



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 3 AUGUST 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg
Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Ms Kathryn Howarth
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Monday, 3 August 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.]

09:19:19 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A
9 Bangura, Kathryn Howarth, myself Brenda J Hollis and Maja
09:33:54 10 Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning Mr President, your Honours.
13 For the Defence today, myself Courtenay Griffiths assisted by my
14 learned friend Mr Morris Anyah and we are joined today by
09:34:09 15 Ms Haydee Dijkstal who is an intern with our team.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Thank you, Mr Griffiths.
17 Please continue. Mr Taylor, I will remind you before you answer
18 any further questions that you are still on your declaration to
19 tell the truth.

20 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

21 [On former affirmation]

22 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

23 Q. Mr Taylor, you will recall that on Friday last when we
24 adjourned we were dealing with the Camp Johnson incident which
09:34:39 25 occurred in the late summer of 1998. Do you recall that?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. And we were looking at the document behind divider 24.
28 That is volume 3 of 3. Could I invite your attention, please,
29 Mr Taylor, to page 7 of that document, please?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And let us just remind ourselves of the sequence of events.
3 We see set out there:

4 "On the evening of August 10, 1998 Mr Johnson was secretly
09:36:16 5 brought into Monrovia via an unknown aircraft, presumably a
6 helicopter, and conveyed to the ECOMOG base in Monrovia under
7 heavy security escort."

8 How did your government come to discover that, Mr Taylor?

9 A. We were told by some of our intelligence officers that were
09:36:38 10 assigned in the general area.

11 Q. "He and his escorts bypassed all immigration and security
12 regulations. He was eventually escorted to his Camp Johnson Road
13 enclave under heavy security cover, thereby increasing the
14 tension in the area which had subsided during his absence from
09:37:00 15 the country."

16 Mr Taylor, why is it referred to as an enclave?

17 A. Well, I would say about - I would put it to around five
18 city blocks had been occupied by former combatants of ULIMO-J.
19 They had practically moved every citizen that occupied houses and
09:37:34 20 apartments in the area from there and had occupied there and
21 established - it's something like a small city state and so we
22 described it as an enclave because of the number of blocks and
23 the manner in which they conducted themselves as a government
24 unto themselves.

09:37:54 25 Q. Why did you allow that to happen?

26 A. Well, let's look at the period that we are talking about.
27 ULIMO-J, if I may remind the Court, LPC - and that's the Liberian
28 Peace Council - are all warring factions that are practically put
29 together in the city of Monrovia, so they are already there,

1 okay. And during the conflict back in '96 remember people were
2 beginning to group up and so they used the conflict in Monrovia
3 when we attempted to arrest Mr Johnson as a way of really
4 consolidating certain parts of the city. I don't think we had
09:38:53 5 any real control over that situation at the time.

6 Q. But why wasn't an early attempt made to dislodge them from
7 that position?

8 A. Well, remember I took the oath of office in - we are
9 talking about a year and we are trying to avoid conflict. We are
09:39:13 10 trying to avoid any action that would provoke crisis. So in some
11 comments made before this Court in some documents read you see
12 where people are referring to us as being cowardly. We are just
13 trying to do everything. Remember I bring Roosevelt Johnson in
14 the cabinet, he says he is sick, we gave him a huge amount of
09:39:42 15 money, some 40,000 plus dollars to travel to Ghana, he goes on to
16 the United States. So everything is being done by my government
17 at this time to avoid what you say literally rocking the boat.
18 This is what I am trying to do.

19 Q. It continues:

09:40:05 20 "Hundreds of ex-ULIMO J fighters, upon Johnson's return
21 regrouped on Camp Johnson Road around his residence while
22 prominent members of the Krahn community, including former
23 legislator Mr George Dweh, presidential adviser Bai Gbala and
24 former Monrovia transit authority managing director Amah Youlo,
09:40:30 25 amongst others, moved into houses adjacent to Johnson's
26 residence.

27 These movements raised suspicion that something was in the
28 making. Residents and motorists complained of harassment by
29 Johnson's men. Businessmen and property owners with legitimate

1 claims were prevented from resettling on Camp Johnson Road.
2 Ordinary residents in the area abandoned their homes out of fear
3 and intimidation by Johnson and his men.

4 Many citizens groups and individuals repeatedly called on
09:41:01 5 the government to take action to address the situation.
6 President Taylor, in response, made many quiet attempts through
7 special emissaries to interact with Mr Johnson in order to
8 address the situation. These interactions resulted in a request
9 by Mr Johnson for an audience with the President in order to
09:41:20 10 settle the issues and erase suspicions.

11 The President consented to the meeting which was set for
12 Friday, August 28, 1998 at the Executive Mansion, to which
13 prominent clergymen, politicians, eminent persons and the
14 leadership of the Krahn community were invited. The meeting was
09:41:41 15 to have convened at 11 a.m."

16 Why did you call that meeting, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Here we have it Johnson had requested a discussion with me,
18 so I said, "Well, fine. I have no problems. I want to reconcile
19 with all parties". So we invited - the clergyman involved here,
09:42:07 20 his name has been mentioned here before, Archbishop Michael
21 Kpakala Francis was one of those that we invited, and as a
22 typical Liberian, and I think most Africans do that, when you
23 have these kinds of disputes you call some elders, you call
24 clergymen to come in. I just wanted them present to be sure they
09:42:35 25 could come up with some ideas that would help to resolve the
26 problem and probably they would listen to them more and would
27 understand that there was nothing political about what actions we
28 were proposing and that it would be, you know, an overall
29 consensus of all of the leading individuals in the country. This

1 was basically the reason.

2 Q. "With the parlours of the Executive Mansion packed to
3 capacity, the President and senior members of government waited
4 patiently for two hours, but Mr Johnson failed to show up. In
09:43:15 5 order to break the stalemate, President Taylor asked for
6 volunteers to visit Camp Johnson Road in order to find out the
7 cause of the delay.

8 His grace, Archbishop Michael Francis of the Catholic
9 Archdiocese and Bishop Arthur Kulah of the United Methodist
09:43:34 10 Church, accompanied by the deputy force commander of ECOMOG,
11 along with a small contingent of ECOMOG officers, headed the
12 delegation to Camp Johnson Road. A number of elders from Grand
13 Gedeh County politely declined to form part of the delegation.
14 They wanted to be no part of Roosevelt Johnson. At Johnson's
09:44:00 15 residence the delegation of clergymen met with hostility from
16 some of Johnson's fighters. Their vehicles were blocked from
17 leaving the area."

18 Mr Taylor, this incident eventually led to something of a
19 conflict with the US government, didn't it?

09:44:16 20 A. Yes, eventually it did. This continues, after several days
21 some actions were taken by Johnson's men and then government
22 forces had to move in, leading to some problems with the United
23 States government.

24 Q. And in due course you received a note from the embassy of
09:44:46 25 the United States, didn't you?

26 A. Well, what we have here is Johnson begins certain
27 activities in the city that begin to block off - there is firing.
28 Our forces decide - are ordered to move in to provide protection
29 for peaceful citizens that want to move around the area of the

1 city that are being prevented from doing so. That involves some
2 major exchange of gunfire between the Roosevelt Johnson forces
3 and the Liberian government forces.

4 This conflict goes on for I would say several hours. There
09:45:43 5 is heavy gunfire - machine gun fire - there are explosions of
6 rocket propelled grenades that is very, very loud. Johnson makes
7 a run for the barracks and --

8 Q. Which barracks?

9 A. The Barclay Training Centre. It is important for the Court
09:46:05 10 to get a view of the general area we are talking about. There is
11 almost something like a triangular situation, and this is what I
12 mean. From - the Executive Mansion in Monrovia sits on top of a
13 little hill called Capitol Hill. About a thousand metres or
14 thereabouts along the - and the Executive Mansion sits on the

09:46:36 15 Atlantic ocean. About a thousand metres, I would say, running
16 northwards from the Executive Mansion is the Barclay Training
17 Centre, the military barracks in Monrovia. You sit in the
18 mansion and just practically look down at the barracks. From the
19 very mansion on top of the hill if you look a little
09:47:01 20 northeastward going down the very road, Camp Johnson Road, the
21 Executive Mansion is practically on the upper part of Camp
22 Johnson Road. So from the Executive Mansion toward the
23 right-hand side you are practically looking - you can't see
24 because of buildings - at where this enclave is.

09:47:27 25 From that enclave moving westward to the Barclay Training
26 Centre is another maybe 1,000 to 2,000 metres. That is why I am
27 describing it as a triangle. You can go down this way and then
28 go back up to the mansion. So when the fighting starts, Johnson
29 makes a break from his enclave into the barracks, but at that

1 position the barracks is even closer to the mansion than the
2 position of this enclave, so that presents a problem for
3 government. And we are listening to Roosevelt Johnson on the
4 radio trying to get his men to push now from the barracks
09:48:15 5 straight up to the mansion, and just for a little added ten
6 seconds' note, it is this very barracks and the route used by the
7 Samuel Doe People's Redemption Council to overthrow President
8 Tolbert. It is a very short distance.

9 We begin to attack them from that position. They cannot
09:48:36 10 leave the barracks to get to the mansion. They are pushed out,
11 and they begin moving towards the part of Monrovia called Mamba
12 Point - that is M-A-M-B-A - Mamba Point. That is the area where
13 you have the diplomatic enclave in Monrovia.

14 Now, the fighting has been going on for several hours.
09:49:11 15 There are large explosions, gunfire approaching the area. As
16 Roosevelt Johnson approaches the area of the United States
17 Embassy the gates of the embassy are opened, Roosevelt Johnson
18 and several of his people go in, it is closed. There are US -
19 not marines, which, I mean, are there on top of the building, but
09:49:35 20 civilian personnel of the embassy are on the street in front of
21 the embassy with handguns and all this kind of stuff with this
22 massive force of gunfire moving towards them. Somebody is shot.
23 He goes on with the group into the embassy within the walls of
24 the embassy, because the gates are open, which they should not
09:49:57 25 have been open, and he dies in there.

26 The matter is concluded. The government has taken control
27 of Roosevelt Johnson's enclave. The matter in the barracks is
28 resolved. Now comes the diplomatic issue. Notes begin to fly
29 between the United States government. We are now accused of

1 violating the Geneva Convention as regards protection to
2 diplomatic property, and there are a series of notes and
3 disagreements and that is how the notes come into being.

4 Q. Let's look at the first note which we will find at page 11.

09:50:51 5 Yes, Mr Taylor?

6 A. That is correct. This is it.

7 Q. And we see that it reads as follows:

8 "The embassy of the United States of America presents its
9 compliments to the ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of
09:51:05 10 Liberia and has the honour to address to the ministry the matter
11 of the disposition of the mortal remains of Mr Madison Wion, a
12 Liberian citizen who expired on the embassy's compound on
13 September 19, 1998."

14 Now pausing there for a minute, Mr Taylor, Prince Johnson
09:51:28 15 had returned to Liberia on 10 August we saw earlier?

16 A. For the sake of the record, it is Roosevelt Johnson.

17 Q. Roosevelt Johnson, sorry. Roosevelt Johnson returned on 10
18 August, yes?

19 A. Yes.

09:51:45 20 Q. And we see now that this incident occurs on 19 September.
21 So had the situation been developing all throughout August and
22 into September?

23 A. That is correct. Remember this meeting where the bishops
24 and other eminent persons, that is late August. So these are
09:52:10 25 developing stories and there is tension from that time.

26 Q. All the way through?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. "... on the embassy's compound on September 19, 1998.

29 The embassy wishes to inform the ministry that Mr Wion died

1 of a gunshot wound inflicted by members of the Liberia National
2 Police in their attempt to apprehend the party of Mr Roosevelt
3 Johnson in front of the embassy grounds prior to his death. The
4 embassy wishes to emphasise that Mr Wi on was neither invited to
09:52:43 5 enter, nor was he assisted, entering the embassy".

6 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Is that correct?

7 A. That is totally incorrect. The fact of the matter is as we
8 go further we will get to find out that the United States embassy
9 personnel violated their own rules and opened the gates of the
09:53:04 10 embassy to permit the entry.

11 Q. "The embassy wishes to emphasise that Mr Wi on was neither
12 invited, nor was he assisted, entering the embassy. Mr Wi on has
13 been temporarily interred on the embassy grounds pending final
14 disposition of his remains.

09:53:23 15 The embassy requests the assistance of the Ministry in
16 preparing for the proper removal of the remains from the embassy
17 compound in accordance with international diplomatic statutes and
18 the laws of the Republic of Liberia.

19 The embassy of the United States avail itself of this
09:53:42 20 opportunity to renew to the Ministry the assurances of
21 consideration.

22 Embassy of the United States of America", and we see that
23 is dated 22 September 1998, yes?

24 A. That is correct, yes.

09:53:56 25 Q. Now we need to note that that diplomatic note is numbered
26 67. Do you see that, Mr Taylor, at the top?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. The next note then comes on the following page, page 12,
29 and we see this is numbered 68?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Now this is a further note from the embassy. Is that
3 right, Mr Taylor?

4 A. That is correct.

09:54:22 5 Q. And this note now reads as follows - and if we just flick
6 to the end we will see that it is dated the following day, 23
7 September, okay?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. "The embassy of the United States of America presents its
09:54:37 10 compliments to the ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of
11 Liberia and has the honour to relate details of a most serious
12 violation of the embassy's diplomatic premises on Saturday,
13 September 19, 1998. At approximately 10.25 on that date,
14 Ambassador Designate Roosevelt Johnson and others arrived
09:55:01 15 uninvited at the main entrance to the embassy. They appealed for
16 refuge within the embassy compound, but the charge d'affaires
17 refused.

18 At 11 a.m. a large heavy armed contingent of government
19 security forces arrived on the scene under the command of the
09:55:23 20 director of police of the Liberia national police."

21 Joe Tate?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. "The charge d'affaires immediately entered into bona fide
24 negotiations with the police director and through the minister of
09:55:39 25 state for presidential affairs, the President of the Republic of
26 Liberia, to obtain assurances from the Government of Liberia that
27 the ambassador designate and his party would be afforded due
28 process under the Liberian law.

29 Before these negotiations could be concluded, the police

1 director, who until that time had maintained control over his
2 forces, departed the scene. The undisciplined security forces
3 advanced on to the embassy premises to a position where they
4 could see Ambassador Designate Johnson, and upon seeing him,
09:56:23 5 opened fire upon his party with automatic weapons. An embassy
6 guard unlocked the gate to allow three American members of the
7 embassy staff to flee the gunfire. Two of them were wounded, one
8 seriously. In the pandemonium caused by the hail of gunfire,
9 Ambassador Designate Johnson, two of his sons Mr George Dweh and
09:56:51 10 Mr Amos Lincoln, forced their way into the embassy compound.
11 Mr Madison Wion, who received a gunshot wound to the chest while
12 going through the turnstile entryway, collapsed and died within
13 the embassy compound. Mr Puna Johnson and Mr Lincoln sustained
14 gunshot wounds and have received treatment. All five men are
09:57:17 15 being held in confinement on the embassy premises.

16 The embassy has been ordered by the Department of State of
17 the United States of America not to compel Mr Roosevelt Johnson,
18 Mr George Dweh, or Mr Amos Lincoln, to depart the premises of the
19 American embassy. The Secretary of State has determined that a
09:57:39 20 dialogue aimed at achieving a mutually acceptable departure of
21 these individuals from the embassy premises will be conducted not
22 by the embassy, which is preoccupied with addressing threats to
23 its security, but by the special presidential envoy for democracy
24 in Africa, the Reverend Jesse Jackson".

09:58:03 25 Where was Jesse Jackson at the time, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Jesse - this is in September. I think Jesse is en route to
27 the region at this particular time.

28 Q. "The embassy wishes to emphasise to the ministry of foreign
29 affairs of Liberia that the charge d'affaires of the American

1 embassy barred Ambassador Designate Johnson and his party from
2 entering the American embassy for a period of almost one hour.
3 They only gained access to the embassy premises as a result of
4 the confusion created by the indefensible use of lethal force by
09:58:43 5 officers of the Liberian national police. Despite assurances
6 given by the director of police that these individuals would be
7 guaranteed safe passage to the residence of the President of the
8 Republic of Liberia, Liberia national police officers shot and
9 killed at least two of their associates and wounded two. The
09:59:06 10 embassy further considers it a matter of grave concern that
11 government security officers fired shots into the embassy
12 compound, the very premises which they are obliged to protect
13 under the terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
14 In the process two members of the embassy staff were injured, one
09:59:31 15 of them seriously.

16 In view of these most serious violations of the diplomatic
17 premises of the United States of America by security forces of
18 the Republic of Liberia, the embassy is astounded and deeply
19 offended that the ministry failed to acknowledge and apologise
09:59:50 20 for them in its note verbale of September 19, 1998. It is
21 equally regrettable that the ministry should place the onus on
22 the Government of the United States for resolving a problem which
23 was brought about by members of the security forces of the
24 Government of Liberia.

10:00:07 25 The embassy of the United States of America avails itself
26 of this opportunity to renew to the ministry the assurances of
27 its highest consideration."

28 So that is number 68, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, thereafter did the Government of Liberia respond?

2 A. Yes, we did. We did.

3 Q. Now, if we go over the page to page 14 we see set out
4 there, do we not, the response of the Government of Liberia to
10:00:47 5 the two notes we have just looked at. Is that right, Mr Taylor?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And in fact it is headed, "Government of the Republic of
8 Liberia response to US diplomatic notes numbers 67 and 68:

9 The ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Liberia
10:01:07 10 presents its compliments to the embassy of the United States of
11 America and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the latter's
12 note 68 dated 23 September 1998 concerning details of an alleged
13 violation of the embassy's diplomatic premises on 19 September
14 1998 by security forces of the Government of the Republic of
10:01:30 15 Liberia, and to refer to the ministry's note of 19 September
16 addressed to the embassy relative to the request of the
17 Government of Liberia for the release of Mr Roosevelt Johnson and
18 his associates, who sought asylum in the embassy's compound on 19
19 September.

10:01:50 20 In view of the urgency and seriousness of this matter,
21 which affects the peace and security of Liberia, the government
22 is surprised that the embassy has not favoured the ministry with
23 a response to the issues raised in its note of 19 September 1998.

24 According to the embassy's note 67 of September 22, 1998,
10:02:13 25 Mr Madison Wion was shot in front of the embassy but managed to
26 enter the embassy grounds prior to his death. It is of interest
27 to observe that in the embassy's note 68 of 23 September 1998, it
28 is stated that Mr Wion received a gunshot wound to the chest
29 while going through the turnstile entryway. The ministry takes

1 careful note of the two versions provided regarding the death of
2 Mr Madison Wion, including the accusation that a gunshot wound
3 was inflicted by members of the Liberia national police in their
4 attempt to apprehend the party of Mr Roosevelt Johnson.

10:02:56 5 The Government of Liberia wishes to clarify and confirm
6 that it did note violate the extra-territoriality of the embassy
7 of the United States of America in contravention of the Vienna
8 Convention and international law. Not a single member of the
9 Liberia national police contingent entered the grounds of the
10:03:15 10 embassy compound."

11 Is that right, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Oh, fully. That is correct and that's why we started
13 having problems with the content of the note, because the street
14 outside of an embassy property is not international property. It
10:03:43 15 is the property of that republic. And the embassy for example in
16 the United States - I mean of Liberia - I mean of the United
17 States in Liberia, excuse me, have walls that are very, very,
18 very high. And so our police we felt had the rights and all
19 forces, national security forces, to move up and down on the
10:04:12 20 street in front of the embassy. They were under strict
21 instructions not to even step on the sidewalk, but the streets
22 are the properties of the country. When it comes to territorial
23 jurisdiction it has to do with the walls and confines of the
24 embassy property and none of our people entered there. No shots
10:04:34 25 were fired at the embassy and it was very strange to us.

26 You have United States marines at the embassy compound.
27 They know combat. They are about the best in the world. Why
28 would the United States embassy open its gates and permit people
29 to enter? And so we were concerned then about the two versions,

1 one they are outside and now they are going through the
2 turnstile. What is going on? Because we don't know actually who
3 shot, okay, because if - with the war that is going on in the
4 city of Monrovia, and for the judges that may not know, Mamba
10:05:25 5 Point is another hilltop. It is an enclave in Monrovia. It is a
6 hilltop. The embassy knew with the many hours of fighting, they
7 had been informed through the foreign ministry that there was a
8 combat going on. So even the description here of Roosevelt
9 Johnson, the ambassador designate's party, as though they are
10:05:49 10 expecting some guests of theirs, this is - you know, it was a
11 little strange to us.

12 So they knew and in fact it could have been the case, and
13 this was our main concern, that knowing that there is combat
14 going on in the city and this massive gunfire coming towards the
10:06:10 15 embassy and people making an attempt to enter the embassy
16 grounds, even the United States marines, which should have been
17 their duty, could have also used force to stop these people from
18 entering the property. So to claim now that someone has been
19 shot by the Liberia national police is also another question for
10:06:31 20 us. So that's why you see this push and pull and we are
21 beginning to raise these issues.

22 Q. "Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Mrs Vicky Huddleston,
23 who earlier had in a telephone conversation with the minister of
24 state for presidential affairs accused the Liberia national
10:06:54 25 police of entry into the embassy grounds subsequently apologised
26 that she made an error by this accusation. The firing of shots
27 on the part of the Liberia national police had occurred outside
28 the walls of the embassy."

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. "There has been no intention on the part of the government
2 of Liberia after more than a century and a half in the conduct of
3 its diplomatic duties and intercourse to conduct a dialogue
4 through threats to the embassy personnel. The ministry welcomes
10:07:26 5 the decision of the United States government to handle this
6 matter at the highest level and it hopes the same will be
7 amicably resolved in the common interest of the long-standing
8 relations that have always existed between our two governments."

9 And we see the normal salutation. Now, was there a
10:07:52 10 response to that, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, the United States government responded with another
12 note.

13 Q. And we find that note, number 69, over the page at page 16.
14 Is that right, Mr Taylor?

10:08:06 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And in this short note dated 27 September:

17 "The embassy of the United States of America presents its
18 compliments to the ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of
19 Liberia and has the honour to announce that the USS Chinook, a
10:08:27 20 coastal patrol vessel, will be in Liberian territorial waters
21 beginning at about 8 p.m. on Monday, September 28, 1998. The
22 Chinook is a sister vessel of the USS Sirocco, which was to have
23 paid a port call in Monrovia in February, 1998. The USS Chinook
24 has been tasked with the mission of providing protection to the
10:08:56 25 American embassy in the event of deteriorating security
26 conditions, such as those recounted in our diplomatic note 68.

27 The embassy of the United States of America" - and again
28 the normal salutation. Mr Taylor, how do you regard the sudden
29 arrival in Liberian territorial waters of a US warship?

1 A. Well, in direct answer to your question, there must be some
2 context to follow though. By this time it is important to know
3 that we are going through a lot of stress by this time, because
4 there are some other things that are not detailed in these notes.

10:09:49 5 Remember Mr Wi on is shot. He is killed. His body has been
6 interred in the embassy compound. We have been asked to come and
7 remove the body. The Government of Liberia refused. The
8 Government of Liberia's position is very simple. We want to call
9 in medical experts to come in jointly with the United States
10:10:24 10 government to determine cause of death. You have said that the
11 police shot. It could very well have been that this forced entry
12 or the rush to the embassy caused the US marines to shoot, so
13 before we move the body we must get - I think we called for a
14 pathologist to come in jointly between the two governments and
10:10:49 15 ascertain the cause of death. They refused. So we have a
16 stalemate. The body is still interred in the compound.

17 And there are - outside of these notes it is important for
18 the Court to know there are telephone calls from Washington, we
19 are responding. There are some of us that I particularly
10:11:13 20 because, you know, these decisions were now being taken at the
21 highest level - I was determined that we were in the right. We
22 did not violate international law, but the mere fact that the
23 United States government had accused the Liberian government of
24 violating the Geneva Convention, this is a serious matter and we
10:11:33 25 were determined to making sure that we got to the bottom of this
26 because following that who knows what else would follow.

27 While this is going on - my explanation to your question
28 then would be there is for me a typical gunboat diplomacy, where
29 okay since the - I mean here we are. The issue of the fighting

1 stopped the same day. The security forces have withdrawn from
2 the city. There are no more threats in the city. We are being
3 told that there is a US Chinook coming. We just personally - I
4 as President interpreted this as gunboat diplomacy. We are going
10:12:22 5 in there and we are going to teach Taylor that he is going to
6 listen or else. This is my interpretation of it and I stand
7 responsible for that.

8 And we were prepared not to be pushed around and we
9 responded to this note very strongly condemning the entry into
10:12:35 10 our territorial waters. We were not asked to enter our waters. We
11 are told here, "We are going to be in there". We protested and
12 said that we felt that this was a hostile act and that there was
13 no need for this kind.

14 So there is a lot of tension going on at this time and I
10:12:54 15 guess, you know, I take responsibility for that because I felt
16 that we had not done what they said that we did and eventually we
17 got to find out that we were right after their own investigation
18 was conducted, the embassy personnel have violated their rules
19 and the matter was subsequently dropped, but this is gunboat
10:13:19 20 diplomacy.

21 Q. Let us then look at your government's response to that note
22 69 and we can find that response if we go back to page 8. Do you
23 have it, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Yes, I do.

10:13:45 25 Q. And we see that it's a response from the Government of
26 Liberia to the US diplomatic note 69 that we just looked at. Now
27 this note in response is dated 30 September, so it is three days
28 after you received note 69 from the embassy?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. "The ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Liberia
2 presents its compliments to the embassy of the United States of
3 America near Monrovia, and has the honour to acknowledge receipt
4 of the latter's note 69 of September 27, 1998, announcing the
10:14:19 5 arrival of the USS Chinook, a coastal patrol vessel, in Liberian
6 territorial waters beginning at about 8.00 p.m. on Monday,
7 September 28, 1998, for the purpose of providing protection to
8 the American embassy in the event of deteriorating security
9 conditions.

10:14:42 10 The ministry would have appreciated it had the embassy,
11 prior to the arrival of the USS Chinook in Liberian territorial
12 waters informed the ministry as the embassy has done in the past
13 to enable it to advise the appropriate agencies of government.

14 The ministry wishes to convey its government's concern
10:15:06 15 about the abovementioned decision of the United States government
16 which has been taken after the extraordinary efforts by our two
17 governments at a very high level to amicably resolve the issue of
18 Mr Roosevelt Johnson."

19 What efforts are you talking about at a very high level,
10:15:26 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. We have Mr Johnson now and they had reported in one note
22 some five members of what they called his party within the walls
23 of the embassy, but our security forces have reported to us that
24 there are between 20 to 30 individuals in there.

10:15:57 25 Q. In where?

26 A. Within the walls of the embassy of the United States
27 accredited near Monrovia. Now we can do nothing about that.
28 Once they are in there, finish. But by this time, because of the
29 attack that Mr Johnson had carried out against the government,

1 killing people in the process, the ministry of justice had issued
2 arrest warrants for Mr Johnson. So we began discussions - my
3 foreign ministry - with the State Department for the handing over
4 of these individuals to be prosecuted under the law for the
10:16:41 5 activities that they had carried on on the streets of Monrovia
6 and the number of people that had died as a result of that.

7 The United States government rightly so was concerned that
8 these people would not be harmed, that if a process of such were
9 undertaken that it would be within the due process of law and,
10:17:04 10 you know, we had agreed to that, but these were ongoing
11 discussions and I think they needed some time to ascertain that
12 the process would have been free and fair.

13 While that is going on, other West African countries are
14 involved in trying to see how they can help to resolve the issue,
10:17:26 15 but finally another solution was found.

16 Q. "With calm and peaceful atmosphere now prevailing in the
17 country since the evacuation of Mr Johnson to a third country."

18 How was that achieved, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Well, finally the United States government determined that
10:17:53 20 the security of Mr Johnson was at stake, and it is apparent that
21 they did not take seriously our own promises. And so a final
22 solution that I just suggested was made that Mr Johnson would be
23 taken to a third country outside of the three countries that had
24 immediate borders with Liberia and that permission would be given
10:18:22 25 for a helicopter to come to the United States embassy compound,
26 pick them up, and fly them out. That was the final arrangement
27 that was done.

28 Q. And which third country was that?

29 A. We expected that they would be taken outside of Sierra

1 Leone, Guinea and La Cote d'Ivoire. They ended up in Freetown,
2 Sierra Leone. By this time I am in contact with President
3 Kabbah, because our expectation was that they would have probably
4 been taken to Ghana. And so I am very upset by this time and I
10:19:12 5 called Tejani and he said, "Well, look" - I can remember exactly
6 what he said. He said, "My brother, I understand exactly what is
7 going on over there. We are not going to let Mr Johnson stay
8 here. He is going to leave," and so he put additional pressure
9 on the United States embassy accredited near Freetown to remove
10:19:34 10 Mr Johnson from Freetown. President Kabbah did that, and
11 Mr Johnson was removed from Freetown and, to the best of my
12 understanding, went on to Accra, Ghana.

13 Q. "With calm and peaceful atmosphere" --

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Excuse me, could I just enquire who took
10:19:55 15 Mr Johnson to Freetown; do you know?

16 THE WITNESS: The embassy of the United States accredited
17 near Monrovia, they arranged. They made all of the arrangements
18 for the removal of Mr Johnson.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:20:13 20 Q. "With calm and peaceful atmosphere now prevailing in the
21 country since the evacuation of Mr Johnson to a third country,
22 the US decision, together with the publicity it has received in
23 the international and local media, seems to have created fear and
24 concern among Liberians and foreigners alike of an impending
10:20:34 25 calamity," and then the normal salutation. Mr Taylor, how
26 concerned were you by this whole incident?

27 A. Well, of course we were very concerned. We are not armed.
28 We are not a big country. We are a little country. The only
29 thing we believed in and were prepared to, if it were possible,

1 give up our lives for truth. We were right and we were not about
2 to be pushed around, even by the great United States. And so,
3 yes, we were scared. We were scared. The Americans are
4 dispatching gunboats when we do not have a crisis. We were
10:21:15 5 scared. We were scared because we didn't know, but we were
6 prepared to stand our grounds because we had done nothing wrong.
7 And in fact, if anyone had done something wrong, they had done
8 something wrong by encouraging this, okay? After Mr Johnson
9 returned from the United States is when he started all this
10:21:33 10 hostility. All of the hand-held radios, walkie-talkies, that he
11 was using in Monrovia had been provided by them. If anybody had
12 offended anybody, they had offended the Liberian state. And so
13 this threat that we saw coming did frighten us, but we were
14 prepared to stand our ground in the face of overwhelming force
10:21:59 15 because truth, in our opinion, should prevail.

16 Q. Now there was a response to that note, wasn't there,
17 Mr Taylor, your response?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And if we go now to page 18, what we see at page 18 is the
10:22:24 20 next note in this sequence of events, isn't it?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Because if you will recall, the last note we saw from the
23 United States embassy was numbered 69?

24 A. That is correct.

10:22:38 25 Q. We are now on 70?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. "The Government of the United States of America presents
28 its compliments to the Government of the Republic of Liberia and
29 refers to the recent events at the United States embassy in

1 Monrovia, in particular, the shooting of two Americans and the
2 indiscriminate firing into the embassy by Liberian government
3 forces.

4 On September 19, two Americans, one a diplomat accredited
10:23:07 5 to Liberia, were wounded in the fusillade and an unknown number
6 of rounds entered the embassy grounds. The details are spelled
7 out in United States embassy Monrovia diplomatic note number 68.
8 This incident was followed by a period of a week, when the
9 embassy was probed and threatened by government forces".

10:23:31 10 Is that right?

11 A. No. How do you - that is totally false.

12 Q. Mr Taylor, just tell us. You were, what, just over a year
13 into your presidency at this stage, weren't you?

14 A. That is correct.

10:23:48 15 Q. And you had received there an inspection panel from the
16 United States earlier that year, hadn't you? We looked at that
17 on Friday?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Tell us, by September had you made a conscious decision to
10:24:02 20 pick a fight with the mighty United States of America?

21 A. No. We are fighting hard to do everything within our
22 powers to get the attention to help our country. We are not
23 trying to - how do you - how does an ant pick a fight with an
24 elephant? It is not possible. You don't. And we are shocked,
10:24:30 25 we are caught off guard about all of these things and surprised,
26 really, by what we see as real hostilities coming, and we are
27 beginning to now wonder what is next.

28 Q. "The hostile intent of the government forces required the
29 deployment of ECOMOG forces around the compound to ensure the

1 safety of our diplomatic mission".

2 Were ECOMOG forces deployed around the compound?

3 A. ECOMOG forces were deployed within the entire diplomatic
4 enclave. And let me explain this because the answer is, yes, but
10:25:11 5 you need some clarification. The United States embassy is not
6 the only embassy in the Mamba point area. It is described as a
7 diplomatic enclave because there are several embassies, including
8 the French. Most of the major embassies are within the Mamba
9 Point area. So before the crisis - before the crisis - we had
10:25:33 10 ECOMOG. Remember, ECOMOG is still involved in some capacity
11 building activities in the country. Their deployment within - at
12 certain points in the city and around the country is still okay
13 with the government. So this is before - even long before this
14 crisis.

10:25:55 15 Q. "As the Government of Liberia knows, governments are
16 required to protect - not threaten - diplomatic missions and
17 personnel. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is
18 unambiguous in providing in pertinent part:

19 Article 22

10:26:17 20 1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable;
21 2. The receiving state is under a special duty to take all
22 appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against
23 any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the
24 peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.

10:26:38 25 Article 29

26 The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable ...
27 the receiving state shall treat him with due respect and shall
28 take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person,
29 freedom or dignity.

1 The 1973 Convention on the Prevention of Crimes Against
2 Internationally Protected Persons, including diplomatic agents,
3 provides in Article 2, in part, that the intentional commission
4 of an attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally
10:27:15 5 protected person, or a violent attack upon the official premises
6 of an internationally protected person likely to endanger his
7 person shall be made, by each state party, a crime under its
8 internal law.

9 Significantly, paragraph three provides that paragraphs one
10:27:35 10 and two of the article 'in no way derogate from the obligations
11 of the states parties under international law to take all
12 appropriate measures to prevent other attacks on the person,
13 freedom or dignity of the internationally protected persons.'
14 Liberia and the United States are party to both the
10:28:00 15 aforementioned conventions."

16 Tell us, Mr Taylor, prior to this note was your government
17 aware of these international obligations?

18 A. Very much so, and we took them seriously.

19 Q. "In firing on the two Americans and our embassy compound,
10:28:18 20 the Government of Liberia did not act in a manner consistent with
21 its obligations under international law. The Government of the
22 United States expects an apology, an investigation into the
23 incident that leads to a public report and announcements of steps
24 taken to discipline the persons responsible, and assurances that
10:28:42 25 effective measures have been taken to prevent a recurrence".

26 So far as the preparation of a public report, Mr Taylor,
27 did the Government of Liberia do that?

28 A. Do what: Apologise?

29 Q. Prepare a report?

1 A. We prepared a report.

2 Q. And is this the report that were looking at now?

3 A. This is the report.

10:29:08

4 Q. "The Government of the United States anticipates that with
5 these actions, our normally good relations and strong traditional
6 ties can be re-established."

7 Now, let's pause there and we see the normal salutation
8 thereafter. Mr Taylor, were you ready to apologise?

9 A. No, we were not ready and we did not.

10:29:26

10 Q. Why not?

11 A. Because of two reasons: Number 1, we had not done what
12 they had charged. An investigation had not been conducted by the
13 two countries to ascertain that these charges were right; and to
14 apologise would suggest, what? That we had in fact violated the
15 convention and could have resulted into what? Additional actions
16 against us. So we were not prepared to apologise, okay? We
17 wanted to make sure that the investigation was conducted by the
18 two governments, that blame was apportioned, and after that the
19 side guilty would then submit an apology. You don't ask for an

10:29:47

10:30:11 20 apology - and there was a word used or statement used here about
21 Liberian government forces were probing the embassy. These are
22 very serious statements. How do you describe security forces of
23 a country providing the very protection that you are talking
24 about being within the vicinity of the compound, which we are
10:30:38 25 entitled to do, as probing? So we were suspect by all of these
26 types of languages that were really languages that our own
27 diplomats and legal people were advising us were trapping-type
28 language for entrapment, where descriptions of security forces
29 providing the protection under the Geneva Convention that you are

1 requesting and having those security forces in the area long
2 after a conflict, as probing an embassy. This was - I mean, for
3 us it was just total foolishness and we were not prepared to just
4 bounce up and say, "We are sorry." Sorry for what? You say
10:31:23 5 sorry when you have done something wrong and you expect somebody
6 to accept the apology, but we were not prepared to do that
7 because of those reasons I just gave you.

8 Q. Now, so you received that note?

9 A. Yes.

10:31:36 10 Q. And when we go over the page to page 20, do we see there -
11 do we see there the response of your government to that
12 diplomatic note, Mr Taylor?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. "The Government of Liberia presents its compliments to the
10:31:58 15 Government of the United States of America and has the honour to
16 acknowledge receipt of the latter's note number 70 of October 5,
17 1998."

18 So just pausing there, Mr Taylor. We have this situation
19 developing from 10 August?

10:32:18 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. So it has been going on for a little while now?

22 A. Oh, yes.

23 Q. "Referring inter alia to the recent events at the United
24 States embassy near Monrovia, with specific reference to the
10:32:34 25 allegations that on September 19th, two Americans were wounded
26 and that an unknown number of rounds entered the embassy grounds.

27 The Government of Liberia wishes to inform the Government
28 of the United States that it has already conducted a preliminary
29 investigation into the entire matter. However, in light of the

1 very grave accusations contained in the aforementioned note, the
2 Government of Liberia wishes to, and hereby invites the
3 government of the United States, to join in an investigation".

4 Did they ever do that?

10:33:15 5 A. They turned it down, but they did conduct their own
6 investigation, but not jointly with the Liberian government.

7 Q. "The Government of Liberia wishes to note that regrettably
8 there was a period of pandemonium within the vicinity of the US
9 embassy during which shooting erupted emanating from the Johnson
10 forces, the US embassy guards and government security forces.

11 However the Government of Liberia emphatically states that at no
12 time did it willfully or intentionally fire upon or sanctioned
13 any firing at the US embassy or at American citizens. It is
14 unfortunate that the US charge d'affaires and other embassy
10:33:59 15 personnel unnecessarily and knowingly exposed themselves to
16 imminent danger when they left the protective walls of the
17 embassy compound and went outside on to the public street into a
18 potentially unsafe environment in which sporadic gunfire had
19 ensued from the previous night.

10:34:20 20 The Liberian government, nevertheless, regrets any injury
21 which may have been suffered under these conditions by persons
22 protected under international law, and it considers the safety of
23 these persons to be of paramount importance and indispensable to
24 the conduct of international relations.

10:34:40 25 The Government of Liberia is fully aware of its obligations
26 and responsibilities under the 1961 Vienna Convention on
27 Diplomatic Relations and the 1973 Convention on the Prevention of
28 Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, and shall
29 continue to provide maximum security and protection to all

1 diplomatic missions near Monrovia and their personnel, including
2 the United States embassy.

3 The Government of Liberia wishes to also inform the
4 Government of the United States that President Taylor, on the
10:35:16 5 night of Friday, the 18th instant did order ECOMOG to deploy in
6 Mamba Point and to provide enhanced protection to that area."

7 Had you done that?

8 A. Yes. Remember they are there, but this is and enhanced -
9 and by enhanced we are talking about in addition to.

10:35:35 10 Q. "The government therefore did take precautionary measures
11 to enhance the protection of the diplomatic enclave in Mamba
12 Point where the US embassy merely constitutes the continuing
13 implementation of the Liberian government's policy in respect of
14 a receiving state's obligation and responsibilities under the
10:35:55 15 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In keeping with
16 international convention, the Government of Liberia takes this
17 opportunity to renew its protest over the illegal entry of the
18 USS Chinook in Liberian territorial waters without its explicit
19 permission, as contained in its note of September 30, 1998.

10:36:22 20 The Government of the Republic of Liberia is perplexed to
21 have learned that contrary to US embassy note 68 that only five
22 persons were at the embassy, we have learnt that instead 23 of
23 Roosevelt's Johnson's supporters were claimed to have been
24 discovered on the embassy premises as per President Clinton's
10:36:46 25 letter of October 2, 1998, to the speaker of the US congress. We
26 are particularly concerned why this information was withheld and
27 remains withheld from the Liberian government. The Government of
28 Liberia expects that the US government will provide a timely
29 explanation as to:

1 (a) how and when these Johnson supporters entered the
2 heavily restricted US embassy compound;

3 (b) why were these persons permitted to remain there, and;

4 (c) why was the Liberian government not informed?

10:37:27 5 The Government of Liberia is also concerned about
6 Mr Roosevelt Johnson's presence in the neighbouring Republic of
7 Sierra Leone."

8 You told us about that earlier, didn't you, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes.

10:37:40 10 Q. "And is profoundly disappointed that the Government of the
11 United States of America did not honour the agreement between the
12 two governments to convey him to a third party state within
13 ECOWAS which specifically excluded him from being conveyed to any
14 of the contiguous state of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote
10:38:02 15 d'Ivoire."

16 And then we see the normal salutation. Now you make
17 reference to President Clinton's letter. Now if we go over the
18 page to page 22, do we see that letter there?

19 A. Yes, we do.

10:38:20 20 Q. And the letter reads as follows. It is dated 2 October
21 1998 and it is a letter written by the President of the United
22 States to the House and Senate on Liberia:

23 "Dear Mr Speaker, Liberia is just emerging from a seven
24 year civil war. Since democratic elections were held in July
10:38:50 25 1997 there have been moments of instability in that country. In
26 the past 10 days, conflict erupted between Liberian security
27 forces and supporters of another former faction leader, Roosevelt
28 Johnson.

29 On the morning of September 19, Liberian government

1 security forces fired on a small group of Liberians led by former
2 ULIMO Krahn faction leader Roosevelt Johnson, who was speaking
3 with US embassy officials outside the embassy compound, after
4 Johnson and his group were initially refused refuge.

10:39:31 5 When Liberian government security forces opened fire on the
6 group, the embassy officials fled into the US embassy, and in the
7 chaos were joined by the Johnson party. Two Americans were
8 wounded in the melee and four members of the Johnson party were
9 killed. The US personnel injured in the gunfire was a government
10:39:54 10 contractor and an embassy staff member.

11 Responding to a US request for enhanced security, forces of
12 the Economic Community of West Africa observer group subsequently
13 positioned themselves in a defensive perimeter around the
14 embassy. Later, a group of 23 supporters of Mr Johnson was
10:40:24 15 discovered hiding on the embassy premises."

16 Now in all of the notes that we have looked at hitherto,
17 Mr Taylor, did you see any information suggesting that there were
18 23 members of Johnson's group in the embassy?

19 A. No, but how do you have 23 people being discovered on the
10:40:55 20 grounds of a United States embassy? How? How? The United
21 States embassies are the best protected around the world. How
22 would 23 people just be discovered on the embassy compound?

23 In fact, just from a personal observation, and these are
24 some of the things that Presidents too can be misled, even the
10:41:20 25 President's account here as you are reading are a little
26 different from some of the notes that are coming through. Here
27 is the President talking about a small group of Johnson people,
28 you know, came near the embassy and in the chaos, the firing, the
29 embassy people are trying to go in and in that chaos the - it

1 doesn't work this way. Even I can see the President here himself
2 is misled because the notes don't account for this. The notes
3 first of all talk about, what, going through a turnstile and all
4 this kind of stuff. So he too, he is misled in a way.

10:41:59 5 And they never tell us these people are there. We are told
6 there are about five. So all of a sudden there are 23 found -
7 discovered. Now in today's world if you discover 23 people in an
8 embassy compound they must be terrorists. If you are discovered,
9 if you - if there is anybody - you open your embassy gate or
10:42:22 10 somewhere on the compound and discover 23 people that the US
11 marines don't know, all the officials don't know. Impossible.

12 Q. "After extensive negotiations between President Taylor and
13 representatives of the US government and West African states,
14 permission was obtained to airlift Mr Johnson and his party to
10:42:46 15 Freetown, Sierra Leone."

16 Pause there. Did you agree for him to be taken to Sierra
17 Leone?

18 A. No, we agreed for them to be taken from Liberia. It was
19 very clear - very clear - that they would be taken outside of
10:43:00 20 those countries that had contiguous borders with Liberia. Very
21 clear.

22 Q. "This was accomplished without incident on September 25,
23 1998. The situation in Monrovia continues to be uncertain and
24 could deteriorate. Although ECOMOG forces remain in the vicinity
10:43:23 25 of the embassy compound their numbers have been reduced. Our
26 embassy believes that security could deteriorate rapidly during
27 President Taylor's absence for an official visit to France."

28 Pause there. You had - had you been on an official visit
29 to France?

1 A. No, I was preparing for an official visit to France in late
2 September.

3 Q. We will come to that in a moment:

4 "The embassy does, however, project that barring further
10:43:55 5 incidents security should significantly improve over the course
6 of the next several weeks as factional tensions ease in the wake
7 of Mr Johnson's departure. There are approximately 230
8 non-official American citizens in Liberia and 29 official
9 Americans at the embassy.

10:44:18 10 On September 27, 1998, due to the tenuous security
11 situation and the potential threat to American citizens and the
12 embassy in Monrovia, a stand-by response and evacuation force of
13 approximately 30 US military personnel from the United States
14 European command deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone."

10:44:46 15 Mr Taylor, were you informed of that in advance?

16 A. No, no, not at all.

17 Q. "About half of this unit has moved on to the navy's coastal
18 patrol craft, USS Chinook, which is operating in the waters off
19 Monrovia equipped for combat. This action is being undertaken
10:45:13 20 solely for the purpose of preparing to protect American citizens
21 and property. The US forces will deploy as soon as it is
22 determined that the threat to the embassy compound has intended
23 or, if an evacuation is necessary, it is completed.

24 I have taken this action pursuant to my constitutional
10:45:31 25 authority to conduct US foreign relations and as
26 commander-in-chief and chief executive.

27 I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep
28 the congress fully informed, consistent with the war powers
29 resolution. I appreciate the support of the congress in this

1 action to assist in embassy security and the security of American
2 citizens overseas."

3 Now, Mr Taylor, did the Government of Liberia thereafter
4 make a statement about this?

10:46:13 5 A. There were several others, yes. I am not sure if it is
6 contained here, but we did follow up with statements and that
7 really never got anywhere.

8 Q. Let's go over the page to page 24. Bearing in mind the
9 date of President Clinton's letter, when we go over the page we
10:46:39 10 see at page 24, do we not, a statement issued by the Government
11 of the Republic of Liberia on 5 October, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "The Government of Liberia recalling events relating to the
14 announcement of the arrival of the USS Chinook in Liberian
10:47:05 15 territorial waters views this action of the United States
16 government as a violation of Liberia's territorial integrity and
17 sovereignty.

18 The Government of Liberia made representations to the US
19 authorities both in Washington DC, and Monrovia, about the
10:47:21 20 presence of the USS Chinook without the permission of the
21 Government of Liberia, and accordingly requested the withdrawal
22 of the vessel from its territorial waters.

23 The Government of Liberia cherishes its long-standing
24 relations with the United States government and, in the spirit of
10:47:40 25 this traditional relationship, would welcome a call at the
26 Monrovia Freeport by the USS Chinook as demonstration of its
27 friendship and non-hostile intent.

28 The Government of Liberia, a signatory to the Vienna
29 Convention on Diplomatic Relations and a peace loving and

1 respected member of the international community, respects the
2 extra-territoriality of diplomatic missions accredited near its
3 capital and would view seriously and indeed investigate any
4 violation of this principle by any Liberian functionary.

10:48:18 5 However, except for the pronouncements on BBC allegedly made by
6 the charge d'affaires AI of the US Embassy that the said embassy
7 remain closed until the Government of Liberia apologised for the
8 violation of the embassy by Liberian security forces, the
9 Government of Liberia has not received any official communication
10:48:40 10 from the United States raising the issue attributed to the US
11 charge d'affaires on the BBC.

12 The Government of Liberia regrets that instead of pursuing
13 such matters through normal diplomatic channels, as is practiced
14 in most civilised countries, efforts have been made by the US
10:49:03 15 charge d'affaires" - what does AI stand for, Mr Taylor?

16 A. What, ad interim? I think it is - I don't know what you
17 call it. Is it - I think ad interim. I think this is ad interim
18 to the best of my knowledge.

19 Q. "... to publicly embarrass and attempt to force the
10:49:29 20 Government of Liberia into taking a decision before it had
21 determined the veracity of the allegation made. In this
22 connection the Government of Liberia, representing a sovereign
23 country, will not countenance such an unfriendly action by any
24 country. The Government of Liberia cherishes its relations with
10:49:47 25 all peace-loving countries, particularly the United States of
26 America, with which it has had a long-standing relationship. It
27 is the view of the Government of Liberia that all matters that
28 concern the two countries can be resolved by dialogue and through
29 normal diplomatic channels. In this context, the Government of

1 Liberia stands ready and will continue to employ its best efforts
2 for the realisation of these important objectives".

3 Now, Mr Taylor, at this point in time did the United
4 Nations Secretary-General have a representative in Liberia?

10:50:39 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. How did he come to be in Liberia?

7 A. When we first got the report all the way back - let me
8 remind the Court - in June, in evidence presented before this
9 Court we see from our minister counselor in New York a meeting
10:51:13 10 that is held with the President of the Security Council. As
11 things begin to hot up in Liberia with accusations here and
12 accusations there, and the United Nations Secretary-General has
13 sent a special representative into Sierra Leone, we ask for a
14 special representative in Liberia to also monitor to have a
10:51:43 15 balanced approach so the United Nations could have a very clear
16 view. That process is already ongoing, but we intensify another
17 angle of it. We then at this particular time call in the special
18 representative, and we agree that the protection of the state was
19 important to the United Nations and that the agreement was we
10:52:15 20 would have all diplomatic or other United Nations messages sent
21 by the special representative that are non-secret that pertained
22 to discussions with the Government of Liberia or any meetings or
23 conferences that he was present in that those reports are
24 submitted to New York, the Government of Liberia should be
10:52:47 25 provided copies.

26 Q. And were you?

27 A. Yes. So as of that particular time, all the way back from
28 about June, the special representative of the Secretary-General
29 would provide copies of those memos to government. They were

1 official documents. I read all of them, because it was for us a
2 little rider, maybe an insurance package, to help to protect the
3 government that when there were several views, that the special
4 representative of the Secretary-General, we gave him a very clear
10:53:22 5 view of that. And I kept those copies over the years in my
6 archives. In fact, the Government of Liberia has copies also.

7 Q. And what was the name of the special representative?

8 A. He was Felix Downes-Thomas.

9 Q. Now this Camp Johnson Road incident, did you discuss that
10:53:43 10 with Mr Downes-Thomas?

11 A. He was very seriously involved in the negotiations with us,
12 and the United States embassy was also trying to lower the
13 temperature, and so he was used significantly by the government
14 as a diplomat in Liberia at the time to help to carry messages
10:54:05 15 between the two sides because of the tension.

16 Q. And have you had sight of any report prepared by him on
17 this Camp Johnson Road incident?

18 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. He prepared a report for his
19 boss, the Secretary-General, and he reported constantly. The
10:54:29 20 main one that I saw was during the first few hot hours of the
21 conflict a few days later. Yes, I have seen that report.

22 Q. Now, before we move on and take a look at this document,
23 can I, ask please, that this document that we have been looking
24 at, Official Report of the Government of Liberia on the Camp
10:54:54 25 Johnson Road Conspiracy, can I ask that this be marked for
26 identification, please. MFI-50 I think, Mr President?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that is correct. This document will
28 be marked for identification MFI-50.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Can I please now invite attention --

2 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me, Mr President, I apologise for
3 interrupting, but it appears this document is not complete. For
4 example, if we look at page 7 of the document, at the last
10:55:25 5 paragraph on page 7, and then we turn to page 8, it is not a
6 continuation of that paragraph. So there seem to be pages that
7 are missing, and we would ask that the entire document at least
8 be made available to the Prosecution. If we look again at page
9 17, it doesn't seem to follow from page 16. It says, "Executive
10:55:54 10 Mansion confirming the meeting we all laughed". That doesn't
11 seem to follow from the preceding page.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: It doesn't seem as though the whole
13 document is in this particular --

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I note that the pagination appears to be in
10:56:12 15 order, Mr President. If one looks at the pagination of the
16 pages, there doesn't appear to be any missing pages. Although I
17 do accept that so far as the two pages referred to by my learned
18 friend, what follows appears to be a non-sequitur when you look
19 at what is on the previous page. I accept that, and I will
10:56:33 20 investigate. I will cause this matter to be investigated to see
21 if there are indeed missing pages. But as I say, as one scrolls
22 through, the pagination is continuous.

23 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I cannot find a note or
24 record of who the author of this report is or who in fact did the
10:56:55 25 investigation.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I can only assist to the extent that this
27 document bears the appellation that it is an official report of
28 the Government of the Republic of Liberia. I apologise, but I
29 cannot assist any further.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, we will note the Prosecution's
2 comments, and it certainly does seem as though there may be some
3 missing pages or passages from the document.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: I fully agree.

10:57:26 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: But at this stage it is only being marked
6 for identification, and we also note that Mr Griffiths is going
7 to look into the matter. So, as I have said before, that
8 document is marked for identification MFI-50.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:57:41 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I wonder if I could now invite your
11 attention, please, to a document behind divider 23 in volume 2 of
12 3. Do you have the document, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, I now have it.

14 Q. What are we looking at?

10:59:19 15 A. This is the report from the special representative of the
16 Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Honourable Felix
17 Downes-Thomas, RSG - that is representative of the
18 Secretary-General - to the Secretary-General at the time.

19 Q. Now, I am not going to bother with the first page of this
10:59:40 20 document. Can we turn, please, to the second page? Yes,
21 Mr Taylor.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And we see that it is addressed to a Prendergast/Miyet at
24 the United Nations, yes?

10:59:54 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. From Downes-Thomas, representative of the
27 Secretary-General, UNOL. What does that stand for?

28 A. United Nations - I am not too sure. Let me not mislead the
29 Court. I don't know what UNOL is really.

1 Q. Monrovia --

2 A. But it is United States mission. Could be the UN mission
3 in Liberia.

4 Q. Or UN office in Liberia?

11:00:30 5 A. Or office. It could be, yes.

6 Q. We see it is dated 19 September 1998?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. So that, given what we have just looked at would be in the
9 middle of this period, stretching back as far as 10 August?

11:00:48 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. During which this whole thing had been bubbling along?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And it is entitled "The Camp Johnson Road Incidents of 18
14 September 1998 and Subsequent Developments."

11:01:10 15 "On 18 September 1998, at approximately 6.30 p.m. sounds of
16 gunfire were heard at the Camp Johnson Road and its immediate
17 vicinity. Subsequent assessment of the situation indicates that
18 there was an exchange of gunfire between the supporters of
19 Roosevelt Johnson and members of the Special Security Services
11:01:32 20 (SSS). That exchange was apparently triggered by the entry of
21 members of the SSS into a building which had been recently leased
22 by the Government of Liberia at the junction of Perry Street and
23 Camp Johnson Road. The SSS took over another building, on the
24 corner of Camp Johnson Road and Benson Street, which was the
11:01:55 25 former premises of the Ministry of internal affairs.

26 The situation which ensued was reminiscent of the April 6,
27 1996, crisis, during which Roosevelt Johnson's supporters were in
28 direct conflict with the government forces. The sound of gunfire
29 drove thousands of panic stricken residents of the Camp Johnson

1 Road to the Bushrod Island and adjacent localities away from
2 central Monrovia. The movement of trucks and other vehicles
3 packed with heavily armed personnel gave a clear indication that
4 we were faced with a potentially explosive situation. There was
11:02:42 5 fear within the diplomatic community that Liberia was about to
6 plunge itself into another internal conflict."

7 Mr Taylor, did you share that fear?

8 A. Yes. In a way, yes, we were concerned.

9 Q. Were you anxious to plunge your country back into civil
11:03:08 10 war, Mr Taylor?

11 A. No, no, no.

12 Q. "In the light of the above, and in an effort to assess the
13 security situation and to contribute towards defusing tension, I
14 met separately today with Ambassador Francis Agyemfra of Ghana,
11:03:27 15 the former vice-chairman of the state council and current
16 chairman of National Reconciliation and Reunification Commission;
17 Ms Victoria Refell, the charge d'affaires of the US embassy; John
18 Bauman; President Taylor; as well as jointly with Ambassador
19 Agyemfra and the ECOMOG force commander, General Timothy
11:03:55 20 Shelpi di."

21 Did you meet with him?

22 A. With the special representatives?

23 Q. Yes?

24 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely, yes.

11:04:02 25 Q. We will come to a note of your meeting a little later, but
26 it continues:

27 "Prior to my meeting with the force commander of ECOMOG at
28 11.35 a.m. today, I telephoned the charge d'affaires of the US
29 embassy, John Bauman, from the ECOMOG base to ascertain the

1 prevailing situation at his end. I then informed him that I was
2 proceeding to a meeting with the President following
3 consultations with the force commander of ECOMOG. According to
4 Bauman, a considerable number of Liberians of the Krahn ethnic
11:04:39 5 group had sought refuge, which he could not offer without
6 endangering the lives of embassy personnel. He therefore
7 accommodated the refuge seekers in an area adjacent to the
8 consular section of the embassy."

9 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Were you consulted by Mr Bauman
11:05:01 10 about that action?

11 A. No.

12 Q. And you will note the reference to "considerable number of
13 Liberians of the Krahn ethnic group", and you will recall, of
14 course, the various notes from the embassy, and you will recall
11:05:18 15 also the letter from President Bill Clinton which mentions 23?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And we see here "a considerable number", yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. "Since ECOMOG troops assigned to that area had withdrawn,
11:05:35 20 he was left with no option but to rely on the cooperation of the
21 director of the Liberian national police, Joe Tate, who,
22 according to Bauman, did an admirable job in separating the
23 Liberian security forces from the Krahns, who had converged in
24 front of the American embassy that morning. However, Tate had to
11:05:58 25 leave the scene when he received a call from the President.

26 Thereafter, all hell broke loose. Also according to the Bauman,
27 shooting started. It resulted in the death of Krahns and the
28 wounding of two embassy personnel.

29 I asked him if he wanted me to ask the President to send

1 back Joe Tate and his men to the vicinity of the US Embassy. His
2 response was that while the presence of security police in the
3 outer parameters of the embassy would be desirable, he preferred
4 ECOMOG to secure the inner security parameter of the US Embassy,
11:06:41 5 that is, the area between the two checkpoints on Mamba Point
6 ECOMOG. I advised the Liberian authorities and ECOMOG
7 accordingly.

8 At 11.35 a.m. I had a joint meeting with the force
9 commander of ECOMOG, the Ghanaian ambassador, as well as with
11:07:02 10 senior staff of the ECOMOG high command. I informed them that I
11 was about to meet President Taylor and would willingly convey to
12 him any concerns they may wish to bring to the attention of the
13 President. It was suggested that I advise the President that:
14 The SSS and the police should withdraw to their respective
11:07:25 15 barracks so that ECOMOG could provide security to the central
16 part of Monrovia; the police and the SSS should withdraw from the
17 diplomatic enclave at Mamba Point, that is, the US Embassy and
18 its immediate vicinity; and, I should emphasise to the President
19 that the problems relating to Krahn's cannot be solved militarily;
11:07:50 20 peaceful methods should be pursued."

21 Pause there.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. "I should emphasise to the President that the problem
24 relating to Krahn's cannot be solved militarily". Had you not
11:08:04 25 been aware of that before, Mr Taylor?

26 A. I had been very aware of it, and don't let's forget the two
27 former chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces of Liberia that are
28 ministers in my government are Krahn's, so we have always known
29 that we could not solve it militarily and we did not seek to do

1 so. The very fact that I could bring Johnson on the cabinet,
2 give him money to go abroad to go and seek what he termed then
3 health assistance, showed that we could not resolve it
4 militarily. We were always aware of this as a government and did
11:08:50 5 everything to preventing this very situation on the ground.

6 Q. "While I had no quarrel with proposals regarding the
7 withdrawal of the Liberian security forces from the diplomatic
8 enclave and the need to emphasise the importance of pursuing
9 political solutions to the problems of Krahn, I expressed my
11:09:13 10 uneasiness with the request for the removal of all SSS and
11 Liberian national police from the entire central Monrovia. Such
12 a request, I pointed out, was bound to resurrect the old and
13 troublesome debate over sovereignty and the role of the
14 government of Liberia in the maintenance of security. The force
11:09:36 15 commander agreed with me that this issue might pose problems to
16 the Government of Liberia. He amended his proposal by indicating
17 he wished to see a return to the status quo at 6 p.m. on 18
18 September; that is, that the Liberian security forces withdraw to
19 positions they held at that time. He also took the opportunity
11:10:02 20 to elaborate on the nature of the crisis and showed me a letter
21 addressed to him by President Taylor requesting him to withdraw
22 the ECOMOG security detail attached to Roosevelt Johnson."

23 Did you write to him in those terms?

24 A. Yes, he had no - he had no business providing security
11:10:25 25 protection to one of the ministers of government that he had
26 surreptitiously brought into the country. I would not object to
27 security being provided to any individual in the country needing
28 security, but for ECOMOG to take upon itself to determine that
29 this minister we must protect, I think it was totally wrong and

1 we said to him that any such request for specific security for a
2 minister in my government should be provided by the government
3 and not on his own accord.

4 Q. Now it continues, and now we come to the meeting you had
11:11:17 5 with him:

6 "Following a 15 minute discussion with the chairman of
7 Reconciliation and Reunification Commission, Victoria Refell, I
8 met the President at his residence at 12.55 a.m. Also present
9 were Mr Ernest Eastman, minister of presidential affairs;

11:11:45 10 Eddington Varma, minister of justice; Thomas Wowej, minister of
11 Labour; Mr Francois Massaquoi, minister of sports and youth
12 affairs; Mr Benenai Urey, commissioner of the Bureau of Maritime
13 Affairs; Reginald Goodridge, deputy minister of public affairs
14 and the President's press secretary. He was accompanied by

11:12:19 15 Gebremedhin Hagoss."

16 I conveyed the concerns which we looked at overleaf and he
17 noted that as far as he was concerned, there was no such thing as
18 a Krahn problem."

19 Did you see the situation as being quote unquote a Krahn
11:12:33 20 problem, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. "In his opinion, the prevailing problems were caused by
23 certain individuals of the Krahn ethnic group who were bent on
24 subverting the government. He indicated that his government was
11:12:50 25 determined to solve the problem within a framework of its
26 sovereign prerogatives. He pointed out that charges had already
27 been leveled against those who had committed treason, murder, and
28 engaged in subversive activities. The President went on to say
29 that the nation could not continue to be held hostage to the

1 dictates of a few individuals whose sole intent was to create
2 instability in the country. He said he had no problems with the
3 Krahs and that many prominent Krahs, including General Philip
4 Kamah, continue to ply the roads of Monrovia in safety and
11:13:32 5 security.

6 He also informed me that he intended to reach President
7 Abubakar of Nigeria and confer with him on the modalities of
8 ensuring ECOMOG's compliance with the sovereign directives of the
9 Government of Liberia. In addition, he intended to keep OAU, as
11:13:54 10 well as ECOWAS, apprised of the situation. He observed that
11 Roosevelt Johnson was brought back to the country by certain
12 forces that wished to implement a specific agenda. Pointing out
13 that ECOMOG high command was to have relocated in Sierra Leone
14 and that a few ECOMOG battalions were to be left behind and led
11:14:17 15 by a colonel, he wondered why so many ECOMOG troops were
16 patrolling the streets. He also referred to his confrontational
17 meeting with Shelpidi on 18 September."

18 Tell us about that, Mr Taylor?

19 A. General Shelpidi had replaced General Victor Malu as forces
11:14:46 20 commander in Monrovia, and this Court already knows - and I don't
21 want to delay the point - that there were problems where these
22 people continued to behave as though they were an occupying
23 force. General Shelpidi on September 18 comes to my office -
24 and, mind you, these are the same people that have brought - your
11:15:10 25 Honours, you know, can you imagine your minister leaving the
26 country and going for medical attention and disappearing, and you
27 only find out that he is back at his residence protected by a
28 massive armed force of people? All of his supporters are now
29 armed and ready for combat. This general came into my office -

1 the President's office has a desk with four chairs before it -
2 and he is a major general at the time. This guy comes into my
3 office after asking to see me, and he comes and he rears back in
4 a very indisciplined way and so I said - I asked him, I said,
11:16:04 5 "Well, General, you are in my office. I am a part of the
6 authority of ECOWAS. You are a general. You are supposed to be
7 a disciplined man. You come into my office, rear back like you
8 are coming to visit your friend. I am not your friend. And
9 since - you cannot disrespect your President commander-in-chief
11:16:25 10 of the Armed Forces of Liberia - I mean Nigeria in this way that
11 you are performing in my office. Get out." And I threw him out
12 of my office. I have told him to get out of my office because I
13 would not accept any insubordination from him, and I picked up
14 the phone and I called Abdul salami Abubakar, the President of
11:16:45 15 Nigeria, and told him to get him out of my country, which he did
16 in very short time. So that is the confusion that happened with
17 this Shelpidi and myself.

18 Q. "... had admitted to me that he had to abruptly end his
19 meeting with the force commander who, President Taylor explained,
11:17:00 20 did not seem to be cooperative and appeared unaware of the
21 understanding between President Abubakar of Nigeria and Taylor
22 regarding the status of ECOMOG in Liberia. He emphasised that
23 his government was duly elected and consequently responsible for
24 the security of its citizens. That, he maintained, was something
11:17:19 25 which the US must accept. He acknowledged that it was indeed the
26 responsibility of his government to address anything untoward
27 regarding events and activities that took place outside the
28 premises of the embassy.

29 In this connection he stated that the United States should

1 understand that war and military confrontation have never been
2 tidy. He stressed, however, that he would want to know not only
3 what happened inside the embassy, but to also have a full account
4 regarding the numbers and identity of those Liberians who were
11:17:56 5 granted refuge within the US embassy."

6 Mr Taylor, had you attempted to get that information from
7 the embassy directly?

8 A. All along we had through discussions. Even if they are not
9 contained in the note, yes, we made every attempt. We did not
11:18:16 10 cut off the telephone communication between the parties, so my
11 foreign minister or maybe the assistant minister for American
12 Affairs were talking. There were discussions going on. Yes, we
13 did try. We did.

14 Q. "Alluding to the departure of police director Joe Tate
11:18:32 15 from the vicinity of the American embassy, he made it clear that
16 he wanted to avoid any mistakes on the part of law enforcement
17 personnel regarding the inviolability of the premises of foreign
18 embassies. It was that consideration, he explained, that led to
19 his call for Joe Tate.

11:18:51 20 President Taylor made it quite clear that he would want the
21 United States to hand over to him or to his government any
22 Liberian who had been granted refuge within the precincts of the
23 embassy, so that, if necessary, the national law would take its
24 course. He gave assurances that, once individuals were handed
11:19:13 25 over to the Government of Liberia, there would be complete
26 transparency with regard to their legal and personal situation
27 during their custody. He similarly emphasised that the
28 individual rights of such individuals would be safeguarded.

29 In response to my query as to whether or not the government

1 was ready to take custody of Roosevelt Johnson, he informed me
2 that Mr Johnson suffers from a heart problem and was therefore
3 reluctant to have an Ibiola situation in his hands."

4 What does that mean?

11:19:50 5 A. Ibiola is a former presidential candidate in the Federal
6 Republic of Nigeria that is believed to have won the elections.
7 He was arrested and while in prison he died and it caused a major
8 problem for the Nigerian government at the time. So because
9 Mr Johnson was sick I am saying that I do not want to keep
11:20:24 10 Mr Johnson in custody in Liberia and have him die. The first
11 thing they will say is, "Taylor killed this man". So I was open
12 to the fact of letting even Johnson get out of there once he was
13 in a country that would pose no direct security problems to my
14 government.

11:20:45 15 Q. "He would, however, accept custody of Mr Johnson if
16 arrangements were made to enable United States or United Nations
17 doctors to attend to Mr Johnson while in government custody.

18 The President made it known that he was aware that through
19 ECOMOG, Roosevelt Johnson and his supporters were in possession
11:21:06 20 of significant quantities of arms, including those that were
21 uncovered in the cemetery of Central Monrovia."

22 Tell us about that, Mr Taylor.

23 A. Oh, they had dug up in the cemetery tonnes of weapons.

24 Q. Who had?

11:21:22 25 A. ECOMOG had dug these up. Now, we are in a process where
26 they have all the weapons.

27 Q. Who?

28 A. ECOMOG. And now they find this large cache of weapons in
29 the cemetery, but it belongs to the LPC and ULIMO-J. So it is

1 apparent now that these are the weapons that they have given to
2 the Roosevelt Johnson supporters in addition to what they already
3 had hidden in other parts of the enclave of Monrovia.

4 Q. How do you know that ECOMOG did that?

11:21:58 5 A. Well, we knew ECOMOG very well. We knew. We bought
6 weapons from ECOMOG while we were fighting. ECOMOG is a
7 different story. But while the fighting was going on, some of
8 the people that we arrested said that ECOMOG had returned the
9 weapons as I am speaking to him.

11:22:18 10 Q. Now, help us. ECOMOG was mainly composed of Nigerian
11 soldiers, is that right?

12 A. Mainly, yes.

13 Q. Were you on good terms with now President Abubakar?

14 A. Very good terms.

11:22:35 15 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. Why would President Abubakar's
16 soldiers in Liberia want to do that?

17 A. You have to distinguish between what is going on at the top
18 in these countries and what is going on at the middle sector and
19 even at the very bottom. General Abubakar, very decent man. He
11:23:02 20 was chief of army staff - of defence staff under the late Abacha.
21 He takes over as President. A very good man. No questions. No
22 problems. He is just coming into office and he is pursuing the
23 line, but don't forget you have senior officers in ECOMOG that do
24 not agree or want to accept that there is a change that there is
11:23:27 25 a constitutional President in Liberia and that now the mission
26 must change. Some of them do not accept this change. What
27 change am I talking about? Peacekeeping versus capacity
28 building.

29 Now you hear your orders come from the President of Liberia

1 as regards not ECOMOG's activities, but as regards what those
2 ECOMOG troops do in Liberia. That is the - some of them do not
3 accept it. And this is why under there I do not think for a
4 minute General Abubakar knew what was going on, but in this the
11:24:07 5 very attitude of General Shelpidi, after General Malu goes, is an
6 indication of dissatisfaction.

7 I mean, the very - and remember at one point in evidence
8 I led here my convoy is buzzed around February. Remember they fly
9 all around the capital. Tanks are deployed throughout the city.
11:24:33 10 Later on we tried to mend it by saying, "Oh, these are some new
11 pilots that just came in and they are practising", and we say,
12 "Okay, fine. Listen, okay, you want to practice. Tell us and we
13 will show you where to go. Don't fly around the presidency and
14 over the President's convoy in this way."

11:24:53 15 So there is hostility, okay, with certain segments of the
16 armed forces that see that Liberians are ungrateful people. "We
17 have come out, we have helped them and now they are trying to
18 restrict our activities." This is the general situation. I
19 don't think the President approved it. I don't think he knew
11:25:12 20 what was going on.

21 Q. "... uncovered in the cemetery of Central Monrovia. It
22 was this fact that enabled Roosevelt Johnson's supporters to put
23 up a ten hour fight.

24 The President also informed me about his plan to address
11:25:24 25 the nation on the current state of affairs in Liberia later in
26 the afternoon today.

27 At 2 p.m. I met with the director of police at his
28 residence to obtain firsthand information about the security
29 situation around the environs of the US embassy. He updated me

1 on the current situation and confirmed the information provided
2 in paragraph 1 above.

3 At 2.35 I met with Bauman, charge d'affaires US mission,
4 Rudy Thomas, director of USAID, and other members of the US
11:26:05 5 embassy. The embassy staff were all in combat gear - crash
6 helmets, bullet proof vests. They also carried handguns. Bauman
7 informed me that prominent Krahns, namely Roosevelt Johnson,
8 George Dweh, the former member of the transitional assembly and a
9 close confidante of Roosevelt Johnson, Amos Lincoln, former
11:26:33 10 general of the defunct ULIMO-J and deputy minister of rural
11 development and two sons of Roosevelt Johnson were in the custody
12 of the embassy."

13 Pause there. Tell me, Mr Taylor, when you appointed Amos
14 Lincoln as deputy minister of rural development were you aware
11:26:52 15 that he had been a general in ULIMO-J?

16 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Yes, I even knew him personally.

17 Q. "John Bauman also informed me about his immediate interest:
18 the evacuation to Sierra Leone, via helicopter, of some
19 non-essential staff. He was afraid, however, that the
11:27:12 20 helicopters would be shot at on the erroneous assumption that
21 they were ferrying abroad Roosevelt Johnson and some of his
22 supporters. I advised that it would be useful to seek clearance
23 and assurance directly from President Taylor. He made telephone
24 calls accordingly."

11:27:33 25 Do you recall those calls, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. "At 7 minutes past 3 that afternoon at the request of
28 Bauman and from the US embassy I telephoned the Honourable Ernest
29 Eastman, minister of state for presidential affairs, to support

1 Bauman's request and to provide assurances that I would ensure
2 that only embassy personnel, not refugee seekers, board the
3 helicopters destined for Sierra Leone. I also alerted Eastman of
4 the need for the Government of Liberia to consider the
11:28:07 5 arrangements that would have to be put in place to effect the
6 handover of Liberians in the custody of the US embassy, since
7 Bauman had reacted rather favourably to the prospect of handing
8 over those particular Liberians to their government.

9 I then briefed John Bauman about my meeting with President
11:28:31 10 Taylor, emphasising that Taylor wished that I convey his strong
11 determination to respect the inviolability of the embassy
12 premises at all times. I also informed him that the President
13 would like the US to be reassured that any individual turned over
14 to his government would be treated fairly and in accordance with
11:28:49 15 the law. In this connection, I also informed him about President
16 Taylor's apprehensions and conditions regarding government
17 custody of Roosevelt Johnson.

18 Bauman informed me that he had just been in touch with the
19 State Department. He specifically said that he had talked to
11:29:08 20 Vicky Huddleston, assistant secretary of state for African
21 Affairs, and ambassador Howard Jetter."

22 We saw a photograph of Jetter last week, didn't we,
23 Mr Taylor?

24 A. That is correct, yes.

11:29:23 25 Q. "... who in turn were in touch with Madeleine Albright.
26 They were of the view that the handover of Roosevelt Johnson to
27 the Liberian authorities carried the possibility that he might be
28 killed in the process. I reiterated that President Taylor had
29 himself expressed certain reservations and conditions about

1 accepting custody of Roosevelt Johnson."

2 That is the Ibiola thing, yes?

3 A. Yes, that is correct.

4 Q. "Bauman expressed a view that Taylor would be better served
11:29:53 5 if ECOMOG could take charge of these individuals, take them or
6 rather evacuate them to a faraway country to be exiled and
7 therefore would not pose a security threat to the Government of
8 Liberia."

9 I note the time. Would that be a convenient point?

11:30:11 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that is a convenient time. We will
11 take the short adjournment and reconvene at 12 o'clock.

12 [Break taken at 11.30 p.m.]

13 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

12:02:13 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes. May it please your Honours:

16 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment we were looking at
17 this report submitted by the Secretary-General's special
18 representative to Liberia. Do you recall that?

19 A. Yes, I do.

12:02:29 20 Q. Could we go back to that document, please, just to complete
21 the narrative. It's behind divider 23 and we had just concluded
22 paragraph 21. Okay, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you have it?

12:02:53 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. "I stated clearly and somewhat categorically that the
27 United Nations could not be associated with any process or
28 activity related to the exile of any citizen. Furthermore, UNOL
29 was in no position to take custody of anybody. Reacting to the

1 position I had just taken, he pointed out that the idea of exile
2 to a far away country was a counterproposal to the one I had
3 proffered regarding the government's desire to take custody of
4 Liberians that were now in the hands of the embassy. To that I
12:03:42 5 simply reiterated my position.

6 Following another telephone call, Bauman informed me that
7 Washington had decided that its counterproposal would be
8 presented to President Taylor by Jesse Jackson. I advised him
9 that I interpreted that piece of information to also mean that I
12:04:04 10 should forthwith refrain from formally conveying to President
11 Taylor any US suggestions or proposals. He confirmed that my
12 understanding was correct. He, however, asked me whether the UN
13 would take part, along with ECOMOG, in the predetermined
14 evacuation of these individuals. I told Bauman that I was not in
12:04:31 15 a position to undertake this responsibility, as I did not even
16 have the opportunity to secure the directives of my headquarters
17 on this entire delicate issue. In any case, I informed him that
18 his government should continue to use the Jesse Jackson channel
19 to advance whatever proposal the US government might have and
12:04:54 20 that I would essentially be out of the loop once Jesse Jackson
21 commenced his contact with President Taylor. I nevertheless
22 assured him of my availability in the event that UNOL's good
23 offices could be of any use to the embassy.

24 John Bauman informed me that Madison Wion, a close
12:05:19 25 confidant of Roosevelt Johnson, was killed just outside the gates
26 of the embassy. He also wanted me to have a discussion with the
27 Krahn leaders who were in the embassy. I declined that
28 invitation; however, on my way out of the embassy I greeted them,
29 confirming that they numbered five persons."

1 So a different figure again, Mr Taylor?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. "Second meeting with President Taylor. Around 7.30 p.m.

4 UNOL received information to the effect that armed Liberian

12:06:00 5 national enforcement officers were regrouping to storm the

6 American embassy in an effort to secure the release therefrom of

7 Roosevelt Johnson. I therefore met again with President Taylor

8 at his residence at 8 p.m. He reassured me that there was no

9 truth to that information and that he had given orders to all

12:06:20 10 concerned to stay away from the American embassy.

11 I also took this opportunity to inform the President about

12 my meeting with US embassy officials and about their response to

13 the views he had shared with me during our midday meeting

14 concerning the envisaged role of Jesse Jackson. The President

12:06:40 15 indicated that he would talk to Jesse Jackson as a friend. He

16 was, however, not ready to engage in any protracted negotiation

17 with Reverend Jackson on the handover of Liberians who had sought

18 refuge in the American embassy. He went on to state that such

19 matters remain exclusively within the purview of the attorney

12:07:06 20 general, not the presidency. He was emphatic in his view that

21 the laws and procedures of Liberia should prevail. He advised

22 that the Government of Liberia will pursue those charged with

23 treason, murder, and participation in subversive activities. He

24 also stated that the Government of Liberia would insist that

12:07:23 25 those individuals be tried in Liberia and under Liberian laws.

26 He also observed that any attempt to evacuate Roosevelt

27 Johnson surreptitiously would be fraught with danger. As far as

28 he was concerned, a writ had been issued for the arrest of

29 Roosevelt Johnson on appropriate charges. Johnson was,

1 therefore, at this moment a fugitive from justice. He would so
2 inform the United States of America. He was certain, however,
3 that there was no way in which Johnson could be whisked out of
4 Liberia on a fixed winged aircraft. It would be disastrous, he
12:08:06 5 asserted, if Roosevelt Johnson were to be transferred to Sierra
6 Leone or to any country within the sub-region."

7 Now, pause there, Mr Taylor. Had you made that observation
8 about Roosevelt Johnson being taken to Sierra Leone to the
9 Secretary-General's representative?

12:08:29 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. "At this point Ernest Eastman informed President Taylor
12 that he had received a call from Howard Jetter regarding the
13 disposal of the remains of Madison Wilson. The minister of
14 presidential affairs also reported that Jetter proposed that the
12:08:46 15 remains of Wilson be handed over to the Government of Liberia. The
16 President stated categorically that that was a non-starter. As
17 far as he concerned, he had yet to officially learn that Madison
18 Wilson was dead. He went on to say that even if such information
19 was provided officially, he would want to know, among other
12:09:09 20 things, the circumstances surrounding Wilson's death. In this
21 connection, clear information should be provided as to whether
22 Wilson was killed inside or outside of the American embassy. In
23 any case, the President continued, there was need for an
24 explanation as to how Wilson's body found its way into the embassy.
12:09:32 25 If Wilson was dead, the President asked rhetorically, who - what
26 institution or government - would be responsible for announcing
27 his death?

28 During the early part of the evening, Monrovia remained
29 relatively calm. Government security forces and ECOMOG troops

1 were seen conducting joint patrols. It appears that a
2 catastrophe of high magnitude was averted. It remains to be seen
3 whether an early solution could be found for the complicated
4 problem of the Krahn leaders, who are currently in the custody of
12:10:11 5 the US embassy. It does not appear likely that the US will be
6 willing to hand over Roosevelt Johnson to the Liberian
7 authorities. In the event that an agreement is reached on the
8 evacuation of Roosevelt Johnson, it will be useful to ensure that
9 for the stability of the sub-region he is evacuated to a country
12:10:32 10 far removed from the ECOWAS sub-region."

11 Now, Mr Taylor, how seriously did you take the threat posed
12 by this whole Camp Johnson Road situation?

13 A. This was - I took it very, very, very seriously. Because
14 to get a picture of the situation at that time, explaining it
12:11:07 15 here just with these notes in the courtroom, people have to get a
16 picture of what's going on. You are involved in several weeks of
17 conflict with the United States government. A little country and
18 a little President sitting up there, African President, it's
19 tough business. But during this time we are getting advice from
12:11:34 20 diplomatic sources: Oh, be careful. We're hearing from American
21 sources that they're going to get you for this. So really it's a
22 frightening situation for me. Be careful, the Americans say
23 they're going to get you. The Americans say they're going to get
24 you. But I say why would the Americans want to get me? Well,
12:11:55 25 this is why, if you watch how - we can consistent with these
26 notes because if it had been found that we have violated
27 international agreements, we would have found ourselves in the
28 fix that we're in - that I'm in right now, okay? We have a
29 situation here where these direct - life from that time was never

1 the same for me. Never. Everything started going downhill, and
2 as we go through this trial you will see after this incident, my
3 life was changed forever. Forever. And here I am before judges
4 now from that incident, and we will go through it.

12:12:49 5 So for me it was a very serious thing. And we fought it
6 and fought it. And through the grace of Almighty God they
7 investigated themselves and found out that their embassy
8 personnel made a mistake and that issue, we never heard about it
9 after they investigated. They did not even provide us a copy of
12:13:10 10 the report. But during that time we had ruffled sufficient
11 feathers that everybody was upset that why we had prolonged this
12 and taken such decision, when a simple apology would have helped.
13 But for us, an apology would have meant the acceptance of
14 breaking international law, and that could have caused them, with
12:13:36 15 their flotilla out there, to probably come in and arrest me and
16 government officials. So it was a very serious matter for us at
17 this time.

18 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor. We've seen from the various
19 documents we've looked at that this was a situation which
12:13:50 20 developed from around about 10 August 1998 when Roosevelt Johnson
21 returned to the country surreptitiously and it continues into
22 October. So help us, during that period - so we're talking about
23 over two months - how much of your time and head space did this
24 incident occupy?

12:14:16 25 A. I would say a lot of it. A lot of it. And while this is
26 also going on - remember this starts in August - there is an
27 incursion.

28 Q. There is what?

29 A. An incursion into Liberia.

1 Q. When?

2 A. In August. In August. There's an inversion out of Guinea
3 into Liberia just before this. So we are dealing with a host of
4 problems and we are beginning to connect all of these things.

12:14:51 5 Q. Now, this incursion you're telling us about, Mr Taylor, did
6 you discuss it with anyone?

7 A. I think one of the good things that happened to us was that
8 the presence of the special representative of the
9 Secretary-General in Liberia --

12:15:10 10 Q. Who are we talking about?

11 A. Felix Downes-Thomas. I think the presence in Liberia
12 helped us. We did not keep him - everything - in fact, every
13 discussion we that had, whether with any crisis situation
14 regarding Liberia or regarding Sierra Leone, we made absolutely
15 sure as a neutral party to have him or one of his aids present.
16 I discussed this matter fully with him, okay? He did reports on
17 this matter to New York about this August incursion, okay, just
18 to be followed by this September fracas in Monrovia. I kept him
19 in the loop.

12:15:51 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes. Now before I move on could I ask,
21 please, that that document we looked at behind tab 23, which is
22 the code cable from Felix Downes-Thomas to Prendergast/Miyet,
23 United Nations, New York, dated 20 September 1998 on the subject
24 matter of the Camp Johnson Road incident of 18 September 1998 and
12:16:26 25 subsequent development, could that be marked for identification,
26 please, MFI-51?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is now marked MFI-51.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now, in light of what you've just told me, Mr Taylor, I'd

1 Like us, please, to look at a document behind divider 22. Do you
2 have that document before you now, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. As we can see, the document is entitled "Lofa - Overall
12:17:41 5 Situation", and it's from Downes-Thomas, Representative,
6 Secretary-General UNOL, Monrovia, to Prendergast, United Nations,
7 New York, and it's dated 17 August 1998:

8 "The incursion into Lofa County has exercised the energies
9 of the Government of Liberia authorities. It has also been, up
12:18:08 10 to now, the main focus of the local media. Yesterday President
11 Taylor met with a group of eminent persons to brief on, and
12 discuss with them, the situation in Lofa. Alluding to the
13 attackers of Lofa, he assured the group that 'nobody is going to
14 remain on one inch of Liberian soil.' Of some significance is
12:18:30 15 the statement by the President that 'under international law we
16 have a right to defend ourselves, but we can't because our hands
17 are tied.' He went on to say, 'I can assure you Liberia will
18 seek military assistance from our friends in terms of troops'."

19 Let us pause there. Question number one, Mr Taylor: From
12:18:53 20 where had this incursion come?

21 A. Guinea.

22 Q. Guinea. And what had the incursion involved?

23 A. An attack. They attacked, came across the border. Just -
24 this is the right time to use the word probe. You will find what
12:19:18 25 these guys do, come, open suppressive fire, attack, and then you
26 manage to overwhelm them, and then they just disappear back in
27 the forest.

28 Q. And so this would have been a year after you had been
29 inaugurated as President?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. And when you are quoted by Mr Downes-Thomas as saying, "We
3 have a right to defend ourselves, but we can't because our hands
4 are tied", what did you mean by that?

12:19:45 5 A. We have no weapons. Don't forget, for the Court, we are
6 disarmed before I go for elections. The weapons are not given
7 back to me after I'm inaugurated as President on 2 August 1997.
8 We are - we survive because ECOMOG is supposed to be helping out
9 with security. The Government of Liberia has no arms whatsoever,
12:20:11 10 ammunition, artillery, nothing. My security forces are walking
11 around with nothing in their hands. Nothing.

12 Q. "He went on to say, 'I can assure you Liberia will seek
13 military assistance from our friends in terms of troops'." From
14 whom would you have sought such assistance?

12:20:31 15 A. Anybody that showed some sympathy to us. Yes, you have a
16 country without arms and if they come under attack, I would have
17 probably asked General Abubakar to help. I would have definitely
18 probably asked La Cote d'Ivoire. I probably would have asked
19 Burkina Faso and Ghana. But anybody that would have wanted to
12:20:57 20 help us, I mean, this would have been a desperate situation.

21 Q. "The mood in Monrovia is somber. Accounting for this is
22 the recent tragic plane crash in which the lives of the police
23 top brass were lost and the Lofa incursion."

24 What plane crash is this, Mr Taylor?

12:21:19 25 A. This is - there was a little accident that we had with a
26 small aircraft that involved the lives of some our people.

27 Q. "The antiwar sentiment currently being expressed by the
28 populace is laced with incipient jingoism. 'We are tired of
29 fighting. We don't want war any more. We will defend our

1 country. We will never again run away from Liberia to become
2 refugees.' The ministry of defence informs that ex-combatants
3 are reporting at its headquarters voluntarily and in significant
4 numbers for recruitment as fighters in Lofa."

12:21:59 5 Was that taking place, Mr Taylor, people volunteering to go
6 to fight in Lofa?

7 A. Yes, but I think we may have to look at this - I do sense a
8 little problem here that - I think that needs to be looked at
9 anyway.

12:22:52 10 Q. What's that? What problem is that?

11 A. I think there is - this - we may be looking at the wrong
12 document here if I'm correct about this. But anyway, this -
13 well, this looks like there are some problems here with dates as
14 my recollection goes, but --

12:23:20 15 Q. Take your time, Mr Taylor, and review the document to see
16 if it's the document you had in mind when we first introduced the
17 topic.

18 A. No, this is definitely not the document. As to the events
19 that I'm recollecting, this is not the document that refers to
20 that particular event. I think there is a problem here with

12:23:40 21 the --

22 Q. With what?

23 A. This situation is not occurring at - I think there's a date
24 problem here. There's a date problem. I think there is a date
12:23:56 25 problem, because this is the situation that is occurring in '99
26 and not 1998, and I think we ought to - I think with this
27 transmitter here he's describing the wrong situation here, in my
28 recollection of it, yes.

29 Q. Very well.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, if you look at page 2,
2 paragraph C, you see they refer to August 1999, not '98.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes, this is supposed to be - this event is
4 occurring in 1999, so he has wrongly dated this. This is my
12:24:38 5 observation.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Right, let's leave this document
7 then, and we'll come back to it at a later stage. And I note in
8 passing this is the second document that we've looked at which
9 has been misdated in this way. Do you recall we looked at one
12:24:59 10 for February '98 when in fact it was February '99. Okay.

11 Q. In any event, Mr Taylor, let's just deal with and clear up
12 one or two aspects regarding events in 1998, the summer. Now, do
13 you recall last week you told us about a meeting you'd been
14 invited to by President Abubakar in Abuja to meet with the
12:25:31 15 Secretary-General?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And also with Tejan Kabbah?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Help us, at the end of that meeting was any document
12:25:41 20 prepared?

21 A. Yes. We prepared a communique that was signed by all of
22 us, the Secretary-General, President Kabbah, President
23 Abdul salami Abubakar and myself that dealt with the Sierra
24 Leonean problem and specifically non-aggression and cooperations
12:26:11 25 between the Mano River Union countries.

26 Q. Could we please look at page 298 of the presidential
27 papers, please. Page 298. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. What is this document?

1 A. This is the document following a letter that President
2 Abubakar wrote me inviting me to meet in Abuja with him in the
3 presence of Secretary-General Annan. That was late June, but the
4 meeting occurred in July. This is that. We meet in Abuja, and
12:27:29 5 this is the communique from that meeting.

6 Q. Let's look at what it says, shall we:

7 "On 1 July 1998, at the initiative of the Secretary-General
8 of the United Nations, Mr Kofi A Annan, the chairman of ECOWAS
9 and Head of State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General
12:27:55 10 Abdul salami Abubakar, hosted a meeting between President Ahmad
11 Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and President Charles Ghankay Taylor
12 of Liberia.

13 The meeting was co-chaired by the chairman of ECOWAS and
14 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, addressed a number
12:28:17 15 of regional and sub-regional issues, including ways in which
16 security and cooperation between the neighbouring states of
17 Liberia and Sierra Leone could be further improved, what
18 confidence-building measures could be introduced by the two
19 governments, and what role ECOWAS and the United Nations could
12:28:37 20 play in support of these efforts.

21 The Heads of State of Sierra Leone and Liberia, in the
22 presence of the chairman of ECOWAS and the Secretary-General of
23 the United Nations, reached agreement on the following points:

24 That they strongly condemned the continuing rebel
12:29:02 25 activities in Sierra Leone as well as the horrendous atrocities
26 that had been committed there."

27 Let's pause there, Mr Taylor. Remember, let us remind
28 ourselves this is a meeting taking place after the ECOMOG
29 intervention in February.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And everyone will recall that thereafter those kicked out
3 of Freetown embarked on an orgy of violence throughout the
4 country of Sierra Leone, yes?

12:29:37 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And were you keeping abreast of that situation from your
7 embattled position in Liberia?

8 A. Yes. We must remember here that following the situation in
9 February the Committee of Five is actually seized of this matter
12:30:03 10 in Sierra Leone. We are actually seized about this matter. And
11 as a reminder to the Court, June - just at the beginning of June
12 - just before this meeting what do we have? We have the special
13 representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone writing a
14 letter to the Security Council informing them that Liberians are
12:30:41 15 involved - that most of the people supporting the junta are
16 Liberians.

17 Q. That's the document we looked at last week?

18 A. Exactly.

19 Q. That's the President of the Security Council speaking to
12:30:51 20 your representative in New York?

21 A. Exactly. Now, we have a situation and in that document
22 they've asked for an official response. That's right away. Then
23 at the end of June here you have the Secretary-General coming to
24 West Africa and asking for a meeting with me. So, yes, we are
12:31:14 25 following the situation in Sierra Leone, okay, because of this
26 level of accusation that is coming which is not coming from
27 ECOWAS but it's coming directly from UN headquarters, yes.

28 Q. "... that they strongly condemn the continued rebel
29 activities in Sierra Leone as well as the horrendous atrocities

1 that had been committed there.

2 That they were determined to cooperate to promote an end to
3 the fighting in Sierra Leone and to foster peace and security in
4 the sub-region.

12:31:53 5 That they reaffirmed the non-aggression protocol of 1986 of
6 the Mano River Union agreement and agreed to seek ways to enhance
7 its effectiveness. Special attention was drawn to the need to
8 control the activities and movements of demobilised former
9 combatants and the leaders expressly reaffirmed their commitment
12:32:17 10 not to permit their territories to be used for actions aimed at
11 destabilising the other."

12 Pause there. Mr Taylor, tell us based on what is being
13 suggested against you I'm asking you bluntly were these weasel
14 words on your part when you were agreeing these things with
12:32:50 15 President Kabbah in front of the Secretary-General of the United
16 Nations in Abuja? Were you lying?

17 A. Not at all. These were very, very serious statements that
18 I was making. They were real statements with earnesty and
19 integrity, because we had gone through this problem, we had
12:33:15 20 worked together with trying to get this junta situation under
21 control and again I don't want us to lose sight of one important
22 point. These matters that are developing are not coming from
23 ECOWAS. They're not coming from ECOWAS, okay? So even in these
24 discussions, this is the communique with the Secretary-General,
12:33:41 25 all of these matters are raised. President Kabbah and I discuss
26 it, the Secretary-General, everybody we discussed this issue and
27 as to why these matters are coming up, okay, when they should
28 not. So these are earnest, sincere words. This is not a joke.
29 We mean what we say and we say what we mean.

1 Q. "That as a further confidence building measure the two
2 leaders would exchange official visits." Did that occur?

3 A. Yes, President Kabbah visited with me.

4 Q. When?

12:34:14 5 A. For the 26th of that year, 26 July, he visited.

6 Q. For the Independence Day celebrations we talked about?

7 A. The Independence Day celebrations, yes.

8 Q. So Kabbah was there for that?

9 A. He came.

12:34:30 10 Q. And we saw that, did we not, when we looked at the speech
11 you made on that occasion? Do you remember that, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. "That both leaders would welcome and support the
14 deployment of United Nations and ECOMOG observers along the

12:34:48 15 border.

16 That both leaders called upon their citizens not to be
17 involved in destabilising activities against the other state and
18 that all those caught committing such offences should be arrested
19 and prosecuted under the laws of the arresting state.

12:35:08 20 That both leaders welcomed the initiative taken by the
21 Secretary-General and the chairman of ECOWAS in facilitating
22 their discussion and expressed their appreciation of this.

23 The three regional leaders called upon the United Nations
24 to increase its presence in Sierra Leone, in support of the
12:35:30 25 efforts being undertaken by ECOWAS and the Government of Sierra
26 Leone to promote peace and security in the country. The
27 Secretary-General of the United Nations expressed support for the
28 need to increase the United Nations presence in Sierra Leone and
29 noted that the Security Council was presently considering the

1 matter.

2 The participants expressed grave concern over the situation
3 in Guinea-Bissau and noted the ongoing consultations among ECOWAS
4 members on this matter."

12:36:08 5 What was that, Mr Taylor?

6 A. The late President Vieira and a general that - I've forgot
7 the general's name. I don't recall it. There were problems in
8 Guinea-Bissau and in fact we were considering sending troops - I
9 mean ECOMOG forces - to help in Guinea-Bissau because of the
10 conflict between President Vieira and the army general.

12:36:34

11 Q. All right. And then we see that it concludes by thanking
12 the Head of State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for hosting
13 the meeting and we see thereafter this is signed by yourself,
14 President Kabbah, President Abubakar and the Secretary-General of
15 the United Nations, yes?

12:37:02

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So that was the beginning of July, Mr Taylor. We of course
18 touched upon that last week --

19 A. Yes.

12:37:14

20 Q. -- and we saw the letter of invitation. We then dealt
21 with, did we not, the Independence Day celebrations?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And we moved on to deal within August, among other things,
24 that letter which had been sent from the Liberian ambassador in
25 Guinea?

12:37:35

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Now can we just pause for a moment now then, Mr Taylor, and
28 catch up on one or two things. We spent the end of Thursday and
29 the beginning of today looking at the Camp Johnson Road incident

1 and its consequences. Now I want us, please, to consider against
2 that background what else was going on. Now, remember in August
3 it had been brought to your attention that there was this group
4 of Sierra Leoneans in Guinea. Is that right?

12:38:26 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Who wanted to make contact with you?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You told us that you thereafter contacted your colleagues
9 on the Committee of Five and, as a consequence, invited Sam

12:38:45 10 Bockarie to Liberia?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. Firstly, did Sam Bockarie come to
13 Liberia as a result of that invitation?

14 A. Yes.

12:38:58 15 Q. Who brought him?

16 A. I sent one of my generals, General Menkarzon, to the border
17 and got messages and he accepted the invitation.

18 Q. How was he transported to Monrovia?

19 A. He was driven. He was driven all the way.

12:39:20 20 Q. Were ECOMOG aware - that is ECOMOG stationed in Liberia -
21 that Bockarie was coming?

22 A. Oh, yes. ECOWAS - I mean ECOMOG was aware. Tejan Kabbah
23 was aware. In fact as we go further we will get to know that the
24 issue of some of these leaders, whether it's from the RUF or the
12:39:47 25 AFRC, travelling out of Sierra Leone were an issue of discussion
26 during that general period. So they were very well aware. There
27 was nothing hidden about Bockarie's coming to Liberia. I
28 informed my colleagues and they were aware.

29 Q. Next question is when was it that Bockarie arrived? Can

1 you help us with a month?

2 A. Yes, Bockarie first arrived in Liberia on my invitation in
3 about - I would say about midway September going - I would put it
4 that, if I am not mistaken, Bockarie came and left just before I
12:40:40 5 travelled to Europe was about the first meeting.

6 Q. To Europe for what?

7 A. I came on an official visit to France in late September of
8 '98.

9 Q. And your recollection is that Bockarie came just prior to
12:40:55 10 that?

11 A. Just - yes. This is the best of my recollection, because I
12 know he had come and left before I came to Europe.

13 Q. And help us, when he came for how long did he stay?

14 A. Bockarie stayed in Liberia just for a few days, two or
12:41:13 15 three days. The initial meeting talking about the problems and
16 what could be done to stop the fighting, because don't let's
17 forget the February incident did not stop the fighting in Sierra
18 Leone. The fighting was continuous. It was ongoing. After the
19 Freetown intervention, it didn't stop. They were fighting all
12:41:40 20 over the country. The Kamajors, ECOMOG, massive fighting, and
21 everyone was trying to find a solution. So our colleagues saw
22 this as an opportunity when they were told that Bockarie had sent
23 - you know, was trying to get to me they saw it was an
24 opportunity for him to come in. So there is heavy fighting
12:42:04 25 before that time.

26 Q. And I'm anxious for us to get as much detail as possible,
27 Mr Taylor, about this because it's a matter of importance. Help
28 us, did Bockarie come by himself or was he accompanied by other
29 members of the RUF?

1 A. Bockarie came with other individuals. I don't remember all
2 of their names, but I do believe that the gentleman that had gone
3 to the embassy did come.

4 Q. Which gentleman?

12:42:38 5 A. Mr Eddie Kanneh. I'm sure Eddie could have come. I don't
6 remember the other individuals, but there were several people
7 that came along with him. In fact a lot of people came with
8 Bockarie, not counting the official delegation. I don't know the
9 number of security personnel, because this is supposed to be the
12:43:02 10 guy on the ground. We did not disrupt the number of security
11 personnel to say that, "Well, you cannot come into Liberia with
12 security." So he brought a sizable delegation with him,
13 including bodyguards and different things. I don't quite recall
14 all of the people. Most times when you meet leaders in these
12:43:25 15 meetings you know the head of delegation. You are introduced to
16 the rest of the people, but you very rarely remember all of them.
17 I really don't.

18 Q. Don't worry, Mr Taylor, I'm sure we all understand. More
19 detail, where was he kept?

12:43:40 20 A. The first meeting that Bockarie came to Liberia we kept him
21 at a hotel and it was very cumbersome, because we did have a
22 problem. Bockarie had come to Liberia, but we had a very good
23 relationship with the Government of Sierra Leone. And so it was
24 harder to provide security at the hotel, because we don't know
12:44:02 25 who might go after them from the Sierra Leonean side or who they
26 might go against, so it was a little more difficult. So by the
27 second time we adjusted that strategy.

28 Q. We'll come to the second time in due course, but I'm still
29 concentrating on the first. Now help us, what did you discuss

1 with him?

2 A. How to bring about first of all, the concern of all of us,
3 a cessation of hostilities. How do we get the fighting stopped.

4 Let me emphasise here by the time the junta have been expelled
12:44:47 5 from Sierra Leone, for some strange reason all of our attention
6 in ECOWAS focused on the RUF. There was not a moment that we -
7 the junta business for us - and I'm saying "strangely" because -
8 everyone started focusing on the RUF because it appeared to
9 everyone that the Sierra Leonean armed forces that really

12:45:18 10 connected with the RUF that called themselves the junta, in fact
11 would have never been a real problem. Do you understand me? So
12 everybody started focusing on the RUF and how we could go back to
13 implementing the November 1996 agreement from La Cote d'Ivoire.

14 This was our - in fact, as I spoke to my colleagues about
12:45:47 15 Bockarie coming - and I'm saying they saw it as an opportunity -
16 this was the opportunity to get back this November 1996
17 agreement, because a lot of us felt that if that agreement had
18 been fully implemented, we probably would not have had the
19 situation of the junta trying to take over and inviting this. So
12:46:12 20 this is our preoccupation.

21 Q. And tell me, Mr Taylor, two things before I forget them:
22 Firstly, had you met Bockarie before?

23 A. Never. Never ever had I ever met Sam Bockarie. I had
24 heard of Bockarie. Even those days that Foday Sankoh came to
12:46:34 25 Liberia he never brought Sam Bockarie. I did not know Bockarie.
26 And in fact, of maybe one or two little truths that I heard in
27 this Court, when I met Foday Sankoh in those years of 1991 up
28 until '92 - when leaders come to talk, they don't bring in
29 bodyguards and all that. They don't enter. I knew Foday Sankoh

1 came at that time, he saw me, he never - I had never known Sam
2 Bockarie, ever, but I had heard of the name because here is Foday
3 Sankoh now in this trouble, and Bockarie is the senior general on
4 the ground. So we're hearing the Bockarie, Bockarie, Bockarie,
12:47:23 5 Mosquito.

6 Q. Now mentioning that fact, Bockarie comes in September.
7 Likewise in September, Mr Taylor, do you recall Foday Sankoh had
8 been put on trial in Sierra Leone for treason?

9 A. Well, that's about this time. Isn't it a little earlier,
12:47:46 10 by my recollection? I'm not sure, but I think it may have come a
11 little - if I'm not mistaken, it could be as early as
12 July/August. I'm not too sure, but I think it's a little
13 earlier.

14 Q. Because it's a judicially noted fact, CMS 370, that in
12:48:06 15 October 1998 Foday Sankoh was found guilty of treason and
16 sentenced to death in the High Court of Sierra Leone?

17 A. I think the trial starts a little earlier, from my
18 recollection.

19 Q. But in any event, that being so it means that when you're
12:48:21 20 meeting with Bockarie, the situation in Sierra Leone is that
21 Sankoh is on trial and he's convicted later and at this stage,
22 Mr Taylor, is Bockarie, in the absence of Sankoh, recognised as
23 the leader of the RUF?

24 A. Don't let's forget, let me remind the Court, upon the
12:48:52 25 arrest of Sam Bockarie in Nigeria, don't let's forget --

26 Q. Of Sam Bockarie?

27 A. Excuse me. The arrest of Sankoh in Nigeria, there's
28 evidence before this Court that Sankoh instructs the RUF to join
29 the junta and it is - there's evidence before this Court that

1 that was done on the radio where it was recorded, and so the most
2 senior person that is already on board that goes to Freetown and
3 commanding is Sam Bockarie, but that authorisation comes from
4 Sankoh. Let's go back to his initial arrest, yes.

12:49:35 5 Q. And so this meeting with Bockarie, you say that Kabbah knew
6 about it?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was Kabbah enthusiastic about the idea, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes. I must admit, everybody wanted to see how we could
12:50:07 10 broker something immediately. We were trying as a group and we
11 were trying individually with the acquiescence of everybody. An
12 example: Remember at a meeting held in Abuja in dealing with the
13 junta, President Conte asked if they could rush over and see if
14 he could fix it. So right after the Abuja meeting they rushed
12:50:29 15 down to Conakry. So we all see this as an opportunity: Well,
16 since this guy is making this effort, okay, let's see what we can
17 do. Let's look at it. So he's enthusiastic about it, yes.

18 Q. And you saw this as an opportunity to do what?

19 A. To try to stop the violence, okay? The war doesn't end in
12:50:55 20 February. It does not end. There are attacks all over the
21 country. ECOMOG is moving forward, along with the Kamajors.
22 There's fighting all over and I don't know all the towns, I've
23 never been to Sierra Leone, I don't know the towns, villages, but
24 there's fighting. The fighting doesn't stop. And what we are
12:51:16 25 trying to do now is to get a cessation of hostilities, a
26 ceasefire as quickly as we can so we can begin to implement that
27 agreement that had been signed in the United States.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, are you sure this was not a clandestine meeting
29 you had organised in order to give orders to your underling?

1 A. Well, if I understand the - no, as a direct answer. But if
2 I understand clandestine, if it had been a clandestine meeting I
3 would not have informed my colleagues and it would not have been
4 done with their acquiescence. And by the way, all of those
12:51:58 5 meetings, at the end of every meeting they were informed again.
6 So there's nothing clandestine that you - if you want something
7 done clandestine, you don't put people in the loop. Every member
8 of that committee, we work with consultations.

9 Q. What was Bockarie's reaction to you?

12:52:18 10 A. Well, Bockarie had - by the time he reached to me, he had
11 some respect for me. He had known of the former relationship
12 between Sankoh and myself. He was a senior officer at the time.
13 He didn't have the opportunity to come to Liberia, so he knew.
14 He had some big concerns. In fact, one of the principal concerns
12:52:43 15 in that meeting was the release of Sankoh. But he felt that my
16 experience as a pan-Africanist would probably help in getting the
17 problem resolved, getting their leader out of jail, and then
18 moving the peace process forward. This was his general
19 impression that I got.

12:53:06 20 Q. And Mr Taylor, I'll ask you bluntly: You tell us this was
21 the first time you were meeting Bockarie. Did he bring you a
22 little introductory gift like, you know, a mayonnaise jar full of
23 diamonds?

24 A. No, he did not.

12:53:25 25 Q. Are you sure?

26 A. I'm very, very sure. And even those that came along with
27 him, if we can get some of them here, will tell you that there
28 was no such. In fact, it would have been silly for him to have
29 done such nonsense, because that would not have been tolerated by

1 me.

2 Q. Now, you said that visit, Mr Taylor, came just prior to
3 your departure on an official visit to France, yes?

4 A. Mm-hm.

12:54:10 5 Q. Now, can we go to the presidential papers, page 140.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, while we're turning to that
7 page, let me take the opportunity to seek clarification. There
8 is a document, I think, in these papers where a date was wrongly
9 cited as 1998 instead of '99, but the evidence on record is that
10 there was an incursion from Guinea in 1998. That evidence
11 remains, does it?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, let me ask Mr Taylor.

13 THE WITNESS: No, the incursion occurred, your Honour, in
14 1999.

12:54:53 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. So there was no incursion in 1998?

17 A. No, the incursion occurred in 1999. That's why when I saw
18 the document I said well, there's a date problem here.

19 Q. Okay. Just one moment before we move on. I'm helpfully
12:55:10 20 reminded - it would be helpful if we deal with this, because it
21 relates to the meeting with Bockarie.

22 At that meeting, Mr Taylor, that first meeting with
23 Bockarie - let's leave that document for the minute, please. I
24 just want to clarify something about the meeting with Bockarie.

12:55:33 25 At that meeting with Bockarie, was any witness who testified in
26 this case present during that meeting?

27 A. I cannot recollect, quite frankly. The only person that I
28 can think about, because I saw that person more than once on - I
29 would say the second meeting - was Eddie Kanneh, who was a very

1 close friend to him. There may have been - I would not be able
2 to remember the faces or the names. When we met in the closed
3 session with Bockarie, there were not too many people. Maybe
4 two, three persons. I really don't - I don't remember any of the
12:56:38 5 faces of those that came here. I remember --

6 Q. Well, let me specific, Mr Taylor. Was Varmuyan Sheriff
7 present?

8 A. No, no, no. Varmuyan Sheriff could never be involved in a
9 meeting with me speaking to the leadership of the RUF. A

12:56:56 10 security captain working at the SSS in Liberia, a Secret Service
11 personnel sitting in a meeting with the President of the Republic
12 of Liberia talking to the leader of a rebel group or another - it
13 doesn't happen. Ever. He could have never been in such a
14 meeting. What would a Secret Service personnel be doing in a
12:57:27 15 meeting with the President talking to the leader from a different
16 country? What would he be doing there?

17 Q. And help us, where did that meeting take place?

18 A. That meeting took place at the Executive Mansion.

19 Q. And was it just one meeting or more than one meeting with
12:57:50 20 Bockarie, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, give me some clarification. When you say more than one
22 meeting, are you talking in terms of one visit, meeting several
23 times, or at different --

24 Q. No, one visit. I'm still just talking about that first
12:58:09 25 visit. Did you meet on more than one occasion?

26 A. Yes, we met more than once, yes.

27 Q. And were all those meetings at the Executive Mansion?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. I asked you about him giving you anything. Did you give

1 him anything?

2 A. On that first visit, no; but later on, yes.

3 Q. Now I'm just dealing with the first visit, Mr Taylor.

4 We'll come to later visits. Did you give him any cash? First
12:58:46 5 visit, remember.

6 A. Yes, it's possible. It's possible and even probable, I may
7 say, that I would have given him cash because this is a system
8 that most Presidents use. Bockarie coming from the bush, it
9 would be normal and I would be lost if I didn't do it. It would
12:59:12 10 be normal to give them some money to do some shopping in town.
11 So I can almost say it's probable that I did.

12 Q. Do you have a firm recollection of having done it, or are
13 you saying this would be the normal practice?

14 A. Well, as far as my recollection goes, I can just about say
12:59:32 15 yes I did. You know, it's what I'm saying it would be out of the
16 ordinary if I didn't do that, so I can say I did.

17 Q. And was that money given to him to purchase arms and
18 ammunition?

19 A. No, no, no, no, no, no. What we are talking about is I did
12:59:53 20 it for him, even when Johnny Paul Koroma came when I sent - when
21 we got him into Liberia, I did the same. No, when you come
22 Presidents will - what we do is we do envelopes, maybe \$1,000 or
23 \$2,000. We will give it to you for you and your boys to go out,
24 have a good time, maybe buy some new jeans, sneakers. The boys,
13:00:19 25 you know, that kind of - no, no, no.

26 Q. And let's move on from the cash. Did you give him any
27 radio equipment?

28 A. On this trip, no.

29 Q. Did you give him a satellite phone?

1 A. On this trip, no.

2 Q. Did you promote Sam Bockarie to general?

3 A. No, no, no, no, no, no. Why would I do that? Sam Bockarie
4 is not my - he is not my military personnel. How could I promote
13:00:54 5 him?

6 Q. Did you give him a jeep?

7 A. No, no, I did not.

8 Q. Did you appoint him commander of the RUF?

9 A. No, I did not. Foday Sankoh did.

13:01:06 10 Q. Did you give any medicines?

11 A. No. Not on this trip, no.

12 Q. Did you give him any uniforms?

13 A. No, I did not. No.

14 Q. Did you promise him a safe house in Monrovia?

13:01:22 15 A. Not a safe house, no. No.

16 Q. Did you promise him any accommodation in Monrovia?

17 A. On this trip, yes, we discussed I mean some accommodation
18 as far as offices and other things. Yes, we discussed that.

19 Q. Why did you discuss that?

13:01:45 20 A. Well, Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia and we hold these
21 discussions. As usual there are promises, "Well, okay", you
22 know, "we will begin to work on this." The first thing that
23 comes to mind is security, but also how do we remain in contact
24 with them following this meeting. It is of principal concern to
13:02:18 25 us and, mind you, I want to remind you while these discussions
26 are going on there are telephone calls being made from Monrovia,
27 to Abidjan, to Abuja. I'm talking about contacting our
28 colleagues, "How is it going?" Everybody is anxious. "How are
29 the talks going on?" "Well, fine."

1 And then what we decided to do was to adopt the same
2 principle another member of the Committee of Five had adopted
3 before. We know who the members of the committee are and I'm
4 referring to La Cote d'Ivoire that had provided - and I'm saying
13:02:59 5 no to safe house, it was not a safe house, but the idea of a
6 location that could be secured where you wanted that could remain
7 in constant contact as a way of resolving the conflict over time
8 that we would not always have to wonder, "How do we reach you?"
9 So we did discuss using the method that was used by La Cote
13:03:26 10 d'Ivoire in the Sankoh case to reintroduce that as a way of
11 maintaining contact.

12 Q. And do you recall a witness telling this Court about being
13 located in Cote d'Ivoire, yes?

14 A. Yes, I do.

13:03:41 15 Q. In 1996, yes?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. And do you recall other evidence about an external RUF
18 delegation who were located in Cote d'Ivoire?

19 A. Yes, I do.

13:03:54 20 Q. Indeed, can you recall some anger being expressed at the
21 refusal of Foday Sankoh to share some of the largesse he had been
22 provided with by the Ivorian government with the other Sierra
23 Leoneans present in that country?

24 A. Yes.

13:04:10 25 Q. Do you remember all of that?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. So when you were offering such facilities or discussing
28 such facilities with Bockarie, did you consider that you were in
29 effect creating a safe haven for the RUF in Liberia?

1 A. Well, we didn't look at it that way and I'm using that word
2 "we" as it involves the ECOWAS. Look, I acted with the knowledge
3 and consent of I can say ECOWAS, because we were acting as a
4 committee, and everything that was done there was ECOWAS. So I'm
13:04:52 5 not going to say "I". I'm going to say "we acted". My colleague
6 in la Cote d'Ivoire had said that the process was very useful as
7 had been introduced by la Cote d'Ivoire at the time in making
8 sure that people were centralised and you know who you're dealing
9 with. So we acted at that particular time in that manner and we
13:05:18 10 did not look at it as such.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment please, Mr President?

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

14 Q. Now we're still dealing with that initial meeting with
13:05:41 15 Bockarie, Mr Taylor. Help me, was Benjamin Yeaten present at any
16 of those meetings with Bockarie?

17 A. It is possible Benjamin could have been in the room, or
18 maybe some other senior. It depends on who was on duty at the
19 time and let me tell you what I'm referring to. The President
13:06:08 20 meeting in a room with a delegation like that there would always
21 be a Secret Service personnel in there, especially this is a
22 group coming and these are military people. If the Secret
23 Service director was not in, another senior Secret Service
24 personnel would be not a part of the discussion, but would be in
13:06:27 25 the room maybe standing in the corner, or something like that.

26 Q. And help me, Mr Taylor. Can you assist as to whether, to
27 your knowledge at that time, Bockarie and Yeaten knew each other?

28 A. I really don't know. It's possible and I want to use the
29 word "possible", not "probable". It is possible because with

1 combatants they could have known each other during that period
2 '91/'92, I don't know. These soldier boys, soldiers have their
3 own society. Military people know each other very well. I'm not
4 - I cannot be sure. The person that I know and I have mentioned
13:07:18 5 to this Court that knew Bockarie at that time, because he used to
6 go in and inspect the people at the border area there, was
7 General Menkarzon - Dopee Menkarzon. I'm not sure if Benjamin
8 knew him. I'm not sure of that.

9 Q. And do you know whether, for example as a result of this
13:07:41 10 trip, an eventual relation developed between Bockarie and Yeaten?

11 A. Yes, I would say yes and for the very reason that Benjamin
12 Yeaten at this time is director of the Secret Service and he is
13 the most senior security person that is responsible for Bockarie
14 coming in the country, responsible for his security while he's in
13:08:12 15 the country and making sure that he's out of the country safely.

16 That's the work of the Secret Service. So it is highly probable
17 that they could have gotten to know each other and developed a
18 friendship.

19 Q. And tell me, Mr Taylor, were you monitoring their
13:08:29 20 relationship; that is the relationship between Yeaten and
21 Bockarie?

22 A. No, I'm the President. I wouldn't even - I'm just saying
23 to you that I am sure that because of their positions they could
24 become friends. At my level I wouldn't even know who is friendly
13:08:45 25 or who is doing what, no.

26 Q. Now also when Bockarie returned to Sierra Leone, did you
27 send any fighters back with him?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Combatants?

1 A. No, why would I send fighters back? No, no.

2 Q. Did you send any arms and ammunition back with him?

3 A. I did not send any arms or ammunition back with him because
4 I didn't - my own security did not have arms and ammunition. The

13:09:19 5 only armed people in Liberia at this time are still ECOMOG.

6 Remember in documents that we just read where I'm talking about
7 if we come, you know, the security don't have any weapons.

8 ECOMOG and the United Nations have all of the weapons - all.

9 Q. Did you plan any operations with him whilst he was in
10 Liberia?

13:09:41

11 A. No, of course not.

12 Q. Did you mention any particular targets for him whilst he
13 was in Liberia?

14 A. No. The only thing I wanted from Sam Bockarie, that all of
15 us wanted, cessation of hostilities in Sierra Leone that we could
16 return to normalcy in the country. That was my preoccupation.
17 That was our preoccupation. That's what all of our colleagues
18 expected of me. That's what I did for ECOWAS.

13:09:59

19 Q. I will be dealing with a number of specific allegations
20 relating to the year 1998 later, but for now whilst we're on this
21 topic let me ask you this. Did you plan a mission called
22 Fitti-Fatta with Sam Bockarie?

13:10:23

23 A. What is Fitti-Fatta? I first heard about Fitti-Fatta here
24 in this courtroom. How would I plan? How would anybody -
25 anybody - believe that Charles Taylor, fighting virtually for his
26 life now - and what do I mean by that? We already have a very
27 strong warning from the United Nations about accusations that are
28 not true and I'm talking about June. Here we have a situation
29 where the President of the Security Council has invited my

13:10:49

1 ambassador and has stated what was in fact not the fact and has
2 asked for an official explanation. Here I am, the
3 Secretary-General comes to West Africa and we go to Nigeria.
4 There is nothing else on our agenda, but Sierra Leone. Tejani
13:11:43 5 comes. We sit down. We talk. For the life of me I cannot
6 understand how people come up with these kinds of things.

7 Then here I am now, Bockarie comes to Liberia on our
8 invitation and I'm supposed to be discussing with Sam Bockarie
9 something called Fitti-Fatta, or Fatta-Fitti or whatever they
13:12:07 10 want to call it. I mean it's total nonsense. I mean it does not
11 make sense. It is not true. Heaven knows it's not true, you
12 understand me?

13 Q. Mr Taylor, are you sure you weren't taking a little time
14 out from the Camp Johnson Road distraction to plan a few little
13:12:33 15 military operations - are you sure - next door in Sierra Leone?

16 A. Sure is not an appropriate word to describe how certain I
17 am.

18 Q. What does Fitti-Fatta mean, Mr Taylor?

19 A. I have no idea whatsoever what Fitti-Fatta means.

13:13:00 20 Q. Are you sure, Mr Taylor, you didn't say to Sam Bockarie on
21 that occasion, "Listen, Sam, you need to retake Kono because I
22 need a few diamonds"?

23 A. If I need diamonds in Liberia I would mine them and they
24 were plentiful. We've seen maps of diamond locations as close as
13:13:22 25 Monrovia as you can get. There were no such - this is all the
26 wild imagination of I guess what prosecutors do. This is total
27 foolishness. It doesn't make any sense.

28 Maybe if we understand some of these things about precious
29 minerals in some of our countries, it is not as complicated as

1 the west. It's far from being complicated. Liberia, Sierra
2 Leone, Guinea, for some reason people just need to know. Gold,
3 diamonds, these are not issues that people look at in these
4 complicated ways as you will find in the west where some of these
13:14:15 5 western ideas pour into our country. People don't look at it.

6 Listen, we've seen evidence before this Court of diamonds
7 being exported from The Gambia. The Gambia does not have
8 diamonds. Mali exported diamonds. Look, we get wrapped up in
9 this whole thing. The West African sub-region, the relationship
13:14:41 10 between West African countries, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,
11 Mali, coming on down, it is never the way you hear in this Court
12 that it's supposed to be as though a diamond is a commodity in
13 West Africa that Presidents have to connive to mine.

14 Come on, people mine diamonds all over Sierra Leone. There
13:15:08 15 are people that have their farms, or what you call tribal
16 reserves, that go on there and dig gold and diamond. You go in
17 West Africa, Sierra Leone, Liberia, you see young boys with gold
18 rings and gold chains. It is not like here in the west where you
19 can't find this stuff. It's there. It's there.

13:15:26 20 So diamonds have been mined in Liberia for years. In the
21 '50s De Beers is doing diamond buying in Liberia. There are no
22 problems with that. So this whole thing that if the President of
23 Liberia wants diamonds that he has to go and take over a country,
24 my God, that's not oil. It's not like going to capture a country
13:15:56 25 to take the oil from them. Diamonds are all over the place.

26 And besides - besides - a very important thing about even
27 this whole aspect of this is that Liberia - Liberia - uses the
28 United States dollar - let me not say uses. Used the United
29 States dollar as its official currency. That's a factor maybe

1 that even attracted a lot to Liberia.

2 Q. Why?

3 A. It is - because of our close relationship with the United
4 States we used the dollar as our official currency in addition to
13:16:50 5 the Liberian dollar, but the United States dollar is legal tender
6 in Liberia. If the President of Liberia wants diamonds he will
7 go and he will mine it at one of maybe 20/30 locations.

8 Q. Mr Taylor, the fact that Liberia used the US dollar, did
9 that have a consequence in terms of the transport and sale of
13:17:18 10 diamonds?

11 A. I want to believe so. Yes, I think so.

12 Q. What consequence?

13 A. Well people from Senegal, people from Mali, people from
14 Sierra Leone, people from Guinea, they went, they bought
13:17:38 15 diamonds, they came to Liberia and they sold them because of the
16 legal tender of the United States dollar, okay? So I think one
17 of the consequences of that dollar is the fact that a lot of
18 commodities from neighbouring countries would flow into Liberia,
19 yes, because of that dollar.

13:18:00 20 Q. So it acted as a magnet?

21 A. I would say yes. I would say yes.

22 Q. We're still dealing with that meeting, Mr Taylor.

23 Mr Taylor, did you not plan the Freetown invasion with Sam
24 Bockarie at that meeting?

13:18:20 25 A. No, no. The only thing that I planned with Sam Bockarie at
26 that meeting was, "Look, stop this nonsense. Let's get a
27 ceasefire. Let's get back to the negotiation table." That's the
28 only thing I was present for.

29 Q. But, Mr Taylor, did you make arrangements to send a ten

1 wheeler truck filled with arms and ammunition to Sierra Leone in
2 order to facilitate military actions?

3 A. Well, let's look at the - no, as a direct answer, but let's
4 look at the background. Where does a ten wheeler truck come from
13:19:09 5 with arms and ammunition? I'll put it this way that, if a ten
6 wheeler truck crossed the border from Liberia into Sierra Leone
7 with arms and ammunition, it had to come from ECOMOG. And I say
8 this because we must never lose sight through the documentary
9 evidence here that Liberia had no weapons, so I don't see how a
13:19:36 10 truck would come with weapons when we do not have it. Where do
11 we get it? Our security forces are walking around with their
12 hands swinging, with nothing. Where do we get it?

13 Now, I'll tell you what happened. We get back to, you
14 know, these phantom arms being brought to Liberia in ships and
13:20:05 15 different things that I'm sure that when we look at a case here
16 in the Netherlands that we cannot divorce from some of these
17 lies, because remember there is a gentle man - these weapons that
18 were supposed to be going across in trucks, there is a gentleman
19 by the name of - well, I'm trying to get the correct Dutch
13:20:42 20 pronunciation, Guus Kouwenhoven or something they call him, who
21 is supposed to be the supplier of these weapons, sailing into
22 ships that were never built, who was put on trial here in this
23 Netherlands for war crimes because of weapons that he was
24 supplying to Taylor at that time. That this government - this
13:21:09 25 Dutch government - investigators and magistrates and all kinds
26 tried him here and eventually the judges threw it out and said
27 this was total nonsense. There were no weapons, but they made
28 these phantom supplies of weapons in truck loads and different
29 things that the Dutch Appeals Court said that it was nonsense and

1 they even asked the Court.

2 We need to bring these documents before this Court, because
3 this is the period that we're talking about, your Honours, where
4 Taylor's got weapons, sending it out, that never existed. Never
13:21:39 5 ever existed. Lies, lies, lies. We have no weapons and so there
6 can be no ten wheel trucks going anywhere.

7 Q. Tell me, Mr Taylor, who in Liberia at this time was
8 responsible for overall security?

9 A. ECOMOG. ECOMOG.

13:22:00 10 Q. Now help us, would it be possible for a ten wheeler truck
11 to drive from Monrovia all the way up to Lofa and over the border
12 into Sierra Leone and escape the attention of ECOMOG?

13 A. Impossible.

14 Q. Why?

13:22:22 15 A. Because ECOMOG is still to a great extent deployed at major
16 road positions and what, but even if you use your head properly
17 and think about it, February ECOMOG has the - is the
18 intervention. They're still fighting. They're still fighting.
19 The intervention occurs in Freetown, but ECOMOG is still fighting
13:22:49 20 upcountry. ECOMOG is going to see the Government of Liberia,
21 their soldiers are dying in Sierra Leone. They're going to see
22 truck loads of ammunition going across the border to rebel held
23 territory and accept it? Is it logical? It is not logical.

24 Q. But you were bribing the ECOMOG officers, Mr Taylor.

13:23:12 25 That's why.

26 A. Bribing them to see their brothers in arms killed?

27 Nonsense. It's nothing like that. No, no.

28 Q. Help us, given what you've told us about the state of the
29 infrastructure in Liberia how many days would it take or how much

1 time would it take for a ten wheeler truck to make it from
2 Monrovia to Sierra Leone?

13:23:50 3 A. Well, I would say the period that we're talking about, that
4 is being discussed right now, that's even the rainy season, it
5 would probably take you close to maybe five/six days on the road
6 because this is about - the rains are in right now and it would
7 be tough on the road.

8 Q. Right. Rainy season is September - what time? Tell us.

13:24:13 9 A. Well, I've heard different versions. It starts to rain in
10 Liberia somewhere around June, I think, because July is heavy
11 rain. August is still raining. September we're talking about,
12 that's the - you're almost at the centre of the storm at that
13 time.

14 Q. So about five days it would take, would it?

13:24:37 15 A. Yes. Thereabouts, yes.

16 Q. And would such a consignment require an armed escort? If
17 you were sending a ten wheeler truck, Mr Taylor, would it require
18 an armed escort?

13:25:03 19 A. I'm sure it would. Yes, it would require an armed escort.
20 With that kind of materiel, yes.

21 Q. Why would it need an armed escort?

13:25:26 22 A. Are you talking about military - you're talking about
23 military materiel. If it's going - a ten wheeler truck, if we
24 look at a ten wheeler, we are talking about - I'm not sure of the
25 tonnage. That would be a pretty big truck. So with that kind of
26 - if you were transporting military materiel, of course you would
27 want to protect it.

28 Q. And give us an idea, how many people would you want to send
29 to protect such a consignment?

1 A. Oh, boy, you would want to send quite a few people because
2 if you look at the region at the time we're one year into my
3 presidency, but there is still - just to remind the Court there
4 is still what I described in earlier testimony before this Court,
13:26:05 5 we have a situation of what I called up in the Lofa region,
6 that's the ULIMO people in that area, and so there's still what I
7 called disquiet. So we would probably for that quantity of
8 ammunition I could put it to maybe not less than maybe 20/30
9 persons to escort it.

13:26:28 10 Q. So we'd be talking about a convoy of vehicles then?

11 A. Oh, definitely.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you ever watch that movie Independence
13 Day?

14 A. I'm not too sure I have seen it, counsel.

13:26:50 15 Q. Because remember those alien spacecraft could cloak
16 themselves and make themselves invisible. Did you have that
17 ability with your trucks in Liberia at the time, to cloak them so
18 that they could pass ECOMOG checkpoints totally undetected? Did
19 you have that kind of ability?

13:27:08 20 A. No, no, that's the kind of the ability that you would
21 expect from the gods.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,
23 Mr President?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. We'll
13:27:23 25 adjourn for lunch and resume at 2.30.

26 [Lunch break taken at 1.27 p.m.]

27 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

1 Q. Mr Taylor, just before the Luncheon adjournment we were
2 dealing with the meeting you had - your first meeting with
3 Sam Bockarie. Do you recall that?

4 A. Yes, I do.

14:31:48 5 Q. Now, you told us also that that meeting was just before you
6 went on an official state visit to France?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. Is that right?

9 A. Yes, I said that - for the record, I said that he had come
14:32:11 10 and returned before I left for France. I hope I won't be
11 confronted with just before, I mean.

12 Q. Now moving on then, Mr Taylor, the visit to France, when
13 had that been arranged?

14 A. We had worked on that several months. It finally came into
14:32:36 15 place around the last week in September.

16 Q. And when we say an official visit, what is entailed in such
17 a visit, Mr Taylor?

18 A. An official visit will be one that would involve
19 discussions of maybe economic, social - well, not social.
14:33:01 20 Political and other issues with that government where there will
21 be formally - where you'll be formally received and formally
22 hosted by the government, that is.

23 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. Did you see any advantage in going
24 to France on that official visit?

14:33:28 25 A. Yes, like I said we had been working on that visit for a
26 very long time. A visit like that to a major western power and
27 permanent member of the Security Council for us was a very, very
28 important meeting. It would afford us an opportunity to even
29 talk about some of the issues that were pending before the

1 council, as it related to Liberia, and for us it was an advantage
2 to get firsthand our views outside besides the discussions with
3 the Secretary-General.

4 Q. Did you see any potential economic gains from such a visit?

14:34:13

5 A. Well economically, yes. Well, gains, we're talking about
6 more in terms of bilateral activities. Liberia at that
7 particular time was looking very seriously at this offshore oil
8 and natural gas potentials. French firms were interested. Total
9 and others were beginning to advance low level discussions. So
10 in terms of gains, it would have helped if we were able to get
11 French companies interested in investing in Liberia.

14:34:46

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I now invite the witness's attention,
13 please, to page 140 of the presidential papers, which is volume 3
14 of 3:

14:35:10

15 Q. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. Now, we see that the heading is "Taylor Visits France" and
18 then it continues, "President Taylor resurrected a 150 year old
19 relationship between Liberia and France with two successful
20 visits to Paris in September and November." Do you see that?

14:35:44

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. So it was two trips that you made?

23 A. Yes, but the November trip is of a little different kind
24 though.

14:35:57

25 Q. We'll come to the November trip in a moment, but I would
26 rather we dealt with both trips in one.

27 A. Uh-huh.

28 Q. Now, you see in the photograph there's the First Lady
29 Mrs Jewel Howard-Taylor?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. President Jacques Chirac, yes?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. Yourself?
- 14:36:15 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. And the wife of the French President, yes?
- 7 A. That is correct.
- 8 Q. And we see the date of 28 September 1998, yes?
- 9 A. That is correct.
- 14:36:27 10 Q. Now pausing for a moment, Mr Taylor, you might not be in a
11 position to be precise, but help us. How long did this trip
12 last? Are we talking about days, weeks or what?
- 13 A. No, no, days. Days.
- 14 Q. Days?
- 14:36:45 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. So would it be fair to say that for a few weeks at the end
17 of September, possibly into October, you were on an official
18 visit to France?
- 19 A. No, you just said for a few weeks.
- 14:36:58 20 Q. A few days?
- 21 A. Okay, for a few days, yes.
- 22 Q. Yes?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Now whilst we're looking at this, can we please go behind
14:37:20 25 binder 48 please. Yes, Mr Taylor?
- 26 A. Yes.
- 27 Q. It should be a photograph, DP28?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor? Do you have that?

1 A. Yes, I have it here. Yes.

2 Q. What do we see in that photograph?

3 A. At the airport in, I think this is Paris, I'm inspecting
4 the honour guard at the airport with the official who was present
14:38:21 5 there, the foreign minister of France, Bernard Kouchner.

6 Q. Are you able to give us a precise date for this photograph,
7 Mr Taylor? If not, say so.

8 A. This has to be 28th/29th. This is on arrival. This is the
9 ceremony on arrival.

14:38:44 10 Q. Right.

11 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: What month would that be?

12 THE WITNESS: September, your Honour.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we move on, Mr President, can I ask
14 that that be marked for identification MFI-53. So photo of
14:39:15 15 President Taylor's visit to France, September 1998, inspecting
16 honour guard.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think it's MFI-52, Mr Griffiths.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, it is.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: But in every other respect I'll mark it
14:39:32 20 for identification MFI-52. It's the photograph that's also been
21 labelled by the Defence as DP28.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Can we go behind divider 29 now, please:

23 Q. Help us with this one, Mr Taylor.

24 A. Yes.

14:40:18 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Did you say 25, or 29?

26 MR GRIFFITHS: DP29, behind divider 49.

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Please come again.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Behind divider 49. It's a photograph. It's
29 the one immediately after the photograph we just looked at.

1 THE WITNESS: You had said 29. That is why.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. What are we looking at in this photograph, Mr Taylor?

14:41:10

4 A. That's the same inspection at the airport. This is the end
5 of the inspection. This is the salute.

6 Q. Right. Now the gentleman standing behind you in the
7 uniform, who is that?

8 A. It's my aide-de-camp, Momo Djiba.

9 Q. Could you spell the first name for us.

14:41:24

10 A. M-O-M-O, Momo, and Djiba some people spell it with
11 D-J-I-B-A. That's Momo Djiba.

12 Q. And the gentleman in the lounge suit standing next to you
13 to your left?

14:41:53

14 A. That's the official receiving me, the Honourable Bernard
15 Kouchner.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I pause for some spellings. Bernard
17 Kouchner, B-E-R-N-A-R-D K-O-U-C-H-N-E-R. Whilst we're on the
18 topic the name Ibiola was mentioned earlier. It's Mashood
19 M-A-S-H-O-O-D, Ibiola I-B-I-O-L-A. Next Guinea-Bissau,
20 G-U-I-N-E-A B-I-S-S-A-U. And finally the President of
21 Guinea-Bissau, V-I-E-I-R-A. Could I ask again, Mr President, for
22 this photograph to be marked for identification, MFI-53.

14:42:19

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph labelled DP29 by the
24 Defence is marked for identification MFI-53.

14:43:00

25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. And can we just go over to the photograph behind the next
27 divider, please. DP30. Yes, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. The man behind you in the photograph in the uniform with

1 the gold braiding, who is that?

2 A. That's my aide-de-camp.

3 Q. Momo Djiba?

4 A. Momo Djiba, that is correct.

14:43:56 5 Q. Then yourself and then we have, do we not, Jacques Chirac,
6 the President of France?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now help us, and I wonder if you would mind changing places
9 for a minute, Mr Taylor, so you can provide us with some

14:44:11 10 assistance. The gentleman - the black man in the foreground to
11 the right, who is that?

12 A. You want to start right up here, right?

13 Q. All right, start there.

14 A. You can hardly see the face. This is the Liberian

14:44:31 15 ambassador accredited near Paris. It's Honourable Molley, that's
16 M-O-L-L-E-Y, H, that's the alphabet H, Scott, S-C-O-T-T. The
17 gentleman here, this is Mr Dupuch. I'm calling it the best way.

18 Dupuch was France's ambassador to La Cote d'Ivoire. He is now a
19 very senior adviser to President Chirac on African affairs,

14:45:14 20 Mr Dupuc. We'll have to fight on that one.

21 The gentleman right here is - the back you can see, this is

22 my chief of protocol, the late Musa Cisse. The second here is

23 the second protocol also - well, let me just describe this. You

24 have the chief of protocol at the Executive Mansion, Musa Cisse,

14:45:42 25 who works with me on a daily basis. This is the chief of

26 protocol RL for the whole republic. This is Ambassador John

27 Adolphus During. That's D-U-R-I-N-G. And of course this is the

28 French President's aide-de-camp, I don't know his name.

29 Q. Thank you very much, Mr Taylor. Can we have that marked

1 for identification, please, Mr President, MFI-54, photograph of
2 President Taylor with Jacques Chirac of France.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph which is also
4 labelled DP30 by the Defence is marked for identification MFI-54.

14:46:47

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. And finally in this regard can we go over, Mr Taylor, to
7 the next photograph, please. What do we see in this photograph,
8 Mr Taylor?

14:47:31

9 A. Here we are exchanging medals of honour. I present the
10 French President with one of the highest Liberian honour awards
11 and he presents the French one also to me. These are just
12 exchanges.

13 Q. Now, again going left to right, can you help us with who
14 else we see in this photograph?

14:47:50

15 A. Yes. Here again is the chief of protocol for the republic
16 RL, what I just mentioned, John Adolphus Durning. Here is the
17 Liberian ambassador, H Molley Scott. Of course that's me. This
18 is the chief the protocol for the Executive Mansion, Musa Cisse.
19 This of course is President Chirac. And standing here is the
20 President of the Liberian Senate, Honourable Charles Brumskinn.

14:48:27

21 That's B-R-U-M-S-K-I-N. Brumskinn, the President of the Liberian
22 Senate who is accompanying me on this visit.

23 Q. Following that visit, Mr Taylor, did you go straight back
24 to Liberia?

14:48:57

25 A. No, no, no, I did not. I made a stopover to visit another
26 colleague.

27 Q. Another what?

28 A. Colleague.

29 Q. And who was that?

1 A. I stopped over to visit the President of Mauritania.
2 Mauritania is an ECOWAS member state with some minor problems.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have marked for identification
4 before we move on that last photograph of President Taylor
14:49:28 5 receiving a medal from the French President, MFI-55, please.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: 55, that's correct, Mr Griffiths. I'll
7 also note that the photo bears the Defence Label DP-31.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes:

9 Q. Now you said Mr Taylor that having left France you stopped
14:49:50 10 over in another ECOWAS country, Mauritania, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Who were you going to see there?

13 A. The President.

14 Q. Who was the President at that time?

14:50:03 15 A. He has since been removed. I think it's Taya if I'm not
16 mistaken.

17 Q. How do you spell that?

18 A. You know those are Arabic names. They have had two or
19 three Presidents after him. I think it's Taya if I've got it
14:50:19 20 straight. We can check on that.

21 Q. Right. Now, how long did you spend in Mauritania?

22 A. Two days.

23 Q. Let's go behind the next divider to the next photograph,
24 please. What do we see there, Mr Taylor?

14:50:57 25 A. This is my being received at the airport in Mauritania. I
26 don't know any of these people. Protocol officials and
27 everything, but that's about it. Their names I don't know.

28 Q. You don't know anyone in the photograph?

29 A. No, these are all Mauritanian officials and this is - the

1 minister that is there - Mauritania is that last part of
2 Northern Africa that in fact until now state that they are not a
3 part of West Africa, so it's a little confusing when it comes to
4 Mauritania. They still say that they are not, but they are part
14:51:38 5 of ECOWAS and in and out.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask that that photograph be marked for
7 identification, please. President Charles Taylor visiting
8 Mauritania, 1998, MFI-56, please. Also DP32.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph is marked MFI-56.

14:52:07 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I pause for a spelling? President of
11 Mauritania is M-A-A-O-U-Y-A O-U-L-D S-I-D-' -A-H-M-E-D T-A-Y-A:

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, whilst we're on the topic of France, let us
13 conclude that episode before we go on to another topic. Can we
14 go back to the presidential papers in volume 3 of 3, please. Do

14:53:05 15 you have them?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Can we go, please, to page 142. I appreciate that we've
18 gone forward in time, Mr Taylor, but I wanted to conclude the
19 French visits in one. Are you with me?

14:53:43 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, as we see from the heading on this page, this is a
22 speech you gave in the French capital on 27 November 1998. Is
23 that correct?

24 A. That is correct.

14:54:02 25 Q. And the topic of this speech was "Strategic Imperatives for
26 Peace and Security in Africa". Is that right?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, why were you returning so quickly to France,
29 Mr Taylor?

1 A. Annually - France had established such good relationship
2 with Africa, there was annually what we call a France Afrique
3 summit. All Heads of State of Africa, members of the OAU, met
4 with the French government to discuss issues of mutual concern
14:54:50 5 between the continent and the Republic of France. It's called
6 the France Afrique summit. That's an annual summit. This time
7 it was being held in Paris and that's where we go.

8 Q. And were you the only person giving a speech?

9 A. All members of the Organisation of African Unity were
14:55:14 10 there. There were several other Presidents giving speeches. Not
11 many, but strategic subjects with spoken about at that particular
12 time and I delivered a speech at that summit.

13 Q. Now I want us to look at this speech, Mr Taylor, in light
14 of the allegations being made against you by this Prosecution.

14:55:41 15 We see that the title of your address is "Peace and Security in
16 Africa", yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. I'd like us please to pick up the speech, column on the
19 right, penultimate paragraph. Do you see that?

14:55:53 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. "The theme of this years' summit - Security in Africa - is
22 most appropriate, because ensuring stability and security for
23 Africa has been and constitutes one of the continent's foremost
24 preoccupation. This has attracted global interest and concern.
14:56:15 25 The absence of war does not necessarily guarantee security and
26 although the prevalence of peace does at times assure security,
27 peace and security are not mutually inclusive.

28 Security, however, appears more encompassing than peace in
29 the absence of war. Security ensures stability, and for a

1 society to be stable it must be wholesomely functioning and
2 secure in its capacity to evolve beyond the ruins of conflict.

3 The phenomena affecting insecurity and instability are
4 multi-dimensional. The concept itself can best be defined in
14:57:05 5 terms of the prevalence of certain conditions, paramount among
6 which are social harmony, mature political culture and conducive
7 economic environment where sustainable development can be
8 achieved.

9 Social harmony in a country does not mean the absence of
14:57:26 10 conflict. However, when conflicts occur, there should be some
11 built-in mechanisms for resolving them without resorting to
12 violence and armed confrontation. In the African setting,
13 achieving social harmony has such bearing on the promotion of
14 national unity, especially through an environment of inclusion
14:57:53 15 and culture of tolerance without unnecessarily imposing
16 sectionalism and tribalism upon the population, merely for
17 self-preservation in power.

18 We must therefore rely on and refer to our cultural and
19 traditional values as a means of preventing and/or controlling
14:58:16 20 whatever situations that may be emerging at any given point in
21 time."

22 Now this:

23 "The belief that African countries should have to change
24 their culture to conform to the norms of other cultures is
14:58:36 25 impractical and undesirable. Europe has not lost its culture,
26 neither has Asia or any region of our global community, and yet
27 they continue to develop. Our African culture is unique and
28 provides many rich opportunities for preventing and resolving
29 crisis and providing a secure environment. Africa needs to

1 preserve and capitalise on its culture as a means of effecting
2 credible security and stability".

3 What are you saying there, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Well, counsel, we got to find out on the continent - and I
14:59:29 5 don't care who out there may say, "Well, maybe he is speaking for
6 himself", but look. Everything that is happening on the African
7 continent must be modelled after that which is either happening
8 in Europe, or the United States, even in terms of conflict
9 resolution. Conflict resolution - and I really want to just -
14:59:54 10 I'm not talking about impunity, because I do not believe that
11 impunity that these things should go with all - but you cannot
12 begin to impose your own sets of values as regards how people
13 behave culturally, how we have lived for thousands of years among
14 ourselves, how we resolve our problems.

15:00:20 15 For example, our people are used to getting kola nuts and
16 sitting down and eating kola nuts and salt and talking it over,
17 or maybe take a chicken and slaughter it, or maybe take a sheep.
18 This whole thing where we are not given an opportunity to do
19 anything. Everybody outside of Africa knows it better than
15:00:45 20 anybody else just because they give you a little bit of money.
21 I'm just trying to say to all of our colleagues with one of the
22 major European powers, "Listen, guys".

23 It's like, you know, when I studied economics in the
24 United States there was a major argument at the time about
15:01:08 25 funding to what is called ghettos and how people on welfare
26 receive money and very, very well in the United States economists
27 and social scientists and different things argue that because
28 someone is on welfare doesn't necessarily mean you have to tell
29 this woman not - you know, are you going to tell her, "Don't have

1 any additional children because you're getting welfare money"?

2 These kinds of things in other societies they were able to
3 bring them under control. There is no such control in Africa.
4 Any one country that feels that it is in the west can come and
15:01:47 5 impose their values and tell you what to do. Even if it is
6 wrong, they still try to impose it in some way.

7 So what I'm trying to draw all of our colleagues' attention
8 to the fact that, "Look, we've got to respect our cultural
9 values. We have to respect our traditional values, you know, and
15:02:06 10 see how we can begin to solve our problems without having them
11 imposed on us by other values that really don't apply to our own
12 thing". Again, I'm saying I'm not talking about the issue of
13 impunity.

14 Q. "Appropriate national infrastructure, including access
15:02:36 15 roads to rural areas, safe drinking water, healthcare delivery,
16 education and skills development, preparedness, income generating
17 opportunities and productive livelihood systems as a means of
18 eradicating poverty must also be developed.

19 I believe that the level of development of economic and
15:02:53 20 sociopolitical culture in Africa determines the level of
21 stability and security. A high profile sociopolitical system can
22 only function in a society where a climate of awareness and
23 appreciation of that culture is broad based. It also presupposes
24 a high level of acceptance by the citizenry, as well as the
15:03:18 25 citizenry's active participation in the political process.

26 In Africa, an overwhelming number of our people are neither
27 adequately did not inform nor understand the political process by
28 which they are governed. Accordingly, they cannot appreciate it,
29 let alone approve of it, and participate validly in the process,

1 giving rise to military adventurism and coup d'etats."

2 Let's pause there again, Mr Taylor. What are you
3 explaining there?

4 A. You go into Africa right now and stop into some of these
15:04:00 5 countries and ask these people as to whether they understand what
6 these people are talking about when they are talking about
7 democracy, rule of law, all these western terminologies, our
8 people don't understand that. They have to be educated. Our
9 people do not understand these matters.

15:04:17 10 You go - I remember during the Liberian election they
11 talked about proportional representation. We had to even - what
12 do our people know about these complex systems? We have to break
13 it down, ballot boxes and different things. Years ago our people
14 got in the line and stood behind the person that they wanted to
15:04:39 15 vote - that they saw as their chief. They stood behind you. You
16 count them.

17 Some of these systems are just so complicated that I don't
18 think those that are imposing them upon us understand them fully
19 themselves, and I'm just trying to say here that we have to
15:04:52 20 educate our people and we have to bring about those systems that
21 can be explained and understood and not changing it. Most of
22 these concepts our people on the continent, I'm not talking about
23 just - even some educated people don't understand these complex.

24 So you come to us and you say, "You are a Third World
15:05:17 25 country." You bring First World ideas to us and you expect your
26 First World ideas to benefit us down here in the Third World.
27 It's like telling me that Liberia should be able to send a
28 spacecraft to land on the moon that the United States just did.

29 I'm just trying to say when you are looking at these

1 systems you have to look at them in terms of different
2 structures. You have you to look at them. You have to evaluate
3 them differently. I'm trying to get these people to say - to
4 understand and pass through to their European friends that when
15:05:56 5 you come to us maybe you ought to sit down with us and ask us,
6 "What will work? What will work for you if we did this?" Some
7 of these people come out and tell us what they know must work for
8 you. These are some of the things that I'm talking about.

9 Now I mean there may be people that may disagree with what
15:06:19 10 I'm saying, but I'm sure across the continent wherever they are
11 listening to this trial there are people that are saying, "Yes,
12 this guy knows what he is talking about", because that's the
13 problem. That's the problem. Education and getting people to
14 understand their complex systems outside of ours. All of a
15:06:35 15 sudden our systems are no longer good.

16 Q. "Abject poverty, ethnic hegemony and growing economic
17 decline along with poor economic performance in many African
18 countries continue to be a potent source of national conflicts,
19 the effect of which contribute to instability and insecurity on
15:07:02 20 the continent.

21 What African leaders must realise is that ethnic hegemony
22 is not a source of protection and security, but rather the root
23 cause of conflict because of the privilege and divisions it
24 creates and the confrontational attendant conditions for its
15:07:23 25 preservation.

26 The irony of this situation is that, even if such leaders
27 want to surrender power, they would fear surrendering power
28 because of possible retribution by those who have suffered
29 suppression and repression at the hands of state security in

1 order to perpetuate these leaders in power."

2 Pause there, Mr Taylor. What do you mean by that?

3 A. We have a typical example in Liberia. We have a typical
4 example of recent problems in Kenya after the elections in Kenya.
15:08:01 5 You have "If I am from this tribe and I get into power, all of -
6 in fact, I try to put my tribe of people into the army. I will
7 try to get my tribal people into the police. Government
8 positions are held by my tribe."

9 This tribalism it is in itself a problem, because you are
15:08:22 10 now forced to stay in power because you are afraid that if you
11 were to leave power there will be retribution from those that you
12 have suppressed and so you have this problem where people must
13 continue to hold power.

14 In Kenya we have, what? What was the problem in Kenya
15:08:44 15 between now the present Prime Minister, who became Prime
16 Minister, and the President? Well, we're talking about two
17 different tribal groups. Most of the conflict came between two
18 different groups.

19 So that's one of the problems that we have that people are
15:09:00 20 so insecure that, when you get into power, your tribal group come
21 around you to protect you, but by so doing they benefit from the
22 process, they suppress people and so you have to hold the power
23 so that you do not have retribution. This is what I'm trying to
24 explain that this tribalism must stop.

15:09:21 25 Q. "This vicious cycle characterises many of Africa's present
26 day political problems, often making their violent overthrow
27 appear to be the only option for change. African leaders must
28 provide windows for change that are genuine and take risks for
29 peaceful transitions. Opportunities must be created for foes to

1 become friends and for perceived villains to become national
2 heroes.

3 The most common conflicts occurring throughout Africa today
4 are essentially internal. For many of us present here today, we
15:09:59 5 are aware that civil crisis can be more destructive and
6 convulsive than a war between states.

7 Why? Because it sets into motion fathers against sons,
8 mothers against daughters, tribes against tribes. In addition to
9 all the internal destruction which it produces, it consumes it's
15:10:22 10 own people. Law and order are flung afar, commonsense is
11 evaporated from society, fair becomes foul and even foul is
12 transformed into fair.

13 Above all, external interference becomes the unwelcome
14 interloper which compounds the general state of insecurity
15:10:44 15 resulting from chaos. This was the situation in Liberia in the
16 1980s following the military coup d'etat that brought 17
17 noncommissioned soldiers to political power, setting off a cycle
18 of violence that would consume the energy and psyche of a whole
19 generation of my countrymen. A number of Liberian civilians
15:11:08 20 including myself, recognising this violation against our nation,
21 sought to redress this tragedy by launching a people's uprising.
22 I have never in my life joined the Liberian army or undergone any
23 military training. I ventured into this conflict situation in an
24 effort to correct what the whole world saw as the aberration of
15:11:35 25 state craft and the unravelling of our country politically,
26 socially and economically.

27 One of the most overlooked sources of conflict in Africa is
28 the policy by some leaders to view their hold on state power as
29 an end in itself. The means adopted by these leaders to achieve

1 this end lead to the creation of conditions in which the interest
2 of the leader is juxtaposed to be synonymous with the interest of
3 the state. Hence, this juxtaposition is essential in
4 legitimising and justifying the unreserved use of state power in
15:12:18 5 the name of the national interest, despite the ulterior objective
6 of the leader to entrench himself into power."

7 Pause there. Sounds like you are talking about
8 dictatorship there, Mr Taylor.

9 A. Definitely.

15:12:36 10 Q. But, Mr Taylor, many would say that you were a dictator?

11 A. Well, I would - you know that's one of those arguments that
12 people haven't really brought to me face-to-face, but sometimes
13 they talk about it. What is - to be a dictator, if we look at -
14 I'll speak about my presidency. I'm into office for six years.

15:13:06 15 I have a multiparty system going on. There is freedom of speech,
16 there is freedom of press, there is freedom of association. In
17 fact, while I'm President there's some 13 political parties in
18 office running. There is not one political party leader that was
19 arrested or harassed. Parties are functioning.

15:13:35 20 You know, we have to separate what - how you want to be
21 branded at a particular time by - because of certain situations
22 from the reality. What I'm talking about here are long
23 entrenched rulers that do not permit opposition in the country.
24 There is not one opposition leader in Liberia that can come
15:14:01 25 forward and say, "Oh, guess what, I was arrested by President
26 Taylor or I was stopped". None of this kind of thing. So that
27 whole branding or wanting to brand Taylor as a dictator, that
28 just doesn't come my way.

29 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, I'm sorry but I have to press you a little

1 further on this, because you will recall that the Prosecution
2 went to great expense to call a Liberian journalist before this
3 Court to suggest that you are precisely that; nothing but a
4 tyrant. What do you say about the evidence of Hassan Bility?

15:14:52 5 A. I would say that when I listened to Hassan Bility, I really
6 thought he was talking about somebody else. Because here is
7 Hassan Bility. There were some things that he said in his
8 statement that made some sense, but his calling me a tyrant, I
9 will tell him to go back to Webster's dictionary and look at that
15:15:25 10 meaning and look at my whole political culture at the particular
11 time when the very Hassan Bility who served as a combatant for
12 ULIMO-K worked for ULIMO-K as a reporter and never stopped the
13 war. For him here is a man who visited my house, visited
14 official functions - for him to call me a tyrant, well, I guess
15:15:54 15 when you're in those positions that he's in I guess you'll say
16 anything.

17 Q. "The danger of this policy is inherent in the means that
18 are adopted irrespective of the grave consequences for the
19 security and stability of the state. Means are defined in the
15:16:15 20 context of their efficacy in perpetuating a leader in power.
21 This practice leads to the conversion of all state auxiliaries to
22 instruments of those in power.

23 In Africa, one of the most frequent means of achieving this
24 end is the use of ethnic identity to create a political hegemony.
15:16:45 25 This ethnic political hegemony is manifested in the army, police,
26 security and in key institutions of governance and economic
27 monopolies. The nation's constitution and statutes are reduced to
28 mere symbolic instruments of those in power.

29 Some members of the international community to a certain

1 extent are responsible for the successful manipulation by such
2 leaders of the process of democratisation. In most instances the
3 superficial adherents to democratic processes, irrespective of
4 credibility of that process, is hailed as conformity and
15:17:39 5 progress. Elections are events that these leaders have come to
6 accept as an appeasement for donors and a means of sustaining
7 international recognition and legitimacy.

8 Leaders are human beings who survive through the process of
9 adaptation. Their survival is determined to a great extent by
15:18:05 10 the external situation, no matter how difficult and challenging
11 it may be. The tragedy of the policy of leadership entrenchment
12 as a means in itself is that such a policy obfuscates the
13 potential for the management of diversity in Africa as a forceful
14 progressivism.

15:18:32 15 Ethnic, religious and culture diversity, if properly
16 managed, may create a bond linked to a common destiny
17 characterised by progressive dynamism. Such a dynamism as
18 contributed to and characterised the transition from traditional
19 societies to modern states.

15:18:57 20 On the other hand, the mismanagement of such diversity has
21 led to the polarisation of society along ethnic, religious and
22 culture lines, thus undermining national unity and creating an
23 environment of insecurity and tension. The conditions created by
24 this environment, which are consciously sustained, eventually
15:19:24 25 lead to the externalisation of frustration through violence.

26 Fellow brothers, distinguished colleagues, the security and
27 stability of Africa depends not on external forces, but upon the
28 proper and efficient management of the affairs of our states.
29 Good governance is not only a responsibility; it must also be our

1 obligation and commitment. It must be guided by the common good
2 and never by sectional and personal interest."

3 Pause there. Let's confront that too, Mr Taylor. The
4 popular image of you is of someone running a country and lining
15:20:18 5 your pocket in the process; that you were involved in a little
6 personal enterprise. What do you say about that?

7 A. I would say that is total falsehood and total nonsense.
8 Look, we are in a court of law. I have heard these accusations
9 before. Taylor is supposed to have robbed the Liberian treasury
15:20:58 10 dry and Taylor - I can still remember I was by this time in
11 Nigeria and the Gyude Bryant who led the transitional government,
12 that name is on the record, was at a donors conference in
13 Washington DC and the former secretary of state of the
14 United States, a very good man, Colin Powell, in describing me or
15:21:40 15 my activities at that time said that he has assets scattered
16 around the world. We have since heard about Taylor with
17 billions. How long has it been?

18 The issue of money, having it or not having it, is about
19 ten years old now. I was still President of Liberia when I was
15:22:22 20 accused of amassing billions. I went on the national radio and I
21 announced to the Liberian people - I said to them if any human on
22 this planet earth goes to any bank anywhere in the world and
23 brings one bank account of \$100,000 belonging to Charles Taylor,
24 I said I will resign the office of President. It's been ten
15:22:57 25 years.

26 I've heard the United Nations has passed asset freeze, all
27 these things. All these asset freeze, what bank accounts have
28 the United Nations ever come up and said oh, guess what, here is
29 a former bank account of Charles Taylor or here is what is in

1 it".

2 You know, we're in this Court in Europe and this may be the
3 only time I may have to really - for the world to hear from me.
4 This situation in the world where people just get up and make up
15:23:42 5 things, unsubstantiated allegations. You'll just hear it one
6 day, boom, Mr Taylor is this. And you will be working for the
7 rest of your life trying to straighten it up and it never gets
8 straightened up. Nobody ever brings factual evidence, but it is
9 repeated and repeated and repeated until people - it begins to
15:24:09 10 sound like it's true.

11 I have heard the Chief Prosecutor of this Court talk about
12 monies of Taylor. I challenge him again here today in this Court
13 that he is Chief Prosecutor, bring one bank account. Bring any
14 evidence from any financial institution. There's none. Let the
15:24:35 15 gentleman come forward and say, "Well, here is an account
16 belonging to Charles Taylor. He had it, but even he closed it
17 years ago". Bring anything.

18 It's such a travesty of justice, you know, that people in
19 the public eye get these statements against them. It's a big
15:24:59 20 thing now, when you want to demonise African leaders you are
21 either eating human flesh like this other person sat here and
22 said, or you are stealing money. And they don't have to prove
23 it. They can just say it. That's all they have to do; say it.
24 And you are struggling the rest of your life trying to straighten
15:25:25 25 it up. And they know it's a lie, but they repeat it.

26 There's no such thing as me lining my pocket. I'll say
27 again before these judges: I ask anyone on this planet if you
28 are a banker in Europe, you are a banker in any part of the
29 world, if you know of any account that I spoke to you about or

1 opened, if you know anybody that represents my interests come
2 forward and tell the world the truth. If you hold any bank
3 account you are obliged today to lift all secrecy that you know
4 about Charles Taylor. What is it about this Taylor that - you
15:26:02 5 know, I ask the question rhetorically. Some people say but this
6 man, everybody seemed to be lying on this man. What is going on?
7 I don't know. But let them come. For God's sake come forward
8 and bring whatever evidence. It's all - it's not true.

9 I mean, I have been subjected to this now for years and we
15:26:22 10 will never get to the bottom of this. Several months back
11 listening to the news I heard that the - it was just concluded
12 that the former President of Romania, Iliescu, they just realised
13 that he didn't have any money. After years, the man is dead. I
14 may be dead and gone before somebody can say, "No, Taylor didn't
15:26:50 15 have any money. He didn't have assets scattered around the
16 world". Bring me one house - one house anywhere outside of
17 Liberia that Charles Taylor owns. None whatsoever.

18 So, counsel, the long and short is that it's a black lie.
19 There's no such thing as lining pockets, there is no such thing
15:27:12 20 as assets all over the world, just as there is no such thing as
21 Charles Taylor going and providing arms and ammunition for rebels
22 in Sierra Leone and receiving diamonds. So they reduce me to a
23 little petty thief. That's what I'm supposed to be. A little
24 petty thug, a little thief receiving little monies in the corner
15:27:32 25 and providing arms. That's what they want me to look like. I'm
26 definitely not that. They can never --

27 Q. "In recognition of this truism, we ran our 1997 election
28 campaign in Liberia on the theme 'Above all else, the people'.
29 It is my hope that this realisation can be appreciated for the

1 inherent truth for which it speaks. And my government is a
2 broad-based government of inclusion.

3 Our own revered colleague from South Africa, President
4 Nelson Mandela, at the OUA summit in Ouagadougou on June 8, 1998,
15:28:20 5 charged us with the responsibility to lead our people and the
6 African continent into a new world of the next century - which,
7 he said, must be an African century - during which all our people
8 will be freed of the bitterness borne of the marginalisation and
9 degradation of our proud continent."

15:28:43 10 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Did you attend that OAU summit in
11 Ouagadougou?

12 A. Yes, I did.

13 Q. June 8, 1998, yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:28:52 15 Q. "I am pleased to share with this honourable body my
16 acceptance of that challenge and wish to use this occasion to
17 call on this generation of African leaders (us, we, everyone) to
18 provide the kind of effective leadership that will lead us into
19 the new millennium.

15:29:12 20 It is the kind of leadership that will make us our
21 brother's keepers. The kind of leadership that will discourage
22 tribalism, sectionalism and greed. The kind of leadership that
23 will provide for an improved quality of life for our citizens and
24 not our tribal groups. The kind of leadership that will inspire
15:29:35 25 a country of laws and not of men. The kind of leadership which
26 will allow dialogue, patience and forgiveness."

27 And then in conclusion you said this:

28 "Mr Chairman, distinguished colleagues: in my view there
29 are several imperatives to African security which we must

1 consider. First, in the fashion of France, we must uniquely
2 modernise our global models on inclusion. We must federalise our
3 friendships. A new order of human and national interaction
4 beyond language and culture and distance must be fondly embraced.

15:30:15 5 The second imperative to African security rests in Africa's
6 dynamic application of the principles of fair play, cultivating
7 its long-standing tradition of conflict resolution through
8 consultation and consensus. Inclusion, and not marginalisation,
9 should be the premise for political participation.

15:30:41 10 The effective management of diversity to produce a dynamic
11 positive national cohesion should be used to facilitate the
12 cultivation of a common destiny and a common national identity.
13 The new creed of good governance should be complemented by the
14 harnessing of appropriate and efficient technology which would
15:31:05 15 facilitate attainable and sustainable development, a new level of
16 technology to enrich development. In short, the majority of our
17 people must be moved up the economic ladder as a matter of urgent
18 priority, thereby creating a middle class.

19 The third imperative to African security consists of a
15:31:27 20 concentrated focus on making available to the African people the
21 economic possibilities for their empowerment towards achieving
22 basic necessities. African states must be afforded the chance to
23 grow and develop through debt relief, equitable terms of trade,
24 investment and assistance in an environment of respect for human
15:31:58 25 dignity guided by a philosophy of genuine partnership. In simple
26 terms, Mr Chairman, a hungry man is an angry man.

27 Lastly, in the short and probably the medium term, regional
28 organisations such as ECOWAS must be strengthened and supported
29 to train military forces in near proportionate numbers to act

1 where necessary to maintain peace in conflict situations, where
2 missions are clearly defined after a clear understanding of the
3 problem. The mission cannot be one of selective engagement
4 solely to restore small governments, but also to maintain peace
15:32:41 5 and stability until democratic institutions are installed."

6 Now is there a bit of a sting in the tail in that last
7 sentence, Mr Taylor, "The mission cannot be one of selective
8 engagement solely to restore small governments", bearing in mind
9 this is the 27 November 1998 and a small government was restored
15:33:11 10 to power by an ECOMOG intervention earlier that year? So what
11 are you saying here?

12 A. Well I'm saying that is in my focus, but there is a little
13 sting to the tail. I'm trying to say, "Well, good, installing
14 small governments", but I was more concerned about what if bigger
15:33:35 15 governments in Africa did that, what had happened in
16 Sierra Leone, we should be prepared to have a mechanism to deal
17 with it and specifically who can reverse a military coup in
18 Nigeria? No-one can.

19 So I'm trying to say that, yes, we should not just say we
15:33:51 20 are going to restore small governments, but if there is a proper
21 mechanism in place that will support the democratic process you
22 won't have to worry about installing small governments, or big
23 governments, because you have a situation in place that you can
24 deal with. Because you cannot just be in the habit of running
15:34:08 25 into small countries and saying that it was a military
26 coup d'etat here and so it's okay when there's a military
27 coup d'etat in a small country to restore that government which I
28 back, but then when it is a coup d'etat in a bigger country, "Oh,
29 they are too big. Let's leave them." No, we have to put into

1 place a mechanism that would stop all coup d'etats whether it's
2 in a small country, or whether it's in a big country. This is
3 the whole point.

4 Q. "As we continue our efforts in understanding the problems
15:34:35 5 of security and searching for answers, let us not overlook the
6 potential and wealth of our traditions and cultural heritage as
7 guideposts. Our African leaders, kings and chiefs have always
8 cared for their people, and such carrying is embedded in our age
9 old adherence to respect for human rights. In essence, while we
10 look outside for joint solutions to our many problems, let us
11 remember that Africa has many answers within its rich culture.
12 We need only to look inward for those answers by appreciating our
13 rich culture.

14 In closing, permit me to quote Samuel P Huntington who
15:35:25 15 wrote in his book, *The Third Wave*, 'Economic development makes
16 democracy possible; political leadership makes it real...History,
17 to shift the metaphor, does not move forward in a straight line,
18 but when skilled and determined leaders push, it does move
19 forward.'

15:35:49 20 So that was your address, Mr Taylor. The sentiments you
21 express there, did you mean them?

22 A. Oh, yes. Yes. Yes.

23 Q. And for completeness before we move on, can we look over
24 the page briefly, please, to page 147. That's another photograph
15:36:23 25 from the November French trip, isn't it?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And we see that this one is dated 27 November 1998?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And it's a photograph taken within the Liberian embassy in

1 Paris, yes?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Okay. Now we began by looking at the first official visit
4 you made to France in late September 1998, yes, Mr Taylor?

15:36:56 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. We then jumped forward to deal with the further visit you
7 made to France at the end of November?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Yes?

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. We already examined this morning the conclusions of the
12 Camp Johnson Road incident which had trickled into October, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. Following the Camp Johnson Road
15:37:26 15 incident and the difficulties you had with the United States of
16 America, what else happened during the month of October?

17 A. Well we have a couple of quick things, but of major concern
18 to us at the time - in fact, it was a little delayed. We use a
19 particular barometer. The report of the Secretary-General is
15:37:56 20 also an important document because you want to know what's going
21 on at the United Nations, because in most cases what goes on in
22 the United Nations has got nothing to do with what countries are
23 thinking. They do what they feel like doing on that side and
24 most countries you don't know. You just hear a decision. So we
15:38:14 25 have the second report of the Secretary-General that comes out in
26 November. It should have come out in - it comes out in October.
27 It should have come out in September. It comes out in October.

28 Q. Yes?

29 A. That deals with all of the activities of the preceding

1 three months and we always look for that so we can know how to
2 govern ourselves.

3 Q. And what do you say the document is called?

15:38:49

4 A. The second report of the Secretary-General on the Sierra
5 Leonean crisis.

6 Q. And you say it came out in October?

7 A. That is correct. It was a little late.

8 Q. And it's a document you've seen, is it?

9 A. Oh, yes, and read very well. Yes.

15:39:00

10 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness can be shown,
11 please, the document behind divider 26. This is exhibit P-306:

12 Q. Do you have the document before you, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. And we see that it's dated, do we not, 16 October 1998?

15:39:53

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And it's headed "Second Progress Report of the
17 Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
18 Sierra Leone", yes?

19 A. Yes.

15:40:06

20 Q. "By paragraph 19 of its resolution 1181 of 13 July 1998,
21 the Security Council requested me to submit an initial report
22 within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution and every 60
23 days thereafter on the deployment of the United Nations Observer
24 Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and its progress in carrying
25 out its mandate and also to inform the council on plans for the
26 later phase of the deployment of UNAMSIL when security conditions
27 permit these to be implemented.

15:40:39

28 The government and Parliament of Sierra Leone have
29 continued to take steps to extend their authority and to reform

1 and strengthen national institutions with a view to increasing
2 efficiency and eliminating corruption and duplication as well as
3 enhancing security and stability.

15:41:24 4 On 2 September 1998, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah outlined
5 plans for the creation of a new national security system based on
6 the reconstitution of national armed forces, the reform of the
7 police force and the integration of the civil defence force.
8 Under this policy, the new armed forces would comprise a total of
9 5,000 troops under effective civilian management and
15:41:50 10 constitutional control.

11 Another prominent issue is the handling of the trial of the
12 leader of the Revolutionary United Front, Corporal Foday Sankoh.
13 After Corporal Foday Sankoh had been brought back from Nigeria
14 and placed in government custody, RUF announced on 17 August 1998
15:42:11 15 a terror campaign against civilians, CDF and the Economic
16 Community of West African States Monitoring Group. "

17 Pause a moment, please. Note there, Mr Taylor, "After
18 Corporal Sankoh had been brought back from Nigeria and placed in
19 government custody, RUF announced on 17 August 1998 a terror
15:43:12 20 campaign against civilians." Do you see that?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Let us remind ourselves, please, of the date of that letter
23 from the embassy of Liberia in Guinea. That letter is dated 12
24 August 1998, so five days before this.

15:43:17 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Do you follow me?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. "CDF and the Economic Community of West African States
29 monitoring group. If the government failed to release Corporal

1 Sankoh within seven days suggesting that peace negotiations could
2 resume only thereafter, however, the government has made it clear
3 that Corporal Sankoh will stand trial and that there will be no
4 resumption of negotiation or peace talks in view of the failure
15:43:56 5 of the RUF and the junta in the past to comply with the
6 provisions of the Abidjan and Conakry Peace Agreements."

7 I pause to mention that it's a judicially noted fact U that
8 Today Sankoh was transferred to the custody of the Sierra Leonean
9 authorities in July 1998. Moving to paragraph 5:

15:44:30 10 "Vice-President Albert Joe Demby and the deputy minister
11 for defence and CDF coordinator Chief Hinga Norman have
12 temporarily relocated their offices to Kenema in the eastern
13 province in order to organise and direct the large scale
14 mobilisation of the Civil Defence Forces for the operations aimed
15:44:51 15 at clearing the remaining rebel controlled areas.

16 The Vice-President has reaffirmed the government's
17 determination to pursue the military option against the elements
18 of the former junta. His statement has been reinforced by a call
19 from Chief Norman to all CDF members to report for combat duty."

15:45:15 20 Were you aware of all these developments taking place in
21 Sierra Leone, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Not the exact details, no.

23 Q. But did you have a rough idea of what was going on?

24 A. Well, yes, we knew that there were conflict and the
15:45:34 25 involvement of the Kamajors and the bombs and movement, but not
26 the very, you know, minute details as mentioned here.

27 Q. Then this:

28 "In my report of 12 August I mentioned the improvement that
29 had occurred in the relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia.

1 Since the relations between the two countries after a period of
2 improvement following the meeting of President Kabbah and
3 President Taylor in Abuja in July have recently experienced
4 complications arising in part from the continuing armed conflict
15:46:16 5 in the east of Sierra Leone."

6 Pause again Mr Taylor. We've already dealt, have we not,
7 with the meeting sponsored by President Abubakar between you and
8 President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in Abuja in June 1998, yes?

9 A. Yes.

15:46:37 10 Q. So that is what the Secretary-General is alluding to here?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Yes?

13 A. Yes, that's it.

14 Q. "On 13 October 1998, President Kabbah informed me of
15:46:49 15 alleged preparations by Liberia for the dispatch of fighters for
16 an incursion into Sierra Leone."

17 13 October, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now let's pause there. Did you have anything to do with
15:47:08 20 that?

21 A. There was no such thing. Nothing to do with it. No such
22 thing.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, on 13 October, by that stage, help us, had
24 the Camp Johnson Road incident completely disappeared by this
15:47:38 25 stage?

26 A. We were still on high security.

27 Q. Now, remember towards the conclusion of that incident the
28 United States had dispatched a gunboat into Liberian territorial
29 waters. Do you recall that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And you remember us going through in some detail the
3 development of that Camp Johnson Road incident from on or about
4 10 August when Roosevelt Johnson returned to the country?

15:48:11 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So help me, Mr Taylor, in those months leading up to this
7 date given in this document, 13 October, what had you been
8 preoccupied with?

9 A. Oh, we are now looking at 13 October. We've had a trip to
15:48:28 10 France.

11 Q. Yes?

12 A. We've come back. We've --

13 Q. Stopped off in Mauritania?

14 A. Yes, and we've processed some legislation. I think I
15:48:40 15 complete the legislation on the human rights commission, sign it
16 into law. That's coming all the way toward the end of September.
17 And then - no, I stop in Mauritania in early October. By the end
18 of October I'm off again to Nigeria. There's a Heads of State
19 meeting. So I'm very busy.

15:49:12 20 Q. We'll come to that.

21 A. I'm very busy during this particular time.

22 Q. But look how this continues:

23 "The allegations were vigorously denied by President
24 Taylor. United Nations military observers also detected no
15:49:27 25 evidence of an armed incursion from Liberia. On 16 October, the
26 two Presidents were reported to have spoken by telephone and to
27 have described the matter as a misunderstanding that has been
28 clarified. The two leaders were reported to have agreed to be in
29 regular telephone contact in order to work towards strengthening

1 relationships. I welcome this constructive approach."

2 Now, do you recall such telephone contact with President
3 Kabbah around this period, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Definitely. Definitely. But it sounds very simple here.

15:50:09 5 In sounds very simple here. There is nothing simple about this.

6 Imagine from the moment that all world capitals - especially
7 those with interests now in Sierra Leone beyond ECOWAS's
8 interests, they have their interests, we Africans don't have any
9 interests, they have it - are saying that Taylor is amassing
10 5,000 men on the border.

15:50:29

11 It's looking simple here, but there are telephone calls
12 from one capital. We're getting calls, what is this? I mean
13 this is unacceptable. I mean a whole lot is happening here.
14 Finally, yes, I called him. "Tejani, what is this?" He calls me
15 his brother, I call him my brother. Sometimes I call him by his
16 first name. "What is this nonsense that I'm hearing?" Because
17 we had a flood in Cape Mount. I had gone up to Cape Mount to
18 visit the victims of the flood and carry food with the press and
19 everything.

15:50:48

20 You would imagine what some of these intelligence reports
21 do. You hear intelligence, intelligence, intelligence reports
22 that we hear about, they are more what? They are more work of
23 art than science. Intelligence is not a science situation. And
24 somebody had called him and had told him that there were troops
25 amassing and I had gone to address 5,000 troops to attack
26 Sierra Leone. So finally we talked.

15:51:23

27 We were lucky at this time to get the UN military observers
28 and people to go there and we were lucky to get it cleared up.
29 If not this would have festered on and on about the same thing.

1 It is either arms or attack or something. This is it.

2 Q. I'm going to skip over the next paragraph, please, and let
3 us go then to paragraph 9, "Rebel activities":

4 "Since my last report the security situation in

15:52:04 5 Sierra Leone has experienced considerable fluctuations. A
6 relatively quiet phase in July was followed by some volatility in
7 late August and September, marked by a considerable increase in
8 rebel attacks. These were accompanied by a resurgence of
9 atrocities of the nature and scale last observed during the
10 period from April to June, including the complete destruction of
11 villages and the torture, mutilation and execution of large
12 numbers of civilians. These disturbing developments are
13 reflected in more detail below.

14 The rebel build-up has been most significant in the north

15:52:50 15 and brought the area of rebel activity closer to the centre of
16 the country. Activity around the Koinadugu area has also
17 intensified, as around Kambia and Kabala. The current
18 concentrations of rebels in the northwest indicates that they may
19 be preparing for a major strike against Makeni or Port Loko.

15:53:14 20 Such operations would sever ECOMOG's main supply route between
21 Guinea, Freetown and Makeni and provide the rebels with a
22 foothold close to the capital city.

23 On 8 October the rebels attacked Mange between Port Loko
24 and Kambia on the road between Lungi and the Guinean border but
15:53:37 25 were driven off. The situation in Freetown itself has remained
26 safe and stable, and the whole of the southern province has
27 remained free of rebel activity."

28 Pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, it is important for us to
29 take stock of the situation. We're now in October, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. This is a report by the Secretary-General of the United
3 Nations to the Security Council, yes?

4 A. Yes.

15:54:07 5 Q. He is setting out a synopsis of the situation in
6 Sierra Leone at the time, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. He has already mentioned at paragraph 7 the fact that there
9 had been this misunderstanding between yourself and President

15:54:25 10 Kabbah, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And that that misunderstanding had been resolved, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, the reason why the date is significant is this: Help
15:54:40 15 us, Mr Taylor, what happened in Sierra Leone a couple of months
16 later in January 1999?

17 A. Well, to be specific, on 6 January 1999 Freetown was
18 overrun by soldiers.

19 Q. Now tell me, Mr Taylor, despite that agreement you had made
15:55:04 20 with Kabbah and the resolution of that problem, did you suddenly
21 decide thereafter that you would plan, organise and sponsor an
22 attack upon Freetown?

23 A. Definitely not. Definitely not.

24 Q. Help us, Mr Taylor: Having made friends with Kabbah and
15:55:24 25 resolved that misapprehension, what did you have to gain from
26 planning, funding, arming a group to attack Freetown? What were
27 you going to get out of that?

28 A. Absolutely nothing. Absolutely nothing.

29 Q. But you understand that's the allegation against you, don't

1 you?

2 A. Yes, I understand that and that allegation is false.

3 Q. You appreciate you're supposed to be the mastermind behind
4 the mayhem which occurred in Freetown. So help us, why did you,
15:55:59 5 Mr Taylor, all of a sudden at the back end of 1998 decide to put
6 all that good work behind you, why? And to sponsor that mayhem
7 in Freetown, why?

8 A. It just never happened so there's no - it just never
9 happened from my side. I had nothing to do with it. And it
15:56:19 10 would not have benefited me. I had everything to lose in the
11 process. It just never happened. Never.

12 And I don't know how they could have come up with such a
13 thing that it happened, when they know very well - they know very
14 well that I did not have anything to do with it. Nothing. In
15:56:38 15 fact they tried to make the - make it appear as though we didn't
16 have cooperation between Kabbah and myself. I mean, there were
17 lots of conversations between Tejan after this particular time
18 where there's a little problem. I was as shocked as everybody
19 else and angry as everybody else to have gotten to hear of an
15:57:00 20 attack in January of 1999 - as angry and shocked as everybody
21 else.

22 Q. Let's just put that in perspective then, Mr Taylor, what
23 you've just told us. In this same volume move forward to the
24 presidential papers behind divider 31, keeping your hand in the
15:57:21 25 page we have open so that we can go back to it quickly. It's in
26 the same volume. It's behind divider 31. Can we have a look
27 behind that divider at page 127. Let's just have a quick look at
28 this photograph and then come back, please. Mr Taylor, who is in
29 that photograph?

1 A. This is the four of us in --

2 Q. Just tell us who they are.

3 A. To the far left --

4 Q. Yes. Yes, if you would just move over please.

15:58:36 5 A. Right here is Ahmad Tejan Kabbah; this is the
6 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan; this is
7 General Abdulsalami Abubakar; and that's me right here.

8 Q. And let's just move up the photograph a bit, please, so we
9 can see the caption, "Abuja, Sierra Leone question October 29,

15:59:16 10 1998". Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, yes, yes.

12 Q. "Held lengthy talks in Abuja on the Sierra Leone question,
13 October 29, 1998". We'll come back to that, but let's go back to
14 the Secretary-General's report please:

15:59:53 15 "On 1 October 1998, the Civil Defence Forces with strong
16 ECOMOG support launched an offensive to capture one of the
17 rebel's main strongholds in Kailahun District and thus disrupt
18 their operations elsewhere in the country. The effects of the
19 offensive are starting to be reflected in a reduction of the
16:00:18 20 intensity of rebel activities in the north, reports of the
21 dispersal of the rebel stronghold at Koinadugu have also been
22 received.

23 Continued logistic support to ECOMOG is needed from the
24 international community in order to ensure the effectiveness of
16:00:38 25 those operations. Several countries in the region have already
26 pledged to contribute some of the additional 6,000 ECOMOG troops
27 required to assist ECOMOG troops already in the country whose
28 number has been estimated at 10,000 to 12,000.

29 The governments of La Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea,

1 Mali and Niger have indicated their readiness to provide
2 contingents stating that they could be deployed if the
3 international community is prepared to bear the costs of
4 transporting them to Sierra Leone.

16:01:15 5 My special representative Mr Francis G Okelo has initiated
6 discussions on this matter and the chief military observer of
7 UNAMSIL has been meeting with contingent commanders from the
8 countries involved concerning their deployment and related
9 expenses for in-country maintenance and other needs.

16:01:39 10 At the end of August 1998, UNAMSIL completed the first
11 phase of the deployment of its military component consisting of
12 40 military observers, the chief military observer and a medical
13 team of 15 personnel. In addition to mission headquarters in
14 Freetown, UNAMSIL has deployed military observers in five team
16:02:08 15 sites namely the three provincial capitals, Bo, Kenema and
16 Makeni, the main demobilisation site at Lungi and Hastings
17 airport. The observers have been well received by the
18 communities and have established good relations with the local
19 authorities as well as with ECOMOG and CDF personnel."

16:02:42 20 Yes. Could we now go, please, and jump to paragraph 36 -
21 no, sorry, it is paragraph 25 first of all:

22 "The state is currently prosecuting for treason and related
23 charges some 40 people in two civilian trials. A court martial
24 was concluded on 12 October and further trials are scheduled to
16:03:26 25 commence in the coming weeks. A separate civilian trial of RUF
26 leader Foday Sankoh commenced on 24 September 1998."

27 So we've got a date now:

28 "Given the highly charged atmosphere surrounding the trial,
29 the Attorney-General has requested the assistance of the UNAMSIL

1 human rights adviser on several occasions to ensure that Corporal
2 Sankoh's rights are respected. However, the government's failure
3 so far to persuade a Sierra Leonean lawyer to represent Corporal
4 Sankoh is a cause for concern.

16:04:08 5 All the accused face the possible imposition of the death
6 penalty. Already 16 civilians and 34 of the defendants in the
7 court martial have been sentenced to death. Under Sierra Leonean
8 law, only the civilians have the right to appeal their sentences
9 to the Sierra Leone Court of Appeal and ultimately to the Supreme
16:04:32 10 Court.

11 If the sentences are upheld throughout the appeals process,
12 there is still the possibility of a pardon should the Head of
13 State decide to exercise the prerogative of mercy under national
14 law.

16:04:46 15 A further avenue of consideration of the sentence is
16 available by virtue of Sierra Leone's ratification of the first
17 optional protocol of the international covenant on civil and
18 political rights, whereby individuals may petition the United
19 Nations human rights committee.

16:05:06 20 So far, UNAMSIL and observers from the international bar
21 association have found that the civilian group trials are being
22 conducted in a manner which appears to comply with international
23 procedural standards. It is also apparent that the government is
24 largely committed to conducting transparent and fair trials.

16:05:26 25 It remains a matter of concern that those tried by court
26 martial are deprived of their right to judicial review of the
27 judgments and sentences. UNAMSIL is also concerned as to whether
28 the manner in which a number of defendants were repatriated to
29 Sierra Leone from neighbouring countries was in accordance with

1 applicable international standards. The concern of UNAMSIL
2 continues to be conveyed to the government in a timely and
3 forthright manner.

16:06:03 4 On 15 October 1998, the United Nations high commissioner
5 for human rights wrote to President Kabbah asking him to
6 intervene in the process to show mercy."

7 Let's go, please, to paragraph 36. No, let's start at 35:

8 "A humanitarian crisis of serious proportions is developing
9 in isolated areas of Sierra Leone, particularly in the northeast.
16:06:41 10 Since the incursion of former junta elements into Kabala at the
11 end of 1998" - note that "former junta elements" - "humanitarian
12 agencies have been unable to assess needs there because of
13 unpredictable security.

14 The countryside between Kabala and Koidu up to the border
16:07:13 15 with Guinea is also out of reach owing to insecurity and
16 inadequate roads and airstrips. Similar conditions apply inter
17 alia to the area east of Kambia in the northwest and in the
18 Kailahun District.

19 Continuing insecurity has resulted in increased
16:07:33 20 displacement of populations. During the reporting period, some
21 14,000 Sierra Leoneans were displaced from South Kenema District
22 into Kenema Town. At the same time, the number of needy
23 beneficiaries in Masingbi has swollen from 16,000 to more than
24 35,000.

16:07:57 25 The United Nations humanitarian coordination unit office
26 for the coordination of humanitarian affairs estimates that up to
27 a quarter of a million persons have been displaced in the
28 fighting that followed the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998,
29 an increase of about 70,000 persons since my last report. It is

1 feared that a considerable number of internally displaced persons
2 remain unrecorded.

3 The number of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea is now
4 357,000, of which an estimated 217,700 have arrived since
16:08:46 5 February 1998. Most of these fled to the Guekuedou area, but
6 some 7,700 have recently arrived in Forecariah following a rebel
7 attack on 28 September at Kukuna near the border with Guinea.
8 There are also 90,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia,
9 including 40,000 new arrivals."

16:09:19 10 Pause there. Mr Taylor, was your country in a position to
11 support this kind of influx?

12 A. No, we were not. We were not.

13 Q. Now further conflict in Sierra Leone, did you anticipate
14 that might result in an increase in the refugee problem?

16:09:48 15 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. It was very clear.

16 Q. And would such an increase place a strain upon the
17 resources of the country of which you were President?

18 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely, yes.

19 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor, what did you have to gain from
16:10:02 20 meddling in Sierra Leone?

21 A. Absolutely nothing. Nothing.

22 Q. "... including 40,000 new arrivals. Another 10,000 Sierra
23 Leoneans have taken refuge in other countries in the region,
24 mainly in La Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia and Senegal, for a total
16:10:25 25 of 457,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in the sub-region. So as to
26 determine more accurately the number of refugees in Liberia, the
27 office of the United Nations high commissioner for refugees will
28 carry out a registration exercise in November 1998.

29 In response to the newly emerged and internally displaced

1 persons situation in both the eastern and northern parts of the
2 country, UNICEF, in collaboration in non-governmental
3 organisations, is providing high energy biscuits to counter
4 malnutrition and providing support to malnourished children
16:11:12 5 referred to therapeutic feeding centres and supplementary feeding
6 programmes."

7 Can we move now then, please, to paragraph 48:

8 "In my fifth report on the situation in Sierra Leone of 9
9 June 1998, I stated that additional deployments of United Nations
16:12:01 10 military observers beyond the first phase would depend on the
11 security situation within the country and the progress made by
12 the government in carrying out its disarmament and demobilisation
13 plan.

14 The security situation in Sierra Leone has not improved
16:12:18 15 significantly since my last report and, in some parts of the
16 country, may have deteriorated. In the last two months the
17 northern province has seen a resurgence of rebel activity,
18 including atrocities, with no sign of weakening in rebel resolve,
19 numbers or organisation.

16:12:40 20 Largely for this reason, the progress made by the
21 government in carrying out its disarmament, demobilisation, and
22 reintegration programme has been less than was hoped for. The
23 intensification of fighting caused by the launching of the
24 CDF/ECOMOG offensive and the consequent large-scale mobilisation
16:13:04 25 of both CDF and re-inducted RSLMP personnel do not at present
26 provide the best conditions for the rapid progress of disarmament
27 and demobilisation.

28 On the other hand, should the CDF/ECOMOG offensive lead to
29 large-scale surrenders among the former junta elements and their

1 participation in the disarmament and demobilisation programme, it
2 may be necessary to deploy United Nations observers very rapidly.

3 I am therefore keeping the situation under careful review."

4 And if we could just finally quickly look at the

16:13:55 5 conclusions, please:

6 "The continuing conflicts Sierra Leone imposes immense
7 suffering on the people of that country. I strongly commend the
8 summary executions, torture, mutilation" --

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think that was "I strongly condemn".

16:14:26 10 MR GRIFFITHS: What did I say?

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: You said "commend".

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Sorry:

13 Q. "... I strongly condemn the summary executions, torture

14 mutilation, rapes, looting and other acts of barbarism carried

16:14:42 15 out by former junta elements and call on them to lay down their

16 arms and surrender. I am particularly outraged by the senseless

17 acts of terror perpetrated against children such as amputation of

18 limbs of boys and girls as young as six years of age, and support

19 the efforts to bring to justice the authors of these especially

16:15:18 20 abhorrent crimes.

21 The human rights abuses committed by the rebels also give

22 rise to the humanitarian emergency in Sierra Leone as they

23 continue to cause the widespread dislocation of local

24 populations. Though United Nations humanitarian personnel and

16:15:42 25 non-governmental organisations have done much to aid the victims

26 of attacks and displacements more needs to be done as a matter of

27 urgency, especially in regard to the provision of medical and

28 surgical capacity, specific services for amputees and

29 psychological treatment for the trauma suffered by the victims

1 and their families."

2 I think the passage crossed out doesn't really add
3 anything:

4 "The continuing commitment of ECOMOG has been essential in
16:16:15 5 assisting the Government of Sierra Leone to restore peace and
6 security throughout the country and the efforts being made to
7 deploy additional troops from ECOWAS countries are welcome. In
8 view of the importance of the present offensive into the east and
9 the west and the wresting of the initiative from the rebels, I
16:16:41 10 appeal to the members of the Security Council and the
11 international community to extend all possible technical and
12 logistical support to achieving the successful conclusion of the
13 conflict in Sierra Leone.

14 At the same time I am encouraged by the focus of the
16:16:58 15 government on strengthening democratic control over the
16 reconstituted armed forces."

17 Let's jump to paragraph 61. Yes, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. "The latest developments in the situation between
16:17:39 20 Sierra Leone and Liberia are a cause for deep concern. I urge
21 the governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia to continue to
22 exercise maximum restraint, pursue dialogue and implement the
23 confidence building measures aimed at improving relations between
24 the two countries which they agreed upon in July 1998. In doing
16:18:02 25 so, the two governments would continue to show their commitment
26 to sub-regional peace and security and their adherence to the
27 non-aggression pact and good neighbourliness treaty contained in
28 the Mano River declaration of 1973. In this context, should both
29 parties agree, the deployment of ECOMOG troops at the border

1 subsequently accompanied by United Nations military observers,
2 could help to stabilise the situation and restore mutual
3 confidence."

4 Yes, Mr Taylor?

16:18:46 5 A. Yes, yes.

6 Q. Now, that's all I want us to look at. Now, Mr Taylor, help
7 us. This suggestion at paragraph 5 which had been made by Kabbah
8 of you massing fighters on the border, yes?

9 A. Yes.

16:19:29 10 Q. Tell me, was it a matter you discussed with the
11 Secretary-General's special representative in Liberia?

12 A. He was all involved in it. I didn't just have to discuss
13 it. He was deeply involved in it because anything that involved
14 Liberia and Sierra Leone from months before, he was involved.

16:19:53 15 The special representatives of the Secretary-General on the
16 Sierra Leonean side would be involved. Here we're talking about
17 the major problem of a possible attack by 5,000 men. Of course
18 he is involved in it at all levels.

19 Q. And as far as you're aware, did he cause to be created any
16:20:24 20 document detailing that particular allegation?

21 A. As always, he would do a full report. A full report to the
22 Secretary-General regarding this very serious matter and I am
23 more than certain if we - the fact that we have the
24 Secretary-General's intervention here on 16 October means that
16:20:59 25 he, because this is directly from his office - means that he had
26 to report this before 16 October. So he had to - he should have
27 done a report that I read before 16 October --

28 Q. Have a look behind divider 25?

29 A. -- detailing what happened. Divider what?

1 Q. 25, same bundle. Do you have it?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Have you seen this document before?

16:21:42

4 A. Yes. This is it. This is it. This deals with the 5,000
5 troops, yes.

6 Q. Now, we see this is a document dated 15 October 1998, and,
7 as you observe, it's the day before the second progress report of
8 the Secretary-General behind divider 26, yes?

9 A. Yes.

16:22:03

10 Q. And it's from Downes-Thomas, representative of the
11 Secretary-General, UNOL, Monrovia, to the United Nations.
12 "Reported attack by Liberia in Sierra Leone":

16:22:28

13 "The main message contained in the copies of code cables
14 from headquarters and from Okelo on the subject above was news to
15 me. I sought clarity and an update from the Liberian side by
16 meeting separately with foreign minister Captan at his ministry
17 on 14 October and with President Taylor in Ganta. I did not meet
18 with the minister of defence, Daniel Chea. I advised the
19 minister that it was important that I know the reaction of the
20 Government of Liberia to the allegations made by Sierra Leone.
21 That, together with any other pertinent information from the
22 Government of Liberia regarding these allegations could be useful
23 to the Secretary-General who would be dealing with this matter
24 shortly, i.e. the next day.

16:22:50

16:23:09

25 The foreign minister dismissed the allegations as
26 groundless. He had so informed Ambassador Winifred Kanu of
27 Sierra Leone. He also advised the ambassador that the Government
28 of Liberia was keen to conduct any joint or otherwise impartial
29 investigation to ascertain the veracity of the allegations

1 leveled against it by the Sierra Leonean government.

2 Minister Captan acknowledged that President Taylor paid a
3 one day visit to Grand Cape Mount County on 9 October 1998 to
4 express solidarity with the victims of the recent floods in that
16:23:51 5 county. He also stated that the President was accompanied by the
6 press throughout the day and, with the presidential entourage,
7 returned to Monrovia at the end of that day's trip. He
8 maintained that it was inconceivable that the President would
9 address and dispatch 5,000 fighters to Sierra Leone in the
16:24:13 10 presence of the press."

11 Did you do such a thing, Mr Taylor?

12 A. That's what is so amazing. These stories pop out. Never
13 did any such thing. I'm supposed to go and stand before 5,000
14 soldiers with the whole national international press corps and go
16:24:39 15 and say, "Guess what, go across the border and attack
16 Sierra Leone". I don't know how they think about these things.
17 I have no idea.

18 Q. "The minister also asserted that ECOMOG had a design to
19 push the RUF into Liberia with the explicit purpose of dragging
16:24:54 20 Liberia into the current conflict in Sierra Leone."

21 Was that a concern of yours, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Definitely. Definitely.

23 Q. "He informed me that President Taylor was aware of these
24 schemes and had served notice to President Abdusalami Abubakar of
16:25:15 25 Nigeria regarding these untoward developments.

26 Meeting with President Taylor. I brought the allegations
27 made by Sierra Leone to the attention of President Taylor. His
28 response was quick and resolute. He categorically rejected the
29 accusations by President Kabbah and General Khobe. He stressed

1 the following points:

2 On 9 October 1998 he paid a one day visit to Cape Mount
3 with the purpose of identifying himself with the suffering of
4 those who had been adversely affected by the floods which had
16:25:52 5 devastated that area. That took him to the towns of Medina and
6 Sinje. At a rally in Sinje he addressed the general public in
7 the presence of the prominent Liberian citizens including the
8 President of Liberia Red Cross, a senator affiliated to the
9 opposition party (All Liberia Coalition Party, ALCOP) former" --

16:26:20 10 A. ULIMO-K.

11 Q. "A Liberian reverend gentleman resident in the
12 United States and also members of the press. These prominent
13 Liberians and the press corps which accompanied him could attest
14 to the fact that he did not address fighters.

16:26:34 15 He requested that the UN, ECOMOG or any interested
16 independent party visit the area immediately by land or air and
17 conduct independent interviews with any persons in Cape Mount,
18 including the thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees in Sinje to
19 assess the situation along the border. He emphasised that he
16:27:01 20 would very much welcome a search by ECOMOG forces stationed in
21 Liberia for evidence that would corroborate the allegations. The
22 search could span the entire stretch from Bo Waterside to the tip
23 of Lofa. He remarked that General Khobe should desist from
24 mischief making and from misinforming President Kabbah about the
16:27:24 25 situation along the border."

26 Pause there. What motive do you attribute, Mr Taylor, to
27 General Khobe to do such a dastardly thing?

28 A. I really don't know what Maxwell Khobe was up to, but one
29 little interesting point to note here is that Khobe now becomes

1 the commander of the Sierra Leonean armed forces of whatever they
2 are dealing with, so he is no longer directly accountable to the
3 President of Nigeria.

4 He requested that the UN, ECOMOG or any interested
16:26:39 5 independent party visit the area immediately by land or air and
6 conduct independent interviews with any persons in Cape Mount,
7 including the thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees in Sinje to
8 assess the situation along the border. He emphasised that he
9 would very much welcome a search by ECOMOG forces stationed in
16:27:07 10 Liberia for evidence that would corroborate the allegations. The
11 search could span the entire stretch from Bo Waterside to the tip
12 of Lofa. He remarked that General Khobe should desist from
13 mischief making and from misinforming President Kabbah about the
14 situation along the border."

16:27:27 15 Pause there. What motive do you attribute, Mr Taylor, to
16 General Khobe to do such a dastardly thing?

17 A. I really don't know what Maxwell Khobe was up to, but one
18 little interesting point to note here is that Khobe now becomes
19 the commander of the Sierra Leonean armed forces of whatever they
16:27:58 20 are dealing with, so he is no longer directly accountable to the
21 President of Nigeria.

22 Q. He is not?

23 A. No, so he now finds himself as commander of Sierra Leone
24 forces, but as far as ECOMOG is concerned, he doesn't have any
16:28:15 25 real serious role in ECOMOG so his - I mean not loyalty, I
26 wouldn't call it loyalty, but he is answerable now to the
27 Government of Sierra Leone and I think he is just doing things.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Mr President.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think we'll adjourn for the day.

1 Mr Taylor, the usual warning: You're not to discuss your
2 evidence with any other persons.

3 We'll adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

4 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.
5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 4 August 2009 at
6 9.30 a.m.]

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR 25736

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS 25736