. Unfortunately, the only
16 difficulty is this: I caused some copies to be made, but we only
17 made three and I need an extra one. So if someone was in a
18 position to make a copy now --

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am quite happy working from
12:02:48 20 the - what's displayed on the screen.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, we've got three copies there now.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think Justice Doherty would like one.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

24 MR BANGURA: Mr President, may I, for clarity, inquire what
12:03:17 25 the report is? I'm not sure what --

26 MR GRIFFITHS: It's just the UN expert panel report. It's
27 that report.

28 MR BANGURA: Thank you.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: I take it you have got access to that, Mr

1 Bangura.

2 MR BANGURA: I do.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Yes. Mr Taylor, before we adjourned, we were looking at
12:03:38 5 the Michel letter which makes reference to a Charles, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Mr Taylor, is that Charles you: Charles Taylor?

8 A. No, not at all. Not at all.

9 Q. Have you seen anywhere, Mr Taylor, where it has been
12:03:59 10 suggested that you are in fact that Charles?

11 A. No, not in this place. But some very high-powering
12 influential people in the international community continue to
13 construe that this referred to Charles Taylor, yes.

14 Q. Some influential people in the international community like
12:04:22 15 whom?

16 A. Well, we've had - in fact, maybe I will qualify it. I will
17 say it was based on that countries. Both this letter, both
18 Britain and America got locked in on: This is the proof that it
19 is Charles Taylor.

12:04:43 20 Q. And have you seen any particular place where reference has
21 been made to this Charles letter suggesting that it's you?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. Where?

24 A. I've seen - there is a publication done by the Washington
12:05:02 25 Post that suggests that.

26 Q. That suggests that the Charles mentioned in this letter is
27 you?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Now, we are going to come to that Washington Post article

1 in due course. But for now, let us just familiarise ourselves
2 with these letters, because we will need to come back to them in
3 detail in due course. So if we continue:

4 "Charles is already preparing the equipment you requested
12:05:31 5 last week."

6 And then we see attached on the same page:

7 "Commission For the Management of Strategic Resources,
8 Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chairman, 56 Spur
9 Road" - that's Foday Sankoh's address - "Freetown.

12:05:49 10 Memorandum of understanding.

11 This agreement is made this 12th day of April, 2000,
12 between the Commission of Strategic Resources of Sierra Leone and
13 Mr Samuel Isidoor Weinberger of 100 Hatton Garden, London ECL8NX.

14 The Commission for Management of Strategic Resources,
12:06:15 15 Reconstruction and Development of Spur Road, Freetown,
16 Sierra Leone, hereinafter known as party A, and Mr Samuel Isidoor
17 Weinberger of 100 Hatton Garden, London, hereinafter known as
18 party B.

19 The parties intend to establish and carry on business
12:06:35 20 transactions in Sierra Leone for buying and selling precious
21 stones. Party A, "that is, the CMRRD, "shall act as facilitators
22 in the business, and party B shall organise the purchase of the
23 precious stones. The former shall use best endeavours as
24 facilitator for the commencement and carrying on of the business
12:07:06 25 in Sierra Leone for the benefit and profit of the latter and the
26 people of Sierra Leone in general.

27 All other agreements on the above mentioned issue is
28 subject to review and rectification for establishing strong
29 business transaction.

1 A final document of this agreement shall be issued later
2 from party A to party B upon the full commencement of the office
3 of the CMRRD based in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

4 Signed by Mr Foday Saybana Sankoh."

12:07:47 5 Now, Mr Taylor, are you aware of the significance of Hatton
6 Garden in London? What is it a centre for?

7 A. I don't know. I really don't.

8 Q. Very well.

9 And then we see that it's signed by Foday Sankoh, Mr Samuel
12:08:09 10 Isidoor Weinberger. And then the final document:

11 "Commission for the Management of Strategic Mineral
12 Resource and Reconstruction and Development, Office of the
13 Chairman, care of 56 Spur Road, Freetown.

14 I, the undersigned, Foday Saybana Sankoh, chairman of the
12:08:36 15 Commission For Strategic Mineral Resources (hereinafter referred
16 to as the commission) acknowledging that Raymond Clive Kramer, as
17 executive officer (hereinafter collectively referred to as
18 Kramer) is able to provide expert counseling and guidance in
19 matters relating to prospecting; mining, exploitation, recovery,
12:09:01 20 processing, marketing, and generally all aspects relating to
21 strategic minerals in Sierra Leone.

22 Do hereby grant to Raymond Clive Kramer and/or any other
23 corporation forming part of the Kramer Group of Companies
24 authority for an initial period of one year subject to renewal
12:09:24 25 thereof for such further periods as may be agreed upon for the
26 purpose described in this mandate:

27 1. To organise and arrange an international mining
28 conference on behalf of the commission to be held in South Africa
29 or such other location or venue as may be convenient to all

1 parties for the purpose of investigating and considering all
2 aspects relating to strategic minerals in Sierra Leone.

3 2. To represent in the commission in all areas relating to
4 mining and mineral resources including, but not limited to,
12:10:01 5 strategic minerals and precious stones.

6 3. Pursuant to this mandate, Kramer shall report to the
7 chairman from time to time regarding any interest shown in the
8 above minerals by interested parties.

9 4. This memorandum of understanding shall serve as
12:10:22 10 authority of the chairman of the commission, entitling Kramer to
11 perform its functions in terms of this mandate.

12 5. To attend to all aspects of the marketing and sales of
13 strategic minerals on behalf of the commission through the Kramer
14 Group of Companies, its affiliates, nominees or agents, upon a
12:10:44 15 profit-sharing basis to be agreed upon between the commission and
16 Kramer.

17 6. Generally to perform any such other service on behalf
18 of the commission as may be required or agreed upon from time to
19 time.

12:10:57 20 This memorandum of understanding is effective as from the
21 immediate setting up of all the structures of, and the employment
22 of, the various members of the commission in line with the Lome
23 Peace Agreement. However, upon the signing of this document,
24 authority is given for the organising of the international mining
12:11:18 25 conference in South Africa by Kramer Group of Companies.

26 Signed at Freetown, Sierra Leone, this 11th day of
27 February, 2000. Foday Saybana Sankoh."

28 Now, let us put - having alerted ourselves to the source of
29 the Michel mentioned, let's go back to the United Nations

1 document.

2 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, just before you do so. When
3 introducing this document before the break, you mentioned that it
4 was a sequence of emails. This reads to me to read as one
12:11:59 5 document, but are you saying that these different paragraphs are
6 sequential emails?

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, it appeared that way to me,
8 your Honour, because it looks like when you print an email, when
9 preceding emails are attached on the same document. But as you
12:12:17 10 can see, it's a prosecution document so I don't know if we can be
11 assisted by my learned friends as to the source of the documents.

12 JUDGE DOHERTY: I just notice it's in your defence bundle.
13 Are you saying it's also a Prosecution exhibit?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, we obtained it from the prosecution.
12:12:36 15 It was disclosed to us by them, which is why it bears that ERN
16 number at the top right-hand corner.

17 Now, we can put this volume away for the moment, but we
18 will be coming back to that Michel letter in due course:

19 Q. Let's go back then to the panel of experts report and we
12:13:03 20 were at paragraph 95 on page 20:

21 "Much of the correspondence suggest that Sankoh was
22 encouraging a wide variety of potential investors, many thinking
23 they would reap exclusive benefits from the same things. One
24 much-circulated April 2000 letter from Michel to the Leader talks
12:13:38 25 about how Sankoh should try to get all of the diamonds mined in
26 Kono, rather than the 10 per cent which the author said was the
27 case, the rest being filtered off to Liberia. Michel proposed
28 that his Belgian partner Charles could hire a private jet to take
29 the diamonds out directly from Kono, avoiding the Lebanese and

1 Monrovia. 'We cannot trust those people', he wrote.

2 Michael Desaedeleer, a US based self-employed Belgian, made
3 contact with the RUF in Togo during the summer of 1999 while he
4 was doing business with the son of President Eyadema. By
12:14:25 5 October, he and John Caldwell, President of the Washington-based
6 US Trading & Investment Company (TIC), had worked up an
7 arrangement with Foday Sankoh which would give them authority to
8 broker rights to all of Sierra Leone's diamonds and gold
9 resources for a ten-year period."

12:14:45 10 That company, Mr Taylor, TIC, have you heard of them?

11 A. No, I have not heard of TIC, no.

12 Q. "Although refused a visa by Sierra Leone's US embassy,
13 Caldwell and Desaedeleer went to Sierra Leone and Liberia anyway
14 and signed the agreement between Desaedeleer's BECA company and
12:15:15 15 the RUF (not with the Government of Sierra Leone or the
16 commission for the management of strategic mineral resources).
17 While they were in Liberia, Desaedeleer was given diamonds by
18 Ibrahim Bah, aka Ibrahim Balde, which Desaedeleer later
19 discovered in Antwerp were worth much less than he had been told.

12:15:39 20 He also claimed to have been shown perhaps hundreds of diamonds
21 by Sankoh's wife, Fatou, during a 1999 meeting in New York."

22 Pause there. Mr Taylor, tell us, were you party to any of
23 these deals?

24 A. None whatsoever.

12:15:56 25 Q. Were you aware that they were being conducted?

26 A. No, I was not aware. Not at all. And I would suggest if I
27 had been they would have at least put it in there. No.

28 Q. "In February 2000, Foday Sankoh, his wife and other RUF
29 officials travelled to South Africa." Were you aware of that,

1 Mr Taylor?

2 A. End of February, yes, of 2000, I was aware that Foday
3 Sankoh travelled to South Africa.

4 Q. And as far as you were aware, what was the purpose of his
12:16:37 5 visit to South Africa in that month and year?

6 A. When I inquired, I was told that he had gone for medical
7 reasons. That he was not well and he had gone for medical
8 reasons.

9 Q. Okay:

12:16:56 10 "In February, Foday Sankoh and his wife and other RUF
11 officials travelled to South Africa. Sankoh was in contravention
12 of a United Nations travel ban prohibiting him from leaving
13 Sierra Leone. The trip was respond sponsored and partly financed
14 by South African businessman Raymond Kramer."

12:17:20 15 Now, remember in the letters or emails we just mentioned,
16 this individual, Kramer, was mentioned, yes?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. "Who earlier the same month had signed an agreement with
19 Sankoh to represent the commission (the CMRRD of which Sankoh was
12:17:41 20 chairman) in all areas relating to mining and mineral resources,
21 including but not limited to strategic minerals and precious
22 stones. When Sankoh's presence in South Africa was made public,
23 he was forced to return to Sierra Leone and curtail his dealings
24 with Kramer. Fatou Sankoh, who travels on a US passport, visited
12:18:06 25 South Africa again in May 2000 and was again deported.

26 The correspondence presents an image of a double-dealing
27 leader, clutching at financial opportunities for personal and
28 political gain outside of the governmental framework in which he
29 was ostensibly working. Much of this related to the diamond

1 trade. It also suggests dissension within the RUF ranks and an
2 attempt by Sankoh to gain control over diamonds that remained
3 effectively in the hands of his fractious field commanders and
4 their Liberian mentors."

12:18:50 5 Who are the Liberian mentors, Mr Taylor?

6 A. I have no idea who these people are suggesting. Here is a
7 man signing agreements, writing legal documents, and if he has
8 mentors in Liberia, or any of his commanders, then there is a
9 serious problem. This, to me, appears like a person that knows
10 exactly what he is doing and doesn't need any mentor in Liberia.

12:19:11

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, can I just revisit quickly a matter I
12 raised with you before the break and it's this: Did you meet
13 with the panel of experts?

14 A. Yes, I met with them briefly.

12:19:30

15 Q. How long did you spend with them at that meeting?

16 A. Probably about an hour, no more.

17 Q. And we will come back to this, but what was the purpose of
18 the meeting with them?

12:19:54

19 A. It was a brief meeting really to - it was just a
20 reassurance meeting, welcoming a top United Nations panel of
21 experts and they come to the country and they paid what we call a
22 courtesy call. I welcomed them and told them that they were free
23 to go wherever they wanted to go uninhibited and that my offices
24 were - you know my minister of state would remain available to
25 them. If they had any snares anywhere, any obstruction along the
26 way, that I would be informed immediately. It was a courtesy
27 call.

12:20:19

28 Q. And did they raise with you the matters which thereafter
29 became the subject of the report?

1 A. No, not the details of the matters.

2 Q. Well, let me ask you specifically, Mr Taylor: Did, for
3 example, Mr Smillie, that expert, ask you directly about your
4 alleged involvement in diamond dealing?

12:20:49 5 A. Ian Smillie never did. He knew what he had had to
6 encounter with government. In fact he was a little concerned
7 about coming to Liberia, but, you know, he was reassured to come.
8 He never, and neither did anyone in that meeting or on that
9 delegation directly say to me, "Mr President, here is some
12:21:11 10 evidence", or, "We know that you or your government", no, it was
11 a courtesy call.

12 Q. No, I am not even interested in evidence, Mr Taylor. Was
13 any allegation made directly to you by any member of that
14 panel --

12:21:26 15 A. No.

16 Q. -- to give you an opportunity of answering that allegation
17 that you were involved in diamond dealing, those diamonds
18 originating in Sierra Leone?

19 A. No, not at all, no.

12:21:40 20 Q. And you met with all of them face to face, did you?

21 A. All of them.

22 Q. And did they at any time make that point directly to you?

23 A. No.

24 Q. In fact, we will come to that meeting in a moment. Let us
12:22:23 25 just finish the next paragraph. "The correspondence presents an
26 image" - no, we have dealt with that.

27 Now, before we come on to deal with the certification
28 process, let us jump forward to paragraph 311, which is page 48
29 of the document. Paragraph 311:

1 "The panel met with President Charles Taylor and found him
2 to be aware of the shortcomings and deficiencies faced by Roberts
3 International Airport, which only a few years ago was a very
4 dynamic air traffic control centre. He was concerned by the lack
12:23:23 5 of resources to control his air space and he said that he had
6 personally approached the United Nations for assistance in
7 acquiring the equipment necessary for effective management of the
8 airport."

9 And remember we looked at the meeting of the management
12:23:39 10 committee of RIA?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. "His requests, he said, have yielded no result. Asked
13 about the priority he would give between the acquisition of
14 military equipment and the acquisition of means to improve his
12:23:58 15 airport, he chose the airport. The day before this discussion,
16 the panel visited Roberts International Airport which is
17 gradually resuming activity. The airport had been burnt out and
18 tumbled down buildings a consequence of the war. As in Conakry
19 and Freetown, the activities of the control tower are limited to
12:24:21 20 takeoffs and landings. However, unlike Conakry and Freetown,
21 there is no link between Robertsfield and the domestic airports
22 of the hinterland and there is no telephone. The authorities say
23 they do not have the means to take inventories or to inspect
24 domestic airports. As regards military flights, the air traffic
12:24:43 25 service are not involved in their movement. A separate sector is
26 allocated to them."

27 And then in the conclusions over the page:

28 "As noted in previous sections of this report, major
29 shortcomings and deficiencies are obvious in the Roberts FIR and

1 its constituent states, in particular, as well as in the other
2 West African FIRs."

3 I don't know what that stands for. I don't know if anybody
4 can assist. FIR?

12:25:24 5 "The civil aviation community is aware of this situation
6 and recommendations and conclusions have been adopted. The
7 problem is a lack of resources."

8 Now, Mr Taylor, first of all, do you recall this discussion
9 about the limitations of Roberts International Airport?

12:25:44 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And in what context did that discussion take place?

12 A. The capacity of Roberts International to act in line with
13 other international air traffic agreements, that was the basic
14 context of the improvements of Roberts International Airport.

12:26:16 15 How they could help and why is it that we did not have the
16 facilities on track as had been expected over the years and I
17 told them it's because of these problems, which were mostly
18 financial.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I just pause to assist. If one goes to
12:26:37 20 page 45 in this document, briefly, at paragraph 275 we have a
21 definition of what FIR is. Paragraph 275, "and into flight
22 information regions (FIRs)", so that's what it stands for.

23 JUDGE DOHERTY: It's on page 7 in the acronyms.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Thanks:

12:27:18 25 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, whilst we are on the subject of the visit
26 of the panel of experts, can we go to page 32 in this document,
27 please. Do you have it? Let's look at paragraphs 180 to 182:

28 "The personal connections between President Charles Taylor
29 and Foday Sankoh go back ten years to their training in Libya, to

1 their combined efforts on behalf of Blaise Compaore in his
2 seizure of power in Burkina Faso.

3 We are already know what your case is, Mr Taylor, with
4 regard to Foday Sankoh in Libya. Did you know him in Libya: Yes
12:28:10 5 or no?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Now, what about this second aspect though:

8 "... their combined efforts on behalf of Blaise Compaore in
9 his seizure of power in Burkina Faso."

12:28:23 10 Were you involved in that?

11 A. No. As a matter of fact, I was in jail in Ghana when
12 Blaise Compaore seized power in Burkina Faso. That's why they do
13 not know what they are talking about. In jail, and I have given
14 evidence before the Court on that effect. It was after the death
12:28:41 15 of Thomas Sankara that I then was freed from jail in Ghana. Had
16 no idea that the two friends had a falling out. Never even in
17 Burkina Faso at the time.

18 Q. And so here we have this allegation being made in a
19 United Nations document that you had combined your efforts with
12:29:07 20 Foday Sankoh to assist Blaise Compaore in seizing power, but you
21 say you were actually in prison at the time?

22 A. Ghanaian records will demonstrate that too. I was still
23 locked up in jail when Blaise Compaore killed all - during the
24 killing of Thomas Sankara, because I can't say he killed, but he
12:29:31 25 didn't do it himself. I was in prison in Ghana and released
26 after the fact.

27 Q. "... and to Sankoh's involvement in Charles Taylor's
28 struggle as head of the NPFL to take power in Liberia in the late
29 1990s."

1 "Sankoh's involvement in Charles Taylor's struggle as head
2 of the NPFL." Was Sankoh involved in such a way?

3 A. Not at all. Not at all.

4 Q. And let's just pause for a minute, Mr Taylor. We saw from
12:30:09 5 the previous paragraphs we just looked at a discussion about
6 security at Roberts International Airfield.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Tell me, did Mr Smillie, that expert, or anybody else on
9 this panel, put these suggestions directly to you about your
12:30:26 10 involvement with Sankoh in Libya, your involvement in bringing
11 Blaise Compaore to power?

12 A. Never.

13 Q. Did any of them say that to your face?

14 A. Never. Never. Did this come up as a discussion. Never.

12:30:40 15 Q. "These events are well documented, and President Taylor
16 told the panel that he was a close friend of Foday Sankoh."

17 Did you say that to them?

18 A. I said I knew Foday Sankoh for a very brief period. Yes, I
19 told them I knew him.

12:30:57 20 Q. Did you tell them that he was a close friend of yours?

21 A. No, I did not use that expression that he was my close
22 friend. Never, no.

23 Q. "President Taylor denies unequivocally, however, that he or
24 his government has provided any training to the RUF, any weapons
12:31:18 25 or related material, any Liberian facilities, or territory for
26 staging attacks or a safe haven."

27 Did you tell them that?

28 A. I told them that.

29 Q. "He told the panel that RUF leader Sam Bockarie's presence

1 in Liberia was a gesture of goodwill on Taylor's part in order to
2 allow the RUF to work together for a peaceful settlement in
3 Sierra Leone after Foday Sankoh and Bockarie had found themselves
4 unable to work together."

12:31:48 5 Mr Taylor, did you tell them it was a gesture of goodwill
6 on your part?

7 A. These people - I told these people - I explained them what
8 I have told the Court, the ECOWAS process. Why they decided to
9 put it this way, I have no idea. It was not just - it was not
10 just a gesture. In fact, if they wanted to be fair, they would
11 have said that we did it as a means of bringing peace to some
12 good conclusion in Sierra Leone.

13 Q. And, of course, Mr Taylor, this was, of course, a panel of
14 experts set up by the United Nations, was it not?

12:32:23 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And was the United Nations, which set up this panel of
17 experts, aware of the reason for Sam Bockarie's extraction from
18 Sierra Leone?

19 A. I would say yes, they had to be aware because their special
12:32:36 20 representative, who represents the Secretary-General in Liberia,
21 has sent all the messages of the details of these meetings. So I
22 have to say yes.

23 Q. "The panel, however, found unequivocal and overwhelming
24 evidence that Liberia has been actively supporting the RUF at all
12:33:02 25 levels in providing training, weapons, and related materiel,
26 logistical support, a staging ground for attacks, and a safe
27 haven for retreat and cooperation."

28 A. "Recuperation".

29 Q. Now, we will come back to that, but let's just pick up

1 where we left off in terms of the diamonds issue. So let's go
2 back, shall we, to page 2020, and we'd concluded paragraph 98
3 when we diverted. So coming back to paragraph 99:

4 "Sierra Leone's new diamond certification system. By
12:33:56 5 resolution 1306 (2000) adopted on 5 July 2000, the
6 Security Council imposed an embargo on the direct and indirect
7 import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone until a new mining,
8 export and monitoring regime could be developed. With technical
9 assistance from Belgium's Diamond High Council and financial
12:34:24 10 assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States, a
11 certificate of origin system was developed between July and
12 October 2000, including a numbered confirmation certificate
13 printed on security paper, new detailed electronic databases of
14 exports with electronic confirmation at destinations and
12:34:49 15 electronic transmission of digital photographs of the packages
16 being exported.

17 In October, after considering the new measures and ensuring
18 that information about them had been disseminated to importing
19 countries, the Security Council lifted the embargo on official
12:35:07 20 Sierra Leone exports. The first diamonds exported under the new
21 arrangements reached Antwerp at the end of the October.

22 The embargo and the new certification system were
23 peripheral to the mandate of the panel, but during our travel it
24 was the subject of much discussion in Sierra Leone, in other
12:35:26 25 African exporting countries, and in all the major diamond
26 importing centres.

27 The new system is indeed foolproof once diamonds enter the
28 formal system. It will be important for Sierra Leone's
29 Government Gold and Diamond Office to ensure, therefore, that

1 only diamonds mined in government-controlled areas are actually
2 certified.

3 This is especially important, given efforts by the RUF to
4 trade diamonds for food and other supplies in Kenema.

12:36:00 5 It is perhaps more important to consider the value of the
6 system beyond conflict diamonds once the war ends. Then the
7 issue for Sierra Leone will focus more on smuggling and other
8 forms of illicit behaviour. In the end, the certification system
9 can only work to its fullest potential if the government is
12:36:22 10 willing and able to track and audit dealers in Sierra Leone, and
11 if it is able to develop systems of support for the artisanal
12 miners who, for the better part of fifty years, have worked
13 outside the diamond industry.

14 There is more to be said about the certification scheme;
12:36:42 15 however, there was never a serious problem with diamonds being
16 exported officially from Sierra Leone. The problem was the
17 illicit and conflict diamonds, which avoided the formal system.
18 In 1999 Sierra Leone officially exported only 9,320 carats, a
19 demonstration, if one was needed, that the formal system was
12:37:09 20 being ignored by the RUF and smugglers. This has changed in the
21 first half of 2000, when concerns about the country's conflict
22 diamonds was noted in the world press and in diamond-buying
23 centres. The consequence was a sudden influx of diamonds into
24 the formal system, offered by dealers wanting at last to go
12:37:34 25 'straight' and avoid charges of illicit trading. While the
26 26,300 carats exported officially during this period did not
27 represent a landslide, it was a significant step in the right
28 direction.

29 The United Nations' embargo effectively stopped this

1 legitimising trend for several months and pushed traders back
2 into their old and time-tested smuggling routes. Because there
3 was no embargo on diamonds from any of Sierra Leone's
4 neighbouring countries, the ban actually punished the victim and
12:38:12 5 rewarded its enemies. This has now changed, and it is to be
6 hoped that the new system will attract a significant volume of
7 diamonds back into legitimate channels.

8 Where the RUF's conflict diamonds are concerned, the
9 legitimate export system, whether it was foolproof or not, was
12:38:33 10 irrelevant, and it will remain so. As long as there is no
11 controls in neighbouring countries, the RUF will continue to be
12 able to move their diamonds out with impunity.

13 For this reason, it is imperative that a standardised
14 global certification scheme be introduced as soon as possible.
12:38:53 15 The issue of conflict diamonds has now been addressed at four
16 intergovernmental meetings in the Kimberly Process and at a
17 further meeting in London in October 2000. On 1 December 2000,
18 the General Assembly passed a resolution on the role of diamonds
19 in fuelling conflict and expressed the need to give urgent and
12:39:16 20 careful attention to the creation and implementation of a simple
21 and workable international certification scheme for rough
22 diamonds. The resolution stated that this scheme should meet
23 internationally agreed minimum standards, it should secure the
24 widest possible participation, and that diamond exporting,
12:39:36 25 processing, and importing states should act in concert. The
26 resolution also noted the need for transparency and for
27 arrangements to help ensure compliance."

28 Mr Taylor, let's pause. Help us. Such regulation of the
29 diamond trading business, was the Government of Liberia opposed

1 to that?

2 A. No, we were not opposed to that.

3 Q. "This resolution is strongly endorsed by the panel. It is
4 a major step forward in recognising the need for what the diamond
12:40:14 5 industry calls rough controls. If implemented, it could go a
6 long way in solving some of the problems identified in this
7 report."

8 Skip the next couple of lines.

9 "The panel notes with concern, however, that some
12:40:30 10 governments and some members of the industry may be approaching
11 the idea of international rough controls with reluctance or
12 antipathy, urging a minimalist approach and a lengthy study and
13 negotiation. The panel believes that any international system
14 must be developed carefully and that it must be appropriate to
12:40:53 15 the need. But the panel is in no doubt about the urgency or the
16 importance of the proposal. Despite all the meetings of the past
17 year, despite the work of United Nations and many governments,
18 the wars in Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of
19 Congo, continue. Diamonds continue to serve as fuel for these
12:41:12 20 wars and as a catalyst for the continuing misery of hundreds of
21 thousands of people."

22 Let's go over the page, and we see the conclusion at letter
23 G, paragraph 110:

24 "The issue of Sierra Leone's conflict diamonds is complex,
12:41:37 25 but it is not unfathomable. As will be noted later in this
26 report, it is tied to the wider issue of illicit diamonds, and
27 this has been recognised in a forthright manner by the diamond
28 industry in WDC documentation. A detailed proposal has also been
29 made by the WDC for a system for international rough diamond

1 export and import controls."

2 And we ought to look at 0 - let's skip the next paragraph
3 and go to paragraph 112:

4 "The panel sought to determine how illicit diamonds from
12:42:30 5 Sierra Leone find their way into the legitimate trade. One line
6 of inquiry was to compare diamond export statistics of
7 neighbouring producer countries with their known mining
8 production capacity to see if exports significantly exceed
9 production capacity. Another was to review the import statistics
12:42:54 10 of major trading centres for anomalies. One such anomaly is the
11 33.6 million carats said to be of Liberian origin that was
12 imported into Belgium in the five years between 1995 and 1999.
13 This volume is far beyond Liberian production capacity and
14 exceeds official Liberian exports by so much that investigation
12:43:23 15 was clearly warranted."

16 Mr Taylor, why is there that disparity?

17 A. This disparity was due to the fact that you had diamonds
18 coming from Russia, Angola, Congo and other places that were
19 being sold in Belgium as Liberian diamonds when in fact they were
12:43:51 20 not Liberian diamonds. We accept that Liberia could not and did
21 not produce this amount of diamonds.

22 But this panel should have also known from the records that
23 there was a reason for that and regrettably they did not get into
24 the reason. But that's the reason for the disparity; diamonds
12:44:09 25 from other countries sold as Liberian diamonds, and sold legally
26 too.

27 Q. "A major difficulty in tracking the movement of rough
28 diamonds, however, is the inconsistent manner in which the
29 governments of major trading centres record diamond imports and

1 exports. The first issue has to do with the general availability
2 of statistics. The Belgian authorities expressed concern to the
3 panel that Belgium had been unfairly criticised in the past
4 because it has been so open with its statistics. It was
12:44:44 5 suggested to the panel that other countries have escaped
6 criticism for importing rough from sensitive countries, either as
7 countries of origin or provenance, simply because they produce no
8 public statistics at all.

9 The panel went to considerable lengths to obtain rough
12:45:04 10 diamond import statistics from all the major trading centres for
11 the years between 1987 and 1999. With the exception of The
12 Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire and the United Arab Emirates, the panel was
13 largely successful."

14 And then it goes on to deal with the various statistics for
12:45:26 15 the countries. I don't think that need detain us. But let's go
16 over the page, please, to page 24 and pick up the narrative at
17 paragraph 122:

18 "The highest estimates of current Liberian production
19 capacity do not exceed 150,000 carats per year. In 1987, the
12:45:58 20 country exported a record high 295,000 carats, at an average
21 value of \$37 per carat. The Liberian Ministry of Lands, Mines
22 and Energy informed the panel that 1998 official diamond exports
23 totalled only 8,000 carats, valued at \$800,000 (that is a \$100
24 per carat). In the same year, Belgium recorded imports from
12:46:30 25 Liberia by 26 companies totalling 2.56 million carats, valued at
26 \$217 million (that is \$85 per carat). One company alone, Company
27 A, imported 168,456 carats, estimated at \$87 million or \$516 per
28 carat."

29 Now, you see that disparity, don't you, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. That your Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy officially
3 record only 8,000 carats coming out of Liberia, yet the Belgians
4 record imports from Liberia of some 2.56 million carats. That's
12:47:30 5 a rather large disparity, isn't it?

6 A. Very large disparity, yes, by 26 companies. Yes, very
7 large.

8 Q. And these companies, Mr Taylor, do you know who they were?

9 A. No. I have no idea who these companies were, but I know
12:47:50 10 the system that would explain how this is possible, and it is
11 true.

12 Q. "In 1999, official Liberian exports grew slightly to 8,500
13 carats at average value of \$105 per carat. Liberian imports into
14 Belgium declined to 1.75 million carats but the stated value
12:48:27 15 increased to \$247 million or \$140 per carat. Company A's imports
16 declined to 75,000 carats valued at \$57 million. This
17 represented a significantly higher per carat value, however, of
18 \$760."

19 Let's skip the next paragraph. Go to paragraph 125:

12:48:56 20 "Belgium has recently changed the data requirements on the
21 import licences that it requires for each shipment. It now
22 requires that each import shipment state the country of
23 provenance, as well as the country of origin. A review of
24 selected Company A import licences, however, showed that diamonds
12:49:18 25 far in excess of the quality and quantity available in Liberia
26 had been imported as Liberian in provenance and origin. Invoices
27 from Liberian firms, none on the list of licencees provided by
28 the Liberian government, accompanied the Belgian import licence.

29 A physical check of the Monrovia street addresses given by

1 most of these firms revealed that there were no such companies
2 and no such addresses. Courier firms in Monrovia, however, have
3 in the past been instructed to route correspondence for these
4 addresses to the International Trust Company (ITC), which in
12:50:06 5 January 2000 changed its name to the International Bank of
6 Liberia Limited."

7 Pause, Mr Taylor, who is that?

8 A. Well, it is going to take a minute to explain this. We go
9 back to the 26 companies just mentioned in the previous
12:50:30 10 paragraph, and the 2.56 million carats. This particular issue
11 here is called - it was first called the ITC and I'm sure we are
12 going to get into the legal documents with that. The
13 International Trust Company, ITC, is registered in Liberia as a
14 shell company. It's been in existence since 1948.

12:50:59 15 Under the Liberian Maritime Registry programme, that
16 address is used in Liberia just as in other parts of the world
17 where you have shell companies, whether it's in the Bahamas or
18 off the island of Jersey. These are shell companies that operate
19 under certain basic laws but without the control of the country
12:51:23 20 they operate and those most of these companies, while they use
21 this address as a shell address, they are mostly, US or European
22 based companies. So they are buying diamonds under this shell
23 address in Monrovia, but they are legitimate companies that are
24 registered in different companies.

12:51:44 25 So I am sure at some later point the Court will have to
26 really look into how shell work and how and why there is this
27 discrepancy with this large increase that we even as a government
28 admit there is no way Liberia is capable of exporting 2.56
29 million carats of diamonds. But they are using the shell address

1 of the International Trust Company. The name International Bank
2 of Liberia, the ITC's programme, they had operated this programme
3 since 1948. That's the maritime - the Liberian ship registry
4 programme had this extra dealing with ITC basically registered in
12:52:32 5 the United States. All of these companies.

6 We took the agreement from them, they had had it since
7 1948, and gave it to a new group called LISCR and because they
8 could not use the name ITC they changed the name to the
9 International Bank of Liberia Limited. But there was no banking
12:52:55 10 done by the Liberian government or any official transaction by a
11 Liberian government. This is owned and operated now by LISCR
12 operating under the shell laws.

13 Q. We will we will come to LISCR in a moment, but I will ask a
14 simple question before I move on. This International Bank of
12:53:18 15 Liberia Limited, does that bank have any association with the
16 Liberian government?

17 A. No, none whatsoever.

18 Q. "Since then, mail addressed to the companies in question
19 has been forwarded to the newly established Liberian
12:53:41 20 International Ship and Corporate Registry (LISCR)."

21 That's the organisation you just mentioned, Mr Taylor, yes?

22 A. That's the organisation, yes.

23 Q. "Which now handles the Liberian Maritime Registry"?

24 A. That is correct.

12:53:50 25 Q. "This means that if the companies in question are more than
26 shells, they are not physically present in Liberia and none of
27 the diamonds in question were either mined in or passed through
28 Liberia. It also means, however, that there is an intimate
29 Liberian connection with these deceptive diamond transactions."

1 What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor?

12:54:35 2 A. Really I don't even know how to say what I understand this
3 to be because it is so - the rationale is too terrible. You know
4 that these are shell companies, but they have to be - do shell
5 companies anywhere in the world act with the connection - the
6 intimate connection of officials in these countries? Nowhere
7 that I know of, and I stand corrected, where there are shell
8 companies and there are many of them in many countries in the
9 world, that even the government knows nothing about their
12:54:54 10 transactions.

11 Most shell companies, you go in, you buy this shell
12 company, you have a name, bingo, that's it. The government has
13 no idea. And these shell companies, for your Honours, they
14 operate almost similar to the banking system that the Swiss used
12:55:10 15 for so many years where now I think they are giving into the US
16 to give up names of depositors. Okay, you don't really know.

17 They say that these are shell companies and then they say
18 with intimate Liberian connection. This is total nonsense.
19 There is no intimate Liberian connection with these shell
12:55:31 20 companies. None whatsoever.

21 Q. Now, where it says, Mr Taylor, "This means that if the
22 companies in question are more than shells, they are not
23 physically present in Liberia and none of the diamonds in
24 question were either mined in or passed through Liberia", what
12:55:58 25 does that mean? What do you understand by that?

26 A. Well, my understanding is that they are saying that most of
27 the diamonds are not Liberian diamonds and that diamonds are
28 coming through from other areas. This is what they're hinting
29 at, and I don't have a quarrel with that.

1 Q. And then it goes on: "The name of retired US army general
2 Robert A Yerks" - now we have come across him, haven't we?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. "... occurs frequently in discussion about Liberian diamond
12:56:31 5 transfers. He was involved with ITC and is currently a senior
6 official in LISCR."

7 Was he?

8 A. Yes. ITC, I have told this Court before, was established
9 for mostly retired United States armed forces generals. Most of
12:56:49 10 them that operate this registry are American generals today as we
11 sit here. And he is a retired lieutenant general.

12 Q. "Companies and individuals in Belgium importing 'Liberian'
13 diamonds in 1999 and/or 2000, include" - and then they go on to
14 list a number of those. Then they go on to deal with at
12:57:21 15 paragraph 129 supposed exporting companies.

16 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, if I may interrupt with a
17 question and perhaps the witness could tell us a little bit about
18 this Liberian Maritime Registry. What was it and what was its
19 function?

12:57:45 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. You have heard the question, Mr Taylor.

22 A. Yes. The Liberian Maritime Registry is a registry that
23 have countries use the flag of Liberia on their vessels for the
24 purpose of moving goods and services around the world. For that
12:58:08 25 service the Liberian government is paid a fee, for the use of the
26 flag. It's called a flag of convenience. That's the Liberian
27 maritime programme.

28 In line with that programme, in 1948, when it was set up,
29 for tax purposes of certain companies they had registered shell

1 companies using the maritime address in Liberia as an addition to
2 their programme to function. But it's mostly a flag of
3 convenience that we call the maritime programme. It was set
4 up - it's been protected by the United States military because we
12:58:54 5 don't have a military. But once you use our flag, in cooperation
6 with the armed forces, if a Liberian - if a ship flying a flag
7 anywhere in the world, the Liberian flag, is stopped or comes
8 into any problem, it is the responsibility of the United States
9 armed forces to intervene with an agreement that the Government
10 of Liberia has with the Government of United States. And most of
11 the people employed in that system, in the maritime system, which
12 is based in the United States and operates under United States
13 laws, are former military officers that are involved in the
14 programme.

12:59:36 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Then in addition to the explanation you
16 have just given, perhaps you could answer this: Is it possible
17 for a company like ITC or LISCR to operate or to have - is it
18 possible for the Liberian government not to know who are the
19 members of LISCR in those circumstances?

13:00:05 20 THE WITNESS: The member of LISCR, the Liberian government,
21 would know. By "members", your Honour, could you please help me
22 with what you mean by "members"? Are you referring to both
23 members, or are you referring to companies that are associated
24 with LISCR?

13:00:21 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Companies.

26 THE WITNESS: Okay. The Liberian government would know who
27 these companies are, yes.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: LISCR is a registry, isn't it? Anyone
29 who looks at the registry documents would know who the companies

1 are that are registered with LISCR; isn't that right?

2 THE WITNESS: Exactly. You would know, but - you know the
3 names of the companies, but I must add you don't have control of
4 their functions, but you do know the names. You do know the
13:00:56 5 names.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And all this - what I am trying to ask is
7 what is in it for Liberia? It's just the fee that you collect
8 for people to use your flag?

9 THE WITNESS: That's all we get, your Honour. It's a fee
13:01:15 10 annually that - a portion of the fee collected is given to the
11 Liberian government. That's how it's worked since 1948.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, let's pick it up, please, at paragraph 129:

14 "Companies supposedly exporting diamonds from Liberia,
13:01:50 15 which are not on the government list of licensees and which do
16 not have a physical presence in Liberia, including Alcorta
17 Trading, Barnet Trading Company, Diamond Trading Associates,
18 Fairlib Enterprises Incorporated, Kamal Daoud SA, Nybelgo
19 Company, and Pier Enterprises. There are undoubtedly more.

13:02:18 20 While the diamonds listed on the invoices of these companies are
21 not necessarily conflict diamonds, companies with a genuine
22 physical presence in Liberia have also provided invoices to
23 Belgian importers.

24 Without further investigation, it is difficult to say
13:02:36 25 whether they are exporting genuine Liberian diamonds or smuggled
26 Sierra Leonean diamonds. Whatever the case, they are engaged in
27 illicit behaviour because they do not have Liberian export
28 licences and because their exports far exceed official Liberian
29 exports.

1 Much has been made in recent months about the need to make
2 a clearer distinction between country of origin and country of
3 provenance. The volume in question regarding Liberia, however,
4 taken in conjunction with Liberia's own figures and its limited
13:03:17 5 capacity to act as a trading centre, indicate that a large
6 proportion of the diamonds entering Belgium under the Liberian
7 label represent neither country of origin nor country of
8 provenance. Most are illicit diamonds from other countries
9 taking advantage of Liberia's own involvement in the illicit
13:03:41 10 diamond trade, its inability or unwillingness to monitor the use
11 of its name internationally, and the improper use of its maritime
12 registry. The larger illicit trade provides Liberia with a
13 convenient cover for the export of conflict diamonds."

14 Pause. "... taking advantage of Liberia's own involvement
13:04:07 15 in the illicit diamond trade." Mr Taylor, have you seen any
16 evidence being presented to you to prove that?

17 A. None. But if I may just say, counsel, you look back at the
18 end of 129. On the one hand, the logic of this all
19 where - whatever the case, they are engaged in illicit behaviour
13:04:39 20 because they do not have Liberian export licences - they do not
21 have Liberia export licences and because their exports far exceed
22 official Liberian export. If we look at this statement, only to
23 go into the next paragraph, you've said they do not have our
24 licences. You've said that, so how do you come up with the
13:05:02 25 conclusion again that this is because the larger illicit trade
26 provides Liberia with a convenient cover? It can't be that way.

27 This is what - we have problem with the logic of this
28 report. They are not our licences. These are companies that are
29 registered in this shell. They have Liberian addresses, but you

1 know that these are shell companies. You admit that the export
2 licences are not Liberian export licences. So how can you say
3 here now that it provides us with a cover? A cover for what?
4 You have already said that these are not our - they are not our
13:05:42 5 licences. We agree that Liberia cannot, and does not, have that
6 quantity of diamonds, and you know that it is illicit, but you
7 know it is going through a legal programme that is registered in
8 the United States. Most of these companies are operating out of
9 Virginia where the registry is located. They only use the
13:05:59 10 Liberian flag and they use this address in Liberia as a working
11 address.

12 Other than that, we have no control. Taxes for this
13 company, the registry, are paid in the United States. The
14 Liberian government is really impotent when it come to the
13:06:15 15 operation of this registry. They know this. So the logic here
16 is just off. How can you say this after you have said that they
17 are not our licences? They are not, it's true. They are not our
18 licences.

19 Q. Well, it goes on, Mr Taylor:

13:06:31 20 "... its inability or unwillingness to monitor the use of
21 its name internationally."

22 Now, what power did Liberia have to control the use of its
23 name internationally?

24 A. Well, I would say a little bit of - that you have to
13:06:53 25 challenge these things maybe through maybe a million courts
26 throughout the world, but that's about all. It's mostly
27 diplomatic and legal. For example, if you are flying a Liberian
28 flag, let's say on a ship, and that ship is involved in something
29 illicit - let's say a Liberian-flag-carrying vessel is caught in

1 the high seas with, let's say, drugs, for example, on board. You
2 are not going to say that these drugs are coming with the
3 complicity of the Libyan government because you are using our
4 flag, so we don't know. So at that particular time, we can then
13:07:32 5 maybe get lawyers through diplomatic channels to try to exonerate
6 Liberia. The only way is exactly the process of exoneration by
7 making the legal documents available to say that - why the name
8 Liberia is used and the registry is with Liberia, but Liberia has
9 no control. That's the best we can do.

13:07:59 10 Q. And where it says:

11 "The larger illicit trades provides Liberia with a
12 convenient cover for the export of conflict diamonds from
13 Sierra Leone", do you have any comment to make on that,
14 Mr Taylor?

13:08:12 15 A. It's the same crazy thing that they are talking about. How
16 do you say - there is no convenient cover. The only way you can
17 conclude that there is a convenient cover, if you now say that
18 the licences for the export are issued by the Liberian
19 government, then you can say it's a convenient cover. But as
13:08:31 20 long as the Liberian government, through legal documents with the
21 United States, with the registry - because the company that runs
22 the registry is a United States company - you cannot come now and
23 say it provides a cover. We don't need a cover. What do you
24 need a cover for something that you are not doing? You don't
13:08:52 25 need a cover.

26 Q. Let's continue then, Mr Taylor. And just briefly, The
27 Gambia:

28 "The Gambia produces no diamonds, but in recent years it
29 has become a diamond-exporting nation. In 1998, Belgium recorded

1 imports from the Gambia of 449,000 carats valued at \$78.3
2 million, an average value of \$174 a carat."

3 Mr Taylor, given your alleged involvement in the diamond
4 business, can you help as to how it is that The Gambia was
13:09:58 5 exporting diamonds when they didn't produce any diamonds there?

6 A. You say my alleged involvement in the diamond business?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. Well, the only thing I can help the Court with on this line
9 is that all of these countries that I named before, whether it is

13:10:19 10 Gambia, Senegal, Mali, our people have never considered this
11 little stone as a major issue. People traveled through those
12 areas. The document talks about the Maracas and all these - our
13 people went - it was their way of life. They traded and it was
14 no big deal until these big buyers made it a big deal. But

13:10:42 15 people from The Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, all of these places
16 went into West Africa and bought diamonds, they bought gold as a
17 way - it was a normal thing amongst our people then, and I can
18 guarantee you right now it's happening right now, regardless of
19 all these certifications. That's how it got into The Gambia.

13:11:06 20 Gambian business people that went into our areas bought the
21 diamonds and bought it back to Gambia and exported it.

22 Q. Let's just quickly look at Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire over
23 the page:

24 "Official Guinean exports were consistent over the 1990s,
13:11:28 25 averaging 380,000 carats per annum at \$96 per carat. The panel
26 examined Belgian, United States, British, Swiss and Israeli
27 import statistics and found that the only significant imports
28 were into Belgium. That is consistent with information provided
29 by the Government of Guinea.

1 Belgian trade statistics, however, record average imports
2 over the same period of 687,000 carats per annum; in other words,
3 Belgium appears to import almost double the volume that is
4 comported from Guinea and the per carat value is almost 75
13:12:08 5 per cent higher than what leaves Guinea.

6 It is unlikely that the difference between Guinean exports
7 and Belgium imports could be complained by the country of
8 provenance issue, because Guinea does not officially import
9 diamonds and any official Sierra Leone diamonds in transit
13:12:25 10 through Conakry do not enter Guinean trade statistics.

11 There are three possible explanations. The first is that
12 the difference is made up of diamonds exported unofficially from
13 Guinea. These could be either Guinean diamonds or diamonds
14 smuggled in from Sierra Leone and elsewhere, as in the Gambian
13:12:47 15 case. Such diamonds could be conflict diamonds or simply illicit
16 diamonds. The second possibility is that Guinea's name is
17 applied to diamonds entering Belgium from other country or
18 countries, as in the Liberian case. A third possibility is that
19 it is a combination of the first two.

13:13:14 20 Let's look at Cote d'Ivoire quickly:

21 "A problem similar to that of Guinea exists in relation to
22 Cote d'Ivoire."

23 Leave it at that. Let's go to paragraph 141:

24 "The statistical anomalies surrounding the Liberian example
13:13:33 25 demonstrate that the Liberian name, and most likely the names of
26 other countries, has been widely used by individuals and
27 companies wishing to disguise the origin of rough diamonds.
28 These diamonds could include conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone,
29 the Democratic Republic of the Congo and/or Angola, but the

1 volumes are such that additional explanations are required.
2 These include the breaking of legally binding commercial
3 contracts, tax evasion and money laundering. Mostly such
4 diamonds are illicit in nature, because the volume in illicit
13:14:19 5 diamonds is so high it is not difficult for the smaller volume of
6 conflict diamonds to become lost in the larger numbers.

7 A country like Liberia, whose name has been used with or
8 without its knowledge by illicit traders, can thus conceal its
9 own trade in illicit or conflict diamonds behind the larger
13:14:41 10 rackets being perpetrated by others."

11 Then let's go on, please, to look at conflict diamonds and
12 illicit diamonds:

13 "Conflict diamonds have been defined as diamonds that
14 originate in areas controlled by forces fighting the legitimate
13:15:09 15 and internationally recognised government of the relevant
16 country. De Beers has estimated that in 1999 the total volume of
17 conflict diamonds was approximately \$255 million, less than 4
18 per cent of the world's rough diamond production of \$6.8 billion.
19 Of these, \$35 million were said to originate in the Democratic
13:15:40 20 Republic of the Congo, \$150 million worth in Angola and \$70
21 million in Sierra Leone. Where the Democratic Republic of the
22 Congo is concerned, some researchers place the figure at about
23 twice De Beers's estimate. Where Sierra Leone is concerned, a
24 more detailed discussion can be found in paragraphs 78 to 80
13:16:08 25 above" - which we dealt with.

26 Over the page, 145:

27 "In its search for conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone, the
28 panel discovered that there is a much greater volume of illicit
29 diamonds and that distinguishing between the two is extremely

1 difficult. As noted above, part of the difficulty in
2 understanding diamond statistics is that once rough diamonds
3 arrive in Europe, they are sorted, traded across borders,
4 resorted and retraded, possibly many times, before they actually
13:16:45 5 get to a cutting and polishing centre.

6 This obscuring of origin makes the diamond industry
7 vulnerable to a wide variety of illicit behaviour. It is no
8 secret that diamonds are stolen from virtually every mining area
9 in the world. Diamonds have long been used as an unofficial hard
13:17:10 10 currency for international transactions. As with other precious
11 commodities, they lend themselves to money laundering operations.
12 Because they are small and easily concealed, they are readily
13 moved from one country to another for the purpose of tax evasion,
14 money laundering or to circumvent trade agreements. Virtually
13:17:37 15 all of these diamonds eventually find their way into the
16 legitimate trade and all of these illicit transactions are made
17 easier by the industry's long history of secrecy. Secrecy in the
18 diamond industry is understandable for security reasons, but
19 secrecy also obscures illicit behaviour.

13:18:01 20 At an October 2000 intergovernmental meeting on conflict
21 diamonds in Pretoria, a senior diamond evaluator and trade
22 consultant estimated that 20 per cent of the worldwide trade in
23 rough diamonds is illicit in nature. The panel raised this issue
24 in its travels and the figure was widely accepted as a reasonable
13:18:23 25 estimate."

26 Let's ignore the next paragraph. We'll go to paragraph
27 149:

28 "Regardless of the explanation, it became obvious to the
29 panel that there is a very large trade in illicit diamonds, and

1 that conflict diamonds are only a part of this trade. They are,
2 in essence, illicit diamonds that have gone septic. They are,
3 however, difficult to distinguish from illicit diamonds because
4 they are often traded in the same way and by many of the same
13:19:00 5 people who have been involved in the illicit trade for
6 generations. When asked how conflict diamonds enter the system,
7 dealer after dealer told the panel that it happens in the same
8 way that illicit diamonds enter the system. Someone brings them
9 to a trading centre, Israel or New York, for example, either
13:19:23 10 smuggling them past customs or making a false declaration.
11 Either way they will find a buyer. Or a dealer will go to Africa
12 and buy them from rebels or from a third or fourth party. He
13 will then take them to Europe, Israel or New York and smuggle
14 them past customs or make a false declaration."

13:19:42 15 And then we come to the conclusion:

16 "The panel visited three import-export regulatory centres
17 in South Africa, Israel and Belgium. Given the huge volumes of
18 diamonds moving in and out of these three countries alone, even a
19 five or ten-fold increase in the size of these regulatory
13:20:02 20 operations would probably not be enough to deal effectively with
21 the issue of illicit diamonds. A global certification scheme
22 with teeth would help, because it would require much better
23 documentation on the part of exporters and importers and would
24 make false declarations less possible. A global certification
13:20:25 25 system would not completely stop smuggling, but the anomalies
26 described in the Liberian, Gambian and Guinean case studies above
27 would not have been possible and such a system would help put an
28 end to conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone."

29 Let's go to paragraph 153, please:

1 "There is reason to believe that a certain amount of
2 diamonds have been traded by the RUF with officers of the former
3 West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in return for cash or
4 supplies. The panel did not see this issue as part of its
13:21:13 5 mandate and so did not examine it in any detail, but repeated
6 accounts, many of them first-hand eyewitness reports, made the
7 stories impossible to ignore. If the issue is thought to be
8 important, it will require further investigation.

9 The issue of illicit diamonds and their implication for the
13:21:36 10 diamond industry, as well as for the tracking and discovery of
11 conflict diamonds, is an important one. This report has touched
12 on it, but ongoing research and monitoring may be required in
13 order to do the subject justice."

14 I am not going to look at the recommendations unless
13:22:02 15 somebody requires me to.

16 Now, the other topic dealt with - and we need to look at
17 this document in a little detail, Mr Taylor, before we come to
18 deal with your government's response. Do you follow me?

19 A. Uh-huh.

13:22:45 20 Q. Can we go, please, to page 31, "Weapons and the RUF". Just
21 so that we see the context in which we are looking at this, if we
22 flick over to page 32, you will see that the panel of experts
23 link this to Liberian support for the RUF. So we need to look at
24 this:

13:23:12 25 "Background. Small arms play an important role in
26 sustaining conflicts, in exacerbating violence, in contributing
27 to the displacement of innocent population and threatening
28 international law, and in fuelling crime and terrorism.
29 Recognising this, the Security Council and the international

1 community have tried to constrain their proliferation in West
2 Africa. The Security Council placed Sierra Leone under a variety
3 of travel, economic and military sanctions after the May 1997
4 coup. Following the return of the elected government, the arms
13:23:53 5 embargo was amended in June 1998 to lift sanctions against the
6 government. Security Council sanctions placed on Liberia in 1992
7 remain in place.

8 On 31 October 1998, members of ECOWAS adopted the
9 declaration of a moratorium on the importation, exportation and
13:24:19 10 manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa. The
11 moratorium came into force on 1 November 1998 for a period of
12 three years, and the programme for coordination and assistance
13 for security and development supports its implementation. That
14 is designed to monitor the moratorium and to establish a database
13:24:43 15 and training programme for law enforcement agencies of the
16 signatory countries."

17 Mr Taylor, was Liberia a signatory to that agreement?

18 A. Yes, we were.

19 Q. "Despite the ECOWAS moratorium, also called the Mali
13:25:02 20 moratorium, West Africa is still awash with small arms. Serious
21 problems with weapons have emerged not only in countries that are
22 victims of war, but also in major cities across the entire
23 sub-region. The rapidly increasing incidence of armed violence
24 is a consequence. The outbreak of civil conflict in Senegal,
13:25:29 25 Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Liberia and Sierra Leone during the past
26 decade has increased the demand for light weapons.

27 Guerrilla armies receive weapons through interlinked
28 networks of traders, criminals and insurgents moving across
29 borders. Arms also travel from one unstable zone to another and

1 rebel movements or criminal gangs to one country sell their arms
2 to groups they are aligned with elsewhere. In other instances
3 governments may see opportunities for their own regional
4 ambitions in West Africa, supplying rebel groups with weapons in
13:26:12 5 order to further these ambitions.

6 Systematic information on weapons smuggling in the region
7 is non-existent and information which could be used to combat
8 problems on a regional scale through ECOWAS or through bilateral
9 exchanges is generally not available. Few states in the region
13:26:35 10 have the resources or the infrastructure to tackle smuggling, a
11 situation that creates opportunities for the smuggling of weapons
12 across all major borders in the region.

13 Officials acknowledge the existence of a large and largely
14 uncontrolled informal weapons trade, and outright illicit
13:26:54 15 trafficking. The extent of such practices, far beyond normal
16 levels of informal trade, aggravate corruption and
17 criminalisation throughout the region.

18 In Sierra Leone, the RUF depends almost exclusively on
19 light weaponry, although it does have access to more
13:27:17 20 sophisticated equipment. Lists of equipment turned in under the
21 disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation programme include
22 those of eastern European manufacture as well as American,
23 Belgian, British and German types. In May 2000, at the time the
24 Lome peace process collapsed, roughly 12,500 weapons and 250,000
13:27:45 25 pieces of ammunition had been collected at the different weapons
26 storage centres that had been initiated eight months earlier.

27 The weapons included the following:

28 496 pistols; 4000 AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles; 1072 AK-74
29 rifles; 940 G-3 rifles; 440 FN-FAL rifles; 451 SLR rifles; 140

1 next subheading "Liberian Support for the RUF" when there's some
2 specific questions that I want to ask you:

3 "Sources of RUF weaponry within Sierra Leone. The RUF need
4 a steady flow of arms and ammunition. Although the arms
14:31:08 5 inventoried by the DDR programme originate in many countries,
6 most of the rifles are of eastern European design. Variants of
7 the AK-47 Kalashnikov are the most readily available. Although a
8 Russian design, the AK-47 is today produced in so many countries,
9 and in so many variants, that a thorough study of model numbers,
14:31:40 10 serial numbers and factory markings would be required in order to
11 determine their precise origin. After this, it might be possible
12 to determine the supply trail of the weapons, but even this would
13 be complicated by the fact that many may have been bought on the
14 open market and may be second- or even third-hand weapons.

14:32:03 15 The RUF have captured many weapons during confrontations
16 with the Sierra Leone Army, ECOMOG and UNAMSIL forces. A
17 forthcoming study made available to the panel by the Small Arms
18 Survey, a Geneva-based NGO, provides a well-documented summary
19 overview of known seizures of weapons by the RUF. The panel was
14:32:32 20 able to verify most of the incidents reported in the survey.

21 Supplies obtained by the RUF from intervening forces
22 deployed in Sierra Leone include, for example:

23 A. Considerable amounts of weaponry seized during
24 confrontations with the Government of Sierra Leone armed forces.

14:33:05 25 A lack of training and discipline led to soldiers abandoning
26 their weapons for ready seizure by the rebels. SLA soldiers are
27 also reported to have sold weapons and ammunition to the rebels;

28 B. A significant number of weapons, including hundreds of
29 rifles, 24 machine guns, 10 mortars, 20 rocket-propelled

1 grenades, several tonnes of ammunition, and three armoured
2 personnel carriers were seized when the rebels detained and
3 disarmed a Guinean UNAMSIL unit in January 2000. Guinean units
4 serving under ECOMOG had also been disarmed during previous
14:33:51 5 ambushes and seizures;

6 C. Kenyan and Zambian UNAMSIL contingents were disarmed
7 when they were taken hostage by rebels in May 2000. In these
8 cases, great amounts of rifles were lost to the rebels, as well
9 as eight armoured personnel carriers and several other military
14:34:16 10 vehicles."

11 Now, Liberian support to the RUF. Now, we've dealt with
12 the next three paragraphs, but I just want to pause briefly and
13 return to paragraph 180 for this reason: Now, do you recall,
14 Mr Taylor, Mr Smillie giving evidence to this Court?

14:34:48 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Last year; do I recall that?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. And do you recall that he had prepared a report for the
19 Office of the Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone;
14:35:04 20 do you recall that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. It did, in fact, exhibit Prosecution P19. Now, going back
23 to paragraph 180, do you see there: "President Taylor told the
24 panel that he was 'a close friend' with Foday Sankoh"? Do you
14:35:36 25 see that?

26 A. "Of Foday Sankoh", yes.

27 Q. Right. Okay. I'll tell us what I want us to do now, I
28 want us to have a look, please, at annex 2 to Mr Smillie's
29 report, exhibit P19. Could we put that up on the screen, please.

1 Let us just remind ourselves. This is annex 2 to Mr Smillie's
2 report and you see it's entitled "Notes on Meeting with President
3 Charles Taylor, UN Expert Panel on Sierra Leone, Executive
4 Mansion, Monrovia, October 6, 2000. Present, UN expert panel
14:36:40 5 members John Kakonge, UN resident coordinator, President Taylor
6 and other Liberians who were not introduced. The meeting began
7 at 12.15 p.m. and lasted about one hour. The meeting was called
8 by President Taylor at the end of the team's visit to Monrovia as
9 a kind of debriefing. We had previously met with the ministers
14:37:03 10 of defence, lands mines and energy, commerce and industry,
11 justice and others in the police, aviation and transportation.
12 We had also met with members of the Interfaith Council, the
13 Lebanese Cultural Union, journalists, diplomats and NGOs.

14 On the morning of the meeting, the Monrovia Guardian had
14:37:26 15 run a negative story about our visit, with the headline "Liberia
16 Continues to Bear Burden of Proof: Accusers Fail to Fix Facts".
17 Mr Kakonge took this as a bad sign and told us that the situation
18 was very dangerous. He said that we should determine the mood of
19 the President before we spoke. If he was in a bad mood, we would
14:37:52 20 know and should not question him. If he was in a good mood, he
21 would encourage questions.

22 On our way into the building, we met the minister of
23 national defence, Daniel Chea, leaving. There were brief
24 introductions with reporters and cameramen present, after which
14:38:09 25 they left.

26 Taylor, sitting behind a large desk, was friendly and
27 charming. He started with a denunciation of the United States,
28 in particular, and all of his detractors, in general, saying that
29 everyone had wanted democratic elections in Liberia. Having been

1 elected democratically, he was now being demonised and Liberia
2 was being ignored by donors. The US, in particular, was a major
3 disappointment to Liberia.

14:38:42 4 This did not last long, and he seemed more disappointed
5 than angry.

6 He then opened the discussion for questions. We only asked
7 about five or six, because he gave long rambling answers that
8 covered a lot of the ground we were interested in.

9 US Ambassador Charles Minor had told us earlier that US
14:39:01 10 Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering had met with Taylor on
11 July 17 and had told Taylor that he personally had seen evidence
12 that Taylor was trafficking in stolen diamonds. We raised this
13 and Taylor said that Pickering had not presented him with
14 evidence of anything. This was blatantly untrue.

14:39:26 15 We raised the question of diamonds and asked what he made
16 of Belgium customs data showing billions of dollars worth of
17 diamonds originating in Liberia. He said, 'You tell me. This is
18 why the UN has appointed you.' He said it was a mystery to him
19 and that getting to the bottom of it was in Liberia's interests.

14:39:45 20 He said that it was highly probable that the RUF was dealing in
21 diamonds and that some went through Liberia but not officially.
22 He said that the borders were very porous. He said that some of
23 the diamonds going through Liberia could be Russian diamonds. He
24 complained that nobody was helping Liberia monitor diamonds. He
14:40:05 25 also said that Liberia had more diamonds than Sierra Leone. He
26 said that four kimberlites had been identified.

27 We asked him about a number of individuals who were of
28 interest to us. He said he had never heard of Sanjivan Ruprah.
29 We asked about Niko Shefer. Taylor said that Shefer had a

1 criminal record, and that when he came to Liberia, he was clean,
2 but he then went bad. He said that Shefer was connected with a
3 criminal group in the US. We asked about Fred Rindel, a South
4 African, who had reportedly trained RUF rebels in Liberia. He
14:40:49 5 said that he had asked Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki for assistance in
6 training the Liberian military. He said that Rindel was
7 legitimately contracted to train the Liberian ATU unit. He asked
8 why the RUF would need training. They had been fighting after
9 all for nine years.

14:41:07 10 He said that he (Taylor) had been instrumental in the Lome
11 agreement; that he had taken Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday Sankoh
12 to the meeting."

13 Pause there. Had you taken Johnny Paul Koroma and
14 Foday Sankoh to the meeting?

14:41:28 15 A. Never.

16 Q. "He said that later there had been a disagreement between
17 Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh and that Kofi Annan had called him,
18 Taylor, and asked him to help. As a result, he asked both of
19 them to come to Monrovia, but he had failed to broker an
14:41:44 20 agreement. He subsequently persuaded Bockarie to walk away from
21 it and he had given Bockarie a place to stay so that he could
22 remain away from Sankoh. Other than that, he was not providing
23 the RUF with training, a staging base, weapons or supplies.
24 Foday Sankoh was his friend."

14:42:09 25 Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes, I see that.

27 Q. Let's go back to paragraph 180 in the United Nations
28 documents. Remember, this is the experts' notes of his meetings
29 with you, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Go back to paragraph 180:

3 "The President told the panel that he was a close friend of
4 Foday Sankoh." Let's go back to his notes of the meeting. Do
14:42:40 5 you see any mention of the word "close" in that paragraph we just
6 looked at in the notes?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Do you see any mention of that --

9 A. No, he doesn't use "close".

14:42:51 10 Q. So, help me, can you assist as to how "friend" becomes
11 "close friend" between notes of the meeting and his final report?
12 Can you help us, Mr Taylor?

13 A. I really can't. This is just Smillie's own way of playing
14 with this situation. This reminds me of something we used to do
14:43:10 15 in school. You put eight people in a line, tell one man the
16 first thing, then tell him to whisper it to the second; by the
17 time you get to the eighth man, it's all different. This is - as
18 it is going along, it will continue to change.

19 Q. "Foday Sankoh was his friend, he said, and that explains a
14:43:30 20 lot of things. But he seems to appreciate that Foday Sankoh's
21 time had passed. Sankoh was in custody. He then returned to the
22 theme of military training and asked why he would have to train
23 Sam Bockarie; Bockarie was already well trained. He turned to
24 another earlier theme, the British and the Americans were
14:43:53 25 deliberately destabilising Liberia and were demonising him
26 (Taylor) over the issue of Fred Rindel's training contract.
27 Since he had assumed office, Liberia had received no US aid, no
28 EC aid. There was a serious campaign of vilification against
29 him.

1 We asked about Leonid Minin and the BAC-111 aircraft that
2 we had been researching. He said that Minin was a strange
3 character who wanted to sell the aircraft to Taylor for use as a
4 presidential jet. He said he had used it on a couple of trips in
14:44:31 5 the region but it was too costly. He said that it was an
6 executive jet with no cargo capacity and could certainly not be
7 used to transport weapons. On the subject of weapons, he said
8 that he hoped we would recommend a lifting of the UN arms embargo
9 on Liberia, as he badly needed weapons to defend Liberia against
14:44:53 10 his own rebel movements. He said that he had asked the US for
11 planes to monitor Liberian air space and Liberia's borders and he
12 said that he had asked Kofi Annan for UN peacekeepers who could
13 be posted on the Liberian side of the border. He said that UN
14 peacekeepers were smuggling diamonds out of Sierra Leone and that
14:45:23 15 we could not avoid dealing with this issue simply because they
16 were peacekeepers. In my notes I recorded a cryptic remark he
17 said about Charles Breeze who he said was a lieutenant of
18 Roosevelt Johnson and who had been in jail since the September
19 fracas. This man he said was not his agent for arms shipments.
14:45:42 20 Taylor volunteered this name; it was not one we had inquired
21 about and we did not meet him because he was in prison at the
22 time.

23 We asked how peace might be achieved in Sierra Leone. He
24 said that a transitional government might be the answer, that
14:45:56 25 President Kabbah was a victim of the process and that a more
26 neutral body was needed. He said that it was necessary to deal
27 with all the combatants, not just the RUF. He said that an
28 ECOWAS force was needed, especially in Kono District. It should
29 not include Nigerians, however, who would trade in diamonds and

1 sell arms to the RUF the way they did to the NPFL. There had to
2 be a larger and more neutral force, he said: Mali, Liberia."

3 'Why wait six or nine months?' he asked. 'Suppose
4 Foday Sankoh dies.' We asked about UNAMSIL. '25,000 troops?' he
14:46:35 5 asked. 'They can't do anything. Conventional forces will never
6 defeat guerillas.' He said that the threat of trials was
7 preventing peace, especially when those concerned were armed and
8 dangerous. 'Will they give up only to be put on trial?' he
9 asked."

14:46:53 10 Can we put that document away and can I return this before
11 it goes missing. All right. Mr Taylor, so here we have
12 Mr Smillie, that expert, making notes of a meeting which lasts
13 about an hour.

14 A. Uh-huh.

14:47:31 15 Q. And that's the record of the meeting that he kept. When we
16 go now back to paragraph 180:

17 "He told the panel that RUF leader Sam Bockarie's presence
18 in Liberia was a gesture of goodwill on Taylor's part."

19 You will recall in his notes you told him that Kofi Annan
14:48:05 20 had been involved in that decision?

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. Do you see any mention of Kofi Annan here?

23 A. None. None. This is just a gesture of goodwill on my
24 part.

14:48:15 25 Q. "... in order to allow the RUF to work together for a
26 peaceful settlement in Sierra Leone. The panel, however, found
27 unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia has been
28 actively supporting the RUF at all levels in providing training,
29 weapons and related materiel, a staging ground for attacks and a

1 safe haven for retreat and recuperation."

2 Now let's have a look at each of these in turn and I want
3 to ask you in detail about each of them, Mr Taylor. Do you
4 follow me?

14:49:02 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. "Training. The RUF has received regular training in
7 Liberia at Gbatala in Gbarnga and elsewhere".

8 A. That's a blatant lie. As blatant as it gets. It's a lie.

9 Q. Mr Taylor, was there a training facility at Gbatala?

14:49:20 10 A. There was a training facility at Gbatala.

11 Q. Who was trained at Gbatala?

12 A. The ATU was trained at Gbatala.

13 Q. And were there any other locations in Liberia where RUF
14 members were being trained?

14:49:38 15 A. None whatsoever.

16 Q. Mr Taylor, apart from reference to Camp Naama by witnesses
17 called by the Prosecution, can you recall a single Prosecution
18 witness suggesting, one, that there was training at Gbatala?

19 A. None.

14:49:58 20 Q. Can you think of a single Prosecution witness who mentioned
21 training in Liberia apart from Camp Naama?

22 A. None.

23 Q. So when this expert talks about "and elsewhere", have you
24 heard any evidence to suggest training at any other site in
14:50:23 25 Liberia apart from Camp Naama?

26 A. None. None. None. Haven't heard it.

27 Q. So you can you help us as to where in this official United
28 States document this reference to Gbatala and elsewhere comes
29 from? Where is the evidence that you've heard, Mr Taylor?

1 A. I've heard none. I've heard none. This is what I call
2 mischief. I've heard none.

3 Q. "Hundreds of ex-combatants and many RUF leaders have
4 confirmed this in oral testimony and in writing."

14:51:01 5 Have we seen any of them in this Court, Mr Taylor?

6 A. No, I haven't. I haven't.

7 Q. "Sufficient corroborative documentary evidence in the form
8 of written reports of RUF commanders to Foday Sankoh is also
9 available."

14:51:21 10 Have you seen any mention of Gbatala or training elsewhere
11 in Liberia in any of the salute reports introduced in this Court?

12 A. None. But if there were any, if he saw them he would have
13 attached them to this report as an exhibit.

14 Q. Because if we flick to the back of the document we'll see
14:51:44 15 that in fact he does indeed as, for example, at annex 4 at page
16 61 attach such proof. So help me, have you seen any such
17 documentary proof, Mr Taylor?

18 A. I haven't seen it.

19 Q. "RUF soldiers have been trained alongside Liberia's
14:52:11 20 Anti-Terrorist Unit." Were they?

21 A. No. No.

22 Q. You do accept though, don't you, Mr Taylor, that some of
23 the ex-combatants who came to Liberia with Sam Bockarie were
24 inducted into the ATU?

14:52:29 25 A. Yes, as citizens, yes.

26 Q. But look at what this report is saying: "RUF soldiers have
27 been trained alongside Liberia's ATU." Did anything like that
28 happen?

29 A. None. No.

1 Q. Now, where did the ATU train?

2 A. The ATU trained at Gbatala.

3 Q. And you accept, do you not, that some of those trained as
4 ATU members were formerly RUF combatants?

14:53:11 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You accept that?

7 A. I accept that.

8 Q. So what do you say has happened here where mention is made
9 of Gbatala and RUF training alongside the ATU, as compared to
10 former RUF combatants inducted into the ATU who are trained at
11 Gbatala? What do you think has happened here, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Well, I think he is inferring here. Once he says
13 "alongside", that means that these RUF individuals are supposed
14 to do that training and then return to carry on activities in
15 Sierra Leone, so these are two separate and distinct groups.

16 One, you have the ATU and, the second, you have the RUF training
17 to go and export or carry back that training that they receive
18 which is totally false. And that's how they manipulate these
19 statements to make you look bad, because he should have known and
20 he was told, okay - when these questions were raised he was told
21 that those people were now citizens of Liberia and these were
22 individuals that were once RUF that had come to Liberia with
23 Sam Bockarie but were citizens of Liberia. And I think to the
24 best of my recollection one of them that testified here did say
25 that they were told that they were now Liberian citizens.

14:54:36 26 Q. Still on the same paragraph:

27 "RUF combatants are frequently used by President Taylor for
28 his own personal security details."

29 Is that true or false, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Totally false.

2 Q. Mr Taylor, we've just looked at the notes of the meeting
3 held with you. Do you recall Mr Smillie making any note of
4 asking you about the nationality of your personal bodyguard?

14:55:26 5 A. No, he didn't. He didn't. No one did.

6 Q. So do you have any idea where he has got this proposition
7 from that RUF combatants are frequently used by President Taylor
8 for his own personal security details?

9 A. I have no idea. Same mischief.

14:55:47 10 Q. "Liberian officers and men are also actively assisting the
11 RUF in Sierra Leone."

12 True or false?

13 A. Totally, totally false. Totally false.

14 Q. "Serving as combatants, trainers and liaison officers."

14:56:08 15 A. Totally, totally false and misleading. But at least he
16 will mention who these are. If you've got this kind of
17 information, at least trainers. Let's say you don't know the
18 combatants but you would know at least one trainer or one liaison
19 officer.

14:56:36 20 Q. "The panel received information on the presence of
21 Ukrainian, Burkinabe, Nigerian, Libyan and South African
22 nationals in Liberia for training purposes."

23 True or false, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Maybe if you broke it down, because if I say true there's
14:57:01 25 some part of this true and some part false.

26 Q. Okay. Let's break it down. Were there Ukrainians in
27 Liberia for training purposes?

28 A. Never. Never.

29 Q. Were there Burkinabes in Liberia for training purposes?

1 A. Never.

2 Q. Pausing. The President of Burkina Faso was Blaise Compaore
3 at this time, wasn't it?

4 A. That is correct.

14:57:32 5 Q. He had been an officer in the Burkinabe army, had he not?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. The Burkinabes, do they have their own military training
8 facilities, Mr Taylor?

9 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

14:57:53 10 Q. Can you help us as to any reason why they would need to
11 come to Liberia, recovering from a decade long civil war, to
12 train? Can you help us?

13 A. None. I really can't help because it would be problematic
14 even in terms of language. This just never happened. I don't

14:58:08 15 know how he perceived this, but this was just not possible.

16 Q. What about Nigerians training in Liberia?

17 A. There were no Nigerians training in Liberia. None.

18 Q. What about Libyans?

19 A. None whatsoever.

14:58:24 20 Q. Now, it may be that I'm misleading. That may not be
21 Nigerian, that might be Niger?

22 A. Nigerian.

23 Q. Nigerian.

24 A. Nobody from Niger, no.

14:58:42 25 Q. What about Libyans?

26 A. None. None. None whatsoever.

27 Q. What about South Africans?

28 A. Yes. We had an official agreement with licenced former

29 South African senior officers with a legitimate contract to train

1 the ATU in Liberia, yes.

2 Q. "The training was given to non-Liberian nationals for
3 deployment in RUF territory in Sierra Leone and for action in
4 recent clashes on Guinean border."

14:59:25 5 Is that true or false, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Totally false. Totally false. And let's go back to the
7 ATU officer that testified here - he is not a protected person -
8 who, when asked, said to this Court that they never came within
9 miles of the Sierra Leonean border. This is a blatant lie. And
10 the very ATU man that sat in this chair said that they never,
11 ever went close to the Sierra Leonean border.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: There could be another meaning to that
13 first sentence of paragraph 184. You'll see that the panel
14 received information on the presence of Ukrainian, et cetera,
15 et cetera, in Liberia for training purposes, and then it says
16 that training was given to non-Liberian nationals. Now, were
17 these people from Ukraine the teachers or the learners?

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Can you help us with that, Mr Taylor?

15:00:43 20 A. I think the President is right. And that's - as far as I'm
21 concerned, Mr President, it still remains rhetorical for me
22 because here it could be either the trainers or the personnel,
23 but there were no trainers and there were no Ukrainian personnel
24 there in Liberia.

15:01:00 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. "Early in 1999, a significant improvement of tactics and
28 use of weapons by the RUF rebels was noted in Sierra Leone. It
29 was more than a coincidence, and this happened immediately after

1 foreigners started training these elements in Liberia."

2 Mr Taylor, do you know anything about that?

3 A. Absolutely nothing. Smillie is lying through his teeth.

4 This is not true. And maybe we could check, just in case there's

15:01:39 5 confusion with the - I'm sure that the witness - because I want

6 to make a direct - I'm sure that the witness is not a protected

7 witness, but I don't want to make a mistake. But I would assume

8 that if there were any such thing regarding the RUF - I mean, the

9 ATU training at that time and this particular person, he would

15:02:03 10 have said. If they were trained by any other person other than

11 the South Africans, he would have said it. And he was asked

12 specifically in examination-in-chief by the Prosecution.

13 Q. Well, he is not a protected witness. It's TFI-388, Jabaty

14 Jaward.

15:02:20 15 A. That's who I'm speaking about. Jabaty Jaward dealt

16 extensively with this in examination-in-chief and

17 cross-examination.

18 Q. And he testified from 8 July 2008 to 18 July 2008.

19 A. He dealt with the issue of citizenship and he dealt with

15:02:43 20 the issue of even proximity to the Sierra Leonean border or

21 thereabouts extensively in both - to the Prosecution and the

22 Defence attorney, and so I don't know where he is getting this

23 from.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, before I move on, I want your clear

15:03:02 25 position on this topic. The panel are saying, in effect, in

26 these sentences, early in 1999, a significant improvement in

27 tactics, more than a coincidence, that this happened immediately

28 after foreigners started training these elements in Liberia.

29 Putting that together, it's suggesting that sometime in either

1 1998 or 1999, you were training elements of the RUF in Liberia;
2 you understand that, don't you?

3 A. I understand that.

15:03:49

4 Q. And that foreigners had been brought in to conduct that
5 training, you understand that, don't you?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. Question 1: Have you heard any Prosecution witness support
8 such a proposition?

9 A. No, I haven't.

15:04:02

10 Q. Apart from Prosecution witnesses speaking of training at
11 Camp Naama in the early parts of that decade, can you think of
12 any Prosecution witness who has spoken of training in Liberia as
13 late as '98/'99?

14 A. None. Never heard of none.

15:04:27

15 Q. Was there any such training going on at all in that period,
16 Mr Taylor?

17 A. None. Even on my side, none. Even for legitimate forces,
18 none.

15:04:51

19 Q. "In addition, the police interrogation statements of some
20 of arrested RUF officials and the oral statements of former
21 rebels interviewed by the panel confirm the presence of foreign
22 mercenaries including South African and Ukrainians training and
23 fighting alongside the RUF."

24 Do you have any knowledge of that, Mr Taylor.

15:05:12

25 A. None whatsoever, no.

26 Q. "South Africans providing training in Liberia", now, you
27 accept that that occurred, don't you?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. "Fred Rindel, a retired officer of the South African

- 1 Defence Force, and former defence attache to the United States,
2 has played a key role in the training of a Liberian
3 Anti-Terrorist Unit, consisting of Liberian soldiers and groups
4 of foreigners, including citizens of Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso,
15:05:51 5 Niger and The Gambia."
- 6 Do you see that?
- 7 A. Yes, I do.
- 8 Q. Let's break it down. Did you employ Fred Rindel?
- 9 A. I did employ General Fred Rindel and a corps of officers --
- 15:06:12 10 Q. And what?
- 11 A. And a corps of his officers to train a professional
12 anti terrorist unit. Fred Rindel was a brigadier general, a
13 retired brigadier general, very, very well decorated officer that
14 had a registered training programme in South Africa, and he came
15:06:36 15 openly. Yes, I employed him.
- 16 Q. You accept that he played a key role in the training of the
17 Liberian Anti-Terrorist Unit?
- 18 A. The key role, yes.
- 19 Q. Breaking it down further, was the ATU composed of
- 15:06:51 20 Liberians, Sierra Leoneans, Burkinabes, Nigeriens and Gambians?
- 21 A. No.
- 22 Q. Were there Liberians in the ATU?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Were there Sierra Leoneans in the ATU?
- 15:07:10 25 A. Well, that's a little - it depends on how we answer that
26 now. They were of Sierra Leonean origin, but they were now
27 Liberian citizens, I'll put it that way.
- 28 Q. Were there former Burkinabes who had now adopted Liberian
29 citizenship in the ATU?

1 A. None whatsoever. None whatsoever. But, counsel, if you
2 look at paragraph 184, Burkinabes are there for - what are they
3 doing, training our people? And if we assume, as the President
4 of the Court raised, if they are there to train our people, then
15:07:54 5 why are they here now receiving training? If they are there as
6 trainees, what are they doing here again? So these don't match.

7 Q. I understand the point you make. What about people from
8 Niger?

9 A. None whatsoever. No, none at all.

15:08:15 10 Q. Even converts to Liberian citizenship?

11 A. None. None. There was no one from Niger.

12 Q. What about Gambians?

13 A. No one from Gambia. None. None whatsoever. All the
14 Gambians that came to Liberia came as Special Forces.

15:08:29 15 Q. Now, I just want to be clear before we move on. You accept
16 Liberians in the ATU, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You accept people originally of Sierra Leonean origin in
19 the ATU, yes?

15:08:43 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Do you accept any other nationality in the ATU?

22 A. There are no other nationality in the ATU. None.

23 Q. Thank you. Let's move on:

24 "The panel interviewed Mr Rindel extensively. Rindel was
15:09:02 25 contracted as a security consultant by President Charles Taylor
26 in September 1998."

27 Is that date right?

28 A. It looks right, yeah.

29 Q. "And training started in November 1998"?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "The contract included consultancy services and strategic
3 advise to convert Charles Taylor's former rebel militia into a
4 professional unit."

15:09:36 5 Is that right?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. "The Anti-Terrorist Unit is used in Liberia to protect
8 government buildings, the Executive Mansion and the international
9 airport and to provide VIP security and the protection of foreign
10 embassies."

15:09:49

11 Is that right?

12 A. That is right.

13 Q. "The numbers trained were approximately 1,200." Is that
14 right?

15:09:57

15 A. I can't be sure. It could be around this. I'm sorry, I
16 don't know the exact figure, but this could be close.

17 Q. "Because of negative media attention, Rindel cancelled his
18 contract in Liberia in August 2000." Is that true?

19 A. That is true.

15:10:16

20 Q. And where was the negative media attention coming from?

21 A. The very, very thing you see in this document, that the ATU
22 was training people from all around Africa to carry out terrorist
23 activities in Africa, and this professional soldier, after
24 fighting for months and months to clear up, exposing everything,
15:10:44 25 the contracts, the payments and everything, just felt that he
26 could not permit his career to be destroyed by this negative
27 publicity, and so he decided to terminate him.

28 Q. "In 1998, ECOMOG identified a plane, registration number
29 N71ARD, owned by a South African company, Dodson Aviation

1 Maintenance and Spare Parts, as having carried weapons to
2 Robertsfield in September of that year."

3 Pause. Do you know anything about that?

4 A. I know nothing about this. September 1998? I'm sure maybe
15:11:26 5 he's got the dates wrong.

6 Q. "The plane is a gulf stream 14-seater business jet that
7 cannot be used for arms transport, but there are other relevant
8 connections. Fred Rindel was the owner of Dodson. The company
9 was closed on 31 December 1998, but during the period under
15:11:50 10 investigation, the plane was leased to and operated by Greater
11 Holdings Liberia Limited, a company with gold and diamond
12 concessions in Liberia. The plane was used for the transport of
13 the Greater Holdings staff to and from Liberia. Niko Shefer" -
14 now, that's a name which appears in those notes from Mr Smillie,
15:12:18 15 isn't it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Is it someone you know, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, I know - I know Niko Shefer.

19 Q. How?

15:12:23 20 A. Niko Shefer was operating the Greater Diamond Company in
21 Liberia working for a group in the United States called Greater
22 Ministries.

23 Q. When did you meet him?

24 A. I met - I would say about early '99, I met Shefer. After
15:12:56 25 he registered in Liberia, I met with him.

26 Q. "... is a businessman located in South Africa and was
27 chairman CEO of the Greater Diamond Company Liberia Limited a
28 subsidiary of Greater Holdings. Shefer denies diamond dealings in
29 Liberia and Sierra Leone except for two exploration agreements

1 with the Liberian government for concessions in Mano and Lower
2 Lofa. When the employees of their diamond operations in Mano
3 came under attack, Shefer discussed security with President
4 Taylor and suggested bringing in minority private security
15:13:37 5 specialists from South Africa."

6 Is that true?

7 A. He suggested that, yes.

8 Q. Did you allow it?

9 A. Not fighting men. This was the beginning of the Rindel
15:13:55 10 situation to bring people to train our people to become
11 professionals, not like bringing in mercenaries, no. To train
12 our people.

13 Q. Because it continues:

14 "This resulted in the security contract with Mr Rindel. In
15:14:10 15 the end, Shefer's explorations were unprofitable and were
16 abandoned. The American partners in Greater Diamonds were at
17 that time under investigation by American authorities for tax
18 evasion and money laundering using assets in Liberia. Shefer met
19 with RUF leader Foday Sankoh in South Africa in February 2000."

15:14:40 20 Now, do you remember, if we just flick back briefly, at
21 paragraph 97 mention was made of Sankoh going to South Africa in
22 February 2000 and you said you knew about that and you understood
23 it was for medical treatment?

24 A. Yes.

15:14:53 25 Q. Over the page, please:

26 "Fred Rindel states that he has never had any involvement
27 with diamonds in Liberia and was never approached by anyone in
28 Liberia with regard to diamonds. According to the Liberian
29 Ministry of Mines, however, Rindel was involved in a diamond

1 project with the son of President Taylor, Charles Taylor Junior."

2 Is that true or false, Mr Taylor?

3 A. I really don't know. No, I don't know.

4 Q. "Rindel includes a reference to De Dekker Diamonds Limited
15:15:40 5 on his business card. Rindel was also contracted as consultant
6 on a mineral and geological survey of the gold potential in the
7 Mano and Nimba areas in Liberia. Geologists from South Africa
8 were hired for the purpose."

9 Is that true?

10 A. Yes, there were geologists, yes.
15:15:56

11 Q. "Rindel acquired the gold and other mineral rights for two
12 concessions on behalf of a Bermuda based company, the Bermuda
13 Holding Corporation, a company in which President Charles and
14 some of his relatives hold interest."

15:16:20 15 True or false?

16 A. Blatant lie. I hold no interest in any company. None.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, have you ever been presented with any evidence
18 of you holding interests in the Bermuda Holding Corporation?

19 A. Never been given any or shown any, none.

15:16:42 20 Q. Mr Taylor, you appreciate that much has been made of the
21 suggestion that you have salted away millions around the world.
22 You know that allegation, don't you?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. During the course of the many years over which those
15:16:59 25 allegations have been made, has this name the Bermuda Holding
26 Corporation ever been put to you?

27 A. Never been put to me. Never been put to me, and I don't
28 even think it was put to them, because these things are so easy
29 to find. The Bermuda based - if you know that this is a company

1 that people have holdings in and I'm under investigation by the
2 United Nations, the next best thing would be to do what? To pull
3 the documents and bring it in the open. As simple as that.
4 There is no such thing. Just as the billions. None. And we
15:17:41 5 still have an opportunity for them to bring them forward.

6 Q. "Mr Rindel denies bringing other South Africans to Liberia
7 as trainers. During his time in Liberia, however, there were
8 several other South Africans there, including Meno Uys, Gert
9 Keelder and Faber Oosthuizen."

15:18:06 10 Do you know these men?

11 A. Not directly. I know of them.

12 Q. And were they in Liberia?

13 A. Yes, they were in Liberia helping to train, yes.

14 Q. They were involved in the training programme, were they?

15:18:17 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. "These men and others worked under contract in Liberia in
17 1998, 1999 and 2000 as security trainers. Their headquarters is
18 at Gbarnga. Another South African, Karl Alberts, is flying
19 helicopters for the Liberian armed forces."

15:18:49 20 Is that true?

21 A. Yes, he was flying helicopters but it was not owned by the
22 Liberian armed forces. It was a helicopter that had been leased
23 from South Africa and he came with the helicopter.

24 Q. "Neither Rindel nor the other South Africans applied for
15:19:11 25 authorisation under the South African Regulation of Foreign
26 Military Assistance Act (1998) because in his case, according to
27 Rindel, his services were purely of a protective nature and did
28 not include any combat training or training of armed forces in
29 Liberia."

1 So that's training. "Safe haven":

2 "There are innumerable accounts in RUF written reports, in
3 oral testimony given to the panel and in police and military
4 intercepts of high level RUF meetings with President Taylor, RUF
15:19:52 5 travel to Monrovia, RUF strategy meetings at the Executive
6 Mansion, RUF travel on Liberian helicopters, RUF staging bases at
7 Camp Schefflein, Voinjama and Foya Kama."

8 Let's deal with them in turn, Mr Taylor. Firstly, high
9 level RUF meetings with President Taylor. Mr Taylor, let's break
15:20:29 10 that down. Do you accept that you have met high ranking members
11 of the RUF?

12 A. Yes, I accept that.

13 Q. For what purpose?

14 A. This is why we have to be - I don't know what years he is
15:20:44 15 referring to here because this is open ended, because I would
16 have something to say about that especially when it comes to the
17 years, because that will be important in this trial.

18 Q. Well, let's just stick to the indictment period then.

19 A. Yes.

15:20:58 20 Q. November 1996 to January 2002, that's what we're interested
21 in. Now, during that period did you meet with high ranking
22 members of the RUF?

23 A. Within that period, yes.

24 Q. For what purpose?

15:21:13 25 A. For the purpose of pursuing peace in Sierra Leone.

26 Q. Now, you will note that they go on to say - do you accept
27 there was RUF travel to Monrovia during the indictment period?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. For what purpose?

1 A. Only for the purpose of peace.

2 Q. At whose direction?

3 A. At my direction.

4 Q. Yes. Acting on whose behalf?

15:21:47 5 A. ECOWAS.

6 Q. Do you accept that there were RUF strategy meetings at the
7 Executive Mansion?

8 A. Never. Other witnesses have said they were held in other
9 places, so he's talking - never. Never discussed any strategy

15:22:06 10 with RUF at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia.

11 Q. RUF travel on Liberian helicopters?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. For what purpose?

14 A. Flying these visitors from Foya to Monrovia, meeting Heads
15 of State, talking about peace, yes.

16 Q. Mr Taylor, do you recall - was it last week - us spending a
17 inordinate amount of time dealing with arrangements made to
18 airlift RUF representatives to Lome?

19 A. Yes.

15:22:50 20 Q. Do you recall going through that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And who provided the helicopter transport for that? Who
23 was that?

24 A. The UN.

15:23:02 25 Q. The United Nations?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Help me. During this time did Liberia own helicopters?

28 A. At that time no, but the period of the indictment that you
29 gave, helicopters are used in the Issa Sesay situation, yes. Our

1 own, yes.

2 Q. Who owned that helicopter/helicopters? Who owned it?

3 A. The Liberian government owned the helicopter.

4 Q. How many did you have?

15:23:30 5 A. We had two helicopters.

6 Q. What make were they?

7 A. They are Mi -2s.

8 Q. And for which branch of government were they used?

9 A. They were being used by the ATU.

15:23:49 10 Q. So where this document speaks of RUF travel on Liberian
11 helicopters, just taking it slowly so that we all understand, do
12 you accept that RUF individuals and personnel did travel on
13 Liberian helicopters?

14 A. Yes.

15:24:12 15 Q. For what purpose?

16 A. Peace.

17 Q. At whose direction?

18 A. My direction.

19 Q. Acting on behalf of?

15:24:20 20 A. ECOWAS.

21 Q. RUF staging bases at Camp Schefflein, Voinjama and Foya
22 Kama. Mr Taylor, taking things slowly, what do you understand by
23 the phrase "staging bases"?

15:24:54 24 A. For me this applies to military activities. Staging base,
25 this is for preparation for military action. This is purely
26 military.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, Camp Schefflein is near where?

28 A. Camp Schefflein is very, very near Monrovia.

29 Q. Just help us, please, with the location?

1 A. Camp Schefflein is an old military - I think it's the
2 second largest military base in Liberia just - remember the map
3 that we saw on yesterday, your Honours, where the arrow - the
4 city of Monrovia where the arrow was pointing --

15:25:38 5 Q. Towards Roberts International Airport?

6 A. Towards Roberts International Airport. Camp Schefflein is
7 right on the - from that junction of Tubman Boulevard it's about
8 3 miles up the highway going towards Roberts International
9 Airport.

15:25:53 10 Q. So that's where that is?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. How far from the Sierra Leonean border is that staging
15 base?

15:26:01

16 A. Camp Schefflein would be, I would say, about 250 to 300
17 miles from the Sierra Leonean border or thereabouts.

18 Q. Now, Voinjama and Foya Kama, they are in Lofa County,
19 aren't they?

15:26:25

20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And they are quite close to the Sierra Leone border, aren't
22 they?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Were there any RUF bases at those three locations,

15:26:41

25 Mr Taylor?

26 A. There were no RUF bases at those locations. None. RUF
27 never had bases inside Liberia.

28 Q. "Liberia's has provided the families of many senior RUF
29 officials with a safe haven."

1 True or false?

2 A. Well, again if we look at the indictment period, and
3 depending on what he's talking about, you can say there is some
4 truth to it but I don't know the amount of mischief he has tied
15:27:20 5 up in this bundle.

6 Q. Let's just restrict ourselves to the "some truth in it"
7 part of your answer. What possible truth is there in this?

8 A. Well, in 1999 December we bring Sam Bockarie - we extract
9 him from Sierra Leone. So he could be referring to this as -
15:27:39 10 because he's ignorant of how he got there, he could be referring
11 to this as offering, quote unquote, a safe haven. I wouldn't
12 apply that it, but I cannot say no to the fact that he is a
13 senior RUF person that has been brought in by ECOWAS. But he
14 doesn't know and so he is making this general statement.

15:28:01 15 That's why I'm saying that I can say yes but, how he has
16 wrapped it up, it will call for some clarification on the fact
17 that, yes, there is a Sam Bockarie who is very senior and other
18 senior people. Eddie Kanneh moves to Liberia and other senior
19 people. But the circumstances I think would have to be laid for
15:28:20 20 the judges to understand what my yes would mean.

21 Q. Now we go on:

22 "Eyewitness accounts speaks of RUF fighters being treated
23 in Monrovia hospitals."

24 True or false?

15:28:39 25 A. Yes, we did have RUF fighters during the crucial period of
26 the negotiations on the peace process, yes, we did - we did on
27 humanitarian ground permit critically injured people to get
28 treatment in some of our hospitals.

29 Q. What time period are we talking about, Mr Taylor?

1 A. We are talking about, I would say, 1999. Mostly in 1999, I
2 would say, during the period leading up to the agreement. As a
3 little softening, we did permit that, yes.

4 Q. Now, it goes on - and this, you appreciate, Mr Taylor, is
15:29:38 5 being put out and published as evidence of your complicity with
6 the RUF?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. That's the context in which we're looking at this, do you
9 understand that?

15:29:48 10 A. I understand that.

11 Q. And he goes on: "Most recently" - and, remember, this
12 report is produced - is published in December 2000.

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. "Most recently, Gibril Massaquoi, acting as RUF spokesman
15:30:08 15 on issues relating to 10 November 2000 ceasefire, has been
16 interviewed in and has made his press statements from Monrovia."

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was Gibril Massaquoi in Monrovia?

19 A. By November 10, yes.

15:30:24 20 Q. Doing what?

21 A. Gibril Massaquoi - let's get some dates in here. August,
22 Issa Sesay takes over as leader of the RUF. Gibril Massaquoi is
23 the senior RUF personnel spokesman that is on the ground. He
24 even speaks at Roberts International Airport. We've seen the
15:30:45 25 picture to that --

26 Q. Exactly.

27 A. -- at the press conference when Issa Sesay is named. He is
28 left on the ground in Liberia as the officer in charge of this
29 process. And don't let's forget, even though August he becomes

- 1 leader of the RUF, you still have major problems in - between
2 even the new leadership of the RUF and the government of Tejan
3 Kabbah to the extent where it is not until late in November that
4 a ceasefire agreement is signed between Issa Sesay as the new
15:31:20 5 interim leader and Kabbah. So Gibril Massaquoi's position in
6 Liberia is one with the acquiescence of ECOWAS because he is
7 stationed there as their spokesman. So, of course, he has to
8 speak from Liberia.
- 9 Q. Stationed - where is he?
- 15:31:35 10 A. At the guesthouse where - that has been given to them by
11 the Liberian government.
- 12 Q. That's the same guesthouse we considered yesterday, which
13 is right by all those embassies, including the Sierra Leonean
14 embassy.
- 15:31:48 15 A. Definitely.
- 16 Q. Is that the guesthouse you are talking about?
- 17 A. That's the guesthouse.
- 18 Q. Right.
- 19 A. But besides, counsel, may I just add for your Honours, if
15:31:56 20 there's anything clandestine about Gibril Massaquoi's presence in
21 Liberia, why would he make a public statement? Why would he make
22 a public statement? He is speaking publicly, and we're talking
23 about to the international press, because he is there
24 legitimately with the knowledge of all those concerned, and I'm
15:32:15 25 speaking with the ECOWAS member states that know that Gibril is
26 there. That's why he can speak publicly. There's nothing hidden
27 about this.
- 28 Q. "Weapons and related materiel. Police and military
29 intercepts, civilian accounts, the written reports of RUF

1 commanders to Foday Sankoh, and oral testimony provided to the
2 panel by ex-combatants provide lengthy and detailed descriptions
3 of a constant flow of weapons and supplies entering Sierra Leone
4 from Liberia. Weaponry and supplies include mortars, rifles,
15:33:06 5 RPGs, satellite phones, computers, vehicles, batteries, food and
6 drugs. Most of the supplies are sent by road or helicopter to
7 Foya Kama, a few miles from the Sierra Leonean border near
8 Kailahun, and then they are trucked across the border into RUF
9 territory for onward distribution."

10 Police and military intercepts, ever seen any, Mr Taylor?

11 A. No, I have not seen any, but that brings me to even - to
12 ask for assistance here. If these material that have been spoken
13 about here that are being used, supposedly these statements are
14 evidence against me, if they exist in Sierra Leone, can we use
15:33:54 15 the Court to get them? Maybe this could exonerate me in a way -
16 can we get hold of them? I need this help. Can we? Because
17 these are police and military intercepts, and this is a Sierra
18 Leonean Court, then one could ask, shouldn't these documents be
19 here? And if they are not here, doesn't that go to the
15:34:20 20 credibility of what they are talking about? So can I get some
21 help here?

22 Q. "The role of other countries. Weapons can be procured
23 directly from producing factories or from surplus stocks of the
24 armed forces in different countries. It is mainly through arms
15:34:43 25 merchants or brokers that weapons are purchased for use by
26 non-state actors. In the case of the RUF, private brokers and
27 arms merchants are the principal suppliers, but most large arms
28 and ammunition supplies only reach the RUF indirectly, through
29 countries with governments sympathetic to the rebels.

1 The panel has found conclusive evidence of supply lines to
2 the RUF through Burkina Faso, Niger, and Liberia. Weapons
3 supplied to these countries by governments or private arms
4 merchants have been diverted for use in the conflict in
15:35:27 5 Sierra Leone. Cote d'Ivoire, under previous administrations, was
6 sympathetic to the Liberian government and indirectly to the RUF
7 in Sierra Leone. The Ivorian relationship dates back to the
8 training of RUF and Liberian rebels in Cote d'Ivoire in the early
9 1990s."

15:35:52 10 Mr Taylor, any truth in that?

11 A. Never trained any Liberian in la Cote d'Ivoire. Never.
12 Never.

13 Q. Well, let's go further. You're the one who is facing these
14 allegations, so let me ask you: Have you heard a single

15:36:09 15 Prosecution witness allege that they were trained in the Cote
16 d'Ivoire?

17 A. None. None.

18 Q. "Typically the movement of the arms from a supplying
19 country to the RUF will entail several stopovers and cross-border
15:36:31 20 shipments. This should expose arms dealers, especially those
21 breaking United Nations sanctions, to controls, legal procedures
22 and regulations on the export, import, and transit of military
23 equipment. Since weapons have moved into the region and across
24 borders with impunity, it can only be assumed that the parties
15:36:55 25 involved - the brokers and suppliers of arms to the RUF - have
26 obtained cooperation from border and customs inspectors and
27 licensing government departments in order to circumvent United
28 Nations sanctions and normal border controls.

29 The President of Burkina Faso is a close ally of President

1 Charles Taylor and Burkina Faso has acknowledged the presence of
2 over 400 Burkinabe soldiers in Liberia during the time Taylor was
3 leading his rebellion in 1994 and 1995."

4 True or false, Mr Taylor?

15:37:38 5 A. That is totally false.

6 Q. 400 Burkinabe soldiers in Liberia?

7 A. Blaise didn't tell him no such - that is totally false.

8 Q. Well, are you aware of this acknowledgment by Blaise
9 Compaore that there were 400 Burkinabes?

15:38:00 10 A. Not at all. I'm not.

11 Q. "Provision was made in the government budget to cover
12 salaries for the services rendered during this period." Any
13 knowledge of that, Mr Taylor?

14 A. No. No knowledge of that.

15:38:13 15 Q. "Burkina Faso has repeatedly denied the involvement of its
16 nationals in supporting the RUF. Eyewitnesses and former RUF
17 combatants, however, confirm the active involvement of Burkinabes
18 with the RUF. A Burkinabe, General Ibrahim Bah, aka Balde,
19 referred to in paragraphs 72 to 73, handles much of the financial
15:38:44 20 diamond and weapons transaction between the RUF, Liberia and
21 Burkina Faso. He shuttles regularly between Monrovia and
22 Ouagadougou. Burkina Faso's involvement in weapons transfers is
23 detailed below."

24 Where does Ibrahim Bah come from, Mr Taylor?

15:39:03 25 A. To the best of my knowledge, Ibrahim Bah is Senegalese. He
26 is not even Gambian. He is Senegalese, and he doesn't come from
27 Burkina Faso, to the best of my knowledge.

28 Q. "The role of aircraft in supplying the RUF. Direct flights
29 into RUF territory. Having no access to the sea, the RUF can

1 import weapons and related materiel only by road or by air. The
2 role of aircraft in the RUF's supply chain is vital especially
3 over the past two years, as their is fear of influence in
4 Sierra Leone has widened. Given the state of the country's
15:39:56 5 roads, it would be impossible to supply RUF operations such as
6 those undertaken at Pamelap in Guinea late in 2000, for example,
7 without aerial support.

8 Most Sierra Leonean landing strips in the areas under RUF
9 control were destroyed or have not been maintained because of the
15:40:16 10 war. The landing strip at Yengema is probably not operational.
11 And although the airstrip at Magburaka was rebuilt during the
12 AFRC period in 1997 and is now in rebel territory, there are few
13 reports of fixed-wing aircraft landing there or elsewhere in
14 RUF-held territory.

15:40:39 15 The absence of reports in itself, however, is not very
16 meaningful, as there is a total lack of government oversight of
17 Sierra Leonean air space due to insufficient infrastructure at
18 the country's airport and in the sub-region in general.

19 This problem notwithstanding, it is known that the RUF have
15:41:03 20 been supplied with weapons by helicopter on a sporadic basis
21 before 1997 and on a regular basis since then."

22 Do you know anything about that, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Before 1997? No. No.

24 Q. Tell me, 1997 is an interesting cutoff point because, as we
15:41:24 25 all understood, that's the year in which you were elected, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Now, prior to your election as President, Mr Taylor, whilst
28 you were head of the NPFL, did the NPFL have helicopters?

29 A. No, the NPFL did not have helicopters. No.

1 Q. Did you have the ability, prior to 1997, to supply the RUF
2 by air?

3 A. None. No. Not at all, no.

15:42:04

4 Q. After you became President of Liberia, Mr Taylor, when did
5 the Liberian authorities first obtain helicopters?

6 A. In 2000.

7 Q. And for what purpose were those helicopters obtained?

8 A. We obtained the helicopters for military purposes.

9 Q. Were those helicopters used to ship arms to Sierra Leone?

15:42:28

10 A. No. These are small helicopters - for the period that he
11 is talking about, these are small helicopters that do not even
12 fly long distances. They were mostly obtained to pick up wounded
13 individuals. No.

14 Q. And just to go back briefly, before coming back to this
15 point, do you recall, Mr Taylor, on that question of Ibrahim
16 Bah's nationality, that on 4 June 2007, at page 37 of the
17 transcript, Mr Stephen Rapp, senior Prosecutor, suggested that
18 Ibrahim Bah was Senegalese? That was in his opening statement.
19 Do you recall that?

15:43:20

20 A. Yes, and he should know because he has met him, I'm sure.
21 So he is Senegalese.

22 Q. Who has met him?

15:43:33

23 A. I'm sure - I mean, to make that statement, he must be sure
24 of himself. But, I mean, he's got that one, at least. He's got
25 that one right, from what I know, too, that he is Senegalese.

26 Q. "The RUF have been supplied with weapons by helicopter on a
27 sporadic basis before 1997 and on a regular basis since then.
28 Helicopters originating in Liberia land at Buedu, Kailahun,
29 Makeni, Yengema, Tumbudu, Yigbeda and elsewhere in Kono

1 District."

2 Have you heard any evidence in this Court to that effect,
3 Mr Taylor?

4 A. None to that effect. I haven't heard anything about
15:44:15 5 helicopters landing in these towns, you know. No, I haven't
6 heard any.

7 Q. Tell me, Mr Taylor, during this time did ECOMOG forces in
8 Sierra Leone have access to air power?

9 A. Oh, yes.

15:44:35 10 Q. What did they have?

11 A. ECOMOG had Alpha Jets. They also had French-made Mi rage
12 Jets that they flew frequent flights in the skies over
13 Sierra Leone and Liberia. But counsel, this 1997 - before 1997
14 we should mean 1996 and 1995.

15:45:05 15 Q. Yes.

16 A. So who - because I don't see it mentioned here. Maybe I
17 missed it, but who would be supplying these weapons before 1997
18 because --

19 Q. Well, it's supposed to be you.

15:45:18 20 A. Well, then let's look at 1996. What is going on in 1996?
21 Charles Taylor is not - there is a Head of State in Liberia.
22 ECOMOG is in full swing. Elections have not been held in
23 Liberia. The whole security control of Liberia is in the hands
24 of the peacekeepers and UN observers. Close to 20,000 of them.
15:45:41 25 So where are we flying these helicopters that we do not have
26 before 1997?

27 The same thing is true for 1995, okay. The entire security
28 of Liberia is in the hands of the peacekeepers, the Head of State
29 and head of government at that particular time, it goes from

1 Wilton Sankawulo, that's also mentioned in the records here, and
2 it ends with Ruth Sando Perry. So does this mean that 20,000
3 peacekeepers are in the country, in charge of security, even in
4 charge of our own personal securities, and where are we supposed
15:46:18 5 to get helicopters come to be flying before 1997?

6 Q. But help me also, Mr Taylor. Have you heard any evidence
7 of these helicopters --

8 A. None.

9 Q. -- who were flying on a regular basis, any of them being
15:46:35 10 shot down by the Alpha Jets or the Mirage Jets over Sierra Leone?

11 A. None.

12 Q. Heard anything like that?

13 A. None.

14 Q. "More recently delivered Mi-8 transport helicopters". Did
15:47:00 15 Liberia have those?

16 A. We had Mi-2s.

17 Q. No, he is being very specific here. And remember, if we
18 just remind ourselves, and we can do so by quickly going to page
19 50. When we go to page 50 we see the letter which appointed the
15:47:27 20 experts. Now, we see that the following five experts were

21 appointed in August 2000: Mr Martin Chungong Ayafor; Mr Ian
22 Smillie, diamond expert; Mr Johan Peleman (Belgium), expert on
23 arms and transportation; Mr Harjit Singh Sandhu (India), expert
24 from Interpol; Mr Atabou Bodian (Senegal), expert from the
15:48:23 25 International Civil Aviation Authority. Then Mr Ayafor was to
26 chair the panel of experts.

27 Now you notice Mr Johan Peleman is an expert on arms and
28 transportation. So going back to paragraph 201, one would expect
29 such a man appointed by an august body like the United Nations

1 would know what he is talking about, wouldn't you, Mr Taylor?

2 A. One would expect that.

3 Q. Now he is talking here about newly delivered Mi-8 transport
4 helicopters. In 2000, and I say 2000 because of the use of the
15:49:08 5 word "newly delivered", did the Liberian government take delivery
6 of Mi-8 helicopters?

7 A. No, the Liberian government had Mi-2 helicopters.

8 Q. Were those Mi-2s delivered in the year 2000?

9 A. Yes, they were delivered in 2000.

15:49:34 10 Q. "... have been used for this purpose, including for the
11 delivery of surface-to-air (SAM-7) shoulder launched missiles."

12 Mr Taylor did you have access to SAM-7 missiles?

13 A. No, we did not have access to SAM-7s. In 2000 - what would
14 we be doing with SAM-7s in 2000? No.

15:49:54 15 Q. "Weapons flights into Liberia. Virtually all of the
16 weapons shipped into RUF territory are transhipped through at
17 least two other countries between their point of origin and RUF
18 territory in Sierra Leone. In virtually all cases, the last
19 transit point before shipment into Sierra Leone is Liberia. The
15:50:20 20 weapons reached Liberia in a variety of ways, occasionally by
21 ship, most frequently by air."

22 True or false, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Well, at the time in question here that's false. But I
24 don't know how their minds run.

15:50:41 25 Q. Remember, they are reporting in December 2000, yes?

26 A. Uh-huh.

27 Q. Now, what are you telling us? By December 2000 had any
28 weapons reached Liberia by sea or by air?

29 A. No. No weapons had reached Liberia by sea or by air by

1 this time in 2000, no.

2 Q. "The panel went to considerable lengths to document some of
3 these shipments in order to demonstrate how the supply chain
4 works.

15:51:24 5 Case study: Burkina Faso delivery of Ukrainian weapons.

6 A shipment of 68 tonnes of weapons arrived at Ouagadougou
7 on 13 March 1999. It included 715 boxes of weapons and
8 cartridges and 408 boxes of cartridge powder. The inventory also
9 included anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles and rocket
10 propelled grenades and their launchers.

15:51:56

11 This shipment has now been well documented. Documentation
12 provided in April and June 1999 by the Ukraine government to
13 United Nations sanctions committees shows that the weapons were
14 part of a contract between a Gibraltar-based company representing

15:52:18

15 the Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso, and the Ukrainian
16 state-owned company Ukrspetsexport. An aircraft of the British
17 company Air Foyle, acting as an agent for the Ukrainian air
18 carrier Antonov Design Bureau, shipped the cargo under a contract
19 with the Gibraltar-based company Chartered Engineering and
20 Technical Services. A Ukrainian licence for sale of the weaponry
21 was granted after Ukrspetsexport had received an end-user
22 certificate from the Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso.

15:52:47

23 The end-user certificate was dated 10 February 1999. The
24 document authorised the Gibraltar-based company to purchase the
25 weapons for sole use of the Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso.

15:53:19

26 The document also certified that Burkina Faso would be the final
27 destination of the cargo and the end-user of the weaponry. The
28 document is signed by Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Diendere, head
29 of the presidential guard of Burkina Faso. During a visit by a

1 panel member to Ukraine this sequence of events was reconfirmed.

2 The authorities of Burkina Faso in correspondence with the
3 United Nations sanctions committee on Sierra Leone denied
4 allegations that the weapons had been re-exported to a third
15:54:03 5 country, Liberia, and during a visit to Burkina Faso the panel
6 was shown weapons that were purportedly in that shipment. The
7 weapons in question, however, were not retained in Burkina Faso.
8 They were temporarily off-loaded in Ouagadougou and some were
9 trucked to Bobo Dioulasso. The bulk of them were then
15:54:27 10 transhipped within a matter of days to Liberia.

11 Most were flown aboard a BAC-111 owned by an Israeli
12 businessman of Ukrainian origin, Leonid Minin."

13 Do you know Leonid Minin, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15:54:47 15 Q. Have you met him?

16 A. I have met him, yes.

17 Q. In what connection?

18 A. Leonid Minin was doing timber business in Liberia.

19 Q. Did you do any arms deals with Mr Minin, Mr Taylor?

15:55:04 20 A. Yes, we tried to get some arms but he failed. He couldn't
21 get them.

22 Q. When was that?

23 A. In 2001.

24 Q. "The aircraft bore the Cayman registration VP-CLM and was
15:55:30 25 operated by a company named LIMAD, registered in Monaco. Minin
26 was, and may remain, a business partner and confidant of Liberian
27 President Charles Taylor."

28 True or false?

29 A. Totally, totally false.

1 Q. Business partner first of all, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Not at all. Not at all.

3 Q. Have you set up any companies with him?

4 A. No, I have not. I have not.

15:56:05 5 Q. Have you had any business dealings with him?

6 A. No, not as an individual, no. He had business with the
7 Liberian government.

8 Q. When you say we tried to get some arms through Minin, who
9 is the "we", just to be clear?

15:56:23 10 A. The Liberian government. At the time of our conflict - in
11 fact did I say 2001? This is around 2000. 2000, to be correct.
12 We were desperate and tried to see if he could use some contacts
13 to get us some weapons but he couldn't. He tried and he failed.

14 Q. "He is identified in the police records of several
15:56:44 15 countries and has a history of involvement in criminal activities
16 ranging from east European organised crime, trafficking in stolen
17 works of art, illegal possession of firearms, arms trafficking,
18 and money laundering. Minin uses several aliases. He has been
19 refused entry into many countries, including Ukraine, and travels
15:57:10 20 with many different passports. Minin offered the aircraft
21 mentioned above for sale to Charles Taylor as a presidential
22 jet."

23 Did he?

24 A. Yes, he tried to sell us a jet and we couldn't afford it.

15:57:27 25 Q. Now, you recall that during the currency of the Prosecution
26 case photographs of such an aircraft were placed before this
27 tribunal?

28 A. But that was not the aircraft.

29 Q. That was not the aircraft?

1 A. That was not the aircraft. That was not the aircraft. And
2 you know, may I just say, Minin - like I say, I know Minin very
3 well. And the strange part about these kinds of reports, Minin
4 is alive and well and still remains a major businessman. He is -
15:58:00 5 from the last I heard from Minin, he is stationed in the state of
6 Israel and travels extensively still. So when business people
7 come to little countries to do business, maybe we should do more.
8 We don't run around trying to get his entire life sketch and what
9 all he did and maybe it's a fault of ours.

15:58:30 10 This is an aircraft, the BAC-111, registered in Europe.
11 This man is such a crook, you've got him flying all through
12 Europe, landing, giving him VIP treatment at airports. Business
13 people coming to Liberia must verify through banks their capacity
14 to do the business that they claim they want to do. It is
15:58:52 15 verified by our embassies in Europe here and the man has money in
16 their European banks. If he is such a crook, then why do you
17 stop his money?

18 So when we do our little verifications to find out, one,
19 that the business is legal in Europe and, two, he has the money
15:59:10 20 and is capable of doing what he says he can do and we grant him
21 licence to could it, then you come back and you denigrate the
22 man. Well, we don't have the means of what you call - and the
23 man is still running around the world, all over the place. If he
24 is such a crook, why is he still running around?

15:59:27 25 So all this stuff here, really, it's just strange, about
26 trafficking, money laundering and stolen arts. What have you got
27 this man running around for? He is living in Israel and still
28 coming to Europe and other places. So, I mean, I don't
29 understand this.

1 But there was no business dealing. And to the best of my
2 understanding, Minin has been spoken to by the United Nations
3 panel of experts, okay, because Minin, if you look on the list of
4 individuals that the UN talked to, he is on that list. And I'm
15:59:59 5 sure if Minin had said that he was a business partner and there's
6 no need to hide it with Charles Taylor, he would state. And if
7 he is hearing me now, if you know you're a business partner of
8 mine, tell the world. I have no such thing to do. Never been a
9 business partner of mine.

16:00:16 10 He passed the litmus test, to our extent in Liberia, for
11 being a businessman in terms of the money that he had and the
12 legitimacy of his business as registered to Europe, and he was
13 granted business right away. There was nothing personal between
14 him and myself. I know him. As usual, the President would meet
16:00:35 15 any good-size businessman coming to Liberia investing 5 or 10
16 million dollars. For a small country like Liberia, of course,
17 you meet that businessman.

18 Q. "And for a period between 1998 and 1999, he is saying, that
19 jet was used for this purpose, as a presidential jet." Is that
16:01:02 20 true?

21 A. Was used as a presidential jet?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. Yes. It's built and configured, yes.

24 Q. Was it retained for that use, Mr Taylor?

16:01:15 25 A. No, we couldn't afford it and we didn't retain it.

26 Q. It was also used to transport arms?

27 A. No. If you look at presidential jets, these - this jet
28 could take, in total seating capacity, about 15 persons. It's an
29 executive jet with, you know - very, very, very well decorated.

1 You would mess up somebody's plane if you tried to transport
2 weapons. And a BAC-111 is a small plane, anyway. It's a small
3 plane.

16:01:53 4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, the question that you
5 asked - two questions back, quoting from the document, it says,
6 for a period between 1998 and 1999, it was used as a presidential
7 jet and was also used to transport arms. You then asked the
8 witness: Is this true? I'm not sure about the answer that he
9 gave.

16:02:13 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. Let's break it into two:

11 Q. Was the aircraft used as a presidential jet between '98 and
12 '99, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Was it also used to transport arms?

16:02:26 15 A. No.

16 Q. "Regarding the shipment in question, the aircraft flew from
17 Ibiza in Spain to Robertsfield in Liberia on 8 March 1999. On 15
18 March, two days after the arrival of the Ukrainian weapons in
19 Ouagadougou, the plane flew from Monrovia to Ouagadougou. On 16
16:02:53 20 March, the plane was loaded with weapons and flew back to
21 Liberia. On 17, it returned to Ouagadougou. After a flight to
22 Abidjan in the Ivory Coast, the plane flew again from Ouagadougou
23 to Liberia with weapons on the 19th. On 25, the plane flew again
24 from Liberia to Ouagadougou and returned on the same day with
16:03:21 25 weapons. On the 27th, the plane flew again to Ouagadougou and
26 from there to Bobo Dioulasso for the weapons that had been
27 trucked there. The aircraft made three flights over the next
28 three days between Bobo Dioulasso and Liberia. On 31 March, the
29 plane flew back to Spain. Because the plane had a VIP

1 configuration, it had only limited cargo capacity, which is why
2 so many flights were necessary."

3 Now, do you understand what is there being suggested,
4 Mr Taylor?

16:03:56 5 A. Oh, I understand.

6 Q. Now, help us. Let us look at, first of all, the timing of
7 this, March 1999. In April 1999, Mr Taylor, what are you
8 primarily engaged on? Think of the dates.

9 A. No, I know. April 1999, we were busy ferrying RUF
10 individuals with the United Nations from Sierra Leone, Liberia,
11 Robertsfield and out.

12 Q. To Lome?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. For the Lome peace talks, yes?

16:04:47 15 A. Exactly.

16 Q. Now, what they are suggesting here is, so that we're clear,
17 is that you, the month before, was busily engaged in using this
18 aircraft to ferry arms from Ouagadougou to Liberia.

19 A. Yes.

16:05:07 20 Q. Were you?

21 A. No, not at all. That's not true.

22 Q. Tell me, during that period in March 1999, I having
23 reminded you that this is the month before, the United Nations,
24 with your assistance, begin airlifting RUF representatives to
16:05:27 25 Lome, in that month of March, what were you engaged on?

26 A. March of 1999? We - let me see. I've got to reflect on
27 that. The preparatory work is going on for the movement of these
28 individuals in March because they start moving in April.

29 Q. And, Mr Taylor, do you remember, at one point the Libyan

1 government lent you an aircraft, didn't they?

2 A. Yes, they did. They gave us what they call this French
3 plane. I forgot the name of the plane. An executive jet was
4 given to us to carry off diplomatic - Falcon 900.

16:06:18 5 Q. When was - did the Libyans provide with you that aircraft?

6 A. That's - the hostages are released - no, no, no. We're
7 talking about 2000. No, that's in 2000.

8 Q. That's in 2000?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. That's to arrange for the hostage release. I'm sorry.

12 Q. "A second plane, an Antonov operated by a Liberian company
13 named Weasua, is reported by eyewitnesses to have flown part of
14 the cargo to Liberia from Bobo Dioulasso."

16:07:02 15 Weasua, Mr Taylor, is that a government airline?

16 A. No, no, no.

17 Q. Who owns it?

18 A. It was owned by a Spanish national that had spent years in
19 Liberia. Weasua was operated - owned and operated by him.

16:07:21 20 Q. Were you aware of Weasua aircraft being used for the
21 purpose suggested here?

22 A. I was not aware, but I can add this much: The aircraft
23 owned by Weasua, the aircraft owned by Weasua cannot - is not
24 equipped to fly from Roberts International Airport to Burkina
16:07:47 25 Faso.

26 Q. Why not?

27 A. It's a very short - short-range small aircraft that has a
28 maximum of - from what I was told - because, in fact, when we
29 even wanted to send delegations to Ivory Coast, they have about

1 an hour and a half of flying time on one-way flying nonstop. Not
2 more than an hour and a half. So this is a very small plane that
3 cannot make a direct non-stop flight from Monrovia to Burkina
4 Faso, no.

16:08:32 5 Q. "Minin's BAC-111 was used for an earlier shipment of
6 weapons and related equipment from the army airport in Niger to
7 Monrovia. This occurred in December 1998, shortly after Minin
8 purchased the plane and started to operate it in the region. On
9 22 December 1998, the BAC-111 made two trips from Niamey to
16:08:59 10 Monrovia. On the second trip, it took a consignment of weapons,
11 probably from existing stocks of the armed forces of Niger. The
12 weapons were offloaded into vehicles of the Liberian military. A
13 few days after these events, the RUF rebels started a major
14 offensive that eventually resulted in the destructive January
16:09:23 15 1999 raid on Freetown."

16 Do you see what the clear implication of that is,
17 Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, I do. Yes, I do.

19 Q. What do you understand by the implication?

16:09:32 20 A. He is trying to say that this BAC-111 brought weapons that
21 resulted to the January 6 attack on Freetown. That's what this
22 man is saying.

23 Q. What do you say about that suggestion?

24 A. That is totally false, but that is quite a contrast to what
16:09:56 25 others have said relating to the same situation.

26 Q. And then it goes on:

27 "The inner circle of the Taylor regime. President Charles
28 Taylor is actively involved in fuelling the violence in
29 Sierra Leone."

1 This is being said in December 2000, Mr Taylor.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Were you?

4 A. No.

16:10:27 5 Q. "He and the small coterie of officials and private
6 businessmen around him are in control of a covert,
7 sanctions-busting apparatus that includes international criminal
8 activity and the arming of the RUF in Sierra Leone."

9 Mr Taylor, help me. What international criminal activity
16:10:54 10 were you involved in?

11 A. None, and I think he would have mentioned it. This is very
12 damning and, quite frankly, the more I - you know, this report
13 reminds me - it reminds me of something like being a Christian
14 the whole - you know, before I converted, you know, you read a
16:11:19 15 passage in the Bible once, and when you read it again, it
16 enlightens you a little more. I have read this report, and the
17 more I read this report, the more it scares me that this is all -
18 I mean, you know, you read the document and you don't see as deep
19 as you did the second time. This, I don't know what this man is
16:11:40 20 talking about. They had brought me down to a little petty
21 criminal. That's what they did.

22 Q. "Over the years, before President Taylor's inauguration,
23 and after, this group has contracted foreign businessmen for the
24 financing, sourcing of, facilitating of these covert operations.
16:12:08 25 The sanctions-busting is fed by the smuggling of diamonds and the
26 extraction of natural resources in both Liberia and areas under
27 rebel control in Sierra Leone. In addition, the sovereign right
28 of Liberia to register planes and ships and to issue diplomatic
29 passports is being misused in order to further the operations of

1 the group. The role of Liberia as a transshipment platform for
2 arms to the RUF is crucial. However, arms are brought into the
3 region from elsewhere. Many businessmen close to the inner
4 circle of the Liberian presidency operate on an international
16:12:56 5 scale, sourcing their weaponry in Eastern Europe. The panel
6 focused on a limited number of individuals, but there are many
7 more examples of the significant presence of criminal
8 organisations in the region.

9 A key individual is a wealthy Lebanese businessman named
16:13:19 10 Talal El-Ndine."

11 Do you know that man?

12 A. I know Talal El-Ndine very well. He is an American.

13 Q. He is what?

14 A. He is an American now. He moves around. He is an American
16:13:37 15 citizen whose name was also put on the sanction list that they
16 could not execute because, being an American citizen, the
17 American government told them that was pure nonsense. Talal
18 El-Ndine was never stopped. He is an American.

19 Q. "El-Ndine is the inner circle's paymaster". What do you
16:14:00 20 say about that, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Total nonsense.

22 Q. "Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone alongside the RUF, and
23 those bringing diamonds out of Sierra Leone, are paid by him
24 personally."

16:14:14 25 Do you know about that?

26 A. I wouldn't even - I wouldn't say I don't, it just never
27 happened.

28 Q. "Arms shippers and brokers negotiate their payments in his
29 office in Old Road, Monrovia. El-Ndine also brings foreign

1 businessmen and investors to Liberia, individuals who are willing
2 to cooperate with the regime in legitimate business activities as
3 well as in the weapons and illicit diamonds. The pilots and crew
4 of the aircraft used for clandestine shipments into or out of
16:14:50 5 Liberia are also paid by El-Ndine. They are mostly of Russian or
6 Ukrainian nationality and they invariably stay at the Hotel
7 Africa in Monrovia.

8 The manager of this hotel is a Dutch national named Guus
9 van Kouwenhoven. Van Kouwenhoven started his hotel and a
16:15:15 10 gambling business in Liberia in the 1980s. He is also a member
11 of President Taylor's inner circle."

12 Was he?

13 A. Never.

14 Q. "... through his contacts with Taylor's economic adviser
16:15:33 15 Emmanuel Shaw."

16 Do you know Emmanuel Shaw?

17 A. Very, very well.

18 Q. "Shaw, a former Liberian finance minister, owns a number of
19 facilities at Robertsfield, including all the hangars."

16:15:48 20 Did he?

21 A. Shaw, I'm not sure. I don't know. It's only the Roberts
22 International management would know. I really don't know.

23 Q. "Van Kouwenhoven is responsible for the logistical aspects
24 of many of the arms deal. Through his interests in a Malaysian
16:16:11 25 timber company in Liberia he organises the transfer of weaponry
26 from Monrovia into Sierra Leone. Roads built and maintained for
27 timber extraction are also conveniently used for weapons movement
28 within Liberia and for the onward shipments of weapons to
29 Sierra Leone."

1 Which roads are they, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Counsel, I tell you, there are no roads but this whole
3 paragraph is - this whole is just filled with a lot of - there
4 are no such roads. And just before you move on, for the sake of
16:16:48 5 the Bench, Emmanuel Shaw, a former Liberian finance minister, he
6 was finance minister under the administration of the late
7 President Doe. He held no position in my government, so that
8 finance minister refers to the administration of Samuel Doe and
9 one of the foremost financial experts in the country.

16:17:09 10 And Guus Kouwenhoven, I know him personally. Not as a very
11 good friend. He was not a close friend. He was as businessman
12 that had been in Liberia from the administration of the late
13 President Tolbert, who was assassinated by Doe, and the property
14 that he operates - that he operated in Liberia was not his own.
16:17:34 15 President Tolbert if you remember, was chairman of the OAU when
16 he was assassinated. The property there is owned by the Liberian
17 government and it was built as the - it is called the OAU
18 facility to host the Heads of State at that OAU conference that
19 made him chairman of the OAU. So even the property is not owned
16:17:56 20 by Guus. It's owned by the Liberian government. These are
21 business people. And he is a businessman. And just to remind
22 the Court, he is one of those with these kinds of lie that were
23 indicted and brought before Dutch courts here that have freed
24 him.

16:18:16 25 Q. Yes, let's just remind us of that. Exhibit D-14, please.
26 12 March 2008:

27 "A Dutch Appeals Court on Monday acquitted a timber trader
28 earlier convicted of selling arms to Liberia's former President
29 Charles Taylor in exchange for lucrative timber contracts. The

1 Appeals Court reversed the eight-year prison sentence for Guus
2 Kouwenhoven, arguing there was insufficient evidence for a
3 conviction. According to the judges, much of the witness
4 testimony was not credible because it was unclear on dates and
16:19:05 5 locations and often contained elements that could be 'objectively
6 proven to be impossible'. A conviction on such evidence would be
7 'built on quicksand', the Court ruled.

8 The ruling is a blow for Prosecutors who had appealed for a
9 stiffer sentence and sought an additional conviction for war
16:19:30 10 crimes.

11 A former President of the Oriental Timber Corporation,
12 Kouwenhoven was convicted in June 2006 for allegedly supplying
13 AK-47 machine guns and anti-tank weapons to Taylor between 2000
14 and 2003, in violation of a UN arms embargo against Liberia.

16:19:52 15 Kouwenhoven, who is in his sixties, has always maintained
16 his innocence. Former strongman Taylor is now being held in a
17 prison in The Hague after his trial before the Special Court for
18 Sierra Leone was moved to The Netherlands, amid fears his
19 presence in Freetown could threaten security in the region."

16:20:14 20 I don't think we need any more of that. So that was the
21 outcome of - eight years after the experts were saying what they
22 were saying in this report that was the outcome, yes, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Exactly. Exactly.

24 Q. Simon Rosenblum; do you know him?

16:20:38 25 A. Yes, I know Simon Rosenblum, yes.

26 Q. "... an Israeli businessman based in Abidjan has logging
27 and road construction interests in Liberia. He too is very close
28 to the Liberian President and carries a Liberian diplomatic
29 passport. His trucks have been used to carry weapons from

1 Robertsfield to the border with Sierra Leone."

2 True or false?

3 A. Totally false. Totally, totally false.

16:21:20

4 Q. "Minin and van Kouwenhoven are linked to Liberia's timber
5 industry which provides a large amount of unrecorded
6 extra-budgetary income to President Taylor for unspecified
7 purposes."

8 Is that true?

9 A. This is total foolishness. It's untrue. Totally untrue.

16:21:38

10 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, just before you proceed on
11 there's actually two parts to the previous question. "He is very
12 close to the Liberian President and carries a Liberian diplomatic
13 passport. His trucks have been used to carry weapons",
14 et cetera, and you put that to the witness and he said totally
15 false. Is that to both, all three parts, or to the latter part?

16:21:56

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Let me break it down:

17 Q. Mr Taylor, was he very close to you, Mr Rosenblum?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Did he carry a Liberian diplomatic passport?

16:22:10

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Were his trucks used to carry weapons from Robertsfield to
22 the border with Sierra Leone?

23 A. No.

24 Q. How did he come to have a Liberian diplomatic passport?

16:22:23

25 A. The way it operates in most countries, and Liberia is no
26 exception, business people of interest that are doing business in
27 the country, a diplomatic passport can be given to them as a
28 passport of service and recognition. It is not - that status is
29 not as a foreign diplomat but you are giving - it helps to move

1 you in and out of the country without any problem. Hundreds of
2 diplomatic passports are issued by countries around the world to
3 individuals of status.

4 Simon Rosenblum is a businessman. In fact, the road
16:23:05 5 contract that is spoken about here was - were not contracts that
6 were granted by the Liberian government. These are contracts
7 that were being paid for by NGOs, European NGOs, to repair roads
8 in the country for the movement of services into areas where they
9 wanted to go. So those contracts were European contracts and
16:23:28 10 they had to be approved by their governments.

11 So Simon is an Israeli national and I know him very well
12 and I'm not going to deny that. But the passport, it's a service
13 passport that's given, not because he's a friend but it's given
14 to so many individuals. Most countries do that.

16:23:49 15 Q. Let's skip a few paragraphs and go to page 42, paragraph
16 252, please. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. "Conclusion regarding weapons and the RUF. Liberia is
19 actively breaking Security Council embargoes regarding weapons
16:24:20 20 imports into its own territory and into Sierra Leone. It is
21 being actively assisted by Burkina Faso. It is being tacitly
22 assisted by all countries providing such weapons, by countries
23 allowing weapons to pass through or over their territory without
24 question, and by countries providing a base for the aircraft used
16:24:43 25 in such operations.

26 The registration of aircraft in Liberia is clearly
27 connected to illegal activities that go beyond the economic
28 rationale for the offshore registration of aircraft or crews.
29 The use of registrations bought in Liberia on an ad hoc basis and

1 for short periods without inspection of the plane or its
2 operators is clearly intended to circumvent the identification of
3 planes that are used for illicit purposes. Victor Bout, Sanjivan
4 Ruprah, Leonid Minin and Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed bin Saqr al
16:25:25 5 Nayhan are key to such illicit practices in close collaboration
6 with the highest authorities in Liberia."

7 A. Excuse me. I think, counsel, if you don't mind, there is
8 something here that I think we ought to look at what this report
9 is talking about. I think the registration of aircrafts, if you
16:25:50 10 don't mind, I think we should clarify it to the judges what this
11 registration of aircrafts is.

12 Q. Very well. Go ahead.

13 A. You find, your Honours, that Liberia did have a registry of
14 aircrafts. What it was, there are certain aircrafts - let's say,
16:26:13 15 for example, the Boeing 727s. For some time some countries - the
16 United States and some part of western Europe prohibit certain
17 types of aircrafts from flying and they will not grant them
18 licence. I think when the Boeing 727s, the older fleet went out,
19 they stopped them from flying mostly in the United States on
16:26:41 20 commercial ventures.

21 Now, some of those aircrafts are still useful on the
22 African continent. Even some aircrafts that they do not permit
23 to fly in Europe are still being used to fly over Africa. And so
24 you go and Liberia and about two or three other countries on the
16:27:03 25 continent grant a licence to these planes to fly over Africa.

26 There's nothing illegal about it. There's nothing unlawful about
27 it. That's the aircraft registry. It is still going on.

28 Q. Now, at the end of that paragraph 253, Victor Bout, do you
29 know him?

1 A. No, I don't. I don't know Victor Bout.

2 Q. Sanjivan Ruprah, do you know him?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Leonid Minin you accept you know?

16:27:35 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Sheik Abdullah bin Zayed bin Saqr al Nayhan, do you know
7 him?

8 A. No, I don't know him.

9 Q. "In summary, the RUF is able to obtain large quantities of
16:27:47 10 arms, military equipment, and related materiel as a result of the
11 following key factors:

12 The purchasing power it derives from the sale of conflict
13 diamonds; the willingness of some major arms producing countries
14 to sell weapons with disregard as to the final users; the
16:28:06 15 willingness of some countries to provide their end-user
16 certificates and/or to facilitate the safe passage of weapons
17 through their territory; the largely unregulated activity of
18 international arms brokers and their intermediaries; corruption;
19 the inability of Sierra Leone and its neighbours to monitor and
16:28:26 20 control their air space; Liberia's interest in destabilising its
21 neighbours."

22 Mr Taylor, we've got less than a minute I think. Did you
23 ever any interest in destabilising your neighbours, yes or no?

24 A. No.

16:28:43 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you. Would that be a convenient
26 point?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's convenient. Thank you,
28 Mr Griffiths. We'll adjourn now.

29 Just before we do, Mr Taylor, I'll remind you that you are

1 ordered not to discuss your evidence with any other person.

2 We'll adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

3 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
4 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 26 August 2009
5 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	27540
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	27540