



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 27 JULY 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg
Mr Artur Appazov

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Monday, 27 July 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:24:42 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution are Mohamed A
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, myself Brenda J Hollis and our case
09:32:04 10 manager, Maja Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning Mr President, your Honours,
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today are myself Courtenay
14 Griffiths, assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah,
09:32:20 15 Mr Silas Chekera and can I introduce Isaac Ip, who is a member of
16 the Bar of New Jersey and who is with us as an intern.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's I-P, is it?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I-P, yes.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths, and welcome to
09:32:40 20 the Court, Mr Ip. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honour, before I commence, can I
22 mention one logistical thing and it's this. We appreciate that
23 we've burdened everyone with a large volume of documentation and
24 I appreciate the practical difficulties of transporting that into
09:33:04 25 the courtroom every day.

26 The point I make is this. If the authorities within the
27 building are agreeable we are quite happy for that material to be
28 kept in court because, as far as we're concerned, there's nothing
29 confidential in them. So rather than be transporting these files

1 backwards and forwards every day, it seems much easier for all
2 concerned if they were to remain in court if that's possible.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well we'll have the Court
4 Manager and the senior legal officer look into that prospect,
09:33:40 5 Mr Griffiths.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Now can I deal with one preliminary matter,
7 Mr President, and it's this. At the end of a long week last
8 Thursday, I failed to ask for two documents I introduced to be
9 marked for identification. The first is our document 10 in the
09:35:03 10 bundle of additional documents to which I referred at page 25159
11 of the transcript.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the ballot paper?

13 MR GRIFFITHS: And the appended report from the Carter
14 Centre.

09:35:30 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Which is the actual document you want
16 marked?

17 MR GRIFFITHS: All of the papers behind divider 10.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: That would be the ballot paper and then
19 the Carter Centre report?

09:35:53 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, and that would be MFI-12.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you want that as the one document?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: As one document, please.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. The ballot paper is actually
24 part of the Carter Centre report, is that right?

09:36:30 25 MR GRIFFITHS: As far as I'm aware, yes, your Honour.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, the Carter Centre report dated 5
27 May 1999 incorporating the ballot paper will be marked for
28 identification MFI-12.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Now the second document I introduced,

1 your Honour, which I failed to request that it be marked, is that
2 New African article behind divider 9. It is the New African
3 magazine December 1997 edition.

09:38:15 4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the copy of the article from the New
5 African magazine December 1997 edition entitled "Taylor's
6 Triumph" will be marked for identification MFI-13.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

09:39:14 8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before you proceed, Mr Griffiths, I
9 forgot to remind Mr Taylor that he is still bound by his
10 declaration to tell the truth. Yes, go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

12 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

13 [On former affirmation]

14 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

09:39:19 15 Q. Last Thursday, Mr Taylor, we dealt with your election as
16 President of the Republic of Liberia. Do you recall that?

17 A. Yes, I do.

09:39:42 18 Q. Now, before I come to conclude that chapter of events, can
19 I ask you this: When you were President of Liberia, did you
20 cause to be created a collection of documents relevant to your
21 presidency?

22 A. Yes, I did.

23 Q. What are they called?

24 A. We referred to them as presidential papers.

09:39:59 25 Q. Help us, what was the purpose of putting together that
26 document?

27 A. Well, it was important to keep everyone informed as to the
28 various activities that had occurred during my presidency, most
29 especially for historical purposes where in the future Liberians,

1 scholars could come back and look in a very organised fashion at
2 what had obtained during my presidency.

3 Q. And what kind of documents are included in that
4 publication, Mr Taylor?

09:40:48 5 A. We have photographs of various activities, including trips
6 abroad, at home. We do have included in that document my
7 inaugural address. Also included in that document are visits of
8 foreign Heads of State, my own visits abroad. It also includes
9 very important occurrences. To be specific about the first
09:41:36 10 edition, we dealt with a particular situation involving a clash
11 again with Mr Roosevelt Johnson at some point during my
12 presidency. So basically it is more like a historical document
13 dealing with almost everything that covered my presidency between
14 July '97 I think for a great deal and throughout 1998.

09:42:10 15 Q. And when was this document first published?

16 A. We managed to get the first publication - I stand corrected
17 on this one - somewhere in I think '98 or early '99. It involved
18 so much money, we didn't have any money in government, so I'm a
19 little - the actual publication date is around, I would say,
09:42:45 20 '98/'99.

21 Q. Now, can I invite your attention to that publication now,
22 please, Mr Taylor.

23 A. Yes.

24 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me, Mr President. I find it curious
09:42:58 25 that the first thing Monday morning we are going to this
26 publication. As your Honours will recall last week the Defence
27 filed hundreds and hundreds of pages of documents out of time -
28 very much out of time - and the Prosecution indicated that for
29 the great majority of those documents we were prepared to have

1 them introduced this week even though they were very much out of
2 time.

3 The document that the Defence is talking about at this
4 point appears to be one of the ones that we specifically
09:43:29 5 indicated we did not have time to review for use this week. So
6 we would ask that it not be used this week until we have time to
7 review it. We have in good faith looked at many, many documents
8 that were provided last week but this was one we specifically
9 mentioned.

09:43:49 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: The only reason why I introduced it now,
12 Mr President, is this: On Friday last we provided to the
13 Prosecution a schedule of all the passages in this document that
14 we would be dealing with this week. So I assumed that over the
09:44:06 15 weekend adjournment, with Friday as well, that they'd had an
16 opportunity of looking at the few passages that we were intending
17 to deal with at this early stage. And for the most part, all I
18 was proposing to do at this stage was to deal with a few
19 photographs in this document and Mr Taylor's inaugural speech
09:44:27 20 which all fall within a very narrow compass.

21 The difficulty is this: That in the chronology of events,
22 because we're not intending to introduce the whole document at
23 this stage, only selected passages dealing with the election -
24 well, dealing with his inauguration, that's all, and some
09:44:50 25 photographs. So I can't see that the Prosecution are going to be
26 prejudiced in any way by the few short passages that I'm
27 proposing at this stage we look at.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before I confer with my colleagues
29 on this, I note that you said, Ms Hollis, that this was one of

1 the documents that you had indicated that you didn't have time to
2 deal with early in the week at least. Now, in view of what
3 Mr Griffiths has just said, what's your position?

09:45:30 4 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, I'm told by my case manager that
5 we did receive a list of pages on Friday afternoon late. There
6 was no indication that they would be used first thing Monday
7 morning and we were dealing with all the other documents, so
8 we're still not really in a position to deal with this document.

9 [Trial Chamber conferred]

09:46:41 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, we're going to give you the
11 time you need. When do you anticipate you'll be in a position to
12 be cognisant enough with these documents to enable Mr Griffiths
13 to proceed?

14 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, we will look at those documents
09:46:57 15 this evening once we're out of Court, so we would be in a
16 position tomorrow.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. Mr Griffiths, is
18 there any other area you can proceed with at this time?

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I hope so, Mr President:

09:47:14 20 Q. Mr Taylor, can I ask you this then, and we'll look at the
21 details of this tomorrow: When were you inaugurated?

22 A. I was inaugurated on 2 August 1997.

23 Q. And who was inaugurated as your Vice-President?

24 A. At that particular time it was the honourable Enoch
09:47:49 25 Dogolea.

26 Q. Now help us. At the time of your inauguration, what was
27 the state of the finances of the Liberian government?

28 A. When we took over it took us a little time to go through
29 the financial position of government. In the Central Bank, if I

1 am recollecting properly, there was under \$20,000. We had some
2 3 billion plus in external debt.

3 Of course, the only possible available source of income for
4 the government was the external maritime funds and the maritime
09:48:51 5 programme in Liberia is a programme that was put in place
6 somewhere around World War II. This was a programme that
7 permitted countries to use the Liberian flag on their vessels to
8 move - the main purpose of moving goods and services across the
9 world for a fee.

09:49:24 10 But the entire economy was in shambles. The war - there
11 was hardly any taxes being collected, so we had total shambles at
12 that particular time. That is the general state of affairs that
13 we met.

14 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, excuse me for interrupting.
09:49:47 15 Before we proceed, may I take it that the dollars referred to are
16 American dollars rather than Liberian?

17 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honour. We are talking
18 about United States dollars.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:49:55 20 Q. And how did that maritime flag situation - how did it work
21 in practical terms?

22 A. You may call it a flag of convenience. There are a lot of
23 ships that are plying the major oceans of the world that have
24 Liberian flags and they are not owned by Liberia. Under this
09:50:27 25 programme, this may have been a way of helping to move goods
26 across the oceans during a very crucial part of the war at a time
27 when, for example, Liberia was not fully involved in that war.
28 And so most ships that were not involved, maybe either on the
29 part of the allies or on the part of Germany and Japan that were

1 prosecuting the war, some of those ships were spared and so the
2 Liberian flag was used as a flag of convenience to move ships
3 across the ocean. And so for a fee, we would charge certain
4 companies and corporations for the movement of those goods across
09:51:34 5 the oceans and they will pay us for the use of the Liberian flag
6 on that vessel.

7 Q. And were the ships actually registered in Liberia?

8 A. They are registered - well, let me just say not "in" so to
9 speak. The programme was so complicated, it was tied up with the
09:52:01 10 United States where we did not have the means, for example, to
11 protect these vessels so they were under US protection and so
12 what happened was that there was a company registered within
13 Liberia but operated out of the United States. And in fact since
14 the programme came into place no Liberian has actually managed
09:52:29 15 the programme. We've had commissioners - what we call - of
16 maritime affairs that are Liberians, but the programmes are
17 managed outside of Liberia. So while they may be registered
18 under the flag with a Liberian address but there were many
19 companies that were operating as such that in some instances they
09:52:53 20 are called shelf companies and there was several of those that
21 were registered in Monrovia but were not actually operating in
22 Monrovia.

23 Q. So that was your main source of income. Now what about the
24 domestic debt?

09:53:15 25 A. We had accumulated a very small amount. Under most
26 circumstances we did not even before my time encourage deficit
27 spending that you will find in most western countries where maybe
28 bonds and treasury notes are sold. We very rarely had that in
29 the Liberian situation.

1 Q. Now I want to ask you about the infrastructure you
2 inherited as President, but in order to introduce that topic do
3 you recall, Mr Taylor, some maps being produced by the Liberian
4 government?

09:54:20 5 A. Well somewhere around 1983, to be exact, the Liberian
6 government with the assistance of the American and German
7 governments and other experts put together an overall programme
8 for investment encouraging foreign investors to come into the
9 country. In order to do that they had to do not just mere maps,
09:55:03 10 but in addition to the maps they had to do what we will call a
11 major survey and a study of road conditions. Investors coming
12 into the country wanted to know how good the roads are. We had
13 to look into other natural resource assets.

14 What do I mean by that? I'm talking about in terms of
09:55:36 15 diamonds, gold, oil, natural gas, bauxite, barite, and all of
16 these natural assets had to be identified and in most cases
17 quantified in order to give the foreign investors something to
18 look at.

19 So roads had to be looked at. We also looked at our forest
09:56:11 20 assets. We had to look at the educational infrastructure, the
21 medical infrastructure, because we realised that in most cases
22 investors come into the country but they - by the time they put
23 in their management positions some people come in with their
24 families so they want to know if there are schools and what's the
09:56:41 25 condition of the medical facilities. Do we have proper - I mean
26 good hospitals. All of these things were taken into
27 consideration over a period of time and finally a document that
28 includes maps was put together. I do have a copy. I have
29 studied that document significantly, even when I became

1 President, and in fact kept a copy of that document in my
2 archives for a presidential library that I was thinking about
3 after my presidency.

09:57:30

4 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, how can those maps assist us here
5 in this Court?

09:57:57

6 A. Well, a great deal. You had evidence led in this Court
7 about road - where roads were or did not exist. I think that's
8 important. I think it's important in looking at the forest
9 region of the country for the Court to have an idea of some of
10 the areas that were talked about by certain witnesses here and
11 the ability of people to traverse those areas with vehicles and
12 some of the things that some of these witnesses spoke about.

09:58:32

13 I'm referring specifically to a diagram that was done here
14 by one of the key Prosecution witnesses. I'll mention his name
15 because he is not a protected witness. Mr Varmuyan Sheriff showed
16 this Court an area of the country that he alleged that trucks
17 could traverse with arms and/or ammunition and I think that is
18 totally incorrect.

09:59:01

19 The next thing that I think could be of help to the Court
20 is we have experts from the United States geological survey and
21 other areas that point out to the various locations of
22 diamondiferous material and where diamonds had been mined in
23 Liberia over time.

09:59:25

24 I think it's important that this Court and the world
25 understands that this issue - and what is the indictment about?
26 To the best of my knowledge - and I'm not a lawyer - it is
27 claimed that I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, terrorised the citizenry
28 of Sierra Leone for the purpose of taking possession of the
29 natural resources to - just to summarise what is said.

1 Now, this map will show that Liberia is considered a major
2 diamond producing country and there's a map, or maps, that will
3 show the location of these diamond areas throughout the country.
4 I think to a great extent this will help the Court in
10:00:27 5 understanding some of the statements made by some of these
6 witnesses and the mere impossibility of those being accurate.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Do your Honours have a document like this?
8 I wonder if the witness, please, could be shown a copy of this.
9 We have smaller versions of this A3 size which can be put on the
10:00:59 10 projector:

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, what you have in front of you, is that the
12 actual size of the book of maps that you were telling us about?

13 A. Yes, it is.

14 Q. Now could we open, please, the first page. The first page
10:02:00 15 looks like this. It's the page that has the words "Atlas Team"
16 on it.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Well, rather than hold up things, we see the names of the
19 individuals who constructed this book of maps, don't we,
10:02:52 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And we see that they come from a wide range of disciplines
23 and indeed countries, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

10:03:04 25 Q. And do you remember telling us that you were assisted in
26 the creation of this book of maps by teams from Germany and the
27 United States of America?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And we see when we look at the second half of that

1 appellation under "Experts on Short-Term Assignment" we can see
2 various individuals from Germany, is that right?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. And also from the United States of America?

10:03:35 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Now if we can put that page away, please, and if we can
7 open out the second page. Can we open out the second page,
8 please, Mr Taylor.

9 A. Yes.

10:04:18 10 Q. Now this page as we see is headed "Natural and Physical
11 Context", yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And following a description of the geology of the country,
14 I would like to direct your attention please to paragraph 1.1.2

10:04:39 15 at the bottom of the page. Now, do you see the heading "Mineral
16 Resources"?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. And you see it says:

19 "The economic usefulness of the mineral deposits within the
10:04:54 20 various rock units is of considerable importance for the
21 formulation of development options. For over 15 years Liberia's
22 mineral industry has been of dominating importance and iron ore
23 is the country's principal export earner."

24 Was that the case when you became President, Mr Taylor?

10:05:21 25 A. No, by the time I took over the presidency the mines had
26 stopped.

27 Q. Why?

28 A. Well, for the most part the war lasting for seven years was
29 of such effect that most of the expatriate employees had left and

1 most of the mines and the movable assets in the mines had been
2 taken away.

3 Q. And were you able at all to reconstitute those industries
4 during the course of your presidency?

10:06:07 5 A. Iron ore mining, no. We did not have the opportunity to
6 restart, no.

7 Q. Now, going back:

8 "The existence of other minerals is well established, but
9 quantification and subsequent exploitations have been inadequate.

10:06:29 10 Part of the reason for this low level of mineral extraction has
11 been the inaccessibility of large sections of the country."

12 Is that true?

13 A. That is true.

14 Q. "Mineral exploration and geological mapping are carried out
10:06:46 15 from river traverses and along motor roads and major bush trails.
16 Furthermore, nearly all the exploration work carried out over the
17 last 45 years have been of a reconnaissance nature with only
18 occasional follow-up."

19 Then if we go to the next column:

10:07:06 20 "The need for Liberia to evaluate and subsequently
21 commercialise many of the non-traditional minerals such as
22 manganese, bauxite and barite and move away from a monomineral
23 iron ore economy cannot be overemphasised. Liberia needs more
24 than ever before to attract sincere and serious minded investors
10:07:30 25 to develop also more attractive diamond and gold deposits and to
26 evaluate more closely other potential major mineral resources."

27 Pause there. What attempts did you make, Mr Taylor, to
28 attract that kind of inward investment?

29 A. We were beginning the process, because historically if we

1 go back to the 1950s when De Beers first established offices in
2 Liberia our people had always been involved in alluvial mining.
3 That is we're talking I would estimate about maybe one to maybe
4 ten feet and probably not more underground, because there are
10:08:30 5 cases in Liberia where you will have it rain and people will find
6 diamonds and then that becomes an area where you go for alluvial
7 work.

8 We were beginning to look at the possibility of trying to
9 industrialise mining. We did not succeed because we will see
10:08:51 10 later on just as we started we were hit with another war just
11 about a year and three quarters into my administration so we did
12 not succeed, but we were looking very seriously at not just the
13 mining but also some of the work we had done offshore for oil and
14 natural gas.

10:09:19 15 Q. It continues:

16 "The first large scale mineral exploration programme
17 carried out in Liberia was by the Holland syndicate in 1934/' 35
18 when most of western Liberia was prospected in search for the
19 continuation of the Sierra Leone diamond field."

10:09:39 20 What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor, "the
21 continuation of the Sierra Leone diamond field"?

22 A. I'm not a geologist but I will help the Court. From what I
23 had my own experts explain to me, I was told that diamonds - that
24 the source of diamonds are what are called kimberlites that are
10:10:11 25 found very deep underground. I'm sure when some of the
26 geologists come they may be able to explain this. It is
27 discovered that between the - from Sierra Leone coming into
28 Liberia and covering about two-thirds of Liberia, that is from
29 the northern part of Liberia and going towards the southeastern

1 part of Liberia, that these - that they found the existence of
2 kimberlites. And so they explained that the reason why they were
3 so many areas in Liberia that diamonds were found - diamonds have
4 been found in Monrovia and diamonds have been found in Kakata and
10:11:02 5 I'm mentioning these because we're showing them on map. Diamonds
6 were found in Nimba as they worked. Diamonds have been found in
7 Lofa, Cape Mount, Bomi; along that whole Liberia-Sierra Leone
8 corridor. It's because of how they term it the kimberlite pipes
9 may push out stones at one point, because they say it operates
10:11:30 10 like a tree, it comes out and the branches go all over the place.
11 So what they are explaining here to the best of my knowledge,
12 they are explaining this kimberlite zone that runs between
13 Liberia and Sierra Leone to the best of my knowledge.

14 Q. "A few kimberlites were identified but in general success
10:11:53 15 was limited. A major by-product of these investigations was the
16 granting of a concession for development of the Bomi Hills iron
17 ore deposit. Since that time other systematic exploration and
18 basic geological work have been undertaken."

19 Then it goes on to deal with major minerals that are found
10:12:24 20 and we see: "Iron ore and the iron formation similar to those in
21 Brazil and Venezuela are found within the Precambrian
22 stratigraphic sequence." I'm not going to ask you about that,
23 Mr Taylor.

24 A. Please don't.

10:12:41 25 Q. And then we see diamonds and let's look at this in a bit
26 more detail:

27 "Diamond mining is a small-scale but widely distributed
28 industry undertaken by local miners working the alluvial deposits
29 using crude methods. More sophisticated methods using a

1 separator plant were applied by a Swiss-British-Liberian
2 syndicate in Lofa County knew Lofa Bridge Town which was in part
3 a response to this large-scale operation. Principal deposits are
4 found in Lower Lofa County near the Sierra Leonean border in the
10:13:26 5 Guma and Gbarma districts northwest of Monrovia along the Lower
6 Lofa River and in Nimba County within the Sanniquellie and Zoe
7 (Bahn) districts. Other diamondiferous areas are Gbama north of
8 Bomi Hills, the rest of the Lofa River and Kakata northeast of
9 Monrovia."

10:13:49 10 Let's leave that there and then look at gold:

11 "Until recently all known economic gold deposits in Liberia
12 have occurred as places derived from the prolonged weathering of
13 certain basement rocks in which the gold is finally disseminated
14 and from small quartz veins. The known exception are the
10:14:18 15 auriferous veins currently being mined by Bentley International
16 in their mining concession in northeastern Grand Gedeh County."

17 Help me. Was that mining operation still going when you
18 became President?

19 A. No, it had stopped because of the war. But I'm aware that
10:14:36 20 Bentley was operating.

21 Q. And then we see other minerals mentioned are barite,
22 kyanite, manganese, rutile and silica sand but we won't delay
23 with those. Can we close that, please, and then open the first
24 map. If we look at the key in the bottom left of this map, we
10:15:36 25 see that the areas coloured in green are forest and where you
26 have the diagonal hatching, those are areas of national forest.

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we see to the left of the map as we look at
29 it a very extensive area of forest running from the word "County"

1 in the left hand side, can you see that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Going up to the north Loma forest, yes?

4 A. Yes.

10:16:28 5 Q. And we see that that area of forest is virtually continuous
6 in that border area with Sierra Leone, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. We then see a further area of forest, do we not, in the
9 southwest of the country; is that right?

10:16:50 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. And then in between the white shaded area - now, we see
12 Monrovia in that white shaded area and we'll come to the
13 transportation system in a moment, but the main road from
14 Monrovia going up to Foya, that follows for the most part,

10:17:25 15 doesn't it, Mr Taylor, the white area on the map?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. What kind of forest are we talking about on the Sierra
18 Leonean border?

19 A. Well, probably we should also correct the records as we've
10:17:47 20 seen it. If you look at that map they are talking about - I
21 would not describe that - maybe I'm colour blind - as being
22 white, but if you look at the description on the legend it says,
23 "No information about forest due to lack of air photo coverage".
24 Liberia is mostly forest, so what you are seeing here in green as
10:18:10 25 described are the central, major forest areas. So you have very
26 old rainforest up - I'm not sure if the judges probably - I'm
27 talking - if I could just point it out on the map.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, can I just interrupt you for a moment.

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Looking at that key, "No information about forest due to
2 lack of air photo coverage", if you look, for example, in the
3 Maryland area of the map, bottom right-hand corner, do you see
4 that's a slightly different shade --

10:18:43 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- from the light area around Monrovia?

7 A. That's forest.

8 Q. And do you see if one looks at by a Lofa Mano national
9 park, top left, there's another area of light green shading

10:18:59 10 there?

11 A. That's forest.

12 Q. And a further one by the west Nimba national forest, that
13 finger of land pointing into Guinea. Do you see that again?

14 A. That's forest, yes.

10:19:12 15 Q. So we see there are areas of that light shading which you
16 tell us is forest?

17 A. It's forest. It is.

18 Q. How thick is that forest, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Well, I'm hoping that Animal Planet can hear about this and
10:19:31 20 go out there. This is rainforest, elephants - some of the
21 largest bull elephants you can find anywhere in the world.

22 Elephants, leopards. This is a major rainforest. This forest is
23 so thick that sometimes when it starts to rain it takes a few
24 minutes before the rain actually hits the bottom of the forest.

10:19:54 25 This is - Liberia has the only - and I think this is a
26 historical fact - the only rainforest left in West Africa is in
27 Liberia. There's a little patch still that continues into la
28 Cote d'Ivoire and we hear often of it. It's called the Tai
29 forest, but that runs into Liberia. And on the Sierra Leonean

1 side also going into Sierra Leone there is - it extends into
2 Sierra Leone. It is not as big, but Liberia has I would say some
3 - I will put it to around 4 or 5 million probably acres still
4 occupied by rainforest.

10:20:48 5 Q. Mr Taylor, looking at the key in the bottom left we see
6 reference to reforestation areas and, glancing at the map, we can
7 see where that's occurring. Why is there a need for
8 reforestation in those particular areas?

9 A. Well, first of all reforestation is really, what, planting
10 of additional trees. Because we wanted to make sure that we did
11 not deplete the forest, there is - you do have timber industries
12 that are operating in the country and so we had to come up - in
13 fact I amended that with more stringent measures that as they cut
14 certain species, that they were replanted so reforestation was
10:21:52 15 incorporated in these areas to make sure we did not lose some of
16 the native species in these particular areas.

17 Q. Where we see those symbols for reforestation, do those
18 locations actually accord with areas of the country where logging
19 industries were being carried out?

10:22:16 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And if we look at the map, we note that in that area of
22 forest next to the Sierra Leonean border there appears to be no
23 reforestation going on in that location, does there, Mr Taylor?

24 A. No, because if you look at - if you look at areas that you
10:22:55 25 have reforestation going on, let's just maybe concentrate on the
26 area around Tubmanburg, which is known as Bomi Hills --

27 Q. Yes.

28 A. Okay, we are now getting into - this is also where you had
29 the mining company and so trees in the area were - they were

1 clearing. Before the Bomi mines started there had to be massive
2 clearing for housing and other things, so a lot of the areas that
3 were cleared what they had to do there was to begin to replant.

10:23:37 4 Now, in the general area around the Sierra Leonean border
5 you do not see - this is the heavy rainforest and really there is
6 not a lot of work being done there, if any at all. This is the
7 heart of the major forest area and so there's nothing going on
8 there.

9 If you look at that area and you look at the legend, what
10:24:05 10 do we see on that border? We see two things. We see "National
11 Forests", but we also see another thing. It is said here
12 "National Parks proposed". So there are also areas of this
13 forest that are in fact eventually become national parks, which
14 mean that there is no work going on in that particular area,
10:24:30 15 okay? You may walk through there. There are no roads that you
16 can traverse with vehicles, okay? So that's why you do not say
17 reforestation because you do not have deforestation going on
18 anyway; deforestation in my little interpretation meaning the
19 cutting of these trees.

10:24:52 20 Q. Now we'll come to transport infrastructure in a moment, but
21 in your last answer you told us there are no roads in that area.
22 Is that the case?

23 A. There are no roads in that area. There are absolutely no
24 drive through roads, no.

10:25:10 25 Q. Let's close that map, please, and go to the next one. This
26 is where we look at the transport infrastructure.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Bearing in mind what you've just told us about there being
29 no roads, let's look at the legend in the bottom left-hand

1 corner. The areas marked in the dark ochre colour we see from
2 the legend means, "Isolated area all seasons five miles or more
3 from roads or airfields", and we note that that area next to the
4 Sierra Leonean border is for the most part coloured in in that
10:26:13 5 colour. Do you see that, Mr Taylor?
6 A. Yes, I do. That is correct.
7 Q. And I'm concentrating on that area for the moment. Now, we
8 see also from the legend the thick maroon line "Lacking connector
9 road". Do you see that?
10:26:37 10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. And when we again go to that area next to the
12 Sierra Leonean border, we see there are three in effect thick
13 such lines suggesting according to the legend an inability to
14 traverse those areas by road?
10:26:56 15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Do you agree?
17 A. I agree.
18 Q. Now bearing in mind what we've just looked at in terms of
19 the areas of forest, Mr Taylor, we now see, do we not, the road
10:27:12 20 which connects that Upper Lofa area, the area of Foya to
21 Monrovia? I wonder if you could just change places for a moment
22 and for our assistance just trace the route - the available route
23 - from Monrovia to Lofa. Just take us through the towns, please.
24 A. It is important to understand that this is Monrovia. In
10:28:03 25 order to get to Foya out here - now we all learn in school that
26 the shortest distance between two points is a straight line and
27 so one would assume that if you look at it just from the naked
28 eye you should be able to drive from Monrovia straight up to Foya
29 if you wanted to get there, but that's not the case. If you are

1 in Monrovia and you want to go to Foya - and I know the argument
2 will come, "Well, this map is in 1993 [sic]", but it exists
3 today. There is virtually no change to the transportation
4 infrastructure in Liberia as of the time of this map in 1983.

10:28:56 5 You have to drive from Monrovia, come to Kakata, all the way to
6 Gbarnga before you begin going northeastward all the way to get
7 to Voinjama and then come on down to Foya, because there are no
8 roads to get directly from here straight up to Foya. There are
9 no roads. Yesterday it happened. Today it is that way for 1983
10:29:35 10 as of that time until now.

11 Q. Now, help us. That route you've just traced from Monrovia
12 through Kakata, Gbarnga --

13 A. Zorzor, Voinjama, Kolahun, all the way to get to the
14 Sierra Leonean border, that's the route today.

10:29:56 15 Q. Now, help us. How much of that route was paved at the time
16 that you became President?

17 A. From Monrovia to Gbarnga on that side the paved road
18 continues going southeastward and it stops at Ganta, but from
19 Gbarnga going into Lofa there are no paved roads as of 1983.

10:30:32 20 There are no paved roads as of today.

21 Q. So from that point, from Gbarnga into Lofa, what kind of
22 road surface are we talking about?

23 A. We are talking about strictly laterite that are very, very,
24 very terrible at times during the rainy - during the rainy season
10:30:57 25 it is virtually impossible to get through certain areas on that
26 road, but it is strictly laterite and by that I mean rock and
27 dirt surface.

28 Q. Now, when we look at the legend we see a green line which
29 represents "Existing main road in need of roadbed upgrading,

1 renovation or sustained maintenance". That was in 1980. Now
2 when we look below that, beneath the heading "Roads" we see two -
3 three types of road surface: Bitumen surface and laterite
4 surface. Do you see that?

10:31:43 5 A. I do.

6 Q. Now the road surface from Monrovia to Gbarnga, what kind of
7 surface was that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. That's what you will call your bitumen surface.

9 Q. And from Gbarnga to Foya?

10:31:58 10 A. Laterite.

11 Q. Now when you say that that road from Gbarnga to Foya can be
12 difficult to traverse in the rainy season, what are we talking
13 about?

14 A. We are talking about - there are many sections of that road
10:32:23 15 that have what you will call clay content. Now, clay is very,
16 very - in fact, that could be a major industry in the future.
17 There's a lot of clay in Liberia. During the rainy season it's
18 virtually impossible to go through clay.

19 So you have a lot of rain in Liberia and you do have a lot
10:32:57 20 of little what we call brooks and creeks that develop and you
21 have water that we don't get - you don't get drained off into
22 major rivers immediately because of the quantity. I don't know
23 precisely right now the average rainfall in Liberia, but it's
24 tough. I think Liberia - if water was a principal source maybe
10:33:29 25 of export, Liberia could probably do a whole lot.

26 So with water settling into certain areas, the outlets
27 alongside the roads - we call them gutters and I don't know
28 another word for it - sometimes they get blocked, so once the
29 water settles on the road in clay even with a four-wheel drive

1 vehicle sometimes it's virtually impossible. So what they are
2 referring to here I think they are being modest. This little
3 green area, for example, up here coming out of Gbarnga going,
4 they are just really saying it is terrible and it needs work. I
10:34:12 5 guess this is what is going on.

6 Q. Well give us an idea then, Mr Taylor. You've heard mention
7 by witnesses of you sending ten tyre truckloads of weapons to the
8 RUF. So help us, could a ten tyre truck make it from Monrovia to
9 Lofa in the rainy season?

10:34:35 10 A. Yes, a ten tyre truck - a ten tyre maybe ten wheel drive
11 truck - could probably make it from Monrovia to Lofa. It would
12 probably take them a very long time.

13 Q. Give us an estimate of that, please.

14 A. I would say it probably would take you - during normal time
10:35:08 15 it would take you about three days and during the rainy season it
16 could take you as much as a week, but let me just qualify one
17 thing because I know the next thing the Prosecution will say is,
18 "Well, in testimony Mr Taylor said that ten tyre trucks could
19 go." I'm responding to your answer as to the possibility of such
10:35:27 20 happening, which has nothing to do with my accepting the fact
21 that it did happen. I want to clarify that for the record --

22 Q. I appreciate that.

23 A. -- because I'm sure the Prosecution will say, "Well,
24 Mr Taylor said that it could happen." Well, it didn't happen
10:35:38 25 with me. I'm explaining a situation where under very tough
26 conditions and with a ten tyre maybe a military type truck it
27 could happen, but I did not even have the weapons to send and
28 would not have sent any weapons.

29 Q. Now bearing in mind the nature of the allegation you face,

1 Let's look also - what is the other potential route for vehicular
2 traffic from Monrovia to Sierra Leone?

3 A. Well, it depends. From Monrovia, the other route to
4 Sierra Leone would be through Grand Cape Mount County to what is
10:36:30 5 known as we've heard evidence Bo Waterside.

6 Q. Now, can you just trace that on the map for us?

7 A. Oh, that would be from Monrovia along this route. Not
8 through Tubmanburg. We'll come somewhere to Klay and branch off
9 here and I think this is Bo right here, so you will come from
10:36:56 10 Monrovia, branch off and then come on to Bo Waterside.

11 Q. Now, just above that we see there is another route which
12 goes via Tubmanburg through Bomi Hills and where a green line
13 takes over which goes to Kongo.

14 A. Yes. If you remember, counsel, just to remind the Court I
10:37:28 15 did mention in my evidence that if you look there there's
16 something also significant there. You see a rail link. I did
17 mention somewhere in my evidence that when Bomi Hills operated
18 the iron ore mine they had an extension of a deposit of iron ore
19 here and so they have a rail track that ran from Kongo down into
10:37:57 20 Tubmanburg and continued to Monrovia.

21 Now what you are seeing here is a road used by the mining
22 company at that particular time and it was in terrible shape
23 because it was not intended - they did not have to truck iron ore
24 from Kongo down, so that road was not important for them. It was
10:38:18 25 more of a type of service road. So they built a rail link up
26 there. So what they are describing here is that this is real bad
27 road and it needs to be worked.

28 Q. So how many routes are available then for vehicular traffic
29 from Monrovia to Sierra Leone?

1 A. In actual fact there are two. One from Monrovia via Klay
2 into Bo. The second from Monrovia via Kakata, Gbarnga, Zorzor,
3 Voinjama, Kolahun and on this side. There's never been any road
4 from Monrovia into Sierra Leone besides these two roads; one at
10:39:14 5 the very northeast tip of Liberia that is up here, and the second
6 towards your northwest tip which is down at Bo. There's no other
7 way then; there's none now.

8 Q. Bearing all of that in mind, Mr Taylor, I would like us now
9 to look at and remind ourselves of exhibit P-25. Now, Mr Taylor,
10:40:18 10 do you recall this map?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. Who introduced it?

13 A. This looks like the map Mr Sheriff if I - Mr Sheriff, yes.

14 Q. And remind us, the various coloured lines on this map, what
10:40:49 15 are they supposed to show?

16 A. Well, according to the legend that he has drawn here, route
17 one he's shown in green there, two yellow, red three and four.

18 Q. Right. Now, Mr Taylor, let's take them in turn, shall we.
19 The green line, what does that accord with?

10:41:15 20 A. Looking at this, I can see that this green line could be
21 consistent with a road from Monrovia and I'm not looking at his
22 legend, I'm just trying to say what I see, consistent with a
23 possible route from Monrovia all the way to the Sierra Leonean
24 border.

10:41:44 25 Q. That was one of the two routes you showed us into
26 Sierra Leone on the previous map?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now I'm wondering how we can do this. Is there a way in
29 which we can place the major transport map that we just looked at

1 alongside this map on the screen so we can see what Mr Sheriff is
2 saying about these other three routes. If we just move that map,
3 please, to the right of it so we can still see the three - the
4 red, the purple and the yellow routes. It's not possible.

10:42:56 5 Very well. Let's try and do it a different way. Let us
6 trace, to begin with, the red route and then we will go back to
7 the other map and see what he's saying. Now, according to the
8 red line on this map it goes through Klay, Tubmanburg, Bopolu,
9 Manawala, Genkpi [phon] Town, to Fassama and then on to Salayea.

10:43:31 10 Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. Right. Let's take that off the screen, please, and,
13 Mr Taylor, could you hold that map in your right hand and let's
14 put the other map on the screen. I now want you to trace for us

10:43:49 15 on this map the route which that man claimed was a route taken to
16 carry arms into Sierra Leone. Do you follow me?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. By reference to his map just take us through the route on
19 this map, please?

10:44:07 20 A. Well, if we look at what he is saying, he is looking at
21 Monrovia.

22 Q. Yes?

23 A. And by the way, don't let us forget that this red line that
24 I see here - if I'm not mistaken, and I stand corrected on this,

10:44:32 25 this could be also construed as the direction taken by ULIMO
26 forces at the time and the area that they occupied. So we have
27 to be a little careful with this. I'm not sure if that's the
28 arms route he is describing here. But what he is referring to
29 appears to be that St Paul River route that really divides ULIMO

1 from the NPFL. This is consistent with that path going up there.

2 So that will come from - this is a small map now.

3 Q. Start at Tubmanburg.

4 A. All right, we start here.

10:45:22 5 Q. And where is the next place that he mentions?

6 A. Let's see. He goes to Bopolu.

7 Q. Can you find Bopolu?

8 A. Without my glasses it's appearing difficult.

9 Q. Mr Taylor, can I assist. Bopolu is here; do you see it?

10:45:58 10 Do you see those three large purple lines? Look at the bottom

11 one of those, go to the left of it and continue along the purple

12 line. Do you see Bopolu?

13 A. Bopolu should be around this area here. It should be

14 around here. You come from Tubmanburg, Bopolu should be in this

10:46:20 15 general area here.

16 Q. Do you see where those two purple lines join at that part
17 of the map?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. In the middle of where they join do you see Bopolu?

10:46:31 20 A. It may be the reflection. I mean, I'm not sure --

21 Q. Can we increase the size?

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. Have you got it?

24 A. Yes.

10:46:57 25 Q. Where is the next place that he mentions?

26 A. I think of importance we may have to go up to Fassama. I

27 think that would be - you can draw the line. Fassama is - maybe

28 with a different map it would be clearer. Maybe we need a better

29 map to locate these.

1 Q. Mr Taylor, look in this area here.

2 A. I see Fassama. That's Fassama up here.

3 Q. So we've got Fassama up here?

4 A. Fassama should be way up here. Yes, Fassama is in here.

10:48:20 5 This is the Fassama area. There's another Fassama up here. You
6 see if you look at - let's go back to - if you look at this map
7 here, what I'm pointing out, this is Fassama here. Sometimes you
8 have areas with two towns, there's a Fassama here. Okay.

9 There's a Fassama and there's a Fassama. So it depends. So
10:49:01 10 there is a small town and a town may have another name, so you
11 have Fassama here but you also have Fassama here.

12 Q. Very well. But roughly speaking, Mr Taylor, when we look
13 at this map with the orange markings on it the route he is
14 talking about goes from Monrovia to Tubmanburg, yes?

10:49:26 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And then it effectively, doesn't it, follow the lowest of
17 those three thick purple lines up to the border, doesn't it?

18 A. That is correct. That's the border going towards Guinea.

19 Q. Yes.

10:49:45 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. The very area where, according to the legend on this plan,
22 "Lacking connector road". Do you see that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. So what do you say about that red line that that man
10:50:02 25 Mr Sheriff marked on that map?

26 A. Well, this particular map, as he is showing it, is not
27 possible. It is not possible.

28 Q. Why not?

29 A. Because we do not have go-through roads. Now, if somebody

1 wants to take - how do I call it? If you want to drive and - how
2 can I put it? Maybe if you have an amphibious vehicle, because
3 even though the St Paul River runs around here you have other
4 rivers that cross. There are no roads. There are no roads. And
10:50:58 5 strangely may I just suggest that besides Mr Sheriff who really
6 doesn't - I'm not sure how much of Liberia he knows because he is
7 half Sierra Leonean and Liberian. I'm not sure of the
8 understanding of through roads - I'm not sure as the evidence was
9 led as to whether we got into - into through roads and maybe
10:51:40 10 areas where people can force their way in the way. But as far as
11 through roads where we want to talk about primary and/or
12 secondary laterite roads, there is no such thing then and there's
13 no such thing today in the Republic of Liberia that anyone in his
14 sound mine and body can say that you can get into a truck and
10:52:03 15 drive from Monrovia through Klay, Tubmanburg, Bopolu, go all the
16 way through Fassama, come up to Salayea and Zolowo, it's not
17 possible. If you really want to make it up, fine. But it is not
18 possible. It was not then; it's not possible now.
19 Q. What about that purple line going from Fassama through
10:52:30 20 Gohnsua, Makpilahun up to Kolahun? Is there a way you could
21 drive a vehicle along that route, Mr Taylor?
22 A. Absolutely no way. And you know, for an evidence as
23 crucial as this, if we want to look at fairness, for evidence as
24 crucial as this - I'm not here to tell the Prosecution what to
10:53:03 25 do, I'm here to answer their questions, but at least you have one
26 or two witnesses that understand what they are talking about to
27 come to bring this type of presentation before this Court. This
28 is impossible. It's never happened. You go now and investigate
29 in Liberia, it doesn't happen now. For someone to talk about

1 Fassama, Gohnsua here, Kolahun, Makpilahun, it's not possible.

2 If this were possible, let's just say if it were even
3 possible, why are people still driving from Monrovia, Kakata,
4 Gbarnga, Zorzor, Voinjama? Why are they still doing it today if
10:53:53 5 there is this through road? Because, you know, it makes better
6 sense if you just were to just drive from Monrovia and cut maybe
7 several hours off your trip and come straight up to Kolahun, why
8 are they still driving today from Monrovia via this long route to
9 come to this place? Because no road existed then and it does not
10:54:17 10 exist now.

11 Q. What about the yellow route, Mr Taylor?

12 A. That even carries it to the insane. Now, you know, people
13 walk. I mean, if he is talking about trails like walking trails
14 in the rainforest, that's another subject matter where - because
10:54:44 15 Varmuyan and them, they walk, they know how to walk a whole lot.
16 But I can tell you what, there is no through road like this.

17 Now, there were mining going on in those areas, both gold,
18 diamond, and they had small timber concessions where companies
19 had to cut down to pull logs, okay. But there is no primary or
10:55:17 20 secondary road then - and I keep saying then and now because I
21 don't want it believed that maybe it didn't exist but it's now -
22 it's not now. Up until today it doesn't exist.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, could you drive a vehicle along that yellow
24 route which that man Mr Sheriff has marked on this map?

10:55:36 25 A. No. Not at all. No.

26 Q. Can we put that map away now, please, and let us just go
27 back to the major transport problems map for a minute.

28 Mr Taylor, on this map can you see any road marked in that area
29 to the left of the plan where Mr Sheriff claimed vehicles could

1 drive to the Sierra Leonean border? Can you see any roads in
2 that area?

3 A. I don't know what Sheriff was talking about.

10:56:27

4 Q. And you will note in that area this plan makes quite clear
5 there are no connector roads, doesn't it?

6 A. It does. There are no connecting road.

7 Q. So help us then, Mr Taylor, what do you say about that
8 aspect of Mr Sheriff's evidence?

10:56:52

9 A. I say bluntly it's a lie. Bluntly. That's as blunt as I
10 can get.

11 Q. Thank you. Can we fold that map away and look at the next
12 one now, please. Mr Taylor, you can regain your seat now. And
13 again we're looking at transport links. Now you recall telling
14 us that that road which leads to Foya, that it's paved as far as

10:58:00

15 Gbarnga?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Do you remember telling us?

18 A. That is correct.

10:58:07

19 Q. Now, when we look at the legend in the bottom left-hand
20 corner, we see that roads demarcated in red are of bitumen
21 surface generally of good or fair quality; do you see that?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. And bearing that in mind we see, going from Monrovia, a red
24 line going through Kakata all the way to Gbarnga and then on to
25 the border with Guinea. Do you see that?

10:58:39

26 A. Ganta, that is correct.

27 Q. Ganta. Now, from Gbarnga we see a blue line going
28 northwards towards Voinjama and then on to Foya. Do you see
29 that?

1 A. I do.

2 Q. In fact we should be careful. That blue line only goes as
3 far as Kolahun, do you see that, and then it becomes a broken
4 blue and white line?

10:59:14 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. And when we look at the legend we see that that section of
7 blue demarcated road refers to a laterite surface generally of
8 good or fair quality and reasonably well maintained; do you see
9 that?

10:59:34 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Now we also see a red line, do we not, going from Monrovia
12 to Harbel, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And also going from Monrovia to Tubmanburg?

10:59:58 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. But where that road to Bo branches off, that is delineated
17 in blue and then blue and white?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. Although, unhelpfully, the map doesn't tell us what the
11:00:19 20 broken blue and white stands for. I don't know if you can
21 assist, Mr Taylor?

22 A. No, it does not state. But what I can say here, it could
23 be referring to maybe a slightly higher grade laterite because we
24 did have a higher grade laterite going both to Bo and to

11:00:57 25 Robertsport. And if you look at the Foya area, at that
26 particular time coming out of Sierra Leone the first major town
27 is Foya and, because of trade and the incident of commerce, there
28 was the tendency to try to keep the road fairly good because
29 goods and services traversed the border. And so I can only guess

1 that these are areas where maybe maintenance is a little more
2 frequent.

3 Q. You will note from the legend that included on this map
4 demarcated by brown lines are what's called farm to market and
11:01:49 5 feeder roads; do you see that?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And we also see in green timber roads and tracks; do you
8 see that?

9 A. I do.

11:02:02 10 Q. Now bearing in mind that detail, help us. When one looks
11 at that area next to the border with Sierra Leone between Grand
12 Cape and Lofa County do you see any farm to market and feeder
13 roads?

14 A. There are no farm to market, there are no feeder, because
11:02:24 15 there are no farms in that rainforest.

16 Q. Do you see any timber roads in that area between Grand Cape
17 and Lofa County --

18 A. No.

19 Q. -- according with what Mr Sherif, that man, told us? Can
11:02:36 20 you see any?

21 A. No, I don't see any timber roads on this map, no.

22 Q. So that area in between where we see on the map Grand Cape
23 and Lofa County where there are no roads whatsoever marked, what
24 covers that area, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind the very first map
11:03:03 25 we looked at today?

26 A. What covers that area is the rainforest. That's the thick
27 - very thick rainforest that is covering this particular area.

28 Q. Okay, let's put that map away now, please, and look at the
29 next one. This is a map showing the mineral resources and mining

1 within Liberia. Is that right, Mr Taylor?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Let's start off first of all with the mineral which is at
4 the heart of this: Diamonds. And when we look at the key to the
11:04:08 5 right, we see that diamondiferous areas are denoted by that
6 diamond symbol. Do you see that?

7 A. That is correct, yes.

8 Q. When we look at the map, we see that there is a
9 concentration of such symbols in the Grand Cape Mount area
11:04:36 10 bordering Sierra Leone. Do you see that?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor. Is that the main concentration of
13 diamond mining in Liberia?

14 A. No, it's one of the areas of concentration. It's not the
11:04:54 15 only.

16 Q. We see that when one goes northeast as we look at the map
17 from Monrovia, an area called Bong Range where again we see that
18 symbol. Do you see that?

19 A. Yes, I do.

11:05:17 20 Q. And then when we go to the far right of the map, we see
21 those symbols again in Nimba County?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. So in general terms we have this U-shaped deposit of
24 diamonds beginning in Grand Cape, running just north of Monrovia,
11:05:40 25 going over to Nimba. Do you see that?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. Now, the gold - the areas where gold is found is
28 concentrated, as you can see, in the bottom right-hand corner of
29 this map. Yes, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes, that is correct.

2 Q. And then we have that large area of blue in the middle
3 which denotes uranium?

4 A. That is correct.

11:06:15 5 Q. Has any of that been exploited, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes, just a very little. It's been tested, it's been
7 quantified, but there has not been any serious mining.

8 Q. And in the next area is areas where iron ore is to be
9 found, and we see that it is concentrated in three main areas:

11:06:45 10 That area around by Kongo which you told us about before at the
11 end of the railway line?

12 A. Yes, that is correct.

13 Q. Yes?

14 A. Yes.

11:06:54 15 Q. Then we have another area up in Nimba?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Which again is connected by a railway line to Buchanan?

18 A. Yes, and that is also the Wologizi Range up in Lofa.

19 Q. Yes?

11:07:07 20 A. Up there there's a major deposit that has not been reached.

21 Q. And how is that exported?

22 A. Well, up until now they have not mined that. I think there
23 are prospects now of trying to connect the Wologizi Range with
24 the Bong Range that is coming where we had operations before. I
11:07:37 25 think there are plans underway right now.

26 Q. Now, the other thing we notice from this map is that
27 offshore we see oil bearing areas with names Union Carbide,
28 Chevron Oil Company, Frontier Oil Company, Option Christian Oil,
29 and so on. Help us with that, please, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Well, it is strange that I'm supposed to be going into
2 Sierra Leone for the wealth of Sierra Leone when Liberia has all
3 that it needs. This is how ludicrous this whole indictment is.

4 There were oil explorations being done off the Liberian
11:08:45 5 coast over and before the period 1983. In fact, my own
6 government contracted a firm in the United States called
7 TGS-NOPEC. It is out of Houston, Texas. I think that's
8 M-O-P-E-X but I think we can find it. It's a major survey firm
9 that my government paid some \$6 million to to do the final
11:09:21 10 mapping of our entire offshore continental shelf and Liberia has
11 been found to have vast reserves of oil offshore. In fact I now
12 understand since my incarceration that most of these blocks have
13 been seeded off, but these were things that I was aware of
14 because I had the reports before I left office.

11:09:54 15 Q. You did what?

16 A. I had the reports of the actual survey reports of the
17 existence of deposits of oil at at least four principal sites
18 offshore. This is old information. This process started during
19 the administration of the late President Tolbert. If we remember
11:10:19 20 the name Tolbert this was killed in the coup of 1980. So this
21 has been long knowing information about these vast reserves of
22 oil and these companies were out there prospecting at that time.
23 So that's what this is. And these are the major oil companies
24 that were out there doing that.

11:10:47 25 Q. And whilst you were President, Mr Taylor, did you negotiate
26 with any company to begin exploiting those oil reserves?

27 A. Well, we started a process of negotiation and there were
28 extensive negotiations with Halliburton.

29 Q. Halliburton?

1 A. Halliburton, a major US outfit that wanted certain blocks
2 of oil offshore. The negotiations broke down.

3 Q. Why?

11:11:39

4 A. The deals that were being offered to Liberia I felt were
5 virtually outrageous.

6 Q. What were they?

7 A. Halliburton had - being negotiated through their agent, a
8 gentleman called John Douche.

9 Q. How do you spell that?

11:11:54

10 A. That could be D-O-U-C-H-E or D-A-U-C-H-E but we can check
11 that. You have to forgive me, your Honours. When you meet
12 people you don't try to get their correct spellings. I would
13 just put it this way: On an average of \$1, Liberia was being
14 offered something under 20 cents to a dollar in terms of what the
15 country would have obtained.

11:12:22

16 Q. Who was offering that?

17 A. Halliburton.

18 Q. Yes?

11:12:34

19 A. And I said that at that time my great great grandchildren
20 would need the oil if I had to give it away for less than 20
21 cents to a dollar. So the negotiations broke down and up until I
22 left office we were beginning to talk to a few more. In fact
23 some of the individuals that were responsible at that time for
24 these negotiations are senior members of the Liberian government
25 right now.

11:12:56

26 Q. Did you speak to anybody else apart from Halliburton about
27 exploiting the oil reserves?

28 A. I don't have all the details. We did have a company - a
29 Liberian company established that was involved in these

1 negotiations and it is only when they got serious that I got the
2 details. But Chevron was involved. Discussions were ongoing
3 with another part of Chevron. Some minor groups in Nigeria. But
4 the one that really I kept a close eye on, because Halliburton
11:13:45 5 was considered a very serious company, and at that time I had
6 insisted that I wanted the Americans, our good friends, to have
7 first shot at this oil because they remain our principal ally and
8 quite frankly I was really pushing very hard to get in America's
9 good books. Unluckily I didn't succeed. But we - most of these
11:14:19 10 discussions were held with American companies.

11 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, so we can put this particular topic
12 to bed. At what stage in your presidency were you having these
13 conversations with Halliburton?

14 A. We're talking about - we were under a lot of pressure at
11:14:46 15 that time, '99, 2000, 2001. It was a very, very crucial period.

16 Q. What pressures were you under?

17 A. Well, that's the same period of these massive accusations.
18 No matter how you tried- it's almost like trying to prove a
19 negative. I could not get aid, I could not get assistance. We
11:15:05 20 were desperate trying to get something going to try to raise the
21 country.

22 Q. And what was happening on the ground? Was it peaceful?

23 A. Well, for Liberia's side around the beginning of this we
24 had a little peace but then we started progressing into the war.

11:15:26 25 Q. With who?

26 A. With LURD as LURD begins to attack. But we are not at
27 peace because we're dealing - on the Sierra Leonean side you
28 still have problems, but the whole problem is in our laps and we
29 are being accused of aiding, we're being accused of abetting,

1 we're being accused of everything. We're being threatened with
2 sanctions. We were just desperate trying to do something to
3 convince whoever that, look, all we want is some peace in this
4 country for our people so we can get our economy rebuilt. That's
11:16:06 5 what we were trying to do.

6 Q. Can you recall the last conversation you had with the agent
7 for Halliburton?

8 A. I remember in fact a very good friend of John Douche, Sir
9 John Straum [phon] I think he was the former Prime Minister of
11:16:35 10 the Bahamas who was also involved in these negotiations. I
11 remember I was playing tennis and I got a call from Sir John. He
12 said to me, "Mr President, we have to get these negotiations
13 going. If we succeed, it will be as if nothing happened. If we
14 don't succeed I'm afraid we can't help you." And then John

11:17:02 15 Douche called me some time later and he said to me,
16 "Mr President, I'm on my way to southern Africa. I just got a
17 brand new G5, it doesn't take me long to get into Liberia. I
18 want to stop by and I'll talk to you", because the agents - his
19 representatives were still in Liberia negotiating. "So I can
11:17:25 20 have a brief talk to you".

21 And then I jokingly said to him I said, "Well, listen,
22 don't stop by because I do not want you to get upset because if
23 the negotiations don't change, you're not going to get any
24 results". I said, "You big oil companies have a way of
11:17:47 25 overthrowing governments in small countries, so I'm afraid you
26 may get upset and overthrow." He said, "No, no, no, no, no,
27 Mr President, there will be no such thing."

28 But it was just a joke that I made with him and he didn't
29 stop because I didn't feel that they would have gotten what they

1 wanted and it would have just been a waste of time. So he
2 continued and didn't come over and the negotiations failed up
3 until the time I left.

11:18:34 4 Q. Let's close that map now, please. Now, what do we see on
5 this map, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Languages.

7 Q. Just take us on a grand tour, please, concentrating on that
8 area bordering Sierra Leone, and help us as to the various
9 language groups we're looking at?

11:18:52 10 A. Well, here we are looking at the Golas.

11 Q. I think it might be of assistance if you changed places.

12 A. Okay, thank you.

13 Q. Just indicate with a pen, please.

14 A. Yes. This entire area going into Sierra Leone, this area,
11:19:33 15 that's our people, the Golas. We are here.

16 Q. Pause there. Now your mother was a Gola?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. And tell me, we see that that area is coloured up to the
19 border with Sierra Leone. Do the Golas end at the border?

11:19:54 20 A. I don't know. If you go across the border there are Gola
21 speaking people that people on this side can understand just as
22 the people on this side understand a lot of the language, yeah.

23 Q. Now, what are the other groups along that border?

24 A. Here you have the Kissies. The Kissies are here and they
11:20:19 25 are also into Sierra Leone. I think evidence has been led here
26 that for instance Sam Bockarie was supposed to be Kissi. The
27 Kissies are here and they extend into Sierra Leone also.

28 Q. So they straddle the border?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Now what other groups do we have along that border?

2 A. You have the Mendes.

3 Q. Who is that?

4 A. The Mendes are scattered through. You have Mendes also in
11:20:50 5 this area. You have Mendes here, okay, and it comes all the way
6 into this area here. You have Mende speaking people along this
7 entire area.

8 Q. And in practical social terms, Mr Taylor, what does it mean
9 in terms of movement across that border?

11:21:16 10 A. Just to add, before I answer your question, you've got the
11 Gbandies here and on the other side you have - we had them here
12 what we call the Temnes also, the Gbandies and - these two
13 languages are just about the same. So what you have along this
14 entire border, whether you are talking with the Kissies, the
11:21:40 15 Mendes, the Gbandies, the Golas, coming further on down the Vais,
16 these areas, our people traverse the areas.

17 We have in this entire area coming into Sierra Leone almost
18 an identical tradition and that identical tradition you had led
19 in evidence before this Court that people tried to malign which
11:22:18 20 is not true. You have this tradition of the Poro society that
21 you heard about. It comes into Sierra Leone, this entire area of
22 Sierra Leone, that's the same tradition. Our people --

23 Q. What society?

24 A. The Poro society. It was mentioned in evidence in this
11:22:40 25 Court.

26 Q. P-O-R-O?

27 A. Yes. You find it not just in Liberia. It comes all the
28 way into Sierra Leone. Most of this entire area are the Poro
29 people and during the Sierra Leonean war when you hear about

1 Kamajor, Kamajor, Kamajor, that's mostly the same tribe of people
2 from this entire segment of the country. So in answer to your
3 question, you have the same people.

4 Let me just clarify it to the Court. No one in this area
11:23:18 5 practically speaks one language, so that's why in Sierra Leone or
6 in Liberia if you are speaking Gbandi here you can speak Gbandi,
7 you can speak Temne, you can speak Mende. That's how it goes.
8 No one here speaks one. So when you cross from Sierra Leone into
9 Liberia there are thousands upon hundreds of thousands of people
11:23:43 10 here that can understand you. So if you cross from here, let's
11 say you are Temne, you come here, there will be somebody here
12 speaking Temne too. So you don't just speak one language and say
13 I'm Temne so I'm speaking Temne. So the Golas here also speak
14 Mende. The Golas here speak Kissi. The Golas here speak Temne.

11:24:03 15 We are talking about one people and it's only when we are
16 dealing with - maybe we need to explain it in a European
17 environment, but it's not unlike what you find in Europe that you
18 may find a French man speaking German, speaking Italian. So if
19 it's good for them why is a different for us? It is not just
11:24:24 20 unique. I mean, come on. So we are talking about the same
21 people.

22 And in terms of the so-called travel across borders and all
23 that kind of stuff, it's very, very unlikely except someone is
24 speaking deep Krio in Liberia. If you came from the Sierra
11:24:46 25 Leonean side and decided that you will speak let's say just Mende
26 no one will tell whether you are Sierra Leonean or Liberian. If
27 you just call any town in Liberia and say I'm from this town
28 nobody is going to ask you any questions. So they are one
29 family, almost one people because, you know, of the closeness of

1 these tribes.

2 Q. Now help us. On that same note, does Liberian English stop
3 at the border and Krio begin at the other side of the border?

4 A. Not at the least. Not at all. In fact, I think - well, I
11:25:27 5 can say I'm sure I led in evidence before this Court was the fact
6 that in most part of the Sierra Leonean side of the border here
7 they use the Liberian dollar. They use the Liberian dollar.

8 Q. Why?

9 A. Well, because they are so far removed from Freetown that
11:25:47 10 most of the trade, commerce and association is in this place.
11 And so the people on this side that also speak this so-called - I
12 have heard a big deal being made about Liberian English, Liberian
13 English. What is Liberian English? They have just tried to

14 [indiscernible] they say, "Oh, my man, my man". It's just so
11:26:11 15 simplistic. Look, Sierra Leoneans on this side speak Liberian
16 English, Liberians on this side speak Krio. You understand me?

17 So when you get into these border areas and people try to
18 make it so distinguished that there is a new thing called
19 Liberian English and - we're talking about Krio and Patois is
11:26:38 20 spoken across West Africa. You speak Patois in Sierra Leone.
21 There is also Patois in Liberia. Nigeria is there. Ghana is
22 there.

23 So the records as they are reflected in this Court as
24 trying to make Liberian English so unique to only you must be
11:26:57 25 from Liberia is a falsehood that is grounded in lies. There is
26 Sierra Leoneans on this side that speak it. There are Liberians
27 on this side that speak Krio. And there's nothing special about
28 this Liberian English that we talk about as compared with
29 speaking Krio or what. There are - in fact you go to Monrovia

1 right now and some people start speaking Krio, you wonder where
2 they come from.

3 Q. Mr Taylor, let's try and round off this particular point
4 before we adjourn. You've heard evidence that during the
11:27:37 5 Freetown invasion, for example, people were heard speaking
6 Liberian English?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. As far as you're concerned, what's the significance of
9 that?

11:27:45 10 A. Well, counsel, I'll put it this way for the Court: Of
11 course you heard them speaking Liberian English because you hired
12 them, you used them as mercenaries and so when the time came of
13 course you expected to hear them. And what am I speaking about?
14 Momoh hired Liberians as mercenaries to fight for him. Valentine
11:28:10 15 Strasser came, he hired Liberians, they fought. There was STF,
16 Special Task Force. They became a part of ULIMO. We now know
17 from evidence before this Court these same Liberians are joined -
18 remember Tejan Kabbah in his statement before the truth
19 commission said that he heard for the first time an order from
11:28:34 20 the chief of defence staff ordering these Liberians to attack
21 these people that were trying to stage a coup d'etat, but they
22 did not do it and they joined the arms forces, okay.

23 So of course you should have heard Liberians speaking
24 because they were there. They were the people that you used when
11:28:53 25 you wanted them. You used them when you wanted to use them, so
26 when they are there you are saying that it is unique to the
27 situation? Of course they had to be there. So I'm not shocked
28 that Liberians were there. Because what had happened? These are
29 Liberians that were part of, what, the armed forces that had

1 staged the coup and were part of the junta and they come back to
2 attack the city. Of course they are there. What did they
3 expect?

11:29:27 4 Q. But because someone speaks Liberian English, Mr Taylor,
5 does that mean they come from Liberia?

6 A. Not necessarily, no. No. Sierra Leoneans from even this
7 section of the border could also speak Liberian English. There
8 is nothing unique about this so-called Liberian English. A
9 Sierra Leone goes to Liberian, within three or four days he comes
11:29:43 10 back and he is speaking, you know, just like a Liberian almost.
11 So there's nothing special about that.

12 Q. Did you send Liberian soldiers to fight in Sierra Leone
13 after that initial period you told us about?

14 A. Never ever sent one Liberian soldier into Sierra Leone to
11:30:07 15 fight. The Liberian soldiers were never under my command, ever.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the end of the tape. We'll
17 adjourn now and resume at 12 o'clock.

18 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

19 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

11:51:31 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

22 Q. Mr Taylor, just before the adjournment we were looking at
23 the map showing the spread of languages in Liberia. It is the
24 penultimate map in the bundle. Now along that border, Mr Taylor,
12:01:10 25 you told us about the various languages. Now, help us. Are we
26 talking about separate ethnic groups here, or what?

27 A. Well, when we use that word "Separate," yes. Separate, but
28 I can almost use the word communal. They are separate, but they
29 are communal groups. By that I mean they are just so intertwined

1 and interrelated, the customs virtually - the culture is just
2 about the same, the same kind of food. You find that across
3 certain sectors of Africa where minus the colonial lines, the
4 people are just the same people.

12:02:17 5 Q. In that border area is there a general name for those
6 ethnic groups?

7 A. Yes, they are really called Mende Mair. That is M-E-N-D-E,
8 like Mende. I think Mair is M-A-I-R, Mair. Mende Mair. That
9 Mende Mair is a name of the peoples, and I am using this, the
12:02:53 10 peoples across a belt stretching from Guinea into Sierra Leone.
11 They are all called generally Mende Mair. Now within that
12 grouping there are these little tribes, but the languages
13 somewhere they got lost, some words. But for the most part the
14 Mendes in Liberia and Sierra Leone can understand a lot of the
12:03:28 15 languages across the border into Liberia and Guinea.

16 Q. Now does that group extend, for example, as far as Nimba?

17 A. Oh, no, no. The Nimbadiens are not a part of the Mende
18 Mair group. The Nimbadiens come under that Dan, Mahn group. If
19 you hear there are three groupings in that sector: Dan, that is
12:03:59 20 the Gio, we have heard that in this Court; Mahn the Manos; and
21 their cousins are the Krahn. If you hear the pronunciation ah,
22 ah, ah, Dan, Mahn, Krahn, that is that segment. They are not a
23 part of the Mende Mair. The Mende Mair group come from on the
24 Guinean side. They are Lomas in Liberia, but in the Guinea side
12:04:29 25 they call them Toma. They speak the same thing. Then you have
26 Bong County here. You have the Kpelle that is spoken in this
27 blue section of the map. It is also spoken across here in
28 Guinea. Then as you come from Lofa County, that is up to the
29 northeastern tip, you have that sector where I showed the Court

1 where you have the Kissies, the Gbandies, you have the Kpelles.
2 As you come further down to our side here, the red section you
3 have our people the Golas, and a little further down you have the
4 Vais that come all the way through Bomi and Cape Mount.

12:05:23 5 JUSTICE DOHERTY: Sorry to interrupt, Mr Griffiths, but I
6 notice Mr Taylor is making indications and I can't see them.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. I think it might be easiest, Mr Taylor, if you change
9 places again.

12:05:36 10 THE WITNESS: Okay, that is true, your Honour.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Can you just repeat what you just told us, please,
13 indicating on the map as we go?

14 A. Now responding to your question about Nimba, let me deal
12:05:49 15 with Nimba. This section here, the Dans and the Mahns that come
16 all the way down here to the Krahn's, this section is a different
17 grouping. From the Bong County area covering Guinea and covering
18 Sierra Leone, this whole set of people here they are called Mende
19 Mair, and by that if you are here you can understand for the most
12:06:28 20 part the people here - what is being spoken here. Also if you

21 are here, for the most part you can understand everything that
22 the people are saying here maybe with a little different twist.

23 For example, we got to find out on the Guinean side some words -
24 you may have a phrase being spoken, but they would throw off a

12:06:59 25 little French word or two in the language. On the Liberian side,
26 I mean, repeating that same phrase we may throw an English word
27 in it, but you are understanding them. The same thing goes
28 across. I mentioned to this Court when there were certain
29 interpreters that were speaking here, because I speak the

1 language - I grew up in Monrovia and I speak what we call Kpelle,
2 which is the largest tribe in Liberia, but with this dialect here
3 I understand some Loma, I understand some Vai, I surely
4 understood - a lot of the Mende words are Kpelle words. A lot of
12:07:48 5 the other group that came here - the Temne. A lot of the Temne
6 words, I could understand them because I speak Kpelle. So that
7 is the same thing with the Mende Mair. So anyone coming from
8 across the border here in this section coming all the way
9 including this Guinean part, the Mende Mair people they have lost
12:08:11 10 the essence of the full language, but the different languages as
11 broken down, you can understand a little bit of what everyone is
12 saying. I couldn't attach a percentage. I would say 20/25. It
13 is sufficient to get by; that is the point I am trying to make.

14 Q. Right. Now, Mr Taylor, you mentioned earlier the Poro
12:08:37 15 society. What is that?

16 A. The Poro society is a traditional social structure that is
17 in place by the Mende Mairs. It is the same in Guinea; it is the
18 same in Liberia; it is the same as Sierra Leone. Only Mende Mair
19 are part of the Poro society, so people in the Nimba range coming
12:09:02 20 all the way down here, that is why Moses Blah could say here that
21 he was not a member of the Poro, because he is from a different
22 sector and so they are not a part of this Mende Mair social
23 structure. That is why he was not. But there are - for official
24 purposes, let's say, if you are a senior member of government and
12:09:24 25 because the Mende Mair are a group that constitute the majority
26 of Liberia, and let me tell you what I mean by that. Because
27 when you look at the Bassa, Grand Bassa, this entire region, when
28 you look at Bong, Lofa, Grand Cape Mount, Bomi, when you look at
29 here, most of the tribes in this section of the country

1 constitute the Mende Mair and this is the bulk of the population
2 in Liberia, okay? So if, for example, you are a very important
3 person from this section of the country you could be invited to
4 join this social structure, and that is really what it is, a
12:10:09 5 social structure out of Guinea. It helps in terms of trouble.
6 It helps in terms of a social cooperation, and in fact the Poro
7 society is so old, it was a social structure developed by the
8 people in this part of the country at that time to resist
9 slavery. That is why Liberia was never colonised, because these
12:10:46 10 tribes all fought together and stopped any - they stopped the
11 movement of slaves from Liberia because of that social structure.
12 They had something like a massive kingdom that crossed this
13 section called Mende Mair.

14 Q. And when you talk about a social structure, Mr Taylor, what
12:11:08 15 are you talking about?

16 A. Well, for example, we have, for example, boys. In our
17 tribal structure boys grow up to be men. At a particular age -
18 because at that time - and this is something thousands of years
19 old, but I will explain it for the Court, and we may have this in
12:11:40 20 other parts of Africa. At a particular age, boys are taught to
21 become men: For example, you learn the basics of farming; you
22 learn how to use the forest to feed your family and to take care
23 of yourself; you learn how to fish; you learn how to hunt. These
24 are things that, you know, you are taught in this particular
12:12:08 25 structure.

26 Girls go through the same process where girls are taught to
27 be women and wives where they learn how to cook, they learn how
28 to do all those things that you see your mother and grandmother
29 doing. They will put you through - I will call it an archaic

1 educational system whereby the time you leave from there when you
2 do find a husband, you know what to do to take care of your
3 husband, how to keep the house, how to cook, how to clean up and
4 to care. It is a structure that was developed by this ancient
12:12:51 5 kingdom at the time and it's called - on the men we call it the
6 Poro side, and on the women we call it the Sandi.

7 Q. How do you spell that?

8 A. That is S-A-N-D-I. But these are social educational
9 organisations that were set up to train young girls to eventually
12:13:07 10 become good women and wives and to train young boys to become
11 good young men and become good husbands. This is what it is.

12 Q. Do you remember the Poro society being mentioned, don't
13 you, Mr Taylor?

14 A. I do remember.

12:13:23 15 Q. Who by?

16 A. This man that knows nothing about it, Mr Zigzag Marzah.

17 Q. Now, what was it that he said about it, Mr Taylor?

18 A. He talked about - and, you know, I tell you, each time I
19 mention it, it really makes me sick at the stomach, and I know it
12:13:44 20 makes a lot of other people sick at stomach to talk about eating
21 human flesh and all this stuff, which is a blatant lie, and the
22 millions of Liberians that are members of this Poro society, all
23 Presidents before me have been members of the Poro society, every
24 - I mean, two-thirds of the Republic of Liberia I can virtually
12:14:08 25 say, men, are members of the Poro society.

26 Q. Are you a member?

27 A. I am a member of the Poro society.

28 Q. Do you hold any position within the society?

29 A. I am a member and because I was President, I am still

1 holding the title as the most senior chief. I have explained
2 this Court that "Dankpannah" means chief. I still hold the most
3 senior chieftaincy position in the country.

4 Q. But is the Poro society a cover for cannibalism, Mr Taylor?

12:14:39 5 A. Utter nonsense.

6 Q. You appreciate that is what Mr Marzah was saying?

7 A. But that's what we - but Marzah also said that he didn't
8 have any formal education and couldn't read and write, and I know
9 people - I felt like throwing up when I heard that nonsense from

12:14:53 10 him. And if I am right, even the Prosecution was shocked at
11 listening to that foolishness about people eating human flesh and
12 all that type of thing. But Marzah said who he was or who he is.
13 He explained to this Court.

14 Q. But he also said, Mr Taylor, that he had engaged in

12:15:12 15 cannibalism with you?

16 A. You know, I tell you, like I say, each time I hear it, it's
17 sickening at the stomach. Here is the situation: The President
18 of Liberia is sitting with an orderly of the special security
19 chief, no-one else is there, and he and I are having a feast of
12:15:40 20 human flesh. Now, it would take the sickest of minds to even
21 tolerate that kind of discussion, so really all I can really say
22 is that it is sickening and you must be sick to believe that.
23 That is all I can say about that.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, he went on to describe how he had been engaged
12:16:03 25 in a ceremony with you where you had buried a pregnant woman. Do
26 you remember that?

27 A. I remember what he said.

28 Q. What do you say about that?

29 A. Total nonsense. It could - you know, if in this case there

1 is this desire to really - it has happened already. I am already
2 humiliated throughout this whole process. But if there is the
3 desire to bring credible things before this Court, I am not a
4 Prosecutor. Probably - don't you think it would have been better
12:16:47 5 to bring people that are capable, officials of government,
6 educated people, to come before this Court? You go scrounging
7 around and bring one man here that surprises even, I guess - and
8 I can't speak for the Prosecution - the Prosecution to talk all
9 this kind of thing. It is just - I guess what you lawyers call
12:17:11 10 it is incredulous. I mean, it is beyond the natural mind. But
11 the gentleman, he took his time to explain to the Court who he
12 is. And if anybody would take this man seriously, well, the
13 question, don't forget, counsel, was asked to Blah, who is at a
14 little different level, who said there was no such thing. So it
12:17:36 15 just shows you the extent that people will go when they are
16 crafting lies and trying to make things up. If the process was
17 to spread this, in fact that is what is being covered now. This
18 whole trial has not been covered. The only thing that has been
19 covered is who is on trial: Charles Taylor, the former President
12:17:59 20 of Liberia, the cannibal, is on trial. People like publicity.
21 Now, I do not dispute - I do not dispute that there may be
22 certain sections in this part of the country where there may
23 still be a few cannibals, and I do not know anything about
24 Marzah. He very well might be. Maybe he was speaking for
12:18:22 25 himself. But for anyone in his rightful mind to believe that
26 Marzah - Marzah and Taylor were at some place sitting down, the
27 two of them cannibalising human beings, it makes you feel like
28 throwing up. It makes me surely.
29 Q. I haven't finished on this topic yet, but I have been

1 informed that the AV booth would prefer you to be sitting in that
2 seat. So could you return to that seat, please. Let's finish
3 with this topic, shall we? Do you remember that same man also
4 describing a ceremony, he said engaged in with you, where people
12:19:13 5 tore apart a live sheep and ate the flesh. Do you remember that?

6 A. I heard him, yes.

7 Q. Did you do that?

8 A. Well, you know, to answer directly: It did not happen.

9 But let's look at the logic behind it. Let's look at the logic
12:19:32 10 behind it. A sheep with its skin on it, for someone to grab it
11 and tear it - I may be wrong, but I don't see how that is even
12 possible, that you would just grab a sheep without cutting it and
13 just tear the skin with the flesh and everything just like that.
14 It never happened, and I don't know how he could have even done
12:20:07 15 it, even if he claims that such a thing was possible.

16 Q. Now he also claims, Mr Taylor, that you ordered your NPFL
17 combatants to eat people. Did you?

18 A. I never ordered any combatant to eat anyone, but I draw
19 this Court's attention to what I have said before and it is part
12:20:33 20 of the records here. I do not dispute that there are cannibals
21 in certain parts of Liberia. In fact, the records will show that
22 when the late General Thomas Quiwonkpa was killed in Monrovia
23 certain individuals did eat his flesh and the issue of
24 cannibalism is - there are cannibals in Europe. There are
12:21:03 25 cannibals in Europe. There are cannibals in Germany. We know of
26 the German man who asked his friend to cannibalise him. I think
27 he is now convicted.

28 And this part of Liberia towards the Ivorian border coming
29 down with that sector, there may still be some individuals.

1 That's not something that is a part of our trait and surely not
2 mine. I never, ever did that.

3 Q. But it is suggested that you ordered that in order to make
4 areas fearful, to quote. Did you, Mr Taylor?

12:21:42 5 A. I did not. How do you make an area fearful if in fact the
6 logic is - by eating someone it is supposed to make an area
7 fearful? But there is nothing there. If you kill somebody and
8 eat the person what is there to make the area fearful when there
9 is nothing there? So even the reasoning is stupid. I mean,
12:22:06 10 there is no such thing.

11 I have explained to this Court that in the National
12 Patriotic Front the way we trained our people about fearful areas
13 I have stated that to this Court, that guerrillas were taught
14 that upon reaching areas that appeared abandoned, but had the
15 semblance of life, you withdraw. That is what our training was
16 as fearful areas. I have no idea of what others interpreted it
17 to be. That if you got in a village and let's say you may see
18 some food in the village, it is abandoned and in some cases you
19 see like there is smoke where there was maybe a fire that just
12:23:00 20 went out but everybody has disappeared, you better be careful
21 because it could have included another group after you or
22 something. That's what we know about fearful areas.

23 Q. Okay, can we look at the final map now, please. Again, let
24 us look first of all at the legend and we see then that the areas
12:23:51 25 of orange or ochre, the darker those areas are the higher the
26 landscape is in that part of the world. Now looking at the
27 northern part of Lofa County, Mr Taylor, is that area quite
28 hilly?

29 A. Yes, it is. Don't forget when you look at the other map

1 you see these are mountain ranges up here.

2 Q. And what consequence does that have in terms of transport
3 and movement?

12:24:35

4 A. Oh, very, very, very, difficult. Very difficult. These
5 are different ranges. We just call them mountain ranges, but
6 these ranges, if you look at - these ranges start from as low as
7 Bong - the Bong Range and the details are not shown here, but
8 because I am away from there the judges are looking at --

12:25:03

9 Q. Well, could you move, please. Sorry to keep moving you
10 around like this, Mr Taylor, but sadly we can't see what you are
11 indicating when you sit there.

12:25:33

12 A. I will just pull the mic a little closer. What I am
13 pointing out is that when you look here at the Bong Mines, this
14 Bong Range, this is a mountain here where we have had iron ore
15 being removed over the years. As a matter of fact this mountain
16 has been exploited again. I understand there has been a major
17 investment programme in Liberia of some \$2.6 billion invested by
18 China in exploring this range.

19 Q. Invested by who?

12:25:58

20 A. China. The country China. The People's Republic of China.
21 But it is important what I was trying to note is that this entire
22 area going up are all ranges. These are little mountains that
23 are here. One of the largest being here what in another map is
24 shown earlier - the Wologizi Range was shown on another map, one
25 of these big maps, okay. So I am just trying to show you that
26 these are all mountain ranges throughout the entire part of the
27 country. Some of them are gold ranges. Some of them are iron
28 ore ranges. This is the situation.

12:26:26

29 Q. Putting that together, that is a hilly area, heavily

1 forested, without any connecting roads?

2 A. That is correct. Primary and secondary roads, that's
3 correct.

4 Q. Right. Can I ask you now, please, Mr Taylor, to put the
12:27:05 5 map away completely. Can I pause, Mr President, and ask that
6 this bundle of maps be marked for identification. I don't know,
7 Mr President, whether it might be wise to give them an overall
8 MFI number and then for future reference purposes give each
9 individual map a separate reference.

12:27:39 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I was going to suggest that,
11 Mr Griffiths. They are really not part of one central document.
12 They are separate maps, so I will give them a separate
13 identification number.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I think we are up to MFI-14, Mr President.

12:28:03 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. You have got your bundle there.
16 What is the first map? Is it Liberia transport?

17 MR GRIFFITHS: The first one is the forested areas. That
18 is map 1.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: That map of Liberia forested areas will
12:28:30 20 be marked for identification MFI-14.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: And then the next one is the major transport
22 problems map.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the map Liberia Major Transport
24 Problems is marked MFI-15.

12:29:15 25 MR GRIFFITHS: And then the next in time, your Honour, is
26 the transport map.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the map Liberia Transport is marked
28 for identification MFI-16.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: And then thereafter we have the mineral

1 resources and mining map.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: The map Liberia Mineral Resources and
3 Mining will be marked MFI-17.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Thereafter we have languages.

12:30:28 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the Liberia Languages map is marked
6 for identification MFI-18.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: And then finally topography.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Liberia Topography map is marked
9 MFI-19.

12:31:03 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you are aware, aren't you, that it is
12 suggested that you were bent on exploiting - controlling Sierra
13 Leone in order to exploit its mineral resources. What do you say
14 about that?

12:31:26 15 A. It is totally false. It is, using American language, far
16 out in left field, which means nonsense. Liberia, your Honours,
17 is a very rich country. Natural resources abound. From gold,
18 diamonds. We have seen the map where diamonds are found all over
19 Liberia. In fact, since this map in 1983 they have found several
12:32:22 20 more locations of diamonds where it rains and people find
21 diamonds.

22 But your Honours will know that why did De Beers go to
23 Africa in the 50s to Liberia, set up shop in Liberia, major
24 buying stations? Why? Why are these companies there? You have
12:32:49 25 barite, you have bauxite. Before my time we are looking for oil.
26 It is found during the administration of the late President
27 Tolbert because this map is done - is completed during the Doe
28 era. My government come in and do the - what they call the - it
29 is something like a 2D dimensional photography. These are

1 specialised companies that do them. Oil is found in abundance.
2 Natural gas. There is uranium, there is barite.

3 For God's sake, everything we need is there. I have not
4 touched it. I know about it. I am not coming from the village
12:33:43 5 that never went to school. I have studied. I know our
6 potentials. I know our wealth. What am I going into Sierra
7 Leone to do? So all of these hypotheses and I keep using the
8 word conjecture and possibilities are just that.

9 It is beyond my imagination that anyone would believe that
12:34:17 10 the President of Liberia will go into Sierra Leone because he
11 wants to, quote unquote, terrorise the people and take their
12 wealth when the vast wealth that we have I have not even touched.
13 What am I going to Sierra Leone for? It doesn't make sense. It
14 never happened and it is beyond thinking that such a theory could
12:34:48 15 be developed. I mean there could be so many - it's not just
16 logical that that is the case.

17 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you understand that what is being suggested
18 is you made common cause with a Sierra Leonean, Foday Sankoh, in
19 Libya to exploit the mineral resources of Mr Sankoh's country.
12:35:16 20 Did you do that?

21 A. I did not. Why would I need to do that? What do I do with
22 my own resources? I did not meet Mr Sankoh in Libya. I said
23 this emphatically. I say this categorically. I say this
24 factually to this Court and the world at large that is listening:
12:35:41 25 I never met Mr Sankoh in Libya. I met Ali Kabbah in Libya, and
26 there was no common cause established between he and myself for
27 no reason. It is false. Total fabrication.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, I want to move on. Unfortunately we will have
29 to come back to certain matters tomorrow, but I want to move on

1 and deal with another topic now, please, and it is this: I want
2 to deal with, in effect, foreign policy upon you becoming
3 President of Liberia. Do you follow me?

4 A. Yes, I do.

12:36:30 5 Q. Now, what was the general situation in West Africa upon you
6 becoming President?

7 A. Liberia has gone through many years of war. By the time a
8 peace finally comes to Liberia in 1997, there are at least eight
9 countries in West Africa - I think the committee dealing with
12:37:18 10 Liberia had grown to about eight. We have the
11 one-day-yes-one-day-no policy of the United States where I
12 described as lost opportunities to bring peace. That did not
13 happen. You now have a war across the border in Sierra Leone.
14 That is British interests, and you have the Organisation of
12:37:56 15 African Unity involved, so the rest of Africa wants to see peace.

16 The United Nations is involved because there have been several
17 resolutions passed by the Security Council dealing with Liberia.
18 I come into office. Naturally, we are a part of the crisis. The
19 economy is wrecked. We have no monies in the government. We
12:38:29 20 made less than \$20,000 there. But other countries are beginning
21 now to look at Liberia, so I am confronted with a major foreign
22 policy issue, and it is important to go through this so we can
23 establish the perimeters of what we are talking about.

24 Imagine a young government coming to power and by August,
12:39:03 25 after my oath of office, there is an ECOWAS meeting and we are
26 placed on the committee, now four - it now increases to the
27 Committee of Five because they want to use my experience in
28 helping to resolve the problem in Sierra Leone.

29 By this time in West Africa ECOWAS has succeeded to a great

1 deal in bringing peace to Liberia. ECOWAS as a regional
2 organisation wants to take credit for what they have
3 accomplished. Now, ECOWAS is also moving to carry out this same
4 feat in Sierra Leone that ECOWAS will also take the credit for
12:40:12 5 having brought peace to Sierra Leone, but there are problems
6 involved with that that affect my foreign policy too. What are
7 these problems? Nigeria is the largest country in that region
8 and the most powerful. By this time - and there is no doubt
9 about it - a bulk of the burden of bringing peace to Liberia fell
12:40:46 10 on the shoulders of Nigeria, and for the most part a lot of the
11 burden of helping to bring peace to Sierra Leone is also falling
12 on Nigeria. I am not saying that other countries were not
13 participating: Other countries; Ghana, participated
14 significantly; Guinea; Senegal; The Gambia, all of them
12:41:10 15 contributed, but there is a little Catch-22 I want to call it
16 here. The President of Nigeria is then General Sani Abacha, a
17 very good friend of mine, who is an action man who wants to get
18 things done, but Nigeria is also being seen by certain countries
19 - and I am speaking specifically to Great Britain, and I am
12:41:48 20 saying this because my government was told in diplomatic language
21 what the British would accept and not accept as regards Sierra
22 Leone. Nigeria, there is a serious effort to making sure that
23 Nigeria does not exercise hegemony over West Africa as the
24 richest, the most populace, and the most powerful in the region.
12:42:18 25 Now, to a great extent there is one side of that argument
26 that some of the small countries that our countries like, and
27 what is that part? That part relating to hegemony. I do not
28 claim here that this was the intent of Nigeria, but based on
29 diplomatic sources and what the British had said to my government

1 they said they had no intention of permitting Britain to hegemony
2 over Sierra Leone.

3 Q. Permitting Britain?

4 A. I beg your pardon?

5 Q. Permitting Britain to exercise hegemony --

6 A. No, Nigeria. Sorry. No, no, permitting Nigeria.

7 Sometimes you explain these things, I am sorry. To exercise
8 hegemony. So I, being - and, you know, little countries are
9 threatened all the time by these big countries, and they need to

12:43:17 10 hear this from a former President too. Veiled threats. What do
11 they come and tell you? And they know they are threatening you.

12 Well, Mr President, you are just recovering from a war. You need
13 a lot of assistance. We want to help, but our hands are tied.

14 We need your cooperation in certain areas because before

12:43:44 15 assistance come, we have to go through Parliament, and in some
16 places Congress, and you have to help us. We can't let this

17 happen. We can't - so we are beginning to find - or I am

18 beginning to find out that I am really between the rock and a

19 hard place. On the one hand, I want to continue - I have to

12:44:05 20 continue to contribute and stick with ECOWAS as a West African
21 organisation, but I am being really threatened from these

22 countries by telling me "Look, your assistance in rebuilding your
23 country depends on how much you cooperate with us".

24 Q. Which countries?

12:44:25 25 A. Well, Britain is involved diplomatically. The United
26 States is involved, and most European Union countries that really

27 hold together. Because what one European Union country tells

28 you, they all tell you the same thing. So you are in this

29 straightjacket where you hardly can - you know, can move here or

1 there. So I am finding myself supporting ECOWAS in what we are
2 doing, but being careful that I am not moving any place because
3 of the threats that are being made to my government, and actually
4 I don't get anything. I choose to stay and follow ECOWAS because
12:45:08 5 I am a pan-Africanist to the core.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Taylor, sorry, I haven't understood
7 the threat that you are referring to.

8 THE WITNESS: Oh, I explained - I said there are veiled
9 threats where they come to you and tell you "Listen, we want to
12:45:25 10 help you but, you know, if you don't do - if you don't, you know,
11 carry out this policy in this particular direction, it puts a
12 problem on us back home with our Parliaments. You know, we have
13 to meet certain obligations based on what Parliament is calling
14 for". In a way it is almost, your Honour, telling you "You
12:45:52 15 either do what we ask you, or you don't get nothing". For me I
16 call it a veiled threat. That is what I meant.

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Does that include, for instance, asking
18 them you to spend their money properly? Would you consider that
19 a veiled threat?

12:46:13 20 THE WITNESS: No. No, because by the time they gave you
21 the money, the conditionalities are there. Even before they get
22 to the money, they are letting you know that: Don't even think
23 about getting anything unless you agree to certain things first.
24 And after that stage - and that particular thing has to do with a
12:46:28 25 policy decision. And in the case of Sierra Leone, this
26 particular policy decision had to do with ECOWAS's decision to
27 reinstate Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power. And when the - when
28 ECOWAS took that decision to finally do that and started the
29 bombing campaign in January of 1998, I was told - my government

1 was told because we - because ECOWAS started the bombing
2 campaign, but had drafted a set of things that they wanted to do
3 and needed Security Council decision under Chapter 7, but the
4 British made it very clear to me "It is not going to happen. We
12:47:26 5 are not going to let Nigeria take Sierra Leone", and what
6 happened back at that time Sir John Weston, I remember who was
7 the British ambassador to the United Nations --

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. How do you spell his name surname?

12:47:44 10 A. W-E-S-T-O-N. So John Weston, he spoke publicly about it and
11 questioned what authority Nigeria had to carry out bombing
12 campaigns in Freetown and that Nigeria did not have the authority
13 to - I mean from the Security Council - to quote unquote
14 reinstate Tejan Kabbah to power.

12:48:05 15 Q. Pause. When you say the British made clear to me, in the
16 context of threats, the question asked by the Learned Justice,
17 what was in fact said to you by the British?

18 A. The British felt that Nigeria was - and Sani Abacha, as
19 President of Nigeria, was a President that had grand designs for
12:48:34 20 West Africa that they would not permit to settle inside Sierra
21 Leone. If you remember at one point subsequent to that this
22 famous Maxwell Khobe was named as head of the Sierra Leonean
23 armed forces, a Nigeria general. But even before that the
24 British - and by me, I mean there are diplomatic messages and
12:49:03 25 diplomatic talks. When a foreign envoy comes to your government
26 and informs you that we think that you should not support the
27 stance of Nigeria in this venture, we do not think it is in your
28 best interests and if you do, you must consider that some of the
29 things that you are looking up to us to do we will not be able to

1 do it, that is what I want to clear I am calling a threat. For
2 me that is a veiled threat.

3 Q. And did that in fact happen?

4 A. That in fact happened and in fact not only am I saying it
12:49:41 5 here, I wrote a letter around about October of 1997 to Sani
6 Abacha warning him in details about what was to come and that
7 Nigeria had to take it very easy because the pressure - I was
8 under diplomatic pressure on the one hand and the reason why I
9 wrote Abacha was this: Abacha was pressurising me to support the
12:50:16 10 Kamajors that I mentioned to this Court before were training at
11 Ricks Institute that I met in place just a few kilometres outside
12 of Monrovia, that the Kamajors were being trained and armed and
13 driven from Monrovia through Cape Mount to the Bo Waterside if
14 you look at that bridge. Ricks Institute is on that road going
12:50:41 15 there. And I had said to him, I said, "Look, my government is
16 too new and fragile. I can't do this."

17 But he is pressurising me. The British are pressurising me
18 not to cooperate with Nigeria in what they called their grand
19 designs, so I find myself between a rock and a hard place. So in
12:51:01 20 October 1997 I wrote an extensive letter to President Abacha
21 detailing all of these facts of which we can present to this
22 Court, telling them --

23 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, can I pause. This is somewhat out of
24 order and it wasn't the way we intended to approach this, but,
12:51:18 25 given your mention of this letter, let's have a look at it,
26 please. It is in the bundle of documents for - yes, 27 July
27 through to 31 July. It is volume 1 of 3 and it is behind divider
28 5.

29 A. Well, I'm sorry, that's affecting my foreign policy.

1 That's why I mentioned that sequence. It's foreign policy.

2 Q. We will deal with the letter and then we will come back to
3 the general overview that you were giving us. Behind divider 5.
4 Now just so that we are clear, this is a letter written by whom?

12:52:55 5 A. This is a letter written by me.

6 Q. To whom?

7 A. To General Sani Abacha, the Head of State of Nigeria at the
8 time.

9 Q. Now we see that it is dated 24 October 1997.

12:53:09 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. That's why I say we are taking it out of order and in terms
12 of the narrative we will have to come back to it.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "Having had several weeks of reflection on the evolving
12:53:21 15 situation in Sierra Leone and the threat it poses to the security
16 concerns of my nation, including the sub-region, I have
17 considered it propitious to share my thoughts with you."

18 Now, pause there. For how long had you been reflecting on
19 this problem, Mr Taylor?

12:53:45 20 A. Well, remember I just got in office in August, so I am
21 seized with this matter continuously. I mean, so I am talking
22 about, what, within a month and a half to two I am seized with
23 this matter of the problems.

24 Q. And when you talk about "the security concerns of my
12:54:06 25 nation" and the threat posed to that by the situation in Sierra
26 Leone, what are you talking about?

27 A. I meet this massive maybe you can call it covert training
28 programme of the Kamajors stationed right in Monrovia
29 practically.

1 Q. Sponsored by whom?

2 A. By ECOMOG.

3 Q. And particularly whom within ECOMOG?

4 A. Nigeria.

12:54:32 5 Q. So Nigeria are sponsoring, through ECOMOG, the Kamajors in
6 your country?

7 A. At Ricks Institute, Virginia, right in Monrovia.

8 Q. Okay, now when you say poses the situation in Sierra Leone
9 poses security concerns, what were those concerns?

12:54:55 10 A. Well, you know, if the Kamajors -they are involved in a
11 war. If they are attacking Sierra Leone from Liberia they are
12 obviously fighting someone in Sierra Leone. But the chances for
13 us would be that those people in Sierra Leone, knowing that the
14 Kamajors are coming out of Liberia, could also re-enter and I
12:55:20 15 just had a fragile election and so the country is still fragile.

16 But even more important to me was the fact that immediately
17 following my election and inauguration as President there is a
18 large unit of ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J that have returned to Sierra
19 Leone. So this for me was only another reason to give people an
12:55:48 20 opportunity to start a new war again inside Liberia. So I didn't
21 want any part of that.

22 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you appreciate, don't you, that the
23 suggestion is you were supporting the RUF who were fighting
24 against the Kamajors? You understand that, don't you?

12:56:05 25 A. Yes, I understand what they are thinking.

26 Q. So what did you stand to gain as President of Liberia by
27 supporting the RUF at this stage? What did you stand to gain out
28 of that?

29 A. Absolutely nothing. It would have brought so much trouble

1 to me, not just in terms of the local war. This would have been
2 in contravention of what ECOWAS was trying to get going in
3 Liberia. I would have lost - everything that had to come to my
4 new government in Liberia would have been lost. There is nothing
12:56:46 5 to gain by assisting the RUF. Nothing.

6 Q. Help me, Mr Taylor. What did you stand to gain from
7 destabilising the neighbouring country of Sierra Leone?

8 A. Absolutely nothing. The only thing you will gain from that
9 process is trouble.

12:57:08 10 Q. What kind of trouble?

11 A. You lose foreign aid, you lose assistance, you lose friends
12 and you will lose - being a very good President, you will lose
13 the chance given you to help your people. You lose everything.

14 Q. Let's go back:

12:57:28 15 "I have considered it propitious to share my thoughts with
16 you. I share it within the context of that special friendship
17 which has developed from a history of considerable interaction
18 and personal trust, for which much appreciation is owed to you."

19 Help us, Mr Taylor. What was the nature of the personal
12:57:49 20 relationship between you and Sani Abacha?

21 A. I explained to this Court. That one conversation upon my
22 accepting an invitation to go to Nigeria where Sani Abacha looks
23 at me and he says, "Mr Taylor, what can we do to bring about
24 peace?" I said to him, "If Nigeria becomes neutral you have
12:58:16 25 peace and I will go to Monrovia". He sat maybe bewildered for a
26 few minutes and said, "Okay, if this is the case on my honour
27 Nigeria will be neutral from now on", and sure enough I went to
28 Monrovia and sure enough there was peace.

29 So from that day he always felt that I was a man of my word

1 and I felt too that he was a man of his word because he had
2 promised that Nigeria would be neutral, that happened. I had
3 promised I would go to Monrovia, that happened.

4 Q. Let's go back:

12:58:55 5 "As you may recall, our friendship has developed from a
6 history of deep personal trust, one which enabled me when I was
7 last in Abuja with you to divulge the hard facts concerning the
8 Sierra Leone conflict and our resolve to approach solutions of
9 fairness. This was done in the spirit of that most special
12:59:18 10 relationship."

11 When had you been in Abuja prior to this?

12 A. I made several trips to Abuja while I was on the Council of
13 State. I made a couple more trips during the period after
14 disarmament for discussions, yeah, and even meetings. I had paid
12:59:44 15 many visits.

16 Q. When we come to the presidential papers we will see the
17 dates - the particular dates - of those meetings, but for now
18 let's stick with this: "To divulge the hard facts concerning the
19 Sierra Leone conflict". Now, help us. What was it that you had
13:00:04 20 said to him?

21 A. What I said to Abacha in very, very firm language was that,
22 "Nigeria will have to do in Sierra Leone what it did in Liberia;
23 become neutral and you will have peace in Sierra Leone. You take
24 part and you start supporting groups as you did in Liberia, the
13:00:35 25 crisis will continue." These with my exact words to him.

26 Q. But, Mr Taylor, what a hypocrite you are, because on the
27 one hand you're advising Sani Abacha not to be partial, but you
28 know it is said that you were partial in that conflict, you were
29 supporting one side.

1 A. That is not correct. That is what - that is why it may
2 look hypocritical because I was not supporting any side.

3 Q. So that's what you said to Sani Abacha, was it?

4 A. That is correct.

13:01:14 5 Q. "This was done in the spirit of that most special
6 relationship.

7 Presently, there are growing anxieties being expressed by
8 the Liberia people over a perceived emerging border crisis. It
9 is their expectation that now is the time for progress to proceed
13:01:36 10 from capacity building to an accelerated base towards a true and
11 meaningful turnover, as promised. These salient changes about
12 which we discussed and entertained most happily do not appear to
13 be a part of the agenda of those who directly shoulder the
14 responsibilities within ECOMOG on the ground."

13:02:04 15 Now, what are you talking about there?

16 A. Well, following the elections - and I want to re-emphasise
17 this covert programme is going on before I am elected President.
18 Following my election I go to Nigeria and I have a very long talk
19 with President Abacha concerning the change and the attitude of
13:02:37 20 the soldiers in ECOMOG that are behaving as an occupation force
21 versus Liberia returning to constitutional democracy and we have
22 a President and Head of State being in control its territory.

23 Now, one of the crucial things that this Court will
24 remember that happened - and this is why I want to emphasise it
13:03:08 25 because it has to do with this alleged movement of arms and
26 ammunition. ECOMOG is given full powers in Liberia during and up
27 to the time of my being inaugurated as President. They are the
28 army, they are the police, they control security throughout the
29 Republic of Liberia. They have become accustomed to not being

1 asked any questions. Even the Council of State that I sat on
2 before leaving to run for the presidency did not have any
3 authority over the ECOMOG forces. ECOMOG had the authority to
4 act as it saw fit to maintain peace and security within the
13:04:08 5 country. Now, following my election the President of Liberia now
6 becomes a part of this word that was used in court before the
7 other day "authority" - becomes a part of the authority of
8 ECOWAS.

9 So my argument now to Abacha is that, "Look, we have to
13:04:28 10 begin to work together. ECOMOG now has to cease being answerable
11 actually to no one, but that as an authority of ECOWAS now I do
12 not wish to command the Nigerian army", because at this
13 particular time I would say almost 80 per cent of the troops are
14 Nigerians, but what I would like to have is that the Nigerian
13:04:57 15 armed forces, the general in charge, and following the arrest and
16 murder of Samuel Doe the general at that time was a Ghanaian
17 general, General Arnold Quinoo - we have to find that spelling.

18 Q. Q-U-I-N-O-O.

19 A. Okay. Following that sad incident of the arrest and murder
13:05:25 20 of Doe, all subsequent commanders of ECOMOG were Nigerian
21 generals, and so my wish at that - and I just brought this in to
22 understand what I mean. Following that time I said, "Well, look,
23 I want for the general to coordinate with my Defence ministry on
24 any and all actions that will be taken in this Republic from now
13:05:51 25 on", and we had a general agreement on that. That is what I am
26 bringing to his attention.

27 Q. Now you go on five lines from the bottom:

28 "To the contrary, some are deliberately attempting to
29 obstruct all rational approaches to this process. As for

1 instance, each time we attempt to deploy personnel of our
2 national security, army and police at our border, they are
3 ignominiously turned back, even arrested and imprisoned by
4 ECOMOG".

13:06:28 5 Q. Is that true?

6 A. That is 100 per cent factual.

7 Q. Over the page:

8 "You will agree, no doubt, my dear friend and brother, that such
9 affronts are totally unacceptable. And even more confrontational
10 and provocative is the fact that elements of the Kamajors are
11 permitted to cross the border into Liberia, where they are
12 treated in medical clinics on Liberian soil, with total disregard
13 to Liberia's territorial rights".

14 Q. Was that happening?

13:07:04 15 A. 100 per cent, yes.

16 Q. With whose assistance?

17 A. Oh, ECOMOG. ECOMOG. They didn't want any questions from
18 anyone.

19 Q. "This blatant disrespect must cease, and the Government of
13:07:20 20 Liberia is again hereby formally informing you of this grave
21 matter, which must be corrected. Quite factually, my dear friend
22 and brother, there is open warfare at my border, and my
23 government has to do something about it".

24 Q. What did you want to do about it, Mr Taylor?

13:07:39 25 A. Well, to get it stopped. We had to get it stopped. We had
26 to move from this period of being answerable to no-one to a
27 period of it is a matter of control, sovereignty is the whole -
28 well, even know it doesn't really exist for Third World
29 countries. It is this issue of sovereignty. How do I, as the

1 new President of Liberia, exercise what is known in legal terms
2 as sovereign rights over our territory where we can make certain
3 decisions? That is what I am confronted with, and there appears
4 to be a major problem in getting that done.

13:08:21 5 Q. So help me, Mr Taylor. Who is controlling the border
6 between Sierra Leone and Liberia at this time?

7 A. The ECOMOG. Don't forget, they are still deployed. As
8 they were deployed for disarmament and demobilisation, they are
9 still deployed and they are carrying out this particular
13:08:41 10 programme, and they are in charge. They are in charge, and now
11 we are trying to see how we can at least begin to exercise some
12 little control within our borders.

13 Q. So who has overall control in these border areas which the
14 Kamajors are using to launch attacks into Sierra Leone --

13:09:05 15 A. ECOMOG.

16 Q. -- and return from --

17 A. ECOMOG, Nigeria.

18 Q. "This blatant disrespect must cease, and the Government of
19 Liberia is again hereby formally informing you of this grave
13:09:23 20 matter, which must be corrected. Quite factually, my dear friend
21 end and brother, there is open warfare at my border, and my
22 government has to do something about it.

23 Believe me, when I reiterate how much I cherish the
24 friendship between the two of us. I believe it confirms our
13:09:42 25 mutual self respect and the honour which we both reserve for each
26 other. It is this mutual self respect that allowed me to
27 disclose that my government could and would not lend support to
28 the Kamajors".

29 Pause there.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Who had asked you to lend them support?

3 A. Abacha.

4 Q. And what had you responded?

13:10:06 5 A. I said to him I couldn't because my government was too new
6 and fragile and that it would be that - I didn't want to open up
7 a new - you know, a new war in Liberia that we had to move and
8 they had done well, and I guess when you hear me say here Liberia
9 is hereby formally, that means that we have talked about it
13:10:35 10 informally. And so I am really telling him that I can't - after
11 he said "Well, you've got to support" - I said "No, I don't want
12 any fighting outside". Even suggested - said I will do whatever
13 in other ways in line with ECOWAS's decision, but to have these
14 Kamajors trained in Liberia, being armed, and just having a free
13:10:58 15 part of this country this way, in fact I am coming under pressure
16 internally from the legislature and other people. It is a big
17 problem.

18 Q. "More logically, it represents elements that are
19 counterproductive to the powering manifestation of your personal
13:11:18 20 influence in the restoration of peace to Liberia through ECOMOG.
21 More castigating is the fact of the unwillingness of these
22 functionaries with ECOMOG to cooperate with our efforts and
23 elements of my government.

24 If you may recall, I confided to you that there is a move
13:11:37 25 to contain Nigeria on the part of your adversaries. I warned you
26 before, and so do I now".

27 Which adversaries?

28 A. Well, I am referring strictly to the diplomatic warning
29 that the British have given me that they will not let Nigeria

1 exercise hegemony in Sierra Leone.

2 Q. "I warned you before". When was that?

3 A. Well in previous discussions that we had had.

4 Q. "That is why I sincerely hope you take the initiative in
13:12:13 5 helping to resolve this Sierra Leone situation peacefully, along
6 the lines that will arrest the support of West Africa and the
7 United Nations".

8 What do you mean by that, "arrest the support of west
9 Africa and the United Nations"?

13:12:31 10 A. Well, you know, if - if the British at that particular time
11 had succeeded in isolating Nigeria to a point where it looked
12 like only a Nigerian affair, they could easily gain the sympathy
13 of Africa and even some of our support in the United Nations.
14 Now, this is the diplomatic situation. So I was trying to warn
13:12:59 15 him, "Don't put yourself in a position where you are isolated
16 where they say, 'Oh, it is only Nigeria. Nigeria wants to do
17 this.'" It must continually be this is an ECOWAS programme and
18 it is an OAU programme. Don't get isolated and get caught out in
19 the cold. That is what I am trying to him here.

13:13:25 20 Q. "To do otherwise will strangulate and subdue your
21 effectiveness as the chairman of ECOWAS. I also pointed out
22 during our last discussion, that the security council would water
23 down ECOWAS's request, and instead, pursue a line different from
24 that which had been conveyed to the council".

13:13:44 25 Now, "water down ECOWAS's request", which request was that?

26 A. ECOWAS was asking for Chapter 7 resolution to authorise
27 force in Sierra Leone to restore Tejan Kabbah.

28 Q. And what do you mean by the security council was watering
29 down that request?

1 A. The British were not going to have any of that. It was
2 going to exercise - it was going to give Nigeria the type of
3 hegemony that they saw and this is why the British ambassador,
4 John Weston - and we can go on the BBC web page and get it - he
13:14:26 5 condemned those attacks against Sierra Leone at that particular
6 time, complaining about massive loss of lives of civilians and
7 different things. John Weston, that is documented, okay? So
8 this is what I am trying to say. So they were determined under
9 certain conditions not to permit a full Chapter 7 resolution, and
13:14:47 10 if you get to find out, the United Nations - and I stand
11 corrected on this - did not grant a Chapter 7 resolution to
12 restore Tejan Kabbah on February 2. It occurred, and after the
13 fact the United Nations passed a resolution welcoming Tejan
14 Kabbah. But to the rest of my recollection, the Security Council
13:15:11 15 had not passed a resolution authorising Chapter 7 to the best of
16 my recollection, and I stand corrected on this.

17 Q. "It was, and continues to be, my conviction that Nigeria
18 must commence listening to other voices, especially Liberia,
19 because I consider you truly a good friend, who stood with me and
13:15:34 20 my country during the period of our hectic crisis.

21 Liberia, unlike Guinea, is new and fragile. Guinea is more
22 capable of assuming the role ECOMOG wants to assume in Sierra
23 Leone".

24 Can you explain that last part about Guinea?

13:15:55 25 A. That is that in other words, I wasn't listening. You want
26 somebody to support the Kamajors, you know, let Guinea do it.
27 Don't bring that to me. They haven't been at war. I am just
28 trying to get my country done so, you know, they are more
29 capable, so take it to them. That is what I am actually saying

1 here.

2 Q. "We agreed at the last summit that the process of ECOMOG
3 in Sierra Leone would be separated from the capacity building in
4 Liberia".

13:16:27 5 What does that mean?

6 A. Well, his argument at that time was, Well, you know, ECOMOG
7 is working in Liberia trying to build your capacity, they are
8 working in Sierra Leone, so we cannot separate what they are
9 doing in Sierra Leone and so if they pull out of Liberia and have
13:16:45 10 to stop this, it will mean that what ECOMOG wants to do in
11 Liberia, it would not be able to do. I am saying, no, no, no,
12 no, we have to separate these two countries. The job of ECOMOG
13 in Liberia now must be capacity building, and what am I talking
14 about? Maybe helping to train our security, helping with our
13:17:11 15 security. Not fighting a war, okay? I am saying you want to
16 help us build our capacity, whether it is helping to train some
17 security forces, providing internal security, yes. It cannot be
18 one of either peace enforcement, which I am not too sure is the
19 issue, but at least peacekeeping. It is no longer peacekeeping
13:17:34 20 now. It has to change from the peacekeeping role to the capacity
21 building role.

22 Q. "Yet nothing has been done to accomplish this. Instead,
23 some ECOMOG officers behave as though they are Lords and Masters
24 in Liberia, and show no respect for authority. There is urgency
13:17:58 25 in making a distinction; indeed, it must occur, because
26 everything done to secure stability in Liberia is threatened as a
27 result of this indifference. We just are too new to shoulder any
28 operation in Sierra Leone outside ECOWAS and the UN".

29 What do you mean by that, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Well, you know, just what I have tried to explain here.
2 Here I am between the rock and a hard place. I am being asked to
3 permit these actions out of Liberia. I see it is going to
4 threaten the peace because Liberia could spin back into a renewed
13:18:46 5 conflict. I am trying to avoid that, so I take cover. And quite
6 frankly, literally speaking I take cover and say well, look, if
7 it is an ECOWAS decision, or if it is a UN decision, I mean, I am
8 bound by the ECOWAS decision, and especially if it is a Chapter 7
9 resolution from the United Nations. Except under extreme
13:19:13 10 conditions one would have to follow it, even though there are
11 instances where Chapter 7 resolutions have not been followed for
12 years. But I am trying to find a cover for myself to say - while
13 not destroying our friendship. Because back in my mind I am
14 still looking to Nigeria for continued help, whether it is in
13:19:36 15 capacity building or all this kind of stuff, and, of course, you
16 do not want to be at odds with the biggest and the most powerful
17 country in the region. So I am stuck here and I find some cover
18 by saying look, I have got to stick with - let it be an ECOWAS
19 decision; that at least if my legislature came after me, which
13:19:57 20 they were beginning to ask questions, I will be able to say look,
21 we are bound by ECOWAS treaties and I am permitting this, and so
22 let's try to keep it within ECOWAS or the United Nations.

23 Q. But, Mr Taylor, too new to shoulder any operations, but you
24 were busy funding the RUF?

13:20:16 25 A. Oh, boy, that is not a laugh; that's - it beats me how
26 people can come up with these explanations. If they only knew or
27 maybe cared to know what was going on with that new government in
28 Liberia. We are there, we have been disarmed to hold elections.
29 I am elected as President. I even request arms for my security.

1 I am not permitted to have them. Every arm is under lock and key
2 by ECOMOG and the UN.

3 So all this nonsense we are running about talking about
4 sovereignty and sovereignty, what is sovereignty to you when you
13:21:12 5 have close to a 20,000 men army on the ground? Here is this
6 covert movement going on, I can't break it. I have no arms
7 whatsoever. None whatsoever. I am fighting trying to get the
8 biggest control over the army to reduce the tension on me in the
9 country. I am under diplomatic pressure on the other side, okay,
13:21:35 10 because of this power play about who is to or who is to not
11 exercise hegemony in Liberia. I am under tremendous pressure.
12 Where do I have the means or the inclination to support somebody
13 in another country?

14 Q. But you were keeping the AFRC in power, Mr Taylor. That's
13:21:54 15 the suggestion.

16 A. Well, for somebody to suggest that I was keeping the AFRC
17 in power could probably extend the suggestion. Johnny Paul
18 Koroma and I had a meeting before he became Head of State. The
19 AFRC had a meeting with me in Monrovia before they took over. I
13:22:13 20 mean that's how silly it would sound, because Johnny Paul Koroma
21 is in prison before he is released by the AFRC, but the AFRC, the
22 Sierra Leone Army, except I am supposed to be meeting with the
23 armed forces of Sierra Leone, that is how ludicrous the whole
24 thing must sound. If you believe that I am supporting the AFRC
13:22:34 25 junta then you must believe that there was a relationship between
26 Johnny Paul Koroma and myself before and you have to believe that
27 I was in control of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, because none
28 of those things even come close to truth, you understand me?

29 So, you know, it is like normal logic. You can't begin to

1 say these kinds of things except you remember to put the pieces
2 together. You people must know it just doesn't come together. I
3 had no contact with these people whatsoever. To the best of my
4 knowledge - I mean from what - I become President in 1997, the
13:23:10 5 Sierra Leonean armed forces, they are busy, what, they are
6 fighting for their President. So am I in control of them? No.
7 So it is impossible. It is not practical. It's impossible.

8 Q. "Liberia must fulfill the wishes of the Security Council,
9 because there is a trap afoot for you, one in which I do not want
13:23:37 10 you to fall, because you are a brother and a friend."

11 Which trap is that?

12 A. Well, that's what I talked about about this thing we are
13 not going to let you exercise hegemony and now, you know, Abacha
14 was very - and I must admit Abacha was my friend, he was a very
13:23:58 15 strong man and they did not like him and there was always the
16 criticism that don't forget Abacha seized power in Nigeria from a
17 civilian and because of his strength and his independence he was
18 not liked. And so I am trying to tell him that, "They just want
19 you to fall into a situation where they will use this as
13:24:24 20 propaganda against you".

21 Q. "Our friendship must be maintained and you must listen to
22 me as I listen to you. Indeed, this should be the basis of our
23 friendship. The present crisis in Sierra Leone must be based on
24 negotiation."

13:24:47 25 Negotiation, Mr Taylor? But you are the warlord who is
26 using warfare next door in Sierra Leone, so what kind of
27 hypocrisy is this?

28 A. Total nonsense. Total nonsense. Don't forget, maybe they
29 have forgotten, how did the crisis in Liberia come to an end?

1 Through negotiations. We fought for seven years. It was never
2 won. It was not militarily won. And by militarily won I can
3 refer to the situation that we recently had in, if I am not
4 wrong, I think Sri Lanka where the military defeated the rebel
13:25:38 5 Tigers, the Tamil Tigers. In the case of Liberia we brought
6 peace to Liberia through negotiations. And finally what happened
7 in Sierra Leone, a peace came through negotiations.

8 And I was trying to tell him that, "Remember you expended
9 lots of monies in Liberia, lots of manpower and assets - military
13:26:09 10 assets - that these wars, you know, are never won like that
11 militarily. So what you did in Liberia that brought this peace,
12 I implore you to do everything that you can to bring peace in
13 Sierra Leone as quickly as possible through negotiations".

14 Q. And you go on to say this:

13:26:34 15 "From every angle, whether political, economic, social or
16 cultural, I see negotiation as the sine qua non. Force will not
17 bring peace to Sierra Leone, as it did not bring peace to
18 Liberia."

19 Pause. Did you achieve a military victory in Liberia,
13:26:57 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. So why did you think you could achieve a military victory
23 in Sierra Leone?

24 A. That's what makes it nonsensical, that on the one hand this
13:27:09 25 man is using his experience and advising as early as 1997 - right
26 after office I am on this committee and I am talking to the
27 powerhouse, "Look, we have got to do it this way". It doesn't
28 make sense. Total nonsense for them to come up with that.

29 Q. "On several occasions during confidential meetings between

1 us, I asked to see Foday Sankoh, to which you did listen and
2 promised to grant my request."

3 Pause there. Why were you asking to see Foday Sankoh?

13:27:52

4 A. I really wanted to see Foday Sankoh for he to sit down -
5 for him to sit down with Abacha and probably go through the same
6 process that I had gone through with Abacha, for Abacha to look
7 at Sankoh and ask him, "What is your problem? What is it going
8 to take to bring this peace?" That's what I really wanted.

9 Q. Now, where was Sankoh at this time?

13:28:12

10 A. Foday Sankoh is still incarcerated in Nigeria.

11 Q. And had been arrested when? Just the month, do you know?
12 I don't know if it is in issue.

13 A. Well, let me take - I am not sure if it is March of 1997.

13:28:39

14 Q. That's correct. But help me, Foday Sankoh wasn't being
15 held in custody as such in Nigeria, was he?

16 A. The exact details I do not know, but for the most part I
17 think in the very early stages he was being held I am not sure in
18 a prison, but he was held at a facility where he did not have
19 access to people. I know that. This is what Abacha told me.

13:29:12

20 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we will take the lunch adjournment
22 now and we will resume at 2.30.

23 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

24 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:31:07

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

27 Q. Mr Taylor, we had reached page 3 of this letter before the
28 luncheon adjournment. I wonder if we could have the third page
29 of it back on the screen, please. Yes, we were looking at the

1 penultimate paragraph, Mr Taylor:

2 "On several occasions during confidential meetings between
3 us, I asked to see Foday Sankoh, to which you did listen and
4 promised to grant my request. I am again calling upon you, my
14:32:22 5 big dear brother, to release him. Holding him will yield no
6 positive result."

7 Now I'd like us to pause for a moment, please. Firstly, as
8 a fact were you able to speak to Foday Sankoh?

9 A. No.

14:32:42 10 Q. Secondly, given that you're allegedly in control of this
11 man, why were you seeking General Abacha's permission to speak to
12 him?

13 A. Well, quite frankly, don't forget now we are in October.

14 I'm a member of the Committee of Five and Abacha is really
14:33:05 15 playing games with me. Really - I mean, any member of this
16 committee could have gone to Nigeria and asked to see - to have
17 Sankoh brought - to see really is to have him brought, just as
18 happened in fact a year later in - in fact, maybe a little more
19 than that. In 2000 the same thing happened. Obasanjo and Alpha
14:33:33 20 Konare went to Freetown to Tejani and they brought Foday Sankoh.

21 So a head of state, a member of a Committee of Five and an
22 authority - okay, a part of the authority telling him that, you
23 know, I think I want to see Foday Sankoh, bring him. Abacha was
24 just playing little games with me. But I had a right to ask to
14:33:55 25 see him and have him brought to sit with us, so I was not going
26 to a prison to go and visit him. But I think that Abacha was,
27 you know, he was playing - you know, we used to - he used to play
28 a lot of little games, but I had a right to do so and I exercised
29 that right. He didn't - I didn't get to see him but I had a

1 right to ask, and I did.

2 Q. Now did President Abacha ever explain to you why he was
3 holding Foday Sankoh?

4 A. Well, I tell you, that did come up in a conversation, but I
14:34:32 5 cannot claim to have gotten a very clear picture from Abacha.
6 Generally I think the strategy was to isolate Sankoh from the
7 crisis. As a result, it would weaken the resolve of the RUF to
8 fight. I think this was playing in people's minds and we threw
9 it around and I tried to tell him look, you know, by holding this
14:35:05 10 man here it will not do. You need to get this man, sit down,
11 talk with him as you did with me, let's find out how we can
12 resolve this problem.

13 Because don't forget, I did mention in my evidence a few
14 days ago - and you're talking about - you asked a question
14:35:26 15 originally that led to this, what was the foreign policy issue
16 that was confronting me. It's very good for this Court to
17 understand. You see Heads of State running up and down. We sit
18 and we talk like normal people do; we laugh, we joke, we fuss,
19 like, you know, everybody else. So at this particular time there
14:35:54 20 is a question that is between and amongst us that is not coming
21 outside, and the biggest question that I raised here the other
22 day, you know, we are concerned that certain decisions had been
23 taken, and let me just touch on what that decision was.

24 I come to office in August, but a decision has been taken
14:36:20 25 in June after the coup of what to do. I meet that decision
26 before me, and that decision is to restore the government of
27 President Kabbah.

28 Q. And that decision was made when?

29 A. In June of 1997 before I'm elected.

1 Q. And where is that decision taken?

2 A. That decision is taken at an ECOWAS meeting right after the
3 coup. They take that decision. So - but we are laughing, we
4 come and a few of us are still talking about it, well, yes, we
14:36:58 5 can restore Kabbah, we're not - nobody's objecting to that. But
6 I mentioned this in the Court the other day, what would happen if
7 there's coup d'etat in Nigeria? Who would restore the elected
8 President? So there is a debate going on in ECOWAS at that time.

9 And let me state categorically I do not believe that it was the
14:37:19 10 intention of Nigeria to exercise hegemony in Sierra Leone, but I
11 think, like, you know, we talk about little countries as turfs of
12 the west, which is factual. This was Britain's little turf in
13 West Africa, and she was not - she was determined she was not
14 getting anywhere with Nigeria, you know, during the

14:37:46 15 administration of Abacha. There were problems and Nigeria was
16 suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations. So there is problem
17 with Nigeria. Both - the west is having problems with Sani
18 Abacha at this particular time. So you have this situation where
19 this ongoing discussion - this is what I want to leave in the
14:38:12 20 minds of this Court. There are ongoing discussions, there are
21 debates where decisions are being taken, they're being thrown
22 around, and everyone is trying to find a solution to this
23 problem.

24 So we had this decision in June, we're following up, I'm
14:38:30 25 trying to tell him listen - but also in that decision there was a
26 decision that the junta would not be recognised, and no member
27 state of ECOWAS recognised the junta. My government surely did
28 not recognise the junta. There is also a decision in that June
29 situation that speaks expressly about negotiations and even

1 setting a date - a date for the return to power, and that date in
2 that June agreement was April of 1998. So this pre-emptive move
3 in February in fact caught most people by surprise. So I'm
4 giving you a general picture here of what is going on.

14:39:15 5 Q. What pre-emptive move in February, Mr Taylor?

6 A. The what you call - there's a word that has been judicially
7 accepted in this Court about the 2 February incident. It's - I
8 forgot the word.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think the intervention.

14:39:39 10 THE WITNESS: The intervention. That's right. The 2
11 February incident. That's the intervention.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. So you're telling us that from June 1997 it had been agreed
14 that some action would be taken in March of '98 - April of '98?

14:39:51 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. We'll come back to that June agreement later, Mr Taylor.
17 Let's try and complete this letter now:

18 "In another matter of high order I engaged you in the
19 topic of the behaviour of some officers of ECOMOG whose
14:40:10 20 pugnacious and intransigent attitudes towards constituted
21 authorities translate into direct insults and disrespect. I
22 advanced my feeling that as they had served prior to the election
23 and the seating of the new government, it was unlikely that they
24 would recognise the change and so demean themselves. You
14:40:40 25 assented and assured me that it was prudent that they be
26 summarily withdrawn, which is still sadly unattended, including
27 the appointment of a new diplomatic envoy near this capital,
28 replacing your present whose attitudes continue to reflect the
29 former era of conflict and divisiveness."

1 Can I just pause and ask you about a little stylistic
2 detail here, Mr Taylor. Why is this phrase used "near this
3 capital"?

14:41:15 4 A. Quite frankly, we all learnt that in diplomatic language,
5 that the ambassador is not accredited - like you hear people say
6 accredited to the country. You always say he's accredited near
7 this capital. I can't help this the Court, but that's the
8 diplomatic language that is used.

14:41:33 9 Q. So even though they are actually physically based in
10 Monrovia, stylistically when referring to them you refer to it as
11 being near the capital?

12 A. Yes. Yes, in fact the Liberian ambassador, let's say in
13 London, is accredited near the capital. Quite frankly, I never
14 investigated to find out why they do that, but that's the way in
14:41:48 15 diplomacy it is stated, that the envoy is accredited near the
16 capital.

17 Q. "Here again, my dear brother, I find it awkward and
18 discouraging that to date, you have been unable to effectuate
19 these changes which have left me saddened and concerned.

14:42:09 20 One last matter of urgency: The presence of military jet
21 fighters at the Roberts International Airport, which are being
22 used to carry out military strikes against Sierra Leone, is being
23 discussed at the Liberian Legislature, wherein the views of every
24 sector of our civilian population has been solicited by that
14:42:32 25 Body, owing to the argument that neither the Government of
26 Liberia nor the United Nations has acquiesced in these assaults.
27 Thus much pressure is being brought to bear, and for which a
28 candid explanation is expected from me."

29 So what was the situation then, Mr Taylor? Had you

1 endorsed the use of Roberts International Airport to carry out
2 air strikes against the AFRC government in Sierra Leone?

3 A. No, that's the problem. These air strikes are going on.
4 Even a permanent member of the Security Council, the British, are
14:43:12 5 condemning it publicly. It's reaching the legislature. There
6 are questions being asked. It is appearing as if Liberia is a
7 part of a war being waged against the sisterly Republic of Sierra
8 Leone. So I'm trying to get him to stop this and that's why I
9 keep hiding behind that the United Nations must acquiesce under
14:43:38 10 Chapter 7 so that I can have something to say to my legislature
11 that, "Look, we have a Chapter 7 resolution. This is going on
12 and that's why we are permitting it from here because ECOWAS has
13 decided." That's the terrible position I'm in at that particular
14 time. I'm between what I termed before the rock and the hard
14:43:58 15 place with this issue.

16 Q. "Notwithstanding the problem which this matter poses to
17 the Executive Branch of Government, we intend to formally re-open
18 the RIA to commercial air traffic 30 days hence; and it being a
19 commercial passage, serves to reflect the activities of the
14:44:28 20 nation during our post-war climate."

21 Let's pause for there for a moment and can I enquire about
22 a detail. When you say "re-open the RIA", was Roberts
23 International Airport closed to commercial traffic at this time?

24 A. For the most part, yes. During the war years that was used
14:44:55 25 as the principal air force base of the Nigerian air force. All
26 air missions within Liberia and Sierra Leone were carried out
27 from RIA.

28 Q. So what was it, despite that use, which prevented it from
29 being used for commercial traffic?

1 A. Well because, you know, the use of a civilian facility, as
2 you will see at any normal international airport, would be
3 operated by civilians and out of the - and let's say military
4 assets, as jet fighter bombs and all these military people posted
14:45:41 5 at the airport, would be taken out of the view of visiting people
6 coming to the Republic. So there were a few civilian flights
7 coming in, but Liberia could not operate as a normal country
8 under these conditions because we had to fix our civilian
9 programme in line with what the military had to do. And here I
14:46:09 10 am anxious to try to get this country out of this whole war
11 picture that we have on our backs and try to return to some
12 semblance of normalcy. This is the whole point.

13 Q. But what kind of physical state was the Roberts
14 International Airport in at that time, Mr Taylor?

14:46:35 15 A. The runway, as it stands, was not touched. The arrival and
16 departure building was damaged, but some minor repairs had been
17 done. They were not totally burned to the ground and so you
18 still had - everything was in tact. You know, the runway, some
19 buildings in tact. All we would have had to do was to reinstall
14:47:05 20 certain equipment. For example, I don't know the technical name,
21 but they are used for landing. Aircrafts before they come in
22 they are radioed and then there are lights that can be installed.
23 Some people install them on both sides of the runway and some in
24 the middle. There is also a system I remember that we finally
14:47:33 25 got in after they left that had to do with at the very - near the
26 beginning of the runway there are certain lights that flash that
27 will help to direct pilots and help them from what was told me
28 how to line up for the airport. All of these things were not
29 there and so we wanted to begin the process of installing these

1 things and returning to normal.

2 Q. We'll look at a report about what needed to be done later,
3 but let's get back to this:

4 "You will agree that we cannot become impervious to
14:48:15 5 criticisms which are likely to emanate from the International
6 Community on account of the presence of these military aircrafts,
7 which are the identical ones being used to persecute the war in
8 Sierra Leone. In this light, therefore, so as to avoid what I
9 perceive to be a floodgate of condemnation from both within and
14:48:37 10 without, as an alternative, we could place at your disposal the
11 James Spriggs Payne Airport where there are hangars, to disguise
12 the aircrafts. But this gesture is only meant as a temporary
13 appeasement of the portentous agitation that looms."

14 So what are you saying there, Mr Taylor? Why are you
14:48:59 15 offering him James Spriggs Payne Airport?

16 A. I'm basically, in all bluntness, trying to find a way out
17 of this to get these planes out of Roberts International Airport
18 so I can get my international airport working that the
19 international community can see some sign of some normalcy
14:49:22 20 returning in Liberia. So I say, "Well, listen. Yes, one of
21 these criticisms and all this kind of stuff, okay? Let's first
22 of all get these planes out of here. Let's put them down to
23 Spriggs. There are no big hangars in Robertsfield for these
24 planes. Let's put them in Spriggs where they're in hangars."

14:49:40 25 So even while this is going on, because quite frankly I can
26 claim that I could have really stopped Nigeria from carrying out
27 what she wanted to do. I didn't have an army to stop Nigeria.
28 So I'm basically trying to work with Abacha as a friend to tell
29 him, "Well, look, Let's move these planes from here. I want to

1 open this airport."

2 We had the Government of China - and when I'm talking about
3 the Government of China now I'm talking the Republic of China
4 that refers to Taiwan - offering equipment to get the airport
14:50:17 5 running, so I'm basically trying to manoeuvre to get these planes
6 and the military people out of this international airport to a
7 smaller airport. That is just basically what I am trying to do.
8 Just some manoeuvring.

9 Q. So were there any commercial flights at all coming into
14:50:31 10 Roberts International Airport?

11 A. Well when I say commercial, there were one or two planes
12 coming in, but from an international aviation standpoint that
13 airport to have been cleared for international civilian traffic
14 it would have had to meet certain standards and that's what could
14:50:54 15 not have been done with military jets landing, taking off, jet
16 fighter bombers and military hardware. That was just not the
17 picture. That's not the picture you want at a normal civilian
18 international airport.

19 Q. "My Foreign Minister" - who is that?

14:51:12 20 A. At that time Monie Captan.

21 Q. I think we've had that spelling before.

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. "...will be arriving shortly in Abuja on a very important
24 mission, to outline to you the official Liberian position and how
14:51:28 25 we intend to strengthen our national security. This will also
26 include areas in which Liberia could be requesting further
27 assistance."

28 So what was the position that Monie Captan was going to
29 outline, Mr Taylor?

1 A. In part it's already stated. We were looking at trying to
2 train security forces, to begin to train police. That whole
3 situation involves capacity building. That is - this is what we
4 were looking at and mostly why we are very, very gentle with this
14:52:15 5 is because it would have taken the assistance of Nigeria to even
6 get some of this done. So we're basically trying to do
7 everything that we can, because Nigeria in all fairness did an
8 excellent job in Liberia. They expended a lot of money and, like
9 I said, they lost a lot of people and we will always remain
14:52:40 10 grateful to Nigeria. I think Nigeria really contributed. So in
11 trying to deal with someone that has done such a great job in
12 your country, you're not yelling and screaming at them. You're
13 trying to, you know, talk with them and that's what I'm trying to
14 do.

14:52:54 15 Q. Can we go over the page, please:

16 "Meanwhile, I sincerely hope you will find time to quietly
17 visit with me, as a friend and as a brother, possibly within a
18 fortnight, owing to the fact that between 10 to 20 November,
19 1997, I will be out of the country on official business."

14:53:18 20 Where were you going?

21 A. Oh, I think this had to be South Africa. I think I had a
22 visit around this time with the President, President Mandela.

23 Q. Well, when we have an opportunity of looking at the
24 presidential papers perhaps we can get a clearer idea then:

14:53:36 25 "As I close, I want you to consider this foremost: If you
26 ever have a friend in this sub-region, I am that friend, my dear
27 brother. With sentiments of my highest consideration and esteem.
28 Cordially, Charles Ghankay Taylor."

29 Now, Mr Taylor, just to remind you of a phrase you used in

1 this letter, "Force will not bring peace to Sierra Leone as it
2 did not bring peace to Liberia." Mr Taylor, the fact of the
3 matter is either you're a very clever man, or you're a prophet,
4 because six years before the indictment was created you were
14:54:20 5 already setting up your defence, weren't you?

6 A. Okay, you can call me a prophet then. No, I mean I'm just
7 speaking about the reality of my experience and why they asked me
8 to come on this Committee of Five. Can you imagine, I'm just
9 taking the oath of office on 2 August. In August I'm asked to
14:54:46 10 come on this committee to use my experience in dealing with
11 guerilla warfare and my whole experience in helping to bring
12 peace. So it is incumbent upon me on this committee and a member
13 of the authority of ECOWAS to really try to get across - and if
14 you see this whole - everything I'm talking about here is
14:55:10 15 basically with Nigeria, because the fact of the matter is Nigeria
16 remains the powerhouse of West Africa.

17 So it may have been a type of prophecy, but I never saw
18 force as being claimed in this indictment as being the way to
19 bring peace to any solution anywhere in the world for that
14:55:33 20 matter. We have some clear examples of these throughout recent
21 history. If we go back to whether we're talking about wars in -
22 let's go back to - if we look at the Korean war it never ended
23 with a full takeover. If you look at the Vietnam war, it did not
24 end with a full military victory. If you look at the recent wars
14:56:11 25 and you look at the war in Iraq, there was a partial military
26 victory in Iraq because until now peace has just been restored.

27 So I have always in fact - even being a student of history,
28 if you read throughout no matter what happens there's always a
29 compromise. Even when the United States bombed Japan at

1 Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had they not brought in the Emperor at
2 that particular time I do not think they would have fully
3 silenced Japan, but it took that level of negotiation. So my own
4 experience in history led me to believing that there had to be
14:56:52 5 negotiations in the Sierra Leonean war as we had negotiations in
6 my war.

7 Q. Now you were telling us generally about the situation in
8 West Africa when you took office when we took a diversion to look
9 at this letter. So what else do you want to tell us in that
14:57:15 10 context, Mr Taylor, about the situation when you came to office?

11 A. Okay. Well, the very last thing that I have mentioned in
12 part had to be with - you know, there are certain conditions that
13 you cannot change. We met a situation when I came to office, one
14 of the first things the National Security Council was involved
14:57:42 15 was a decision on the part of ECOWAS that the peace agreement
16 that had been signed between President Tejan Kabbah and the RUF
17 in December of 1996 --

18 Q. I actually think it's November.

19 A. November, thank you. That was the quote unquote road map
14:58:12 20 for Sierra Leone and that what had happened on the part of the
21 SLA by seizing power would not be left to fully obtain on the
22 ground. And that is what I met coming in as President, along
23 with several other ground rules that had been set by ECOWAS
24 including the fact that, one, that no ECOWAS country will
14:58:43 25 recognise the junta and that the junta would have to restore -
26 turn over power to President Tejan Kabbah, and that's why I said
27 April had been the deadline. If that deadline had failed, there
28 would have been the consideration of other measures. I met this
29 as I came in, so a road map had been drawn and I agreed with that

1 particular ECOWAS decision.

2 Q. Well, we're going to look at that road map now, but can I
3 pause to request that that letter be marked for identification,
4 please. MFI-20 I think, your Honour. So it's a letter to Sani
14:59:27 5 Abacha, President of Nigeria, dated 24 October 1997.

6 A. And he's also chairman of ECOWAS at the time.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document will be marked for
8 identification MFI-20.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:59:46 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you mentioned earlier page 98-99 on the
11 transcript, and again just now, about decisions which had been
12 made by ECOWAS and which you met when you came into power. Now,
13 when had those decisions been made?

14 A. That's in, to the best of my recollection, June of 1997.

15:00:16 15 Q. And when you became President, did you have cause to see
16 and note that decision?

17 A. Yes, yes.

18 Q. And in what form was it?

19 A. Well, this - it was something like a final - like a final
15:00:36 20 communique of a decision that had been taken. It was not a
21 letter. It was more like a communique.

22 Q. Can we, please, go to bundle of additional exhibits for
23 weeks - for the 27th to 30th behind divider 6. This is the
24 bundle from last week, your Honours. Do you have it, Mr Taylor,
15:01:44 25 behind divider 6?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. Now can we start at the last page of that document, please,
28 in order to note the date. The last page, please. Because what
29 I want us to do first of all is to place the meeting which led to

1 this communique in context. We see that it was done in Conakry
2 on 26 June 1997, the Ministers For Foreign Affairs. Now help us:
3 What's going on in Liberia on that date?

15:03:03 4 A. 26 June 1997, we are - I'm sure we are in the electoral
5 period. I don't quite recall.

6 Q. Because the election is on 19 July?

7 A. Yes, so we're right on the verge of holding elections.

8 Q. Now when we go back to the front page now, we see this:

9 "At the initiative of His Excellency General Sani Abacha,

15:03:35 10 Head of State, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the
11 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chairman of the Economic Community
12 of West African States, ECOWAS, following the request of His
13 Excellency General Lansana Conte, President of the Republic of
14 Guinea, and consultations with other Heads of State in the

15:03:59 15 sub-region, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS states
16 met at Conakry, Republic of Guinea, on Thursday 26 June 1997.

17 His Excellency President Lansana Conte graciously accepted to
18 host the meeting. The following member states were represented",

19 and you see inter alia just below the middle, "the Republic of
15:04:28 20 Liberia."

21 Pause there, Mr Taylor, do you know who was the
22 representative of Liberia at this meeting?

23 A. Yes, it had to be the foreign minister, Monie Captan.

24 Q. And at this point in time who is in charge in Liberia?

15:04:46 25 A. Ruth Sando Perry. And I know there's got to be some
26 concern when Monie Captan is your foreign minister and Monie
27 Captan is called here. I have explained to the Court that during
28 the transitional government there were ministers appointed from
29 sides. Monie - the foreign ministry came under the NPFL side and

1 he was appointed foreign minister, and he was foreign minister
2 during that time. After my election as President I carried him
3 on because he had the experience, okay.

4 Q. Now let's go to the meat of the matters, paragraph 3:

15:05:28 5 "A delegation from the Organisation of African Unity led by
6 His Excellency Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General, was also
7 in attendance. The meeting was opened by His Excellency General
8 Lansana Conte, President of the Republic of Guinea.

9 The meeting reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone since
15:05:52 10 the coup d'etat of 25 May 1997.

11 The Ministers for Foreign Affairs exchanged views on the
12 situation in Sierra Leone and its consequences on peace and
13 security in the sub-region.

14 They explored ways and means for achieving a speedy
15:06:10 15 restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone.

16 The Ministers for Foreign Affairs agreed that as far as
17 Sierra Leone is concerned, the following objectives should be
18 pursued by ECOWAS:

19 Early reinstatement of the legitimate government of
15:06:30 20 President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah; the return of peace and security;
21 and the resolution of the issues of refugees and displaced
22 persons.

23 Therefore the ministers:

24 (i) reaffirmed the decision made in Harare by the Heads of
15:06:50 25 State and government at the 33rd summit meeting of the
26 Organisation of African Unity on the situation in Sierra Leone;

27 (ii) reaffirmed the support of ECOWAS for the Abidjan Peace
28 Accord signed on 30 November 1996;

29 (iii) stressed that no country should grant recognition to

1 the regime that emerged following the coup d'etat of 25 May 1997,
2 and to work towards the reinstatement of the legitimate
3 government by a combination of three measures, namely, dialogue,
4 imposition of sanctions and enforcement of an embargo on the use
15:07:41 5 of force.

6 In order to increase the effectiveness of the above
7 measures, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs recommended prior
8 consultations among member states at the highest level.

9 The Ministers for Foreign Affairs deplored the bloodletting
15:08:03 10 and other human losses that occurred during the coup d'etat of 25
11 May 1997. They warned the illegal regime against all acts of
12 atrocities against Sierra Leonean citizens, foreign nationals
13 living in Sierra Leone, and personnel of the Economic Community
14 of West African States Monitoring Group.

15 In order to ensure the implementation of decisions
16 resulting from the recommendations of their meeting, they
17 established a committee made up of Nigeria, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire
18 and Ghana."

19 What did that committee come to be called, Mr Taylor?

15:08:48 20 A. The Committee of Four on Sierra Leone.

21 Q. And did it remain a Committee of Four?

22 A. It subsequently changed to five and then an addition, six.

23 Q. Who joined to make the five?

24 A. Liberia.

15:09:01 25 Q. When?

26 A. About August 1997.

27 Q. We'll come to that in a moment:

28 "The session submitted its report to the President of the
29 host country and directed the committee to convey to the Chairman

1 of ECOWAS the results of their deliberations. The committee also
2 was entrusted with the task of monitoring developments in Sierra
3 Leone and the implementation of the measures adopted with a view
4 to achieving the above-mentioned objectives. Within two weeks of
15:09:37 5 this date the committee shall return to the chairman of ECOWAS
6 and brief him on the outcome of their efforts.

7 The Ministers for Foreign Affairs called on the
8 international community to support the ECOWAS initiative on
9 Sierra Leone.

15:09:52 10 The meeting appealed to the international community to give
11 emergency aid and assistance to the Republic of Guinea and other
12 countries of the sub-region affected by the problem of refugees."

13 Pause. Was Liberia so affected?

14 A. Yes, seriously.

15:10:12 15 Q. Over the page:

16 "The Ministers for Foreign Affairs expressed deep gratitude
17 to His Excellency General Lansana Conte, President of the
18 Republic of Guinea, and to the government and people of Guinea
19 for the hospitality extended to them and for the facilities but
15:10:33 20 at their disposal."

21 Pause again, Mr Taylor. So this is 26 June 1997, okay?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. We have the elections in Liberia on 19 July, roughly a
24 month later. You're inaugurated on 2 August.

15:10:51 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. So by the time you become President, you're met with these
27 decisions by the ECOWAS?

28 A. And the OAU, yes.

29 Q. And just dealing with the decision which had been made, did

1 you grant recognition to the junta regime in Freetown?

2 A. Never. No, no. Never.

3 Q. Now thereafter, Mr Taylor, were you aware of a subsequent
4 meeting of the Committee of Four on the situation in Sierra
15:11:40 5 Leone?

6 A. Yes. There was a subsequent meeting somewhere - I think
7 it's around August before the Heads of State meeting, but there
8 is a subsequent meeting, yes.

9 Q. So there's a subsequent meeting in August before the Heads
15:11:56 10 of State meeting?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And are you able to assist us as to the precise date of
13 that?

14 A. No, I don't recall. I don't recall.

15:12:10 15 Q. Did you ever see any document recording the outcome of that
16 meeting?

17 A. I was briefed by my national security council about this
18 meeting that actually reaffirmed what had happened and I was
19 briefed about it, but that meeting really based on my briefing
15:12:42 20 was just an extension of what had been done in June, really.

21 Q. Well we'll come to look at that report in a moment, but
22 before we do that can I ask, Mr President, before I forget that
23 this document be marked for identification MFI-21.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That's the Final Communique,
15:13:05 25 Conakry, 26 June 1997 will be marked for identification MFI-21.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you. I'm grateful:

27 Q. Can I therefore now invite your attention, please, behind
28 divider 8 in the same bundle.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

1 MS HOLLIS: We would have an objection. There's been no
2 foundation laid for this. The witness was asked if he ever saw a
3 document. He said he was briefed. He said nothing about a
4 document.

15:13:55 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you have an objection.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I'll ask a few more questions then
7 about it:

8 Q. Mr Taylor, did a document ever come into your possession
9 regarding this meeting?

15:14:14 10 A. Well, I'll put it this way. When I said that I was briefed
11 about these things, when Heads of State get into meetings
12 normally they don't burden them with a whole bunch of documents.
13 I have browsed through the documents as President, okay, and
14 that's what I mean by I was briefed, because normally you're
15 given a briefing document and if you wish to see a specific
16 document you call for the whole document. So when I say I was
17 briefed, it simply means that you have a working knowledge of the
18 document as I have stated here. That's what I'm saying.

15:14:39 19 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness can now be shown the
15:14:58 20 document, or whether the objection still stands?

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, do you still maintain the
22 objection?

23 MS HOLLIS: It's our understanding from what the accused
24 just said that in fact he saw the document and that has
15:15:12 25 previously been upheld as sufficient foundation, so we would not
26 have an additional objection.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful. Can we have a look at the
29 document behind divider 8, please:

1 Q. Is this the document, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes, this is the document.

3 Q. And we see from the frontispiece that it's headed "Economic
4 Community of West African States: Report of the Committee of
15:16:02 5 Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone" and it's dated 26 August
6 1997, Abuja. Let's go to page 2, please:

7 "The Situation in Sierra Leone. On 25 May, 1997, a section
8 of the military in Sierra Leone violently overthrew the

9 legitimate government of President Tejan Kabbah. This was an
10 unfortunate event for Sierra Leone. The coup d'etat was tragic
11 in nature and consequence for, upon seizing power, the elements
12 broke into prisons and threw open the gates thus releasing all
13 sorts of criminals and convicts. The rebellious RUF members were
14 invited by the coupists from their bases in the jungle into

15 Freetown. In the general mayhem which ensued, massive looting of
15:17:15 16 property, murder and rape became the order of the day. Vital
17 national assets were not spared as they too were vandalised and
18 looted.

19 This situation also threatened the stability and security
15:17:36 20 of the neighbouring countries and indeed the entire sub-region.
21 Hundreds of refugees fleeing from the situation in Sierra Leone
22 constituted additional burden on the economies and societies of
23 neighbouring countries, especially Guinea. This situation also
24 posed a special threat to peace in Liberia for which our
15:18:04 25 sub-region had laboured for several years."

26 Pause there. That last sentence, Mr Taylor, "posed a
27 special threat to peace in Liberia", did you consider the
28 coupists posing such a threat?

29 A. Oh, definitely.

1 Q. "Reaction of the International Community. The coup d'etat
2 in Sierra Leone took place on Africa Day when the leaders of the
3 continent were gathered in Harare, Zimbabwe on the eve of the
4 33rd Ordinary Summit of the OAU. The leaders roundly condemned
15:18:55 5 the seizure of power and called for the immediate restoration of
6 constitutional order to the country. They urged the
7 international community not to recognise the illegal regime in
8 Sierra Leone and called on the leaders of ECOWAS to take the lead
9 in restoring constitutional order to the country. The
15:19:16 10 Secretary-General of the United Nations who was in Harare
11 endorsed the OAU position, including the restoration of the
12 legitimate government. This was reinforced by a statement by the
13 President of the UN Security Council, two days after the coup,
14 which unequivocally condemned the coup d'etat.

15:19:43 15 Meanwhile, in our sub-region, the Chairman of ECOWAS has
16 commenced measures aimed at resolving the Sierra Leone crisis.
17 His consultations with the leaders of the sub-region resulted in
18 the convening of a meeting of ECOWAS Foreign Ministers in Conakry
19 on 26 June, 1997."

15:20:07 20 That's the meeting and the document we just looked at,
21 Mr Taylor. Is that correct?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. "The meeting reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone and
24 recommended ways and means of achieving a speedy restoration of
15:20:20 25 constitutional order to the country. It identified three

26 objectives to be pursued by ECOWAS in Sierra Leone. These were:
27 (i) The early reinstatement of the legitimate government
28 of President Tejan Kabbah;

29 (ii) The return of peace and security; and.

1 (iii) The resolution of the issue of refugees and
2 displaced persons.

3 The Foreign Ministers recommended a combination of three
4 measures to be applied in the pursuit of these objectives. These
15:20:58 5 were dialogue, imposition of sanctions/embargo; and the use of
6 force. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministers established a
7 Ministerial Committee of Four, comprising the Foreign Ministers
8 of Nigeria, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, to be joined by
9 representatives of the OAU and ECOWAS Secretariats. This
15:21:30 10 Committee was charged with implementing the recommendations and
11 decisions on Sierra Leone.

12 After the Conakry meeting, the newly established Committee
13 of Four on Sierra Leone submitted a report to the Chairman of
14 ECOWAS in Abuja on 6 July, 1997. The Chairman endorsed the
15:21:52 15 recommendations of the foreign ministers and considered it
16 appropriate that ECOWAS's position should be conveyed to the
17 Secretary-General of the UN and the UN Security Council, by the
18 Committee of Four.

19 On 11 July, 1997, members of the Committee visited New York
15:22:16 20 and briefed the Secretary-General of the UN and the UN Security
21 Council on ECOWAS's perspectives on the gravity of the situation
22 in Sierra Leone as well as the need for prompt and concerted
23 action by the international community. The Foreign Ministers
24 restated, in clear and unequivocal terms, the need for the
15:22:39 25 illegal regime to comply fully with the demands of ECOWAS, the
26 OAU and the international community and return power to the
27 legitimate government of President Tejan Kabbah. Following the
28 briefing of the Security Council, a meeting of the Council was
29 convened, at the instance of the ECOWAS Ministers, on the

1 situation in Sierra Leone."

2 Can we pause there for a minute, Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor,
3 were you aware of all these machinations going on at that time?

4 A. I was too busy. This report's date, they are referring to
15:23:17 5 what happened pre my election. I'm busy. I'm not aware before
6 now, okay, of these. These are happening when I'm deep into my
7 campaigning.

8 Q. "At the end of the Council's deliberations, a Presidential
9 Statement was issued which expressed deep concern about the
15:23:40 10 continuing crisis in Sierra Leone and reiterated its view that
11 the attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government of
12 President Kabbah was unacceptable. The Council also welcomed the
13 mediation efforts of ECOWAS and expressed full support for the
14 objectives of these efforts, as set out in the Final Communique
15:24:05 15 of our meeting in Conakry on 26 June, 1997."

16 Now this:

17 "In accordance with the mandate given to the Committee of
18 Four, we established contact with the elements in Sierra Leone
19 and invited the leader, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, for a meeting
15:24:26 20 in Guinea. However, in their response, the regime in Freetown
21 indicated a preference for Cote d'Ivoire rather than Guinea as
22 venue for the proposed meeting. The Committee of Four had no
23 difficulty with this proposal. They recognised that Cote
24 d'Ivoire was not only a member of the sub-region but also of the
15:24:53 25 Committee of Four on Sierra Leone. Indeed, Cote d'Ivoire had
26 been actively engaged in the search for peace in Sierra Leone
27 which culminated in signing of the Abidjan peace agreement of 30
28 November, 1996 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
29 Revolutionary United Front."

1 Let us pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, you see there at the
2 beginning of that paragraph reference to the Committee of Four
3 being set up to try and find a solution to this problem and
4 negotiating directly with Johnny Paul Koroma, yes?

15:25:35 5 A. That is correct, yes.

6 Q. Now let us jump forward a little bit. When you or when
7 Liberia became a member of an expanded Committee of Five, what
8 were you mandated to do?

9 A. When I was put on this committee I was immediately made the
10 point individual on Sierra Leone and let me explain what I mean
11 by point. When we go back to the Committee of Four, we will find
12 out that La Cote d'Ivoire became the point country on the
13 Committee of Four. That is they hosted the meeting that led to
14 the agreement in November and so La Cote d'Ivoire is the point.

15:26:26 15 Immediately I come on I am now made the point man on Sierra
16 Leone.

17 Q. And just give us a little preview, what does being the
18 point man involve?

19 A. Well, you are almost like a mediator. I can only - the
15:26:51 20 best description in today's world is to look at what is happening
21 I would say with the six party talks on North Korea where China
22 is considered the point country in dealing with. So if you have
23 messages, if you have any points to make, that individual is then
24 to put things together and keep the committee informed for
15:27:29 25 finally giving it to the entire ECOWAS. You become the lead
26 person in the crisis, so to speak.

27 Q. And help us. Here we have a situation where sanctions are
28 proposed on the AFRC regime; furthermore, it has been decided as
29 far back as June that the regime should not be recognised, but

1 here we have the Committee of Four speaking to them directly.

2 Now let us jump forward again, Mr Taylor. Did you speak directly
3 to the RUF after you became the point person on the Committee of
4 Five?

15:28:18 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Why did you do that?

7 A. Because that was my job. That was what they asked me to
8 do. They agreed, they acquiesced. I was expected do that, yes.

9 Subsequent to my appointment on the Committee of Five I spoke to
10 the RUF many, many times by inviting the leadership to Liberia,
11 by hosting them, everything with the knowledge and consent of the
12 committee and ECOWAS. Yes, I did.

13 Q. But that's just not true, Mr Taylor. You were only
14 meddling, weren't you?

15:28:56 15 A. That's what the Prosecution says. That's not meddling.
16 That's what I was required to do. It is contained in communiques
17 after communiques that this Court will see. I mean, for anyone
18 to describe the work that I did in Sierra Leone with the
19 knowledge, consent and acquiescence of not just the Committee of
15:29:13 20 Five, but of ECOWAS as a whole, if anyone calls that meddling.

21 Q. Anybody else apart from ECOWAS?

22 A. Of course the United Nations knew. The United Nations
23 knew, because most of my discussions in Sierra Leone I either
24 spoke to Kofi Annan directly or through his special
15:29:31 25 representative in Liberia, where I insisted on making sure that
26 we had notice of communications. All of those are available to
27 present to this Court. So, I mean, that's hardly meddling. I
28 was authorised. I was asked. In fact, there's evidence of a
29 time that I got angry because of all of the accusations and said

1 "Forget it, I'm through with this committee." I was asked to get
2 even personally involved, and we have official documents here to
3 demonstrate. So for anyone to say that I was meddling, between
4 1997 I got on the committee up until 2001, everything that I did
15:30:15 5 in Sierra Leone was done with the knowledge, the consent,
6 acquiescence, participation of ECOWAS, and I have documentary
7 evidence to prove it. Everything.

8 Q. Let's go back to this, please:

9 "The first meeting with the illegal regime in Sierra Leone
15:30:45 10 took place in Abidjan from 17 to 18 July 1997. Major JP Koroma
11 was not present, but he was represented by a 12 member delegation
12 led by Mr Alimamy Pallo Bangura. The delegation included
13 politicians such as Dr Karefa Smart, Dr Abbas Bundu, some RUF
14 members, and a section of the Sierra Leonean military. The
15:31:20 15 Committee of Four presented to the Sierra Leonean delegation the
16 content of its mandate, endorsed by the Chairman of ECOWAS, the
17 OAU and the United Nations Security Council, including the early
18 reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Kabbah.
19 For their part, the Sierra Leonean delegation presented their
15:31:45 20 views on the situation in their country. They expressed their
21 readiness to work towards the early restoration of constitutional
22 order.

23 Discussions were held in an atmosphere of cordiality and
24 frankness."

15:32:06 25 Pause again, please.

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, were you aware, given the date of this document,
28 of this meeting between the Committee of Four and this delegation
29 from the AFRC?

1 A. Not the details. The general information of the meeting
2 during that particular time is an issue of news reports. That's
3 all. I'm not aware of details. If you look at here, 17, 18,
4 July - I mean, in fact I'm now held up probably waiting for the
15:32:36 5 day, because by 18 July we can't even campaign but we're indoors
6 the last day. So I'm just right on the doorstep of my election.

7 Q. Very well:

8 "Discussions were held in an atmosphere of cordiality and
9 frankness. The representatives of the illegal regime agreed with
15:32:59 10 the views expressed by the ministers for the resolution of the
11 Sierra Leone crisis. They were, however, concerned that any
12 solution proffered should be such that would preserve the dignity
13 of all sides. Consequently, the meeting decided:

14 (i) to resolve all issues related to the Sierra Leone
15:33:22 15 crisis peacefully, in the best interest of the people of Sierra
16 Leone, the sub-region, Africa, and the international community as
17 a whole;

18 (ii) that all hostilities should cease and therefore a
19 ceasefire be immediately established throughout Sierra Leone
15:33:42 20 while all efforts are deployed towards the peaceful resolution of
21 the crisis;

22 (iii) to work towards the early restoration of
23 constitutional order, including the reinstatement of the
24 legitimate government of President Kabbah; and

15:34:01 25 (iv) to allow the Sierra Leone delegation sufficient time
26 to return home and hold further consultations with the regime in
27 Freetown in order to facilitate a consideration of the detailed
28 modalities for the return of constitutional order to their
29 country.

1 From 29-30 July 1997 the second meeting between the
2 Committee of Four and the representatives of Major JP Koroma was
3 held again in Abidjan. This time the composition of the
4 delegation of the illegal regime had changed substantially from
15:34:47 5 what it was at the first meeting. Some of the politicians were
6 dropped and the ranks included more RUF members. The ministers
7 requested the delegation to present their proposals on the
8 modalities for the restoration of constitutional order in their
9 country. Regrettably, the representatives of the regime reneged
15:35:10 10 on the agreement reached at the first meeting on the question of
11 the reinstatement of President Tejan Kabbah.

12 Moreover, while the meeting was in progress, the Foreign
13 Ministers were alerted to an announcement by the illegal regime
14 in Freetown to suspend the constitution of Sierra Leone and
15:35:36 15 remain in office illegally until the year 2001. The implication
16 of this announcement was not lost on the Ministers. They
17 therefore considered that further dialogue with the
18 representatives of the illegal regime at that point would serve
19 no useful purpose. Accordingly, the Ministers decided to
15:35:55 20 recommend to the Chairman of ECOWAS the formal introduction of
21 the regime of sanctions and embargo, which are part of the
22 measures earlier agreed, to ensure the early and full
23 implementation of the mandate of the Committee of Four.

24 The Chairman of ECOWAS has since asked for a full-scale
15:36:21 25 application of sanctions and embargo against Sierra Leone, while
26 not foreclosing the option of returning to negotiations as a way
27 of resolving the crisis peacefully. The Chairman has also
28 renewed his call for the support of the international community
29 for the ECOWAS initiative in Sierra Leone.

1 The Foreign Ministers of the Committee of Four convened in
2 Accra, Ghana, from 14 to 15 August 1997".

3 Pause. Did your foreign minister attend this meeting?

4 A. No, we would not have been a part of that yet. It was at
15:37:05 5 the Heads of State meeting later that we became a part.

6 Q. Now, prior to the Heads of State meeting was there an
7 earlier meeting in August in Abuja?

8 A. That's the Heads of State meeting in Abuja.

9 Q. Help us with this: Who was your chief of defence staff in
15:37:28 10 August?

11 A. We appointed Lieutenant General Prince Johnson, not as
12 Senator Prince Johnson, but another Johnson.

13 Q. This is another Johnson?

14 A. That's correct.

15:37:45 15 Q. And he was chief of staff?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now help us, did he attend any meeting of ECOWAS in August?

18 A. Yes, that's the chiefs of staff meeting. That's the
19 different from the foreign ministers' meeting.

15:38:01 20 Q. Now that chief of staffs meeting, what are we talking about
21 there?

22 A. The military chiefs of ECOWAS met to discuss general
23 military issues of ECOWAS and for the first time to invite - I
24 mean, not invite - to welcome Liberia back into the fold and to
15:38:25 25 listen to the new chief of staff of Liberia to find out what were
26 some of the difficulties and some of the issues that he was
27 concerned about to bring to his colleagues and to see - and to
28 find out if Liberia was on board with the rest of the decisions
29 prior to that particular time. That's why the chiefs of staff

1 would meet, to consider what was the military situation in
2 Liberia before and what is it like in Sierra Leone.

3 Q. And was there a report prepared at the conclusion of that
4 meeting?

15:39:04 5 A. Yes. There was a chiefs of staff meeting and there was a
6 report always. Because that report would have to be made and
7 eventually all reports, whether it's from the foreign ministers,
8 or whether it is from the defence ministers, or whether it is
9 from the chiefs of staff, they all end up at the Heads of State
15:39:22 10 meeting.

11 Q. So you've seen that report?

12 A. Yes, I have. I have.

13 Q. We'll come to that in a moment. But just dealing with this
14 document:

15:39:35 15 "To review the developments in Sierra Leone in the
16 aftermath of the abortive meeting of 29 to 30 July 1997 in
17 Abidjan. At that meeting, they were informed of the new
18 initiatives on Sierra Leone being undertaken by the President of
19 Guinea, His Excellency General Lansana Conte, and which had the
15:39:56 20 potential of facilitating the peaceful resolution of the crisis
21 in line with the ECOWAS objectives. The initiatives involved a
22 proposed meeting between President Lansana Conte and the leader
23 of the illegal regime in Sierra Leone. The facilitator of this
24 process was the former Head of State of Sierra Leone, Major
15:40:19 25 General Joseph Momoh. Under the circumstances, the Ministers
26 decided to adjourn for a few days and to reconvene in Abuja on 25
27 August 1997 in order to allow time for this initiative to take
28 place.

29 Meanwhile, it was agreed that details of sanctions and

1 embargo to be applied against the regime in Sierra Leone should
2 be prepared in readiness for submission to the Chairman of ECOWAS
3 before the commencement of the summit of the Heads of State and
4 government of ECOWAS scheduled for Abuja from 28 to 29 August
15:41:06 5 1997."

6 Did you attend that meeting?

7 A. Yes, I did.

8 Q. "Conclusion. The situation in Sierra Leone remains a
9 matter of serious concern to our sub-region and our organisation.
15:41:23 10 However, in order to keep our efforts and interests focused and
11 productive, there is need to take appropriate measures to counter
12 the various machinations of the regime in Sierra Leone, who seem
13 more interested in hanging on to power at all costs rather than
14 seek a peaceful negotiated solution to the crisis.

15 In pursuit of our overall objectives in Sierra Leone, the
16 support of the international community, including the OAU, the
17 Commonwealth and the United Nations, remains important. It is
18 necessary therefore that we keep in close contact with these
19 organisations and institutions, in particular, the United Nations
15:42:10 20 Security Council. It is noteworthy that the final communique of
21 the meeting of the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers in Conakry and the
22 declaration issued by the Committee of Four at the end of their
23 first meeting in Abidjan with representatives of the illegal
24 regime from 17-18 July, 1997, have been adopted as documents of
15:42:31 25 the Security Council. The Security Council is actively seized
26 with the matter. We express our profound appreciation to the
27 members of the international community which have all refrained
28 from according recognition to the regime in Sierra Leone.

29 Furthermore, whilst the use of force remains an available

1 option to ECOWAS in resolving the crisis in Sierra Leone,
2 sanctions and embargo will first, have to be vigorously applied.
3 The details of sanctions and embargo which were prepared in Accra
4 from 14 to 15 August, 1997, have been prepared, taking into
15:43:17 5 consideration the experience in other countries where sanctions
6 have been similarly applied. There can be no doubt that in the
7 application of sanctions and embargo, some measures of force may
8 be required. In consideration of this, together with the need to
9 assure peace and security in Sierra Leone and the sub-region,
15:43:38 10 consideration should be given immediately to the extension of the
11 present mandate of ECOMOG, to cover the situation in Sierra
12 Leone.

13 Nevertheless, in line with our original intention and
14 position, we must keep the door open for the regime in Sierra
15:44:00 15 Leone to carry out realistic negotiations if and when they decide
16 to do so. The application of sanctions should be seen as part of
17 the pacific measures to be taken by ECOWAS against the illegal
18 regime. The main interest of ECOWAS in this case is mainly to
19 ensure the return of peace and stability to Sierra Leone."

15:44:26 20 Can we pause there, Mr Taylor, and can I seek your
21 assistance with this. When a committee like the Committee of
22 Four on the situation in Sierra Leone meet, is there a free and
23 frank exchange of ideas and thoughts between the committee
24 members?

15:44:51 25 A. I can say yes. Yeah, yeah, there can be - well when I got
26 on the Committee of Five, put it this way, I know they heard some
27 very frank views from me too, but I just want to interject here
28 that you are still - in Africa we are still - we still deal with
29 certain matters in certain ways. What do I mean by that? I

1 experienced these matters and like other Heads of State. Let's
2 say if you got to a meeting, now say General Lansana Conte is
3 here, he is on this committee, Konan Bedie, the President of Ila
4 Cote d'Ivoire at the time is on this committee.

15:46:07 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Do we have that spelling?

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't recall having it.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Okay, could you help us with the spelling?

9 A. Kona K-O-N-A and Bedi B-E-D-I - please help me.

15:46:22 10 Q. We'll look it up on the internet.

11 A. Now, I'm trying to give you an example. It is not as
12 confrontational as you may have maybe in certain other circles.
13 I mean General Lansana Conte making a strong point in that
14 meeting may hardly be directly challenged by maybe a younger Head
15 of State. We don't behave that way. And so when you talk about
16 frank expressions, maybe for some of us that were trained in the
17 west we sometimes lost some sight of our respect for some of our
18 other people, but to a great extent there are exchange of views
19 but when you add the word "frank" then I would not - I will hold
15:47:21 20 back a little bit.

21 Q. Let's approach it differently then, Mr Taylor. If you, as
22 the President of Liberia say, on such a committee have an
23 accusation to make against the President of a neighbouring
24 country, for example you want to speak to when LURD attacked
15:47:47 25 Liberia from Guinea, if you wanted to accuse President Lansana
26 Conte of harbouring them would you do that directly?

27 A. Well I could, but if - you are asking a question, but you
28 are dealing with a real situation and I can tell you to help the
29 Court what I did in that situation. This is not a hypothetical

1 any more. It's a real situation. When I had this attack I took
2 the matter to President Obasanjo to complain about what was going
3 on in - on the border, and strangely at this particular time the
4 chairman of ECOWAS was the President of Mali, Alpha Konare. But
15:48:43 5 in our own traditional way - I mean, even though he was chairman
6 of ECOWAS, I did not report General Conte to Alpha Konare because
7 Conte would have told Alpha Konare he didn't want to hear from
8 him and Konare would have shut up. But I went to Obasanjo and
9 Obasanjo invited he and myself to Abuja and we went and we met
15:49:13 10 and had a free exchange between the three of us.

11 So this is to show you that within that circle in this real
12 situation that you explained I did it the way that I think could
13 have gotten the best results, that by going to one like Obasanjo
14 who also from - now we're talking about President Conte, there
15:49:34 15 was a different person, he would look at Obasanjo too as a former
16 senior military general that could really question him. That's
17 how sometimes we find these.

18 Q. Now bearing in mind what you just told us and looking at
19 this document in the round, the document we've just looked at,
15:49:56 20 Mr Taylor, is there anything that strikes you about it?

21 A. Well, there could be several. I mean, what comes to mind
22 here is the - I mean, there are several things. Number one, let
23 it be very clear this idea - and this may be the first time that
24 it's come out in the open - discussions are being held with the
15:50:24 25 junta by ECOWAS. That's the first thing that comes to mind, that
26 there are discussions. And if you look at the calibre of people,
27 one named Dr Abbas Bundu - Abbas Bundu was executive secretary of
28 ECOWAS at the time of the Liberian crisis. So this is a very
29 senior West African diplomat, okay? So that comes to mind, that

1 there are ongoing discussions.

2 The next thing that comes to mind is the willingness on the
3 part of ECOWAS to try to find a peaceful solution to this without
4 having to use force, but also when you hear - when you read in
15:51:08 5 that document and it talks about the use of force will have to be
6 applied because of the sanctions, they are not talking about
7 military attack on the junta. They are referring to, for
8 example, the interdiction of ships bringing in arms that they
9 would have to stop them - a what you call cease and desist type
15:51:35 10 situation. So this is what they're talking about, because
11 everyone is fully aware that an attack on the junta will require
12 a Chapter 7 use of force resolution.

13 Q. Now help me, Mr Taylor, looking at that document that we've
14 just looked at, do you see any mention of Liberia?

15:51:54 15 A. Well, no, and in fact these meetings that are being
16 attended if there are any questions with Liberia they will come
17 out.

18 Q. Questions like what?

19 A. Well if Liberia is interfering, or involved in attacks, or
15:52:13 20 providing arms, it would definitely come out in this meeting.
21 There is no such thing.

22 Q. Do you see in this document any reference to Liberia
23 supporting the junta?

24 A. None whatsoever. That's why I'm saying if that were the
15:52:29 25 case it would have come out in this meeting. There would have
26 been no escape to this issue, because don't forget now everyone
27 is dealing with this issue. Not just ECOWAS who is dealing with
28 it, but the OAU is dealing with it and it has reached where? It
29 has reached to the Security Council that has passed on the

1 recommendation that came from ECOWAS to the OAU, it gets to the
2 Security Council and so the international community is dealing
3 with this matter. So if there are any questions about any
4 interference at any level, it will come up.

15:53:03 5 Q. Now when you spoke of meeting with Obasanjo over the LURD
6 situation, were you speaking about fact then or just
7 hypothetically?

8 A. No, no, fact.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you. Spelling break, Mr President.

15:53:26 10 Henri H-E-N-R-I, Konan K-O-N-A-N, Bedie B-E-D-I-E.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now we mentioned in passing, Mr Taylor, a meeting of ECOWAS
14 chiefs of staff. Do you remember telling us about that?

15:53:48 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And how you had seen that report prior to attending the
17 Heads of State meeting in Abuja?

18 A. That is correct. We were represented, yes.

19 Q. Yes, can we have a look now, please, behind divider 11.

15:54:04 20 No, before we do that could I ask that before I forget the report
21 of the Committee of Four be marked for identification MFI-22.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
23 identification MFI-22.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: And it's a report of the Committee of Four
15:54:31 25 on the Situation in Sierra Leone dated 26 August 1997.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's correct.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Mr Taylor, we see that the document is headed "Economic
29 Community of West African States, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS

1 Chiefs of Staff, Abuja, 26-27 August, 1997"?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Help us with this. What's the point of having such a
4 meeting of chiefs of staff?

15:55:48 5 A. Because in the final analysis if it came down to military
6 action it would require contributing manpower or military assets
7 for such an operation, so it's important the chiefs of staff met
8 to look into these kinds of questions.

9 Q. Now let's turn over the page, please. We see the following
15:56:22 10 states were present. Just below halfway the Republic of Liberia,
11 do you see that?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "Also present, following an invitation...was Major General
14 Shami, the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer
15:56:44 15 Mission in Liberia".

16 Do you see that?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. We see the agenda was follows: A welcome by General
19 Abubakar, chief of defence staff of the Federal Republic of
15:57:07 20 Nigeria. He was later to become President of Nigeria, wasn't he?

21 A. That's correct. Abdul salami Abubakar.

22 Q. Next on the agenda was the security other statements, which
23 need not delay us, security situation in the sub-region, then a
24 discussion that which was to include a review of performance in
15:57:29 25 Liberia; restructuring and training of the Liberian armed forces;
26 extension of tenure of ECOMOG in Liberia; extension of ECOMOG's
27 mandate to Sierra Leone; embargo or sanctions on Sierra Leone;
28 and the status of forces agreement between ECOWAS and Liberia.

29 Now let us start three lines from the bottom of the page,

1 please.

2 "Major General Abubakar recalled that at the occasion of
3 the 19th summit of the Authority of Heads and State and
4 Government held in Abuja" - help us, Mr Taylor. That title, the
15:58:20 5 Authority of Heads of State and Government, what is that applied
6 to.

7 A. Presidents. The Presidents of the ECOWAS states are
8 referred to as the "Authority".

9 Q. "The Authority held in Abuja last year, where the state of
15:58:36 10 collective stability and security in the sub-region was reviewed.
11 The meeting's primary concern was with the slow progress and the
12 realisation of durable peace in Liberia, particularly in the
13 aftermath of the renewed violence of April 1996."

14 Now let's put that together. April 1996, what violence are
15:58:58 15 we talking about?

16 A. I'm sure he's referring to the attempted arrest of
17 Roosevelt Johnson.

18 Q. Which you described to us last week?

19 A. That is correct.

15:59:13 20 Q. "He, however, observed that despite of all obstacles placed
21 in its way and by dint of total commitment, dedication and
22 perseverance, ECOWAS has succeeded in putting in place a
23 democratically elected civilian government under the presidency
24 of Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor and has established peace, security
15:59:38 25 and order throughout Liberia.

26 Major General Abubakar, on behalf of ECOWAS's chiefs of
27 staff, congratulated President Charles Taylor on his election as
28 the 21st President of Liberia, wishing him divine guidance in the
29 formidable task of building a virile and prosperous nation. He

1 stated that the ECOMOG experience has been hailed as a new
2 initiative in subregional conflict resolution the world over."

3 Now pausing there, Mr Taylor, how did ECOWAS feel about the
4 fact that they'd managed to bring about a peaceful solution to
16:00:26 5 the Liberian conflict?

6 A. This is what I talked about before. They were elated and
7 were prepared and wanted to see this happen in Sierra Leone.
8 ECOWAS viewed this achievement in Liberia as being - as he
9 described it here, he is chief of army staff, but he is really
16:00:54 10 expressing the views of all of the leaders of West Africa, and we
11 wanted to - in fact, this was discussed subsequent to this - to
12 these meetings, that this was something that had happened, that
13 for the first time in Africa a regional organisation had done
14 something, they had achieved peace, and that it did not require
16:01:21 15 bringing in outsiders, you know, to intervene; that this had been
16 an African solution to the Sierra Leonean problem, but that was
17 not to be the case. That was not to be the case and that's why I
18 touched on this other part where there were other designs that -
19 no, no, no, we cannot let that happen and this whole - in my
16:01:47 20 letter when I talked about Nigeria not permitting herself to be
21 isolated so it can be said this is about Nigeria, because I said
22 that diplomatically I had been warned that there was a rising
23 sort of Nigerian hegemony that would not be accepted by Great
24 Britain. That's what I'm talking about here.

16:02:10 25 Q. So there was a sense of pride that Africans had solved an
26 African problem?

27 A. Yes.

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Taylor, perhaps you misspoke when you
29 said that the Africans had solved the Sierra Leonean problem.

1 Did you mean Liberian problem?

2 THE WITNESS: No, no - yes. Yes, your Honour. I mean, I'm
3 sorry. There was a sense of pride that they had solved the
4 Liberian problem. This was an African problem that had been
16:02:40 5 solved by Africans.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. "He stated", that being Major General Abubakar, "that the
8 ECOMOG experience has been hailed as a new experience in
9 sub-regional conflict resolution the world over. He paid a well
16:03:00 10 deserved tribute to the ECOMOG high command and to all the brave
11 men and women under the able leadership of the force commander,
12 Major General SVL Malu, and his predecessors for their courage,
13 sacrifice and professionalism in the face of difficulties."

14 Pause there. How well did you know Major General Malu?

16:03:23 15 A. Very, very well. Very well. Very well.

16 Q. "At this juncture a moment's silence was observed in honour
17 and memory of all those who made the supreme sacrifice by laying
18 down their lives in order that their Liberian brothers and
19 sisters may live a fulfilling life.

16:03:51 20 The chairman recalled the recommendation made at their 13th
21 and 14th meetings for the restructuring and training of the Armed
22 Forces of Liberia, police and security agencies as part of the
23 revised schedule of the Abuja agreement."

24 Now, what was being done about the restructuring and
16:04:18 25 retraining of the Armed Forces of Liberia and the police,
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. We never - we started the process. We didn't get around to
28 it. There was some words and phrases used here before in this
29 document, "status of forces agreement". I raise that because it

1 has some significance in dealing with the problem in Liberia
2 where, because of the issues that were raised in my letter, that
3 letter to General Abacha about the attitude of certain officers,
4 calling for some of them to be transferred immediately out of
16:05:00 5 Liberia and replaced, all of these never obtained. And so our
6 next move was to ask for a status of forces agreement, and what
7 is that?

8 A status of forces agreement was an agreement designed to
9 spell out in details what the mission would be, what the ECOMOG
16:05:27 10 mission in Liberia would continue to be post elections in
11 Liberia. And so while all of these were going on, we never got
12 really to the training of the armed forces.

13 Q. Over the page, please. Page 4:

14 "For this reason, he stated an ad hoc committee had been
16:05:58 15 set up to provide the necessary framework. He expressed the hope
16 that the report of that committee, which would be rendered in the
17 course of the meeting, would be considered frankly to enable
18 chiefs of staff to come up with resolute ideas on how to conduct
19 the tasks set out.

16:06:20 20 The chief of defence staff noted with regret the events in
21 neighbouring Sierra Leone involving the violent overthrow of the
22 legitimate government of President Tejan Kabbah on 25 May 1997,
23 which poses a serious security threat to sub-regional peace and
24 is capable of reversing the gains that have been made in
16:06:46 25 Liberia."

26 Pause there. So here we have a Nigerian major general
27 saying that events in Sierra Leone are capable of reversing the
28 gains made in Liberia. How might the events in Sierra Leone have
29 done that, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Well, just to help you out, counsel, I think the chief of
2 defence staff was higher than a major general. But the fact of
3 the matter is ECOWAS is so proud of this accomplishment and it's
4 like a baby, you don't want anything to touch that baby. This
16:07:33 5 particular coup d'etat in Sierra Leone and the additional
6 fighting that he sees, and I guess I can almost say knowing some
7 of the other things that are underway, any time there is not a
8 cessation of hostilities in Sierra Leone, of course it will pose
9 a threat to the Liberian side in terms of refugees, in terms of
16:08:05 10 other commitments that ECOWAS is trying to carry out. It is just
11 - there is no way you can have war in one country on your border
12 and say you are totally at peace. I guess this is what he's
13 trying to convey.

14 Q. "He observed that with the intransigence of the illegal
16:08:27 15 regime of Major JP Koroma, who has not only reneged on an initial
16 agreement to work towards early reinstatement of President
17 Kabbah, but has also announced the regime's intention to remain
18 in office till the year 2001, it becomes necessary for the
19 meeting to review the situation in Sierra Leone.

16:08:47 20 He stated that from all indications, peaceful resolution
21 through dialogue had failed and the next option without recourse
22 to the use of offensive action was the enforcement of
23 sanctions/embargo on the regime through an economic blockade.

24 He implored the meeting to proffer solutions on how best to
16:09:14 25 conduct whatever mission might be assigned to ECOMOG to ensure
26 the restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone and subsequent
27 relative peace in the sub-region.

28 In conclusion, Major General Abubakar stressed the need for
29 closer ties, cooperation and consultations between the armed

1 forces of the member states, as the future and destiny of all
2 within our sub-region are indeed interwoven."

3 Now when we go over the page we see that the Chief of the
4 General Staff of the Armed Forces of Niger, Colonel Moussa
16:09:58 5 Djermakoye, then makes a statement. Let's ignore the first
6 paragraph:

7 "Colonel Djermakoye presented a brief background to the
8 Liberian crisis and outlined the various actions undertaken by
9 ECOWAS in that country. He recalled in particular the decision
16:10:20 10 taken on 17 August 1997 by the Heads of State and government to
11 strengthen ECOMOG. In this connection, he informed the meeting
12 that his country had dispatched a contingent of 320 men to
13 Liberia.

14 The Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Niger
16:10:47 15 expressed the wish that the meeting would draw lessons from the
16 joint deployment of the sub-region's armed forces in Liberia. He
17 specifically underscored the need to capitalise on the experience
18 of ECOMOG in order to evolve a common strategy for effective
19 action against the banes of society, such as religious
16:11:09 20 fundamentalism, ethnic strife, and power struggles which were
21 likely to cause conflicts.

22 Colonel Djermakoye listed the factors which had paralysed
23 the actions of ECOMOG and retarded the accomplishment of its
24 mission. He was of the opinion that ECOMOG should consolidate
16:11:30 25 peace before disengaging totally from Liberia, where the newly
26 restored peace still appeared to be fragile."

27 Pause there. Was it fragile, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes. It was in a way fragile, yes.

29 Q. And Mr Taylor, was there anything that you wanted to do to

1 endanger that fragile situation?

2 A. I wanted to do nothing to endanger it.

3 Q. Over the page, please.

4 "Finally, he touched on the distressing situation in Sierra
16:12:09 5 Leone following the military coup d'etat of 25 May 1997 and
6 appealed to the junta for a return to democratic rule.

7 Delivering a statement, His Excellency" - and please note
8 this paragraph, Mr Taylor - "Mr Joe Blell, the Sierra Leone High
9 Commissioner to Nigeria, representing the Legitimate Government
16:12:41 10 of Sierra Leone headed by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah."

11 So this is Kabbah's High Commissioner, not a High
12 Commissioner appointed by the AFRC, do you follow?

13 A. Yes, because they are not recognised.

14 Q. Right, so this is Kabbah's man speaking:

16:13:00 15 "...expressed his country's appreciation and gratitude to
16 ECOMOG. He praised the efforts made by the ECOWAS Ministers of
17 Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Four on Sierra Leone to
18 return his country to democracy and the rule of law. He
19 reiterated his country's support for ECOWAS objectives in Sierra
16:13:28 20 Leone and reminded the meeting that without peace in Sierra
21 Leone, the recently-won peace in Liberia would continue to be
22 threatened. He therefore called on ECOWAS to act decisively in
23 Sierra Leone and put an end to the crisis."

24 Mr Taylor, let's pause there. You see there a reference to
16:14:01 25 Liberia, yes? Bearing in mind that this is the High Commissioner
26 of the Legitimate Government of Sierra Leone speaking, does
27 anything strike you about that paragraph?

28 A. Well, I would put it this way. The Legitimate Government
29 of Sierra Leone is present at this meeting. It is not the junta,

1 one. But even more important here is the representative of
2 Tejani Kabbah at this meeting and of course at this time, if
3 there are any problems, one would expect this Joe Blell to get up
4 and say, "But listen, gentlemen. We are talking about this
16:15:07 5 problem, but Liberia is making trouble in Sierra Leone." Of
6 course, one would expect him. Because he is represented at this
7 meeting, he would of course want to raise any concerns regarding
8 Liberia's actions, whether they are negative or positive, of
9 course he would want to represent it here because again the junta
16:15:30 10 is not here. It is at this meeting - all official meetings of
11 ECOWAS are attended by official representatives of the Government
12 of Sierra Leone. So one would expect this person at this
13 meeting, the High Commissioner, to say, "Well, you know, you
14 people are talking about this. The Liberian Chief of Staff is
16:15:49 15 here, Lieutenant General Prince C Johnson II, but Liberia is
16 causing trouble here and so what do you have to say about it?"
17 Q. And, Mr Taylor, this is a meeting of chiefs of staff,
18 military men dealing with the military situation on the ground,
19 yes?
16:16:11 20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now from your vantage point as the former President of a
22 country, would concerns about assistance being provided to a
23 rebel regime be the kind of matters that would be discussed at a
24 meeting such as this?
16:16:34 25 A. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, you have to look at this in
26 context. Why are they meeting? They are meeting to discuss this
27 problem and of course, if there are issues of arms or movement,
28 it would come out at this meeting. Of course at a meeting like
29 this that's where you want to talk about this particular matter,

1 because the military matters get turned back over to diplomats.
2 After a decision has been taken, "Well, we've found this to be
3 true. We've found this to be true. We've found this to be
4 true", and then the foreign ministers take it, put it in
16:17:16 5 diplomatic language and it reaches to the Heads of State. So at
6 a meeting like this, where they are discussing the problems in
7 Sierra Leone, the possibility and maybe the probability of it
8 having a direct effect in reversing the gains in Liberia would
9 come up here, yes.

16:17:32 10 Q. We then come to:

11 "Lieutenant General Prince C Johnson II, the Chief of Staff
12 of the Armed Forces of Liberia, in his statement expressed deep
13 appreciation for the reception and hospitality accorded to his
14 delegation since their arrival in Abuja.

16:18:06 15 He reflected on the genesis and the extent of the work done
16 by the Chiefs of Staff; the financial, human and material
17 resources invested in the Liberian crisis over the past seven
18 years in the search for peace in Liberia and in the sub-region as
19 a whole.

16:18:21 20 He also pledged the wholehearted support of the Government
21 and people of Liberia for all decisions, taken by the body.

22 On the issue of security in Liberia, Lieutenant General
23 Prince C Johnson II stated that Liberia depends largely upon
24 ECOWAS through ECOMOG for its security until the Armed Forces of
16:18:46 25 Liberia is restructured and re-armed to assume its constitutional
26 role of protecting life and property."

27 What does that mean, re-armed, Mr Taylor?

28 A. It simply means that we have no arms and that if they are
29 to provide the type of security they will have to be armed. So

1 that means that all arms are now where? Locked away.

2 Q. Mr Taylor, tell me, did you send this lieutenant general to
3 Abuja to tell lies?

4 A. No.

16:19:27 5 Q. Well, help us. At this time you're supposed to be
6 providing military assistance to the AFRC regime, so why is your
7 man in Abuja saying that you're in need of rearmament?

8 A. Every general sitting in that room, every leader of West
9 Africa, every leader of Africa, every individual from the
16:19:53 10 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, all know
11 very well that Liberia is disarmed totally. All know that the
12 arms, ammunition, artillery and warlike materiel are within the
13 custody of the international community under lock and key.

14 And as General Johnson is saying here, he is saying here,
16:20:24 15 "Liberia depends largely on ECOWAS through ECOMOG for its
16 security", the security of Liberia is still being handled by
17 ECOMOG. Even though we have this big title here of "Lieutenant
18 General Prince C Johnson II, as Chief of Staff of the Armed
19 Forces of Liberia", that is used to show that a structure will

16:20:52 20 follow, but there is at this time there is no - in fact, your
21 Honours, right now as we sit in this Court the Armed Forces of
22 Liberia is just being trained. They've never been trained from
23 that time until now. They're being trained now, now, now in
24 Monrovia. They're just training this Armed Forces of Liberia.

16:21:16 25 From the war until now, they are just training them. There was
26 no army. There was no gun. That title is a title that heads the
27 armed forces. It is from there that we begin to build.

28 Prince C Johnson was a trained - a very, very well trained
29 - career United States officer trained individual that had

1 attended top military schools in the United States. Even our
2 good friends the Americans liked him, because this was a career
3 not just a rank soldier. This was a career, well trained armed
4 forces personnel. He had at this time spent some 25 years in the
16:21:58 5 service, or thereabouts, and so it is this construct that we are
6 trying to do. We have a chief of staff and we begin to build.

7 Q. Now, let's go over the page:

8 "He" - that being of course Lieutenant General Prince
9 Johnson - "informed the meeting that the President and
16:22:25 10 Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Liberia" - who is that?

11 A. I'm the one.

12 Q. "...had expressed concern about security in Liberia,
13 largely because of intelligence reports received in Liberia which
14 indicate that:

16:22:44 15 (a) The Kamajors fighting the military junta in Sierra
16 Leone have retreated along the Liberian border areas to launch
17 their attack, with the threat of a possible spillover effect into
18 Liberia."

19 We've dealt with that and so we won't go there again, but
20 then secondly:

21 "Ex-combatants of the just-ended Liberian crisis are being
22 armed to fight for the Kamajors. Furthermore, security is being
23 undermined by the rising incidence of armed robbery in the city
24 of Monrovia and its environs."

16:23:24 25 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Oh, yes, and that's the danger. That's the danger to this
27 Court. These people that are being armed by ECOMOG to fight
28 alongside the Kamajors, who are these people? ULIMO-J and
29 ULIMO-K that have just come from fighting us, now I'm elected as

1 President they are volunteering to fight alongside the Kamajors.
2 But what is that to do? That's re-arming ULIMO-J and K and the
3 LPCs, okay? So that's the main threat that we see, okay?
4 Because we are dealing with - once those guys got armed we now
16:24:12 5 the government is without arm, all they have to do is do what we
6 say in the military an about-face and come and take government in
7 Monrovia. So we were afraid of this type of situation and that's
8 what we had conveyed and you keep hearing the expression reverse
9 the gains in Liberia. This would reverse the gains in Liberia if
16:24:33 10 ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K personnel are armed. But they ended up
11 giving them arms and they joined and started this fight all over
12 in Sierra Leone and so as we go along you will hear about
13 Liberian and English Liberian, but like I keep saying they've
14 always armed Liberians. They did it, okay? And then they will
16:25:05 15 say, "Well, Charles" - but they did this and this is what he's
16 talking about here.

17 Q. Who is doing the recruiting?

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'll let you know now so
19 you can plan your last few questions that we've got five minutes
16:25:16 20 of tape left.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. I'm grateful for the indication.

22 THE WITNESS: ECOMOG is arming them.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, who is the - is there an individual who is organising
16:25:30 25 the Kamajors, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes, what comes to my attention is the late Chief Hinga
27 Norman is responsible for Kamajor activities in Liberia. In
28 fact, he is stationed at Ricks Institute that I spoke about.

29 Q. Who is stationed at Ricks Institute?

1 A. I said the late Chief Hinga Norman is there.

2 Q. When did he first become stationed at Ricks Institute on
3 Liberian soil?

4 A. I met this Kamajor thing going on upon my inauguration on 2
16:26:13 5 August and that's why in the letter that just past I keep pushing
6 the issue of trying to get it out of Liberia because more people
7 are getting armed.

8 Q. Did you make any attempt to prevent Hinga Norman from
9 recruiting Liberians in Liberia, Mr Taylor?

16:26:34 10 A. Let's not forget again that it is not - I couldn't have.
11 This is an ECOMOG operation. ECOMOG is armed and in the letter
12 read you see about areas where even some of our security people
13 are being arrested and some of our security people are being
14 arrested, some of our security people are being stopped. I mean
16:26:51 15 Chief Norman, a very good man, was not doing this hiding and
16 sneaking. He thought he was doing it with the backing of ECOMOG,
17 which was the case. So it's not that he was in Liberia doing
18 something that was illegal, but for him he had the protection of
19 ECOMOG, we didn't have any access to him and he was just doing it
16:27:16 20 because he had the backing of ECOMOG and Nigeria at the time.

21 Q. And when we're talking about the recruitment of
22 ex-combatants, did your intelligence provide you with any idea as
23 to the numbers involved?

24 A. I would say that I could put that anywhere between 1 to
16:27:36 25 2,000 people were recruited at that time.

26 Q. 1 to 2,000 Liberians?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Recruited to fight with the Kamajors?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. "For all these reasons, it's stated it had become
2 imperative that the Armed Forces of Liberia be restructured as
3 soon as possible to enable the army to join ECOMOG in its task of
4 providing security in Liberia. In conclusion, the Liberian Chief
16:28:08 5 of Staff pledged the support of the Armed Forces of Liberia to
6 all decisions taken by ECOWAS, the OAU, and the UN to restore the
7 elected Government of Sierra Leone to power."

8 Mr Taylor, you're lying again there, aren't you? You sent
9 this man all the way to Abuja to tell lies because you didn't
16:28:28 10 want Tejan Kabbah to return. You had your pet government, the
11 AFRC in power, so why were you telling him to tell lies like
12 this?

13 A. That's the total nonsense that has been put before this
14 Court, and I don't understand the logic of how that hypothesis
16:28:47 15 could have come up when everyone is fighting hard trying to bring
16 peace and stability to the sub-region. But I guess for the
17 purpose of having Charles Taylor locked up in jail where I am,
18 that's a necessary statement to put forward. But it's a
19 statement of lies, it's a statement of deceit and deception.
16:29:05 20 It's a blatant lie, that's what it is. All it is.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: On that note, Mr President, I wonder if that
22 would be a convenient point.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, we're going to adjourn now.
24 I'll remind you don't discuss your evidence with any other
16:29:20 25 person. We'll adjourn now until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

26 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
27 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 28 July 2009 at
28 9.30 a.m.]

29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR | 25205 |
| EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS | 25205 |