



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 5 AUGUST 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg
Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Wednesday, 5 August 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:31:33 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, Brenda J Hollis and Maja Dimitrova.

09:31:49 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning Mr President, your Honours,
12 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself Courtenay
13 Griffiths assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah,
14 Mr Silas Chekera and we're also joined today by our legal
09:32:05 15 assistant Mr Simon Chapman and also by James Kamara who is with
16 us as an administrator.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I sit down, your Honour, can I thank
19 the Court for their understanding yesterday in not sitting in my
09:32:21 20 absence and I'm grateful for all the sympathetic notes and texts
21 that I received from everyone associated with the Court.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll note that. Thank you,
23 Mr Griffiths. Mr Taylor, I'll remind you you are still bound to
24 tell the truth in accordance with the declaration you've given
09:32:46 25 the Court.

26 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

27 [On former affirmation]

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I start first of all, Mr President, with
29 some housekeeping. On Monday I referred to Prosecution exhibit

1 P-306 which is the second progress report of the
2 Secretary-General of the United Nations Observer Mission in
3 Sierra Leone dated 16 October 1998. The housekeeping which needs
4 to be done, and I was helpfully reminded of this by
09:33:17 5 Mr Meisenberg, this document was admitted under Rule 92 bis and
6 only certain parts of the document were introduced. I during the
7 course of my examination of Mr Taylor introduced additional parts
8 of the document and I'm told as a consequence that it should be
9 marked then for identification.

09:33:42 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't think the Bench told you that,
11 Mr Griffiths. Certainly we'll mark it, but I note that the
12 Prosecution adduced the evidence it wanted to from that document
13 under Rule 92 bis and you adduced the evidence from that document
14 you wanted, or the additional evidence you wanted, by oral
09:34:07 15 evidence reading it on to the record, so it is on the record, but
16 certainly if you want to mark it for identification, we'll do
17 that.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I think it would be best in the
19 circumstances, Mr President, so that would be MFI-57 if I'm
09:34:22 20 correct.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, and what's the description of that
22 document?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: It's the second progress report of the
24 Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
09:34:39 25 Sierra Leone and it's dated 16 October 1998.

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Would you kindly remind us where to
27 locate it.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: You will find it behind tab 26.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked for

1 identification MFI-57.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

3 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

09:35:07

4 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when we adjourned on Monday we were dealing
5 with a document behind tab 25, a report by the special
6 representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations
7 dated 15 October 1998. Do you recall that?

8 A. Yes, I do.

09:35:43

9 Q. And we had got to the second page of that document at
10 bullet point number 4. Do you have that?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. Where we see:

09:36:11

13 "He remarked" - that being you - "that General Khobe should
14 desist from mischief making and from misinforming President
15 Kabbah about the situation along the border."

16 Now what was all that about, Mr Taylor?

09:36:39

17 A. General Khobe had this new assignment and it is apparent in
18 most of these cases people try to impress their new bosses. He
19 was just making statements, just speaking, and I said to the - I
20 said to the special representative of the Secretary-General that
21 I would speak to President Kabbah about it because it was out of
22 order for the commander of the armed forces of a country to be
23 making statements that were improper and that he could not be
24 held accountable for. That was I felt a matter left for the

09:37:06

25 President of Sierra Leone, who was a colleague, and if there were
26 any questions, as had been done before, he would raise these
27 questions with me instead of having some field general talking
28 and making statements that he had no business making. I felt
29 that he should stop him and, if there was anything that he had to

1 discuss with me, as we talked frequently on the telephone it was
2 proper to discuss it with me.

3 Q. It continues:

09:37:42

4 "He", that being you, "regretted that President Kabbah did
5 not seek clarification from him before acting on false
6 information provided by an individual who had an agenda to
7 advance. In this regard he indicated that he would pursue the
8 matter further with President Abubakar and raise the issue at the
9 forthcoming summit of ECOWAS in Abuja."

09:38:06

10 Now did you attend that summit in Abuja, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, I did.

12 Q. We'll come to that later:

09:38:20

13 "In an apparent allusion to the matter of Roosevelt
14 Johnson, as raised in President Kabbah's letter to the
15 Secretary-General, President Taylor explained that regarding
16 Roosevelt Johnson's extended stay in Lungi his intention in
17 summoning the Sierra Leonean ambassador was merely to impress
18 upon him and his government that the prolonged stay of Johnson in
19 Sierra Leone was at variance with the understanding reached
20 between the United States and Liberia."

09:38:43

21 Now pausing there, that was a matter we discussed again on
22 Monday, Mr Taylor, when we looked at the official report of the
23 Government of Liberia on the Camp Johnson Road incident.

24 A. That is correct.

09:38:58

25 Q. "He was therefore attempting to indirectly place pressure
26 on the United States since he realised that President Kabbah had
27 been pressured to accept Johnson and beyond the anticipated
28 duration."

29 Who were you saying put pressure on President Kabbah,

1 Mr Taylor?

2 A. Well, I'm sure the United States government asked President
3 Kabbah to intervene in the interim. That was acceptable to me
4 because President Kabbah and I had also spoken about the
09:39:31 5 possibility of Roosevelt Johnson going in, but what we were
6 having problems with now was the length of time that Johnson
7 apparently would be staying there which was even giving Kabbah a
8 hard time. He didn't want Johnson there either and so we decided
9 that I would put the pressure from my side and he would do
09:39:53 10 everything that he could to making sure that Johnson left.

11 Q. Now, it goes on:

12 "The Government of Liberia will not accept any entry into
13 Liberia of any armed group from Sierra Leone as his government is
14 clearly aware that the former ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J fighters are
09:40:18 15 trained in Zimmi to attack Liberia. He maintained that this was
16 common knowledge in certain American and British circles."

17 What's that about?

18 A. We are now getting information about the formation of a new
19 group to attack Liberia and we are beginning to add pressure to
09:40:43 20 the Government of Sierra Leone and we were right about it. That
21 group ended up being what we get to know later as LURD.

22 Q. And so help us, Mr Taylor, when did you first start getting
23 that kind of information?

24 A. We started getting this information, I would say, from
09:41:13 25 about mid-1998. We are receiving these intelligence, I'm in
26 constant contact with President Kabbah and we are discussing it.
27 He has done some good things, I have done some things and we are
28 cooperating as far as this information is concerned.

29 It continues and it begins to strengthen in its intensity

1 by about this time that this situation is going on in Monrovia
2 and we are keeping up the discussions so that we do not lose
3 track with it, but it's about I would say by mid-1998 it was
4 pretty clear that a new group was being formed to attack because
09:42:08 5 we've gone through several phases of this.

6 One important phase would be the accusations. Here we are
7 and this is a time when Liberia now is being accused of amassing
8 some 5,000 troops to attack Sierra Leone. This is similar to the
9 situation that we had before with our President Momoh with the
09:42:38 10 initial rebel attack in Sierra Leone that caused Momoh to hire
11 the ex-ULIMO and AFL soldiers that became ULIMO into Liberia, so
12 I'm trying to prevent this. I do everything that I can to clear
13 up this so-called 5,000 man situation, because once you realise
14 that the only recourse that President Kabbah would have would
09:43:04 15 probably do what President Momoh did the first instance in trying
16 to get maybe a group to counter attack and so we are fighting
17 very hard.

18 But they go beyond this some time earlier. They accuse
19 Liberia of training RUF in Liberia at Camp Naama. We tussle with
09:43:29 20 that. We are lucky to escape this by having the United Nations,
21 the United States government through its embassy in Monrovia, the
22 head of the United States military mission to Liberia, Colonel
23 Dempsey, and all of these people go up to Camp Naama only to see
24 that there is nothing going.

09:43:51 25 Now, why am I going through this? I'm trying to show here
26 that in the first instance there is the accusation that we are
27 training at Camp Naama. That's not true. There is this second
28 accusation that we are now amassing 5,000 men on the border. The
29 UN go there and find out that's not true. So I'm very concerned

1 by this time that the intensity of these accusations could lead
2 Tejan Kabbah to doing that which was not right by trying to
3 encourage a new force to come out of Sierra Leone.

09:44:31 4 Q. "Should the Secretary-General consider it advisable that
5 Liberia respond to the allegations in writing, he was ready to do
6 so." Did you in due course respond in writing Mr Taylor?

7 A. No, we dealt with this on the phone. After the UN forces
8 went there and found and said, "There's no such thing", I called
9 my colleague Kabbah and said, "Listen, we have to stop this.
09:45:00 10 This matter of trying to listen to this Khobe, who does not know
11 what he is doing, is something that we ought to continue to keep
12 in contact and avoid these kinds of errors." He said, "Well
13 listen, my brother. It's a misunderstanding, it's over with and
14 that's it."

09:45:15 15 My press secretary made statements subsequent to that,
16 President Kabbah's press secretary made statements subsequent to
17 our discussions and through the grace of almighty God the matter
18 was laid to rest.

19 Q. Now:
09:45:32 20 "Lastly he emphasised that I quickly relay a message to the
21 Secretary-General and keep him informed of any course of action
22 expected of him."

23 Then it goes on:

24 "It does not seem that the immediate preoccupations of
09:45:48 25 President Taylor would permit him to engage, at this time, in the
26 type of reckless adventurism which the allegations from
27 Sierra Leone suggest."

28 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Now, as we see, this is the
29 observation being made by the special representative of the

1 Secretary-General. Do you understand that?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. Now when Mr Downes-Thomas is observing that your immediate
4 preoccupations would not permit you to engage in this type of
09:46:31 5 reckless adventurism, what were your preoccupations at the time?

6 A. I'm just - I'm just barely getting over the Roosevelt
7 Johnson situation. The United States government in Liberia are
8 still going through these diplomatic notes. This famous USS
9 Chinook is still right looking at the Executive Mansion. I'm
09:47:00 10 speaking figuratively now by the boat looking at the Executive
11 Mansion.

12 So I am busy trying to protect the country from any hostile
13 act by the United States, trying to clear up things. I would not
14 want to deal with any type of thing outside of this and he sees
09:47:18 15 our preoccupation. I'm calling him 24/7, "Get this message to
16 this diplomatic source. Get this message, please, to the United
17 Nations. Talk to the Secretary-General. Here is the situation".
18 So I am very busy. That's what he is referring to.

19 Q. Mr Taylor, I want us to dwell on this a little further.

09:47:37 20 Help us, Mr Downes-Thomas was he based in Liberia?

21 A. Oh, yes.

22 Q. When had he first come to Liberia?

23 A. Oh, the special representative is in Liberia I would put it
24 to around the beginning of '98.

09:47:57 25 Q. Beginning of '98?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And is it the same individual throughout this period?

28 A. Yes, he is in Liberia throughout I would say up to - he
29 spends a few years there, yes.

1 Q. And what access does he have to the geographical entity
2 called Liberia?

3 A. Oh, total access. He's an accredited diplomat to the
4 country. He has diplomatic status. His movements are
09:48:31 5 unrestricted, he is protected and in fact his own - the way the
6 Secretary-General had it organised is that there was one special
7 representative in Sierra Leone and one in Liberia. Those
8 officers coordinated their activities so he could leave Liberia
9 and go to Sierra Leone. He could also travel to Guinea.

09:48:56 10 Because Liberia was being focused on as the eye of the
11 storm, so to speak, everything that was happening there, the
12 special representative we had him involved. He travelled to
13 Guinea. He travelled to Nigeria. He was the Secretary-General's
14 man on the ground to give the Secretary-General of the United
09:49:18 15 Nations office his full assessment of what was going on on the
16 ground.

17 Q. You see, I'm trying to investigate with you the kind of
18 factual basis upon which this man could make such an observation.
19 So help us, how much access did Mr Downes-Thomas have to you?

09:49:40 20 A. The special representative could, upon request, see me
21 depending on my schedule. I would see him either immediately, or
22 some time immediately thereafter, but access I would say amongst
23 the diplomatic corps accredited near Monrovia one like the
24 representative of the Secretary-General, the ambassador of the
09:50:12 25 United States, the ambassador of Great Britain, these are envoys
26 that would have almost immediate access.

27 Q. And help us, apart from meeting with such individuals in
28 person, could they also contact you by telephone?

29 A. He would, yes, but most diplomats would not just try to do

1 that. He could - if there were an actual emergency he would
2 process a call, but normally diplomats would not just pick up the
3 phone and call the President. It would virtually not be proper.
4 He would probably call the foreign minister and say, "Listen, I
09:50:58 5 have a message from my government", or he would call the foreign
6 minister and say, "I have an urgent message from the
7 Secretary-General. I need to see the President immediately".
8 That would be conveyed through the ministry and then a message
9 would go back and say, "Well, I will see the ambassador right
09:51:13 10 now", or, "I will see him in two hours", "I will see him in three
11 hours". You know, that's how it's done.

12 Q. Now, was there any restriction on Mr Downes-Thomas meeting
13 with ECOMOG commanders?

14 A. Oh, no, no, no. It was a part of his duty. He had
09:51:32 15 unbridled access to ECOMOG commanders, yes.

16 Q. And so bearing all of that in mind, he is here on 15
17 October 1998 observing that:

18 "The immediate preoccupations of President Taylor would not
19 permit him to engage at this time in the type of reckless
09:51:51 20 adventurism which the allegations from Sierra Leone suggest. As
21 he himself observed, since the defence of Sierra Leone is being
22 guaranteed by ECOMOG, it would be foolhardy on his part to even
23 contemplate sending troops into Sierra Leone that would, in
24 effect, be fighting against ECOWAS, Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana.
09:52:16 25 Especially just before the forthcoming ECOWAS summit where he
26 would be seeking support for lifting of the arms embargo on
27 Liberia."

28 That arms embargo, Mr Taylor, was that a priority?

29 A. Well, yes.

1 Q. Why?

2 A. Because we - since my inauguration as President, my
3 security forces in the country have no arms to protect the
4 country. We are getting constant reports of another armed group
09:52:51 5 formulating itself. We have armed robbery in the city. Our
6 police are going to investigate an armed robbery with a baton. I
7 mean how does that - it's not proper. ECOWAS earlier during the
8 year had asked for these embargoes to be lifted.

9 Q. We had seen that. That was in July?

09:53:14 10 A. Exactly and they had said no, so we're going back. We are
11 trying to be in our best - I mean set of actions to get these
12 things lifted. I'm concentrating on peace in Sierra Leone,
13 getting this Roosevelt Johnson business straightened out, I'm
14 trying to make peace with the United States. I'm just too busy.
09:53:39 15 I'm just too tied up to think about trying to advance a 5,000 man
16 force and advance them with what, when I do not have arms?

17 Q. Mr Taylor, help us. You've indicated that the lifting of
18 the arms embargo, a matter to be discussed at a forthcoming
19 ECOWAS meeting, was a matter of priority for you?

09:54:03 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. Would you - were you in the mood to jeopardise that
22 by invading Sierra Leone with 5,000 troops?

23 A. No.

24 Q. "5,000 fighters assembled at any location should be an
09:54:25 25 obvious spectacle. Especially if they are being exhorted and led
26 by a President to sally forth into another country." Because
27 it's right, isn't it, Mr Taylor, that the suggestion was that you
28 had addressed these assembled 5,000 troops; is that right?

29 A. Yes, that's the suggestion which is total nonsense. How

1 does a President - in fact how does a President get in front of
2 5,000 soldiers, if it even exists, lead them with a corps of the
3 international and local press where we should - and address them
4 and say, "Here we are at the border, go into battle." It does
09:55:18 5 not make sense. But in fact what are they going to fight with?
6 What are they going to fight with when I do not have arms? What
7 are they going to fight with? So this is all just foolishness
8 that was designed by Khobe and thanks to God they find out that
9 it is not true, no.

09:55:33 10 Q. It continues:

11 "Yet we have received no word or confirmation from anyone
12 in the Cape Mount, Sinje area, not even from NGOs about this
13 event. The absence of corroborating evidence becomes a bit
14 baffling when one realises, as the President argued, that it
09:55:54 15 would take a convoy of not less than 50 military lorries to ferry
16 5,000 fighters from one place to another.

17 In the light of the above, it does not surprise us that
18 President Taylor is extremely confident that the various forms of
19 fact-finding missions that he is proposing would prove his
09:56:19 20 contention right. It was quite clear to me that President Taylor
21 was genuinely disturbed, disappointed and apprehensive about this
22 matter."

23 Why apprehensive, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Well, you can see where there is smoke there is fire. I
09:56:36 25 see that something - something is building up. When these guys
26 decide to do - well, when some of these countries decide to do
27 their little dirty things you find little unsuspecting things
28 coming around and finally, boom, that's it. You hear about
29 accusations. He's amassing troops. There are no troops. We see

1 diplomatic notes being circulated. I'm being accused of
2 violating the convention in dealing with the protection of
3 diplomatic status. I see the USS Chinook come into the waters.
4 Then I see here that we are about to invade another country. For
09:57:31 5 me, I see trouble.

6 Q. "He expressed dismay over the actions of General Khobe,
7 commander of ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone and chief of staff of
8 the Sierra Leone Army, and disappointment with President Kabbah's
9 decision to go to the extent of writing to the Security Council
09:57:54 10 without consulting him. As he put it, 'Look, assembling,
11 addressing and leading 5,000 persons to fight in another country
12 is a serious matter. It is an open declaration of war'. He felt
13 that these allegations were a form of harassment. That is, part
14 of a conspiracy to unseat or destabilise his government."

09:58:22 15 Did you honestly believe that?

16 A. Definitely, of course.

17 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. Who did you think were the
18 conspirators?

19 A. Quite frankly, I trained immediately on the British and
09:58:37 20 American activities in the area at the time and how these
21 accusations were coming. Immediately I knew that it was coming
22 from either both or from one of them that a decision had been
23 taken to destabilise my government. Whether I'm right in that
24 assumption is another matter. That was my thinking at the time.

09:59:03 25 Q. And then if we go to the final page:

26 "It would therefore be prudent to do everything possible to
27 appeal to the Sierra Leonean government not to insist on the
28 official circulation of President Kabbah's letter. If it becomes
29 the official document of the council, the Government of Liberia

1 will respond in kind and the consequences of such exchange of
2 letters can only be detrimental to relations between the two
3 neighbours."

4 Now, could I ask, please, Mr President, that that document
09:59:58 5 which is an outgoing code cable from the special representative
6 of the Secretary-General to the United Nations dated 15 October
7 1998 be marked for identification MFI-58.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-58.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

10:00:22 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've dealt with one or two events out of
11 order, and I would just like to go back a little bit, please, and
12 clarify and clear up one or two things. Going back to September
13 and the visit to France?

14 A. Yes.

10:00:47 15 Q. Help us, did you visit - we know that you went to
16 Mauritania on your way back from that visit?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But did you go anywhere else on your way to France?

19 A. Yes, I did.

10:01:01 20 Q. And where did you go?

21 A. En route to France I stopped in La Cote d'Ivoire to consult
22 with my friend and brother Konan Bedie, then the President.

23 Q. All right. Could I ask, please, that the witness be shown
24 the photograph behind divider 45. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

10:02:17 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. What does this photograph depict?

27 A. This is my arrival in Abidjan, being received by the - this
28 could be the protocol minister of state at the airport.

29 Q. Would it be helpful if you changed seats for a moment,

1 Mr Taylor, and just assist us with a few individuals?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. I think it might be best if we started from the steps of
4 the aeroplane from the top?

10:02:53 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Are those members of your entourage?

7 A. That is correct, yes.

8 Q. And who are they?

9 A. All right. The gentleman right here is my - is the
10:03:20 10 personal physician of the President, Dr Samuel Brisbane. That's
11 B-R-I-S-B-A-N-E. Here is the chairman of the National Patriotic
12 Party, the ruling party.

13 Q. What's his name?

14 A. Chief Cyril, C-Y-R-I-L, Allen.

10:03:51 15 Q. Yes?

16 A. The gentleman right here is the deputy minister of state
17 and press secretary, Honourable Reginald Goodridge. Here is a
18 former member of the Council of State that represented the NPFL
19 just before my going to Monrovia in 1995. This is now the late
10:04:30 20 General Isaac Musa. The lady right here is the religious adviser
21 to the President, Reverend Lillian Mitchell. Right behind me
22 here is my then wife, presently senator, Jewel Howard-Taylor.

23 Behind here, only a part of the head can be seen, is my
24 aide-de-camp Lieutenant General Momo Dgi ba. I say that so far
10:05:24 25 with certainty. Some of these other faces I don't want to
26 speculate.

27 Q. Okay. And the gentleman holding your right arm?

28 A. I'm not sure of his position, but at this particular point
29 he could either be the chief of protocol or the minister of

1 state. I would say he is probably the minister of state in the
2 office of the President.

3 Q. And where are you arriving there, Mr Taylor?

4 A. This is at the airport in Abidjan.

10:05:55 5 Q. Abidjan?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And this is - and how long did you spend on this trip?

8 A. The total trip, or just the trip to Abidjan?

9 Q. Just the trip to be Abidjan.

10:06:09 10 A. This is just a stopover for consultations really with my
11 brother on a few matters before continuing.

12 Q. And then?

13 A. And then I continued on to Paris for my visit.

14 Q. And we know that you arrive on Paris on 28 September?

10:06:30 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Was this the day before?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. The aeroplane that you are embarking from bears the name
19 Burkina Faso. How is that?

10:06:55 20 A. This aircraft is a Boeing 727 presidential jet belonging to
21 the President of Burkina Faso. It is configured in an executive
22 form. It is not a transport airliner. He had asked the
23 President to have the service of his aircraft because of serious
24 financial strains on Liberia. And this happens all the time
10:07:21 25 where Presidents ask others to assist them especially in the area
26 of aircrafts. This is the presidential aircraft.

27 Q. So who does it actually belong to?

28 A. The Government of Burkina Faso.

29 Q. And the President then being?

1 A. Blaise Compaore.

2 Q. So, put simply, Blaise Compaore lent you his presidential
3 aircraft?

4 A. That is correct, yes.

10:07:48 5 Q. Did Liberia have one?

6 A. No, no, no, no.

7 Q. Let's stay where you are for the minute, Mr Taylor. Before
8 I go on, can we mark that photograph for identification, please,
9 MFI-59.

10:08:09 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph which also bears the
11 Defence marking DP25 will be marked for identification MFI-59.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Let us now look, please, behind divider 46. Yes,
14 Mr Taylor?

10:08:45 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Who is that you are greeting?

17 A. That is the then President of La Cote d'Ivoire, President
18 Henri Konan Bedie.

19 Q. Now, the gentleman wearing the gold braided cap, that's
10:09:29 20 Momo Dgiba. We've met him before, haven't we?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Can you help us with anybody else on this photograph?

23 A. Quite frankly no. These are all Ivorian faces. I don't
24 know them.

10:09:41 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I have that photograph marked for
26 identification, photograph of President Taylor meeting President
27 Bedie of Cote d'Ivoire. MFI-60.

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Presumably on the same occasion?

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. This is on the same visit, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes. Yes, your Honour. From the airport we go to the
3 presidency.

10:10:11

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: That photograph which also bears the
5 Defence marking DP46 will be marked for identification MFI-60.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Finally in this regard, Mr Taylor, can we look behind
8 divider 47. Now, helpfully this photograph bears the date 27
9 September 1998, yes?

10:10:44

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So this is the day before you arrive in France?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And just confirm for the record, please, who are you
14 sitting next to?

10:10:58

15 A. That's the President of La Cote d'Ivoire, Henri Konan
16 Bedie.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes. Again can I ask for that photograph to
18 be marked for identification, please, Mr President, MFI 61.

10:11:25

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph bearing the Defence
20 marking DP27 is marked for identification 61.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now we looked at the photographs of your visit to France
23 and the stopover in Mauritania.

24 A. Can I move now?

10:12:10

25 Q. Yes, please, that would be helpful. And we've gone forward
26 and dealt with the supposed - the allegation of 5,000 troops
27 massing for the invasion of Sierra Leone.

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. I wonder if the witness could now be shown, please, the

1 presidential papers, page 208. Now, Mr Taylor, what is this
2 event about?

3 A. This is the signing of the bill putting into place a human
4 rights commission in Liberia.

10:13:23 5 Q. And we see this is dated Monday, 27 October 1998, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Why was it felt necessary to establish such a commission,
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. We were coming out of a war and there were just so many
10:13:48 10 issues at stake. There were the creation of various human rights
11 groups in Liberia, NGO reports. We wanted to make sure that as
12 we moved from war to peace, that there would be some

13 accountability and that there will be no doubt about our

14 government being able to handle acts that tended to abuse the

10:14:22 15 rights of our people. And so we put into place a commission that
16 would deal with these matters and those that were found violating
17 rights, that the course of law could be pursued. So we put

18 together - we put this commission together and it is headed

19 actually by a retired judge who sat on the Supreme Court, judge -

10:14:52 20 I think it was Hall Badio and that's spelled B-A-D-I-O. Hall
21 Badio. To try to - to start a new page, where there would be no
22 impunity and those that were going to abuse the rights of our
23 people would have to be accountable to the law.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we won't look at all of your address on
10:15:19 25 this occasion, but can we turn over the page to page 209, please.

26 And can we start with the second paragraph in the right-hand
27 column:

28 "My decision to take the lead on the human rights issue
29 stems from not only my declared commitment, both public and

1 private, to make human rights an integral part of the policies of
2 this administration, but from a silent pledge made to myself and
3 my God to protect the fundamental rights of the little boys and
4 girls, the men and women, the mothers and fathers, brothers and
10:15:59 5 sisters of this great republic."

6 Were you truly committed to those sentiments, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Very much so. Very much so.

8 Q. But do you appreciate that the allegation made against you
9 is that your behaviour was on the contrary; totally inimical to
10:16:22 10 the idea of human rights? You appreciate that, don't you?

11 A. I appreciate that but that's a total falsehood, because in
12 fact later on I'm sure it will be brought before this Court.
13 Even during the war in Liberia the NPFL under my leadership at
14 the time had orphanages throughout Gbarnga, an orphanage in
10:16:53 15 Totota where young children, boys and girls, were collected that
16 were orphaned and brought into these orphanages where the NPFL,
17 coming and becoming the NPRAG, took care of them and in fact one
18 such individual that managed these orphanages is still running
19 one now in the city of Monrovia.

10:17:21 20 So no, this was nothing that we were just getting up and
21 saying. We had already started this process before I went to
22 Monrovia and it continued with the collection of young people,
23 putting them into orphanages. I personally, as President, with
24 all my children, even adopted an orphan from one of these
10:17:41 25 orphanages. So I'm speaking earnestly and truthfully about this.

26 Q. It goes on:

27 "The constitution of our country is clear on the issue of
28 fundamental rights. The constitution says that all persons are
29 born equally free and independent and have certain natural

1 inherent and inalienable rights, among which is the right of
2 enjoying life. I say to you my fellow citizens and all who
3 reside within our borders that my administration will ensure that
4 your rights are protected. Because I, as your leader, having
10:18:21 5 seen and experienced the worst forms of abuse of human rights in
6 our recent history, I have decided to become the chief campaigner
7 for human rights in Liberia and beyond our borders.

8 Our mission in this regard will be to promote the ideals of
9 the values of human rights in our sub-region and encourage our
10:18:43 10 colleagues across the great continent of Africa to work for the
11 creation of an effective human rights commission in the Economic
12 Community of West African States, ECOWAS, and the Organisation of
13 African Unity.

14 As Liberia from its independence in 1847 became a champion
10:19:08 15 for freedom, democracy and equality across the African diaspora
16 and worked tirelessly through both diplomacy and legal action to
17 ensure the independence of African nations from the shackles of
18 colonialism and protect the human rights of citizens of Southern
19 Africa against a scourge of racial segregation and injustices, so
10:19:27 20 this nation, this people, are morally bound to champion the cause
21 of human rights for all African people's everywhere.

22 We assure you that the national commission on human rights
23 will remain unfettered from any interference from any
24 administration. It will serve as a free and independent watch
10:19:50 25 dog, as well as an a coordinating institution for observance of
26 human rights in our land. The existence of the commission in no
27 way precludes or restricts civil initiatives and actions aimed at
28 advocating for and protecting civil rights.

29 This administration will maintain a sustained policy of

1 partnership and collaboration with our society on all matters of
2 human rights and its protections. We expect that the national
3 human rights commission and all its collaborating civic
4 organisations will serve as reminders of our sacred obligations."

10:20:39 5 And you go on, missing the next paragraph:

6 "As we make this declaration, we call on the international
7 community and all men and women, as well as institutions of
8 goodwill and charity, to continue their assistance to this
9 country and its people in our efforts to recover from the civil
10:21:00 10 conflict. In particular, we anticipate that the UNHCR, the
11 UNFAO, the UNICEF, the WHO, the WFP, together with all other UN
12 organisations and international and local humanitarian agencies,
13 will redouble their efforts to supplement our endeavours."

14 Now let's just pause for a moment, please, Mr Taylor. Help
10:21:27 15 us with this: Just in general terms, what powers did this human
16 rights commission have?

17 A. It had powers to investigate. It had subpoena powers
18 through the Courts not only on - because under our constitution
19 the power of subpoena rests with the legislature and the courts,
10:21:58 20 so even the President doesn't have subpoena powers, but they have
21 subpoena powers through the courts and this is why we had a
22 retired justice to sit as head of this commission so they could
23 go out and investigate without favour or fear and anyone that
24 even refused to appear before that commission could be subpoenaed
10:22:22 25 using the courts to subpoena that person and bring that person
26 before that commission. And if it were found that an individual
27 had deliberately violated someone's right, which in fact would be
28 the law, that case would then be processed through the justice
29 department.

1 Q. Yes. Now staying with that document, can we go to page 127
2 please. Now we've looked at this before, but we're looking at it
3 again in order to get matters in sequence. The date of this
4 photograph, as we see, is 29 October. Is that right, Mr Taylor?

10:23:38 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. So this is a couple of days after the event we've just
7 looked at, which is the bill setting up the human rights
8 commission, yes?

9 A. That is correct.

10:23:55 10 Q. And you're in Nigeria at this time, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. As a guest of whom?

13 A. The President of Nigeria, General Abubakar.

14 Q. And you've already indicated he is the gentleman in the
10:24:13 15 uniform standing to your right in this photograph?

16 A. Yes, that is correct.

17 Q. And the gentleman to his right is well-known, Dr Kofi Annan
18 --

19 A. That is correct.

10:24:23 20 Q. -- the United Nations Secretary-General, and to his right,
21 President Tejan Kabbah, yes?

22 A. That is correct, yes.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, there had been a meeting with President
24 Kabbah and the Secretary-General in July?

10:24:37 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now this is a further meeting, is that right?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. And what was the purpose of this further meeting?

2 A. The same Sierra Leonean problem.

3 Q. And what about that problem?

4 A. There are several accusations. The accusations do not
10:25:04 5 stop. If you look at the second report of the Secretary-General
6 that we just went through, I think on Monday, and followed up by
7 the report from his special representative in Monrovia, you see
8 now there's been an escalation. Now I'm amassing troops to
9 attack. So there is this escalation and so things are not quiet,
10:25:33 10 so there's this second meeting to discuss these matters to see
11 how, you know, it can be brought under control.

12 And let's just note here that that so-called 5,000 man
13 amassing on the borders, in this second report of the
14 Secretary-General that we saw a little earlier all of that was
10:26:02 15 cleared up where the Secretary-General finally reports to the
16 Security Council that there is no such thing.

17 Q. And just to remind ourselves, that second report is dated
18 16 October 1998?

19 A. That is correct.

10:26:20 20 Q. The day after the 15 October report by the
21 Secretary-General's special representative, yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. So by the time you arrive in Abuja on 29 October 1998,
24 what's the state of play between you and President Kabbah?

10:26:43 25 A. Really we are just - we've already smoothed things over,
26 we've talked about it and on the phone during the time we've
27 cleared it up, so we meet there and our principal concern is,
28 "Look, Tejan, how can we continue to work together to make sure
29 that we don't have these misunderstandings again?" This is

1 basically what we talked about and working out certain modalities
2 how we can promote peace. We talked about the continued conflict
3 in Sierra Leone and how it could come to an end.

4 By this time I also raised the good prospects of peace,
10:27:33 5 because by now let's not forget Sam Bockarie has been to Liberia.
6 He has left. I also explained to them face-to-face about the
7 meeting and the prospects that I saw and how I evaluated the
8 meeting as a very good meeting with Bockarie at that time about
9 some cessation of hostilities.

10:27:58 10 Q. Now by this date, Mr Taylor, 29 October, how many times had
11 you seen Sam Bockarie?

12 A. By now I have seen Sam Bockarie two times.

13 Q. Now, you told us about the first visit.

14 A. Yes.

10:28:13 15 Q. Now, you told us that that first visit was just before your
16 trip to France?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Now, we know that you left to go to France via la Cote
19 d'Ivoire --

10:28:23 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- on 27 September 1998?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. So I take it your visit - the visit by Sam Bockarie - is
24 some time prior to 27 September?

10:28:37 25 A. That's the first visit.

26 Q. The first visit.

27 A. The second one is October, yes.

28 Q. Now, the second visit is when?

29 A. Is about early October.

1 Q. Early October?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And how does that visit come about?

4 A. The first meeting is a very good meeting. We talked about
10:28:56 5 all of the possibilities of cessation of hostilities and I
6 explained to him the importance of peace and that the Committee
7 of Five was interested in having the conflict stop. His own
8 approach was very good. He said that they wanted peace. He
9 raised the issue of his leader being free and all of that. I
10:29:25 10 said, "Well, look, these are matters that will be discussed, but
11 the first thing that we need to do is to get the fighting
12 stopped". I then tell him that upon his return we will let him
13 know if we were going to pursue this any further and he leaves.

14 I then inform my colleagues about the discussions and then
10:29:50 15 tell them that I felt that it was a very good discussion and that
16 I felt that it was better to call him back for a second time and
17 that I was thinking about doing what President Bedie, the
18 President of La Cote d'Ivoire, had done before with Foday Sankoh
19 and that we will provide a place in Monrovia that they could come
10:30:12 20 to and that we should maintain contact with them. That was the
21 reason for his second visit.

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just help us with this. The accommodation,
23 when was that set up?

24 A. The accommodation was set up on the second visit of
10:30:36 25 Sam Bockarie to Liberia.

26 Q. Now taking things slowly, firstly what accommodation was
27 provided?

28 A. I will expand on that word. We call it accommodation, yes,
29 but it's a little more than that. What we did was we determined

1 (1) that because of the security of Bockarie coming to Liberia we
2 needed for the delegation to be in first of all a secure
3 location. We had put him up the first time in a hotel and we had
4 to have securities assigned there, so we decided this time that
10:31:17 5 the RUF activities in Liberia should all be centralised, as had
6 been done before in La Cote d'Ivoire, by providing a building
7 that they could eat in, sleep in, work out of and maintain
8 communication with their colleagues across the border, so we
9 leased a house on the boulevard.

10:31:42 10 Q. Which boulevard?

11 A. On Tubman Boulevard in Monrovia on the open boulevard.

12 Q. And help us with this. What is the main road leading into
13 Monrovia?

14 A. In the city is the Tubman Boulevard.

10:32:00 15 Q. And how public is that thoroughfare, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Very, very public.

17 Q. How far, for example, is it from Spriggs Payne airfield
18 where there was an ECOMOG base?

19 A. I would say about a little less than a quarter of a mile.

10:32:24 20 Q. And help us, was there an embassy right next door to this
21 facility?

22 A. Yes, about 100 I would say metres - no, about 1,000 metres,
23 not a hundred, the Nigerian embassy is right there.

24 Q. And how big is that Nigerian embassy?

10:32:46 25 A. Very big. It's a huge compound.

26 Q. And is that embassy on the same side of the road as this
27 facility for the RUF?

28 A. The same side of the road I would say about 1,000 metres
29 from the embassy, very next to the embassy.

1 Q. And, Mr Taylor, was there something clandestine in the
2 setting up of this house for the RUF?

3 A. There was absolutely nothing clandestine about the setting
4 up of this house and let me tell you why. The house is on the
10:33:18 5 open boulevard. It is opened with the knowledge and consent of
6 many of my colleagues in ECOWAS, including members of the
7 Committee of Five. It is open. Diplomatic missions accredited
8 near Monrovia went to that building and they met RUF individuals,
9 including staff members from the Sierra Leonean embassy in
10:33:42 10 Monrovia. There was nothing clandestine there.

11 Q. Just pause there. There was a Sierra Leonean embassy in
12 Monrovia, was there?

13 A. Oh, definitely, definitely.

14 Q. And an ambassador?

10:33:54 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. From Sierra Leone?

17 A. Oh, definitely.

18 Q. That is from the Kabbah government?

19 A. Oh, definitely.

10:33:59 20 Q. And what are you telling us, that they also visited this
21 facility?

22 A. Members of that embassy visited that building frequently,
23 frequently.

24 Q. So did you assume that President Kabbah himself knew about
10:34:14 25 it?

26 A. I did not assume. I knew that he knew about it, because he
27 was told.

28 Q. And did he know that, amongst others, Sam Bockarie --

29 A. Oh, yes.

1 Q. -- the bete noire of the RUF was visiting those premises?
2 Did he know?

3 A. Yes, yes.

10:34:36

4 Q. And was there anything hidden or surreptitious about these
5 visits by the RUF to this facility?

10:34:57

6 A. Nothing hidden. The building from the main - and I think
7 the judges need to know that from the main boulevard, the
8 building is about 100 metres from the main boulevard. It's on
9 the boulevard. It's not hidden in a cluster of buildings. It's
10 not hidden behind. It's on the main - you drive up the boulevard
11 and as soon as you turn up the boulevard you're practically into
12 the yard of this place.

10:35:15

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, could I seek clarification.
14 The witness said he is sure that President Kabbah was told.
15 Perhaps you could clarify who told President Kabbah?

16 THE WITNESS: I told him. I guess I talked a little fast.
17 I said I'm sure he was told.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Who by?

10:35:28

20 A. By me.

21 Q. And when --

10:35:42

22 A. Excuse me, because I note that the Justice may be very
23 concerned. I mean, if you listen he was told. Let's put a
24 period to that, okay? I know he was told. It means that's just
25 me.

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I don't think that's the question I
27 asked. The question I asked was "Who by?"

28 THE WITNESS: I told President Kabbah, your Honour.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, did you tell him before or after
2 this second meeting with Bockarie in October?

3 A. Before. Before. Long before.

10:36:21

4 Q. And help us, what facilities were provided within that -
5 within those premises?

6 A. We had installed a landline telephone. We also had
7 installed a long range radio that could call - that they could
8 call across the border into Sierra Leone.

9 Q. Who provided that; they or the Liberian government?

10:36:51

10 A. The Liberian government provided that.

11 Q. Why?

12 A. Because that building was to be used as offices and a means
13 of maintaining contact with them across the border at all times,
14 and the arrangement was that someone would be left there at least
15 to make sure that any time we wanted to contact them that they
16 would be available.

10:37:11

17 Q. Why was it considered necessary to have such a facility,
18 that is that they could maintain contact with the forces in
19 Sierra Leone?

10:37:30

20 A. Well, Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia for a day or two and he
21 returns. We want to get in contact - by "we" I mean I as
22 President, or some foreign diplomat wants to find out what's
23 going on over there, if there is an emergency, we want something
24 done like trying to stop the fighting, how do you contact them?

10:37:55

25 The whole point that they made, similar to the point that they
26 made in Ivory Coast that we replicated, was that they needed a
27 means to be in contact to know what was happening with their
28 people.

29 So let's make it very clear. We replicated exactly what

1 had been done in La Cote d'Ivoire before with President Bedie
2 when Sankoh was there in 1996. This is exactly what they called
3 for when we opened the facilities in Monrovia, that they needed
4 to be in contact with their people on a regular basis and that
10:38:35 5 they needed this communication, and we did provide it for them.

6 Q. So help us, in the La Cote d'Ivoire situation you've
7 mentioned, did Foday Sankoh have a radio provided for him so that
8 he could maintain contact with RUF combatants on the ground?

9 A. Oh, definitely, yes. Yes.

10:38:57 10 Q. How do you know this?

11 A. Because the President of La Cote d'Ivoire told me this,
12 that they maintained Sankoh down there. We're in contact now.
13 We're in contact.

14 Q. That's why I'm asking, you see, Mr Taylor. Help us.

10:39:11 15 Before you decided to replicate to borrow your word this
16 situation in Liberia, who did you speak to in order to be able to
17 replicate?

18 A. Well, don't let's forget now La Cote d'Ivoire is a member
19 of the Committee of Five. We spoke to - we were in contact with
10:39:29 20 them. La Cote d'Ivoire is a member of the Committee of Five that
21 we keep talking about in Sierra Leone and so there is constant
22 exchange of information, "How did you do this? Why did you do
23 this?" So they are in the loop on all of these discussions and
24 always you get experience based on what other people have done.

10:39:50 25 They felt that this was a good way, because this was a major
26 headache for them that they had to do this in order to maintain
27 contact and so they told us that, "We think this would be a good
28 thing to do. We did it and it did not present any hiccups for
29 us", so we did it too.

1 Q. So put simply, where did you get the blueprint from for
2 what you set up in Monrovia for the RUF?

3 A. La Cote d'Ivoire.

4 Q. Now still on this issue, because you appreciate of course
10:40:27 5 that much has been said about the RUF having free rein in
6 Monrovia in effect and so let's deal with it in a little more
7 detail, shall we? When members of the RUF came to this facility
8 in Monrovia, did they come armed?

9 A. Oh, no, no. All arms were left at the border. We would
10:40:59 10 permit maybe at maximum - I don't know what the securities
11 permitted, but the instructions were on the matter of handguns
12 that a few of Bockarie's security would carry handguns - by
13 handguns I'm referring to pistols, 38 pistols - but something
14 like rifles or such thing there would be no such thing, no.

10:41:30 15 Q. Were they allowed to maintain stocks of arms and ammunition
16 at this address?

17 A. No, no, that address was not just free wheeling. Also at
18 that address were Secret Service personnel posted there to make
19 absolutely sure that they were protected from any outside
10:41:57 20 interference, but also it would give the Government of Liberia an
21 opportunity of having an eye on what they were doing too. That's
22 the whole purpose.

23 Q. Which secret service?

24 A. The Special Security Service of Liberia.

10:42:10 25 Q. Run by?

26 A. The Liberian government.

27 Q. Yes, who was head of it?

28 A. Well, that is different from being run by. Benjamin Yeaten
29 headed the Secret Service?

1 Q. Right, so Benjamin Yeaten then had some direct involvement
2 in supervising that facility?

3 A. Total involvement, yes.

4 Q. So did he visit the address?

10:42:29 5 A. I would want to believe that he should have visited it. I
6 wouldn't know the details, no, but I'm sure as head of SSS he had
7 to visit there.

8 Q. And, as far as you're aware, did any kind of relationship
9 develop between Bockarie and Yeaten?

10:42:49 10 A. Oh, yes. I want to believe, yes, they did develop a close
11 relationship. Yes.

12 Q. How do you know?

13 A. Well, it is normal. They are about the same age group and
14 former combatants, so you would expect that they would become
10:43:06 15 friends.

16 Q. Now help me, Mr Taylor, did you ever visit that address?

17 A. No, no. When I wanted Bockarie, I sent for him. I had no
18 need to be there.

19 Q. And apart from the provision of radios, did you provide any
10:43:28 20 - or the Liberian government provide any - other services within
21 that facility?

22 A. In the facility besides the radio I have said we put a
23 landline telephone in the building.

24 Q. What about services like catering and so on?

10:43:44 25 A. Oh, yes. Yes, we had a kitchen in the building where food
26 was cooked, we had the services and let me just break one little
27 thing. All of these things are geared to when you get to a
28 country and they put you in a guesthouse and put cooks, service
29 people and everything in there, what are they really telling you?

1 "We want to keep an eye on you to make sure that you don't - we
2 know you're every move". We had catering services right in the
3 building. They cooked there. They ate there. They did all the
4 work out of there. There was a guest car posted there. Wherever
10:44:25 5 they went, they were escorted by Secret Service personnel. So
6 everything that they needed in that building was there.

7 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, a couple of further details. How
8 regularly was that facility used by the RUF?

9 A. You say how regularly. The RUF, from the time we gave them
10:44:50 10 the building it remained permanently the building of the RUF.
11 They didn't have to change and go. It was the permanent
12 building, yes.

13 Q. My fault entirely. I should have been much clearer in my
14 question. What kind of numbers would be staying at the address?

10:45:08 15 A. Oh, there would be at any point in time I would say not
16 more than about five persons to the best of my knowledge. Just a
17 small group of individuals. Foday Sankoh - let me say I didn't
18 say Foday Sankoh. Sam Bockarie's - there was a big guest room
19 that was there and they cleaned up their own - they had their own
10:45:41 20 people there, about two or three persons to clean up. They had I
21 think one radio man. I would say about five. I think not more
22 than five.

23 Q. And help us, when members of the RUF came to stay at those
24 premises did they have free rein to run all over Monrovia as they
10:46:03 25 liked?

26 A. No, we would - we made sure that they understood that there
27 were security concerns for their being in Monrovia because there
28 was a very large Sierra Leonean population in the country. If
29 you remember there's evidence here there was some 90,000 Sierra

1 Leonean refugees in Liberia and sometimes people would want to
2 put them in specific locations, but no one was restricted in
3 movement. So we wanted to make sure that they did not bump into
4 any Sierra Leoneans that could cause them trouble. They may have
10:46:42 5 had some supporters, but Liberia was not into the business of
6 bringing the RUF in Monrovia to make contacts. So we made sure
7 that their movement, while we did not stop them from moving, but
8 we did advise them where and when to move.

9 Q. Bluntly, Mr Taylor, what was in it for Liberia in providing
10:47:13 10 these kind of facilities?

11 A. What was in it was very simple: Making sure that as
12 quickly as possible peace would return. That's all Liberia
13 wanted from that. Do everything you can, hurry up, let's get the
14 cessation of hostilities and peace in Sierra Leone so real peace
10:47:37 15 can also come to Liberia. That's all that the Liberian
16 government was interested in.

17 Q. You're sure you weren't interested in a few diamonds,
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. No, if I wanted diamonds I would have mined them in
10:47:52 20 Liberia.

21 Q. Because you know what the allegation is, don't you; that
22 when Bockarie came to Monrovia, he was bringing an endless stream
23 of mayonnaise jars filled with diamonds. Is that what was in it
24 for you?

10:48:09 25 A. There was no such thing between Bockarie and myself. I
26 cannot - I cannot and will not account or even deny the fact that
27 Bockarie could have brought diamonds to Liberia. That's not my
28 concern. Because Liberia was a place where business people from
29 Sierra Leone, Guinea, all over West Africa, came to do business.

1 As far as this President is concerned, Sam Bockarie never
2 brought me or gave me any diamonds. And I have listened to the
3 evidence before this Court and all I'm hearing people say, "Oh,
4 Bockarie told us that he was carrying diamonds". I don't know,
10:48:55 5 and I stand corrected, of anyone who said, "I was standing there
6 and saw Bockarie gave Mr Taylor diamonds". This is total
7 nonsense. There was no such transaction between Sam Bockarie and
8 myself or any other member of the RUF.

9 Q. We need to confront these things directly, Mr Taylor.

10:49:16 10 That's why I'm raising these matters with you.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Were you providing him with arms and ammunition in exchange
13 for diamonds?

14 A. None whatsoever.

10:49:27 15 Q. Did you set up this guesthouse to make a personal profit,
16 Mr Taylor?

17 A. They didn't have to pay for it, so if I wanted profit they
18 would have leased it on their own. The guesthouse was leased and
19 paid for by the Government of Liberia and our taxpayers even with
10:49:44 20 hardly any resources. No.

21 Q. Now, we're in October 1998, Mr Taylor. We've dealt with
22 the foreign trips in September. We've dealt with Camp Johnson
23 Road which trickles into October. You've now mentioned this
24 second trip by Bockarie in October. Whilst we're on the topic of
10:50:20 25 Bockarie, help us with this: Did Bockarie come back to Liberia
26 after that second trip in 1998?

27 A. Yes. Bockarie came back through Liberia.

28 Q. Is that for the third time?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. And can you help us with a month?

2 A. That is I would say somewhere in November or thereabouts.

3 Bockarie came through Liberia, yes.

4 Q. And what year was that?

10:51:02 5 A. We're talking about 1998.

6 Q. Right. Now, we had got to 29 October and the meeting in

7 Abuja, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Which is the photograph we were looking at at page 127,

10:51:20 10 yes, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Can we go over to page 129, please. The top photograph on

13 that page, yes?

14 A. Yes.

10:51:36 15 Q. That's you sitting, speaking to?

16 A. Secretary-General Annan.

17 Q. The Secretary-General Kofi Annan?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And is this during that meeting in Abuja?

10:51:55 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And why was he there, the Secretary-General?

22 A. I guess he had been, on the word used, seized with this
23 matter by the Security Council and he is trying to help to bring
24 an end to this problem.

10:52:24 25 Q. Underneath that photograph we see another photograph with

26 you with President Lansana Conte, yes?

27 A. Yes, that is correct.

28 Q. And the caption reads that this is the first of two visits
29 to attend a Mano River Union summit which was also attended by

1 President Kabbah of Sierra Leone?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now help us. That meeting being described there, is that
4 before or after the trip to Abuja?

10:52:48 5 A. Well, this - there is a trip to Conakry right after Abuja.
6 We run all the way early November into Conakry. But this
7 particular one is the one before the trip after Abuja.

8 Q. Yes. Let us go to page 269, please, in this same document.
9 Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

10:53:26 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. You see that this is headed "Report to the Liberian Nation
12 of the Visit of the President of Liberia to the 21st Ordinary
13 Summit of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the
14 Economic Community of West African States", yes?

10:54:23 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now the photographs we've just looked at are photographs
17 taken during that summit. Is that right?

18 A. You mean the photograph with Secretary-General Annan?

19 Q. Yes.

10:54:37 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And with President Abubakar and President Kabbah?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now let's have a look at this, please, because what were
24 you seeking to do in this address, Mr Taylor?

10:54:59 25 A. Well, again just if you read the address, it's dealing with
26 the whole problem that we're facing.

27 Q. Okay, let's deal with it then:

28 "My fellow countrymen, from ancient times men and women of
29 goodwill have had to depart their native lands and travel to

1 distant places, entrusting their lives to unknown elements,
2 leaving behind loved ones and compatriots, searching for
3 understanding among people in order to prevent conflict, creating
4 strategic alliances for the common good and to protect national
10:55:35 5 interests.

6 In spite of our present domestic agenda which calls for
7 empowerment of our people across this country, we continue to
8 project an active foreign policy directed primarily towards peace
9 and stability in the West African sub-region."

10:55:57 10 Was that the case?

11 A. Yes, yes.

12 Q. "And reconstruction of a positive image for Liberia in the
13 greater international community. Hence we are bound by duty and
14 tradition to follow the ancient practice of travelling to distant
10:56:13 15 places in the interest of this, our native land.

16 Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, my fellow countrymen,
17 our recent visit to Abuja, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to
18 attend the 21st ordinary session of the authority of heads and
19 government of ECOWAS member states was embarked upon with a keen
10:56:37 20 sense of responsibility in the expectation that all of our
21 deliberations, actions and decisions would meet the approval and
22 gather the support of the Liberian people. In this respect I
23 have the honour to report to the Liberian nation our
24 participation in the recent ECOWAS summit in Abuja, Nigeria.

10:57:03 25 At the head of a twelve member official delegation we
26 depart Liberia last Thursday morning aboard a special aircraft
27 for a three hour flight to Abuja with a brief fuelling stop in
28 Bobo, Burkina Faso."

29 We needn't deal with the flight conditions:

1 "My good friend and brother, General Abdulsamali A
2 Abubakar, Head of State, commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
3 Federal Republic of Nigeria, and chairman of ECOWAS personally
4 greeted me and my party at the steps of our aircraft. This kind
10:57:45 5 gesture indicated, and at the same time reassured me of our
6 friendship, common interest and good working relations with the
7 Nigerian leader and people.

8 Following the honoured guard ceremony we immediately
9 proceeded to a fruitful 50 minute tete-a-tete in the VIP lounge
10:58:09 10 of the airport covering topics of common interest."

11 You then go to the Hilton hotel, your official residence:

12 "The rest of the Thursday evening was spent in quiet
13 contemplation and pleasant exchange of greetings by telephone
14 with a number of my colleagues who had also begun arriving for
10:58:31 15 the summit. We enjoyed the happy occasion of reviewing our
16 fraternal relations with our immediate neighbour, President Ahmad
17 Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, Henri Konan Bedie of Cote d'Ivoire
18 and Lansana Conte of Guinea.

19 The opening ceremony of the 21st ordinary summit of ECOWAS
10:58:58 20 was as prestigious as it was historic. In attendance were 15
21 Heads of States and government representing ECOWAS member states
22 and President Nelson Mandela, who graced the occasion in his
23 capacity as Head of State of South Africa and chairman of the
24 Southern African Development Community, SADC.

10:59:22 25 In his usual charisma and statesman's eloquence, President
26 Mandela said he is saddened by the inability to visit every
27 country in Africa that had assisted the African National Congress
28 in its struggle against apartheid to show his gratitude and
29 appreciation. By being present at the auspicious gathering,

1 although for a few hours, President Mandela used the opportunity
2 to greet each leader individually, a moment which seemed to
3 electrify the jammed packed conference hall. On our brief
4 exchange, President Mandela and I renewed our acquaintance which
11:00:02 5 is built on historic and traditional alliances.

6 He also indicated that his presence at the ECOWAS summit
7 was a show of solidarity and to share ideas on some of the
8 complex issues confronting the West African sub-region, issues
9 which are similar to those confronting the Southern African
11:00:25 10 region. He called for the building of economic links between
11 ECOWAS and SADC in order to strengthen democracy and good
12 governance.

13 The wise African statesman admonished his West African
14 colleagues to pursue peaceful political solutions to conflict, a
11:00:42 15 foreign policy stance that this nation has always adopted in line
16 with our recent political history. We are happy to note the
17 rebirth of South African-Nigerian relations, a process to which
18 we are honoured to lend our support. This reunion between two of
19 Africa's most industrialised and most populous nations can only
11:01:08 20 give impetus to a meaningful South-South cooperation that will
21 benefit all African nations.

22 In his keynote address, General Abubakar also pointed
23 toward a promising future for ECOWAS member states. Although
24 ECOWAS's involvement in peacekeeping has been topical at recent
11:01:31 25 summits, the new chairman reported new progress in key areas such
26 as establishment of the ECOWAS monetary zone and the enforcement
27 of treaties and protocols of ECOWAS. We applauded General
28 Abubakar for elaborating on the policy platform of his
29 administration which includes an open door policy of dialogue,

1 the quest for global peace and commitment to integration in the
2 sub-region in critical areas such as economic cooperation,
3 transportation and communication."

4 Let's skip and go to the last paragraph on the left-hand
11:02:10 5 side:

6 "The launching of the ECOWAS commemorative stamp was
7 another important part of the opening ceremony which was followed
8 by the honouring and presentation of plaques of all nations,
9 international institutions and individuals who contributed to
11:02:35 10 ECOMOG initiatives in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Included on the
11 honour list were all former and present forces commanders of
12 ECOMOG in recognition of their invaluable services to the peace
13 process in Liberia. It is our honour during the ceremony to have
14 been called upon to present plaques to former forces commander
11:02:54 15 Major General Timothy Shelpidi."

16 Was he your friend, Mr Taylor?

17 A. No, I think - this was why this was done. It was just a
18 little show thing. General Abubakar knew what had happened
19 between Shelpidi and myself and I think this was just a way of
11:03:12 20 calling upon me to present him the plaque and that he would have
21 to salute me anyway. So I think it was just a little prank that
22 was played because when he misbehaved in Liberia that I threw him
23 out of my office, immediately General Abubakar removed him from
24 Liberia. So I guess this was just something that he did for me
11:03:35 25 to honour those people that served in Liberia because I was now
26 the President. I don't think Shelpidi viewed me as his friend
27 either.

28 Q. "I hereby invite my fellow citizens to once again join me
29 in giving a big thanks to all former forces commanders, the men

1 and women of ECOMOG, for their brotherly service to our nation."

2 Then this:

3 "Our two days of intense yet brotherly deliberations which
4 took us into the wee hours of the morning was intending to

11:04:13 5 address some of the most intractable issues confronting the
6 sub-region as we all bear witness to the rapid transformations of
7 cultures, economies and politics across our world today. Being
8 also fully aware that our sub-region is perhaps the last among
9 other African regions in terms of development, everyone
11:04:35 10 acknowledges that we still have greater potential for advancement
11 into the 21st century only if we can properly put our house in
12 order in terms of political stability, responsible governance and
13 economic development.

14 Looking across the landscape of the new West African

11:04:55 15 leadership during the summit I could not help but be gratified by
16 the urgency, earnesty and new direction of our brothers, and like
17 ourselves driven toward revolutionary progress for the betterment
18 of our people and the development of our nation into modern
19 citadels for the new millennium. Among my brothers I also sensed
11:05:19 20 the collective courage to combat and prevent the scourge of war,
21 poverty and political instability from our sub-region. Only then
22 can we win the respect and confidence of our peers in the other
23 African regions and beyond.

24 Our discussions, my fellow citizens, covered a wide range

11:05:42 25 of topics in bilateral and multilateral relations, regional
26 security and stability, the serious business of conflict
27 resolution, the prevention and control of drug abuse, the free
28 movement of persons across the sub-region, and the restructuring
29 of the secretariat of ECOWAS for which Liberia was selected

1 amongst seven other countries to serve on a restructuring
2 committee.

3 This committee is also charged with the responsibility of
4 reviewing the allocation of ECOWAS statutory posts within the
11:06:17 5 sub-region.

6 As important as the above mentioned issues were, our focus
7 throughout our deliberations remained on projecting our domestic
8 policy of strong national security, which ultimately, is
9 correlated with the ongoing search for peace in Sierra Leone and
11:06:40 10 Guinea-Bissau. In this regard, Liberia's concern with its
11 long-term security and stability requested assistance from the
12 ECOWAS authority for continued military capacity building and
13 security assistance. This request was unanimously granted with
14 the details of modalities to be worked out jointly between the
11:07:04 15 Liberian authorities and the ECOWAS secretariat."

16 Pause there. Mr Taylor, why did you still need, as this
17 suggests, for ECOMOG - for continued military assistance for
18 security.

19 A. There is still - there is still a contingent of ECOMOG
11:07:27 20 left in Liberia headed by a law officer to continue to help with
21 capacity building; that is, to begin to prepare to possibly train
22 security forces, help with this border, you know, between Liberia
23 and Sierra Leone. So we want that to stay in place, because this
24 is the only way we can also guarantee that - the accusations of
11:07:54 25 assistance and arms going across the border, that there will be
26 someone neutral that will be able to verify whether they happen
27 or not. So this is why we still need them there.

28 Q. "The basis of this request is seen in the growing ability
29 of the Liberian Government to gradually assume responsibility for

1 its own security, thereby lifting the burdens off the ECOMOG
2 force, whose attention is drawn primarily towards more needed
3 crisis situations in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. In a show
4 of further goodwill toward Liberia, the ECOWAS authority pledged
11:08:33 5 their commitment to launch an international appeal for support of
6 Liberia in development funding, security reconstruction, and
7 diplomacy. "

8 Pause again. Now, in terms of assistance, Mr Taylor, we
9 recall that there had been a US inspection panel in February of
11:08:54 10 1998?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Now, they gave Liberia a clean bill of health, you told us?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor, did you receive any aid from the US
11:09:13 15 government?

16 A. Not a dime. Not a dime.

17 Q. Now, we've already heard that the Doe regime had received
18 some 500 million from the US Government; do you remember that?

19 A. Yes, that is correct. That is correct.

11:09:34 20 Q. And are you saying throughout your administration you
21 didn't receive anything at all?

22 A. Well, let me qualify this. There are different forms of
23 assistance and when I'm saying not a dime, what these governments
24 do is this: Money is put into UN agencies, NGOs like the World
11:10:02 25 Food Programme, and these things are considered as aid to the
26 country. The government doesn't get it. From my government's
27 side as it would support government programmes, not a dime.

28 Q. So why was it necessary to - for ECOWAS to be launching
29 this appeal?

1 A. Well, Counsel, when you get into bad so-called books with
2 these big countries, everything dries up. The so-called
3 international community, whether it is the European Union or
4 whether you're talking about some of these institutions that we
11:11:07 5 talked about like the World Bank and the IMF, you get nothing.
6 So ECOWAS, now seeing the need, is saying: Well, look, we don't
7 understand this, so we will launch an appeal for Liberia. And
8 let the Court understand throughout all of these crises you are
9 seeing with the accusations here and - it is not coming from
11:11:31 10 ECOWAS. Everything is flowing from New York. So ECOWAS, now
11 seeing the problem and seeing how hard we're working with ECOWAS,
12 is saying: Look, we see the need in Liberia, so we will go out
13 now and launch an appeal for Liberia since no one is listening
14 directly to Liberia. So ECOWAS decides that they are going to
11:11:57 15 try to launch this appeal.

16 Q. Let's continue. "At the end of our deliberations a new
17 chairman of ECOWAS was elected in the person of President
18 Gnassingbe Eyadema, President of the Republic of Togo. Our
19 government's foreign policy stance on the crisis in Sierra Leone
11:12:26 20 and Guinea-Bissau remained pragmatic, suggestive and concrete,
21 always in the context of using our own situation of peaceful
22 resolution of our conflict as a springboard example for the
23 resolution of their respective conflicts.

24 Our discussion with the parties involved President Ahmed
11:12:47 25 Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, General Joao Bernardo Vieira of
26 Guinea-Bissau, and General Ansumana Manneh, gave us every
27 assurance that the conflicts of Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau
28 will be solved, given due consideration to peaceful negotiated
29 settlements."

1 Let's pause there. Mr Taylor, was Sierra Leone's war on
2 the agenda at that summit?

3 A. Every agenda, yes.

11:13:28

4 Q. And just help us, we've seen that there were some twelve
5 Heads of State present?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. Did those discussions on Sierra Leone involve all of those
8 Heads of State?

11:13:40

9 A. Yes. This is an ordinary session. Yes, we would talk
10 about it in plenary, yes.

11 Q. And apart from in plenary did you have occasion, for
12 example, to sit privately with President Tejan Kabbah and
13 discuss, just between the two of you, the issue?

11:13:57

14 A. Oh, yes. Don't let's forget, in the paragraph you've just
15 read I arrive at the hotel for the meeting. Who do I call? I
16 call Tejan Kabbah; I called General Conte; and I called who?
17 Bedie. Okay? So we always consult. When you get to the meeting
18 there is no fight and - I mean, Tejan Kabbah and I are not at
19 blows - throwing blows. We are calling on the telephone. We are
20 talking at the conference. We're meeting. We're discussing.
21 There are sidebars. Of course there's no animosity like hatred
22 between Tejani and myself.

11:14:21

23 Q. Just help us further with that, Mr Taylor. How did you
24 actually get on with him on a personal level?

11:14:45

25 A. We got on very well. We were very, very frank with each
26 other. We would meet. He would be extremely frank with me; I
27 will be extremely frank with him. When we meet, he will probably
28 raise an issue. I will tell him, "It's not true." I will raise
29 some issues with him. He will say, "Oh, my Brother, it's not

1 true." But we were very frank where we had to be frank. He had
2 his people to protect and sometimes, you know, you have to get a
3 picture of this - by that I mean the Court. When you are a
4 President sitting there and you have advisers and so-called
11:15:26 5 intelligence reports coming to you, I'm getting them. President
6 Kabbah is getting them. He is getting pressure from those people
7 that are supporting Sierra Leone that want to assist. So you
8 have pressures coming from all over. Sometimes you are almost
9 constrained to make decisions that may be impractical. So
11:15:48 10 there's pressure on us, and sometimes we would talk and he would
11 say to me, like I would say to him, "My Brother, I'm under a lot
12 of pressure. The war is going on, and people are accusing you.
13 What do you expect from me?" I said, "Well, listen, you've got
14 to trust me. Send your security. I'll send my security."
11:16:07 15 There's pressure on him, there's pressure on me, there's pressure
16 coming from the outside, but we always tried to find time to talk
17 and we always talked.

18 Q. On that same note, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind the
19 accusations, I mean, did you have discussions along the lines of
11:16:25 20 President Kabbah saying to you: "Look my Brother, I know you're
21 the one funding the RUF and sending arms and ammunition to them."
22 Did he ever make that accusation to your face?

23 A. Well, in a little different way. Not exactly as that. He
24 will tell me, "Well, my Brother, we are receiving security
11:16:44 25 reports that there are arms coming from Liberia. What do you
26 expect me to do?" So I said, "Well, listen, arms may be coming
27 from Liberia, but I can assure you I'm not sending them. We have
28 to put all our efforts together to try to get people posted on
29 that border." We agreed and that's why I begin this process at

1 least three, four, five times, and there will be other Security
2 Council reports here, where we are asking for the posting of
3 troops on that border or some security to verify. Yes, he makes
4 it, but not exactly as you did. He will tell me what he's
11:17:21 5 received and I will tell him, "Listen, don't believe these
6 reports." When these security people get ready for us, sometimes
7 they will come with intelligence this, intelligence that, money
8 is put out to them, and it goes nowhere. We laughed about it
9 where we'd say sometimes when our securities go broke and want
11:17:39 10 money, then they come and bring - and find a need for the
11 generation of more reports, and we talked about this.

12 Q. Let's get specific then, Mr Taylor. We're talking about a
13 meeting at the end of October 1998 at a fairly critical stage in
14 the crisis in Sierra Leone, bearing in mind also that this is a
11:18:05 15 meeting which comes shortly after the same Tejan Kabbah accused
16 you of sending 5,000 Liberians across the border, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Were your relations with him still amicable at the end of
19 the month.

11:18:23 20 A. I would say yes. I would say yes.

21 Q. Even though only a matter of weeks before he had made this
22 allegation against you?

23 A. We thrashed it out. We thrashed it out. I called him and
24 I - once the United Nations forces had gone to the border and had
11:18:38 25 said there's no such thing, the special representative from
26 Liberia had verified it, his - the special representative of the
27 Secretary-General stationed in Sierra Leone had also verified it.
28 All we just said, "My Brother, it's a misunderstanding. You know
29 these things happen, so let's move on," and we thrashed it out.

1 Q. Okay. But at this summit did he suggest to you, as per my
2 question a moment ago, that arms were coming over the border from
3 Liberia at this summit at the end of October?

4 A. Yes. He suggested to me that they were still receiving
11:19:17 5 reports that some arms were coming across the border from
6 Liberia. He suggested that and I assured him that if arms were
7 come across, it had to be from maybe people selling arms, maybe
8 from the - those around the border, but that I had no arms and
9 would never, even if I had arms, permit them to go across the
11:19:42 10 border. Yes, we talked about it.

11 Q. Yes. And did you tell him about the recent visit at the
12 beginning of - sometime in October by Sam Bockarie?

13 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes, we talked about it.

14 Q. Yes?

11:19:57 15 A. And more than him, yes.

16 Q. And what was discussed?

17 A. That Sam Bockarie had come. We had talked about the
18 continued hostilities over there and that Sam had promised that
19 they would begin to try to find a solution to the problem, that
11:20:17 20 Bockarie had raised the issue of the release of their leader, and
21 I had told him that that decision was not something that I could
22 do, but that it would be an ECOWAS decision. Then he mentioned
23 to me - I mean Kabbah now - about the progress of ECOMOG, because
24 ECOMOG was still attacking, trying to get places, and we talked
11:20:39 25 about it, and if I remember clearly he did mention that the RUF
26 and that - but they were not serious and that people could not
27 trust what they were saying and that ECOMOG will continue to
28 pursue their objective.

29 Q. Now mentioning Bockarie, can we just pause and deal with

1 something. Could Bockarie enter Liberia and go to the RUF
2 guesthouse without you knowing about it?

3 A. Not likely. I would - even if I did not know at the time
4 let's say he was coming into the country, I would know as soon as
11:21:30 5 he got there.

6 Q. Why?

7 A. I mean Sam Bockarie, for example, if I asked that he be
8 brought, you know, to Liberia I would know when he is coming.
9 For example, sometimes delays on the road. But whenever he
11:21:52 10 reached the city as a matter of my security briefing I would get
11 to know.

12 Q. So did you consider that summit to be constructive,
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, in a - yes, it was constructive, yes.

11:22:22 15 Q. And help us, what conclusions were reached as to how to
16 progress the search for peace in Sierra Leone?

17 A. Mostly we - the movement of ECOMOG, that ECOMOG's actions
18 should continue, and that the process of demobilisation should be
19 put, you know, on movement. There was also a discussion around
11:23:00 20 about some of the requests that had been made by some members of
21 the junta and the RUF that they needed to travel in the
22 sub-region to talk to other leaders, all of these discussions
23 were held at the meeting, and how that would be possible.

24 There was also the discussion in that meeting about some
11:23:27 25 individuals that showed an interest to surrender and how they
26 would be treated and handled. These were basically about
27 disarmament, demobilisation, some surrender, those individuals
28 that say they wanted to go outside of Sierra Leone to contact
29 other leaders for advice and before coming to final peace from

1 the RUF and the AFRC people, that was discussed in those
2 meetings.

3 Q. Now what was said to you by your fellow Heads of State
4 about your contact with the RUF and any continued contact with
11:24:12 5 them, if anything?

6 A. They felt that it was a good idea and that we should pursue
7 the talks and begin to press them so that we could get back to
8 the negotiations as per the agreement I keep mentioning here of
9 1996, November.

11:24:42 10 Q. Now following that summit, Mr Taylor, was there a further
11 meeting of ECOWAS in November?

12 A. Well, let's not forget here now, after that meeting in
13 Abuja there is another meeting but it is a Mano River Union
14 meeting following that meeting.

11:25:12 15 Q. And where is that Mano River meeting held?

16 A. That's held in Conakry.

17 Q. And did you attend that meeting?

18 A. Yes, I did.

19 Q. Can you help us as to a date?

11:25:27 20 A. The meeting in Abuja is around about - what's that? Late
21 October, right?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. That is immediately - that's about early November we go
24 straight on to Conakry.

11:25:47 25 Q. And who is present at that meeting in Conakry?

26 A. President Kabbah. You have President Conte. I'm present.
27 If my recollection is correct I think Jesse Jackson is also
28 present at that meeting, if I'm not mistaken.

29 Q. And what was the purpose of that meeting?

1 A. We're trying to see how we can get the Mano River Union
2 countries, and there are only three of them - Liberia,
3 Sierra Leone and Guinea constitute the Mano River Union. We are
4 trying to see how within ECOWAS and within our three countries we
11:26:33 5 can also forge peace, security, and a good working relationship
6 to also further the overall peace objective as it is being
7 pursued by the greater ECOWAS member states.

8 Q. Can we go to page 123, please. Do you see the third
9 paragraph on that page, Mr Taylor, above the photograph?

11:27:37 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. "Reverend Jackson was also instrumental in bridging the gap
12 between Presidents Taylor and Clinton who personally telephoned
13 President Taylor from Air Force One during his Africa visit in
14 April."

11:27:53 15 We've deal with that.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. But this is where it gets important for our purposes now:

18 "Reverend Jackson also sponsored the Liberia Day Chicago
19 conference in Chicago, April 16 -21" - again we've dealt with
11:28:04 20 that - "and participated in two peace building meetings between
21 President Taylor and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone. One in
22 Monrovia and the other a summit of Mano River Union states with
23 Taylor, Kabbah and Lansana Conte of Guinea in Conakry, November
24 24, 1998."

11:28:25 25 Do see that?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Does that assist with the date?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now, mention is made of another meeting in Monrovia. When

1 was that?

2 A. That meeting had to be around July. At the time Reverend
3 Jackson comes to Monrovia he invites - in fact I invite President
4 Kabbah to Monrovia. That's around this July meeting I suppose.

11:28:53 5 Q. Was that the occasion of the Independence Day celebrations?

6 A. That is correct. That is correct.

7 Q. So let's just pause for a minute before the break,
8 Mr Taylor. So you meet with President Kabbah in July in Abuja,
9 yes? Is that right?

11:29:14 10 A. No. You got also in Monrovia now.

11 Q. No, we're starting in Abuja at the beginning of July?

12 A. Beginning of July, yes.

13 Q. Then in Monrovia?

14 A. Yes.

11:29:23 15 Q. Then at the ECOWAS summit?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Then again at the Mano River Union meeting, yes?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And in between times were you on the telephone to each
11:29:34 20 other?

21 A. Many times.

22 Q. So you were in constant contact with him throughout?

23 A. That is correct.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,
11:29:44 25 Mr President?

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll adjourn for the morning break and
27 reconvene at 12 o'clock.

28 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

29 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Before the short adjournment, Mr Taylor, we were looking at
3 that meeting in Conakry of the Mano River Union states on 24
4 November 1998, yes?

12:02:23 5 A. Yes. I don't know, my recollection may be a little off,
6 but the Conakry summit appears to be further to the front end of
7 November, so maybe my recollection is wrong, but we come from
8 Nigeria and I would say there may be something wrong here. Maybe
9 I'm at fault, but helping the Court I think it was a little
12:02:59 10 further to the front end, but --

11 Q. But in any event, what was the outcome of that summit?

12 A. We agreed to restart the Mano River Union. We looked at
13 the non-aggression treaty, we looked at possible security
14 cooperation between the Mano River Union states. I considered
12:03:26 15 that it was a very successful meeting.

16 Q. Now, let's take each of those achievements in turn.
17 Firstly, this: When had the Mano River Union been established?

18 A. Oh boy, the Mano River Union I would put it as far back as
19 the - that was during the administration of I think President
12:03:53 20 Tubman, Siaka Stevens and Toure, so that had to be, oh I would
21 say in the late 70s or thereabouts. I remember these were --

22 Q. And why were you having to restart it in 1998? What had
23 occurred?

24 A. Oh, the conflict in Liberia, then the conflict in Sierra
12:04:26 25 Leone. There had been a breakdown of real cooperation between
26 and amongst the union members. I guess everybody became so busy.
27 Tolbert, the President of Liberia, had been killed. You had coup
28 d'etats in Sierra Leone. So things just fell apart and there was
29 a need to bring it back together.

1 Q. And were all parties equally anxious to bring it back
2 together?

3 A. I want to think so. I want to think so. We demonstrated
4 at that meeting that we were very anxious to get it together. We
12:05:08 5 even pledged amounts to be paid immediately to get the union
6 moving. In fact, the last Secretary-General of the Mano River
7 union was - the Secretary-Generalship was held by Liberia and the
8 name that has come up before this Court, I think the Honourable T
9 Ernest Eastman who also served as minister of state later on in
12:05:36 10 my government and had served - so I can say that we were all
11 equally enthusiastic about it.

12 Q. And you made mention of a non-aggression treaty?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Explain what you mean by that?

12:05:53 15 A. Well, we had said that we were not going to permit our
16 territories to be used as a launching ground for attacks against
17 our neighbours and that anybody found involved in such would be
18 dealt with in line with our laws. We had a very strong law in
19 Liberia against these types of actions and we shared that. There
12:06:25 20 is a law on what we call mercenaryism. So it was very important
21 to get that going.

22 Q. Now, so that meeting is some time in November?

23 A. Yes, I would say near the mid-section of November. Not as
24 far to the end so, my recollection may be wrong.

12:06:53 25 Q. Now so far, Mr Taylor, you have dealt with two visits by
26 Sam Bockarie to Monrovia, yes?

27 A. Uh-huh.

28 Q. And the second visit you told us occurred in October prior
29 to you going to Abuja, yes?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. And was it just yourself who met Bockarie on that occasion?

3 A. Bockarie met with I think several - well, let me remove
4 that word "think". He met with me, but he also met with other
12:07:32 5 security officials of government and there were visits there of
6 members of the ECOWAS diplomatic delegation that were on that
7 Committee of Five. For example, the Ghanaians would have gone
8 there and met with him.

9 Q. Would have?

12:07:52 10 A. Yes, it was a part of our arrangement. I didn't get a
11 report as to whether who went there, because it was not
12 necessary, but we all agreed that they would all have access to
13 him and I am sure - I did not receive any complaints, but I am
14 sure that they did.

12:08:13 15 Q. Now you mentioned the third visit by Bockarie, yes?

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. And that was in November?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Was this before or after the Mano River Union meeting in
12:08:28 20 Conakry?

21 A. That was after the Mano River Union meeting in Conakry.

22 Q. And at whose request had this third visit been made?

23 A. It was at Bockarie's request. He had requested to really
24 not come to visit with me, but to stop by. He wanted to travel
12:08:57 25 in line with - he wanted to travel outside of our region, outside
26 of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and he was coming to pass through
27 with a delegation en route to - he was en route to Burkina Faso.

28 Q. So let's just go through that slowly. He requests
29 permission to come to Liberia?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. But not in order to see you?

3 A. No, not exactly. No.

4 Q. He was in transit going to where?

12:09:38 5 A. Burkina Faso.

6 Q. What for?

7 A. Well, remember I just mentioned that discussions had taken
8 place about members of the RUF and the junta amongst delegations
9 that wanted to travel out. And specifically Bockarie and I think

12:09:58 10 from the junta there was some Musa, if I am not mistaken. But
11 there was a general discussion that some attention would be given
12 to members of the RUF and junta that wanted to go outside and
13 their request was based on the fact that they wanted to speak to
14 other African leaders to discuss peace and different things and
12:10:22 15 it was generally accepted that they could come through and make
16 those trips.

17 This was one of the trips that he wanted to come through
18 and since it had been discussed amongst Heads of State - in fact
19 and even some of the, if I am not mistaken, United Nations
12:10:42 20 representatives were aware of this particular move on some of
21 these people - by some of these people, excuse me, he was
22 permitted to come through.

23 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, could I seek a
24 clarification. Where was Sam Bockarie coming from?

12:11:00 25 THE WITNESS: Sierra Leone.

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Passing through Liberia?

27 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. To go to?

1 A. Burkina Faso.

2 Q. And did you know his final destination was Burkina Faso?

3 A. To the best of my knowledge that was what I knew. As to
4 whether he continued to other places he did not convey that to

12:11:21 5 me, but I knew that he was en route to Burkina Faso because

6 Burkina Faso was also playing a constructive role in peace. So
7 with that since - I can almost say the international community
8 knew about it that it was not a problem with them passing
9 through.

12:11:41 10 Q. And did you provide any assistance for the trip to Burkina
11 Faso?

12 A. No, I did not provide any assistance for the trip to
13 Burkina Faso.

14 Q. And did Bockarie go on to Burkina Faso by himself, or were
12:11:57 15 there others in his party?

16 A. No, no, Sam Bockarie came with a small delegation from
17 reports that reached to me. I am sure on that delegation - the
18 one person whose name I keep remembering, and I don't know the
19 other people, is Eddie Kanneh I am sure was on that delegation
12:12:19 20 from what I can remember from the reports. He came. Eddie
21 Kanneh was on that delegation and they travelled.

22 Q. Can you identify anybody else apart from Eddie Kanneh?

23 A. No, I mean - no, I can't remember any of them. I remember
24 Eddie from the first and when the report came that he had come

12:12:42 25 with a small delegation who were travelling I can vividly
26 remember the name Eddie Kanneh.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, you are aware that one of your alleged
28 co-conspirators is a man called Ibrahim Bah?

29 A. Yes, that's what I am told.

1 Q. Do you know an Ibrahim Bah?

2 A. Oh, yes, I do.

3 Q. When did you first come across Ibrahim Bah?

4 A. Ibrahim Bah came into Liberia as one of the boys with
12:13:16 5 Dr Manneh, Kukoi Samba Sanyang, and had left Liberia many, many
6 years along with Kukoi Samba Sanyang himself, but I knew of the
7 name.

8 Q. And how well did you know Ibrahim Bah?

9 A. Well, I would say not very well, because Ibrahim Bah was
12:13:38 10 one of Dr Manneh's boys. He was not an associate of mine. He
11 was one of Dr Manneh's boys that came with Dr Manneh and so he
12 and I didn't have an association as friends or comrades or
13 colleagues. So I knew of him and let me be very clear of this.
14 I know of him, I know him, but he was not a colleague and
12:14:03 15 associate of mine like his boss, Dr Manneh, no.

16 Q. And what happened to Ibrahim Bah after he left Liberia?

17 A. Quite frankly I don't know. To be very - as specific to
18 your question, I really don't know, because Ibrahim Bah left
19 Liberia somewhere around I would put it to 1993/1994. And I am
12:14:30 20 saying this because that's about the same time that Dr Manneh
21 left Liberia, because I go to Monrovia in 1995. Dr Manneh is not
22 there when I go to Monrovia, neither is Bah. Some of the boys go
23 with Manneh. Some of them remain. Those that remain are few.
24 Some of them are still my security personnel. Most of them have
12:14:53 25 Liberian wives and children already, but I did not know Bah very
26 well, but I know him. If I saw him today I know him very well.

27 Q. And that group that Sam Bockarie left with to go to Burkina
28 Faso, was Ibrahim Bah in that group?

29 A. To tell you the truth I would not dispute that he was. I

1 don't recall his name being among the delegation that came from
2 Sierra Leone. I don't recall that. I remember Eddie Kanneh
3 being on the list, but I don't recall. He could have gone. He
4 could have come to Monrovia and gone with him, but the report
12:15:41 5 that I received was about who came with Sam Bockarie from Sierra
6 Leone.

7 Q. And when you say on the list, what do you mean?

8 A. Well, when the security reports come you will see
9 Sam Bockarie and the delegation and they would write it, but it
12:15:56 10 has been years now. I don't remember. I remember Bockarie and I
11 remember Kanneh, but I don't remember the rest of the - but these
12 were supposed to be high-powered RUF individuals that were
13 travelling to go and hold discussions with another ECOWAS leader
14 on the peace process. So I don't know who they were really.

12:16:18 15 Q. Who knew that Bockarie was en route to Burkina Faso?

16 A. Well, I can almost say every member of the Committee of
17 Five knew. I am not sure if President Kabbah knew at that time,
18 but he got to - but he was informed later.

19 Q. What about the United Nations? Did they know?

12:16:45 20 A. I want to believe yes. I want to believe yes because --

21 Q. Why?

22 A. Because their representatives were part of the overall
23 discussions of the possibility of letting certain senior people
24 from the RUF and the AFRC travel outside of the contiguous
12:17:05 25 countries, okay. So knowing how faithful they are, I am sure
26 they should have reported that to the Secretary-General.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let us just pause for a moment and examine
28 another aspect of this. In 1998, how old would you have been?

29 A. Well, we will just have to check that.

1 Q. You were born in 1948, yes?

2 A. About 50, wouldn't I be?

3 Q. Yes, so you were a maths teacher after all. Now, help us,
4 Mr Taylor. You are aged 50. Was Sam Bockarie the same age group
12:17:52 5 as you?

6 A. No, Sam Bockarie is a little boy. My oldest daughter is
7 over 40, so Sam Bockarie is a little boy. I mean he was not a
8 colleague of mine and could have never been. I would say
9 Sam Bockarie was about the same age as my director of security
12:18:12 10 services, Benjamin Yeaten; in their probably early to middle 30s
11 I would put it. He is not my colleague.

12 Q. Now was he someone you would sit down and have a drink with
13 and shoot the breeze, to borrow a phrase?

14 A. No, let's be serious. No. Number one I don't drink, but
12:18:31 15 Sam Bockarie would not - I look at Sam Bockarie as, what, a
16 soldier, one of Sankoh's boys, I mean a young man. No, no, no,
17 Sam Bockarie would not get to that level. Even Sam Bockarie
18 would not be invited by the President even for a formal dinner.
19 No, Sam Bockarie could not get to that level.

12:18:56 20 I liked him as a young man. He seemed to be someone that
21 you could talk to and my mission at that particular time was to
22 try to - you know when you take over mediation the first thing
23 you try to do is to study the individual, see who you are dealing
24 with, try to develop some confidence with him. I tried to do
12:19:26 25 that. Some trust where whatever I said I meant and whenever a
26 statement that represented the views of the economic community or
27 the OAU or the international community's view on a particular
28 subject we were very straightforward about it. I look at him
29 more as a young man that, you know, I could talk to and that by

1 putting him in that frame of mind we could have achieved our
2 objective, which was to bring peace to Sierra Leone. That is how
3 I looked at him.

12:20:13 4 Q. Let's put the question differently then. You say he was a
5 little boy to you. Does that mean he was under your control,
6 Mr Taylor?

7 A. Oh, no, you know Africans, when we talk about little boys
8 and young men, we not talking about even our children or those
9 that we would control. We have a tradition across this continent
12:20:29 10 - excuse me, this continent. I am in Europe, I forgot. Across
11 Africa of respect. I am then a 50 year old man. Sam Bockarie is
12 a young 30, maybe late 20s, he is a little boy as far as we are
13 concerned. In Africa we still - sometimes I am amazed when
14 Europeans call each other by a first name, a little boy calling a
12:20:59 15 50 year old man John. It never happens. We don't take that. We
16 don't do that. It's always mister this or mister. We show
17 respect. We don't think it is respectful. So I use that thing
18 as a little boy not as somebody under my control but in the
19 typical African sense where respect is shown to older people. We
12:21:14 20 still respect our older people. We don't just address them Mary
21 and John, we don't do that. That's what I mean.

22 Q. Did he follow your orders, Mr Taylor?

23 A. No, no, no, that was not the objective. Let's look at a
24 typical situation. You have the six party talks now that
12:21:38 25 concerns North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia, the United
26 States and China. The six party talks on North Korea. China is
27 the point country on the six party talks. Would it be proper to
28 say that the North Korean government is taking instruction from
29 the Chinese government? No. What you do is you build a

1 relationship. You build a relationship where people tend to
2 trust you, because there is just this mistrust, okay.

3 Number one, the first thing that Bockarie said to me for
4 example on the first visit was that, "We don't trust Guinea. We
12:22:18 5 believe that Tejani Kabbah is Guinean and Conte has been imposing
6 him on Sierra Leone". If it's true or not I don't know and I am
7 not here to debate that. This is how they were feeling. "Tejani
8 Kabbah is not a Sierra Leonean, he is a Guinean and they are
9 imposing him on this country. We don't trust him". So with
12:22:43 10 these kinds of things the first thing you do is to build trust
11 that when you say something you mean it.

12 So I just drew this analogy to show that this whole thing,
13 when people mediate and develop trust to accomplish an objective
14 goal as set by the very international community, in my case it is
12:23:03 15 construed that I have control. Well, what do you say about
16 China? Does China control North Korea? No. So it can't be
17 different for me and when it comes to the big countries it is
18 different. The rules are the same. There are bigger countries,
19 there are smaller countries, but the rules are the same. There
12:23:24 20 is no difference.

21 Sam Bockarie does not take orders from me. He takes
22 instructions from their council. He does not take orders from
23 me, he does not need them from me, I do not seek to do that. All
24 I seek to do is to gain the confidence of the RUF that if I say,
12:23:41 25 "You can come to a peace talk here", or, "if you announce a
26 ceasefire, this will happen", that is the type of situation that
27 exists.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, I have to press you further on this, because you
29 appreciate what is being alleged.

1 A. I do.

2 Q. Did you, Charles Taylor, decide to take advantage of
3 Bockarie's inexperience and age in order to control the RUF and
4 their actions in Sierra Leone?

12:24:13 5 A. Oh, no, you will be surprised at Sam Bockarie's
6 intelligence and the people he dealt with. There was - I don't
7 quite remember, that is why I haven't called it. There is an
8 older man that used to always be with them. I don't quite
9 remember his name. He is a very older man, probably at that time
12:24:35 10 a little older than I was, just looking at him. But, no, that
11 would be - I think that would just be terrible if anyone were to
12 try to take advantage of a young man because of his age. That
13 would be terrible. That was never my desire, and I do not think
14 my colleagues in ECOWAS would have appreciated this, because
12:25:02 15 again there is this belief out there that I was operating alone,
16 but as we go further they will get to know that everything that I
17 did - everything that I did - is documented either with ECOWAS or
18 the United Nations. I did nothing on my own. And all these
19 conversations - and I am sure they would not appreciate me taking
12:25:24 20 advantage, because they would want to follow up, and some of
21 these countries followed up on their own.

22 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, is it the case that you being a former
23 rebel leader, yourself Sam Bockarie looked up to you as a
24 godfather? Did you become a godfather figure for him?

12:25:45 25 A. No, I did not. I don't think Sam Bockarie needed a
26 godfather, no. All he needed was somebody - a country in ECOWAS
27 that they could get their views through that would get to the
28 rest of the Heads of State. I think this was their
29 determination.

1 Q. Did you bring Sam Bockarie and his delegation to White
2 Flower any time in 1998?

3 A. No, that is another problem. White Flower, my residence
4 that is described in Congo Town that you have been hearing about,
12:26:32 5 I obtained that property before I was elected as President. It
6 was an unfinished building, totally in chaos. I bought it. I
7 liked the property. I bought it, and it took me about a
8 year-and-a-half to complete. I was still President completing
9 that building, and in fact I did not move into that building
12:26:57 10 until my birthday, January 28, 1999. So I met Sam Bockarie at
11 the Executive Mansion. So at that particular time I had not
12 moved and there was no-one living in White Flower. I met him at
13 the mansion.

14 Q. One moment. Did you allow Sam Bockarie or his delegation
12:27:34 15 access to any kind of arms warehouse in Monrovia?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Or at White Flower?

18 A. No, no. Charles Taylor? No.

19 Q. Did you share radio operators with Sam Bockarie?

12:27:50 20 A. No, no, no. At the residence that was given them on the
21 boulevard, their radio was installed there. Look, there is no
22 cooperation at the level that I have heard here as the RUF is
23 supposed to be an entity that the Liberian government is
24 cooperating with as you cooperate with countries. Look,
12:28:20 25 Sam Bockarie comes to Monrovia. He deals with the government.
26 He knows that he is dealing with me as the President of Liberia,
27 but also a member of the committee that he is aware of is
28 responsible now as the point country for Sierra Leone. The radio
29 is at his house. Why would the Liberian government share a radio

1 with Sam Bockarie? Why?

2 Q. Well, the Prosecution would say because you were running
3 him?

4 A. Well, the Prosecution is dead wrong. That is why the
12:29:03 5 theory - you know, some theoris just never make it. That is why
6 their theory is just that: A theory.

7 Q. Mr Taylor, let's deal with - we have now dealt with the
8 three trips Bockarie made: The initial trip at your invitation,
9 yes?

12:29:22 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. The second trip when the guesthouse is set up?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. The third trip when he is en route to Burkina Faso?

14 A. That is correct.

12:29:31 15 Q. On that third trip, did you meet him?

16 A. I met him briefly, yes, on his way to Burkina Faso.

17 Q. Where did you meet him?

18 A. At the Executive Mansion.

19 Q. At the Executive Mansion. Now, on any of those three trips
12:29:49 20 did you promote Sam Bockarie to the rank of three star general?

21 A. No, no.

22 Q. You have heard that said in this court, haven't you?

23 A. That is total nonsense.

24 Q. You have heard it said that he came back from Monrovia and
12:30:03 25 said that the Papay had promoted him?

26 A. Total, total nonsense. Total nonsense. It never happened.

27 Q. Did you on any of those three trips plan any military
28 operations with Sam Bockarie?

29 A. No, no, no, no, no. The only thing I was interested in in

1 all of those trips, the first one, the second one - discussion,
2 the third one he was travelling out in line with the knowledge of
3 a lot of Heads of State and including the United Nations were
4 aware of these discussions on their travel, didn't even know that
12:30:41 5 Sam Bockarie may have been planning an operation. I had no
6 knowledge whatsoever.

7 Q. What was the purpose of the brief meeting with him in
8 November?

9 A. I really wanted to find out specifically from Sam Bockarie
12:30:56 10 what he was going to Burkina Faso for and what he hoped to
11 accomplish.

12 Q. Yes, and what did he say?

13 A. And he said to me that they were going to try to seek the
14 advice of that government as to what to do with this peace
12:31:13 15 process and to discuss with the President, if they could get to
16 him, as to what would be the best way forward. And as far as I
17 knew, because we are - several Heads of State and including
18 members of the international community had dealt with this
19 problem of the travel, I saw nothing wrong with that.

12:31:34 20 Q. Did Sam Bockarie say to you that he was en route to Burkina
21 Faso to purchase arms and ammunition?

22 A. No, no, no, he did not say that to me. No.

23 Q. You have heard evidence in this Court, have you not, that
24 Sam Bockarie did conclude an arms deal in Burkina Faso in
12:31:56 25 November 1998?

26 A. I have heard that evidence here, yes.

27 Q. It is contained in a salute report presented to Foday
28 Sankoh in the autumn of 1999. Do you recall that?

29 A. I do.

1 Q. Were you aware that that was the purpose of his trip to
2 Burkina Faso?

3 A. No, I was not aware. If he had told me I would have
4 discouraged it, and I still don't know as to how he managed to
12:32:23 5 pull that off. Maybe that country, that is a sovereign country,
6 would have to account for that. I was not aware of that.

7 Q. Did you, Charles Taylor, as President of Liberia,
8 facilitate Bockarie's trip to Burkina Faso to enable him to
9 purchase arms and ammunition?

12:32:43 10 A. Not a dime did I give to it, no. I had no part to play. I
11 know he went there. We did not fund the trip, no.

12 Q. Did Sam Bockarie return to Sierra Leone via Liberia?

13 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie did return via Liberia. By the time
14 Sam Bockarie - if I am not mistaken, I had launched the polio
12:33:25 15 campaign. I may not have been in the capital when he returned.
16 I may have been on one of the - we launched a massive national
17 polio vaccination campaign that ran all the way into the late
18 part of the year. I was not in the city when he returned from
19 Burkina Faso.

12:33:50 20 Q. When he returned from Burkina Faso, did he return with arms
21 and ammunition, Mr Taylor?

22 A. I really do not know. I do not.

23 Q. How come you don't know? You are the President of the
24 country.

12:34:03 25 A. Ah, but somebody arriving at the international airport, I
26 would not know if he brought arms. That was never reported to
27 me.

28 Q. Well, if somebody arrives at the international airport of
29 your country with a consignment of arms and ammunition, it is

1 hardly likely to escape your attention, is it, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Well, it could escape my attention depending on who he is
3 dealing with. You know, Liberia --

4 Q. What do you mean by that?

12:34:30 5 A. Well, Liberia is not unique in terms of crooks. I have
6 heard evidence in this Court that really has shocked me and, if
7 it is true, I mean, it is shocking to me. I have heard that he
8 returned with arms and that I think some officials had been paid,
9 or at least some of the documents that I have read, and if this
12:34:55 10 is - it is true that officials were paid, that would not be
11 shocking to me. We did have a few crooked people in government.
12 So if he returned with arms, that was not reported and since it
13 was not reported to me, and if we assume that it is true, then I
14 am sure that there were a lot of bribes involved.

12:35:19 15 Q. But you have an intelligence service, don't you, as part of
16 your government?

17 A. Ah, there are intelligence services everywhere. If I
18 remember the evidence presented before this Court, the evidence
19 is that some arms came to the airport and they were loaded on
12:35:40 20 trucks and left off on the highway. If I am not mistaken, this
21 is the evidence. And then subsequently some people went into the
22 city and then continue on. Now, if there is anything - that is
23 possible. That is possible. And, you know, when I say that is
24 possible, there are a lot of deals that are pulled off in
12:36:02 25 countries that leaders do not know, so it is possible. It is
26 possible.

27 Q. Did you, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind that this last visit -
28 this third visit by Bockarie in November 1998 precedes by just a
29 month or so the Freetown invasion --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- did you plan with Bockarie the Freetown invasion?

3 A. Never. Never. But let's not forget even this Court - even
4 this very court - has found that RUF was not involved in the
12:36:48 5 Freetown invasion. And besides, if I push you forward to that
6 invasion I can tell you something: On the morning that that
7 report reached to me that Freetown had been hit, the first - I
8 mean, I was so amazed and shocked. We sought to find out what
9 happened. And the report that got to me - the initial report
12:37:19 10 that got to me - was that Sam Bockarie did not know anything
11 about it. The first report that came to me was that "Well,
12 Sam Bockarie says he does not know anything about what is going
13 on".

14 Q. Pause there. Who provided that first report?

12:37:34 15 A. Oh, my government. I had the minister of national security
16 immediately contact Bockarie to find out - excuse me, "What is
17 the hell is going on?"

18 Q. Pause there. Contact him how?

19 A. By telephone. By telephone.

12:37:50 20 Q. We will come back to the details of that when we get to
21 January, but I ask again: Did you plan with Bockarie in November
22 1998 to invade Freetown?

23 A. No, I did not. I never knew about it.

24 Q. Did you order Bockarie to capture Kono?

12:38:15 25 A. Why would I? No.

26 Q. Why? Because, it is said, of the strategic diamond
27 resources in Kono. Did you tell him to do that?

28 A. I did not tell him to do that, and I did not even know.

29 What do I know about what strategic areas there are in Sierra

1 Leone that contain diamonds? I know what is strategic as far as
2 diamond goes in Liberia. I have no knowledge of the strategic
3 nature of resources in Sierra Leone. It is not my business, and
4 I don't want to know. So why? It is only with such a knowledge
12:38:52 5 that one would say "Go and take this place" or "Go and take that
6 place". I don't know.

7 Q. Very well, Mr Taylor. Now, whilst we are on that topic, do
8 you recall that we mentioned on Monday various high profile
9 trials which were taking place in Sierra Leone during the autumn
12:39:45 10 of 1998?

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. Do you recall that, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Including the trial of Foday Sankoh?

12:39:54 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Who was eventually, in October, convicted of treason and
17 sentenced to death?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Likewise, others put on trial by the Kabbah government --

12:40:08 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- had been found guilty in court-martials and likewise
22 sentenced to death, yes?

23 A. Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

24 Q. Were those, or any of those, sentences carried out?

12:40:25 25 A. To the best of my knowledge, I think some of them were
26 carried out, and one in particular I remember because I was
27 outraged by this particular situation, and it could be that same
28 group. There was a Victor King who was - and I am not certain
29 which group this is, but there was a group of 24 killed and I

1 think this particular Victor King was amongst them, and he was
2 supposed to be the air force chief. I was outraged by that, and
3 Kabbah got to know about that.

4 Q. Why were you outraged by that?

12:41:09 5 A. We had a situation - remember I explained to this Court
6 about the two helicopters that flew into Spriggs Payne Airport at
7 the time of the intervention where the ECOMOG forces finally took
8 control of Freetown. Victor King was amongst those that came on
9 those two aircrafts. One of the things that happened, King was
12:41:52 10 one of those. I think he was also a member of the junta, from
11 what he said to security investigators, and was concerned for his
12 life.

13 Now, I had raised the issue of having those people remain
14 in Liberia, the occupants, all of them, of the helicopters, but
12:42:17 15 ECOMOG was pressing for them to go, and Tejani Kabbah was also
16 pressing for them to go and had assured me that they would not be
17 executed.

18 Now, there was no reason why I should have sent any Sierra
19 Leonean back to Sierra Leone. Why? There was no extradition
12:42:43 20 treaty between Sierra Leone and Liberia. That treaty had been
21 broken some years before by one of my predecessors. The late
22 President Tubman had a problem with Siaka Stevens where there was
23 an attempted coup d'etat in Sierra Leone launched by, I think,
24 this very Sankoh and the rest of them. But there was a general,
12:43:08 25 General Lansana, took refuge in Liberia along with Hinga Norman,
26 all of them, and General Lansana was returned to Sierra Leone on
27 the promise that he would not be executed, and Stevens executed
28 General Lansana, and President Tubman broke off the extradition
29 arrangement between Sierra Leone and Liberia.

1 I reminded Tejani that I would have none of that where,
2 before one other President had gotten somebody out of Liberia and
3 executed them, that I would only finally give into these people
4 going back to Sierra Leone if they would be tried and their
12:43:50 5 rights should be protected, and they had promised faithfully
6 that - because he was one of those that was very adamant that he
7 did not want to go. After that execution I was outraged, and I
8 felt that they had lied to me, and that it should never have
9 happened, and that I would not make such mistakes again. No
12:44:12 10 matter who told me from Sierra Leone to send somebody back, I
11 would not do it, and that is why I was outraged.

12 Q. And where did you express that outrage?

13 A. To Tejani himself.

14 Q. Anywhere else?

12:44:26 15 A. Well, some of my colleagues got to know. I explained to
16 them what had happened and that it was unreasonable because - and
17 some of us had raised the issue. In the midst of this confusion
18 we are still fighting, and let's not forget fighting is still
19 going on, and you have trials and you have executions of
12:44:50 20 officers. How do you bring - there was frustration on the part
21 of a lot of our colleagues that, you know, what they - what we
22 do, sometimes these frustrations are stated in meetings, but they
23 never come out in the open. But people are frustrated, but how
24 can we be fighting for peace in Sierra Leone while there are
12:45:14 25 trials going on, there are executions of the very military
26 officers, then we are calling for ceasefire. How - can't these
27 executions wait? Can't these trials wait until we have peace?
28 So there is frustration, and let nobody mislead anybody to say
29 that it was all smooth sailing.

1 But again I don't blame President Kabbah a lot for
2 everything, because he too is under a lot of pressure from
3 outside. You have to act, you have to do something, and so to a
4 great extent there were some decisions that were taken in Sierra
12:45:50 5 Leone that went at least, I would say, against the wishes of
6 ECOWAS. But we did not have control over sovereign Sierra Leone,
7 and so some of the bigger countries that could exercise their
8 influence did. And so sometimes Tejani had to leave the region
9 and act maybe in the best interests of Sierra Leone to bring
12:46:15 10 about peace.

11 Q. Very well. Mr Taylor, can I now please, just to complete
12 the chronology of events, invite your attention, please, to page
13 274 of the presidential papers. Do you have it?

14 A. 274?

12:47:18 15 Q. 274.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, we see from the top that this is a statement made by
18 you on the occasion of the countdown towards national polio
19 immunisation and it is November 22, 1998, yes?

12:47:40 20 A. Yes, yes.

21 Q. What was this programme about?

22 A. We launched a national polio vaccination campaign to try to
23 eradicate polio from Liberia during this time. It was a major
24 programme under the auspices, I think, and assistance from the
12:48:03 25 United Nations.

26 Q. And what was your role in this polio programme?

27 A. As President, this was a major issue for me. I was the
28 chief patron of this launch. In fact, I did immunise some
29 children myself. This was a major programme for us, and as

1 President it was of concern to me for the eradication of polio.

2 Q. And did that involve you travelling outside of Monrovia at
3 all?

4 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes, I went to several places.

12:48:52 5 Q. So that is on the 22nd?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, we have already dealt with this, that on the 27th to
8 the 28th of November you were back in France at the summit of
9 African Heads of State and Government, yes?

12:49:03 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. And we looked at the speech you made on the strategic
12 imperative for peace and security in Africa?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you remember us going through that?

12:49:11 15 A. Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

16 Q. Now, so that is the 27th and the 24th. Yes, so let's move
17 on, then, into December, and can I invite your attention to page
18 276 of the presidential papers. We are now in December, aren't
19 we, Mr Taylor?

12:49:51 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And now it is 10 December?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Yes?

24 A. Yes.

12:49:58 25 Q. And here we see this is the speech made commemorating the
26 50th anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights,
27 yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And this is on 10 December 1998?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. At the Unity Conference Centre in Virginia, Liberia, yes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, again bearing in mind how the case is put against you,

12:50:25 5 let us - and your attitude towards human rights, let us have a
6 look at this document, shall we?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. "Today concludes the pronouncement of the Government of the
9 Republic of Liberia on the issue of human rights".

12:50:40 10 Now, you had passed a bill, or your Parliament had --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- weeks beforehand setting up a human rights commission,
13 yes?

14 A. That is correct.

12:50:52 15 Q. And you are now making this address to commemorate the 50th
16 anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights, yes?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. "Today concludes the pronouncement of the Government of the
19 Republic of Liberia on the issue of human rights. For the period

12:51:09 20 of one full week - from 4 to 10 December - we have commemorated
21 the observance of the 50th anniversary of the universal

22 declaration of human rights. And although we end today our

23 week-long programmes to endorse awareness of this universal

24 concept here at home, by no means are we discarding our resolve

12:51:31 25 to remain steadfastly committed to the ideals of decency and

26 humane attributes as inherited traditions in this land that we

27 love. So while we end, yet still we remain abreast of these

28 events.

29 My fellow citizens, largely owing to the exemplary pride

1 which we share as Liberians, and also our historic legacy as a
2 nation long renowned for being a founding member of numerous
3 institutions and organisations of humanitarian pursuits around
4 the world, we are duty bound in pledging our support to the
12:52:13 5 promotion of peace and a harmonious society throughout the world.
6 We as a people and a nation - irrespective of our territorial
7 size - have persistently stood in the vanguard of enlightened
8 nations who sought to promote the high ideals that ensure human
9 advancement. Thus, it was entirely consistent with our
12:52:41 10 orientation that side by side with other nations Liberia observed
11 this period as the national human rights week.

12 No less distinguished by our historic undertakings within
13 the international arena, we, the citizens of this rich heritage,
14 are called anew to create future models by which other regions
12:53:06 15 and nations of our world may yet be evaluated. Determined as
16 certainly as we must, to survive the bitter agony of our
17 despairing national turbulence of recent memory, we stood the
18 test of an unparalleled national election, where democratic
19 standards were sharpened, and incisive tools employed by experts
12:53:33 20 of every field, all before the full view of the world. When
21 those standards we met and the results proclaimed as
22 democratically free and fair, no-one dared deny our victory.
23 Thus, freedom's advocates everywhere applauded and hailed little
24 Liberia for what it had accomplished.

12:53:56 25 But, in meeting these challenging standards and the
26 international community having raised the curtain of hope in a
27 live drama for us as a people, our act was - and still has been -
28 consigned to the reaction of an empty theatre, without the
29 promised infusion of the essential stimulus, and an uncaring

1 disposition as to what becomes of our rights".

2 What did you mean by that?

3 A. We have no assistance whatsoever. Institutions are not
4 being built. There is no help. They expect a whole lot, but
12:54:33 5 they are not assisting. I am just calling their attention to
6 what it is going to take to help us to really achieve our goals.

7 Q. Continuing:

8 "Strengthened by the golden rule which commands us to love
9 our neighbours as ourselves and propelled by our customary

12:55:00 10 practices, we have chosen to elevate the sterling ideals about
11 which the focus of a civil society is preached. For indeed, my
12 fellow citizens, where legislative reforms and even information
13 campaigns have failed, we as a people and a nation, perhaps being
14 more vulnerable than others whose colonial past was monitored and
12:55:25 15 the focus of human rights did not transcend such barriers as
16 race, creed and other western cultural values, we are pleased to
17 be progenitors of the concept reaching out to the essence of an
18 African people centred government?"

19 Skip the next paragraph:

12:55:46 20 "The Liberian human rights commission enacted by law a year
21 ago to strengthen the existing social culture and political
22 entities into a dynamic force of a humane and law abiding society
23 is making a positive impact. Specifically in the aftermath of a
24 protracted civil crisis as it concerns our penitentiaries, we can
12:56:12 25 stoutly state that there are no prisoners in detention without
26 charges."

27 Was that true, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

29 Q. "Our boast is also underpinned by the chorus that each

1 detainee is provided with adequate defence mechanism." Is that
2 true?

3 A. That is true.

4 Q. "Without exception in listing our accomplishments there are
12:56:37 5 to be found no member of the press in jail for having expressed
6 divergent views."

7 Is that true?

8 A. That is true.

9 Q. What about a Mr Hassan Bility?

12:56:47 10 A. Well, Hassan Bility said he was arrested and released, but
11 there are no press people held in prison. None.

12 Q. "Indeed we may add human rights under this government is
13 respected in Liberia where we are dedicated to the cause of
14 inclusion and of allowing all elements of the opposition to join
12:57:09 15 in the responsible process of nation building. Indeed it can be
16 stated with an abundance of factual evidence in the absence of
17 any prejudice that the prevailing human rights record of this new
18 administration has more positive and universally acceptable
19 lustre to it than at other periods in our history. The fourth
12:57:32 20 estate in Liberia, as an example, is today an eloquent testament
21 to our unbridled commitment to the universal declaration of human
22 rights which we eternally hold inviolate."

23 Now speaking of your human rights record, Mr Taylor --

24 A. Yes.

12:57:54 25 Q. -- was there at or about this time any document prepared
26 regarding Liberia's human rights record?

27 A. While this was going on, later on every year there is a
28 report done by the United States State Department, what they call
29 country report on human rights. That document did come out not

1 too long after this particular speech and we - because it was
2 false, we responded seriously to it.

3 Q. Now, let's just keep a hand in our position at page 277 and
4 just go back and have a look behind divider 29. What is that,
12:59:30 5 Mr Taylor?

6 A. This is our response to the United States government
7 country report on human rights of Liberia. This is our response
8 to it.

9 Q. Right. We will come to that in a moment. Can we go back
10 to 277 and just conclude. Yes, are we back at 277?
12:59:43

11 A. Yes, we are.

12 Q. "Landmarks in our brief period as head of this government
13 include the creation of a national reconciliation commission and
14 the convening of a national conference on the future of Liberia:
13:00:12 15 Vision 2024, from July 19 to August 10, 1998. Our approach,
16 therefore, has always been to invite the participation of all our
17 people in expressing their various views on matters affecting our
18 national fabric. Along the guidelines derived from such an
19 exercise, we are now pursuing a path of collective guidance in
13:00:39 20 our approach to good governance.

21 My fellow citizens, Liberia's focus on human rights is
22 already visible and deeply rooted within the perspective of
23 international standards. We cite, for example, the low
24 occurrence of crimes committed, as compared elsewhere in the
13:01:02 25 region and on the continent.

26 Turning attention to the rights of children, the Government
27 of Liberia has resolved to spearhead a vigorous worldwide
28 campaign to ban the use of children as child soldiers in conflict
29 situations, not only within our territorial confines, but in our

1 region, on our continent and around the globe. In all of such
2 policies, we act with the best interest of the child at heart,
3 and his inherent right to life, survival and development."

4 Did you mean that, Mr Taylor?

13:01:42 5 A. Of course I did and we joined the campaign. We did.

6 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you will appreciate that it will be
7 suggested that you are a complete hypocrite, because you had used
8 child soldiers it will be suggested in the NPFL?

9 A. Yes, but I am saying that that suggestion is totally false.
10 We did not use child soldiers in the NPFL. We did not.

11 Q. So when you expressed these sentiments in December 1998,
12 were you being truthful?

13 A. Very much so, yes.

14 Q. "Shortly, therefore, we will expound on our programme based
13:02:27 15 on our cherished belief that children are the root foundation of
16 a society, and in this respect, any form of advantage or abuse
17 taken over them in their vulnerable state of mind development
18 should attract our concerned effort for adjustment and promotion
19 into productive adulthood, in accordance with our African
13:02:48 20 traditions and cherished cultural values. As it is, we have
21 witnessed a proliferation of war-like games and toys for our
22 children's amusement, which although thrilling to a child, are
23 nonetheless inputs of a negative mental culture from the western
24 world."

13:03:09 25 What are you saying there?

26 A. Well, you have all these toys, toy tanks, toy machine guns,
27 toy bombs, toy grenades. They fixed them, they send them to our
28 children and then they are talking about the same problem. So I
29 am just saying that, look, the development of children, we have

1 to be very careful with it. All these terrible things, we don't
2 manufacture them. You are telling us that war must stop on our
3 continent. We agree. And you are making all these things so
4 children started growing up thinking war. They see the guns,
13:03:46 5 they see the bombs, they see the tanks, they see the soldiers
6 that are glorified.

7 Q. Yes but, Mr Taylor, the cynic would say in the case of
8 Liberia it wasn't toys, it was the real thing. Rocket propelled
9 grenades, AK-47s. Real ones, not toys, being carried by
13:04:06 10 children?

11 A. Yes, the same cynic would say when they drop bombs in other
12 countries and kill people they don't call that death, they don't
13 call that murder. They call it what? They have a military term
14 to describe it as - I have forgotten the term, but cynics would
13:04:23 15 say what they want to say. But they have terms for describing
16 things that make it - collateral damage. When bombs are dropped
17 in places and kill and blow up women and children it's collateral
18 damage. But that's what cynics do all the time.

19 So I mean once they have trained in on you, of course they
13:04:45 20 will find - cynics would find a description. But it doesn't
21 necessarily make it right. It can only be right when you
22 describe it one way, but when we describe it another way it's
23 wrong. In my case I say the cynics are totally wrong and if we
24 are looking for the term hypocrites, those cynics are the
13:05:03 25 hypocrites. Why must it be collateral damage for you and
26 something else for us? So come on, I mean life is life, so let's
27 be real here.

28 Q. "As we commemorate this year's human rights week, my fellow
29 citizens, let us be reminded of the tireless efforts that led to

1 the publication of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
2 exactly 50 years ago and the setting aside of this week and this
3 day universally. It may interest you to know from many different
4 opinions to one final declaration, the Universal Declaration of
13:05:44 5 Human Rights emerged after two full years of meetings, hundreds
6 of amendments, thousands of statements and 1,400 rounds of voting
7 on practically every word and clause. In the end the United
8 Nations Human Rights Commission ended its deliberation and
9 produced on this date a document listing the human rights to
13:06:05 10 which it affirms the entitlement of all men, women and children
11 everywhere in the world.

12 Surely it must be understood that there was never the
13 expectation that the walls of oppression would crumble at the
14 sound of this first horn. Yet the adoption of the Universal
13:06:27 15 Declaration of Human Rights did propel high expectations. Today,
16 fifty years since the declaration was proclaimed, and throughout
17 this half century, many have looked to the declaration as a
18 yardstick by which we measure the degree of respect we show for
19 human rights the world over.

13:06:46 20 Besides the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there
21 also exists an international bill of human rights, which contains
22 the international covenant on civil and political rights; and the
23 international covenant on economic, social and culture rights and
24 an optional protocol, all to which Liberia is a worthy signatory.
13:07:08 25 We ought not be silent. Instead we need to be candid in stating
26 that while these lofty rights which are enshrined in the 30
27 articles of the declaration of human rights remain inviolate,
28 there does appear to be a marked tendency by big powers to ignore
29 human rights."

1 What are you talking about there?

2 A. That's what I just mentioned. You know, human rights means
3 one thing in one set of countries and it means a different thing
4 in another set of countries. They have their own, own

13:07:51 5 interpretations. And so when we look - if we go back a little in
6 history, don't let's forget we talk about since the idea was
7 advanced some 50 years ago. To the best of my recollection it
8 may have been the wife of the President of the United States I
9 think Mrs Roosevelt first addressed the United Nations about

13:08:13 10 human rights, but the first President of the United States that
11 actually pursued to a great deal the issue of human rights was
12 who? Jimmy Carter made human rights the cornerstone of his
13 administration. All preceding administrations - not that they
14 had ignored it - but it was not as forceful as President Carter

13:08:36 15 came along with and then over subsequent years. So this has been
16 a very, very slow development, but they still interpret it -

17 look, which little country sits down to make a report about human
18 rights violations in the United States? Which little country has
19 the time to do it? If we were to have the means to sit down to

13:09:01 20 document human right abuses in the United States, or in Canada,
21 or in Great Britain, or in any country, I am sure we would come
22 up with a lot too against them. So this matter of human rights,

23 I mean, we defend human rights, but let's not forget it is not
24 because you are big. You can defy human rights your way, write

13:09:20 25 whatever you want to write about little countries, but we see -

26 look, I went to school in America, okay? I was in Boston during
27 the school desegregation in South Boston where black children
28 could not go to school in South Boston. I remember that time

29 very well where a black student had to be put on buses and bussed

1 with police escort. Who writes about that in little countries?

2 So the point I am trying to make here is that there are
3 human rights violations of one kind all over the world in every
4 big, middle sized, first world, second world, third world country

13:10:01 5 and the problem little countries are having - and I have to say
6 this here in this Europe here. The problem little countries are
7 having, we don't have the means of communication to expose them
8 as they do us. And what do I mean? Who runs BBC? We don't run
9 the BBC. We don't run VOA. When you want to hear news in the
13:10:28 10 world now, which television do you turn on? You turn on CNN.

11 You hear what they have to say; you understand me? If you are
12 not - you either watching CNN, or you are watching BBC on
13 television, or you are listening to CNN - I mean, VOA radio, or
14 you are listening to the BBC radio. In terms of human rights,

13:10:49 15 who do you go to to hear about human rights? You go to Britain
16 from Amnesty International. If you want to hear from the other
17 side, you go to Human Rights Watch in the United States. These
18 people have just dominated everything because they are big. They
19 define it their way and they write. I am not criticising, and I

13:11:08 20 don't want anybody to say Taylor does not like - Taylor wants to
21 see it done, but the problem is when it happens in your country
22 we don't see your report about yourselves, about your dirt in
23 your own countries, and you come to us and you tell us all this
24 nonsense about what we are doing. Yes, we admit that we have

13:11:26 25 things that we are doing wrong, so I am trying to tell them that
26 these big countries should become accountable for some of the
27 things happening in their countries. Until today in the United
28 States there is an amendment that has not been passed for so many
29 years about what? The rights of women. Let anybody bring me

1 that amendment. It is equal rights for women. That amendment is
2 still pending.

3 So it is almost as if the guy who gets all the information
4 is the good guy; the guy he is reporting against is the bad guy.
13:12:02 5 There is what it is, and this is not to mean that there are not
6 problems in our country, but I tell you it is - we have no
7 control, and so they need to look into their own back yards too.
8 That is what I am saying here.

9 Q. "Seemingly, their only concern is registered when it comes
13:12:21 10 to small countries' alleged violation of human rights. They
11 ignore numerous complaints and put money in little countries to
12 cause confusion, thus making reporting on human rights issues a
13 business to enrich oneself financially.

14 My fellow citizens, be fully assured that my government
13:12:44 15 will steadfastly uphold and defend the right of the labourer to
16 proper wages; the right of every innocent man to his own person;
17 the right of all to equity before the law; the right of every man
18 to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These rights are
19 no longer abstractions of speculative visionaries, not even
13:13:10 20 innovations, but the established and inalienable rights of all
21 humanity.

22 In reaction to my directive that firm and swift action be
23 taken in favour of judicial reforms, the minister of justice has
24 submitted to me a number of recommendations, which I have
13:13:29 25 approved. He will, therefore, shortly announce these changes,
26 including the charging of a number of magistrates and justices of
27 the peace. We have also ordered the release of several prisoners
28 from further detention.

29 Lastly, human rights is our system of tradition; it is our

1 birthright, and it flows from parent to child, much as a river
2 carries water to those living along its banks. Let it flow, my
3 fellow citizens, let it flow. Human rights today, human rights
4 tomorrow, human rights forever".

13:14:12 5 Now, on a similar theme before I come to the Government of
6 Liberia's response that we looked at a moment ago, if we flick
7 over the page to page 280. As part of the commemorations of the
8 50th anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights, on
9 12 December you visited the Monrovia Central Prison and delivered
13:14:42 10 this short address, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And if we just flick quickly over the first three
13 paragraphs to sum up the theme:

14 "I have called you here today to inform you of the
13:14:55 15 celebration of the National Human Rights Week declared by this
16 government in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the
17 universal declaration of human rights. As part of this year's
18 celebration this government wishes to reaffirm its total
19 commitment and protection for the fundamental human rights of all
13:15:15 20 mankind within our borders guaranteed by the constitution of the
21 Republic of Liberia and other international conventions to which
22 we are a signatory.

23 In view of the foregoing, the Government of the Republic of
24 Liberia believes that people at detention centres are fully
13:15:33 25 entitled to the enjoyment of some basic facilities that would
26 assure them of their existence as human beings, even while they
27 are serving their prison sentences. These facilities, like
28 water, food and medical care, we have found to be either lacking
29 or in poor conditions at our prison centres; this we are

1 satisfied with"?

2 A. No, no, no, they surely made - no, this is an error. "This
3 is we are not satisfied with."

4 Q. "Hence, as a way of bringing relief to our fellow citizens
13:16:12 5 and other nations who are in detention in various prison centres
6 around our country, we are hereby instructing the ministries of
7 justice, rural development, national defence and health, the
8 Liberian Water and Sewer Corporation, with the assistance of the
9 Liberia National Red Cross Society and other international
13:16:34 10 humanitarian organisations, to ensure that these facilities are
11 provided and/or made available within the shortest possible
12 time".

13 Yes, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, yes.

13:16:48 15 Q. Now, were the conditions in the prisons bad?

16 A. Terrible. They were terrible. We had a situation where,
17 when it goes back to the justices of the peace Liberia - the writ
18 of habeas corpus in Liberia has a time span of 48 hours. We had
19 people going to jail. They would be arrested, taken before a
13:17:13 20 magistrate and they are in there sometimes waiting three, four,
21 five months and no-one ever hears about it, okay? So we were now
22 trying to restructure to get to - recruit some of the recent law
23 school graduates to try to begin to rebuild the judiciary from
24 that level, because that principle level of the justices of the
13:17:39 25 peace and the magistrates, that is the first instance and if
26 there is failure down there, High Court judges don't even know
27 what is going on down there. So people are locked away in
28 prison, and the conditions are bad and no-one knows. So we begin
29 from the magisterial level trying to get qualified people in,

1 trying to make sure that the writ of habeas corpus is enforced in
2 line with the law and making sure that water - there was a
3 terrible - some people had been in prison and didn't even know
4 what they were there for, okay? And so we tried to correct this.

13:18:13 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I drew your attention a short while ago to
6 the document behind divider 29. Can we return to it, please.

7 Now, we are still on the topic of human rights here, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And we see that this document is entitled "Government of
13:18:46 10 Liberia Position on the 1998 United States State Department Human
11 Rights Report on Liberia". Taking things in stages, firstly,
12 what had that State Department report said about Liberia?

13 A. Terrible things. Things that were not true, and we wanted
14 to set the record straight.

13:19:10 15 Q. And so what was the purpose of this document that we are
16 looking at?

17 A. The purpose was to - if they took it seriously, was to set
18 the record straight and if they did not believe it, we were
19 prepared to let's work on it together. You sit in Washington and

13:19:28 20 write what you feel like writing about our country, and there is
21 something else that I mentioned that you read here a few minutes
22 ago about this whole thing being a business. Look, you come to
23 our little countries. They pay these little boys 100, 150, 200
24 dollars to report on the situation, they are just writing up

13:19:48 25 everything they can - they are writing every little thing. They
26 don't understand. They are not trained into investigating and
27 evaluating these rights. For them, they are just getting their
28 little money by the end of their month. They go into regions,
29 try to find people, pay them, "Tell me what is going on," and

1 these people lie. This is - you know, we have this playing out
2 in so many areas in Africa and I am sure, you know, just as I see
3 money going through this Court right now, I am sure it has got to
4 be playing out in this Court where, when you pay witnesses moneys
13:20:22 5 to come, you expect them to lie, okay? So this is the same
6 playing out that we have seen with human rights. You pay
7 somebody; that is their livelihood. Without this some of these
8 people cannot live. So to get truth out of people that you
9 practically have to - it is very hard, that kind of business. So
13:20:42 10 we then took this document and we listed everything and we
11 responded, hoping that the United States government will say,
12 "Well, fine, if we are in error we are prepared to review it",
13 something that they never do.

14 Q. Well, let's have a look at this document now, shall we? It
13:21:01 15 is issued, as we see, by the Department of Public Affairs,
16 Minister of State For Presidential Affairs, Republic of Liberia.
17 Is that correct, Mr Taylor?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. "The Government of Liberia views the recently published US
13:21:16 20 State Department human rights report on Liberia as an unfortunate
21 lack of understanding of the critical issues in Liberia by those
22 who published the report.

23 The Government of Liberia subscribes to the universal
24 declaration of human rights and has done everything to observe
13:21:36 25 and protect the basic rights of its citizens.

26 The Government of Liberia therefore expresses regrets that
27 the US State Department would compile a litany of unsubstantiated
28 reports from local rogue organisations pandering as human rights
29 organisations".

1 Which local rogue organisations are you talking about,
2 Mr Taylor?

3 A. Oh, I couldn't even begin to talk about all their names,
4 but the proliferation of human rights organisations that sprang
13:22:10 5 up in Liberia, I tell you, was just unbelievable. There may have
6 been as many as 60/70. Anyone that came up and said I am for
7 human rights and can get a little money, the western countries
8 were pouring in money for human rights organisations. Whether
9 you knew what you were doing, all you had to do was go and
13:22:31 10 register, "I am a human rights organisation" - boom, they will
11 give you money. And the more reports you send in, the more money
12 they gave you. No reports, no money. And so the lies, the
13 deception, the disinformation was just very serious. And that is
14 typical to - even what you find in intelligence. That is why
13:22:50 15 even big countries are deceived through information that is
16 supposed to become intelligence. The same thing is happening now
17 with human rights. Without money - I mean, without reports, you
18 don't get money.

19 Q. Now, you go on the say this:

13:23:05 20 "The government is even more concerned that this report is
21 one which attempts to be partisan in local affairs and views the
22 report as purely political"?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What do you mean by being purely political?

13:23:20 25 A. Well, for the United States State Department in a human
26 rights report to state in a report that Charles Taylor got
27 elected because people were afraid that if they did not elect him
28 that he will restart war, that's, for me, is far from being a
29 human rights report. You are getting political. That is

13:23:52 1 meddling, and we had to respond. That is what we are talking
2 about, and it is contained in that report. How can you be
3 reporting about human rights and then getting involved in
4 politics and say "Oh, people were afraid of Taylor and that is
5 why they elected him"? That is politics.

13:24:13 6 Q. "The report further demonstrates the naivety and
7 gullibility of some United States State Department officials who
8 compiled these unsubstantiated reports from local organisations
9 under the cover of American government human rights report on
10 Liberia.

11 Hence, the Government of Liberia wants to make it clear
12 that it does not consider the report to be credible and that it
13 will have no effect on the progress of the Liberian government
14 and its determination to provide basic needs to its citizens and
15 reconstruct the country".

16 Let's go over the page, shall we, to page 2. This page is
17 headed, "A rejoinder to a US State Department Human Rights Report
18 on Liberia":

13:25:00 19 "A critical look at the recently published US State
20 Department human rights report on Liberia only exposes the
21 limited and jaundiced view of the American government whose chief
22 preoccupation now is to paint Liberia black. The report
23 glaringly shows the many contradictions of the Americans?"

13:25:24 24 Now, Mr Taylor, you tell us that you had been anxious to
25 develop normal relationships with the United States of America?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. This is rather strong language you are using here then for
28 somebody who is trying to make friends?

29 A. Well, what is stronger than sending a flotilla of gunboats

1 right outside of the Executive Mansion? What is further than
2 beginning to arm an insurgency in the country? What is worse
3 than trying to state that elections that have been conducted by
4 the international community were not free, fair and transparent
13:26:01 5 and that the President is really an imposter? What's worse than
6 that? Of course we had to respond. Are we supposed to be
7 cowards and just die as cowards? No.

8 Q. What insurgency are you talking about being armed?

9 A. LURD. That's coming on down. We are now seeing LURD -
13:26:21 10 remember we see LURD developing and this whole thing now is
11 developing. We are getting reports, I am talking about mid-1998.
12 We are seeing all of the makings of a new insurgency in Liberia,
13 okay.

14 Q. And who is funding that insurgency do you say, Mr Taylor?

13:26:40 15 A. The United States, Guinea and in part - in part - in a very
16 little part I would say Sierra Leone. Very small, because Tejani
17 eventually tells them to get out of Sierra Leone and they end up
18 in Guinea and they are now being trained. And I am not talking
19 about guessing. We confronted - in the final analysis when LURD
13:27:02 20 starts we confront the United States government. They accept
21 that they have given money and they have United States marines
22 training Guinean regulars and who they train and cross in Liberia
23 they cannot be held responsible for. So we know what's going on
24 now.

13:27:20 25 Q. "From the onset the report set the tone for its own
26 indictment. It charged in the first paragraph that, 'In July
27 1997 Taylor won the presidency in elections that were
28 administratively free and transparent, but were conducted in an
29 atmosphere of intimidation, as most voters believed that Taylor's

1 forces would resume fighting if Taylor were to lose'."

2 Now, you will recall, Mr Taylor, perhaps as long ago as a
3 couple of weeks ago we looked at various reports regarding that
4 election?

13:27:58 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. From people who were on the ground in Liberia?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Who described them as being free and fair?

9 A. Yes.

13:28:08 10 Q. Free also of any hint of intimidation?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Yet here we have in 1998 a US government department
13 suggesting that you had only come to power through fear. How did
14 you feel about that, Mr Taylor?

13:28:25 15 A. Well, that is why you see this strong response. I mean I
16 felt - I mean I was hurt, but there is something sinister about
17 this. There is something sinister about it. It's not just about
18 me feeling bad, there's something sinister.

19 Q. What is sinister?

13:28:45 20 A. When you see that the President came to power through
21 intimidation in fact he is not President and you are now calling
22 into question the legitimacy of that government which should give
23 rise for people in the country to do what? To fight that
24 government. That is what is sinister about this and this is why
13:29:09 25 we are reacting so very strongly.

26 When the United States government makes a statement like
27 this, the world's only superpower, people in the country see it
28 as a rallying position to begin to act. Oh, well the Americans
29 say that this government is not legitimate and so - and so this

1 is a very, very, very serious statement that they made.

2 Q. "Here was an election that was carefully supervised under
3 the watchful eyes of the ECOMOG, the international community,
4 local and international election monitors and former US President
13:29:45 5 Jimmy Carter who has gained world prominence as a credible
6 elections monitor.

7 Months before the elections the regional peacekeepers had,
8 in their own words, successfully disarmed and demobilised
9 Liberia's warring factions. As a matter of fact, all of
13:30:08 10 Liberia's factional heads were active participants in the
11 elections, either as standard bearers or executive members of
12 political parties."

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we have just about reached the
14 lunch hour now, Mr Griffiths.

13:30:23 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will adjourn for lunch and resume at
17 2.30.

18 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

19 [Upon resuming at 2.32 p.m.]

14:32:55 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, please, Mr Griffiths.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

22 Q. Mr Taylor, before the luncheon adjournment we were looking
23 at the response to the United States State Department human
24 rights report on Liberia, and you'd made a number of comments
14:33:14 25 about the report that had been prepared about your country,
26 including the suggestion that people were being paid, in effect,
27 to produce misinformation?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Is that right?

1 A. Definitely. What I'm making reference to here is you are
2 coming out of a civil war, there's a deep wound, there are
3 several warring factions that participate in this national civil
4 war. That's the NPFL, you have ULIMO-J, you have ULIMO-K, you
14:34:04 5 have the LPC, you have the coalition forces. These are all
6 things that have been introduced as evidence in this Court.

7 Now, the wound is deep. If you go to, let's say, ULIMO-J
8 and ask ULIMO-J people to become human rights reporters, what
9 will ULIMO-J people do? They will report against who was maybe
14:34:40 10 formerly an NPFL. And if you go to an NPFL person and you say we
11 want you to report, of course they will report against ULIMO-J or
12 ULIMO-K people. So you come into a country where there is a
13 major conflict just ending and you begin to pick people from - in
14 a society to report constructively on human rights, of course
14:35:05 15 they will not. They will take sides, they will misinform; but
16 all they want is their money. So apparently what was going on at
17 this time, the more lies that came in, the more money they gave.

18 If somebody just came up and say I went way in the bush some
19 place and I saw people that had been beaten, you don't have to
14:35:29 20 bring physical evidence like pictures. They just wrote and
21 reported and there was nothing credible about this, okay? These
22 are the kind of things that I'm talking about, okay, when I even
23 mentioned the fact that this is one of the difficulties that we -
24 that I have here, sitting here for 12 months and listening to
14:35:52 25 evidence here that was impossible.

26 Now, take for example - and I want to mention this - a
27 gentleman that has not been here yet. According to disclosures
28 that were made to this Defence, John Tarnue probably received
29 more money that some lawyers probably sitting in this Court.

1 What do you expect from him? This is a man that is a liar, and
2 maybe he will come here for rebuttal, that is being paid huge -
3 John Tarnue is being paid some \$30,000-odd a year. What do you
4 expect from this man coming from nowhere? So you have this kind
14:36:30 5 of problem where people are paid to get information, they lie,
6 because they have to keep lying because that's how the money
7 comes. And that's the difficulty that we have with human rights,
8 and these are some of the difficulties that we're going to have
9 right here because you come into these impoverished nations. In
14:36:49 10 Sierra Leone, you've got people in Sierra Leone that probably
11 work a whole year would not make \$2,000. Your child being sent
12 to school, school fees paid, your hospital bills paid, everything
13 paid. What do you expect from him or her? That's the difficulty
14 in general that I'm talking about about people being paid, and
14:37:09 15 you cannot expect - and we expected the United States to be able
16 to thoroughly investigate some of these claims, and they did not.

17 Q. Now, we were at page 2, Mr Taylor, and we had stopped at
18 the paragraph which ends, "Either as standard bearers or
19 executive members of political parties", and it continues:
14:37:41 20 "Moreover, long before elections Taylor was not the only
21 key player in the Liberian peace process. Faction leaders George
22 Boley, Alhaji Kromah and Roosevelt Johnson were all on equal
23 footing with Mr Taylor. So if, according to the Americans'
24 thinking, Liberians feared Taylor, which would have reverted to
14:38:12 25 war had he lost the elections, then equally so Liberians were
26 scared if George Boley or Alhaji Kromah lost as well. So why did
27 Liberians actually vote Taylor in?

28 During the campaign one did not need a crystal ball to
29 define who would have won the elections. Among all the

1 candidates it was Taylor alone whose political platform touched
2 the Liberian people. His campaign managers used all the
3 strategies in the book to give the Liberian populous a glimmer of
4 things to come if they opted for Ghankay, and so Liberians chose
14:38:53 5 Taylor to the chagrin of those crying wolf today.

6 Apparently America is wallowing in a mire of contradictions
7 of her own making if, in the same voice, State Department
8 officials declare the past election transparent, but go on to say
9 it was conducted under intimidating conditions where, then, does
14:39:19 10 the credibility of President Carter lie? Are the Americans
11 insinuating that their chief elections emissary fooled the entire
12 world when he declared the Liberian election transparent?

13 The report again in the same first paragraph said leaders
14 of the former warring factions, including Taylor, did not make
14:39:41 15 any serious attempt to reconcile their differences. Another
16 gross contradiction.

17 Was it not Taylor who, upon assuming office, constituted
18 the National Reconciliation and Reunification Commission and
19 appointed former ULIMO-J faction leader and All Liberian
14:40:00 20 Coalition Party standard bearer Alhaji Kromah as its head? Yet,
21 for reasons best known to himself, Kromah surreptitiously left
22 the country and chose to remain in self-imposed exile rather than
23 contribute to the national healing and reconstruction process."

24 Pause there. Did Alhaji Kromah do that, Mr Taylor?

14:40:24 25 A. Kromah, yes, went to the United States.

26 Q. When did he go to the United States?

27 A. Following the inaugurations, he stayed for a few months. I
28 talked to him about taking over this commission. He said he
29 would do it. He travelled to the States after promising that he

1 would take over as chairman of the commission and did not return.

2 Q. "Roosevelt Johnson, another former wartime rival of
3 President Taylor, was also shown the olive branch when he was
4 appointed minister of rural development immediately after
14:41:04 5 elections. Because he harboured ulterior motives, Johnson chose
6 to still operate a base on Camp Johnson Road with all the
7 trappings of an active war lord. His bodyguards, composed mainly
8 of his Krahn loyalists, constantly terrorised the inhabitants and
9 residents of Monrovia who ventured in the Camp Johnson Road
14:41:29 10 vicinity, even in broad daylight.

11 All attempts by government to amicably resolve the
12 situation proved zilch until security forces were finally pushed
13 against the wall to restore law and order in Monrovia in the
14 events which led to the September 18-19 Monrovia shoot-out
14:41:49 15 between Johnson's forces and government troops.

16 The American government deceptively orchestrated Johnson's
17 flight from justice by harbouring him in the compounds of their
18 embassy near Monrovia."

19 Mr Taylor, did you think it was politic to be using terms
14:42:08 20 like "deceptively" about the American government?

21 A. Well, I was more concerned about the truth, and it was the
22 truth. It was deceptive, and we told them that. It was
23 deceptive, what they had done, and so we couldn't hide it from
24 them.

14:42:26 25 Q. "Yet in their scandal of a report, the US State Department,
26 in a haphazard cover-up, said Johnson sought refuge in a western
27 embassy on 19 September. Why are they shy in naming their
28 embassy as Johnson's refuge?

29 The Liberian government is on record for being the most

1 liberal administration since the founding of this republic.
2 Opposition party members not only form the crux of its cabinet,
3 but are major decision makers in the affairs of state. Therefore
4 the State Department's flummoxed insinuations that President
14:43:07 5 Taylor never reconciled with his former rivals are downright
6 unfounded.

7 On the question of Liberia's alleged human rights
8 violations, it is rather pathetic that the United States State
9 Department can connive with gravy seekers selling their souls for
14:43:25 10 a few dollars to concoct a pack of lies against their own
11 country.

12 The numerous human rights initiatives of the government
13 clearly signify the honesty with which it views the rights of all
14 its citizens and residents regardless of religion, race or creed.
14:43:44 15 Hence, President Taylor wasted no time last year in setting up
16 the Independent Commission on Human Rights to probe into reports
17 of human rights violation. Up to date, the commission has not
18 published any case of human rights violations by the Government
19 of Liberia. So it is obvious from whence the American State
14:44:08 20 Department gathered its reports.

21 What the United States government really needs to do is
22 review its own grossly racist records of human rights violations
23 which often pit whites against minorities."

24 Again, Mr Taylor, do you think it was wise to remind the US
14:44:27 25 government of that?

26 A. Well, you asked the question was it wise? Probably not.
27 Probably not wise. But was it right? Yes. They had published
28 reports that were inflammatory and incorrect and I think since we
29 had an opportunity to respond I think it was proper advice to

1 also mention to them their own problems that still exist, like
2 all countries have. Of course it was proper doing that. Wise,
3 maybe that's why we're in trouble today, but it was right.

4 Q. "On a daily basis American police gun down suspected
14:45:25 5 criminals in the streets and homes, while cases abound in courts
6 in all 52 states of torture, rape, police brutality and murder of
7 prisoners in detention.

8 A case in point is the recent cold blooded murder of a
9 Guinean immigrant, one Diallo who was shot forty times by four
14:45:48 10 white cops.

11 Another incident of America's total disregard for the
12 rights of others is the recent United States launching of scores
13 of cruise missiles on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in which
14 innocent civilians lost their lives and millions of dollars worth
14:46:06 15 of properties were destroyed. Where then does America stand when
16 it comes to the question of human rights abuses? Can she
17 vindicate herself?

18 The report further went on to allege that government has on
19 numerous occasions muzzled the press by instituting arbitrary
14:46:26 20 arrests and flogging of journalists. Yet it is a fact that the
21 liberty of uncensored rights that the media enjoys today is
22 unparalleled. Both in the print and electronic media,
23 practitioners agree that the Taylor administration is very
24 flexible with the press compared with past governments. As a
14:46:45 25 matter of fact, many newspapers and radio stations today would
26 have placed closure in the past with the type of news articles,
27 editorials and talk shows they feature.

28 It is about time that the American government states in
29 clear cut terms its intention towards this country. We know how

1 Liberians used to look up to the United States as a big brother,
2 as a kind of savior. We also know that United States interest
3 here diminished with the end of the Cold War. And we know how
4 many of us were betrayed by the great 'Uncle Sam' who we thought
14:47:25 5 would have saved us from the wrath of the civil war.

6 We know we freely and fairly elected Charles Taylor to the
7 presidency of this land without fear or favour. But what we
8 don't know is the motive behind the current smear campaign
9 against Liberia. Obviously it is only done to take bread out of
14:47:43 10 the mouths of ordinary Liberians. For these negative and false
11 signals only exacerbate our economic flight. Because, even
12 though the United States State Department Human Rights Report is
13 mere trash, it also has the potential of scaring off genuine
14 friends of Liberia."

14:48:05 15 Now pausing there, Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor, don't you think
16 that some of the language used in that response is rather
17 inflammatory?

18 A. I wouldn't say inflammatory. Why would it be inflammatory?
19 I would say that if it's factual, if it's right, why should it be
14:48:26 20 inflammatory? We see everything being done to destroy the
21 country, to destroy the government. We see sinister moves. When
22 the United States says in a report that a government elected -
23 this is a year after being in office, almost a year and a half.
24 If you say that that government was brought to power through
14:48:53 25 intimidation, what do you do then? Let's be earnest before God.
26 It opens a floodgate in your country for trouble. When the
27 United States says that a government is not credible, it opens a
28 floodgate for confusion and problems in your country.

29 This was the signal then that led to the LURD incursion in

1 Liberia. Liberians now, "Oh, well America says it's no good and
2 so, okay, we can do what we want to do." It was intentional, the
3 government was upset and as you asked the question it may not
4 have been wise, maybe we should have fell to our knees and
14:49:36 5 started kissing feet, but we felt that it was better to stand up
6 and speak our minds on the truth than bow to this type of
7 aggression against the country and this is what we did.

8 Q. But, Mr Taylor, a little supplication, a little crawling on
9 one's knees, could have saved you a lot of problems, couldn't it?

14:50:03 10 A. Slavery would have still be in existence if black had
11 stayed crawling, okay? South Africa would not have had her
12 independence if the blacks in South Africa had crawled on their
13 knees to the apartheid boards I mean of Southern Africa.

14 Come on, look. There are some times you have to stand up
14:50:18 15 for something and speak the truth when it is the truth. It may
16 be painful to you maybe afterward, but I was more concerned about
17 the truth. I spoke the truth. We approved this document. I do
18 not withdraw myself from it even today. There's nothing in this
19 document that is false. I do not even withdraw from it now.

14:50:40 20 Q. So, Mr Taylor, if you felt so incensed as to cause to be
21 published a response like this, help us. Looking at that last
22 paragraph, "... but what we don't know is the motive", so help
23 us. With the benefit of hindsight, what do you say the motive
24 was?

14:51:05 25 A. Well, we encountered LURD was the motive. Eventually, it
26 did not take too long - this was December 1998. By then the
27 pressure mounted. In order to show the world that you mean
28 business, that you want peace, we are prepared to help Liberia.
29 All of these things they saw it and I guess what we say they kept

1 their cool. They knew what they wanted to do to me. They came
2 and said, "Look, we are prepared to let the past be the past. We
3 think that a good gesture would be to destroy - let's burn all
4 the arms of war as a demonstration to the world that Liberia
14:51:52 5 wants to put war behind her."

6 We debated. From the beginning of the year, the
7 legislature was a major national debate. We finally fell for the
8 total destruction of every arm. This is why I keep saying you're
9 hearing arms going to Sierra Leone in 1998, total nonsense. We
14:52:16 10 had no arms. Finally, we agreed to destroy all of the weapons
11 that were collected from disarmament before 1997 July's election.
12 Every gun, every round of ammunition, artillery were all
13 destroyed by the international community.

14 Q. When?

14:52:35 15 A. In about July/August 1999. Then immediately thereafter
16 LURD attacked us and it ended up to the war. So we are now
17 saying that the motive behind this whole thing was LURD and the
18 creation of LURD.

19 Q. Let's leave that topic now, please, but before we do,
14:53:02 20 Mr President, could I ask that it be marked for identification,
21 please. "Government of Liberia position on the 1998 United
22 States State Department Human Rights Report on Liberia" MFI-62,
23 please.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-62.

14:53:22 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, if I may enquire, what is
27 the date of this document?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: There isn't a date on the document, save the
29 reference to 1998 in the first page. We've been unable to locate

1 a more precise date for it, I'm sorry.

2 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Not even from the witness?

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:53:44

4 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, can you help us as to when this particular
5 response was?

6 A. That response came out in December. The reports come out
7 at the end of the year. It's a December document. December
8 1998.

14:54:31

9 Q. Thank you. Now, Mr Taylor, we looked a little while ago at
10 the second progress report of the Secretary-General, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And that was dated October of 1998, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14:54:47

14 Q. And we noted when we looked at that document that the
15 Secretary-General was required by UN resolution to produce a
16 report at certain fixed intervals.

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Was there a further report after that October one?

19 A. Yes.

14:55:00

20 Q. When did that report come out?

21 A. That report - because the intervals if I recall correctly
22 were about 30 days, so that's about the second week in December a
23 report should have come - the third report should have come.

24 Q. A report by whom?

14:55:18

25 A. The Secretary-General.

26 Q. To whom?

27 A. To the Security Council on the progress of the activities
28 in Sierra Leone based on the mandate of the Security Council.

29 Q. Did you have reason to look at that report?

1 A. Oh, definitely. That was the yardstick for us to know what
2 was coming next. When you read that report then you know what's
3 coming next, yes.

14:56:29 4 Q. Can we have a look, please, behind divider 27. Do we see
5 here, Mr Taylor, the third progress report --

6 A. Yes, we do, this is the report.

7 Q. -- of the Secretary-General?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And help us, what's the date?

14:56:46 10 A. This is 16 December. Yes, this is it. 16 December 1998.

11 Q. And we see by paragraph 1 that the Secretary-General was
12 required, as you indicated earlier, to submit reports at
13 particular intervals?

14 A. Yes.

14:57:20 15 Q. Yes?

16 A. Yes, 30 days.

17 Q. And that the present report is submitted pursuant to that
18 request and describes developments since the second report on 16
19 October 1998, yes?

14:57:36 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Now it continues:

22 "Since my second progress report, the Government of Sierra
23 Leone has continued its efforts to consolidate the position, to
24 restore the stability of the country, and to improve relations
14:57:55 25 with its neighbours. The government has launched initiatives to
26 strengthen the civil service and fight corruption. Sierra Leone
27 is also increasingly active in the regional and international
28 arena."

29 And of course, Mr Taylor, you can attest to that, can't

1 you, having met with President Tejan Kabbah and spoken to him on
2 numerous occasions during the course of 1998?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. "On 30 October the government launched a nationwide
14:58:26 5 consultative exercise organised with the support of the United
6 Nations development programme aimed at enhancing the capacity of
7 government ministries, other national institutions and civil
8 society to take charge of the development process. The
9 consultation exercise is expected to conclude on 14 December,
14:58:51 10 with the adoption of a national consensus on major policy issues,
11 including national reconciliation.

12 The government has also pursued legal proceedings against
13 both military and civilian supporters of the illegal coup of May
14 1997 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. On 19 October
14:59:20 15 1998, after a court martial had sentenced 34 officers found
16 guilty of treason to death, 24 of them were executed by firing
17 squad. The executions took place despite appeals from the United
18 Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and others, including
19 myself, for a stay of execution and a grant of a right of
14:59:48 20 appeal."

21 Now you've already told us what your position was regarding
22 those executions, Mr Taylor.

23 A. Yes, I have.

24 Q. "On 23 October 1998, a jury at the High Court in Freetown
15:00:01 25 found Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary
26 United Front, guilty of treason and related offences and
27 sentenced him to death by hanging. Corporal Sankoh, who had not
28 been legally represented during his trial, has now selected legal
29 advisors to undertake his appeal following efforts by the

1 government, with UNOMSIL assistance, to secure legal
2 representation for him."

3 Let us pause there. Mr Taylor --

4 A. Yes.

15:00:40 5 Q. -- what was your view as to the efficacy and assistance
6 which would be provided to the peace process by the execution of
7 Sankoh? Did you think it would help?

8 A. In fact I thought it would hurt, but they were doing what
9 they wanted to do in Sierra Leone.

15:01:05 10 Q. Why did you think it would hurt?

11 A. You still don't have peace in the country. There's an
12 active war and you're trying to execute some people. In my
13 opinion it didn't make sense, but that was the decision for that
14 government. I didn't feel that it was the proper thing to do but

15:01:26 15 they --

16 Q. Why?

17 A. Well, you have a raging war, as I mentioned. You have the
18 committee working on restoring peace. The United Nations is in
19 there. You know, this is diplomatic language here. The

15:01:49 20 Secretary-General says a stay of execution was asked for by the
21 United Nations High Commission for Human Rights and others.

22 Well, that could also include him. Everyone was trying to get
23 Sierra Leone not to do this. No one was going to jump on the air
24 and say, "Oh, we don't approve of it," but we're trying to tell

15:02:12 25 them quietly: Listen, gentlemen, we're trying to bring about
26 peace, so hold these people in jail. There is going to be time
27 for this. But while you are asking for a ceasefire upcountry,
28 the ECOMOG people are fighting and you are basically killing some
29 people here in Freetown. We didn't think it was proper, but like

1 I said, it was their decision, and we voiced that opinion what
2 you will say diplomatically by not putting it on the air, but
3 they knew what our own stance were. And not just one country; I
4 think a lot of countries advised against it.

15:02:55 5 Q. Now, those 24 who were executed, Mr Taylor, they were
6 members of the former junta regime whose colleagues had fled the
7 capital following the ECOMOG intervention, yes?

8 A. I'm not sure if they all were. I do know that King - there
9 was this King boy - man I remember who had pleaded seriously not
10 to be sent back. I remember him. I'm not certain if the rest of
11 them were all on that plane. I'm not certain about that.

12 Q. But help me: As the President of the sister and adjoining
13 nation, did you think that the execution of former AFRC
14 colleagues might inflame the situation in that country?

15:03:48 15 A. I thought so.

16 Q. "At the summit meeting in Abuja on 30 to 31 October 1998,"
17 we've looked at that, "the Heads of State and government of the
18 ECOWAS agreed to combine the strengthening of its monitoring
19 group with efforts at dialogue to achieve lasting peace and
20 national reconciliation in Sierra Leone."

21 Pause. That word "dialogue", did that include contact with
22 the RUF, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Definitely. Definitely.

24 Q. "The Heads of State and government also expressed gratitude
15:04:35 25 to Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria for contributing troops to ECOMOG in
26 Sierra Leone, encouraged Benin and Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia,
27 Mali and Niger to deploy the troops they had promised to
28 contribute as soon as possible and appealed to the international
29 community to provide the necessary logistical support. The

1 arrival of these additional troops is still being awaited.

2 On 7 December 1998, the chairman of the Security Council
3 sanctions committee and permanent representative of Sweden,
4 Ambassador Hans Dahlgren, arrived in Freetown for a four-day
15:05:19 5 assessment mission. Ambassador Dahlgren met with President
6 Kabbah, the ECOMOG force commander, Major General Timothy
7 Shelpidi . . ."

8 Pause there. By this stage Shelpidi, who you told off in
9 your office, remember telling us about that?

15:05:38 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Shelpidi is now in Freetown?

12 A. That is correct. He was pulled out of Liberia.

13 Q. "... the ECOMOG task force commander, Brigadier General Abu
14 Ahmadu, and others from the United Nations and the international
15:05:52 15 community. During his visit to the front line areas, the local
16 authorities conveyed to Ambassador Dahlgren their request for
17 United Nations assistance in controlling the border with Liberia
18 through the establishment of a buffer zone, the deployment of
19 United Nations military observers and assistance to ECOMOG in
15:06:13 20 patrolling the border. Ambassador Dahlgren also visited
21 Monrovia."

22 Did you speak to him?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. And did he mention to you the possibility of creating such
15:06:27 25 a buffer zone?

26 A. It was a general discussion that had been thrown around.
27 We threw it around, but he did not promise that there would be
28 one.

29 Q. "Following his visit to The Gambia on 9 December, President

1 Kabbah reportedly accepted an offer from the President of The
2 Gambia to mediate a peace agreement with the rebels."

3 Did you know about that, Mr Taylor?

15:07:06

4 A. Not exactly, no. This would have been a little odd. I
5 didn't know about that.

6 Q. "As called for by the special conference on Sierra Leone
7 held at United Nations headquarters on 30 July 1998, the
8 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
9 Ireland convened a meeting of the International Contact Group of

15:07:23

10 Donors to Sierra Leone in London on 5 November. The objectives
11 of the meeting were to build up international support for Sierra
12 Leone's efforts to restore peace, democracy and human rights; to
13 encourage further assistance to ECOMOG, and contributions to the
14 United Nations trust fund for Sierra Leone, to try to match
15 specific ECOMOG requirements to donor offers, and to encourage
16 the Government of Sierra Leone to develop political dialogue and
17 national reconciliation beyond the programme for the disarmament,
18 demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and to
19 encourage participation in it.

15:08:07

20 The London meeting, which was opened by Mr Tony Lloyd,
21 Minister of State For Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was
22 attended on behalf of the Government of Sierra Leone by Mr James
23 Jonah ..."

24 Now, we've come across him before, haven't we?

15:08:24

25 A. Yes.

26 Q. "... the Minister of Finance, Development and Economic
27 Planning, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mr Lansana Kouyate ..."
28 Is that someone known to you?

29 A. Yes, I know Kouyate very well.

1 Q. "... and my special representative for Sierra Leone,
2 Mr Francis G Okelo ..." We've come across him before, haven't
3 we?

4 A. Yes.

15:08:48 5 Q. "... the meeting expressed strong support for the dual
6 track approach, military and diplomatic, agreed upon at the
7 ECOWAS summit on 31 October, by which efforts to strengthen
8 ECOMOG would be accompanied by the opening of dialogue to achieve
9 lasting peace and national reconciliation."

15:09:11 10 And what did that dialogue involve, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Going back to the 1996 agreement with the rebels. That's
12 what we wanted to begin pursuing. By the 1996 agreement, I'm
13 talking about the November 1996 agreement in Abidjan, La Cote
14 d'Ivoire. That's the agreement that we focused back on.

15:09:41 15 Q. "The meeting agreed on a series of next steps to be taken
16 by the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS and ECOMOG, and the
17 international community. In particular, the government would
18 pursue the above-mentioned dual track approach for restoring
19 peace and stability in Sierra Leone. Troop contributors would
15:10:05 20 continue their efforts to augment ECOMOG with the aim of
21 completing the additional deployments by the end of 1998. For
22 its part, the international community would press on with
23 financing and other support to help ECOMOG remain in Sierra Leone
24 and expand its operation, including through contributions to the
15:10:27 25 trust fund to support United Nations peacekeeping related efforts
26 in Sierra Leone as well as bilateral contribution.

27 It has provisionally been decided that the next meeting of
28 the International Contact Group will be held in New York in
29 January 1999. In Sierra Leone, a government working party

1 chaired by the Minister of Finance is continuing to follow up on
2 the commitments and pledges made by donors. The membership of
3 the working group also includes UNOMSIL and donor
4 representatives."

15:11:04 5 Now this:

6 "Relation between Sierra Leone and its neighbours. On 12
7 November 1998, at the invitation of President Lansana Conte of
8 Guinea, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, and
9 President Charles Taylor of Liberia participated in an
10 extraordinary summit meeting of the Mano River Union in Conakry."

15:11:30

11 Now, let us pause for a minute. Do you remember earlier,
12 Mr Taylor, you telling us that that date on that photograph was
13 wrong?

14 A. That is correct.

15:11:43

15 Q. That that date showed 24 November, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And I think it might be useful if we were to correct that
18 now. Page 123, of the presidential papers, please. Everyone
19 will recall us referring to the last sentence "... and the other,
20 a summit of Mano River Union States, with Taylor, Kabbah and
21 Lansana Conte ... in Conakry November 24, 1998." For future
22 reference, we should cross out that date of the 24th and put in
23 the 12th.

15:12:10

24 A. Right. Remember I said that it was right after Abuja and
25 it was closer to the front end of the month. This is - the 12th
26 is correct.

15:12:33

27 Q. "The summit was also attended by the Reverend Jesse
28 Jackson, the presidential special envoy for the promotion of
29 democracy and human rights in Africa, as well as my special

1 representative for Sierra Leone and my representative for
2 Liberia, Mr Felix Downes-Thomas.

3 In a communique issued after the meeting the three Heads of
4 State announced their decision to rejuvenate the Mano River
15:13:43 5 Union. They further pledged to ensure the strict observance of
6 the 1986 non-aggression and security cooperation agreement
7 between Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea that had been signed and
8 ratified by the three member states. The three Heads of State
9 agreed to work collectively to restore peace in Sierra Leone and
15:14:04 10 maintain stability in the sub-region.

11 After the summit in a meeting with President Kabbah in
12 Freetown, Reverend Jackson stressed the advantage of negotiations
13 over confrontation and called for a negotiated settlement to the
14 conflict in Sierra Leone. A Liberian delegation led by the
15:14:27 15 minister of national security concluded a two day visit to Sierra
16 Leone on 9 December. "

17 Mr Taylor, who was your minister of national security?

18 A. General Philip Kamah. That's already in the record.

19 Q. Philip Kamah?

15:14:50 20 A. Yes, he was former chief of staff of the Armed Forces of
21 Liberia.

22 Q. And what was the purpose of that visit?

23 A. Security cooperation.

24 Q. "The Liberian government subsequently announced that
15:15:08 25 President Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's request for
26 cooperation on joint border patrols. "

27 Let's pause there. Let us note the language of that
28 sentence, "President Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's
29 request". Who originated the idea, Mr Taylor?

1 A. I did. I did. I was trying to work to again fight to
2 remove all these accusations. I said, "Well, listen. Why don't
3 we agree to jointly patrol and monitor the border together?" He
4 agreed. Our next step now was to get the type of assistance to
15:15:57 5 finance it and we started - we were, you know, working on this
6 and we were still having to depend on the international community
7 so to speak to do that, but he agreed with me.

8 Q. Let us just pause for a moment, Mr Taylor, because remember
9 you are said to be party to a design to terrorise the people of
15:16:30 10 Sierra Leone. So let us just pause at this moment please,
11 December 1998, and see what remains of that plan. First of all
12 Foday Sankoh has been sentenced to death in Sierra Leone, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And what's your reaction to that, Mr Taylor, bearing in
15:16:56 15 mind he's supposed to be your co-conspirator, to borrow a phrase?

16 A. My own take on the Foday Sankoh sentence to death is very
17 simple. It is a bad thing to do in the face of the war while
18 we're trying to obtain peace that no action of such should be
19 taken. We should pursue peace first and after whatever action
15:17:27 20 they wanted to take that could be looked at. In fact that was
21 the view of so many leaders that don't pull anything like this in
22 the midst of all of this confusion. You grab the leader of the
23 RUF and execute him. It would have been a silly thing to do.
24 That was my view then and it still remains my view that it would
15:17:49 25 have been a silly thing to do and thank God they did not do it.
26 They listened to all of us in the international community, I can
27 say, that felt that it was not a good thing to do.

28 Q. But help us, Mr Taylor. Were you in contact with Mr Sankoh
29 at this time?

1 A. No, no, not at all.

2 Q. When had you last been in contact with him?

3 A. My last - very last - contact with Foday Sankoh was back in
4 1992. That was the last time I spoke to Foday Sankoh.

15:18:25 5 Q. Are you sure about that?

6 A. I am as sure as can be.

7 Q. Now help us, whilst we're talking about the plan, where was
8 Dr Manneh at this time?

9 A. Dr Manneh had left Liberia round about '93.

15:18:46 10 Q. And speaking of him, as far as you're aware did he know Sam
11 Bockarie or vice versa?

12 A. I don't know. Oh, no, Manneh would never have - no, he did
13 not know Bockarie, not to my knowledge.

14 Q. Why can you be so categorical about that?

15:19:07 15 A. Because Manneh left - well, okay, maybe you've got a point,
16 but Manneh left Liberia in 1993. I didn't know Sam Bockarie at
17 that particular time and so if he got to know Bockarie he could
18 have met him maybe some time after maybe 1998 I would put it,
19 because unless Sam Bockarie travelled through some other means
15:19:34 20 the only time I know that he went through Liberia was in 1998.

21 So Manneh had left Liberia a long time ago and now I don't
22 believe that Manneh would have known him at any time subsequent
23 to that.

24 Q. Now you do appreciate, Mr Taylor, that at the time that the
15:19:58 25 Secretary-General is reporting to the United Nations you are
26 supposed to be planning the Freetown invasion? You do appreciate
27 that, don't you?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. Were you?

1 A. No. No, I was not. I was not.

2 Q. And when you went to that meeting at the Mano River Union,
3 were you genuine?

4 A. Very genuine.

15:20:30 5 Q. Let's go back. Over the page:

6 "Activities of the mission relating to the security
7 situation. While reaffirming its commitment to end the ongoing
8 rebel war as soon as possible, the government has expressed its
9 readiness to address any grievance the rebels might have on
10 condition that they first stop fighting, lay down their arms and
11 surrender to ECOMOG or UNOMSIL. There has also been discussion
12 in government circles of a possible offer to provide safe passage
13 to five persons identified as leaders of the two factions
14 comprising the rebel groups - Johnny Paul Koroma and SAJ Musa of
15 the AFRC and Sam Bockarie, Denis Mingo and Eldred Collins of the
16 RUF - to leave the country for a non-neighbouring country of
17 their choice."

18 Pause there. Mr Taylor, what does that mean?

15:21:28 19 A. Don't let's forget this report is during the 16th - it's
15:21:55 20 the 16th, but it's covering the 60 days prior to this time.

21 These are the discussions about people wanting to travel, some
22 people were talking about surrendering, some people wanted to go
23 out to seek advice, and these discussions were being held among
24 the nations in the presence of these people who were there to
15:22:15 25 talk about who might be serious about going out for consultations
26 as they had said they wanted to do touch base and these are some
27 of the people. There were probably more, but I think they paid
28 attention to these.

29 And now this name here looks like one of the Eldred

1 Collins, I think this is the older man. I think this could be -
2 this name now is ringing a little bell to me. But these are some
3 of the people that they were talking about being able to move out
4 to go and consult and talk to other people. These were the
15:22:55 5 people that they were talking about.

6 Q. Now, earlier today we discussed the trip made by Bockarie
7 on his third visit to Liberia to Burkina Faso. Do you remember
8 that?

9 A. Yes, that is correct.

15:23:10 10 Q. In light of what is being said in this paragraph in this
11 report, Mr Taylor, did that visit by Bockarie to Burkina Faso at
12 the time strike you as being in any way unusual?

13 A. No, no, no, no. No, it was not unusual.

14 Q. Why not?

15:23:30 15 A. Because the discussions were already underway where
16 diplomats and others had been informed that some of these people
17 needed to get out, they had said they needed to go to consult
18 people to consolidate peace and they needed to get to people that
19 they have met before during the old peace process. So any one of
15:23:50 20 these people, Johnny Paul Koroma or SAJ Musa or Bockarie or some
21 of them or Eldred Collins, wanting to come out to travel in the
22 sub-region, they would not have been hindered at all, or entering
23 a country they would not have been stopped in West Africa.

24 Q. "In this context, UNOMSIL has cooperated closely with the
15:24:14 25 government and with ECOMOG in following up indications that
26 SAJ Musa along with several of his supporters might be prepared
27 to surrender to UNOMSIL. Despite suspicions that this reported
28 offer might be a feint, UNOMSIL has made provisional preparations
29 to accept the surrender of individuals or groups of rebels if

1 this can be arranged under proper security conditions. UNOMSIL
2 has also been in contact with SAJ Musa to try to secure the
3 release of a Catholic priest, Father Mario Guerra, who was
4 kidnapped near Makeni on 17 November 1998 by elements of the
15:25:10 5 AFRC.

6 Since the establishment of UNOMSIL, my special
7 representative has consulted the resident agencies, funds and
8 programmes on a regular basis and has instituted weekly United
9 Nations coordination meetings to address issues covered under the
15:25:25 10 respective mandates of the organisations. Moreover, a joint
11 security committee meets weekly to share and assess information
12 about the situation on the ground. UNOMSIL has also actively
13 pursued close contacts with representatives of civil society,
14 including good working relations with local non-governmental
15:25:48 15 organisations and participation in civic events, such as symposia
16 and workshops. "

17 Now let's see what is actually happening on the ground in
18 this period:

19 "On the basis of the information received by UNOMSIL on
15:26:07 20 the strength, organisation and activities of the rebels, there
21 appear to be six rebel battalion-type formations comprising
22 approximately 300 fighters each. Two of these are primarily AFRC
23 and based in the north. The other four, believed to be RUF with
24 some AFRC elements, are deployed around Kailahun. It is believed
15:26:46 25 that the AFRC units receive supplies of arms and ammunition from
26 the Kailahun District. "

27 Yes, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I see that.

29 Q. "In the north of the country, and especially in the

1 northwest, rebel attacks against civilians have persisted and
2 have recently intensified. In the first few days of December
3 1998, a large rebel force moving southwards and westwards
4 launched coordinated and well-planned attacks on several
15:27:23 5 locations near the road from Freetown to the Guinea border,
6 including Mange, Lunsar and Masiaka, inflicting heavy casualties
7 on civilians and property damage and causing thousands to flee
8 and take refuge in the capital and surrounding districts. This
9 rebel force is believed to be under the command of SAJ Musa."

15:27:47 10 Pause there, Mr Taylor.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this Court has heard much evidence about
13 what happened in Sierra Leone in the period between the ECOMOG
14 intervention in February --

15:28:02 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- going down to December and the prelude to the Freetown
17 invasion, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And you will recall much evidence being called from the
15:28:15 20 northern parts of Sierra Leone, Kori bundu and places like that,
21 of atrocities being carried out?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Yes?

24 A. Yes.

15:28:27 25 Q. By people like Staff Alhaji and so on. Do you recall that
26 name?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. Now, note what is being said here, that in that part of the
29 country at the time they were primarily AFRC based in the north?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you see that at paragraph 18?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And also that this group moving towards Freetown is led by

15:28:50 5 SAJ Musa?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. SAJ Musa, as we know, was a member of the Sierra Leonean

15:28:59 10 army, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. A former member, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Bearing those facts in mind let's continue:

15:29:07 15 "There is much speculation concerning the motive behind
16 these attacks, which have taken place at a time when Musa has
17 publicly offered to surrender to UNOMSIL. These atrocities are
18 taking place against the background of a rift which appears to
19 have arisen between the AFRC remnants in the north and the RUF in
15:29:34 20 the east."

21 Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. And you appreciate this has implications for who is
24 responsible for those atrocities we heard so much evidence about?

15:29:46 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And also who is responsible for the Freetown invasion?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. You appreciate that, don't you?

29 A. Yes, yes.

1 Q. So let's look at this with care:

2 "These atrocities are taking place against the background
3 of a rift which appears to have arisen between the AFRC remnants
4 in the north and the RUF in the east. ECOMOG and the Civil
15:30:18 5 Defence Forces have done much to disrupt the supply of arms and
6 ammunition from Kailahun to the rebels in the north.

7 In the northeast, the rebel capacity to concentrate and
8 coordinate their forces appears to have eroded since the time of
9 their attack on Kabala in July. The rebel concentration in
15:30:42 10 Koinadugu area was broken up by combined efforts of reconstituted
11 battalions of former soldiers of the Republic of Sierra Leone
12 military forces and ECOMOG, thus reducing the threat to Makeni
13 and to the Koidu-Lunsar road. Repeated rebel attempts to gain
14 control of the diamond rich Koidu area have been unsuccessful.

15:31:13 15 However, the situation remains unpredictable and the area is
16 still in danger from rebel attacks.

17 In the southeast, rebel attacks during October and November
18 1998 seemed designed to surround and cut off Kenema, both from
19 Freetown and from the Liberian border, by controlling the road
15:31:35 20 that links Daru with Joru and Zimmi. UNOMSIL, in close
21 collaboration with ECOMOG and CDF units based at Kenema, is
22 standing by in case the rebels' failure to achieve their
23 objective should lead some of them to open talks with the
24 government.

15:31:56 25 The south and southwest of the country, including Freetown,
26 have remained calm, though tension in the capital rose during
27 December following a rebel attack on the road linking Masiaka and
28 Rogberi."

29 Let's continue with the situation on the ground:

1 "In the north, ECOMOG has shown increased willingness to
2 engage the rebels in the bush, while the CDF, which essentially
3 originated in southern Sierra Leone, has begun to operate in the
4 north. These developments, as well as the reintroduction of
15:32:44 5 former Republic of Sierra Leone military forces soldiers into
6 combat alongside ECOMOG, appear to have taken a toll on rebel
7 strength in the northeast. As noted above, an important
8 objective of the pro-government forces has been to disrupt
9 ammunition supply lines between the main rebel stronghold in the
15:33:08 10 Kailahun District and rebel units in the north of the country.
11 In the southeast the CDF, with ECOMOG support, has now
12 established fairly effective control of the area south of Kenema
13 after stemming the rebel offensive along the Daru-Joru-Zimmi
14 road.

15:33:29 15 The CDF in both the north and east has, however, been
16 hampered by serious shortages of ammunition, communications,
17 food, transportation and medicines. In addition to logistical
18 shortages, there have been occasional lapses in coordination
19 between ECOMOG and the CDF. Air strikes launched by ECOMOG to
15:33:49 20 disperse rebel preparations for an attack on Joru on 15 November
21 reportedly caused casualties among a CDF concentration nearby,
22 underlining the need for improved coordination between the two
23 forces.

24 Despite efforts to organise and fund the deployment of
15:34:12 25 reinforcements, ECOMOG also remains overstretched in terms of
26 manpower and requires urgent logistical support. Nevertheless,
27 there are indications that ECOMOG has been concentrating its
28 resources to support operations into Kailahun District,
29 apparently in preparation for more intensive activity now that

1 the rainy season has ended. The government continues to be fully
2 committed to concluding the war as soon as possible."

3 Let's forget the next three chapters, "deployment of the
4 mission, creation of a new Sierra Leonean army, disarmament,
15:35:08 5 demobilisation and reintegration", and go to paragraph 36,
6 please. Yes, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. "Widespread rebel attacks on civilian population have
9 characterised the period since my last report. Attacks and forms
15:35:27 10 of abuse of civilians exhibited a characteristic modus operandi:

11 Amputation of limbs; mutilation; actual or attempted
12 decapitation; rape; burning alive of men, women and children;
13 destruction of homes; abduction; and looting. In one typical
14 incident at the end of October, five farmers were burned alive by
15:35:52 15 rebels in a house some 10 miles from the town of Alikalia in the
16 northeast. In early November the entire northern township of
17 Bafodia was destroyed. At the end of November, the northern town
18 of Yifin was again devastated in a rebel attack, during which up
19 to 50 youths were abducted.

15:36:22 20 During September and October 1998, the incident of hospital
21 admissions for amputations and mutilation reached levels similar
22 to those during May and June, with 71 admissions in just two
23 hospitals in the west of the country and an unverifiable number
24 in other regions. It is likely that the hospital admission
15:36:43 25 figures are more lower than the actual levels of civilian
26 fatality and injury. During November, although the overall
27 number of atrocities reportedly fell, there was an escalating
28 rate of reports of actual and attempted decapitation.
29 Particularly since late October, rebel elements have indicated

1 that attacks were motivated by a desire for revenge against the
2 sentencing to death of Corporal Foday Sankoh.

3 Since my last report there have been further complaints
4 regarding the behaviour of certain CDF contingents. One incident
15:37:24 5 investigated and confirmed by UNOMSIL involved the killing by the
6 CDF of four captured alleged rebels at Romeni near Port Loko.
7 UNOMSIL has indicated to the Government of Sierra Leone its
8 willingness to assist in the training of key CDF personnel
9 regarding provisions of human rights and humanitarian law
10 applicable to their activities. There have also been reports of
11 inappropriate behaviour by certain elements of ECOMOG, including
12 unlawful detention. My special representative has taken this
13 matter up with the force commander of the monitoring group.

14 Since my last report, there have been frequent reports of
15:38:05 15 children being sent into combat environments, notwithstanding
16 indications of some ECOMOG commanders refusing to allow underage
17 CDF combatants to serve under them. However, on 25 November the
18 government reiterated its commitment to non-recruitment and
19 demobilisation of combatants aged under 18."

15:38:32 20 Now just pausing there, Mr Taylor. That provides a
21 synopsis of the situation on the ground in Sierra Leone during
22 this period October through to December.

23 A. December, yes.

24 Q. Now help us: Were you aware of this situation?

15:38:59 25 A. Not in its entirety. The details here are very much - most
26 of it is new to me. I'm not following the day-to-day actions in
27 Sierra Leone, no. I'm not aware of all of these details.

28 Q. Now, let us just deepen our understanding of this situation
29 by bearing in mind certain adjudicated facts from the AFRC

1 judgment, CMS 765.

2 Number one. Fact 10: That in October 1998, following an
3 armed clash with Denis Mingo, SAJ Musa left Koinadugu District to
4 join the advance team and prepare for an attack on Freetown. SAJ
15:39:51 5 Musa did not follow the same route taken by the advance teams in
6 his journey to the west.

7 Fact 11: Upon his arrival in Colonel Eddie Town in
8 November 1998 --

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

15:40:10 10 MS HOLLIS: Yes, Mr President, I understand the great
11 breadth that your Honours are giving the questioning of this
12 witness, however, it does not appear that these are questions.
13 It appears that Defence counsel is making argument by reading
14 adjudicated facts into the record, so we would object to whatever
15:40:28 15 it is he's trying to do.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, we are merely seeking to
18 provide as comprehensive an account as possible for the
19 assistance of the Court and the witness. It seems to us that it
15:40:47 20 is helpful at all stages to bear in mind what proof is available
21 on certain salient aspects of the case. Here we have a situation
22 where we're dealing with a Secretary-General's report to the
23 United Nations, dealing with precisely these facts, and it seems
24 to us to assist everyone that we bear in mind all matters
15:41:13 25 relevant to that issue and that's the purpose of introducing
26 these at this time.

27 [Trial Chamber conferred]

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I know there's a decision
29 on this, but these adjudicated facts that you are putting to the

1 witness I take it the Trial Chamber has taken judicial notice of
2 them, is that correct?

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, that's correct.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, we are going to

15:45:36 5 overrule the objection and in our view the accused has every
6 right to address and comment on adjudicated facts and this is his
7 opportunity to do so.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

9 Q. The second such matter that I would like to remind you of,
10 Mr Taylor, is this:

11 "That upon his arrival in Colonel Eddie Town in November
12 1998, SAJ Musa assumed command. He emphasised his disenchantment
13 with the RUF and stressed that it was vital that his troops
14 arrived in Freetown before the RUF. SAJ Musa reorganised the
15:46:17 15 troops and began to advance towards Freetown. The troops passed
16 through the villages of Mange, Lunsar, Masiaka and Newton before
17 arriving in Benguema in the Western Area in December 1998.
18 Throughout the advance the troops withstood frequent attacks by
19 ECOMOG."

15:46:38 20 Do you recall all of that, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. So it's in that context that we look at what is being
23 reported here in that section by the Secretary-General to the
24 United Nations. Now can we jump forward, please, to page 11 of
15:47:03 25 this report. Just let's look at paragraph 52 to see the
26 consequence of what had been going on:

27 "Displacement of civilian populations continued during the
28 period under review. By mid-November the United Nations
29 humanitarian assistance coordination unit estimated that 308,695

1 persons had been displaced since February 1998, an increase of
2 58,000 internally displaced persons since my last report. The
3 hostilities which have continued since mid-November have driven
4 approximately 6,000 additional persons from their homes. As
15:48:05 5 fighting continues into the dry season, the optimum period for
6 military operations, the humanitarian community is concerned that
7 access will continue to be constrained while displacement
8 increases."

9 Let's just notice as we pass on over the page, remember you
15:48:34 10 were telling us about the polio immunisation programme in
11 Liberia?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Look at paragraph 59, "On 14 November 1998, President
14 Kabbah launched activities for the forthcoming national
15:48:55 15 immunisation days which will target polio"?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So a similar programme was afoot in Sierra Leone at the
18 same time?

19 A. Yes, and we - the cooperation between he and myself at that
15:49:09 20 time, we dispatched our culture ambassador to Sierra Leone by the
21 name of Julie Endee to assist down there in some little cultural
22 performances. I'm just trying to point out the cooperation. I'm
23 aware that there was a programme ongoing in Sierra Leone too.

24 Q. All right. Let's move on then now, please, to chapter 10
15:49:42 25 of this report which one finds on page 14. Let's just look at
26 the observations and recommendations. Paragraph 71:

27 "Despite the progress made by the government in
28 consolidating its authority, I am disturbed at the continuing
29 attacks inflicted by the rebels on civilians in the north and the

1 atrocities and abductions that accompany these attacks. I
2 condemn these serious violations and abuses of human rights and
3 international humanitarian law and call again on the RUF and the
4 AFRC to desist from attacks against their unarmed compatriots and
15:50:29 5 to lay down their arms and surrender.

6 The elaboration of a dual track approach to the resolution
7 of the conflict following the ECOWAS summit of 31 October 1998
8 and the London meeting of the international contact group of 5
9 November is a welcome development, and UNOMSIL will work with the
15:50:53 10 government to pursue this approach. ECOMOG, the CDF and the
11 reinducted Republic of Sierra Leone military forces personnel
12 have done much to defend the government and people of Sierra
13 Leone against rebel attacks and should continue to do so. At the
14 same time, I call on the government to explore ways to encourage
15:51:13 15 the rebels to lay down their arms and surrender in order to avoid
16 more bloodshed.

17 Clear evidence has emerged during the national consultative
18 process described above to demonstrate that the people of Sierra
19 Leone are willing to reconcile themselves with the rebels, on
15:51:34 20 condition that they accept the authority of the government, lay
21 down their arms and surrender. UNOMSIL will continue to offer
22 its services to the government in facilitating such surrenders,
23 provided this can be done under acceptable security conditions.
24 UNOMSIL is also prepared to work with the government concerning
15:51:56 25 assurances that those who surrender will be humanely treated in
26 accordance with internationally accepted standards and that any
27 rebels who face criminal prosecution for their acts receive a
28 fair trial."

29 Now this:

1 "I am particularly encouraged by the outcome of the
2 extraordinary summit meeting of the Mano River Union on 12
3 November 1998 at which President Kabbah, President Taylor and
4 President Conte agreed to continue to strengthen the union and
15:52:39 5 improve their mutual relations. The importance of this
6 sub-regional approach to the strengthening of stability and
7 security in all three countries cannot be overemphasised. I look
8 forward to further steps by all three governments to prevent the
9 use of their territory by armed groups who would seek to
15:52:58 10 undermine stability and would use their territory for the illegal
11 transit of weapons and ammunition, especially where this is in
12 violation of United Nations resolutions. I am prepared to
13 assist, through my special representative in Sierra Leone and my
14 representative in Liberia, in developing and implementing a
15:53:24 15 viable strategy for a sub-regional approach.

16 The onset of the dry season in Sierra Leone has opened the
17 way for more effective action by ECOMOG, the CDF and the
18 reinducted personnel of the RSLMF. In order to maintain the
19 pressure they have exerted to split the rebel forces, the
15:53:49 20 military forces assisting the government need to continue to
21 receive adequate logistical support. In this context, I would
22 like to express my appreciation to those governments that have
23 already made contributions to the trust fund to support United
24 Nations peacekeeping related efforts in Sierra Leone and to
15:54:10 25 encourage others to make similar contributions or to consider
26 providing the necessary assistance bilaterally to ECOMOG or to
27 individual ECOWAS countries."

28 I don't think there's anything else I would wish to deal
29 with in that document. Is there anything else that you want to

1 deal with in that document, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No, I think it's covered. I think we've covered it.

3 Q. So just to pause and take stock, this is the report of 16
4 December 1998?

15:55:00 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And you are aware of some of the details of what's going on
7 in Sierra Leone, are you?

8 A. Some of the details, yes.

9 Q. Are you aware at this stage, Mr Taylor, 16 December, that
15:55:27 10 elements of the AFRC were about to launch an attack on Freetown?

11 A. Well, no, not that they're about to. I didn't have any
12 specific details, but we get reports that there is fighting going
13 on in the direction coming from one region of Sierra Leone
14 approaching in regions that they had not been in before, but I

15:55:59 15 don't have any knowledge of the on the ground situation
16 whatsoever, no.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask that this document, the "Third
18 Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
19 Observer Mission in Sierra Leone", be marked for identification,
15:56:17 20 please, MFI-63.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-63 for
22 identification.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's just change tack for a moment,
15:56:38 25 please, and have a look at page 284 of the presidential papers,
26 bearing in mind that that document we just looked at is dated 16
27 October[sic].

28 A. Did you say 284?

29 Q. 284, please. Do you have it?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. I'm primarily interested in the date here. What date do
3 you see at the top of this page?

4 A. 14 December 1998.

15:57:31 5 Q. So we're talking about a couple of days before the
6 Secretary-General reports to the United Nations?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Now, let us see what the content of this address by you is
9 dealing with?

15:57:45 10 A. Okay. We have to - this is an address by me. I'm sure I'm
11 not - okay, go ahead. Go ahead.

12 Q. It's launching the Good Governance Policy Review Forum at
13 the University of Liberia. Second paragraph from the left:

14 "What do we mean by 'good governance'? When we say good
15:58:20 15 governance, we mean the transparent administration of the affairs
16 of state. Good governance requires the broad participation in
17 decision making based on consensus amongst the stakeholders,
18 transparency and accountability."

19 Mr Taylor, why was it found necessary to have this
15:58:42 20 discussion at this time?

21 A. Well, that's a national debate and what better place?
22 Let's not forget now we are preparing for this polio campaign. I
23 am not present at this. This is being done on my behalf. This
24 is my speech, okay. I do not go to the university at this time
15:59:00 25 and so I am on the road, okay, so - but the University of
26 Liberia, this is a time for advancing the whole argument that we
27 are making in the country about good governance, rule of law and
28 respect for human rights. These are the basic things, and what
29 better place to advance this dialogue than at the University of

1 Liberia.

2 Q. Because as we see, this was being read by Mr Eastman, yes?

3 A. My Minister of State, yes.

4 Q. But who had penned these comments, Mr Taylor?

15:59:44 5 A. This is my speech now.

6 Q. And I'm just going to look at one other passage. The
7 passage just to the right of the one we've just looked at:

8 "By way of reflection, let us note the context in which
9 some of the major policy decisions and actions were taken during
16:00:05 10 the past one year. The elections of July 19, 1997, were
11 conducted using the proportional representation method, which had
12 the greatest prospects to ensure power sharing in the immediate
13 post-war governance of Liberia. In principle we did achieve
14 power sharing. There are seven political parties in the
16:00:25 15 legislature; however, in reality the way the power is shared does
16 not provide the basis for political compromises on contentious
17 issues within the national legislature."

18 What's that a reference to?

19 A. Well, there are seven parties, but the NPP has won about 70
16:00:46 20 plus per cent of the votes. So we get 71 - we get about 70 per
21 cent plus of everything, okay, the Senate seats and the House
22 seats. So this whole thing of political compromise, we had to
23 bring it as a matter of goodwill, but the other six parties were
24 just super weak; that unless from a good heart there was no need
16:01:18 25 to compromise, but we saw a need to compromise. That's what we
26 are talking about here.

27 Q. Now, just looking at other events that are taking place at
28 the time, can we go back to page 56 in the presidential papers,
29 please?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you have it?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Let's just look at the penultimate paragraph on that page:

16:02:05 5 "In yet another incident, the Government of Sierra Leone on
6 December 22, 1998, called for the arming of a citizens defence
7 force and the Kamajor militia fighting along with ECOMOG against
8 the AFRC/RUF forces, following months of pointing accusing
9 fingers at the Government of Liberia for supporting the AFRC/RUF.

16:02:30 10 In response, the Liberian government closed its borders
11 with Sierra Leone, deployed military forces to the border, and
12 issued a sound policy statement aimed at reducing tensions. In
13 the end, the first 16 months of the Taylor administration was
14 marked by patience, diplomacy and tactful approach to conflict
16:02:52 15 resolution based on the strength of our security preparedness and
16 broad-based consultations to protect the fragile peace and
17 newly-won democracy."

18 Did that border closure take place on 22 December,
19 Mr Taylor?

16:03:05 20 A. Yes. Once we announced it, it closed.

21 Q. Now, help us with this. "Following months of pointing
22 accusing fingers at the Government of Liberia", what are we
23 talking about there?

24 A. We are talking just the continuation of the finger pointing
16:03:23 25 and actions being taken here to try to --

26 Q. What specific incidents are we talking about there?

27 A. On the 22nd?

28 Q. No. What specific incidents had been taking place in the
29 months leading up to this, as referred to in that paragraph?

1 A. Well, there had been so many things. We've had accusations
2 of arms going into Sierra Leone. It has been raised by President
3 Kabbah. We've had this same issue raised at the United Nations.
4 The Secretary-General has come, we have discussed it, and there
16:04:05 5 is still no proof, but it keeps coming and coming and coming. So
6 once President Kabbah now went openly - remember, for a long time
7 it had not been public knowledge that the Kamajors were a
8 government force. So now he decides now he's going to go public
9 and that they are going to be armed to carry out certain actions.
16:04:29 10 We get concerned now and close the border, because the very
11 Kamajors that he's talking about, some of them are Liberians that
12 have been re-armed, that have been recruited by ECOMOG to help
13 them back in Liberia. Remember I spoke here about Ricks
14 Institute. They have been armed and trained there, so we are
16:04:53 15 concerned now that this statement that we're going to arm and
16 train the Kamajors to carry out these missions, we see this now
17 as a buzz word for attacks on Liberia. So we decide to say:
18 Okay, our borders are closed.

19 Q. Right. So you see reference is made on that page to 22
16:05:15 20 December?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can we go now, please, to page 289 in this bundle. Do you
23 have it?

24 A. Yes.

16:05:40 25 Q. Look at the date?

26 A. December 22.

27 Q. Same date?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And we see that this is a statement you make on your return

1 home from attending the inauguration of the President of Burkina
2 Faso?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Blaise Compaore?

16:05:57 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. So can you help us as to the date when President Compaore
7 was inaugurated?

8 A. A couple of days before. I didn't spend too many days in
9 Burkina Faso, so I will say - I will put it not later than about
16:06:23 10 the 20th or so because we go, attend the ceremonies and then come
11 back. So I spent a couple of days over there, so I would put it
12 to about 20 December or thereabout.

13 Q. Now, let's just look at what you say in this speech, shall
14 we, as briefly as possible. Last paragraph in the right-hand
16:06:46 15 column:

16 "Following the ceremony" - that's the inauguration - "we
17 were invited, along with our ECOWAS colleagues, for an afternoon
18 reception prior to which we held a brief mini summit and
19 discussed pressing issues concerning peace, stability, and
16:07:14 20 progress of our sub-region."

21 Now, let's just see who the colleagues who were present
22 were.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Jump up to the previous paragraph. Do you see President
16:07:22 25 Bedie of Cote d'Ivoire?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Barri of Niger?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Alpha Konare of Mali?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Abdou Diouf of Senegal and Jerry John Rawlings of Ghana,
3 and no doubt the newly installed Blaise Compaore?

4 A. That is correct.

16:07:37 5 Q. Okay. "Later in the evening we attended a state banquet
6 which climaxed the inauguration day. My fellow citizens,
7 distinguished ladies and gentlemen, travelling out of Liberia at
8 this time of the year, with the Christmas holiday right around
9 the corner, and particularly in light of recent announcements on
16:07:58 10 the radio regarding the closure of our border with Sierra Leone,
11 must have created some concerns. We have often given you our
12 assurance, and we do so now. We are not an irresponsible
13 leadership. We will never do anything that will put the security
14 of this country in jeopardy.

16:08:19 15 Our actions a few days ago were taken in response to
16 certain signals that we had received that the escalating nature
17 of the conflict in Sierra Leone might spill over into Liberian
18 territory. On the other hand, we have received intelligence
19 reports that elements loyal to the defunct ULIMO-J faction were
16:08:40 20 planning to infiltrate hundreds of insurgents across our border
21 following months of training from the town of Zimmi in Sierra
22 Leone. Whether this report is authentic or not, and given our
23 experience during the seven years of civil war, we cannot afford
24 to take chances; neither can we afford to ignore the threat.

16:09:02 25 After all, our constitutional responsibility is to protect and
26 defend the territorial integrity of this nation as we groom our
27 new democracy and nurture our peace and stability.

28 Upon receiving these intelligence reports we immediately
29 convened a national security council meeting to discuss the

1 issues and contemplate government's response and reaction. Based
2 on the decisions of the council the government decided, among
3 other things, that it would be in the best interest of the
4 security of the state to institute precautionary measures to
16:09:47 5 safeguard the territorial integrity of our nation. Some of these
6 measures include, among other things: Closure of the border;
7 collaborating with ECOMOG to enforce the closure; deployment of
8 security and paramilitary units along the border; and inviting
9 the UNHCR and the Red Cross to make preparations for humanitarian
16:10:09 10 services in case the need arises.

11 More than that, we held a series of meetings with senators
12 and representatives of Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties to
13 brief them on the reports and solicit their assistance in
14 verifying the reports. Consequently, the legislature agreed to
16:10:32 15 embark upon a fact finding mission to the border, accompanied by
16 a team of journalists and reporters, all in an effort to put the
17 matter in perspective and help guide our government's decisions
18 and actions."

19 Let's pause there. So the intelligence reports were to the
16:10:53 20 effect that ULIMO-J and supporters of them were planning to
21 infiltrate the country?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Now help us: The "J" in ULIMO-J stood for what?

24 A. Johnson.

16:11:12 25 Q. Is that the Johnson of the Roosevelt breed?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Now, where was that Mr Johnson at this time? Where had he
28 been since the Camp Johnson Road incident?

29 A. Sierra Leone. And then, based on our information, he left

1 Sierra Leone.

2 Q. But for how long was he in Sierra Leone, that man
3 Mr Johnson?

4 A. I cannot say for - I cannot say factually, but I do know
16:11:44 5 that it could have - he could have been there for not more than
6 two months. Because with the constant communication between
7 President Kabbah and myself, finally I know that President Kabbah
8 did succeed in getting him out. I don't know exactly when.

9 Q. "On the diplomatic front, we made a number of telephone
16:12:11 10 calls to ECOWAS leaders, including my good friend and brother,
11 President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, who I am sure is
12 unaware of the diabolical intentions of the would be insurgents."

13 Did you speak to Tejan Kabbah?

14 A. Yes, I did. We get this information. I don't jump to
16:12:38 15 conclusions. I call him on the phone. He assures me that there
16 cannot be any truth to this, but we continue the diplomatic
17 efforts because we consider it very serious.

18 Q. "We also dispatched the foreign minister on a sub-regional
19 tour to brief our colleagues on our actions and intentions, and
16:13:04 20 addressed special communications to the Head of State of Nigeria,
21 General Abdulsalami Abubakar, the United Nations
22 Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the ECOWAS Chairman Gnassingbe
23 Eyadema and the OAU Chairman Blaise Compaore. During our just
24 ended visit to Ouagadougou we also addressed the issue with the
16:13:29 25 leaders present and received a sympathetic ear and support for
26 our actions."

27 All of that correct, Mr Taylor?

28 A. All of that correct.

29 Q. Let's go over the page and let's skip the first paragraph:

1 "However, we are all cognisant of the ever present threat
2 that the stubborn conflict in Sierra Leone poses to our
3 stability. Moreover, the international conspiracy which points a
4 finger to our country as the one which fuels the conflict in
16:14:04 5 Sierra Leone cannot and must not be ignored as one that may have
6 sinister motives. Hence the announcements by Sierra Leone
7 authorities of unusual military operations and the arming of the
8 Kamajors and the Citizens Defence Force in Kenema by Sierra Leone
9 ECOMOG forces are enough reasons for our government to be
16:14:26 10 cautious about securing our border and taking the necessary
11 precautions against the spill over of violence into our
12 territory."

13 Pause there. Mr Taylor, let's look at, please, the second
14 sentence, "Moreover, the international conspiracy which points an
16:14:49 15 a finger to our country as the one which fuels the conflict in
16 Sierra Leone." What are you talking about there?

17 A. Where are the accusations coming from? They're not coming
18 from ECOWAS. They are coming from the United Nations, the
19 countries involved with the every day about what's going on in
16:15:09 20 Sierra Leone, the British are every day popping out information.
21 There's not one complaint - one complaint - from ECOWAS saying,
22 "Well, look. Our brother, Charles Taylor, is doing this. We
23 have this information, we have this evidence and so he cannot be
24 on this committee or we're going to investigate." There is no
16:15:31 25 such thing coming from them.

26 I go to these meetings. If there are issues we discuss
27 them. We thrash them out. We are talking about deploying people
28 on our borders. We are working with President Kabbah. He and I
29 are not at the position of about to throw blows. Sometimes we

1 are also perplexed by this whole thing. So this conspiracy we
2 see - mind you, we just got through human rights reports, my
3 government is not, you know, a proper government. There is
4 something in the making. We sense it, we feel it and so we begin
16:16:13 5 to caution our citizens.

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, some might say that this is a case of
7 paranoia on your part and that there was no such international
8 conspiracy. What do you say to that?

9 A. I would just have to look at the records. I will tell
16:16:35 10 them, "Go back and check the records." I mean, if we - I'm sure
11 I have spent so much time detailing action by action by action.
12 If that is not a conspiracy, I don't know what it is. When you
13 set out to say a government is practically not legitimate, when
14 you deny us the right to defend ourselves, you encourage
16:17:00 15 Roosevelt Johnson. You bring him into the city. After he
16 receives money from the government to go for medical attention,
17 you bring him in. He wages a war against the government a few
18 blocks from the seat of power. You harbour him into the embassy,
19 you harbour others and you come out and you tell us that they
16:17:20 20 were discovered in the embassy compound. You fly Johnson out.

21 You encourage ECOMOG to do things in the country that would not
22 be done in any other country. What else do I call it? There is
23 no other name but a conspiracy. The handwriting is on the wall.

24 Remember, let's go back. Let's go back in August when my
16:17:50 25 ambassador in Guinea writes a letter and says that, what, this
26 information that remember Bockarie and this Eddie Kanneh goes now
27 and they are saying that it is being discussed that we must get
28 rid of Taylor. So we have all of this and we don't forget this
29 information. There's all of this put together, we begin this

1 diplomatic offensive because we can see. I discuss it with my
2 colleagues at so many fora and we get to know that there is
3 something. They are sympathetic, but they know that we are in
4 trouble. We cannot get any money. We cannot get any assistance.

16:18:33 5 It's on the wall.

6 Q. But, Mr Taylor, of all the little Third World countries
7 around the world which these conspirators could have picked on,
8 why have they picked on you?

9 A. Quite frankly, to put it shortly I am not sure if they are
16:18:56 10 not picking on them too, but I will talk about me. Look, Liberia
11 is that little sore spot that unfortunately I will say got maybe
12 someone with a strong will that I have. I mean, I'm a very
13 strong willed person. I'm not just easily run over. And coming
14 into power, winning the elections even against all odds when
16:19:31 15 funds were being used to support other parties, I guess that
16 determination to removing me from power remained.

17 I can remember there was a show on CNN called Diplomatic
18 Licence and they had a British guy that used to be a commentator
19 on this show. In fact, it was predicted within the first six
16:20:10 20 months of my presidency that I wouldn't last. "Oh, he's not
21 going to last. Taylor is on his way out." All these
22 predictions, everything was done to achieve that objective.

23 So it's a good question "Why Liberia?", but Liberia to some
24 people is a special area. They wanted Liberia. It's not to say
16:20:25 25 that other countries don't go through this. Maybe they handled
26 it in different ways. I probably handled it in a different way
27 and probably a wrong way in how I reacted to some of these
28 powerful nations that went after me, but that was the decision
29 that I took at that time. But I just think that in the beginning

1 they just never wanted Taylor to win the presidency.

2 Q. Page 291, last paragraph on the left:

3 "Let me assure all of our citizens at home and abroad, our
4 partners in progress, as well as members of the international
16:21:05 5 community that this government is committed to peace, stability
6 and progress in our sub-region and good relations with our
7 neighbours. We will exercise every option and a great deal of
8 patience to ensure that no conflict arises along our borders. On
9 the other hand, let no one underestimate our resolve and capacity
16:21:31 10 to defend ourselves against incursions from within or without.
11 We have the assurances of our colleagues in Guinea and Sierra
12 Leone that they will not allow any unfriendly forces to use their
13 territories to enter Liberia."

14 Pause there. Where did LURD come from?

16:21:52 15 A. Guinea.

16 Q. Yet here you're saying you'd been given an assurance by
17 Guinea, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. That they would not allow any unfriendly forces to use
16:22:05 20 their territories to enter Liberia?

21 A. Yes and they lied. The only person that I will say was -
22 that fought very hard and he told me over and again and I must
23 say this because it is true, Tejan Kabbah in his little way told
24 me, he said, "My brother, we will work together. I can promise
16:22:27 25 you I will do the best I can. I can't promise you that I can
26 stop everything, but I will do my best to stop it", and I gave
27 him that promise and we kept it. In the case of Guinea, Conte
28 did not keep it. He did not.

29 Q. So in effect you're saying that Conte's two-faced?

1 A. He was now, yes. But I always had a problem with Conte.
2 We've tried to fix it. Remember ULIMO-K was backed by who?
3 Lansana Conte. Lansana Conte did everything, he supported Kromah
4 all the way through and so he and I always had this up and down.
16:23:11 5 I tried to assure him in every possible way. I go to Monrovia.
6 Can you imagine the risk that I took? In 1995 I go to Monrovia,
7 join the Council of State and where do I go? I join the
8 delegation with Kromah, George Boley - those pictures were
9 exhibited here - and I go to Conakry to demonstrate to him that I
16:23:34 10 mean well. I took a risk.

11 After my being elected as president, I visited Conte. I
12 went to Conakry at least twice. Throughout my presidency Lansana
13 never came to Monrovia - never came to Monrovia at all. Never
14 put his foot into Monrovia one day during my presidency in
16:23:58 15 Liberia. So he was someone that we talked, we met at meetings,
16 we talked, but I mean I never really took what he said very
17 seriously because I knew that, you know, he really did not like
18 me and so I accepted him for that and so whenever we had to talk
19 about West African issues we talked, he invited me to Guinea, I
16:24:25 20 went. I invited him to Liberia, he didn't come.

21 Q. But, Mr Taylor, just look at that. On the face of it he's
22 given you an assurance, but in reality he's doing something
23 completely different.

24 A. Of course.

16:24:37 25 Q. You agree?

26 A. I agree.

27 Q. So you would accept as a proposition then that Presidents
28 of countries can be two-faced?

29 A. Yes, I can see that.

1 Q. So what makes you an exception?

2 A. Well, I tell you it depends on the issue. There are
3 certain diplomatic issues that you can be. There are other
4 serious issues that you should not be and cannot be. I will give
16:25:08 5 you an example. What they call deniability - and it's also
6 considered as indispensable - in dealing with certain diplomatic
7 things. For example you have a recent case before you right now,
8 former President of the United States Bill Clinton goes into
9 North Korea. The United States government is saying it's a
16:25:33 10 private visit, but you know and I know that, hey, yes, it's
11 private, but it is not private again because somewhere under
12 there there are things that you do not bring open. So in that
13 way you can be two-faced.

14 No, it's a private visit of President Clinton. We have
16:25:53 15 nothing to do with it. Yes, you put it that way. In the future
16 you will get to know different. But when it comes to serious
17 matter of state as we are confronted here with, as this is war
18 and security you don't go about lying about these kinds of things
19 because it is not just about you. It's about nation states,
16:26:14 20 okay, and nation states are greater and bigger than all of the
21 Presidents combined.

22 Q. Very well. Let's try and conclude this little chapter
23 tonight because I note the time:

24 "In the same vein we have given our assurance that no one
16:26:30 25 will use Liberian territory to invade any of our neighbours.
26 Alternatively we decided at the recent Conakry summit that we
27 would revitalise the Mano River Union as an effective mechanism
28 to promote multilateral relations in trade, commerce and
29 development and thereby erase all suspicions about covert

1 activities and build confidence among ourselves.

2 We in Liberia have enjoyed two years of peace and stability
3 following seven years of devastating conflict. On the eve of the
4 new millennium, as we begin to reap the benefits of our
16:27:07 5 progressive democracy, we cannot, and must not, allow anyone to
6 turn back the hand of the clock. We have too much at stake.
7 Come, my fellow citizens, let us join hands against the enemies
8 of peace."

9 Yes, Mr Taylor?

16:27:28 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And just to conclude this particular chapter, let us just
12 flick quickly to page 155, please, and note a photograph. Do you
13 have it, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, I do.

16:27:58 15 Q. Do you see the photograph at the top?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Look at the caption.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Yes, that's you meeting the NPP Secretary-General Chief
16:28:10 20 Allen. That's the Cyril Allen you pointed out on the steps of
21 the presidential aircraft when you went to Burkina Faso - when
22 you went to Abidjan, yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. With Internal Affairs Minister Edward Sackor in foreground
16:28:26 25 and members of the Council of Elders upon his safe return from
26 Burkina Faso on 22 December.

27 A. Yes.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,
29 Mr President?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. That's a
2 convenient point.

3 Just before we adjourn, Mr Taylor, I will remind you you
4 are ordered not to discuss your evidence with any other person.

16:28:51 5 We will adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow.

6 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
7 to be reconvened on Thursday, 6 August 2009 at
8 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

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