



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 2 NOVEMBER 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Monday, 2 November 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:30:52 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,
6 please.

7 MR BANGURA: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours, and
8 counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this morning are myself
9 Mohamed A Bangura, Mr Christopher Santora, and our case manager
09:32:37 10 Ms Maja Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Bangura. Yes,
12 Mr Griffiths.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
14 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay
09:32:47 15 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah of counsel.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Taylor, I remind you you
17 are still bound by your oath. Please plead proceed,
18 Mr Griffiths.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please, your Honours.

09:32:58 20 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

21 [On former affirmation]

22 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

23 Q. Mr Taylor, on Thursday last when we adjourned we were
24 looking at the testimony of Varmuyan Sherif. Do you recall that?

09:33:13 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Now, taking up where we left off. On the 10 January 2008 -
27 and I am looking at page 886 of the transcript - the witness was
28 asked this question by Ms Hollis:

29 "Q. Mr Witness, when we concluded your testimony

1 yesterday, you were talk to get judges about a problem
2 between Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay and you testified that
3 Charles Taylor invited them to Monrovia to discuss this,
4 and you testified that the dispute was discussed and it was
09:33:58 5 finalised that Sam Bockarie was now changed and Issa Sesay
6 became the new commander. Now, when you testified
7 yesterday that it was finalised that Sam Bockarie was now
8 changed and Issa Sesay became the new commander, who
9 finalised that arrangement?

09:34:16 10 A. Mr Taylor supervised into finalising - solving the
11 problem between the RUF leadership.

12 Q. And what exactly did Mr Taylor do to finalise that
13 problem?

14 A. The confusion that erupted within the RUF forces, that
09:34:37 15 was the reason why he sent for them and then he discussed
16 with them, and then now he said that the former leader
17 Mosquito was changed and Issa became the leader, Issa
18 Sesay. Sam Bockarie was now instructed to move from the
19 RUF territory to come back to Liberia. He came back to
09:35:00 20 Liberia with all of his soldiers, about 350 men. We used
21 some of the SSS men. Some of the SSS went to get the men
22 and also the helicopter."

23 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor? Did any such thing
24 occur?

09:35:18 25 A. Well, in direct answer to your question, no. No such
26 situation occurred where I sent for Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay
27 to discuss a conflict between them that would lead to the
28 departure of Sam Bockarie.

29 Having said that - but I think the Prosecution knew that.

1 The Prosecution should have known that there was no such
2 discussion between Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay and myself that led
3 to the departure of Sam Bockarie. They must know. They had gone
4 through tons of witnesses and tons of United Nations and other
09:36:07 5 documents about the movement of Sam Bockarie. So to ask Varmuyan
6 Sheriff about some departure of Sam Bockarie from La Cote d'Ivoire
7 based on some major discussion I think is misleading, and I think
8 they misled the Court if they said that, because they knew. They
9 had to know that there was no such thing about the departure of
09:36:33 10 Sam Bockarie from Sierra Leone as related to a conflict between
11 he and Issa Sesay. They knew that was between Sam Bockarie and
12 Foday Sankoh because of the different problems involving Lome,
13 the discussions, the different meetings, the conflict, the
14 announcements, the radio, the television. They had to know. So
09:37:01 15 I think by even asking Varmuyan Sheriff that question in fact is
16 sinister, and I think the Prosecution misled the Court by asking
17 such a question. I think it's nonsensical to ask that question,
18 because they knew or had to know.

19 Q. Because, Mr Taylor, was there ever an occasion when you
09:37:20 20 invited both Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay to Monrovia to broker a
21 change in leadership for the RUF?

22 A. Never. Never.

23 Q. Tell me, what time frame separated Bockarie moving to
24 Monrovia and Issa Sesay being - becoming leader of the RUF? What
09:37:47 25 kind of time frame separated the two?

26 A. We are talking about several months, beginning with the
27 departure of Sam Bockarie to Liberia which occurred in December
28 1999, verses Issa Sesay taking over the leadership of the RUF in
29 August 2000. So we are talking about a time frame of about,

1 what? Eight - if I'm doing my math correctly, between January to
2 August. I think that's about eight months. So there is no
3 correlation between the two whatsoever.

09:38:33 4 Q. Now, one detail which Mr Sheriff provided was to this
5 effect. He said this at page 887:

6 "The helicopter was used, that's to airlift some of
7 Bockarie's men to Foya to Monrovia, and then they were sent to
8 Gbatala base for training."

9 Were they airlifted, Mr Taylor?

09:38:52 10 A. Never. And if the Court believes this story, then that
11 means that all of the other stories they have said that Sam
12 Bockarie came across in trucks - and remember there is testimony
13 given before this Court that there was supposed to be trucks sent
14 with arms and/or ammunition with clothes and food across the
09:39:15 15 border that had to come back across the border. There was no
16 witness, and one of the principal individuals involved in the
17 movement across the border was a Prosecution witness Jabaty
18 Jaward, who never talked about any use of any helicopter. There
19 were no helicopters used at all in the movement of those people.
09:39:39 20 None whatsoever.

21 Q. Now, another detail in relation to helicopters he provided
22 was this. Same page, line 25:

23 "When you spoke of a helicopter that was used, what
24 helicopter was this?"

09:39:56 25 Now, this is December 1999, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And the answer is:

28 "Anti-terrorist. They had two helicopters, ATUs. The
29 helicopter belonged to Mr Taylor."

1 Did the ATU have two helicopters in December 1999?

2 A. No, they did not. No.

3 Q. Now, moving to page 891, he was asked this question at line
4 6:

09:40:43 5 "Q. You also testified about performing monitoring duties
6 in relation to the movement of arms and ammunition in
7 Lofa County and you testified that you travelled once to
8 Foya. You testified earlier yesterday that your home where
9 you originated from was in Voinjama. Now, during this time
09:41:03 10 you were performing these monitoring duties, did you also
11 travel to Voinjama?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And could you tell us what, if anything, you observed
14 about the movement of arms, ammunition and people when you
09:41:16 15 went to Voinjama?

16 A. I did observe the former fighters of ULIMO still having
17 hidden arms and some of them were taking them to Sam
18 Bockarie to the RUF territory in Sierra Leone and also Sam
19 Bockarie sent Superman, one of his senior commanders at the
09:41:38 20 time, he also travelled to Voinjama and the surrounding
21 Voinjama areas to buy arms and ammunition to take it to
22 Sierra Leone.

23 Q. Now, during this time you were performing these
24 monitoring duties how many trips did you make to Voinjama?

09:41:58 25 A. I made about more than seven trips or more than two."
26 And then he was asked again:

27 "Q. How many trips did you make to Voinjama during this
28 time?

29 A. Three times.

1 Q. And did you observe this type of behaviour each time?

2 A. The one I explained just now was the only thing I
3 observed, that the RUF members were now patrolling the
4 whole of Lofa County, buying arms and ammunition and taking
09:42:32 5 them to Sierra Leone."

6 What do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

7 A. I am not aware. As I have sat here, I have heard of the
8 trade up there. I doubt very much if Varmuyan was on the
9 monitoring shift up in Lofa.

09:42:55 10 Q. Well, he said that you had ordered him to monitor this
11 situation and ensure, remember, that there was a free trade in
12 arms in Lofa County. He said you had given him that specific
13 instruction?

14 A. Which is a blatant lie. That's not true. Varmuyan Sheriff,
09:43:13 15 as assistant director of the Secret Service responsible for
16 putting my convoy together, would have not been given such an
17 assignment out of town. Let's not forget that there are also
18 some former NPFL individuals that are in the region, but ULIMO
19 are in the majority. But I would not instruct Varmuyan Sheriff to
09:43:38 20 leave his duty.

21 But I guess this shows this Court generally, and I think it
22 proves the point that there are arms going across the border,
23 they are not official and that there is an illegal trade going
24 on, and it is not with the consent of the government or the
09:44:02 25 acquiescence. If Varmuyan - in fact, on page 891 Varmuyan is not
26 being truthful to this Court when he says that he had observed
27 that former ULIMO soldiers were trading arms. But wait a minute.
28 Varmuyan Sheriff was one of the most - I think the second or third
29 in command and most senior general and was based in Voinjama and

1 Foya during that time. He was aware --

2 Q. Which time?

3 A. During the time of the conflict. He was aware of the fact
4 that during disarmament they had hidden these arms. So for

09:44:48 5 Varmuyan to tell this Court that: Oh, this is something he
6 observed, it's a blatant lie. Because this could have never gone
7 on in that area. He was the commander. He was on the ground.

8 And this trade is what ensued following my election as President
9 with his trade across the border. And I want to believe that

09:45:08 10 Varmuyan was a part of this trade and even in the picture that
11 was shown in this Court with Varmuyan Sheriff with a pick-up, in
12 blue overall, with arms, alleging that he is being sent by me is
13 a blatant lie. This is the type of trade that Varmuyan Sheriff
14 was involved in. So to say that this was something that he

09:45:30 15 observed, I think was misleading.

16 Q. Yes. But there is some details in there though, Mr Taylor,
17 that I do want to ask you about. Were you aware that such a
18 trade was going on across that border in this unstructured way
19 between former ULIMO combatants and the RUF? Were you aware of
09:45:57 20 that?

21 A. No, no. I was not aware at all. And if I had gotten even
22 a little bit of information on this matter, what I would have
23 done, one, I would have stopped it and the method I would have
24 used is the government would have bought the arms itself, okay.

09:46:15 25 Where we would trade-in, you bring in your arms and we give you
26 money, okay. Because we were trying to do this very thing in
27 other parts of the country, but we did not know that these people
28 were over there doing their own thing. I would have bought the
29 weapons. We needed the weapons for security. We did not have

1 the weapons. I would have bought them.

2 Q. Now, another aspect of it that I want to ask you about, the
3 picture being described by Mr Sheriff is of RUF combatants roaming
4 Lofa County, making these deals with these former ULIMO
09:46:54 5 combatants. Were you aware of RUF combatants having that degree
6 of access to Liberian territory?

7 A. No, not the combatants. No, I was not aware of that.
8 Let's just clarify that maybe for the Court. The fact that
9 Sierra Leoneans are going and coming across that border I think
09:47:15 10 was a normal thing. After elections we are talking about
11 generally the period around 1998. So people are moving about,
12 but it's got to be secret. It's undercover. I am not aware that
13 ex-combatants are coming in and involving in the movement and
14 trade of arms. No, I am not aware of that.

09:47:33 15 Q. And one final matter that I want to ask you about in that
16 regard, did you ever suspect that Varmuyan Sheriff, because of his
17 past links with ULIMO and the rank he held within ULIMO, that he
18 may have been involved in any illegal activities such as arms
19 trading with the RUF? Did it cross your mind?

09:48:04 20 A. Well, I will put it this way: Not really. But I tell you,
21 when - it was sometimes - it was not until during the war with
22 LURD and Varmuyan got involved as deputy chief of staff of the
23 army and the discovery that weapons that were brought into
24 Liberia in 2001 within hours had entered the hands of the LURD
09:48:47 25 soldiers, really, it started raising a lot of questions. But at
26 the time, no.

27 Q. Can I just pause you for a moment, Mr Taylor. What you say
28 was, line 21, "got involved as deputy chief of staff of the army
29 and the discovery that weapons that were brought into Liberia in

1 2001", by whom?

2 A. By the Government of Liberia. We are in a full scale war,
3 and I have discussed this 2001 where we write the
4 Security Council and inform them that the Government of Liberia
09:49:26 5 were bring in arms for legitimacy of defence. And the rapid way
6 in which LURD were able to obtain our weapons, we launched an
7 investigation and that investigation at that time revealed not
8 only that Varmuyan's brother was the most senior general in LURD
9 fighting right - maybe a mile or two from where he was located
09:49:52 10 and then things started coming out, "But, chief, Varmuyan has
11 been doing this for a long time, even before the war he was
12 dealing." But I must admit in 1998, '99 I had no idea that
13 Varmuyan was involved in this shady deal across the border, no.

14 Q. What's his brother's name?

09:50:16 15 A. He used the name Cobra. The overall commander of LURD
16 forces was Varmuyan Sherif's brother fighting right across from
17 me. And Varmuyan was fighting on the Liberian side and his
18 brother - at least we were led to believe that he was fighting on
19 our side. But we got to know that weapons were being passed
09:50:39 20 across to Cobra and that's how LURD made a lot of their advances,
21 because Varmuyan was giving them spaces, you know, to enter and
22 weapons to fight.

23 Q. When you mentioned you had no idea that Varmuyan was
24 involved in this shady deal, what deal are you talking about?

09:50:55 25 A. Well, you asked me as to whether I was aware of Varmuyan -
26 or had any knowledge of the fact that Varmuyan was dealing with
27 the RUF and I am saying no. Then I explained the scenario and
28 said I had no idea that he was involved in these shady
29 transactions.

1 Q. Now, on page 892 of the transcript of the 10 January,
2 Mr Sheriff also went on to say that - he was asked this question:

3 "Q. You also talked yesterday about a shipment to Roberts
4 International Airfield. You testified that you saw Sam
09:51:40 5 Bockarie and others meeting at a restaurant near Roberts
6 International Airfield and that they were discussing how or
7 who should receive parts of the arms shipment that was
8 coming in. You testified that the arms shipment was taken
9 to White Flower and you followed behind the police

09:51:59 10 director. Do you know how many vehicles were loaded with
11 arms and ammunition from this shipment?

12 A. After every one or two months, Paul Mulbah was
13 receiving arms and ammunition at the Roberts International
14 Airport. That did not happen once. It happened more than
09:52:23 15 three to four times. Up to 2003 arms and ammunition were
16 still coming down at Robertsfield and Paul Mulbah was there
17 receiving them."

18 And then he goes on to say that this stopped in 2003 at the
19 time Mr Taylor left power "because the last time that came was
09:52:47 20 blasted in the air at Robertsfield."

21 Now, there's a lot there. Firstly this: Do you know of
22 any incident when Sam Bockarie was present at Roberts
23 International Airfield to receive an incoming arms shipment?

24 A. Not at all, no. And I doubt that it happened. I strongly,
09:53:08 25 strongly dispute that that would have happened, no.

26 Q. Secondly, was it the case that shipments were coming into
27 Roberts International Airfield, shipments of arms that is, every
28 one or two months?

29 A. No, that is not true. Well, I look, Sam Bockarie being at

1 Roberts International Airport to receive arms, I mean, let's just
2 see if we can put some meat on this. Sam Bockarie comes to
3 Liberia in 1999. There is evidence, if it's to be believed, Sam
4 Bockarie leaves Liberia in 2000. What is he going to be - how
09:54:03 5 does he get to Roberts International Airport and for what purpose
6 is he going to Roberts International Airport? In the first
7 instance if it's 2000, he leaves in 2000, so what is he going to
8 be doing at Roberts? Except we are talking - except he is
9 suggesting sometime earlier than the time of --

09:54:20 10 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, I can help you to this extent because, in
11 an effort to seek clarification, Ms Hollis asked Mr Sherif this
12 question:

13 "Q. During what year did these shipments begin?

14 A. You mean the time when they started bringing them or
09:54:44 15 the time they stopped bringing them?

16 Q. The time they started bringing them.

17 A. I started experiencing it since 2001 and it went up
18 to 2003, if my memory serves me well. I realised that arms
19 and ammunition were coming to Roberts International
09:55:05 20 Airfield and it started in 2001 up to 2003."

21 Then he was asked this:

22 "Q. Now, yesterday you testified that this meeting where
23 Sam Bockarie was at Roberts International Airport and you
24 received this arms shipment, you testified that this was
09:55:22 25 before the attack on Freetown in January 1999?

26 A. Sam Bockarie, I didn't see him receiving the arms. I
27 said Sam Bockarie was at the Robertsfield and they were
28 discussing which logistics - how much logistics each person
29 was supposed to receive. But Paul Mulbah - that all of

1 these arms, they would take them first to White Flower and
2 everybody will only receive from Mr Taylor himself. "

3 So there's two things being said there. Firstly, that Sam
4 Bockarie was present at Roberts International Airport when a
09:56:07 5 shipment was expected just prior to January 1999. What do you
6 know about that?

7 A. None. Nothing. And I don't think that is true because,
8 again, I mean let's - you know, I don't know how maybe the
9 Prosecution - Sam Bockarie is alleged, I mean, which is factual,
09:56:34 10 went to Burkina Faso in December 1998. Is this what Varmuyan
11 Sheriff is talking about? Now he is describing an incident where
12 he is present where some materials come and he specifically says
13 Sam Bockarie does not receive it, but Sam Bockarie - and he says
14 that, Sam Bockarie does not receive it, but they are discussing
09:56:57 15 logistics. So what are we talking about? Are we talking about a
16 trip that Sam Bockarie goes to Burkina Faso as some have said and
17 brought arms in? Okay, if he brought it in then he has it so he
18 cannot say he did not receive it. So except we are talking about
19 a different thing.

09:57:13 20 As far as the second part this have of 2001 and on, Sam
21 Bockarie was not in Liberia and could not have been at the
22 airport. So unless we can really - you know sometimes these guys
23 mix up these things because they are trying to get things
24 together. It does not make a lot of sense that Sam Bockarie is
09:57:33 25 at the airport, Roberts International Airport, before the January
26 invasion but he does not get the arms and ammunition. That's
27 what he says, he doesn't get, they are only discussing logistics,
28 verses someone who said that he went and he brought in arms and
29 ammunition.

1 So I think that this witness is either confused or
2 deliberately misstating the information as he maybe is told to
3 say it, because it is not clear here really what he is saying.

4 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you appreciate the juxtaposition of
09:58:13 5 Bockarie being at Roberts International Airport prior to the 6
6 January Freetown invasion and also at or about the time when he
7 has just returned from Burkina Faso. And you recall other
8 evidence suggesting an arms shipment arriving in Roberts
9 International Airport from Burkina Faso in or about December
09:58:44 10 1998. You recall all of that, don't you?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. So help us. Was Bockarie present at the airport, awaiting
13 an arms shipment as described by Mr Sheriff?

14 A. No, no. Not to my knowledge, no. Because when Bockarie
09:59:01 15 went to Burkina Faso to the best of my knowledge, he did not
16 bring arms and ammunition into that republic that I know of, no.
17 So that's not possible.

18 Q. Another detail I want to ask you about. Well, on that same
19 topic before I move on, did Blaise Compaore advise you or inform
09:59:26 20 you in or about December 1998 that he was sending arms to the RUF
21 via Roberts International Airport?

22 A. No, he did not. And quite frankly, I can't speak for
23 Blaise, but I doubt very much if he would have done such a thing.
24 I do not think that Blaise in his position at that time, or any
09:59:51 25 other time, would have given them weapons. I can't speak for
26 him, but he never had any such discussions with me.

27 Q. Well, let me ask you another question. Would Blaise
28 Compaore have sent arms via Roberts International Airport without
29 first informing you?

1 A. Oh, no. He would have at least had the courtesy to say, I
2 "am sending in arms and ammunition", but that never happened.

3 Q. And on that same note, Liberia - there was an arms embargo
4 on Liberia at the time, was there not?

10:00:35 5 A. There was.

6 Q. Now, would the leader of the African Union send arms to
7 Liberia knowing that the UN had imposed an arms embargo on
8 Liberia?

9 A. I don't think so, no. I doubt it very much.

10:00:55 10 Q. Another detail, Mr Taylor, and it's this. The witness was
11 asked this on page 898 at line 15:

12 "Q. Did the RUF come to assist in the fight against the
13 LURD?

14 A. Yes.

10:01:10 15 Q. And where did they operate? In what area?

16 A. They operated in Foya, Kolahun and Voinjama.

17 Q. Do you recall the names of any of the RUF commanders?

18 A. The only person that I could recall his name, when Abu
19 Keita came to Voinjama he sent me a written message that

10:01:33 20 he's in good hands and now he has just been sent forth to
21 assist the Liberian government to fight against the LURD.

22 The RUF at that time when they came into Liberian territory
23 to help the government they were reporting directly to
24 Benjamin Yeaten.

10:01:53 25 Were the RUF assisting in that way, Mr Taylor?

26 A. But, I mean, counsel, maybe I didn't - that reading, maybe
27 I did not get it properly. Did I understand your question that
28 the RUF was asked by my government to come and assist the
29 Government of Liberia and that --

1 Q. Well, that's implied.

2 A. Okay. And that one of the RUF commanders that came was Abu
3 Keita; am I understanding that correctly?

4 Q. Yes.

10:02:35 5 A. Well, if we believe that to be true - but don't let's
6 forget now, but who is Abu Keita fighting against? Abu Keita is
7 the individual that is alleged to this Court that I sent to
8 Sierra Leone, okay, to fight. So is he a part of the Liberian
9 government forces, or is he an RUF commander? So now he is an
10:03:02 10 RUF commander. Well, in answer to your question, counsel, I
11 never asked the RUF to come into Liberia to fight at all.

12 But, now, you know, that's where in this case, you know, I
13 guess in a hurry to get a conviction to destroy Charles Taylor,
14 anything goes. So Abu Keita cannot be a commander that I sent to
10:03:25 15 Sierra Leone. I am supposed to send him with men to participate
16 in the 6 January invasion of Sierra Leone. Now he comes back as
17 an RUF commander. Well, it can't be - it can't be true.

18 Q. Fighting against LURD.

19 A. Fighting against LURD.

10:03:41 20 Q. Now, LURD, remind us, Mr Taylor, who were they?

21 A. LURD were ULIMO - these are the disgruntled ULIMO
22 individual that fled into Sierra Leone and are coming back and
23 attacking - so Abu Keita, in other words, is fighting himself.
24 This is what it amounts to. Because Abu Keita is an ULIMO-K
10:04:07 25 general, and ULIMO-J and K constitute LURD. So how can now Abu
26 Keita - on the one hand, he is a Liberian commander sent in by
27 me; on the other hand, he is an RUF commander sent in by the RUF
28 to fight against his very brothers that are in exile fighting
29 against - so who is he fighting? Himself? Me? Who is he

1 fighting? It's just - that just shows the depth of this lie.

2 Q. And he went on to say, Mr Taylor - and I must ask you about
3 this - that when the RUF came to Lofa to assist in the fight
4 against LURD, you provided Benjamin Yeaten with guns which Yeaten
10:04:59 5 in turn distributed amongst the RUF combatants. Is that true?

6 A. That is not true. Well, it depends on the picture - it
7 depends on the period in question. Arms are - well, I don't know
8 what period he is talking about.

9 Q. He is talking about fighting against LURD.

10:05:18 10 A. Okay. But LURD starts in early period. Guns do come to
11 Liberia in 2001, and so if he is talking about any time prior to
12 2001, we don't have the guns. That's why LURD makes so much
13 progress, because we really can't fight them. We are not
14 equipped.

10:05:42 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, was it the case that wounded RUF combatants
16 were taken to Monrovia - to the John F Kennedy Hospital in
17 Monrovia for treatment?

18 A. Well, you know, again these questions are yes and -
19 depending on the period. Depending on the period I can say yes.

10:06:09 20 The period prior to Lome, that is July 1999, we deliberately -
21 and I say this was my government's decision. Individuals that
22 were coming out of Sierra Leone - critically wounded individuals,
23 whether you were a civilian or what - during that crucial period
24 of negotiations, if a request was made individuals did come, that
10:06:38 25 is, up to Lome.

26 Q. Right. Now help us, Mr Taylor. We know when Lome was:
27 July 1999?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. But help us, what's the start and the end of this period

1 that you are now talking about?

2 A. Well, I am talking about between, I would say, the
3 beginning - I would put it to the beginning of - I would say the
4 first quarter of 1998 into July 1999, individuals - not just
10:07:16 5 soldiers. But it was a decision of my government to permit
6 anybody, civilians, that needed assistance came across the border
7 in Liberia for treatment, yes. This was purely humanitarian,
8 from my perspective, in my capacity as mediator in the process,
9 yes.

10:07:37 10 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, were there any Sierra Leonean
11 doctors at the John F Kennedy Hospital?

12 A. Wow, I don't know. Quite frankly, I don't know. A lot of
13 the - a lot of doctors in Sierra Leone were trained in Liberia,
14 so they all were trained at the Dogliotti College of Medicine,
10:08:06 15 including one of the protected witnesses that came here who
16 trained in Liberia, Sierra Leonean - I mean, the Prosecution
17 witness that came here that trained in Liberia. So the chances
18 of a Sierra Leonean working not just in JFK, but in other
19 hospitals of Liberia, I would say yes. Sierra Leoneans came to
10:08:28 20 Liberia to look for employment. There was [i ndi scernible] in
21 Sierra Leone that came to Liberia.

22 Q. The witness you mentioned, the protected witness, is
23 TF1-358.

24 A. He was trained in Liberia and worked in Liberia before.

10:08:36 25 Q. Now, on that note, Mr Taylor, the treatment of RUF and
26 other civilian wounded in JFK, was there a time when this caused
27 some public concern?

28 A. Well, there was a time that the issue was raised. I
29 wouldn't call it a public concern. Some - a couple of newspapers

1 at the time did raise it, but, you know, there are about three
2 things I want to mention. Let's go back to the issue of
3 treatment at JFK. It must be stated that the JFK at a particular
4 point in time in question had certain facilities that individuals
10:09:32 5 came from as far as way as Mali, Ivory Coast, Guinea, for
6 treatment in Liberia. There is nothing unique about Sierra
7 Leoneans coming in, that's number one.

8 The second important one about the question that you asked
9 me, I just - would you - I just --

10:09:57 10 Q. The question was: Did the treatment of RUF and other
11 civilian wounded in JFK, was there a time when this caused some
12 public concern?

13 A. Some newspapers - the newspaper situation in Liberia is
14 very - is unlike - let's forget the west. Newspapers in Liberia
10:10:20 15 are supported by embassies. They are supported by NGOs. They
16 were not that free press, independent, as you see in other
17 countries. So depending on - you may have five, ten newspapers,
18 and depending on who is opposing and what views you want to hear,
19 you will hear them. So it did come up in a couple newspapers,
10:10:43 20 and we explained that for humanitarian purposes we let people
21 come from anywhere into Liberia for treatment.

22 Q. Because Mr Sheriff did mention that the press people visited
23 the hospital and some other politicians visited the area, and
24 they said on the radio and in the newspaper that the war in
10:11:05 25 Liberia is not true because they are seeing some citizens from
26 other countries like from Sierra Leone in the hospital.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Would you agree with that statement?

29 A. Yes, I agree. And just to add: Listen, I operated in

1 Liberia and in West Africa very openly. In my position as
2 mediator, there were discussions I took and discussed with
3 individuals. But look, let's very be frank about this. If I,
4 Charles Ghankay Taylor, am trying to hide the fact that
10:11:41 5 individuals from neighbouring countries are taking treatment in
6 the hospital, isn't it simple to close the ward off? You close
7 the ward off and say no one is going to enter. Finish. The fact
8 that the press can go in, it simply means there is nothing
9 sinister about what is going on. It was simple to close the ward
10:11:59 10 off and say absolutely no press, as is done in other countries.
11 You go - right now you go into Washington DC, you go into the
12 Walter Reed Army Medical Centre, there are some times they permit
13 the press, and other times they shut it off. I mean, it's simple
14 as that in the most modern of countries. So there's nothing
10:12:20 15 sinister about it. It is right. You permit the press to go in
16 and we tell them. Yes, my position is one of - a very serious
17 one, and I used different methods as mediator at that particular
18 time to encourage - I would say perhaps cajole, if you want to
19 put it that far - I used whatever was necessary to my disposal to
10:12:50 20 get peace in Sierra Leone, as most countries do, whether you are
21 talking about what level of mediation. And I can go through a
22 host of mediating countries in the world; whether we are talking
23 about China, whether we are talking about Egypt, or whatever we
24 are talking about. There are certain things that are not made
10:13:11 25 public, but in my position as President, there are lot of little
26 things that you do to encourage people to move forward. And so,
27 yes, but it was not secret.

28 Q. Two other matters before I conclude with this witness. On
29 page 925 of the testimony of the 10 January 2008 the witness said

1 this, "On one occasion when" - in order to put it in context, the
2 witness was being asked about the relationship between Benjamin
3 Yeaten and you, okay, and he described the relationship as being
4 like a father and son. And he goes on to say that he himself,
10:14:12 5 Mr Taylor, made it clear to all of us, the SS members, that
6 Benjamin Yeaten is like his son.

7 And he went on. The relationship was very cordial between
8 you and Benjamin Yeaten.

9 "... because Benjamin Yeaten, he did anything. If he did
10:14:30 10 anything, he would not be questioned. Sometimes, in fact,
11 he did certain things before taking instruction from
12 Mr Taylor, and even when Mr Taylor got to know about it, he
13 would just forget about it and nothing went out of it.

14 Q. Now, when you say if he did anything he would not
10:14:54 15 questioned, what do you mean?"

16 And he gives this example:

17 "On one occasion when the Special Court wanted to arrest
18 Mr Taylor in Ghana, in less than one hour Benjamin Yeaten
19 executed two of the ministers in Liberia. He arrested the
10:15:08 20 Vice-President and he went and had him in jail, and when
21 Mr Taylor came he explained on the radio publicly that the
22 Liberian people should now consider that it is a mistake and that
23 was all."

24 So, pausing, firstly, was Benjamin Yeaten like a son to
10:15:33 25 you?

26 A. Sheriff was like a son to me. Son, I think is - I would
27 say - I would accept. I would say yes, if we are speaking as son
28 in terms of our typical African way where a younger man is like a
29 son to you. Just as I said to this Court that Bockarie was like

1 a son to me. Sheriff, as far as I was concerned, was like a son
2 to me. Not in the way that he described it, but I would accept
3 that he was like a son to me with that explanation.

10:16:13 4 Q. Now what about this suggestion: That sometimes Yeaten
5 would act without seeking any instructions from you?

6 A. Oh well, yes, Benjamin - yes. Most officials of government
7 did not - I mean if a President had to operate - I would say yes.
8 If a President had to operate with everyone calling and getting
9 instructions before he could take certain crucial decisions I
10:16:40 10 don't think the President would have a minute of his own. So
11 most individuals in fact are trained to take decisions, but to
12 take prudent decisions. I would say even Varmuyan Sheriff took
13 all the decisions he took by giving arms to his brother Cobra, of
14 course he didn't ask me. People take decisions and sometimes
10:17:04 15 they are right and sometimes they are wrong. And they bear
16 responsibilities for them. But I would say yes.

17 Q. Now, what about this suggestion that on that occasion when
18 you were in Ghana and the Special Court wanted to arrest you,
19 that in less than an hour Benjamin Yeaten executed two ministers
10:17:25 20 in Liberia, is that true?

21 A. That is not true. And to show it is not true, let's
22 reflect on Moses Blah's testimony. Moses Blah sat here and told
23 this Court that when I returned from La Cote d'Ivoire, one of the
24 ministers that Varmuyan is referring to, Moses Blah alleges that
10:17:47 25 I attacked the minister in a meeting. So how could he be dead
26 and I am attacking him? That's a blatant lie. It did not
27 happen.

28 But I think there are two words that he used. One word
29 "cordial". There was nothing cordial between Benjamin Yeaten and

1 myself. Benjamin Yeaten was a general. He performed. And as an
2 army personnel, he knew where his responsibilities stopped. But
3 in terms of what happened during that particular period, it is
4 very important for the first time for the world to get to know
10:18:31 5 what happened. And as we go further and we look at the 2006
6 testimony by a Lieutenant Colonel David Crane before the
7 Senate - I mean the House Foreign Relations Committee, we will
8 see the intent. The indictment was opened on the day that I went
9 to Ghana.

10:19:03 10 But something else happened during that particular time.
11 The war was being fought in Monrovia. LURD was then attacking
12 Monrovia. The United States of America at the time had brought
13 5,000 Marines from Iraq and they had about a half dozen ships
14 within view off the coast of Monrovia. The then President of the
10:19:35 15 United States George Bush had said that I should step down and
16 leave Liberia. The United States had brought special ops people
17 in Liberia at the embassy and the whole scenario was timed that
18 while I was in Ghana, the unfolding of the indictment - at that
19 particular time Moses Blah was summonsed to the United States
10:20:07 20 embassy and he was asked to take over power because I had been
21 indicted and I would not be returning.

22 Moses Blah went and asked the general, General Yeaten at
23 the time - at the time we are talking about General Yeaten is not
24 just director of SSS. He is the deputy chairman of the joints
10:20:32 25 chief of staff and in charge of military operations in the entire
26 republic. General Yeaten, responding as he rightly did as a
27 general, said to the Vice-President, "If you are asking me
28 to - if you are telling me that you want to stage a coup d'etat
29 it's unacceptable." And I was in contact with General Yeaten,

1 the Defence Minister and everybody at the time of this incident
2 in Accra. Moses Blah was never touched. Moses Blah, when I
3 returned to Accra - I mean to Monrovia on the day of the
4 unfolding of this - of the opening of this indictment, on board
10:21:13 5 the presidential plane of the Republic of Ghana, Moses Blah
6 received me at the airport that night. We went to Monrovia and I
7 ordered him placed under house arrest for an attempted coup
8 d'etat when he asked the armed forces to overthrow.

9 Immediately the special ops man at the United States
10:21:33 10 embassy left the country that night on my arrival and that ended
11 the issue. Yes, there were two individuals that did get killed
12 during that particular time. They were not ministers of
13 government. There was a John Yormie and another very good friend
14 of mine I understand accidentally - he was a pure party member of
10:21:59 15 our party, a gentleman by the name of Vaye that got killed during
16 that process.

17 Q. Could you give us some spellings?

18 A. The first one is John Yormie. John Yormie was Deputy
19 Minister of National Security and Vaye was also I think an
10:22:22 20 assistant minister at I think public works if I am not mistaken.

21 Q. Spellings?

22 A. Vaye, V-A-Y-E. Yormie is Y-O-R-M-I-E. But that's the
23 scenario where the Moses Blah and the house arrest and officials
24 getting killed and that is completely, completely further from
10:22:49 25 what he has explained.

26 Q. And the final matter I want to deal with in relation to
27 this witness is this, the witness was asked:

28 "Q. How would you characterise Charles Taylor's
29 relationship with the RUF?"

1 A. It is also that he was the father of the RUF for the
2 fact that Sam Bockarie made it clear to me that when they
3 were going on a mission, and Mr Taylor was sending him, Sam
4 Bockarie, on a mission, he was small. So the instruction
10:23:21 5 had been between Mr Taylor and Foday Sankoh at the time,
6 but now he had come and had seen Mr Taylor so he had talked
7 to his father and he was receiving well in his body and
8 anything they are supposed to do now to carry on his
9 mission, everything will go on successfully."

10:23:44 10 Would you describe your relationship in that way?

11 A. No, I would not. I would not describe my relationship with
12 Sam Bockarie in that way. I don't need to - I think this Court
13 understands the role that I played now and I would not burden the
14 Court with any long explanation. My role was one of a mediator.
10:24:08 15 I did what I had to do. These little fellows like Varmuyan and
16 the rest don't - I don't put it to the fact that they are
17 deliberately lying. They are being asked to explain things that
18 they cannot explain, and this is the best of their explanation.

19 There was a very crucial role that I played at this
10:24:32 20 particular time, a very crucial role. ECOWAS encouraged me to
21 play that role. The United Nations encouraged me to play that
22 role. The OAU encouraged me to play that role and I played it to
23 their satisfaction, with their knowledge and with their
24 acquiescence.

10:24:51 25 Now if you ask a little fellow like Varmuyan who, for what
26 reason he was brought to this Court to testify as, quote unquote,
27 an insider, of course you would expect him to try to explain to
28 the best of his ability. But I think his explanation is at that
29 level. But my role was crucial and I played it. There was

1 nothing special. Like I said, I never knew Sam Bockarie. And
2 all of the witnesses that have come before this Court - during
3 the time that Sankoh visited me in Liberia between August '91 and
4 May '92 never brought Sam Bockarie to Liberia. He never. I
10:25:40 5 never knew the young man. The only time I got to know Sam
6 Bockarie was after I guess he successfully fought to get to me
7 after maybe Varmuyan had misled him over time that he could have
8 brought him to me, which he did not, was in August 1998 when we
9 get this letter and I invite him over in September 1998.

10:26:05 10 Q. Very well. Now, I did say that was the final question, but
11 I have just spotted one other matter which I want your comment
12 on. Mr Sherif was asked at page 926, going into page 927:

13 "Q. Yesterday you testified that as a member of ULIMO you
14 fought against the RUF and the NPFL in Sierra Leone.

10:26:28 15 During what period of time did you fight against the RUF
16 and NPFL in Sierra Leone?

17 And this is what I want you to comment on. He said that:

18 "A. That is the end of 1991 to 1992."

19 So what he is saying is that as a ULIMO combatant, he began
10:26:52 20 operations against the RUF and the NPFL end of 1991 to 1992 and
21 he goes on to say that he fought in the Pujehun District.

22 Now, Mr Taylor, would you agree with that time frame for
23 the start of hostilities involving ULIMO, end of 1991?

24 A. The only thing I can - no, in direct answer to your
10:27:27 25 question. There is a question with the time here. But the only
26 help I can give is that if he is saying the end of 1991, '92 that
27 he is fighting in Pujehun, that he is fighting in Pujehun, which
28 is in Sierra Leone, this only, for me, opens up the whole period
29 that these people, ULIMO and other Liberians, are still being

1 used as mercenaries with - I mean by the Government of Sierra
2 Leone. And so we may very well find out that Varmuyan may have
3 been involved in more than that.

4 But the period in question is something that - I think if
10:28:15 5 he's fighting in Pujehun, remember by this time '91/'92 ULIMO is
6 also fighting in Liberia. And if he is fighting in Liberia and
7 fighting in Pujehun, I can see here that he is being - that they
8 are being used maybe in dual roles at the time, you know, as the
9 Government of Sierra Leone did use Liberians as mercenaries. So
10:28:45 10 he is fighting in Liberia and fighting in Sierra Leone because I
11 guess of his Sierra Leonean rank. And I wouldn't put it past the
12 fact that, you know, his involvement even after - even after my
13 election as President. But the period in question, it would be
14 strange that he would be fighting in both places.

10:29:10 15 Q. Very well. We are going to move on and deal with another
16 witness now, Mr Taylor.

17 Now, Mr Taylor, we cannot mention - well, I'm assured that
18 I can mention the name of this witness: TF1-597, Samuel Kargbo.
19 Now, Mr Taylor, this witness deals with the period of the AFRC.
10:29:49 20 Do you recall his testimony?

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 Q. Now, I would like us to deal with one or two aspects of his
23 testimony which was provided to this Court in May 2008. Now, the
24 first point that I want to ask you about is at page 10441, where
10:30:18 25 the witness says that Pa Sankoh told the RUF that the RUF should
26 come and join them, he being an AFRC member. So within 72 hours
27 the RUF came and joined them. Did you know about that?

28 A. Well, I heard about the joining at this particular time. I
29 am not sure of the time, but yes, I heard about it.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, he goes on to say this on the same topic:

2 "Q. Sir, you indicated that Johnny Paul Koroma called
3 Foday Sankoh. How do you know that?

4 A. We are in the office."

10:31:09 5 Jumping a few lines, line 27:

6 "Q. After Johnny Paul Koroma called Foday Sankoh, did he
7 tell you what was discussed with Foday Sankoh?

8 A. Yes, after the telephone conversation he told us that
9 he had spoken to Foday Sankoh and that Sankoh had said he

10:31:26 10 will send somebody who will come to meet us. Then the RUF
11 would eventually come and join us. So within 72

12 hours - within 48 hours the person whom he said came and
13 met us, Gibriil Massaquoi. He brought with him telephone
14 numbers and the RUF came and joined us."

10:31:45 15 Were you aware of such contact between Foday Sankoh and
16 Johnny Paul Koroma?

17 A. No, I was not aware.

18 Q. This is at the time of the AFRC coup in May 1997?

19 A. I heard that information here and I have read some accounts
10:32:07 20 in documents provided by the Prosecution, but that's the extent
21 of my knowledge. I am not President at the time of this.

22 Q. Now, he goes on:

23 "Q. Did Gibriil Massaquoi introduce himself as a member of
24 any group?

10:32:33 25 A. Yes, he said he was a member of the RUF and that he was
26 sent - his leader had sent him, Foday Sankoh.

27 Q. You mentioned that he came with phone numbers. Did you
28 ever see the phone numbers, or the names associated with
29 those numbers?

1 A. No, we did not ever see the numbers, but he was
2 explain ing when he had given the numbers to Johnny Paul , he
3 said that was the number of Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor, the
4 number of Mainassara from Ni ger, the number of Bl aise
10:33:11 5 Compaore from Burki na Faso, and the number of Mohamed
6 Gaddafi for Li bya. "

7 Now, taking things in stages. Firstly, had you provided a
8 telephone number to Foday Sankoh such that he could send that
9 number via Gibri l Massaquoi to Johnny Paul Koroma?

10:33:33 10 A. No, and I do not even think he had the numbers of any of
11 these people. No, I did not give my number. Well, if Foday
12 Sankoh had my number, why during the entire period he is in
13 Abi djan he never calls me? Why is he going to - he does not have
14 my number. He does not have my number and he did not give it.

10:33:57 15 And I'll tell you, well, even though he did not come before the
16 Court, but when you read Gibri l Massaquoi's account of this
17 entire story from his statements that he made to the prosecution
18 that we have, this is a different account that Gibri l Massaquoi
19 gives in his documentation. This is a blatant lie. Total lie.

10:34:22 20 Q. Now, just dealing with some of the detail, Mohamed Gaddafi
21 was President of Li bya at the time, was he?

22 A. Well, he was the leader of Li bya, yes.

23 Q. And Bl aise Compaore, was he the President of Burki na Faso
24 at the time?

10:34:41 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And who was the President of Ni ger at the time?

27 A. Ni ger is Mai nassara Bare.

28 Q. Pardon?

29 A. Mai nasarra Bare. The "Mai nasarra" is correct.

1 Q. Now, were you President of Liberia at the time?

2 A. No, I was not.

3 Q. This is May 1997.

4 A. Yes. I am not President of Liberia at that time.

10:35:04 5 Q. So of the four numbers given allegedly to Foday - to Johnny
6 Paul Koroma, three are for Presidents of African countries, but
7 you are not President at the time?

8 A. That is correct.

9 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, isn't the President of
10:35:25 10 Liberia Muammar Gaddafi?

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Libya.

12 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Did you say not say "Mohamed"? Sorry, of
13 Libya. Did you say "Mohamed"?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, that's how it appears on the
10:35:39 15 transcript.

16 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And the witness agrees with you?

17 THE WITNESS: No, I am saying he was not President. His
18 name is not Mohamed, it's Muammar, but he does not carry the
19 title President.

10:35:50 20 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I am concerned about that first name
21 anyway, not the title.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Is his name Mohamed Gaddafi?

24 A. No, it Muammar Gaddafi, and he's not President. He carries
10:36:09 25 the title only as leader. I think it's an error, your Honour.

26 Q. Now, he goes on, the witness does, on the next page, page
27 10443 he is asked this:

28 "Q. Did Johnny Paul Koroma discuss with you and other
29 members of the RUF why the RUF was being invited to come to

1 Freetown and join you?

2 A. Yes, the discussion was we needed their support, their
3 manpower and the contacts that they had before."

4 And I just need to find another reference for completeness.

10:37:11 5 Later - that was at page 10443, and remember the answer was:

6 "The discussion was we needed their support, their manpower
7 and the contacts that they had before."

8 On the next day of the witness's testimony at page 10512
9 that answer is followed up. He is asked this at line 17:

10:37:36 10 "Q. Now I would like to turn to page 10443, and at that
11 time we were talking about the initial AFRC overthrow. I
12 asked you at the beginning of the page: 'Sir, did Johnny
13 Paul Koroma discuss with you and other members of the AFRC
14 why the RUF was being invited to come to Freetown and join
10:37:58 15 you?' You answered, 'Yes, the discussion was we needed
16 their support, their manpower and the contacts that they
17 had before.'

18 Q. What did you mean when you talk about 'the contacts
19 they had before'?

10:38:13 20 A. Well, the contacts they had through Charles Taylor, who
21 was their godfather, and the total peace that we needed
22 that the government had abandoned that we, the soldiers,
23 were suffering. So we were asking them to come and join
24 hands with us and for the contacts that they had.

10:38:34 25 Q. Well, what do you mean? Which contacts that they had?
26 What contacts - what contacts were you aware of that you
27 are referring to?

28 A. Well, at that time the international community did not
29 recognise us and we said where the RUF was fighting, that

1 was along the border of Liberia. We knew they had a
2 contact with Charles Taylor, so we needed them to have
3 Charles Taylor on our side. That was why we called the
4 RUF, and we got them and they brought the number. The
10:39:09 5 chairman used to call Charles Taylor and he spoke to him
6 and he said, yes, he will support us to be together, so all
7 of us will be together."

8 You see what's being suggested there, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes.

10:39:24 10 Q. That the reason behind the fusion of the RUF and the AFRC
11 was in order to get the RUF's contacts, the major contact being
12 you, and thereafter you are in frequent contact with the
13 chairman, Johnny Paul Koroma, providing support. What do you
14 say?

10:39:45 15 A. That is totally not true, and he tells several lies here.
16 You chose to move over this. I think on 10443 or 4 he goes
17 further. He says that Liberia recognises the junta.

18 Q. I am coming back to that.

19 A. And now he amplifies the lie by saying that - this boy is
10:40:12 20 putting me as President. That's how the lie is being - if I
21 remember this witness, this is this traveller, and I am not
22 surprised and I really have to mention this, that he's mentioned
23 all those names. This is - if I remember, this is this witness -
24 this is one that travelled mostly around West Africa. He goes to
10:40:31 25 Guinea. He's travelled almost into every West Africa country.
26 Kargbo. That Kargbo - I remember that Kargbo boy, then you know
27 how he managed to know these names. But there is no such thing
28 of Johnny Paul Koroma calling me and talking to me.

29 Quite frankly, your Honours, if Johnny Paul Koroma - even

1 when I became President, I did not speak to him. But if there
2 was an opportunity to have spoken to Johnny Paul Koroma when I
3 was President, I would have. I would have spoken to him because
4 by the time I was elected President and put on the Committee of
10:41:16 5 Four, I had the authorisation to do so. But I never spoke to
6 Johnny Paul Koroma before I became President, even during my
7 presidency, up until the time he is moved out of there in August
8 1999. So it's a blatant lie about having my number and talking
9 to me and where he states earlier, that you will go back to, as
10:41:32 10 you mentioned --

11 Q. I'm going back to it now.

12 A. -- that Liberia recognised the junta, which is a blatant
13 lie.

14 Q. Did Liberia recognise the junta?

10:41:44 15 A. Never. Liberia, along with ECOWAS, never recognised the
16 junta, no.

17 Q. Because when we go back to page 10443, we see at line 10:
18 "A. We did not get recognition from the international
19 community, but we got from Liberia - we got recognition
10:42:09 20 from Burkina Faso, Niger and Libya."

21 So you see the correlation. We're given four names:
22 Gaddafi, Blaise Compaore, President of Niger, and you.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And they are the four countries, according to the witness,
10:42:32 25 who recognised the junta. Is that true?

26 A. That's not true. Not one West African country - let's
27 leave the rest of the world out. Not one West African country
28 recognised the AFRC junta. Not one. At this particular time the
29 chairman of the Council of State in Liberia is Ruth Sando Perry.

1 There is no such recognition of the junta by Liberia or any other
2 West African country. It's a blatant lie.

3 Q. Now, in the context of the numbers being provided to Johnny
4 Paul Koroma, the witness was asked this:

10:43:15 5 "Were you present when Johnny Paul Koroma made any attempts
6 to contact any one outside of Sierra Leone besides the call to
7 Foday Sankoh that you mentioned?"

8 And he goes on:

9 "It was within one to two weeks after the coup when the RUF
10:43:33 10 had joined us when Gibril Massaquoi had brought those numbers."

11 That's 10444 at line 22. Then he goes on:

12 "An officer called Banjah Marrah made the call. He gave
13 the phone to Johnny Paul in the office, and Johnny Paul was
14 explaining, asking for recognition for Mr Ghankay Taylor in
10:43:59 15 Liberia. He was talking to him, but we did not hear where the
16 other side was saying. We only heard him saying, 'Yes, sir.

17 Yes, sir. We need a recognition.' He said a lot of things that
18 I cannot recall now. Afterwards the call went off and he said he
19 had spoken to Mr Ghankay Taylor, and he had advised us to work
10:44:21 20 with other brothers who had come to join us. He said in case
21 there were any hiccups we should just give him a call, so that
22 was what he was explaining to us just after the telephone
23 conversation with him."

24 Mr Taylor, did you have such a telephone conversation?

10:44:41 25 A. Never had any telephone conversation, never had the
26 authority to recognise a country or a junta, so how could I have
27 recognised, because he is associating the recognition of the
28 junta with Liberia and Charles Taylor as being the President. I
29 am not, don't recognise, don't have the authority, never had any

1 conversation with Johnny Paul Koroma at the time. Never.

2 And by the way, you know, it did not come before this
3 Court, but we have in our possession documents, we have them from
4 the Prosecution. In fact, the individual that brought the
10:45:27 5 instruction or letters from Foday Sankoh has mentioned in
6 statements that he made to the Prosecution that were supplied to
7 this Defence, Gibril Massaquoi even states that he travelled
8 through Guinea to get to Sierra Leone. So I am not sure if - it
9 should have taken him longer. I mean, that's not before the
10:45:47 10 Court so I am sure it's going to be hearsay, but we have the
11 documents and Gibril Massaquoi's account is that he travelled
12 through Guinea with the letters to come to the thing on
13 statements provided by this Prosecution that I have read.

14 So I mean - so this young man here, whatever he is saying,
10:46:06 15 is totally, totally untrue. It is not true. And if I was
16 associated with the junta at that time, why would Gibril
17 Massaquoi have to come all through Guinea instead of just coming
18 through Liberia and going on to Freetown? He travels from
19 Nigeria, he says he comes all the way through Ivory Coast, then
10:46:29 20 he borders Mali, enters Guinea and comes into Sierra Leone. If
21 there is this association with me, why don't you just come
22 through? But because he does not know what's talking about, he
23 associates me with being President at the period and granting
24 this thing. That's what he is trying to lie about.

10:46:49 25 Q. Because he says that the call is two weeks after the coup,
26 which we know was 25 May. Now at the beginning of June, were you
27 President of Liberia?

28 A. No, I was not. But, in fact, that's another lie. Let's
29 call it what it is. Because if that lie is supposed to be

1 believed that it happens some two weeks after, we know from other
2 testimony, except we don't believe them, that within days of this
3 particular situation, the recording is played on the BBC in
4 Sierra Leonean radio that Foday Sankoh had instructed the junta
10:47:25 5 to join. Within days, not two weeks. Within days.

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall seeing a letter addressed to
7 you from Johnny Paul Koroma seeking your assistance? Do you
8 recall that?

9 A. Here in this Court, yes. I really do not recall seeing it
10:47:48 10 as President. I don't dispute that the letter could have come.
11 I don't recall seeing it. I saw it here in this Court.

12 Q. Now, the point is this: Can you help us as to why it is,
13 you having been in telephone contact with Johnny Paul Koroma some
14 two weeks after the coup, why thereafter he had to write to you?
10:48:16 15 Can you help us?

16 A. I can't. That's just shows you how terrible their
17 construct is. Why would you have to write me when all you could
18 have done was to call me and say, "Listen, I am sending down - I
19 would like this and that." No, I have no idea how they put
10:48:34 20 together their coat of many colours. I have no idea.

21 Q. And it goes on for completeness, same page 10445:
22 "After the telephone conversation, Johnny Paul Koroma told
23 us in the office that he had spoken to Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor.
24 He had explained to him, asking him for recognition and some
10:48:56 25 other things and Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor had encouraged him,
26 asking him to work as a team with the RUF brothers. So he said
27 for that one there was not going to be any problem."

28 Did you provide him with any such advice?

29 A. Never. No.

1 Q. Because he goes on:

2 "Johnny Paul said if there were any problems between us and
3 the RUF, Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor had told him to call him.
4 Johnny Paul Koroma said Charles Taylor said he should call him in
10:49:29 5 case we had a problem with the RUF. That is what he explained to
6 us in the meeting."

7 And then he was asked:

8 "Q. Do you know if Johnny Paul Koroma made any other calls
9 to persons outside of Sierra Leone?

10:49:42 10 A. Yes. He made calls to the Niger President, Maïnassara.
11 He made call to the Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore
12 and he made a call to the Libyan President, Ahmed
13 Gaddafi - sorry, Mohamed Gaddafi" - I am reading directly
14 from the transcript. "He told us that all of them said they were
10:50:07 15 ready to assist us."

16 Then he was asked this, line 21:

17 "Q. Were all of the calls approximately the same length of
18 time or was there any difference in the amount of time
19 spent with the different leaders?

10:50:22 20 A. The times were different.

21 Q. Which was the longest call?

22 A. It was the one when he spoke to Mr Taylor, that was
23 long."

24 A long conversation with Johnny Paul Koroma, Mr Taylor?

10:50:35 25 A. Never, no, never.

26 Q. Now, do you remember, Mr Taylor, hearing some evidence
27 regarding an incident involving the Iranian embassy in Freetown?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now, in that context, the witness goes on, page 10449, line

1 1:

2 "I heard chairman Johnny Paul Koroma talking over the set,
3 saying that all of those who had gone to the Iranian embassy
4 should be arrested. But I still went round with the vehicle to
10:51:19 5 see what had happened. So when I went I met an officer who
6 explained to me that your colleagues have come and looted here,
7 together with some RUF commanders, so the Pa had ordered their
8 arrest and none of them should enter here any more.

9 So I returned, went to the lodge to the chairman, Johnny
10:51:42 10 Paul Koroma at that time, and he said we should arrest Gborie,
11 Issa Sesay, Hassan Bangura alias Papa, Foday Kallay. He said we
12 should arrest them, so we did. I led the team. There was about
13 to bring in fighting when his men deployed from Hill Cut Junction
14 to Uphill Station."

10:52:10 15 That's when they went to arrest Issa Sesay, by the way? In
16 fact, let me go back.

17 "So we sent a team to arrest Issa Sesay and he resisted.
18 He resisted arrest. There was about to bring in fighting
19 when his men deployed from Hill Cut Junction to Uphill
10:52:30 20 Station where his residence was. He refused to be
21 arrested. At that time all of us went to the office,
22 chairman Johnny Paul Koroma's house at Spur Road, and he
23 called Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor and he told Control to
24 call Banjah Marrah. When he called they were talking,
10:52:56 25 'Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.' He was responding after
26 he had explained. When the phone went off he said he had
27 called Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor. He said they were to set
28 up an inquiry who had gone and who did the looting and
29 whosoever was involved, action should be taken against that

1 person or people.

2 Q. In this phone conversation with Charles Ghankay Taylor
3 what kind of phone was used?

4 A. At that time it was still the landline up at Spur Road,
10:53:31 5 Johnny Paul Koroma's house.

6 Q. Can you repeat what Johnny Paul Koroma tell you that he
7 had discussed with Charles Taylor?

8 A. Yes, he said he had spoken together with Charles Taylor
9 and Charles Taylor had said they should set up an inquiry
10:53:50 10 team to investigate the incident at the Iranian embassy;
11 that whosoever was involved, action should be taken against
12 that person. That was what he explained to us after the
13 telephone conversation.

14 Question: Did you have such a conversation with Johnny
10:54:11 15 Paul Koroma?

16 A. No, never. Never did.

17 Q. Did you provide him with any such advice?

18 A. No, never did.

19 Q. The witness then goes on, Mr Taylor, to say this, and I am
10:55:01 20 looking at page 10453. He says this, line 14:

21 "When he had asked me question regarding the Iranian
22 embassy that was why I went there straightaway. But before
23 that he had a telephone conversation that he was to send
24 delegates to him, to Charles Taylor in Liberia. He said he
10:55:31 25 was to send delegates to Charles Taylor in Liberia, headed
26 by SYB Rogers and other high command of the RUF and SLA
27 commanders and officers then, one Colonel Charles Conteh
28 who is dead now and AK Sesay, all of them were part of
29 the delegation to Liberia.

1 Q. So I understand from your answer that this phone call
2 was before the phone call involving the Iranian embassy?

3 A. Exactly."

4 So what he is suggesting here: Before this phone call
10:56:09 5 regarding the embassy, you had had a prior conversation with
6 Johnny Paul Koroma where you had discussed the sending of a
7 delegation to Monrovia. Did such a call occur?

8 A. No, no such call occurred. But I think if we look at this
9 in a more serious term, I don't know when this Iranian situation
10:56:40 10 occurs, but it is apparent here that it occurs before I am
11 elected as President.

12 Q. Well, it's difficult to say from the context, Mr Taylor. I
13 can't assist you with that.

14 A. Okay. Well, because we are talking about - I know he
10:57:02 15 doesn't say, but when we look at the issue of a delegation coming
16 to Monrovia, it is important and I know - well, Koumjian as usual
17 did not want to go into that, but it would have been very good to
18 set up a timeline because a delegation does come to Monrovia that
19 I do not receive. But it is very strange that the way that he
10:57:33 20 talks about it - and this Court has evidence from a protected
21 witness that that witness went to Monrovia and headed that
22 delegation.

23 Now we have him here putting SYB Rogers as head of this
24 delegation and even the make up of this delegation is different
10:57:56 25 from what that protected witness said before this Court, because
26 I know that delegation included - and this witness, if he knows
27 what he is talking about, there was somebody very important on
28 that delegation, Karefa-Smart was on that delegation, and this
29 witness could not have forgotten an important person as

1 Karefa-Smart because he was just not an ordinary person at the
2 time.

3 So depending on whatever version that is brought before
4 this Court, here you have an attempt to reveal a realistic
10:58:38 5 situation and mix it up with disinformation. So I am at a loss
6 in knowing what he is talking about because if we zero in on the
7 time of the Iranian situation that Mr Koumjian did not ask him
8 about, it is very difficult to know what he is talking about.
9 But realistically there is a delegation, the leader of the
10:58:59 10 delegation that comes from Monrovia at the time I can't call his
11 name in this Court, I think the Court is aware of whom I am
12 talking about, and he includes Karefa-Smart and not some of the
13 other people that he is talking about.

14 So what I can just say about this in comment in direct
10:59:19 15 answer to your question, I did not have such a conversation. I
16 did not give such advice, so all this nonsense about these
17 conversations and different things are not true.

18 Q. Well, let me provide with you a bit more information then,
19 Mr Taylor, on this to see if it assists you. The witness goes on
10:59:45 20 to say that he was not present when the telephone conversation
21 between Johnny Paul Koroma and you regarding this delegation took
22 place, but he continues:

23 "A. But he," that being Johnny Paul, "wrote the letter,
24 and he said he will call before the delegation would leave.

11:00:06 25 Q. Can you tell us in a little more detail whatever you
26 can remember now about what Johnny Paul Koroma discussed at
27 the Supreme Council meeting regarding the purpose of this
28 delegation that you are talking about?

29 A. It was a letter that they were supposed to take with

1 them for us the AFRC government to be recognised, and some
2 other things that he had discussed privately with the
3 delegation that was to go, that he did not discuss in the
4 meeting, but they discussed that before they left, a letter
11:00:39 5 that they were to go and deliver to
6 Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor."

7 Over the page:

8 "Q. Do you know where in Liberia they went?

9 A. Yes, they went to Monrovia, the city. At that time I
11:00:56 10 don't know whether it was at the house or the office of
11 Mr Ghankay Taylor.

12 Q. Are you aware whether there were other communications
13 between Johnny Paul Koroma and Charles Taylor during the
14 period that the AFRC was in Freetown?

11:01:16 15 A. Yes, the calls were many, but the other one that I can
16 recall was pertaining to the arms shipment, that a
17 delegation was supposed to go again headed by Mike Lamin
18 and Sam Bockarie recommended one General Ibrahim in a
19 meeting for arms and ammunition that he should be able to
11:01:39 20 go and facilitate it. General Ibrahim came but he did not
21 come to the supreme meeting."

22 So two delegations, Mr Taylor; the first delegation headed
23 by SYB Rogers to bring you a letter. Do you recall that?

24 A. No. As a matter of fact, the letter in question is
11:02:05 25 read - is here. The Court has seen the letter. Nothing about
26 recognition. There was a letter from Johnny Paul Koroma, if I
27 remember, somewhere in September/October. I am not too certain
28 about the dates - it's been given before the Court - where Johnny
29 Paul Koroma states - and I think it's in October, to be - I am

1 not too sure, but it's around there - that they are pleased with
2 statements that had been made by my government at the General
3 Assembly speech at the United Nations and requested weapons. And
4 this Court is also aware that a delegation, as he mentioned
11:02:54 5 headed by Mike Lamin that in his testimony he had come to
6 Monrovia was not received by me.

7 Now, why on earth would I receive a telephone call from
8 Johnny Paul Koroma advising me, with my acquiescence, that he is
9 sending a delegation to Liberia to see me. And normal thinking
11:03:23 10 would suggest that I would acquiesce and a delegation would
11 arrive and I would not see them? I mean, how would that be
12 normal? It simply means that there were no such conversation.
13 The delegation comes to Monrovia. I do not see the delegation
14 for several reasons. And mind you, at the time in question,
11:03:51 15 which is after September - because the General Assembly
16 statements are normally around August/September - I had all right
17 to see that delegation if I wanted to. Because as a member of
18 the now Committee of Five, I was under obligation to speak to
19 them. I could have spoken to them if I wanted to.

11:04:15 20 The Government of Liberia took a decision at the
21 time - let's not forget, there are serious negotiations going on
22 about the return to power, and the government wants to do nothing
23 that would make the - this junta understand that it was getting
24 any sympathetic ear in any way from Liberia. So I refuse - my
11:04:38 25 government refused to see the delegation and they were returned.
26 This is hardly an indication of a President that just got off the
27 telephone with another leader of another country, being informed
28 that he's sending a delegation, you know, to see him and
29 refusing. It's just not so. That's - but these are the types of

1 lies that they really want this Court to believe; that on the
2 other hand, you call somebody and say, "I am sending somebody,"
3 and I say, "Send them", and they get there and you don't see
4 them. I mean, Koumjian should have known better. He knows that.

11:05:16

5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, what the witness is suggesting is quite
6 clear: That two delegations are sent to you. As best you can
7 recall, how many delegations were sent to Monrovia by the junta
8 regime?

9 A. One. To the best of my knowledge, one.

11:05:33

10 Q. One?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And can you recall now, just roughly, Mr Taylor, when that
13 delegation arrived?

14 A. I swear I - I would put it to I would say the last quarter.

11:05:51

15 Q. Of?

16 A. Of '97. I would put it to the last quarter of '97. I
17 can't remember exactly when, but I would put it to about the last
18 quarter of '97.

19 Q. Now, you understand that the witness is suggesting that

11:06:06

20 there is this second delegation sent to go and facilitate an arms
21 transaction. And he continues:

22 "General Ibrahim had been recommended that he will
23 facilitate the arms and ammunition movement. In the evening we
24 came to the lodge and met General Ibrahim. He had come two days
11:06:32 25 before. We met him at the lodge to chairman. That was where I
26 saw him and that was where I knew him."

27 Jump to line 26 on the same page".

28 "The delegation that went to Liberia - from Liberia they
29 went to other countries, Niger, Libya and Burkina Faso." The

1 same four countries again, Mr Taylor.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "That was the delegation headed by SYB Rogers, not the one
4 headed by Mike Lamin. It was the delegation headed by SYB
11:07:11 5 Rogers. From Liberia they went to some other countries."

6 Now, do you know about a delegation from Sierra Leone
7 visiting those three countries, including Liberia, Mr Taylor?

8 A. No.

9 Q. It continues:

11:07:27 10 "Q. I now want to ask you about the delegation where you
11 mentioned Mike Lamin.

12 A. Well, the delegation that went, there was Fonti Kanu,
13 Mike Lamin, General Ibrahim, but after that we went to
14 Magburaka airstrip and the ammunition arrived with a
11:07:47 15 soldier who had a uniform on in green with a black hat and
16 the crown on the hat was a Burkina Faso crown. That was
17 the insignia. And Lieutenant Colonel Fonti Kanu came and
18 the ammunitions were off-loaded and a soldier also called
19 Musa.

11:08:06 20 Fonti Kanu was a lieutenant colonel in the Sierra Leonean
21 army.

22 I said that they went to Liberia with the delegation headed
23 by Mike Lamin. They went to Freetown, Kenema, Kailahun and
24 crossed into Liberia by road.

11:08:23 25 Q. Can you explain to us, when you discussed sending this
26 delegation at the Supreme Council you mentioned, what was
27 the purpose of the delegation's trip?

28 A. Well, that particular delegation which was headed by
29 Mike Lamin that went to Liberia was to go and obtain some

1 arms and ammunition. That was why chairman Johnny Paul
2 Koroma assigned Fonti Kanu to go and tell them the kinds of
3 ammunition we needed at that time.

4 Q. Was there any discussion of how the arms and ammunition
11:08:56 5 would be paid for, or obtained?

6 A. Well we just discussed in the meeting that they will
7 give a parcel, but they did not discuss what parcel it
8 would be in that meeting.

9 Q. The word 'parcel' what does it mean?

11:09:14 10 A. It has a meaning. At that time we hadn't money. We
11 only had diamonds, so I believe that that was what they
12 meant by parcel, that we meant - that Johnny Paul Koroma
13 meant.

14 Q. Do you know if any arms and ammunition ever arrived?

11:09:31 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. How long after the delegation left did the arms and
17 ammunition arrive, if you recall?

18 A. Between one to two weeks the arms and ammunition
19 arrived.

11:09:44 20 Q. How did the arms and ammunition come to Sierra Leone?

21 A. They came on a flight, silver coloured, and it landed
22 at night around between 7 and 9. It was dark already. We
23 used our vehicles and we parked them far away from the
24 flight so that they could provide light. The arms and
11:10:05 25 ammunitions were dropped. At that time Lieutenant Colonel
26 Fonti Kanu and a soldier who had on the Burkina uniform
27 came down from the flight.

28 Q. Where was it that the plane landed?

29 A. Magburaka airstrip."

1 Now, that's a lot for us to take in, Mr Taylor, but the
2 point is quite simple. A delegation led by someone called Mike
3 Lamin, including one Ibrahim Bah, is sent to Liberia by road
4 carrying a parcel of diamonds with a view to purchasing arms. A
5 couple weeks later, a flight arrives from Burkina Faso with a
6 Burkinabe soldier on board and arms are off-loaded at Magburaka
7 airstrip. Were you involved in that arms transaction, Mr Taylor?

11:10:51 8 A. No, not at all. Not at all. But I think it's possible
9 under other circumstances that some references I am sure we will
10 make regarding this particular thing. I am not aware. I do not
11 dispute that arms could have landed in Magburaka. I don't think
12 that's my quarrel. They did not come from Liberia. I was not
13 aware of this transaction. But I cannot speak publicly about it.

14 The comments I want to make I cannot make them public because
11:11:45 15 they will go too far in terms of protecting certain individuals.
16 But there are cross-references that can be made to demonstrate
17 that this witness is lying that I cannot speak about in open
18 court.

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, your denial is good enough for me, but on
11:12:10 20 the note of this particular transaction, the witness adds further
21 detail, which I think it important for you to comment on. Later
22 at page 10477, in relation to this transaction, he said this:

23 "A. We discussed in the Supreme Council the chairman
24 together with other members that it was for arms and
11:12:33 25 ammunition that Mosquito had given the recommendation.
26 Then the chairman said that we needed to have somebody from
27 the army who would know our needs, and that was why he
28 recommended Lieutenant Colonel Fonti Kanu to go with the
29 delegation that was to go and bring the arms and

1 ammunition. They were to give something to the delegation
2 that was not discussed to the Supreme Council. The
3 chairman only said he would give them a parcel to go with.

4 Q. Now, you said Sam Bockarie recommended someone or made
11:13:07 5 a recommendation. What was Sam Bockarie's recommendation?

6 A. Sam Bockarie recommended General Ibrahim. He said he
7 would be able to facilitate the bringing of arms and
8 ammunition. At the time he was not in the meeting, but
9 when he came back, we all met at the chairman's, Johnny
11:13:27 10 Paul Koroma's, house."

11 Over the page:

12 "Q. Prior to this discussion where Bockarie recommended
13 Ibrahim Bah and Johnny Paul Koroma and Fonti Kanu, had any
14 delegation travelled related to this shipment?

11:13:46 15 A. Yes, that was the delegation that was headed by Mike
16 Lamin. They went and crossed into Liberia."

17 Now, you see what the implication is, Mr Taylor? Because
18 you recall earlier in the testimony of this witness the
19 suggestion was made that RUF joins AFRC in order that AFRC may
11:14:07 20 take advantage of RUF contacts.

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. Now it's being suggested in that context that Bockarie has
23 recommended this General Ibrahim and the implication clearly is
24 that Bockarie being your boy, so to speak, that this is being
11:14:33 25 done with your hidden hand in the background. Do you follow?

26 A. Uh-huh.

27 Q. What do you say about that?

28 A. That's not true. But it would just be so off the wall that
29 Sam Bockarie - if we go back into the history of this particular

1 case, we know that Ibrahim Bah is a friend of Foday Sankoh. This
2 Court knows that he is with Foday Sankoh in 1996. He is in
3 Abidjan with him. We know about the letters that Foday Sankoh
4 wrote to Talibi. We know the association goes beyond Bockarie,
11:15:13 5 and so that would just be nonsensical to believe that Sam
6 Bockarie - and like I said, I can't go - because I mean I can dot
7 the i's on this matter but I can't speak about it publicly in
8 this open session because there are cross-references relating to
9 this Magburaka and other things that I am sure that we can tie
11:15:39 10 together to prove that this witness is misleading this Court in
11 what he is saying.

12 Q. Well, this is the second time you have made that
13 suggestion, Mr Taylor. Mr President I wonder if we can go
14 briefly into private session to enable this witness to answer the
11:15:54 15 question in the way in which he chooses?

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think I know what the witness is
17 alluding to, but it will need to be in private session. How long
18 do you think that will take?

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Five minutes, I'm told.

11:16:09 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Five minutes.

21 Well, to members of the public, we are going to have to go
22 into private session to protect the identity of a witness who
23 enjoys the benefit of protective measures orders made by this
24 Court. What that means is for the next five minutes you will
11:16:28 25 still be able to watch the proceedings, but you won't be able to
26 hear anything.

27 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of the
28 transcript, pages 30831 to 30832, was extracted and sealed under
29 separate cover, as the proceeding was heard in private session.]

1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Mr Taylor, what I am going to do now is quickly summarise
11:20:11 5 about half a dozen pages of this witness's testimony in order to
6 set a context for a particular question I want you to deal with.
7 The witness deals with the period at the time of the ECOMOG
8 intervention, okay, in February 1998 and explains how he links up
9 with Johnny Paul Koroma and he is taking Johnny Paul Koroma to
11:20:40 10 safety from Freetown. They travel via Masiaka, Makeni and they
11 get to a place call Magbonki neh. Then this question:

12 "Q. What did Johnny Paul Koroma do once he got to
13 Magbonki neh?

14 A. When I arrived in that village in the early hours he
11:21:04 15 told Banjah to call. By then the satellite phone was under
16 my seat because Banjah had given it to me to take care of
17 it because I was putting it under my seat. Because I
18 normally do not alight, I keep it under the seat. So I
19 took the satellite phone and gave it to Banjah and then he
11:21:24 20 called and he spoke on the BBC and told them that he was up
21 in the hills and that we will soon come in again. Then
22 afterwards he called Mr Taylor and told him about this
23 helicopter shuttle, but then I did not know anything that
24 they had been conversing about, that in town until he
11:21:49 25 called me. I called him and spoke about the helicopter.
26 As they were talking and after they had finished talking,
27 Johnny Paul Koroma asked how many of us were there and he
28 said because the helicopter would soon arrive because he's
29 spoken to Mr Taylor. He has to find out the number of us

1 there, because we were going to wait for the helicopter."

2 Now, Mr Taylor, the witness goes on to say that
3 effectively, and I am jumping to page 1049:

4 "He called afterwards and he said Mr Taylor had told him,
11:22:35 5 because by then we were not hearing what Mr Taylor was saying but
6 we heard what Mr Johnny Paul was saying, he said Mr Taylor told
7 him that it was not possible for the helicopter to come to
8 Magbonkinah to pick us up, he said because of the Alpha Jet raids
9 from the ECOMOG forces."

11:22:55 10 So what in summary the witness is saying, Mr Taylor, is
11 during the course of his flight from Freetown at this particular
12 location, Johnny Paul Koroma spoke to you on a satellite phone
13 and you promised to send a helicopter to rescue him. Did you?

14 A. No. That is not true. Never spoke to him on a telephone.

11:23:18 15 Number two, assuming that I did - let's just for the sake of
16 argument assume that I did. I accept I would have been - I don't
17 know what I would have been sending to him because I didn't have
18 a helicopter to send to him, but there was no contact with Johnny
19 Paul Koroma during that period, no.

11:23:40 20 Q. Now let me explain the context, a further aspect of the
21 context in which this was being said. Because in the same
22 passage of testimony, the witness is asked this:

23 "Q. Do you know someone by the name of Victor King?

24 A. Yes. Victor King was the flight commander and then he
11:24:01 25 was a Supreme Council member. When we had made way for
26 Johnny Paul Koroma and he had come, as we were coming along
27 the road in the vehicle I heard him grumbling about why
28 Victor had taken the helicopter to Liberia without us
29 knowing. He said, 'Why is he taking the helicopter to

1 Liberia?' And so I heard the chairman grumbling thus about
2 Victor King."

3 And then he goes on to deal with the fact that a helicopter
4 had been seized in Monrovia at Roberts International Airfield and
11:24:36 5 in that context the witness was referred to a document in which
6 you were quoted as demanding that ECOMOG hand over AFRC officials
7 arrested on Friday when two helicopters that were used to escape
8 Freetown were forced to land in the capital Monrovia by an ECOMOG
9 jet.

11:24:59 10 "In a radio broadcast reported by AFP, Taylor said Liberia
11 is a sovereign state and should take charge of the AFRC
12 detainees. Taylor said that a low level flight by an ECOMOG jet
13 over the presidential Executive Mansion on Friday was an act of
14 provocation. Taylor also demanded ECOMOG remove its tanks from
11:25:21 15 parts of Monrovia and Robertsfield International Airport."

16 So that's the whole context now, Mr Taylor, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Victor King, as we know and you accept, did land at
19 Paynesville in a helicopter, yes?

11:25:38 20 A. 14 February 1998. I remember that very well.

21 Q. And he was thereafter returned in due course to Sierra
22 Leone where he was executed by Kabbah?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Now, putting all of these disparate facts together, the
11:25:54 25 account appears to be this: Because King had taken the
26 helicopter, Koroma had no way of escaping Sierra Leone, hence the
27 satellite telephone call to you and you promising to send a
28 helicopter to pick him up.

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. That's the context?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in or about February 1998, did you have a
4 helicopter?

11:26:21 5 A. No, I didn't have a helicopter. No.

6 Q. Did you have any means of airlifting Johnny Paul Koroma
7 from Sierra Leone?

8 A. No, didn't have any means. But if I actually wanted Johnny
9 Paul to come to Liberia and if there was contact, if there was
11:26:39 10 not a helicopter what was the next best thing to do? To drive
11 him across the border. There was no such thing. In fact there
12 were two Sierra Leonean helicopters.

13 Q. Now, during the course of his flight from Freetown the
14 witness goes on to say that Johnny Paul Koroma gives the witness
11:27:04 15 an order to put some men together and the purpose was he, that
16 being Johnny Paul Koroma, said he had received a call from
17 Mr Taylor that he should go and capture Kono. Do you see that,
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes.

11:27:23 20 Q. And he continues - that was page 10492 on the same topic.
21 10494:

22 "He, that being Johnny Paul Koroma, said he had called
23 Mr Taylor and they had spoken again. He said Mr Taylor
24 says he should go and recapture Kono. He said it would be
11:27:42 25 better for them to do the pick up there with the
26 helicopter. He said we should go back to Kabala. By then
27 Superman had met him. I and Akim, and the chief security
28 and Rambo, he said we should go. He said where we had left
29 them is a safe place. He said we should all come down to

1 Makeni and go and capture Kono.

2 Q. After Johnny Paul Koroma told you that was there any
3 discussion with any other commanders?"

4 This is page 10495, line 6:

11:28:18 5 "A. Yes, I, Superman, Rambo, Akim, we immediately drove
6 off to Kabala on to the villages and we tried to summon all
7 the officers who have been hiding in the villages."
8 Then he explains that a meeting was held.

9 "Q. What exactly was discussed and agreed upon?"

11:28:37 10 A. Well, it was the things that had been happening, that
11 we should put aside all differences to go and capture Kono
12 and that it was the chairman who was saying that we should
13 come together. That was what was arranged."

14 Did you give any such instruction, Mr Taylor?"

11:28:56 15 A. No, I did not. I did not.

16 Q. Now he goes on to describe that there was a first advance
17 towards Kono which was unsuccessful and he is then asked this.

18 "Q. After that attempt to enter Kono was there any
19 communications by Johnny Paul Koroma that you were aware
11:29:19 20 of?"

21 A. Yes. When we returned he communicated to Mr Taylor and
22 he said we should try to capture there 'so that I will be
23 able to send a helicopter to pick you up.' So he
24 pressurised us and we moved and finally captured there. At
11:29:38 25 that time the satellite phone - the credit in the satellite
26 phone had finished."

27 Mr Taylor, were you giving any such instructions?"

28 A. No, no. And if you - oh, boy. When you look at these
29 different accounts - and just a quick reminder. We are told in

1 this Court by different accounts Johnny Paul Koroma comes from
2 Freetown, he calls a meeting. We are told that in that meeting
3 he does one important thing, he promotes Sam Bockarie. He makes
4 him chief of defence staff. We are also told that Sam Bockarie
11:30:28 5 informs Johnny Paul Koroma that he is now the man in charge and
6 not Johnny Paul Koroma. And so now we have now a different
7 account of Johnny Paul Koroma being in charge and he is supposed
8 to be in contact. But we also have accounts that I am the one
9 instructing Sam Bockarie, okay, to take Kono and to - because
11:30:50 10 it's important for money. These are all not true. These are not
11 true. I am not in touch with Johnny Paul Koroma. I never speak
12 to him. Never speak to Johnny Paul Koroma while he is in power
13 or even out of power.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Pause there.

11:31:07 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you. We will take the morning
16 break now and resume at 12 o'clock.

17 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

18 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:01:47 20 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor. So before the short adjournment we were
21 looking at the suggestion made by the witness that you had
22 communicated with Johnny Paul Koroma following the ECOMOG
23 intervention instructing him, among other things, to capture
24 Kono. Do you recall that?

12:02:09 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. And the witness went on to provide this detail at page
27 10497:

28 "After the first attempt to take Kono, and we were unable,
29 we came back to Makeni. Then Johnny Paul Koroma called

1 Charles Taylor and Charles Taylor told him that he should
2 go and capture Kono and when he should have captured Kono,
3 the helicopter will come and pick him up together with his
4 family. "

12:02:43 5 Did you have such a conversation?

6 A. No.

7 Q. And the witness goes on to describe that Johnny Paul Koroma
8 was also speaking to the President of Niger, this is page 10500,
9 and the President of Burkina Faso on that satellite phone. Now,
10 do you know anything about such communication, Mr Taylor?

12:03:10

11 A. No, I don't.

12 Q. And then this - the witness goes on to say this: He
13 describes receiving a message from Superman, and then he is
14 asked, page 10501:

12:03:35 15 "Q. What did Johnny Paul Koroma do?

16 A. Before we left, after the message had come, I can
17 cannot recall the actual date, he decided to convene a
18 meeting with us, the SLA and the RUF commanders in the high
19 command so that we should all receive ourselves together as
20 he was now on his way to go to Buedu to Kailahun District.

12:03:58

21 So he said anywhere soever SLA would be a commander, the
22 RUF would deputise, and anywhere RUF served as commander,
23 the SLA would deputise. He said we should hold firm to the
24 cause and he was going to meet Charles Taylor and he will
25 come back to meet us, but by then he appointed me to go,
26 Rambo and his family members. "

12:04:25

27 He is asked where the meeting took place and he says it was
28 in Koidu. Did Johnny Paul Koroma come to meet you sometime after
29 the ECOMOG intervention, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Never put his foot in Liberia. Never. In fact, there is
2 sufficient evidence here now that Johnny Paul Koroma was not able
3 to ever leave Sierra Leone. He was incarcerated. In fact, Sam
4 Bockarie took command. That's not true. He never put his foot
12:05:05 5 in Liberia before August 1999. Never.

6 Q. Another specific allegation made by the witness at page
7 10515:

8 "Q. Once you were pushed out of Freetown," so we're
9 talking about the ECOMOG intervention, Mr Taylor, "was
12:05:31 10 there any way for the SLA, the AFRC, I mean the non-RUF
11 component to obtain heavy weapons to replace those that
12 were lost.

13 A. No, there was no way. The only way that we had was
14 when we would fight and we could capture arms. We together
12:05:50 15 with the RUF would capture weapons and we used to get ammo
16 from Liberia through Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor."
17 What do you say about that?

18 A. Totally false.

19 Q. Now, remember the earlier suggestion I put to you,
12:06:29 20 Mr Taylor, coming from this witness to the effect that you had
21 agreed to send a helicopter to pick him up along with his family?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. The witness goes on to say this, page 10523, line 20:
24 "A. We got to Buedu. In the morning Sam Bockarie came and
12:06:55 25 met Johnny Paul. We were all sitting on the veranda with
26 Johnny Paul the chairman. He said Charles Ghankay Taylor
27 had said that he will send vehicles to come pick us up.
28 Johnny Paul Koroma asked Sam Bockarie and said, 'When?',
29 and he said that he did not state any time, but when they

1 would be ready he will call for him to meet him. So we
2 were there for one or two weeks in the month of March and
3 one morning we saw the vehicles, about four to five Land
4 Rovers. "

12:07:34 5 Over the page, page 10524:

6 "The vehicles were supposed to pick us up from Buedu and
7 take us to Monrovia.

8 Q. So what happened the day that these vehicles arrived?

9 A. When the vehicles arrived Sam Bockarie came and told
10 chairman Johnny Paul Koroma while we were all sitting on
11 the veranda that same morning that the vehicles had arrived
12 because we saw the vehicles but we did not see many people.
13 We only saw a few SS and one Colonel Jungle. We saw some
14 other men wearing civilian clothes but we could not
15 identify them. "

12:08:12 16 He goes on to describe them being four or five Land Rovers:

17 "These SS were the ones who were in uniform but the beret
18 they had had no crown. It was a blue combat uniform. They came
19 to pick us up. "

12:08:33 20 Mr Taylor, did you send any vehicles to pick up Johnny Paul
21 Koroma or anybody else for that matter in Sierra Leone?

22 A. No. You know, I don't know what - I haven't read through
23 all the Rules of this Court, but I do not understand how this
24 Prosecutor, Koumjian, could go through with this evidence. I
12:09:04 25 really - these people - Koumjian and the Prosecution know very,
26 very well that Johnny Paul Koroma never left Sierra Leone from
27 the tons of witnesses that they have brought before this Court.
28 So how one witness would come and say he never left and another -
29 this thing is just - it's just a destructive process. So what is

1 - Johnny Paul Koroma, your Honour, never left Sierra Leone. We
2 know from the evidence before this Court that Johnny Paul Koroma
3 came, he was arrested shortly thereafter, after the diamond
4 incident where he is stripped of these diamonds. We've seen it.
12:09:44 5 So when did he leave? And we are told that he was then taken
6 from there and he was carried to a place and placed under house
7 arrest. When did he leave? And all the witnesses have said - so
8 why would the Prosecution bring one witness saying something on
9 the same issue? At least they could have cut all of our time
12:10:04 10 down, okay. What's all of - you want to destroy Charles Taylor
11 so badly that, what, it is a pick and choose?

12 Johnny Paul Koroma never left. The Prosecution knows
13 because this is the only witness that I'm hearing here saying
14 that Johnny Paul Koroma - that a convoy of vehicles came from
12:10:20 15 Liberia for him and he left. What is this? He never left.
16 Well, okay, if he left, maybe he went into space. Johnny Paul
17 Koroma never came to Liberia until August 1999 when I arranged
18 for him to come in dealing with the West Side Boys. Other than
19 that, he left never that place and every other Prosecution
12:10:43 20 witness that came before this Court, not one of them confirmed
21 that Johnny Paul Koroma went for a joyride in a convoy of Land
22 Rover vehicles into Liberia. And the Prosecution knows that.

23 Q. Now, the witness goes on to describe various transactions,
24 when vehicles came from Liberia carrying arms, Mr Taylor.

12:11:35 25 Mr Taylor, do you know about any such transfers of arms and
26 ammunition to Liberia?

27 A. No. To Liberia? To Sierra Leone.

28 Q. Sorry, to Sierra Leone.

29 A. No, I do not. I do not. But, excuse me, counsel, you see,

1 this whole conspiracy that I talked about in my initial
2 statement, blue combat uniform, who appeared on that border in
3 blue combat uniform? Varmuyan Sheriff. We saw in this Court,
4 Varmuyan Sheriff with a pick-up with blue uniform. You see, the
12:12:10 5 whole set that these people arranged against me, tying in, tying,
6 blue combat uniform. You know SSS. That's Varmuyan Sheriff in
7 blue uniform. And arms, arms come across. Varmuyan says, "Here
8 I am in blue uniform." That's all these constructions. Nothing.

9 If we look very carefully at this particular period, what
12:12:33 10 happens after the intervention in February 199? What happens?
11 There is conflict. We see helicopters. There is conflict
12 between ECOMOG and myself in me trying to establish and make sure
13 that the sovereignty of Liberia is respected. There is conflict
14 between ECOMOG and myself, and here I am shipping arms across the
12:12:57 15 border. There is fighting going on between - because the
16 fighting just doesn't stop in February. We have all the evidence
17 here. So here I am in the midst of this with no material, I'm
18 sending ammunition over there, and who is carrying them? Blue
19 uniformed people, alluding to Varmuyan Sheriff. What is this?
12:13:19 20 It's all a lie, your Honour. It's a blatant, blatant
21 fabrication. That's what it's all about.

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you recall mediating with regard to the
23 situation which had developed at Okra Hills?

24 A. Yes, I do.

12:13:38 25 Q. Now, in that regard this witness provided some testimony,
26 and I pick it up at page 10567. The witness says, "I called the
27 West Side men. Their call sign was Bravo 33 and I started
28 talking to Ibrahim Bazzy."

29 Now, Bazzy, does that name ring a bell, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Bazy sounds like a - that's one of the AFRC fellows on
2 trial, I think, Bazy.

3 Q. He goes on over the page at page 10568. So he is on the
4 radio, he comes off the radio and he continues, picking it up at
12:14:34 5 line 14:

6 "So straightaway as we were standing there the signaller,
7 one of Issa's radio men, because by then Mosquito was not on the
8 ground, that is Buedu, he said, 'Master, they are calling you on
9 the phone, the satellite phone.' So he went and took the

12:14:55 10 satellite phone. He talked to the person who was calling him on
11 the satellite phone. They spoke. When they spoke I heard, 'Yes,
12 sir. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.' From there Issa told us,
13 he said Charles Ghankay Taylor says they should take the

12:15:21 14 satellite phone and the radio set so that we can go to Johnny
15 Paul in Kangama. So all of us boarded the vehicle and drove off
16 to Kangama. As we got to Kangama the phone rang again. When the
17 phone rang Issa answered, 'Yes, sir. Yes, sir,' and he handed
18 over the receiver to Johnny Paul. So Johnny Paul spoke and when
19 he had spoken he continued saying, 'Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Yes,

12:15:46 20 sir. No problem. No problem.' Then Johnny Paul gave the
21 receiver to Issa. Then he said they should call the men, the
22 West Side men."
23 I'm going to continue with this account in a moment but I
24 pause to ask you this, Mr Taylor: You accept - or do you accept
12:16:09 25 that in order to resolve this Okra Hills situation, contact was
26 made with Johnny Paul Koroma in Sierra Leone?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Is it correct, as suggested by this witness, that the
29 initial point of contact was with Issa Sesay and it was through

1 him that contact was made with Johnny Paul Koroma?

12:16:59 2 A. No. That contact was made with - it was made with
3 Sam Bockarie. Now, I do not know who Sam sent with the
4 telephone, but I did speak to Sam Bockarie and in order to get
5 the assurance I asked him to make sure wherever they were holding
6 Johnny Paul, yes, to take the telephone and I wanted to speak to
7 Johnny Paul. I do not think it was with Sam Bockarie that the
8 contact was made and I'm sure probably Sam sent Issa Sesay with
9 the phone to Johnny Paul, yes.

12:17:15 10 Q. Just to clarify one or two details there, Mr Taylor.
11 Before you made contact with Sam Bockarie were you at that time
12 aware that Johnny Paul Koroma was effectively in RUF custody?

12:17:47 13 A. Quite frankly not exactly, no. When this West Side thing
14 started there were low level contacts with Sam Bockarie and what
15 Bockarie has said that Johnny Paul Koroma was not under arrest
16 but he was in a different location. But the West Side Boys were
17 insisting that he was under arrest. So I said good. This was
18 the time that I decided that I will call directly, you know. So
19 I asked them to get Sam Bockarie on the phone. They said, "Oh,
12:18:09 20 he is not here, Mr President, but he is at a different location."
21 I said, "Well, fine. To cut the matter, I want to speak to him
22 so make sure you send this telephone to where he is", because the
23 only way the conflict would have been settled is if I spoke to
24 him personally. But I didn't know at the time.

12:18:26 25 Q. He goes on to mention how Johnny Paul Koroma following that
26 call spoke to Bazzy then he says this, page 10569:

27 "The satellite phone rang again. Issa took up the
28 satellite phone and handed it over to Johnny Paul Koroma. He
29 spoke on the satellite phone and after he had spoken all of us

1 boarded the vehicle and we came back to Buedu. When we came to
2 Buedu the satellite phone continued ringing and it was handed
3 over to Johnny Paul, so Johnny Paul was saying, 'No problem. We
4 will go. No problem. We will go.' So from there Johnny Paul
12:19:08 5 told us, 'Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor said that we should go to
6 Liberia with the families and you the supreme members.' "

7 Now pause again. Firstly, Mr Taylor, do you recall Issa
8 Sesay being involved in any way in this contact with Johnny Paul
9 Koroma?

12:19:30 10 A. I do not recall, but it would not be unusual. Issa Sesay
11 was the deputy to Sam Bockarie. He could have very well been
12 involved. I do not recall, but I would not fight with his
13 account. It's highly probable that for such an operation Sam
14 Bockarie would have sent his most senior person to get him out.
12:19:57 15 So I don't have a fight with his account of it on that side. I
16 really don't know.

17 But I did speak to Sam Bockarie. I did ask him to send the
18 telephone to Johnny Paul Koroma. I did speak to Johnny Paul
19 Koroma. But how they handled it on their side I don't know. And
12:20:18 20 it could have very well been Issa because I did not personally
21 know Issa Sesay personally at the time. I had never met him. Up
22 to this time of the hostage crisis I had never met Issa Sesay.
23 So it's possible that the person that was answering the telephone
24 was Issa Sesay. I don't deny his accounts.

12:20:41 25 Q. In any event, the witness goes on to describe as follows,
26 page 10570, line 7:

27 "We drove off to Foya. The helicopter came. The
28 helicopter that landed in Foya had Sam Bockarie who alighted from
29 the helicopter together with Colonel Jungle and other SSS

1 securities who were not even up to five. Sam Bockarie came along
2 with a lot of luggage. He alighted the helicopter. Then Jungle
3 came. He said Mr Taylor said that only four people should go to
4 Monrovia, Johnny Paul and three other people. So the three of
12:21:23 5 us, plus Johnny Paul and Jungle and the SSS securities, we've
6 flown to Monrovia. We landed in Paynesville airfield."

7 Now, taking things in stages, when Johnny Paul Koroma came
8 to Monrovia, Mr Taylor, was he transported by helicopter?

9 A. Yes, by this time - and you know this will tie one
12:21:45 10 important piece of evidence. By this time we have an Mi-2.

11 That's August of 1999. We have an Mi-2 and I guess the reason
12 why they are - I do not know who goes to pick them up. I really
13 don't know, but the number getting on the plane sounds realistic
14 because of the size of the plane. It could not really take
12:22:11 15 everybody. So it's an Mi-2. Yes, we do have an Mi-2 at the
16 time.

17 Q. But note this also, Mr Taylor: The witness is saying that
18 the helicopter which came to Foya to pick up Johnny Paul Koroma
19 arrived with Sam Bockarie on board who had a lot of luggage, so
12:22:33 20 the suggestion clearly is Bockarie is in Monrovia when you are
21 speaking to Johnny Paul Koroma on the phone?

22 A. So who releases Johnny Paul Koroma? It is Bockarie.
23 Bockarie is on the ground in Sierra Leone. Bockarie releases
24 Johnny Paul Koroma. He is not in Monrovia at the time, no.

12:23:00 25 Bockarie is - but who would I be talking to? Because this whole
26 issue happened over a very, very, very, very - the negotiation to
27 finally bring out Johnny Paul and the decision happened over a
28 couple of days. But the crisis lasts a little longer. We're
29 talking about it, there's confusion about he is not going to go,

1 he may not come and all of that. But Bockarie remains on the
2 ground inside Sierra Leone when Johnny Paul Koroma is brought
3 out. He is not in Liberia at the time. He doesn't come with him
4 either, no.

12:23:48 5 Q. The witness goes on to describe how, having arrived by
6 helicopter in Paynesville, the following day, page 10577, line
7 10, "They came and picked us up and we went to the mansion. We
8 were driven up to the mansion with the guests." And he is asked
9 who it was that went in the car with you to the mansion. He says
12:24:13 10 this, page 10578:

11 "A. I was there. Johnny Paul Koroma was there. Brima
12 Kamara too was there. Jumu Jalloh. We were there in our
13 car Guest 7, and the driver who was given to us. And
14 Bazzy - Bazzy and the others who had gone with the
12:24:36 15 delegation together with Hassan Papa Bangura were in the
16 other vehicle.

17 Q. Okay. And when you talk about the delegation with
18 Hassan Papa Bangura, are those the West Side Boys you
19 described earlier?

12:24:50 20 A. Exactly.

21 Q. Do you recall approximately how many of them went to
22 that meeting at the mansion?

23 A. All of those who came who went, they were in two groups
24 and us made it up to three.

12:25:06 25 Q. If you could proceed to tell us about what happened at
26 the mansion.

27 A. We entered the mansion. I could not recognise the
28 person but the man was dressed in a black coat. He
29 received us downstairs and took us upstairs and placed us

1 in a small room. It's a small room with window curtains
2 right around. While we were there a man in a green uniform
3 with the Liberian crown and badges on him opened one of the
4 curtains and met us and greeted us and we too responded.

12:25:44 5 We were there for not too long when Mr Charles Ghankay
6 Taylor came out from the same direction where the man had
7 come from. He took the front seat, sat down and folded his
8 legs. "

9 He is asked to describe the seating arrangements and he

12:26:01 10 says:

11 "We were sitting - were sitting on the wall like this. We
12 were sitting by the wall like this and Mr Charles Ghankay
13 Taylor came and sat in front of us.

14 He is asked at line 10 on page 10579:

12:26:12 15 "Q. How was Mr Taylor dressed?

16 A. He had a black coat, dark eyeglasses and white shirt
17 and a blue/black coloured tie, neck tie, with a black pair
18 of shoes.

19 Q. Tell us what you remember about what happened at the
12:26:29 20 meeting?

21 A. The commander of the West Side, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara,
22 presented the position statement they had brought to
23 Mr Taylor. After the presentation Mr Taylor started
24 talking, giving us words of encouragement that we should
12:26:49 25 all see each other as one and that the accord was in our
26 favour. He said a lot of things. I cannot remember all of
27 them now. He folded his legs and put - he crossed his arms
28 over his knees, talking to us, giving us words of
29 encouragement, telling us that the accord was in our

1 favour. He kept on talking about that and Johnny Paul
2 himself responded, saying one or two things to him and
3 afterwards Mr Taylor ordered the man who was in uniform who
4 was standing by him, he took the briefcase, opened it up
12:27:27 5 and took out a package, a brown envelope, and gave it to
6 chairman Johnny Paul Koroma and took out the other one and
7 gave it to Bazzy and he said that was for us. From there
8 he shook hands with us and we left. We came out and
9 Mr Taylor went to his office.

12:27:49 10 Q. You said Mr Taylor took out a package, a brown
11 envelope, and gave it to the chairman Johnny Paul Koroma
12 and took out the other one. What do you mean by 'the other
13 one'?

14 A. He took out another envelope of the same type like the
12:28:02 15 other and gave it to Bazzy, but when we went to the hotel
16 when we had left, accompanied chairman Johnny Paul Koroma
17 to his house, we went back to the hotel. We asked Bazzy
18 what was in the envelope and Bazzy said - he opened it and
19 he said Mr Taylor had given us \$5,000 to be shared amongst
12:28:25 20 us."

21 And he goes on to say that he saw the money and he received
22 \$700 and they were United States dollars. Taking things in
23 stages, first of all: Were you giving those assembled words of
24 encouragement, Mr Taylor?

12:28:44 25 A. No. Never did.

26 Q. Were you telling them that the accord was in our favour?

27 A. Well, I mean I could have said in that meeting - I would
28 say, yes, that the accord was in their favour in Sierra Leone,
29 yes.

1 Q. Which accord is that?

2 A. Lome. He is speaking about Lome. He must be. Well, I
3 can't speak for him but he must be speaking about Lome. I say in
4 my exact words to everybody that I met Lome was in everybody's
12:29:16 5 interests, I said, and that to the peace of the Sierra Leonean
6 people.

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, what was the purpose of this meeting
8 between Johnny Paul Koroma and the West Side Boys? What was the
9 purpose? What was the whole idea behind it?

12:29:35 10 A. Well, this witness - first I want to correct something that
11 he said earlier and I do not agree. He said they landed at
12 Paynesville airport. There is no airport in Paynesville. I want
13 to suggest that he may be talking about Spriggs Payne Airport.
14 So I would just call that a slip, but for the sake of the record
12:30:02 15 I want to put that on the record, there's no Paynesville airport.
16 There's a Spriggs Payne. It could be just maybe a casual mistake
17 because he didn't know.

18 Now, from listening to the explanation of this witness, one
19 might want to believe that upon Johnny Paul's arrival at Foya and
12:30:27 20 he's flown to Monrovia, there is this giant meeting with
21 everybody. Well, that is not the case. This is where we find
22 out facts mixed up with confusion. But if we look at it, based
23 on your question, one of the things that happened was that upon
24 the arrival of Johnny Paul Koroma in Monrovia, Johnny Paul Koroma
12:31:01 25 said that he wanted to meet the leadership of the West Side Boys
26 that he had had no formal communication with for a very long
27 time, from about February/March of 1998 up until the August
28 situation in 1999. So I got in touch with President Kabbah and
29 the United Nations on the ground and they - the UN, along with

1 Tejan Kabbah - arranged an aircraft for the West Side Boys to be
2 brought to Monrovia to meet with Johnny Paul Koroma.

3 So, in direct answer to your question, the purpose was to
4 give Johnny Paul an opportunity, as he said, to speak to the boys
12:32:08 5 that had created the problem in Sierra Leone and he wanted to
6 speak to them to know what led to the problem. And those men
7 were sent by Tejan Kabbah and the United Nations that picked them
8 up, took them to Lungi airport, provided an aircraft from Lungi
9 to Monrovia for the leadership of the West Side to come to meet
12:32:36 10 with Johnny Paul Koroma.

11 Now, having said that, let's look at the account at the
12 meeting. I did talk to them and asked them to recognise the Lome
13 agreement. One of the issues - in fact, there were two or three
14 issues that had been raised by them because when Johnny Paul
12:32:57 15 arrived in Monrovia he was in contact with them. Just to remind
16 the Court in helping out here, one of the issues raised was the
17 fact that they were not party. And why were they not party to
18 the Lome agreement? The second issue that was raised was what
19 would be the role of Johnny Paul Koroma. And the third, I would
12:33:27 20 say, issue was what would eventually happen to the SLA. These
21 were the issues that Johnny Paul wanted to discuss with them.
22 That's why he asked us to bring them.

23 Now, there's another witness that came before this Court -
24 I think he is an unprotected witness - who said that he was a
12:33:48 25 part of that delegation that came to Monrovia. Sesay Alhassan, I
26 think. Alhassan Bobson Sesay. I may be calling it wrongly.
27 But, now, let's look at the money account, this witness here is
28 alleging - I don't know. I forgot the -
29 Q. TF1-334.

1 A. Is that the right name? I don't know.

2 Q. Alimamy Bobson Sesay.

3 A. Bobson Sesay. If we look at his account now of the
4 meeting, he said - now, we don't know this witness's full account
12:34:26 5 and I'm not sure if this witness is a part of the meeting. He
6 speaks as if he is a part of this meeting.

7 Q. His account is he is present in the meeting.

8 A. Ali Hassan Bobson Sesay told this Court that I had said
9 that I - and told them, say, "Oh, you'll be this and that." I'm
12:34:46 10 just trying to summarise now. And that "even some of your men
11 came and I kept them and armed them and sent them back to you.

12 The Sierra Leoneans that came were armed," and all of that. He
13 speaks of one envelope, if I'm not wrong, with an amount of about
14 \$15,000. One envelope. This witness recalls two envelopes, one
12:35:11 15 given to I think Johnny Paul and the other to I think he says
16 Bazy here. Now, my - the correct version of this is that I did
17 give an envelope to Johnny Paul Koroma for he and his men.

18 The second account is I did not - I did encourage them to
19 accept the agreement. I worked very hard with other colleagues
12:35:37 20 of ECOWAS at the time to get the issue of the SLA resolved. It
21 was resolved before they left. And also the issue of the role
22 that Johnny Paul Koroma would play upon their return to Sierra
23 Leone. This is a correct account as I've given it.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, I would like to leave that witness now and move
12:36:05 25 to another witness. And everyone will be pleased to know, there
26 is some light at the end of the tunnel now. There are only
27 another three witnesses to go. Now, this witness is a protected
28 witness, Mr Taylor, so we cannot mention his name. But his
29 reference is TF1-338. Now, swiftly, the witness, at a fairly

1 early stage in his testimony, mentions travelling with Sam
2 Bockarie to Monrovia in order to transport diamonds to you, and
3 he also made such journeys in company with Issa Sesay. One word
4 answer, Mr Taylor: True or false?

12:36:58 5 A. False.

6 Q. He also claims that he was assigned in 2001 to Foya and he
7 was at Foya as commander amongst the RUF and the AFRC and the
8 Liberians "and at that time I was there to assist in the shipment
9 of arms, the materials that used to enter Sierra Leone. It used
10 to come from Charles Taylor through Benjamin Yeaten." True or
11 false, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Totally false. 2001?

13 Q. 2001. Let me give you the specific wording. Page 15089:
14 "Q. And where were you assigned in 2001?"

12:37:48 15 A. I was at Foya.

16 Q. And what were your duties there?

17 A. I was at Foya as commander amongst the RUF and the AFRC
18 and the Liberians and at the same time I was there to
19 assist in the shipment of arms, the materials that used to
20 enter Sierra Leone. Shipment of arms from whom?

12:38:10 21 A. From Liberia.

22 Q. And if you know, from whom in Liberia?

23 A. It used to come from Charles Taylor through Benjamin
24 Yeaten. It will come to me and then I will in return send
25 it to Sierra Leone.

12:38:34 26 Q. And how long did you hold this position?

27 A. I was there for a complete six months.

28 Q. On who was it who came and took over Foya?

29 A. Junior Vandii. Junior Vandii, a Black Guard."

1 Mr Taylor, any truth in this?

2 A. Totally untrue. But let's remind the Court, 2001, what is
3 going on in Sierra Leone in 2001? To the best of my knowledge,
4 Sierra Leone is being disarmed. So here I am sending weapons to
12:39:21 5 Sierra Leone at the time of disarmament. Sierra Leone is
6 disarmed because if I'm right on dates, in January - January
7 2002, the President of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr Ahmed Tejan
8 Kabbah, announced to the world that the conflict in Sierra Leone
9 is over. He could not have made that announcement in January
12:39:46 10 2000, unless they had successfully completed the disarmament by
11 2001. So they are disarming in 2001 and I'm sending weapons?
12 Total nonsense. That's a lie.

13 Q. The witness goes on to describe, Mr Taylor, at page 15096
14 training in Voinjama. And he is asked, line 18:

12:40:25 15 "Q. These people were training for what group?

16 A. They told us that he were Charles Taylor's soldiers."
17 Line 28:

18 "A. We later knew that those of us who were training there
19 we were going to fight as RUF."

12:40:46 20 Then he describes one of -

21 "Q. Who was in charge of the training base at Voinjama
22 while you were training there?

23 A. They had one commander who was called Bropleh Devi I.
24 He was a Liberian and a member of the NPFL."

12:41:03 25 Now, Mr Taylor, was there a training base at Voinjama?

26 A. It depends on what year. Never. No. No. But what - what
27 time could he be talking about? Because there was never - except
28 during the very early stages of the NPFL war in 1990, 1991, there
29 was never a training base in Voinjama. What would - maybe if we

1 got the year we'll be able to even destroy that lie even further.

2 But there was no such training base in Voinjama, no.

3 Q. Do you know of any RUF combatants being trained by
4 Liberians in Voinjama?

12:41:48 5 A. No. No. Impossible. Impossible. No.

6 Q. And the context in which the witness makes this assertion,
7 Mr Taylor, is this: He claims that he and 62 others were
8 captured in the Koindu area in Sierra Leone and brought to
9 Voinjama to be trained to fight in Sierra Leone. Do you know

12:42:20 10 anything about that?

11 A. No. No, not at all.

12 Q. Captured Sierra Leoneans being brought from Sierra Leone to
13 Voinjama for training?

14 A. Well, the only comment I can make on that: If RUF are
12:42:38 15 "captured", then though must be captured by what? An enemy
16 force. Now - so maybe he is referring to ULIMO capturing them
17 and bringing them to Voinjama. But if there is this cozy
18 relationship and I mean in control, why would they be "captured"?
19 So, I mean, I don't know the full context of this whole

12:43:03 20 discussion that he is having here, but it seemed to me that if
21 RUF soldiers are captured and brought to Voinjama, they must -
22 capturing for me indicates the action of an enemy. So it's got
23 to be ULIMO then. I don't know. No, but it never happened with
24 the NPFL.

12:43:24 25 Q. Well, it would appear from the overall context of the
26 witness's evidence, Mr Taylor, that this capture and training
27 took place in the early 1990s. '91 or '92, and I say that for
28 this reason: We're now going to come on to another aspect of his
29 evidence. But as far as you're aware - when I'm assisted - in

1 any event, it would appear from page 15092 of the transcript,
2 Mr Taylor, that this narrative regarding training in Voinjama
3 takes place in or about May - commences in or about May 1991.

4 Now, do you know anything about RUF combatants at about that time
12:44:33 5 being taken from Sierra Leone - captured Sierra Leoneans into
6 Liberian territory, Voinjama, for training to fight for the RUF?

7 A. Never. No. No. No.

8 Q. And then he is asked this question at page 15107:

9 "Q. To your knowledge, in 1992, did Foday Sankoh take any
12:44:58 10 trips outside of Sierra Leone?

11 A. He went to Liberia. He used to go to Gbarnga. He used
12 to go for arms and ammunition there from Charles Taylor."
13 True?

14 A. 1992, yes, Foday Sankoh came to Gbarnga and, yes, he did
12:45:17 15 receive ammunition from me up until May 1992, yes.

16 Q. And he continues: "He used to come with AK-47 rounds, G3
17 rounds and RPG rockets," and that they were usually transported
18 in vehicles. Now, your answer is: Yes, that may well be right
19 up until May 1992?

12:45:44 20 A. Well, yeah, but I have to add here, I'm saying they used to
21 be transported in vehicles. Vehicles. Foday Sankoh received
22 ammunition - I'm saying ammunition, not arms, I didn't have
23 arms - ammunition in little quantities during that period, yes,
24 up until May 1992, yes.

12:46:06 25 Q. Then he says this at page 15109, line 12:

26 "Q. Throughout 1992 to your knowledge who was in charge of
27 these fighters in Sierra Leone?

28 A. The overall commander was Dpoe Menkarzon.

29 Q. And who were the commanders that were next in command

1 to him?

2 A. He had various commanders. He had Sam Tuah, James
3 Caway, Christopher Varmoh who is also known as Liberian
4 Mosquito."

12:46:48 5 Throughout 1992 was that the position, Mr Taylor?

6 A. No, that was not the position. Two mistakes. Not
7 throughout 1992 and not with Dopoe Menkarzon. Two errors.
8 Completely false.

9 Q. This witness also spoke about your involvement in promoting
12:47:24 10 individuals, Mr Taylor, okay? So let me give you his account so
11 that you can deal with it in turn. Page 15115:

12 "The communication was sent to Mosquito by somebody else
13 and that person did say that it was Foday Sankoh who sent
14 him to do so.

12:47:43 15 Q. And who was this other person who sent the
16 communication to Sam Bockarie?

17 A. We heard one Jungle who is called Daniel. Jungle was
18 an SSS in Liberia. He worked for Charles Taylor. Jungle
19 passed ranks to Mosquito. The communication was about

12:48:05 20 ranks. Well, he promoted Mosquito, Issa and some other
21 fighters. Then he said that Charles Taylor had said Papay
22 said Mosquito should take direct orders from him.

23 Q. Mosquito should take direct orders from whom?

24 A. From Charles Taylor.

12:48:30 25 Q. Now, you said he said Charles Taylor said Papay said.
26 So who is telling Mosquito that Charles Taylor had said
27 something from Papay?

28 A. Jungle was the one who sent the communication over the
29 VHF radio to Mosquito. He said it was from Charles Taylor.

1 He said Charles Taylor had told him that he should send the
2 message to Mosquito that Papay had promoted him to force
3 commander and Issa was his deputy and then he promoted
4 other commanders. And Jungle also said that Foday Sankoh
12:49:11 5 had said that Mosquito should take instruction and command
6 from Charles Taylor until he returned from Nigeria. That
7 is until Foday Sankoh returned from Nigeria.

8 Q. Did Sam Bockarie obey that instruction?

9 A. Yes, he obeyed the instruction."

12:49:35 10 Now, Mr Taylor, question: Somewhat confusing, but let's
11 see if we can unpack it. Radio message from Jungle bearing
12 message from you promoting Bockarie, Issa and other RUF
13 commanders and also passing on a message from Foday Sankoh that
14 Bockarie should take instructions from you. What do you say
12:50:05 15 about that?

16 A. Oh, counsel, I swear. This is so terrible. So terrible.
17 This is just so [indiscernible]. That's not true. That's not
18 true. I think there's sufficient for this Court here on the
19 promotion of Sam Bockarie and many others by Foday Sankoh
12:50:25 20 immediately after the AFRC takes over. There's a promotion.
21 That has been covered widely in this Court. This issue that I'm
22 supposed to be almost Foday Sankoh's boy, passing his messages.
23 I'm not in contact with Foday Sankoh during his arrest in Nigeria
24 at all. Neither am I in contact with Bockarie. So this whole
12:50:50 25 thing about promotions, there are two promotions that have come
26 before this Court and I think it's very clear, one from Sam
27 Bockarie and one from Johnny Paul Koroma that makes him forces
28 commander after Johnny Paul Koroma retreats from Freetown in
29 February 1998. I'm not and I really mean not involved in any

1 promotion or recommendation of any officers of the RUF at all.

2 None.

3 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, we were told by other witnesses that you
4 had promoted Bockarie in Monrovia. So which is it; did you
12:51:35 5 promote him in Monrovia or did you send an instruction via Jungle
6 over the radio? Which of the two is right?

7 A. Neither of the two.

8 Q. The witness goes on to confirm that he did not see
9 Foday Sankoh again from 1996 to 1999 following his departure to
12:51:57 10 go to the Abidjan Peace Accord and following his arrest in
11 Nigeria. Now moving on.

12 The witness goes on to describe, Mr Taylor, being present
13 at a meeting with you at the Executive Mansion in Liberia and
14 during that meeting you thanked Bockarie for maintaining the RUF
12:52:34 15 until Sankoh returned and also for securing Foya and Voynjama
16 from the LURD rebels and you also told Bockarie not to encourage
17 infighting and gave him \$15,000 for everyone at the meeting. Did
18 any such meeting take place to your knowledge?

19 A. No, no such meeting took place. But let's look at - they
12:53:03 20 sure didn't take their coaching properly, whoever did it I mean
21 look at the - he failed. But let's look at the language. I
22 congratulated Bockarie for holding the ground until Foday Sankoh
23 returned. Bockarie, I accept, is in Liberia in September of 1999
24 with Foday Sankoh. So that means Foday Sankoh must be present in
12:53:27 25 this meeting, okay. I'm just suggesting that. If I'm
26 congratulating Bockarie that means in a meeting with Bockarie in
27 Sankoh, "Oh, thank you very much for holding on until Sankoh
28 came", which is not - and if that is even so, what would this
29 bodyguard be doing in a meeting with Sam Bockarie and

1 Foday Sankoh and me? What would he be doing there? Because I
2 know this witness, he is a bodyguard. What would he be doing
3 there? He's a bodyguard sitting down in a meeting with
4 Foday Sankoh who is just coming now from Lome. I mean not Lome
12:54:05 5 exactly, but wherever he is told. He is coming in in September,
6 Bockarie is there and he is supposed to be in the meeting, a
7 little bodyguard, with Bockarie, Sankoh and myself.

8 Q. That's the context, Mr Taylor.

9 A. But that did not happen. It's a blatant lie.

12:54:19 10 Q. Let's pick up the account at page 15117.

11 A. My God, these people.

12 Q. Line 7:

13 "Q. What happened after were you in Monrovia with
14 Foday Sankoh?

12:54:35 15 A. When I was in Monrovia with Foday Sankoh we saw Charles
16 Taylor twice and later he sent me as an advance team to
17 come and see if Freetown was safe because he wanted to fly
18 directly from Monrovia to Freetown. That is in Sierra
19 Leone. The first time we saw Charles Taylor all of us went
12:54:59 20 there and we saw him on the sixth floor mansion office in
21 Monrovia. When all of us saw him he thanked Mosquito
22 because he had maintained the RUF until Foday Sankoh's
23 return. He also thanked him for - because he secured Foya
24 and Voinjama from the LURD rebels. And he told us not to
12:55:21 25 encourage infighting amongst us."

26 He is then asked by Ms Hollis:

27 "Q. Now you say that he thanked Mosquito. Who is it who
28 was thanking Mosquito?

29 A. Charles Taylor thanked Mosquito. After he had thanked

1 them and advised that we should not encourage infighting
2 amongst us, we should love each other, later on he gave us
3 \$15,000. He gave the money to Mosquito for the guys who
4 had come."

12:55:53 5 Then he describes a second meeting with Sankoh but he
6 wasn't present at that meeting.

7 Now Mr Taylor, firstly this: When Sankoh arrived in
8 Monrovia in the autumn of 1999 following the signing of the Lome
9 Peace Agreement --

12:56:11 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- how many times did you meet him?

12 A. Oh, I could have met Foday Sankoh at least a half dozen
13 times. At least a half dozen times.

14 Q. And was there an occasion during that time when you met
12:56:28 15 with both Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie?

16 A. No. At no time. All of the meetings that I met
17 Foday Sankoh, he was either alone or with Johnny Paul Koroma.
18 Either Johnny Paul Koroma alone, or with Foday Sankoh. It did
19 not involve any of their under people in these delicate
12:56:54 20 discussions. At some other point a few of the senior people's
21 came - people came in initially, but it did not involve the type
22 of people he is talking about here, no.

23 And let me just correct something for the record. There's
24 no - the office of the President of Liberia is not on the sixth
12:57:17 25 floor. I think it's on the fourth floor of the Executive
26 Mansion, but he says the sixth floor. That is totally incorrect
27 and I don't think this is deliberate to lie but it's just an
28 error. It's not on the sixth floor, it's on the fourth floor.

29 Q. But let me ask you another question in this regard,

1 Mr Taylor. During the time that Foday Sankoh was in Liberia, at
2 that time, did Sam Bockarie visit Monrovia?

3 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Sam Bockarie was in Monrovia when
4 Foday Sankoh arrived, yes.

12:57:57 5 Q. But did you ever meet the two of them together?

6 A. Well, in the way that he explained, Foday Sankoh brought
7 his senior people in one meeting. I would say, you know,
8 together. I met Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie and I guess a couple
9 of other senior people along with Johnny Paul and his senior

12:58:20 10 people in an initial meeting. So together, yes, I would say
11 together. But not as in just the two of them coming on. No, not

12 in that way. But they were together in a meeting that later on
13 they left and left the leadership. That's what I - I hope I have
14 explained this to clarify. Not like just the two of them coming

12:58:42 15 to see me and I'm talking to them. No, not in that particular
16 way.

17 Q. Was there an occasion at this time when you gave Sam
18 Bockarie \$15,000?

19 A. No.

12:58:54 20 Q. In effect to thank him --

21 A. No.

22 Q. -- for being resolute in preserving the RUF?

23 A. I guess they were until meeting with Alhassan Bobson Sesay
24 and the \$15,000 business came up, and so everybody remembers a

12:59:07 25 15,000 and they don't know where to place the lie. So there was
26 no money that I gave to Sam Bockarie during that period. Not a

27 dime. And if I had any money to give, I would have given it to
28 his leader, Foday Sankoh, who was already there. But I guess

29 when you're in these whatever and you are hearing these figures

1 you attach them whenever you can. But that's not true. Totally
2 false.

3 Q. Next point I want to deal with, Mr Taylor, is this and in
4 order to locate when this is occurring, let me provide you first
12:59:51 5 of all with this question at line 6 on page 15128:

6 "Q. I would like you to think about the year 2000. After
7 you had gone to Makeni and then moved on to Lebanon in
8 Koidu Town. During this period what trips if any did Issa
9 take outside Sierra Leone?

13:00:15 10 A. Issa said Charles Taylor had told him that he should go
11 with one person from among the people who were in Freetown
12 when Pa Sankoh was arrested."

13 Now you recall the arrest of Foday Sankoh, Mr Taylor?

14 A. That is correct.

13:00:34 15 Q. May 2000, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. 8 May, I think?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. "He should take that person to him in Liberia." So that's
13:00:44 20 the time we're talking about, okay?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. "Q. Now, you said that Issa said Charles Taylor had told
23 him and earlier you said Charles Taylor had spoken with
24 him. Did Issa say in what way Charles Taylor communicated
13:00:59 25 with him?

26 A. Issa used satellite phone and it was through that
27 satellite phone that he used to communicate. I was not
28 present whether he spoke to him or not, but that was what
29 he said.

1 Q. Now, after Issa relayed this conversation, what did
2 Issa do?

3 A. So he made a delegation and they went to see Charles
4 Taylor.

13:01:25 5 Q. And how did they travel to meet Charles Taylor?

6 A. They took a United Nations vehicle from Koidu Town.
7 They went through Manowa and crossed in Pendembu, went to
8 Kailahun and travelled to Koindu, Foya mand it was from
9 Foya that the chopper came and took him to Monrovia. The
10 chopper was Weasua."

13:01:47 11 He goes on to describe that being an airline company:

12 "Q. And what happened when Issa and the delegation arrived
13 in Monrovia?

14 A. They took them to a guesthouse in Congo Town."

13:02:04 15 Now, at or about that time do you recall a visit by Issa
16 Sesay?

17 A. Yes, but --

18 Q. May 2000?

19 A. Oh, yes. This witness, as he's describing it, we're
13:02:24 20 talking about sometime later because in May - on May 8, 2000, to
21 the best of my recollection, I do leave. So it has to be
22 thereafter. I leave Monrovia on May 8. I go to a meeting in
23 Abuja. There's an ECOWAS meeting, okay, and I return. So the
24 time he's talking about that Issa Sesay actually comes to

13:03:01 25 Liberia, this is a little later on. I would think this is going
26 toward the end of May, and this is with regards to releasing the
27 UN hostages, okay. So it's not immediate, because immediately
28 following this situation, I go off. In fact, I leave on the day
29 of the arrest of Foday Sankoh, on the 8th, and I go to - that

1 evening I leave - I leave Liberia for Abuja, where there is a
2 meeting.

3 And so later on - if he is talking about later on, Issa
4 Sesay does come to Liberia. This is when I say, the first time I
13:03:40 5 ever meet Issa Sesay is in relations to negotiating for the
6 release of the hostages in late May. To that extent I would say
7 yes. I'm not sure if he accounts so properly, but this is the
8 situation as it stands.

9 Q. Now, the witness describes what happens in - no, before I
13:04:07 10 move to that, Mr Taylor, were the United Nations involved in the
11 transport of Issa Sesay from Sierra Leone to Monrovia?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. At that time?

14 A. Yes, the UN was involved.

13:04:21 15 Q. So where the witness makes mention of a United Nations
16 vehicle taking them from Koidu Town to Foya, do you raise any
17 questions with that?

18 A. No, no, I don't raise any questions. I must admit, you
19 know, based on your question, do I - I don't - I don't know
13:04:39 20 exactly what vehicle, but the UN was involved. Because, like I
21 say, we are dealing with the hostage situation and they are
22 giving whatever assistance they can give to help me resolve the
23 problem.

24 Q. Now, the witness goes on to describe what happens
13:04:58 25 thereafter, page 15130, line 8:

26 "Q. What happened after Issa and the delegation went to
27 the guesthouse?

28 A. From there, at night, around 10 to 11 o'clock, Benjamin
29 Yeaten came and drove them to the Mansion Ground to meet

1 with Charles Taylor. That's the Executive Mansion Ground
2 where Charles Taylor was.

3 Q. What happened then?

4 A. From there he took them to the sixth floor in one of
13:05:31 5 the waiting rooms to meet with Charles Taylor.

6 Q. And what happened at that meeting?

7 A. From there Charles Taylor came and he sat with them.
8 He greeted and they all greeted back. I asked what had
9 occurred in Freetown, who was the right person that came
13:05:50 10 from there. And the person who had come from there got up
11 and he asked him that why had his brother been arrested?

12 That was Foday Sankoh. And the person explained to him
13 that it was because of - it was because the United Nation
14 officials were arrested. That's what made the

13:06:11 15 pro-government officials to attack Foday Sankoh's lodge on
16 8 May.

17 Q. What happened after that exchange?

18 A. Thereafter he, " that being you, "asked if they knew
19 about any British MI LOBS that were arrested in some part of
13:06:37 20 Sierra Leone and the same person replied, yes, that he knew
21 about a British military observer but he had been handed
22 over to the Indian UNAMSIL contingent who were in Kailahun.

23 Q. So then what happened after Charles Taylor was told
24 that this person had been handed over to the Indians?

13:06:57 25 A. So he, " that being you, "said that, ' You have done a
26 great mistake. You have made a great mistake. You would
27 have held on to that man and use him as a ' " -

28 And he goes on:

29 "' He would have been used as a bargaining chip, as a

1 bargaining chip for Foday Sankoh to be released.' Because
2 he saw the way the man was received at in England. He said
3 he was received with flowers at the airport. Charles
4 Taylor was saying this. It was Charles Taylor who said he
13:07:33 5 saw the way the man was received. He said he saw that on
6 CNN, the way the man was received with flowers in England.
7 And he said, 'Okay, that one is past now. It's gone.' And
8 he advised that Issa should take care of the ground. He
9 should maintain the ground until Foday Sankoh returned and
13:07:53 10 he said Foday Sankoh was too old for him to be arrested
11 severally. He was arrested in Sierra Leone, later in
12 Nigeria, now again in Sierra Leone, that the man was too
13 stubborn. The man was too suborn. Issa said the UNAMSIL
14 and other pro-government forces were still attacking him
13:08:15 15 but he hadn't any materials so he told him to appoint one
16 person to go with Joe Tuah."

17 And then he goes on to say, "Well, we'll deal with that in
18 a moment." But, Mr Taylor, you see the contents of what he
19 claims to be that meeting at or about that time with Issa Sesay?

13:08:33 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. That you make an observation that a British military
22 observer who had been captured shouldn't have been handed over to
23 the Indian contingent; rather, the RUF should have kept him as a
24 bargaining chip to secure the release of Foday Sankoh. Did you
13:08:52 25 ever have any such conversation with Issa Sesay?

26 A. I never had any such conversation with - that is - that is
27 for someone that is a fool to make - so one British person is
28 more important than 500 others that have been held? There are
29 more than 500 Africans and other nationals held. One little

1 British fellow would be so important that I would make such silly
2 statement? I never had any such - any such discussion like that
3 with them. If anybody wanted to logically talk about bargaining
4 chip, you've got 500 United Nations people. I don't say that,
13:09:31 5 "Hold these 500 as a bargaining chip." I would say, "Oh, you
6 should have held one British human being." So his life is more
7 important than the rest of the 500? That is not my way of
8 thinking.

9 Even if someone remotely thinks that Taylor would do such a
13:09:48 10 thing, I think he would be considering me a fool if I were to
11 make such a statement. There is no such statement. I meet Issa
12 Sesay and I tell Issa Sesay exactly what all of my colleagues,
13 even the United Nations personnel, have all discussed. And, in
14 fact, in a document presented here written to the
13:10:09 15 Secretary-General by his special representative in Liberia,
16 Downes-Thomas, where I was the first one that said, "There will
17 be no quid pro quo when it comes to the release of Foday Sankoh
18 and the hostages." I'm the first to make such a statement, okay.
19 And it's public on United Nations documents, not written by me
13:10:28 20 but by their own people, that no quid pro quo the hostages must
21 released. That's the position I take from day one. And the
22 documents are here before this Court.

23 Q. Now, in the same context, the witness claims that you
24 having ordered Issa Sesay to take care of the ground, Issa Sesay
13:10:53 25 said the UNAMSIL and other pro-government forces were still
26 attacking him but he hadn't material. And so he told him to
27 appoint one person to go with Joe Tuah and that they were to go -
28 this is page 15133 - to Belle Fasama - B-E-L-L-E, F-A-S-A-M-A -
29 to receive materials so they will be able to take that:

1 "Q. You were saying that Issa was to appoint someone to go
2 with Joe Tuah and that they were to go to Belle Fasama to
3 receive materials.

4 A. Belle Fasama was between Gbarnga and Zorzor.

13:11:47 5 Q. And what kind of materials are you talking about?

6 A. AK-47 rounds, G3 rounds, RPG rockets and some rifles."

7 Now, Mr Taylor, that material is then taken by truck to the
8 Mansion Ground, the Executive Mansion, and from there the next
9 morning they were taken from - they were taken from the Weasua
10 airport, they took them to the Weasua aircraft - airport, and
11 they met the materials, had already been loaded in the chopper,
12 and they went to Foya. "And what kind of chopper was this?
13 Weasua. And that material was used to fight against the
14 Kamajors."

13:12:28 15 Now, Mr Taylor, so you invite Issa to Monrovia. You meet
16 with him. You congratulate him. You deplore the fact that he
17 has handed over this abducted - the British military observer.
18 He then mentions that he doesn't have materials to protect and
19 maintain the ground as instructed by you, so you send Joe Tuah
13:13:00 20 with an RUF representative to Belle Fasama to collect material
21 which is brought back to Monrovia from an area between Gbarnga
22 and Zorzor loaded on a helicopter for transport to Sierra Leone.
23 Yes?

24 A. Yes. What the witness does not remember, at this
13:13:28 25 particular time - in fact, other witnesses are covered it. We
26 can go through this again. At Spriggs Payne International
27 Airport, the place is jam packed with UN helicopters, UN military
28 people, international press. Everybody is aware that Issa Sesay
29 is in town. Is there a secret-that Issa Sesay has been brought

1 to town to negotiate the hostages? Everybody is anticipating the
2 hostage release. I mean, there are hundreds, hundreds of United
3 Nations civilian military intelligence personnel at Spriggs Payne
4 International Airport. Here is this dummy, Charles Taylor,
13:14:12 5 terrible Taylor, carrying arms to Spriggs Payne Airport and
6 loading them on a helicopter in the very view of the United
7 Nations and everybody else and sending them off. I'm not such a
8 fool. Even if that were anticipated by me, I'm not such - it
9 never happened. You understand me? Never ever, ever happened.

13:14:36 10 The helicopters are all there standing by. We don't use any
11 Weasua. Nothing. Every step that is being made by Issa Sesay is
12 being covered fully by the press and the UN personnel. This is a
13 very tense time in the international community and there is no
14 such thing going on. It's a blatant, blatant fabrication.

13:14:59 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, is there a location called Belle Fasama?
16 A. Yes, there is a location in Lofa called Belle Fasama.
17 Q. It's in Lofa, is it?
18 A. It's in Lofa County, yes.

19 Q. Now, according to the witness, a truck - you meet with Issa
13:15:20 20 Sesay in Monrovia. You then send Joe Tuah with someone to Lofa
21 County --
22 A. To bring weapons to Monrovia.

23 Q. -- back to Monrovia to be transported back to Lofa County
24 in a helicopter. Why did you do that?
13:15:37 25 A. Because I'm crazy. Lies, lies, lies. It never happened.
26 In fact Belle Fasama is closer to Foya in terms of distance than
27 to Monrovia. Fasama is in Lofa County and it's called Belle
28 Fasama because in - you can travel to - from Belle Fasama you go
29 to Voi nj ama, from Voi nj ama you go to Kol ahun and Foya. So it

1 would have been shorter to drive it there. But, no, I drive from
2 Lofa, back through Gbarnga all the way to Monrovia to put
3 something on a helicopter in the full view of the United Nations
4 that is at the airport waiting for these hostages, I'm supposed
13:16:28 5 to put arms in a helicopter and send them. That did not happen.
6 It did not happen. It's a lie. That's all it is.

7 Q. The witness speaks of another occasion, Mr Taylor, when
8 Issa Sesay gave you some diamonds and you indicated that you
9 would keep them for safekeeping until Pa Sankoh returns. This is
13:16:58 10 page 15161:

11 "From there Issa said they lacked materials and the enemies
12 were threatening their position. By the end of it all we
13 went and took some materials at Schefflein. They had a
14 barracks called Schefflein in Monrovia. It was called Camp
13:17:18 15 Schefflein. We met some materials there, boots and
16 uniforms in large quantities. We brought AK-47 rounds, RPG
17 rockets and G3 rounds.

18 Q. When Issa said they were lacking materials, what if
19 anything did Charles Taylor say about that?

13:17:37 20 A. He said we will talk to Benjamin Yeaten.

21 Q. So after this meeting then where did Issa Sesay go?

22 A. He drove back to his house, the guesthouse in Congo
23 Town.

24 Q. Then you said that Issa went and took some materials at
13:17:55 25 Camp Schefflein. How did Issa travel from the guesthouse
26 to Camp Schefflein?

27 A. He used a vehicle together with Benjamin Yeaten in a
28 jeep. He met uniforms there and boots and he also met
29 AK-47 rounds in large quantities, G3 rounds and RPG

1 rockets.

2 Q. And what happened after Issa got these materials at
3 Camp Schefflein?

4 A. Being that the materials were many and they had
13:18:21 5 manpower enough to go, so they took some of the materials
6 in the ATU chopper that Momo Dgiba was the commander and
7 they went there and met him. He was called Bulldog. He
8 brought the chopper and the times were loaded in there, but
9 not everything and it was taken to Foya. Not everything
13:18:40 10 was loaded in the chopper."

11 Now do you know anything about such a meeting, Mr Taylor?

12 A. No. Not at all. This witness is lying again. And you
13 know I hate to do this, but this is about my life so I've just
14 got to keep reminding the Court about some of these lies. You
13:19:06 15 just saw here, counsel, where this witness is telling this Court
16 Issa Sesay gave me diamonds to keep until Sam Bockarie returned.
17 That's what he's saying. But we - yes, he said that earlier,
18 that Issa Sesay gave me some diamonds to keep until Sam Bockarie
19 - until Foday Sankoh returned. Yes, he said that.

13:19:32 20 Q. That's at page 15161, line 18. He is asked this question
21 by Ms Hollis:

22 "Q. Now, Mr Witness, what happened then after Issa Sesay
23 gave these diamonds to Charles Taylor and Charles Taylor
24 indicated that he would keep them for safekeeping until Pa
13:19:56 25 Sankoh returned?"

26 JUDGE DOHERTY: That's the point, Mr Taylor said initially
27 Sam Bockarie returned. He has now corrected himself.

28 THE WITNESS: Okay, no, until Foday Sankoh returns. Now,
29 you know, I don't know what's going to happen after this is all

1 over with these people. Because these lies are deliberate, your
2 Honours. I mean no one can tell me that somebody didn't put
3 these people up. Remember we heard another side of this, that
4 Sam Bockarie was supposed to give me diamonds to keep until Foday
13:20:31 5 Sankoh returned and remember Foday Sankoh was supposed to return
6 and he gets so angry and upset that they give me diamonds.

7 Now, somebody probably heard that. Now they have connected
8 it now. They are saying oh, okay, so now this is the second
9 person after now - I'm saying now there's Issa Sesay now giving
13:20:57 10 me diamonds to keep until Foday Sankoh returns for the second
11 time. I raise this because these people just - how did they
12 educate these people with these lies I don't know. It is just
13 God that they are making these errors in connecting their dots
14 and different things. There is no such thing about Sam Bockarie
13:21:25 15 giving me diamonds to keep until Foday Sankoh returns. Neither
16 is there any situation now of Issa Sesay giving me diamonds until
17 Foday Sankoh returns from where? You understand me?

18 So I mean - you know, and they just keeping fabricating and
19 fabricating, fabricating. They go where? To Lofa. Close to
13:21:45 20 Foya. Take weapons when they are driving to Monrovia, only to
21 put it on the helicopter. Because when you get the map you look
22 at where Belle Fasama is, only to fly it back. These are all
23 lies.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:22:00 25 Q. He indicates, Mr Taylor, that this trip that Issa Sesay
26 took to Monrovia occurred at the end of the year 2000?

27 A. Now look at that. Well, we do know - we do know that Issa
28 returns - I mean comes to Liberia many times in 2000, but now it
29 depends on what he is talking about because Issa comes to Liberia

1 in August 2000.

2 Q. No, he is being specific because he goes on: "That was the
3 last trip he made in 2000, at the end of 2000 going to 2001."

4 A. Never did. Never, never - Issa Sesay came to Liberia and
13:22:39 5 never, ever, ever, neither then or at any time, gave me any
6 diamonds to keep for nobody, himself or otherwise, never.

7 Q. He then goes on to speak of another trip to Monrovia in
8 early 2001 when Issa took some diamonds with him to Charles
9 Taylor, page 15165, line 1. He describes how he travelled:

13:23:07 10 "From Foya, the ATU chopper came and collected him from
11 Foya and took him to Monrovia where he stayed at the Boulevard
12 Hotel. At night from the hotel Benjamin Yeaten collected him,
13 took him to the Executive Mansion Ground to Charles Taylor for
14 him to hand over the diamonds that he took for Charles Taylor.
13:23:27 15 When he met with Charles Taylor he handed over the consignment
16 and Charles Taylor asked him what he had done about the UNAMSIL
17 being that he said whether they were still threatening him. And
18 he said he had managed to get the situation under control but
19 that the Kamajors were still posing a threat, so from there Issa
13:23:47 20 returned to the hotel."

21 Do you recall such a meeting in early 2001, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Let's get this thing straight. No. But what UNAMSIL are
23 we talking about in 2001?

24 Q. Well, I'm only reading what's written down here, Mr Taylor.
13:24:04 25 I can't help you.

26 A. The issue with UNAMSIL is where? In 2000. May of 2000,
27 that's when UNAMSIL situation is watchamacallit. Where does
28 UNAMSIL situation come in now in 2001? There is no situation
29 that I know of that I'm involved in with UNAMSIL in 2001, no.

1 It's the year 2000, okay, that Issa Sesay, the very, very, very
2 arrest of Foday Sankoh on 8 May, following that that's when all
3 the UNAMSIL situation. So it's a lie that there's any connection
4 with anything in 2001 that I'm aware of relating to UNAMSIL.

13:24:48 5 He's lying. The records are there regarding that situation with
6 UNAMSIL.

7 Q. And then he goes on to record that on this trip as well,
8 following a meeting with you, again further arms and ammunition
9 are sent by helicopter back with Issa Sesay to Sierra Leone?

13:25:19 10 A. Well, that's wrong. That's a lie. But let me just remind
11 the Court for the record. We know that by the end of the year
12 2000 - in fact, there is the first ceasefire agreement signed
13 between RUF and the forces on the ground by Issa Sesay now as
14 leader of the RUF we know by the end of 2000. Remember after he
13:25:54 15 takes away in August there is a conflict with - even I'm involved
16 in that conflict where I'm pushing for disarmament and the
17 United States said that they needed six months and there is still
18 conflict and finally the initial agreement is signed in late 2000
19 about the ceasefire. And by 2001 we are really pushing into the
13:26:19 20 period of what? Of really implementing Lome, okay, by 2001.

21 That's when we have the real fruitful part of Lome that occurs in
22 2000.

23 Nobody is moving any weapons. Nobody is doing any
24 anything. Yes, there were skirmishes here and there, but the
13:26:41 25 fruitful part of Lome occurs in 2001 where disarmament is done
26 finally and Tejan Kabbah announces in 2002 that the war is over.
27 So there's no such thing about anybody trying to obtain or get
28 weapons. Not to my knowledge. Not with Issa Sesay. That is not
29 true.

1 Q. The witness went on, Mr Taylor, to describe another trip
2 made by Issa Sesay to Monrovia. On this occasion he says - the
3 question was asked at page 15167:

13:27:23 4 "Q. Did Issa Sesay take any other trips outside of Sierra
5 Leone in 2001?

6 A. Yes, he made another trip, one more trip to Liberia.
7 He went to Monrovia.

8 Q. Do you recall when it was that he made this other trip
9 to Monrovia?

13:27:36 10 A. Well, that was in 2000, but I can't recall the month.
11 It might be March or May or April, something like that, but
12 I cannot recall the exact actual month because I was not
13 keeping record of those dates.

14 Q. And what year are you talking about?

13:27:55 15 A. I'm talking about 2001.

16 Q. And why did he take this trip to Monrovia?

17 A. He again took diamonds with him to Charles Taylor."

18 Now I know what your answer is to that allegation,

19 Mr Taylor, but there is this added detail when we go over the
13:28:14 20 page at page 15168, beginning at line 20:

21 "When he went and handed over the diamonds, Charles Taylor
22 told him that he shouldn't be coming frequently with
23 diamonds to him. He said because the United Nation
24 observers and the international community was having eyes
13:28:33 25 on him to see whether he had connections with the RUF and
26 that they were always bringing diamonds to him. He said
27 Issa shouldn't be bringing diamonds to him but that he was
28 going to try and get somebody, present somebody to him who
29 will be assisting him when he got diamonds from him to get

1 certain items for him, so that he said Issa Sesay shouldn't
2 be bringing diamonds frequently to him. So that was what
3 he said when he received the diamonds from Issa and later
4 Issa drove back to the Boulevard Hotel.

13:29:06 5 Q. He said Issa shouldn't be bringing diamonds to him but
6 that he was going to try and get somebody present, somebody
7 who will be assisting him?

8 A. Charles Taylor said he will look for somebody to whom
9 Issa will be bringing his small small diamonds to him for
13:29:25 10 him to be exchanging it for money so he that when Issa gets
11 the money he will use it to buy his basic needs that he
12 would use on the front line.

13 Q. Use on front line where?

14 A. In Sierra Leone."

13:29:39 15 Did you express such a concern to Issa Sesay, Mr Taylor?

16 A. No, not at all.

17 Q. And help us. In March or April 2001 what was your
18 assessment of the RUF's need for war materials?

19 A. I didn't - the RUF was busy trying to disarm and so I don't
13:30:01 20 think they had a need for weapons.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think there is time just for one more
22 question.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you ever have a consultation with Issa
13:30:21 25 Sesay regarding the disarmament of child combatants?

26 A. No. Never had any discussion with Issa Sesay about any
27 specific phase of disarmament. My only discussion was that Lome
28 should be followed.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point because the

1 next question is slightly longer?

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll adjourn for lunch and resume at
3 2.30.

4 [Lunch break taken at 1.29 p.m.]

14:29:41 5 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Mr Taylor, before lunch we were looking at an alleged visit
8 made to you by Issa Sesay to discuss the disarmament of child
9 combatants, and I'm looking at page 15174, transcript for 2

14:32:12 10 September 2008. The witness continues, line 22:

11 "A. He went to consult Charles Taylor regarding the
12 disarmament of the child combatants.

13 Q. And where did he go to consult with Charles Taylor,
14 where in Monrovia?

14:32:28 15 A. At the Executive Mansion Ground in Monrovia.

16 Q. And what happened during this meeting?

17 A. Well, he met with Charles Taylor, he consulted with him
18 and he told him that Opande and the United Nations
19 Secretary-General's representative Adeniji had told him

14:32:56 20 that he should disarm the child combatants. But the first
21 question Charles Taylor asked him was whether that was safe
22 for him and then later he told him that he shouldn't accept
23 to disarm to the UN at all. So he said he advised him that
24 he shouldn't disarm at all to the United Nations. He said

14:33:14 25 the United Nations were people who would talk nicely to you
26 today and tomorrow they would turn around and arrest you,
27 so he asked Issa not to disarm to them at all. So Issa
28 just answered to him, he left and went home and that was at
29 the guesthouse where he was lodged."

1 And he confirms, line 20, the same page: "Charles Taylor
2 told Issa that he shouldn't disarm to the United Nations".

3 What do you say about, Mr Taylor?

4 A. [Microphone not activated]. Excuse me, your Honour, the
14:34:12 5 microphone was off. If they do not know my contribution or
6 appreciate it and the only thing they can do is put these lies
7 together about what - now he's suggesting that I was obstructing
8 the peace process? Well, we all have a Maker to account to. I
9 did everything, and my contribution led significantly to this
14:34:39 10 peace that they have in Sierra Leone and now here I am sitting
11 down in a Dutch prison. It's a blatant lie. I never - in fact,
12 I pushed Issa Sesay, I encouraged him. Well, "push", I would
13 say, is the wrong - I encouraged him, and he worked very closely
14 with me, ECOWAS and everybody else in getting this disarmament.
14:35:01 15 I never told Issa Sesay not to disarm to the UN. Never.

16 [Overlapping speakers].

17 Q. But, Mr Taylor, the witness continues that following that
18 meeting where you told Issa not to disarm, Issa travelled back to
19 Foya and in Foya, page 15176, he, Issa, was grumbling to his
14:35:28 20 commanders that he travelled with.

21 "He said he is not - he is no longer going to do this. He
22 said he doesn't believe that he will continue taking instructions
23 from Charles Taylor. He said Charles Taylor is now living in
24 peace. Now they held the election and he won and he is now the
14:35:48 25 President, and he was saying that he too is going to allow for
26 the disarmament to take place so that he will be able to give
27 peace to his own people in Sierra Leone. That was what Issa was
28 grumbling."

29 So you had given Issa this advice "Don't disarm to the UN",

1 and Issa Sesay was upset, in effect saying: You're all right
2 Jack, Mr Taylor, giving me that advice, because you're now
3 President, but I would like to see peace for my own people in
4 Sierra Leone. Do you follow?

14:36:21 5 A. Yes, I follow. That's totally false. I guess we'll get to
6 find out soon enough. That's totally false. Totally, totally,
7 totally false.

8 Q. Now the next point that I want to deal with is this: The
9 witness claims that in 2001 - and I'm putting it in a nutshell,
14:36:44 10 and then we'll come to the substance of what he says - that Sesay
11 made another trip to Monrovia in 2001 at the request of Benjamin
12 Yeaten and in a meeting in Monrovia with Benjamin Yeaten, Yeaten
13 was to provide - you instructed Yeaten to provide materials to be
14 used by Sesay to enter Guinea. Did you do that?

14:37:13 15 A. No, I did not.

16 Q. Now let's look at the actual words. Page 15176, line 23:
17 "Q. In 2001 did Issa Sesay take any additional trips
18 outside of Sierra Leone?

19 A. He made a trip that I recall outside Sierra Leone.

14:37:34 20 Q. Where did he go?

21 A. He went to Monrovia. He was invited by Benjamin
22 Yeaten. Benjamin Yeaten told him that he called on Issa
23 and he said Charles Taylor told him that the materials that
24 he had given to him, he was to use them to enter Guinea.

14:37:48 25 He said that was the reason why he invited him, so that he
26 will come for them to discuss. He said that those were the
27 materials that he was supposed to use to enter Guinea. He
28 said it was that so as to be able to disturb the Guineans
29 because the Guineans had been allowing the LURD rebels to

1 use their grounds to penetrate Liberia. He said as long as
2 the LURD rebels were coming from Guinea to Liberia, he said
3 he was also going to set a defensive against Guinea, so he
4 asked Issa to go and enter Guinea."

14:38:21 5 Did you?

6 A. No. But here is a witness that just said I told Issa Sesay
7 not to disarm. Issa Sesay gets annoyed and says but look at this
8 guy. He's President. I want to be bring peace to my people.

9 The same Issa Sesay gets called back and given arms, and he goes
10 running. Well, then logic will follow that Issa Sesay must say
11 but - he should say at this point: But this guy is really nuts.
12 I just said that I wanted to bring peace to my people and guess
13 what he does? He calls me back on this matter. He's got to be
14 crazy. I mean, how do these logic - how do they fashion these
15 things like this? It's a lie. It's a total lie that I will call
16 Issa and give him material. Issa is disarming and wanting peace
17 to his people, but he can go off to another war. Wow.

18 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, there's a bit more to it in that regard.
19 Now, after the meeting where you had told him not to disarm,
14:39:25 20 Mr Taylor, as I said to you, he returned to Sierra Leone
21 grumbling. He's asked this by Ms Hollis, page 15188, line 11:

22 "Q. Now when Issa Sesay went back to Sierra Leone what did
23 he do in regards to disarmament?

24 A. He followed the order that Opande gave to him. He
14:39:49 25 mobilised the child soldiers to be disarmed.

26 Q. Now, after he went back and began this disarmament,
27 what did he do with the arms and ammunition?

28 A. Some of the arms and ammunition were disarmed, but it
29 came to a time when Benjamin Yeaten said to him that

1 Charles Taylor had said the weapons and the remaining
2 rounds were to be sent back to Liberia because those were
3 his weapons, he was the one who supplied them to Issa so
4 Issa should not use them to disarm."

14:40:31 5 Continuing on the same note, page 15190:

6 "Q. When you say 'those arms belong to him', who are you
7 referring to, the arms belong to whom?

8 A. He was referring to Charles Taylor.

9 Q. To whom should the arms be brought back?

14:40:51 10 A. He said they should take the arms back to Benjamin
11 Yeaten. They should meet Benjamin Yeaten in Vahun. At
12 that time Benjamin Yeaten was in Vahun when the instruction
13 came to Issa. He said Charles Taylor said the arms and
14 ammunition that he had given to him, those that he did not
14:41:10 15 use he should assemble them and bring them back - bring to
16 Benjamin Yeaten. Because Charles Taylor had said he was
17 the one who had the weapons, he had given them the weapons,
18 if he did not use them he should bring them back to him.
19 Immediately after that Issa called one of his securities
14:41:34 20 and sent him to Tongo to bring the remaining arms from
21 Gbarnga to Koidu Town. From Gbarnga to Koidu Town. The
22 ones he sent, he sent his bodyguard to Gbarnga ..."

23 This is page 15190.

24 "... he sent his bodyguard to Gbarnga for Banya to collect
14:41:56 25 the heavy weapons that were there and the ammunition that he had
26 in his possession to be brought to Lebanon. And the ones that he
27 had in Lebanon, he put some into the truck and a jeep and they
28 took them to Vahun to Benjamin Yeaten."

29 What about that, Mr Taylor? Ask for your arms and

1 ammunition back?

2 A. Yeah, this boy is so busy that - I don't know whether he
3 means bringing arms from Gbarnga to Koidu.

4 Q. I'm not sure either, but the thrust of what he's saying
14:42:28 5 is --

6 A. I don't know if there's a Gbarnga in Sierra Leone.

7 Q. Well, neither do I, Mr Taylor. But let's put Gbarnga to
8 one side.

9 A. Yeah, but if that's just the function of the lie, there is
14:42:38 10 no such movement of no arms. I never told Issa to bring me back
11 any arms, and I guess he is lying so much until he brings in
12 Gbarnga - that arms are coming from Gbarnga to Koidu. But
13 remember I have asked, he says, for the arms to be brought to me,
14 so --

14:42:52 15 Q. In Vahun?

16 A. To Vahun. So the arms are in Gbarnga. He takes them to
17 Koidu and then brings them back to Vahun. So what are they doing
18 - what would those arms be doing in Gbarnga? Maybe it's just
19 maybe a slip of the tongue, but that's what you do when you're
14:43:11 20 telling these things. I don't understand what he means.

21 Q. Well, at a later stage he does go on to correct --

22 A. Okay. Okay. Oh, that's what that --

23 Q. -- that he was wasn't referring to Gbarnga; he was talking
24 about Banya in Tongo?

14:43:27 25 A. Okay. All right.

26 Q. So he does correct it.

27 A. But there's no such thing as me asking Issa to return any
28 arms to me that had been given him because I had supplied them to
29 him. That's not true.

1 Q. Now, another specific matter, and I appreciate, Mr Taylor,
2 in asking you this that I have asked you about diamonds on
3 previous occasions and you have dealt with that topic. But there
4 is a specific aspect to what this witness says about diamonds
14:44:00 5 that I need to ask you about. At page 15192, testimony of the 2
6 September 2008, he was asked this specific question in relation
7 to diamonds, line 10:

8 "Q. Did Issa ever say anything about how many diamonds he
9 took to Charles Taylor?

14:44:25 10 A. He said something about it some time in 2002.

11 Q. And what did he say?

12 A. In 2002 when the RUF had been transformed into a
13 political party, the man who was appointed to be the
14 presidential candidate of the RUF asked Issa what his
14:44:47 15 account was and he said he hadn't any account, but that he
16 had diamonds with Charles Taylor up to 5,000 carats and he
17 had \$150,000 that he had given to Charles Taylor for
18 safekeeping and Charles Taylor had said any time elections
19 would be coming close he would assist the RUF and that was
14:45:16 20 why he was keeping the diamonds.

21 Q. Now you testified that Charles Taylor had also said
22 that he was going to hold on to the diamonds that were
23 given to him by Issa and by Sam Bockarie to give to Foday
24 Sankoh when Foday Sankoh was released. To your knowledge,
14:45:38 25 did Foday Sankoh ever receive those diamonds from
26 Charles Taylor?

27 A. Well, he did not receive them in my presence and, in
28 fact, he did not receive them because Foday Sankoh was not
29 released. He died in detention."

1 Now, Mr Taylor, first of all, those precise quantities,
2 5,000 carats worth of diamonds, were you given that quantity of
3 diamonds by Issa Sesay?

4 A. No.

14:46:17 5 Q. Or anybody for that matter?

6 A. No, never given any diamonds by Issa Sesay.

7 Q. Were you given \$150,000 by Issa Sesay?

8 A. No, never given \$150,000 by Issa Sesay.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've heard this morning about you handing
14:46:41 10 out sums of \$15,000 to - \$5,000 to various people who come to
11 Monrovia, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Was that money money which you were safekeeping for the
14 RUF?

14:46:58 15 A. No, no. Not at all. Giving out little amounts of money,
16 not just to the RUF but to, I mean, different delegations that
17 visit various Heads of State in West Africa is as normal as
18 getting up in the morning. These people came and it's a normal
19 tradition. We put envelopes together, we give it to them just
14:47:33 20 to help them serve as a way of encouragement, buy them little
21 things for their families. Had nothing to do with diamonds.

22 And, in fact, I'm sure this will be covered because it's also
23 alleged that this \$150,000 in another testimony, that it was
24 money that I was supposed to contribute some money to the
14:47:55 25 elections. It's reversed - it's in the reverse order here. Now
26 instead of me giving money, Issa Sesay is giving me money. But I
27 recall, I think it's \$80,000 at some hotel, that one of the
28 protected witnesses who testified that he was sent to Boulevard
29 Hotel. So this is all a part of the reverse construct that was

1 brought here before.

2 But no. We give money all the time. I'm not the only one
3 - other African Heads of State all the time give out money. Even
4 when Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma were on their way back
14:48:33 5 to Sierra Leone, whatever little I could put together, I did.

6 Obasanjo himself sent \$25,000. It's a normal African thing.
7 Normal. It's as normal as getting up in the morning. But it was
8 not a part of any money that anybody, in line to your question,
9 was giving me to keep. This is just a normal thing that African

14:48:52 10 leaders do. It's not a payoff. Like in other western countries,
11 it's not permissible. In Africa, people that come to see you
12 from maybe towns, villages, chiefs or commissioners, or if a
13 little group comes from a different country, except it's a

14 colleague, but anything other than that, there's nothing unusual
14:49:14 15 about giving envelopes to them. It's usual. Not for money they
16 gave me to keep, no.

17 Q. On that same note, Mr Taylor, at a later stage the
18 witness's attention was brought back to what he had said
19 regarding that money. And at page 15226 he was asked this:

14:49:43 20 "Q. And you testified that Issa received \$300,000 US and
21 that he gave half of that, \$150,000, to Charles Taylor.

22 How did you know about that?

23 A. I was present when he collected the money and he called
24 me, Augustine Gbao and Lion, and he divided the money into
14:50:05 25 two. He said he will not take all of this money back to
26 Sierra Leone. He kept one part of it with Charles Taylor.

27 At first he wanted to keep it with Benjamin Yeaten, but he
28 said Benjamin Yeaten will use it, and so he divided it into
29 two parts and gave one part to Charles Taylor for

1 safekeeping and he took the remaining to Sierra Leone.

2 Q. And how did you know that he actually gave this money
3 to Charles Taylor?

4 A. He told me. And in early 2002, he dispatched me to go
14:50:38 5 there. He told me that in Monrovia, that he had given the
6 money to Charles Taylor for safekeeping.

7 Q. And tell us again the amount that he gave to
8 Charles Taylor for safekeeping.

9 A. He said 150,000 United States dollars."

14:50:56 10 Now, first of all, Mr Taylor, taking matters slowly, what
11 knowledge do you have as to the source of the \$300,000 US
12 received by Issa Sesay in Monrovia?

13 A. None whatsoever.

14 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you were the one, so it is alleged, who was
14:51:17 15 selling diamonds on behalf of the RUF and making a profit. So
16 help us, where did Issa Sesay get \$300,000 US from, not a small
17 sum, in Monrovia, please?

18 A. I have no idea. I don't even think Issa Sesay had
19 \$300,000. It's a lie this boy put together. I'm sure in time to
14:51:38 20 come other Defence witnesses will prove that these are lies.

21 Q. The reason I'm asking, Mr Taylor, is this: If you're
22 supposed to be the holder of the diamonds, logically, if Issa's
23 got \$300,000, it's come from you. So why is he giving you back
24 \$150,000, half of it? Do you follow?

14:52:01 25 A. But that's the way how the logic goes with them, the lies
26 go. I'm supposed to give it to him, he gives me back and I've
27 got the diamonds. All lies. And in time to come we will get to
28 know that they are lies, just lies.

29 Q. Now, one other matter we should deal with. We've touched

1 on this before, but there's an added detail that I want you to
2 consider. At page 15203, testimony of 2 September 2008, the
3 witness was asked this question:

4 "Q. Now, Mr Witness, you also testified about Foday
14:52:54 5 Sankoh's arrest in 1997 and you testified about
6 instructions he sent to Sam Bockarie, that Sam Bockarie
7 should take over as the commander on the ground and that
8 Sam Bockarie should take instructions from Charles Taylor.
9 How did you know about these instructions from Foday Sankoh
14:53:10 10 to Sam Bockarie?

11 A. I told you earlier in my statement that I worked with
12 Sam Bockarie from the end of 1996 to 1997 until the AFRC
13 overthrow. In 1997 we were in Koindu catering to get arms
14 and ammunition through ULIMO. That was where we were when
14:53:34 15 Jungle called using the radio from Monrovia and said he had
16 an instruction that he wanted to pass on to Sam Bockarie
17 that they should get Sam Bockarie on the set and the
18 operator ran to Sam Bockarie and called him that somebody
19 wanted to talk to him from Monrovia. Sam Bockarie came to
14:53:54 20 the set and he spoke with Jungle and Jungle passed the
21 instruction to Sam Bockarie. He said that instruction from
22 Charles Taylor."

23 And he said that he heard that because the radio
24 transmitter was on loud speaker. Now, do you know anything about
14:54:17 25 that, Mr Taylor?

26 A. No, nothing. And I'm sure it didn't happen that way, the
27 way he's explained it. In 1997? What part of 1997? We know,
28 again, that Sam Bockarie is promoted and given that position by
29 Foday Sankoh himself, and other witnesses have testified,

1 Prosecution witnesses. So I don't know why they led this witness
2 into that line of answer when they knew very well that they had
3 sufficient information that Foday Sankoh himself had passed those
4 instructions, promoted Sam Bockarie and talked to Johnny Paul
14:54:55 5 Koroma, gave the instructions to join, they knew very well that
6 that information was factual. I don't know why they led this
7 other man into this particular direction. No such thing
8 happened, counsel. No such thing happened.

9 Q. Well, very well. Now we've dealt with that. Let's go back
14:55:12 10 to the \$150,000 US to complete the picture. The witness goes on
11 to say at page 15227 how after Sesay mentioned the \$150,000 in
12 your safekeeping, thereafter he, the witness, made a trip to
13 Roberts International Airport, flying from Lungi:

14 "Q. And what happened after you arrived?

14:55:43 15 A. When I arrived he told me that on my arrival I should
16 meet Benjamin Yeaten so that he will lead me to
17 Charles Taylor, but when I arrived there - when I went to
18 Benjamin Yeaten at the back of White Flower they told me
19 that he was not there, he had travelled to one place in the
14:55:59 20 forest and being that I was not able to go there - being
21 that I was not able to go there I called" -

22 He goes on to say how he called someone, I think it was
23 Issa. And then he continues, page 15234, jumping a couple of
24 pages. He goes on to explain that he met with you and he says
14:56:28 25 this, line 23:

26 "A. I was at that time talking to Charles Taylor," so he
27 eventually meets with you, you see, Mr Taylor. "I told him
28 that it was Issa who sent me to come to him and that he
29 said he had kept money with you, which was \$150,000, and

1 that you had said when the RUF will be going for elections
2 he will give some help and he said I should come for that
3 help and the money that he kept with you.

14:57:02 4 Q. So when you said you had said he would give some
5 help, who are you referring to?

6 A. Charles Taylor.

7 Q. Then you testified that 'he told me later that if Issa
8 had worked with instruction.' What do you mean by that?

14:57:21 9 A. Charles Taylor asked me whether Issa went according to
10 the instruction he gave to him.

11 Q. And then you went on to say or I thought you said, 'I
12 told him I did not know whether he worked with the
13 instruction but he told me that he had said we shouldn't
14 disarm.' So who told you he said we shouldn't disarm?

14:57:36 15 A. Charles Taylor told me that he had told Issa that we
16 shouldn't disarm.

17 Q. And what happened after Charles Taylor told you that?

18 A. And then he said he's going to send me back to go and
19 tell Issa that he does not have any money for him and he
14:57:51 20 said if Issa himself had come on that mission he would have
21 ordered his arrest and execution. So he asked the woman to
22 take us back to the place and wait for Benjamin Yeaten. He
23 said if Issa himself had come, because he said he had given
24 Issa an instruction that he did not go by and so he said if
14:58:15 25 he himself had come he would have ordered his arrest and
26 execution."

27 Did you have such a conversation with this witness,
28 Mr Taylor?

29 A. Never. Never had any conversation. I - you know, I just

1 have to do this to remind this Court. Remember this money for
2 elections, if this Court recalls, a witness came before this
3 Court, a very protected witness. Just in case it's necessary, I
4 can write the name down just in case we can't find the TF1
14:59:04 5 number. That witness said that Issa Sesay came to Liberia to
6 collect money that he had given me for elections. He was
7 supposed to be lodged in the Boulevard Hotel and he sent to me
8 for this money. I sent, I think, 80,000 of the money and Issa
9 refused to receive the money, and they had to prevail upon him to
14:59:27 10 take the money. That's one witness's account about this election
11 money. I don't know the TF1 number. I can write the name down
12 on a piece of paper if the Court requires it. But this witness -
13 now here's another witness that has now come up with his version
14 of this money now that - now Issa does not come. He flies into
14:59:51 15 Roberts - it's all not true. How they do this I don't
16 understand, okay? So I don't know why there was never - in fact,
17 your Honours, I did not get the opportunity. I would have loved
18 to assist the RUF during the election. I did not have the means
19 to help them because ECOWAS states were - it was suggested to us.
15:00:19 20 We decided that, look, to keep these people in line - but I did
21 not have the means to assist. If I had the means as other
22 countries did, like Nigeria helped the RUF, Senegal to a great
23 extent assisted, I would have done it. I did not have any money.
24 So this thing about this witness coming to me and the other
15:00:45 25 witness saying no, Issa Sesay was in Monrovia and he was upset
26 because - it's all just falsehood. But I'm sure there are other
27 Defence witnesses that will clear this up, that will corroborate
28 what I'm saying. It is a lie.
29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just for reference purposes I wonder if

1 you'd mind writing that name on a piece of paper for us, please,
2 so we know who it is you're talking about.

3 A. Yes.

15:02:01 4 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if this could be shown to the
5 I learned judges and to counsel opposite, please:

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just so this reference doesn't get lost, I
7 wonder if you could take back this piece of paper and just write
8 in summary something to the effect "witness who claims to have
9 received money", something like that, so we can identify what
10 we're talking about at a later date.

15:02:45 11 I think for completeness, Mr President, we perhaps ought to
12 mark that document for identification, which would make it
13 MFI-271.

14 Could you please sign and date that document, please,
15:03:46 15 Mr Taylor.

16 A. If my date is correct, I've got the 2nd.

17 Q. It's 2 November. Okay?

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just a minute. While Mr Taylor has that
19 document, I think we should add the TF1 number as well.

15:05:43 20 MR GRIFFITHS: It's TF1-375.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: 375. Should that be a confidential
22 document?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I think it should be, Mr President, because
24 it refers to the name of a protected witness. So I think it
15:05:57 25 should be.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. You will recall,
27 Mr Griffiths, that we have had several incidents in the past
28 where a confidential name has been written on a piece of paper
29 and it's been admitted straight into evidence rather than marking

1 it for identification. Really there is not much point marking it
2 for identification, is there?

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I was just trying to be overcautious,
4 I guess. But I don't have a problem if it's not marked for
15:06:32 5 identification if we all now understand who the witness is
6 talking about.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. You'll tender it in evidence at
8 this stage, is that correct?

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, I will.

15:06:43 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection to that?

11 MR BANGURA: None, your Honour.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. That document will be
13 admitted as a Defence exhibit. I don't have the current number
14 at the moment.

15:06:58 15 MS IRURA: Your Honour, it would be D-91.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That's admitted into evidence as a
17 Defence exhibit D-91 and it shall be marked "confidential".

18 [Exhibit D-91 admitted]

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:07:37 20 Q. All right, Mr Taylor, let's move on.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before you do, I omitted to show the
22 Prosecution what Mr Taylor had written on this piece of paper.
23 Mr Griffiths, did you get a chance to see what was written on it?

24 MR GRIFFITHS: No, I didn't.

15:08:17 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'll have it shown to you and the
26 Prosecution.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

28 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, your Honour, counsel, it's
29 important - I just wanted - I don't know the - it's important.

1 This particular evidence is not going to mean anything to us
2 unless it relates to the transcript, because this is giving a
3 contrasting view to an incident that a witness is stating here
4 that I'm giving an opposite view. So there's got to be, in my
15:10:28 5 opinion, some connection to the incident on the record now.
6 Because taken at face value it really means nothing, unless it is
7 contrasted with what this witness is saying in his evidence that
8 led to me giving a contrasting view. So I'm not sure how it ties
9 in unless the whole picture is - well, I'm sure the Court will
15:10:58 10 handle that.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, Mr Taylor, the exhibit D-91 will be
12 considered by the Court in the context of the oral evidence in
13 which it was tendered.

14 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you, your Honour.

15:11:14 15 MR GRIFFITHS:
16 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, I don't think there is any need to be
17 concerned about that, because I think it will be fairly obvious
18 at a later stage, if one examines the transcript of this
19 exchange, the context in which that particular document came into
15:11:30 20 existence, so the juxtaposition will be clear.

21 Now, although the witness goes on to make further
22 allegations about diamonds, Mr Taylor, I'm not going to trouble
23 you with those because your position on that is quite clear.

24 A. Yes.

15:11:47 25 Q. So what I'm going to do now is to move on to another
26 witness.

27 Now, the witness I want to move on to, Mr Taylor - and
28 hopefully we can conclude this witness fairly swiftly - TF1-114,
29 one Dennis Koker, who gave evidence in open session in January

1 2008. Now, the first suggestion made by the witness beginning at
2 page 1249 is to this effect: He speaks of travelling from Koidu
3 with, amongst others, his aunt and one Eldred Collins and his
4 family, and he said that he was escorting some money and they
15:13:25 5 went to a place called Baome, B-A-O-M-E, and then he said this,
6 page 1250, line 12:

7 "A. It would reach Kailahun, go to Buedu and not stop
8 there and go to Liberia.

9 Q. How did you learn that?

15:13:51 10 A. We met our colleagues in this thing and they were
11 saying that whatever good, whatever beneficial they had in
12 the war on that end they would take to Charles Taylor. But
13 God wants the truth. I did not see them discuss the
14 business with Charles Taylor, but I used to see them take
15:14:08 15 them to Liberia."

16 So money was being taken to you from Sierra Leone. So not
17 just diamonds, Mr Taylor. Money as well. What do you say?

18 A. A lie. Was that leones? I mean, it's a lie.

19 Q. Was there such a force in Liberia, Mr Taylor, as the NPFL
15:14:37 20 Navy Rangers?

21 A. We had a navy division, not Navy Rangers. We had a navy.

22 Q. Because the witness speaks of soldiers speaking a Liberian
23 dialect wearing military fatigue, they had on camouflage and a
24 black cap, some of them had on a polo T-shirt on which it was
15:15:03 25 written "Navy Rangers". "NPFL Navy Rangers". This is page 1281,
26 by the way, testimony of 15 January 2008. And that these
27 individuals had brought arms - war materials for the RUF. Know
28 anything about that, Mr Taylor?

29 A. No.

1 Q. Now, this was said to occur in 1998, July 1998, in fact.
2 Now, in July 1998, Mr Taylor, was the NPFL still in existence?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Did any of your soldiers, Mr Taylor, wear this distinctive
15:16:36 5 T-shirt bearing the logo "NPFL Navy Rangers"?

6 A. In 1998, no. There were different T-shirts that had the
7 unit, navy, army, marines, but I'm not aware of any Navy Ranger.
8 We didn't have any attack boats or anything for them, so that's
9 not - no, not to my knowledge.

15:17:13 10 Q. A couple of other matters before we conclude with this
11 witness. Now, the witness accepted as truth that a portion of
12 his statement which was read to him in which he said, "From the
13 time I was in Buedu, Issa Sesay was deputy to Bockarie and would
14 go back and forth to Liberia to do business and make these
15:17:56 15 arrangements with Taylor's men. I know this because of one
16 incident when Sesay went to Liberia with 18 bags of money from
17 the bank in Kono and came back and said the money was stolen."

18 Now, Mr Taylor, do you know anything about 18 bags of money
19 being stolen from Issa Sesay in Liberia?

15:18:20 20 A. No. The only stolen things we've heard about here
21 concerning Issa Sesay is that Issa Sesay is allegedly taking
22 diamonds to Monrovia that should have - one group said should
23 have been brought to me, another group said he should have
24 carried to Burkina Faso that got stolen. But money, no, I never
15:18:43 25 heard of that.

26 Q. Do you recall evidence regarding the robbery of a bank in
27 Kono?

28 A. Yes. That was stated here.

29 Q. Do you recall that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, do you recall what the evidence was as to what
3 happened to that money stolen from the bank in Kono?

4 A. Well, to the best of my recollection - you know, from what
15:19:19 5 I recall, the first thing is that the bank had been broken into
6 and it had not been approved by Sam Bockarie and someone said
7 that there was supposed to be a large diamond along - a large
8 diamond along with cash taken from that bank and that it was
9 mostly done by a group I think under the command of who? If I'm
15:19:47 10 not mistaken, Superman or somebody. That's the best of my
11 recollection.

12 Q. Very well. Now, that's all I want to ask you about that
13 witness, Mr Taylor, and you'll be pleased to know we've got two
14 to go. The penultimate witness I want to deal with is Hassan
15:20:03 15 Bility. Now, in general terms, Mr Taylor, first of all, when did
16 you first come across Hassan Bility?

17 A. When you say "come across", when did I first meet him?

18 Q. My fault. It was an imprecise question. When did you
19 first hear of Hassan Bility?

15:20:29 20 A. I would put it back to about '96. About 1996. I would put
21 it to about '96.

22 Q. And how was it that you came to learn about this chap?

23 A. Hassan Bility worked with Alhaji Kromah.

24 Q. As what?

15:21:00 25 A. As one of his, I think his principal press officer and ran
26 the - a paper for ULIMO then and then ALCOP, the political party.
27 That's how I heard of him.

28 Q. Can you recall now, Mr Taylor, what the paper was called?

29 A. I know the paper that he ran in Monrovia for the party was

1 - had some connection with I think, what do you call it - The
2 Analyst was the paper that he ran as the political arm of ALCOP,
3 the political party, The Analyst.

15:21:48 4 Q. And that political party had grown out of which particular
5 faction?

6 A. ULIMO-K.

7 Q. Now, what was Hassan Bility - to your knowledge, what is
8 Hassan Bility's ethnic origin?

9 A. He's Mandingo. He's Julia. He's Mandingo.

15:22:07 10 Q. And as far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, what are this
11 political affiliations?

12 A. Hassan was a member of ALCOP and a very, very die hard
13 ULIMO-K personnel. That's as much as I know about him.

14 Q. What do you say that?

15:22:28 15 A. He worked - Hassan is - he worked with Alhaji all the years
16 of the war. I cannot give any testimony to the fact that he
17 actually held a rifle in war, but he worked so closely, and what
18 they say, the pen is mightier than the sword. But he's a very,
19 very, very, very - he was a very die hard ULIMO personnel that
15:22:55 20 stuck with the movement throughout the elections.

21 Q. Now, I want to ask you something else in general terms
22 about him before we get to the specifics. As far as you're
23 aware, Mr Taylor, what's Hassan Bility's attitude towards you?

15:23:19 24 A. Well, my own interpretation, as far as I see his attitude -
25 you know, Hassan reminds me of a story that we heard a few months
26 ago. This Japanese soldier that, I think he was found, I don't
27 remember his name, a few months ago that was still resisting from
28 World War II. Hassan just never - until now he hasn't stopped
29 the war. Hassan is a very, in my opinion, vindictive person. He

1 never stopped the war.

2 Q. Which war?

3 A. The original - the war that ended in 1997, he never
4 stopped. And even as LURD came in, he rejoined the war.

15:24:04 5 Throughout my presidency, he wrote extensively. I mean, he wrote
6 a lot of lies and disinformation. So he's just one of those
7 individuals that just never - just didn't want the war to end.
8 As far as he's concerned, this conflict for him is still not
9 over. This is my whole attitude.

15:24:24 10 So for me is he - there are about two of these boys that
11 have just made me their target. In fact, Tom Kamara, with the
12 New Democrat in Monrovia, writes about he - he's written about me
13 every day for the past 10 years. Every day for 10 years or more
14 he's written about me. They just don't want the war to end.

15:24:48 15 Today, if you look at the New Democrat, yesterday, last week,
16 last Monday in Monrovia, it's about Charles Taylor. Every day.
17 They just never let - they haven't given up.

18 So for me, his attitude has been one that - he just doesn't
19 like me, which is his right. I don't have any problems with
15:25:12 20 that. Where he has gone wrong, I have done what I felt
21 necessary, but that's about the end of it.

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, Mr Bility, as you will recall, gave
23 extensive evidence regarding a number of occasions when he was
24 arrested and on occasions beaten by your security services. Now,
15:25:36 25 tell us, Mr Taylor, in general terms, did Hassan Bility tell
26 these judges the truth as you saw it?

27 A. Well, there are a couple of cases where I would say he told
28 the truth. Some of the explanations - quite frankly, I don't
29 even know why the Prosecution brought Hassan Bility here.

1 Q. Why do you say that?

2 A. Well, let's look at Hassan's Bility's evidence. Let's look
3 at the indictment. I don't see - but maybe they saw it. I don't
4 see what the bearings on Hassan's own testimony on this
15:26:17 5 indictment. It doesn't cover anything. It covers his activities
6 in Liberia and what he did. I don't see how personally he
7 contributed, but maybe that's not for me to say. So I think that
8 Hassan has another purpose for coming here.

9 But going back to your question, there is an arrest of
15:26:39 10 Hassan Bility that I can account for, that's about 2002, that he
11 mentioned about. His explanation that he was brought to me is
12 true in 2002. His explanation that upon his arrest he was
13 visited by senior officers of the United States embassy is
14 correct. And all of those, I was very aware of. And, in fact,
15:27:05 15 the visit of the United States embassy officials to him and
16 bringing him to a press conference that I held subsequently are
17 true. Also his testimony, he mentions that he visits my home at
18 my birthday party, that's true, which I don't know if anybody
19 thinks I'm crazy, If I considered a little Hassan Bility, a
15:27:32 20 journalist, as an enemy to my - to come to my residence at my
21 birthday party, he wouldn't step foot to the gate. So I don't
22 know how he figures so.

23 For me, I never looked at him at a level that I would have
24 some animosity against him. I never looked at - he's not an
15:27:48 25 equal, so I don't look at people that are not my equals. I don't
26 have confusion with people that I do not have respect for. I
27 mean, if you bring yourself to a level that we can have, you
28 know, a quarrel, then I will quarrel, but if I figure that you're
29 not at that level, there's no point to quarrel with you.

1 So he visited my house at my birthday party, that is true,
2 and then I'm sure at the appropriate time we'll get into the
3 circumstances. But, generally, I don't see his - I mean, why he
4 came here, but I guess we'll get into it. You are the lawyers.
15:28:24 5 I don't know.

6 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, what he tells us is this - or what he told
7 the Court was this in January of this year. He told them that
8 the first time he was arrested was in August 1997, okay? Now,
9 his account of what happened following his - his account of what
15:28:49 10 led to his arrest goes in this way: That he had published an
11 article called "Who Was the Judas in ECOWAS?" Now pause. First
12 of all, do you recall such an article appearing in a newspaper in
13 Monrovia in or about the summer of --

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: I thinks there - is there an objection,
15:29:15 15 Mr Bangura?

16 MR BANGURA: Not an objection. It's just for a page
17 reference, your Honour.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: A page reference. I'm looking at page 22302
19 :

15:29:34 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I was asking do you recall such an article
21 appearing?

22 A. Quite frankly, I don't recall it. But I saw it here, and I
23 have no reason to doubt that it did appear, but I don't recall
24 it. August of 1997, I don't dispute that it came out. I'm sure
15:29:53 25 it did. I don't personally recall it.

26 Q. Well, let me pose the question differently. Do you recall
27 the newspaper The Analyst, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Did Mr Bility used to work for The Analyst?

1 A. Oh, yes.

2 Q. And was The Analyst - did The Analyst have any particular
3 political affiliation?

4 A. Yes.

15:30:18 5 Q. And what was that?

6 A. They were the voice of ALCOP, the party of ULIMO-K.

7 Q. Now did you - were you a regular reader of The Analyst?

8 A. No. No, I was not a regular reader of The Analyst.

9 Q. Was there a reason for that?

15:30:42 10 A. No. The Analyst is a political paper. In fact, most times
11 for papers, the way how things were done in my government, there
12 would be a summary by my press - by the press department in the
13 presidency of important issues. If I wanted to follow through on
14 it, I would call for that particular paper. They didn't bring me

15:31:04 15 all the papers in the city and say, "Here are the papers." It
16 doesn't work that way. They would do a summary of the important
17 issues in the paper and if it's something that interested me, I
18 would say bring me this paper or bring me that paper. But, I
19 mean, like I say, I don't doubt it. I think he did, but that was
15:31:22 20 not a regular thing for me.

21 Q. Well, you see, Mr Taylor, Mr Bility's testimony would
22 suggest that you must have seen the article. And the reason why
23 I make that suggestion is this. What he told this Court on 12
24 January 2009 was this at line 10:

15:31:44 25 "I was arrested and taken to the headquarters of the
26 National Patriotic Party?

27 Q. Where is the headquarters of the National Patriotic
28 Party?

29 A. It's located in Sinkor, Monrovia. It's called the

1 Vamoma Bui l di ng. "

2 And he claims at this time the National Patriotic Front was
3 headed by President Charles Taylor. And he says that when he got
4 there -

15:32:18 5 "Q. So what happened when you arrived that headquarters of
6 the NPP?

7 A. I met with the late Director of Police, Mr Joseph
8 B Tate and I'm taking to President Charles Taylor.
9 President Taylor was in the building there at the office at
10 the headquarters.

11 Q. What happened after you were taken to President Taylor?

12 A. Well, President Taylor came forward and spoke with me
13 and warned me to desist from writing what he thought were
14 publications or articles designed to undermine his
15 government and expose it to ridicule. And he also said
16 that he was averse to me against continuing to publish
17 stories, you know, of that nature and he said whatever was,
18 you know, going on between him and the - between Mr Taylor
19 and the Revolutionary United Front was nobody's business.

15:32:51 20 He also did mention that he didn't pick on anybody, it was
21 the government - with the government then in Sierra Leone,
22 then headed by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, collaborating
23 with ECOMOG that attacked him, that picked on him. So he
24 didn't think that anybody could twist the hands of the RUF
15:33:11 25 and in his opinion the RUF was fighting - that's the
26 Revolutionary United Front was fighting a just war. I
27 mean, the conversation lasted a long time and he said a
28 wide range - he talked about a wide range of issues and
29 then warned that I was too young, too young a man, you

1 know, to lose my life pursuing such a course."

2 Did you have such a meeting with Mr Bility, Mr Taylor?

3 A. No. No, and in fact the - you know, Hassan Bility is a
4 diabolical liar in this. Look, let's look at the facts. August
15:34:13 5 1997, now let me be clear, I don't dispute that Hassan Bility
6 wrote in the paper. I don't dispute that, you understand me? I
7 did not see this particular thing, and if I had seen it, it was
8 not sufficient to send for Hassan Bility. August 1997, what am I
9 going to be doing at the party headquarters at this particular
15:34:38 10 time in August 1997? What am I going to be doing there? And in
11 fact, is Tejan Kabbah President of Sierra Leone in August 1997?
12 Tejan Kabbah is not in Sierra Leone in August 1997, so why would
13 I be saying to him about Tejan Kabbah, who is not President in
14 Sierra Leone. August 1997, what's going on? Tejan Kabbah is in
15:35:04 15 exile in Guinea. And this is the same man who says he met Sam
16 Bockarie at this headquarters. He's lying. I know this Hassan
17 Bility boy. He likes to be as though he's into things. This is
18 a basic Hassan Bility lie. If Hassan Bility was brought to the
19 NPP headquarters in 1997, it was not when I was there. I did not
15:35:22 20 know he was brought there. At the time that Hassan Bility was
21 arrested, that I am very aware of - I say it's 2002; not before
22 then - Tejan Kabbah is not even in Sierra Leone in August of 1997
23 for me to be referring to him as a President in Sierra Leone.

24 Q. Did the NPP have its officers in Sinkor, Mr Taylor?

15:35:52 25 A. Yes, that's common knowledge, yes.

26 Q. Was it called the Vamoma Building?

27 A. No, I think we may be accused of misstating the evidence.
28 He doesn't say that it is the Vamoma Building. He says it's the
29 near the Vamoma Building.

1 Q. After the Vamoma Building. Sorry, my fault.

2 A. But it is not far from the Vamoma House. Yes, that is
3 correct.

4 Q. Now, Mr Bility went on to say, Mr Taylor, that he was
15:36:31 5 arrested again on 14 October 1997. Do you know about that
6 arrest?

7 A. I am not aware of that arrest, no. It could have happened.
8 I'm not aware of it. I'm not aware of it. At least I would have
9 been told or intervened, but I'm not aware that he was arrested.

10 Q. Now, thereafter he mentions that on his arrest he was told
15:37:08 11 this - I'm looking at page 22377 - by you, Mr Taylor:

12 "He said many things generally about Sierra Leone. Among
13 the things he said that I recall about Sierra Leone were, he did
14 say that - it was basically a recap of most of the things he'd
15:37:46 15 said to me in the past regarding Sierra Leone. One, he didn't
16 even care who thought about - you know, who thought if he were
17 involved with the RUF or not, he didn't care about that. As far
18 as he was concerned his forces - he had the best ground force,
19 I'm not sure what he meant by that, but my opinion was military.

15:38:11 20 He said he had the best ground force and he was willing even to
21 move into Sierra Leone again if necessary. He also said that he
22 wanted to say something - he said, 'Let me tell you something.

23 As far as the Tejan Kabbah situation is concerned, and the RUF is
24 concerned, the RUF is fighting a just war and I'm not going to
15:38:34 25 let anybody arm twist the RUF. I was never going to' - he said
26 he was never going to let that happen. 'And I still stand firm,
27 ready to do whatever it takes if necessary to move into Sierra
28 Leone. You know I'm not afraid of anything'. It was a very wide
29 ranging conversation, you know, and it lasted a long time. I was

1 sitting there scared, actually scared, because I had been accused
2 by President Taylor whom I know of plotting to overthrow him. I
3 thought I was dead instantly. And once I will not say what he
4 wanted me to say - by this time when he asked the question he
15:39:17 5 asked, he did like this. He told the cameraman roll the - I'm
6 sorry, but that's what he did, he snapped his finger. 'Roll the
7 camera.' And then the camera is focused on me. My assumption at
8 that point was that whatever I said would be aired on the radio
9 and on television to make people convinced that indeed this was
15:39:38 10 true, and that I had been involved in clandestine activities or
11 been paid by Tejan Kabbah."

12 Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall such a conversation with
13 Hassan Bility?

14 A. It just never happened. No. Here the President on two
15:39:56 15 occasions - all I have to do is sit down with Hassan Bility and
16 lecture him for a long time. This is very - this is Bility at
17 his best. This is his style. Bility wants to - is a big
18 show-off, he wants to show - I have nothing to do. But somebody
19 arrested, and I'm supposed to call them and hold these long
15:40:21 20 conversations with Hassan Bility. I know who Hassan Bility - we
21 - look, we watch Hassan Bility, we've been hearing, I saw his
22 activities with Alhaji Kromah. He's a very prolific writer and
23 writes a lot of nonsense, and this is somebody that I will down
24 now on the second occasion and talk to? There was no such
15:40:44 25 conversation with Hassan Bility, no. I listened to him here in
26 disgust. No such conversation.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, you recall of course, do you not, what was the
28 situation in Sierra Leone in October 1997? Who was in power?

29 A. October 1997 it's still Johnny Paul Koroma.

1 Q. He's in power?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Because you note that, among other things, the witness
4 claims that you said, this is in October '97:

15:41:19 5 "As far as the Tejan Kabbah situation is concerned, the RUF
6 is fighting a just war and I'm not going to let anybody arm twist
7 the RUF."

8 Where was Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in October 1997?

9 A. Tejan Kabbah was in exile out of Sierra Leone in Guinea in
15:41:46 10 October 1997.

11 Q. So help me, why were you bringing Tejan Kabbah into this
12 conversation with Hassan Bility?

13 A. That's Bility's - there was no such conversation with
14 Bility. His assertion that I'm talking about President Kabbah,
15:41:59 15 and Kabbah has been out of power since the AFRC overthrow him.
16 The junta and they are working together by this time. So, I
17 mean, I would be stupid. Maybe he should have corrected me and
18 said, "Have you forgotten that Kabbah is not in the country?"
19 There's no such conversation with Bility.

15:42:17 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, of course we need to recall that the
21 allegation is that you were controlling not merely the RUF, but
22 also the AFRC. So help us, why in October 1997 were you boasting
23 that you had the best ground force and you were willing to move
24 into Sierra Leone if necessary? Were you contemplating invading
15:42:40 25 Sierra Leone in October 1997?

26 A. No, no. But that's the whole irony of the whole thing,
27 that Mr Bility is going along and he has forgotten - if I say I'm
28 not going to twist anybody's arm or let anybody twist the RUF's
29 arm, why would I be threatening to go in because I have the,

1 quote unquote, best ground force? Hassan Bility and I never had
2 this conversation. Never.

3 Q. Let's go on to discuss the third arrest as alleged by him.
4 Now, he tells us at page 22335, line 2, that this arrest occurred
15:43:27 5 on 22 January 1998 and it followed the publication in The
6 National newspaper in Monrovia of an article called "S-t-o-p".
7 Now, do you recall such an article, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes, I do recall.

9 Q. Now, what's your recollection of that article, please?

15:43:50 10 A. That "S-t-o-p" thing I think had to do with stop helping
11 the rebels in Sierra Leone and all that kind of stuff as alleged
12 by Bility in that particular stuff. That's as much as I remember
13 about his "S-t-o-p".

14 Q. Well, this recollection was to this effect: That the
15:44:14 15 article, line 23 on page 22335, was, in effect, trying to explain
16 that the media was being muzzled and that journalists were under
17 attack by you and your government. That's his explanation for
18 his arrest.

19 A. Well, you know, when you get to these - a boy like Hassan -
15:44:41 20 all of the journalists in Monrovia - there is a Press Union in
21 Liberia. Does he claim here that he's the spokesman for the
22 Press Union of Liberia? No one in Liberia now is have problems.
23 There is one Hassan Bility that is being arrested and kicked
24 around by the government because he is the only man willing to
15:45:04 25 stand up? Look, what did I do when I took over the presidency?
26 What did I do? The first executive order that I issued was the
27 repeal of decree 88A in 2A granting press freedom in Liberia. I
28 could have let those decrees stay on the books.

29 In fact, my whole background, in talking about civil

1 liberties and free speech, started from my days in America.
2 That's what brought me to Liberia in 1990 as chairman of the
3 union in the United States when I was talking about free speech,
4 free press and the rule of law. Hassan Bility missed the boat
15:45:45 5 here. There is no way - if somebody - look, if somebody stopped
6 him or if the police called him in at that particular time, quite
7 frankly, there are two things, and I would be totally, totally
8 earnest about it. Look, 1997/1998, if any radio station - I will
9 tell these judges - any radio station, any newspaper or any one
15:46:19 10 had engaged in any activity to renew the war in Liberia, I would
11 have taken action against that person. I don't care whether it's
12 Bility or whether it's what. That is a normal course. It's
13 happening now all over the place. It just happened in Sierra
14 Leone where somebody got on the radio talking some nonsense, the
15:46:42 15 government had to take action. It is the responsibility of
16 government to take action.

17 This Hassan Bility, I didn't - look, if I had arrested
18 Hassan Bility or ordered his arrest, I would tell this Court, "I
19 ordered Hassan Bility's arrest." I would say so. Finished. And
15:46:58 20 I wouldn't - what would be there to be afraid of to say that I
21 ordered - who is Hassan Bility that if I arrested him I would
22 come here and lie? I was not aware that Hassan Bility was
23 arrested. If he had been arrested with my knowledge - the time
24 that Hassan Bility got arrested that I ordered, I ordered it, it
15:47:16 25 was in 2000 at the height of the war when we realised that he was
26 working as an intelligence officer for the United States
27 government. We intercepted his emails and his arrest was
28 ordered. I take full responsibility for this.

29 All this other nonsense about, oh, he's coming in and

1 sitting with me for - I didn't have Hassan Bility on my mind. He
2 was the least of my problems. I do not dispute that maybe the
3 police called him in or the justice ministry or the minister of
4 information. It was not with my knowledge, acquiescence or
15:47:46 5 orders whatsoever.

6 Q. Now, he goes on to say, Mr Taylor, that on the occasion of
7 this third arrest in January 1998, following the publication of
8 that editorial "S-t-o-p", page 22338, line 17:

9 "I was arrested and beaten. I was at the offices of The
15:48:17 10 National newspaper. I was arrested by the police and some
11 Special Security Service personnel who took me to the police
12 headquarters, to the office of the late police director Joseph B
13 Tate who in turn asked one of President Taylor's security
14 personnel, Montgomery, I'm not sure what his first name is, to
15:48:35 15 take me to the Executive Mansion. I was beaten in the offices of
16 The Analyst newspaper in a vehicle as we headed for the police
17 station, that's where I was beaten. They were throwing punches
18 at me. I was hit with batons, using the butts of their guns,
19 their arms, their AK-47 assault rifles to hit my shoulders, head,
15:48:58 20 stuff like that. I was taken to the Executive Mansion," page
21 22339, line 22, "by Montgomery," line 26.

22 And then he goes on. He was asked:

23 "Q. Was anybody else present in the transport of you to
24 the Executive Mansion?

15:49:23 25 A. No. There were other security personnel, you know, low
26 ranking officers. I don't know - I didn't know them. So
27 Montgomery is the person that I recognised because he is a
28 little famous.

29 Q. What happened after that? Did you eventually arrive at

1 the Executive Mansion?

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. What happened then?

4 A. I was taken to a small waiting room, after which I was
15:49:45 5 brought to President Taylor. This was on the sixth floor."

6 And then he qualifies that:

7 "A. Once we got there, my thinking was it was on the sixth

8 floor. I don't specifically because we went with an

9 elevator, so I don't know. I was beaten, I was bruised

15:50:08 10 and, you know, I wasn't really observing in terms of what
11 floor that was.

12 Q. How long did you wait before you were brought to see

13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. Less than hour.

15:50:20 15 Q. What happened after that, specifically?

16 A. President Taylor called me my name. He says, 'Are you

17 Hassan again?' And he says in Liberian English, 'So you,

18 boy, you will now forget this thing. I mean hey kid,

19 aren't you going to forget this?' And he says - as he

15:50:40 20 spoke, his comments - as he progressed with his comments he

21 became more and more furious and he says, 'Well, I have

22 warned you before.' "

23 And then he goes on to clarify, this is page 22341:

24 "A. His first comment, 'Are you not going to forget this

15:51:02 25 reporting?' So once he said that I didn't respond and he

26 began to talk, to say, he asked if I were a spy, if I

27 worked for Tejan Kabbah, President Tejan Kabbah. And he

28 said, well, the whole ECOMOG/RUF, whatever business I was

29 reporting on, that in fact he didn't care about ECOMOG or

1 what-MOG. And he says if I wasn't careful I would lose my
2 life for reporting on those issues and that his involvement
3 with Sierra Leone - his business in Sierra Leone was nobody
4 else's or was nobody else's business and he thought that
15:51:35 5 the RUF was fighting a just war and that there is nothing
6 that anybody could do about it. He wouldn't allow any
7 arm-twisting tactics and that basically many things, but
8 there were some key points, key things that I picked up
9 from what he said.

15:51:58 10 Q. Who else was present?

11 A. Well, Joseph what he call Montgomery actually went out.
12 And once we started a conversation, what is his name, the
13 police director Joseph Tate came in and he was also there."
14 He was asked if he responded to you, Mr Taylor, and he
15:52:21 15 said:

16 "No, I just listened. I sat there and listened because I
17 was scared. And he said that I was paid by Tejan Kabbah or I
18 worked for Tejan Kabbah. I said, no, I don't know him. I don't
19 work for him. And he specifically mentioned that Kabbah was an
15:52:36 20 enemy, you know, by associating with ECOMOG in the first place,
21 so I was trying to prove one point, that I didn't work for
22 President Tejan Kabbah and I was not a spy. So those were the
23 answers I gave that, you know, I wasn't."

24 He said that he was shut - he would ordered to shut down by
15:52:57 25 newspaper, The National newspaper, which he followed through
26 with.

27 After my arrest and subsequent release I didn't go to work
28 that day. I went to hospital, to a small clinic on Jamaica Road,
29 Bushrod Island."

1 And he went because, as he says, "I was wounded. I was
2 injured, you know, if you like. I went to seek medical
3 treatment."

15:53:26 4 So, Mr Taylor, third arrest, third time brought in front of
5 you. Third time you're saying bad things about Tejan Kabbah and
6 ECOMOG, and that you won't allow the RUF to have its arms
7 twisted. Sounds a bit like a stuck record, Mr Taylor, so help
8 me.

9 A. That's January 1998, you see.

15:53:45 10 Q. That's January 1998.

11 A. Tejan Kabbah is still not in Sierra Leone.

12 Q. So just to remind ourselves of the full picture, Mr Taylor,
13 arrest August '97, the month of your inauguration, brought before
14 you. Arrested again on 14 October 1997, brought before you.

15:54:06 15 Arrested now on 22 January 1998, brought before you for the third
16 time in succession. Is that true?

17 A. That is not true. Hassan Bility was never brought to me in
18 my presence. Liberians that know me - Hassan Bility would be
19 brought to me injured by the police and I would do nothing about
15:54:29 20 it? You tell that one to a million Liberians, they will say, no,
21 that's not President Taylor. Hassan Bility was not brought to
22 me. He was never brought to me. Never. Never.

23 Q. So that's arrest number three, Mr Taylor. Now, let's move
24 on to arrest number four. You recall that according to him that
15:55:07 25 arrest in January took place when he was editor of the newspaper
26 called The National, which eventually you closed down. Now, he
27 says thereafter, page 22348, line 7:

28 "A. I started at The Analyst as news editor and rose to
29 become the editor in chief.

1 Q. During your time at The Analyst, did anything happen to
2 you in particular?

3 A. Several.

4 Q. What happened to you during your time at The Analyst?

15:55:44 5 A. During my time at The Analyst, I reported on a story on
6 which - in which I had published pictures of Libyans who
7 were supposed to be training Liberian security and RUF
8 security forces. The article - actually, it was a news
9 story. The article discussed - says that 500 people - 500
15:56:03 10 Liberian security personnel - were going to be trained in
11 Libya. The government, based on my personal investigation,
12 was trying to hide this training because there had begun to
13 be more and more voices in Liberia calling for the Liberian
14 government to behave itself properly so that it will be
15:56:23 15 able to cultivate a good friendship diplomatically of the
16 west in the national community. And then people thought it
17 was badly timed if the government went ahead to send people
18 to Libya at this time for training. We didn't need that.
19 So in the details of the article, the article will reveal
15:56:44 20 that the government was actually sending RUF soldiers -
21 some RUF soldiers former who were in Liberia, some RUF
22 soldiers and Liberian government personnel, security
23 personnel - well, let me not say soldier, but security
24 personnel - to Libya to be trained and I had published
15:57:06 25 through a Liberian who had returned from Libya."

26 Now let's just pause and take stock of where he is going
27 with this, Mr Taylor. Now, this is an article published after
28 September 2000, okay?

29 A. Okay.

1 Q. Now, you see what he's saying, he's talking about security
2 personnel being sent to Libya for training. Question: Did such
3 a thing take place?

4 A. No.

15:57:45 5 Q. Did you ever send any security personnel from Liberia to
6 Libya for training?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Specifically, did you send some RUF soldiers to Libya for
9 training?

15:58:07 10 A. No.

11 Q. Did you, Mr Taylor?

12 A. No, no, no. I said no. Never sent any Liberian or RUF.
13 But, I mean, I can put a face on this. Based on the explanation
14 he's given with - you said September 2000. This could be

15:58:36 15 earlier. Did he specifically --

16 Q. No. What he says was this, Mr Taylor, when we go a little
17 further on in the page where I paused, page 22349:

18 "Q. When approximately was this article published?

19 A. This was in 2000."

15:58:52 20 Have you found the spot?

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 Q. "Q. Can you recall when in 2000?

23 A. The month I'm not sure. It was in 2000. It was the
24 latter part. I can approximate that it was after
15:59:02 25 September."

26 Yes?

27 A. I see what he's talking about. That's not true. What
28 again - the only thing I can put on this is Hassan Bility is
29 referring to the training of the RUF personnel that come into

1 Liberia with Sam Bockarie that are to be trained at Gbatala.
2 When he talks about the training of - that's the best I can put
3 on it. Because this training begins in - by early 2000 - not
4 early. I would say about the second quarter of 2000 when the RUF
15:59:43 5 - the former RUF personnel that come in with Sam Bockarie in 1999
6 are put into training. But they are not trained in Libya. We've
7 talked about this here. They are trained by a South African team
8 that the government hires. They are not sent anywhere --

9 Q. Rindel --

16:00:02 10 A. [Overlapping speakers] yes. We do no training at all
11 outside of - during my presidency we did train in two places: We
12 trained in Israel and we trained in Egypt, police officers. But
13 other than that, we never trained in Libya. None whatsoever.
14 Secret Service personnel in Libya and police officers in - I
16:00:32 15 mean, Secret Service personnel in Israel and police officers in
16 Egypt. But we never did trained any - all of our training was
17 done inside Liberia.

18 Q. Now, the witness goes on to say this, that his - in
19 relation to his arrest in September 2000 - sorry, I've missed
16:01:09 20 something out. He says that - prior to that he says at page
21 22349 that following the publication of that article, Mr Taylor,
22 he was once again arrested and beaten. Do you know about that
23 arrest, which would be his fourth arrest, and his alleged
24 beating?

16:01:29 25 A. No. That's one too many beatings. I'm not aware that
26 Hassan Bility - but Hassan Bility came to my residence because
27 the party that Hassan Bility attended had to be January of 1999.
28 By this time he had already been beaten for the second time.

29 Q. January 1999?

1 A. Because he was beaten - he was arrested in August '97.

2 Q. October --

3 A. October '97, January of 1998 he had been arrested, he says,
4 for the third time. So by 1999 January he's at my place and - I
16:02:21 5 mean, quite frankly now, this is a damnable situation. Here is a
6 man that has been arrested three times, beaten mercilessly, and
7 there's an invitation going out for people - the press, and he
8 shows up at my house. I mean, you would think that man would be
9 scared straight. I'm not even going close to this man. This man

16:02:48 10 - they beat me up and brought me before this man and then I'm
11 going to - I'm not - he didn't have to go to this place. I mean,
12 this is hardly an indication of a man that is at serious odds
13 with the President that you would take the occasion from - to -
14 couldn't you send another journalist to cover this thing? You

16:03:05 15 have to be present there? I mean, are you somebody that I even
16 give a fig about? No. I mean, this is - no. I mean, four times
17 you're beaten, you never go to court, you never file any -
18 nothing? I don't know. You know, he's a journalist. He writes
19 very well and maybe he's doing his book too, so it's good to put

16:03:33 20 out these kind of lies. And I don't care where I am, if I'm
21 alive if he produces that book I will sue him for libel because
22 he will be lying in that book. But there's no such thing. Four
23 beatings? You do not go to court, nothing? The Press Union of
24 Liberia, that will go to any length to protect a journalist,
16:03:51 25 nobody protests? No.

26 Q. Now, let's go on and deal with arrest number five,
27 Mr Taylor. This occurs, as we are told at page 22349 - no,
28 sorry, 22355, line 17 he's asked this:

29 "Q. Now, after this arrest and detention in September 2000

1 did you return to The Analyst newspaper?

2 A. Yes, sir. I did, sir.

3 Q. Did anything happen thereafter while you were working
4 at The Analyst?

16:04:47 5 A. Yes, sir. Something happened in 2001. May 1st, 2001.
6 May Day. May 1st, 2001. Yes, something happened.

7 Q. What happened to you?

8 A. I had been working on - I had been investigating some
9 alleged abuses, human rights abuses that included rape and
16:05:10 10 gang rape of women. I had been working on the involvement -
11 the intention of the Liberian government to destabilise
12 Sierra Leone further."

13 Remember, Mr Taylor, this is May 2001.

14 "... the intention of the Liberian government to
16:05:22 15 destabilise Sierra Leone further. I had been investigating
16 murder - well, executing civilians in Lofa County and in other
17 places by Liberian government officials, and even across the
18 border into Sierra Leone, and I had been working on the
19 involvement of the Liberian government in the diamond-for-gun
16:05:48 20 trade."

21 Now, this is an important distinction:

22 "For Amnesty it was not the diamonds and guns trade. For
23 Amnesty it was the human rights abuses, so that was their area of
24 interest. So I emailed - I chronicled the information, spoke
16:06:05 25 with the witnesses, agreed to conceal their identities. Because
26 I could not publish that in The Analyst. Other guys wouldn't let
27 me because, you know, there was a serious of arrests and stuff
28 like that, harassment. I decided to have them emailed to Amnesty
29 International because I thought that these women needed to have

1 their voices heard, and some of these included Sierra Leonean
2 women and girls that were on refugee camps in Liberia around the
3 coffee farm area, that is coffee farm, around what is called
4 Caldwell towards Dixville. So based on those persons that -
16:06:43 5 those investigations - I thought it was necessary if someone told
6 the story. I knew certainly then that I couldn't tell that
7 story. They were going to come after me and they were going to
8 come hard. So I sent the information to Amnesty which in turn
9 verified them, and then on May 1st Amnesty's researcher on
16:07:04 10 Liberia, Tania Bernath, was on the BBC Focus on Africa accusing
11 the Liberian government of a wide range of issues, human rights
12 abuses, rapes, gang rapes, murder, execution, you know,
13 harassment of Sierra Leonean refugees, murder all sorts of
14 things. This was 5 o'clock, 5 past 5."

16:07:30 15 Now, first of all, Mr Taylor, help us. Do you recall in or
16 about May 2001 your - government officials being involved in the
17 kind of activities described by Mr Bility as taking place in Lofa
18 County and, indeed, across the border in Sierra Leone; that is,
19 rape, murder, execution of - gang rape, execution of civilians.

16:08:04 20 Was it going on?

21 A. 2001, there's a war being fought in Lofa. Remember, LURD
22 is fighting us. Hassan Bility is a full - oh, my God. This man
23 fought. He did his share with the pen. He really did his share
24 with the pen. Hassan Bility is writing in Monrovia, writing to
16:08:49 25 Amnesty International. His combatants are fighting in Lofa. If
26 there's anyone carrying out atrocities in Lofa, we are
27 complaining about what LURD is doing in Lofa. Here is Hassan
28 Bility sending information to Amnesty International that is not
29 checked. But in 2001 let's not forget that disarmament and

1 demobilisation is going on in Sierra Leone. They are disarming
2 and demobilising. What would Liberians be doing over there
3 raping - you know, rape is something that I dealt with. I mean,
4 the records are very clear now before this Court. I dealt with
16:09:27 5 rapes during the NPFL time. I don't tolerate that. I don't.
6 But what would we be doing in Sierra Leone in 2001 in May when
7 the people are just about a quarter of their disarmament process?
8 With all of the UN and other forces in Sierra Leone they are
9 dealing with what? Disarmament in 2001.

16:09:54 10 So these people, just the same time of disinformation that
11 is sent. Hassan Bility, good with the pen and he worked it until
12 he caught up with him later on. This is when he really gets
13 arrested, when he begins to plan to attack in Monrovia. Hassan
14 Bility is a combatant covered by the journalist's cloak. That's

16:10:24 15 what Hassan Bility is. And he is the only - there are other
16 human rights groups in Liberia. Hassan Bility, the one-man human
17 rights machine. You have the Catholic Justice and Peace
18 Commission, you have - all of the NGOs are in Monrovia, and
19 Hassan Bility is the only one that is sending all this

16:10:43 20 information out. And these people account for the type of
21 information that went out that Taylor has stolen billions of
22 dollars. This is where it's coming from. And you will search
23 from now until Judgment Day and you will not find it. This is
24 it. There was no such thing going on that I knew of. I do not
16:11:03 25 disclaim that there were some - during the war in Lofa there were
26 some things that we heard of that LURD had done. Some of our
27 soldiers did commit some wrongful killing in Lofa, and those
28 people were removed. But to the fact that the Armed Forces of
29 Liberia people in 2001 are fighting and raping - gang rape in

1 Monrovia and he's secretly sending things off to Amnesty
2 International, that is - that's typical Hassan Bility.

3 Q. Now he says, Mr Taylor, that following this fifth arrest -
4 no, following the publication - following the broadcast on the
16:11:48 5 BBC of details of his investigation by Tania Bernath, he heard on
6 KISS FM that the Government of Liberia had issued an arrest
7 warrant for him for funneling sensitive anti-government
8 information to the government's enemies in the west.

9 A. Nonsense.

16:12:11 10 Q. And he went on that thereafter, he was investigated for
11 that by the National Security Agency, in particular by its
12 director Freddy Taylor, page 22366:

13 "An investigation - after the investigation - the
14 investigation was ended and it was deemed that I did not do
16:12:37 15 anything harmful. They did, however, question me about the
16 Amnesty International report, if I was aware of its content. I
17 said yes, I was aware of the contents. The agents assigned to
18 investigate this, the case, and I said my belief in it wasn't
19 going to make any difference. So on 4 June the Government of
16:12:57 20 Liberia issued a press release and asked - take it to the various
21 newspapers and radio stations that says, amongst other things,
22 the government - after a one month - after a one-month's
23 investigation the government security agency found that Hassan
24 Bility was not involved in any clandestine activity and that he
16:13:16 25 is, quote unquote, one of the finest Liberian journalists whose
26 footsteps are worth emulation." And he goes on to say, "He was
27 now a free man and I resumed my work," and that the report, in
28 effect, exonerating him was signed by the director of the
29 National Security Agency, Freddy Taylor. Do you recall such an

1 investigation, Mr Taylor?

2 A. I don't recall. I think it could have gone on. I don't
3 recall it. These are things that - well, at least, if he's
4 telling the truth here, he does attempt to give some credit to a
16:13:59 5 government agency that investigates him and releases him.

6 And let me just clear for the Court, Freddy Taylor is not
7 related to Charles Taylor in any way. As a matter of fact, it's
8 a different Taylor. Freddy Taylor has both a son and a daughter
9 by my sister. My sister, one mother, one father. And that's not
16:14:26 10 what you call that thing they used to do with these royal
11 families, that's not that. There's no relationship between
12 Freddy Taylor and Charles Taylor. And so the fact that - but,
13 you know, look - oh, God.

14 I'm glad they investigated him because, let's be clear for
16:14:47 15 today and tomorrow, reports that go out to Amnesty International,
16 Human Rights Watch and different human rights groups in the
17 world, in fact, nowadays do affect foreign policy of countries.
18 And so no government now, especially from a third world country,
19 should take for granted any report going to Amnesty

16:15:20 20 International. And, in fact, this was done, like I say, without
21 my knowledge and he was cleared. But probably if this had been
22 serious enough to have been brought to my attention, I would have
23 asked the justice department to look into it, because let's not -
24 right now human rights reports that go out to these agencies
16:15:39 25 affect every aspect of foreign policy to small countries.

26 Whether it has to do with foreign aid, whether it has to do with
27 diplomatic relations, the reports of Amnesty International and
28 Human Rights Watch affect countries. And so I would not let him
29 get away so easily with sending something out to Amnesty

1 International that is false, because governments, especially
2 Europe, governments make their decision based on human rights
3 activities.

4 And so, of course - of course it, shouldn't go unchallenged
16:16:16 5 and I'm glad that they did. But this is not something that would
6 necessarily reach to me. I mean, not all these things - so I'm
7 glad he experienced this way, but I did not know that this went
8 on and I do not think that the National Security Agency went this
9 far to say that - to publish a note, no, I don't think so. But
16:16:38 10 the fact that he was investigated and released, I think it simply
11 shows that at least he didn't lie that he was beaten up this time
12 and that he probably, you know - but I think the actions were
13 right. And, in fact, they should have gone further by maybe
14 investigating it and sending it to the justice department
16:16:57 15 because, like I say, these agencies do affect how countries
16 govern themselves.

17 Q. Now, let's move on, Mr Taylor, to the next arrest. Okay?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So we move now to 24 June 2002. This is arrest number six.

16:17:24 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. He says he was taken to the national police station. By
22 the way, Mr Taylor, where is that, the national police station?

23 A. It's right in Monrovia near - well, in an area called
24 Capitol Hill in Monrovia.

16:17:43 25 Q. Is it near to the Executive Mansion?

26 A. Yes, it's in Capitol Hill, yes.

27 Q. Now, he said what happened then when he got to the national
28 police station, page 22371:

29 "I was brought into a holding cell, a holding room, and I

1 stayed there up to the time of focus - Focus on Africa." And he
2 explains that it's broadcast about 5am. "And I'm sitting in this
3 guy's office, chief of counterintelligence, at least that's how
4 he described, you know, his title to me, chief of
16:18:25 5 counterintelligence. I was sitting in his office and his office
6 back is turned to the outside of the front part of the Liberian
7 National Police headquarters and the windows are very big, large
8 sliding windows," which he describes. And he recalls there being
9 a vendor outside selling kernels, chicklets, cigarettes and stuff
16:18:50 10 like that. And then he goes on to say how he heard this BBC
11 radio announcement from a radio being kept by the vendor. And
12 then he goes on.

13 He then says, "It's dark in the room," page 22372, line 11.
14 "They came in, blindfolded me, tied my hands behind my back, took
16:19:17 15 my watch, took my money, took my shoes and take me into the
16 basement of the Liberian National Police headquarters and then
17 I'm blindfolded. But when I reached there I clearly recognise
18 the voice of the police director, Paul Mulbah. They talked to
19 one another and then Paul Mulbah, police director, says, 'Well,
16:19:38 20 put him in a jeep. Put him in the back.' And I'm brought - I'm
21 forced to the back of this jeep and driven to the home - to the
22 residence - of at this time President Charles Taylor and the jeep
23 stops across the street. We're coming from Monrovia, we're going
24 to Congo Town. The jeep stops on the other side of the road and
16:19:57 25 President Taylor's home is on the other side, which was commonly
26 referred to as White Flower. We get down, get off and then the
27 blindfold is removed."

28 And then he goes on. He is asked:

29 "Q. How did you know where you were if you were

1 blindfolded?

2 A. I lived almost all of my life in Monrovia and I know
3 White Flower, I know Congo Town, I know the President's
4 official residence. I've been there before. I've been
16:20:30 5 there for a Christmas party that the President held for
6 reporters, journalists and other people. So I know the
7 place. As I get off and as we cross the road the blindfold
8 is removed and I look at the fence and I'm ushered into the
9 building. President Taylor's son Chucky and one of his
16:20:50 10 bodyguards Momo Dgi ba and Benjamin Yeaten are in the same
11 room.

12 Q. In what room?

13 A. The sitting room, waiting room, living room, or
14 whatever you call it.

16:21:01 15 Q. Okay.

16 A. With other people. Then there is another whom, which I
17 think - that was the President's private office and/or
18 meeting room, small in size, and the door is opened. I
19 mean, one of the guys who was taking me opens the door and
16:21:15 20 they send me in there."

21 So they're in your office, now, Mr Taylor, yes?

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. "I'm referring to the room where President Taylor with some
24 of his government officials were sitting in. I think it's either
16:21:33 25 his private office or his private meeting room at White Flower.
26 When I enter, I see of a lot government officials, security
27 chiefs including Musa Cisse, Iate now, who was an uncle of mine.
28 I see many of them, Kadiatu Jarra, Emmanuel Shaw. I'm sorry,
29 this is a little bit hard for me. And as I entered, the

1 President says - he points at me and tells his ministers,
2 security chiefs, 'This is the guy who wants to overthrow my
3 government.' And I quickly remarked, 'Mr President, that's
4 inaccurate.' So I observed that most of the guys in the room,
16:22:05 5 though there were chairs and couches, were sitting on the floor
6 and the President asked me to have a seat. 'Please take a seat.'
7 And I go and I sit not on the floor as many other people were but
8 in a chair and crossed my legs and the chief of - Musa Cisse, who
9 was popularly known as the President chief of protocol, says,
16:22:29 10 'Why are you sitting in the chair? The President is sitting in
11 this chair. You sit in the chair? Everybody else, I mean people
12 were sitting on the floor. Well, okay, sit.' President Taylor
13 said, 'No, never mind, leave him, I'll talk to him.' And then
14 the President authorises a video recording team from his
16:22:47 15 television station to come and record what I will say."

16 Before we continue, Mr Taylor, and before we lose sight of
17 them, first of all, do you recall such an incident when Bility is
18 taken to your home address?

19 A. Yes.

16:23:03 20 Q. At night?

21 A. No, not at night. That's broad open day. But I recall the
22 incident where he's brought to me, yes.

23 Q. Well, this is in June 2002. We've yet to come to the
24 seventh and final arrest. No, this is June 2000 --

16:23:26 25 A. 2002.

26 Q. Yes.

27 A. This is 2002. What he is explaining here, I recall it in
28 2002. All of the fact are not right because when he talks about
29 people sitting - so my ministers are sitting on the floor?

1 That's, you know - they mix a little bit up. He said all the
2 people in the room are sitting on the floor. My ministers would
3 not be sitting on the floor. Total nonsense. But he is brought
4 to me, and another fact: This is not immediately following his
16:23:57 5 arrest. This is after he's been visited by the officials of the
6 American embassy. He explains it like it's just following
7 through, but this is after he's been visited. He's arrested,
8 he's been held, he's been visited, and after that I do send for
9 him, yes.

16:24:17 10 Q. Visited by whom?

11 A. Two senior officials from the United States embassy.

12 Q. Visited where?

13 A. While he's being held at the NBI. He's been - he's
14 arrested --

16:24:31 15 Q. NBI?

16 A. Yeah, the National Bureau of Investigation. We do have an
17 NBI. Remember his first investigation, he says, was done by the
18 NSA, that's National Security Agency, but he's being hold by the
19 NBI now because this is a more a legal matter. After we capture
16:24:51 20 these - we take these emails and have the physical evidence this
21 is when he's being held. So this is not something that's just
22 happening within days, but I accept most of the explanation.

23 Q. So, Mr Taylor, you accept, do you, that on this occasion he
24 was brought to your home address?

16:25:10 25 A. Definitely.

26 Q. Why did you have him brought to your home address?

27 A. Well, this is on a day I'm at my place. I used that house
28 both for home and work. I worked out of there also. This is a
29 time when - and you see the quantity of people here. Because of

1 the allegations out there, Hassan Bility has been killed, in fact
2 he's been buried, his body cannot be found, this is the
3 explanation around. Even though the Americans have visited him,
4 but because this is their employee, they are pumping them up.

16:25:53 5 Q. What do you mean, "this is their employee"?

6 A. Hassan Bility worked for the United States embassy in
7 Monrovia. He was their boy. They financed the newspaper. We
8 knew it. We confronted them about it. Hassan Bility we accused
9 of also being an agent. This is why he could do all of these
10 little crazy things, and in fact the whole attitude - how many
11 people in Liberia got arrested that the United States embassy
12 sent their most senior person, just - I think the charge and
13 other two to visit, and we let them visit them, okay? So this is
14 the situation. So we called the press. We call - in fact, he
15 missed it. There were visiting diplomats. There were diplomats
16 there. So what I sought to do was to invite them into my huge
17 living room - there were some diplomats, there was the press and
18 ministers - and say, "Here is Hassan Bility that everyone is
19 saying he has been killed and buried some place." That's how he
20 got there. So I invited him to come.

16:26:31 21 Q. Now, just so we can put this in context, Mr Taylor, do I
22 understand what you're telling us is this: Your security
23 services have had in their possession some emails?

24 A. Yes.

16:27:20 25 Q. As a consequence of that, Bility is detained?

26 A. As an enemy combatant, yes.

27 Q. As an enemy combatant?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Following his detention there is public furore with the

1 suggestion that he's been killed whilst in custody. Is that
2 right?

3 A. Not exactly. I wouldn't say "public". There are questions
4 from most - from the United States government specifically. They
16:27:50 5 are there - the ambassador that calls, the United States
6 government; not the public. The United States government is
7 formally saying that Hassan Bility now - since they last met him,
8 their information is that he's killed. I guess this was an
9 attempt to push us to present the bod - you know, to present him,
16:28:09 10 and they succeeded. But this is not the public. This is the
11 United States government raising these concerns and threats and
12 that if Hassan Bility is killed, this will lead to a serious
13 diplomatic problem with the United States, and so we sought to
14 let them go on and go on and build up their case; then we
16:28:31 15 produced him.

16 Let me just - I know the time, but if we have to stop -
17 because I don't want to - let's look at the time in 2002. We are
18 looking at a time when there is total chaos in Liberia; there's
19 fighting in the city of Monrovia; all ministries and agencies are
16:28:57 20 closed; There is hardly anyone - there is fighting go on in the
21 streets of Monrovia almost, and this is the time that this
22 particular incident - so we are in a state of emergency, I may
23 call it.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I'm going to a rather lengthy
16:29:18 25 passage, and I don't think I can complete it, dealing with the
26 exchange which is alleged to have taken place at this meeting.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think that would be better off
28 commenced tomorrow morning, Mr Griffiths.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll adjourn now, Mr Taylor, and I'll
2 remind you of the order not to discuss your evidence. We will
3 adjourn court until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

4 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.29 p.m.
5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 3 November 2009 at
6 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	30783
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	30783

EXHIBITS:

Exhibit D-91 admitted	30894
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