



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 28 JULY 2010
9.00 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Nicholas Koumjian
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Terry Munyard
Mr Silas Chekera
Ms Logan Hambriek

1 Wednesday, 28 July 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.]

09:04:24 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances
6 first, please.

7 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,
8 your Honours and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this
9 morning, Maja Dimitrova and Nicholas Koumjian.

09:04:38 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,
11 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay
12 Griffiths, with me Mr Silas Chekera, Mr Terry Munyard and Mr Hawi
13 Alot.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. Good morning, Mr Sesay. I
09:04:58 15 remind you of your oath to tell the truth, which still binds you
16 today. Please proceed, Mr Griffiths.

17 WITNESS: DCT-172 [On former oath]

18 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Cont'd]

19 Q. Mr Sesay, yesterday we began looking at a document that,
09:05:13 20 unfortunately, had not been reproduced in full. And
21 consequently, we had to adjourn our examination of it until the
22 copies were obtained. I'd like us now to return to that
23 document, please. It's behind divider 4, in the week 27
24 additional binder. Do we all have it?

09:06:18 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Now, you will recall, Mr Sesay, that this was a document
28 bearing your name and the name of Gibril Massaquoi, addressed to
29 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, then Kofi Annan.

1 Let us begin again at the beginning of the document so that
2 we can have its contents in context. We see it's from --

3 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. It's our position that I believe
4 the witness denied any knowledge of the document, so there's no
09:07:02 5 foundation to go through the document with the witness.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: This is a document bearing the witness's
7 name, which no doubt Mr Koumjian in due course may choose to
8 cross-examine the witness on. It seems to me the witness has
9 ever right to have an opportunity of dealing with the document
09:07:24 10 before he's cross-examined on it in due course.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now, you see that it's from the Revolutionary United Front
14 of Sierra Leone, defence headquarters, Makeni, dated the 6th
09:07:42 15 of April 2001. In April 2001, Mr Sesay, where were you based?

16 A. I was in Kono.

17 Q. Where was Gibril Massaquoi?

18 A. Gibril was in Monrovia.

19 Q. Where was the RUF defence headquarters?

09:08:10 20 A. No, sorry, Gibril was in Makeni in April 2001.

21 Q. And where was the RUF defence headquarters in 2001?

22 A. In Makeni.

23 Q. Now, we see that the heading is "Detailed information about
24 the RUF and her position on the ongoing peace process":

09:08:41 25 "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone deems it
26 necessary to inform you and the United Nations Security Council
27 through you about her activities from 1991 when she launched her
28 insurgency and on to the current peace process because of the
29 intensification of President Kabbah and his government's

1 propaganda machinery to destroy the RUF.

2 Below are the contents the RUF is informing you about her
3 activities and position:

4 (a) Cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

09:09:18 5 (b) Atrocities during the conflict.

6 (c) Failure of various Peace Accords on Sierra Leone.

7 (d) Position of the RUF on the current peace process and
8 her political stance.

9 (a) Cause of the Conflict in Sierra Leone:

09:09:37 10 The Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone
11 believes that she has been sidelined for too long and that
12 international community seems to only listen to President
13 Kabbah's own version which have definitely not yielded any
14 fruitful peace for the people of Sierra Leone. And, therefore,
09:10:00 15 it is now time to listen to the RUF too so as to achieve durable
16 peace, not one that is dictated by the recycled and corrupt
17 politicians of Tejan Kabbah's government."

18 Can I pause for a moment and ask you this: By April 2001,
19 Mr Sesay, had the RUF established itself as a political party?

09:10:31 20 A. No. It was after the disarmament.

21 Q. Let's continue.

22 "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone was formed
23 by a group of gallant men and women headed by Corporal Foday
24 Saybana Sankoh in 1982, in the south and eastern parts of the
09:10:56 25 country, with a full participation of people with all walks of
26 life in the entire country and Sierra Leoneans out of the
27 country.

28 The cause of the conflict is known to all Sierra Leoneans,
29 both in and out of the country, except those politicians along

1 with their families who pretend not to know due to their own
2 actions. Leaders of this country created misery on this nation,
3 especially after independence on to the current date. Massive
4 corruption, nepotism, tribalism, mismanagement and misuse of
09:11:44 5 State resources and funds was the order of the day by the one
6 party rule, All People's Congress (APC). The poor become poorer,
7 the rich richer, and education and health was completely zero,
8 and they became privileges instead of rights. People dying
9 without medication on a daily basis, number of drop-outs from
09:12:11 10 school due to unaffordable school fees was also on daily basis.
11 Civil servants not paid at the end of the month. No development
12 throughout the country, especially the rural areas. No freedom
13 of speech and association. The saying of the day was: 'Where
14 you tie a cow feeds itself there' in local language 'Creole'
09:12:40 15 meaning" --

16 Maybe you can help me with the next sentence, Mr Sesay, the
17 Krio part.

18 A. "Where you tie a cow is where it feeds from."

19 Q. "There was total breakdown in governance. Instead of
09:13:07 20 government of the people, it became government of the politicians
21 and families."

22 Now, Mr Sesay, that description of the way life was in
23 Sierra Leone, is it one with which you agree?

24 A. Yes, that's how life was in Sierra Leone. Things were
09:13:28 25 difficult, because I experienced that myself, personally. My
26 father worked at the Ministry of Works. It took them three to
27 four months without being paid any salary.

28 Q. Let's continue.

29 A. That's why I didn't further my education.

1 Q. "Today, the same recycled politicians, moving from one
2 party to another for self-interest, are now telling you that the
3 war is about diamonds, which is totally untrue, trying to
4 misconstrue our agenda."

09:14:06 5 Mr Sesay, was the war about diamonds and mineral resources
6 in Sierra Leone?

7 A. No.

8 Q. "Although diamonds are part of our endowed natural
9 resources which have been mismanaged since 1930 when it was
09:14:27 10 discovered, virtually it has not produced development in this
11 country. Even roads leading to the sites are unmotorable. The
12 politicians are only interested in getting the gemstones for
13 their own use and not the State and her people.

14 The RUF only took Kono in December 1998. From 1930 on to
09:14:59 15 date, what have the diamonds done for this nation? Same for gold,
16 bauxite, rutile, fishes, iron ore, crude oil, et cetera,
17 et cetera.

18 President Kabbah and his cohorts are propagating that the
19 war is a diamond war because he signed contracts with the British
09:15:24 20 to exploit our minerals, which we will not agree to. The people
21 of Sierra Leone this time should be involved in their mining and
22 knowing where the resources go, not only cabinet or
23 parliamentarians of the proportional representative system who
24 are not voted for by the people to these positions.

09:15:49 25 The resources of Sierra Leone belong to Sierra Leoneans,
26 which RUF is part of. We cannot cry down politicians for
27 mismanagement of our resources and turn around to copy them. We
28 have enough arms captured from government forces, some in store
29 and others on assignment. No need to sell diamonds for arms as

1 alleged."

2 Now, pausing there again. By 2001, Mr Sesay, what was the
3 position of the RUF, in terms of arms available to them?

4 A. RUF did not look for arms or ammunition during this time.

09:16:45 5 Q. But did you have arms and ammunition in April 2001?

6 A. Yes, we had arms and ammunition, many of them, and we had
7 tanks that we captured from the ECOMOG, and many bombs, mortar
8 guns, mortar bombs, we had many of those that we captured
9 in December '98.

09:17:11 10 Q. Now, tell me, was it the case that at this time the RUF
11 found it necessary to trade arms in order to -- to trade diamonds
12 in order to obtain arms and ammunition?

13 A. No, it was not necessary.

14 Q. "For all these reasons mentioned, students and trade unions
09:17:35 15 demonstrated - demonstrations, failed several times for a change
16 in government and governance but were all foiled by the
17 government. Some were arrested and detained and others killed.
18 This made the RUF to take up arms as the last resort in 1999 to
19 wipe off this system throughout the country, as it was now the
09:18:05 20 order of the day.

21 The RUF therefore advised that the cause of the conflict is
22 not neglected by United Nations if durable peace is to reign in
23 Sierra Leone.

24 Lastly, the continuous propaganda of President Kabbah that
09:18:25 25 RUF is using diamonds to purchase arms from President Taylor is
26 rubbish. Let them prove it by giving you one of the end user
27 certificates or certificates. In fact, he, President Kabbah, is
28 one of the causes of the conflict by stealing State resources,
29 including two others in 1968, wherein Justice Singor Boaku Betts

1 passed a ruling of Tejan Kabbah not to hold public position of
2 trust in Sierra Leone, during the commission of inquiry after
3 stealing a shipload of cocoa. This very man on the BBC Focus on
4 Africa admitted that RUF was right to fight and that when at
09:19:20 5 Central African Republic, Bongay, he was not happy as corruption
6 engulfed the whole nation. Because he wants to entrench himself
7 into political power by hook and crook, he's now bent on
8 destroying RUF. Realistically, the RUF can no longer leave the
9 destiny of this country in the hands of crooked politicians.

09:19:48 10 Conclusively, the RUF fought for democracy, justice and
11 human rights when there was one-party dictatorial rule of the All
12 People's Congress, and there is no way we cannot accept being
13 sidelined by the same politicians who are the cause of the
14 conflict."

09:20:12 15 I'm going to pause again, Mr Sesay, and I'm going to ask
16 you directly: Why did you, as a young man, decide to take up
17 arms and enter Sierra Leone?

18 A. Well, during my training at Naama, when Foday Sankoh was
19 addressing us, lecturing us, as you said, yes, the man was saying
09:20:39 20 the truth, that the State was ruled by one party and that the
21 people was suffering, and that was the fact that gave me the
22 cause to be part of the revolution.

23 Q. Now, tell me, Mr Sesay, whilst you were training at Camp
24 Naama, did any of those undergoing the same training as you
09:21:05 25 suggest to you, firstly, that the whole purpose of this
26 enterprise was to control the mineral resources of Sierra Leone?

27 A. No. Throughout the time that I spent at Naama, nobody ever
28 told me. None of the instructors, including Mr Sankoh, nobody
29 spoke about mining diamonds.

1 Q. Did, for example, anyone say to you that Foday Sankoh and
2 Charles Taylor had made a plan, an agreement, in Libya to carry
3 out such a purpose in Sierra Leone?

4 A. No, no, nobody told me that.

09:21:50 5 Q. Did Foday Sankoh, in Camp Naama, tell you, for example,
6 that he had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and that the two of
7 them had decided to conspire together?

8 MR KOUMJIAN: Objection. The questions are leading the
9 witness into answers suggested by counsel.

09:22:17 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: What is your response, Mr Griffiths?

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Let me just repeat the question: "Did Foday
12 Sankoh, in Camp Naama, tell you, for example" --

13 MR KOUMJIAN: He's repeating the suggestion. We all can
14 read the transcript.

09:22:30 15 MR GRIFFITHS: -- "that he had met with Charles Taylor in
16 Libya and that the two of them had decided to conspire together?"

17 What is the allegation being made by the Prosecution in
18 this case? Am I not allowed to put it to the sole most-senior
19 surviving member of the RUF to get his answer on that? Why is
09:22:47 20 Mr Koumjian afraid of any answer that the witness might give to a
21 question like this, which goes to the very heart of the
22 allegation being made by the Prosecution?

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please, order. Order.

24 Please sit down. We've heard the objection. We've heard
09:23:06 25 the response. Let me consult.

26 [Trial Chamber conferred]

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: We are of the view that this is one of
28 the main Prosecution assertions in their case, alluded to in the
29 indictment, and that it may be put precisely in the manner that

1 Mr Griffiths is putting it to the witness.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm very grateful.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:24:24 5 Q. Mr Sesay, did Foday Sankoh in Camp Naama tell you that he
6 had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and the two of them had
7 decided to conspire together?

8 MR KOUMJIAN: I do have another objection. It's a compound
9 question. There's two parts, and they should be separated.

09:24:44 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think counsel has the right to put the
11 assertion as he has put it. Please go ahead.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Did Foday Sankoh, Mr Sesay, in Camp Naama tell you that he
14 had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and the two of them had
09:25:07 15 decided to conspire together?

16 A. No, Mr Sankoh never told me that. He never told any of us
17 that at Naama. In fact, what we knew from Mr Sankoh and Rashid
18 Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli and - they said that the leader of
19 the RUF who was training at Libya was called Mohamed Kabbah, he
09:25:37 20 was the leader of the RUF then.

21 Q. I'm grateful. Let's go back to the document, shall we:

22 "The judiciary lost its sense of justice, whereby the
23 criminals reached triumph over the judicial system while the poor
24 became entrapped in abject frustration and punishment. The
09:26:07 25 judiciary's criminally responsible for frustrating so many youths
26 in taken arms in this nation. Up to date, the judiciary
27 continues to be the hallmark, spectra and behemoth of injustice
28 and intolerance. The judiciary have refused itself to be
29 independence.

1 The politicians have politicised and institutionalised
2 corruption within their midsts. Backed by the philosophy of
3 'Wusai den tie cow, dog-eat-dogism.' "

4 What does that mean? What does that sentence in Krio mean?

09:27:02 5 A. Where they tie a cow, that's where it feeds from. That
6 means where you work, you feed from there.

7 Q. "I.e. - 'engulfed in one big fight for survivalism and
8 hence lost its sense of justice'.

9 (b) Atrocities During the Conflict.

09:27:25 10 The civil war in Sierra Leone have been catalogue with
11 a lot of atrocities especially at a latter date, simply because
12 of the amount of forces involved in the fight. The international
13 community have not investigated the commission of these
14 atrocities fully, either from the people themselves or the
09:27:50 15 fighting forces. They only cast blame on the RUF due to what the
16 so-called Government of Freetown tells them or spoon feeds people
17 to say RUF did this to me.

18 The RUF will never deny involvement in committing
19 atrocities in Sierra Leone during the 10 years civil war, but the
09:28:18 20 kind of appalling atrocities committed at a latter time of the
21 conflict cannot be attributed to the RUF, because the RUF is
22 bounded by rules and regulations which cannot allow anybody to
23 commit atrocity against innocent civilians whom the RUF took arms
24 to save from the misery imposed on them by politicians."

09:28:47 25 I'm going to pause. Mr Sesay, I'm going to ask you again
26 do you agree with this proposition:

27 "The RUF will never deny involvement in committing
28 atrocities in Sierra Leone during the 10 years' s civil war."

29 Do you agree with that?

1 A. Yes, I agree with it, that the RUF cannot deny being
2 involved in committing atrocities. Yes, I agree with it. But as
3 you read, that the later part, all the atrocities in Sierra Leone
4 was being blamed on the RUF. That's a lie. Because,
09:29:35 5 for example, in Freetown, the invasion in 1999, January, even
6 like the late Defence Minister of the SLPP who was arrested, and
7 all of us were in detention; there were times when we had
8 arguments with our friends, the AFRC guys, and once one morning
9 Hinga Norman told myself, Alex Brima - Gullit - were arguing,
09:30:04 10 because he told me that he wanted to testify that Superman was --

11 Q. This is important, so I want you to take your time. I
12 don't want to miss a word of this. Do you get me? Now, you were
13 having a discussion with whom? Hinga Norman, the former - what
14 was his position?

09:30:23 15 A. He was the Defence Minister for the SLPP government during
16 that time.

17 Q. Who else was involved in this discussion?

18 A. Tamba Alex Brima, alias Gullit.

19 Q. Anybody else?

09:30:43 20 A. Five-Five was there, Santigie Kanu, Morris Kallon was there
21 and Augustine Gbao. It was in the morning at the detention
22 centre in Freetown, because all of us were in detention.

23 Q. Was this while you were awaiting trial or during the trial?

24 A. This was during the time that Alex Tamba Brima was to go
09:31:11 25 and testify in the Court. That was when he suggested this to me.
26 And I said, "No, I was not going to accept that." So I informed
27 Kallon and Gbao. So there was there was an argument between us.
28 Chief Norman was the one who mediated. When Tamba Brima, alias
29 Gullit, told me that he wanted to go and tell the Court that it

1 was himself and Superman who carried out the attack
2 on January 6th. And I said, "Oh, why are you going to call out
3 the name of Superman when Superman was not involved in the
4 incident?" And I said, "No, I will not accept this." And I
09:31:44 5 said, "In fact, I'm going to tell my colleagues." Then I told
6 Gbao and Kallon. And Gbao said, "You see, what was their
7 handiwork, now they want to put the blame on the RUF." He said,
8 "Let him not even - don't even encourage him to bring those sorts
9 of discussions to you." And Gbao invited Brima, Tamba Brima,
09:32:08 10 alias Gullit, and asked him, and said, "What did you tell Issa?"
11 When he asked him, he did not want to respond. And I came there,
12 and I explained that Tamba had said he wanted to go and testify
13 in court that he carried out the attack in Freetown, together
14 with Superman. And Gbao said, "Man, you go and say what you did.
09:32:31 15 Forget about the RUF, because Superman was not in Freetown and no
16 RUF joined you in Freetown."

17 And Chief Norman came to calm down the situation, to talk
18 to us, together with Tamba. And he said, "This is strange to
19 me." He said, "I was the Defence Minister. Trust me, I myself
09:32:55 20 went with the idea that it was you, the RUF and the AFRC, that
21 carried out the attack in Freetown. So that means what, just
22 telling lies on you guys, and we are taking sins from you. It is
23 only now that I've realised that RUF never took part in the
24 attack on Freetown." So Chief Norman mediated and resolved the
09:33:21 25 issue. And I said, "No." And Chief Norman said, "Brima", that
26 is Gullit, "if you are going to testify, go and testify about
27 what the AFRC did. Don't implicate the RUF in things that they
28 did not do. If you knew that the RUF did not take part in the
29 attack, say that. If they did it, then you can say it. But if

1 you know that no RUF commander did not go to Freetown and they
2 were not part of the attack on Freetown, don't try to bring any
3 problem."

09:33:58 4 So Chief Norman advised him and he accepted it. But even
5 the SLPP government and the authorities in that government during
6 the invasion of Freetown, and after that invasion, they had the
7 idea that RUF was part of the attack, but it was later that they
8 came to realise that it was not the RUF, that the RUF took no
9 part in the attack on Freetown.

09:34:21 10 Q. Thank you.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: If I may seek clarification, Mr Sesay.
12 When you say "during the 10 years of the civil war the RUF will
13 never deny involvement", could you be precise as to what part of
14 these - which 10 years you are referring to here, from which year
09:34:41 15 to which year?

16 THE WITNESS: Like, my Lord, I'm talking about from 1991 to
17 the end of the conflict. Because even like the man who wrote
18 this letter committed atrocities.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: And when you say that you do not agree
09:35:08 20 that the RUF was responsible for the latter time of the conflict,
21 what specific time are you referring to as the latter time of the
22 conflict?

23 THE INTERPRETER: I'm talking about since the time the RUF
24 joined the AFRC in 1997 to the end of the conflict.

09:35:32 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are saying that the RUF does not
26 acknowledge committing atrocities from 1997 to the end of the
27 conflict, is this what you're saying?

28 THE WITNESS: No, that is not it. I was saying that they
29 were not just to cast blames on the RUF for conflicts committed

1 from 1997 to the end of the war; that it was only the RUF that
2 committed atrocities. That is what I'm saying, ma'am.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:36:13 4 Q. Mr Sesay, let's clarify that. Do you accept, Mr Sesay,
5 that after the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998, up until the
6 Freetown invasion in January 1999, that first - that a number of
7 atrocities were committed?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Who was responsible for them?

09:36:38 10 A. The AFRC, some were by the RUF and some were by the CDF.
11 And even the ECOMOG.

12 Q. Yes?

13 A. Because even the ECOMOG committed atrocities because they
14 were dropping bombs, they were killing innocent civilians, they
09:37:04 15 were shelling heavy missile rockets that dropped in civilian
16 villages, towns and killed people.

17 Q. Now, who committed the bulk of the amputations which took
18 place during that period, Mr Sesay?

19 A. Well, those were committed by the AFRC, because a witness
09:37:35 20 testified against us during our trial and that witness was from
21 an NGO, and they were the ones receiving the amputees from
22 Masingbi, from Kabala, from Makeni in '98, Port Loko, up to the
23 time for the invasion in Freetown. And all that witness's
24 testimony, according to the witness, the areas that they received
09:38:05 25 the amputees, and all the atrocities committed against the
26 amputees, up to the early 1999, the witness testified about all
27 of those, that they were committed by the AFRC.

28 Q. Thank you.

29 JUDGE LUSSICK: But, Mr Sesay, are you saying that if it

1 were not for that witness you would not know who committed the
2 atrocities?

3 THE WITNESS: My Lord, I know, because those atrocities
4 committed for example in 1998, there was no RUF present in
09:38:40 5 Koinadugu District from February '98 up to August. It was only
6 the AFRC who were there. And those same AFRC moved down to
7 Bombali District, up to the time they attacked Karina, and they
8 went down to Port Loko District and down to Freetown in early
9 1999. And during those times, those were the times that the
09:39:02 10 amputations actually took place, because, when we attacked Kono
11 and we went to Masingbi, Magburaka, Makeni in December '98, no
12 amputations took place. And even the civilians in Makeni did not
13 see anyone being amputated in November 1998.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:39:26 15 Q. Does the name --

16 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I thought I heard the witness
17 say Koinadugu District. Which district did you say, Mr Sesay,
18 that the RUF was in in 1998?

19 THE WITNESS: My Lord, I said from February of '98 -
09:39:44 20 from February to August of '98, RUF were not present in Koinadugu
21 District and from --

22 JUDGE DOHERTY: The record shows Kono when it should be
23 Koinadugu.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

09:40:04 25 Q. Mr Sesay, does the name Staff Alhaji mean anything to you?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Was he a member of the RUF?

28 A. No, he was AFRC.

29 Q. How do you come to know the name?

1 A. Well, I came to know that name when I attacked Kono
2 in December 1998 and it was after the attack that I heard about
3 Staff Alhaji and even Savage, the atrocities that they had
4 committed in those areas in Small Sefadu, Benduma and Tombodu.

09:40:39 5 Q. What atrocities had they committed, Staff Alhaji and
6 Savage?

7 A. Well, when I came and attacked Kono, they told me that
8 those two men and their followers, they used to put people into
9 houses in Tombodu and they would put fuel on the houses and burn
09:41:02 10 them. They were amputating civilians, they were amputating
11 ECOMOGs in Kono, in Koidu, and they were killing people.

12 Q. Was Savage a member of the RUF?

13 A. No, Savage was AFRC.

14 Q. I'm grateful. Let's go back to the document:

09:41:30 15 "...cannot be attributed to the RUF because the RUF is
16 bounded by rules and regulations which cannot allow anybody to
17 commit atrocity against innocent civilians whom the RUF took arms
18 to save from the misery imposed on them by politicians. If you
19 can recall from 1991 until 1996, when the first peace accord was
09:42:05 20 signed on Sierra Leone in the Ivorian capital Abidjan on the 30th
21 of November 1996, you never heard of the kind of appalling
22 atrocities which you are hearing now. This is simply because of
23 the principles RUF operates under. The kind of atrocities you
24 are seeing now started in 1997 when President Kabbah took over
09:42:35 25 the government of this country, coming on to the AFRC rule,
26 ECOMOG intervention and up to pushing ECOMOG from the hinterlands
27 to Freetown.

28 Any RUF who is identified by any victim of committing
29 atrocities against him or her will face the full weight of the

1 law. Even those who went against the ideology of the RUF during
2 the armed struggle, steps was taken against them severely. This
3 is why Foday Sankoh himself took time to teach the men on how to
4 deal with civilians, prisoners of war and humanitarian laws."

09:43:26 5 During your ideology training at Camp Naama, Mr Sesay, did
6 that training cover the topics listed here?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. "Do not forget that a lot of forces have been involved in
9 the fight in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone Army, Kamajors,
09:43:55 10 Kapras" - what is Kapras?

11 A. Well, they were part of the Civil Defence Force. They were
12 on the northern axis in Sierra Leone. They were the Kapras in
13 Tonkolili District, Bombali District and Port Loko District.

14 Q. What about Donsos?

09:44:12 15 A. The Donsos were also part of the CDF but they were the
16 Konos, the Kono group. They had the Donso.

17 Q. What about Gbentis?

18 A. The Gbentis, those were in the Port Loko District.

19 Q. And were they part of any larger force?

09:44:32 20 A. Yes, they were part of the CDF force, because they were
21 under the government.

22 Q. "ULIMO forces from Liberia based in Sierra Leone,
23 Executive Outcomes, Ghurkhas, Sandline, ECOMOG forces, especially
24 Nigerians and Guineans, all on the part of the government and the
09:44:59 25 RUF.

26 For President Kabbah to suggest to the United Nations for
27 the RUF to be tried alone means covering his own atrocities
28 committed during his blind and purported democratic rule in
29 Sierra Leone. We fought for democracy, fair and equal justice

1 and human rights in Sierra Leone. During the arm struggle, if
2 any member of the RUF was identified committing crimes against
3 civilians, charges were levelled against him or her when found
4 guilty and necessary steps were taken against the person.

09:45:44 5 Likewise now. We welcome action taken by international community
6 against any member who will be identified by a victim, not only
7 say RUF. In the same vein, what will happen to Kabbah's forces
8 who committed worse crimes like burning of human beings alive
9 with tyres in Freetown, ECOMOG forces killing hundreds of
09:46:14 10 civilians at the Aberdeen Bridge and threw them into the river in
11 Freetown, claiming they were rebel collaborators, using jet
12 bombers and helicopters gunships in the killing of dozens of
13 civilians behind the rebel line in the north and eastern part of
14 Sierra Leone and destroying houses, raping, looting and innocent
09:46:39 15 killing of civilians by pro-government forces (CDF). This has
16 been attested to by one of the Kamajor chiefs, Francis Goba."

17 Do you know Francis Goba, Mr Sesay?

18 A. I heard the name but I don't know the person facially.

19 Q. Very well:

09:47:04 20 "Francis Goba in an interview with Ninja News when he
21 classed Kamajors as worst in committing atrocities more than any
22 fighting force who claimed to be fighting on their behalf, worst
23 atrocities committed by Johnny Paul Koroma's West Side Boys who
24 attacked Freetown on January 6th 1999. This have been attested
09:47:34 25 tested by Mr John Selehemen of Reuters in an interview with Musa
26 Jalloh in charge of the amputees and some of the amputees
27 themselves in Freetown. The people of Freetown can also attest
28 that atrocities committed in Freetown was done by the AFRC (Arm
29 Forces Revolutionary Council) of Johnny Paul Koroma. Even West

1 Side themselves after arresting the 11 British soldiers,
2 confirmed that on the BBC Focus on Africa, and above all, Gibril
3 Massaquoi, who was detained at Pademba Road Prison, tried for
4 treason by the Tejan Kabbah government, was removed from prison
09:48:29 5 on the 6th of January 1999 and was with the West Side Boys and
6 saw all what they did in Freetown after being released from
7 prison, spent weeks with West Side Boys" --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the interpreters from the
9 Krio booth are asking that counsel be advised to slow down his
09:48:51 10 pace.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

12 Q. "...January 1999 and was with West Side Boys and saw all
13 what they did in Freetown after being released from prison,
14 spent weeks with West Side boys in Freetown before joining the
09:49:11 15 RUF troops in Waterloo. These very West Side Boys are now being
16 trained back as the new army by the government."

17 Let's pause again, Mr Sesay. When was Gibril Massaquoi
18 released from Pademba Road - sprung from Pademba Road Prison?

19 A. It was on the 6th of January 1999.

09:49:50 20 Q. Did he thereafter rejoin the RUF?

21 A. Yes, after the AFRC withdrew from Freetown, Gibril went and
22 rejoined the RUF in Waterloo where he met Superman and Rambo.

23 Q. Did you, Issa Sesay, speak to Gibril Massaquoi about his
24 experience in Freetown after he was sprung from prison?

09:50:19 25 A. Yes, when I came to Waterloo, I met him there. That was
26 when Bockarie sent me to come and ask him to go and meet him in
27 Buedu. But when I was ready to go, I asked him to go with me but
28 he hide away from me. He hid away from me. But he told me at
29 that time that they had been sprung from Pademba Road and that on

1 their way retreating the guys were talking about the atrocities
2 that they had committed in Freetown. He said, "Oh, these people,
3 they burnt down Freetown. They killed so many people. They
4 amputated people. So many people in Freetown." And I said, "Is
09:51:01 5 that so?" He said, "Yes", and I said, "Okay."

6 Q. And which people was Gibril Massaquoi telling you had
7 committed these atrocities?

8 A. The AFRC troops who attacked Freetown.

9 Q. "The Mende tribal Kamajors crossed to the north from the
09:51:27 10 south killing and amputating civilians in the north when they
11 claimed are brothers and sisters of Foday Sankoh ethnic group,
12 like in Mile 91 and Yonni Bana. There are mass graves to prove.
13 Some civilians killed and their parts removed for their Kamajor
14 societal activities and political stance.

09:51:58 15 There are dozens of evidence with the RUF to prove the
16 guilt of the government in the bulk of atrocities committed in
17 this country by her forces, some written evidence by victims in
18 person, mass graves, recordings, documents, et cetera, et cetera.

19 The RUF welcomes the idea of international community
09:52:26 20 investigating genuinely human rights abuses in this country and
21 not one dictated by President Kabbah's so-called suggestion of
22 Special Court on RUF for his political gains. We fought for
23 equal and fair justice and human rights, and we will love to see
24 that exercise in Sierra Leone.

09:52:56 25 (c) Failure of Various Peace Accords on Sierra Leone.

26 There are three Peace Accords signed by parties to the
27 conflict for sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. For example, the
28 Abidjan Accord of the 30th November 1996, the Conakry Peace Plan
29 of 22nd October 1997 and the Lome Accord of July 7th 1999. The

1 question to be answered by parties to the conflict is that why
2 has peace not returned to Sierra Leone? Generally this can be
3 answered thus; signing international document is one thing and
4 knowing the intentions of those signing it is another issue.

09:53:59 5 Having clear intentions to give peace to the people of
6 Sierra Leone and political motives and entrenchment are the two
7 aims that are seriously disturbing peace moves in Sierra Leone by
8 parties. Until these two issues are seriously addressed, there
9 will always be problems.

09:54:22 10 The Abidjan Accord of 30th of November 1996 could not give
11 peace to the people of Sierra Leone due to the insincerity of
12 President Kabbah and his cohorts. In the first place, after
13 signing the Abidjan Accord, he, President Kabbah, summoned a
14 meeting at his State House office where his chief of army staff,
09:54:54 15 Colonel James Max Kanga, chief of defence staff, Brigadier Hassan
16 Conteh, and deputy defence minister, Hinga Norman, including the
17 ULIMO commander, the commander of the Nigerian air wing, the Air
18 Force commander of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, including others,
19 were in attendance and instructed by their commander in chief,
09:55:25 20 who is also the president, to attack the RUF base where the
21 leader Foday Sankoh left for Abidjan on the peace accord
22 (Zogoda). "

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: "Peace process (Zogoda)."

24 MR GRIFFITHS: "Peace process (Zogoda)."

09:55:50 25 Q. "This attack was successfully carried out in which nearly
26 150 civilians died and others wounded, and the RUF commander
27 Zino's whereabouts was not known up-to-date. President Kabbah
28 further told them to give the credit to the Kamajors so that he
29 could not be seen as one not fulfilling his obligation under the

1 Abidjan Accord, because, when asked, he will reply that it is the
2 civilians going back home and he has no option of stopping them.

3 This was revealed in a voluntary statement by the then-army
4 chief of staff, Colonel James Max Kanga, during the kangaroo
09:56:44 5 court martial in 1998 in Sierra Leone. Colonel James Max Kanga
6 was killed by the government after the court martial, even though
7 he was not part of the other ranks who successfully overthrew
8 him, simply because he leaked the president's secret.

9 In another development, President Kabbah connived with the
09:57:10 10 late Head of State of Nigeria, Sani Abacha, to have our leader,
11 Foday Sankoh, detained after the eruption of fighting caused by
12 him as stated in top paragraph. Foday Sankoh went to Nigeria
13 upon the invitation of Sani Abacha, the then ECOWAS chairman, in
14 order to resolve the continued violation of ceasefire, and Kabbah

09:57:44 15 was to go there too. The RUF members sent to represent RUF on
16 the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace were given money by
17 Kabbah and the then UN Secretary-General's Special Representative
18 to Sierra Leone by then Mr Bahama Dinka, in order to forge new
19 leadership for the RUF which they attempted and failed. We know

09:58:16 20 that President Kabbah will deny this, but the question for him to
21 answer is - why did he ask his ambassador to Guinea, Mohamed
22 Jabbie, to join Philip Palmer, Fayia Musa and others to cross
23 into RUF territory from Guinea, to convince them to denounce the
24 leader, Foday Sankoh, for Philip Palmer? Why did Kabbah swiftly

09:58:48 25 go on the media on the 23 March 1997 to support Palmer and others
26 as new leaders of the RUF, failing to realise that he signed a
27 peace deal with Foday Sankoh in Abidjan? All of these people
28 were arrested, along with the ambassador and bodyguard called
29 Sergeant Gobeh, all from Guinea.

1 Furthermore, creating a militia group against the national
2 army made the situation worst when they started killing one
3 another, which is contrary to the Constitution which led to
4 the May 25th 1997 takeover of government by the junior ranks of
09:59:36 5 the army.

6 After the May 25th 1997 coup d'etat and subsequent takeover
7 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, the RUF leadership was
8 contacted for peace where he agreed for the RUF to join the AFRC
9 for peace, while on the detention at the Sheraton Hotel in
10:00:03 10 Nigeria by Kabbah and his colleague Sani Abacha. The AFRC signed
11 a peace agreement whereby they were to stay in power from 22
12 October 1997 until 20 April 1998. This agreement was signed by
13 international community, especially ECOWAS, as mandated by the
14 United Nations on behalf the of the ousted Government of Kabbah.

10:00:36 15 This time never expired when Kabbah hired Sandline mercenaries to
16 bring in arms to fight along with Nigerians to destroy the
17 agreement and to violate the arms embargo on Sierra Leone by
18 United Nations Security Council, and nothing came out of it.

19 After Tejan Kabbah's return, he made four courts of treason for
10:01:06 20 those they termed as collaborators, including our leader, Foday
21 Sankoh, and it was in these courts that Solomon Berewa, the
22 attorney general, said that they were not signatories to the
23 Conakry peace plan and therefore it was not binding on them.

24 Dozens of civilians were killed in and around Freetown in a cold
10:01:34 25 blood while fighting to reinstate Kabbah, and that was the end of
26 the Conakry peace plan. Twenty-four soldiers were killed, even
27 though they had legitimate reasons for the overthrow, and Kabbah
28 never listened to the international community to stop the killing
29 of these soldiers.

1 The Lome Peace Accord was signed after international
2 community, including ECOWAS, supported Tejan Kabbah to have a
3 two-track approach on the crisis in Sierra Leone. It was
4 Mr Francis Okelo, the United Nations Secretary-General's
10:02:18 5 Representative to Sierra Leone, who saw the failure of the
6 two-track approach that decided to forgo the military option for
7 a political settlement which was supported by ECOWAS after the
8 RUF had taken over two-thirds of the provinces and West Side Boys
9 take over two-thirds of Freetown, the capital city. After months
10:02:45 10 of deliberations, the agreement was signed on the 7th
11 of July 1999. This agreement was derailed by Tejan Kabbah for
12 its full implementation. Propaganda against the RUF was the
13 order of the day, just to create corridor for the
14 non-implementation of Lome. To start with, any time our leader,
10:03:11 15 Foday Sankoh, went out of the country, even with his permission,
16 he always created tensions in the country that Foday Sankoh went
17 out to buy arms, given ugly pictures of the leadership to both
18 the local people and the peacekeepers.

19 President Kabbah failed to give parastatals and
10:03:36 20 ambassadorial positions to the RUF, including other public
21 offices, as agreed to in Lome. Any time RUF supporters wanted to
22 gather either to welcome their leader back from trips or for
23 meetings, they were stopped by Tejan Kabbah under the guise of
24 state of emergency. But state of emergency never stopped them
10:04:04 25 ganging their Kamajors and SLA troops, including their
26 supporters, to attack the residence of Foday Sankoh on the 8th
27 of May 2000, hence derailing the whole programme. The incident
28 that happened between UNAMSIL and RUF was on the verge of
29 settlement which should not have extended to this stage. We

1 would have made progress if they had not attacked RUF leadership,
2 including the officials in Freetown. The deputy UNAMSIL force
3 commander will attest to this. So the attack on RUF officials
4 and RUF leaders was not because of what happened between UNAMSIL
10:04:49 5 and RUF but a deliberate act to derail the peace process, planned
6 and masterminded by Tejan Kabbah and Johnny Paul Koroma for
7 political gains.

8 Deployment of UNAMSIL did not occur in Kono as well because
9 Tejan Kabbah failed to set up the commission for the management
10:05:17 10 of strategic resources, reconstruction and development. No
11 office space was provided. Teams came from Britain and America
12 to assist in setting up the commission, and there was no
13 cooperation from President Kabbah due to his hidden agenda.

14 There was a lot of lapses on the part of government, including
10:05:44 15 even the DDR programme, reference to RUF position paper dated 27
16 December 1999, which a copy was sent to the United Nations on
17 violations of various articles of Lome by President Kabbah."

18 Then we come to sub-heading (d), which is the final
19 section.

10:06:12 20 "Position of the RUF on the current peace process and her
21 political stance. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
22 still believes that the only way out of the crisis in
23 Sierra Leone is genuine peace. The creation of awareness have
24 been made especially to the grass roots by the armed struggle.
10:06:38 25 It is therefore now left with international community to count on
26 the integrity of the parties by putting aside the past and compel
27 parties to do the right thing in the interest of the masses.

28 On the part of RUF, we are also concerned about the double
29 role of some self-seeking mediators and conflict settlers in

1 Africa, thus prolonging on the conflict as long as they are
2 enriching themselves. We will partly criticise the international
3 community for failing to fulfill their obligations under the
4 international documents they sign. For instance, failing to give
10:07:24 5 trust fund to the RUF for her political transformation, according
6 to Lome. International community failed to prevail on
7 politicians and leaders of various African countries to govern
8 their countries in the interests of the masses. They sit aside
9 until things go out of hand that lead to civil wars, only at the
10:07:51 10 end for them to start saying war crimes, human rights, et cetera,
11 et cetera. They don't condemn the politicians earlier when in
12 power and abusing human rights.

13 The RUF's position is very clear as far as the ongoing
14 peace process is concerned. UNAMSIL is allowed to deploy in our
10:08:17 15 territories, which is the first step. We know we have been
16 blamed in the past for creating obstacles to UNAMSIL deployment.
17 It will not happen this time around. Non-governmental
18 organisations are also welcomed into all of our territories
19 without hindrance, but before disarmament the following have to
10:08:41 20 be addressed:

21 The RUF knows very well that by us joining other political
22 parties in asking for interim government, the so-called
23 'something' government will tend not to accept if not pressurised
24 by international community as our people are suffering. They
10:09:08 25 always say the Constitution don't have room for that. This is
26 unacceptable to us because this same Constitution was abused by
27 them from day one of their rule on to date. For instance, there
28 is no provision that says when a man conduct elections, he will
29 accept appointment in the formation of the ruling party's

1 government. Neither there is a provision for a foreigner to head
2 Sierra Leone's army or police force. There are a host of other
3 abuses of the 1991 Constitution by the so-called government. The
4 RUF is not in position to accept any Constitution of poverty on
10:09:55 5 our people.

6 The release of all RUF members detained by President Kabbah
7 as he promised in his August 20th 2000 press communique in
8 Freetown in the presence of two ECOWAS leaders which he has not
9 done up until now.

10:10:13 10 Training of Kamajors and so-called Sierra Leone army to
11 stop, as it is contrary to Lome, UNAMSIL is aware and have not
12 stopped these trainings.

13 Mercenaries to leave Sierra Leone in the security of the
14 state to be in the hands of UNAMSIL alone and not in conjunction
10:10:39 15 with any armed group in Sierra Leone.

16 Disarmament to commence under an interim government as
17 President Kabbah's 10 year of office is over. This will further
18 enhance disarmament and speedy implementation of the peace
19 process, a level and fair political playing field and the
10:11:01 20 international community to be able to investigate human rights
21 abuses and war crimes. This is a challenge to the Tejan Kabbah's
22 lead government since they are claiming that the RUF is unpopular
23 and has committed worse crimes during the conflict and do not
24 have a political agenda. The interim government to be headed by
10:11:26 25 a reputable Sierra Leonean whereby all political parties,
26 including RUF and civic organisations, will be absolved for true
27 peace and reconciliation.

28 Disarmament to be carried out by all parties and UNAMSIL to
29 take over State security, even up to six months after elections.

1 The removal of our disarmed brothers from Port Loko DDR
2 camp to Pademba Road central prison. Some have been released and
3 now with us while others remain languishing in the Pademba
4 prison.

10:12:09 5 Creating obstacles for the RUF to get party house in
6 Freetown by President Kabbah's several times is also our most
7 concern, threaten to burn houses of anyone leased to RUF.

8 Treating the RUF as a separate entity and not part of their
9 last government e.g. a big commotion arose for the withdrawal of
10 our vehicles at the quay when they arrived last year."

11 Pause there. Mr Sesay, "the arrival of our vehicles at the
12 quay", what's that about?

13 A. Yes, because Mr Sankoh had a friend of his, whom he went to
14 Gibril in South Africa. He planned to send vehicles for the use
10:13:07 15 of the party; after we would have disarmed, those are the
16 vehicles we would have used for the use of the party.

17 Q. And with what had those vehicles been purchased in
18 South Africa?

19 A. Well, he met a friend called Nkrumah. That was the name of
10:13:33 20 the man. So according to Mr Sankoh, when he returned from
21 South Africa, he said this man said he will support him to get
22 all necessary items for the party's transformation. So he was
23 ready to investment with Mr Sankoh, and he said after the
24 elections Mr Sankoh would pay him back; that he wanted to invest
10:13:59 25 in agriculture to cultivate big farms of corns, because he wanted
26 went to Magburaka and Makeni and he spoke about those farms. So
27 that was the man who was supposed to support that agricultural
28 programme.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, you said big farms of

1 what?

2 THE INTERPRETER: Corn, C-O-R-N, your Honour.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Corn.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Corn.

10:14:35 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. "If these issues are not addressed, disarmament on our side
7 will be definitely derailed and there will be a political
8 stalemate. The RUF joins other organisations and countries in
9 the world in support of your excellently serving another term as
10 UN Secretary-General using our African brother and your efforts
11 in resolving our crisis."

12 And we see that Gibril Massaquoi's name appears, and you
13 will recall that over the page your name appears. And we see
14 that this document was to be sent to a number of individuals,
10:15:20 15 apart from the UN Secretary-General, those people being named.

16 Go back to page 9, please. Mr Sesay, the propositions
17 which the writer of this document sets out on this page, was
18 there any discussion within the RUF about these issues? Party
19 offices, difficulty in getting the vehicles off the quay and so
10:15:54 20 on, had there been such a discussion within the RUF?

21 A. Yes, those discussions went on. I was aware of them.
22 Because even the party office in Freetown, President Kabbah used
23 to dodge the discussions to give us the office, except when
24 pressure was piled on him, then the office space was allocated.
10:16:24 25 And even the building was an empty house; I was the one who gave
26 money to Mike Lamin to renovate the house, to repair it, and to
27 buy office equipment. And even the office in Bo, they used to
28 dodge us. And after disarmament they gave us a two-room
29 apartment, and in Kenema President Kabbah refused giving office

1 to us. So I was the one who provided money to take the office in
2 Kenema and Makeni.

3 Q. Yes, we can put that document away now, please.

4 When we adjourned yesterday, Mr Sesay, we'd been - we'd
10:17:56 5 embarked on looking at some evidence heard by these Judges from a
6 witness, TFI-571. And I was inviting your comment on some of the
7 testimony given by that witness. I'd like to continue with that
8 process now, please.

9 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I do have an objection to
10:18:29 10 exactly what counsel stated he plans to do; invite comment by the
11 witness on another witness's testimony. There's nothing that
12 allows a witness, and that's what Mr Sesay is, to comment on
13 other witness's testimony. He can state facts, he can give his
14 opinion about what happened, he can say whether something is true
10:18:48 15 or not, but he can't comment and give his opinion about it.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, what is your response?

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I really don't see either the logic or the
18 sense in what Mr Koumjian is saying. Given that, for example,
19 he, Mr Koumjian, has on several occasions invited witnesses to
10:19:16 20 comment on whether another witness is a liar or has told lies or
21 not. What's the difference? What's good for the goose is good
22 for the gander - sit down, I haven't finished. I haven't
23 finished.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could we have some decorum in the Court,
10:19:35 25 please. I cannot have two counsel standing at the same time and
26 neither can I have counsel shouting at each other. Please, try
27 and maintain decorum in this Court.

28 Mr Griffiths, I've asked you to give your response and you
29 were in the course of doing that.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

2 The point we make is very simple. It is perfectly
3 acceptable for a witness to be reminded of the evidence of
4 another and for the witness to comment on that evidence. And I
10:20:18 5 underline, Mr Koumjian himself has embarked on such an exercise
6 on several occasions. So I submit, quite bluntly, that it's
7 totally hypocritical of him now to be making this objection.
8 That is my response.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm going to give a ruling on this
10:20:39 10 objection, Mr Koumjian.

11 It is perfectly admissible for a witness sitting in the
12 witness box to have excerpts of past testimony read to the
13 witness where past witnesses have given evidence relating to the
14 participation of this particular witness or relating to events
10:21:02 15 that this witness is able to speak to. There is absolutely
16 nothing irregular about it. So the objection is overruled.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

18 I am helpfully reminded by Mr Munyard that I did not
19 request that your Honours mark the last document for
10:21:34 20 identification.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, we did not hear what you
22 said because your folder was interrupting.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I am helpfully reminded by
24 Mr Munyard that I did not ask for the last document we looked at
10:21:50 25 to be marked for identification.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you really require this document,
27 because whilst I did rule that you could put the document to the
28 witness, the witness did say yesterday that he did not know where
29 this document emanated from and that his purported name at the

1 end - he couldn't associate himself with this document.

2 Secondly, you've read virtually the entire document into the
3 record and the witness has commented on excerpts of it. Do you
4 still need to mark this document for identification?

10:22:35 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, please.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. The document will be marked
7 MFI - right, this is the document entitled - well, this is a
8 document addressed apparently, to the United Nations
9 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, it is dated 6th of April 2001, and
10:22:58 10 it appears to emanate from the RUF Defence Headquarters, Makeni,
11 and is apparently written by one Gibriil Massaquoi, Secretary of
12 and Spokesman of the RUF. So that document will be marked
13 MFI-10.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

10:24:04 15 Q. Now, you recall that the aspect of this testimony that I
16 invited your attention to yesterday was regarding the transfer of
17 two parcels of diamonds, firstly, 43 diamonds, then 18, by - to
18 Foya by Jungle and then on to Monrovia, do you remember that? Do
19 you remember me asking you about that yesterday, Mr Sesay?

10:24:49 20 A. Yes, I remember.

21 Q. Now, thereafter, this Court was told this by the witness,
22 he was asked, "Did Jungle" --

23 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. May I have a citation?

24 MR GRIFFITHS: 9384. I'm picking it up at line 25.

10:25:19 25 Q. This is after the second trip, witness told these judges,
26 that was made to Monrovia with diamonds:

27 "Q. Did Jungle return after he left Tongo Fields on that
28 occasion?

29 A. Well, Jungle came but he did not meet us in Tongo. By

1 the time he came back, my assignment had changed."

2 And then he went on. He said this --

3 MR KOUMJIAN: Sorry. Could I just get the date? I don't
4 have the date in front of me.

10:26:06 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Sorry. It's 8 May 2008 and I'm now going to
6 page 9393.

7 Q. And the witness now goes on to deal with a meeting that
8 took place between Waterworks and Buedu. This is page 9392,
9 bottom line. Now, Mr Sesay, where is Waterworks?

10:26:45 10 A. You mean in Buedu? Waterworks is between Buedu and a
11 village called Benduma, about a mile - not a complete mile but
12 about a mile from Buedu Town.

13 Q. Is it on the Foya road?

14 A. Yes, it is that road that leads to the borderline in Dawa
10:27:16 15 and when you cross you take the road to Foya.

16 Q. Okay. Now, the witness says this:

17 "Q. Why was this meeting held at this particular place?"
18 Page 9393, line 4:

19 "A. Well, at that time there was serious fighting between
10:27:38 20 us and ECOMOG and we were afraid of the air raids so we
21 decided to look out for a thick forest where we could hold
22 the meeting, so that was why we were there.

23 Q. Who called this meeting?

24 A. Mr Bockarie.

10:27:57 25 Q. Are you able to say when this meeting took place?

26 A. This meeting took place after the intervention, that
27 was in 1998.

28 Q. How long after the intervention?

29 A. Well, if my memory serves me well, because when we

1 I left February we went to Daru, March - it was April, May,
2 around June or even before the death of Abacha, we held
3 that meeting before Abacha died."

4 He then goes on to describe Abacha being the Nigerian
10:28:36 5 President. And then he continues when asked what was the purpose
6 of the meeting, line 25:

7 "A. Well, Mr Bockarie called this meeting and it had so
8 many reasons for which we held the meeting."

9 And then he goes on to describe, page 9394, line 6, that
10:28:55 10 there were about 600 people at this meeting. Now, let me pause.
11 Do you recall a meeting at that kind of time, Mr Sesay, between
12 Waterworks and Buedu in a forest, attended by some 600
13 individuals?

14 A. Well, no, this is a lie. It's a lie. Because Bockarie
10:29:24 15 posted me to Pendembu in late April 1998. And all the meetings
16 that Bockarie held about the front lines in Pendembu - about the
17 front lines, it was in Pendembu that we held the meeting about
18 the front lines in, you know, Baiima, Mobai, Kuiva, they would
19 come together with their staff to Pendembu. It was in Pendembu
10:29:52 20 that we held the meetings. Even to create the brigade
21 around May 1998, it was in Kailahun District that we held the
22 meeting. But Bockarie came from Buedu and we held the meeting in
23 Pendembu. So no meeting took place at Waterworks to my
24 knowledge. No meeting took place there from February right up
10:30:19 25 to December of 1998.

26 Q. I need to make you aware, Mr Sesay, the witness is claiming
27 that this meeting took place in a thick forest between Buedu and
28 Waterworks and some 600 people were present. Do you know of such
29 a meeting?

1 A. No, no. Such a meeting never took place there.

2 Q. Another aspect of this. Now you will recall that the
3 witness told these judges that this meeting took place
4 in April, May or June of 1998. Now, this is how the witness

10:31:11 5 continued, page 9394:

6 "Q. What happened at the meeting?

7 A. Well, at that time Mr Bockarie was just from Monrovia
8 in the first place."

9 Q. In April, May or June of 1998 did Bockarie go to Monrovia?

10:31:39 10 A. No, Bockarie did not go to Monrovia.

11 Q. And I should ask you this, Mr Sesay, just so that we're
12 clear. Do you recall any meeting called by Bockarie, attended by
13 some 600 individuals?

14 A. No. Never did a meeting take place in Kailahun District
10:32:04 15 under Sam Bockarie when 600 people attended who were RUF
16 fighters, no, commanders, no.

17 Q. And he continues:

18 "A. Well, at that time Mr Bockarie was just from Monrovia
19 in the first place and he told us about his new promotion
10:32:23 20 that he had. And, secondly, he told us about the command
21 structure between us and the AFRC. And at that time,
22 Johnny Paul himself was present in the meeting."

23 Pause. Do you recall such a meeting where Johnny Paul was
24 present?

10:32:47 25 A. No. Such a meeting did not take place.

26 Q. "He also told us of the role of Jungle and he explained
27 that to Johnny Paul and his men. He told us about the
28 Fitti-Fatta operation that was supposed to take place in Kono and
29 he told us about his travel to Burkina Faso together with General

1 Ibrahim."

2 Now, when was it that Bockarie went to Burkina Faso?

3 A. That was late November 1998.

4 Q. In or about April, May or June of 1998 did Bockarie go to
10:33:38 5 Burkina Faso with Ibrahim Bah?

6 A. Not at all.

7 Q. Help me, when was the Fitti-Fatta mission?

8 A. The Fitti-Fatta mission was in late July to
9 early August 1998.

10:33:57 10 Q. Prior to the Fitti-Fatta mission, did Bockarie go to
11 Burkina Faso?

12 A. I said no.

13 Q. "He told us about his travel to Burkina Faso together with
14 General Ibrahim and that General Ibrahim was supposed to move
10:34:19 15 with him. He discussed so many other things but I think those
16 were the major things that we discussed. He also told us about
17 the diamonds that Issa took along with him that he said got
18 missing. That was in Monrovia."

19 Do you recall such a discussion at a meeting involving 600
10:34:44 20 individuals?

21 A. No. No such meeting took place. In fact, even the
22 Fitti-Fatta that this person is claiming about, that Fitti-Fatta
23 mission, at the time Sam Bockarie invited Superman, it was only
24 Sam Bockarie, Mike Lamin and Superman who had a meeting. And
10:35:08 25 even that was held in Sam Bockarie's room. That was where they
26 discussed about the plan to attack Kono during the Fitti-Fatta
27 mission. Because even for me, Sam Bockarie called me, because by
28 then I was in Pendembu, and this person who was speaking here was
29 in Baiima at this time. And after the meeting that Superman held

1 with Sam Bockarie, he and Mike Lamin - Sam Bockarie gave his
2 jeep, his Land Cruiser, to Mike Lamin. Superman and his
3 bodyguards in Mike Lamin's vehicle. They travelled to Pendembu
4 where they met me and from there Mike Lamin stayed with me in
10:35:44 5 Pendembu and Superman said he was going to visit the front lines
6 in Baiima, Mobai and Kuiuva.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please slow down as you are narrating
8 your testimony. Slow down, please, for everybody's sake.
9 Continue.

10:36:00 10 THE WITNESS: So Superman left. Mike Lamin stayed with me
11 in Pendembu. Superman said he was going to visit the front
12 lines. He went to Baiima, he met the battalion commander and his
13 men. He left there, he went to Mobai and from there he went to
14 Kuiuva.

10:36:15 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Which part of slow down did you not
16 understand, Mr Sesay? Do you understand when I say slow down and
17 address the judges? Your testimony is not to counsel. It is to
18 us. So you face us and slow down and give your testimony.
19 Slowly, please.

10:36:36 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. What were you saying, Mr Sesay?

22 A. Yes, I've heard that, my Lord.

23 Q. Go on, Mr Sesay.

24 A. Yes. Where did I stop?

10:36:54 25 Q. Let me remind you. You were saying this: And after that
26 meeting that Superman held with Sam Bockarie, he and Mike Lamin -
27 Sam Bockarie gave his Land Cruiser to Mike Lamin. Go on from
28 there.

29 A. I said Sam Bockarie gave his Land Cruiser to Superman.

1 Mike Lamin used his own vehicle, he also had a Land Cruiser. And
2 both of them drove, they came to Pendembu where they met me and
3 then Mike Lamin stayed in Pendembu with me and Superman told me
4 that he was going to visit the front lines. From Pendembu
10:37:48 5 Superman went to Baiima, and from Baiima he went to Mobai. From
6 Mobai he went to Kuiiva, he went to Baiwala and then he came back
7 to Pendembu and went to Buedu.

8 So to say that there was any battalion commander, be it
9 Baiima, Mobai, or Kuiiva, who attended the meeting at the time
10:38:19 10 Superman came to Buedu and they held it before the attack on Kono
11 or the Fitti-Fatta mission, that is a black lie. Because even
12 the witness that the Prosecution brought against me during my
13 trials who was Superman's operator, who was part of the people
14 who came with Superman from Kono to Buedu, that witness testified
10:38:42 15 before Trial Chamber I that Superman, Mike Lamin and Sam Bockarie
16 were the people who held the meeting in Sam Bockarie's room and
17 they planned the attack on Kono.

18 So there was no other commander, including me, who left
19 from outside Buedu and attended that meeting. The meeting - in
10:39:10 20 the meeting were only Superman, Mike Lamin and Bockarie.

21 Q. Now, the witness went on, Having been asked this question:

22 "Q. What did he say about his new promotion?"

23 Answer, page 9395:

24 "A. Well, he left us in Sierra Leone and went to Monrovia
10:39:51 25 and we were - we used to call him Colonel Bockarie and then
26 he came with two promotions and those were high promotions.
27 He was called general now, he and Issa Sesay, and he said
28 it was President Taylor, Pa Taylor, who gave them that
29 promotion."

1 In April, May or June of 1998, Mr Sesay, were you promoted
2 to the rank of general by Pa Taylor?

3 A. No. Throughout 1998, up to December, I was a colonel, and
4 that was what everybody knew within the RUF. Mr Taylor did not
10:40:52 5 promote me.

6 Q. Did Mr Taylor promote Sam Bockarie to the rank of general
7 in April, May, June of 1998?

8 A. No, not at all. It was Johnny Paul Koroma who promoted
9 Sam Bockarie to brigadier in March of '98, and that was the rank
10:41:15 10 that Sam Bockarie used up to December 1998.

11 Q. So help us: This evidence of Bockarie being promoted in
12 Monrovia, is it true or false?

13 A. It's a big lie because everybody in Kailahun within the RUF
14 knew that Sam Bockarie was promoted to the rank of brigadier by
10:41:44 15 Johnny Paul in 1998.

16 Q. Now, the witness was further asked this: He was asked
17 about what Bockarie said about the command structure between us
18 and the AFRC, and he said this:

19 "A. Well, he made it clear to all the AFRC men who were
10:42:08 20 present that AFRC was no longer in power and that where we
21 had now come, it was called the jungle, and that everybody
22 was supposed to be under the RUF command and that the RUF -
23 anywhere the RUF was serving as a commander, the AFRC
24 should serve as a deputy."

10:42:33 25 Do you recall anything like that, Mr Sesay?

26 A. Well, those things did not happen during any meeting.

27 Q. And then he said this, having been asked:

28 "Q. Was that something that was accepted at the meeting?

29 A. Yes, everyone accepted, up to the leader, the leader

1 for the AFRC. All of them accepted, all of us, and those
2 of us who was there besides SAJ Musa."

3 Now, do you recall such a meeting taking place between
4 Waterworks and Buedu where SAJ Musa was present?

10:43:22 5 A. No. SAJ Musa never went to Kailahun throughout '98. SAJ
6 Musa did not even go to Kono, let alone Kailahun.

7 Q. But he goes on:

8 "Q. Was SAJ Musa at that meeting?

9 A. No, no, no. He was not there, but after the meeting
10:43:42 10 they made it possible to send it as a message to all the
11 front lines."

12 Then this question:

13 "Q. What did Sam Bockarie say about the role of Jungle at
14 the meeting?

10:43:56 15 A. Well, he put it clear to Pa Paul, Pa Johnny Paul, that
16 that was the man whom the leader had introduced to us to be
17 Pa Ghankay's own representative in the RUF territory. So
18 he was the person that always linked us to Pa Taylor, and
19 he wanted them to know that for them to recognise him."

10:44:26 20 What about that, Mr Sesay?

21 A. It's a lie. That type of meeting did not take place. It's
22 a big lie. Since the time Johnny Paul went to Buedu, when we
23 arrived in Buedu from Kono, he did not attend any meetings
24 between March and August in Buedu. He did not attend any
10:44:52 25 meetings wherein he addressed people, nor did he and Sam Bockarie
26 attend any meetings where they addressed people.

27 Q. Okay. Then this, page 9396, line 5. This question was
28 asked:

29 "Q. What was said about the Fitti-Fatta mission?

1 A. Well, he said" - that's Bockarie - "he would want us to
2 go and clear the mining area" - that is Kono - "and that
3 the Pa" - Mr Taylor that is - "had told him that nothing
4 goes for nothing and that he had no machine to make arms,
10:45:44 5 that they were materials. He also brought them from some
6 other areas, so he said - he said we should go and capture
7 the mining area so we would be able to get money from there
8 and get the materials."

9 And then he goes on to confirm that the Pa who was said
10:46:03 10 that to him was Mr Taylor. Do you recall anything like that ever
11 being said by Sam Bockarie, Mr Sesay?

12 A. No. Sam Bockarie never said so, and even the meetings he
13 attended in Pendembu to create the brigades, he never said that,
14 because for me this type of meeting that he's talking about here,
10:46:30 15 no such meeting ever took place in 1998 between Waterworks and
16 Buedu. This is a lie.

17 Q. Now, just help us, Mr Sesay. Having been a senior
18 commander in the RUF, you should be able to assist us with this.
19 When the RUF were discussing the planning of an operation such as
10:46:59 20 the Fitti-Fatta mission, who would be present at such a meeting?

21 A. Well, because what I am testifying about here is the
22 reality that happened. Before the Fitti-Fatta attack, it was
23 only Superman who carried out the attack. Mike Lamin, who was
24 advisor to Bockarie, and Bockarie, they were the ones who
10:47:30 25 discussed these things in Sam Bockarie's bedroom. No other
26 commander took place in that discussion. And for me, it was
27 after the meeting that they came to me, they met me in Pendembu,
28 and that was the time Mike Lamin informed me about the things
29 that they discussed in that meeting. And even for me, at the

1 time I was going to attack Kono, the meeting we held at
2 Waterworks, it was only myself, the commanders and Sam Bockarie's
3 adjutants and the late SYB Rogers. We did not invite any other
4 commander, who is a junior commander, on the front line to attend
10:48:13 5 the meeting. You, the commander, who was going to undertake the
6 operation will be at the meeting with Sam Bockarie, including his
7 advisor, Mike Lamin. And if it was necessary, it will include
8 the war council chairman. Because to plan such a meeting, you
9 did not need to involve all commanders, junior commanders,
10:48:33 10 because we wouldn't want the information to leak out. Because,
11 when you are planning an attack, you will have to keep it a
12 confidential business until the day of the attack, or two or
13 three days before the attack because, if the information went
14 out, the junior fighters would go around saying it and they would
10:48:52 15 spread out the information saying that, "Oh, we are going to
16 attack so and so place", and we did not want that kind of thing.
17 We did not like that. So in planning an attack, that is not
18 something you will have to assemble everybody to discuss; no, we
19 never used to do things like that.

10:49:10 20 Q. Question, line 19, page 9396:

21 "Q. Another thing that you said was discussed at the
22 meeting was Sam Bockarie's travel to Burkina Faso with General
23 Ibrahim.

24 Q. What did Sam Bockarie say about that?

10:49:33 25 A. He said that Mr Taylor told him that he would link in
26 with Blaise Compaore, the President of Burkina Faso, and it
27 was Mr Ibrahim who was going to travel with him, he was to
28 move with him to Burkina Faso."

29 Now, who arranged for Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso,

1 Mr Sesay?

2 A. Well, at the first time I knew that Sam Bockarie went to
3 Burkina Faso was late November 1998, because Sam Bockarie went at
4 first to Monrovia in September and he returned; he went again
10:50:23 5 in October and returned; and, after his return, he invited me
6 from Pendembu, when I went. He said he had met with President
7 Taylor on two different occasions about the revisitation of the
8 Abidjan Accord and he said that President Taylor said that he was
9 going to contact the OAU chairman, who was President Blaise at
10:50:46 10 that time. So his travel to Burkina Faso, according to Bockarie,
11 President Taylor had spoken to Blaise about Sam Bockarie's
12 travel. That was when he, Eddie --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
14 to slow down in that area and repeat it slowly.

10:51:08 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Mr Sesay, I'd like you to take it up from this part,
17 please: "So his travel according to Burkina Faso, according to
18 Bockarie, President Taylor had spoken to Blaise about
19 Sam Bockarie's travel." Go on from there.

10:51:28 20 A. Yes. I said when Bockarie returned after his second visit
21 in October, and before he left in November, he told me that I and
22 Mike Lamin should come and stay in Buedu until his return. He
23 said because President Taylor had told him that he was going to
24 contact President Blaise Compaore about his - about the
10:51:54 25 revisitation of the Abidjan Peace Accord. So Sam Bockarie told
26 me that --

27 JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Griffiths, your question was: Who
28 arranged for Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso?

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Correct.

1 JUDGE LUSSICK: What is the answer?

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm coming back to it.

3 Q. Who arranged for Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso,
4 Mr Sesay?

10:52:23 5 A. It was President Taylor.

6 Q. And why was Sam Bockarie going to Burkina Faso?

7 A. Sam Bockarie said he had discussed with President Taylor
8 about the revisitation of the Abidjan Peace Accord. So that was
9 why Mr Taylor said he was going to contact the ECOWAS Leaders -
10:52:45 10 other ECOWAS Leaders, because they were the guarantors for the
11 accord, for them to revisit the Abidjan Accord.

12 Q. Thank you. Now, the witness was also asked this: About
13 what you, Issa Sesay, had done. And the question was this?

14 "Q. Another topic that was discussed by Sam Bockarie at
10:53:19 15 the meeting was something that Issa Sesay had done, is that
16 right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What did Sam Bockarie say about Issa Sesay at the
19 meeting?

10:53:30 20 A. Well, he told us. He said sorry to everybody for what
21 happened. And he asked for forgiveness from Mr Sesay for
22 what he did when he took the diamonds with him to Monrovia
23 and he said on his way they had gone missing. Those were
24 the things that he told us.

10:53:48 25 Q. Who asked for forgiveness?

26 A. Well, Sam Bockarie said so. He said Issa said we
27 should forgive him. And he said when he went - when he
28 went, the Pa himself told him that we should forgive him."
29 The Pa being Taylor. Do you recall any such thing being

1 said, Mr Sesay?

2 A. No. No such things took place in any meetings.

3 Q. And then returning to the learned judge's question a moment
4 ago, the witness was asked this question:

10:54:30 5 "Q. Did Sam Bockarie say why Charles Taylor was going to
6 link him to Burkina Faso, send him to Burkina Faso?

7 A. Yes. Because he said he told him about the mission
8 that we were to take to free the leader. And it was a
9 mission that involved heavy materials, because we were
10:54:54 10 supposed to clear the ECOMOG force before we get to
11 Freetown. So he said he was going to link him up where we
12 would be able to get direct material so that we would bring
13 them over and be able to run the mission."

14 Did you have such a discussion with Bockarie, Mr Sesay?

10:55:18 15 A. I did not have such discussion with Bockarie and Bockarie
16 did not tell anybody that throughout 1998. And even before he
17 went to Burkina Faso he did not say that to anybody. And even
18 when he came back before we attacked Kono, we had no plans in
19 mind to attack Freetown.

10:55:44 20 Q. Now, you will have noted that in the course of that answer
21 this individual mentioned a mission to free the leader. So the
22 witness was asked this:

23 "Q. What were you referring to?

24 A. Well, that was Operation Free the Leader, and that was
10:56:21 25 the material he went for, for us to come and run the
26 mission to capture Freetown and free the leader."

27 I'll pause there before I continue. Do you recall an RUF
28 operation called Operation Free the Leader, Mr Sesay?

29 A. No, I do not recall any operation that we named Operation

1 Free the Leader. Even the operation that I took to Kono did not
2 have any name. But, you know, sometimes when you carry out a
3 successful operation, fighters will give any kind of name to that
4 operation. But to say we gave it a name that it was Operation
10:57:06 5 Free the Leader or that Sam Bockarie gave it a name, no.

6 Q. Just to complete this, the witness continued by saying that
7 this meeting lasted for some eight hours; line 13, page 9398. So
8 the witness is talking about a meeting in a thick forest
9 involving 600 people in which all of these things were discussed
10:57:42 10 and the meeting lasted for eight hours. Do you recall such a
11 meeting, Mr Sesay?

12 A. I do not recall any meeting of the such because we did not
13 hold any meeting in 1998 that lasted for eight hours. The only
14 meeting we had at Waterworks in December 1998, before I went to
10:58:11 15 Kono, was about how to go and attack Kono and after that, we all
16 dispersed.

17 Q. Now, I need to take you through some more of this account
18 in order to come to the next matter that I want to deal with, in
19 order to put it in context. This question was asked, line 14,
10:58:42 20 page 9398:

21 "Q. Did anyone apart from Sam Bockarie speak at that
22 meeting?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Who?

10:58:51 25 A. It was Sam Bockarie who spoke more and then later
26 Jungle spoke and he buttressed the introduction that Mr Sam
27 did, told the former AFRC members and he did say that he
28 would try his utmost best to see that things worked out
29 well. So he said so. And then later Johnny Paul too spoke

1 and some other people also spoke during the meeting."

2 Q. Can you remember whether there were high level
3 commanders at the meeting?

4 A. Yes."

10:59:35 5 And he went on to name that Bockarie was there,
6 Johnny Paul was there, Jungle was there, Issa Sesay - that's you
7 - was there, Eddie Kanneh was there, Gullit was there, AB, FOC,
8 and some other commanders. Then he goes on to give details about
9 those commanders. He again goes on:

11:00:02 10 "A. Yes, Gullit was there. Gullit was there and Superman
11 was there, Morris Kallon was there and Akim Turay was
12 there."

13 And then he continues at page 9423.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, perhaps we could continue
11:00:33 15 with that new page after the break, the midmorning break.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll reconvene at half past eleven.

18 [Break taken at 11.01 a.m.]

19 [Upon resuming at 11.30 a.m.]

11:34:11 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Koumjian?

21 MR KOUMJIAN: There is a change of appearance. We are
22 joined by Brenda J Hollis.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I also register a change of appearance.
24 We have been joined by Ms Logan Hambrick.

11:34:37 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is noted. Please continue.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Mr Sesay, in April, May, June of 1998, where was Gullit?

28 A. In May of 1998, Gullit left Kailahun and went to Kono.
29 From Kono he went to Koinadugu.

1 Q. Now, the witness was asked this at page 9423 in relation to
2 that meeting which we have been talking about:

3 "Q. What were the topics that were discussed at that
4 particular meeting?

11:35:30 5 A. Well, firstly, we discussed about trying to free the
6 leader, and in that case we were to reattack Kono and go up
7 to Freetown and then free our leader and take over power.
8 We also discussed the disloyalty of SAJ Musa."

9 Now, pause there. I've already asked you, Mr Sesay,
11:35:57 10 whether you had ever heard of an Operation Free the Leader, and
11 you answered in the negative. Do you recall a meeting at which a
12 mission to go up to Freetown was discussed?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Well, then he goes on. He was asked this:

11:36:41 15 "Q. When you say the first target should be Kono, to
16 Makeni, up to Freetown. What do you mean by that, the
17 first target was to be Kono?"

18 Now, let's pause there. When you embarked on that mission
19 to capture Kono in December 1998, Mr Sesay, was it part of the
11:37:05 20 plan that after Makeni was captured, you should go on to
21 Freetown?

22 A. No. That was not part of the plan, because before I left
23 Buedu, we were not sure of capturing Kono even, so there was no
24 other further plan, apart from the Kono attack.

11:37:30 25 Q. Now, he goes on:

26 "Q. What do you mean that the first target was to be
27 Kono?"

28 A. Well, Kono is a mining area. In that whole country,
29 that is the place we know, the high level productivity for

1 diamonds, so we believed that if we were able to capture
2 there first it would have been good for us. That was the
3 reason why Kono. He said 'Kono should serve as the first
4 target that we should capture'."

11:38:21 5 Now, I'm pausing again to ask you this: Mr Sesay, was the
6 capture of Kono in December 1998 motivated by a desire to
7 commence mining on behalf of the RUF?

8 A. No. That was not the motive, because when we retreated
9 from Freetown, we went through Kono and to Kailahun, and ECOMOG
11:39:02 10 advanced to Kono and the deployment that they had in Kono was so
11 strong, so we attacked Kono to pursue ECOMOG, it was not with the
12 intent of mining.

13 Q. "Q. Were any particular commanders given the role of
14 capturing Kono?"

11:39:28 15 A. Well, yes.

16 Q. Who?

17 A. Well, Sam Bockarie told us that this plan was designed
18 in Monrovia by Mr Taylor. He said it was designed in
19 Monrovia so he only brought it to brief us, that this
11:39:53 20 should be the way we should do things so that we will be
21 able to succeed in the war."

22 Now, the decision to attack Kono, Mr Sesay, was that
23 devised in Monrovia by Charles Taylor?

24 A. No, not at all. It was at the meeting that we held at
11:40:23 25 Waterworks. It was there that Sam Bockarie planned and discussed
26 the meeting - the attack with us, and he never said that the
27 attack on Kono was an instruction he got from Mr Taylor, no.

28 Q. Page 9425. Line 22 - 21:

29 "Q. What commanders were given the role of clearing Makeni?"

1 A. It was Issa who was the overall for that operation and
2 Morris Kallon was his deputy and Superman was third in
3 command."

4 Is that true?

11:41:07 5 A. No. That is not true.

6 Q. Who was your deputy in that operation to capture Kono and
7 then on to Makeni?

8 A. Morris Kallon was the 2IC to me, the deputy, but from Kono
9 to Makeni Superman was not with us, it was in Makeni that we met
11:41:31 10 with Superman. And when we met in Makeni, Superman was senior to
11 Kallon. It was not possible for Superman to be third in command.
12 When we met in Makeni for this short time, after me it was
13 Superman who was second in command.

14 Q. Now, the witness continued in this way:

11:41:58 15 "Q. Then you said on to Freetown" - remember, the plan
16 discussed at the meeting, according to this witness, is capture
17 Kono, then Makeni, then on to Freetown:

18 "Q. Then you said on to Freetown. Was anyone given the
19 role of moving on to Freetown?"

11:42:19 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause, Mr Koumjian?

21 MR KOUMJIAN: I'm lost on where we are, have we moved a
22 page, because I don't see it, I'm not exactly sure --

23 MR GRIFFITHS: It's 9425.

24 Q. "Q. Then you said on to Freetown. Was anyone given the
11:42:45 25 role of moving on to Freetown?

26 A. Yes. They gave the mission to somebody.

27 Q. Who?

28 A. Well, Sam Bockarie sent the message to SAJ Musa, even
29 before they attacked Kono but he refused. He rejected

1 the orders. He said he cannot take orders from him. So
2 there was a heated argument over the issue."

3 Now, I want you to understand what this witness was telling
4 these judges, Mr Sesay. Did Sam Bockarie send a message to SAJ
11:43:29 5 Musa giving him the role of moving on to Freetown?

6 A. Not at all.

7 Q. I want us to be clear, Mr Sesay. Because what this person
8 was telling these judges was this; that the decision to attack
9 Kono, Makeni and then on to Freetown was formulated in Monrovia,
11:43:57 10 brought back to Sierra Leone by Sam Bockarie, and that Sam
11 Bockarie gave an order to SAJ Musa to carry out the Freetown leg
12 of the attack. Did any such thing take place?

13 A. This is a bloody lie. It's a lie. Because the attack on
14 Freetown was an independent attack by the AFRC, planned by SAJ
11:44:25 15 Musa, and Bockarie was not part of it. And before this time,
16 that is, before December, Bockarie and SAJ Musa never
17 communicated. For a long time they never communicated with each
18 other, so this is a lie. And even when I captured Makeni, we did
19 not just capture Makeni and say we should move to Freetown. No,
11:44:54 20 when we captured Makeni, we made an attempt to capture Kabala -
21 when we attacked Kabala, I organised troops and we attacked
22 Bumbuna and we attacked Mile 91. So we did not just go to
23 Makeni, and we took the road straight to Freetown like we had a
24 plan to go to Freetown just after Makeni, no.

11:45:18 25 Q. On this issue of SAJ Musa, this witness's testimony
26 continued in this way. He was asked about this heated argument
27 between Bockarie and SAJ Musa, and he answers in this way, page
28 9426, line 18:

29 "A. After the meeting - but there had been arguments even

1 before the meeting, before this mission there had been an
2 argument. Just at the time Sam Bockarie sent the message
3 to all the stations, right from that time, SAJ Musa was not
4 happy about it. He was disgruntled, right up to this
11:46:03 5 mission time. And after they had held the meeting. He
6 sent the same order to SAJ Musa and he refused even before
7 the Kono thing."
8 And then he continues, page 9427, line 3:
9 "Q. The second issue that you said was discussed at the
11:46:30 10 meeting was SAJ Musa.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. What was it about SAJ Musa that was discussed at the
13 meeting?
14 A. Well, Sam Bockarie told us that the complaint had gone
11:46:44 15 up to Mr Taylor, that the man's complaint had been lodged
16 about his disloyalty towards the mission and he too gave
17 his own piece of advice.
18 Q. Sam Bockarie told you that a complaint had gone up to
19 Mr Taylor? Who is the man that made the complaint?
11:47:09 20 A. Sam Bockarie lodged the complaint to Mr Taylor against
21 SAJ Musa, regarding his attitude."
22 Now, do you recall SAJ - do you recall Sam Bockarie making
23 such a complaint to Mr Taylor about SAJ Musa's refusal to accept
24 this mission, Mr Sesay?
11:47:40 25 A. No. This is my first time to hear about this issue even,
26 this topic. That never happened. And what I knew, and that was
27 what happened - that was what used to happen from February of
28 1998 SAJ Musa and Bockarie had no discussion of sending message
29 to each other until December when SAJ Musa died in 1998. They

1 never had any business of operation.

2 Q. And this individual went on to say this in answer to this
3 question:

4 "Q. At the meeting was there any other discussion about
11:48:38 5 SAJ Musa? Apart from the fact that Sam Bockarie had made a
6 complaint to Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes. Mr Bockarie made us to understand that that man
8 should not live to tell the story."

9 And on the next page he said:

11:49:03 10 "A. He" - that being Bockarie - "said we should go all
11 out to ensure that that man should not live to tell the
12 story. He said" - line 23 - "we should only be able to
13 get him when there was a mission, when there was an
14 operation going on. He" - that being Bockarie - "even made
11:49:26 15 us to understand that that was something he was discussing
16 with Gullit; that during any mission that man should not
17 live, he should die because he was a traitor, he referred
18 to him as a traitor."

19 And it goes on, page 9429:

11:49:47 20 "A. In the military terms, they said it should be during
21 operations, you know, if they will mean arms he should die
22 during the battle. He should be shot."

23 Now, do you recall Sam Bockarie - let me start again, my
24 fault. Where did SAJ Musa die?

11:50:13 25 A. SAJ Musa died in Benduma, Waterloo, in December 1998.

26 Q. How did he die?

27 A. Well, I was not present. What I heard later was that when
28 they had captured Benduma, SAJ Musa and others captured a lot of
29 weapons and ammunition, including bombs.

1 Q. And?

2 A. And the bombs were in the ammunition dump. So they said it
3 was SAJ Musa who said they were to set the ammunition dump
4 alight, so it was after the place was set on fire, it was one of
11:50:55 5 the bombs that - it was one of the fragments that caught him and
6 that was how he died, but I was not present, I only heard it.

7 Q. Do you recall Bockarie discussing with Gullit the killing
8 of SAJ Musa during a military operation?

9 A. This is my first time to hear this, because before SAJ Musa
11:51:26 10 joined Gullit and others, when they planned the attack on
11 Freetown, because SAJ Musa came from Kurubonla after the
12 infighting between himself and Superman, then he came and joined
13 Gullit's group in Major Eddie Town. That was where they planned
14 the attack on Freetown. Before that time, Bockarie and Gullit
11:51:48 15 were not on speaking terms. But before this time, before they
16 joined him in Major Eddie Town --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this
18 area slowly, kindly.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Pause.

11:52:02 20 Q. Pause, Mr Sesay. Before that time, Bockarie and Gullit
21 were not on speaking terms. But before this time, before they
22 joined in Major Eddie Town. Pick it up from there, please.

23 A. Yes. When SAJ Musa arrived in Major Eddie Town, he gave a
24 strong warning to Alfred Brown and King Perry that they were not
11:52:31 25 to go close to the radio set. From that time, in Major Eddie
26 Town, right up to the time SAJ Musa died, Bockarie was not in
27 contact with any - he was neither in contact with SAJ Musa, nor
28 with Gullit before SAJ Musa died, there was no communication
29 between them.

1 Q. Well, the witness was further asked on this topic, though,
2 this question:

3 "Q. Did he say who should shoot him?

11:53:13

4 A. He" - that being Bockarie - "just told us that he had
5 spoken to Gullit and that the two of them had been
6 discussing that even before Gullit went to where SAJ Musa
7 was, that was what he made us to understand. It was the
8 discussion that he had with Gullit. He did not specify who
9 should do the shooting, but the decision - the discussion
10 had been going on with Gullit."

11:53:33

11 And then counsel for the Prosecution returned to the topic
12 at a later stage, page 9450:

13 "Q. Just one matter that I wish to return to from your
14 evidence this morning. When I was asking you questions
15 about the meeting that took place in December 1998, the
16 three-hour meeting" --

11:53:55

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Are you reading from page 9450?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: 9450.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could we please have that page on the
20 overhead.

11:54:09

21 MR GRIFFITHS: The 9th of May 2008.

22 Q. "Q. Just one matter I wish to return to from your evidence
23 this morning, when I was asking you questions about the
24 meeting that took place in December 1998, the
25 three-hour meeting, and you said one of the issues was the
26 SAJ Musa issue, I asked you this: Did Sam Bockarie say how
27 SAJ Musa was to die? And you gave this answer:

11:54:27

28 Well, in the military terms, they say it should be during
29 operations, you know. If they will mean arms, he should

1 die during the battle, he should be shot. Can you just
2 explain what you meant by that answer."

3 Line 22:

4 "A. What I meant, when they said somebody should die, he
11:55:05 5 should be killed in a battle or in operation. We were not
6 fighting with sticks. A commander will not come to tell
7 you that you should use a knife or a stick. During battles
8 we were using rifles, that's why I said the man should be
9 killed with an arm. That was why I said he should be
11:55:28 10 killed during the battle. Arms should be used. I don't
11 know if that is clear enough."

12 Over the page, 9451, line 11:

13 "A. That man was a commander and he had a lot of soldiers
14 under his command. He cannot be lying in his house while
11:55:48 15 there were securities and you would go there and kill him.
16 That would not be easy. The only time you would get your
17 colleague, that should be when firing was going on, when
18 everybody would be concentrating on the enemy. That was
19 the easiest time you would kill somebody that you had
11:56:07 20 targeted."

21 Did Bockarie give an order for the killing of SAJ Musa,
22 Mr Sesay?

23 A. Bockarie did not give such orders. And even the ones who
24 were with SAJ Musa where SAJ Musa died, they were not taking
11:56:26 25 instructions from Bockarie before SAJ Musa's death. And Gullit
26 left Kailahun in April of 1998, and even the instructions that
27 Bockarie gave to him was to go and join Superman to defend Kono.
28 But on Gullit's arrival in Kono, he did not go by the
29 instructions. He gathered the AFRC group and they joined SAJ

1 Musa. From that time Gullit did not take instructions from Sam
2 Bockarie until that December, after the death of SAJ Musa, when
3 he contacted Bockarie and he told Bockarie that SAJ Musa was
4 dead. And even there, Bockarie did not believe him. But before
11:57:12 5 the death of SAJ Musa there was no communication between Gullit
6 and Sam Bockarie.

7 And, honestly, from what Gullit used to tell me, Bockarie
8 would not give orders to Gullit to kill SAJ Musa. Gullit and SAJ
9 Musa grew up together. They were born in the same Wilberforce
11:57:36 10 Barracks and during the NPRC Gullit was a bodyguard to SAJ Musa
11 and - and SAJ Musa was his commander. Even before the overthrow,
12 and even when they had overthrown, when the AFRC took power, it
13 was Gullit who called who told Johnny Paul to call SAJ Musa to
14 come. So Gullit cannot obey those orders. Not at all.

11:58:04 15 Q. Now, the meeting at which this instruction or discussion
16 took place, we are told, going back to page 9429, line 27, that
17 this meeting was at night in December of 1998. Line 17:

18 "A. It was a very short meeting, just for three hours,
19 because it was at night and we did not even want Johnny
11:58:39 20 Paul to know."

21 So let's be clear what this individual was telling these
22 judges, Mr Sesay. The meeting to plan the attack on Kono, then
23 on to Makeni, then on to Freetown, took place at night and Sam
24 Bockarie was at pains that Johnny Paul Koroma shouldn't know
11:59:06 25 anything about it. Is that correct?

26 A. That is not correct, because the meeting about the attack
27 on Kono was in the afternoon. We went and sat by a water well.
28 There is - there is a barri at the water well, we were in that
29 meeting. That is myself, Mike Lamin, Eddie Kanneh, late SYB

1 Rogers, Lawrence Womandi a and Rashid Sandy who was the adjutant
2 general at that time. After that afternoon meeting - we spent
3 about one hour 30 minutes in that meeting. The following day we
4 went to Johnny Paul in Kangama and Sam Bockarie briefed Johnny
11:59:59 5 Paul. And the following day, Mike Lamin escorted me, that is
6 Mike Lamin, myself and Bockarie, we went there and Bockarie
7 informed Johnny Paul about the plan that he had made to attack
8 Kono. And the following day Mike Lamin escorted me to the Moa
9 River and I travelled together with Morris Kallon to Kono. So
12:00:21 10 Johnny Paul was fully aware. Myself, Bockarie and Mike Lamin met
11 him and he was informed by Bockarie about the attack on Kono.
12 Q. Thank you very much. Can we go to page 9430, please.

13 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. My understanding was that the
14 question was when he was informed about the plan to kill Gullit,
12:00:42 15 not the plan to attack Kono. That was the question as
16 I understood it.

17 JUDGE DOHERTY: I don't think it was to kill Gullit. Was
18 it not to kill SAJ Musa?

19 MR KOUMJIAN: Sorry, yes.

12:01:12 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: The problem the question is asked and
21 then so much else is said. Now I'm trying to find the last
22 question.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: The question was:

24 "So let's be clear what this individual was telling these
12:01:22 25 judges, Mr Sesay, the meeting to plan the attack on Kono, then on
26 to Makeni, then on to Freetown took place at night and Sam
27 Bockarie was at pains that Johnny Paul Koroma shouldn't know
28 anything about it. Is that correct?"

29 And the witness has then gone on to explain how Johnny Paul

1 Koroma was in fact informed about it.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Indeed. What is irregular about that,
3 Mr Koumjian?

12:01:49

4 MR KOUMJIAN: Because that's misstating the testimony of
5 the witness from the transcript. The witness in the transcript
6 makes it clear that it's the plan to kill SAJ Musa that Johnny
7 Paul Koroma was not to be informed about. That's what
8 I understood what counsel read.

12:02:13

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Was this a different meeting than the
10 meeting in which it was discussed to attack Kono? Was it a
11 different meeting?

12 MR KOUMJIAN: That's my understanding.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: In any event, the evidence is what the
14 witness says it is.

12:02:30

15 MR GRIFFITHS: Well --

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: It remains to us to make what we will of
17 it.

12:02:43

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm sure it's my fault, Madam President, and
19 I'm sure I'm the one who is being stupid, but I note that at page
20 9429 the witness says this:

21 "Q. This particular meeting, how long did it go on for?

22 A. It was a very short meeting, just for three hours,
23 because it was at night and we did not even want Johnny
24 Paul to know."

12:02:59

25 You go to page 9430, line 18:

26 "Q. This meeting, this three hour short meeting, was there
27 anything else discussed apart from the plan to attack
28 Freetown and the SAJ Musa issue?

29 A. Yes."

1 So it's one meeting at which a number of different things
2 are discussed. This is a Prosecution witness, so I cannot
3 understand why there is this difficulty in understanding the
4 testimony of their own witness.

12:03:27 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: In any event, please proceed.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. So let's go to page 9430:

8 "Q. This meeting, this three hour short meeting, was there
9 anything else discussed apart from the plan to attack

12:03:42 10 Freetown and the SAJ Musa issue?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What?

13 A. Well, at that time, even the leader who had his
14 revolution was there. That should be the first target to

12:03:58 15 go to Pademba Road and to free - to release the leader.

16 And second we were to go to State House and overthrow the
17 President and, if possible, if we met him there, we should
18 kill him.

19 Q. Just so it is clear, what President is to be
12:04:19 20 overthrown and possibly killed?

21 A. President Kabbah.

22 Q. And what leader was to be released from Pademba Road?

23 A. Foday Sankoh.

24 Q. The person Jungle who you discussed yesterday, was he
12:04:35 25 at this meeting?

26 A. Yes, yes. He was part of this 12-man meeting.

27 Q. Did Jungle speak at the meeting?

28 A. Yes."

29 Now, at that meeting in December which you attended, and

1 you've already assisted us, Mr Sesay, as to who was present, was
2 there a discussion at that meeting that in addition to moving on
3 Freetown, that Foday Sankoh was to be released from Pademba Road
4 Prison?

12:05:16 5 A. We did not have any discussions about Mr Sankoh and we did
6 not have any discussions and any plans about attacking Freetown
7 during that meeting. The only discussion we had was when
8 Bockarie told us - those of us who were there and the other
9 people - and it was about the attack on Kono. Not even Makeni,
12:05:36 10 because we were not that sure whether I was even going to be able
11 to attack Kono. So we did not have any other plan. The target
12 was Kono, and that was the only thing that we discussed during
13 that meeting.

14 Q. But I need your assistance, Mr Sesay, because this
12:05:58 15 individual was giving a very detailed account to these judges and
16 I need your assistance with the detail. Now, was there a
17 discussion about killing President Kabbah at that meeting?

18 A. No, no. We did not discuss anything pertaining to
19 President Kabbah.

12:06:21 20 Q. Secondly, was Jungle present at that meeting?

21 A. Jungle was not present at that meeting. Those of us who
22 attended the meeting were seven in number and those were the
23 names I have called. Jungle was not present. Not at all.

24 Q. Where was Jungle at this time in December 1998?

12:06:45 25 A. Jungle was in Liberia, he was not in Buedu.

26 Q. How do you know?

27 A. Well, had he been in Buedu I would have known because it
28 was myself, Mike Lamin --

29 THE INTERPRETERS: Your Honours, could the witness be asked

1 to repeat that area slowly.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Could you just start again, please, from the beginning,
4 Mr Sesay. Thanks.

12:07:09 5 A. I said it was myself, Mike Lamin and Sam Bockarie who
6 remained in Buedu. Look at Sam Bockarie's house here and my
7 house is across the other side, the other road. And had Jungle
8 been in Buedu I would have known, but Jungle was not there. And
9 even when Sam Bockarie came back, when we had the meeting, up to
12:07:33 10 the time I left, Jungle was still not there.

11 JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Sesay, you've told us you know Jungle
12 the was not in Buedu. How do you know he was in Liberia?

13 THE WITNESS: My Lord, Jungle used to go to Liberia because
14 when I met with him in Liberia in April - and I had told you that
12:08:01 15 it was Jungle who used to bring food supply from the Lebanese,
16 from Hijazi and Fayard. So had Jungle been in Buedu, I would
17 have been in the know. But he was not there. He was in Liberia.

18 JUDGE LUSSICK: You're saying that if he's not in Buedu,
19 the only other place he possibly could have been is Liberia? Is
12:08:29 20 that what you're saying?

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, because in 1998, he used to stay in
22 Liberia when he used to come with Fayard and the other man and
23 they would come and go back. So if he was not in Buedu, he would
24 go to his people in Foya Tinkia where he would spend some time.
12:08:52 25 That was just across the border.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Now, the witness continued in this vein:

28 "Q. Did Jungle speak at the meeting?

29 A. Yes. Later, after the plan had gone on, Sam Bockarie

1 spoke to Mr Taylor about the plan, how the mission was to
2 carry on, and" - line 16 - "they briefed President Taylor,
3 the former President, about the plan, how it was set.

4 After that, Jungle too buttressed the same topic to him,
12:09:44 5 how the plan had been made, and he in turn thanked them and
6 told them to carry on and that he said he should pray that
7 the mission should be successful."

8 Now, do you recall, following that meeting at Waterworks
9 that you've told us about, that Bockarie called President Taylor
12:10:15 10 to brief him about the plan, how it was set?

11 A. No. After the meeting, all of us went on board the
12 vehicles, the vehicles that we had used to go there. We all
13 boarded the vehicles back and came back to Buedu. Bockarie did
14 not have any communications with President Taylor, no.

12:10:40 15 Q. Well, I need to press you a little further on this. Can we
16 go back to page 9424, please? And I want to ask you which of the
17 two propositions is right. At page 9424, line 24, this
18 individual told the judges:

19 "Well, Sam Bockarie told us that this plan, the plan to
12:11:10 20 capture Kono, Makeni, then Freetown, was designed in Monrovia
21 with Mr Taylor."

22 When we go to page 9431, this same individual was saying,
23 line 16: "They briefed President Taylor about the plan, how it
24 was set."

12:11:32 25 Now what I want your assistance with is this: Was the plan
26 designed in Monrovia or was the plan designed in Sierra Leone and
27 then Mr Taylor was briefed about it? Which of the two is right?

28 A. The plan to attack Kono was discussed and decided right in
29 Buedu at the Waterworks and Bockarie gave the mission to me.

1 I was the one now who came ahead and made the plan to attack
2 Koidu Town and to meet with the others whom I met in Kono.

3 Q. Tell me, Mr Sesay, was Charles Taylor involved in any way
4 in creating this plan to attack Kono?

12:12:40 5 A. As far as I know, no. He had nothing to do with the plan
6 about the attack on Kono. It was RUF who planned to attack Kono.

7 Q. Page 9432, line 5:

8 "Q. What did Jungle say at the meeting?

9 A. Well, in the first place, Jungle himself told us about
12:13:08 10 the material that Mr Bockarie had brought and that we
11 should not fear this time round, and that there was no
12 force to that could withstand us. That was what he said in
13 the meeting and he said he had discussed it with the Pa in
14 Monrovia even before they came.

12:13:30 15 Q. And did he say what the Pa had said in Monrovia?

16 A. Yes. It was just what Sam Bockarie told us. He just
17 spoke about the same issue Sam Bockarie had spoken about,
18 that the Pa had said our first target should be Kono before
19 we should proceed."

12:13:54 20 Line 24:

21 "Q. Did Jungle say in the meeting what the Pa had said to
22 Jungle in Monrovia?

23 A. Yes, that is what I explained. They said they were
24 the ones who came so he too told us about the materials
12:14:14 25 that had been brought for the mission and that the Pa, that
26 they had discussed with the Pa how the mission should go
27 on. That is Pa Taylor."

28 Now, another detail, Mr Sesay, and it's this: In that
29 third trip that Bockarie made to Monrovia and then on to Burkina

1 Faso, did Jungle go with him?

2 A. No. Jungle was not part of the group with which Bockarie
3 left Buedu; and, on his return, Jungle did not come with him.

4 Q. Thank you. And on this briefing of Charles Taylor after
12:15:26 5 the meeting, page 9434, this question was asked:

6 "Q. You gave some evidence earlier when you used the
7 phrase 'they briefed President Taylor'."

8 Line 25:

9 "Q. Who briefed President Taylor?"

12:15:46 10 A. First it was Sam Bockarie. He held the phone and
11 spoke to the Pa. He briefed him about the arrangement we
12 had done about the mission and later Jungle himself went on
13 the same phone and spoke on the same topic to Charles
14 Taylor - President Taylor."

12:16:13 15 Page 9435, line 2:

16 "Q. Where was this phone?"

17 A. It was a satellite phone."

18 Line 21:

19 "A. All of us were in the veranda where the meeting was
12:16:27 20 held. I was at the veranda myself. I was part of the
21 meeting.

22 Q. Are you saying the 12 of you were there when the
23 conversation took place?

24 A. Yes, because the meeting had not ended yet so all 12 of
12:16:47 25 us were still there."

26 Now, the meeting to plan the attack on Kono, where did it
27 take place?

28 A. Waterworks.

29 Q. Is there a veranda at the Waterworks?

1 A. No. The place where we were seated had a small barri. In
2 fact there were no chairs there. We all sat against the wall, we
3 all sat against the wall, and there was a thatch cover; it was an
4 open place, it had no veranda.

12:17:36 5 Q. Now, do you recall us looking at some photographs of Sam
6 Bockarie's house in Buedu? Do you recall that?

7 A. Yes, very well.

8 Q. Could we have a look, please, and I would like your
9 assistance with this, if you would, at --

12:18:30 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, are you referring to the
11 photographs that we marked for identification?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, I am. It's MFI-4A. Found it. Could
13 we have a look at it, please.

14 Q. Mr Sesay, do you recall looking at this, identifying this
12:19:35 15 photograph, as being Sam Bockarie's house in Buedu?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And you help us. What would you refer to as a veranda in
18 this photograph? Do you want to move places to point it out for
19 us?

12:20:03 20 A. Well, if I speak from here, you might see the - this is the
21 veranda here. This point. Starting from this door up to the
22 other door, towards the wall here, towards the railing, within
23 here. This is what we called the veranda. This is the veranda.
24 This is the veranda

12:20:33 25 Q. So you're indicating that area between the low
26 green-painted wall and the windows and door behind it; is that
27 correct?

28 A. Yes, yes. That's the veranda.

29 Q. Now, what I want your assistance with, Mr Sesay, is this,

1 because it's very difficult, merely by looking at a photograph,
2 to get an idea of the size of this building. That veranda, would
3 it be big enough to hold a meeting involving 12 people?

12:21:19 4 A. Well, 12 people can sit here because, if you sit against
5 the low wall here, people can sit on this side, they can sit on
6 the ordinary side here; yes, 12 people can sit there. And even
7 above 12, above 12 people, they can sit here, because they could
8 have chairs against the higher wall there and then people could
9 sit on the lower wall.

12:21:41 10 Q. Thank you for that, Mr Sesay. You can put that photograph
11 away, please.

12 So the - this individual is saying, this discussion over
13 the satellite phone, and that all 12 individuals present at the
14 meeting were there when the conversation took place, and over the
12:22:33 15 page to page 9436, line 8:

16 "A. He" - that being Bockarie - "told him that" - being
17 Mr Taylor - "about the mission that had been discussed in
18 Monrovia. He said he had come and put it to the senior
19 officers and that was the meeting that was going on and
12:22:52 20 that the same plan he had given to him was the same plan
21 they had come to discuss.

22 Q. Same plan that they had given to who?

23 A. Sam Bockarie."

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who gave the plan?

12:23:10 25 THE WITNESS: Mr Taylor, Mr Taylor."

26 Line 23:

27 "Q. And what did Jungle say?

28 A. He repeated the same thing to Mr Taylor because he was
29 the representative for him in the RUF, so he explained the

1 same thing to him that the plan they had discussed in
2 Monrovia, they had come and put it to the senior officers
3 and they had assured him that they would go ahead with the
4 plan."

12:23:40 5 Is there any truth in any of this, Mr Sesay?

6 A. I said it's a lie. This witness is lying. Because before
7 I went on the attack in Kono, this meeting, which we held at
8 Waterworks, there was nothing like a meeting that we held in Sam
9 Bockarie's veranda about this. The meeting was held at

12:24:09 10 Waterworks. It was after all that Sam Bockarie went and briefed
11 Johnny Paul, and Johnny Paul advised me, before I left to go to
12 Kono; even the brigade commander who came after us, the senior
13 commanders, was the most senior brigade commander in Kailahun.

14 Bockarie did not invite him to attend this meeting, and who would
12:24:30 15 be this witness? Who was this witness to have been invited to
16 attend such a meeting? This is a black lie. This witness is
17 lying. The brigade commander, the deputy brigade commander, and

18 even Morris Kallon who was in Pendembu, Bockarie did not invite
19 him to this meeting. It was after the meeting that Bockarie told
12:24:48 20 me to invite Morris Kallon to join me to go to Kono. So this man
21 - those who were in higher in position, above him, they were not

22 invited to the meeting. How would he have been invited to such a
23 meeting? He was not part of any meeting about the attack on
24 Kono. To my living God, he was not there.

12:25:19 25 Q. Page 9442. 9 May 2008. Question line 3:

26 "Q. I want to turn now to a topic involving arms and
27 ammunition. Can you tell the Court generally, while you
28 were with the RUF, where you got the arms and ammunition
29 that you used from?"

1 A. Well, first in 1991, after we had been trained, the
2 Liberians were mainly leading the war. The ammunition was
3 coming from Liberia. That was 1991, right up to --

4 Line 16:

12:26:15 5 "Q. For how long did the arms and ammunition continue to
6 come from Liberia?

7 A. From 1991 to '92."

8 Line 23:

9 "Q. When you say the arms and ammunition were coming from
12:26:34 10 Liberia, where, if you know, in Liberia were the arms and
11 ammunition coming from?

12 A. Well, I couldn't tell the part of the country where the
13 ammunition was coming from but the NPFL fighters who came
14 were the ones who brought the ammunition because at that
12:26:53 15 time, I was a junior man in the movement.

16 Q. And did the NPFL fighters tell you where they got the
17 ammunition from?

18 A. No."

19 Line 16:

12:27:13 20 "Q. Can I ask where the NPFL fighters came from?

21 A. It was Liberia.

22 Q. And where did the NPFL fighters get their arms and
23 ammunition from?

24 A. Well, at that time I did not ask them where they got
12:27:29 25 their arms and ammunition but only that we got arms and
26 ammunition from the NPFL fighters.

27 Q. Earlier in your evidence, you did say that you got arms
28 and ammunition in 1991 to 1992 from Liberia. Do you
29 remember giving that evidence?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. How do you know that the arms and ammunition at that
3 time came from Liberia?

4 A. When we were in here, we were pushed to Liberia and we
12:28:09 5 went to Bomi. When Pa Sankoh and Mr Ghankay came and met
6 us and they issued materials to us to come and fight in
7 Sierra Leone, so by that I know it was Liberia, we were not
8 in any other country but in Liberia."

9 I want to pause there and ask you this, Mr Sesay: If
12:28:40 10 I understand your evidence, there were two occasions when the
11 RUF, or members of the RUF, were forced to retreat into Liberia,
12 is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. One occasion was when Zogoda fell, is that right?

12:29:08 15 A. Yes, October '96.

16 Q. And Mike Lamin led the survivors into Liberia and they
17 surrendered to ULIMO, is that correct?

18 A. Yes, that's correct.

19 Q. When was the other occasion?

12:29:29 20 A. 1991, that was when the soldiers and the ULIMO pushed the
21 RUF out of Pujehun, so the RUF crossed into Liberia, across the
22 Mano River. Whilst others based in Sierra Leone, like Gibril
23 Massaquoi, Momoh Rogers, and even this person who came here and
24 spoke here, he was part of that group in 1991, they were in
12:29:59 25 Pujehun, in those villages operating from there, while those who
26 had been pushed and went across to Liberia, but that other group,
27 they stayed in Pujehun District from 1991 up to 1994 when
28 Mr Sankoh invited them to come from Pujehun and join him in
29 Zogoda.

1 Q. Now, those who were pushed in 1991, did you have occasion
2 to speak to them after that had occurred?

3 A. Yes, some of them who went to Liberia, they came to
4 Kailahun, but some decided to go off the RUF, they were no longer
12:30:48 5 part of the RUF, because Rashid brought some of them to Kailahun
6 and they came back and joined the Kailahun group, whilst others
7 were on their own, they no longer joined the RUF.

8 Q. Now, those who had been pushed into Liberia and later
9 returned, did they tell you that they had met with Charles Taylor
12:31:11 10 in Liberia?

11 A. No. They did not tell me that.

12 Q. Did any of them tell you that after they had been pushed to
13 Bomi Hills they met with Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh and were
14 provided with materials to come back to Sierra Leone and fight?

12:31:40 15 A. No, they did not tell me that because even the ones who
16 were pushed, Sam Bockarie was among that group when Foday Sankoh
17 took them to Kailahun. And when Sam Bockarie came, it was the
18 house where I was with Morris Kallon in Pendembu, it was the same
19 place that he stayed. He did not tell me that.

12:31:59 20 Q. Those who returned from Bomi Hills, having been pushed
21 there by ULIMO and the government soldiers, did they return with
22 arms and ammunition?

23 A. No. They did not bring arms. They did not return with
24 arms. They travelled from Bomi Hills to Lofa Bridge and from
12:32:20 25 Lofa Bridge to Kungbahun, Vahun, and they came to Vahun on to
26 Bomaru in Sierra Leone.

27 Q. Question, page 9444 --

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: What was that? They came Lofa Bridge to
29 Vahun and they came to some other place.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Sierra Leone.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: There was a place, Mr Interpreter, that
3 you said.

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord, I said Bomaru. They came from
5 Vahun, they crossed the border into Bomaru, that is in Sierra
6 Leone.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: And you said - what is this other place
8 you said?

9 THE WITNESS: Kungbahun.

12:33:10 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: That cannot be on the record yet. Can
11 you please spell it for us.

12 THE WITNESS: K-U-N-G-B-A-H-U-N.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, question - line 6, page 9444:

12:33:38 15 "Q. Did you know whereabouts in Liberia the arms and
16 ammunition had actually come from?

17 A. No.

18 Q. In 1992, did something change in relation to where you
19 got your arms and ammunition from?

12:33:52 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What was the change?

22 A. That was the time ULIMO took the border from us, 1992,
23 between us and NPFL, when they came from Lofa they
24 fortified the border."

12:34:14 25 Line 21:

26 "A. That was the time the ULIMO forces came from Lofa and
27 they ensured that the entire border was fortified between
28 us and the NPFL. They captured right up to Robertsport.
29 From that time, the relationship had started cutting off

1 between us and the NPFL.

2 Q. What effect did that have on the arms and ammunition
3 that they - you had?

12:34:50

4 A. Well, that affected the movement greatly. The war was
5 not progressing because we were not having any other place
6 to get ammunition from, so it affected us greatly.

7 Q. What was it that affected the getting of the
8 ammunitions and the arms?

12:35:12

9 A. Well, at that time the enemy had cut off the supply
10 line between us and the NPFL, where we used to get our
11 ammunition to fight with. That was why the war was not
12 progressing, because we could not fight without the
13 logistics that so affected us immensely.

14 Q. What happened to the movement?

12:35:35

15 A. Well, the movement collapsed a little. We were just on
16 defensive. Our only offensive was to lay ambush and we
17 returned to our same base where we were, so that really
18 created a problem for us."

19 Line 27:

12:35:55

20 "Q. How long did that situation last?

21 A. It started in 1992 up to 1993. It stopped there and
22 then phase 2 started when we went and met with the leader
23 but from 1992 right up to 1996, the border between us and
24 NPFL was cut off. We had no relationship with them from
12:36:23 25 1992 right to 1996."

26 Now, pausing again, question one: Do you agree with what
27 this witness was telling these judges, that from 1991 to 1992,
28 the RUF were getting their arms and ammunition from the NPFL?

29 A. No. Because this, it was in --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Start again.

4 A. I said this person was in Pujehun District in '91 to '94

12:37:12 5 and what happened in late 1991, the ULIMO and the government --

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: What person is the witness referring to?

7 Mr Sesay, which person are you referring to who was in Pujehun?

8 THE WITNESS: The witness.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: How do you know who the witness is?

12:37:36 10 THE WITNESS: Well, they asked me about the certain person

11 yesterday, where he was, and from the way I can follow this

12 testimony, I just conclude that it's the person.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: The person that you are referring to is

14 the person that counsel asked you before you went into the

12:38:01 15 testimony? Very well.

16 So the question we haven't had an answer to relates to the

17 - whether you, Mr Sesay, agree that from 1991 to 1992, the RUF

18 were getting their arms and ammunition from the NPFL, and you

19 said no. Then you were about to tell us why you disagree.

12:38:41 20 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said the RUF were on two

21 flanks; the Pujehun District and the Kailahun District. The

22 Pujehun District in late 1991 the ULIMO forces and the government

23 troops pushed the RUF to the border. In fact, the ULIMO, which

24 he said came from Lofa and they fortified the border, between

12:39:10 25 Liberia and Sierra Leone, this is Pujehun District, no, that's

26 not correct. The ULIMO came from there and they came through

27 Pujehun District, they crossed the Mano River Bridge when they

28 defeated the RUF and before they spread into Lofa Bridge and into

29 Lofa County after they crossed the Mano River. So from late 1991

1 the RUF in Pujehun District were cut off. They were now
2 surviving on captured ammunition from the government troops. Up
3 to 1994, before they joined Mr Sankoh in Zogoda, some of them -
4 while some of them remained in Pujehun.

12:40:01

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. So those who were pushed from Pujehun, what knowledge would
7 they have of those who remained in Kailahun?

8 A. There was no communication because had they hadn't any
9 radio sets to communicate with the Kailahun group, so they

12:40:22

10 couldn't communicate with Mr Sankoh. This continued until 1993,
11 when they sent Manawai, together with other men, to check in
12 Kailahun and to be able to see Mr Sankoh and explain their
13 situation in Pujehun to him, and, indeed, they came through the
14 Gola Forest to Jojoima, it was in Jojoima that they came and they

12:40:52

15 went to Mr Sankoh. So this group, about seven of them to ten,
16 remained in Kailahun, that was including Augustine Koroma, he was
17 the most senior man among them. They were now in Kailahun until
18 1994, December 1993, when they went to Mr Sankoh, that Mr Sankoh
19 was to create the Zogoda. So Mr Sankoh was to send them,

12:41:24

20 together with some other armed men, to go to radio set - to go to
21 the Pujehun District. And when they went there, they installed
22 the radio set and they spoke to Mr Sankoh. That was early 1994.
23 When they called for reinforcement from Pujehun, that is Gibril
24 Massaquoi, Monica Pearson, Momoh Rogers, many of them came.

12:41:51

25 Q. Now, second question: Do you agree that ULIMO effectively
26 sealed the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia up to
27 Robertsport from 1992 through to 1996?

28 A. Yes. ULIMO controlled the entire border from 1992 to 1997,
29 the entire Liberian-Sierra Leone border, from the Mano River

1 Bridge down to Mendekoma, that is the Kailahun District; the
2 entire Liberian border, ULIMO controlled it from 1992 to 1997.

3 Q. And the testimony continues in this way. Line 14, page
4 9446:

12:42:58 5 "Q. And in relation to the getting of arms and
6 ammunition, what happened in 1996?

7 A. Well, in 1996 we had serious pressure from the
8 Kamajors and it was almost at the point of collapsing, the
9 movement was almost at the point of collapsing. Well, at
10 that time we were able to get connection again with Liberia
11 because there was now peace in Liberia and so we had some
12 connection with Liberians again.

13 Q. And what was the result of the connection you had with
14 Liberia, when it comes to the getting of arms and
15 ammunition?

16 A. That was the time Foday Sankoh came from Abidjan and
17 met us in Kailahun. He gave some money to Sam Bockarie,
18 some dollars. At that time we had so much pressure. We
19 had materials to fight against the Kamajors, so he gave
20 some money to that man to try by whatever means for us to
21 get logistics to fight with."

22 And then he goes on to explain that the money was given to
23 Sam Bockarie.

24 "Q. Do you know how much money was given to Sam Bockarie?

12:44:21 25 A. No, he did not disclose the total to us. He only said
26 the Pa had left some money for us to try and get
27 ammunition."

28 Now, is it right that in 1996, Sankoh gave some money to
29 Bockarie after Sankoh came from Abidjan to purchase arms and

1 ammunition?

2 A. Yes, yes, Mr Sankoh gave \$7,000 to Sam Bockarie in Buedu in
3 my presence, and Gibri I Massaquoi was also there. Peter Vandi
4 too was there and Sam Bockarie; that is in November 1996, yes.

12:45:07 5 Q. Question line 7, page 9447:

6 "Q. Do you know whether Sam Bockarie was able to get arms
7 and ammunition with that money?

8 A. Yes. We started getting some arms and ammunition that
9 sustained the movement."

12:45:29 10 Line 15:

11 "Q. Was there a time when you, yourself, were involved in
12 getting arms and ammunition?"

13 Line 20:

14 "A. Yes.

12:45:47 15 Q. How many times were you involved in obtaining arms and
16 ammunition for the RUF?

17 A. Three times.

18 Q. When was the first time?

19 A. The first time, it was after the intervention.

12:46:00 20 Q. Where were you based at this time?

21 A. I was in Baiima then."

22 Now, you've indicated, Mr Sesay, that you know who this
23 witness is. Was this witness in Baiima after the intervention?

24 A. Yes, yes. From February - from March, it was in March that
12:46:27 25 Sam Bockarie deployed him in Baiima, from March he was in Baiima
26 up to October 1999.

27 Q. "Q. How was it that you became involved in obtaining arms
28 and ammunition on that occasion?

29 A. I had a call from our high command, who was Sam

1 Bockarie. He called me at his base in Buedu.

2 Q. What did that Sam Bockarie say to you?

3 A. He said Pa Taylor was to send some ammunition for the
4 RUF, that we were to go and collect it."

12:47:10 5 And then he goes on to describe that he had a Land Rover.

6 Did this individual have a Land Rover after the

7 intervention, Mr Sesay, can you recall?

8 A. Yes. He had a Land Rover. That was what he used in

9 Baiima.

12:47:31 10 Q. "Q. What did you do after the phone call you had with Sam

11 Bockarie?

12 A. When he called me he told me that ammunition was to be
13 brought to Foya and so we should go and collect it."

14 Line 24:

12:47:54 15 "A. So I joined him and we travelled, we took his two

16 jeeps that he had and mine and we moved to Foya.

17 Q. Who did you join?

18 A. I joined Mosquito. We took his two jeeps that he had,
19 and mine, and we moved to Foya.

12:48:16 20 Q. So how many jeeps went to Foya?

21 A. Three.

22 Q. Three vehicles. And who were the people who went to
23 Foya?

24 A. I went - the two of us went with few of his security
12:48:28 25 men and his radio man.

26 Q. Do you know the name of the radio man?

27 A. Elevation.

28 Q. What did you do when you got to Foya?

29 A. Well, at that time we went but the helicopter had not

1 arrived yet because he told us that the helicopter was to
2 bring the materials and we went to the commander, the
3 commander was one Commander Joseph."

4 Now, there is a lot there that I want to ask you about,

12:48:58 5 Mr Sesay. So what this individual is saying, sometime after the
6 intervention, so after February 1998, he gets a call from Sam
7 Bockarie who tells him that he, Sam Bockarie, has received a call
8 from Pa Taylor, who will be sending ammunition to Foya by
9 helicopter and you are to go there and collect it. Any truth in
10 that?

11 A. That is not true. That is not true. Because I never heard
12 that a helicopter landed in Foya for the RUF, or brought a RUF
13 person throughout 1998 - for a helicopter to bring a RUF person,
14 that was after the Lome Accord that that started between
12:49:51 15 Mr Taylor and the RUF. But before that time, no, and this - this
16 witness, this person, was - I came to Buedu in late February
17 1998, and this man was in Daru at that time. Because when we
18 withdrew from Kenema, they were in Daru, so Bockarie and
19 I visited Daru, we visited Daru from Buedu, they were there. Up
12:50:27 20 to the time ECOMOG and the Kamajors captured Daru and they
21 withdrew. That was the time Bockarie said I should take care of
22 Baiima and Manawai was to go and take care of Kui va and Foday
23 Kamara should take care of Mobai. From that time I was --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this
12:50:52 25 area, kindly, slowly.

26 JUDGE DOHERTY: Before he does repeat this, I understood
27 the question was directed to who will be sending ammunition to
28 Foya by helicopter and you go there to collect it. And he's
29 referring to a RUF person coming by helicopter.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Okay, let's clarify this. First of all, in 1998, to your
3 knowledge, was any arms or ammunition transported by helicopter
4 to Foya to be picked up by RUF personnel?

12:51:38 5 A. No, that never happened in 1998, such a thing never
6 happened. And to say - like even what you said, that Elevation
7 was Sam Bockarie's operator, Elevation never became Sam
8 Bockarie's operator. Elevation was my own operator. And he
9 never crossed the Sierra Leonean border with Sam Bockarie, never.

12:52:08 10 Q. That was at page 9449, line 10, that the radio man that
11 went with them was Elevation. You're saying that never happened?

12 A. No. Elevation - that never happened. Elevation was my
13 radio operator from 1997 to 2001, up to the end of the
14 disarmament. He was never assigned to Sam Bockarie, and he never
15 moved anywhere where Sam Bockarie went.

16 Q. Do you know of a commander in Foya called Commander Joseph?

17 A. No, I never knew that person to be a commander in Foya.

18 Q. And the witness's account of these events continues at page
19 9453 in this way. Line 16, having explained that, after an hour
12:53:08 20 or so, we saw a helicopter coming, it came to Foya, it was flying
21 over Foya:

22 "Q. Where did it land?

23 A. Foya airfield.

24 Q. Can you describe the helicopter, please?

12:53:25 25 A. It was a military helicopter.

26 Q. What do you mean by military?

27 A. It had a green colour.

28 Q. How many people were in the helicopter?

29 A. Two pilots and I saw up to five people who alighted

1 from the helicopter."

2 Line 21.

3 "A. Mr Bockarie introduced me to a man whom he said was
4 Mr Taylor's chief bodyguard. He said his name was Benjamin

12:53:53 5 Yeaten and they used to call him Director."

6 Line 27:

7 "Q. Did you see the person who was the pilot of this
8 helicopter?

9 A. Yes, sir.

12:54:02 10 Q. Can you describe what that person looked like?

11 A. He was white. They were white people."

12 And then he goes on line 11:

13 "They were Ukrainians. Bockarie - later I asked
14 Mr Bockarie and he said they were Ukrainians."

12:54:18 15 Line 17:

16 "Q. Did you know where this helicopter had flown from?"

17 Line 20:

18 "A. Monrovia."

19 Over the page, please, 9456:

12:54:32 20 "A. After the blacks had alighted we went there and
21 off-loaded the material and put them into the vehicle.

22 Q. Can you remember what the materials were?"

23 Line 9:

24 "A. They were AK rounds and there was RPG rockets and
12:54:52 25 there were RPG tubes; 40 boxes of AK rounds were there, 10
26 boxes of RPG tubes and some arms, AK-47s."

27 Mr Sesay, after the intervention, do you recall the RUF
28 receiving that quantity of material flown by helicopter from
29 Monrovia to Foya, 40 boxes of AK rounds, 10 boxes of RPG rockets?

1 A. This kind of thing never happened, after the intervention.
2 It never happened. It never happened. Because if this kind of
3 thing happened, then there was no need for Sam Bockarie to send
4 Kennedy, Matthew Kennedy Sesay, to go and be based in Voinjama to
12:55:48 5 be buying buried ammunition from the ex-ULIMO fighters, honestly.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: To be what? To go to Voinjama to do
7 what?

8 THE WITNESS: To be buying ammunition that ex-ULIMO
9 fighters had buried. Those were the ammunition that Kennedy
12:56:10 10 bought. I said if Sam Bockarie received this kind of ammunition
11 that this person spoke about, then there was no need for Kennedy
12 to be sent to be buying buried ammunition from Voinjama because
13 when they would bring them they would have to wash them, dry them
14 in the sun, before we would ever use them.

12:56:31 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. And then he continues, page 9457, line 12:

17 "A. We left Foya, we came to Buedu. The materials were
18 put into the store, the ammunition dump.

19 Q. Where was the ammunition dump?

12:56:50 20 A. It's on the Foya road very close to his house.

21 Q. Whose house?

22 A. Sam Bockarie's house."

23 Now, Mr Sesay, help us: Was there an ammunition dump close
24 to Sam Bockarie's house?

12:57:06 25 A. No. There was no ammunition dump near Sam Bockarie's
26 house. The only place where Bockarie stored ammunition was at
27 his store room, the place I pointed. That door, the store door
28 that I pointed at. Even the ammunition that Kennedy bought, they
29 were stored there. But if you come from the Foya end and you

1 pass the court barri and pass the place where Lawrence and others
2 were there, there was no ammunition dump in between there and
3 Bockarie's house.

4 Q. Now, you will recall that when I began dealing with this
12:57:46 5 topic of arms and ammunition, I recounted to you that the witness
6 had said that he was involved on three such missions to collect
7 ammunition. At page 9458, 9 May 2008, he was asked this:

8 "Q. When was the second occasion?

9 A. That was in 1998 still.

12:58:15 10 Q. Whenabouts in 1998?

11 A. Well, after this mission, because this other one was
12 around March to April, it was not too long. It was a short
13 time. That was the time ULIMO and the LURD forces invaded
14 Lofa."

12:58:36 15 So let's pause and put that together, shall we. What this
16 individual was telling these judges was this: Shortly after the
17 ECOMOG intervention, the RUF received 40 boxes of AK rounds, ten
18 boxes of RPG rockets and some AK-47s. Not too long after that, a
19 second trip is made, so let's deal with the second trip. Line
12:59:13 20 16:

21 "Q. How did you become involved on that occasion in
22 obtaining the arms and ammunition?

23 A. The commander called me again, that is Mosquito at the
24 same place, Buedu, and explained the issue to me. That
12:59:28 25 that was what the Pa had told him, that those men had
26 invaded his men at Lofa County. That's ULIMO and LURD."
27 And he then explains that the Pa is Mr Taylor.

28 "Q. Now you said that those men had invaded his men at
29 Lofa, who were those men who invaded and who were his men?

1 A. The LURD forces.

2 Q. And who had the LURD forces invaded?

3 A. Charles Taylor.

4 Q. So what else did Sam Bockarie tell you?

13:00:09 5 A. He said we were to put men together to go and help
6 to clear the enemy from that place.

7 Q. And what did you do when you were told to put men
8 together and go and help to clear the enemy?

9 A. Well, he gave me my own task that I was to go and
13:00:24 10 prepare men in Kono and that Issa - I was told to go and
11 prepare manpower for that same mission" - line 17 - "and he
12 said that he had told Issa and Morris Kallon to do the same
13 preparation in Kono."

14 Now, pause. March/April 1998, that's page 9458. Was there
13:01:00 15 discussions about you going to Kono with Morris Kallon at that
16 time in 1998, Mr Sesay?

17 A. Not at all.

18 Q. And do you recall at or about the time that the attack on
19 Kono was being planned, that simultaneously it was being
13:01:25 20 suggested that men be put together to go and fight LURD in
21 Liberia?

22 A. In fact, since the time I left Kono in February of '98
23 I never went back to Kono until December. That was when I went
24 back to Kono and --

13:01:48 25 Q. My question is this: At the time that there was a
26 discussion about attacking Kono, was there at the same time a
27 discussion about sending RUF fighters to Liberia to fight LURD?

28 A. No.

29 Q. "Q. What did you do in relation to the manpower?"

1 A. I brought them to Buedu.

2 Q. How many men did you bring to Buedu?"

3 Line 28.

4 "A. 62 in number."

13:02:31 5 And then he goes on:

6 "We divided the number into two groups, we divided them and
7 told them that we were to enter at two flanks. While Sam
8 Bockarie and I were to enter by the Foya axis, and the other
9 flank was to enter by Vahun."

13:02:57 10 Line 12:

11 "Q. And did you and Sam Bockarie enter by the Foya axis?"

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And what did you do?

14 A. We attacked Foya Town.

13:03:09 15 Q. Who did you attack?

16 A. The LURD forces.

17 Q. Where did the LURD forces go after you attacked them?

18 A. They went to Kolahun. We chased them and we went to
19 the same Kolahun.

13:03:23 20 Q. Where did you chase them to?

21 A. Voinjama.

22 Q. What happened after you captured Voinjama?

23 A. We had an order from Benjamin Yeaten to chase the men
24 right from where they had come from.

13:03:40 25 Q. And where had they come from?

26 A. They said they'd come from Guinea.

27 Q. Did you chase them to Guinea?

28 A. Yes. We captured a town that was called Bayalo in
29 Guinea. We received orders to burn the entire town and

1 that we did.

2 Q. Who did you get the order from?

3 A. Benjamin Yeaten?

4 Q. And what happened after you got to Voinjama?

13:04:08 5 A. We spent the night there and in the morning we put our
6 men together and we returned to Foya. Then we left the
7 Liberians there.

8 Q. Where did you go?

9 A. Then Sam Bockarie took me to Monrovia."

13:04:19 10 Do you know anything about this, Mr Sesay?

11 A. No. I don't know about any movement that this man
12 undertook to go to Liberia. That did not happen in 1998. I said
13 throughout 1998 to October 1999 this man was based at that place,
14 Baiima.

13:04:42 15 Q. Now, let's be clear what the man was telling these judges.
16 That this took place in March/April 1998, when RUF combatants
17 entered Lofa County at two points, Foya and Vahun, and battle
18 pushed LURD forces all the way to Voinjama upon the orders of
19 Benjamin Yeaten. Mr Sesay, help us. In March/April 1998, what
13:05:21 20 was the position of the RUF in Sierra Leone?

21 A. Well, Sam Bockarie posted me to Pendembu in late April of
22 '98 and I used to visit Vahun, I used to visit Tengbeh there, and
23 there were over 100,000 displaced persons in the refugee camp in
24 Vahun. There had no attacks in Lofa throughout 1998. And in
13:05:51 25 fact LURD attack was in 1999. That was the time the fighting
26 started going on there when we heard about it over the BBC. It
27 was in '99, not '98. So that man was working directly under me
28 from April to December '98 when I left the Kailahun District.
29 Everything having to do with Baiima, Mobai, Jojoima, every one of

1 them reported to me. They used to report to me and I in return
2 reported to Sam Bockarie. Mike Lamin used to come, he would
3 visit Baiima, he would visit Mobai, he would visit Kui va.

4 So everything pertaining to these various targets and the
13:06:31 5 battalion commanders around that area, shortage of food, shortage
6 of ammunition, medicine, if the combat medic did not have
7 sufficient medicines I was the commander who was based in
8 Pendembu that they used to inform. And what I knew about is that
9 this man was in Baiima starting from March of 1998 up to December
13:06:54 10 when he left the Kailahun District. He did not move to go to
11 anywhere. The only places - the only place he moved to was to
12 come to Pendembu where he attended meetings, or sometimes he left
13 Baiima to go to the village where his family was based. That was
14 between Mobai Junction and Pendembu.

13:07:12 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, how far is Baiima from Buedu?

16 THE WITNESS: My Lord, from Buedu to Kailahun Town is 17
17 miles, Kailahun Town to Pendembu is 17. That is 34. And
18 Pendembu to Mobai Junction is 10 miles. 44 miles. And Mobai
19 Junction to Baiima is 5 miles. That is 49 miles, my Lord. 49
13:07:41 20 miles.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: So from where you were living to where
22 this man was living is about 49 miles?

23 THE WITNESS: No, ma'am, my Lord. From Buedu to Baiima is
24 49 miles. From where I was staying, Pendembu to Baiima, is 19
13:08:01 25 miles - no, 15 miles. Because Mobai is 10 miles, then Baiima 5
26 miles, 15 miles if you use the main road. But if you use the
27 footpath it's 10 miles. From where I was staying and where he
28 was staying. If you use the car road it's 15 miles. If you use
29 the bush path, the survey road, it's 10 miles.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Please proceed.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, do you know of an occasion when Sam Bockarie took this
4 man who we are talking about to Monrovia in 1998?

13:08:44 5 A. No, Sam Bockarie never took this man with him to Monrovia
6 in 1998.

7 Q. Page 9461, line 25:

8 "A. Then Sam Bockarie took me to go to Monrovia."

9 9462, line 3:

13:09:02 10 "A. I went --

11 Q. Who went to Monrovia?

12 A. I went and Sam Bockarie went too and one of his
13 bodyguards called Magazine.

14 Did Sam Bockarie have a bodyguard called Magazine?

13:09:25 15 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie had a fellow called magazine.

16 Q. "A. Well, we were the ones who went.

17 Q. How did you get to Monrovia?" Remember this is '98.

18 "A. The same military helicopter with the combat colour
19 picked us up from Foya."

13:09:45 20 Line 15:

21 "Q. When you landed at this field in Monrovia city, where
22 did you go from there?

23 A. A vehicle came and received us and we drove together
24 with Benjamin Yeaten and we went to Benjamin Yeaten's place

13:10:04 25 White Flower.

26 Q. Where did you meet Benjamin Yeaten?

27 A. Well, this helicopter that came, all of us travelled
28 in it.

29 Q. Where did you meet Benjamin Yeaten?

1 A. Foya.

2 Q. Had he come in the helicopter?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What did you went do when you went to his place at
13:10:25 5 White Flower?"

6 Page 9463:

7 "A. That was where we lodged, because he had taken us
8 there. We spent some days in Monrovia, like three days.

9 I was at Mr Benjamin's place and in the morning the two of

13:10:42 10 them would go out to meet with the President. They will

11 say they were going to meet with the President. That being

12 Benjamin Yeaten and Sam Bockarie.

13 Q. Did you yourself ever go to meet with Taylor on that
14 occasion?

13:11:00 15 A. No."

16 Question page 9464 - no, to get the context we need to go
17 higher up:

18 "Q. Did you speak to Sam Bockarie after he had met with
19 Charles Taylor?

13:11:23 20 A. Yes. He told me that they had come from the
21 President's and that was the mansion ground.

22 Q. Did he tell you what had taken place in his meeting
23 with Charles Taylor?

24 A. The Pa said we should wait, that he had promised to
13:11:43 25 give us morale booster and some ammunition for us to go
26 back with.

27 Q. And did you wait?

28 A. Yes, we waited.

29 Q. What happened after you waited?

1 A. The day that we were to move was when I saw some
2 ammunition and Sam Bockarie told me that the Pa had given
3 him \$10,000.

4 Q. Where did you see this ammunition?

13:12:09 5 A. It was at the Pa's house where Benjamin Yeaten was, at
6 the back of the house Pa Taylor's house, White Flower.

7 Q. And what was this ammunition that you saw there?

8 A. They gave us AK rounds and some RPG rockets. And then
9 he went on to say that he saw the \$10,000 and how the
13:12:35 10 helicopter took them to Foya and that on return, he,
11 Bockarie, invited the commanders Issa, Morris Kallon and
12 the other officers, and he explained to them about the few
13 materials that we had gone with and the \$10,000 that the Pa
14 had given us."

13:12:58 15 And then he goes on:

16 "Q. What happened to the \$10,000?

17 A. We decided that, well, let the money be used to buy
18 drugs for the wounded soldiers so that they would be
19 treated."

13:13:19 20 Now, that's page 9468, lines 4 and 5. Do you recall any of
21 this, Mr Sesay?

22 A. No. These events did not take place.

23 Q. Well, you see this individual is saying you were there,
24 involved in this discussion with Sam Bockarie, after Bockarie had
13:13:44 25 returned from Monrovia bearing \$10,000. So you were supposed to
26 be there. Did this happen, Mr Sesay?

27 A. I said it's a lie, he's lying, this kind of thing did not
28 happen. It did not happen.

29 Q. Page 9469, line 12:

1 "Q. Was there a third occasion when you yourself were
2 involved in obtaining arms and ammunition for the RUF?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. When?"

13:14:26 5 Line 16:

6 "A. That was 2000, after the May incident that occurred in
7 Freetown."

8 So remember, in May 2000, Mr Sesay, did you travel to
9 Monrovia?

13:14:47 10 A. Yes, late May, I travelled to Monrovia.

11 Q. "Q. And just so that we get the context, when was this
12 one, the third occasion?

13 A. That was 2000, after the May incident that occurred in
14 Freetown. There was some problem between RUF and the

13:15:12 15 Government of Sierra Leone. Our men and the UN had some
16 clash in the northern province and a lot of the UN
17 personnel were captured. That was the problem that went
18 right up to Freetown. Even the civilians and the soldiers,
19 the government demonstrated against the RUF who were in
13:15:33 20 Freetown because that was their own zone. So that was the
21 problem.

22 Q. And where were you based in May of 2000?

23 A. I was in Bo Town".

24 Now, we know who we're talking about, Mr Sesay, so help us.

13:15:56 25 In May of 2000 was this individual based in Bo?

26 A. Yes, he was in Bo. He was not in Kailahun at this time.

27 He was in Bo.

28 Q. Line 7:

29 "A. We were there to monitor the peace, it was because of

1 the peace that I went there. I was working with CNC, that
2 is, ceasefire monitoring committee or commission."

3 Was he?

4 A. No. He was not a CMC member. He only went to Bo where
13:16:35 5 Mr Sankoh was trying to have an office established, but the CMC
6 members who were in Bo, he was not part of them.

7 Q. Page 9471, please, line 18:

8 "Q. And you said at that time you were in Bo Town and you
9 became involved in a third mission to obtain arms and
13:17:06 10 ammunition for the RUF. How did you become involved in
11 that third mission?

12 A. Well, the time that incident took place in Freetown,
13 most of our men, our RUF members, were captured, and even
14 those of us who were in Bo, the same thing happened to us.
13:17:28 15 They tried to ransack wing and then they captured some
16 people but I escaped and I went to Kenema. When I went to
17 Kenema the same thing started there. I also escaped and
18 I went to Tongo."

19 Do you recall any of this?

13:17:50 20 A. Well, I knew that after the incident in Freetown, this
21 fellow, and the other RUF members who were in Kenema and Bo, they
22 left Kenema and Bo and they went to Kailahun and Tongo.

23 Q. "Q. And you escaped and you ended up, you said you went to
24 Tongo, what happened in Tongo?

13:18:15 25 A. Well, when I got there I sent a message to Mr Sesay,
26 General Sesay, that I had arrived there and then he ordered
27 me not to stay there but that I should go to Kailahun."
28 Did you give him such an order?

29 A. No. He withdrew from Kenema to Kailahun. He did not send

1 any message to me from Tongo. He went back to Kailahun and to
2 Baiima here - where he was before.

3 Q. "Q. What happened when you went to Kailahun?

13:18:53

4 A. Well, when I went to Kailahun, at that time I realised
5 that the Indians were captured and that was the same place
6 where I went to. And then he said to me that they were
7 going to change the command. That was the first brigade
8 commander who was there, that I was supposed to replace
9 him. And then at that time he gave me a new promotion and
10 a new assignment to serve as brigade commander."

13:19:10

11 True?

12 A. Yes. I replaced the brigade commander but that was in late
13 2000, when I said he should be the brigade commander, that was
14 around November 2000.

13:19:30

15 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm not sure I understand that last
16 answer. "Yes, I replaced the brigade commander but that was in
17 late 2000, when I said he should be the brigade commander, that
18 was around November 2000." So what kind of an answer is that?

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:20:06

20 Q. Did you appoint this witness to become brigade commander?

21 A. Yes. That was what I said. I said it was in November
22 2000, that was when I appointed him as brigade commander.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Not that Issa Sesay replaced the brigade
24 commander but that he replaced the person who was brigade
25 commander. That's what he means, yes.

13:20:32

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. "Q. Well, the commander who was there" - line 24 - "who
28 was there, Denis Lansana was the person that I replaced."
29 Is that true?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "Q. And what were your duties when you replaced
3 Denis Lansana?

4 A. My first duty after taking up the command was that
13:21:05 5 I should put pressure on the commanders to free these men,
6 that is the UN peacekeepers who had been arrested, who had
7 been taken hostage by the men. After I had taken over the
8 UN, the other Indians in the UN also came to receive their
9 brothers in Kailahun but that resulted to a serious
13:21:25 10 disaster that led to destruction of places in Pendembu and
11 other areas. So I went there and I tried to put things
12 under control but my men incurred serious casualties and
13 I lost the lives of most of my men in that mission.

14 Q. How were the lives of most of your men lost in that
13:21:47 15 mission?

16 A. Well, we did not expect that kind of battle to confront
17 us and they took us unawares, it was very early in the
18 morning that they attacked, they raided us in the air and
19 then they bombarded us on the ground, and I was living
13:22:02 20 around that same area in Pendembu, so both soldiers and
21 civilians lost their lives on that ground and more than
22 50 houses were burnt down."

23 Do you recognise such an incident?

24 A. Yes, that incident took place but he was not the brigade
13:22:22 25 commander at that time. That was when the Indians who were in
26 Kailahun decided to bulldoze their way to withdraw from Kailahun
27 Town. So they attacked Pendembu, so it was not up to 50 RUF
28 combatants who died. They were the ones who the Indians met in
29 the hospital who were the wounded soldiers that the Indians

1 killed and they burned down 50 houses in Pendembu Town and then
2 proceeded to Daru.

3 Q. Was this witness the brigade commander at the time of that
4 incident?

13:22:59 5 A. No, no. It was after that time that I appointed him as
6 brigade commander.

7 Q. And then he continues:

8 "Q. After that had taken place, did you receive a fresh
9 assignment?

13:23:14 10 A. Yes. That was my assignment but I went on one
11 operation and I was still brigade commander.

12 Q. What was the operation that you went on?

13 A. Well, that was the last invasion that Damate Konneh,
14 the same LURD that we're talking about, that

13:23:37 15 commander that brought them, that is Sekou Damate Konneh's
16 own troops, they came and based in Voijnjama."

17 And he goes on to explain that they were LURD forces. Line
18 23:

19 "Q. Your mission was to do what?

13:23:56 20 A. Well, I received the similar instruction from the
21 commander, Mr Sesay, that I should put men together to go
22 and join Benjamin Yeaten at Kolahun."

23 Did you give this witness such an instruction, Mr Sesay?

24 A. No. I did not give him such an instruction and at the time
13:24:19 25 he took over, when I appointed him as commander in Kailahun he
26 did not take any men across into Liberia to go and fight there.

27 Q. He goes on to say that they went to Foya and then to
28 Kolahun, this is page 9475, line 15:

29 "A. When we got to Kolahun we were there for two to three

1 days and we were waiting for ammunition.

2 Q. Did more ammunition arrive?

3 A. Yes."

4 And then he goes on to say that thereafter they moved on to

13:25:16 5 Voijnama. And he goes on to say at page 9477 that:

6 "A. We captured Voijnama" - line 3 - "and the LURD forces
7 withdrew to Guinea. And that they then chased them to the
8 border. And that this was communicated to Benjamin Yeaten
9 and that their radio operator was someone called Mortiga."

13:25:56 10 Do you know of a radio operator called Mortiga?

11 A. Yes, I know Mortiga.

12 Q. Do you recall an occasion in the year 2000 when Mortiga
13 accompanied this witness on a mission into Liberia?

14 A. No, no.

13:26:17 15 Q. Whose radio operator was Mortiga?

16 A. At first, Mortiga was Mr Sankoh's radio operator, and
17 later, starting from '97 up to 2000, he was an operator who was
18 normally assigned to targets in the Kailahun District.

19 Q. What is Mortiga's real name?

13:26:47 20 A. Well, I don't know his real name.

21 Q. And then the witness says that after this mission, line 17,
22 page 9478:

23 "A. Mr Yeaten took me to Monrovia.

24 Q. Why did Benjamin Yeaten take you back to Monrovia?

13:27:13 25 A. Well, he was so happy with the mission, and he said we
26 should go for me to see - meet the President, Mr Taylor."

27 And then he describes travelling by helicopter to Monrovia.
28 Then page 9479:

29 "A. We went to White Flower with Benjamin Yeaten.

1 Q. Was there anybody else in Monrovia that you met after
2 you arrived?

3 A. Well, no. We did not meet some other person, but
4 somebody met us there.

13:27:48 5 Q. Who was the person that met you there?

6 A. General Sesay, Issa Sesay."

7 Now, do you recall an occasion, Mr Sesay, when this witness
8 that we are talking about met you in Monrovia?

9 A. No. This witness never met me in Monrovia, nor did I ever
13:28:14 10 meet him in Monrovia. Since the time I became interim leader,
11 this witness did not go to Monrovia. He remained in Kailahun up
12 to the disarmament time.

13 Q. "Q. And whereabouts in Monrovia did General Issa Sesay
14 meet you?"

13:28:51 15 Page 9481:

16 "Q. The person you met, who met you in Monrovia, you said
17 was Issa Sesay, whereabouts did he meet you?

18 A. Well, we met at Benjamin Yeaten's place. This is at
19 the back of the President's house."

13:29:15 20 Mr Sesay, have you ever been to Benjamin Yeaten's house?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. When?

23 A. I went to his house in - it was in October 2000. October
24 2000, I went to his house. That was the time I went with the
13:29:34 25 delegation, when I went to drop the delegation. That was the
26 first time I went to his house.

27 Q. Had you - did you go to his house thereafter?

28 A. No. After that time, I never went to his house any more.

29 Q. When in October 2000 you went to Benjamin Yeaten's house,

1 did you meet this witness there?

2 A. No. This witness was not in Liberia, at the time I was
3 taking the delegation along, this witness was in Kailahun. By
4 then I met him in Pendembu, he was based in Pendembu. Before
13:30:22 5 October, he was not the brigade commander at that time. It was
6 in November 2000 that I appointed him as the brigade commander.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, if this is an appropriate
8 time, we will take our luncheon break and reconvene at 2.30.

9 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

14:26:01 10 [Upon resuming at 2.32 p.m.]

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, please
12 continue.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, can I indicate for the
14 record that Mr Munyard is no longer with us.

14:32:59 15 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, this individual gave further details of this
16 trip to Monrovia during which he met you. He said this:

17 "A. The first plan after the mission" - that was the
18 mission that he went on in Foya up to Voinjama - "was that
19 after accomplishing the mission, I should come and see the
14:33:48 20 Pa, and that was the reason why we moved me to that place,
21 but after the arrival of Issa, I did not see that happen
22 again. After Issa's arrival, I did not see Mr Taylor."

23 And then he goes on:

24 "A. Issa Sesay and Benjamin Yeaten would go to the
14:34:12 25 mansion."

26 And further:

27 "A. I was at Benjamin Yeaten's place" - this is 9497, line
28 24 - "when they told me that they were going to meet Mr
29 Taylor at the mansion. So they moved together with

1 Benjamin Yeaten, Issa Sesay, Benjamin Yeaten, so I did not
2 follow them any longer. They moved again and went to the
3 mansion. When we arrived in Monrovia on the first day,
4 Issa was not there but he came on the second day."

14:34:52 5 And then he said that on the fourth day they returned.

6 This is page 9498, line 13:

7 "A. We flew back, Issa Sesay and I. We came back to Foya
8 because that is where we left the troops.

9 Q. When you left to return to Foya, how did you travel?

14:35:19 10 A. That morning, I saw war materials, logistics, and they
11 were put into the vehicle, and that same field where we
12 used to land was the same field where we took the
13 logistics."

14 And then he indicates that these were taken from the dump
14:35:37 15 at the back of the President's house, Benjamin Yeaten's place,
16 and then these were the logistics, page 9499:

17 "A. I saw AK rounds, a good number of it, RPG rockets,
18 that too a good quantity. I saw AK machine guns, new ones,
19 they were also in good quantity, and I saw RPG tubes, and
14:36:02 20 they too were in good quantity and they were new ones, and
21 I saw grenades and other materials that I cannot recall
22 now.

23 Q. When you were there and you saw this material at the
24 back of the President's house" - bottom of the page - "who
14:36:20 25 else if anyone was present apart from you?

26 A. Issa was present, Benjamin Yeaten and the security
27 officers were present. And I saw Zigzag Marzah. He was
28 there too. The time the materials was loaded I saw Zigzag
29 Marzah and other ATU soldiers." Line 18: "Zigzag Marzah

1 was one of the President's securities."

2 Now - and then he goes on to say, page 9503, line 9:

3 "Q. What happened to that material that you saw there?"

4 Bottom of the page, line 26.

14:37:09 5 "A. I said when they had loaded the materials into those
6 two vehicles, one van and a jeep, when they'd loaded the
7 materials, they brought another jeep where we - we went
8 into that vehicle and went to the field."

9 Over the page, 9504:

14:37:29 10 "Q. Who went to the field with the vehicle?" Line 4.

11 A. Issa Sesay."

12 And then the bottom of the page:

13 "A. After we arrived, the materials were taken out and
14 transferred into the helicopter but I was really concerned
14:37:48 15 why this quantity of materials, when there was disarmament
16 on in Sierra Leone, they were talking about peace and again
17 they'd sent this quantum of materials."

18 And then it goes on. Line 17:

19 "A. Issa Sesay entered into the helicopter." Line 21:

14:38:12 20 "We landed in Foya." Line 23: "We met vehicles that had
21 come from Kailahun and we loaded all the material into the
22 vehicles. We waited until the evening and we travelled,
23 and they waited until the evening because we were afraid
24 because at that time UNAMSIL had deployed and we were
14:38:31 25 travelling with materials. We were afraid that they will
26 see us. That is why we waited until night."

27 And then he goes on to say that the material was moved with
28 you accompanying it to Buedu, to Kailahun, to Pendembu.

29 Now, I have gone into some detail in relation to that,

1 Mr Sesay, because this individual is implicating you deeply in
2 carrying a quantity of war materials in a helicopter from
3 Monrovia to Foya and then by road from Foya to Kailahun at a time
4 when you say you were disarming. Is this true?

14:39:22 5 A. No, this is not true. This is not true. The time that I
6 went to Monrovia in October 2000, when I went to accompany the
7 delegation that was to go to Abuja, like Jamba Goba, the two of
8 us travelled together, that woman, from Kono to Monrovia. Then I
9 waited in Monrovia while they returned. I travelled together
14:39:50 10 with them from Monrovia back to Kono. I did not travel with this
11 man to Monrovia and I did not meet him in Monrovia, and I did not
12 break any single rounds, no, no ammunition to Sierra Leone. In
13 October 2000 there was no UNAMSIL in Kailahun, the Indian troops
14 that were deployed there had withdrawn and had come to attack
14:40:17 15 Pendembu and had come to Daru. So I can say from September,
16 October, November to December there was no UNAMSIL in Kailahun at
17 this time, so this was just a made up story.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, the witness mentioned a
19 name of someone that was to go to Abuja, what was that name
14:40:42 20 again.

21 THE WITNESS: Madam Jamba Goba, the two of us travelled. I
22 travelled then from Kono to Monrovia and we travelled again from
23 --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: The name, I just want the name. Do we
14:40:56 25 have that name on the record?

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I think we did, it is the sister of Jande.

27 Q. Is that the person whom you said was the sister of Jande,
28 Foday Sankoh's wife who was executed, is that right?

29 A. Yes, yes.

1 Q. That name was mentioned a couple of days ago, but just to
2 be on the safe side, just spell the name for us please.

3 A. It is J-E-M-B-A. Then Goba is the same as Jande's.

4 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, I have to explain to you what this
14:41:42 5 individual claimed this material that you brought back from
6 Monrovia was meant for. Page 9507, line 2:

7 "Q. And the reason why the materials were brought, he" -
8 that being you - "said Mr Taylor had given those materials
9 and the weapons and that we were to attack Guinea from two
14:42:13 10 flanks. From the Sierra Leone end, he said those were the
11 materials and even the money that he had told me about was
12 for that mission. Because he went on to say that you
13 brought \$50,000 with you from Monrovia, that which
14 President Taylor had given to you."

14:42:46 15 Now, is that true?

16 A. No. That's a lie. President Taylor never gave me \$50,000.
17 It never happened. It is a big lie and this man - the two of us,
18 I never met him in Monrovia and the two of us never travelled
19 from Monrovia to Sierra Leone. He is telling lies.

14:43:22 20 Q. Now, he went on to say that this mission to Guinea did, in
21 fact, take place in 2001. Did you order any RUF men to carry out
22 a mission at Mr Taylor's behest in Guinea in 2001, Mr Sesay?

23 A. No. No, no. I did not order anybody on Mr Taylor's behalf
24 to attack Guinea, no.

14:43:57 25 Q. And did you at some stage accuse this witness of having
26 sabotaged Mr Taylor's plans?

27 A. No. I never accused that person, that he sabotaged Mr
28 Taylor's plan. Because the two of us were never any mission on
29 behalf of Mr Taylor, no.

1 Q. Yes. Now, I want to ask you some details about one or two
2 individuals before we go on to look at more transcripts.

3 Did you know someone called King Perry, Mr Sesay?

4 A. Yes, very well.

14:45:40 5 Q. Who was he?

6 A. He was a radio operator.

7 Q. With whom?

8 A. Well, first he was in Kailahun because they were the ones
9 that came together with Rashid Mansaray to Kailahun and he was in

14:46:13 10 Kailahun with Mr Sankoh, Kailahun Town in '93 and we retreated to

11 Koindu, but he did not go to Koindu, he was in Giema with

12 Sam Bockarie and others as a radio operator. So he remained in

13 Giema with Sylvester Miller from December '93 to June '94. When

14 I came to Giema he was the one I met there as station commander

14:46:44 15 in Giema. So he was working with me --

16 Q. From where?

17 A. From June when I met him there as station commander he

18 worked with me from June '94 to early '95 when Mr Sankoh

19 requested for them - himself and some other operators would went

14:47:08 20 to Zogoda in '95. So from '95, Mr Sankoh posted him to the

21 Kangari Hills, so he was there and worked with George and he came

22 and --

23 Q. Who?

24 A. With one CO, George, he was the battalion commander in the

14:47:33 25 Kangari Hills.

26 Q. How do you spell that name?

27 A. I think it is G-O-R-G-E, George, it's George.

28 Q. And for how long did he stay in the Kangari Hills?

29 A. He was at the Kangari Hills from '95 to May '97. He was

1 the station commander there for Isaac Mongor from January '96 to
2 May '97.

3 Q. Now, after the coup in May '97, what happened to King
4 Perry?

14:48:13 5 A. Well, when Isaac left with the RUF troops from the Kangari
6 Hills to Matotoka, then Magburaka, Makeni, King Perry was in
7 Makeni as the station commander for the radio that was there
8 throughout the AFRC period up to the intervention. During the
9 intervention, February '98, he withdrew to Kono and he operated
14:48:42 10 with Superman as station commander from February '98 to July of
11 '98 when Sam Bockarie sent him and Alfred Brown to go to the
12 Koinadugu flank.

13 Q. Now, as Sam Bockarie sent him to the Koinadugu flank, who
14 was in charge of that flank when Bockarie sent him there?

14:49:09 15 A. SAJ Musa was in charge of that area, together with Gullit,
16 because at that time Gullit was in Rosos and SAJ Musa, Brigadier
17 Mani and General Bropleh were in Kurubonla. Bockarie decided to
18 send them there, together with Alfred Brown and others, because
19 Bockarie did not know anything that was happening in that axes,
14:49:30 20 so he sent those operators so they would be able to send messages
21 to him so that he would know how the men were operating there.

22 That was the purpose for him to send them there, so he was there.
23 From Kurubonla he joined Gullit and others, up to the time that
24 SAJ Musa join them in Major Eddie Town and all of them, together
14:49:57 25 with SAJ Musa, came to Freetown, they came to Waterloo. SAJ Musa
26 died and he - Gullit and others continued to Freetown. So in
27 February they withdrew from Freetown and he came. I saw him in
28 Waterloo, I saw him there. And he came to Makeni. He was
29 operating with Superman in Lunsar during the infight, the

1 infighting. From that time he was in Makeni up until
2 disarmament.

3 Q. Thank you very much. Now, another person I want you to
4 assist me with is Monica Pearson. When did you first encounter
14:50:47 5 Monica Pearson?

6 A. It was at the Naama training base.

7 Q. How did she come to be at the Naama training base?

8 A. Her sister brought them there, herself, her brothers, and
9 some other people. That is Fatou Brown, Mr Sankoh's wife there.

14:51:14 10 Q. So Fatou Brown brought her to Camp Naama?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Along with who?

13 A. Monica Pearson, Fatou Gbembo and Monica's junior brother,
14 that is, Theophilus Pearson, Musa Gbembo, Gabriel Decker and

14:51:37 15 Anthony Decker, that was the woman that brought all of them
16 together, that is the same group, Fatou Brown.

17 Q. And at Camp Naama, how close were you to Monica Pearson?

18 A. Well, when Monica Pearson came, because they were the ones
19 who were cooking for Mr Sankoh, said the two of us had a
14:52:11 20 relationship. She was my girlfriend at Camp Naama.

21 Q. Now, following the invasion of Sierra Leone, between 1992
22 to '94, where was Monica Pearson based?

23 A. Monica came to Kailahun because she was with the Koindu
24 group with late CO Kargbo, together with Isaac Mongor and others.

14:52:43 25 So around May '91 she joined Mr Sankoh and they went to Pujehun.

26 So from that time of - from '91 to '94 I was in Pujehun. They
27 were the ones who joined Mr Sankoh from Pujehun.

28 Q. And what was she doing in Pujehun?

29 A. She was a WACs commander. They were there with the other

1 people.

2 Q. From 1994 to 1996 where was she?

3 A. Well, '94, Mr Sankoh sent her to the training base in
4 Jui koya, around Zogoda --

14:53:38 5 Q. How do you spell that first name?

6 A. Jui koya?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. No, I don't know how to spell it.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder, Mr Interpreter, if you can assist
14:53:49 10 us?

11 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honours, it's J-U-I-K-O-Y-A.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Yes, and you were saying they were there with the other
14 people - you were saying?

14:54:02 15 A. I said Mr Sankoh sent her to the training base at Jui koya
16 that was very close to Camp Zogoda. She was there.

17 Q. Go on.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, the witness said something
19 like she was a WACs commander which appears as a works commander,
14:54:23 20 could you please ascertain what the witness meant.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. She was a WACs commander, what is that?

23 A. Those - that is the women's commander in the Pujehun
24 District during '91 to 1994 before they joined up with Mr Sankoh
14:54:45 25 in Zogoda.

26 Q. WACs, is that WACs, as in W-A-C-S?

27 A. Yes, you're right.

28 Q. Now you say she was sent as training commander somewhere
29 near Zogoda; is that right?

1 A. Yes, Jui koya. She was the training commandant there.

2 Q. And for how long did she hold that post?

3 A. She was there up until '95 when Mr Sankoh transferred her
4 to open another base in Matru Jong after the capture of Sierra
14:55:36 5 Rutile.

6 Q. And how long did she stay there?

7 A. Well, she was in Matru Jong where she established that
8 training base. She was there as training commandant until around
9 July/August 1996 because of the Kamajor attacks on the RUF
14:56:01 10 position in Rutile to Matru Jong. That is why they withdrew to
11 Camp Zogoda.

12 Q. And what happened to her after she went to Camp Zogoda?

13 A. When she came to Camp Zogoda she was there up until October
14 when the Kamajors and the SLA attacked Zogoda. She was among the
14:56:33 15 group that Mike Lamin headed and they went to Pujehun and crossed
16 over the border to the ULIMO zone and they surrendered. So from
17 October '96 she was in Liberia to around November '97 when she
18 returned to Freetown, when she came back to Sierra Leone through
19 Kailahun and Kenema and she joined Mike Lamin. She was at Mike
14:57:07 20 Lamin's house at Hill Station November '97. So she was in

21 Freetown up until the intervention and they retreated with Mike
22 Lamin through the peninsula to Tombo and they crossed to Fogbo
23 and to Masiaka and she was with Mike Lamin when they went to
24 Makeni. And from Makeni they went to Kono. All of them went to
14:57:37 25 Kono. From Kono - February '98 she was in Kono up until March.

26 Then Sam Bockarie sent a radio message for her to report to
27 Kailahun. So when she reported in Kailahun, Sam Bockarie
28 appointed her as deputy training commandant at the training base
29 in Bunumbu under the command of Jah Glory because Jah Glory was

1 the training commandant there.

2 Q. Jah Glory, how do you spell that?

3 A. J-A-H G-O-L-R-Y.

4 Q. And how long was she there for?

14:58:34 5 A. She was there as deputy training commandant Jah Glory until
6 around April an unknown person shot Jah Glory and he was taken to
7 Buedu and he died, so Bockarie appointed her as training
8 commandant. So from that time she was in Bunumbu up to
9 February --

14:59:03 10 Q. February of which year?

11 A. Up to January/February of 1999 when Sam Bockarie instructed
12 her and the other instructors to transfer the training base from
13 Bunumbu to Yengema to Kono. So from January/February of '99 to
14 the disarmament she was in Kono. After the disarmament she
15 transferred to Magburaka.

16 Q. Do you know someone called Alimamy Bobson Sesay?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Who is that person?

19 A. He was one of the honourable, one of the 17 members that
15:00:03 20 overthrew the SLPP. He was the bodyguard to that person. That
21 is Papa Bangura, Bomb Blast.

22 Q. Have you met Alimamy Bobson Sesay?

23 A. Yes. During the retreat I saw him in Kono. I met with him
24 in Kono during the retreat because during the retreat I was
15:00:35 25 together with Bomb Blast and he was with Bomb Blast from Makeni
26 to Kono. From that time I did not meet with him, but during the
27 retreat from Freetown to Kono I met with him.

28 Q. Who is Samuel Kargbo?

29 A. Samuel Kargbo was one of the honourables for the AFRC.

1 Q. Have you met him?

2 A. Yes, I met with him during the AFRC time in Freetown. And
3 during the retreat I was at Four Mile, that is Songo, coming to
4 Waterloo. When the troops retreated from Freetown, he and the
15:01:29 5 others were in Kono, to oversee the mining in Kono. So when they
6 came from Kono they met me at Fogbo - sorry Four Mile. So all of
7 us drove to where the group crossed the river from Tombo. So all
8 of us retreated to Masiaka and from Masiaka I saw him again in
9 Makeni when I came from Bo and we met in Johnny Paul's village.

15:01:58 10 I met him there. Then we were the ones - we met again in Kono
11 during that meeting with Johnny Paul. Then all of us travelled
12 again from Kono. They met me in Gandorhun. We travelled from
13 Gandorhun to Kailahun, Buedu, because he was in Kailahun with
14 Akim. From there later he was posted to Pendembu as brigade
15:02:27 15 commander by Bockarie. So the two of us were there from May to
16 December. I left him in Pendembu in December '98.

17 Q. December of which year?

18 A. I said '98. He was in Pendembu. And I left him there. He
19 remained in Pendembu until after the signing of the Lome Accord
15:02:46 20 and he joined Johnny Paul to go to Monrovia. From there they
21 came back to Freetown.

22 Q. To your knowledge, Mr Sesay, when was the first time Samuel
23 Kargbo went to Monrovia?

24 A. Well, the first time Kargbo went to Monrovia, that was
15:03:17 25 between August until September of 1999. That was the first time
26 he went to Monrovia with Johnny Paul Koroma and Jumu Jalloh,
27 because I recall I was the one who drove them, I took them to
28 Foya where they were collected - picked up by the helicopter.
29 That was the first time he went to Monrovia.

1 Q. Now you said he went to Monrovia with Johnny Paul Koroma
2 and another. Give us the name of that another, please?

3 A. Mr Jumu Jalloh.

4 Q. Can you help us with the spelling of the first name?

15:03:54 5 A. I think it is J-U-M-U.

6 Q. Thank you. That's helpful. Now another individual I want
7 to ask you about. Does the name Albert Hindowa Saidu mean
8 anything to you?

9 A. Yes, very well. I know him.

15:04:15 10 Q. Who is he?

11 A. Well, that was Albert Saidu, commonly called Eyeball.

12 Q. Commonly called what?

13 A. That his nickname, Eyeball. Eyeball.

14 Q. Eyeball?

15:04:35 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. As in --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And when did this person join the RUF?

19 A. In 1991.

20 Q. Where?

21 A. In Kailahun District.

22 Q. And thereafter what - did he achieve any rank within the
23 RUF?

24 A. Yes. He became a lieutenant before we joined the AFRC and
15:05:10 25 during the AFRC he was a lieutenant. He was operating around
26 Kenema, Tongo Field, Kailahun, up to the time they retreated back
27 into Kailahun. And before - he was in the Peyima Jungle before.
28 They were the ones who retreated from Peyima to Giema in October
29 '96 and before the AFRC he was staying in Giema up to the for the

1 AFRC coup in '97. He was in Giema before the AFRC coup. And
2 after the AFRC coup he was in Kenema, Tongo and later he withdrew
3 to Kailahun. So from March - in March he was in Daru, so
4 February, March - and part of March, he was in Daru. That was in
15:06:07 5 '98. And from March to December up to part of 1999 he was in
6 Baiima in the Kailahun District.

7 Q. Did he remain in the RUF until disarmament?

8 A. Yes. Some part of '99 he was at Jormu Kafebu and I recall
9 at the time I came Mr Sankoh said I should go and inform them
15:06:43 10 about a disarmament in 2000.

11 Q. What was that name, he was at - what's the location?

12 A. Jormu Kafebu, something like that.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr Interpreter, I wonder if you can assist
14 us.

15 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honours. It's J-O-R-M-U
16 K-A-F-E-B-U.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

18 Q. Go on. You were saying, Mr Sesay?

19 A. Yes, I said he was - around '99 he was in Jormu Kafebu as
15:07:34 20 adjutant to the commander who was there and that was Harris
21 Momoh. And in March of 2000 when Foday Sankoh said I should go
22 to Segbwema to organise the men and all the surrounding - all the
23 fighters in the surrounding of Segbwema for them to assemble at
24 Segbwema for the disarmament. I met Eyeball, he was at Jormu
15:08:01 25 Kafebu with Harris Momoh and all of them came to Segbwema at the
26 disarmament time and after the disarmament in Segbwema he stayed
27 in Segbwema until the end of the war.

28 Q. I want your assistance with another individual now, please.
29 Who is Idriss Kamara?

1 A. Idriss Kamara. Idriss Kamara was AFRC.

2 Q. What can you tell us about him?

3 A. Well, Idriss Kamara was part of the AFRC group that was
4 with Brigadier Mani at the Koinadugu flank. They were there with
15:09:30 5 Brigadier Mani and they moved with Brigadier Mani in December '98
6 to Makeni. But he was operating with Brigadier Mani and
7 Colonel T. That was what I knew about him.

8 Q. Have you ever heard of a Red Goat battalion, Mr Sesay?

9 A. Those were the AFRC who were in the Koinadugu District.

15:10:10 10 This Idriss Kamara we are talking about, that was their group.

11 Q. And this Red Goat Battalion, was it involved in the
12 Freetown invasion at all?

13 A. No. They were not part of the Freetown attack because, at
14 the time Gullit and others attack Freetown, this group was based
15:10:33 15 in Makeni.

16 Q. Did you know someone called Alice Pyne?

17 A. Very well.

18 Q. Who is she?

19 A. That was the wife of CO Nya, who joined the RUF in Kailahun
15:11:00 20 District and was a radio operator.

21 Q. Who joined the RUF in the Kailahun district, just to be
22 clear?

23 A. Alice.

24 Q. And CO Nya, when did he join the RUF?

15:11:22 25 A. In 1991.

26 Q. Where?

27 A. In Kailahun. Those were the ones that Anthony Mekunagbe
28 brought with him, so he stayed.

29 Q. So what nationality was CO Nya?

1 A. A Liberian.

2 Q. And what about his wife, Alice Pyne, what nationality was
3 she?

4 A. A Sierra Leonean.

15:11:51 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, for the assistance of the stenographer,
6 Nya is N-Y-A-H. It is on the record already. It is on the
7 record.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: It is N-Y-A.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: What did I say?

15:12:14 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: N-Y-A-H.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay.

12 MR KOUMJIAN: I don't think Mia Farrow is Nya, as the
13 transcript currently shows.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:12:39 15 Q. So help us: What can you tell us about Alice Pyne?

16 A. Well, Alice Pyne was one of those trained in Pendembu as
17 radio operator in 1992. So she was with Nya as her partner to
18 the time the RUF was pushed from Kailahun. So she was with Nya
19 in a village called Taidu in late 1993, together with Mohamed
20 Tarawalli.

21 Q. What's the name of the village?

22 A. Taidu.

23 Q. How do you spell that?

24 A. T-A-I-D-U.

15:13:26 25 Q. Go on. You were saying she was there in late 1993 together
26 with Mohamed Tarawalli. What else were you telling us?

27 A. Yes, yes. So around February of 1994, they moved Nya, his
28 wife, all of them moved with Mohamed Tarawalli from Taidu and
29 came to Giema, and from Giema they moved to go and establish the

1 Northern Jungle in Kangari Hills through the Peyima Jungle. So
2 since that time Nya - Alice was with Nya at the Kangari Hills,
3 and she was at the Kangari Hills with Nya up until 1997.

4 Q. When in 1997?

15:14:28 5 A. In May '97, when the RUF joined the AFRC in Makeni she was
6 part of that group. They used to come to Freetown, she and Nya,
7 and then return to Makeni. And they were in Freetown up until
8 the time for the intervention. They retreated through Tombo to
9 Makeni and to Kono. And then she was with Nya in Kono from
15:15:00 10 February up until August, and they moved to the Koinadugu
11 District together with Superman, up to December of '98, they came
12 to Makeni, and from Makeni they went and based in Lunsar, and
13 they were there after renewed fighting, they were in Lunsar
14 sometimes and in Makeni. And in '99, they were in Lunsar. In
15:15:35 15 2000, she came to Makeni. So during the May 8 incident, Alice
16 was in Makeni, whilst Nya was arrested in Freetown. So Alice
17 left Makeni in 2000. She was in Makeni in 2000, up to 2001, the
18 disarmament time.

19 Q. Thank you very much. Another individual now please. Do
15:16:07 20 you know a Rashid Foday?

21 A. Yes, I know him.

22 Q. Who is he?

23 A. He was a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh.

24 Q. From when?

15:16:23 25 A. From 199' - I can say 1992, from 1992 up until 2000, when
26 Mr Sankoh left him in Monrovia.

27 Q. When did he go to Monrovia?

28 A. In 2000.

29 Q. And why did he go to Monrovia?

1 A. Well, he was with Mr Sankoh in Freetown, and Mr Sankoh sent
2 him to stay in the guesthouse in Monrovia. He was there,
3 together with Memunatu Deen as the caretaker of the guesthouse.

4 Q. And for how long did he stay in that capacity?

15:17:27 5 A. Well, he was there because the guesthouse was there for us.
6 He was there until around December of 2000 to January of 2000,
7 when they said the guesthouse - we were not supposed to use the
8 guesthouse any longer because by then peace had almost started
9 reigning back in Sierra Leone.

15:18:00 10 Q. Mr Sesay, I need your help here. You said he was there up
11 until around December of 2000 to January of 2000.

12 A. Yes. We stopped using the guesthouse around January to
13 February of 2001. We stopped using it.

14 Q. So help me, just so that we're clear for the purpose of the
15:18:25 15 transcript: Which month did he go to be the caretaker at the
16 guesthouse, and which month and year?

17 A. Well, he went there around - Mr Sankoh sent him there
18 around - around January of 2000.

19 Q. And he remained there until when?

15:18:52 20 A. Until around January 2001. The guesthouse was closed to
21 us. They asked us to stop using it. So I had to provide money
22 for them to rent another place for the meantime, and after some
23 time they could return back to Sierra Leone.

24 Q. And in the course of that answer you said, "They asked us
15:19:22 25 to stop using it." Who is the "they"?

26 A. The Liberian government.

27 Q. And you say that you had to rent somewhere else; is that
28 right?

29 A. Yes. Because I gave money to him, Rashid, because he had

1 three children with him, together with his wife. I said, okay,
2 they should go and rent a place, he and Memuna, until they were
3 able to organise themselves and return to Sierra Leone.

15:20:12 4 Q. Thank you. Now, there is somebody else I want your
5 assistance with. Do you know someone called Jabati Jaward?

6 A. Yes, very well.

7 Q. Who is he?

8 A. Well, Jabati Jaward was born in the village close to
9 Pendembu called Mandekiema, and he joined the RUF and trained at
15:20:32 10 the vocational secondary school in Pendembu in '91.

11 Q. He was born in a village close to somewhere, close to
12 where?

13 A. I said the village was called Mandekiema, five miles away
14 from Pendembu.

15:20:55 15 Q. How do you spell that name, Mande --

16 A. M-A-N-D-E.

17 Q. Yes?

18 A. K-I-E-M-A.

19 Q. And you were saying he trained where?

15:21:16 20 A. He was trained at the vocational secondary school in
21 Pendembu.

22 Q. Trained as what?

23 A. He was trained as a fighter.

24 Q. And thereafter, what postings did he have?

15:21:31 25 A. Well, he was just a fighter within the RUF up to the time
26 the RUF was pushed in '93, and then he was with me at Pomodu in
27 '94, because he and my bodyguards were brothers. So he was with
28 my bodyguards, '94 at Pomodu. And when I came to Giema later, he
29 stayed in Pomodu with Peter Vandj. So when the government troops

1 retreated from Kailahun in April '95 and he came to Buedu and he
2 now based in Buedu with Peter Vandí .

3 Q. Pause there. And did he have any particular role when he
4 was with Peter Vandí ?

15:22:28 5 A. Yes. He was adjutant to Peter Vandí .

6 Q. And what happened to him thereafter?

7 A. So when Peter Vandí moved to Giema, he left him in Buedu,
8 so he was with Peter Vandí 's family in Buedu up until 1995, '96 -
9 up to the time of the coup. So in 1998, he became Sam Bockarie's

15:23:10 10 S4. That was when Sam Bockarie retreated to Kailahun.

11 Q. As S4, what were his responsibilities?

12 A. He was responsible for the storage of food stuff. He was
13 in charge of the food store in Buedu. Food, fuel, used clothing,
14 he was in charge of the store.

15:23:46 15 Q. And for how long did he remain in that position?

16 A. From February/March of '98 up until December of 1999, when
17 he joined Sam Bockarie and they went to Liberia.

18 Q. Do you know someone called Matthew Sesay?

19 A. Yes, very well .

15:24:22 20 Q. Where did you first meet him?

21 A. We first met at Camp Naama in 1990.

22 Q. How was he popularly known?

23 A. CO Kennedy.

24 Q. From 1991 to 1992 what was his responsibility within the
15:24:53 25 RUF?

26 A. He was a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh up until '93.

27 Q. And, as far as you're aware, how far back did he go with
28 Mr Sankoh? For how long had he known Mr Sankoh?

29 A. Well, I do not understand the question.

1 Q. Do you know when CO Kennedy and Foday Sankoh first met?

2 A. Well, CO Kennedy was one of the people who were recruited
3 around the Harbel, Kakata areas. Mr Sankoh brought them to
4 Naama.

15:25:53 5 Q. Did he know Sankoh from before then?

6 A. Well, I can't tell.

7 Q. From 1995 until 1996 did CO Kennedy have any particular
8 responsibility?

9 A. Yes.

15:26:20 10 Q. What was that?

11 A. He was the area commander at the Peyima Jungle.

12 Q. And where was Sam Bockarie at that time?

13 A. Sam Bockarie too was in the Peyima Jungle but he was
14 working under Kennedy as one of the battalion commanders.

15:26:55 15 Q. In December of 1996 was CO Kennedy given any particular
16 assignment?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What was that?

19 A. Well, in December '96 Sam Bockarie became boss to Kennedy,
15:27:16 20 so Sam Bockarie posted him to Koindu. He was in Koindu. He was
21 receiving the ULIMOs, he used to buy the ammunition from the
22 ULIMO.

23 Q. And for how long was he retained in that position?

24 A. He was there from December '96 to May of '97.

15:27:40 25 Q. And then where did he go?

26 A. Sam Bockarie then withdrew him and he was now in Kailahun
27 Town, so around July Sam Bockarie asked him to come to Kenema and
28 Sam Bockarie took him from Kenema to Freetown and --

29 Q. And what did he do in Freetown?

1 A. Well, he was the commander responsible for sharing of food
2 and monies, salaries. So Sam Bockarie placed him in charge of
3 that. He was in charge of logistics.

4 Q. Was he still in Freetown at the time of the intervention?

15:28:27 5 A. Yes, yes. He was in Freetown until February. All of them
6 withdrew from Freetown through the peninsula to Tombo and they
7 crossed through Fogbo and they met me across the river. And he
8 retreated to Masiaka and from Masiaka he was with the group with
9 Superman, Mike Lamin and others went they went to Makeni with
15:28:56 10 Isaac Mongor. And then I met them later in Makeni. All of us
11 went to Kono and I left him in Kono. So from February to March
12 he was in Kono up until the time the bank was broken into in Kono
13 when Superman got the information and arrested the people who
14 broke into the bank and he was able to retrieve some of the
15:29:22 15 monies from them.

16 Q. Pause.

17 A. So he had to put those monies together.

18 Q. Who retrieved the money from them?

19 A. It was Superman.

15:29:32 20 Q. And what happened to that money?

21 A. He gave the money to Kennedy to be taken to Sam Bockarie,
22 because he sent a message to Sam Bockarie saying that the monies
23 that they had looted from the bank, he had collected some and he
24 had given that to Kennedy to take it to Sam Bockarie. That was
15:29:54 25 in '98.

26 Q. Which month in '98?

27 A. Early April. They arrived in Buedu in early April with the
28 money.

29 Q. And when he returned with that money was he given any

1 particular assignment by Sam Bockarie?

2 A. Yes. Sam Bockarie sent him to Voinjama where he was up to
3 July, where he was buying ammunition from the ULIMO, the
4 ammunition that they had buried during the disarmament in
15:30:34 5 Liberia. And at the time I came from Monrovia when Major Mulbah
6 called me from Monrovia, whilst we were coming we met Kennedy in
7 Voinjama. In fact, the pick-up that took him there was the one
8 that brought us.

9 Q. Now, that trip to Monrovia, just so that we're clear, did
15:31:09 10 anything happen to you during the course of that trip?

11 A. Yes. That was the time I lost the diamonds, at the time I
12 was supposed to transit to Burkina Faso.

13 Q. So you travelled back from Voinjama with CO Kennedy?

14 A. No, no. I travelled back to Voinjama with CO Mulbah and we
15:31:38 15 met Kennedy in Voinjama.

16 Q. And then what happened?

17 A. And then myself and Mulbah came to Buedu where - whilst
18 Kennedy was in Voinjama.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, you tell us that in July you were
15:31:57 20 withdrawn from Voinjama?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Firstly, why?

23 A. Well, he had informed Sam Bockarie that the ammunition that
24 he had been buying, he said the men have said that the ammunition
15:32:14 25 is finished. He said the onces that they had buried into the
26 earth, so --

27 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness be asked to
28 continue from where I stopped.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. He said that the ammunition is finished, the ones that they
2 had buried in the earth, so Sam Bockarie did what?

3 A. Sam Bockarie said he should return to Sierra Leone, to
4 Buedu.

15:32:46 5 Q. And when he returned to Sierra Leone where was he posted?

6 A. Sam Bockarie posted him to Kono as mining commander and he
7 was in a village near Superman Ground.

8 Q. And from then, which you tell us was July '98, for how long
9 did he remain as mining commander?

15:33:08 10 A. He remained as mining commander until February 2000.

11 Q. And thereafter did he remain in the RUF?

12 A. Yes, he was in Kono until the disarmament and he came to
13 Magburaka.

14 Q. Why was CO Kennedy removed as mining commander?

15:33:57 15 A. It was Mr Sankoh who gave me the instruction. He said the
16 man had taken a long time there as mining commander, so I should
17 relieve him. That was the time I was sent to supervise the
18 mining in Kono. He said I should change Kennedy because he had
19 taken a long time there.

15:34:26 20 Q. There are a few other individuals I want to ask you about.
21 Do you know someone called Francis Oscar Charles?

22 A. Yes, very well.

23 Q. How was he commonly known?

24 A. FOC.

15:34:45 25 Q. When did he join the RUF?

26 A. '91.

27 Q. Where?

28 A. Kailahun District, Kailahun Town.

29 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. I see the witness appears a bit

1 tired, and I have a matter I would like to bring up in private
2 session outside the witness's presence that requires five or ten
3 minutes.

15:35:18

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is the matter related to the current
5 testimony?

6 MR KOU MJIAN: It is related to today's testimony, yes.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can it wait until towards the end of the
8 current testimony, say in the last five minutes or so?

15:35:38

9 MR KOU MJIAN: I believe I would be taking a risk if I did
10 that. I would prefer to do it now.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: I am in no position because I am entirely in
12 the dark as to what this is about.

15:35:58

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Koumjian, you say, "I see the witness
14 appears a little tired." I don't know where you get that
15 impression from.

16 MR KOU MJIAN: He was hanging his head down, staring at his
17 feet and sighing.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: And your application is relating to his
19 demeanour?

15:36:09

20 MR KOU MJIAN: No, your Honour. I simply wanted to take
21 advantage of the fact that it appeared that he could use a break
22 and I would like to do something outside his presence.

15:36:40

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, this has nothing to do with
24 your apparent tiredness. I don't believe that you are tired.
25 But counsel here opposite wants to raise an issue with the Court,
26 I don't know what exactly, that we won't trouble you with. So
27 you take a break of about 10 to 15 minutes and we will call you
28 back.

29 THE WITNESS: Thank you, my Lord.

1 [In the absence of the witness]

2 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I would make an application to
3 go into private session because it concerns the privacy and
4 security of witnesses.

15:37:37 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. Madam Court Manager, please
6 organise a private session. This will not take long for the
7 members of the public. You will be able to see into the well of
8 the Court but you won't hear what is being said for a few
9 minutes.

10 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of
11 the transcript, pages 44928 to 44933, was
12 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as
13 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

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1 [Open session]

2 [In the presence of the witness]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, please proceed.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:58:45 5 Q. Mr Sesay, I was asking you about your knowledge of a man
6 called Francis Oscar Charles who you told us was also known as
7 FOC?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Let's just pick up the threads of that. When did he join
15:59:12 10 the RUF?

11 A. 1991.

12 Q. Where?

13 A. Kailahun Town.

14 Q. And following - was he trained at all?

15:59:29 15 A. Yes. He was trained and in 1992 he became bodyguard to
16 Mr Sankoh.

17 Q. Where was he trained?

18 A. He was trained at the National Secondary School training
19 base in Kailahun Town.

15:59:47 20 Q. For how long did he remain a bodyguard to Foday Sankoh?

21 A. Well, he remained a bodyguard for Foday Sankoh from '92 to
22 '96, Zogoda. Mr Sankoh went to Ivory Coast, his team carried the
23 name of bodyguard, and when Mr Sankoh returned in 1999 --

24 Q. Yes?

16:00:16 25 A. He was still a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh in Freetown up to the
26 May 8th incident. He was among the group of Superman, Gibriil
27 Massaquoi and others who escaped from Freetown as a result of
28 demonstration and they rejoined the RUF in Lunsar. From there he
29 was in Makeni, he went to Kono and joined me. He was with me in

1 Kono up to the disarmament in Kono and we came to Makeni.

2 Q. Now a couple of details. Was he in Zogoda at the time when
3 Zogoda fell to the Kamajors?

16:01:25

4 A. Yes, yes. He was in Zogoda. In fact he was one of the
5 people who was lucky to survive the attack and arrived in Giema
6 in October '96. Because when he arrived in Giema he had swollen
7 feet and a swollen face, except when he had to be treated, even
8 up to the time Mr Sankoh came he was not fully recuperated.

16:02:00

9 Q. Now I see the record says a swollen feet and a swollen
10 fist. The witness actually said face. And what had caused the
11 swelling, Mr Sesay?

16:02:27

12 A. It was the type of food. Because he was in the bush for a
13 long time. He was in the bush and he could not have access to
14 salt and there were thorns in the bush. When he came, there was
15 no slippers even. He did not even wear a slippers. He was
16 living in the bush up to the time he went to - when he went to
17 Kailahun, he used to live on raw food in the bush.

18 Q. Now where was he at the time of the coup in May 1997?

16:02:58

19 A. He was in Giema. All of us were in Giema in the village,
20 Giema Town.

21 Q. And did he remain in Giema after the AFRC took over?

22 A. No. He moved with us, all of us came to Daru and he
23 together with Mosquito and others came to Freetown and I remained
24 in Daru.

16:03:25

25 Q. Now you mentioned that he was in Freetown with Foday Sankoh
26 at the time of the May 2000 incident. Is that right?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And you told us that he escaped with Gibril Massaquoi to
29 Lunsar, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. After your escape, did you meet up with him?

3 A. Yes. I said I met with him in Makeni and he went to Kono
4 and stayed with me. In fact, the meeting that we attended, the
16:04:05 5 first meeting with the ECOWAS at the Executive Mansion he went
6 with me to Monrovia. I took him along.

7 Q. You took him along to Monrovia. Which Monrovia trip?

8 A. I'm referring to the time that we attended a meeting with
9 the five ECOWAS Heads of State at the Executive Mansion, the five
16:04:38 10 ECOWAS Heads of State in July 2000. The first meeting, he was
11 among the group that I went with.

12 Q. Now, when you met him after the May incident was this
13 before or after the UNAMSIL personnel had been released?

14 A. It was after I had released the UNAMSIL personnel. It was
16:05:08 15 the following week that they came because they arrived in Lunsar
16 and came to Makeni in early June of 2000, and I released the
17 UNAMSIL in late May.

18 Q. And when you saw him following the release of the UNAMSIL
19 personnel, did you discuss what others within the RUF thought
16:05:30 20 about the decision to release those people?

21 A. In fact he was one of the men who told me that when they
22 got to Lunsar they heard that - that is himself, Superman and
23 Gibril, together with Jackson Swarray and others. They heard
24 that I had released the UNAMSIL.

16:05:54 25 Q. Go on?

26 A. He said Gibril and Superman had said, "Issa has finally
27 sold Pa Sankoh out." He was the number one man who gave me that
28 information. He said Gibril and others were grumbling that I had
29 released the UNAMSIL personnel, that I had no right to do that,

1 it was only Pa Sankoh who was to have released the UNAMSIL and
2 not me. I should have negotiated and gave them conditions that
3 Pa Sankoh must have been released before I should have released
4 the UNAMSIL, but I did not do that, so that I had sold out Pa
16:06:33 5 Sankoh.

6 Q. Let's move on to somebody else. Do you know someone called
7 Seibatu Jusu?

8 A. Yes, I know her.

9 Q. Who is that person?

16:06:52 10 A. Well, first she was a girlfriend to one of Mohamed
11 Tarawalli's bodyguards, but the man eventually died in the
12 Western Jungle around '95. So from that she was trained in the
13 Western Jungle as an RUF operator, radio operator, around '95 and
14 she was with a radio operator as her boyfriend called Waco-Waco.

16:07:34 15 Q. Pause there. How do you spell Waco-Waco?

16 A. Well, except you help me out - if the interpreter assists.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please, Mr Interpreter.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour. Phonetically it's

19 W-A-C-O hyphen W-A-C-O.

16:08:06 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Now, let's take things chronologically before we come on to
22 her various postings. First of all, did Mosquito have a wife?

23 A. Yes. He had a wife called Hawa.

24 Q. And was there any particular relationship between Seibatu

16:08:34 25 Jusu and Mosquito's wife?

26 A. Yes. They were cousins.

27 Q. When did she join the RUF?

28 A. Because she and Hawa trained in the same '91, all of them
29 trained together.

1 Q. Hawa being?

2 A. Who later became Mosquito's wife, together with Seibatu and
3 others.

4 Q. And you say that she was married. What was her first
16:09:11 5 husband's - what was her husband's name?

6 A. Ansu Sillah.

7 JUDGE DOHERTY: I don't think he said married,
8 Mr Griffiths. He said she had a boyfriend.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I am sorry. My fault.

16:09:22 10 Q. What was her boyfriend's name?

11 A. Ansu Sillah.

12 Q. How do you spell the first name?

13 A. A-N-S-U.

14 Q. And how do you spell the second name?

16:09:34 15 A. S-I-L-L-A-H.

16 Q. Now, you say she became a radio operator. Where did she
17 train to become a radio operator?

18 A. In the Western Jungle.

19 Q. And to whom was she assigned as a radio operator?

16:10:01 20 A. To Superman.

21 Q. For how long did she remain with Superman as a radio
22 operator?

23 A. She was with Superman until May '97.

24 Q. Then what happened to her?

16:10:25 25 MR KOUMJIAN: I would ask for a redaction of basically all
26 of these personal details.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: On what grounds?

28 MR KOUMJIAN: I would prefer to say it in private session,
29 but - because otherwise I will be compounding the problem.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just give me a moment to read this.

2 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honours, I could make my point in one
3 minute in private session.

16:11:20

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just give me a moment to read this and to
5 consult my colleagues.

6 [Trial chamber conferred]

16:12:17

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: We are of the view that nothing so far
8 that has transpired in the manner in which counsel is questioning
9 jeopardises the security of any witness, or the protection of any
10 witness; and I think sometimes it is the interventions that do
11 draw attention unnecessarily to these issues. We are of the view
12 that we cannot - for me to start now ordering a general redaction
13 would be going back on the order that I made that we're not going
14 to make general redactions.

16:12:42

15 So please proceed.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. What happened to her after May 1997?

18 A. Well, she went to her parents' in Kenema.

19 Q. Why?

16:13:04

20 A. Well, her father was in Kenema, her mother too was there.

21 She went and stayed with them. And when Mosquito transferred to
22 Kenema, she was almost like staying with Hawa at the same time
23 staying with her parents. So she was in Kenema. So I can say up
24 to - from August up until the intervention.

16:13:27

25 Q. And after the intervention?

26 A. Well, she withdrew to Kailahun town with her parents
27 because her mother and father, they all moved from Kenema to
28 Kailahun town, including her younger sisters.

29 Q. And did she remain in Kenema?

1 A. No, in Kailahun. They withdrew to Kailahun in February
2 '98.

3 Q. And did she remain in Kailahun?

4 A. Yes. She was in Kailahun up to June/July and May. Then
16:14:10 5 she went to Buedu. June/July of '98. She then went to Buedu.

6 Q. And what did she do in Buedu?

7 A. Well, she used to assist Hawa in the kitchen, and at the
8 same time she would go on the radio set. But most time she
9 concentrated on the domestic work, the domestic chores, assisting
16:14:41 10 Hawa in the kitchen.

11 Q. Page 157, line 4: To assist Hawa, H-A-W-A.

12 And at this time, when she was assisting Hawa in the
13 kitchen doing domestic work, where was she living?

14 A. She was staying in one house in Buedu, but in the morning
16:15:14 15 she will come over to Hawa and spend a day with her, and then at
16 night she goes back to her house and sleep.

17 Q. And where was she doing this domestic work with Hawa? In
18 whose home?

19 A. Sam Bockarie's house. Sometimes she was the one who even
16:15:37 20 served Sam Bockarie food, and other times she used to serve us.
21 When she brought the food outside, she would dish the food, and
22 then Sam Bockarie would invite us to come and eat with him.

23 Q. And what happened to her in December 1999?

24 A. Well, she went with Sam Bockarie. She went with Hawa to
16:16:05 25 Liberia.

26 Q. Does the name Mohamed Kabba mean anything to you?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Was he a member of the RUF?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. When did he join the RUF?

2 A. 1991. 1991, yes.

3 Q. Where?

4 A. In Kailahun town.

16:16:43 5 Q. What role did he play within the RUF?

6 A. Well, around '93 he trained as a radio operator. And
7 around '94 he was at Peyima. And he was with Mr Sankoh later at
8 Zogoda. And then --

9 Q. Pause. Let us just put a full stop at Zogoda. I want to
16:17:17 10 get a few more details. Did he have any brothers or sisters?

11 A. Yes. His younger brother was my bodyguard. He was called
12 Isaka Kabba.

13 Q. And Isaka, is that spelled I-S-A-K-A, and then the surname
14 is Kabba, K-A-B-B-A?

16:17:50 15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. And for how long was his younger brother your bodyguard?

17 A. Well, he served as my bodyguard from December '93 to the
18 disarmament.

19 Q. Now, you said that Mohamed Kabba trained as a radio
16:18:17 20 operator and then went to Zogoda. To whom was he assigned in
21 Zogoda?

22 A. He was with Mr Sankoh as one of the operators.

23 Q. What happened to him when Sankoh went to the Ivory Coast
24 for the peace talks?

16:18:35 25 A. Well, Mr Sankoh invited him, and he too went to Ivory
26 Coast, he, Kabba. He went to Ivory Coast in '96 but later
27 returned and stayed in Giema. He came through Guinea, and he
28 stayed in Giema.

29 Q. And help us: When was it that he went to Abidjan at

1 Mr Sankoh's invitation?

2 A. 1996.

3 Q. Can you give us a month?

4 A. No, I do not recall the exact month.

16:19:13 5 Q. Very well.

6 A. But he later returned. He, Ray and others came back around
7 October '96 and they stayed in Giema. So he was now in Giema as
8 one of the operators up to the time the May '97 coup took place.

9 We were all in Giema. He was with me. Himself, Tiger, they were
16:19:41 10 operating the sets.

11 Q. And then where was he assigned after the coup?

12 A. Well, after the coup - after the coup, he stayed in
13 Kailahun, but he later joined Sam Bockarie in Kenema.

14 Q. And for how long was he with Sam Bockarie in Kenema?

16:20:12 15 A. Well, he was with Sam Bockarie up to the intervention, and
16 after the retreat he went and stayed in Kailahun Town. He was
17 then the station commander in Kailahun Town in '98.

18 Q. And did he remain in that position?

19 A. Yes. He was in Kailahun town up to 1999. He then went to
16:20:40 20 Buedu.

21 Q. In what capacity?

22 A. Well, he went to Buedu and became the signals commander in
23 '99.

24 Q. Who appointed him as signals commander?

16:20:59 25 A. Sam Bockarie. It was around - around October/November of
26 '99.

27 Q. What happened to him after Sam Bockarie departed in
28 December 1999?

29 A. Well, he was in Kailahun, and then he later went to

1 Freetown because Mr Sankoh invited him to Freetown, because from
2 Freetown he met me in Kono. As he came as signals commander, he
3 was in Kono for some time and later went to Makeni, and then he
4 went back to Kailahun during the disarmament.

16:22:05 5 Q. Do you know someone called Sonia Beggs, Mr Sesay?

6 A. Sonia Beggs? I don't know that person facially, but
7 somebody who was that person's family member - my family member
8 told me about Sonia Beggs when I was in the detention centre
9 because my wife's sister had a child with Sonia Beggs' elder
10 brother, from the same father and the same mother, because an
11 incident took place - can I go ahead?

12 Q. Yes, go ahead.

13 A.

14 {Redacted}

16:23:09 15 and it was during that time that I
16 heard about this name when the woman called Tata, because it was
17 Tata's sister who got a baby for Tonia [phon], and they are from
18 the same mum and the same dad, so they - she explained all the
19 story to me, that they were living in the same house when they
16:23:32 20 attacked and captured her during the AFRC intervention in
21 Freetown.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. Please pause. I
23 personally am getting lost. Is this Tonia or Sonia? Is this
24 character a man or a woman?

16:23:50 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Is Sonia a man or a woman?

27 A. A woman.

28 Q. And you mentioned a name, Tata?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. How do you spell that?

2 A. It's T-A-T-A.

3 Q. And you say that she was captured during the AFRC
4 intervention in Freetown, yes?

16:24:12 5 A. Yes. So she was telling Tata that she never knew me before
6 but that we were not the ones who came to Freetown during the
7 intervention in Freetown, and she told Tata that she knew the
8 people who captured her and those were the people that she was
9 going to prosecute, those were the people who captured her, not
16:24:42 10 the ones who did not take part in her capture.

11 Q. Now, does the name Augustine Mallah mean anything to you?

12 A. Yes, yes, I know that person very well.

13 Q. Was that person a member of the RUF?

14 A. Yes, an RUF member. Alias, OG is an RUF member.

16:25:22 15 Q. Is that letter O, letter G, OG?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. When did he join the RUF?

18 A. He joined the RUF in 1991 in Pujehun District.

19 Q. What happened to him in Pujehun District?

16:25:49 20 A. Well, they were with Gibriil Massaquoi and others. They
21 were with Gibriil Massaquoi and others in the Pujehun District
22 from '91 to '94 and he was among the group that joined Mr Sankoh
23 at Zogoda in '94 and became a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh in '94/'95
24 and then in '96, early '96.

16:26:19 25 Q. Mr Sankoh assigned him to whom?

26 A. To Mike Lamin, before Mr Sankoh departed to the Ivory
27 Coast.

28 Q. And did he remain with Mike Lamin?

29 A. Yes, he was with Mike Lamin, and they used to go on patrols

1 to the Western Jungle and Northern Jungle from Zogoda, and after
2 Zogoda was moved, then he and Mike Lamin moved through Pujehun
3 and then they surrendered in Liberia. So he stayed in Liberia
4 whilst Mike Lamin came back in in June of '97 and rejoined the
16:26:55 5 RUF. And then OG and others came in the second batch around
6 August of '97. So when they came they were with Mosquito in
7 Kenema.

8 Q. Pause there. I want to clarify a couple of things there.
9 You say that he was with Mike Lamin when they surrendered in
16:27:19 10 Liberia, to whom?

11 A. To ULIMO, ULIMO, okay.

12 Q. And you say he came in a second batch around August of '97,
13 came from where?

14 A. Came from Liberia, from Bomi Hills. They came through Lofa
16:27:40 15 Bridge and then they came to Sierra Leone through Vahun.

16 Q. And went to where?

17 A. They came to Kailahun and went to Kenema where they met Sam
18 Bockarie. And from there, he was with the fighting group in
19 Tongo, and from there he went to Freetown, he met Mike Lamin
16:28:01 20 there. And Mike Lamin gave him a Land Cruiser. He gave him a
21 Land cruiser jeep with mining equipment, and then went back to
22 Tongo and was doing mining there for Mike Lamin until January
23 when they were attacked in Tongo. And when they were attacked in
24 Tongo, he withdrew to Kenema. And from Kenema he went to
16:28:27 25 Kailahun. From Kailahun he was with the group that Sam Bockarie
26 sent to receive us in Gandorhun. And from there, after that,
27 when we got to Kailahun, Sam Bockarie asked him to go and stay in
28 Baiima. So he was in Baiima throughout '98.

29 Q. Thank you.

1 A. And in '99 - in '99 he was in Baiima up until after the
2 Lome when Mike Lamin went to Kailahun and collected Mr Sankoh's
3 bodyguards, OG was one of them, and he too joined Mike Lamin to
4 go to Freetown. So they went to Freetown. They stayed in
16:29:24 5 Freetown until around December of - until - I mean, November
6 1999. Mr Sankoh sent he, OG, and two other people, who were
7 Black Guards, to go to Segbwema and talk to their brother RUF
8 people, for them not to team up with Sam Bockarie. So they were
9 there until the time Sam Bockarie left. He was in Segbwema and
16:29:53 10 around 2000, he was in Tongo Field up to 2001.

11 Q. Thank you very much, Mr Sesay.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I am moving on to another
13 topic and I note the time.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Indeed. We have come to the end of
16:30:15 15 today's proceedings. We will continue tomorrow at nine. And,
16 Mr Sesay, as usual do not discuss your evidence with anyone.

17 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
18 to be reconvened on Thursday, 29 July 2010 at
19 9.00 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DCT-172 44805

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS 44805