



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 26 JULY 2010
9.00 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda Hollis
Mr Nicholas Koumjian
Ms Kathryn Howarth
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Ms Logan Hambriek
Ms Fatiah Balfas

1 Monday, 26 July 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.]

09:02:45 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances
6 first, please.

7 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President, good morning,
8 your Honours, and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this
9 morning, Brenda J Hollis, Kathryn Howarth, Maja Dimitrova and
09:03:16 10 Nicholas Koumjian.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, your Honours, counsel
12 opposite. For the Defence today, myself, Courtenay Griffiths.

13 Before we commence, Madam President, can I thank the Court
14 for its indulgence during my illness in the two days before the
09:03:42 15 recess.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you are most welcome back.
17 It's good to see you, and I hope you're feeling much better.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I am.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. I don't know if there are any
09:03:52 20 preliminaries before I speak with the current witness.

21 MR KOUMJIAN: Yes, your Honour, I believe when we adjourned
22 Friday, there was an issue, and that is regarding the appearance
23 of Ms Campbell. There is an outstanding court order for her to
24 appear on the 29th of July. A communication has been received by
09:04:15 25 I believe the court, that they are requesting a modification of
26 the order to the 5th of August. The Prosecution has no problems
27 with that. So we would request that the date of appearance be
28 modified to 5 August for Ms Campbell, that your Honours' record
29 be modified.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Koumjian, were there any reasons given
2 for this change of date?

3 MR KOUMJIAN: Yes, your Honour, I believe they were in a
4 confidential communication with the Court.

09:04:50 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't know what organ of the Court
6 you're referring to, but the judges certainly are not aware of
7 the reasons for this change.

8 MR KOUMJIAN: Basically, your Honours, it was the
9 availability of counsel; that was their main reason given.

09:05:12 10 JUDGE LUSSICK: Just for my own, edification, I was under
11 the impression that Ms Naomi Campbell was a witness. What's this
12 about counsel being available or not?

13 MR KOUMJIAN: That, of course, is a matter for your
14 Honours, but that was the communication, that there is a request
09:05:29 15 to have her counsel. We are not taking a position ourselves, the
16 Prosecution, but, because this requires certain logistical
17 arrangements, we were not adverse, especially given that the
18 current witness has been taking longer than anticipated, that the
19 date be modified to 5 August.

09:05:52 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. Mr Griffiths, do you have any
21 views on this issue?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, we were alerted to the request that
23 the appearance of that witness be delayed until 5 August. The
24 reasons given initially were different to the reasons now being
09:06:15 25 canvassed by my learned friend because as we understood the
26 situation, inquiries were being made by - on behalf of
27 Ms Campbell, which required the delay in her appearance, and it
28 was not until, I think it was last week, that I received what
29 purports to be a motion requesting certain protective measures,

1 and also the appearance of two lawyers to have rights of audience
2 in court on behalf of Ms Campbell. We received that last week.
3 Interestingly, that purported motion is not signed by anyone on
4 behalf of the Prosecution, but is actually signed by a former
09:07:05 5 roommate of mine in the United Kingdom and a former Director of
6 Public Prosecutions in the United Kingdom, Lord Macdonald, which
7 I find somewhat strange. We have not had an opportunity to reply
8 to that purported motion, but in due course, and I can make it
9 plain now, we would oppose any application for any special
09:07:32 10 measures to be taken on behalf of Ms Campbell, including the
11 right of audience of two lawyers to be in court in order to
12 assist the witness. We find that somewhat strange because as far
13 as we are concerned, there is nothing special about this
14 particular witness.

09:07:52 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, for now really all that I'm
16 interested in was whether or not you oppose the application
17 really to defer her appearance until 5 August.

18 The other matter relating to the motions, we are aware that
19 they have been filed but we haven't had a chance to read them and
09:08:14 20 that's a totally different matter and I'm sure the parties on
21 both sides will have an opportunity to make their submissions
22 known in relation to that other matter.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, so far as the adjournment - request
24 for the adjournment is concerned, Madam President, we have no
09:08:30 25 difficulty with that.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. Then I think in the interests
27 of expediting today's proceedings, we will restrict ourselves to
28 that. I've consulted my colleagues and we are of the view --

29 [Trial Chamber conferred]

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: As I was saying, we have heard from both
2 sides. Mr Koumjian, we believe that the parties have a right to
3 organise the order, the call order, of their witnesses. As for
4 the reasons given in this particular instance for Ms Campbell
09:10:53 5 delayed appearance, I will not go into those now since there is a
6 motion or two pending in relation to that issue and I would not
7 want to pre-empt a ruling in that regard. But I can only say
8 that the leave is granted and the date is postponed accordingly
9 for her appearance, with the hope that it will not be postponed
09:11:18 10 yet again.

11 Now, Mr Sesay, good morning. I know it's been a week or
12 more since you last testified, but I will not have you swear
13 again; I will simply remind you of the oath that you initially
14 took at the beginning of your testimony to tell the truth and
09:11:36 15 that oath is still binding on you today. I believe we were
16 continuing with the examination-in-chief, Mr Griffiths. Please
17 continue.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: That is correct, Madam President.

19 WITNESS: DCT-172 [On former oath]

09:11:52 20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Cont'd]

21 Q. Mr Sesay, a week last Wednesday, when we last met, we were
22 looking at the adoption of some UNAMSIL individuals, your journey
23 to Monrovia to speak with Mr Taylor, he giving you \$5,000 on your
24 request for diesel, and you then returning to Sierra Leone with
09:12:28 25 that money. Do you remember that?

26 A. Yes, I remember.

27 Q. Now, after you returned to Sierra Leone, Mr Sesay, what did
28 you do?

29 A. Well, when I returned to Sierra Leone, I went to Kono and

1 I sent for diesel to be bought and I transported UNAMSIL. We
2 travelled from Kono and we came to the Moa River and we crossed
3 into Kailahun, and we travelled to Foya where we met - that is
4 where in Liberia, where we met the commander there and he sent a
09:13:22 5 message to Monrovia that we had arrived there, that I had got
6 there with the UNAMSIL personnel, and they sent a helicopter and
7 they came to transport them into Monrovia.

8 Q. Now, some details on that, please, Mr Sesay. First of all,
9 how many UNAMSIL personnel were involved?

09:13:50 10 A. Well, I would say there were about 315 personnel. I cannot
11 recall the exact number but it's about that.

12 Q. No need to be precise. That's good enough for my purposes.
13 Now, help us, were they transported from Kono to Foya in one
14 batch or did you have to make several trips?

09:14:20 15 A. No. Those from Kono - all of us moved on the same day from
16 Kono and we arrived in Foya. We moved from Kono through
17 Kailahun, and we arrived in Foya.

18 Q. Were there some personnel who were taken from another
19 location to Foya?

09:14:48 20 A. Well, except the Indians, about 23 of them, they were from
21 Kailahun. They too were taken to Foya but not on the same day,
22 like the ones that I had brought from Kono.

23 Q. And the helicopters which arrived at Foya to transport
24 them, to whom did those helicopters belong?

09:15:17 25 A. Mr Taylor owned the helicopters. They were not two
26 helicopters, it was one helicopter that made the first trip and
27 made the second trip. It was just one helicopter.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that Mr Taylor's personal helicopter?
29 Is that what you mean?

1 THE WITNESS: It was the Liberian government that owned the
2 helicopter.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. And how long did this whole operation take to transport the
09:15:52 5 UNAMSIL personnel to Foya and for them to be then taken on to
6 Monrovia?

7 A. Well, when I returned from Monrovia, I passed the night in
8 Kono and the following afternoon, around 2, was when we left Kono
9 for Kailahun. And when we travelled to Kailahun, we passed the
09:16:25 10 night in Kailahun Town and the following morning we went to Foya.
11 I can say it was about two to three days, because when we arrived
12 in Foya, it was on that very day that they were transported in
13 the evening by the helicopter, all of them were taken to Monrovia
14 because we were in Foya at the airfield when the helicopter came
09:16:52 15 for them, for the first batch, and it went, and it came back for
16 the second batch and took them to Monrovia.

17 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, why did you release the UNAMSIL personnel?

18 A. Well, when Mr Taylor invited me and the message was sent to
19 Pendembu and I went to meet with him, first he told me that he
09:17:38 20 would want me and my colleague RUF members to know that RUF and
21 Mr Sankoh should abide by the Lome Accord and that two, capturing
22 the UNAMSIL is against the Accord, and that he would want us to
23 know that we cannot fight the United Nations and that was not in
24 the interest of the RUF and therefore they, as ECOWAS leaders had
09:18:12 25 mandate from the Security Council that they should facilitate the
26 immediate release of the UNAMSIL personnel. And so that was why
27 his colleague ECOWAS leaders had given him the mandate to talk to
28 us and that they wanted the people so I should try to bring them
29 come. That's why I came to take the people and to go with them.

1 And the ones whom I took to Foya, that the helicopter came to
2 take them, they brought uniforms for them and they wore the
3 uniforms. As they wore the uniforms they boarded the helicopter
4 and they went.

09:19:00 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. Mr Interpreter, you said
6 something that I personally didn't pick up. You said "and they"
7 - "I wanted the people so I should try to bring them" something
8 "that's why I came to take the people and to go with them."
9 There was something that you said we didn't catch.

09:19:21 10 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness kindly be
11 asked to repeat?

12 THE WITNESS: I said Mr Taylor said they wanted the people,
13 that is the UNAMSIL personnel, so I should come to take them to
14 Liberia. He said because they wanted the people to be released
09:19:39 15 immediately and that is the mandate that they had had.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Now this event you told us, Mr Sesay - well, perhaps
18 I should ask you. This event took place when?

19 A. This event, I think it took place in late May 2000.

09:20:19 20 Q. Now, remind us, at this time, where was Mr Sankoh?

21 A. At this time, Mr Sankoh was in custody, he was in prison
22 under the Government of Sierra Leone by then.

23 Q. Were you able to consult with Mr Sankoh regarding the
24 release of the UNAMSIL personnel?

09:20:47 25 A. No, I wasn't able to talk to Mr Sankoh. In fact, from the
26 time that the UNAMSIL were captured to late May, it was only
27 Mr Taylor who called me to talk to me because - but before that
28 time, nobody contacted the RUF up to that time.

29 Q. And the decision to release the UNAMSIL personnel,

1 Mr Sesay, was that decision accepted by everyone within the RUF?

2 A. No. Some of my colleagues were against the idea, like
3 Gibril Massaquoi, Superman and others. They said that - because
4 they were in Freetown with Mr Sankoh, when the demonstration took
09:21:44 5 place against Mr Sankoh at his house they escaped from Freetown
6 and it took over a month before they arrived in Lunsar. And by
7 the time they got there, I had released the UNAMSIL. I had taken
8 them. And they were saying that I had no right to release the
9 UNAMSIL personnel and that it was only Mr Sankoh that had the
09:22:13 10 right to give that order. And they said instead of the -

11 I release the UNAMSIL, I would have negotiated the release of
12 Mr Sankoh.

13 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, at this point in time, when you met with
14 Mr Taylor in Monrovia, who was effectively - and I stress that
09:22:40 15 word - in charge of the RUF at that time, bearing in mind that
16 Mr Sankoh was in prison?

17 A. Well, at that time, it was myself, Morris Kallon. Then
18 when Superman and Gibril arrived, it was then the four of us who
19 were in charge of the RUF.

09:23:04 20 Q. And had anyone at that time suggested that you be the
21 person to take decisions on behalf of the RUF?

22 A. Please repeat the question, sir.

23 Q. At that time, at the time of the release of the UNAMSIL
24 personnel, had anyone been appointed as a leader to succeed
09:23:40 25 Mr Sankoh?

26 A. No, no. That idea hadn't come up yet.

27 Q. So why did you decide to make that decision? What gave you
28 the authority to take the decision to release the UNAMSIL
29 personnel?

1 A. Well, if you look at the story on my testimony before this
2 Court, from the initial stage that Mr Sankoh brought the idea in
3 February 2000 in Makeni, I was not supporting that idea so --

4 Q. Pause there. What idea are you talking about, Mr Sesay?

09:24:36

5 A. When Mr Sankoh said that the UNAMSIL's mission in Sierra
6 Leone was not in the interests of the RUF. He said the UNAMSIL
7 mission in Sierra Leone was only in the interest of the President
8 of Sierra Leone at that time, and the government, and that is
9 Mr Tejan Kabbah. Alhaji Tejan Kabbah. He said he had disarmed
10 in Port Loko and he had disarmed in Fadugu and he was planning to
11 carry on disarmament in Segbwema. He said but the way Jetley was
12 forcing him to disarm, and the UN, the UNAMSIL, did not tell
13 President to Kabbah to implement his own part of the agreement
14 and that is the Lome Accord. Instead, General Jetley was just
15 pushing him and harassing him to disarm the RUF.

09:25:34

16 So that was why he had given the instruction that we should
17 arrest - I should organise the RUF, some of the RUF, to wear the
18 attire of the Civil Defence Force to set an ambush and arrest
19 some of the military observers and take them into the forest and
20 I said, "Oh," I said, "Pa, I don't think this idea is in place."
21 I said, "If you think that Pa Kabbah is not implementing the
22 agreement, why can't you complain to the guarantors?" And Pa
23 Sankoh was bitterly annoyed with me in the room. All of us were
24 there together with Gibril Massaquoi, myself, Morris Kallon,
25 Augustine Gbao, and Jackson Swarray, Rashid Sandy, together with
26 a Sesay, he was a bodyguard to Akim, all of us were in the room.
27 So because of my piece of advice, Mr Sankoh became annoyed. So
28 when he came to Freetown he decided to take me out of Makeni and
29 sent me to Kono.

09:26:01

09:26:32

1 So when the problem started in Makeni I wasn't there. When
2 I came the problem had already occurred. And I was not really in
3 favour of what happened. Because the thing that made us to
4 support Mr Sankoh against Sam Bockarie in December 1999 was
09:27:20 5 because we thought that Bockarie did not want to disarm to the
6 Nigerians, the Nigerian UNAMSIL, because he said those were his
7 enemies who had fought against him. And Bockarie left, and just
8 about two months afterwards Mr Sankoh too started bringing the
9 same kind of idea and I said then there was no need for us to go
09:27:43 10 against Bockarie. So even if UNAMSIL contacted me before that
11 time, even before Mr Taylor had done, I would have listened to
12 UNAMSIL. But nobody, absolutely nobody contacted the RUF.
13 Nobody sent to talk to me until when Mr Taylor sent for me. So
14 even if some other person had sent to talk to me to release
09:28:16 15 UNAMSIL I would have done so, because I was thinking about their
16 feeding and I was thinking about their medication so --

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, the simple question you
18 asked the witness was: What idea are you talking about,
19 Mr Sesay? With the way he's going on, I must admit I'm lost now
09:28:35 20 as to exactly the answer to your question.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I before we recommence indicate that a
22 name mentioned by the witness does not appear on the transcript.
23 That's the name Jetley. We see that omission on page 12 at line
24 24, and on page 13 at line 3:

09:29:27 25 Q. So, Mr Sesay, having taken that decision, and you say there
26 were some within the RUF who were opposed to it, did that have
27 any consequences for you personally?

28 A. Yes, because Gibril and others started inciting the
29 fighters in Makeni, Lunsar. So when the ECOWAS leaders invited

1 me, they said the leadership was to change from Mr Sankoh and
2 I was appointed, so I decided to - because the ECOWAS leaders
3 told me that I was to send a delegation to Monrovia, so I sent
4 Gibril Massaquoi to be among the delegation in Monrovia so that
09:30:39 5 he could not continue to incite the men against my administration
6 because I knew the past experience that I had had with him.

7 Q. That's the topic I want to come on to now, Mr Sesay; that
8 topic being your appointment as interim leader of the RUF.

9 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before you get to that point
09:31:15 10 could I have a clarification as to who was the "he" who could not
11 continued to incite the men against my administration. Who is
12 the he referred to there?

13 THE WITNESS: That is Gibril Massaquoi, I'm talking about
14 him. And --

09:31:35 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Now, let's go on and deal with now, please, your
17 appointment as interim leader. First of all, when did that
18 occur?

19 A. Yes, before - I would want to say something before we go to
09:31:56 20 my appointment as interim leader. I have spoken about Segbwema.
21 Yes, Mr Sankoh disarmed in Segbwema also around March 2000 and
22 that Jetley was present at all of these disarmaments, the one
23 that took place in Port Loko in Fadugu and the one in Segbwema.
24 And after the Segbwema disarmament was when Mr Sankoh travelled
09:32:29 25 to South Africa through Ivory Coast. In the same March, Ibrahim
26 Bah, Louis and Michel, they came to Freetown and met Mr Sankoh
27 there before he went to South Africa. That was when they brought
28 three trucks and two pick-ups, and they had shipped those
29 vehicles through Water Quay. So they had travelled and met

1 Mr Sankoh in Freetown before Mr Sankoh left for South Africa, so
2 all of these things happened in March 2000.

3 Q. And just to be clear, these trucks and pick-ups came
4 through where?

09:33:10 5 A. Well, it was Michel and Ibrahim Bah who brought them but
6 I understood that they shipped them from Belgium to Freetown, so
7 it was through the Water Quay in Freetown that they received
8 them. So Ibrahim Bah, Louis and Michel, they travelled and met
9 Mr Sankoh in Freetown and handed over the vehicles to him. That
09:33:34 10 was before Mr Sankoh and Gibril travelled to South Africa through
11 Ivory Coast.

12 Q. Now, pause there.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think Water Quay is spelled as in
14 Q-U-A-Y, isn't it?

09:33:53 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Is it spelled Q-U-A-Y, Mr Sesay?

17 A. Yes, my Lord.

18 Q. Two things. Firstly this: Why did Louis and Michel along
19 with Ibrahim Bah bring those vehicles from Belgium into Sierra
09:34:16 20 Leone?

21 A. Well, they were Mr Sankoh's business partners.

22 Q. And for what purpose were those vehicles to be used?

23 A. Well, Mr Sankoh was to use them for the party, because by
24 then the disarmament was now going on, so what we were now
09:34:41 25 thinking about was for Mr Sankoh to transform the RUF into a
26 political party. And Mr Sankoh was also using those trucks to
27 transport food supplies from Freetown to Kailahun, to Makeni, to
28 Kono before the May incident.

29 Q. Secondly, this: Who paid for those vehicles?

1 A. It was Mr Sankoh.

2 Q. Where did the money come from to pay for these vehicles?

3 A. Well, we were undertaking mining activities and these two
4 guys, Ibrahim Bah, and the other two fellows had come, they were

09:35:28 5 in Kono from December 2000 to January, and even at the time

6 I went and took over the mining in Kono, when Mr Sankoh sent me

7 Gibril Massaquoi with the mining equipment in February, when the

8 UNAMSIL personnel brought them, the diamonds that I had mined in

9 February, March, to April, it was Gibril who used to collect them

09:35:57 10 and take them to Mr Sankoh in Freetown.

11 Q. Now you say that - I want some clarification, you said the

12 two - the other two fellows who were in Kono from December 2000

13 to January?

14 A. Yes, to late January. And those were Louis, Michel,

09:36:22 15 together with Ibrahim Bah. When I said Ibrahim Bah and two

16 fellows, those are the two men that I am talking about.

17 Q. December of which year, Mr Sesay?

18 A. '99.

19 Q. So when you said earlier that these two fellows were in

09:36:42 20 Kono from December 2000 to January, is that correct?

21 A. No, no. No, it's not correct. It's not correct. I meant
22 from December '99 to January 2000.

23 Q. Now, what was the purpose of Mr Sankoh's trip to South
24 Africa?

09:37:05 25 A. Well, I was - he made me to understand when he called me to

26 go to Segbwema and organise the combatants for the disarmament,

27 and when he came to Segbwema to disarm the RUF he told me that he

28 was going to South Africa to meet with one of his friends, you

29 know, to meet a friend of his about the party issue, so that was

1 the reason why he went.

2 Q. Okay. Now, let's come on to the topic of your appointment
3 as interim leader.

4 Firstly, when did that occur?

09:37:53 5 A. The first meeting was in July, July 2000, between - between
6 the 20th to the 25th, between those few days.

7 Q. Now, let's pause there for a minute. Between May, when the
8 UNAMSIL personnel were released, until the 20th to the 25th of
9 July, what was happening in terms of the RUF?

09:38:28 10 A. Well, between May to July, during those times, fighting was
11 going on between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone in
12 Lunsar, Gberi Junction, that was where fighting was taking place.
13 And at the same time, the Government of Sierra Leone was
14 attacking the RUF in Lunsar, Makeni, Tongo Field with helicopter
09:38:54 15 gunships, which also killed people in Magburaka. Fighting was
16 going on during that time, because during that time the AFRC had
17 also joined President Kabbah, so they were all fighting against
18 the RUF, because they came, they captured Lunsar from us and the
19 RUF also repelled the attack and pushed them out of Lunsar.

09:39:27 20 Q. And during this period, that is, between the release of the
21 UNAMSIL personnel and the 20th to the 25th of July, who was
22 effectively running the RUF during that period?

23 A. During that time, I was the one. Because I was the field
24 commander and I, together with the other commanders, myself,
09:39:54 25 Superman, Kallon, Gibril Massaquoi, because it was after this
26 time that Gibril went to Monrovia, but during this time we were
27 the ones controlling the RUF, and it was Gibril who was based in
28 Lunsar itself.

29 Q. And in terms of the disarmament process which was supposed

1 to be in place, who were - from the UNAMSIL side, who were they
2 dealing with within the RUF?

3 A. Well, they were dealing with me, because after the first
4 meeting, and the second meeting, in Monrovia, they advised that
09:40:45 5 the ECOWAS people gave me - that was especially after the second
6 meeting that took place at RIA, that was with President Obasanjo,
7 President Taylor and President Alpha Konare. After the meeting
8 they invited me into a small office, which was a closed door
9 meeting, where they instructed me that I should work with the
09:41:07 10 UNAMSIL and that I should work with the Government of Sierra
11 Leone, so -

12 Q. Pause there, we will come to the details of that in a
13 minute, Mr Sesay.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you did ask a question,
09:41:21 15 about a page and a half before, I think it was page 15, where you
16 said, "Now, let's go on to deal with your appointment as interim
17 leader". And you said, "First of all, when did that occur?"
18 Now, the witness opted to go on into some other matters. I'm not
19 sure that he's really answered that question. It's important.

09:41:43 20 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm coming back to it now.

21 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, what I want us to do now is to go through,
22 chronologically, your appointment as interim leader, okay?

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. Starting at the beginning, you've told us that occurred in
09:42:05 25 late July of 2000. Is that correct?

26 A. Yes. That was when the first meeting took place.

27 Q. Which meeting?

28 A. Well, that was when the ECOWAS had invited me.

29 Q. Now, taking things slowly, how was that invitation

1 communicated to you?

2 A. That invitation - they called, they sent a radio message
3 through the radio that was based - was at the guesthouse, it was
4 through Memunatu Deen, who sent a message to me, that they had
09:42:55 5 got an information from Joe Tuah that President Taylor had said
6 that we will have to have a meeting in Monrovia with ECOWAS
7 leaders and that I was to travel with some of my colleagues.

8 Q. Now, who sent that message?

9 A. Memunatu Deen.

09:43:18 10 Q. From whom did she get the information in order to send the
11 message?

12 A. From Joe Tuah.

13 Q. And who had instructed Joe Tuah to give Memuna Deen that
14 message?

09:43:35 15 A. It was President Taylor.

16 Q. And on whose behalf was Mr Taylor acting when that message
17 was sent?

18 A. It was on behalf of the ECOWAS.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, if I may ask for
09:43:51 20 clarification, who exactly appointed Mr Sesay as interim leader
21 of the RUF?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: We are coming to that.

23 Q. Now, the message that you received, Mr Sesay, was to what
24 effect?

09:44:13 25 A. The message said that I should travel to Monrovia with some
26 of my colleagues, and that the ECOWAS Head of State wanted to
27 have a meeting with us, we, the RUF, so that was the message.

28 Q. Now, who went?

29 A. Myself, Patrick PS Binda, Jabba, my adjutant. I went with

1 FOC.

2 Q. FOC is who?

3 A. That was one of Mr Sankoh's bodyguards.

4 Q. What is his full name?

09:45:02 5 A. I think it was something like Francis O Charles.

6 Q. Now, go on. Who else went?

7 A. Colonel Lion.

8 Q. Yes, who else?

9 A. I think these are the names that I recall for now. And
09:45:33 10 Augustine Gbao, he too went with us.

11 Q. How did you travel to Monrovia?

12 A. We travelled from Kono in a vehicle, we went to the Moa
13 River, we crossed over and we went to Foya, and when we got to
14 Foya we went to the commander's house and the commander sent a
09:45:56 15 message to Monrovia and a helicopter came and collected us to
16 Monrovia.

17 Q. Where in Monrovia did you stay?

18 A. When we went, we stayed in a guesthouse.

19 Q. And did you meet with anyone whilst you were in Monrovia?

09:46:22 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. With whom did you meet?

22 A. Well, when we went we passed the night and the following
23 day Joe Tuah came and collected us and took us to the mansion.
24 And at the mansion we met with President Taylor in his office,
09:46:42 25 and together with President Obasanjo, President Yahya Jammeh,
26 President Alpha Konare and the late President Eyadema of Togo.
27 Those were the five people that we met with.

28 Q. And who met with those leaders?

29 A. Myself and my colleague, RUFs, those whose names I have

1 called.

2 Q. What was said to you in that meeting?

3 A. Well, during that meeting, the Heads of States spoke one
4 after the other, but all the main thrust of their discussions
09:47:23 5 were that they, as ECOWAS leaders, who are the guarantors to the
6 Lome Peace Accord, and that they had decided that they were no
7 longer going to work with Mr Sankoh, because they said Mr Sankoh
8 did not respect anyone and did not want to implement the Lome
9 Peace Accord, and that they, as leaders in the region, they will
09:47:45 10 not allow the Lome Accord to fail. So for that reason, they said
11 they deemed it necessary to change the leadership of Mr Sankoh.

12 Q. And at that meeting, was any suggestion made as to who
13 should take over as leader from Mr Sankoh?

14 A. Yes. Obasanjo asked President Taylor, he said, "The time
09:48:13 15 we spoke about the release of the UNAMSIL, who did you contact?"
16 That was when Mr Taylor said, "It was this young man that
17 I contacted." That was when Obasanjo said, "Well, it looks like
18 Issa is someone who listens to people, then why can't you give
19 him the leadership - for him to become the interim leader?" And
09:48:31 20 Mr Taylor said, "Yes, Issa is somebody who listens" he said
21 "because when Issa came - when he came I told him that he should
22 go and bring the UNAMSIL people. He did not waste any time in
23 doing so. He went and within 48 hours he brought the people.
24 And I sent helicopter to go and transfer the people." So he
09:48:51 25 said, "Should we appoint Issa? I believe that he will do the job
26 that we will want him to do." So that was when Obasanjo said,
27 "Then it is better we give Issa the leadership." And the late
28 Eyadema supported, Alpha Konare too supported. That was when
29 I too asked their permission for me to say something. I said

1 I wanted to say something. They said, "What do you want to say?"
2 And I said, "Oh, this leadership that you want to give me now,
3 I will ask of you to give me a week so that I will go back and
4 consult with my fellow RUF people. I said because Mr Sankoh was
09:49:30 5 operating over a divided loyalty, and I said it would not be good
6 at this point, I said it would not be nice at this point if you
7 make me interim leader and then I go back to Sierra Leone, then
8 you hear that we have people have started attacking again, or we
9 start attacking each other. So I said what I want you to do, and
09:49:53 10 the job you would want me to do, it would not be possible for it
11 to happen. So I said they should give me time to go and inform
12 my colleague RUF that this is the decision of the ECOWAS leaders.
13 And I said number two, we as RUF who were here now, please allow
14 us to write a letter so that you will send this letter to
09:50:18 15 Mr Sankoh who is already under the custody of the Government of
16 Sierra Leone. So Obasanjo particularly was saying that "Oh", he
17 said "Issa, if we make you leader, we are the Heads of States of
18 the region, who else will challenge your leadership?"
19 Q. Go on.
09:50:37 20 A. That was when the late Eyadema said "Oh", he said, "No, let
21 us listen to what the young man has said." He said he believed
22 that the idea that I had brought up, they said they should give
23 me the one week and that we should write the letter, and they
24 will take it to Mr Sankoh. So we drafted the letter and we
09:50:59 25 handed the letter over to Obasanjo, and he and President Alpha
26 Oumar Konare took it to Sierra Leone and they - the President
27 Kabbah brought Mr Sankoh from Freetown, they took him to Lungi
28 airport where the letter was handed over to him. So the ECOWAS
29 leaders allowed me to go back, inform my colleagues, and that in

1 a week's time I should return to Monrovia.

2 Q. That letter, where was it written?

3 A. We wrote that letter - in fact it was Gbao who wrote the
4 letter; we wrote that letter in Monrovia, and they took it along.

09:51:41 5 Q. And did you write the letter whilst you were in Monrovia
6 for that meeting?

7 A. Yes, it was in Monrovia that we wrote the letter.

8 Q. And help us: What was the thrust of that letter?

9 A. Well, we told Mr Sankoh about the decision of the ECOWAS
09:52:09 10 and about my appointment. So, when they took the letter to him,
11 I later understood that even when President Obasango and Alpha
12 Konare and President Kabbah handed the letter over to Mr Sankoh
13 in Lungi, Mr Sankoh read through the letter. Mr Sankoh opposed,
14 he said no. He said he would not want me to serve as interim
09:52:34 15 leader. He said he would want Mike Lamin to serve in that
16 capacity. So he said, he was asking the ECOWAS leaders to give
17 that leadership to Mike Lamin. And then Obasanjo and Alpha
18 Konare, all of them said no. They said the time Mr Sankoh should
19 tell them anything whatsoever has already passed. So they were
09:52:56 20 saying that there the ECOWAS leaders wanted Issa, so Mr Sankoh
21 was no longer in place to tell them who they should appoint.

22 Q. Now, I want us to take things in stages, Mr Sesay so we
23 don't get ahead of ourselves. You go to Monrovia for that
24 meeting, the letter is written and taken to Mr Sankoh. Did you
09:53:23 25 remain in Monrovia?

26 A. No. After we had handed over the letter, after we had
27 handed over the letter, we went back to Sierra Leone, so we went
28 to Sierra Leone, and when I went back, I also convened a meeting
29 of commanders and I informed them about the outcome of the

1 meeting that took place in Monrovia. And I told them about the
2 decision that had been taken by the ECOWAS. So, during the
3 meeting, some people suggested that Mike Lamin should be the
4 leader, some of the commanders, including Gibril himself; he said
09:54:09 5 Mike Lamin should serve as the leader, while Jackson Swarray said
6 Pa Rogers should serve as the leader. So, from that moment, when
7 they all spoke, I said "okay" but others said no, I was the one
8 that had been invited by people; they said why shouldn't I be the
9 leader? So your Honours --

09:54:30 10 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
11 to repeat that area?

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now, what you said, Mr Sesay, because the interpreter
14 missed part of your answer, you told us "while Jackson Swarray
09:54:46 15 said that you should serve as the leader, so from that moment
16 when they all spoke I said 'okay', but others said no, I was the
17 one that had been invited by people, they said why shouldn't I be
18 the leader?" Go on.

19 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, are you reading into the
09:55:08 20 record what you consider the correct answer, because I recall the
21 witness saying that Jackson Swarray wanted Pa Rogers to be the
22 leader.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm sorry, that's right, "Jackson said Pa
24 Rogers should be the leader." That's line 13 on page 26. I'm
09:55:26 25 grateful.

26 Q. You were explaining, Mr Sesay, about what was said at the
27 meeting?

28 A. Yes. I said those were the different views that came up
29 during the meeting; whilst some, including Kallon, said that

1 I was the one who had been invited and you have briefed us, and
2 the people said - the ECOWAS people said "you are the one that
3 they wanted, why shouldn't you be the leader?" So those were the
4 views that came out of the meeting, so after the one week

09:56:04 5 I returned to Monrovia and I - at this time.

6 Q. Pause there. We will come on to Monrovia in a minute but a
7 bit more detail, please. Who was present at that meeting?

8 A. At that meeting, I can say almost all the commanders,
9 because commanders like: Myself, Morris Kallon, Superman, Gibri

09:56:29 10 Massaquoi, Komba Gbundema, Lion, I invited all the various
11 commanders from the RUF controlled areas, Kailahun, Tongo,
12 Magburaka, Makeni, Lunsar, Kambia, and Kamakwie.

13 Q. Where was the meeting held?

14 A. In Kono.

09:57:01 15 Q. How long did the meeting last?

16 A. Well, the meeting - we started the meeting around 6 o'clock
17 in the evening and we were there until 11, 11 p.m.

18 Q. And the final decision, how was it made, by a vote or what?

19 A. No. They did not vote. They did not vote. When the

09:57:39 20 others said that I should be the interim leader, because I was
21 the one suggested by ECOWAS. Those who said so dominated those
22 who were in favour of Mike Lamin. So definitely, the majority
23 accepted the action of the ECOWAS leaders - the appointment of
24 the ECOWAS leaders.

09:58:06 25 Q. Was Mike Lamin present at that meeting?

26 A. No. He was in prison at that time. He was at the Pademba
27 Road Prison.

28 Q. Now you tell us that you returned to Monrovia. When you
29 returned, did you go alone or with others?

1 A. Myself and some other people, like Augustine Gbao, Jonathan
2 Kposowa, Samuel Jabba, Patrick PS Binda and Colonel Lion, we were
3 the ones who went.

4 Q. First of all, how did you travel to Monrovia?

09:58:58 5 A. We travelled by road to Kailahun from Kono, and then we
6 crossed the border to Foya and we went to the commander, and the
7 commander called Monrovia and we were there for about three hours
8 and a helicopter came and collected us to Monrovia.

9 Q. And where did you stay in Monrovia?

09:59:21 10 A. We stayed in the guesthouse.

11 Q. And help us, Mr Sesay, pausing for a moment, who was
12 permanently resident at the guesthouse at that time?

13 A. It was Memunatu Deen and one Foday Rashid that had been
14 sent there by Mr Sankoh in - around February; Mr Sankoh sent him
09:59:57 15 from Freetown to go there around February 2000, it was he and his
16 wife who were at the guesthouse.

17 Q. He and his wife. Who is the "he"?

18 A. Rashid Foday.

19 Q. Who is his wife?

10:00:14 20 A. Memunatu Deen. No, no, sorry, sorry, it was not. Memunatu
21 Deen's husband was Osman Tolo; he too was at the guesthouse.
22 Mr Sankoh had sent him there. He went there to stay there with
23 Memunatu Deen, but Rashid Foday's wife, I think it was Bintu.

24 Q. And was she at the guesthouse as well?

10:00:45 25 A. Yes, he - she was there with her three children.

26 Q. And did you meet with anyone whilst in Monrovia on that
27 occasion?

28 A. Well, when I was in Monrovia, yes, they invited us, they
29 came to collect us to go to the airport, that is RIA.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, may I interrupt again to
2 seek a clarification? Regarding this letter that the witness
3 says he and his colleagues drafted and left or handed over to the
4 ECOWAS Leadership in Monrovia. Now, the witness has testified at
10:01:32 5 page 25, line 14, that they handed this letter to Obasanjo, and
6 then he went on to say that Obasanjo and Alpha Konare and
7 President Kabbah handed the letter to Sankoh in Lungi. Now,
8 I had understood that Sankoh was in Pademba Road Prison at this
9 time. I just want a clarification, did these three Presidents
10:02:03 10 take this letter and actually hand it to Sankoh in Lungi? And
11 then the witness went on to say, or to tell us, about Sankoh's
12 reaction when he read the letter but he said he understood that
13 reaction but he didn't tell us how did he learn about this
14 reaction because he wasn't in Freetown.

10:02:26 15 MR GRIFFITHS:
16 Q. I'm going to ask you to go over that again, Mr Sesay.
17 Because I recall you saying that Mr Sankoh was taken to
18 Lungi. At the time that the letter was taken to Freetown, where
19 was Mr Sankoh?

10:02:43 20 A. Mr Sankoh was in prison in Sierra Leone in Freetown.

21 Q. Which prison?

22 A. Pademba Road Prison.

23 Q. Now, how did Mr Sankoh receive that letter which was
24 written?

10:03:06 25 A. Well, during the second meeting, Obasanjo made me to know
26 that they communicated with President Kabbah and President Kabbah
27 took Mr Sankoh to Lungi from prison from Freetown. It was
28 President Kabbah who took Mr Sankoh to Lungi and met with his
29 colleague Head of States, together with Mr Sankoh and the letter

1 was handed over to him.

2 Q. Earlier you told us what Mr Sankoh's reaction was when he
3 received that letter, that he favoured Mike Lamin to become the
4 interim leader. When were you told that?

10:03:48 5 A. It was during the second meeting that President Obasanjo
6 told me that, and --

7 Q. Pause there. And where did that second meeting take place?

8 A. At RIA, in Liberia, at the airport.

9 Q. You were telling us how, on this second visit to Monrovia,
10:04:14 10 you were taken to RIA. Is this the meeting you were telling us
11 about?

12 A. Yes, that's the meeting.

13 Q. So help us now. So you go to the guesthouse and you were
14 telling us you were taken to RIA. What happened when you got to
10:04:32 15 RIA?

16 A. We arrived at RIA together with my colleagues in the hall,
17 and the Heads of State, because President Taylor was there
18 together with President Konare. As soon as we were getting
19 there, they also arrived.

10:04:57 20 Q. Which Presidents arrived?

21 A. I said we met President Taylor there and President Konare,
22 Alpha Konare, they were there. But as our vehicle was parking, a
23 plane landed with President Obasanjo. Because that morning it
24 was raining, so the three of them were in the meeting together
10:05:23 25 with us and we attended the meeting.

26 Q. Where in RIA did the meeting take place?

27 A. Well, in one of the buildings at RIA, in the conference
28 hall. That was where the meeting took place.

29 Q. And apart from the three Presidents that you've named, who

1 else was present in that meeting?

2 A. Well, I think the other Heads of State sent representatives
3 because there were representatives in the meeting, and together
4 with my RUF brothers and the press, because the press too was
10:06:05 5 present.

6 Q. And you speak of representatives. Representatives from
7 where?

8 A. Like from Togo, and from Gambia, because those Heads of
9 States did not go but they sent their representatives.

10:06:23 10 Q. And you say members of the media were also present. Who
11 had invited them?

12 A. Well, I think it was the Government of Liberia because just
13 after the meeting, it was broadcast on the BBC.

14 Q. Who was present from the RUF at that meeting?

10:06:51 15 A. I said myself, Augustine Gbao, Jonathan Kposowa, Patrick
16 Binda, Samuel Jabba and Colonel Lion. We were the ones in the
17 meeting.

18 Q. Take us through slowly, Mr Sesay, what actually happened at
19 the meeting?

10:07:13 20 A. Well, while we were at the meeting, President Taylor spoke,
21 he greeted his brother ECOWAS members and he greeted us, and he
22 spoke about our assembly there and about the implementation of
23 the Lome Accord to return peace to Sierra Leone. And he said we
24 had had our first meeting and that was the second one and he told
10:07:50 25 - he told President Obasanjo the message that they had got from
26 Mr Sankoh and President Obasanjo said that they took the letter
27 that we give to them, but that the suggestion that Mr Sankoh gave
28 to them, they did not accept it because they said they would want
29 to know from me the outcome of the meeting. So I explained what

1 transpired in the meeting in Kono. I said some people suggested
2 Pa Rogers and others suggested Mike Lamin and some others
3 suggested me. And Obasanjo said, "We want you as interim
4 leader." And President Taylor also said, "Yes, it is Issa whom
10:08:38 5 we want." That's what happened.

6 And President Konare himself said that this time they had
7 given enough time to Mr Sankoh, that they had facilitated
8 Mr Sankoh's release from prison, he was in Lome, they had put
9 efforts together and their energy from various governments, and
10:09:02 10 they had put in their financial resources for the Lome Accord to
11 be negotiated and that they had given privileges to Mr Sankoh
12 which he abused. And he said they were not going to work with
13 Mr Sankoh and they were not going to listen to him any more, so
14 I should become the interim leader of the RUF.

10:09:25 15 Those were the discussions - those were the discussions in
16 the main conference room. So after the main conference room's
17 meeting and the delegation went outside, including the press,
18 that was when the three Heads of State entered into a small room
19 like a conference place. That's when I was invited. They sent
10:09:48 20 one of their protocol officers to invite me, to call me, so
21 I went there. They were sitting and they asked me to sit as well
22 and I did.

23 So when I sat, they said now they had got the support of
24 all their ECOWAS leaders, including President Kabbah of Sierra
10:10:12 25 Leone, and that all that they have done, President Kabbah knew of
26 it and he was supportive of it. They said now I was a young man
27 and that please I should not let them to be ashamed and that
28 I should go by whatever they told me. They said the first thing
29 was that I should arrange the return of the seized UNAMSIL

1 equipment and, two, I should work with UNAMSIL that whenever
2 UNAMSIL contacted me I should make myself available, I should
3 work with them and I should prepare myself to work with the
4 Government of Sierra Leone in respect of the implementation of
10:10:55 5 the Lome Accord.

6 They said in due course they were going to invite me for
7 another meeting, it could be in Monrovia, it could be in Mali, it
8 could be in Nigeria. And they said so they will talk to the
9 Government of Sierra Leone and the UNAMSIL and they will tell
10:11:18 10 them that we will start having meetings together with me to
11 arrange a redeployment of UNAMSIL in the RUF-controlled areas and
12 the opening of the roads. That was what I was told in that
13 closed-door meeting. So from there, the meeting ended and I was
14 brought back to the guesthouse.

10:11:45 15 Q. And from the guesthouse, where did you go?

16 A. From the guesthouse, it was the following day that
17 I returned to Sierra Leone.

18 Q. By what means?

19 A. Through the helicopter. In the evening Joe Tuah told me
10:12:07 20 that the Pa said I should be ready to return tomorrow, so the
21 President said I should be ready to go tomorrow. So whenever the
22 helicopter will be available it will come to pick me up together
23 with my colleagues.

24 So in that meeting, that closed-door meeting, they told me
10:12:25 25 that I should have a delegation of four or five people that were
26 to be based in Monrovia, that any time the ECOWAS would want to
27 contact me they would just inform those people and they in turn
28 would inform me. But if ECOWAS needed any urgent meeting they
29 will contact those people, so in fact those people would hold a

1 meeting together with ECOWAS. That was why - okay, I said okay.
2 So I appointed Kposowa and I got Gibril from Sierra Leone and
3 Macaulay and Abdul Razak. They were the ones in Monrovia as a
4 delegation that the ECOWAS had requested to be based in Monrovia.

10:13:13 5 Q. So those names were - and I'm asking you again because some
6 are missing from the record - Gibril Massaquoi; is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You mentioned Jonathan Kposowa; is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10:13:31 10 Q. Can you give us the name of the others, please?

11 A. Ken Macaulay.

12 Q. Macaulay?

13 A. Yes. And Abdul Razak.

14 Q. Is that A-B-D-U-L R-A-Z-A-K?

10:13:54 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And is Macaulay spelt M-A-C-A-U-L-L-Y?

17 A. Yes, Macaulay.

18 Q. Thank you. And those individuals you've named, where in
19 Monrovia were they based?

10:14:19 20 A. Well, those people, I rented a flat for them and I paid
21 \$5,000 per year. They were there in 2000 to early 2001 and they
22 returned to Sierra Leone.

23 Q. Where did the money come from to rent the flat?

24 A. That money was got through the mining that I did.

10:14:49 25 Q. Now, two things I want to ask you. Firstly, were you
26 appointed interim leader by Charles Taylor alone?

27 A. No, no. In fact, it was Obasanjo who brought up the idea
28 about the appointment.

29 Q. Secondly, on those trips that you made to Monrovia that

1 you've told us about, did you on any occasion return from
2 Monrovia with a consignment of arms and/or ammunition to Sierra
3 Leone?

4 A. No, not at all.

10:15:38 5 Q. I just want us to be clear about this, Mr Sesay. You've
6 told us about an occasion when you went to Monrovia regarding the
7 release of the UNAMSIL personnel. You told us of two occasions
8 when you went with regard to your appointment as interim leader.
9 On all those occasions you've told us you travelled by

10:16:02 10 helicopter. I'm going to ask you again: On any occasion when
11 you travelled by helicopter from Monrovia to Foya, were you given
12 a consignment of arms and ammunition by Charles Taylor to take
13 back with you?

14 A. No, Charles Taylor did not give me any arms or ammunition.
10:16:31 15 All of those trips that I made, he did not give me any ammunition
16 or arms.

17 Q. Now, following that meeting at Roberts International
18 Airfield you tell us that you returned by helicopter to Foya.
19 What happened when you got back to Sierra Leone?

10:16:49 20 A. Well, when I came back to Sierra Leone because I was
21 advised not to continue with any further attacks and from that
22 time even the hostilities that were between us and the government
23 in Lunsar discontinued, because they told me to stop and from
24 that time it ceased. And we were there while the government was
10:17:23 25 observing the ceasefire and we too were observing the ceasefire
26 on our own side until --

27 Q. Until when?

28 A. Until October, and I got a message from my delegation that
29 the ECOWAS - that they had got a message from President Taylor

1 that they were to have a meeting in Abuja so I should go and
2 discuss with them and if I should go with some other people to
3 join the delegation in Monrovia, so I should go. So I travelled
4 to Monrovia.

10:18:01 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: What did the witness say? He says I got
6 a message from my delegation that ECOWAS that he had got a
7 message. Who had got a message from President Taylor?

8 THE WITNESS: The delegation that was in Monrovia said they
9 had got a message from President Taylor that we were to have a
10:18:23 10 meeting, that is the RUF was to have a meeting with the
11 Government of Sierra Leone in Abuja.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. And did you go to Abuja?

14 A. No. I stopped in Monrovia. The people whom I took with me
10:18:40 15 joined the delegation in Monrovia. They were the ones who went
16 to Abuja.

17 Q. Now, I want to pause for a moment now, please, and invite
18 your attention to an exhibit.

19 Could the witness be shown exhibit D-243, please? Just
10:19:56 20 take a moment and glance at that document, please, Mr Sesay. And
21 can I ask: Have you seen this letter before?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Now, have a look at the date. 11 May 2000. In May of
24 2000, had you been appointed interim leader of the RUF?

10:20:33 25 A. No.

26 Q. 11 May 2000, help us, can you recall the date upon which
27 Mr Sankoh had been arrested?

28 A. Yes. Mr Sankoh was arrested on 8 May.

29 Q. So this letter is three days after Mr Sankoh's arrest.

1 Have a look at the second page of the letter. Do you see your
2 name at the bottom of that letter?

3 A. Yes, I've seen it.

4 Q. Now, tell me, is that the way you spell your name?

10:21:34 5 A. No. My name does not start with an E. The whole RUF wrote
6 my name with an I.

7 Q. And --

8 A. I-S-S-A, not E.

9 Q. Do you see a signature on this letter?

10:21:52 10 A. No.

11 Q. Let's just have a look at the contents of the letter. You
12 see that the letter is addressed to His Excellency Dankpannah Dr
13 Charles Ghankay Taylor. Do you see that?

14 A. Yes, I see that.

10:22:15 15 Q. President, Republic of Liberia. And it continues:

16 "Dear Mr President, in view of the developments unfolding
17 in our country, the violations of the Lome Peace Accord by the
18 United Nations, which attacked our position at Makeni, Magburaka
19 and Lunsar driving us to the current situation, the

10:22:37 20 non-compliance by President Kabbah and his government of the Lome
21 Peace Accord, refusing to appoint RUF representatives to

22 designated government positions, refusing to create a commission
23 to be chaired by the RUF, while insisting that the United Nations
24 maintain conditions creating a personal army, minus RUF

10:23:00 25 participation, by including the other factions, Kamajors, SLA,
26 AFRC, refusing to issue a diplomatic passport to our leader in
27 his capacity as Vice-President of the country, plus numerous
28 other affronts and despite repeated protests by our leader to the
29 international community, the United Nations and especially the

1 ECOWAS we have never received the slightest response, even
2 negative."

3 Do you recognise anything at all about this letter,
4 Mr Sesay?

10:23:41 5 A. No. I did not write such a letter. I did not write such a
6 letter. Because the 11th of May I was not communication with
7 mister - even before this time on 11 May and after 11 May I was
8 not in communication with Mr Taylor. It was late May that
9 Mr Taylor invited me. In fact, this time, that is 11 May,
10:24:09 10 government had just started attacking our positions. It was not
11 the UN that was attacking the RUF positions, it was the
12 Government of Sierra Leone. After the fight between the UN and
13 the RUF in Makeni Town, Magburaka, the UN withdrew to Kabala and
14 Bumbuna. It was the government, the AFRC, the Kamajors, they
10:24:34 15 were the ones attacking. It was not the UN. I did not write
16 this letter.

17 Q. Can we put that letter away now, please, and could the
18 witness now be shown exhibit D-258.

19 Now, Mr Sesay, have you seen this letter before?

10:26:06 20 A. No. I don't know this letter.

21 Q. Okay. Let's put that document away, please.

22 Could the witness now be shown exhibit P-363, please.

23 Now, you see, Mr Sesay, top right-hand corner, this is a
24 letter dated 14 January 2000. If we look at the second page, we
10:28:26 25 see that it is signed by Mr Jackson Swarray. Are you aware of
26 this document?

27 A. No. I'm not aware of it because it is not addressed to me.

28 Q. Okay. Can we put that one away, please, and can we now
29 look at exhibit D-259.

1 Now, you will see, Mr Sesay, that this document has a
2 handwritten date at the top, 21 August 2000. And we see:

3 "Press communi que issued by the Revolutionary United Front,
4 RUF, following a meeting with His Excellency Alpha Oumar Konare,
10:30:16 5 President of the Republic of Mali, and chairman of ECOWAS, His
6 Excellency Chief Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of
7 Nigeria, and His Excellency Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor,
8 President of the Republic of Liberia. Monrovia, Liberia, August
9 21, 2000.

10:30:42 10 The high command of the RUF today met with His Excellency
11 Alpha Oumar Konare, President of Mali, and chairman of ECOWAS,
12 His Excellency Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal
13 Republic of Nigeria, and His Excellency Dankpannah Dr Charles
14 Ghankay Taylor, President of the Republic of Liberia.

10:31:07 15 The meeting was sequel to the one held in Monrovia on 26
16 July 2000 and the high command's letter dated 1 August 2000 to
17 chairman Foday Sankoh on developments connected with the peace
18 process in Sierra Leone."

19 Pausing there, Mr Sesay, do you recall this press
10:31:31 20 communi que?

21 A. This press communi que, it was Gibril who wrote this one,
22 because at that time he had gone to Monrovia, I was in Sierra
23 Leone.

24 Q. Look at the second page, please. Whose signature is that?

10:32:27 25 A. Well, it looks like my signature but I'm not aware of me
26 signing this document because at the time of this communi que
27 I was not in Monrovia.

28 Q. When did the meeting at RIA take place, Mr Sesay? Can you
29 recall the date?

1 A. It was 5 August, and I returned to Sierra Leone just the
2 following day.

3 Q. Yes. That's the meeting at RIA, yes?

4 A. Yes.

10:33:08 5 Q. Now, do you know who prepared this press communique?

6 A. Yes, when Gibril and others went, because when I came to
7 Sierra Leone, in Kono, I called Gibril from Makeni and I told him
8 that himself and Abdul Razak were to join Jonathan Kposowa, Ken,
9 and others in Monrovia, to be part of the delegation in - for the
10 RUF. So that was when this press conference came about.

10:33:39

11 Q. I want to show you one other document, please. It's
12 exhibit P-538.

13 Now, Mr Sesay, have you seen this document before?

14 A. Hold on, please. Yes.

10:35:42

15 Q. Let's just have a look at the contents, please.

16 You see it's directed to His Excellency, Dr Charles G
17 Taylor, and it's dated the 14th of November 2000.

18 "The RUF family commends you and the Government of the
19 Republic of Liberia for your transparent effort rendered to a
20 peacemaking solution in Sierra Leone. Your Excellency, be
21 informed that Colonel Gibril Massaquoi is henceforth impeached
22 from the external delegation."

10:36:07

23 Pause there. Is it the case that Gibril Massaquoi was
24 impeached from the external delegation?

10:36:33

25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Was this the external delegation that you tell us that you
27 formed upon the instruction of the ECOWAS leaders?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Why was Gibril Massaquoi impeached from that external

1 delegation?

2 A. It was because Gibril was communicated with Mr Sankoh's
3 wife who was in America, the woman was called Fatou, and they
4 were pushing some documents through the internet saying that they
10:37:16 5 were my instruction, which was not the case, so - and the way he
6 was communicating over the media, we realised that he was opposed
7 to the peace process that was afoot.

8 Q. Now, where you say, "The woman was called Fatou and they
9 were pushing some documents through the internet saying they were
10:37:44 10 my instructions". What were the - what did those documents say?

11 A. Those - in fact, even before this time, these internet
12 documents that I'm talking about, some were about 2001 and
13 General Opande used to call me on my satellite phone from
14 Freetown and he said, "Young man, I have just met with you four
10:38:13 15 days ago but I have seen something over the internet, how comes",
16 something like that? And I told him I did not know about it.
17 And he used to forward the internet documents to me through my
18 secretary in Magburaka, Ali Hassan. And I told General Opande
19 that this was not from me, I did not send something like this.
10:38:33 20 And this was talking about threats to the peace process that I,
21 General Issa, would never disarm the RUF whilst Foday Sankoh was
22 behind bars, which means it was going contrary to what the ECOWAS
23 had told me and what I had accepted. So it was a direct opposite
24 of what the ECOWAS had told me and what was on the internet.

10:39:04 25 Q. Let's go back to the letter.

26 JUDGE DOHERTY: What exactly does "impeach" mean?

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. What does "impeach" mean, Mr Sesay?

29 A. Well, that he was removed from the delegation.

1 Q. Go back to the letter, please.

2 "His Excellency Sir Gibril is replaced by Colonel Jonathan
3 Kposowa, a vanguard and a college graduate. Your Excellency,
4 Colonel Kposowa has held numerous positions in the RUF since the
10:39:51 5 struggle. He served as adjutant general, now chief of
6 administration. The entire RUF hopes you call on Colonel Kposowa
7 for all external discussions and not Colonel Gibril. Effective
8 the date above."

9 And it continues, "That Kposowa what would reside in
10:40:14 10 Monrovia, as usual, with the entire delegation of seven."

11 And then we see - is that your signature?

12 A. Yes, this is my signature.

13 Q. And this stamp that we see there, Mr Sesay, when did the
14 RUF Sierra Leone start using that stamp?

10:40:39 15 A. It was in the year 2000 that I started using this stamp.
16 That was after my appointment, I started using stamp for the
17 first time.

18 Q. Now, moving on, following your appointment as interim
19 leader, Mr Sesay, from then until the end of that year, 2000, how
10:41:13 20 did things progress so far as the disarmament process is
21 concerned?

22 A. Well, from the meeting in August 2000, the fighting ceased
23 between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF and there were no
24 longer attacking our position based on the advice of the ECOWAS.
10:41:40 25 And from that, the route from that, things were then calm, beside
26 the one or two or more raids that took place between the Kamajors
27 and us, like areas around Kono and Kailahun, and that was the
28 situation that prevailed until October, when we had the Abuja I.

29 So things progressed from August to the end of the year.

1 The peace was really on track. And from that August, that was
2 the final moments that actually took the route to peace, that was
3 when fighting and every other thing ceased and we went into pure
4 di sarmament.

10:42:35 5 Q. What was Abuja I?

6 A. Abuja I was a discussion between the Government of Sierra
7 Leone and the RUF in respect of implementation of the Lome Peace
8 Accord.

9 Q. And did you attend that meeting?

10:42:57 10 A. Well, I did not attend but I sent my delegation.

11 Q. Who were the members of that delegation?

12 A. Well, those who went, Jonathan Kposowa was the head of the
13 delegation. It included Patrick Binda, Madam Jamba Goba, Eddie
14 Kanneh, Patrick Binda, Gibril Massaquoi, Ken Macaulay. Those are
10:43:41 15 the ones who went.

16 Q. Madam, what was the surname?

17 A. Madam Jamba Goba, sister of --

18 Q. Sister of who?

19 A. Sister of Jande, the late Foday Sankoh's girlfriend. They
10:44:00 20 were the same family. Madam Jamba Goba. And Madam Jamba Goba
21 was the head of the RUF --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, that last word was not
23 clear to the interpreters.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:44:13 25 Q. She was the head of the RUF what?

26 A. She was the head of the RUF primary schools, the free
27 primary schools in Kailahun and the other districts where the RUF
28 had established schools.

29 Q. Can you help us with the spelling of her name, please?

1 A. J-A-M-B-A, Jamba. Goba is the same as in Jande Goba.

2 Q. I think we've had that spelling before. Who called that
3 meeting in Abuja?

4 A. It was the ECOWAS leaders.

10:45:03 5 Q. And then in 2001, what was happening throughout that
6 period?

7 A. Well, in 2001, we had a second meeting in Abuja also, and
8 that was labelled Abuja II, and I also sent a delegation there.

9 And from that meeting, the two groups agreed, based on the

10:45:43 10 request of the ECOWAS, to bring about a tripartite meeting, and
11 that the tripartite meeting was to decide the fate of disarmament
12 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF.

13 Q. Clarification of a couple of things, please. Firstly, when
14 did Abuja II take place?

10:46:09 15 A. In May 2001.

16 Q. Secondly, you say the two groups agreed. Which two groups?

17 A. The two groups were the Government of Sierra Leone and the
18 RUF, they agreed based on the request of the ECOWAS, the ECOWAS
19 guarantors, on the creation of a tripartite meeting and the start

10:46:42 20 of disarmament, that was in May 2001, which was labelled Abuja
21 II.

22 Q. And this tripartite meeting, who was to attend it?

23 A. The tripartite meeting was between the SRSG, the special
24 representative of the secretary general who chaired it, members

10:47:10 25 of the United Nations Force were to attend, UNAMSIL, the
26 Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and the press.

27 Q. And did that meeting take place?

28 A. Yes. After the Abuja II, we had the first meeting about
29 the introduction of the tripartite meeting, Mammy Yoko in

1 Freetown. I sent a delegation to attend the meeting. And from
2 there, the tripartite meeting started. And I had tripartite
3 meeting in the different districts. I can say almost all the
4 districts - the tripartite meetings took place in almost all the
10:48:02 5 districts.

6 Q. And throughout 2001, Mr Sesay, were there any hostilities?

7 A. No, there were no hostilities. It was peacetime. Starting
8 from August till disarmament, there were no hostilities. It was
9 from August 2000 to May 2001, and it all continued. We continued
10:48:35 10 with the tripartite meetings, and during the meetings, we always
11 discussed, and it was the SRSG who chaired the meetings. And
12 during the discussion, the government suggested to - suggested to
13 start disarmament in southern districts and the RUF also would
14 suggest the disarmament in certain districts, and maybe if the
10:49:00 15 government said they were disarming in --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
17 to slow down that area.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Let's go back.

10:49:13 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, a tripartite meeting is a
21 meeting between three parties, I would imagine. That's what
22 tripartite means, but who are the three parties, especially?

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Who were the parties who attended these tripartite
10:49:30 25 meetings, Mr Sesay?

26 A. My Lord, UNAMSIL, the Government of Sierra Leone, and the
27 RUF.

28 Q. And I think you also said that the special representative
29 of the security - of the Secretary-General also attended. Is

1 that correct?

2 A. Yes. He was the head of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, so he
3 used to chair the meetings.

4 Q. What's his name?

10:50:00 5 A. Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji.

6 Q. That name is on the record. Now, throughout this period,
7 Mr Sesay, from August 2000 to the end of 2001, what areas did the
8 RUF control?

9 A. The RUF controlled parts of Port Loko District. The RUF
10:50:39 10 controlled the whole of Kambia District. The RUF controlled part
11 of Koinadugu District. The RUF controlled the whole of Bombali
12 District. The RUF controlled 90 per cent of Tonkolili District.
13 The RUF controlled the whole of Kono District. The RUF
14 controlled about 40 per cent of Kenema District. The RUF
10:51:04 15 controlled 90 per cent of Kailahun District.

16 Q. Now, in Kono District, during that time, Mr Sesay, was
17 mining being conducted?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And who controlled that mining?

10:51:27 20 A. It was myself.

21 Q. And what happened to the diamonds that were discovered?

22 A. Well, the diamonds, I used to sell them and we used that
23 for the welfare of the RUF. And I did expenditures on behalf of
24 the RUF, the transformation of the RUF. The welfare of the RUF
10:51:57 25 in terms of food, medication, buying of vehicles, renting
26 political party houses. And it was even responsible for some of
27 the RUF commanders. I bought power saws and we were we sawing
28 boards, we distributed those to various secondary schools. And
29 even the schools, we supported the education.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: You were sawing what?

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Boards.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, what are those?

4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, boards, as in b-o-a-r-d.

10:52:50 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you mean timber?

6 THE INTERPRETER: Timber, your Honours.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. And just briefly for now, Mr Sesay, to whom were the
9 diamonds being sold?

10:53:06 10 A. Well, I sold the diamonds to Louis and Michel in October
11 2000, when I - they provided four satellite phones and two
12 computers and they handed over to me the remaining money and from
13 that money Ibrahim Bah had to take some of that money. And also
14 I used to sell to some Maraka men in Kono who was in Kono --

10:53:44 15 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the name of the Maraka man
16 was not clear to the interpreter.

17 THE WITNESS:

18 Q. We need to go over some of what you said, Mr Sesay. You
19 used to sell some to the Maraka men in Kono. Did you give a name
10:54:03 20 of the man? What's his name?

21 A. I said Alhaji Bakorie.

22 Q. How do you spell the surname?

23 A. B-A-K-O-R-I-E.

24 Q. And you were going on after you'd mentioned his name to say
10:54:25 25 some other things. What else were you saying?

26 A. Yes. I said I was doing business with another Pa who was
27 called Alhaji Modebor. He was living in Kenema on Sesay Street.
28 He was a Gambian. He used to come from --

29 Q. He used to come from there?

1 A. He used to come from Kenema. At any time I asked him to
2 come he will use an XL motorbike and his runner would ride him -
3 I will move from Kono and he will come from Kenema and we would
4 meet in Segbwema and we transacted business there and I would
10:55:07 5 tell him list of items that I needed.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could we have the name of this second
7 Alhaji?

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I'll come back to it.

9 Q. The Gambian who lived in Kissy Street, what's his name?

10:55:27 10 A. Sesay Street. He was called Alhaji Modebor.

11 Q. First of all, how do you spell the name of the street?

12 A. It's the same as in my surname, Sesay.

13 Q. And how do you spell Alhaji's second name?

14 A. M-O-D-E-B-O-R.

10:55:54 15 Q. I now want to pause for a bit, Mr Sesay.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness said some of the proceeds had
17 to go to Ibrahim Bah. Why did the proceeds have to go to Ibrahim
18 Bah?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. I said there was a time I did
10:56:20 20 business through Ibrahim Bah who brought Michel and the other guy
21 to Monrovia. They bought the diamonds from me. So the money was
22 to be handed over to Ibrahim Bah, but Ibrahim Bah duped me. He
23 took part of the money.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:56:39 25 Q. How much money?

26 A. Ibrahim Bah took about \$60,000. But he said he was going
27 to give me the money but until the time of disarmament he did not
28 give me the money.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. We had served some photographs on the

1 Prosecution and the Court, DP-280 through to DP-284. Can I ask
2 whether your Honours have them to hand?

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Were these in some folder that were
4 circulated or what?

10:57:40 5 MR GRIFFITHS: They were. They look like this.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Are these Prosecution documents or
7 Defence documents?

8 MR GRIFFITHS: They are Defence documents which were served
9 a couple of weeks ago. Can I inquire whether the Prosecution
10:57:59 10 have copies of them?

11 MR KOUMJIAN: Yes.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm afraid the judges don't appear to
13 have these documents, no.

14 MS IRURA: Your Honour, Court Management does not appear to
10:58:35 15 have been served with a copy of those photographs, and we usually
16 receive the copies for the judges as well as their legal officer.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, in view of the time, we
18 could break now for our usual mid-morning break while you sort
19 this matter out and hopefully we will have copies at the end of
10:59:04 20 the tea break. We will adjourn for 30 minutes and reconvene at
21 half past 11.

22 [Break taken at 10.59 a.m.]

23 [Upon resuming at 11.30 a.m.]

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue, Mr Griffiths.

11:30:25 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, can I first mention a
26 change in representation? I have now been joined by Ms Logan
27 Hambrick and Ms Fatiah Bal fas.

28 Your Honours should now have five photographs, DP-280
29 through to DP-284. Could the witness be shown these photographs

1 please?

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I might be mistaken but I
3 think we don't have the serial numbers. You might have to refer
4 to the tab number before us. These photographs have not been
11:31:08 5 stamped with any serial number.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. It might be easiest, then, if I deal
7 with them in the order in which your Honour has them in the
8 bundle. Can we look, first of all, please, behind divider 1.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Why do we have such a feedback?

11:32:00 10 MS IRURA: Your Honour, I have been advised it is as a
11 result of lead counsel's two microphones being on, but one has
12 been switched off now.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

14 Q. Can we first of all look at the photograph behind divider
11:32:24 15 1, please.

16 Mr Sesay, do you recognise the building shown in that
17 photograph?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What do we see in that photograph?

11:32:42 20 A. It is a house.

21 Q. Whose house?

22 A. This was the house where Sam Bockarie was in Buedu.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: What does he mean by "where Sam Bockarie
24 was in Buedu"?

11:33:05 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Who lived in this house?

27 A. It was where Sam Bockarie lived.

28 Q. Can you help us as to when he took up residence in this
29 house?

1 A. Well, he took up residence in this house first in January
2 1997, because from the time the Kamajors and the government
3 soldiers started attacking us in Giema. He left Giema and he
4 came and put up at this house. So after this the Sierra Leone
11:34:04 5 government was overthrown in May. He met me in Giema and he went
6 to Freetown, and later I joined him from Daru.

7 Q. Go on?

8 A. And we withdraw - after he - after the intervention and he
9 retreated to Kailahun, that is from Kenema to Kailahun, it was at
11:34:26 10 this house that he lived from February 1998 to December 1999.

11 Q. Thank you. Could we look at the photograph now behind
12 divider 2, please.

13 What are we looking at in this photograph, Mr Sesay?

14 A. This picture, it's a house.

11:35:09 15 Q. Whose house is it? Do you recognise it?

16 A. It is the same house that we're talking about. This is the
17 side of the house.

18 Q. And behind divider 3, please. Again, same process, what
19 are we looking at in this photograph?

11:35:51 20 A. It's a house.

21 Q. Yes, which house?

22 A. This is in Buedu. I lived here, opposite that other house.

23 Q. So what we see behind divider 3 is your house, is that
24 right?

11:36:10 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And when did you live in that house?

27 A. I lived in this house from late February 1998 to - because
28 I was there till late April, after I returned from Monrovia.

29 Bockarie sent me to Pendembu, my family was there, and I also

1 used to visit there. And my family --

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Of which year?

3 THE WITNESS: 1998. 1998, my Lord. When I returned from
4 Monrovia my family continued to live there until December 1998,
11:37:00 5 and I went on the attack in Kono, but my family was there and I
6 returned. After I was attacked in Makeni, I was there again from
7 April of '99 to October of '99. And, finally my family left the
8 house from December 1999.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:37:28 10 Q. And where was this house in relation to the house you
11 identified earlier as being Sam Bockarie's house?

12 A. They were opposite each other. It was only the street that
13 separated them.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: If I may inquire, Mr Sesay, was this your
11:37:51 15 personal house? Did you own this house?

16 THE WITNESS: No, I did not own the house.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. How did you come to occupy it?

19 A. Well, when I withdrew - when I retreated to Kailahun in
11:38:13 20 late February 1998, it was Sam Bockarie who said I should stay in
21 this house. That was opposite his own house where he was. But
22 these houses belonged to a civilian Pa. Later I came to know
23 that he was Chief Norman's elder brother, Pa Albert. He was the
24 one who owned those two houses.

11:38:37 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: And were you renting these houses from
26 this person or what was the arrangement?

27 THE WITNESS: My Lord, the owner of these houses was not in
28 the area, he was in the Bo District at that time.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, but that doesn't answer my question.

1 Were you renting these houses or what was the arrangement?

2 THE WITNESS: My Lord, you can rent a house when the house
3 has an owner that you know, but there was no owner that was
4 around. So because there was nobody there, and also Sam Bockarie
11:39:13 5 told me to stay there.

6 In Makeni, when I wanted a house to rent there was an
7 owner, and I rented a place for three years where I was in
8 Makeni. But most of the houses in Kailahun, the owners were not
9 there, my Lord. From '91 most of them fled Kailahun.

11:39:28 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: And was that the same with Bockarie's
11 house; he, too, was living in someone else's house?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said it was the same Pa who
13 owned both houses.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:39:45 15 Q. Now, can we have a look behind divider 4, please.

16 Now, again, Mr Sesay, what do we see in this photograph?

17 A. That is the same house where I was.

18 Q. And, finally, can we look behind divider 5, please.

19 What are we looking at here?

11:40:40 20 A. This is Buedu Town.

21 Q. And do you recognise any of the buildings shown in this
22 photograph?

23 A. No, I don't recognise any of these houses, because, like
24 this, sign - inscription, this was written after the war.

11:41:15 25 Q. Now, help me with one thing, Mr Sesay, and it's this; where
26 were arms and ammunition stored in Buedu?

27 A. Where? We had the G4 store. At the same time Sam Bockarie
28 also used to store in that shop room - in that door that you saw
29 by the bedroom, that is where he stored the ammunition.

1 Q. Let's go back to the photograph behind divider 1 please.

2 Now, earlier you identified this building as being Sam
3 Bockarie's house. You are now telling us that arms and
4 ammunition were stored in this house. Where in this house?

11:42:20 5 A. This - we can't see that.

6 Q. Well, you will have to change seats momentarily. And then
7 if you could put point to where you say arms and ammunition were
8 kept in this house. Now, you have got to point on the screen, Mr
9 Sesay. On the flat screen in front of you.

11:42:48 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness has pointed to the large door
11 on the right-hand side of the building.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: The large double doors with what appears to
13 be a sign in the top left-hand corner. Yes, you can --

14 Q. Whilst you are there, Mr Sesay, let me ask you this; you
11:43:10 15 told us that Bockarie had a radio set. Where was the radio set
16 kept?

17 A. Where the radio set was kept, the radio set, when the
18 operators were off for the day they would take it to their
19 houses, but when they were on duty there were times like during
11:43:39 20 the day they would be at the barri, that is this road leading
21 down this way, this road. In the evening they would come here
22 and they will install the radio set and they will connect the
23 antenna up here. The radios had to be here.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: The witness is indicating to the right of
11:44:00 25 the building on what appears to be a veranda, adjacent to which
26 is a short wall painted green.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Actually, it is in front, right in front
28 of the double door that he pointed to before.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. So that's where the radio would be, is that right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And go to the photograph behind divider 2 now, please.

11:44:45

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't understand. Did this radio -
5 where was this radio stored, say, during the night?

6 THE WITNESS: It was a Thompson set. At night the
7 operators would take it to their houses wherever they were.
8 Because they had their own houses where they stayed.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:45:03

10 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, you mentioned in your earlier answer,
11 "During the day, they would be at the barri, that is the road
12 leading down this way". Okay.

13 Look again at the photograph behind divider 2, please.

11:45:31

14 Now, you have earlier identified the building as being Sam
15 Bockarie's house and we can see the double doors you indicated
16 earlier. Can we, in this photograph, see the barri where the
17 radio was kept during the day?

11:45:55

18 A. No, you cannot see the barri, because you will pass this
19 house and another house. The barri was at the back of these
20 trees, by the same road. There are two houses in between this
21 house and the barri.

22 Q. I don't know if there are any further questions before I
23 move on from these photographs.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: None from the judges.

11:46:28

25 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I, therefore, ask, please, that these
26 photographs be marked for identification. I think it should be
27 MFI-4. And could I ask that they be numbered MFI-4A, B, C, D and
28 E, please.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, they are so marked MFI-4A, B, C, D

1 and E accordingly. I think there are five photographs.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Five photographs.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:47:10 5 Q. Mr Sesay, before I forget, you indicated when you described
6 the radio as a Thompson, you made a gesture, what were you
7 suggesting? You made a gesture like this.

8 A. The radio - the Thompson radio set had a kit bag like a
9 backpack that you strap on your back. You strap it on your back.

11:47:41 10 These straps would be on your two shoulders, so you move it like
11 a backpack. That's how it was.

12 Q. We can put those photographs away please.

13 Now, I want us to deal with a few discrete topics. First
14 of all this: Taking things slowly, Mr Sesay, at the start of the
11:48:19 15 war in Sierra Leone, what was the command structure of the RUF?

16 A. Well, we had the leader, that was Mr Sankoh. We had
17 Mohamed Tarawalli, who was the field commander. Then we had John
18 Kargbo, he was the battle group, because initially Rashid was the
19 battle group, but because Mr Sankoh detained him, he replaced him
11:49:08 20 with late John Kargbo as battle group commander.

21 Q. Rashid who?

22 A. Rashid Mansaray.

23 Q. Now, did there come a time when that command structure
24 changed?

11:49:28 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. First of all, when did that change occur?

27 A. That was around April/May of 2002, during the confusion
28 between the NPFL and the RUF.

29 Q. Mr Sesay, can I interrupt you and ask you: You said,

1 "During the 'confrontation' between the NPFL and the RUF," and
2 you said 2002.

3 A. That was a mistake. That was 1992. I said around April
4 and May 1992, during the confrontation between the NPFL and the
11:50:27 5 RUF. So Mr Sankoh accused John Kargbo of supporting the NPFL
6 because Mr Sankoh had said that John Kargbo could not take action
7 against the NPFL, so he replaced him and he appointed Isaac
8 Mongor as the acting battle group - Isaac Mongor as the acting
9 battle group, yes.

11:50:58 10 Q. Now, that change in April/May 1992, was there any further
11 change after that?

12 A. Yes. When the ULIMO finally pushed Rashid and others from
13 Pujehun District and they were advancing to occupy Lofa, Rashid
14 came to Kailahun with some of the RUF from Pujehun, and Foday
11:51:39 15 Sankoh appointed him - he reinstated him as battle group
16 commander.

17 Q. When was that?

18 A. That was around June/July 1992.

19 Q. And the Rashid who came to Kailahun, Rashid who?

11:52:08 20 A. Rashid Mansaray. I cannot recall the specific month now.

21 Q. Now, that arrangement, how long did that last?

22 A. That lasted from the time Rashid was reinstated by Foday
23 Sankoh in '92 as battle group - it lasted until around October of
24 1993, when Foday Sankoh gave order for Rashid -

11:52:47 25 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness kindly be
26 asked to complete his answer?

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. When Foday Sankoh gave order for Rashid to do what?

29 A. For Rashid to be executed, because Mr Sankoh arrested him

1 and he confessed to Mr Sankoh that, yes, he recruited some men in
2 the RUF and he had a link with a colonel in the army and they
3 were to join together to overthrow the RUF, and that colonel
4 should have used his own group from the Sierra Leone Army and the
11:53:31 5 RUF to carry on with their mission.

6 Q. And was Rashid Mansaray executed at that time?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And who replaced him?

9 A. Well, from that October there was no battle group until
11:53:52 10 December 1993, when Mr Sankoh appointed Sam Bockarie as battle
11 group commander before they left to go and establish the Zogoda
12 Jungle at the Kambo Hills.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, the what hills?

14 THE WITNESS: Kambo Hills, your Honours, Kambo forests,
11:54:22 15 Kambo Hills.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. How do you spell Kambo?

18 A. I think it is K-A-M-B-O.

19 Q. Now, that situation with Sam Bockarie as battle group
11:54:40 20 commander, did that situation remain unchanged or what?

21 A. Yes, it changed.

22 Q. When did it change?

23 A. It changed in 1995, after Mohamed Tarawalli captured -
24 after Mohamed Tarawalli and Superman captured Sierra Rutile,
11:55:10 25 Mr Sankoh instructed Mohamed Tarawalli to advance and create the
26 Western Jungle. So he dispatched Sam Bockarie from around Zogoda
27 in Bandawor to move Mongor and take command in Sierra Rutile
28 before Superman would go. So Sam Bockarie came to Sierra
29 Rutile --

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pause, Mr Interpreter, I am going to ask
2 you to please - Mr Interpreter.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour.

4 HER HONOUR: I am going to ask you to speak clearly.

11:55:43 5 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour. Sorry, your Honour.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: I know the witness is speaking fast, but
7 we need you to speak clearly for us to understand what you are
8 saying. If the witness is speaking too fast, simply ask us to
9 have him slow down. We cannot have both you and the witness
11:56:03 10 running.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, your Honours.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, you were telling us that the situation
14 changed in 1995. Just go over that answer again for me, please.

11:56:13 15 A. Yes. I said it changed in '95, after the capture of Sierra
16 Rutile. That was Mohamed Tarawalli and Superman who captured
17 there. So Mr Sankoh sent Sam Bockarie to go and take command at
18 Sierra Rutile while Mohamed and Superman were to go and create a
19 jungle, that is the Western Jungle. So Sam Bockarie went to
11:56:42 20 Sierra Rutile. He was the commander there. But he killed, I
21 think, one or two RUF fighters, and Mr Sankoh invited him and he
22 changed - he replaced him and he demoted him from major to staff
23 sergeant, and he was sent to the training base for advanced
24 training.

11:57:10 25 Q. So who took over his position?

26 A. Nobody. From that time, for the whole of '95 to November
27 1996, there was no the battle group.

28 Q. Then what happened in November 1996?

29 A. In November '96, when Foday Sankoh came from Ivory Coast to

1 Kailahun in Giema, that was the time he reinstated Sam Bockarie
2 as battle group commander.

3 Q. And to whom was Sam Bockarie responsible as battle group
4 commander?

11:58:01 5 A. I don't understand the question.

6 Q. Who was above Sam Bockarie in his role as battle group
7 commander?

8 A. He reported to the leader, because at this time the field
9 commander also wasn't there, in this November, the field
10 commander too wasn't there.

11:58:27

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: "Wasn't" or "was in"?

12

13 THE WITNESS: "Wasn't", your Honours.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:58:36

15 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, that situation with Sam Bockarie as battle
16 group commander, for how long did that last?

17 A. Bockarie was battle group commander from November 1996 to
18 March 1997, when Mr Sankoh appointed him as field commander. So
19 from October of '96 to March of '97, there was no field
20 commander.

11:59:16

21 Q. Now, which was the higher position, battle group commander
22 or battlefield commander?

23 A. Well, first, it was the battle group. When we were in
24 Naama that was what Foday Sankoh made us to know. That is after
25 him, the leader, it was Rashid Mansaray and after Rashid Mansaray
26 was Mohamed Tarawalli, he was the battle group. So first it was
27 the battle group, but around '92 he changed that. It became the
28 field commander and from field commander to battle group, from
29 battle group to battalion commanders and down to unit commanders.

11:59:37

1 Q. Now, when Bockarie, in March 1997, was appointed field
2 commander, again, to whom was he answerable?

3 A. He reported to the leader, Mr Sankoh.

4 Q. For how long did that situation stay that way, with
12:00:26 5 Bockarie as battlefield commander?

6 A. Well, that situation from March 1997 continued to late May
7 of 1997.

8 Q. And what --

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, when the witness answered
12:00:47 10 it became the field battle commander and from field commander to
11 battle group, what does that mean? Does he mean that the
12 nomenclature changed but the position remained the same, or what
13 does he mean?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Let's inquire:

12:01:08 15 Q. Mr Sesay, when Bockarie's position changed from battle
16 group commander to battlefield commander, did his
17 responsibilities remain the same?

18 A. Yes. He did the same job.

19 Q. So what was - was there a difference between battle group
12:01:35 20 commander and battlefield commander?

21 A. Yes, because in the RUF, starting from '92 - 1992, the
22 field commander was the senior person for the battle group.
23 Field commander was a superior commander to the battle group.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: That sounds to me like there were two
12:02:02 25 distinct positions, one called the battlefield commander and,
26 probably subordinate to that, the battle group commander. Am I
27 correct?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, let's ask the witness:

29 Q. Were they two different positions, Mr Sesay?

1 A. Yes, my Lord, that's true.

2 Q. And which was the senior position?

3 A. Battlefield. Battlefield commander was senior to battle
4 group commander.

12:02:32 5 Q. Before Bockarie took up that position in March 1997, had
6 there been a battlefield commander?

7 A. No. Starting from October 1996 to March 1997, there was no
8 battlefield commander. He had been missing in action, and that
9 was Mohamed Tarawali.

12:03:06 10 Q. So prior to Bockarie being elevated to that position, the
11 battlefield commander had been Mohamed Tarawali; is that right?

12 A. Yes. From 1991 to October 1996, Mohamed Tarawali was the
13 battlefield commander.

14 Q. And then you have told us that from October '96 until April
12:03:31 15 '97 the position was vacant until Bockarie was appointed by
16 Mr Sankoh; is that right?

17 A. March '97.

18 Q. Now, when Bockarie was so appointed, was a new battle group
19 commander appointed at that time?

12:03:56 20 A. Yes, Mr Sankoh appointed me.

21 Q. Now that situation with Bockarie as battlefield commander
22 and you as battle group commander, how long did things stay that
23 way?

24 A. Well, that remained that way until March of 1998 when
12:04:25 25 Johnny Paul promoted Sam Bockarie to chief of defence staff, and
26 then Sam Bockarie asked me to act as battlefield commander and he
27 appointed Superman as battle group commander.

28 Q. Now that new situation with Bockarie as chief of defence
29 staff, you as acting battlefield commander and Superman as battle

1 group commander, for how long did things stay that way?

2 A. It remained that way until - I think until around May or
3 June of 1999 because when Mr Sankoh was taken to Lome he was in
4 Lome when he told Sam Bockarie that he did not recognise the
12:05:32 5 position of chief of defence staff for him. He said he only
6 recognised Sam Bockarie as field commander for the RUF.

7 Q. And so what did Sankoh do as a result of that?

8 A. Well, Sankoh considered Sam Bockarie as field commander for
9 the RUF and me - I as the battle group. So Sam Bockarie too
12:06:05 10 resigned in the middle of December and Mr Sankoh appointed me in
11 December 1999.

12 Q. Appointed you as what?

13 A. As battlefield commander.

14

12:06:20 15 Q. So in December 1999, when Bockarie resigned, you took over
16 as battlefield commander; is that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And in December 1999 did someone replace you as battle
19 group commander?

12:06:41 20 A. Well, in December, no, there was no battle group. It was
21 in January that Mr Sankoh appointed Morris Kallon as battle group
22 commander. It was in January 2000.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: In December 1999 when the witness says
24 Bockarie resigned, did this resignation also apply to his
12:07:04 25 position as chief of defence staff?

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Let's go back, Mr Sesay. You told us a moment ago that
28 whilst in Lome, Sankoh said he did not recognise the position of
29 chief of defence staff. He only recognised the position of

1 battlefield commander. Do you remember telling us that?

2 A. Yes, I recall.

3 Q. So what consequence did that have in terms of Bockarie's
4 title?

12:07:40 5 A. Well, Mr Sankoh said he did not recognise that and indeed
6 he said he did not recognise Bockarie as chief of defence staff.
7 He said he only recognised Bockarie as battlefield commander for
8 the RUF.

9 Q. And did Bockarie's title change as a result of that?

12:08:01 10 A. Yes, because Mr Sankoh used to call him battlefield
11 commander. So, when Mr Sankoh came in October to downtown
12 Freetown, and that was in 1999, in about one or two months' time
13 Sam Bockarie started getting problems with Mr Sankoh. So he
14 decided to leave the RUF. That was the reason why, when Bockarie
12:08:29 15 left the RUF, Mr Sankoh did not appoint any other person as chief
16 of defence staff. I was the one that he appointed as battlefield
17 commander. He said that was the position he gave to Sam Bockarie
18 and that was the position he recognised. He said he did not have
19 any position like a chief of defence staff in the RUF.

12:08:52 20 Q. Thank you. Now, when have then a situation in December
21 1999 when you're battlefield commander, in succession to Sam
22 Bockarie. Then you tell us early in 2000 Morris Kallon was
23 appointed as battle group commander; is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

12:09:16 25 Q. Now the situation with you as battlefield commander and
26 Kallon as battle group commander, for how long did things stay
27 that way?

28 A. Well, it remained that way up till May - May, June, July -
29 it continued until July/August when the ECOWAS leaders asked me

1 to serve as interim leader, August 2000.

2 Q. Now when you were appointed interim leader in August 2000
3 did you appoint someone as battlefield commander?

4 A. Yes.

12:10:12 5 Q. Who was that?

6 A. That was Superman.

7 Q. And at that time who was battle group commander?

8 A. It was Morris Kallon.

9 Q. Now the situation with you as interim leader, Superman as
12:10:32 10 battlefield commander and Kallon as battle group commander, for
11 how long did things stay that way?

12 A. Well, that continued until August 2000 - from August 2000
13 up to February 2001 when Superman said that he was leaving the
14 RUF. So he resigned and left the RUF and went. So, since that

12:11:04 15 time, it was Kallon who served as field commander.

16 Q. And when Kallon moved into the position vacated by
17 Superman, did someone take Kallon's role as battle group
18 commander?

19 A. Yes, it was Kailondo.

12:11:29 20 Q. And the situation with you as interim leader, Kallon as
21 battlefield commander and Kailondo as battle group commander, for
22 how long did things remain that way?

23 A. Well, it remained that way until - until the disarmament
24 concluded - until the disarmament concluded on 19 January 2002
12:12:06 25 because 19 January 2002 was the last date for disarmament. In
26 fact, that was the day that I too disarmed.

27 Q. Now a few more matters on this issue of the command
28 structure of the RUF. In Camp Naama what rank did Sam Bockarie
29 have?

1 A. He had no rank.

2 Q. When Bockarie was first promoted, to what rank was he
3 promoted?

12:13:03

4 A. At first it was as a lieutenant in 1992. And after the
5 conflict with the Liberians, Mr Sankoh made him a target
6 commander and all of us together with him crossed the Moa River
7 and when we went to Kono, Mr Sankoh promoted him to a captain.

8 Q. And when was his next promotion?

12:13:44

9 A. From the rank of captain, the next promotion was in
10 December 1993 as a major in Giema - no, he appointed him as
11 battle group, but his promotion as major was given to him in June
12 of 1994 and in Giema he appointed him as battle group in December
13 '93. So he promoted him to a major rank in June 1994.

14 Q. Did he remain a major?

12:14:17

15 A. No. He became major in '94, and up to early '95. From
16 then he demoted him again to a sergeant and, when he made him
17 sergeant, he sent him to Peyima later as that as battalion
18 commander and he promoted him again to a captain and he was
19 serving under Matthew Kennedy Sesay. He was the target commander
20 at Peyima Jungle and he became captain from around mid '95 to
21 October '96 - up to November '96 and Mr Sankoh again re-promoted
22 him again to a major from - when he was re-promoted to a major in
23 '96, Mr Sankoh again promoted him in March 1997 to a colonel.

24 Q. And did he remain a colonel?

12:15:29

25 A. Yes, he became a colonel until March of '98 when Johnny
26 Paul promoted him to a brigadier, a brigadier general.

27 Q. And did he receive any further promotions thereafter?

28 A. Yes, in December 1999 Johnny Paul promoted him to a two
29 star major general.

1 Q. When did Johnny Paul do that?

2 A. That was in December '99.

3 Q. Now, did he remain a two star general?

4 A. Yes, until he left the RUF.

12:16:24 5 Q. For how long was he a two star general?

6 A. Well, from December - it was for a year; from December '98
7 to December '99.

8 Q. So let me ask you then: When did he receive the promotion
9 to a two star general, which year?

12:16:55 10 A. That was in '98.

11 Q. I ask because earlier you said it was December 1999. Is
12 December 1999 the correct date or what?

13 A. December '98 is the correct date.

14 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, were any of those promotions made by Charles
12:17:29 15 Taylor?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Is it the case that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia on one
18 occasion and returned to Sierra Leone telling everyone that he
19 had been promoted to a two star general position by Charles
12:17:54 20 Taylor?

21 A. No, no. It was after Kono, Makeni had fallen. That was
22 when Johnny Paul had promoted him.

23 Q. Putting Johnny Paul to one side, who was responsible within
24 the RUF for promotions?

12:18:18 25 A. Well, it was Sam Bockarie - I mean, it was Mr Sankoh but in
26 the absence of Mr Sankoh, he - because he had been arrested in
27 Nigeria, it was Johnny Paul who was responsible in '97 and '98.
28 And after Johnny Paul it was only Sam Bockarie who promoted other
29 RUF members, because he promoted me, Mike Lamin, Peter Vandi,

1 Isaac Mongor, Morris Kallon, Superman. So he used to promote all
2 the other ranks.

3 Q. I now want to come to you, having now dealt with Sam
4 Bockarie. When you were in Camp Naama, what rank did you have?

12:19:06 5 A. I hadn't a rank.

6 Q. Who gave you your first promotion?

7 A. My first promotion, I was recommended by Mohamed Tarawalli
8 to Mr Sankoh and it was then that he promoted me to a lieutenant.

9 Q. When?

12:19:29 10 A. It was in 1992.

11 Q. When was your next promotion?

12 A. In 1993. In 1993, in December of '93 Mr Sankoh promoted me
13 to a captain. That was the time he left me at the Koindu border
14 with Liberia.

12:19:52 15 Q. For how long did you remain a captain?

16 A. I remained as captain from December '93 to June '94.

17 Q. And did you receive a further promotion in June '94?

18 A. Yes, in June '94, Mr Sankoh promoted me to a major and he
19 appointed me as area commander for Kailahun. So he instructed me
12:20:18 20 to move from the Koindu area and to come and be based in Giema.

21 That was in June '94.

22 Q. For how long did you remain a major?

23 A. I remained as major from June '94 to November - I remained
24 as major from June '94 to - from June '94 to July 1995, but I

12:20:52 25 became area commander from June '94 to November '94 - I mean,

26 November '95, sorry. June '94 to November '95. I served as area
27 commander in Kailahun. So I went for a medical treatment in the
28 Ivory Coast and it was then that Mr Sankoh appointed Peter Vandi
29 as area commander. So when I --

1 Q. Go on.

2 A. So when I returned from the Ivory Coast I was under
3 investigation because I returned from Ivory Coast in April and,
4 in May I went to Zogoda. I was under investigations until July.

12:21:38 5 When the investigation ended I was demoted to a captain.

6 Q. And did you remain a captain thereafter?

7 A. Yes, I remained a captain from July until November '96 I
8 was captain.

9 Q. And then what happened to you in November 1996?

12:21:59 10 A. Well, when Mr Sankoh visited Giema, he reinstated Sam
11 Bockarie that very morning, and that was the very morning that he
12 promoted me again to a major, but without assignment.

13 Q. And did you remain a major?

14 A. Yes, I remained as major from November '96 to March '97.

12:22:32 15 Q. Then what happened to you?

16 A. Mr Sankoh then promoted me to a lieutenant colonel and
17 appointed me as battle group.

18 Q. Did you remain a lieutenant colonel?

19 A. Yes. I remained a lieutenant colonel from March '97 to
12:22:57 20 March '98 when Johnny Paul promoted me to a colonel.

21 Q. And did you receive any further promotions thereafter?

22 A. Yes, in February 2000 - sorry, February 1999 Sam Bockarie
23 promoted myself and my other colleagues to brigadier.

24 Q. Did you receive any further promotions after that?

12:23:28 25 A. Well, it was at that point, brigadier general, that I
26 stopped. I did not get any further ranks. It was only the
27 promotion that I got as interim leader.

28 Q. Now, all of those promotions - were any of those
29 promotions, Mr Sesay, made by Charles Taylor?

1 A. No, not at all.

2 Q. Now, from the invasion of Sierra Leone in 1991 who was in
3 control of the RUF, Mr Sesay?

4 A. It was Mr Sankoh.

12:24:15 5 Q. When Mr Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria did he remain in
6 charge of the RUF?

7 A. Yes. He continued to be in charge of the RUF until the
8 time they cut off communication - until the time they cut him off
9 from having communication, that was in late May 1997. But from

12:24:48 10 March, when he was arrested in '97, he was communicating - he
11 used to give instruction - until late May 1997 when he was
12 stopped from communicating. He was cut off from communicating
13 with the RUF.

14 Q. From that point, when he was cut off from communicating
15 with the RUF, who was in control of the RUF?

12:25:10 16 A. Well, at that time it was Johnny Paul, because he had given
17 orders to Sam Bockarie that everybody in the RUF should take
18 orders from Johnny Paul. So the RUF was controlled by Bockarie
19 and Johnny Paul.

12:25:34 20 Q. Did that situation remain that way?

21 A. Yes, that situation, I consider it still remain because
22 even in '98 Johnny Paul issued promotions to Sam Bockarie until
23 the time Mr Sankoh was taken to Lome.

24 Q. So just to be clear, between that time in '97 when Sankoh
12:26:11 25 lost contact with the RUF until Lome, who controlled the RUF?

26 A. Well, it was Bockarie who controlled the RUF, he and Johnny
27 Paul.

28 Q. And during that time, Mr Sesay, was Bockarie taking orders
29 from anyone?

1 A. No, not to my knowledge.

2 Q. Specifically, during that time was Bockarie taking orders
3 from Charles Taylor?

4 A. No, no.

12:26:52 5 Q. After Lome, up until May of 2000, who was in charge of the
6 RUF?

7 A. It was the leader, Mr Sankoh.

8 Q. Following his arrest in May of 2000 until your appointment
9 as interim leader in August 2000, who was in control of the RUF?

12:27:24 10 A. Myself and the other commanders.

11 Q. After you were appointed as interim leader in August 2000,
12 was anyone in control of you?

13 A. No, no.

14 Q. During your tenure as interim leader, were you taking
12:27:46 15 orders from Charles Taylor?

16 A. No, I was not taking orders from him.

17 Q. Let's just pursue that a little further. Between the time
18 of your appointment as interim leader in August 2000 until the
19 end of disarmament in January 2002, what contact did you have
12:28:21 20 with Charles Taylor during that period?

21 A. Well, the contact that I had with Mr Taylor after my
22 appointment they - were the signing of the Liberia I delegation,
23 which was through Liberia, and he facilitated --

24 Q. Pause there. Did you say Liberia or Abuja?

12:28:58 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: The signing of what?

26 THE WITNESS: No, I said during the meeting for the Abuja
27 I, the delegation passed through Liberia, Monrovia. And I was in
28 Monrovia until the return of the delegation, and after the
29 delegation had returned, I met with Mr Taylor and told him that I

1 was travelling back because I had requested during the meeting
2 with the ECOWAS leaders, I requested for a phone and Obasanjo had
3 promised that he was going to provide me with a phone, and
4 Mr Taylor had given me the satellite phone. So after that,
12:29:47 5 around November to early December of 2000, Mr Taylor called me,
6 through my delegation, they sent a message through Memunatu Deen.
7 When I went and met, I went with - I met with Colonel Lion and Pa
8 Binda. So we went to Mr Taylor, he discussed with us and said,
9 "Now" --

12:30:15 10 Mr GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Go on.

12 A. He said, "Well, now we have now got the peace on track. We
13 have got the peace process back on track", he said, "because now
14 you have gone and attended the Abuja I meeting" and he said that
12:30:34 15 was going to be followed by another meeting. So he said, "I am
16 also going to talk to you guys, now, Issa, and your brothers. I
17 will say it is good now because now disarmament is coming and you
18 are going to be transferred into a political party. You should
19 all come together as one body and allow unity to prevail between
12:30:55 20 you, as RUF commanders and RUF members. So your brother, Sam
21 Bockarie's issue, he has spoken to me and he has said that he
22 would want to re - to come back. So I am also requesting from
23 you now that Sam Bockarie returns back. But the decision is up
24 to you." And he said, "What do you think about it?" And he
12:31:24 25 said, "It will really be nice if we came together as one
26 organisation, being that you are now coming to disarm, we should
27 have unity, so that we will be able to form our party in Sierra
28 Leone." So he said --

29 Q. Pause there. I want to be clear about a couple of things.

1 Firstly, this meeting that you are talking about now with
2 Mr Taylor, when did it take place?

3 A. This was around November to December 2000. After the Abuja
4 I meeting, that is when he called me.

12:32:00 5 Q. And was that the first time you had met Mr Taylor since
6 your appointment as interim leader?

7 A. No, I met him when I went to accompany the delegation for
8 Abuja I. Yes, this was --

9 Q. When was that?

12:32:20 10 A. I think that was - I think it was October. I think it was
11 October.

12 Q. And then are you telling us that you met him again sometime
13 late November/December?

14 A. Yes, of 2000.

12:32:39 15 Q. When there was some discussion about Bockarie rejoining the
16 RUF?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, after that meeting late November/December, did you
19 meet Mr Taylor again?

12:33:01 20 A. No, I did not meet with him again.

21 Q. So help us then, Mr - I just want to recap, Mr Sesay.
22 During the course of your testimony, you've told us that you saw
23 Mr Taylor in Lome but didn't speak to him, is that right?

24 A. Yes.

12:33:23 25 Q. You've also told us that you met him in May with regard to
26 the release of the UNAMSIL personnel?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. You told us that you met him again at the end of July after
29 your appointment as interim leader, is that right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You met him again in August at Roberts International
3 Airfield; is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

12:33:50 5 Q. You met him then in October of 2000?

6 A. November/December 2000.

7 Q. Did you meet him when you accompanied the external
8 delegation to Abuja?

9 A. Yes, I met with him.

12:34:10 10 Q. When was that?

11 A. That was October.

12 Q. And then you met him again late November/December 2000; is
13 that right?

14 A. Yes.

12:34:21 15 Q. Thereafter you did not meet him again; is that correct?

16 A. No, after that I did not meet with him again.

17 Q. So, if I put all this together, would it be correct to say
18 that you met Mr Taylor on six occasions between May 2000 and late
19 November/December 2000?

12:34:45 20 A. Yes, you are correct.

21 Q. On any of those - and where did those meetings take place?

22 A. Well, the meeting that you said I met with him in Lome, I
23 only saw him, I did not speak with him.

24 Q. You have told us that.

12:35:09 25 A. The second - the first meeting where I spoke to him and he
26 too spoke to me was in late May 2000, about the release of
27 UNAMSIL, at the Executive Mansion.

28 Q. I just want to just go through those six occasions and you
29 tell me where you met. Late May, where did you meet him?

1 A. Late May it was at the Executive Mansion.

2 Q. Late July when you met him with regard to, along with other
3 Presidents, where was that?

4 A. At the mansion, the Executive Mansion.

12:35:47 5 Q. August when you met again, where did that take place?

6 A. I met him at RIA.

7 Q. When in October you went with the external delegation,
8 where did you meet him?

9 A. I met him at flower house, his house. In fact, on that
12:36:13 10 day, just when you entered the fence, into the fence, you will
11 see them right in front of the house, there were some other
12 people there. It was an open place.

13 Q. Whose house was it?

14 A. His house.

12:36:28 15 Q. Well, I don't think there is any dispute about the name of
16 the house. When in late November/early December you met him,
17 where was that, just where?

18 A. His house, flower house.

19 Q. On any of those six trips to Monrovia, Mr Sesay, did you
12:36:54 20 return to Sierra Leone carrying arms and ammunition given to you
21 by Charles Taylor?

22 A. No. He did not give me arms, nor did he give me
23 ammunitions. In fact, he told me, like the two meetings where I
24 met him without the presence of the ECOWAS, he said we should
12:37:18 25 maintain unity to push the peace process forward. So he would
26 not meet me and tell me about making the peace process to go
27 onward and give me ammunitions. That would not work.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness says this at page 81 line 10
29 when he is quoting what Mr Taylor told him. He says, "And he

1 said it will really be nice if we came together as one
2 organisation, being that you are now coming to disarm. We should
3 have unity so that we will be able to form our party in Sierra
4 Leone, so he said." Does this "we" include Mr Taylor?

12:38:06 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Let me ask the witness.

6 Q. When you told us that at that meeting in late
7 November/December you had a discussion with Mr Taylor regarding
8 Sam Bockarie, in the context of that you told us this: "And he
9 said it will be really nice if we came together as one
10 organisation". First of all, who is the "he" who said that?

11 A. That is Mr Taylor.

12 Q. And who is the "we" who he was suggesting should come
13 together?

14 A. "We", that is the RUF men, we the RUF commanders, he said
12:38:59 15 we should come together. He was referring to myself, Sam
16 Bockarie and my colleagues, but --

17 Q. But?

18 A. When he said it where he invited us, that is myself, Lion,
19 Patrick Binda, and I told him that, "Well, Mr President, the
12:39:27 20 issue of Sam Bockarie, it is not Sam Bockarie and me that have a
21 problem, or Sam Bockarie and any other commander." I said, "The
22 problem is between Sam Bockarie and Mr Sankoh, so the best thing
23 is for me to inform the other commanders, because Sam Bockarie
24 has been threatening to kill some of us, so I cannot just come
12:39:51 25 now and accept the Sam Bockarie issue. So I have to inform the
26 other commanders." So that's when he said, "Okay, you can inform
27 your colleagues, but that is purely an RUF business. I am just
28 talking to you guys to try and come together as one
29 organisation." And I said, okay, I will inform my colleagues and

1 I will get back to him. That was the end of it.

2 Q. Now following that last meeting in November/December 2000
3 did you thereafter speak to Mr Taylor?

4 A. No, from that I did not speak to Mr Taylor.

12:40:35 5 Q. For example, did you communicate with him by satellite
6 phone or radio?

7 A. No, never did we communicate that way. Even before that
8 time and after that time, never did we communicate on a radio or
9 satellite phone.

12:40:53 10 Q. Now the next topic, the discrete topic that I want to deal
11 with is --

12 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before you move on to your
13 next topic, on two occasions the witness has referred to
14 accompanying the delegation to Abuja and I understood from his
12:41:10 15 evidence prior to the break that he did not go to Abuja but he
16 had sent the delegates. Which is it?

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord, I sent the delegation. I
18 escorted them from Sierra Leone to Monrovia. From Monrovia now
19 the delegation went. I stayed in Monrovia. I waited for them.

12:41:36 20 JUDGE DOHERTY: I am clear now.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. The next matter I want to deal with, Mr Sesay, is this:
23 Was there any system within the RUF to discipline individuals who
24 committed wrongs?

12:42:02 25 A. Yes, there was a system.

26 Q. Could you slowly please describe how that system operated?

27 A. Well, in that system we had MPs - we had IDUs and MPs.
28 IDUs were informants?

29 Q. Pause there. Before we lose sight of it, IDU stands for

1 what?

2 A. Internal Defence Unit.

3 Q. And MP stands for what?

4 A. Military Police.

12:42:53 5 Q. And just remind us, what was the role of the IDU?

6 A. The IDUs were agents that gathered information and they
7 reported to their commander or to the nearest commander,
8 especially about the activities on the front line and the
9 liberated areas, that is controlled areas.

12:43:19 10 Q. And who was in charge of the MPs and the IDUs?

11 A. Well, the IDU, it was Mr Augustine Gbao who was in charge.
12 But because of the time frame of the war and the areas of
13 operation, there were times that the sub-commanders would report
14 to the nearby commanders that they operated with. And the MPs

12:43:58 15 were under different commanders. Like initially they were under
16 Late Ajimine, Morris Kallon.

17 Q. What's the first name?

18 A. I said Late Ajimine. But the first MP commander --

19 Q. How do you spell that name?

12:44:27 20 A. Ajimine, A-J-I - I think it is A-J-A-M-I-N. A-J-I-M-I-N-E,
21 Ajimine.

22 Q. Okay. And you were going to say the first MP commander was
23 who?

24 A. The first MP commander was a vanguard called Jimmy, but he
12:44:59 25 died. And from there Ajimine became MP commander. From that
26 Late Pa Kanneh, that was '93. And after Late Pa Kanneh, Peter
27 Vandi.

28 Q. Go on?

29 A. After Peter Vandi, '93 to late '93 was Peter Vandi. And

1 after Peter Vandi Mr Sankoh appointed Patrick PS Binda. From
2 December '93 to May '94 Patrick Binda was the MP commander. And
3 from May '94 to November '95, it was MP Jalloh, Mohamed Jalloh.
4 Then from November '95, Kaisuku. '96, Kaisuku. '97, Kaisuku.
12:46:20 5 '98, Kaisuku. '99, Kaisuku. Then Kaisuku went with Sam Bockarie
6 in '99 to Liberia. But from my appointment, when I held the
7 second meeting with the ECOWAS leaders, Kaisuku told me that he
8 wanted to return, and I said no problem. So the two of us
9 returned and I reinstated him as MP commander until disarmament.

12:46:52 10 Q. Thank you. Now what kind of - let me start again. Was
11 there some list of rules, offences, a code of conduct, issued by
12 the RUF?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What was it called?

12:47:27 15 A. Well, they had routine orders; orders that will govern the
16 units.

17 Q. And what kind of wrongs would trigger the involvement of
18 the MPs and the IDUs?

19 A. Well, before I would answer that question I would want to
12:47:52 20 clarify this area that you know that during '98/'99 there was
21 some breakaway with Superman and his group. And whenever those
22 breakaways happened this commander would not be able to control
23 the group of Superman and the others.

24 Q. Thank you. Now we were going on to discuss the kinds of
12:48:18 25 offences that would be investigated by the MPs and the IDUs. Can
26 you help us with that?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: But Mr Griffiths, you are suggesting some
28 of these things. The witness has not told us about a system.
29 You asked him at page 87 line 13 whether there was a disciplinary

1 system, and you asked him to slowly describe how the system
2 operated. Now, apart from telling us that they had MPs and IDUs,
3 which he then went on to enumerate, he hasn't told us what the
4 roles were. He hasn't even answered your question, really.

12:49:06

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Let's go right back to the beginning, Mr Sesay. What did
7 the MPs do?

8 A. The MPs were there to arrest, detain and investigate. They
9 would implement punishment.

12:49:29

10 Q. Arrest for what?

11 A. For offenders - those who committed crimes, offences.

12 Q. Offences such as?

13 A. If you did battle a civilian or if you killed a civilian or
14 you raped a woman or you harassed a civilian or took a property

12:49:57

15 of the civilian in liberated areas, if the commander who is there
16 is a disciplined commander, he would instruct the MP to arrest

17 you, investigate the issue and you would be punished, because the

18 MP would recommend the punishment and the commander would approve

19 of the punishment, but the MPs would be more effective depending

12:50:19

20 on the commander who will be on that ground. If the commander is
21 a disciplined commander, he will look after - who will look after

22 the welfare of the civilians, then the MPs would be more

23 effective. They will be able to do their job.

24 Q. And such punishments, would they be preceded by a trial?

12:50:47

25 A. Yes, because when the MPs would arrest, they would invite
26 the IDUs, the IDUs, the MP - even in some cases they would have

27 some representatives from the G5, the combat medic, they would

28 all be there to investigate. If you are found guilty, they would

29 recommend a punishment, and the commander would submit it to the

1 commander who will be there on that occasion, and if the
2 commander too thought that, he would forward it to another
3 commander, he would forward it to that commander for his
4 approval.

12:51:25 5 Q. And what kind of punishments were imposed?

6 A. Well, it depends on the crime. It depends on the crime.
7 If the crime committed warranted execution, then execution would
8 be recommended, because I can recall in 2000, when an RUF fighter
9 met a Pa in his village, it was --

12:52:00 10 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness kindly
11 repeat the name of the town?

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Pause. You say in the year 2000, when an RUF fighter met a
14 Pa in his village. Pause. What is the name of the Pa?

12:52:21 15 A. I don't recollect the name of the Pa, but the village is
16 between - that is the road from Small Sefadu to Tombodu after
17 Benduma. That is the last village of Tombodu. But I don't
18 recall the name of the village. But that's an incident that I
19 can say everybody in Kono knew. So this fighter got to the
12:52:46 20 village and his colleague, and they asked the Pa if he had palm

21 wine, and he said, "Yes, but all I have is for my own use," and
22 he said, "Except if you want me to give you a cup of it." And
23 the Pa brought the gallon which contained the palm wine and he
24 gave them one cup. And after he had taken the one cup, he said
12:53:07 25 the Pa should give him all of the palm wine, and he said, "No,
26 this palm wine is for my own use. I cannot give everything to
27 you." And he took the palm wine from the Pa, and the Pa said,
28 "Well, you are" - he said, "I'm not an RUF man but" --

29 Q. You said something. Let's go back again because I think

1 something has been lost by the translator. What did the Pa say
2 to the fighter?

3 A. The Pa told the fighter that he will not give him all of
4 his wine because that was his food that he was going to use, he
12:53:49 5 was going to drink that wine, and he said he could only offer him
6 one cup, one RUF man. And the RUF fighter took the gallon from
7 the Pa forcefully, and the Pa said - said, "Look at me. I'm an
8 old man and I'm your head man, I'm your town's head man here.
9 How can you molest me here in the presence of the civilians?" He
12:54:16 10 said, "If you say you are going to take this wine forcefully, I
11 will not accept it," and the Pa go and try to take the gallon
12 away from him, and they started fighting for the gallon, and he
13 took --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this
12:54:33 15 part?

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. They started fighting over the palm wine and what happened?

18 A. And they were fighting over the gallon - the fighter took
19 a pestle and hit the Pa at the back of his neck, and he fell, and
12:54:51 20 he continued hitting the Pa on his neck until he died. And the
21 other civilians brought the report to Small Sefadu and Small
22 Sefadu informed the MPs in Koakoyima, and the MPs found out and
23 they arrested this fighter, and he was the younger brother of one
24 of the battalion commanders, but he was not a small boy, he was
12:55:18 25 around 25/26 years of age. So he was arrested and taken to the
26 MP, and the MP informed me, and I said they should inform the
27 other units, including the caretaker chiefs. And they all went
28 for the investigation, and he was found guilty that he killed the
29 Pa for the reasons that I have explained, that the Pa - he said

1 the Pa challenged him, that's why. And they said, "No. The way
2 that you've killed this Pa, we are not going to accept that. You
3 are going to die the same way you killed the Pa." And so the
4 people, the MP, the IDU, the G5, including the civilians who were
12:56:04 5 there, agreed that this fighter should die. And when they
6 brought that to me, I said, "Well, that is the conclusion of the
7 board, so what the board has said I will accept." So if you kill
8 a civilian that way, a commander who was there that had interest
9 about the civilian population and he was seeking the civilians'
12:56:27 10 welfare, he too will make sure that the MPs do their job by
11 arresting the fighter, investigating that person; if he is found
12 guilty, he will implement the punishment that would be
13 recommended by the board.

14 Q. What, in fact, happened to that fighter?

12:56:43 15 A. The fighter was executed. He was shot.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, is Small Sefadu the name of
17 a person or a place?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: It is on the record before. It is a place
19 name.

12:56:59 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. But he says the civilians brought
21 the report to Small Sefadu and Small Sefadu informed the MPs. A
22 place doesn't inform.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Is Small Sefadu a person or a place, Mr Sesay?

12:57:14 25 A. It was the name of a village, but there were MPs there. So
26 the civilians informed the MPs in Koakoyima, and the fighter was
27 arrested.

28 Q. Just let's go over that again. What happened in Small
29 Sefadu?

1 A. I said the civilians in the village --

2 Q. In which village?

3 A. I said the village that was after Benduma, because after
4 Small Sefadu you go to Benduma, and after Benduma you go to that
12:57:57 5 village. When the fighter killed the Pa --

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, we have heard the long story.
7 The question is simply this: What happened in Small Sefadu?
8 Zero in on that and tell us what happened.

9 THE WITNESS: Well, the civilians complained to the MPs in
12:58:19 10 Small Sefadu.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. And after the complaint was made to the MPs in Small
13 Sefadu, what happened to the complaint thereafter?

14 A. The MPs took the complaint to the MPs in Koidu Town,
12:58:36 15 Koakoyima.

16 Q. Thank you. Now, were there other punishments apart from
17 execution, Mr Sesay?

18 A. Yes. That's why I said it depends on the crime. There
19 were some crimes, if you were to be locked up, you would be
12:58:58 20 locked up and you will do hard labour, you will be working.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, this disciplinary system
22 that the witness has described, could he tell us a bit more
23 whether there was a complaints procedure? How would, for
24 instance, a civilian report a wrong done to them? How and where
12:59:27 25 would they report, if such a system existed?

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. How would a civilian make a complaint, Mr Sesay?

28 A. Well, I will answer this question, but I want to clarify
29 something, because now the questions that are --

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, please answer the question that
2 I asked first.

3 THE WITNESS: Well, my Lord, I can answer in relation to
4 where I operated. For example, when I was in Makeni, when I came
13:00:03 5 to Makeni in December '98 to March 1999, I had civilians who were
6 permanent people in Makeni. Civilians reported to those people.
7 They got information from the civilians and they informed me. At
8 the same time, civilians who committed offences to them, they
9 complain to the G5 and at the same time they would complain to
13:00:30 10 the MP.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Now, that complaint system which you operated in Makeni,
13 was the same system of complaint operated in any other area?

14 A. No. It was not like that, because some areas - it depended
13:00:52 15 on the commander that was there. Like, the crimes that were
16 committed in Kono in 1998, because I was not on the ground and I
17 cannot testify about that, but if the commander who was on the
18 ground was able to make sure that he followed up on the
19 complaints - even when I was in Pendembu from April to November
13:01:21 20 1998, civilians used to lodge complaints to the G5 and to the
21 MPs.

22 Q. And the G5 was responsible for what?

23 A. The G5 was responsible for the welfare of civilians. They
24 were the go-between for the civilians and the RUF.

13:01:47 25 Q. And the system of complaint and investigation and
26 punishment that you have described, Mr Sesay, when did that
27 system start? I am talking about MPs investigating, detaining
28 and punishing the IDUs and so on and the G4. When did that
29 system start?

1 A. That system started from 1991. There were breakdowns,
2 depending on the commander that would be on the ground, but the
3 system started from 1991.

4 Q. Who put the system in place?

13:02:35 5 A. It was Mr Sankoh.

6 Q. For how long did that system remain in place?

7 A. Well, that system continued throughout.

8 Q. Was the system always effective?

9 A. No. In some areas the system was not effective.

13:02:58 10 Q. And why was the system not effective in some areas?

11 A. Well, it all depended on the individual commanders in the
12 various areas. At times, like the time we joined the AFRC there
13 were crimes committed that the commander in the area would not be
14 able to have control over his men, or that if the commander who
15 was in the area also encouraged crimes or the commission of
16 crimes, then the law on the ground would not be effective.

13:03:27 15 was in the area also encouraged crimes or the commission of
16 crimes, then the law on the ground would not be effective.

17 Q. Was the offence of rape ever condoned within the RUF,
18 Mr Sesay?

19 A. Well, it was not allowed. It was not allowed.

13:04:06 20 Q. What would be the punishment for rape within the RUF,
21 Mr Sesay?

22 A. Well, if you raped you will be killed.

23 Q. In the areas in Kailahun which you commanded, Mr Sesay, was
24 rape a prevalent offence?

13:04:36 25 A. No. In Kailahun raping did not take place there. Even
26 during my trials, the Prosecution witnesses that were brought,
27 they informed them that in Kailahun raping was not committed
28 there.

29 Q. Now, when the RUF entered Sierra Leone, Mr Sesay, where did

1 the bulk of the RUF recruits come from, which district?

2 A. The bulk of the RUF group, you mean in 1991, the time the
3 war started?

4 Q. No, no, after you entered Sierra Leone and training camps
13:05:19 5 were set up, where did the bulk of the recruits come from?

6 A. They were natives of Kailahun.

7 Q. And those natives of Kailahun who were recruited into the
8 RUF, did they go around Kailahun raping?

9 A. Oh, no, those are their own people, so it wouldn't happen
13:05:53 10 easy for them to do that.

11 Q. Did you know of offences of rape being committed by RUF
12 combatants, Mr Sesay, did you hear of that?

13 A. In Kailahun District after early '92 when we fought the
14 NPFL and they went back, since then up to disarmament I did not
13:06:31 15 here about rape in Kailahun. I did not see it and I did not hear
16 about it in Kailahun.

17 Q. What about in other parts of Sierra Leone, are you aware of
18 the RUF combatants committing the offence of rape?

19 A. Well, I was not present in those areas.

13:06:56 20 MR KOU MJIAN: Objection. That does not answer the
21 question.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, indeed, it doesn't answer the
23 question.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:07:11 25 Q. Mr Sesay, did you hear of offences of rape being committed
26 in other areas of Sierra Leone, other than Kailahun, by RUF
27 combatants?

28 A. Yes. Those incidents happened, like, for instance, in
29 Kono, when Peter Vandi took action, I asked - I heard about a

1 fighter who raped a woman in Sewafe, and Peter Vandi and the
2 joint security investigated it. They found him guilty and he was
3 executed. And even in Makeni, at the time I came there in
4 December '98, when a civilian man complained to me that fighters
13:08:05 5 went to his house and they raped him, he was a suckling mother.
6 And when I went there, the fighters were trying to run away. I
7 had to open fire at them, and one of them, I shot him and the
8 other one we arrested him bodily and he confirmed that the man
9 who died was the one who did the raping.

13:08:26 10 Yes, those offences used to come in but we took action
11 against the offenders.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, you kept saying the
13 fighters went to his house and they raped "him" and "he" was a
14 suckling mother. Now, I don't know who the "he" is in this case.

13:08:47 15 Was the victim a man or a woman?

16 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, it should be a "she". She
17 was a woman, my Lord. It was the man who came and lodged the
18 complaint.

19 THE WITNESS: He came to my house and lodged a complaint
13:09:03 20 that fighters went to his house and that his wife was there, a
21 suckling mother, and where I was living by the Saint Francis and
22 where the incident took place, around the Lunsar Road, it was not
23 a far distance, and it was something that people witnessed in
24 Makeni. And when the man came and lodged the complaint to me, I
13:09:33 25 too went there. And when they heard that I was around - so the
26 fighters decided to run away. So I opened fire at them. I shot
27 one and we arrested one. And the one whom we arrested agreed
28 that it was the man who was shot that did the rape. So I, too,
29 sent the woman to a hospital to see a doctor.

1 Mr GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Now, aside from rape, let's look at other instances of ill
3 discipline. Was looting of people's property condoned by the
4 RUF, Mr Sesay?

13:10:19 5 A. Yes. In some areas looting took place, when they attacked
6 a town they looted, yes. The only thing, after you had finally
7 captured the town you stopped the fighters from looting the
8 property - people's property, but for the first one or two days,
9 it happened, though it was all dependent on the commander who
13:10:47 10 would lead an attack.

11 Q. So were combatants in the RUF instructed by their
12 commanders to go out and loot?

13 A. Well, not all commanders, but some commanders saw the
14 action going on but did not take action against it.

13:11:11 15 Q. So was looting something which the RUF accepted and agreed
16 with?

17 A. Well, in some areas, yes, it happened during the war, but
18 after having total control over the area and having civilians
19 around the area, you'd not allowed that to happen any more.

13:11:40 20 Q. My question is slightly different, Mr Sesay. Was it the
21 policy of the RUF to condone looting?

22 A. No. It was not a direct policy to say that they gave
23 instructions saying that they should go and loot, but it
24 happened.

13:12:04 25 Q. And what about the burning of people's homes and property,
26 was that condoned by the RUF?

27 A. No. People only did it on their own accord, but it was not
28 a policy of the RUF.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: What does he mean by "people", which

1 people?

2 THE WITNESS: The RUF members that I have explained about.
3 People did it on their own, like commanders, fighters who
4 committed such crimes, but it was not a policy that if you
13:12:47 5 captured a town you would burn it down, no.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. I want to move on to another topic, please, Mr Sesay. And
8 what I want to ask you about now, as a discrete topic, is arms
9 and ammunition from 1991 through to 2002. Do you follow me? At
13:13:21 10 the time of the invasion of Sierra Leone, where did the arms and
11 ammunition used to commence the invasion come from?

12 A. Well, when we came to Lofa it was Anthony Mekunagbe who
13 gave us those very tasks in Vahun. But it was not that there was
14 a truckload of ammunition parked by or that escorted us, no.

13:14:01 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you'll notice - I think the
16 witness said, "Who gave us those Berettas", meaning a weapon, a
17 type of weapon.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I am sorry, Madam President, I am not
19 following you.

13:14:21 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: It is something that I noticed in the
21 transcript, but I think it will be corrected.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. You did say Beretta, didn't you, Mr Sesay? Remember, well,
24 it's been quite a while now, so it might have been forget. Do
13:14:44 25 you remember spelling Beretta for us, B-E-R-R-E-T-T-A?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And it's a make of firearm, is it not?

28 A. Yes, it is a type of gun that's used shot bullets,
29 something like pistol rounds.

1 Q. Now, do you know where Anthony Mekunagbe got those Berettas
2 from?

3 A. Yes, Anthony Mekunagbe was the commander in Lofa, all the
4 fighters in Lofa were under his control.

13:15:28 5 Q. Yes, but it still doesn't answer my question, Mr Sesay. Do
6 you know the source of those Berettas?

7 A. Well, those Berettas, I saw some of those in his fighters'
8 hands, some of his fighters were using it, but I did not know how
9 he got them, but some of the fighters we met in Vahun, it was the
10 same Beretta type of gun that they were using.

11 Q. Now, thereafter, following the commencement of the
12 invasion, did the RUF receive further arms and ammunition?

13 A. Yes, because when we attacked Bomaru and Baiwala we
14 captured Bomaru, we got an armoured car there and even the
15 ammunition dump. The soldiers left escaped and left everything
16 behind. So those are the arms and ammunition that the RUF were
17 now using to advance.

18 Q. And as you continued to advance, did you receive further
19 arms and ammunition?

13:16:55 20 A. Yes, we used to capture arms and ammunition.

21 Q. What kind of arms were you capturing?

22 A. AK-45s, G3s, those were the sort of arms, and the HMG
23 mortar guns, RPGs.

24 Q. After the events you have described to us, Top Final, what
13:17:38 25 was the position of the RUF in terms of arms and ammunition?

26 A. Well, before - after the Top Final things were bad because
27 Mr Sankoh had come with the RUF - NPFL after six months of the
28 invasion to fight around the Joru flank, by then there was enough
29 ammunition. But after the conflict when we drove them things

1 became worse. So after that for us to get ammunition was when we
2 started setting up ambushes, when we captured arms and ammunition
3 from the government troops. And it was those materials that the
4 RUF used it cross the Moa River to capture Sandaru and where we
13:18:36 5 captured some other ammunition dump and with some heavy weapons
6 and we got some other twin barriers with a large quantity of
7 ammunition in Gandorhun.

8 Q. Let's approach this slightly more systematically, please,
9 Mr Sesay. Between the start of the invasion and Top Final, where
13:19:03 10 did the RUF get arms and ammunition from?

11 A. Well, after six months of the invasion Anthony Mekunagbe
12 and Mr Sankoh came with a small reinforcement of NPFL fighters
13 including ammunition. But the truck came packed of load in
14 Pendembu at Mr Sankoh's house and those were the arms and
13:19:35 15 ammunition that the NPFL were using to attack the ULIMO people
16 around Nyandehun Junction, Kambiana, up to Joru - up to Joru and
17 after Joru the ULIMO had bases around one of the towns that I
18 have now forgotten.

19 Q. Don't worry about that. Now you say that was after six
13:20:04 20 months, yes? Now that truck, where did it come from?

21 A. That truck came from Gbargna, because it was Mr Sankoh who
22 came with it, loaded of ammunition.

23 Q. Now that was after six months, you say?

24 A. Yes.

13:20:27 25 Q. During that period - and remember we're talking about start
26 of invasion to Top Final, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Are you aware of any other shipments of arms and ammunition
29 coming from Liberia?

1 A. No. It was that ammunition that I knew about and I did not
2 know about any other ammunition that came around. I only knew of
3 that truck that came with the NPFL who came to join us to attack
4 ULIMO bases and for them to open the road to Zimmi so that they
13:21:05 5 would be able to link up with their brothers who were on the
6 other flank in Pujehun.

7 Q. Just so that we're are clear, you are provided with
8 Berettas by Anthony Mekunagbe at the start of the invasion,
9 correct?

13:21:34 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. There is this truckload of arms and ammunition which
12 arrives in October 1992, is that correct - no, sorry, in October
13 of which year? Sorry, my fault.

14 A. '91.

13:21:47 15 Q. Right. We then have Top Final in which month and year?

16 A. April 1992.

17 Q. When the NPFL left in April 1992 did they leave their arms
18 and ammunition behind?

19 A. Oh, no, no, they went with it.

13:22:17 20 Q. In April of 1992 was the RUF a well-armed,
21 well-provisioned, in terms of ammunition, unit?

22 A. RUF was not armed. The RUF was not armed. We did not have
23 ammunition. We had few arms at the targets. The only thing that
24 RUF had by then was manpower. But the RUF totally lacked arms
13:23:01 25 and ammunition.

26 Q. So after April '92 and the departure of the NPFL, where did
27 the RUF get arms and ammunition from?

28 A. It was through ambushes and through Guinea.

29 Q. And from whom in Guinea?

1 A. Like Ansu Nemahun who was the contractor for the RUF.
2 Mr Sankoh used to send him to buy ammunition through the Guinean
3 soldiers. And at the same time we used to set ambushes, because
4 I recall after the NPFL had left in April, around May/June
13:24:00 5 information reached the NPRC because by then the NPRC had just
6 overthrown the Sierra Leone government, so they made an advance
7 from Daru, they came and captured Kui va, to Mobai and Bai ima. So
8 Mr Sankoh instructed Mohamed Tarawalli to set up an ambush on the
9 road, ambush between that Mobai Junction and Bai ima. And we
13:24:30 10 carried out an attack in Bai ima and we sent another ambush
11 between Mobai and Kui va and the ambush that was between Mobai
12 Junction and Bai ima, it fell to the RUF and the RUF captured --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
14 to slow down and repeat that area slowly.

13:24:51 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. The RUF captured what, Mr Sesay?

17 A. I said the RUF captured - when the truck fell in the ambush
18 the RUF captured a twin barrel that was mounted in the truck with
19 so much ammunition, AK rounds and RPG rounds, G3 rounds, they
13:25:10 20 were all in there. And at the same time the late Daboh, one of
21 the Special Forces from Libya, during that ambush mission they
22 attacked Bai ima and during that attack they too attacked a 106
23 missile together with so many rockets and ammunition.

24 Q. So you are describing the RUF obtaining arms and ammunition
13:25:41 25 from ambushes and trade with the Guineans. For how long did that
26 go on?

27 A. Well, that continued until the time the RUF was pushed in
28 '93 and that continued until - it continued until the time the
29 RUF joined the AFRC in '97. We only - the RUF only sustained

1 itself by captured ammunition and ammunition that were traded
2 from Guinea. From '92 that was the system by which the RUF
3 sustained itself in terms of arms and ammunition until the time
4 the RUF joined the AFRC in 1997.

13:26:33 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, what was the name of that
6 junction near Baiima.

7 THE WITNESS: Mobai Junction.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, can you spell Mobai for
9 us.

13:26:50 10 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, it's M-O-B-A-I.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: And Kuiva, can you spell that for us?

12 THE INTERPRETER: It is K-U-I-V-A, my Lord.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, another matter. You remember telling us
13:27:13 15 about the \$7,000 US that Mr Sankoh left with Sam Bockarie?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. And you remember telling us how Bockarie used that to
18 purchase ammunition from ULIMO?

19 A. Yes.

13:27:36 20 Q. When did that start?

21 A. Well, that started in December 1996.

22 Q. And continued until when?

23 A. It continued until May 1997.

24 Q. May 1997 being - what happened in May 1997 to change that?

13:28:05 25 A. When the RUF joined the AFRC.

26 Q. So let's try and put that together, shall we? Between
27 April 1992, the time of Top Final, until May '97 when you join
28 the AFRC, arms and ammunition were obtained from ambushes; is
29 that right?

1 A. Yes. Ambushes and from Guinea and from the ULIMO.

2 Q. During that period, Mr Sesay, were the RUF receiving
3 shipments of arms and/or ammunition from the Liberian - from
4 Charles Taylor in Liberia?

13:29:06 5 A. No, not at all.

6 Q. If, during that period, from April 1992 until May 1997, the
7 RUF were receiving shipments of arms and ammunition from Charles
8 Taylor in Liberia, would you have been in a position to know
9 about it?

13:29:34 10 A. Very well, yes, because from 1991 to 1997 I was based in
11 Kailahun. The only time I left Kailahun was when I went to Ivory
12 Coast for treatment in November '95 to March - to March/April
13 1996. And during that time the ULIMO was in control of Lofa
14 since 1992 up to 1997. So definitely there was no means - there

13:30:15 15 was no road. And in fact I did not know about any communication
16 between Mr Taylor and RUF. That did not happen, because
17 Mr Sankoh himself was against Mr Taylor, because those were some
18 of the reasons why the NPRC was able to push us to the border
19 because Mr Sankoh said would he never cross into Liberia, he said
13:30:45 20 he would instead go to the jungle and his war would now be
21 transformed into a jungle warfare, a guerilla army. So since
22 then the RUF was --

23 Q. The RUF was what?

24 A. The RUF was a self-reliant body. They obtained their
13:31:05 25 ammunition on their own.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. We will take the luncheon
28 break and reconvene at 2.30.

29 [Lunch break taken at 1.31 p.m.]

1 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, please
3 continue.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:30:52 5 Q. Mr Sesay, before lunch we were talking about sources of
6 arms and ammunition for the RUF between 1991 and 1997, and we
7 ended with you telling us how Foday Sankoh wanted the RUF to be a
8 self-reliant body.

9 Now, that takes us up to May 1997. In May 1997, as you've
14:31:33 10 told us, the RUF joined the AFRC upon Sankoh's instructions to
11 form the People's Army. That's correct, is it not?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. During the course - after you joined the RU - after you
14 joined the AFRC, there was an arms embargo placed on that
14:32:08 15 government, was there not?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. During the period of the AFRC, Mr Sesay, did the AFRC
18 receive any arms and ammunition from abroad?

19 A. No. I did not witness that, except the flights that came
14:32:39 20 from Burkina Faso that Ibrahim Bah and Fonti Kanu brought.

21 Q. Now, apart from that shipment, Mr Sesay, did the AFRC
22 receive any arms and ammunition from abroad?

23 A. No. I did not witness that, and I did not hear about it.

24 Q. So during the period of the AFRC, of your involvement - the
14:33:19 25 RUF's involvement with the AFRC, from May 1997 until the
26 intervention in February 1998, where did the AFRC/RUF get their
27 arms and ammunition from?

28 A. Well, the AFRC was the army. They had ammo dumps from the
29 coup, even before that time. The army had ammunition dumps.

1 That was the ammunition that we used, the AFRC and the RUF, until
2 the fight in late 1997 - the until the flight in late 1997.

3 Q. And is that the flight into Magburaka that you mentioned
4 earlier?

14:34:23 5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat
6 that?

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. What did you just say, Mr Sesay?

9 A. You, the Interpreter, told me that it was the - the escape,
14:34:37 10 that he escaped from Magburaka. I was asking who escaped from
11 Magburaka.

12 Q. Did you say anything about an escape from Magburaka,
13 Mr Sesay?

14 A. No, I did not say that, but --

14:34:56 15 Q. Did you not say "flight"?

16 A. Yes, it's "flight". I mean airplane.

17 Q. Now, that was in late 1998, you tell us, yes? 1997, sorry.

18 A. Yes, yes.

19 Q. Between then and the intervention in February 1998, did any
14:35:25 20 arms and ammunition enter Sierra Leone from abroad?

21 A. No, no.

22 Q. Let's go to another time frame now.

23 Let's start February 1998 down to January 1999, okay?

24 During that period, where did the RUF get arms and ammunition
14:35:59 25 from?

26 A. From January '98 to January '99?

27 Q. From February '98, the intervention, until January 1999,
28 after the Freetown invasion, where did the RUF get arms and
29 ammunition from?

1 A. Well, one, the RUF, when they retreated,
2 that's February '98, Bockarie sent Kennedy to Kolahun, he used to
3 buy the buried ammunition from ULIMO. Before the Guineans
4 crossed to attack Sierra Leone, we used to have ammunition from
14:36:53 5 their soldiers. And the ammunition that Mike Lamin bought in
6 exchange of the machine from the battalion commander in Bomi
7 Hills, Liberia, at the borderline. Then the few sardine AK
8 rounds containers that we used to have, the sardine tins of
9 rounds, the ones that I bought from the commander in Vahun, those
14:37:27 10 are the ammunition that we had until the time Bockarie made that
11 trip and he returned with the ammunition that he bought from
12 Lofa. From that up to January '99, those were the ammunition
13 that I knew RUF had.

14 Q. Now, the ammunition used for the Fitti-Fatta mission, where
14:37:54 15 did it come from?

16 A. That ammunition was the ammunition that Kennedy bought from
17 the ex-ULIMO fighters, and those few ones that they got from the
18 Guinean border.

19 Q. And the ammunition which Mike Lamin bought in exchange for
14:38:22 20 a machine from the battalion commander in Bomi Hills, when was
21 that?

22 A. That was around September '98.

23 Q. The ammunition which was used in December for the attack on
24 Kono and onwards to Makeni, where did that come from?

14:38:48 25 A. That ammunition was the one Bockarie bought from Lofa, but
26 that ammunition was the one we used to attack Kono. It was from
27 Kono now that we got ammunition to go down to Makeni.

28 Q. And when you said that it was in Kono that you got
29 ammunition to go down to Makeni, that ammunition in Kono, where

1 did it come from?

2 A. It was from the ECOMOG, the ammunition and arms that we
3 captured from ECOMOG. That's what we used to fight to go to
4 Makeni.

14:39:30 5 Q. During that period, February 1998 through to January 1999,
6 were the RUF receiving arms and/or ammunition from Charles Taylor
7 in Liberia?

8 A. No. I did not hear that, nor did I see it.

9 Q. If that was going on, Mr Sesay, were you, during that
14:40:03 10 12-month-or-so period, in a position to know?

11 A. Yes, because I was in the Kailahun district. I was in
12 Pendembu and Bockarie was in Buedu. I was in Pendembu. So I was
13 to have known, because I was in Buedu from March, April, when I
14 went to Monrovia to go to Burkina Faso, so when I lost the
14:40:34 15 diamonds. When I returned Bockarie posted me to Pendembu. And
16 it was later that I went to Kono.

17 Q. Now, you spoke of the purchase of arms by Bockarie in Lofa
18 in December, yes?

19 A. Yes, ammunition, not arms.

14:41:00 20 Q. Ammunition, thank you. And you mention Mike Lamin trading
21 with the commander, the battalion commander in Bomi Hills, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can you help us as to whether those purchases were with the
24 knowledge of the Liberian government or not?

14:41:27 25 A. No, those were individual commanders selling. It was not
26 with the knowledge of the government, because even the ammunition
27 that we bought from Guinea, the Guinean government did not know.

28 Q. And for how long did that trade with the Guinean military
29 go on for?

1 A. That started from '92 and it continued up to 1998 until
2 when they crossed that July and they attacked Koindu.

3 Q. And who was the President of Guinea during that period?

4 A. It was President Lansana Conte.

14:42:21 5 Q. Now, as far as you're aware, was President Lansana Conte
6 aware of the fact that his soldiers were trading with you over
7 the border?

8 A. No, he did not know, because I knew when the army
9 headquarters used to send from Conakry, he used to send soldiers
14:42:49 10 to the border to patrol to see what the Guinean soldiers were
11 doing on the border. So during those patrols, the Guinean
12 soldiers would stop all the transactions. So even with the
13 Sierra Leoneans who used to go there to transact business, they
14 would stop them until the patrol team would return back to
14:43:09 15 Conakry, then the business would resume.

16 Q. Now, the trade with ULIMO, who on the ULIMO side, Mr Sesay,
17 was involved in that trade?

18 A. Well, like, Abu Keita, he was involved in that business.
19 Varmuyan Sherif was involved in that business, and many other
14:43:50 20 ULIMO fighters, whose names I cannot recall now. But the entire
21 ULIMO at Lofa, Voinjama, Kolahun, right down to Foya, Foya Tinkia
22 to Vahun, they knew that about trade. It was not a secret.

23 Q. Now, when you were trading with the likes of Varmuyan
24 Sherif and Abu Keita, did they tell you that they were acting on
14:44:17 25 behalf of the - on behalf of President Taylor?

26 MR KOU MJIAN: Excuse me, I don't recall the witness saying
27 that he dealt with these individuals.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay. Mr Griffiths, the evidence was
29 that these various people that he's named, or organisations, knew

1 about the trade. Where do you get the impression that the
2 witness dealt with these people, in terms of business
3 transaction?

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, let's ask him.

14:45:02 5 Q. Did you deal with Varmuyan Sherif?

6 A. Well, I did not do direct transaction with him, but he sold
7 ammunition to Bockarie that I was fully aware of.

8 Q. How did you become aware of that?

9 A. The other time I - we went to Koindu, we went, me and
14:45:27 10 Sherif, and others brought a pick-up with ammunitions at night.
11 The other time he brought ammunition at Masabulahun border that
12 he sold to Sam Bockarie.

13 Q. At the time that this trade was going on with Sam Bockarie,
14 what was your position?

14:45:43 15 A. At this time I was a battle group commander.

16 Q. Did that make you Sam Bockarie's immediate deputy?

17 A. Yes, because before the business started I was not a battle
18 group commander. I became battle group commander in March and
19 the business started in December and it continued

14:46:13 20 from December '96 to May of '97. And even before I became battle
21 group commander, when Bockarie left Giema, at that time Bockarie
22 and I were living in the same house in Giema. So when Mr Sankoh
23 gave him the money and we went to Foya, I knew about everything.
24 When he went and came along with the ULIMOs, I knew everything.

14:46:43 25 We were together. So there was nothing that Bockarie was doing
26 that I was not aware of. I knew about the transactions. Even
27 the ammunition that they bought, he left them with me in Giema.
28 When the Kamajors and the SLA's attacked, he went and based in
29 Buedu to continue the transaction, and I was based at the front

1 line in Giema. He would buy the ammunition. There were times I
2 would go and pick them up. There were times he would send them
3 to me. And there were some other times he himself would come and
4 spend two or three days and he would return, until the coup
14:47:14 5 in May '97.

6 Q. Did you personally meet Varmuyan Sherif, Mr Sesay, or see
7 him?

8 A. Yes, I said we met in Koindu.

9 Q. Now, let's go through the same process with Mr Abu Keita.
14:47:33 10 Have you met him?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Where did you meet him?

13 A. Abu Keita, he used to do business with Bockarie and the two
14 of us met in Buedu, and from then we lived together in Buedu and
14:47:55 15 we lived together in Makeni and we lived together also in Kono.

16 Q. And during that time did you speak to Mr Keita?

17 A. Yes, Keita and I had close discussions. We kept companies
18 together from Buedu up until the time we went to Makeni and to
19 Kono.

14:48:20 20 Q. Did you speak to Abu Keita about the supply of ammunition
21 from former ULIMO fighters in Liberia?

22 A. Yes. In fact, that was what brought about the friendship
23 between Bockarie, Abu Keita and the RUF because of the assistance
24 that Abu Keita and the others rendered to Bockarie, selling the
14:48:45 25 ammunitions. Those are the relationships that made Abu Keita to
26 even come and stay with the RUF.

27 Q. From your position, from also your relationship with Sam
28 Bockarie during this period, from also the conversations with
29 you've told us you had with Abu Keita, the dealings with ULIMO

1 that the RUF had, was that with the knowledge and support of
2 President Taylor?

3 A. Well, in 1997 President Taylor did not know anything about
4 this because he did not have contact with the RUF. And even in
14:49:35 5 1998, the time that Bockarie sent Kennedy to Voinjama, when
6 Kennedy used to buy the ammunition from Titus, Bockarie did not
7 have dealings with Mr Taylor and, to my knowledge, Mr Taylor did
8 not know anything about this, and even in 1997, because RUF and
9 Mr Taylor broke up in '92. Up to '97 when this transaction was
14:50:09 10 going on there was no relationship. We did not know - he did not
11 know anything about that, and at that time ULIMO were enemies to
12 Mr Taylor.

13 Q. Now, let's stay with that period. Intervention,
14 February 1998 through to January 1999. During that period where
14:50:37 15 did the ousted members of the AFRC get their arms and ammunition
16 from?

17 A. The AFRC used ammunition from the - the captured ammunition
18 they got from ECOMOG. That was the only ones they used, because
19 - because from February that Brigadier Mani, SAJ Musa and their
14:51:12 20 groups went to the Koinadugu District when we separated in
21 Makeni. From that time up to January of '99, AFRC used - they
22 captured ammunition purely. That's what they used to fight.

23 Q. Now, you've already told us that the RUF were not involved
24 in the Freetown invasion, but help us, Mr Sesay. The ammunition
14:51:44 25 used by the AFRC to mount that assault on Freetown, where did it
26 come from?

27 A. That was the ammunition that they captured on their own.
28 That was what they used to attack Freetown. That was why they
29 went out of ammunition, because they were not getting supplies.

1 Q. As far as you're aware, Mr Sesay, did Charles Taylor send a
2 consignment of war materials in late 1998 for use in the assault
3 on Freetown?

4 A. No, that never happened. That never happened, because the
14:52:39 5 AFRC that carried out the attack on Freetown, it was just
6 coincidental that SAJ Musa died before the real attack, because
7 he was the one that led the troops from Koinadugu to Bombali
8 District to Port Loko District and to Waterloo where he died.
9 But SAJ Musa had no dealings with the RUF. We had no business
14:53:06 10 with the RUF. So that operation was a purely independent AFRC
11 operation. He had no orders from anybody, not Mr Taylor or the
12 RUF.

13 MR KOUMJIAN: The witness has not answered the question.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Well the words "no, that never happened"
14:53:35 15 strike me as being fairly clear.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please hold on, please hold on, let me
17 see. Yes, I think Mr Griffiths is right, the witness did answer
18 the question.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

14:54:42 20 Q. Yes. I want to move on now, Mr Sesay, please, to another
21 topic; diamonds. At the start of the invasion, Mr Sesay, in 1991
22 were diamonds a priority for the RUF?

23 A. No.

24 Q. When Foday Sankoh, or Pa Morlai, as you then knew him, was
14:55:46 25 training you and the others at Camp Naama, did he tell you that
26 the purpose - one of the purposes behind the invasion of
27 Sierra Leone was to capture and take the mineral resources of
28 Sierra Leone?

29 A. No, no. That was not the plan.

1 Q. Was there any mention of diamonds and other minerals during
2 training in Camp Naama?

3 A. No, we never discussed diamonds or gold or any other
4 mineral.

14:56:29 5 Q. Now, after the invasion was launched, what was the RUF's
6 attitude towards diamonds?

7 A. Well, honestly, the RUF had no focus on diamonds when the
8 war started in '91. And even when the RUF went to Kono in '92,
9 around January, February, March, when RUF was in Kono in '93 when
14:57:12 10 we were pushed out, RUF did not mine diamonds in Kono, no.

11 Q. So just help us, was that the first time that the RUF
12 controlled a diamond area in Sierra Leone?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And just give me the periods of time in 1992, now you say
14:57:55 15 19 - you say in 1992 around January, February, March, when the
16 RUF was in Kono in '93. First of all, which year was it that the
17 RUF first controlled Kono?

18 A. RUF went to the Kono District in October '92. And they
19 kept on fighting and they captured Koidu Town and advanced to
14:58:26 20 Sewafe and captured Sewafe. It was only the bridge that RUF
21 could not cross. So around November RUF was in Sewafe.

22 November, December, January, RUF was in Kono, until
23 around February they started pushing RUF up to March when RUF was
24 pushed out of Kono District. So during that time when RUF was
14:58:53 25 there, they did not do any mining in Kono. RUF did not burn any
26 houses in Kono at that time.

27 Q. Now, up until this time, around about 1993, were you aware
28 of Foday Sankoh or anyone within the RUF coming into possession
29 of diamonds?

1 A. No, I did not know about anybody who was in possession of
2 diamonds, because RUF was not mining.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment, please.

15:00:13

4 Q. Now, when was the next time, Mr Sesay, that the RUF
5 controlled a diamond mining area?

6 A. Well, I was in Kailahun when RUF attacked Kono again under
7 the command of Matthew Kennedy Sesay, that is in 1995, and RUF
8 was in Kono for about two to three months and they did not do any
9 mining there.

15:00:41

10 Q. So when did the RUF, as far as you're concerned, Mr Sesay,
11 first begin mining proper in Sierra Leone?

12 A. Well, it was in 1997 that I know that RUF actually took
13 part in mining in Tongo Field. After Sam Bockarie and the AFRC
14 had attacked Tongo and captured Tongo from the Kamajors they were
15 doing mining there.

15:01:27

16 Q. When in 1997?

17 A. I said in August. August was the time Sam Bockarie and
18 others attacked Tongo from Kenema. And after the capture of
19 Tongo they started doing mining. So they were mining there, the
20 AFRC and the RUF, including civilians, up to the time the
21 Kamajors re-attacked again and pushed them out of Tongo
22 in January 1998.

15:01:45

23 Q. So from August 1997 until January 1998, the RUF was
24 involved in mining in Tongo?

15:02:06

25 A. Yes, the RUF who were in Kenema together with Sam Bockarie,
26 they were doing mining in Tongo. But not all the RUF, because
27 RUF were in Freetown, some were in Makeni and some were in Bo who
28 was not involved in the mining.

29 Q. Now, when on the previous occasions the RUF had captured

1 Kono, why did the RUF not become involved in mining on those
2 previous occasions?

3 A. Well, honestly, at that time, Mr Sankoh did not focus that
4 much on mining. Because the RUF was fighting a war on their own
15:03:02 5 without any support from outside, we used to capture ammunition
6 from the soldiers. That was the ammunition that the RUF used to
7 fight with. So the RUF did not have any real focus on mining
8 issues. It was the time the RUF actually got idea on this idea
9 of mining and mining was as a result of the Executive Outcome
15:03:29 10 that they had brought, and when they came they took over Kono
11 straightaway. So it was - it was those people compared to the
12 RUF that the RUF too decided to involve into mining with the
13 AFRC.

14 Q. And when was it that the Executive Outcome were brought?

15:03:50 15 A. That was in 1995, when they came they deployed straightaway
16 in Kono and they were in Kono from that '95 up to '97.

17 Q. And just so that we're clear, what is Executive Outcome?

18 A. Well, it was a fighting mercenary group, a company that was
19 fighting alongside the NPRC government. They were hired
15:04:28 20 mercenaries. They had gunships, they had tanks, and they were
21 fighting against the RUF.

22 Q. When the RUF, you tell us, began serious mining
23 in August 1997 in Tongo, what happened to the diamonds which were
24 obtained?

15:04:52 25 A. Well, the diamonds - the AFRC were mining in Tongo and the
26 RUF too were mining there and the diamonds that they mined - the
27 ones they got, they gave them to Sam Bockarie and Sam Bockarie
28 used to sell them. And the others also, the civilian that he had
29 put in charge of the mining who was called --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the name was not clear to
2 the interpreter.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:05:31

4 Q. Pause. The interpreter didn't catch the name that you
5 gave?

6 A. The name was called Monpleh.

7 Q. How do you spell that, please? Mr Interpreter, can you
8 assist us?

9 THE INTERPRETER: M-O-N-P-L-E-H.

15:05:51

10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. And this man, Monpleh, where was he from?

12 A. Well, Bockarie had said he knew him in Kono even before the
13 war because Bockarie too had lived in Kono before the war, so he
14 said he knew him there. He said all of them worked for the NDMC.

15:06:16

15 He said he used to be his friend.

16 Q. NDMC, what does that stand for?

17 A. National Diamond Mining Company.

18 Q. Now, did Bockarie sell diamonds to anybody else at this
19 time?

15:06:33

20 A. Well, Bockarie and Kanneh used to transact business with
21 Lebanese people, they used to sell diamonds to the Lebanese in
22 Kenema. But the only thing is that I was not in Kenema to have
23 known the exact names of the people. But he used to come to
24 Freetown and he used to say that to us. He said some of the
25 diamonds that he collected, he sold them to the Lebanese.

15:06:58

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: That was Bockarie and who?

27 THE WITNESS: Bockarie and Eddie Kanneh, the SOS.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. SOS standing for what?

1 A. Secretary of State. He was the Secretary of State East for
2 the AFRC.

3 Q. So what happened to cause this period of diamond mining to
4 come to an end?

15:07:34 5 A. Well, like I said, the Kamajors attacked the AFRC/RUF in
6 Tongo and they pushed them out of Tongo. So they came to Kenema.
7 And in February '98 the attacks continued and they withdrew, they
8 went to Kailahun.

9 Q. When was the next time that the RUF had control of a
15:08:05 10 diamond mining area?

11 A. Well, the only time I know that RUF did mining again, a
12 mining to a certain scale like the one in Tongo was in '99.
13 Because the mining in Kono in '98 was a small-scale mining. And
14 even the man who controlled the mining confirmed that he only had
15:08:41 15 61 people who were mining in '98. And it was ECOMOG who was in
16 control of the whole of Koidu Town. So the RUF was just in the
17 outskirts of the town. And every other day the ECOMOG attacked
18 and the Alpha Jet too was flying over. So it was not an
19 effective mining kind of.

15:09:05 20 Q. Now, when in 1999 did effective mining recommence?

21 A. Well, when the RUF captured Kono in December '98 RUF -
22 RUF --

23 Q. Pause.

24 A. -- saw a lot of gravels that had been piled up in Kono that
15:09:32 25 the ECOMOG left behind.

26 Q. And so what happened?

27 A. So I said the gravel were many, they were in Koidu Town,
28 around Opera, Sahr Lebbie Street. They were many in Koidu Town.
29 So the mining commander informed Bockarie about the mining that

1 ECOMOG has done in Koidu Town. So Bockarie too instructed the
2 mining commander to wash the gravels and the mining commander -
3 by then I had left. I went to Makeni and based there. So the
4 mining commander washed those gravels for about three months.

15:10:20 5 Q. And who was the mining commander in that period?

6 A. Matthew Kennedy Sesay.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, to your question, "Now,
8 when in 1999 did effective mining recommence," what is the
9 answer?

15:10:39 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Let me try again, Mr Sesay. When did the RUF capture Kono?

12 A. It was in December '98.

13 Q. When did effective mining recommence --

14 A. Well, the washing of those gravel was in January '99. That
15:11:12 15 was the time they started washing those gravel.

16 Q. For how long did the RUF remain in control of Kono
17 thereafter?

18 A. Well, from that time the RUF controlled Kono up until 2001
19 when the RUF disarmed in Kono. And that was

15:11:40 20 around July/August that the RUF disarmed in Kono 2001, because
21 they UNAMSIL deployed around May 2001 in Kono.

22 Q. Now, let's just put Kono to one side for the minute.

23 You've mentioned the RUF controlling Tongo. Did the RUF
24 control Tongo ever again?

15:12:15 25 A. Yes. RUF controlled Tongo again in January '99.

26 Q. And for how long did the RUF remain in control of Tongo?

27 A. RUF controlled Tongo from January '99 to 2001, the
28 disarmament time. But no mining activities took place in Tongo
29 throughout 1999, from January to December. No mining activities

1 took place in Tongo. And even - even someone during my own
2 trials, because he - the person was a Prosecution witness, and I
3 do not just want to call names like that. The person was --

4 Q. What about that person?

15:13:16 5 A. I said, well, that person too confirmed this that I'm
6 saying, that throughout '99 no mining took place in Tongo,
7 because the Kamajors were attacking and there was air-raids going
8 on and there was threats coming from the Kamajors always. So no
9 mining took place in Tongo. And that is a true story, that in
10 Tongo, starting from January to December in '99, no mining
11 activities took place there.

12 Q. What about in 2000 up to disarmament?

13 A. Yes, mining took place there.

14 Q. Now, I want to now go back to the general topic.

15:14:10 15 During the period that the RUF controlled Kono,
16 from December 1998 through to disarmament in 2001, what happened
17 to the diamonds that were mined?

18 A. Well, from January '99 to December '99, the mining
19 commander used to report the diamonds to Bockarie, and Bockarie
15:14:55 20 used to sell the diamonds to the business people that - people
21 that I had spoken about in my testimony here, like Louis,
22 Michel -- I mean Louis, Michael and Carlos, Ibrahim Bah used to
23 bring those people, they used to transact business with Sam
24 Bockarie, including the two Lebanese men who were in Monrovia,
15:15:25 25 Fayard and Ahmed, they too used to transact business with
26 Bockarie. And after Bockarie had left, Mr Sankoh came from -
27 since then, the mining - since then, in December/January, the
28 diamonds that were mined, it was Ibrahim Bah, Michael and Louis
29 who used to buy them. And at the time they brought those

1 vehicles, they brought them to be able to continue to do further
2 business with Mr Sankoh. So since the time Bockarie left, up
3 to May, the diamonds that were mined, it was Mr Sankoh himself
4 that I used to send them to, after Mr Sankoh had come. Gibril
15:16:19 5 used to collect them and take them to Mr Sankoh. So since that
6 time up to disarmament, the diamonds that were mined, they used
7 to hand them over to me and I used to sell some and put it for
8 the interests of the RUF, the welfare of the RUF, the
9 transformation of the RUF. That was how I used the monies, the
15:16:43 10 funds, and most of my colleagues knew about it.

11 Q. So I want to deal directly now with that period. When did
12 you effectively start receiving the diamonds that were mined in
13 Kono? Give me a month and a year.

14 A. Well, from February, when I went to Kono, when Mr Sankoh
15:17:13 15 sent me there, that was the first time I started receiving
16 diamonds from the mining activities of the RUF. I used to put
17 them together. When Mr Sankoh sends Gibril, I will hand them
18 over to him and he would take them to him in Freetown. So when
19 Mr Sankoh was arrested in May - and May was in the rainy season -
15:17:33 20 there was no effective mining. So the small diamonds that I used
21 to get, I used to send - sell them for RUF activities.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
23 to slow down and continue from where I stopped?

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:17:53 25 Q. Mr Sesay, let's just take things slowly and carefully.
26 May, Sankoh is arrested, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Do you then become effect - are you then in effective
29 control of the diamonds being mined in Kono?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And remember, this is 2000 now, and you've already told us
3 that there was mining in Tongo in this period, yes?

4 A. Yes.

15:18:31 5 Q. Were you receiving the diamonds from both Tongo and Kono?

6 A. Yes, I was receiving the diamonds from Tongo and Kono.

7 Q. And just explain to us what the procedure was. Taking
8 things in stages, during your - this period, who was in charge of
9 mining in Kono?

15:19:00 10 A. During this time, it was Amara Peleto who was in charge of
11 mining in Kono.

12 Q. That name is on the record. What about Tongo? Who was in
13 charge of mining in Tongo?

14 A. Tongo, it was only the brigade commander who was there that
15:19:27 15 controlled the mining at that time. That was Colonel Gbanya.

16 Q. How do you spell that name?

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, could you assist, please?

18 THE INTERPRETER: G-B-A-N-Y-A.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:19:48 20 Q. Now, that individual, and Peleto in Kono, were they
21 required to keep records of the diamonds that were found?

22 A. Well, for those in Tongo, I don't know whether he had
23 records, but for those in Kono, yes, they kept records.

24 Q. And just explain the procedure from the time when a diamond
15:20:23 25 is found until it reaches you. What was involved at each stage?

26 A. Well, like for those times it was in the raining season and
27 mining was not effective, and the mining that was taking place in
28 Kono and Tongo was manual, it was not mechanised. So for some
29 areas, most of the minings were industrial mining. You would

1 hear about 50 pieces of diamond, but if they brought them to be
2 valued, they did not carry much value. So - and the mining was a
3 two-pile system. When they washed the RUF pile, they would hand
4 over the diamonds to the mining supervisor, and the mining
15:21:24 5 supervisor would take the diamonds to the mining commander, and
6 the mining commander, in turn, will report the diamonds to me.

7 Q. Now, those doing the mining in Tongo and Kono, were they
8 forced to mine?

9 A. No, they were not forced. The mining was a two-pile
15:21:54 10 system. If it was pit mining we would provide the shovels and
11 food, and the civilians who were mining would divide their gravel
12 into two piles. One pile would be for the civilian miners, and
13 the other pile for the RUF. And the RUF only had rights - or the
14 supervisor only had rights to supervise the pile that is meant
15:22:19 15 for RUF. After it's been washed, whatever they got there, they
16 would hand it over to the RUF. Once the miners got for
17 themselves, they would sell it to the Djula people, the Djula
18 men, because by then there had been so many Djula men in Kono,
19 Gambians, Guineans, Fullahs, Temnes. There were many there. So
15:22:41 20 at that time they were buying diamonds.

21 Q. Djula, how do you spell that?

22 THE INTERPRETER: D-J-U-L-A.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: And what does it mean? What is Djula?

24 THE WITNESS: Djula meant diamonds dealers, your Honours.

15:23:07 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Now, the transport of the diamonds from the diamond
27 supervisor or the commander to you, how would that be done?

28 A. Well, in some areas, if it was a pit, maybe it would take
29 up to two or three weeks or one month before they removed the

1 gravel, and after washing it, the supervisor who was present, he
2 would collect the diamonds and he would bring it to the
3 commander, the mining commander, and the commander, after putting
4 all the diamonds together after a week, he will report them over
15:23:54 5 to me. That was how it used to happen.

6 Q. And would you go to Kono or to Tongo to pick it up or would
7 they send it to you?

8 A. No. I was in Kono. The mining commander in Kono would
9 come to my house and hand them over to me, or the one in Tongo
15:24:15 10 would also come and give them to me. But I was not, like,
11 running after them for them to hand them over to me, no.

12 Q. And when you physically received the diamonds, Mr Sesay,
13 where would you keep them?

14 A. I used to keep them in my room. Sometimes I had a bag
15:24:39 15 strapped around my waist. I used to put them in there, and the
16 waist bag was always in my place.

17 Q. And did you have to account to anyone for the diamonds you
18 were receiving?

19 A. Well, yes, I was, so I'd been accounting to the leader.

15:25:09 20 But because the leader was normal and the RUF had so much
21 responsibilities, like medication, schooling, the welfare, all of
22 those things, I was responsible. So on behalf of the
23 administration and the welfare of the RUF, that was the money I
24 used, because, for example, like, when I used to call Alhaji
15:25:36 25 Modebor from Tongo, when we'd meet in Segbwema, sometimes he
26 bought the diamonds, if it were for 30, 40 thousand dollars, I
27 would make a list, I would ask the combat medics to write a list
28 of medicines, sometimes the medicines cost \$10,000; the rice
29 maybe up to 500 bags; sometimes about 200, 300 bags of salt;

1 cartons of Maggies. So those were some of the ways that I used
2 the money - the proceeds from the diamond.

3 Q. My question is this, Mr Sesay: Before using the diamonds
4 for these kinds of things, would you, for example, call up other
15:26:28 5 commanders and discuss with them, "I have these diamonds now,
6 they're about to be used for this, what do you think?" Did
7 anything like that occur?

8 A. Yes, I used to inform Kallon, I used to inform Superman at
9 the time he was present. At any time they sent to me that they
15:26:51 10 wanted - they needed some ration I would tell them, I said, "The
11 only thing I can do, I can sell the diamonds that I have." Yes,
12 I used to inform them about that.

13 Q. Now, before we go any further, Mr Sesay, I'd like you to be
14 shown a document, exhibit P-150, please.

15:28:10 15 Mr Sesay, could we, please, go to - well, let's start at
16 the front. In fact, it might be helpful if we looked at the
17 original of this, because the writing on the front of the book is
18 somewhat indistinct.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Manager, do we have the
15:28:51 20 original?

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, rather than waste time --

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think the original was a notebook,
23 wasn't it?

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I seem to recall seeing the original
15:29:30 25 notebook. Yes. Thank you very much, Madam Court Manager. Could
26 I have a look at --

27 MS IRURA: Your Honour, I'm checking if we have the
28 original. Your Honour, we do not have an original. That is the
29 copy in our possession.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: What you could do is to give the witness
3 a hard copy and then put another copy on the overhead.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: I am trying to --

15:30:32 5 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we only have one copy in our
6 possession; which is the exhibit.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Mr Sesay - and you may need to put your glass spectacles
9 on, if you need them for reading. Mr Sesay, can you help us with
10 the handwriting on the first page of the book? Now, you see the
11 line "name". Can you make out the name of the person?

12 A. Yes, I see Abdul Koroma. Abdul Koroma, Abdul Rahman
13 Kamara.

14 Q. I think you're looking at the wrong page. I am asking
15:31:38 15 about the cover of the book. Mr Sesay, if I can point out to
16 you, Do you see just there you can make out the printed word
17 "name" and there's a handwritten name beside it. What does it
18 say?

19 A. I think Captain Joseph something Bangura or - no, it's not
15:32:09 20 Bangura. Bakundu? It's not clear.

21 Q. All right. Next to the printed word "School" can you make
22 out what's written there?

23 A. "RUF mining - mining unit".

24 Q. And then just next to "Class", what do we see there?

15:32:43 25 A. "Black Guard".

26 Q. Thank you. And then I think the next line is fairly clear,
27 "Record, year 1999", yes?

28 A. Yes, "Record book '99".

29 Q. Now, can we go now, please, to the page which has the

1 printed number 8237, please.

2 Now, if we look in the top right-hand corner of this page,
3 Mr Sesay, do you see "Tongo Field production"? Do you see that?

4 A. Yes, I see it.

15:34:04 5 Q. And if we go to the page with 8241, do you see at the top
6 of that page "Kono production"?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, I should have asked you this: Have you seen this
9 exercise book before?

15:34:44 10 A. The one that was shown to me is different from this.

11 Q. Shown to you by whom?

12 A. The one that was an exhibit against me, it's different from
13 this. Because as far as I know, and that's the reality, nobody
14 can give records of diamonds of RUF mining in '99 because RUF was
15:35:22 15 not mining in '99. So anybody who has records of that sort, that
16 would be the handiwork of people who prepare false documents.

17 Q. Were you ever shown a record such as this, Mr Sesay?

18 A. No, the record that was presented in my case, that is the
19 mining book of Kono in '98, '99, that was what was shown to me.

15:35:58 20 But mining record book '99 in Kono - sorry, Tongo, there was
21 nothing like that. It was not shown to me. In fact, there was
22 no book like that for '99.

23 Q. Well, when you took charge of diamond production after
24 Sankoh's arrest, did your mining commander come to you and show
15:36:25 25 you a record of what diamonds were being produced?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Okay. Let's put that document away, please.

28 Now, the diamonds that you tell us which were given over by
29 Johnny Paul Koroma in 1998, where had they come from?

1 A. Those diamonds came from the AFRC mining in '97 in Kono,
2 because they used to mine in Kono and in Tongo.

3 Q. Could the witness now be shown, please, exhibit P-18. I
4 would like the witness's attention drawn to paragraph 72 in that
15:37:51 5 document. This is the United Nations panel of experts' report on
6 diamonds. Paragraph 72, please.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Did you say exhibit P-18 or P-19?

8 MR GRIFFITHS: It should be. It should be the
9 United Nations panel of experts' report on diamonds. 72, please.
15:39:21 10 Is it up on the screen? Yes, thanks.

11 Q. I want you to listen to this, Mr Bockarie [sic], and then
12 I'm going to invite your comment on it:

13 "Late in 1998 after the AFRC had been forced out of
14 Freetown by ECOMOG, RUF forces led by Issa Sesay, and under
15:39:48 15 orders from Sam Bockarie then referred to as chief of defence
16 staff for both the RUF and the AFRC, undertook a mission to move
17 former AFRC chairman Johnny Paul Koroma to the safety of RUF
18 headquarters in Buedu. While they were there, Sesay discovered
19 that Koroma was in possession of a parcel of diamonds and that he
15:40:17 20 was planning to escape to Ghana with his family. Sesay and
21 Brigadier Mike Lamin confronted Koroma, finding it hard to
22 believe that while they were trying to regroup Koroma would keep
23 diamonds for his own use and flee, leaving them with a problem he
24 had created. The diamonds were subsequently handed over to the
15:40:43 25 RUF leadership. According to RUF reports, the diamonds were then
26 given to Ibrahim Bah and sister Memuna and taken to Liberian
27 President Charles Taylor."

28 Now, first of all, was it you who discovered that Koroma
29 was in possession of diamonds?

1 A. No, I was not the one. I was not the one. In fact, we
2 were not the ones, it was not myself nor Bockarie or Mike Lamin
3 who discovered that Johnny Paul had diamonds on him. We
4 travelled from Kono to Buedu with Johnny Paul. And Johnny Paul
15:41:33 5 was with - with Mosquito in Buedu in his bedroom. He did not
6 tell us that he had diamonds with him. It was his own Chief of
7 Security, CSO, that told Bockarie --

8 Q. You've given us this account before, Mr Sesay. I'm not
9 trying to cut you short, but we recall your evidence on this
15:41:55 10 point, okay?

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. But the short answer is that you did not discover diamonds
13 on Johnny Paul Koroma?

14 A. No, I was not the one.

15:42:05 15 Q. The second question I'd like your assistance with is this:
16 What, in due course, happened to the diamonds handed over by
17 Johnny Paul Koroma?

18 A. Those were the diamonds that Bockarie gave to me to go and
19 meet Ibrahim Bah for us to go to Burkina Faso. Those were the
15:42:32 20 diamonds that I lost in Monrovia. Those are the diamonds.

21 Q. Where then in this United Nations report it is said that
22 "According to internal RUF reports, the diamonds were then given
23 to Ibrahim Bah and sister Memuna and taken to Liberian President
24 Charles Taylor." Firstly, as far as you're aware, are there any
15:43:02 25 such internal RUF reports?

26 A. No, no, no.

27 Q. Secondly, as far as you're aware, were those diamonds given
28 to Ibrahim Bah and sister Memuna to take to President
29 Charles Taylor?

1 A. Not at all. The diamonds were given to me by Bockarie. He
2 did not give it to Memuna, nor did he give it to Ibrahim Bah.

3 Q. Now, whilst we're on this page, could we look at a couple
4 of other things, please. Firstly, paragraph 67:

15:43:47 5 "The Revolutionary United Front initiated the war in 1991.
6 Until 1995, RUF diamond mining and digging was probably done on a
7 sporadic and individual basis. By 1995, however, the RUF and its
8 patrons were clearly taking a much greater interest in the
9 diamond fields of Kono District and had to be removed forcefully
10 at that time by the private military company Executive Outcomes.
11 From then on, the RUF interest in its diamonds became more
12 focused, especially with the 1997 imprisonment of Foday Sankoh in
13 Nigeria. During his imprisonment and subsequently, the diamond
14 areas of Kono and Tongo Field became a primary military focus of
15:44:27 15 the RUF, and diamond mining became a major fund raising
16 exercise."

17 In 1997, Mr Sesay, did the RUF control Kono?

18 A. No, RUF did not even have the deployment in Kono
19 throughout the AFRC time. It was the AFRC who had deployment in
15:45:20 20 Kono. RUF had no deployments in Kono. And the Mines Ministry
21 was purely controlled by the AFRC. They were the ones
22 controlling mining in Kono. It was not the RUF. For example,
23 like when the RUF had its fighters in Freetown, Makeni, Tongo,
24 Bo. They were not like that in Kono. They were not like that in
15:45:42 25 Kono and in Kabala. RUF had no fighters deployed in Kono with
26 the commander representing the RUF, no, representing them, no.
27 That's a lie.

28 Q. Did the RUF control Tongo Field in 1997?

29 A. Yes, both the AFRC and RUF, they controlled Tongo

1 from August, since the coup took place in May.
2 From May to August it was SLPP that controlled Tongo Field
3 because it was the Kamajors and the SSDs, they were the ones in
4 Tongo. So it was in August of '97 that the RUF/AFRC attacked
15:46:27 5 Tongo and the Kamajors were dislodged from Tongo.

6 Q. Let's now look at paragraph 71, please.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, what again are the SSDs?

8 THE WITNESS: Sierra Leone Police; it's a branch in the
9 Sierra Leone Police.

15:46:50 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Paragraph 71, now, please:

12 "In addition to being a source of revenue, diamonds have
13 also been a source of constant friction and confusion within the
14 RUF. In 1999, Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie, a former diamond digger
15:47:12 15 became the RUF's battle group commander and high command,
16 complained to Foday Sankoh that during the AFRC-RUF marriage in
17 1997, Denis Mingo, Colonel Superman, had sold a diamond to a
18 Lebanese businessman. A portion of the proceeds had gone to the
19 AFRC government and the balance, 9 million leones was intended
15:47:40 20 for the RUF. Instead, Superman embezzled the money, according to
21 Bockarie."

22 Now, is that accurate?

23 A. Yes, that is correct, because the AFRC had diamonds from
24 Kono which they sold. And from the money Johnny Paul gave
15:48:04 25 Superman over 9 million leones to go and give Sam Bockarie to be
26 distributed among the officers and Superman spends the money.

27 Q. Right. Now, I'm going to ask you for a second time for
28 good reason. The diamonds which you lost in Monrovia, where did
29 they come from?

1 A. Those were the diamonds that we took from JP.

2 Q. On how many occasions did you lose diamonds in Monrovia?

3 A. Only once.

4 Q. Let's now have a look at paragraph 74 in this document:

15:48:45 5 "Issa Sesay, the current RUF leader, has had his own
6 problems with diamonds. Late in 1998, Captain Michael Coomber of
7 the RUF mining unit brought a parcel of diamonds from Kono to the
8 RUF headquarters in Buedu. Sam Bockarie gave the diamonds to
9 Sesay, who took them to Liberia, where he was to meet Ibrahim
15:49:20 10 Bah. Together they were then to meet a business associate of
11 Foday Sankoh to make arrangements for the procurement of military
12 equipment. Sesay lost the diamonds somewhere in Liberia,
13 claiming he had accidentally dropped the parcel in the mud. This
14 led to a major contretemps between Sesay and Bockarie, although
15:49:47 15 Sesay was eventually forgiven."

16 Let's look at a couple of the details. When was it that
17 you made that trip to Monrovia when the diamonds were lost,
18 Mr Sesay?

19 A. It was April '98.

15:50:07 20 Q. Was it late in 1998?

21 A. Not at all.

22 Q. And the diamonds that you lost in Monrovia, had they been
23 brought from Kono to RUF headquarters in Buedu by Captain Michael
24 Coomber of the RUF mining unit?

15:50:29 25 A. No, no, these were the diamonds that we took from Johnny
26 Paul. They were the diamonds that Bockarie gave to me and those
27 are the diamonds that I lost. During this time Michael Coomber
28 did not bring any diamonds to Buedu, during this '98.

29 Q. Who is Captain Michael Coomber?

1 A. Well, Captain Michael Coomber worked with the mining unit.
2 He worked with Kennedy.

3 Q. Now, let's - having looked at that document, and don't move
4 the document too far, I'll be coming back to it - I want to go
15:51:36 5 back a stage now. Now, Mr Sesay --

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm a little bothered about
7 something I see in the transcript. I think the witness said at
8 page 143, line 13, he said: "During this time Michael Coomber
9 did not bring any diamonds to me". The sentence now reads: "The
15:52:02 10 only time that Michael Coomber did not bring any diamonds to buy
11 during this time is 1998." The exact opposite.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: To what was said.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I sincerely hope that these are the kinds
14 of things that will be corrected in the final transcript.

15:52:24 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Now, let's go back, Mr Sesay - now, Mr Sesay, going back to
17 what you told us about diamonds being brought to you when you
18 became effective leader of the RUF. Who did you sell those
19 diamonds to?

15:52:48 20 A. I said I sold diamonds to Michel through Ibrahim Bah. I
21 sold diamonds to people who were in Sierra Leone, like, first I
22 sold diamonds to Michel in October of 2000, and I sold diamonds
23 to Alhaji Bakoray [phon] in - on several occasions; Alhaji
24 Modebor in early 2001; Ibrahim Bah --

15:53:26 25 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this
26 one slowly.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. In early 2001, what about Ibrahim Bah?

29 A. Ibrahim Bah brought a man called Sammy, he was a Lebanese,

1 he said he was borne in Sierra Leone. And Ibrahim Bah sent Sammy
2 - he came to Kono, together with Eddie Kanneh. So when they came
3 to Kono, they were there for about five days and they returned to
4 Liberia. So I sold diamonds to him as well.

15:54:01 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Were there two different Alhaji's
6 mentioned?

7 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, ma'am. Two different Alhajis. One
8 was in Kenema and the other I used to visit in Kono, but he was
9 based in Bo. He would only come to Kono to transact business and
10 he would return.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you please slowly repeat the two
12 names of the Alhajis.

13 THE WITNESS: One is Alhaji Bakoray and the other one is
14 Alhaji Modebor.

15:54:37 15 MR GRIFFITHS: We had these two names earlier this
16 afternoon.

17 Q. Now, when did you first meet Michel, Mr Sesay?

18 A. Well, Michel - I met with them first in October 1999 before
19 I travelled from Buedu to Makeni, when Ibrahim Bah brought them
15:55:08 20 to Buedu to meet with Sam Bockarie, that was my first time to
21 know them.

22 Q. And by what route did Ibrahim Bah bring them to Buedu?

23 A. It was - he used the road from Monrovia through Lofa by
24 road. He brought the four-door pick-up that he used. He owned
15:55:38 25 it.

26 Q. And was Michel the only person who came with Ibrahim Bah?

27 A. No, together with Louis, because that was the same man, he
28 was called Michel and he was also called Michael. So that was
29 the same man. Michel, Michael, that was the same person. And

1 there was also the other man, Louis.

2 Q. How long did they stay in Sierra Leone on that occasion?

3 A. At that time they spent two days in Buedu and they returned
4 and that was the time I went to Makeni.

15:56:21 5 Q. Did you ever see Michel and Louis again?

6 A. Yes, I saw them again.

7 Q. When?

8 A. December '99 when they came together with Ibrahim Bah again
9 with a truck from Monrovia through Lofa. They came to Pendembu,

15:56:47 10 while Mr Sankoh used helicopter to Pendembu.

11 Q. From where? From where did Mr Sankoh come?

12 A. Mr Sankoh came from Monrovia, because he had come from
13 Freetown to Monrovia. From Monrovia the UNAMSIL helicopter
14 brought him to Pendembu, the UN helicopter. From Pendembu then

15:57:07 15 he came to Freetown.

16 Q. And this truck which came, was there anything in it?

17 A. Yes, it had mining equipment.

18 Q. Who had sent that mining equipment?

19 A. Those who brought it, they were the ones who brought them,
15:57:38 20 Ibrahim Bah, Michel and Louis. They were the ones who brought
21 the items.

22 Q. And where did those items end up?

23 A. They ended up in Kono.

24 Q. How long did the white men remain in Sierra Leone, having
15:57:58 25 arrived in December?

26 A. They were in Kono from December to late January when
27 Mr Sankoh visited Kono for the first time. The very day that
28 Mr Sankoh left Kono was that very day that they too returned
29 through Kailahun to Liberia.

1 Q. Now, could the witness please be shown - if we leave that
2 there for the minute, but could the witness now be shown exhibit
3 D-388, please.

4 Now, Mr Sesay, as you can see from the top of this
15:59:47 5 document, this is a document purportedly found at the residence
6 of Foday Sankoh in May 2000. Now, you've just told us that the
7 man, Michel, left Kono sometime in late January of which year?

8 A. Of 2000.

9 Q. Now, you see that this is a letter from Michel to the
16:00:35 10 leader:

11 "I am back in Washington. I got your fax on Thursday and
12 I'll go to the embassy of Sierra Leone this Monday morning for
13 this visa. As soon as I will get the visa I will fly to Freetown
14 to meet you.

16:00:53 15 Dear Foday, let me take a few minutes of your time to
16 explain to you what happened last week in Antwerp. As you
17 already know, I met my partner. You met his employee in Freetown
18 10 days ago. My partner is now decided to work with us without
19 any restriction. As I told you already, with him involved in the
16:01:14 20 picture, money is not an issue any more.

21 Important: The American, during the meetings in Freetown,
22 offered him to open a buying office in Sierra Leone. They would
23 like to see three buying offices working in Sierra Leone.

24 However, as my partner told me last week, all this could
16:01:41 25 take X weeks or months.

26 You do not have any time to waste any more, neither do I.
27 This is what we suggest: He will come with me to see you next
28 week, we will bring with us what you know.

29 Dear Foday, this meeting is very important. If Charles, my

1 partner, meets you and gets the confirmation of what I told him
2 already, based on our argument, he will be ahead full speed
3 immediately.

4 The problem: At this time, and after" --

16:02:19 5 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffith, that word was "agreement" and
6 you said "argument", which is a little different.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Sorry:

8 Q. "Based on our agreement, he will be ahead full speed
9 immediately.

16:02:34 10 The problem: At this time and after one year of efforts, I
11 did not get anything, yet you and I know it. But what is done is
12 done, let's forget it and move forward.

13 With Charles, we can buy. I am not talking about received
14 for free, the 10 per cent going to Freetown but also the
16:02:54 15 remaining 90 per cent in Kono.

16 In short, if we put together what we have, yourself,
17 Charles and myself, we can start immediately what we were
18 supposed to start months ago and all of us would finally make
19 money instead of losing money every day.

16:03:17 20 At this time, you and I are the big losers. I don't know
21 about you, but as far as I'm concerned, I am tired of it.

22 What we have to solve: How will you convince the people in
23 charge in Kono to bring everything to you instead of 10 per cent
24 and it is not possible. How are you going to convince them to
16:03:44 25 sell those 90 per cent to us instead of keeping it or selling it
26 to the Lebanese or whoever?

27 The other point: If we can buy it, how are we going to
28 ship it outside? Through Freetown is probably out of question.
29 Through Monrovia is not safe either, we cannot trust those

1 people.

2 Charles has the financial ability to do anything, a private
3 jet from Belgium to Kono or to Monrovia or Freetown or any other
4 solution.

16:04:22 5 With Charles we can do whatever is possible. It is now up
6 to you and me to find a solution.

7 Today, what I'm saying is this: The money is finally on
8 the table, you make sure that the merchandise is available one
9 way or the other and all of us will be okay.

16:04:41 10 At the minute the commission will be in place and we have
11 the final contract. Everything will be easier for us all but
12 please let's do something in the meantime.

13 The ambassador of Sierra Leone went to see Charles's father
14 in Antwerp yesterday. Don't forget he is the president of the
16:05:02 15 association for all the diamond buyers in Antwerp. Following our
16 advice, Charles's father told the ambassador that Antwerp was not
17 ready to do anything until the commission is in place.

18 Charles is already preparing the equipment you requested
19 last week."

16:05:25 20 Now, first of all, Mr Sesay, this Michel, do you know this
21 individual?

22 A. Yes, I know Michel.

23 Q. And as far as you're aware, was Michel in discussions with
24 Foday Sankoh about diamonds?

16:05:48 25 A. Yes, that was why Michel came with Foday Sankoh. They
26 drove by road from Monrovia to Pendembu and they drove from
27 Pendembu to Kono. And when they went there, they went back to
28 Freetown. Later they came to Mr Sankoh.

29 Q. Now, another detail. You spoke of some vehicles coming

1 into Sierra Leone from Belgium. Do you remember telling us about
2 that?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. When did that happen?

16:06:26 5 A. Well, that was around March.

6 Q. March of which year?

7 A. 2000.

8 Q. Just so that I'm clear, the men had - the white men had
9 left Kono - had left Sierra Leone in late January; is that right?

16:06:49 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And the vehicles arrive in March?

12 A. Yes, but they took him to Freetown. They came and met
13 Mr Sankoh there in March. There were people who were interested
14 in continuing with the business between them and Mr Sankoh. That
16:07:12 15 was what I understood.

16 Q. And now I want your particular assistance with another
17 detail. You were based in Kono at this time?

18 A. Of course, yes.

19 Q. Bottom of the page, please:

16:07:28 20 "How will you convince the people in charge in Kono to
21 bring everything to you instead of 10 per cent And it is not
22 possible. How are you going to convince them to sell those 90
23 per cent to us instead of keeping it or selling it to the
24 Lebanese or whoever?"

16:07:52 25 Now, who was in charge of mining in Kono at this time?

26 A. Well, around this time it was the RUF who were in Kono.

27 Q. Did the RUF allow anybody else, apart from RUF personnel,
28 to mine in Kono?

29 A. Yes, because around - no, no. It was only the RUF and

1 civilians who were around the RUF-controlled area. They mined in
2 Kono at that time. Although Mr Sankoh had other two Lebanese
3 guys who were based in Freetown. One was Jami I Sahid's son. And
4 he too had - he had two Lebanese men who were buying diamonds and
16:08:50 5 they were at the same time mining.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
7 to repeat that.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Could you go over that part again, please, Mr Sesay.

16:09:00 10 A. I said during this time, around March of 2000, Mr Sankoh
11 sent two Lebanese men from Kono and one was the late Jami I Sahid
12 Mohamed's son with whom they were doing business. The other
13 guy's name I don't know, I don't remember. But that fellow too,
14 he sent two Lebanese men in Kono who were doing mining, at the
16:09:28 15 same time they were buying diamonds. So they were in Kono until
16 after the arrest of Mr Sankoh when the UN problem had been solved
17 in Makeni and when Mr Sankoh had been arrested they told me that
18 they were going back to Freetown. And I said to them, okay.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, this name, the late Jami I who?

16:09:49 20 THE WITNESS: Jami I Sahid. He was a prominent Lebanese man
21 who had been in Sierra Leone before but he's now deceased.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Can you help us with the spelling of his surname?

24 A. Sahid.

16:10:12 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: So he was the son of the late Jami I
26 Sahid. This is the testimony, is it?

27 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. He was the one doing business.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, can you spell either of
29 those two names?

1 THE INTERPRETER: J-A-M-I-L, Jami I. Sahid is S-A-H-I-D.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, what I want your assistance with, Mr Sesay, in light
4 of what you've told us, what is this 10 per cent/90 per cent
16:10:53 5 split being spoken of here?

6 A. Well, I don't understand this 10 per cent/90 per cent
7 because what Mr Sankoh used to discuss with those people, he did
8 not tell me everything. The only thing that he told me that I
9 know was that the mining condition in Kono at that time was that
16:11:25 10 if the gravel was up to 100 buckets, it would be divided into
11 two. The 50 buckets would go to the civilians and the other 50
12 buckets would go to the RUF. And the 50 buckets meant for the
13 civilians, anything they got there, they were free to sell it to
14 whosoever. But this 90 per cent and 10 per cent, I don't - I
16:11:51 15 don't understand about this.

16 Q. Very well. Can we go back now, please - can we put that
17 document away and go back to exhibit P-18?

18 Can we look, please, at paragraph 86: "A Liberian is said
19 to be President Taylor's representative in Kono."

16:13:13 20 Who was President Taylor's representative in Kono, please,
21 Mr Sesay?

22 A. I never had anyone in Kono who was Mr Taylor's
23 representative, never. Starting from 1999 to 2001, I did not see
24 anyone in Kono who was serving as Mr Taylor's representative.

16:13:39 25 That is a lie.

26 Q. But the report goes on that that person had a mandate to
27 supervise diamond operations. Is that true?

28 A. No, no. The people who supervised the mining operation
29 were the mining commanders, and they were Sierra Leoneans, not

1 Liberians.

2 Q. "And on the RUF side, during much of 1998, Denis Superman
3 Mingo was in charge of the diamond operations in Kono. He
4 regularly took diamonds to the RUF headquarters at Buedu, and
16:14:18 5 from there they were transferred to Liberia."

6 Was Superman in charge of diamond operations in Kono in
7 1998?

8 A. No, no.

9 Q. Did the RUF control - when in 1998 did the RUF gain control
16:14:41 10 of Kono?

11 A. Well, from February '98 the AFRC and RUF were in Kono, in
12 Koidu Town, up to the time that the ECOMOG pushed them out of
13 there in May of '98. So ECOMOG took over charge of Koidu Town
14 and RUF were now living in the outskirts of the town, up to
16:15:08 15 December '98 when we finally came and attacked ECOMOG in Kono.
16 But during '98, they said in the mining sector there were 61
17 people and the man who was there with the people, who was
18 supervising, who was in control of the mining, he said he had
19 only 61 people who were miners. And I, too, confirm by that that
16:15:31 20 it was a low-scale mining that was taking place in Kono in '98.

21 Q. Who was in charge of those 61 individuals?

22 A. Can I ask for a pen so that I can write it, because he was
23 a protected person?

24 Q. Okay.

16:15:59 25 A. Because I have now forgotten his TF number.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness please be given a piece of
27 paper and a pen?

28 Q. I want you to write down the name, sign and date it,
29 please.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Could that document be marked for
2 identification, MFI-5, please.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: The piece of paper with a name written on
4 it will be marked MFI-5 and will remain confidential.

16:18:57 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, we're still looking at that same paragraph,
7 86. Was Denis Superman Mingo in charge of diamond operations in
8 Kono for much of 1998?

9 A. No. Superman was not in charge of mining in Kono, and
16:19:27 10 Superman never took diamonds to Bockarie in Buedu. It was only
11 at one time that Superman went to Buedu to see Sam Bockarie on
12 Sam Bockarie's instruction, and that was before Fitti-Fatta
13 attack. That was the only time Superman went to Buedu in the
14 whole of 1998.

16:19:47 15 Q. Where was Superman for much of 1998?

16 A. Well, February to early August, Superman was in Kono, and
17 from early August to part of December, he was in the Koinadugu
18 District, and in December '98, Superman was in Makeni.

19 Q. At various times diamonds were taken to Monrovia by Eddie
16:20:26 20 Kanneh, Sam Bockarie, and Issa Sesay, is that true?

21 A. No, it's not true, because the diamonds that I used to take
22 along with me was not meant for Monrovia. I was just to pass
23 through Monrovia. And throughout '98, I did not hear from anyone
24 that Eddie Kanneh took diamonds with him to Monrovia or Liberia.

16:20:56 25 Q. To your knowledge, did Sam Bockarie ever take diamonds to
26 Monrovia?

27 A. Sam Bockarie used to do business with two Lebanese in
28 Monrovia, and Michel and the other guy came, that other man also
29 - one man called Carlos, he too came. But the Lebanese with whom

1 Sam Bockarie had transaction, they used to come to Buedu, they
2 would meet him there, and they'd transact the business with him
3 there. That was what I knew about. But I did not know about
4 Sam Bockarie travelling with diamonds to Monrovia, no.

16:21:42 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, there is a matter at
6 page 154, line 19, where the witness stated that he had only six
7 - somebody had only 61 people who were miners. Now, the one
8 "minor", as written here, I think is wrong. It's not
9 M-I-N-O-R-S; it's M-I-N-E-R-S, as in people who go to mine.
16:22:12 10 Isn't that right, Mr Sesay?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, that was a title. The ones that I spoke
12 about in my testimony were the people who did the mining, the
13 miners.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you.

16:22:34 15 Q. Now, let's go back to this:

16 "There have been frequent disputes over the diamonds, and
17 RUF couriers travel in fear of being robbed by rogue Liberian
18 NPFL, National Patriotic Front of Liberia, fighters. At RUF
19 headquarters in Buedu, concerns have occasionally arisen that
16:23:08 20 diamonds said to be held in safekeeping by President Taylor might
21 actually have been sold. On one occasion in 1998, Sam Bockarie
22 went to Monrovia to see Taylor about this concern, and when he
23 returned, he reported that he had seen the diamonds."

24 Question one: Was the President of Liberia,
16:23:39 25 Charles Taylor, acting as a custodian for RUF diamonds at any
26 time?

27 A. No. I never knew about that.

28 Q. Question two: Are you aware of a visit paid by
29 Sam Bockarie to President Taylor in 1998, in effect to check - to

1 check out what had happened to the RUF diamonds?

16:24:30 2 A. No, I did not know about any such visit. I only know about
3 the visit during which Dope Menkarzon came and collected
4 Bockarie from the borderline and took him to Monrovia. At that
5 time, again, Bockarie went to Monrovia in October and
6 in November also, but to say he went to check on diamonds that he
7 had been keeping with Mr Taylor, I don't know about that, and I
8 never knew that Sam Bockarie ever gave diamonds to Mr Taylor for
9 safekeeping throughout the moments I was in the RUF-controlled
16:24:52 10 area.

11 Q. Let's go now, please, to paragraph 90:

12 "The Lome Peace Agreement appointed Foday Sankoh chairman
13 of a commission for the management of strategic mining mineral
14 resources. Between the time Foday Sankoh returned to
16:25:16 15 Sierra Leone late in 1999 and the resumption of hostilities
16 in May 2000, members of the commission never actually met, and
17 the commission did not function. During his time in Freetown,
18 Foday Sankoh spent money lavishly, although he had no obvious
19 source of income. He imported vehicles, satellite phones and
16:26:01 20 other expensive equipment."

21 Now, you've already told us about vehicles arriving
22 in March 2000, haven't you, Mr Sesay?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What about satellite phones?

16:26:16 25 A. Yes, Mr Sankoh had satellite phones.

26 Q. "In 1999, before Foday Sankoh's appearance Freetown, Sam
27 Bockarie wrote a 'to whom it may concern' letter on RUF
28 stationery, appointing Mohamed Hijazi, a long-time diamond miner
29 and dealing, as the RUF's agent to negotiate with any person or

1 company within or outside Sierra Leone for the prospecting,
2 mining, buying and selling of diamonds."

3 Do you know a Mohamed Hijazi?

16:27:11 4 A. Well, this is the man. Mohamed Hijazi and Fayard. This
5 was the Lebanese guy. But this Hijazi is the Lebanese guy. He
6 is Mohamed Hijazi. But the other one is called Fayard. But he
7 was borne in Sierra Leone. He was a native of Sierra Leone. But
8 during the intervention, he too escaped from Sierra Leone and
9 then he went and based in Monrovia.

16:27:31 10 Q. So when you say, "Well, this is the man", which man?

11 A. I mean Mohamed Hijazi. It was this second name that I did
12 not recall. But as I have seen it now, I recalled.

13 Q. So where was this Mohamed Hijazi based?

14 A. Mohamed Hijazi was based in Monrovia in '98 and '99.

16:28:03 15 MR GRIFFITHS: And can I assist the stenographer to this
16 extent: Mohamed is spelt in the normal way. Hijazi is
17 H-I-J-A-Z-I.

18 Q. Now, you say he was based in Monrovia in '98 and '99. And
19 the other Lebanese guy, what did you say his name was?

16:28:32 20 A. His name was Fayard.

21 Q. And where was Fayard based?

22 A. He too was based in Monrovia. These were the same men who
23 used to bring trucks to Kailahun, they buy the produce and return
24 to Monrovia. They used to bring food supplies by trucks and then
16:28:56 25 they returned. This is one of them.

26 Q. Let's try and complete this topic this afternoon. Let's go
27 to paragraph 80. Do you see the - what's said here is this:

28 "While the total generated by the RUF, whether it is 25
29 million, 70 million or 125 million, is very small in relation to

1 the global annual output of diamonds, it nevertheless represents
2 a major and primary source of income to the RUF and is more than
3 enough to sustain its military effort."

4 Mr Sesay, do you agree that the RUF were making these kind
16:29:56 5 of sums of money from diamonds sales?

6 A. No, this is a very big surprise to me. It's a big lie. I
7 controlled the RUF mining and I did not see in one bulk \$400,000.
8 This is a big lie. You know, the way people exaggerated these
9 things and tried to make news out of it, they had people - we

16:30:22 10 have people in Sierra Leone who are criminals. They dealt with
11 those blood diamonds, fake diamonds. Even at the time I had been
12 arrested and I was in detention, the SLPP government was

13 arresting those people. They knew about them. They were duping
14 people then from above. They used to collect people's monies

16:30:41 15 from Europe. They called on investors to come. They will say,
16 "Oh, we are doing business with the RUF. I am RUF
17 representative." They used to dupe people's money. I can give
18 you an instant that I saw. At one time --

19 Q. Pause, Mr Sesay.

16:30:56 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, the witness is talking
21 about a bulk. He did not see in one bulk \$400,000. Now, where
22 does this figure come from? Who is talking about one bulk of
23 \$400,000?

24 Mr Sesay, where do you get that figure from?

16:31:20 25 THE WITNESS: When I see millions of dollars - that is why
26 I just - it's just a guess. I'm saying that I never saw this
27 kind of money. RUF never made sales of diamonds to get 2, 3 or
28 \$400,000 dollars. When I see 20 millions here, 70 millions here,
29 even at my own time they did not bring such documents before me.

1 No.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. I think we've come to the end
3 of the day's proceedings.

4 Mr Sesay, as usual, you are not to discuss your evidence.

16:31:59 5 Proceedings are adjourned to tomorrow 9 o'clock.

6 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.32 p.m.
7 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 27 July 2010 at
8 9.00 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DCT-172	44537
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	44537