



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
v.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 27 AUGUST 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

---

**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Ms Doreen Kiggundu  
Ms Kate Gibson

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimicrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay Taylor:** Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Terry Munyard



1 efforts you had made towards building peace in Sierra Leone. Is  
2 that right?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. We see now here at page 31 commencing at paragraph 145 the  
09:33:31 5 heading "Contributions by the Government of Liberia towards the  
6 resolution of the Sierra Leonean crisis and the building of peace  
7 and stability within the Mano River Union":

8           "The Government of Liberia has remained a constructive  
9 member of the international effort to bring an end to the  
09:33:51 10 bloodshed, brutality and destruction inflicted on the people of  
11 Sierra Leone by the nearly ten-year-old fratricidal war. From  
12 her active participation at Heads of State level to her full  
13 participation at the level of the mediation committee of ECOWAS,  
14 coupled with her numerous persuasive interventions to prevent  
09:34:15 15 renewal of hostilities, Liberia has committed time and resources,  
16 the latter of which is very scarce, and as well as provided  
17 refuge to the numerous brothers and sisters fleeing the fighting.

18           Drawing on experiences gained in the resolution of its own  
19 crisis which covered a seven year period, the government has  
09:34:39 20 often found itself at odds with some influential nations in  
21 mapping out strategies that would enhance a speedy resolution.  
22 Most often than not, however, the Government of Liberia,  
23 demonised at the onset of these discussions, has prevailed to the  
24 extent that it is repeatedly invited to remain actively seized of  
09:35:07 25 the Sierra Leonean matter.

26           What appears to be the foremost point of divergence between  
27 the Government of Liberia and some members of the international  
28 mediation effort is the desire of some respected members of the  
29 international community to pursue a military conquest as opposed

1 to dialogue as the basis of the resolution of the conflict in  
2 Sierra Leone."

3 Pause there. What did you mean by that, Mr Taylor?

4 A. I'm referring to the British action, the delay in making  
09:35:45 5 sure that they start the process as has been laid out by the new  
6 RUF leadership. I'm also talking about the six months delay that  
7 is recommended by the United States in getting additional ECOWAS  
8 forces placed in the military theatre. I see these actions as  
9 obstructionist and feel that from all of the diplomatic points  
09:36:16 10 coming to us - and in these discussions you find diplomats from  
11 different countries coming in and saying, Look, we think that  
12 this is going to happen and that is going to happen. It is very  
13 clear that the big powers, Britain and America, have decided on  
14 the military option and I'm opposed to that and I will even say  
09:36:36 15 the committee because this is not the mandate of ECOWAS. ECOWAS  
16 is not mandating a military option, rather dialogue.

17 Q. "The government's repeatedly stated opposition is that a  
18 military conquest considerably dampens the process of  
19 reconciliation which is necessary to ensure that whatever  
09:37:01 20 settlement is derived will be long lasting. More importantly,  
21 the possibility of a spillover into Liberia and Guinea of such a  
22 military operation would continue to undermine the peace,  
23 security and stability of the Mano River Union states. The  
24 government remains fully cognisant of the fact that for these and  
09:37:24 25 other reasons stated above, it will continue to be the focus of  
26 hostility and condemnation by those members who wish to pursue  
27 their military adventurism at the expense of additional  
28 bloodshed, loss of lives, destruction of properties, and the  
29 insecurity of the entire sub-region.

1           In pursuit of the objectives of dialogue and an amicable  
2 resolution of the conflict, the Government of Liberia has  
3 maintained contacts with all the belligerent parties, often times  
4 at the behest of ECOWAS, the Sierra Leonean government, and the  
09:38:08 5 United Nations hosted and facilitated meetings between the  
6 parties to the conflict and even between elements of one  
7 belligerent group when it was self-evident that their quarrel had  
8 adverse effects on the peace process in Sierra Leone. The  
9 government also most hosted numerous mini summits of ECOWAS Heads  
09:38:35 10 of State in Monrovia attended by the chairman of ECOWAS and  
11 President Obasanjo, amongst others. A milestone achievement of  
12 one of these summits was the evolution of an interlocutory  
13 leadership of the RUF which pledged to unconditionally return  
14 weapons and other materiel seized from UN peacekeepers with a  
09:38:58 15 further commitment to enhance the building of confidence between  
16 the RUF and UNAMSIL, on the one hand, and the RUF and the Sierra  
17 Leonean government on the other.

18           But previously, in Lome, Togo, when peace talks under the  
19 auspices of the then chairman of ECOWAS, President Eyadema,  
09:39:19 20 appeared to be faltering, the Liberian leader was summoned to  
21 salvage the process. The role of the President and his  
22 participation in the ensuing discussions remains memorable in the  
23 annals of ECOWAS's history as the peace process was restored and  
24 sighs of relief permeated the talks. Most importantly, the  
09:39:46 25 notion was debunked that Africans lacked the capacity to resolve  
26 their own problems. Prior to the return of the estranged leader  
27 of the RUF, Mr Foday Sankoh, and the former chairman of the AFRC,  
28 Mr Johnny Paul Koroma, in line with the provisions of the Lome  
29 agreement, the government elicited and obtained their commitment

1 that they would work together to ensure the smooth and unabated  
2 process of disarmament and demobilisation of their forces, a  
3 further strengthening of the process of peace and reconciliation  
4 in their country.

09:40:26 5 When 500 UN peacekeepers were abducted by the RUF, the  
6 Government of Liberia was again called upon by ECOWAS, the United  
7 Nations and other members of the international community to  
8 intervene and mediate the unconditional release of the detainees.  
9 Having successfully concluded this assignment, the benefit of  
09:40:52 10 hindsight and the circumstances thereafter impose on the  
11 Government of Liberia the notion that this effort has not been  
12 fully appreciated by some members of the international community  
13 since, in fact, it substantiates their allegation that the  
14 Government of Liberia is the prime sponsor of the RUF.

09:41:14 15 Notwithstanding, all 500 abductees have been returned to their  
16 country of origin and reunited with their families.

17 It is instructive to observe that at the Silver Jubilee  
18 celebrations of ECOWAS, the authority of Head of States,  
19 including the Liberian President, spent considerable time in  
09:41:37 20 discussion on matters affecting the peace process in  
21 Sierra Leone. There was renewed hostilities taking place in that  
22 neighbourly country. At the close of its deliberations, the  
23 Heads of State resolved to announce a ceasefire, the withdrawal  
24 of all forces to lines established when the Lome agreement was  
09:42:01 25 signed, and the deployment of its troops under UNAMSIL into areas  
26 under the control of the RUF. The reasoned consideration of the  
27 Head of State was that a ceasefire would allow the mediation  
28 committee to investigate the basis for the breakdown and  
29 recommend remedial actions to ensure a compliance with the Lome

1 agreement.

2 This effort was opposed by some officials of the Clinton  
3 administration and Her Majesty's government and precipitated the  
4 visit to the region of Ambassador Thomas Pickering, US  
09:42:43 5 Under-Secretary for Political Affairs. After his meeting with  
6 the Liberian President, Mr Pickering, in a letter to the  
7 Government of Liberia, expressed support of his government for a  
8 ceasefire and a negotiated settlement of the Sierra Leonean  
9 crisis. The Clinton administration had earlier issued a  
09:43:09 10 "demarche" - what is that, Mr Taylor?

11 A. It's a diplomatic note that borders on a warning.

12 Q. "... in which it objected to ceasefire in Sierra Leone  
13 which was earlier declared by the authority of Heads of State of  
14 ECOWAS.

09:43:34 15 In response, the Government of Liberia provided proposals  
16 and suggestions to further the shared objective and requested  
17 assistance specifically to monitor its ports of entering and  
18 activities along the Liberia-Sierra Leonean-Guinean borders. No  
19 such assistance has reached the government, nor is there any  
09:44:00 20 reason to believe from the recent experiences from the Government  
21 of Liberia that the United States intended to fulfil this or any  
22 of the other promises made to the government and people of  
23 Liberia.

24 As a consequence of numerous consultations and diplomatic  
09:44:17 25 shuttles in the region, especially by and between the Presidents  
26 of Nigeria, Mali and Liberia, and after considerable delays  
27 awaiting the promised assistance, a ceasefire agreement was  
28 signed in Abuja, Nigeria, by the parties and international  
29 facilitators on 10 November 2000, establishing a new basis for

1 the continuation of the peace process. Again, and  
2 notwithstanding this achievement, assistance to facilitate the  
3 movement of troops from ECOWAS into areas controlled by the RUF  
4 to commence the withdrawal of the RUF from diamond mines under  
09:45:03 5 its control and the disarmament and demobilisation of all  
6 belligerent forces is yet to be provided to ECOWAS.

7 Additionally, the Government of Liberia, in an attempt to  
8 reduce the high level of suspicion prevailing on its frontier  
9 with Sierra Leone, undertook a mission to Freetown to hold  
09:45:25 10 consultations with the Sierra Leonean authorities on joint  
11 measures that could be taken to enhance mutual security,  
12 especially along the border. The two countries resolved that it  
13 would undertake joint patrols along the border commencing with  
14 the exchange and establishment of guard posts in each country to  
09:45:46 15 be manned by personnel of the security service of the other  
16 country. The two nations have appealed to the international  
17 community, especially the United States, for the essential  
18 logistical assistance to facilitate this important initiative."

19 Can I pause there, please, Mr Taylor. When had that  
09:46:09 20 agreement been made with the Sierra Leonean authorities?

21 A. I would put this - it's not a written agreement. I would  
22 put this to 1999 going - late 1999, early 2000, where we  
23 discussed and agreed verbally that this would be a good thing to  
24 do, where Liberians would operate across the border in  
09:46:40 25 Sierra Leone, they would operate across our border at security  
26 checkpoints too.

27 Q. "The response of the international community and the United  
28 States government remain the same as previously stated. Again,  
29 in an attempt to reduce mutual suspicion within the Mano River

1 Union, the Government of Liberia attended a one-day Mano River  
2 Union summit in Conakry, Guinea, under the auspices of the  
3 chairman of ECOWAS, the Malian President, Alpha Konare. Dr Ahmad  
4 Tejan Kabbah, President of Sierra Leone, was also in attendance.

09:47:18 5 A communiqué to improve relations within the context of the Mano  
6 River Union and assuage mutual suspicions was issued at the end  
7 of the summit. Regrettably, a third and most invidious invasion  
8 by Liberian insurgents from Guinea occurred soon thereafter.

9 Through it all, sensing the urgent imperatives to  
09:47:49 10 re-establish and strengthen bonds of friendship and good  
11 neighbourliness, especially within the context of the Mano River  
12 Union, the Government of Liberia hosted a Parliamentary summit in  
13 Monrovia. Although the absence of a Guinean Parliamentary  
14 delegation was conspicuous and while a number of positive  
09:48:07 15 attributes were derived necessitating a continuation of this  
16 intercourse, the desire of the Parliamentarians and the  
17 Government of Liberia is undermined by the unavailability of  
18 financial and other resources.

19 Returning to the imposition of UN Resolution 1306, the  
09:48:32 20 Government of Liberia wholeheartedly welcomes the resolution and  
21 informed the Security Council of the United Nations through its  
22 Secretary-General that it would ensure its fullest compliance and  
23 further recommended additional initiatives which the government  
24 believes would operate in favour of enhancing the compliance and  
09:48:52 25 monitor of the said resolution.

26 Cognisant of the responsibility of nation states for the  
27 protection of their territorial integrity and the maintenance of  
28 peace and security within the confines of its territorial limits  
29 as prescribed and accepted under the UN charter and international

1 norms and standard, Liberia was constrained to request the  
2 lifting of the arms embargo, which had been imposed prior to the  
3 holding of democratic elections.

4 It must be noted that the refusal of the United Nations to  
09:49:30 5 lift the said embargo after the elections precipitated ECOWAS to  
6 grant Liberia the right to purchase arms for self-defence  
7 following repeated armed incursions from without, in the face of  
8 international indifference to the aforesaid violations of  
9 Liberia's territorial integrity."

09:49:56 10 Mr Taylor, could you explain that part, "precipitated  
11 ECOWAS to grant Liberia the right to purchase arms for  
12 self-defence"?

13 A. Well, if we recall, all the way back in 1997, following my  
14 being elected President, ECOWAS lifted the arms embargo and all  
09:50:19 15 sanctions that she had imposed because it was ECOWAS that  
16 requested the sanctions in the first instance from the Security  
17 Council. ECOWAS then instructed the executive secretary to  
18 request from the Security Council that the arms embargo be  
19 lifted. The Security Council did not follow suit, but ECOWAS had  
09:50:44 20 not revoked her lifting of the arms embargo that she had imposed  
21 on Liberia, so we used that to the best of your abilities.

22 Q. So what is the situation then, Mr Taylor, where ECOWAS  
23 lifts the embargo but the United Nations embargo is still in  
24 place? Does that still allow you to purchase arms, or what?

09:51:14 25 A. Well, what we did at that particular time, in fact, a  
26 little later on, in fact, we are thinking about it at this time,  
27 is to look at the charter of the United Nations which provides  
28 for member states to defend themselves in the face of aggression.

29 Now, if New York is saying that the region doesn't know

1 what its doing, that they know it all, what we did was to invoke  
2 our rights under the United Nations charter under Article 51, the  
3 legitimate right to self-defence, and we actually informed the  
4 Security Council that we were going to bring in material for  
09:52:00 5 self-defence and that they had no right under the charter to deny  
6 us legitimate self-defence that they themselves have realised  
7 that Liberia was under attack from an invading force. And so  
8 what we did was, using what ECOWAS had done, we wrote them, we  
9 sent a list of the weapons that we wanted, and we told them that  
09:52:24 10 we are going to bring it in for self-defence, and they could send  
11 and verify.

12 JUDGE SEBUTI NDE: Mr Griffiths, could we have an indication  
13 of a time frame when this happened?

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:52:36 15 Q. When are we talking about, Mr Taylor?  
16 A. We are talking about 2001, where we are now.  
17 Q. Can you give us a month in 2001?  
18 A. Oh, I would say, this is a decision after consultation that  
19 happens about January, February, at the beginning of the year,  
09:53:00 20 2001.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we move on, can I deal with a  
22 matter of housekeeping, please, Mr President. You recall  
23 yesterday that there were questions asked about the appendices to  
24 this document. Well, I do have the original in Court and I  
09:53:19 25 caused copies of the appendices to be made which have been  
26 checked now, and we have complete sets of those copies now which  
27 we can use to replace what is in your Honours' bundles.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. We may as well  
29 do that now.

1           MR BANGURA: Mr President, may I say that I have - well ,  
2 what appears to be the original of the document that we were  
3 referring to and I have compared it with the copy that we were  
4 served with and they compare favourably.

09:53:58 5           PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. You've already seen the copy  
6 that's going to be distributed to us now.

7           MR BANGURA: The original of the response, public copies of  
8 some part of it is what has been copied out and is being  
9 circulated now, I'm not so sure, but what I have is the original  
09:54:21 10 of the response which we were served with originally.

11          PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. That was the whole response, was  
12 it?

13          MR BANGURA: That's right.

14          PRESIDING JUDGE: I take it that's what we are now going to  
09:54:32 15 get.

16          MR GRIFFITHS: What we've done is we've checked now with  
17 the original and we've produced faithful copies now of what was  
18 the original document.

19          PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you for that,  
09:54:49 20 Mr Bangura.

21          MR GRIFFITHS: I don't know if your Honours would like to  
22 have a look at the original copy. I don't know if that assists.

23          PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll take a look at the distributed  
24 appendices first. Was one of those available for the Prosecution  
09:56:27 25 as well ?

26          MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, we have copies for everyone. So what I  
27 suggest is that we discard what was initially provided and  
28 replace it with this verified copy.

29          Now, Mr President, I think what you will find is that many

1 of the difficulties identified by Mr Bangura quite correctly  
2 yesterday remain, but can I just invite attention to the index to  
3 the appendices, which is the page immediately after page 34 of  
4 34. Mr President, you'll see that in relation to each of the  
09:59:28 5 appendices, following the description of the item it tells you  
6 which pages of the original document have been appended. So  
7 that, for example, in relation to the Heart of the Matter you  
8 will see pages 5 and 13 and then when we look at the extracts  
9 from the Heart of the Matter article you see that indeed it's  
09:59:50 10 page 5 and then page 13. So that's the scheme of the document.  
11 I hope that assists.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. I understand.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, bearing that in mind, could I ask,  
14 please, that the preliminary response of the Liberian government  
10:00:11 15 to the report of the panel of experts appointed pursuant to UN  
16 Security Council resolution 1306 be marked for identification  
17 MFI-193, please.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's actually termed "preliminary  
19 reaction".

10:00:31 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Preliminary reaction, yes.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for  
22 identification MFI-193.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, what was done with that document?

10:01:00 25 A. This document was circulated to ECOWAS member states, OAU  
26 member states, diplomatic missions accredited near Monrovia, to  
27 as many sources as we could get them to.

28 Q. What about the Security Council?

29 A. We wrote a letter to the Secretary-General, detailing the

1 important aspects of our response along with the response and  
2 sent it to the United Nations.

3 Q. So you wrote a letter to the Secretary-General?

4 A. That is correct.

10:01:38 5 Q. But before we come to that letter, so far as the  
6 preliminary response is concerned, did that in turn elicit any  
7 kind of response from any international body?

8 A. ECOWAS became very, very concerned about this and they read  
9 the report, they read our response, had technical people in the  
10 secretariat look at it and they themselves - and I don't speak  
11 for ECOWAS, but most of the leaders questioned and actually  
12 agreed with some of the points that we had raised in our  
13 preliminary response. And then ECOWAS got prepared, because it  
14 was very certain then that something was coming down and we would  
15 get to know later on after they imposed sanctions, ECOWAS reacts  
16 because they are aware of their report and our response.

17 Q. Now, you say you wrote to the Secretary-General?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Can you recall when that was, Mr Taylor?

20 A. That letter to the Secretary-General, to the best of my  
21 recollection, went out, I would say, late January or early  
22 February - late January of 2001.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Could we look, please, in binder 3 of 4 for  
24 week 33. So if we put away now binder 2 and take up, please,  
10:03:21 25 binder number 3 for week 33.

26 MR BANGURA: Mr President, can we have an indication which  
27 tab the document can be found?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Tab 105. Behind tab 105:

29 Q. Is this the letter, Mr Taylor?

1 A. This is the letter.

2 Q. We see that it's dated 22 January 2001. It's addressed to  
3 His Excellency Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United  
4 Nations:

10:04:51 5 "Mr Secretary-General, I have the honour to present my  
6 compliments and on behalf of the Government of Liberia refer to  
7 the allegations as contained in the report of the panel of  
8 experts appointed pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1306  
9 (2000) paragraph 19 in relation to Sierra Leone. The report  
10 alleges that I and my government are engaged in and profiting  
11 from the sale of illicit diamonds from the Republic of Sierra  
12 Leone in exchange for the supply of arms and related war materiel  
13 to the Revolutionary United Front. According to the report,  
14 amounts received from these sales have been in excess of US \$200  
10:05:47 15 million annually for the last few years.

16 These allegations are grave, especially as they are  
17 directed against both the President and the Republic of Liberia,  
18 a respected member of the international community. Liberia is a  
19 founding member of both the League of Nations and the United  
20 Nations, the successor body to the League of Nations. My country  
21 is also a founding member of continental and regional  
22 organisations including the Organisation of African Unity, the  
23 Economic Community of West African States, the Mano River Union,  
24 and the non-aligned movement.

10:06:34 25 But most significantly, Liberia, the oldest independent  
26 African republic, has remained in the vanguard of the liberation  
27 and independence of the African continent and has maintained an  
28 active posture of resistance to acts of injustice, oppression,  
29 and tyranny, not only in Africa, but the rest of the world. This

1 historical struggle impelled Liberia to institute legal  
2 proceedings against the apartheid regime of South Africa at the  
3 International Court of Justice in The Hague. This is a proud  
4 legacy that I, the 21st President of the republic, will never  
10:07:22 5 besmear.

6 In December of 1989, cognisant of this legacy, I, along  
7 with other compatriots, launched a civil insurrection to  
8 overthrow a military regime which had earlier dethroned the  
9 constituted government and orchestrated the retardation of our  
10 nation. This action was one designed and executed when it was  
11 obvious that the junta was determined to maintain their hold on  
12 power against the wishes of the majority of the population. This  
13 movement, which commenced with less than 100 civilians,  
14 galvanized momentum and eventually engulfed the entire country  
10:08:09 15 and gained the support of the people.

16 The discipline and commitment with which we led the  
17 national revolt ultimately ensured our success at the national  
18 plebiscite in July 1997. Although Liberia's civil strife  
19 obtained over a period of seven years and assumed broader  
10:08:32 20 dimensions than we imagined, our leadership of the movement was  
21 firmly opposed to any act of mayhem, maiming, rape, and the  
22 amputation of individuals. Along similar lines the Government of  
23 Liberia is, therefore, opposed to and condemns all acts of mayhem  
24 perpetrated by the RUF or any other belligerent group in the  
10:08:58 25 Sierra Leonean conflict. It is the view of the Government of  
26 Liberia that those individuals engaged in such inhumane acts be  
27 brought to justice.

28 This government has never denied our knowledge of the RUF.  
29 However, we have always rejected, and continue to reject, any

1 claims that this contact is commercial or economic in nature.  
2 Quite to the contrary. Our relationship with the RUF and our  
3 corresponding security concerns have been both publicly and  
4 privately expressed to the British and the United States  
10:09:44 5 government, the United Nations and ECOWAS. Our contact with the  
6 RUF is an expected response to successive Sierra Leonean  
7 governments' active support and arming of Liberian dissident  
8 groups resident in Sierra Leone. Indeed, at the time of this  
9 writing armed Liberian dissidents are members of the official  
10:10:08 10 Sierra Leone Army and constitute almost 50 per cent of the  
11 Kamajors."

12 Pause there. Mr Taylor, where did you get that figure of  
13 50 per cent from?

14 A. Well, if the - we estimated that some 2,000 plus Liberians  
10:10:32 15 had been recruited by ECOMOG to join the Kamajors, and the  
16 estimated amount of Kamajors were about 4,000 or 5,000, so we  
17 think that most of those were Liberians that had been recruited.

18 Q. "... a pro-Sierra Leone government militia headed by  
19 Mr Hinga Norman, Sierra Leone's Deputy Minister of Defence.

20 10:10:56 These dissidents have stated and demonstrated that their  
21 objective is to overthrow the Liberian government by force of  
22 arms.

23 Since 1998, Liberia has sustained four massive attacks from  
24 these same insurgents, now from the Guinean side, in  
10:11:17 25 collaboration with the Guinean government. The loss of lives,  
26 displacement of the population, and destruction of the entire  
27 northern region of Liberia, have occurred without any  
28 condemnation from the international community. At the same time,  
29 an arms embargo, originally imposed by the Security Council in

1       1992 at ECOWAS' behest, is still in existence, although in 1997,  
2       with the inauguration of the democratically elected government in  
3       Liberia, ECOWAS lifted the arms embargo, and despite ECOWAS'  
4       recommendation to do so, the United Nations has refused. It is  
10:12:04 5       important to emphasise that the initial attack from Guinea  
6       occurred immediately after we complied with the international  
7       community demands, and under UN supervision, destroyed all our  
8       arms and ammunition left over from our civil war.

9               Mr Secretary-General, the well-known historical fact is  
10      that Liberia has always been a commercial point for Guinean,  
11      Sierra Leonean, and Liberian diamonds, attracted by the fact that  
12      the US dollar is legal tender in Liberia. This trade has never  
13      been government controlled, sponsored, or organised; it is  
14      carried out by the Lebanese, Indians, tourists, Mandingos, Julas  
10:13:00 15     and Fulas, ethnic groups with family links in Guinea, Mali,  
16     Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia and the Ivory Coast, who interact  
17     without regard to colonially established national boundaries.  
18     Liberia is indeed also a victim of this illicit trade and derives  
19     absolutely no benefit from same.

10:13:30 20               As earlier stated, the report claims the value of the trade  
21      by Liberia of illicit Sierra Leone diamonds to be in excess of US  
22      \$200 million annually for the past few years. Clearly, the  
23      movement of such large amounts of money over a period of time  
24      would necessarily leave a trail because the transactions would  
10:13:49 25     involve either cash, cheques or bank transfers. Each of these  
26     would have to be documented in the tradition of the venerated and  
27     reputable European banking system. It is reasonable to assume  
28     that if indeed I was or am involved in the sale of any diamonds,  
29     for that matter, the money trail would inevitably lead to me.

1           Consequently, I request the United Nations Security Council  
2 establish a blue ribbon panel to investigate and determine my  
3 ownership, if any, of any large personal funds as a result of  
4 diamond trade in banks of any member state up to the time of  
10:14:39 5 publication of the report by the panel of experts and, by this  
6 declaration, waive all rights of non-disclosure to all banking  
7 institutions. In the event it is determined that I own large  
8 personal funds in any foreign accounts, the information should be  
9 made public, the funds confiscated and transferred to the  
10:15:03 10 Liberian people. I have informed the Liberian national  
11 legislature and the people of Liberia that in the event this is  
12 found to be true, I shall resign my position as President of the  
13 Republic of Liberia."

14           Pause there. Mr Taylor, did the United Nations ever set up  
10:15:24 15 such a blue ribbon panel?

16 A.       No, they did not.

17 Q.       And you are saying there that you were effectively waiving  
18 any right to non-disclosure of your private banking details?

19 A.       Everything, yes. That's what I'm saying.

10:15:42 20 Q.       And tell me, since this date, 22 January 2001, when you  
21 made this declaration, are you aware of any investigation being  
22 conducted with regard to your finances?

23 A.       Yes, I am aware. Subsequent to this letter and some time  
24 later, not a blue ribbon panel, but what the Security Council  
10:16:08 25 passed a resolution what they say putting a freeze on all assets  
26 and bank accounts and to search for this money, which they  
27 started doing since 2001. And until today, you only hear the  
28 flag of "He's got billions." But until today - and I'm still  
29 waiting for it - there's not been one iota of evidence. But that

1 panel --

2 Q. Eight years later?

3 A. Yes. Yes.

4 Q. "However and correspondingly, I would expect and assume  
10:16:41 5 that having provided the United Nations Security Council this  
6 unique and unprecedented authorisation, the council will utilise  
7 this opportunity and expeditiously confirm the allegations of the  
8 panel of experts or publicly exonerate me and the Government of  
9 Liberia.

10:17:03 10 I request that you circulate this letter to members of the  
11 Security Council as a document of council."

12 Yes, Mr Taylor.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, did you obtain a response from the Secretary-General  
10:17:15 15 to that letter?

16 A. No, I did not.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I have a moment, please, Mr President.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

20 Q. Now, the panel of experts report, Mr Taylor, implicated  
21 other countries apart from Liberia in the events taking place and  
22 unfolding in Sierra Leone, did it not?

23 A. Yes, it did.

24 Q. Including, in particular, certain eastern European  
10:18:03 25 countries which were said to be the source of the arms being used  
26 by the RUF in Sierra Leone?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, was there any reaction from any of those countries to  
29 that allegation?

1 A. Yes. One of the countries involved, the Ukraine, had its  
2 ambassador at the United Nations respond officially before the  
3 council in dealing with the accusation.

4 Q. Yes. And did you see that response?

10:18:35 5 A. Yes, I have a copy of the response as part of my papers.

6 Q. Have a look behind divider 106, please. What is that  
7 document, Mr Taylor?

8 A. This is the response of the permanent representative of  
9 Ukraine to the United Nations before the council on the issue of  
10 arms.

11 Q. Now, we see that the document is entitled --

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I move on, could I ask, please, that  
13 the letter to Kofi Annan from Charles Taylor, President, as he  
14 then was, dated 22 January 2001, be marked for identification

10:19:36 15 MFI -194.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for  
17 identification MFI -194.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

19 Q. Let's go back behind divider 106, Mr Taylor. We see that  
10:20:17 20 this document is entitled "Statement by Ambassador Mr Valeriy  
21 Kuchinsky, Acting Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the  
22 United Nations, at the Meeting of the Security Council on the  
23 Report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and  
24 Arms", and it's dated 25 January 2001:

10:20:43 25 "Thank you, Mr President.

26 At the outset, we would like to thank the Presidency for  
27 convening this meeting. It provides an important opportunity for  
28 the council to listen to the views of the member states and to  
29 take them duly into account before it takes appropriate action.

1 Our thanks also go to Ambassador Chowdhury, chairman of the  
2 Sierra Leone sanctions committee, for presenting the report. I  
3 wish to take this opportunity to reassure that Ukraine will  
4 continue to support the activities of the committee and to  
10:21:26 5 contribute to the collective efforts of the international  
6 community to ensure that the measures taken by the Security  
7 Council produce tangible results.

8 We particularly welcome the participation of the members of  
9 the panel of experts on Sierra Leone arms and diamonds at this  
10:21:43 10 meeting. We would also like to commend their work in preparing  
11 an extensive and comprehensive report, which embraces important  
12 aspects of the implementation of the Sierra Leone sanctions. At  
13 all stages of the panel's work, including during the visit of a  
14 member of the panel to Ukraine, our government fully cooperated  
10:22:08 15 with the panel of experts in the fulfillment of their mandate.  
16 Ukraine is prepared to continue maintaining such level of  
17 cooperation in the sanctions committee.

18 My delegation attaches particular importance to the  
19 consideration of the report of the panel of experts on  
10:22:29 20 Sierra Leone, both by the sanctions committee, which is entrusted  
21 to consider the information concerning violations, and to  
22 recommend appropriate measures in response thereto by the  
23 Security Council. We also believe that active involvement of  
24 other member states in this process will be extremely useful for  
10:22:52 25 the comprehensive, all-around examination of various issues  
26 raised in the report.

27 The report and the findings of the experts represent an  
28 important source of information with regard to the ways and means  
29 of sanctions violations and the sources of illegal financing of

1 the RUF activities. We commend the efforts of the panel to  
2 address these issues and consider the recommendations of the  
3 experts as valuable terms of reference for consideration by the  
4 council. We also note as a positive development that a number of  
10:23:34 5 measures and initiatives stemming from the recommendations of the  
6 experts, including in the field of diamonds certification and  
7 trade, arms, air traffic control, have already been taken by the  
8 countries in the region. In this connection, I would like to  
9 draw the attention to the recent decisions by the Liberian  
10:23:58 10 government to ground all Liberian registered aircraft and its  
11 proposal to establish for Liberia a United Nations-supervised  
12 monitoring regime for diamonds and arms trade."

13 Pause there. Mr Taylor, had all Liberian registered  
14 aircraft been grounded?

10:24:22 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. "As we understand, further measures are being considered at  
17 the regional level by ECOWAS member states. All these  
18 developments clearly demonstrate that the work of the panel and  
19 its report has already had a visible effect on the turn of events  
10:24:55 20 around the Sierra Leone conflict, and there is hope that these  
21 developments, coupled with the responsible approach by the  
22 Security Council, will help to advance the peace process in  
23 Sierra Leone."

24 Now, Mr Taylor, help us, when were all the Liberian  
10:25:19 25 registered aircraft grounded?

26 A. The report comes out in around about December, so almost  
27 immediately thereafter we, that would be by early January - we  
28 then order that all aircrafts bearing the EL number globally be  
29 grounded and the process is a process of announcements where we

1 inform our embassies in all of these countries of origin of the  
2 aircrafts, where the aircrafts are. They are registered under  
3 Liberia but they are stationed in those countries, that  
4 effectively they are grounded until the process is served. So I  
10:26:02 5 would put that to early 2001.

6 Q. And why was that decision taken?

7 A. Well, we admit that a lot of the registrations that people  
8 were claiming were registrations that were done not during my  
9 administration, but were still functioning and some of them in  
10 fact were bogus that people were using so we did not know the  
11 legitimate ones issued by my government as opposed to the  
12 illegitimate ones that had been issued by preceding national  
13 unity governments during the crisis.

14 So what we sought to do to figure it all out was to say,  
10:26:46 15 "Fine, we'll ground everything then order the Ministry of  
16 Transportation to review each aircraft certificate individually."  
17 And so it was necessary to ground everyone until we figured out  
18 which were the good ones and which were the bad certificates.

19 Q. Well, I guess the obvious question which follows then,  
10:27:05 20 Mr Taylor, is this: Why had it taken your government so long to  
21 take action on that?

22 A. Well, we had received no reports of any violation. It's  
23 not a matter of long. Once there are no complaints, what they  
24 say is if it's not broken don't fix it. We had received no  
10:27:28 25 complaints of any violation of the Liberian licence anywhere. In  
26 case there is a complaint we investigate. If there's no  
27 complaint then we do not investigate. But once there is a  
28 complaint we move in and this is a situation where the Ministry  
29 of Transport has jurisdiction over this matter, so we did.

1 Q. And who issued the directive that the planes be grounded?

2 A. I as President.

3 Q. And, as a practical matter, could Liberia enforce the  
4 grounding of those aircraft?

10:27:58 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. How?

7 A. Under the aviation agreements with member states in Africa,  
8 if we say that all Liberian EL numbers must be grounded the air  
9 traffic control of those countries, any time there is a call for  
10 any of those aircrafts to take off they would not give them the  
11 right to take off.

12 Q. Now, explain to us, please, EL number, does that denote a  
13 Liberian aircraft?

14 A. Yes. All aircrafts in the world have these numbers. I  
15 don't know what the other countries did. I don't know many of  
16 the other countries, but EL stands for Liberia. I know the  
17 Liberian one. All of these countries have the first  
18 documentation of aircrafts preceded by letters. There are two  
19 letters and those letters will state the country. If you know -  
20 if you look on a chart, it will tell you. It may be - if it's MO  
21 it would be a particular country. You would know almost  
22 immediately.

23 Q. Right.

24 A. Yes.

10:29:09 25 Q. Let's go back to the document, please:

26 "At the same time I have to state that a number of the  
27 experts' recommendations have rather controversial character and  
28 they should be looked at from the point of view of their  
29 consistency with both the original mandate of the panel and with

1 the work being done in other fora."

2 What did you understand that to mean, Mr Taylor?

3 A. That even the Ukraine is questioning some of the  
4 recommendations that are contained and even the information  
10:29:49 5 contained in the report. They too are concerned that there's  
6 inconsistency.

7 Q. "As an example, let me refer to the recommendation  
8 contained in paragraph 262, which suggests that consideration  
9 could be given to the Security Council's embargo on weapons  
10 exports from specific producer countries until internationally  
11 acceptable certification schemes have been developed. We are  
12 convinced that this issue, as well as a number of other issues of  
13 general or global nature, should be dealt with in the specific  
14 competent forums. In this regard, we would like to recall the  
15 idea that was initially put forward by Ukraine regarding the  
16 convening of an international experts' meeting of major  
17 arms-producing countries with a view to elaborating effective  
18 measures to prevent the reselling of arms from end-users to third  
19 parties."

10:30:57 20 And again, Mr Taylor, what did you understand by that point  
21 the ambassador is seeking to make?

22 A. Well, my understanding is that the ambassador is actually  
23 saying that this panel of experts and this group that is out -  
24 it's not clothed with the expertise to deal at depth with the  
10:31:17 25 issues that they have dealt with and come up with these kinds of  
26 recommendations when there are really expert groups in different  
27 fora that can better do it. And in fact, that the mandate in  
28 fact we still hold was not to go as far as they went. So I think  
29 they also see that additional work must be done to get to the

1 bottom of this thing and come up with a reasonable set of  
2 recommendations. That's why he talks about specific competent  
3 forum.

4 Q. Over the page, please:

10:31:55 5 "I should also note in this context the ongoing work in the  
6 preparatory committee for the United Nations conference on the  
7 illicit trade in small arms and light weapons as well as the  
8 anticipated convening in Budapest this April of a meeting on  
9 small arms. A similar observation could be made with regard to  
10 the recommendation regarding the establishment of a global  
11 certification scheme for diamonds as well as some other  
12 recommendations.

13 Let me now turn to several points in the report where my  
14 country is specifically referred to. The relevant comments were  
10:32:37 15 made by our delegations in the sanctions committee, so I will  
16 just briefly recall some of them.

17 The panel extensively looked into the case of Burkina Faso  
18 delivery of Ukrainian weapons in 1999. The report confirms that  
19 a Ukrainian licence for sale of the weaponry was granted after  
10:33:00 20 the Ukrainian authorities had received an authentic end-user  
21 certificate from the Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso. In  
22 this regard, I wish to recall that as far as in April 1999  
23 Ukraine, on its own initiative, and later on in June 1999,  
24 provided to the Sierra Leone sanctions committee, following  
10:33:24 25 thorough investigation in Ukraine, a detailed information related  
26 to the above shipment. The results of the investigation  
27 undertaken by the competent authorities of Ukraine, proved that  
28 the above delivery was made in full compliance with the  
29 legislation of Ukraine and the relevant requirements of the

1 Security Council resolution. The Government of Ukraine on  
2 several occasions expressed its grave concern at the reports that  
3 that shipment had been subsequently re-exported in violation of  
4 the respective resolutions of the Security Council.

10:34:03 5 As to the references in the report to the mercenary  
6 activities of the Ukrainian nationals, I wish to confirm that my  
7 delegation formally requested the committee's assistance in  
8 obtaining all information in possession of the panel to  
9 facilitate criminal investigation of the facts by Ukraine. The  
10 committee has also been informed that mercenary activities are  
11 prohibited under Ukrainian law" - and they were also prohibited  
12 under Liberia law, weren't they, Mr Taylor?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. "... which provides for criminal Prosecution against  
10:34:44 15 offenders. In this context I wish to recall that my government  
16 is providing over 500 peacekeepers and 400 APCs and trucks to the  
17 UN mission in Sierra Leone."

18 APCs, armoured personnel carriers?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. "This is a concrete illustration of Ukraine's commitment to  
21 assist the Government of Sierra Leone and the international  
22 community in bringing peace and stability to this war-torn  
23 country.

24 A few words regarding the working methods of the panel. My  
10:35:20 25 delegation strongly believes that in order to ensure the highest  
26 standards of credibility and effectiveness of the work of the  
27 experts, the following aspects should be given the highest  
28 priority: The mandate should be pursued in close cooperation and  
29 consultations with the governments concerned. In other words,

1 all relevant evidence should be brought to the attention of the  
2 governments so that they would have the opportunity to provide  
3 their replies and other relevant information to the experts at  
4 the time the report is being prepared."

10:36:03 5 What do you understand by that paragraph, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Well, my understanding is that one should be confronted  
7 with any accusation and given an opportunity to respond to it.  
8 And that was not done in our case.

9 Q. And this is the point being made by the Ukrainian  
10 ambassador?

11 A. Exactly.

12 Q. "Any statements or reports should be based on thoroughly  
13 investigated and corroborated facts; the highest degree of  
14 credibility should be extended to governments that bear the main  
15 responsibility for compliance with the charter of the United  
16 Nations and the resolutions of the Security Council.

17 I would like to reiterate Ukraine's adherence to  
18 strengthening the effectiveness of the sanctions regime as an  
19 important tool to curtail the RUF's abilities to wage war. We  
20 are ready to work closely and actively in the council on the  
21 elaboration of workable measures to achieve this objective."

22 Now, Mr Taylor, tell me, was Liberia the only nation  
23 concerned by the import of the panel of experts report?

24 A. Well, so far I'm not aware of any other nations. They  
25 could have, but we were only aware of this official one by the  
26 Ukraine. And I'm sure they protested. I'm sure they did.

27 Q. And tell me, what was the attitude of ECOWAS leaders to the  
28 recommendations of the report?

29 A. The ECOWAS leaders did not hesitate. Immediately they

1 requested that the council take no action against Liberia and  
2 requested time to further consult on the matter.

3 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: What council would that be?

4 THE WITNESS: The Security Council, your Honour. The  
10:38:14 5 Security Council of the United Nations.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. When you say that they requested time to further consult on  
8 the matter, who is "they"?

9 A. ECOWAS requested the executive secretary to convey to the  
10:38:32 10 Security Council of the United Nations that no action be taken to  
11 Liberia. In fact saying, "We are on the ground. We're looking  
12 at this. If there's anything, we will give you our input on what  
13 we think should be the appropriate action."

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before I move on could I ask, please,  
10:38:54 15 that the statement by ambassador Mr Valeriy Kuchinsky, acting  
16 permanent representative of the Ukraine to the United Nations at  
17 the meeting of the Security Council on the report of the panel of  
18 experts on Sierra Leone diamonds and arms dated 25 January 2001  
19 be marked for identification, please, MFI -195.

10:39:17 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI -195.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now you say, Mr Taylor, that ECOWAS tried to secure a  
23 delay, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

10:39:41 25 Q. How do you know this?

26 A. That was discussed in a meeting but it was subsequently  
27 reported by the ECOWAS and the Pan-African - it was copied from  
28 ECOWAS by the Pan-African News Agency.

29 Q. And have you seen a report prepared by them?

1 A. Yes, I have seen it. I had a copy of it.

2 Q. Have a look behind divider 107, please. Have you seen that  
3 document before, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes, this is the document.

10:40:22 5 Q. So this is the Pan-African News Agency report, right?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Rather challenging on the eyesight, but let's try and do  
8 our best. "West Africa: ECOWAS asks UN to delay sanctions on  
9 Liberia." This is dated 13 February 2001.

10:40:55 10 Can we just pause there, Mr Taylor. Now, following the  
11 publication of the panel of experts report in December, what had  
12 the United Nations or the Security Council decided to do about  
13 the recommendations in the report?

14 A. Impose sanctions.

10:41:14 15 Q. And when did you first become aware that they had decided  
16 to take such action?

17 A. By mid to late January, it was all being crafted. It was  
18 all being crafted. Different levels of the document were being  
19 circulated. What happens at the UN, when the resolution or  
10:41:41 20 important document is coming out, they would circulate drafts, so  
21 the drafts were being circulated. At that time, if you were a  
22 member state, you know that you are in - there is action right  
23 around the corner. We had seen the draft. We had brought this  
24 matter before our colleagues in ECOWAS, so they decided to act  
25 immediately. But we had seen the draft.

26 Q. Okay:

27 "New York, United Nations. A ministerial delegation of the  
28 West African regional grouping, ECOWAS, met with the UN Security  
29 Council in New York on Monday and asked for a two-month delay of

1 a resolution proposing sanctions on Liberia."

2 Tell me, Mr Taylor, had the ECOWAS ministerial delegation  
3 who made this proposal discussed the matter with you before they  
4 made this request at the United Nations?

10:42:48 5 A. Not directly, no. This is an ECOWAS decision. No, they  
6 did not discuss it with me personally, but they discussed it with  
7 all of us.

8 Q. And the reason I ask is this: Was there a particular basis  
9 for the request for a two-month delay?

10:43:08 10 A. Well, what normally happens in these diplomatic  
11 arrangements, this two-months delay will be sufficient time for  
12 diplomatic manoeuvres, where heads of governments and Heads of  
13 State will individually contact the members of the permanent  
14 five. Within that two months, this is just buying time to calm  
10:43:33 15 the storm. This is what - it could have been one month, it would  
16 have been three months, but they just figured that it would take  
17 about two months. This is a ministerial delegation.

18 After that, the Heads of State would then get involved by  
19 directly calling and lobbying - I would really call it lobbying -  
10:43:55 20 permanent members, and especially the two members that are  
21 pushing this, to leave us. "We are on the ground. We don't  
22 agree with what is being said in this report. Let's cool it and  
23 do some more work." I think is why they suggest two months, but  
24 it could be any number of months.

10:44:15 25 Q. "But Pan-African News Agency learned that many Security  
26 Council members, particularly the five permanent members, spoke  
27 strongly in support of sanctions against Liberia."

28 Was that your understanding, Mr Taylor?

29 A. That was not my understanding. That was not my

1 understanding. Some of these countries are not aggressive like  
2 that, no.

3 Q. Well, just for the assistance of a wider audience outside  
4 who might not be aware of these things, Mr Taylor, who are the  
10:44:47 5 five permanent members of the Security Council?

6 A. You have the - in Europe, there are three. You have  
7 Britain, France and Russia. In North America, you have one;  
8 United States. In Asia, you have one; China. That's the five

9 Q. That is the five permanent members?

10:45:10 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. "The British ambassador to the United Nations, Jeremy  
12 Greenstock, who sponsored the sanctions resolution . . ."

13 Now, let's pause there. Again, Mr Taylor, just for the  
14 assistance and education of everyone, someone wants to make -

10:45:34 15 pass a resolution in the United Nations, what's the procedure?

16 A. To the best of my knowledge, there is always a sponsor, and  
17 that sponsor is an individual that is proposing certain actions.  
18 They would do a draft of their proposition. That draft is then  
19 circulated amongst the members for addition or subtraction,

10:46:00 20 participation, whatever they want to do. In most cases, there

21 are little deals cut. They cut deals. "Okay, well, don't put  
22 this part. Soften the language here, then I will support it."

23 They begin a bargaining process of how it will go. So at this  
24 particular point, the proposition for sanction is being proposed

10:46:19 25 by Britain.

26 Q. "... who sponsored the sanctions resolution, told reporters  
27 after the meeting that Liberia's continued support to  
28 Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front rebels had made the  
29 sanctions necessary.

1           To avert the sanctions, Greenstock said Liberia needed to  
2 take urgent steps to cut off ties with the rebel group, get its  
3 members out of Liberia, and stop the trafficking of diamonds from  
4 Sierra Leone and arms into the country."

10:46:56   5           Pause there. But, Mr Taylor, had Liberia not, right at the  
6 beginning of that preliminary response, set out a number of  
7 bullet points regarding your withdrawal from the whole process?

8   A.     Yes.

9   Q.     To your knowledge, were the British, who were sponsoring  
10   this, aware of this?

11   A.     Oh, yes. Oh, yes. They were aware. These people's minds  
12   were set, and it really didn't make any difference what anybody  
13   said. Their minds were bent on the fact, without any evidence,  
14   that we could stop diamonds, that we could - that we were sending  
10:47:45   15   arms. They had made up their minds. It really didn't matter.  
16   They knew.

17   Q.     "The ECOWAS delegation, led by Mali's Foreign Minister,  
18   Modibo Sodibe, and which included the ECOWAS Executive Secretary,  
19   Lansana Kouyaté; Nigeria's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs,  
10:48:08   20   Dubem Onyia; and Togo's Foreign Minister, Koffi Panou, was in  
21   New York to brief the council on the situation in Sierra Leone,  
22   Liberia and Guinea.

23           Foreign Ministers Monie Captan of Liberia and Sama Banya of  
24   Sierra Leone, as well as Guinea's ambassador to the United  
10:48:29   25   Nations, François Lonseny Fall, attended the meeting as  
26   observers.

27           The council had decided in January to wait for  
28   consultations with ECOWAS before moving forward with the  
29   resolution that would ban Liberian diamonds from the

1 international market.

2 Kouyate told reporters that ECOWAS was not opposed to  
3 sanctions against Liberia but had decided to ask for the delay to  
4 allow Liberia to take certain measures to show its commitment to  
10:49:03 5 ending support for the RUF.

6 ECOWAS, he said, has demanded that Liberia fulfil certain  
7 conditions during the interim, including cutting off links with  
8 the RUF.

9 Captain said Liberia, aware of international skepticism, was  
10:49:23 10 ready to prove that it can meet its commitment.

11 Already, he said, the Liberian government had taken some  
12 measures and would be introducing more in the next few weeks to  
13 end links with the RUF.

14 He explained that ECOWAS wants Liberia to regulate its  
10:49:40 15 diamond business and cut off ties with the RUF.

16 'We want to prove to the world that Liberia will meet its  
17 commitment,' Captain added.

18 He said there was need for the verification and  
19 confirmation of Liberia's compliance by ECOWAS and the UN.

20 Sierra Leone's Banya said his country was comfortable with  
21 discussions during the meeting, particularly considering that  
22 everybody, including the ECOWAS delegation, spoke in support of  
23 sanctions against Liberia.

24 Liberia has been accused of supporting the RUF with arms  
10:50:19 25 and serving as a conduit for the rebel group's illegally mined  
26 diamond that continued to fuel the war.

27 The RUF, then led by Foday Sankoh, a former soldier in the  
28 Sierra Leonean army, began a rebel war against the Freetown  
29 government of deposed President Joseph Momoh in March 1991.

1           It is believed that the Liberian leader, Charles Taylor,  
2 who launch his own rebel war in Liberia in 1989, was behind  
3 Sankoh's rebellion.

4           Kouyate said, the ECOWAS delegation also briefed the  
10:50:55 5 council on its plan to deploy troops to the common borders of  
6 Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

7           ECOWAS leaders, he said, had resolved the countries  
8 contributing troops to the deployment would finance their  
9 participation for 90 days, and that the United Nations would work  
10:51:13 10 out arrangement for its involvement in the mission.

11           Nigeria, Senegal and Mali are contributing some 1,700  
12 troops for the operation."

13           Now, Mr Taylor, just explain to us what the situation is  
14 then. We have, on the one hand, the United Kingdom sponsoring  
10:51:39 15 this sanctions resolution and, on the other hand, ECOWAS asking  
16 for this delay of two months. What did you make of that  
17 situation?

18 A.       Well, you have to look at this from the position of trying  
19 to buy time. If you look at here where Kouyate told reporters  
10:52:05 20 that ECOWAS was not opposed to sanctions against Liberia but had  
21 decided to ask for the delay to allow Liberia to take certain  
22 measures, in diplomacy, what is he doing? Lansana Kouyate is a  
23 seasoned diplomat who retired as Under-Secretary-General of the  
24 United Nations also; Lansana Kouyate. Now, this is diplomatic  
10:52:30 25 English. They have asked for two months. They say, "We are not  
26 opposed to sanctions, but we want you to give Liberia a time to  
27 comply with what you are saying."

28           Now, in this vein, my understanding of this whole thing is  
29 that what they want for the UN to do is to put in place a

1 mechanism based on our request that within that two-months period  
2 there is no longer a need for sanction. You understand me? So  
3 the language being used here, you must look at it from a  
4 diplomatic standpoint where we are not opposed to this, but give  
10:53:03 5 them two months and let them straighten up their house. So, in  
6 other words, they are talking about compliance.

7 So the UN is saying, "We want you to get rid of these  
8 people." ECOWAS knows that at this period, who is in Liberia  
9 from Sierra Leone? Sam Bockarie. But ECOWAS knows how  
10:53:19 10 Sam Bockarie got there. So what they want to us do, fine. The  
11 UN - the principal panel members say that you should cut off  
12 links with the RUF, throw them out of the country, put them out.  
13 So they are trying to help Liberia to buy time to comply with the  
14 resolution. This is my understanding of this process.

10:53:39 15 Q. Well, why is ECOWAS doing that?

16 A. Well, once a decision is taken by the Security Council  
17 under Chapter VII, it becomes mandatory. So even - there are  
18 cases in UN history where resolutions passed under Chapter VII  
19 are not taken. There's so many cases of 242, 338, and we can go  
10:54:13 20 on and on in naming resolutions. But, under most circumstances,  
21 member states tend to comply.

22 Now, even though ECOWAS may know different, and which they  
23 know differently from what is being suggested, they will be  
24 subjected to and be compelled to, under their own laws, to follow  
10:54:31 25 a Security Council resolution, whether there is a mistake or not.  
26 You understand me? So what ECOWAS is trying to do is prevent the  
27 resolution from being put into place. So, immediately, if they  
28 can, within the two or three weeks, come back and say, "Well,  
29 I listen, council, Liberia has complied to stop it," but they need

1 time because this train is moving.

2 Q. But when you say ECOWAS know differently, know differently  
3 what?

4 A. Well, they know that most of the issues contained here -  
10:55:04 5 let's say cutting off ties with the RUF. ECOWAS is aware, the UN  
6 is aware that those RUF individuals that are in Liberia were  
7 brought there under their auspices, the UN and everybody, so why  
8 would the council pass a resolution knowing very well that these  
9 people were brought there with their knowledge, acquiescence and  
10:55:26 10 consent? So at this particular point it really doesn't matter  
11 from a regional organisation. You go before the council, you  
12 speak. After you're through you leave the room and the council  
13 decides.

14 And the way it works, and I'm sure across the world  
10:55:41 15 listening to this they know what I'm talking about. The five  
16 permanent members of the Security Council sit. There are other  
17 members, but the voice that really matters are the permanent  
18 five. In most cases some of these countries do not let  
19 themselves get bogged down in some of these nitty gritty issues.  
10:56:03 20 So if Britain and American push a resolution, except it hinges on  
21 their direct national security concerns, they go along or  
22 sometimes when you see in some cases where resolutions are passed  
23 and you see a member abstain. They just say, "I wash my hands.  
24 I don't want to have anything to do with it." But abstention  
10:56:30 25 does not mean that a resolution will not get passed. So it's a  
26 very complicated process in the United Nations. ECOWAS cannot  
27 stop this, but she is trying to slow it down until she can come  
28 back and say, "Well, look, we see progress. Will you stop it."  
29 Q. Now, were you in discussion with other ECOWAS Presidents at

1 this time, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Oh, yes. I was speaking to all of my colleagues.

3 Q. Well, tell me, did they take the view that sanctions were  
4 necessary against Liberia?

10:57:06 5 A. No. No. They did not take that view. They did not take  
6 that view.

7 Q. So what was their view?

8 A. Their view that there were two powerful nations that were  
9 bent on hurting Liberia that they really could not stop. They  
10 had individually tried to stop it, but that these two nations  
11 were moving at a speed that they were not able to stop. They  
12 raised the example of, "Look, what can we do?" Let's nobody joke  
13 around here about believing that these, the regional  
14 organisations, make any real difference. Remember in 1997 ECOWAS  
15 lifted arms embargo, saying, "We've lifted it, we've lifted all  
16 sanctions. Security Council, will you do it?" "No, we're not  
17 going to do it." So the individual approach to this matter  
18 sometimes is even better than the regional approach because when  
19 one of these major countries decide that they want to do  
20 something, they will do it.

21 Q. So in terms of ECOWAS members, Mr Taylor, and their desire  
22 or lack of it for sanctions against Liberia, what was  
23 Sierra Leone's attitude?

24 A. Well, I would say that publicly - I would say that  
25 Sierra Leone would support sanctions. Sierra Leone didn't have a  
26 choice in this matter. Sierra Leone wouldn't have --

27 Q. I'm not interested in publicly. Did you speak to Tejan  
28 Kabbah about it?

29 A. No, not directly about the sanctions issue. No, I never

1 spoke to him about it but they would support it. They wouldn't  
2 have a choice.

3 Q. So we have this situation then, do we, that ECOWAS, your  
4 neighbours on the ground, are not supporting sanctions, but the  
10:59:05 5 United Kingdom are sponsoring this resolution nonetheless,  
6 contrary to the wishes of your neighbours to impose sanctions on  
7 Liberia?

8 A. Yes.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just to clarify what Mr Taylor has said.

10:59:30 10 You asked Mr Taylor what was Sierra Leone's attitude to the  
11 sanctions and he said, "Well, I would say that publicly - I would  
12 say that Sierra Leone was opposed to sanctions." And then you  
13 asked, "Did you speak to Tejan Kabbah about it?" Answer, "No,  
14 not directly about the sanctions issue. I never spoke to him  
11:00:01 15 about it, but they would support it." So within two answers he  
16 is saying Sierra Leone is opposed to sanctions and then they  
17 would support the sanctions.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Would you explain and clarify, Mr Taylor?

11:00:18 20 A. I would think there's something wrong with the transmission  
21 because I said that publicly Sierra Leone, okay, would not be  
22 opposed to the sanctions. That's what I'm saying. Publicly they  
23 would not be opposed to the sanctions.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. The LiveNote record reads, "I  
11:00:34 25 would say that Sierra Leone was opposed."

26 THE WITNESS: No, would not be opposed to the sanctions.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. And why would they be not opposed to the sanctions,  
29 Mr Taylor?

1 A. If these actions are being taken within the interests of  
2 Sierra Leone, it would be foolish for them to come out publicly  
3 and say they are opposed to what the UN is doing. If you look at  
4 this report, what the Sierra Leonean ambassador says, he is being  
11:01:12 5 very diplomatic here. He says his country was comfortable with  
6 discussions during the meeting, particularly considering that  
7 everybody including ECOWAS delegations spoke in support. So what  
8 he does right now, he groups himself with ECOWAS and says, "Well,  
9 I'm happy with the outcome", okay. But there's no way a member  
11:01:37 10 state, seeing that the United Nations is supposed to be acting in  
11 the interests, would come out publicly and say, "I do not support  
12 your actions." No, that wouldn't happen.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've had your preliminary response. We've  
14 also had your letter to the Secretary-General of the United  
11:02:05 15 Nations on 22 January, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did your government take any further action in terms of  
18 responding to the panel of experts report?

19 A. Yes, we just did an open document. We got some of our  
11:02:27 20 lawyers to - from both the Foreign Ministry and others to look at  
21 what the lawyers call the motives and opportunities that were  
22 used in coming up with this decision and to look at the motives  
23 and both the opportunities of the United Nations panel in  
24 recommending these sanctions. It was a legal document that was  
11:02:53 25 done in February on the legal basis probably for this whole  
26 action being proposed by the Security Council.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we come to that document, could I  
28 ask, please, that the Pan-African News Agency report, "West  
29 Africa: ECOWAS asks United Nations to delay sanctions on

1 Liberia", dated 13 February 2001, be marked for identification,  
2 please, MFI -196.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI -196.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:03:40 5 Q. Have a look behind divider 108, please, Mr Taylor. Do you  
6 recognise that document?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What is it?

9 A. This is the document done by Liberian government lawyers.

11:03:57 10 The only thing absent here, I don't see the front page with the  
11 date, but it's in February.

12 Q. So it's February what year?

13 A. 2001.

14 Q. We see that the document is headed "Motive and opportunity  
11:04:21 15 for United Nations panel of experts recommended sanctions against  
16 Liberia":

17 "Historical overview. During the past convulsive decade, a  
18 sustained, well-organised, and orchestrated assault has been  
19 waged against Liberia, the intent of which seemed designed to  
11:04:46 20 impair the aspirations of Charles Ghankay Taylor, the man that  
21 officials in the outgoing Clinton State Department have loved to  
22 hate. The latest efforts of certain members of the Security  
23 Council to recommend inter alia the intensification of sanctions  
24 against Liberia based on allegations of diamond smuggling and  
11:05:13 25 gun-running are but the latest in continuing concerted attempts.

26 From the start of the civil offensive launched in Gbutuo,  
27 Nimba County, by the then NPFL in December/January (1989/90),  
28 duplicitous initiatives were commenced by certain officials of  
29 the American government to ensure contacts with the NPFL

1 authorities, while at the same time advising foreign embassies  
2 and consulates near Monrovia to withhold any diplomatic and  
3 consular intercourse with the NPFL, even in some instances  
4 suggesting that their offices be closed down and their personnel  
11:06:03 5 returned home."

6 What's that about, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Well, they were doing business with us. They had given us  
8 communication. We were talking to them. In the meantime, I  
9 guess as a way of what they call applying pressure, and we can go  
11:06:20 10 back to Herman Cohen's book where he talks about certain measures  
11 that they put into place along the way when they want things  
12 done, they were asking some of these missions to close down as a  
13 way of putting pressure on. So they were dealing both sides.

14 Q. "Regular visits of United States ambassadors resident in  
11:06:43 15 Abidjan, United States embassy diplomats resident in Monrovia, as  
16 well as State Department officials, including Chester Crocker and  
17 Herman Cohen, two former Assistant Secretaries of State for  
18 Africa who travelled all the way to the Ivorian-Liberian border  
19 to hold meetings, exchange ideas and further suggestions as to  
11:07:12 20 the objectives of the NPFL. Throughout these exercises the

21 United States embassy never closed down its mission, but remained  
22 in Liberia thereby making sure of the continuation of its  
23 diplomatic operations. Throughout these periods promises of  
24 assistance were proffered to the NPFL authorities and these  
11:07:33 25 authorities were advised to suspend military advance to Monrovia  
26 with the assurance that the United States would negotiate the  
27 departure of President Samuel Doe, deserted by his government and  
28 besieged in the Executive Mansion, from Liberia. As the NPFL  
29 forces progressed from Tappita to Gbarnga to the outskirts of

1 Monrovia, high level United States officials continued these  
2 frequent visits and held long, productive discussions with the  
3 Taylor officials.

4 To the surprise of many, with the ascendency of the Clinton  
11:08:17 5 administration obstructing mechanisms were suddenly placed  
6 between the NPFL authorities and these frequent interactions with  
7 the NPFL changed course. It is believed by many that the rebel  
8 leader, Taylor's decision to run for the presidency of Liberia  
9 following the cessation of hostilities, must have upset the grand  
11:08:43 10 design of erstwhile friends in Washington DC at the time who  
11 might have wanted to install a hand-picked leader for Liberia."

12 Pause there. Where did you get that idea from?

13 A. Well, we saw the handwriting on the wall from the Banjul  
14 meeting where it was apparent that the - they had in mind someone  
11:09:12 15 that they felt should take over the leadership of Liberia.

16 Q. And who was that?

17 A. That person was Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.

18 Q. So from then you say?

19 A. Oh, yes. We knew then that they had - in fact they had  
11:09:29 20 mentioned to me that the best thing --

21 Q. Who is "they"?

22 A. The United States government had suggested to me.

23 Q. That what?

24 A. That I not stand to take the leadership during the  
11:09:41 25 transition that I had insisted on and that it be given to her and  
26 that I could come around and run later and I said no, I was not  
27 prepared to take that chance.

28 Q. "It appears that this decision triggered a negative  
29 reaction, and from this point on, a series of schemes were

1 devised to stop the political aspirations of Mr Taylor. One of  
2 the earliest such moves in this grand design was the imposition  
3 of sanctions, arms embargo and travel restrictions against the  
4 NPFL and its supporters for what was described as 'incalculable  
11:10:24 5 behaviour and obstruction to the peace process'. Concurrently,  
6 special arrangements were concluded by the State Department for  
7 the release of millions of dollars from the maritime Registry  
8 funds to the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) in  
9 Monrovia. Surreptitiously, European and other capitals were  
11:10:50 10 urged to abort all contacts with the NPFL authorities. Virtually  
11 every possible area of NPFL cooperation with the outside world  
12 was thwarted."

13 Is that true?

14 A. That is true. That is true.

11:11:08 15 Q. "A purely internal conflict within the NPFL hierarchy was  
16 exploited by the American embassy in Monrovia. Arms, ammunition,  
17 communication equipment, GI camouflaged uniforms and funding were  
18 made available to Prince Johnson who had earlier defected from  
19 the NPFL to further his rebellion."

11:11:32 20 Is that true?

21 A. That is correct. That's true.

22 Q. What, they were given GI camouflaged uniforms?

23 A. Yes. Remember, according to evidence here, Prince Johnson  
24 entered Monrovia when the Americans asked me, in evidence here  
11:11:45 25 that we've given, to leave the road open to Sierra Leone, the  
26 Sierra Leonean border. Prince Johnson comes in Monrovia. He  
27 cuts it off. And there's also a document that was presented with  
28 the frequency of his meeting at the Chancery of the United States  
29 embassy in Monrovia. They form a connection and really pull

1 Prince Johnson to them, and it was Prince Johnson that was in  
2 charge of an area of Monrovia called Bushrod Island in Monrovia  
3 central following his murder of Samuel Doe.

4 Q. "With this massive backing, General Johnson's breakaway  
11:12:23 5 faction, the INPFL, joined forces with the intervention force  
6 ECOMOG to drive Taylor's NPFL out of the vicinity of Monrovia,  
7 thereby allowing ECOMOG to establish a formidable beachhead in  
8 Monrovia. As a result of a clever sequence of events, President  
9 Doe was lured to the free port of Monrovia with the promise of  
11:12:47 10 evacuation. Unfortunately for him, General Johnson received a  
11 coded call on his American supplied radio set, rushed to the  
12 Freeport, ambushed Doe and tortured him to death on 9 September  
13 1990."

14 How do you know that he was - Johnson received a coded call  
11:13:08 15 on his American supplied radio?

16 A. Well, Johnson supporters subsequently wrote about it. And,  
17 in fact, at the time of this writing, one of the individuals that  
18 were involved in the arrest of Doe talked about it, that Johnson  
19 received a call. That they did not know that Doe was scheduled  
11:13:29 20 at the place but he received a call that Doe was coming into that  
21 area, and that, in fact, he was advised not to interfere, and so  
22 Johnson even betrayed them. They were trying to protect Doe to  
23 get him out. I do not think and I wouldn't even allege for a  
24 minute that the Americans supported the killing of Doe. No.

11:13:49 25 They had warned Johnson, apparently, that, "President Doe  
26 is coming. He is leaving. Do not interfere with that process."  
27 He used that information to attack.

28 Q. So where did the call come from?

29 A. It came from, from what we were told, the American embassy.

1 Q. "Far from the expectation of many Liberians, the war did  
2 not end with the death of Doe, but rather a half dozen new  
3 factions emerged with external support to oppose the NPFL. This  
4 turn of events created a new set of complications in the Liberian  
11:14:27 5 contemporary military, political and social psyche that this  
6 generation of leaders is saddled with for better or worse. This  
7 burden is made no less bearable with the latest barrage of  
8 threats to the same group of individuals, products of the NPFL  
9 era, now leaders of a legitimately elected government.

11:14:52 10 The hard questions. The recent accusation of diamond  
11 smuggling and gun-running channelled through the Security Council  
12 have, however, galvanised the Liberian people and led them to  
13 wonder about the sincerity and objectivity of the United States  
14 and the United Kingdom towards Liberia. The unsupported  
11:15:16 15 accusation has raised many questions, including the issues of  
16 social justice and moral principles as practiced by these two  
17 Anglo-Saxon countries towards Liberia. It has aroused the  
18 national consciousness of Liberia and has awakened the Liberian  
19 people's sense of national patriotism. They are indignant about  
11:15:44 20 the self-appointed missionaries of international reform who, in  
21 fulfilling their assignment against Liberia, have left themselves  
22 out of these reforms.

23 Many Liberian citizens are asking: Can the Security  
24 Council expect a small nation to deprive itself of its inherent  
11:16:02 25 legitimacy to protect its own national rights of survival while  
26 two world powers practice muscular diplomacy against it? Is it  
27 reasonable to expect that Liberia's proud heritage as a founding  
28 member of the League of Nations, the United Nations, the  
29 Organisation of African Unity, and ECOWAS, and the Mano River

1 Union, as well as her role as a key player in the liberation and  
2 independence movements in Africa, will count for nothing? Can  
3 such spotless credentials be swept under the rug while the rest  
4 of Africa stands by idly? Where is Nelson Mandela? Where is Sam  
11:16:47 5 Ujoma? Where is Nigeria? Where is the OAU? Where is ECOWAS?  
6 Where is Africa when Liberia is in need of a friend to come to  
7 her rescue?

8 Why is it that these operations originating from only  
9 two nations of the Security Council, directed against President  
11:17:09 10 Taylor and the innocent Liberian people, are falling on deaf  
11 ears? Why is he being targeted with a torrent of proofless  
12 accusations? What are the sources of these injustices? What are  
13 the real reasons?

14 Does it make any sense at all for any Liberian, least of  
11:17:29 15 all the President of Liberia, to be involved in trading diamonds  
16 from Sierra Leone when Liberia has so much diamonds of its own;  
17 or are the detractors insinuating that Liberia is smuggling its  
18 own diamonds? Is it not like saying that a person is stealing  
19 his own car?

11:17:50 20 The Liberian people have conviction that any well-meaning  
21 citizen of the world will see through this false accusation.  
22 Liberians believe that the ordinary decent people of the United  
23 States and the United Kingdom will impress upon their respective  
24 governments to refrain from condemning Liberia at a mock trial in  
11:18:14 25 the United Nations Security Council. They should urge their  
26 governments not to dispense with or dismiss the Anglo-Saxon  
27 tradition of fairness.

28 Motives and opportunities. In the aftermath of the  
29 publication of the draft report by the United Nations Security

1 Council panel of experts, the people of Liberia remain  
2 unimpressed by the latest campaign orchestrated by detractors in  
3 the outgoing Clinton administration and the present Tony Blair  
4 government to deal a death knell to the government and people of  
11:18:59 5 an impoverished country such as Liberia. Having repeatedly  
6 denied the allegations levelled against Liberia in the illicit  
7 diamond trade and supply of arms to the RUF, it would serve the  
8 conscience of an objective observer to consider a case-by-case  
9 analysis of events that may have formed part of the general  
11:19:21 10 misconceptions that have probably led to the current efforts at  
11 selectively targeting Liberia for paralysing sanctions that could  
12 derail the post-war development aspirations of the Liberian  
13 people.

14 On reflection, it is noteworthy to mention that motive and  
11:19:44 15 opportunity for negatively targeting Charles Ghankay Taylor and  
16 concurrently his democratically elected government, dates back to  
17 the genesis of the civil war, when the National Patriotic Front  
18 of Liberia rebelled against a brutal and inhumane regime of  
19 President Samuel K Doe.

11:20:09 20 Although the NPFL uprising was overwhelmingly welcomed and  
21 popularly supported by the Liberian people, the international  
22 community, assisted by their surrogates in the Interim Government  
23 of National Unity, initiated at the outset a process of  
24 demonisation and image battering to cast the aspirations of the  
11:20:36 25 NPFL in a negative position.

26 One of the early signals in this grand design was the  
27 scenario surrounding the 1993 Carter Camp Massacre in Harbel,  
28 Margibi County, where more than 600 innocent civilians were  
29 butchered with machetes and other forms of blunt weapons.

1 Without any prior investigation, the US State Department joined a  
2 chorus with IGNU and others to point an accusing finger at the  
3 NPFL.

4 Eventually, a special commission established by the United  
11:21:18 5 Nations, known as the WACO Commission, conducted a thorough  
6 investigation of the massacre and exonerated the NPFL of these  
7 false charges. The WACO Commission provided convincing evidence  
8 that the Armed Forces of Liberia, which was then controlled by  
9 the interim government of Dr Amos Sawyer, was held responsible  
11:21:41 10 for the massacre."

11 Now, that report into the massacre near Harbel, Mr Taylor,  
12 have you read that report?

13 A. Oh, in full, yes, I have.

14 Q. And did you have a copy of that report in your archives?

11:22:02 15 A. Yes, I have a copy in my archives.

16 Q. Have a look behind divider 115 - let's pause for a moment -  
17 in this volume. Mr Taylor, is that the report?

18 A. This is the report.

19 Q. And we see that it's headed "Executive Summary. The Carter  
11:22:54 20 Camp Massacre. Results of an Investigation by the Panel of  
21 Inquiry Appointed by the Secretary-General into the massacre near  
22 Harbel, Liberia, on the nights of June 5/6, 1993." We see that  
23 the panel members were: The Honourable S Amos Wako, Chairman,  
24 Mr Robert Gersony and Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem. Yes, Mr Taylor?

11:23:26 25 A. That is right, yes.

26 Q. Let's just pause for a minute just to take a quick glance  
27 at this document:

28 "This document summarises the essential elements of a  
29 75-page report of the panel of inquiry established on 4 August

1 1993 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to  
2 investigate the massacre of nearly 600 displaced persons which  
3 occurred near Harbel, Liberia, on the night of June 5/6, 1993."

4 It then goes on to deal with the number of people who had  
11:24:05 5 died, the principal parties in the conflict, ECOMOG's  
6 intervention at paragraph 4; paragraph 5, numbers displaced, and  
7 "just over 1,800 of these displaced persons were assigned to live  
8 in Carter Camp, one of the Firestone facilities, located just 1  
9 kilometre from the centre of Harbel town."

11:24:32 10 "At about midnight, on the night of Saturday/Sunday, June  
11 5/6, 1993, armed soldiers attacked and systematically massacred  
12 and mutilated the bodies of nearly 600 Carter Camp residents,  
13 mainly women, children and elderly persons. Some 45 bags of rice  
14 and beans and other loot were removed from the camp, apparently  
11:24:55 15 carried by 100 or more survivors abducted by the attackers.  
16 About 1,100 terrified survivors managed to escape the massacre  
17 and fled in all directions.

18 The next morning, ECOMOG security forces who visited the  
19 camp discovered a trail of rice, beans, clothing and eight bodies  
11:25:19 20 leading to a nearby abandoned AFL Black Beret Camp adjacent to an  
21 iron bridge called Du Bridge. Following the same trail, they  
22 discovered 14 more bodies at a place called 'Camp A', 3  
23 kilometres further along.

24 Within hours of its discovery, Liberia's Interim Government  
11:25:43 25 of National Unity, GNU, ECOMOG, the AFL and the international  
26 media had attributed the massacre to the NPFL. By June 10, two  
27 well-known international human rights groups repeated the  
28 allegation in public statements and testimony. But strong NPFL  
29 denials, coupled with the testimony of some survivors reported in

1 the Liberian press, raised the possibility of AFL negligence or  
2 even complicity in the incident. By June 6, the  
3 Secretary-General special representative for Liberia had begun a  
4 preliminary investigation.

11:26:18 5 On 9 June, the Security Council strongly condemned this  
6 massacre and requested that the Secretary-General conduct a  
7 thorough and full investigation."

8 It goes on to describe the "Assessment Procedures" adopted.

9 Over the page, description of the camp, which we need not  
11:26:40 10 bother with. And then the "Narrative Account" of the incident  
11 thereafter follows. And when we continue at paragraph 35, we  
12 have account of the "Execution of the Massacre Operation" and  
13 thereafter "Massacre Accounts". And then when we go to paragraph  
14 48:

11:27:30 15 "All reports agree that the 14 recently murdered adult  
16 bodies were discovered that Sunday morning at Camp A by the same  
17 ECOMOG unit which followed the trail of rice and beans which led  
18 there from Carter Camp. One person had been murdered by gunshot  
19 wounds, 13 apparently with sharp or blunt instruments. By the  
11:27:51 20 time the government pathologist arrived on the scene on June 11,  
21 the bodies were said to be in an advanced state of  
22 decomposition."

23 Go to paragraph 50:

24 "The scene described by the pathologist was inconsistent  
11:28:08 25 with the Carter Camp massacre where the victims had been randomly  
26 killed and found only half clothed and the food and houses had  
27 been looted. The pathologist report concluded that NPFL soldiers  
28 had passed through Camp A en route to Carter Camp on Saturday,  
29 June 5. Finding residents in possession of liberty notes, they

1 tried and executed them without looting their homes, then  
2 proceeded to conduct the massacre and return along the same route  
3 the next morning, leaving a trail of rice and beans behind them.

4 The AFL August 31 official report, corroborated by another  
11:28:46 5 credible source, contradicted the pathologist. It concluded that  
6 the 14 persons murdered at Camp A were in fact abducted as  
7 porters from Carter Camp on the night of the massacre and then  
8 murdered. The Ministry of Justice report stated that the rooms  
9 found at Camp A were in complete disarray. Furthermore, both  
11:29:07 10 ECOMOG and AFL commanders stated that military commonsense  
11 dictates that the attacking party would not use the same route to  
12 enter and withdraw from the attack location."

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Mr President.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

11:29:24 15 We'll take the morning break now and resume at 12 o'clock.

16 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

17 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

12:00:58 20 Q. Mr Taylor, just before the short adjournment we had taken a  
21 diversion to look at the executive summary of the investigation  
22 by the panel of experts set up by the Secretary-General into the  
23 Carter Camp massacre, yes?

24 A. Yes.

12:01:16 25 Q. Now, before I continue briefly with that document, because  
26 I don't want to dwell overlong on it, can I ask you this: From  
27 your viewpoint what was the significance of that incident,  
28 Mr Taylor, and the subsequent appointment of this panel of  
29 experts to investigate it?

1 A. The Carter Camp was a very sad situation where, as has been  
2 mentioned, 600 or more Liberians got slaughtered. But if we  
3 reflect a little bit, this is happening in 1993. In 1992 we had  
4 gone through a series of negotiations, both in Cotonou where  
12:02:09 5 these agreements had faltered, followed - in fact, preceded by  
6 Yamoussoukro in 1991. Now, for the records that is stated  
7 already, in late 1992 there is this famous operation called  
8 Operation Octopus that is on the record of the NPFL's attempt to  
9 take Monrovia to end the war.

12:02:35 10 With that background occurring late 1992, we now see in  
11 1993 where these innocent civilians are murdered of this number.  
12 This is an opportunity for Taylor and the NPFL to be stopped. In  
13 fact, it was very clear. It was said that whoever is responsible  
14 for this is going to be charged with war crimes and crimes  
12:03:05 15 against humanity. It was said in diplomatic circles, "We are  
16 going to bring Charles Taylor to justice and this NPFL. This is  
17 going to be the end of the war." They were so certain. So  
18 within a matter of days the Security Council had taken a decision  
19 that a panel should be appointed, legal people, experts in  
12:03:28 20 forensic and all were sent down to Liberia to conduct this  
21 investigation to bring Charles Taylor and the NPFL people to  
22 justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity. That was the  
23 significance of this report.

24 Q. Okay. Now, as I say, I don't want to dwell overlong on  
12:03:46 25 this. This is just a sideshow to fill in some gaps for us so  
26 that we can go back to the other document. But in order to  
27 conclude it as quickly as possible can we go to paragraph 68 on  
28 page 13, please. Do you it have, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. "All investigations which identified the massacre  
2 perpetrator as the NPFL did not satisfactorily explain why the  
3 NPFL would have massacred and mutilated the bodies of its own  
4 former combatants and/or adherents."

12:04:44 5 Those killed were who, Mr Taylor?

6 A. They were mostly former NPFL combatants and sympathisers.

7 Q. "The ad hoc nature of the response of the panel's question  
8 on this matter, and their contradictions of a fundamental fact to  
9 which all sides agreed, reinforced the panel's view that this  
12:05:03 10 issue had not been given sufficient attention in previous  
11 investigations."

12 Can I pause to mention that Mr Munyard has left us.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Thank you. That's noted. Thank  
14 you, Mr Griffiths.

12:05:16 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

16 Q. Over the page, please:

17 "The reported NPFL pattern of atrocities in the three  
18 months prior to the Carter Camp massacre was given significant  
19 weight by official and independent investigators. In its  
12:05:32 20 absence, at least one important investigator would have concluded  
21 that the AFL conducted the Carter Camp massacre.

22 Both principal organisations suspected of perpetuating the  
23 massacre had engaged in a pattern of atrocities against civilians  
24 in their areas of authority and were deemed capable of carrying  
12:05:52 25 out the Carter massacre. The polarised political environment of  
26 Liberia mooted the objectivity of many of those who participated  
27 in investigations of the Carter incident.

28 The AFL successfully deceived public opinion regarding  
29 responsibility for another recent atrocity by using the pattern

1 argument to shift the responsibility to the NPFL for an act which  
2 AFL soldiers had committed."

3 Over the page, please, paragraph 79:

4 "Eyewitness accounts received by the panel, including  
12:06:36 5 signifying messages spoken by the attackers during the massacre,  
6 which tended to point to the participation of AFL soldiers, and  
7 in one case to the possibility of a ULIMO soldier."

8 Again let's go over the page, please. Page 16:

9 "Because of an early apparent assumption that the NPFL was  
12:06:59 10 responsible for the massacre, many kinds of important physical  
11 and other evidence were systematically ignored or overlooked by  
12 other investigations."

13 Paragraph 86:

14 "Most previous investigations discarded eyewitness accounts  
12:07:20 15 pointing to the AFL as perpetrators of the massacre based on  
16 sociological/political factors which did not apply to testimony  
17 they reported receiving which tended to confirm the theory that  
18 the NPFL was the perpetrator.

19 The panel concurs with previous investigations that  
12:07:37 20 eyewitness testimony could be perverted by fear of reprisals by  
21 the party such witnesses would identify as having conducted the  
22 massacre.

23 However, the most immediate threat to the eyewitnesses was  
24 posed by AFL soldiers in Harbel, under whose authority the  
12:07:53 25 survivors were living, and whom survivors in Harbel (as in all  
26 interview locations) identified as having conducted the massacre.  
27 These survivors said they'd seen in Harbel after the massacre AFL  
28 soldiers who they had witnessed participating in the massacre.  
29 This underlined the courage and conviction which characterized

1 the survivor accounts and, in the panel's view, enhanced their  
2 credibility.

3 The argument that the political loyalty of the survivors to  
4 the NPFL had not been affected by their knowledge that the NPFL  
12:08:31 5 had conducted the slaughter strains credibility."

6 Over the page, please. Paragraph 93:

7 "Reports indicated that several AFL soldiers risked their  
8 lives to protect Carter survivors from their AFL peers. It was  
9 alleged that one of those who defended the survivors was killed  
12:08:54 10 by AFL elements after the incident."

11 And finally page 18, paragraph 97:

12 "The massacre at Carter Camp was planned and executed by  
13 units of the Armed Forces of Liberia.

14 The murders at Camp A were carried out following the Carter  
12:09:16 15 Camp massacre by the same party which carried out the massacre  
16 itself: The AFL. The trails of rice and the torn Liberty notes  
17 were part of a scheme of deception.

18 The NPFL, ECOMOG and ULIMO had no role in the Carter Camp  
19 massacre and the murders at Camp A. However, evidence suggests,  
12:09:44 20 but it is not conclusive, concerning the possibility that a few  
21 ULIMO stragglers or deserters who found themselves in Harbel may  
22 have, on their individual initiative, participated with the AFL  
23 soldiers in the massacre operation."

24 Until this report came out, Mr Taylor, who was the finger  
12:10:08 25 being pointed out?

26 A. Oh, me and the NPFL. We were the individuals that had  
27 massacred them and we would be brought to justice.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we move on can I ask, please,  
29 that that executive summary, "The Carter Camp massacre, results

1 of an investigation by the panel of inquiry appointed by the  
2 Secretary-General into the massacre near Harbel, Liberia on the  
3 night of 5/6 June 1993" be marked for identification MFI -197,  
4 please.

12:10:40 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI -197.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful. Can we now go back to behind  
7 divider 108 and pick up the account at page 6, please.

8 MR BANGURA: Mr President.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Bangura.

12:11:02 10 MR BANGURA: Mr President, your Honours, the Prosecution  
11 would object to further use of this document with the witness on  
12 the basis that there has not been sufficient foundation laid,  
13 one, as to the source of the document. The witness, you will  
14 recall, had said that this document was prepared by lawyers of  
12:11:28 15 the Government of Liberia and it was at the instance of the  
16 President.

17 Your Honours, the document does not have a cover and  
18 nothing on the face of it says that. Besides, there's no date on  
19 the document. The witness has said it was prepared in February  
12:11:49 20 2001, I believe, but nothing in the document indicates this.

21 Furthermore, if your Honours take a quick look at the  
22 document, it doesn't even seem to be a complete document. It  
23 ends at page 19 and there is nothing beyond that page, some  
24 endorsement by the makers or preparers of the document. And  
12:12:18 25 beyond that, your Honours, the witness has said that this was a  
26 document prepared by lawyers, which suggests - raises the issue  
27 of privilege. We do not know what the relationship clearly was  
28 and whether, in fact, the witness has such authority - if it was  
29 prepared for the Government of Liberia, whether he could waive or

1 he has a right to waive any privilege which that government has.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you wish to reply to that,

3 Mr Griffiths?

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, firstly, as to the issue of privilege,

12:12:56 5 Mr President, the witness has stated that this is a document  
6 prepared by government lawyers in response to the report prepared  
7 by the panel of experts. Consequently, in those circumstances,  
8 it's difficult to see how an issue of privilege arises.

9 Secondly, so far as the preparation of the document is

12:13:21 10 concerned, the fact that it's prepared by lawyers is of little  
11 moment for this reason: It may be that had this been prepared  
12 with litigation in mind, my learned friend would have a valid  
13 objection, but let us remind ourselves that no indictment had  
14 been issued or drawn up against Mr Taylor at the time this  
12:13:46 15 document was prepared. On the face of it, it's quite clear the  
16 document is prepared as a response to a recent event, which is  
17 the publication of the panel of experts report at a time when no  
18 litigation, such as that upon which we are currently engaged, was  
19 contemplated.

12:14:05 20 So it seems to us, in the circumstances, that the objection  
21 has no foundation, because if there is an issue of privilege, it  
22 belongs to the Government of Liberia, and that government has no  
23 standing in these proceedings. And, furthermore, as President,  
24 it seems to us that Mr Taylor is perfectly entitled to waive such  
12:14:28 25 privilege, if, indeed, it exists. So we do conclude that this  
26 objection lacks foundation and that sufficient foundation has  
27 been laid by the witness for the use of the document.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. I agree with you, Mr Griffiths. I  
29 think you've established that the witness is competent to give

1 evidence about this document and I'll overrule the objection.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

3 Q. We had concluded the second paragraph on that page,

4 Mr Taylor, so let us pick it up where it says:

12:15:13 5 "It is surprising that the result of the WACO Commission's  
6 investigation did not elicit any calls for condemnation or  
7 censure of the interim government and the matter was left to  
8 conveniently fizzle out."

9 Now, was that the case, Mr Taylor?

12:15:30 10 A. That was the case. Following the WACO report, nothing was  
11 done thereafter. There were no arrests. There were no further  
12 investigation. Nothing, no Prosecution. Nothing. The case -  
13 because Taylor and the NPFL were not involved, case was closed,  
14 until today.

12:15:50 15 Q. But I thought you told us that when that panel of inquiry  
16 was set up, it was envisaged that trials for war crimes would  
17 ensue.

18 A. Definitely.

19 Q. So what happened? And who was making that suggestion, that  
12:16:05 20 trials for war crimes would ensue?

21 A. This was pursued by the American government. In fact, if  
22 you look at the - in fact, the document explains that. The  
23 American government was pushing that "We are going to pursue this  
24 to the end." The British government pursued it. And other NGOs,  
12:16:27 25 non-governmental organisations, human rights groups, were all  
26 saying, "Whoever is responsible for this must be brought to  
27 justice. This is outrageous." And I agreed. But we kept  
28 maintaining that, look - by the way, if you look at the report,  
29 it refers to other reports.

1           What the Government of Liberia did at the time, the interim  
2 government under Amos Sawyer, they did a report implicating the  
3 NPFL. That's what the report - the United Nations document here  
4 refers to as other reports. It was signed, sealed, and they were  
12:17:06 5 just waiting now for the ursine on it by bringing in a UN panel  
6 of appropriate people to come and just nail it and Taylor and the  
7 NPFL will be finished. And it did not turn out that way because  
8 of the intensive investigation done with forensic studies and all  
9 of this.

12:17:27 10           Once it was said the NPFL was not responsible - and this  
11 report goes further to name names of those - I remember. This is  
12 only the executive summary, but the report names the names and  
13 identifies who carries out - who participates in the massacre.  
14 No arrests are made. Nothing happens after that.

12:17:47 15 Q.       "Other attempts by the outgoing officials of the State  
16 Department and their surrogates to prevent the NPFL winning an  
17 outright victory went from the cunning to the subliminal and on  
18 to more overt tactics. Such tactics included a well-orchestrated  
19 anti-NPFL campaign through local and major international news  
12:18:15 20 networks, support, funding and arming of over half a dozen  
21 warring factions including ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, LPC, AFL, INPFL,  
22 NPFL-CRC" - who are they?

23 A.       The NPFL-CRC now are the new group of three breakaway  
24 ministers at that particular time, Samuel Dokie, Tom Woweyu,  
12:18:51 25 that break away. They called them NPFL/CRC.

26 Q.       ".... GNU's Black Beret, all opposed to the NPFL.

27           The basis for this anti-NPFL stance problem was the  
28 widespread notion that Taylor was backed by Libya's Muammar  
29 Gaddafi who at the time was in a diplomatic and security wrangle

1 with the United States over the bombing of the Pan Am flight over  
2 Lockerbie in 1983. It was believed that with Libya's backing,  
3 any victory by the NPFL would pull Liberia, a traditional ally of  
4 the United States, away from the orbit of US influence into a  
12:19:35 5 radical alliance with Gaddafi.

6 Fortunately, the NPFL's mission, philosophy and integrity  
7 as a revolutionary movement was embraced by the population.  
8 Hence no amount of foreign intervention and trickery was able to  
9 derail the progressive agenda of the movement.

12:20:02 10 With diplomatic dexterity, the NPFL was instrumental in  
11 forging ahead with the peace plan in Abuja, growing out of  
12 efforts initiated in other West African capitals that culminated  
13 in disarmament, demobilisation and eventually elections.

14 The crux of the Clinton State Department's opposition to  
12:20:21 15 the NPFL came during the visit of Madeline Albright, then US  
16 Ambassador to the United Nations, to Monrovia in 1996 during the  
17 transitional period when the affairs of the country were run by a  
18 Council of State. It appears that Ms Albright arrived in  
19 Monrovia with preconceived animosities against council member  
12:20:48 20 Charles Ghankay Taylor, who was then representing the NPFL on the  
21 council.

22 In the course of a lengthy meeting with members of the  
23 council, according to an unimpeachable source who was present,  
24 Taylor did not take kindly to arrogant instructions and nuances  
12:21:07 25 by Ms Albright and made his feelings known by asking her to show  
26 more respect for the authority of the Council of State.  
27 Albright's animosity towards Taylor, who she saw as an upstart  
28 and a culprit in the Liberian conflict, was evident in her body  
29 language during the photo opportunity that followed the meeting.

1           Ms Albright eventually went on to become Secretary of State  
2       in the second term of the Clinton Presidency. Through her  
3       Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Susan Rice, Albright  
4       convinced the administration that because of Taylor's alleged  
12:21:52 5       record he had no chance of winning the elections. Taylor  
6       confounded everyone by winning 75.3 per cent of the vote against  
7       the United States-sponsored candidate Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.

8           It is no surprise then that the State Department, under the  
9       leadership of Ms Albright, has made every effort to demonise  
12:22:21 10      President Taylor personally and destabilise his government by  
11       floating the policy of 'ABT', Anyone But Taylor, for leadership  
12       in Liberia.

13           Some of these attempts include the barrage of accusations  
14       of human rights violations against the Taylor government; and  
12:22:38 15       maintenance of a negative travel advisory which has discouraged  
16       and prevented investors from visiting Liberia. Other actions  
17       include the maintenance of the arms embargo on Liberia in spite  
18       of the fact that ECOWAS has recommended lifting it, and despite  
19       external threats to the security of the country through several  
12:23:01 20       armed incursions from Guinea; interference in the internal  
21       affairs of Liberia through channelling substantial resources and  
22       direct support to opposition presidential candidates during the  
23       1997 elections and wide publication of the State Department  
24       Annual Human Rights Report on Liberia, to name a few. Of course,  
12:23:28 25       lately the State Department has applauded the human rights record  
26       of Liberia since they are convinced that the new allegations of  
27       diamond smuggling and gun-running are sufficient to undermine the  
28       Liberian government."

29           Pause, Mr Taylor. "Lately the State Department has

1       applauded the human rights regard of Liberia"?

2       A.     Yes. Yes. What happened is that, Liberia was voted on the  
3       Human Rights Commission of the United Nations stationed in  
4       Geneva, in Geneva, Switzerland, and after we sat on that Human  
12:24:12      5       Rights Commission, and that was a commission that was widely  
6       contested, the United States did reduce her criticism of Liberia  
7       because on that commission we were asked to cooperate with that  
8       country, the United States, on so many other human rights issues.  
9       So I guess as a give and take, they just lowered the temperature  
12:24:39      10      against Liberia.

11      Q.     In the intervening period, Ms Albright's protege at the  
12      United Nations, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, has publicly  
13      expressed disdain for the President of Liberia by referring to  
14      him as the 'Milosevic of Africa' .

12:25:02      15      Did he do that?

16      A.     Oh, yes. Holbrooke did that, yes.

17      Q.     "No clear justification was given for this bizarre  
18      characterisation. Holbrooke has also worked furiously within the  
19      United Nations system to not only maintain the arms embargo on  
12:25:18      20      Liberia but to tarnish Liberia's image diplomatically and to  
21      prevent meaningful international assistance from coming to the  
22      country for reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation.

23            Furtherer to that, the United States Senator Judd Gregg is  
24      on the record to have publicly called for the assassination of  
12:25:42      25      President Taylor, and Ms Albright's State Department did not even  
26      the decency to distance the Government of the United States from  
27      such a reckless statement. Can any objective observer not be  
28      left with the impression that there was a concerted effort to  
29      destabilise Liberia?

1           The Roosevelt Johnson Debacle.  
2           On at least two occasions, the State Department  
3 orchestrated covert military intervention in Liberia. It can be  
4 recalled that in the wake of the 6 April 1996 crisis, US Navy  
12:26:21 5 helicopters from the Atlantic fleet were seen openly supplying  
6 the LPC and ULIMO-J factions at the BTC military barracks in  
7 Monrovia as well as the Schefflein military base outside of  
8 Monrovia."

9           Is that true?

10          A. Yes, that is true.  
11          Q. "A military surveillance aircraft overflew the positions of  
12 the government forces, mostly comprised of NPFL commandos and the  
13 Congo Town home of Council of State member Charles Taylor.  
14 Simultaneously, a massive gunboat pulled up on the shores just  
12:26:59 15 behind the home of Taylor in Congo Town with the obviously  
16 intimidating posture to influence the outcome of the fracas.

17           The US embassy in Monrovia airlifted the murderous rebel  
18 leader Roosevelt Johnson and his close associates to safety after  
19 they had used a fire canon to burn down the city. He was brought  
12:27:24 20 back surreptitiously into Monrovia at midnight aboard an unmarked  
21 helicopter following the elections in 1997.

22           The presence in Monrovia of Roosevelt Johnson, leader of  
23 the erstwhile ULIMO-J faction, and the apparent backing that he  
24 received from external sources, enabled him to believe that he  
12:27:47 25 could challenge the authority of the newly elected Government of  
26 Liberia.

27           The carving out of an arms-infested enclave by Johnson and  
28 his associates on Camp Johnson Road, a few blocks away from the  
29 seat of government, and the harassment, intimidation, abduction

1 and torturing of innocent citizens, created not only an unsafe  
2 environment, but prevented the smooth operation of business and  
3 commerce in Monrovia that challenged the authority of the  
4 Liberian government.

12:28:23 5 The decoration of his Camp Johnson Road office with the  
6 Seal of the Republic, and posting the national colours, and the  
7 presidential flag behind his desk, and frequent visits to that  
8 office by United States embassy personnel, raised suspicion about  
9 the motive of the United States embassy vis-a-vis Johnson's  
12:28:48 10 authority.

11 An attempt by the Taylor government, assuming the  
12 constitutional authority to maintain law and order and prevent  
13 the recurrence of the 6 April fracas, led to the outbreak of the  
14 18 September 1998 shootout in Monrovia when Roosevelt Johnson's  
12:29:08 15 forces humiliated and opened fire on law enforcement officers  
16 who had been dispatched to restore order to the area.

17 The unsuspecting police officers sustained death and  
18 injury. The government sent in reinforcement to calm the  
19 situation. In the ensuing melee, which claimed the lives of  
12:29:36 20 dozen of Liberian citizens, Johnson and his associates  
21 miraculously arrived at the front gate of the United States  
22 embassy in Mamba Point, several miles away from his Camp Johnson  
23 Road hideout. Eyewitnesses, who observed his getaway through a  
24 ghetto corridor of Sonywein, reported that he was accompanied or  
12:29:57 25 guided by United States embassy personnel (African Americans).  
26 Johnson and entourage were reportedly met out the embassy gate by  
27 the United States charge d'affaires John Bauman, who invited them  
28 into the embassy and granted them sanctuary.

29 In the critical moments that preceded Johnson being given

1 refuge by his American hosts, some shots from pursuing forces of  
2 the government hit the outer walls of the United States embassy.  
3 Albright's State Department again used the incident to accuse the  
4 Liberian government of attacking its embassy in Monrovia, which  
12:30:39 5 was proven untrue. She exerted extreme diplomatic pressure for  
6 an apology from the government, with a threat to close down the  
7 embassy.

8 A close associate of Roosevelt Johnson, Madison Wi on, was  
9 inadvertently gunned down by American Marines who had surrounded  
12:30:57 10 the parameter of the embassy's fence to give Johnson safe haven.

11 Although repeated requests were made by the Liberian  
12 government and family members for the body of Madison Wi on, those  
13 requests were never honoured, thus creating the appearance that  
14 the US embassy conveniently disposed of the corpse.

12:31:21 15 Subsequently the US embassy airlifted Roosevelt Johnson,  
16 his immediate family and close associates into neighbouring  
17 countries. Later these same fugitives surfaced and formed part  
18 of dissident forces that are being trained in Sierra Leone and  
19 Guinea and have carried out five incursions into Liberia over the  
12:31:44 20 past two years from Guinean territory.

21 Bauman was an important cog in the State Department's  
22 tussle with the government and people of Liberia. He cunningly  
23 authored the provocative statement, 'There are more good people  
24 than bad people in Liberia. The one million good people will  
12:32:08 25 win, and the bad people will lose.' This statement was made in  
26 reference to the erroneous assumption that over one million  
27 people lived in Monrovia, one and a half million displaced as  
28 refugees in neighbouring countries. With a population of 2.5  
29 million, it was speculated that hardly anyone, except Taylor and

1 his NPFL fighters, lived in Greater Liberia. This statistic was  
2 fed to the State Department in Washington DC and gave rise to the  
3 conclusion that Taylor would lose in the ensuing election. As  
4 has been stated, this calculation was wrong. Bauman was recalled  
12:32:55 5 by his government in the wake of the September 18th incident,  
6 apparently embarrassed over bad judgment that he exercised in  
7 handling the situation.

8 Throughout this period Liberia submitted itself to all  
9 international norms and diplomacy in the interest of security at  
12:33:18 10 home, on the one hand, and peace in Sierra Leone and the  
11 sub-region on the other.

12 Burning of civil war arms and attacks from Guinea.  
13 In an effort to shed the image of warmongering that had  
14 been successfully planted by Liberia's detractors, the Taylor  
12:33:40 15 administration, in July 1998, cooperated with the United Nations  
16 in destroying all of its civil war arms and ammunition.

17 Among the arms and ammunition destroyed were 18,000 small  
18 arms, dozens of heavy weapons and artillery pieces, hundreds of  
19 rounds of rocket-propelled grenades, and three million rounds of  
12:34:08 20 ammunition.

21 The United Nations, ECOWAS, the Organisation of African  
22 Unity and the international community at large applauded the  
23 decision of the Liberian government, and pledges were made by the  
24 United States government to assist Liberia in her reconstruction  
12:34:27 25 efforts. It is sadly noted that the promise of assistance was  
26 mere lip service and has never materialised.

27 Barely two weeks after the burning of those arms in August  
28 1998, Liberia came under attack by armed dissidents based in  
29 Guinea, destroying Voinjama and a number of strategic towns in

1 Lofa County. The dissidents occupied Voinjama and the  
2 aforementioned towns along the Guinean border, abducted United  
3 Nations personnel, destroyed farms, properties and created  
4 mayhem.

12:35:09 5 In spite of Liberia's protestations, no one, including the  
6 United Nations, the prominent members of the Security Council,  
7 nor other members of the international community, who had barely  
8 three weeks earlier applauded the government's decision to  
9 destroy the arms, condemned the wanton act of violation of the  
12:35:33 10 territorial integrity of Liberia.

11 Since that first attack, there have been four subsequent  
12 attacks on Voinjama and Zorzor in Lofa County and Nimba County by  
13 dissidents operating out of Guinea, with clear and convincing  
14 evidence that they had been given sanctuary, assistance and  
12:35:57 15 artillery support from the Guinean armed forces.

16 In spite of clear evidence that the dissidents were getting  
17 support from Guinea, backed by calls to the news media by their  
18 supporters in the United States (Alhaji Kromah, Joe Wylie and  
19 others) who have sought, and been given, asylum by the US  
12:36:20 20 government, and with further evidence of dozens of wounded  
21 soldiers being evacuated out of the war zone, corroborated by  
22 independent media, the US embassy near Monrovia informed  
23 Washington DC that they were not convinced of rebel incursions  
24 into Lofa County and termed the brutal incursions as propaganda."

12:36:46 25 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Oh, yes, that's true.

27 Q. "Shocking to many observers in Liberia was the disclosure  
28 by the United States State Department that American forces have  
29 been, and continue, to train the Guinean military to deal with

1 the imminent danger to instability in Guinea.

2         The people of Liberia are saddened by this turn of events  
3 in view of the two centuries old relationship she has had with  
4 the United States. It is hypocritical, to say the least, that  
12:37:26 5 the United States did not deem it necessary to come to the aid of  
6 a traditional ally that is defenceless and has come under five  
7 attacks, but would deem it expedient to train the Guinean army  
8 and supply it with arms. These same arms have been resupplied to  
9 Liberian dissidents, who have vowed to destabilise Liberia and  
12:37:49 10 overthrow a democratically elected government.

11         Several months ago, Guinean authorities rounded up,  
12 humiliated and brutalised hundreds of Liberian and Sierra  
13 Leonean refugees in the capital city, Conakry, and other parts of  
14 the country, in contravention of the Geneva Convention. These  
12:38:15 15 refugees were accused of complicity in the emergent dissident  
16 activities in Guinea.

17         Without notice to the Liberian government, the American  
18 embassy in Conakry arranged for the selective airlifting of  
19 dozens of Liberian refugees to the United States on the basis of  
12:38:35 20 undisclosed criteria, leaving hundreds of others stranded."

21         Did that occur, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What, they were airlifted directly to the United States of  
24 America?

12:38:50 25 A. Exactly. Hundreds of them. In fact, most of them are  
26 still there.

27 Q. "Reports from the Liberian embassy has indicated that the  
28 Liberian refugees airlifted are close relatives, siblings, and  
29 family members of the leaders and members of the dissident forces

1 that are operating in Guinea and attacking Liberian territory.  
2 The airlift was apparently organised after Liberian government  
3 forces liberated Voinjama from the insurgents and routed their  
4 bases along the border. This operation is said to have claimed  
12:39:27 5 the lives of many of the commanders of the insurgency.

6 The issue of diamond smuggling and gun-running.

7 In the aftermath of the breakdown in the implementation of  
8 the Sierra Leone peace process (Lome Peace Plan) a new pressure  
9 was mounted against Liberia and the issue of diamond smuggling  
12:39:52 10 and gun-running surfaced.

11 These false allegations had their genesis in the State  
12 Department in Washington DC and the Foreign Office in London. As  
13 if to trivialise the substantive issue of peace and stability in  
14 Sierra Leone and the West African sub-region, it appears that  
12:40:14 15 Monrovia's detractors have finally discovered a new twist in the  
16 demonisation process against the Liberian people.

17 While, on the one hand, President Taylor has been  
18 instrumental in the freeing of over 500 United Nations hostages  
19 held by the RUF in May and June 2000; the salvaging of the Lome  
12:40:40 20 Peace Plan, with the hosting of the Monrovia conciliatory talks  
21 in October 1999 - which broke the ice between factional rivals  
22 Corporal Foday Sankoh of the RUF and Major General Johnny Paul  
23 Koroma of the AFRC - to ensure that peace returns to Sierra  
24 Leone. Hardly anyone gives Liberia credit for these constructive  
12:41:05 25 endeavours.

26 The now infamous visit to Liberia in the latter part of  
27 2000 by United States Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering,  
28 and further bellicose remarks against Liberia made by British  
29 Foreign Minister Robin Cook, are proof of the special agenda

1 against the success of the current Government of Liberia. Thomas  
2 Pickering came to Monrovia to, in his words, 'deliver an  
3 ultimatum to the Liberian government', because, as he indicated,  
4 there was overwhelming evidence of President Taylor's complicity  
12:41:51 5 in the diamond trade and indirect supply of arms to the RUF in  
6 Sierra Leone.

7 Meanwhile, there appeared to be serious attempts by the US  
8 State Department and the British Foreign Office to circumvent the  
9 ECOWAS effort in respect of the peace process in Sierra Leone.

12:42:13 10 In the first instance, the outgoing US administration in  
11 Britain flatly refused for a ceasefire to take effect between the  
12 RUF and UNAMSIL forces, in spite of indications that the RUF had  
13 been ready for months for a ceasefire had unilaterally created a  
14 lull in the fighting. In the second instance, the British  
12:42:45 15 military dispatched a contingent of their forces to Freetown and  
16 proceeded to train the so-called Sierra Leone in contravention of  
17 the Lome Peace Accord.

18 To the utter dismay of the Liberian people, hundreds of  
19 the recruits that form part of the so-called Sierra Leone Army,  
12:43:02 20 have been identified through photographs as members of former  
21 warring factions that participated in the Liberian civil war.  
22 Many of them are fugitives who were airlifted along with  
23 Roosevelt Johnson by the United States embassy near Monrovia.

24 Consequently, arms and ammunition supplied by the British  
12:43:26 25 military to the so-called Sierra Leone Army have found their way  
26 into the hands of Liberian dissidents based in Guinea.

27 Many of these arms were captured by Liberian government  
28 forces and a British made rifle was displayed and presented to  
29 the current ECOWAS Chairman, Malian President Alpha Oumar Konaré,

1 and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo when they visited  
2 Monrovia in July 2000.

3 In the wake of these developments, the United States State  
4 Department dispatched its Under-Secretary of State, Thomas  
12:44:15 5 Pickering, to Monrovia. The Liberian people were certain that  
6 the State Department had patented their motive and were now  
7 searching for an opportunity to deal Liberia its heaviest blow -  
8 crippling sanctions.

9 As if the people's premonition was accurate, the US State  
12:44:36 10 Department, just weeks following Pickering's ultimatum,  
11 reinforced its travel ban on Liberia by declaring to its citizens  
12 that the country is unsafe for travel. Subsequently, the State  
13 Department imposed a comprehensive visa restriction on the  
14 President of Liberia, his family, close associates and selected  
12:44:55 15 government officials.

16 Thomas Pickering's visit to Liberia sent more signals than  
17 was immediately apparent. The composition of his delegation left  
18 many wondering as to the real intent of his message. Far from  
19 being a merely diplomatic delegation, Pickering was accompanied  
12:45:16 20 by ten top military and intelligence officers including Mr Bred  
21 McConnel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defence; Brigadier  
22 General Leslie Lawrence Fuller, Commanding General, Special  
23 Operations Command of the US army; Colonel Volney James Warner,  
24 United States Navy Commander; Richard Heircue and Major James  
12:45:48 25 Moeller, among the others.

26 Clearly the level of military and intelligence expertise  
27 floated into the sub-region by the Albright State Department must  
28 have had a specific agenda, beside just accompanying Pickering to  
29 deliver an ultimatum. It is the belief that such an ultimatum

1 could have been sent through diplomatic channels. Therefore, it  
2 is no surprise that critical information about the alleged  
3 involvement of Liberia vis-a-vis the diamond trade and military  
4 operation of the RUF has been compiled in so convincing a

12:46:30 5 fashion.

6 More specifically, during the period, the Liberian  
7 government documented a series of violations of diplomatic  
8 immunity by United States embassy staff members and military  
9 attaches. Some of these violations included snooping around the  
12:46:51 10 residence of the President in Congo Town and attempting to bribe  
11 Special Security Service personnel manning the guard posts;  
12 attempts to photograph the Executive Mansion from the vicinity of  
13 the University of Liberia; attempts to observe the formation of  
14 the SSS Protective Service in the convoy of President Taylor at  
12:47:14 15 the Antoinette Tubman Stadium and attempts to carry out  
16 surveillance activities at sensitive Liberian government  
17 installations."

18 Is all of that true, Mr Taylor?

19 A. All of it true. All.

12:47:33 20 Q. In spite of Liberian government protestations through  
21 diplomatic notes to the United States embassy, according to  
22 foreign ministry sources, these unorthodox activities continued.  
23 This led to the decision by the Liberian government to expel from  
24 the country a top US military attache."

12:47:59 25 Do you recall who that was, Mr Taylor?

26 A. No, I do not recall the name. And, in fact, that was  
27 arranged. He was not subsequently expelled. We withdrew it  
28 after they promised not to continue, and we led that evidence  
29 before the Court before.

1 Q. "This decision was only reversed when the military attache  
2 pleaded mercifully with the authorities and indicated that his  
3 career would be in jeopardy if the decision were to hold. After  
4 he promised that such surveillance would cease, the Liberian  
12:48:33 5 government reversed its decision.

6 The Four Foreign Journalists Episode.

7 Perhaps the most unnerving situation in the whole scheme of  
8 attempts to demonise the Liberian government came with the arrest  
9 of four foreign journalists in Monrovia in August 2000 on charges  
12:48:54 10 of espionage.

11 The journalists, Sorious Samura, a Sierra Leonean and  
12 producer of the 'Cry Freetown' film; David Barre, a British  
13 citizen and the alleged script writer; Timothy Lambon and  
14 Gugulethu Radebe, South African cameramen, purportedly came to  
12:49:23 15 Liberia to produce a documentary. In the course of things, the  
16 Liberian government, through a tip-off from the security  
17 apparatus, uncovered a 'pre-manufactured' script, which was  
18 clearly intended to corroborate the false allegations against  
19 President Taylor and the Liberian government on diamond  
12:49:37 20 smuggling, gun-running and support to the RUF.

21 Clearly, the debacle of the journalists must have unmasked  
22 the diabolical intent of powerful interests in London and  
23 Washington DC, given the outpour of appeals that came from  
24 influential members of the international community. Those who  
12:50:01 25 called the government to plead for the release of the journalists  
26 included the Reverend Jesse Jackson, former South African  
27 President Nelson Mandela, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo,  
28 the British Foreign Office, London's Channel Four TV, as well as  
29 the CNN.

1           The Liberian people applauded the government, which, in  
2 accordance with its laws, exercised restraint, patience and  
3 maturity in dealing with the four journalists issue, thereby  
4 preventing it from creating an international crisis.

12:50:35 5           Following the charge against the journalists and a day  
6 before their appearance in a court of competent jurisdiction,  
7 the British ambassador accredited to Liberia with residence in  
8 Abidjan and Special Counsel representing Channel Four TV in  
9 London, flew to Monrovia. They were joined by the Sierra Leone  
12:50:59 10 ambassador accredited to Monrovia to 'find a way out of the  
11 mess'.

12           In the wake of the legal procedures, Channel Four TV faxed  
13 an unreserved apology to the Liberian government for any offence  
14 that the actions of the journalists, who were in their employ,  
12:51:17 15 might have caused the Liberian government and people.

16           Subsequently, the four journalists, while in prison, issued  
17 a similar handwritten unreserved apology. They were eventually  
18 released by the courts and permitted by the government to depart  
19 the country following their apology.

12:51:36 20           Perhaps what is more unnerving about the entire episode is  
21 the intelligence information uncovered about the true identity of  
22 the so-called journalists. Through Interpol cooperation, it was  
23 revealed that one of the so-called journalists, Timothy John  
24 Lambon, the assumed TV cameraman, was a soldier of fortune who  
12:51:59 25 once offered his service in Rhodesia during its civil war years  
26 and has been involved in wars throughout southern Africa,  
27 including Angola and South Africa during the apartheid era.  
28 Aside from attempts to corroborate the false allegations against  
29 the Taylor government, what then could have been the motive of a

1 potential assassin parading as a TV cameraman among a media crew,  
2 several of whom are also suspected to have been impersonating  
3 real journalists? Suspicion of their deadly motive was further  
4 revealed from their desperate, tenacious and persistent efforts  
12:52:44 5 to interview the President of Liberia at all cost.

6 The four journalists' episode was a clear indication that  
7 their intention to produce a documentary on Liberia and link  
8 President Taylor to blood diamonds and gun-running charges was  
9 connected to the motive of the outgoing US State Department and  
12:53:06 10 the British Foreign Office.

11 Also, following this episode, an avalanche of allegations  
12 against Liberia ceased for a considerable period, until October  
13 (2000) when the Greenstock delegation and a panel of experts from  
14 the United Nations Security Council visited Liberia to  
12:53:24 15 investigate the diamond trade and its effects on the Sierra Leone  
16 conflict.

17 All in all, it is the view of the Liberian people that the  
18 draft report of the panel of experts, which has selected Liberia  
19 out of more than a dozen countries mentioned, resembles the plot  
12:53:46 20 of a very thrilling Ian Fleming novel with James Bond as the  
21 central figure. The people of Liberia appeal to the sensibility  
22 of the good people of Britain and the United States to see  
23 clearly the litany of schemes that have been devised over the  
24 past decade by a select number of officials within the US State  
12:54:08 25 Department and the British Foreign Office respectively to deny  
26 the government and people of Liberia their God-given right to  
27 enjoy the fruits of their peace and stability, the cornerstones  
28 of democracy and the prerequisites for the reconstruction of  
29 their war-torn country."

1           Now, Mr Taylor, what was done with this document following  
2 its creation?

3       A.     This document was really kept by the government as the  
4 basis for arguments and the presentation of our arguments to  
12:54:55  5 foreign diplomats in detailing that there was a motive for this  
6 and they were trying to seek an opportunity. So as we presented  
7 the case, it was something like a working document for government  
8 officials in having what I would call notes in the presentation  
9 of the case from a legal perspective as we lobbied other  
12:55:19 10 diplomatic missions.

11     Q.     But, Mr Taylor, given the precarious situation you were in  
12 at the time, sanctions being threatened by the Security Council,  
13 did you not think that some of the language in this document was  
14 rather bellicose?

12:55:39 15     A.     Well, yes, in a way, but what do we go for? Do we - are we  
16 after truth? Here is an attempt to kill me. And let me just  
17 mention, I think the Serious report is available, and why it was  
18 - I mean, they were arrested, those journalists were arrested.  
19 In fact, the camera - we were told that the camera that was  
12:56:09 20 supposed to be used for this so-called documentary where they  
21 insisted on interviewing me contained some beam or something that  
22 fired at me would, over a period of time, lead to cancer that -  
23 we were told by a major western intelligence source. In fact,  
24 the tip-off not to talk to them came from a particular western  
12:56:35 25 intelligence source that said, "Do not meet that group. The  
26 camera is going to be your demise." So we were prepared for them  
27 when they arrived. We get there - so what we are talking about,  
28 yes, it's bellicose, but we're talking about the truth. We have  
29 a situation where everything is being done to destroy the

1 government. Now they're trying to kill me, so why wouldn't they  
2 be bellicose? Of course they would have to be. I mean, for me,  
3 truth - I mean, is there no dignity that must be left in a man  
4 that he must be so afraid that he cannot speak the truth? So  
12:57:11 5 everything that we see - I mean, that was said here by these  
6 government lawyers are all true, and they were never refuted from  
7 the issue with Secretary Albright, the statement made by  
8 Holbrooke, all of those things are factual. They never contested  
9 it up until today. These are not secret documents. These were  
12:57:27 10 public pronouncements that had been made even. Besides this  
11 internal memo we had spoken publicly about these, and I'll tell  
12 you, if Mandela didn't get involved, we would have gone ahead  
13 with the trial. But after he called me personally and we talked  
14 about it and they had hired a lawyer - by "them" I'm referring to  
12:57:52 15 the TV Four people - copies of the documents seized from them  
16 were sent to all diplomatic missions. So this was very, very  
17 serious, so I think there is a reason to bellicose.

18 Q. Interestingly, a little aside, the lawyer hired for them is  
19 now a judge in the ICC.

20 A. No kidding.

21 Q. Justice Fulford.

22 A. Is that right?

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor - before we move on, can I ask, please --

24 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I presume you're going to ask  
12:58:36 25 to have it marked. Could I clarify one particular paragraph.  
26 It's at page 9, and it's about the third to fourth line, and it's  
27 said: "It can be recalled in the wake of the 6 April 1996  
28 crisis," et cetera. "US Navy helicopters were seen openly  
29 supplying," but it doesn't say what they were supplying, and I'm

1 not clear what was supplied.

2 THE WITNESS: Okay, that's true, your Honour. Normally  
3 they would be referring to ammunition to the Barclay Training  
4 Centre.

12:59:14 5 JUDGE DOHERTY: Thank you.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I therefore ask that this document,  
7 "Motive and Opportunity For United Nations Panel of Experts  
8 Recommended Sanctions Against Liberia", dated, we are told by the  
9 witness, February 2001, be marked for identification MFI -198,

12:59:41 10 please.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI -198.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just to recap now on the steps taken by the  
14 Liberian government in the aftermath of the publication of the  
13:00:02 15 panel of experts' report, we had first of all the preliminary  
16 response. Is that right?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. We then had the letter written to Kofi Annan dated 22  
19 January 2001. Is that right?

13:00:15 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was there any further steps taken by the Liberian  
22 government in that regard?

23 A. Yes. After that preliminary report and all that you  
24 mentioned, late in February we did an official response to the  
13:00:35 25 sanctions imposed on Liberia.

26 Q. Now, when you say an "official response", what do you mean?

27 A. The Liberian government did an official letter - official  
28 document responding to the sanctions.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I'm sorry to ask. I might

1 have missed this. This document we've just marked 198, what  
2 became of it? Where did it go? Did I just miss it?

3 MR GRIFFITHS: I think the witness dealt with it, but we'll  
4 revisit it:

13:01:09 5 Q. What happened to that document that we just looked at,  
6 Mr Taylor?

7 A. That document was kept and maintained as a working document  
8 by the government - by my government in how officials would  
9 approach the general issue in dealing with other diplomatic  
13:01:27 10 missions, your Honour. What I mean, your Honour, is before  
11 positions are stated by various agencies of governments, whether  
12 - let's take, for example, defence, foreign affairs, and those  
13 agencies of government that may have to make public  
14 pronouncements, a document is constructed. Each of those

13:01:56 15 agencies is provided a copy, and that serves as the guidepost for  
16 their pronouncements and their interactions. That's what this  
17 document is.

18 JUDGE SEBUTI NDE: So, in other words, it was retained  
19 internally?

13:02:17 20 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now, you were speaking of an official response, Mr Taylor.  
23 Is that right?

24 A. Yes.

13:02:25 25 Q. And you said that response came in late February of 2001?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Have a look behind divider 109, please. Do you recognise  
28 that document, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, this is the statement.

1 Q. This is the statement, is it?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And we see it's headed, "Statement of the Government of  
4 Liberia on the Imposition of Sanctions By the United Nations  
13:03:03 5 Security Council", and it's dated 27 February 2001:

6 "The government and people of Liberia are labouring under  
7 threats of the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations  
8 Security Council on charges of support to the Revolutionary  
9 United Front and complicity in the trade of illegal diamonds for  
13:03:26 10 guns. A fortnight ago, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter  
11 of the United Nations, and in consonance with the rules of the  
12 Security Council, the Economic Community of West African States  
13 requested a recess of two months within which the regional body  
14 would monitor and verify measures announced by the Government of  
13:03:57 15 Liberia in lieu of the allegations.

16 This intervention by the sub-region is extremely relevant  
17 to Liberia. The ECOWAS intervention underscores the desire of  
18 the West African sub-region and its leadership to remain seized  
19 of developments in the region, as it has ably demonstrated in the  
13:04:18 20 past in the development of mechanisms suitable to the solution of  
21 problems confronting the region. Additionally, the intervention  
22 of ECOWAS avails the opportunity to the Government of Liberia to  
23 have its commitments tested and its measures verified.

24 Accordingly, the Government of Liberia reiterates its commitment  
13:04:44 25 to the full implementation of the measures announced and further  
26 commits to work with ECOWAS and the United Nations Security  
27 Council to disengage from the RUF."

28 When you say "disengage from the RUF", Mr Taylor, can you  
29 elaborate on that, please?

1 A. This is English used in the resolution that we are really  
2 using; that is, to - for us, we interpret it as getting away from  
3 the whole process.

4 Q. What process?

13:05:17 5 A. The process of being active in the peace in Sierra Leone.

6 Q. And whilst we're on that topic, Mr Taylor, we're now in  
7 February - late February of the year 2001. To what extent have  
8 you been engaged, during the months of January and February of  
9 that year, with events in Sierra Leone?

13:05:41 10 A. Not hardly. We're busy trying to - you know, to work  
11 against these sanctions since everybody is hell bound on putting  
12 them. So we are not that involved in any of the activities going  
13 on in Sierra Leone, but we are aware of the disarmament process  
14 beginning to take shape.

13:06:04 15 Q. So that leads me to my second question. What is actually  
16 happening on the ground in Sierra Leone during these months?

17 A. Well, we have to then reflect to November of 2000. If my  
18 recollection is correct, November 2000 the ceasefire agreement  
19 is signed between Issa Sesay, now the new interim leader, and the  
13:06:31 20 government.

21 Q. That was in Abuj a? Was that in Abuj a?

22 A. Exactly. That's November of 2000. So between November,  
23 December, going into the new year of 2001, that whole process now  
24 of beginning the disarmament and the movement of UNAMSIL soldiers

13:06:54 25 into those areas is now underway and that's --

26 Q. Go on?

27 A. That's how we follow it. But we are not involved in any of  
28 the day-to-day actions on the ground, no.

29 Q. And in terms of those events unfolding in Sierra Leone, is

1 there any hostility at this point?

2 A. Where?

3 Q. In Sierra Leone?

4 A. Oh, yes. Yes, there is hostility. They do have some  
13:07:26 5 little hiccups from our understanding, but they do not last too  
6 long.

7 Q. Okay. Going back to this document:

8 "The policy of disengagement is being construed as proof of  
9 complicity with the RUF in the perpetration of the madness  
13:07:45 10 attending the Sierra Leonean crisis. This misunderstanding of  
11 the intentions and actions of the Government of Liberia is most  
12 unfortunate. Notwithstanding, the Government of Liberia believes  
13 that it is no longer productive to dissuade international opinion  
14 determined to will it into guilt. What is important is the  
13:08:16 15 establishment of verifiable indicators that would vindicate the  
16 people of Liberia, restore the integrity of the government, and  
17 enhance peace and security in the sub-region. Towards this  
18 constructive engagement and cooperation, the Government of  
19 Liberia renews its fullest support.

13:08:41 20 Already the Government of Liberia has undertaken, in  
21 collaboration with ICAO" - what does that stand for?

22 A. I really - this is one of those international civil - I  
23 don't really know the - but it has to do with international  
24 aviation, but I don't know the real --

13:08:59 25 Q. It's to do with international aviation?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. "... the immediate grounding of all aircraft under the  
28 Liberian registry, most of which were registered prior to the  
29 election of this government. In partnership with ICAO, the

1 government wishes to have those planes grounded until an  
2 acceptable registration regime is in place and airworthiness  
3 assured in accordance with acceptable international standards.  
4 An additional request to ICAO has been made to provide for an  
13:09:36 5 effective air control system that would especially serve to  
6 modernise and enhance air traffic control in the region."

7 ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organisation.

8 "In similar light, the Government of Liberia has concluded  
9 investigation into the earlier registration of aircraft owned by  
13:10:04 10 a Victor Bout. The investigation confirmed that Mr Bout, working  
11 through his agents, did register aircraft during the period of an  
12 interim administration of Liberia. The contracts between the  
13 agents of Mr Bout and the interim administration, of which the  
14 sitting President was not a party, was disclaimed and voided by  
13:10:41 15 the Ministry of Transport after the inauguration of the current  
16 leadership of the country. The result of this investigation and  
17 evidence of the transactions and its subsequent nullification are  
18 being forwarded to the leadership of ECOWAS, ICAO and the United  
19 Nations Security Council for its cognisance.

13:11:00 20 On the trade in diamonds, the Government of Liberia  
21 welcomes the establishment of a certification regime similar to  
22 that of Sierra Leone for the export of diamonds. Most  
23 importantly, legislation requiring the centralised export of  
24 diamonds through the Central Bank of Liberia has been enacted and  
13:11:31 25 promulgated. Requests have already been made to the World  
26 Diamond Council to second experts to the bank, who will assist in  
27 the establishment of an internationally acceptable standard of  
28 certification. On the other hand, the Government of Liberia has  
29 proposed to the United Nations Security Council to have the World

1 Diamond Council present at least two companies acceptable to the  
2 World Diamond Council to undertake the purchase of diamonds in  
3 Liberia under the scrutiny of the United Nations Security  
4 Council. The diamonds must be certificated, while any trade in  
13:12:16 5 diamonds outside this arrangement is to be considered illegal and  
6 embargoed. The second proposal would accelerate the  
7 establishment of a certification regime from which the Government  
8 of Liberia would immensely benefit. Although the Liberian  
9 government has received no response to its proposal, it implores  
13:12:40 10 ECOWAS to facilitate the response of the World Diamond Council  
11 and the United Nations Security Council so as to have these  
12 measures immediately instituted in Liberia."

13 Pausing there, Mr Taylor. Now, this is the third public  
14 response?

13:13:02 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Following the preliminary response, the letter to Kofi  
17 Annan, we now have this public statement. Has there been any  
18 reply from the United Nations?

19 A. Not official. None. None. No official responses.

13:13:23 20 Q. Now, these proposals that the Liberian government are  
21 making, for example, regarding diamonds, is there any response to  
22 that?

23 A. There is no response. There is no response. We even send  
24 our minister to Brussels, our ambassador. We attend all of the  
13:13:44 25 meetings in Brussels, South Africa. There are about three or  
26 four meetings in different places. But the die is cast. They -  
27 just as normal, they ignore these. They've taken a decision and  
28 that's it.

29 Q. "Furthermore, the waiver requested by the President of

1 Liberia for disclosure of personal information as to bank  
2 accounts and assets remains enforceable and the Liberian Leader  
3 renews his call on the United Nations Security Council to  
4 establish a blue ribbon panel to investigate this matter, a  
13:14:30 5 result of which should be made public and, should it be  
6 determined that there is a money trail from the sale of diamonds  
7 to the President of Liberia, all such accounts and properties  
8 related thereto must be confiscated and returned to the Liberian  
9 people. The Liberian Leader renews his promise to resign  
13:14:52 10 immediately thereafter. Contrarily, however, should the results  
11 of the investigation reveal otherwise, the Liberian Leader and  
12 government would expect to be forthrightly cleared of the  
13 accusations of diamond smuggling and gun-running.

14 Returning to the presence in Liberia of RUF officials and  
13:15:20 15 their spouses, the Government of Liberia unreservedly requested  
16 the departure of all RUF individuals and the closure of its  
17 contact office in Monrovia. With the acquiescence of ECOWAS, the  
18 contact office was established to facilitate accessibility to and  
19 contacts within the sub-region for the enhancement of the Sierra  
13:15:55 20 Leonean peace process. All RUF individuals have departed Liberia  
21 in line with a 72-hour ultimatum issued by the Liberian  
22 government and the contact office closed. The Government of  
23 Liberia eagerly awaits the verification by the United Nations and  
24 ECOWAS of the implementation of this measure to finally debunk  
13:16:18 25 speculations as to the seriousness of the government to implement  
26 its own measures."

27 Pause. "All RUF individuals have departed Liberia", is  
28 that true?

29 A. That is true.

1 Q. Does that include Sam Bockarie?

2 A. Sam Bockarie departed Liberia in 2001, yes.

3 Q. When?

4 A. We - that's in February of 2001, early February. Early to  
13:16:50 5 mid-February, Sam Bockarie leaves.

6 Q. And goes where?

7 A. Well, he goes through Ia Cote d'Ivoire, and we do not know  
8 where he goes beyond that.

9 Q. Who else leaves with him?

10 A. I think Sam Bockarie took a handful of individuals. I  
11 don't think not more than five or ten persons. But the rest of  
12 the people are in Liberia, they are Liberians. So, for us,  
13 that's not our problem. They are Liberians.

14 Q. Well, I was coming to deal with that. What about those who  
13:17:23 15 had been inducted into the ATU?

16 A. Well, they were Liberian citizens. And unless they did  
17 something for us to withdraw their citizenship, as in the case of  
18 Sam Bockarie, we saw no reason to expel them.

19 Q. Well, what had Sam Bockarie done to justify you in  
13:17:44 20 withdrawing his citizenship?

21 A. Well, Sam Bockarie had become the centre of an allegation  
22 that was bringing untold harm to the republic. And since he was  
23 born in Liberia and had been granted this citizenship by virtue  
24 of the rights of the President under the constitution, that harm  
13:18:08 25 that was coming to the republic was sufficient to withdraw it.

26 Q. What allegation?

27 A. That Sam Bockarie was in Liberia planning to carry out  
28 additional strikes and that he was training men in Liberia to  
29 re-enter Sierra Leone.

1 Q. But, Mr Taylor, was there any truth in those allegations?

2 A. There was no truth, but we had sanctions imposed on it. In  
3 the absence of it, there was no truth. None. But, still,  
4 sanctions are on us and they are hurting the entire citizenry.

13:18:44 5 Q. Yes. But, you know, what about your much vaunted sense of  
6 principle? The man hasn't done anything. And despite these  
7 accusations, there's no truth in it. So why bend to that  
8 pressure?

9 A. Well, you know, that has got nothing to do with our sense  
13:19:03 10 of dignity, no. Here is a situation, this - you have to look at  
11 these individual cases. Here is a situation that there is an  
12 individual who is affecting the good of all, who is naturally not  
13 a Liberian, that his continued stay in Liberia will only lead to  
14 additional hardship. And a decision had to be taken at that  
13:19:28 15 particular time regarding safeguarding Sam Bockarie as an  
16 individual or the good of the Liberian nation, and the government  
17 took a decision that if this was going to remove the very, very  
18 black clouds over Liberia, that that should be taken in the  
19 interest of all of the people of Liberia.

13:19:56 20 Q. "On the issue of the supply of arms and ammunition to the  
21 RUF, the government rejects recent claims by the British  
22 ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, that it  
23 facilitated in January a meeting between RUF officials and a  
24 Leonid Minin in La Cote d'Ivoire where diamonds were exchanged  
13:20:22 25 for weapons. The ambassador is aware that the individual with  
26 whom the RUF allegedly transacted has been in Italian custody  
27 since last year. Perhaps a more useful purpose could be best  
28 served if we commit ourselves to the pursuit of the truth."

29 Now, this meeting between RUF officials and a Leonid Minin

1 in January, January of which year, Mr Taylor?

2 A. If I look at Jeremy Greenstock, he could be talking about  
3 January 2001, I would suppose. We are referring to what he says.

4 Q. Now, were you aware or were you informed of this meeting in  
13:21:15 5 the Cote d'Ivoire?

6 A. No, we were not informed of this meeting in la Cote  
7 d'Ivoire.

8 Q. Was Liberia involved in setting up that meeting in any way?

9 A. No, Liberia was not involved in setting up this so-called  
13:21:33 10 meeting, but we get to know later on that the period in which  
11 Jeremy Greenstock is speaking, Leonid Minin is in custody in  
12 Italy. So, in fact, there was no such meeting. It was a lie.  
13 That's what we are talking about. So this whole thing is just -  
14 Minin was then under custody in Italy. He was being  
13:21:52 15 investigated, and they are claiming that a meeting was set up  
16 between Leonid Minin and the RUF in la Cote d'Ivoire, and we are  
17 saying that it could not be possible.

18 Q. I see:

19 "However, the Government of Liberia welcomes the  
13:22:08 20 strengthening of measures by ECOWAS aimed at reinforcing the  
21 ECOWAS's protocol on the moratorium of small arms in the region.  
22 Additionally, the Liberian government renews its call to the  
23 international community, especially the United Nations Security  
24 Council, to have its air, land and sea entryways placed under  
13:22:33 25 international observation and scrutiny.

26 It is the desire of the Government of Liberia to live in  
27 peace with her neighbours. It was this conviction that  
28 predicated the destruction of arms and ammunition collected by  
29 peacekeepers in the aftermath of Liberia's own tragic experience.

1      Unfortunately, reasons abound which demand that the Government of  
2      Liberia remains conscious of and attentive to the intentions,  
3      threats and actions of some states in a relatively volatile and  
4      hostile neighbourhood. Four unprovoked attacks, at least two of  
13:23:19 5      which witnessed the capture of European Union ambassadors and  
6      international aid workers and their subsequent release in  
7      Conakry, Guinea, have rendered the entire northern region of  
8      Liberia desolate. Known Liberian dissidents continue to redefine  
9      their stated objective to oust the Liberian government by force  
13:23:41 10     of arms from safe havens in one neighbouring country, while  
11     remnants of a defunct Liberian warring faction (ULIMO) espousing  
12     to similar objective are not only allowed to roam and wreck havoc  
13     on Liberia with apparent impunity but some elements are being  
14     recruited and armed as members of another country's military.

13:24:13 15       The Government of Liberia believes that serious and honest  
16     dialogue within the context of the Mano River Union and ECOWAS  
17     could reverse the sense of insecurity prevalent along the Guinea,  
18     Liberia and Sierra Leone border. The Liberian government desires  
19     dialogue with her neighbours and requests interested members of  
13:24:36 20     the international community to bring their influence to bear on  
21     the other leaders of the Mano River Union to have us embark upon  
22     this high road to restoration, peace and good neighbourliness.

23       In the same vein, Liberia welcomes the immediate deployment  
24     of the intervention force of ECOWAS to enhance security along  
13:25:04 25     the border with Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and guarantee  
26     the safe movement of refugees and individuals trapped by the  
27     unfortunate turn of events in Guinea. The citizens of Guinea,  
28     Liberia and Sierra Leone, bonded by common sociology and history,  
29     demand a leadership in the direction of peace, security and

1 sustained development of their nations and welfare.

2         The Government of Liberia remains a stakeholder in the  
3 peace process in Sierra Leone. The interest of Liberia  
4 translates into a conviction towards the success of UNAMSIL and  
13:25:49 5 ECOWAS in the resolution of the Sierra Leonean conflict. To this  
6 end, the Government of Liberia is pleased with the current  
7 efforts underway to deploy, disarm and demobilise the  
8 belligerents. At the same time, in keeping with terms of the  
9 recent ceasefire agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria, the  
13:26:17 10 Government of Liberia calls on the parties to the agreement and  
11 its facilitators to accelerate steps that would lead to the  
12 realisation of the ultimate objective of the agreement, the  
13 restoration of sustainable peace to Sierra Leone. The process of  
14 building confidence, accessibility to the entire country, return  
13:26:33 15 of UNAMSIL weapons, release of prisoners and deployment of  
16 peacekeepers, especially in the diamond districts, must continue  
17 as a guaranteed path towards the total disarmament and  
18 demobilisation of the RUF and all other belligerents.

19         The horrific intensity of sheer evil that has attended the  
13:27:04 20 Sierra Leonean crisis leaves much to be desired in terms of  
21 reconciling the entire country. The Liberian experience has  
22 shown that often times the path of reconciliation is laden with  
23 thorns, but one which must be ultimately threaded in the  
24 long-term interest and survival of one's patrimony.

13:27:28 25 Additionally, human nature imposes upon man the likelihood to  
26 forgive himself by blaming others. However true, leadership,  
27 especially under crisis, demands that we place the interests of  
28 our people above self and assume those actions that would ensure  
29 that our people, the real victims, are never made to follow the

1 same path of destruction twice. The maiming and amputation of  
2 brothers and sisters in the name of a cause is unconscionable and  
3 incomprehensible. The perpetrators of such dastardly acts must  
4 certainly be brought to the full force of justice. Equally,  
13:28:11 5 those who seek to exploit and pander the sad state of the victims  
6 to suit their political objectives must realise that this is  
7 equally wrong.

8 Finally, the Government of Liberia wishes to reassure  
9 ECOWAS, the United Nations, and other interested members of the  
13:28:29 10 international community that it shall continue to seek dialogue  
11 as a means of resolving common problems, cooperate with the  
12 international community to evolve solutions to these problems,  
13 and resolves to continue to work steadfastly within the context  
14 of this renewed spirit of constructive engagement. The interests  
13:28:54 15 of the people of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea will not be  
16 served with the imposition of sanctions on Liberia, a country  
17 that is grappling with the harsh realities of the recovery from  
18 seven years of a devastating civil war."

19 Can I ask, please - I note the time - if we have sufficient  
13:29:11 20 time to mark this for identification MFI-199, Mr President.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document --

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Entitled "The statement of the Government of  
23 Liberia on the Imposition of Sanctions by the United Nations  
24 Security Council", dated 27 February 2001.

13:29:44 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for  
26 identification MFI-199. We will take the lunch break now and  
27 resume at 2.30.

28 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

29 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Mr Taylor, just before the luncheon adjournment, we were  
4 looking at that statement issued by your government. Do you  
14:30:32 5 recall that?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Now, did that statement elicit any kind of response?

8 A. No.

9 Q. So, did your government take any further steps?

14:30:53 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Yes?

12 A. Yes, we did.

13 Q. And what was that?

14 A. While this is going on at the United Nations, remember the  
14:31:06 15 Clinton administration has already imposed certain travel bans on  
16 Liberia. These preceded the United Nations security sanctions.  
17 While this is going on, the United States congress gets into  
18 motion and is holding a hearing on the different charges that are  
19 being alleged against Liberia. And these committee hearings are  
14:31:38 20 being presided over by a former congressman Ed Royce. And so we  
21 cause to be written an open letter from the embassy of Liberia in  
22 the United States to Congressman Royce to give him a few words of  
23 advice on what we felt we could do to help to bring a very  
24 credible result to the hearings that he was holding on Liberia.

14:32:13 25 Q. Have a look behind divider 111, please. Do you have it,  
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. Is that the letter?

29 A. This is the letter.

1 Q. Now, you see that it is headed "Open letter to the house of  
2 international affairs committee Africa subcommittee", yes?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. And it's from the embassy of the Republic of Liberia in  
14:32:58 5 Washington, addressed to the honourable Edward R Royce, chairman,  
6 subcommittee on Africa, with the address:

7 "Dear Chairman Royce, the Government of Liberia is aware of  
8 the concern, which the Africa subcommittee attaches to Liberia as  
9 is demonstrated by the holding of this hearing. The Government  
14:33:26 10 of Liberia welcomes and appreciates the subcommittee's concern.

11 It is hoped that thereafter the subcommittee will have a  
12 better understanding and appreciation of the complex problems  
13 presently existing in the West African sub-region, especially  
14 those involving the countries comprising the Mano River Union.

14:33:55 15 Namely, the neighbouring countries of Liberia, Guinea, and  
16 Sierra Leone.

17 It is unfortunate that the title of this hearing has been  
18 designated 'Confronting Liberia'. Liberia has no intention of,  
19 and indeed cannot and should not be perceived as to 'confronting'  
14:34:20 20 the United States or any government.

21 It is regrettable that the subcommittee did not see fit to  
22 invite officials of the governments concerned to participate in  
23 these hearings and to have been given an opportunity to be heard.  
24 Perhaps this would have enabled the subcommittee to arrive at a  
14:34:41 25 balanced and more objective conclusion in respect of the problems  
26 facing not only Liberia, but also its immediate neighbours.

27 The Government of Liberia shares the pains as well as the  
28 unspeakable brutality and destruction the prolongation of the  
29 conflict is reaping for the people of the Mano River Union. The

1       memories of similar circumstances are fresh in the mind of the  
2       Liberian government and people, having just endured more than  
3       seven years of war. Accordingly, Liberia has condemned the RUF  
4       and all other groups responsible for the violation and horrific  
14:35:27 5       crimes committed against innocent civilians in Sierra Leone.

6                 The ongoing conflict in the region has resulted in untold  
7       suffering to hundreds of thousands of people. It has created an  
8       exodus of refugees as well as internally displaced persons in all  
9       three countries. Liberia has been and continues to be host to  
14:35:52 10      tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans.

11               Mr Chairman, the temptation is obvious to find a scapegoat  
12       for the anger, which the suffering of the innocent people in  
13       Sierra Leone have engendered worldwide. It would, however, be  
14       grossly unfair to put Liberia in this role as the convenient  
14:36:15 15      scapegoat to assuage and purge the conscience of the powerful.

16               The Government of Liberia acknowledges and shares the  
17       concerns of Sierra Leoneans to end the destruction of their  
18       country and the retrieval of their mines from the hands of  
19       foreigners to the benefit of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. It is a  
14:36:43 20      historical fact that the ordinary Sierra Leonean has not  
21       benefitted from the country's immense endowments of diamonds;  
22       rather the beneficiaries have been and continue to be expatriate  
23       brokers and buyers.

24               Mr Chairman, permit me to offer several additional points  
14:37:06 25      for the committee to ponder:

26               Liberia in the past has repeatedly requested the help and  
27       cooperation of friendly governments in finding a solution to the  
28       Sierra Leone conflict. The Liberian government has stressed that  
29       peace and stability in Liberia is to a large extent dependent on

1 the existence of peace and stability in Sierra Leone given the  
2 close historical and cultural ties between the two countries and  
3 peoples. We have renewed this request and hope that the required  
4 help and assistance will be forthcoming.

14:37:43 5 Liberia has been accused of fueling the conflict in  
6 Sierra Leone by trading guns to the RUF in exchange for diamonds.  
7 Not only has the Liberian government denied and rejected these  
8 charges, but also it has gone further by offering the use of its  
9 territory to the United Nations and the United States government  
14:38:05 10 to monitor its borders, airports and seaports, including the  
11 stationing of personnel there. These offers have not been acted  
12 upon.

13 The Liberian government has been accused of trading in  
14 so-called 'blood diamonds' without any evidence being presented  
14:38:24 15 to support these allegations. If there were any basis in fact  
16 for them, surely, the sale of millions of dollars worth of  
17 diamonds over the years would have left a money trail in Europe  
18 where diamond sales are made. President Taylor has made an  
19 unprecedented offer in a letter to the Secretary-General of  
14:38:46 20 the United Nations waiving all rights of privacy to investigate  
21 and make public if any evidence can be found anywhere in the  
22 world that he has benefitted from any diamond sales. Moreover,  
23 he has affirmed that any such evidence would result in his  
24 immediate resignation from the presidency.

14:39:05 25 President Taylor has never denied having a relationship  
26 with the RUF in the early years of its establishment. And this  
27 relationship became helpful when President Taylor was requested  
28 by the United Nations and mandated by ECOWAS to negotiate the  
29 release of the 500 UN hostages held by the RUF. He was initially

1 applauded by the United Nations, by the United States government  
2 as well as ECOWAS only later to be accused of having some sort of  
3 direct control over the RUF.

4                 However, President Taylor has denied providing weapons or  
14:39:51 5 other war materiel to the RUF. Indirect confirmation of this  
6 denial can be found in the recent United Nations experts report  
7 on Liberia which details the large quantities of arms acquired  
8 over the years by the RUF - not from Liberia or other external  
9 sources - but all entirely from internal sources in Sierra Leone.

14:40:18 10                 To avoid the persistent claims of Liberia's close  
11 association to the RUF, the Government of Liberia announced in  
12 December 2000 its decision to disengage from the Sierra Leone  
13 peace process and implemented its compulsion of all RUF members  
14 from Liberia and the closure of their liaison offices in the  
14:40:46 15 country.

16                 What should be noted is that the smuggling of diamonds is  
17 endemic to the diamond industry worldwide and is not limited to  
18 Sierra Leone or the West African sub-region. Historically,  
19 Liberia itself has always faced this problem and previous  
14:41:06 20 governments have been unable to adequately deal with this  
21 problem. The present government finds itself less able to do so  
22 given the fact that the country has recently emerged from a  
23 disastrous seven year civil war, which completely destroyed the  
24 basic national infrastructure. The problem cannot be adequately  
14:41:26 25 addressed due to the highly porous nature of the border,  
26 government's lack of adequate resources and personnel, including  
27 customs and immigration personnel, transport and communications.

28                 The Liberian government itself estimates that between 80 to  
29 90 per cent of its domestic production of diamonds is illegally

1 smuggled out of the country. It is obvious that since the  
2 Liberian government lacks the resources and capability to prevent  
3 its own locally produced diamonds from being smuggled out of the  
4 country, it is also and equally unable to prevent diamonds from  
14:42:06 5 being smuggled from neighbouring countries.

6 The Government of Liberia has in the past requested the  
7 assistance of the international community in helping to install a  
8 credible certificate regime to monitor the exportation of  
9 diamonds from the country. In the interim, the Liberian  
14:42:27 10 government has imposed a ban on the exportation of diamonds from  
11 the country for a period of 120 days to permit the installation  
12 of a credible and internationally verifiable certification  
13 regime.

14 For the same reasons why it is unable to prevent the  
14:42:46 15 prevent the smuggling of diamonds, the Liberian government is  
16 also unable to effectively monitor the registration procedures of  
17 its aircraft registry. The problem has been compounded by the  
18 fragmented nature of the Liberian government prior to the  
19 election and inauguration of the present administration. The  
14:43:06 20 Liberian government is now attempting to address these problems  
21 and has revoked all registrations previously granted as well as  
22 requested all governments worldwide to ground all Liberian  
23 registered aircrafts operating in their territories. Henceforth,  
24 no aircraft will be registered that does not provide required  
14:43:29 25 information, stipulate strict adherence to the Liberian civil  
26 aviation regulations and conforms to the standards and  
27 recommended practices of the International Civil Aviation  
28 Organisation.

29 The Government of Liberia is particularly troubled by the

1 successive waive of dissident attacks from Guinea. Those attacks  
2 continue to threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of  
3 the Republic of Liberia. It has been shown that on six different  
4 occasions between April 1999 and February 2001, Liberian  
14:44:06 5 insurgents harboured, and operating with the knowledge and  
6 support of the Government of Guinea, has launched military  
7 operations against the government and people of Liberia.  
8 Presently, dissident forces are occupying sections of Lofa  
9 County. There has been massive loss of Liberian life and  
14:44:27 10 destruction of properties as a result of these continuous  
11 violations of the territorial integrity of Liberia."

12 Now, Mr Taylor, that assertion, "Presently dissident forces  
13 are occupying action sections of Lofa County." Now, the last  
14 incursion you told us about was in July of 2000.

14:44:49 15 A. That is correct.  
16 Q. So is that incursion still continuing until this time?  
17 A. That is correct, yes.  
18 Q. So since July of the year 2000 until - we are now in March  
19 2001?

14:45:01 20 A. That is correct.  
21 Q. There has been conflict in Lofa County with these  
22 insurgents?

23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. "There has been massive loss of Liberian lives and  
14:45:09 25 destruction of properties as a result of these continuous  
26 violations of the territorial integrity of Liberia.

27 The denial of complicity by the Guinean authorities and the  
28 frightening indifference shown by major western powers, as well  
29 as the United Nations, are a source of deep concern to the

1 Government of Liberia. On 17 August 2000, the Government of  
2 Liberia intimated to then US Under-Secretary of State Thomas  
3 Pickering, during his visit to Monrovia, the blatant acts of  
4 violation of Liberian territory by dissident attacks launched  
14:45:51 5 from Guinea and implored the United States government to condemn  
6 these attacks. Similar representation was made to the United  
7 Nations Security Council through the Secretary-General. Neither  
8 the United Nations nor the United States government is yet to  
9 condemn the acts of aggression against Liberia by Guinea. The  
14:46:11 10 Liberian government also called on the United States government  
11 to 'facilitate the deployment of international observers to be  
12 stationed at our borders and to provide technical assistance to  
13 improve monitoring of all its ports of entry'. All of these  
14 invitations have gone unanswered.

14:46:35 15 Today, there are thousands of Liberian dissidents that have  
16 been trained by the British military mission in Sierra Leone and  
17 are fighting alongside the Civil Defence Force, or Kamajors, the  
18 Sierra Leonean Army, the British troops, and other militias in  
19 that country. Most of these men were members of the Armed Forces  
14:46:57 20 of Liberia who fled Liberia in 1990 at the height of the civil  
21 war in the country. Conclusive proof was obtained when the  
22 Liberian government forces captured a stock of weapons from the  
23 Liberian dissidents in Lofa County which were a part of those  
24 supplied by the British government to pro-government militias in  
14:47:20 25 Sierra Leone. Some of the weapons were publicly delivered to the  
26 Chairman of ECOWAS, President Alpha Oumar Konaré, and President  
27 Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,  
28 respectively.

29 The Government of Liberia acknowledges that there is room

1 for improvement in its continuing efforts to build democratic  
2 institutions in the country, foster genuine reconciliation and  
3 respect for the rule of law. It has reached out to other  
4 political parties by establishing a government of inclusion.

14:47:56 5 Scarce resources are being utilised to organise by-elections to  
6 ensure a more broadly based representative government.

7 The welfare of the people of Liberia is a pressing and  
8 urgent concern of the government. The imposition of sanctions  
9 against any of the major export earning industries of Liberia  
14:48:18 10 would result in the strangulation of the economy, the curtailment  
11 of basic services, and exacerbate the suffering of the people.

12 The Government of Liberia is committed to the full  
13 implementation of all of the measures it has undertaken to  
14 address the concerns of the international community as outlined  
14:48:39 15 in the United Nations experts' report on Liberia. Consequently,  
16 Liberia has requested that a monitoring regime be established to  
17 verify its compliance with the terms of the United Nations  
18 Security Council resolution of 7 March 2001, which calls for  
19 imposition of sanctions against Liberia after 60 days if the  
14:49:05 20 country is found to be in non-compliance.

21 The propensity of Liberia's neighbours over the past 20  
22 years to permit their territory to be used by dissident groups to  
23 launch attacks against Liberia; the suspicion and distrust among  
24 leaders of the Mano River Union countries; the attempts by  
14:49:26 25 nationals of some of the countries to redress inequities in their  
26 society by military rather than political means; and the designs  
27 of external powers to retain exclusive control over the resources  
28 of some of these countries, are some of the root causes of the  
29 continuous strife and instability in the sub-region.

1           As the oldest independent republic in Africa with long  
2 historical ties to the United States of America, which was  
3 instrumental in the founding of Liberia, it is the sincere desire  
4 of the Government of Liberia to engage and work closely with the  
14:50:05 5 United States government and the US Congress in addressing issues  
6 of common concern.

7           A sincere attempt must be made not to demonise,  
8 economically strangulate, or isolate one country, but to  
9 critically look at the actions of all of the countries comprising  
14:50:25 10 the Mano River Union, taking into account their acts of omission  
11 and commission. An acknowledgement of past shortcomings would be  
12 a solid foundation upon which to reconstruct and build confidence  
13 among the leaders of the West Africa sub-region, particularly  
14 Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

14:50:49 15          The leadership role of the United States in pursuing this  
16 approach, while seeking to address in a comprehensive way some of  
17 the root causes of the currently instability and civil strife in  
18 the region, would prove most beneficial.

19           It is my hope that this hearing, and future ones, will help  
14:51:08 20 to identify and establish goals which the international community  
21 could pursue, under the United States leadership, in the building  
22 of democratic institutions and the promotion of peace, stability  
23 and economic development in West Africa and elsewhere on the  
24 continent.

14:51:29 25          I welcome the opportunity to work with you and your  
26 committee in pursuing these objectives and respectfully request  
27 that this letter forms a part of your records."

28          Now, Mr Taylor, what was the outcome of that hearing by the  
29 Africa subcommittee?

1 A. What Ed Royce and his committee ended up doing was to  
2 sustain the actions on the part of his government, and really we  
3 were pushing for at least our foreign minister to appear at these  
4 hearings because they are very important. The Africa  
14:52:15 5 subcommittee is responsible for appropriations in the  
6 United States Congress, as Congress is responsible now. Just as  
7 a point of information, these foreign policy issues are really  
8 the authority of the executive branch of government. So what  
9 they finally tell the embassy is that they cannot interfere in  
14:52:46 10 foreign affairs. And all they do is to sustain what their  
11 administration has told them: Do not accept our invitation to  
12 have our foreign minister. We volunteered and said, "Well I look,  
13 we are prepared to send our ambassador or foreign minister to  
14 testify before this committee," but they did not accept it and  
14:53:05 15 they sustained their government's position.

16 Q. And did the US government thereafter take any specific  
17 steps against you, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes they did.

19 Q. What was that?

14:53:23 20 A. In an executive order issued by former President Bush,  
21 Liberia was declared a threat to the national security interest  
22 of the United States and under that executive order could  
23 have - asked Congress to permit it to act in line with the  
24 national security threat that they saw coming out of Liberia.

14:53:55 25 Q. What, Liberia posed a security threat to the United States  
26 of America?

27 A. That is correct. It's contained in the executive order.

28 Q. Have a look behind divider 112, please.

29 And whilst we are looking at that document, can I ask,

1 please, that open letter to the House International Affairs  
2 Committee, Africa Subcommittee, dated 14 March 2001, be marked  
3 for identification MFI -200, please.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI -200.

14:54:41 5 There are, at least in the documents that I have here - I've got  
6 some other documents behind that letter. I've got executive  
7 order 13213.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: That should be behind the following divider,  
9 Mr President.

14:54:57 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: It is. I think there has just been some  
11 filing mistake. And then I have got - no, I think it's just an  
12 error. In any event, I've only marked the letter.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I am only interested in the letter,  
14 Mr President. You can discard any other document behind it.

14:55:23 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you need to go through this document with  
18 care, because we've not encountered one of these before. Now, we  
19 see it's headed "Executive Order 13213" and it provides as  
14:55:56 20 follows:

21 "By the authority vested in me as President by the  
22 constitution and the laws of the United States of America,  
23 including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the  
24 National Emergencies Act, section 5 of the United Nations  
14:56:17 25 Participating Act of 1945, and section 301 of Title 3,  
26 United States Code, and in view of the national emergency  
27 described and declared in executive order 13194 of January 18,  
28 2001, and the United Nations Security Resolutions 1306 of 5 July  
29 2000 and 1343 of 7 March 2001."

1           Now, Mr Taylor, 1343 of 7 March 2001, which one is that?

2   A.   That's the actual imposition of - that's the sanctions  
3   resolution.

4   Q.   Right. So on 7 March 2001, sanctions are imposed on  
14:57:13 5   Liberia?

6   A.   That is correct.

7   Q.   By the United Nations?

8   A.   Exactly.

9   Q.   Just so that we get the sequence correct, the sanctions are  
14:57:22 10   imposed on 7 March, then that open letter is sent to the House  
11   International Affairs Committee a few days later - well, a week  
12   later on 14 March. Is that right?

13   A.   That is correct.

14   Q.   "George W Bush, President of the United States of

14:57:57 15   America, take note that in executive order 13194 the President  
16   responded to, among other things, the insurgent Revolutionary  
17   United Front's illicit trade in diamonds to fund its operations  
18   in the civil war in Sierra Leone by declaring a national  
19   emergency consistent with the United Nations Security Council

14:58:20 20   Resolution 1306 by prohibiting the importation into the  
21   United States of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone except for  
22   those imports controlled through the certificate of origin  
23   regime of the Government of Sierra Leone. United Nations  
24   Security Council resolution 1343 takes note that the bulk of RUF  
14:58:50 25   diamonds leaves Sierra Leone through Liberia and that such  
26   illicit trade cannot be conducted without the permission and  
27   involvement of Liberian government officials at the highest  
28   levels; determines that the active support provided by the  
29   Government of Liberia for the RUF and other armed rebel groups in

1 neighbouring countries constitutes a threat to international  
2 peace and security in the region; and decides that all states  
3 shall take the necessary measures to prevent the importation of  
4 all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such diamonds  
14:59:34 5 originated in Liberia. The Government of Liberia's complicity in  
6 the RUF's illicit trade in diamonds and other forms of support  
7 for the RUF are direct challenges to United States foreign policy  
8 objectives in the region as well as to the rule-based  
9 international order that is crucial to the peace and prosperity  
14:59:57 10 of the United States."

11 Now, Mr Taylor, from your vantage point, what challenge did  
12 this pose to the United States' policy objectives in the region?  
13 What were those objectives? Did you know?

14 A. No, I did not. We were stunned as you can imagine. We did  
15 not understand it. And I write to him to find out what this is  
16 all about.

17 Q. We will come to that in a moment, but did you pause and  
18 consider what US objectives in West Africa were?

19 A. I guess - yes, we did. Yes, we did pause to consider.

15:00:45 20 Q. And what did you surmise?

21 A. That they were economic, they were military and other. You  
22 know, that's all we can put it to because --

23 Q. Economic in what sense?

24 A. That probably they had an interest in economic activities  
15:01:00 25 in West Africa, Sierra Leone to be particular.

26 Q. "Therefore, I find these actions by the Government of  
27 Liberia contribute to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the  
28 foreign policy of the United States described in executive order  
29 13194 with respect to which the President declared a national

1 emergency. In order to deal with that threat and to ensure  
2 further that the direct or indirect importation into the  
3 United States of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone will not  
4 contribute financial support to further aggressive actions by the  
15:01:49 5 RUF or to the RUF's procurement of weapons; to implement  
6 United Nations Security Council resolution 1343; and to  
7 counteract, among other things, the Government of Liberia's  
8 facilitation of and participation in the RUF's illicit trade in  
9 diamonds through Liberia, I hereby order the following additional  
15:02:16 10 measures to be taken with respect to prohibiting the importation  
11 of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone."

12 So, Mr Taylor, are we to understand that the measures now  
13 being adopted by the United States through this executive order  
14 are in addition to the sanctions imposed by the United Nations on  
15:02:40 15 7 March 2001?

16 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes, yes.  
17 Q. "Section 1. Except to the extent provided in regulations,  
18 orders, directives, or licences issued pursuant to this order,  
19 and notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations  
15:03:01 20 conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any  
21 contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to  
22 the effective date of this order, the direct or indirect  
23 importation into the United States of all rough diamonds from  
24 Liberia, whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia, on  
15:03:26 25 or after the effective date of this order is prohibited.

26 Section 2. Any transaction by a United States person or  
27 within the United States that evades or avoids, or has the  
28 purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of  
29 the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited. Any

1 conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in  
2 this order is prohibited."

3 And then there is a definitional clause and then section 4:

4 "The secretary of the treasury, in consultation with the

15:04:13 5 Secretary of State, is hereby authorised to take such actions,  
6 including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to  
7 employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA and UNPA, as  
8 may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The  
9 secretary of the treasury may re-delegate any of these functions

15:04:39 10 to other officers and agencies of the United States government.

11 All agencies of the United States government are hereby directed  
12 to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry  
13 out the provisions of this order, including modifications,  
14 suspension or termination of licences or authorisations in effect

15:05:02 15 as of the date of this order.

16 This order is not intended to create, nor does it create,  
17 any right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural,  
18 enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its  
19 agencies, officers, or any other person."

15:05:24 20 And the order is effective as at one minute past midday,  
21 eastern daylight time on the 23 May 2001. And we see that --

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that midday or morning? The a.m. is  
23 the morning, isn't it?

24 MR GRIFFITHS: It's morning, sorry. Yes, one minute past  
15:05:51 25 midnigh, eastern daylight time on 23 May 2001 and it bears then  
26 the name of George W Bush:

27 Q. Now, tell us, Mr Taylor, how does an executive order like  
28 this bite?

29 A. Well, in the first place, executive orders once written are

1 automatically sent to congress, in our case the legislature, and  
2 it is passed. It becomes law. So executive orders become law.  
3 And what this would do, this is a - we took this seriously  
4 because it's a lot tied up into these kinds of orders and they  
15:06:50 5 can affect you politically. In this case, it's also economic.  
6 It could also affect you militarily. Because when there is an  
7 extraordinary threat posed, as is mentioned here, so it could  
8 really - it is a very serious situation.

9 Even military action is taken, as you look on page 2 where  
15:07:14 10 it refers to that the secretary of treasury may re-delegate any  
11 of these functions to other officers or agencies of the United  
12 States government, all agencies of the - so it could go whatever  
13 other way. And if you look at page 1, the top, when you talk  
14 about the different areas of concern, they talk about the  
15 National Emergencies Act. So what happens at this time, this  
16 whole thing is couched in language that Liberia really right now  
17 is sitting on a time bomb. That any reason could be found to act  
18 against Liberia.

19 Q. Act in what way?  
15:08:02 20 A. Militarily, redefine or add, they could add maybe - for  
example, they could say even though it includes diamonds, but  
they could stop maybe rubber importation, timber importation.  
23 This is, once passed by congress, given the scope of this, the  
24 administration can then begin to tie you up as much as they want.

15:08:29 25 Q. So, Mr Taylor, did you take this as being tantamount to a  
declaration of war against you by the United States?

27 A. Regime change, declaration of war, yes.

28 Q. So you took it to mean that they were intending to get you  
29 out of office?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. So what did you do about it, Mr Taylor?

3 A. I immediately wrote to George Bush.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we come to the letter you wrote

15:09:00 5 to George Bush can I ask, please, that the executive order 13213

6 be marked for identification MFI -201, please.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI -201.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Now, we note that the order is dated 23 May 2001 and you

15:09:27 10 say you wrote to him immediately, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, is that the 22nd? The order is - is it the 23rd or

12 22nd?

13 Q. It's signed the 22nd, but effective as of the 23rd.

14 MR BANGURA: I just need clarification here regarding the

15:09:50 15 document that has just been marked for identification. I have

16 the first two pages which my learned friend has been reading to

17 the Court, but then there are others. They all come under the

18 same tab, I should say. I am not sure whether we are dealing

19 with more than just those two pages.

15:10:07 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I explain, Mr President. You will see

21 that the pages are numbered consecutively and basically it was

22 downloaded from a US government website and this is the complete

23 document. But I am quite happy to discard pages 3 et sequentes.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: All you want marked is the order itself?

15:10:37 25 MR GRIFFITHS: The order itself will suffice for our

26 purposes.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We can discard pages 3 to 7

28 then.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Now, you said say that you wrote to him virtually  
2 immediately, yes?

3 A. Yes, that is correct.

4 Q. Have a look behind divider 113. Is that the letter?

15:11:12 5 A. This is the letter, yes.

6 Q. And to whom is it addressed?

7 A. To President George W Bush.

8 Q. And it's dated when?

9 A. 29 May 2001.

15:11:44 10 Q. "Mr President, I have read with serious concern the  
11 executive order of 22 May 2001 on additional measures with  
12 respect to prohibiting the importation of rough diamonds from  
13 Sierra Leone. I am deeply troubled by the conclusion that the  
14 Government of Liberia poses an 'unusual and extraordinary threat  
15 to the foreign policy objectives of the United States'. May I  
16 assure the government and great people of the United States that  
17 Liberia will never knowingly act to threaten the interest, peace  
18 and prosperity of the United States, a nation with which Liberia  
19 shares more than 180 years of unfailing friendship. The history  
15:12:03 20 of Liberia is enriched by the traditional bonds that have  
21 subsisted between our governments and people since the founding  
22 of the Liberian nation by American philanthropists under the  
23 aegis of the American Colonisation Society and the subsequent  
24 adoption by Liberia of the political, social and economic values  
15:12:51 25 of the United States. Today, grappling with the realities of  
26 national recovery and reconciliation, born out of a devastating  
27 civil conflict of more than seven years, Liberia, a nation of  
28 less than four million inhabitants and classified by the World  
29 Bank as least developed, stands in need of support and

1 assistance, particularly from the United States. This is why,  
2 Mr President, the Liberian nation is troubled by such perception  
3 and pronouncement from the United States of America.

4 Doubtless you may have heard many unkind things about me  
15:13:31 5 and a devilish portrayal of my government as the destabilising  
6 factor in West Africa. This is simply not true. Over-burdened  
7 by the scarcities of our post-war situation, a ten-year-old arms  
8 embargo, the absence of development aid or donor funding for the  
9 rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged national

15:13:56 10 infrastructures, compounded by various forms of selective  
11 sanctions that have undermined foreign investments, the portrayal  
12 of Liberia as a super aggressive warmongering nation is unfair,  
13 unjustified and heaps additional hardship on a war-weary,  
14 traumatised and destitute population. The truth remains that  
15 Liberia harbours no intent, nor do we have the means to engage,  
16 in hegemonic aspirations as the allegation presupposes.

17 Contrarily, however, the Liberian government has, and will  
18 continue to, invest in peace, security and stability at home, in  
19 the Mano River Basin, and the West African sub-region. Indeed,  
15:14:49 20 Mr President, even following a brutal civil war, and except for  
21 the northern province of Liberia, which has been invaded and  
22 occupied by dissident forces with overt support from the  
23 neighbouring Republic of Guinea, Liberia remains amongst the  
24 safest nations in the West African sub-region. Armed robbery,  
15:15:12 25 rape, murder and many of the social ills that plague  
26 post-conflict nations are absent in Liberia. We are a  
27 peace-loving people with a long tradition of hospitality towards  
28 foreigners and peaceful co-existence with our neighbours.

29 Notwithstanding Guinea's proven support of insurgency

1 against our peaceful sovereign, the Government of Liberia  
2 continues to prevail on the Guinean government for dialogue as a  
3 means of resolving this grave threat to the peace, security and  
4 stability of our countries and the entire sub-region. The plight  
15:15:54 5 of Liberian, Guinean and Sierra Leonean refugees, exacerbated by  
6 this ill-advised military adventure, must remain the shared  
7 responsibility of the leadership of the Mano River Union and  
8 inspire us to redirect our energies and resources to the  
9 maintenance of peace and security along our common frontier. In  
15:16:19 10 neighbouring Sierra Leone I am particularly heartened that a  
11 sustained process of dialogue, to which the Liberian government  
12 has always remained committed and for which we have sustained a  
13 barrage of false accusations, is recording unparalleled success  
14 in the evolution of the peace process."

15:16:40 15 Pause there. So what are you reflecting there, Mr Taylor,  
16 in that passage? How are things developing in neighbouring  
17 Sierra Leone? We are now in May 2001.

18 A. We are beginning to see the peace dividend.

19 Q. And is the DDR programme in Sierra Leone underway at this  
15:17:08 20 stage?

21 A. That's what I am saying. Yes, that's the part of the  
22 dividend. The DDR is put together. The meeting with UNAMSIL and  
23 the Government of Sierra Leone, they have signed the DDR  
24 agreement on what is going on. So the dividends of peace are  
15:17:27 25 beginning to take shape.

26 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor - and I am diverting at this point  
27 in order, bearing in mind the nature of the indictment, to seek  
28 your assistance on what's happening in Sierra Leone. At this  
29 time are you still in contact with Issa Sesay?

1 A. Yes, we are still in contact with Issa Sesay, yes.

2 Q. So I must ask you, Mr Taylor, in the preliminary response  
3 to the panel of experts' report you spoke of disengagement, so  
4 why are you still speaking to Issa Sesay?

15:18:07 5 A. Well, because we were persuaded not to disengage. What  
6 became the crucial point was to remove Sierra Leoneans that were  
7 in Liberia. That was more crucial to them than totally getting  
8 out of the process.

9 Q. So why are you still speaking to Issa Sesay?

15:18:26 10 A. Because Issa Sesay is not living in Liberia. He is in  
11 Sierra Leone and I am still on the Committee of Six. That  
12 disengagement is from the RUF as they are in Liberia. Now, they  
13 are operating in Sierra Leone now as the RUF, but I am  
14 encouraged to remain engaged with them, but expel those that were  
15 in Liberia, and those that were in Liberia was Sam Bockarie that  
16 they felt was a threat to peace.

17 Q. All of that I understand, Mr Taylor. Maybe it's my fault  
18 in the way in which I am asking the question. If things, to  
19 borrow a phrase, are all hunky-dory in Sierra Leone and a peace  
15:19:08 20 process is ongoing, why do you still need to speak to Issa Sesay;  
21 do you follow me?

22 A. I understand you. Because I am discouraged from totally  
23 withdrawing from the peace process, okay? That's what I am  
24 saying.

15:19:25 25 Q. But, Mr Taylor maybe it is my fault. If things are all  
26 fine and dandy in Sierra Leone, why do you need to be in contact  
27 with him? To achieve what?

28 A. But things are not fine and dandy yet. That process is  
29 taking shape, but it has not ended. It ends with an electoral

1 process. It hasn't ended, okay? So we are looking at the  
2 process of disarmament, demobilisation in preparation for  
3 elections. So things are not fine in Sierra Leone yet. That's  
4 why I still have to remain engaged.

15:20:04 5 Q. Okay. Now, you say you had been discouraged. Who by?

6 A. By ECOWAS. Remember, ECOWAS is not in favour of the  
7 sanctions anyway. So ECOWAS will - they have just encouraged me  
8 to - the members of the committee - to stay on because the job is  
9 not yet finished.

15:20:25 10 Q. Well, you will understand that I need to ask you the  
11 obvious question then, Mr Taylor: Were you retaining contact  
12 with Issa Sesay for selfish commercial reasons?

13 A. No. How could I? No, I was only maintaining contact with  
14 Issa Sesay because the committee wanted that to continue until we  
15 got the job done, that's all.

16 Q. Well, I need to ask you, Mr Taylor, in light of the  
17 accusation you face. Despite the fact that you are now under the  
18 spotlight following the publication of the panel of experts'  
19 report, yes?

15:21:07 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was it the case that the financial returns you were  
22 receiving from diamonds was such that you found it impossible to  
23 disengage from contact with the RUF? Do you follow me?

24 A. I follow you. I follow you. No, there is no such thing.

15:21:28 25 There is no such thing, no. There is no such thing.

26 Q. Very well. Let's go back to the letter:

27 "The Government of Liberia, an immediate and direct  
28 beneficiary of peace in Sierra Leone, has recommitted itself to  
29 do whatever is required within the framework of ECOWAS to

1 accelerate this process, culminating into the total disarmament,  
2 demobilisation and reintegration of the belligerents.  
3 Mr President, even a cursory review of the report of the United  
4 Nations panel of experts will show that the conclusions reached  
15:22:09 5 by the panel against the government and people of Liberia are  
6 largely unsupported, uncorroborated and unsubstantiated by the  
7 facts. An objective eye will find the report to be based  
8 entirely on conjectures, rumours, and other subjective  
9 considerations. What is even more disturbing is the fact that  
15:22:32 10 the Government of Liberia was provided no opportunity to answer  
11 the gossip and misrepresentations contained in the report, an  
12 aberration of the standards set by the panel in pursuit of its  
13 work. Prior to, during, and after the publication of the report,  
14 the Liberian government, its people and I have remained the  
15 unfortunate victims of massive and successful disinformation  
16 campaigns, devolving upon us the onus of proving ourselves  
17 innocent before an international court of public opinion  
18 determined to will us into guilt. The government, its people and  
19 I are yet to be confronted with any evidence of wrongdoing or  
15:23:18 20 proven complicity in the commission of any international wrong.

21 Notwithstanding, I clearly understand the obligation of the  
22 United States to comply with United Nations Security Council  
23 Resolution 1343. However, while fully recognising the authority  
24 of your wise leadership to judge said compliance as warranting a  
15:23:40 25 national state of emergency, or that actions allegedly undertaken  
26 by this government represent an unusual and extraordinary threat  
27 to the peace, prosperity and foreign policy objectives of the  
28 United States, I hasten to reassure you, Mr President, that  
29 Liberia has always been, and intends to remain, a faithful and

1 reliable ally of the United States. Although small and  
2 impoverished, our abiding faith in freedom, justice, the rule of  
3 law and democracy, virtues that have been nourished and  
4 strengthened by our close association with your great nation,  
15:24:19 5 shall remain the unshakable pillars upon which the Liberian  
6 government will continue to strive.

7 In closing, I wish to confirm the strong desire of the  
8 government and people of Liberia for a close and friendly  
9 relationship with the United States and its great people."

15:24:40 10 Did you get a response to that letter, Mr Taylor?  
11 A. Not that I recall, no. I did not get a response to this,  
12 no.

13 Q. So in the absence of a response, what did you do?  
14 A. There were two quick letters fired off to President Bush.

15:25:07 15 I did this and I did a second quick one.  
16 Q. You did a second letter to him, did you?  
17 A. Yes, I did.  
18 Q. Have a look behind divider 114. Do you recognise that  
19 document?

20 A. Yes, this is it.  
21 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we go any further, can I ask,  
22 please, that the letter from President Taylor to President Bush  
23 of the United States America, dated 29 May 2001, be marked for  
24 identification MFI-202, please.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-202.  
26 MR GRIFFITHS:  
27 Q. Now, this letter is dated 1 June 2001, Mr Taylor, so within  
28 a couple of days of the first letter we looked at, yes?  
29 A. Yes.

1 Q. "I have read with grave concern the executive order of 22  
2 May 2001 on additional measures with respect to prohibiting the  
3 importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone. I am deeply  
4 troubled by the conclusions that alleged actions of the  
15:26:33 5 Government of Liberia pose an 'unusual and extraordinary threat  
6 to the foreign policy objectives of the United States'. May I  
7 assure the government and great people of the United States that  
8 Liberia will never knowingly act to threaten the interest, peace  
9 and prosperity of the United States, a nation with which Liberia  
15:26:54 10 shares more than 180 years of unfailing friendship."

11 Now, pause, Mr Taylor. Now, some of the language here used  
12 is virtually identical to the previous letter, isn't it?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. So why are you writing again so quickly?

15:27:13 15 A. Well, we are talking to diplomatic sources. The first  
16 letter is a very long letter, and most times Presidents don't  
17 like reading long letters. So some of our diplomatic friends who  
18 write the President a letter just condense the first letter as  
19 much as you can. He might just read it himself and in most  
15:27:34 20 cases, if you really want leaders to read, don't go two pages; do  
21 it in one. So we tried to cut it down to two now. This is just  
22 condensing the first letter, hopefully that he would say, "Okay,  
23 let me look at it."

24 Q. "The portrayal of Liberia by some as a super aggressive,  
15:27:52 25 warmongering nation is unfair, unjustified and heaps additional  
26 hardship on an already war-weary, traumatised and destitute  
27 population. The truth remains that Liberia harbours no intent,  
28 nor do we have the means to entertain any hegemonic aspirations  
29 as the allegation presupposes. Contrarily, however, the Liberian

1 government has and will continue to invest in peace, security and  
2 stability at home, in the Mano River basin and the West African  
3 sub-region. Indeed, Mr President, even following a brutal civil  
4 war and except for the northern province of Liberia which has  
15:28:39 5 been invaded and occupied by dissident forces, with overt support  
6 from the neighbouring Republic of Guinea, Liberia remains amongst  
7 the safest nations in the West African sub-region. Armed  
8 robbery, rape, murder and many of the social ills that plague  
9 post conflict nations are absent in Liberia. We are a peace  
15:29:01 10 loving people with a long tradition of hospitality towards  
11 foreigners and peaceful co-existence with our neighbours.

12 With respect to Sierra Leone our position has been made  
13 clear. The civil war in that neighbouring state has been brutal,  
14 characterised by many atrocities, not to mention the evil  
15:29:20 15 amputations. We have not minced words in expressing our disgust  
16 and condemnation for these outrageous and appalling acts on the  
17 part of the belligerents and have called on the RUF to lay down  
18 their arms a support the peace process. I am particularly  
19 heartened by reports that the process of dialogue to which  
15:29:41 20 Liberian government has always remained committed is achieving  
21 some success in the evolution of the peace process. The  
22 Government of Liberia, an immediate indirect beneficiary of peace  
23 in Sierra Leone, will continue to support the initiatives of  
24 ECOWAS and the international community at large in restoring  
15:29:59 25 stability and peace to the Mano River Union basin.

26 Notwithstanding, I understand the obligation of the  
27 United States to comply with the United Nations Security Council  
28 resolution 1343. However, while fully recognising the authority  
29 of your wise leadership to judge said compliance as warranting a

1 national state of emergency or that actions allegedly undertaken  
2 by this government represents an unusual and extraordinary threat  
3 to the peace, prosperity and foreign policy objectives of the  
4 United States, I hasten to reassure you, Mr President, that  
15:30:36 5 Liberia has always been and intends to remain a faithful and  
6 reliable ally of the United States. Although small and  
7 impoverished, our abiding faith in freedom, justice, the rule of  
8 law and democracy, virtues that have nourished and strengthened  
9 by our close association with your great nation shall remain the  
15:31:00 10 unshakable pillars upon which the Liberian government will  
11 continue to strive.

12 In closing, I wish to reaffirm the strong desire of the  
13 government and people of Liberia for a close and friendly  
14 relationship with the United States and its great people."

15:31:14 15 Now, help us. Did you get a reply or response to that  
16 letter?

17 A. No, we did not get a response to this letter.

18 Q. Now, so far as the disarmament process in Sierra Leone,  
19 which is hinted at in that first paragraph on that page,  
15:31:38 20 Mr Taylor, to what extent were you still involved with that?

21 A. Not on a very regular basis because things were moving on  
22 smoothly, but we were involved to the extent that we were  
23 constantly briefed by our colleagues of the activities and if  
24 there was a need to make a call for anything - by making a call,  
15:32:11 25 I mean if there was a need to talk to Issa, or, you know, to get  
26 moving, get moving, fine, that would happen. But other than  
27 that, there was no real need for even the committee to be  
28 involved on a daily or weekly basis.

29 Q. But did that involvement, for example, include you being

1 served with relevant documentation from that theatre of conflict?

2 A. Yes. That's what I mean we were being briefed, yes. For  
3 example, the DDR documents that were signed between the RUF and  
4 UNAMSIL, we were supplied copies. All members of the committee  
15:32:53 5 were supplied copies. We got ours.

6 Q. And who was that signed by?

7 A. On the Sierra Leonean side that was signed, if I am not  
8 mistaken, by Gi bri l Massaquoi . He signed one of those.

9 MR GRI FFI THS: Right. We will come and have a look at that  
15:33:12 10 in a moment, but before we do can I ask, please, that letter from  
11 President Taylor to President George W Bush of the United States  
12 of America dated 1 June 2001 be marked for identification  
13 MFI -203.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that letter is marked MFI -203.

15:33:40 15 MR GRI FFI THS:

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you spoke of a document signed by Gi bri l  
17 Massaquoi ?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Have a look behind divider 116, please. Is that the  
15:34:05 20 document?

21 A. That is it, yes.

22 Q. Now, we see it's a communique issued by the Joint  
23 Government of Sierra Leone, RUF and UNAMSIL committee on  
24 disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, yes?

15:34:21 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And it's signed by, for the Revolutionary United Front,  
27 Gi bri l Massaquoi , spokesman, and by the Attorney-General and  
28 Minister of Justice of the Government of Sierra Leone, one  
29 Solomon Berewa and it is also signed by the special

1 representative of the Secretary-General, Oluyemi Adeniji, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "The joint committee on disarmament, demobilisation and  
4 reintegration comprising representatives of the government, the  
15:34:58 5 RUF and UNAMSIL held its fourth meeting in Kenema on 10 August  
6 2001 under the chairmanship of the special representative of the  
7 Secretary-General to Sierra Leone, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji.

8 The government delegation was led by the Attorney-General and  
9 Minister of Justice, the Honourable Solomon Berewa and the RUF  
15:35:22 10 delegation was headed by Mr Giabri Massaquoi, RUF spokesman. The  
11 meeting took place in an atmosphere of cordiality and  
12 constructive dialogue even more remarkable than in earlier  
13 meetings."

14 Now, is that reflective, Mr Taylor, of your understanding  
15:35:43 15 of how things were developing; becoming increasingly more cordial  
16 between the parties?

17 A. That was my understanding, yes.

18 Q. And how did you view that development?

19 A. As positive. Welcomed.

15:36:00 20 Q. And what impact did you think it had for Liberia?

21 A. Well, we were happy that the sooner they got it over with,  
22 got peace going, the better it would be for Liberia. So that was  
23 a welcomed development.

24 Q. "The committee reviewed the conduct of disarmament in the  
15:36:24 25 Kambia and Port Loko Districts and expressed its satisfaction at  
26 its success. Therefore, the joint committee formally declared  
27 the end of disarmament in the two districts.

28 The committee noted that whilst disarmament in Kono and  
29 Bonthe Districts has proceeded through the month of July, there

1 are still pockets of combatants in Kono District that are yet to  
2 disarm. The joint committee therefore decided to extend  
3 disarmament in Kono until 17 August 2001 and called upon the CDF  
4 and RUF leadership to ensure that all their combatants in the  
15:37:10 5 district disarm by that date.

6 In pursuance of its earlier decision, that the new stage of  
7 disarmament should take place in Koinadugu and Moyamba Districts,  
8 the joint committee decided that the disarmament in Moyamba  
9 should start on 15 August and in Koinadugu on 20 August 2001, to  
15:37:34 10 be completed on 31 August 2001.

11 On completion of the two districts mentioned in paragraph 3  
12 above, disarmament will take place in Bombali and Bo Districts in  
13 September 2001.

14 The next meeting will be held in Makeni on Thursday, 6  
15:37:53 15 September 2001."

16 So it would appear, according to that, Mr Taylor, that  
17 things were going rather swimmingly next door in Sierra Leone?

18 A. That is correct.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, Mr President, that that  
15:38:12 20 communiqué issued by the Joint Government of Sierra Leone, RUF,  
21 UNAMSIL committee on disarmament, demobilisation and  
22 reintegration dated 10 August 2001 be marked for identification  
23 MFI-204, please.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, marked MFI-204.

15:38:35 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you had caused your ambassador in  
27 Washington to write to that Senate committee, didn't you?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And, help us, who was your ambassador in Washington at the

1 time?

2 A. At this time it's Ambassador William Bull.

3 Q. And given your concerns about the deterioration in  
4 relations between your two countries, was he actively engaged in  
15:39:56 5 trying to build bridges in the United States?

6 A. Oh, yes. As a part of all ambassadors' functions they try  
7 to build bridges. During this particular period in particular,  
8 following my letters to President Bush, you know sometimes in  
9 diplomacy this happens, he does not respond directly. But the  
15:40:29 10 desk officer at the State Department responsible for Liberia is  
11 changed and the desk officer decides that he is going to pay a  
12 courtesy call on Ambassador Bull to talk about the problems. So  
13 he comes over to the embassy from the State Department to have a  
14 chat with Ambassador Bull.

15:41:02 15 Now, when you look at that, that's a little, I would say,  
16 unusual, and that is not just done on the sole decision of a  
17 State Department official to just walk over to an embassy that  
18 way. So we were happy. We viewed that as a sign that someone  
19 coming into the administration was interested in looking at the  
15:41:30 20 problems of the Liberia. So Ambassador Bull used this  
21 opportunity to listen to him and to put across the Liberian  
22 government's case and to then report back to Monrovia faithfully  
23 what had transpired on the visit from the visit of the desk  
24 officer to the embassy.

15:41:51 25 Q. Right. Have a look behind divider 117, please. Do you  
26 recognise that document?

27 A. Yes, that is the faithful report sent back to Monrovia by  
28 Ambassador Bull.

29 Q. And we see it's dated 3 September 2001?

1 A. That is correct.  
2 Q. "Mr Minister, I have the honour to present my compliments  
3 and to inform you that on Friday, 31 August 2001, the newly  
4 assigned Liberian desk officer at the United States Department of  
15:42:35 5 State, Mr Andrew Silski, paid me a courtesy visit at the embassy.  
6 The meeting, which lasted about 30 minutes, was  
7 characterised by frankness and allowed us to reflect on a wide  
8 range of issues centring on improving US-Liberia relations.  
9 Minister Plenipotentiary Aaron Kollie and first secretary Abdulai  
15:43:06 10 Dunbar joined me during the meeting.

11 I welcomed Mr Silski to the embassy and congratulated him  
12 on his new assignment, highlighting the historical ties binding  
13 our two countries. I reviewed political developments in the  
14 country over the past seven years and reiterated the desire of  
15:43:27 15 President Taylor's government to constructively engage the  
16 United States government.

17 In response, Mr Silski said that during his tenure, he  
18 would seek to influence US policy towards Liberia in promotion of  
19 'US interests'. He said a convincing argument or case could be  
15:43:49 20 made that the United States has lost its ability to influence  
21 Liberia because of the very hostile and negative approach which  
22 it has adopted towards the country. The desk officer underscored  
23 the urgent need for the US to adopt a constructive posture  
24 towards the people of Liberia. He opined that even if the US has  
15:44:18 25 problems with President Taylor, that did not justify the current  
26 United States policy of 'benign neglect' of Liberia which was  
27 impacting negatively on the people."

28 Let's pause, Mr Taylor. Tell me, when this letter  
29 recording this meeting first arrived on your desk, tell me, what

1 was your feeling after reading those first few paragraphs?

2 A. May I just say vindication.

3 Q. In what sense?

4 A. Well, this was for us - from our analyst this was, at that  
15:45:03 5 level, an admission that they were a little too heavy-handed in  
6 dealing with Liberia and that they were not - they themselves  
7 were not fully convinced that some of the actions that they were  
8 taking were justified and this, for us, appeared to be a low  
9 intensity of saying, "Look, we want to turn a new page."

15:45:27 10 JUDGE SEBUTI NDE: Mr Griffiths, before you continue and  
11 before this goes off the page, at page 145, line 2, the witness  
12 has recorded as having said, "This faithful letter." "This  
13 faithful report sent back to Monrovia." Did you say "faithful"  
14 or "fateful"?

15:45:52 15 THE WITNESS: Faithful report. That is, concise with  
16 accuracy in diplomacy. It's a faithful report.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. "He concurred with my assertion that President Taylor was  
19 democratically elected and has legitimacy, having won over 75  
15:46:21 20 per cent of the popular votes in 1997. Mr Siliski also discounted  
21 the notion in some quarters that President Taylor was elected by  
22 the people out of fear."

23 Now, do you see that?

24 "Mr Siliski also discounted the notion in some quarters that  
15:46:40 25 President Taylor was elected by the people out of fear."

26 Mr Taylor, were you conscience that that was a perception held by  
27 some people?

28 A. Yes, counsel. Yes. Remember that some people had  
29 construed something that came before the Court: You killed my

1 Ma; you killed my Pa; I will vote for him. Some people had  
2 construed that in a different way as saying that the people had  
3 said that I had killed their fathers and their mothers, so they  
4 will vote for me. What we have already explained is that they  
15:47:14 5 were saying: Even if he did it, we think this is the right man.  
6 What you people are saying about him is wrong. So yes, it was  
7 construed that way in some quarters.

8 Q. "He said the US ought to come forth with financial and  
9 economic assistance to help Liberia's democracy to develop as  
15:47:32 10 well as provide assistance to the people to alleviate their  
11 suffering. He said a policy which focused on only the President  
12 is not the right approach."

13 Now, Mr Taylor, "a policy which focused on only the  
14 President", what did you understand that to mean?

15:47:52 15 A. It appears to mean that he is saying that, look, we - and I  
16 am being earnest about this - it is Taylor that we want, and so  
17 if we - so just focusing on Taylor, fine, do that, but still help  
18 the country, okay? So this was behind the curve an indication  
19 that, look, we have a problem with Taylor, but we don't need to  
15:48:19 20 make it a countrywide problem. This is how I interpreted it.

21 Q. So it was personal?

22 A. It was personal, yes.

23 Q. Over the page, please:

24 "Continuing, the desk officer said he could empathise with  
15:48:36 25 the concerns and perhaps frustration of President Taylor,  
26 especially in the wake of the devastating effects of the seven  
27 years of civil crisis, the ongoing incursions by dissident forces  
28 resulting from Liberia's porous borders, and the problem of  
29 winning of loyalty of individuals, amidst the lack of

1 international assistance. In his view, these should warrant the  
2 US doing something positive, instead of dwelling on the notion of  
3 the good people verses the bad people.

4 The desk officer expressed optimism that various benchmarks  
15:49:15 5 could shortly be identified that would help to move US-Liberian  
6 relations forward, reminiscent of the past. In this connection,  
7 he referred to the European Commission's discussion with  
8 officials of government and requested information on the  
9 benchmarks identified to enhance EU-Liberian cooperation. In his  
15:49:40 10 opinion, the US has adopted a far too strict view on Liberia  
11 which is not correct, noting that the US cannot expect to go into  
12 the country and control everything 100 per cent. 'We have to  
13 make Liberia a little America in Africa, while at the same time  
14 being mindful of the fact that its sovereignty should remain  
15:50:06 15 intact. We have removed ourselves from the game to the extent  
16 that we have lost our ability to play when it comes to Liberia.'

17 Reflecting on his experience as desk officer for Estonia  
18 and Latvia and the approach adopted to strengthen US relations  
19 with these countries, he suggested that a strategic investor  
15:50:31 20 ought to be identified for Liberia. This investor would not only  
21 pursue its business interest, but would use its resources to help  
22 lobby the US Congress and administration on behalf of Liberia."

23 Now, just pause there.

24 "This investor would not only pursue its business interest,  
15:50:55 25 but will use its resources to help lobby the US Congress and  
26 administration on behalf of Liberia."

27 Mr Taylor, remember yesterday we were talking about the  
28 issuance of diplomatic passports?

29 A. Uh-huh.

1 Q. Is this the kind of situation in which a diplomatic  
2 passport might be provided to someone?

3 A. That is correct. That is correct.

4 Q. "He cited Angola as another case in point, where  
15:51:24 5 involvement by American investors extended beyond the economic  
6 dimension. He said a well-known US hydroelectric company in  
7 Minnesota could be approached to develop Liberia's hydroelectric  
8 capability.

9 At this juncture I referred to Liberia's abundant natural  
15:51:48 10 resources, noting the very encouraging interpretation of data  
11 which suggests that Liberia has oil of commercial quantity. In  
12 this connection, I informed him of President Taylor's keen desire  
13 to see increased US investment in Liberia, particularly in the  
14 oil sector.

15:52:09 15 Continuing, I referred to the close historical ties of  
16 friendship between Liberia and the United States and noted that  
17 the rest of the world will judge America by its treatment of  
18 Liberia. I wondered why the United States could not make Liberia  
19 a show case of its benevolence in Africa.

15:52:32 20 Responding, the desk officer acknowledged US strategic  
21 interest in Africa, especially as America's European partners  
22 appeared to be losing their traditional regard for their  
23 strategic partnership. He said with Liberia's small population  
24 of about three million, there is no reason why Liberia could not  
15:52:53 25 be a showcase, not so much of American benevolence, but  
26 'institutions' in Africa as a fitting mark of the close  
27 historical ties which bind our two countries and peoples.

28 On the question of the US-British sponsored UN travel ban  
29 on Liberian officials, Mr Sileski admitted that the list appeared

1 to have been unfairly drawn up, since there are some individuals  
2 who ought not to be on the list. I then noted that the Liberian  
3 government has officially challenged the list, since no criteria  
4 appeared to have been used in its constitution.

15:53:38 5 Touching on Foreign Minister Captain's pending visit to the  
6 United Nations, I suggested that it would be useful if meetings  
7 could be arranged with Secretary of State Colin Powell and other  
8 senior officials which would facilitate the continuation of  
9 discussion aimed at improving US-Liberia relations. The desk  
15:54:05 10 officer concurred and said he would draw up a proposed itinerary  
11 as well as identify issues to be discussed during the visit,  
12 which would be shared with the embassy for its inputs.

13 The desk officer referred to a recent meeting which  
14 maritime officials held with senior officials in the African  
15 department and reaffirmed that the United States is not  
16 contemplating further imposition of sanctions as being suggested  
17 to include the time better and maritime programmes. He said that  
18 the present measures are already posing serious hardship for the  
19 people of Liberia."

15:54:47 20 Were they, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Oh, yes. Uh-huh.

22 Q. "As long as the process of disarmament and elections go  
23 unimpeded in neighbouring Sierra Leone, the issue of sanctions  
24 against Liberia will die a natural death, he averred.

15:55:06 25 Another issue" - this is a fax and this is unintelligible.  
26 "The desk officer agreed that Liberia was at a disadvantage  
27 because of its exclusion from the group of participating  
28 sub-Saharan African countries. He pledged to work with the  
29 embassy to ensure Liberia's inclusion, since he feels 'US

1 economic interests' are not being served by his decision.

2 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I think that's "African  
3 Growth and Opportunity Act".

4 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful. I am grateful.

15:56:08 5 Q. "He pledged to work with the embassy to ensure Liberia's  
6 inclusion since he feels 'US economic interests' are not being  
7 served by this decision.

8 On the issue of the US travel advisory on Liberia, he  
9 agreed that it needed to be amended, but said he would  
15:56:27 10 recommended that certain parts of Liberia, especially where there  
11 are armed conflicts, should be still off limits to US citizens.  
12 Regarding the relaxation of visa restrictions between Liberia and  
13 the United States, the desk officer pledged to review the matter,  
14 consistent with the existing agreements between our two  
15 countries. He revealed the recent decision by the United States  
16 to extend the deferred enforcement departure for Liberians  
17 indefinitely. It should be observed that this is a most  
18 interesting development, especially since legislation is pending  
19 in Congress to grant permanent resident status to Liberians who  
15:57:17 20 have resided in the US for more than ten years.

21 Other areas of interests discussed were the activation of  
22 USAID's programme in Liberia and the United States military  
23 mission in the country. I referred to previous requests made by  
24 government for their reactivation. I mentioned also my recent  
15:57:42 25 meeting held with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence and  
26 the current legislation which was cited as preventing US  
27 assistance to Liberia even though they were providing so-called  
28 'non-lethal assistance to neighbouring Guinea'. Mr Sills felt  
29 that the US government should also extend non-lethal military

1 assistance to Liberia. He expressed surprise that the US would  
2 complain about discipline at some levels within the Liberian  
3 security forces when it has not helped to provide the kind of  
4 assistance and training needed to enhance cordial  
15:58:28 5 military-civilian relations. He said he would revisit this  
6 matter with the defence authorities and he was confident some way  
7 would be found to resume our cooperation.

8 Our discussion also centred on other non-governmental  
9 actors, which could be approached to assist Liberia's  
15:58:52 10 reconstruction efforts. As a practicing Mormon, he promised to  
11 introduce me to Mr JW Marriott and officials of his church at a  
12 gathering to be hosted later this month by Mr Marriott. He  
13 believes that the Church of the Latter Day Saints could be very  
14 helpful in providing assistance in the development of our health  
15:59:15 15 delivery service."

16 Mr Taylor, did that in due course pay off?  
17 A. No, not really. Not really.  
18 Q. But is that church linked in any way with Liberia today?  
19 A. Yes. They went in, did some little work, built a couple of  
15:59:39 20 churches for the Mormons.

21 Q. "I thanked Mr Silski for the visit, which I characterised  
22 as a very productive one. I observed that if our discussion was  
23 a reflection of the fresh new approach in the way our two  
24 governments would deal with each other, then it was certainly a  
15:59:59 25 most welcomed development since this had been the constant  
26 advocacy and/or appeal by government. I assured him that  
27 Liberia, as America's oldest ally in Africa, remains committed to  
28 working closely with the United States. All that we desire is  
29 America's empathy and support.

1           In response, Mr Silski said many of the views expressed  
2 were his own, but as desk officer for Liberia, it is his  
3 determination to help bring them to fruition. He noted that he  
4 is a civil servant and not a foreign service officer and that he  
16:00:38 5 served as desk officer for Latvia and Estonia for 11 years. He  
6 said he has 17 years to go before retirement and he would not  
7 mind remaining at the Liberian desk. He expressed enthusiasm  
8 about his new assignment and his determination to do things a  
9 little differently, aimed at improving the relations between the  
16:01:01 10 two countries and peoples to our mutual benefit.

11           It is my considered view, Mr Minister, that policy changes  
12 do not occur overnight or in a vacuum. In spite of the desk  
13 officer's caution that we should not expect a miracle overnight  
14 and even his disavowal that this represents a new policy to  
16:01:27 15 towards Liberia, the mere fact that he could make these  
16 assertions and proposals to us clearly indicate that a new  
17 thinking is emerging in the Bush administration about Liberia.

18           To be sure this should not be attributed to a single  
19 initiative or to mere US altruism, but should be viewed as a  
16:01:49 20 cumulative effort over the past several months, through various  
21 diplomatic initiatives and persistent advocacy that such a review  
22 be undertaken. It is also the result of the pragmatic policy  
23 changes by government which are beginning to have very beneficial  
24 effects. While it would be prudent to maintain continuity in our  
16:02:14 25 current policy responses to domestic and sub-regional issues,  
26 every effort should be deployed by government to address these  
27 additional issues that will be identified in our continuing  
28 dialogue with the US administration. Needless to observe, should  
29 this trend continue, I am cautiously optimistic that by God's

1 grace, the long awaited light at the end of the tunnel may not be  
2 too far in sight."

3 Now, Mr Taylor, how did you greet this letter overall?

4 A. For us, there was a sigh of relief, at least that, as the  
16:03:00 5 ambassador rightly puts it, there appears to be some new  
6 thinking. But you can only hope. But we had a sigh of relief  
7 that at least we were about to turn the corner.

8 Q. Now, help us, on that last page, "It is also a result of  
9 the pragmatic policy changes by government, which are beginning  
16:03:26 10 to have very beneficial effects". What are they?

11 A. More engagement with them. Remember the letters - we have  
12 written several letters. We never stop. Even we write letters,  
13 we do not get responses, we will still write. I guess they all  
14 viewed that as positive developments. We invited them to review  
16:03:53 15 some of the policy restrictions that we also had imposed. There  
16 was nothing extra beyond that that the government did, just  
17 encouraged more contacts with them.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, that this letter from the  
19 Liberian ambassador in Washington to His Excellency Monie Captan,  
16:04:33 20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 3 September 2001, be marked  
21 for identification MFI-205.

22 Now, Mr President, can I indicate, you will see that there  
23 are some succeeding pages, but what is clear is this is a fax and  
24 the pagination is sequential and for my purposes I am merely  
16:05:00 25 interested in the five pages of the letter.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, actually the extra pages look to be  
27 a different letter altogether and they are a different date as  
28 well. So I will simply remove those from my binder. The letter  
29 that you have just described, Mr Griffiths, will be marked for

1 identification MFI -205.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you will recall that on 22 January of this  
4 year, 2001, you had written to the Secretary-General of the  
16:05:48 5 United Nations. The letter we've just looked at is dated the  
6 beginning of October of 2001. Had you received a response from  
7 him by then?

8 A. Secretary-General Annan - I'm sure, yes, the  
9 Secretary-General wrote, but at this particular time of the year  
16:06:16 10 my government is doing most of the writing and so I write him at  
11 this time.

12 Q. You write Kofi Annan?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What about?

16:06:26 15 A. You know, the sanctions are in place and the sanction  
16 resolution and all of the pressure on the Liberian government is  
17 about removing RUF personnel from Liberia, and so we engage in  
18 the process of moving those individuals that do not have  
19 citizenship. In fact, there are some people that come subsequent  
16:06:57 20 to the arrival of Sam Bockarie that are still there. We complete  
21 that process under the resolution and then we write him, finally,  
22 during this period to tell him that we have completed that  
23 process and that we are in full compliance with the resolution  
24 13 - the sanctions resolution. I just forgot the number there.

16:07:20 25 Q. Have a look behind divider 118, please. Yes, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. This is a letter dated 29 October 2001 addressed to His  
28 Excellency Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations:  
29 "Mr Secretary-General, having complied with the demands of

1 the United Nations Security Council, the Government of Liberia  
2 avails itself of this opportunity to renew its call for the  
3 lifting of the regime of sanctions imposed under resolution 1343.

4 The government and people of Liberia were assured that  
16:08:14 5 sanctions were to be applied in an even-handed, non-porous way  
6 and that, having complied with the demands of the  
7 Security Council, the council will be prepared to fulfil its  
8 commitments and have the sanctions lifted. The council demanded  
9 that the Liberian government expel all RUF members, cease all  
16:08:39 10 financial and military support to the RUF, prohibit the  
11 importation of uncertified Sierra Leonean diamonds, freeze all  
12 assets of the RUF in Liberia and ground aircraft under the  
13 Liberian registry."

14 Mr Taylor, is that a full list of the sanctions that were  
16:09:00 15 imposed?

16 A. 1343, yes.

17 Q. So let's just go through and just list them. One, expel  
18 all RUF members, yes?

19 A. Yes.

16:09:12 20 Q. Two, cease all financial and military support. Three,  
21 prohibit the importation of uncertified Sierra Leonean  
22 diamonds, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Four, freeze all assets of the RUF in Liberia and, five,  
16:09:31 25 ground aircraft under the Liberian registry, yes?

26 A. That is correct, yes.

27 Q. Now, before we continue with the letter, Mr Taylor, can I  
28 just ask you about a couple of those. Firstly, did the RUF have  
29 any assets in Liberia?

1 A. None, no.

2 Q. Let's continue:

3 "The Government of Liberia has expelled all RUF members,  
4 there is no financial and military support provided RUF, a  
16:10:17 5 moratorium on the export of Liberian diamonds is being enforced,  
6 assets identified to be owned by individuals associated with the  
7 RUF have been frozen and licences of aircraft operators under the  
8 Liberian registry have been revoked. Confirmation of these and  
9 other measures taken by the Government of Liberia, in full  
16:10:47 10 compliance with the demands of the Security Council, has been  
11 documented and forwarded to the United Nations. More  
12 importantly, the report of the panel of experts pursuant to  
13 Security Council resolution 1343 concerning Liberia revealed no  
14 violations attributable to the Government of Liberia since the  
16:11:08 15 effective date of the resolution. Paragraph 11 of resolution  
16 1343 provides for the immediate termination of the measures  
17 imposed if the council determines that the Government of Liberia  
18 has complied with its demands. Clearly, there exists no further  
19 basis for the continued application of the regime of sanctions  
16:11:32 20 imposed by resolution 1343.

21 Furthermore, paragraph 3 of the resolution stresses the  
22 intent of the demands of the Security Council as being to 'lead  
23 to further progress of the peace process in Sierra Leone'. The  
24 Government of Liberia is particularly pleased to note the success  
16:11:56 25 of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone in achieving the  
26 substantial disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the  
27 RUF and other militias; the deployment of UNAMSIL and the  
28 extension of the authority of the Sierra Leonean government into  
29 areas formerly under the control of the RUF; the return of

1 weapons and other equipment seized from UNAMSIL and the release  
2 of abductees."

3 So, Mr Taylor, to repeat a phrase, things are still going  
4 swimmingly next door in Sierra Leone, yes?

16:12:39 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Has all hostility effectively ended in Sierra Leone by this  
7 time, Mr Taylor?

8 A. You can virtually say so, yes.

9 Q. We're at the end of the October 2001?

16:12:59 10 A. Yes, yes. You know, I am saying virtually you can say so,  
11 because "all" is another word, but I would say virtually all of  
12 the hostilities have ceased.

13 Q. "30 November 2001 and 14 May 2002 are dates set for the  
14 completion of the disarmament process and the conduct of national  
16:13:27 15 elections. It is our understanding from recent reports that all  
16 sides have expressed optimism that these dates are realisable and  
17 that the peace process is irreversible. Reaffirming the  
18 continued support of the Liberian government to the  
19 Sierra Leonean peace process and the mandate of UNAMSIL, the  
16:13:51 20 Government of Liberia believes that the intent of the  
21 Security Council has been realised and all moral basis further  
22 removed for the continued application of the regime of sanctions.

23 Of equal importance is the progress attained in the level  
24 of confidence, peace and security among member states of the  
16:14:15 25 Mano River Union. High-level discussions have taken place in the  
26 three capitals, resulting into the reconstitution of the MRU  
27 Joint Security Committee, essentially dedicated to resolve the  
28 plague of dissidents operating to render our common frontier  
29 unsafe. A summit meeting of the three heads of state, scheduled

1 for January 2002, attests to the commitment of the MRU leadership  
2 to live in peace and resolve their problems through dialogue.  
3 The government remains firmly committed to this process of  
4 dialogue and is reasonably assured that these initiatives will  
16:15:03 5 form the basis for sustainable peace, security and the  
6 realisation of the objectives of the Mano River Union. To this  
7 end, the Government of Liberia renews its request to the  
8 international community for assistance and support in the  
9 repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally  
16:15:26 10 displaced persons and the revitalisation of the various organs of  
11 the union.

12 However, it is imperative to note that inequities in the  
13 administration of Resolution 1343, especially paragraph 4, which  
14 states that:

16:15:45 15 "All states in the region take action to prevent armed  
16 individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and  
17 commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any  
18 action that might contribute to further destabilisation of the  
19 situation on the borders between Guinea, Liberia, and  
16:16:07 20 Sierra Leone",

21 could undermine the ongoing efforts to consolidate peace  
22 and security in the Mano River Union and the West African  
23 sub-region.

24 Your Excellency, seemingly oblivious to these numerous  
16:16:24 25 positive developments and the intent of Resolution 1343, Global  
26 Witness, a British-based propaganda outfit, has launched a  
27 dubious campaign, assisted by Liberian political opponents, to  
28 extend and expand the current regime of sanctions and prolong the  
29 suffering of the Liberian people. Politically motivated, Global

1      Witness accuses the Government of Liberia essentially of the  
2      'reckless exploitation' of the Liberian rainforest and the use of  
3      revenues therefrom to provide arms and ammunition to the RUF".

4            Was that the case, Mr Taylor?

16:17:11 5      A.       Yes. This was the case, yes. We couldn't understand how  
6      Global Witness could say that the sovereign Republic of Liberia  
7      was recklessly engaging in forest work in the country. This is  
8      like saying that somebody is pulling oil from underground too  
9      fast. I don't - we didn't understand it. But these are all  
16:17:49 10     personal things that they do when they want to keep things in  
11     place. Well, no, do not remove it. Similar to the situation  
12     that you have now in probably Zimbabwe, for example. Things are  
13     moving, but keep the sanctions on. And sanctions continue to  
14     hurt people; they don't hurt the big government officials. So  
16:18:14 15     it's strange for us.

16      Q.       "The capacity of Liberia's rainforest is widely documented  
17     by more credible international research. The German forestry  
18     mission to Liberia concluded in a report that Liberia has an  
19     estimated annual allowable cut of 3.2 million cubic metres  
16:18:37 20    without endangering the environment. The total production and  
21     export volumes for fiscal year 2000 are below one million;  
22     896,586.108 and 626,657.090 cubic metres. Three hundred thousand  
23     trees out of a total of one million are being grown for  
24     replanting. This active reforestation exercise would also cover  
16:19:15 25     grounds victimized by shifting cultivation and slash and burn,  
26     traditional methods employed by local farmers.

27            A new national forestry law enacted in April 2000 forbids  
28     clear felling, introduces environmental impact studies, increases  
29     the national forest reserves, strengthens the protection thereof,

1 and reinforces the regulatory and monitoring administration of  
2 the Forestry Development Authority. Logging companies are by law  
3 only permitted to operate annually, land areas not exceeding 4  
4 per cent of the total area of land mapped out in the concession  
16:20:03 5 agreement, and only trees which have matured to a specified  
6 diameter and have been identified, inspected, and approved by the  
7 Forestry Development Authority are felled.

8 Evidently, the larger proportion of the West African  
9 tropical rainforest exists in Liberia because of public policy,  
16:20:28 10 as well as the commitment of the government and logging companies  
11 to sustainable forest management practices.

12 More importantly, available statistics will reveal that the  
13 timber industry in Liberia provides employment opportunities for  
14 more than 10,000 individuals. It is further estimated that each  
16:20:49 15 employee provides livelihood for a minimum of ten dependents. A  
16 total of 100,000 individuals are directly dependent on the timber  
17 industry for their livelihood. This is achieved by the  
18 payment of over \$10 million annually for salaries and benefits.  
19 This in addition to the provision of free primary and secondary  
16:21:13 20 school facilities for children of all employees, while assisting  
21 substantially in the rehabilitation of public schools in rural  
22 Liberia. Timber concerns operate clinics and hospitals at their  
23 various operational sites, catering to the health needs of  
24 employees and other Liberians. In maverick agreements with the  
16:21:36 25 Liberian government, timber companies have improved major roads  
26 and highways across Liberia, ensuring their accessibility  
27 throughout the year and improving the constant movement of goods  
28 and services throughout the country.

29 Revenues from the timber sector account for more than 8

1 per cent of the national budget; however, effective fiscal year  
2 2001-2002, the Government of Liberia has instituted a policy  
3 which ensures that 100 per cent of revenue from timber is  
4 retained in the various political subdivisions for rural  
16:22:14 5 development. Unarguably, in the absence of the iron ore sector,  
6 the entire economy of rural Liberia, the home of at least 80  
7 per cent of the population, is dependent on the agro-forest  
8 industry.

9 Additionally, as part of its programme to improve the value  
16:22:33 10 of its export, the government has mandated the Liberian timber  
11 industry to install saw and plywood milling facilities and veneer  
12 plants. These measures will minimise the future export of round  
13 logs and increase the value of timber products. Additional and  
14 much needed jobs will also be created. Implementation of this  
16:22:56 15 policy has already commenced with the ongoing installation in  
16 Buchanan of one of the largest plywood mills in West Africa,  
17 which should become operational in December 2001.

18 That the Liberian nation has been under attack from  
19 dissidents in Lofa County, northern Liberia, since April 1999, is  
16:23:18 20 an undeniable fact known to the United Nations Security Council.  
21 The unfortunate loss of Liberian lives, the wanton destruction of  
22 property, and the massive displacement of inhabitants of the  
23 area, are well documented and have been repeatedly brought to the  
24 attention of the international community by the Government of  
16:23:38 25 Liberia. It must be expected that the Liberian government,  
26 acting under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,  
27 would utilise every available means to defend its sovereignty,  
28 protect its territorial integrity, and preserve its people. To  
29 this end, the Government of Liberia renews its request to the

1 Security Council to permit the Government of Liberia to  
2 adequately provide for the defence of the Liberian nation the  
3 sacred preservation its heritage. It must be clearly emphasised  
4 that the Government of Liberia has neither the will, the means,  
16:24:22 5 nor the desire to engage in hegemonic aspirations; however,  
6 preserving the State and defending the republic are obligations  
7 the Liberian government will not compromise.

8 Returning to additional measures taken by the Government  
9 Liberia to ensure compliance with the demands of the  
16:24:40 10 Security Council, the government risked severe political and  
11 economic consequences when it banned the export of domestically  
12 produced diamonds. This action has left a considerable number of  
13 Liberians without a source of livelihood. But more importantly,  
14 the request of the Government of Liberia to the Security Council  
16:25:02 15 for assistance in the establishment of an internationally  
16 credible certificate of origin regime, alleviating the hardship  
17 imposed by the ban, is yet to be answered.

18 The issue of the centralization of revenues of the Liberian  
19 government, evidently an exclusive prerogative of the  
16:25:28 20 Government of Liberia, is, however, well settled. By legislative  
21 enactment, the Central Bank of Liberia is the depository of all  
22 revenues of the government. While the Government of Liberia will  
23 react favourably to international support and other technical  
24 assistance, the international supervision or monitoring of its  
16:25:47 25 expenditure will impugn on the sovereignty of the Liberian  
26 nation. The Liberian government will find such actions  
27 unacceptable.

28 Finally, Mr Secretary-General, the severe social,  
29 humanitarian, and economic effects of the sanctions on the

1      Liberian government and the general population are well  
2      documented in the report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of  
3      paragraph 13A of Resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia. The  
4      United Nations Humanitarian Impact Study Report leaves little  
16:26:19 5      doubt that sanctions imposed under Resolution 1343 are  
6      engendering punitive effects. The resilience of the  
7      Liberian people, having just endured more than seven years of  
8      civil strife, more than two years of ongoing insurgency, a  
9      paralyzed economy recording little or no international assistance  
16:26:43 10     and damaged national infrastructure, is being stretched beyond  
11     its limits with continued application of these sanctions. It  
12     would seem a matter of profound obligation to have these  
13     sanctions lift or suspended. Contrarily, it will unfair and  
14     unjust for the United Nations to be led into an extension and/or  
16:27:01 15     expansion of the application of the sanctions regime in achieving  
16     other and unrelated ends.

17        In the final report of the Secretary-General pursuant to  
18        Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia, the  
19        Secretary-General strongly suggested that 'the international  
16:27:21 20      community remain engaged with Liberia and its people'. The  
21      Secretary-General reasoned correctly that 'external pressure  
22      without dialogue may not have a lasting impact on a country that  
23      is battling its own armed insurgency and is mired in deep  
24      political, economic and social problems' It was the hope of such  
16:27:42 25      a constructive engagement between the Government of Liberia and  
26      the international community, which, in spite of the disagreements  
27      with, and denials of, accusations of gunrunning and diamond  
28      smuggling, catalysed the policy of compliance with the demands of  
29      the United Nations Security Council, faithfully undertaken by the

1      Government of Liberia.

2               Recommitting the Government of Liberia and looking forward  
3      to a more positive and rewarding engagement with the  
4      international community, particularly the various organs of the  
16:28:13 5      United Nations, I request the United Nations, the moral  
6      conscience of the international community, to empathise with the  
7      suffering people of Liberia and have these sanctions lifted or  
8      suspended."

9               Were they, Mr Taylor?

16:28:26 10     A.    No.

11               MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask that that letter to the  
12      Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, from  
13      President Taylor be marked for identification MFI-206, please.

14               PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that letter is marked MFI-206.

16:28:49 15     MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder whether that would be a convenient  
16      point, Mr President.

17               PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think that's a convenient point.  
18      We are going to adjourn, Mr Taylor. Once more I will remind you  
19      that you are ordered not to discuss your evidence with any other  
16:29:03 20      person. The Court will adjourn now until 9.30 next Monday  
21      morning.

22               [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.  
23      to be reconvened on Monday, 31 August 2009 at  
24      9.30 a.m. ]

25

26

27

28

29

## I N D E X

### WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	27830
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	27830