



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 5 JULY 2010
9.05 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg

For the Registry:

Mr Gregory Townsend
Ms Advera Kamuzora
Ms Rachel Irura
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Nicholas Koumjian
Ms Kathryn Howarth
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the Office of the Principal
Defender:

Ms Claire Carlton-Hanciles.

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Ms Silas Chekera
Ms Logan Hambriek
Ms Salla Moilanen
Ms Fatiah Balfas

1 Monday, 5 July 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.]

08:59:56 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances
6 first, please

7 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,
8 your Honours and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this
9 morning, Brenda J Hollis, Kathryn Howarth, Maja Dimitrova and
09:05:06 10 Nicholas Koumjian.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,
12 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself, Courtenay
13 Griffiths; with me Mr Silas Chekera, Mr Morris Anyah, Ms Logan
14 Hambri ck, and our case manager Ms Salla Moilanen, and we're also
09:05:28 15 joined today by the Principal Defender.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Principal Defender is welcome to the
17 Court. Now, Mr Griffiths, you will introduce your next witness.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, before I call the next
19 witness who is DCT-172, could I address a couple of preliminary
09:05:57 20 matters, please.

21 Firstly, that the witness will give evidence in open
22 session. The language is Krio, but there's one other
23 administrative matter regarding his welfare which I would like to
24 raise at this stage and it's this: Hitherto every witness called
09:06:18 25 by either the Prosecution or the Defence has been provided with
26 culturally appropriate food by the WVS whilst that witness is at
27 Court. Mr Sesay is a detainee, DCT-172, and as such, those
28 responsible for his security are currently refusing to allow him
29 to receive food whilst at court from WVS.

1 Now, to an extent I can understand the reluctance to allow
2 food to be brought in for Mr Sesay at the detention facility, and
3 understandably Mr Sesay is having difficulty dealing with the
4 food provided to him where he is currently being housed, a
09:07:14 5 facility designed for individuals from a completely different
6 cultural background. I mention this in court because I've been
7 engaged with WVS in seeking to resolve this issue but, given my
8 other responsibilities, I would like to hand over the
9 responsibility of resolving this issue to the Principal Defender
09:07:40 10 who is present in The Hague.

11 I therefore seek two indications from your Honours:
12 Firstly, an observation publicly made that your Honours see no
13 security issues with WVS providing food to the witness whilst the
14 witness is at court, because I presume that it is accepted by
09:08:10 15 this Court that WVS can be trusted in that regard. And the
16 second application is that the Principal Defender be allowed to
17 see the witness during the luncheon adjournment in order to
18 investigate and hopefully resolve the issue.

19 Now, this we regard as a rather serious matter, your
09:08:38 20 Honours, because the diet could impact on the witness's health
21 and consequently his ability to concentrate and, frankly, last
22 the course of what is quite a lengthy court day. So that is the
23 request I make.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm not quite sure that I
09:09:02 25 get your request as far as the Trial Chamber's involvement is
26 concerned. I can only reiterate that administrative matters that
27 relate to the detention facilities, either of the ICC or of the
28 United Nations, are matters beyond the Trial Chamber and really
29 fall within the ambit of the Registrar, and that includes the

1 dietary restrictions of prisoners.

2 The head of sub-office, who is the Registrar's
3 representative in The Hague, is very conveniently in court and
4 I'm sure has heard what you have to say. I don't know if you've
09:09:41 5 approached him with these concerns yet or not, but I would advise
6 that he is the right man to address. The Principal Defender too
7 has had time and opportunity, I'm sure, outside of the trial time
8 to consult with Mr Sesay --

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Not on this issue.

09:10:02 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: -- I would believe. I have seen the
11 Principal Defender; I spoke to her on Friday, and she did
12 intimate to me that she did talk to him on a number of issues
13 including his dietary concerns. So I am not - I don't think that
14 I'm mistaken, but obviously the Trial Chamber has no objection to
09:10:25 15 the Principal Defender speaking with Mr Sesay during the luncheon
16 break.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful for that.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: As relates to the protective measures of
19 the upcoming witness, you said that he is a protected witness who
09:10:42 20 wishes to testify openly. That would implicate a recision of
21 measures, wouldn't it?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, it would.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll hear you on that one, please.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, we would like the measures lifted,
09:10:54 25 your Honours, put simply.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm not quite sure what measures exactly.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't have the measures immediately to
28 hand, but I do believe they were the general measures granted in
29 respect of all witnesses.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. The measures granted to
2 DCT-172, which were for the protection of his identity, are
3 hereby rescinded on his own application.

09:11:32 4 MR GRIFFITHS: I can provide your Honours with the CMS
5 number. It's CMS 782 of 27 May 2009.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well then. Those are the measures
7 that I have referred to as having been rescinded. Please call
8 the witness in.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I call DCT-172.

09:13:06 10 MR TOWNSEND: If I could address the Court, your Honour,
11 while we have this moment to explain. The witness is not in the
12 immediate area of the holding cell here, so it may take just a
13 few moments. With regard to counsel's request about WVS
14 providing food, I will discuss this matter with WVS and the STL.
09:13:23 15 That's all.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Townsend.

17 If I may inquire are the Krio interpreters in place?

18 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour.

19 WITNESS: DCT-172 [Sworn]

09:16:18 20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Could you give the Court your full name, please?

22 A. My name is Issa Hassan Sesay.

23 Q. How do you spell your first name, Mr Sesay?

24 A. I-S-S-A.

09:16:58 25 Q. And how do you spell your last name?

26 A. S-E-S-A-Y.

27 Q. Now, before we begin, Mr Sesay, can I explain certain
28 ground rules. First of all, this is a large courtroom, and it is
29 important that everyone in this courtroom hear what you have to

1 say. So could you speak - please speak slowly and clearly into
2 the microphone in front of you.

3 Secondly, I ask the question and it's natural and human to
4 look at me, just as you are now, because I'm the one asking the
09:17:46 5 questions and speaking to you, but could you please address your
6 answers to the judges sitting right in front of you, okay?

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. How old are you, Mr Sesay?

9 A. I am 40 years old plus some days.

09:18:09 10 Q. What's your date of birth?

11 A. I was born on 27 June 1970.

12 Q. And where were you born?

13 A. I was born in the centre of Freetown, at Sackville Street.

14 Q. Help us: What languages do you speak?

09:18:44 15 A. I speak my language, that is Temne, and I also speak Krio,
16 but my English is not that good.

17 Q. And you say you speak Temne. What's your ethnic
18 background?

19 A. I am a Temne by tribe.

09:19:08 20 Q. Are your parents still alive, Mr Sesay?

21 A. Yes, my father is alive but my mother is deceased. She
22 died in October of 2006.

23 Q. And do you have any brothers and sisters?

24 A. Yes, I have three brothers and three sisters.

09:19:46 25 Q. And where do you come, so far as your brothers and sisters
26 are concerned? Are you the first, the eldest, or what?

27 A. I am the second child.

28 Q. Did you attend school, Mr Sesay?

29 A. Yes, I attended up to form 3, but my father had a problem

1 in terms of support - sponsoring our schooling, so after I go
2 through the exams in form 3, I went for holidays to my elder
3 sister. That's when I stopped school. That was in Makali in the
4 Tonkolili District.

09:20:51 5 Q. So can you read and write, Mr Sesay?

6 A. Yes, I do try it up to my own level.

7 Q. And when you left school and went to live with your sister,
8 what did you do with yourself?

9 A. Well, when I went to Makali to my eldest sister, my elder
09:21:25 10 sister's husband was a gold miner and at the same time he used to
11 buy gold. His name was Mr John Bangura. So when I went there,
12 the man taught me how to buy gold. So sometime when he was going
13 to his mining site, he will leave me at the - at his place for me
14 to be buying gold.

09:21:49 15 Q. For how long did you remain in Makali?

16 A. I was in Makali in the village of Makong from '86 to '89.
17 Then one of my friends told me to go to Ivory Coast so I went to
18 the Ivory Coast.

19 Q. Pause there. Can you spell Makali for us?

09:22:31 20 A. Yes, it's M-A-K-A-L-I.

21 Q. And you gave us the name of another town.

22 A. Yes, it's Makong, M-A-K-O-N-G.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is Makali a district? What is it?

24 THE WITNESS: Makali is a chiefdom headquarters under the
09:23:05 25 Tonkolili District, ma'am.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. So you tell us that you went to the Ivory Coast. How old
28 were you at that time?

29 A. I think by then I was about 17 years old, something like

1 that, 17 to 18, 18 years, I think so.

2 Q. Now, when you arrived in the Ivory Coast, where in the
3 Ivory Coast did you go to?

09:24:12

4 A. Well, I went to Abidjan. I was in Abidjan, in an area
5 called Cite Fairmont.

6 Q. Could you spell that for us?

7 A. No, that's a French name.

8 Q. What were you doing for a living and to survive in the
9 Ivory Coast?

09:24:45

10 A. I was selling cigarettes by gross.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat his
12 answer more audibly?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, can you repeat your answer?

09:25:07

14 The interpreter didn't hear what you said. A little louder,
15 please.

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said I was selling
17 cigarettes, and I was selling the cigarettes by gross. I joined
18 some of my Sierra Leonean colleagues whom I met in Abidjan.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:25:24

20 Q. Can you give us the names of some of those fellow Sierra
21 Leoneans that you met in Abidjan?

22 A. One is Abdul Rahman Bangura; 2, Ibrahim Nabi eu; 3, David B
23 Sesay; Kei fa Wai and others.

24 Q. Now, you mentioned that one of those whom you met was

09:26:14

25 Ibrahim Nabi eu?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. Did he in due course introduce you to anyone?

28 A. Yes, sir.

29 Q. Who did he introduce you to?

1 A. Well, Ibrahim Nabieu had a table like where I'm sitting
2 here, that was where he was selling his cigarettes, at a parking
3 station called Paysanville [phon]. I went there to visit him.
4 But at this parking station, vehicles, buses from Burkina Faso
09:27:02 5 and other West African countries, used to park there to take
6 passengers. So when I went to Ibrahim Nabieu, I was sitting at
7 his table when one Pa came. The Pa was where they were selling
8 tickets. So the man who was selling the tickets was a French
9 man. He came and called Ibrahim Nabieu for him to go and do some
09:27:36 10 translation for this man. So Ibrahim Nabieu left me at his table
11 and went to this place.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: This name Nabieu is already on the record
13 as N-A-B-I-E-U or - yes, I think so. Isn't it, Mr Interpreter?

14 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour.

09:28:01 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. And you were saying, Mr Sesay?

17 A. So when Ibrahim Nabieu went there and interpreted for this
18 man, after that he and the man came to the table. Then he said
19 "My man, this is one Sierra Leonean Pa." Then I greeted the Pa.
09:28:19 20 Then the Pa said that his name was Pa Morlai. So he said his
21 name was Pa Morlai and he greeted us, and he said he wanted to
22 talk to other Sierra Leoneans, so that should be made possible
23 for him by Ibrahim. Then he asked Ibrahim where he was staying.
24 Then Ibrahim Nabieu told the Pa, Pa Morlai, that he was staying
09:28:51 25 at Boulevard de la Pierre. Then he said "okay". He was waiting,
26 he would be going to a hotel but he would come later for Ibrahim
27 Nabieu to take him to his place for him to go and know there.

28 Q. Boulevard de la Pierre, is that boulevard, as in
29 B-O-U-L-E-V-A-R-D, de D-E, la Pierre L-A P-I-E-R-R-E?

1 A. I can't confirm. These are French names.

2 Q. Very well.

3 A. So in the evening Pa Morlai came back but at the time I had
4 left and gone where we were selling, so he and Nabieu went to
09:29:46 5 Boulevard de la Pierre and he went and knew where Nabieu was
6 staying. So from there, the next morning I, Kei fa Wai, came to
7 where Nabieu was working, and he said the Pa went yesterday to
8 know where I was and he promised to come there again today in the
9 evening and he had said that he wanted to talk to Sierra
09:30:07 10 Leoneans. He said he had something to tell the Sierra Leoneans.
11 So Nabieu - no, I mean Kei fa Wai told me, he said, "Issa, let's
12 go there so that we can go and hear what this man was going to
13 say."

14 Q. And did you go?

09:30:25 15 A. Yes, I and Kei fa Wai went there and we met some other
16 Sierra Leoneans there. Among those whom we met there, I was the
17 youngest one among them. We were about ten in number. So
18 Mr Morlai told us that he had a job, that he had a restaurant in
19 Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso he said but he needed some Sierra
09:30:58 20 Leoneans to go and work in this restaurant. So being that we
21 were in Abidjan selling cigarettes and the profit was small, the
22 elders told us that we should go. Then I agreed.

23 Q. We will come back to that in a moment, to the details of
24 it. But in due course, Mr Sesay, did you become a member of the
09:31:35 25 RUF, the Revolutionary United Front?

26 A. Yes, I became a member of the RUF.

27 Q. And eventually were you appointed in the year 2000 as the
28 interim leader of the RUF?

29 A. Yes, sir, after Mr Sankoh had been arrested, the late

1 Foday Sankoh, I received a call from the President of Liberia
2 then, and I met with ECOWAS Leaders, from the five ECOWAS states,
3 and those Heads of State were the guarantors for the Lome Peace
4 Accord. They told me that I and my colleagues who had gone to
09:32:26 5 meet them at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia at Mr Taylor's
6 office, the ECOWAS Leaders said they were the guarantors and they
7 wouldn't afford to let the Lome Accord fail. So, in that
8 respect, they wouldn't work with Mr Sankoh any longer and that
9 they were ready to change the leadership of the RUF.

09:32:49 10 Q. Can I pause you for a moment, Mr Sesay. We will come to
11 the details of your appointment in due course, but the fact of
12 the matter is you did become interim leader, did you not?

13 A. Yes, sir. I became an interim leader on the ECOWAS
14 Leaders' appointment, the ECOWAS Leaders.

09:33:11 15 Q. And again, Mr Sesay, just answer this shortly: As interim
16 leader of the RUF, did you supervise the disarmament of RUF
17 combatants?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. And going back now so that we get the time frame, were you
09:33:33 20 one of those who entered Sierra Leone under the banner of the RUF
21 in March 1991?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 MR KOUMJIAN: Objection. Counsel is leading the witness
24 and suggesting answers.

09:33:47 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I would have thought it's fairly obvious,
26 given that we've seen so many exhibits with this man's name on
27 it, stating quite clearly that he trained at Camp Naama and was
28 one of those who entered Sierra Leone. Do we really need to
29 waste time in this Court on such obvious facts?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, please do not lead the
2 witness. The Rules do not change just because Mr Sesay is
3 sitting at the witness table.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

09:34:16 5 Q. Did you enter Sierra Leone, Mr Sesay?

6 A. Yes, I was among the group of RUF who attacked Bomaru in
7 March 1991.

8 Q. Now that we've got the time frame let's try and move on
9 quickly, please. I would like to ask you one or two

09:34:42 10 propositions, Mr Sesay. Firstly, between those two dates, your
11 entry into Sierra Leone and disarmament, were members of the RUF
12 involved in looting?

13 A. Yes, RUF members looted.

14 Q. Did members of the RUF commit murder?

09:35:19 15 A. Yes, the RUF members committed murder, but at a certain
16 time in the war, like in Kailahun, that did not happen later, but
17 in some other districts it happened.

18 Q. Did members of the RUF commit the crime of rape?

19 A. Yes, RUF fighters, apart from Kailahun District, that
09:35:53 20 happened.

21 Q. Are you aware of members of the RUF forcing women into
22 marriage?

23 A. Yes, with the exception of Kailahun District, it happened.

24 Q. What about the use of child soldiers?

09:36:27 25 A. Well, the children, some of the commanders - the fighters
26 used to do that, but it was not a policy in the RUF that children
27 should be trained the way adults were to be trained and to take
28 part in a conflict. But, for example, in 1991, when the war
29 started in Kailahun District, some of the people who were going

1 to the training base, like some men who were 40, 45, 50, they
2 were going with their children, and some matured men used to go
3 with their young ones to train but they were not taking active
4 part in the conflict like on the battlefield.

09:37:29 5 Q. What about forced labour, Mr Sesay? Did the RUF use forced
6 labour?

7 A. Yes, in other districts that happened, but in the Kailahun
8 District they were not forcing civilians there, but with other
9 commanders like in 1998, yes, that happened out of the Kailahun
09:37:59 10 District.

11 Q. What about amputations, Mr Sesay? Did members of the RUF
12 commit that particularly heinous crime?

13 A. As far as I recall, from the time the war started in 1991,
14 the first time that I heard about amputation I was not in Sierra
09:38:23 15 Leone. It was during Operation Stop Election; that is in '96
16 when elections were conducted in Sierra Leone. From that, except
17 in 1998. In 1998 those who committed amputations were members -
18 some members of the RUF. I won't dispute that fact. But really,
19 those who committed the majority of the amputations were members
09:38:48 20 of the Sierra Leone Army, because they did it in Kono, they came
21 down to Koinadugu District, to Bombali District, to Port Loko
22 District, until they attacked Freetown in January 6 and when they
23 came to Freetown it was glaring that it was their handiwork.

24 Q. Now, were you ordered - let me start again. You mentioned
09:39:19 25 Operation Stop Election. Who gave that order?

26 A. Well, Operation Stop Election, by then it was the leader
27 who was in charge of the operation, that is Foday Sankoh, but I
28 can throw light on that as well about what happened if you give
29 me the go-ahead.

1 Q. Please do.

2 A. Okay, sir. When Mr Sankoh and his delegation met with
3 Maada Bio and his own delegation from the NPRC, they met in
4 Yamoussoukro in the Ivory Coast. That was the first peace talk
09:40:05 5 where the ceasefire was declared. Maada Bio returned, but one
6 member of the external delegation, that is Mr Deen-Jalloh's wife,
7 Maada Bio was her younger brother. By then we understood that it
8 was Deen-Jalloh who was sponsoring Maada Bio's schooling. He
9 brought him up. So Mr Deen-Jalloh and some of the members of the
09:40:30 10 external delegation and his wife came to an agreement with Maada
11 Bio that the day - during the day of the election, Foday Sankoh
12 should instruct his men to attack the RUF, that Foday Sankoh was
13 to instruct the RUF to attack Bo, Kenema and Magburaka. On these
14 various attacks, Maada Bio would instruct the army to withdraw to
09:40:59 15 Freetown. So, on the day of the elections, when the RUF carried
16 out these attacks, they met with strong resistance from the army
17 and that caused the amputation of some people's fingers although,
18 by then, I was not in Sierra Leone, but that was what I was made
19 to understand, especially in places like Bo and Magburaka.

09:41:27 20 Q. Now, apart from that instance, Mr Sesay, in the years of
21 the war in Sierra Leone, did Foday Sankoh ever order you or other
22 members of the RUF to terrorise the civilian population of Sierra
23 Leone?

24 A. Well, the only time that I knew Foday Sankoh ordered
09:41:56 25 killings, like this Operation Stop Election he ordered it, and an
26 incident happened again in Kailahun when Foday Sankoh ordered the
27 execution of some people, including one of his girlfriends and
28 other relatives of his girlfriend whom they had alleged had been
29 communicating with senior officers in the NPRC, but they were

1 giving information to the army to overrun Kailahun and to capture
2 Foday Sankoh, and Foday Sankoh's girlfriend was called Jande.
3 She was a native of Giehun Luawa.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, correction. The place name
09:42:50 5 is Giehun Luawa.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Now, you've given us those two instances, Operation Stop
8 Election and the incident involving Foday Sankoh's girlfriend
9 Jande, but let me ask you again: Apart from those two instances,
09:43:16 10 was it the general policy of the RUF to terrorise the civilian
11 population of Sierra Leone?

12 A. Well, before answering that question, I forgot one
13 incident.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness be
09:43:33 15 instructed to speak slowly.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, the interpreter is having
17 difficulty keeping up with your speed. Please slow down a little
18 bit and start again your answer.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am, my Lord. I said I forgot to
09:43:53 20 mention another incident that involved Rashid Mansaray, who was
21 one of the Special Forces from Libya, and other bodyguards and
22 other RUF members whom Foday Sankoh ordered their execution in
23 '93.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:44:10 25 Q. So can we go back to my question now regarding the
26 terrorising of the civilian population of Sierra Leone? Was that
27 a general policy of the RUF?

28 A. No, sir, it was not a general policy.

29 Q. Were you trained to behave in that way?

1 A. No, sir.

2 Q. Another general question, please, Mr Sesay: When did you
3 first see Charles Taylor?

09:45:03 4 A. The first time I saw Mr Taylor was in 2000. The first time
5 that I saw him was during the Lome Accord but I did not talk to
6 him. At the time that I spoke to him that he knew me was in late
7 May 2000. That was the first time that we spoke, when he
8 identified me to be Issa.

09:45:27 9 Q. So the first time you see him is in Lome at the time of the
10 peace talks, but you did not speak to him on that occasion. Is
11 that right?

12 A. No, sir, I did not talk to him. I saw him but he did not
13 see me and he didn't know me.

14 Q. But you did see and speak to him in May 2000?

09:45:44 15 A. Yes, sir, because he had sent for me.

16 Q. And that was the first time you spoke to him, yes?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Was Charles Taylor ever in charge of the RUF, Mr Sesay?

19 A. As far as I'm - as far as my knowledge is concerned, no.

09:46:12 20 Q. Did you ever give diamonds to Charles Taylor, Mr Sesay?

21 A. I never gave diamonds to Mr Taylor.

22 Q. To your knowledge, did Foday Sankoh ever give diamonds to
23 Mr Taylor?

24 A. Foday Sankoh never told me that.

09:46:39 25 Q. To your knowledge, did Sam Bockarie give diamonds to
26 Charles Taylor?

27 A. Sam Bockarie did not tell me that, sir.

28 Q. Do you know of an event called Top Final, Mr Sesay?

29 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Did the RUF receive arms and ammunition from Charles Taylor
2 after Top Final?

3 A. After Top Final, no. The relationship between Mr Sankoh
4 and Mr Taylor was strained.

09:47:26 5 Q. Finally before we come to the detail of your account,
6 Mr Sesay, were the RUF involved in the Freetown invasion?

7 A. No, the RUF did not take part in the Freetown attack. It
8 was the army, the AFRC that attacked Freetown.

9 Q. Now, before we came to deal with these general
09:47:52 10 propositions, you were telling us how you had come to meet a man
11 called Pa Morlai, who mentioned that he was recruiting fellow
12 Sierra Leoneans to work at a restaurant in Ouagadougou in Burkina
13 Faso. Do you recall telling us that?

14 A. Yes, I recall.

09:48:17 15 Q. I would now like to pick up on that account now, please.
16 So having mentioned that to you and the others who he addressed
17 at that meeting, what happened after that?

18 A. Foday Sankoh came back, as I had said. The following day
19 he came back to Ibrahim Nabieu's place at Boulevard de la Pierre
09:48:47 20 and the Sierra Leoneans there were about ten in number. He spoke
21 to us and he said he had a restaurant and he needed Sierra

22 Leoneans to go there. But he would travel with us to Man and
23 from Man we would board a flight to go to Burkina Faso. He said
24 the following day we were all to assemble at the place, so the
09:49:11 25 following day we went to the place in the afternoon. He came
26 with a mini bus, about - an 18-seater bus. So we boarded this
27 mini bus and drove up to the evening and in the night we got to
28 Yamoussoukro. We continued driving. In fact, some of us fell
29 asleep. The vehicle went to Danane. It was when the vehicle had

1 parked that they asked us to come down. That was when some of us
2 were woken up. And we found ourselves in Danane.

3 The following morning we saw some Ivorian security guards
4 at the gate. In the afternoon we were put into some - into
09:50:01 5 another vehicle and brought to the Liberian border and we went to
6 one town called Ganta. We passed the night in Ganta. We spent
7 about two days there. Then Foday Sankoh - he was Mr Morlai by
8 then. That was the name we knew. He took us to Cuttington. We
9 were at Cuttington for about two weeks. One - after one week,
09:50:28 10 Foday Sankoh took --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this
12 area slowly.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please repeat this area a little slowly.
14 You said after Freetown, what happened? Sorry, after Cuttington,
09:50:45 15 what happened?

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. You said you spent a couple of days in Cuttington, yes?
18 And what did you do thereafter?

19 A. We were not doing anything at Cuttington. Mr Sankoh just
09:51:01 20 lodged us in one place, Pa Morlai. That was where we were with
21 him. After about a week, he took - because he had a pick-up that
22 was covered, a van that was covered, he took Isiaka and his
23 driver and he said they were going to Danane to go and purchase
24 some commodities for us. So when they went there, Isiaka
09:51:23 25 escaped. He did not come back.

26 So when Mr Sankoh returned, that was my first day that I
27 saw him carrying an AK-47 on his shoulders. Then he told us that
28 that man that he had gone with has escaped. In fact, the fact
29 that he has escaped, I understand that they have killed him. If

1 anybody escapes, that person will not survive. So everybody was
2 going to stay here until I tell you where we are going. Then we
3 said, "Okay, sir."

4 Just about some days again, he brought a vehicle, a truck.

09:51:58 5 He brought another man called Rashid Mansaray and some other few
6 Sierra Leoneans, about five of them, who had been in Liberia. He
7 brought them to Cuttington and we boarded the truck together with
8 Rashid and they took us to Camp Naama.

9 Q. Pause there. I want to clarify a couple of things, please,
09:52:23 10 Mr Sesay, before we forget them. First of all, when you first
11 met this man who mentioned that he had a restaurant in
12 Ouagadougou at which he wanted you to work, by what name did you
13 know him?

14 A. The name he introduced himself with was Pa Morlai.

09:52:47 15 Q. When did you first learn that that man also went by the
16 name of Foday Sankoh?

17 A. Well, it was at the time that he spoke on the BBC, when he
18 gave the late President of Sierra Leone 90-days ultimatum to step
19 down. It was at that time that he called his name on the radio
09:53:11 20 BBC that he was called Foday Saybana Sankoh. At that time, we
21 were now at Sokoto in Camp Naama.

22 Q. Pause there. The second matter I want to clarify is this:
23 How many of you Sierra Leoneans were taken by Pa Morlai by bus to
24 Cuttington? How many of you?

09:53:43 25 A. Those of us from the Ivory Coast were nine in number. He
26 brought us to Cuttington. But when he and the other man went,
27 the other man escaped and we remained eight in number.

28 Q. And you tell us that thereafter Pa Morlai arrived with
29 another man called Rashid Mansaray and five Sierra Leoneans in a

1 truck. Is that right?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. And that in due course you eight Sierra Leoneans from the
4 Ivory Coast, plus these five, were transported to Camp Naama. Is
09:54:27 5 that right?

6 A. Yes, just in a day when he brought Rashid, and the
7 following day he brought a truck and he said we should go to
8 Naama, and we were loaded in this truck and we went to Naama.

9 Q. The final matter before we return to your account,

09:54:44 10 Mr Sesay, is this: When you left Ivory Coast and went eventually
11 to Cuttington, were you aware that you were going to receive
12 military training?

13 A. Yes, sir. Mr Pa Morlai by then told us - I saw the signs
14 at Cuttington, but when we got to Naama, it was at that time that
09:55:18 15 he said that he was organising a revolution to go and fight
16 against the APC because there was no democracy in Sierra Leone,
17 so he was going to fight there.

18 Q. Now, pausing again for a moment, you tell us you were taken
19 to Camp Naama. Could you just take a little time and explain to
09:55:46 20 us the layout of Camp Naama, please?

21 A. Well, Camp Naama is away from the junction. That is the
22 road - that is the Lofa Road, and you would branch off and enter
23 - you would pass about two villages before you get to the Naama
24 village itself. From the Naama village, you get to the barracks,
09:56:15 25 and the barracks is an old military barracks, a former military
26 barracks. But where we the RUF people were, they called there
27 Sokoto at Crab Hole. It's a section of the barracks, but it is
28 down the valley. That was where we were. It was only us the RUF
29 people under Pa Morlai who were there.

1 Q. Who were where?

2 A. At Sokoto, Camp Naama. The place is called Crab Hole. But
3 Pa Morlai called the base - the training base Camp Sokoto. He
4 said it was Sokoto base.

09:57:01 5 Q. Now, were there only RUF members present at Camp Naama?

6 A. Where we were it was only the RUF that was there, but we
7 had another section in the barracks where the artillery men were.
8 That is the NPFL. But they did not come to where we were. And
9 for us, Pa Morlai had said that place was out of bounds. We

09:57:33 10 should not go out of where we were without permission from the MP
11 or the training instructors.

12 Q. So was there a mixing of the RUF and the NPFL soldiers who
13 were training at that camp?

14 A. No, we did not mix with them at all.

09:57:54 15 Q. Now, when you arrived at Camp Sokoto, how many RUF recruits
16 were there?

17 A. Well, at the initial stage, the very day that we got there,
18 we were just about 15, between 13 and 15, because we were eight
19 plus the five men. We were about 13. We were there. Within 72
09:58:28 20 hours Foday Sankoh started moving people. Within a week he
21 started --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this
23 last part slowly.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, Mr Sesay, you are running again
09:58:41 25 with your testimony. Please slow down and repeat that last bit
26 of your answer where you said, "We were about 13. We were
27 there." Continue from there, please.

28 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said at the initial stage
29 when we arrived in Camp Sokoto we were 13, but within the next 72

1 hours Foday Sankoh started - Pa Morlai started bringing people.
2 He brought both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians from Harbel,
3 Kakata, and Buchanan, and later through his wife Fatou Brown in
4 Gbarnga, she too started bringing people. So our number

09:59:32

5 increased at the base.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Now, you mentioned individuals being brought from Harbel,
8 Kakata and Buchanan. Are you aware who recruited those
9 individuals?

09:59:57

10 A. Yes, sir, it was one Pa Daniel Kallon. Later he became an
11 adviser to Mr Sankoh. Pa Daniel Kallon was working with a
12 company. I think he was working with LAMCO that was based in
13 Harbel. He was recruiting. He and his wife were working. It
14 was Pa Kallon who was recruiting together with his wife, both the
15 Sierra Leoneans and the Liberians, because Pa Kallon was a senior
16 man in the company and he had been in Liberia for a long time
17 before the war.

10:00:32

18 Q. What's Pa Kallon's wife's name?

19 A. She is called Mamiel.

10:00:52

20 Q. And you mentioned that Pa Kallon was recruiting Sierra
21 Leoneans and Liberians. Did you tell us that?

22 A. Yes, they recruited both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians.

23 Q. And in due course, Mr Sesay, how many Sierra Leoneans and
24 Liberians trained at Camp Sokoto, just roughly?

10:01:30

25 A. Well, I think we were up to 300 or 300 plus, something like
26 that.

27 Q. And assist us with this, please: Firstly, who took care of
28 your food, housing, that kind - those kind of welfare issues at
29 Camp Naama? Who took care of that?

1 A. Well, the housing issue, it was Foday Sankoh who gave us
2 that place. All the people whom he brought were divided into
3 rooms, sometimes ten of us in a room, just like that. So he was
4 in charge of the place, but he used to go, and sometimes he would
10:02:20 5 bring food. Pa Kallon used to send food, cassava, rice, soap,
6 because his wife was producing soap. They used to bring soap in
7 boxes. Every one recruit would have a bar of soap for a week,
8 and sometimes palm oil, they would send palm oil, cocoa-yam. And
9 sometimes Mamie I herself used to come to the base to cook - to
10:02:49 10 cook for us, the recruits. That happened I think about - for
11 about two or three occasions before we left Naama.

12 Q. And what training did you undergo at Camp Sokoto?

13 A. I was trained in physical fitness, arms. I was trained how
14 to set ambushes, and I was trained also on political ideology,
10:03:23 15 courtesy and discipline.

16 Q. And who was responsible for that training?

17 A. The instructors who trained us were Rashid Mansaray,
18 Special Forces, Mohamed Tarawalli, Mike Lamin. They were the
19 main instructors who trained us, because the others, they came in
10:03:54 20 late. Like Gonkanu, Isaac Mongor, PI, they came in late. In
21 fact, like, some of them were not effective instructors, because
22 I can recall at one time when we had lectures from Isaac Mongor
23 as to how to attack a town, city attack, we talked about how to
24 capture a town, the lectures that he gave us that day, and later
10:04:26 25 Foday Sankoh knew about the lecture he had given us, Foday Sankoh
26 was angry with him. So he did not become one of the main
27 instructors because --

28 Q. What was the lecture that Isaac Mongor gave?

29 A. Well, Isaac Mongor was teaching us that, look, when you are

1 dividing a town - when you are dividing a troop to attack a town,
2 when you've captured the town, you will call all the civilians
3 for them to come out of their houses, you would assemble them and
4 you divide the group into two, kill one group, you kill
10:05:02 5 everybody, and the other group they would stay with you. Those
6 who want to train, you would talk to them, and the others would
7 stay in the town as civilians. But if you do not kill the
8 people, they wouldn't understand what the cause of the revolution
9 was. That was why Mr Sankoh was angry with him.

10:05:22 10 Q. Now, what was the political ideology in which you were
11 trained, Mr Sesay?

12 A. Well, they trained us how to behave to the civilian
13 populace in general, that the cause of the RUF was one of
14 liberation. It was meant to fight for the liberation of the
10:06:00 15 Sierra Leoneans and to install democracy in Sierra Leone.
16 Without the support of the civilians, the revolution would never
17 succeed. So we were to behave nicely to the people, talk to them
18 nicely. We were not to take their property. We weren't to use
19 violence against them. We were not to kill them, and we were not
10:06:22 20 to force women. Those were some of the trainings that we
21 underwent.

22 Q. Who was responsible for the teaching of political ideology?

23 A. Mike Lamin. He was the main instructor for political
24 ideology. Sometimes Rashid too used to teach us.

10:06:53 25 Q. Now, during that training, Mr Sesay, were you trained how
26 to use arms?

27 A. Yes, sir, we were trained how to fire AK, G3, how to
28 dismantle and assemble them. We were trained in all of that.
29 Only that there were not so many arms. It was only the

1 instructors who had few arms.

2 Q. What about the recruits? Did any of the recruits whilst
3 training at Camp Naama have arms?

4 A. No, we had sticks. They asked us to make sticks. We would
10:07:35 5 tie a rope to the sticks and hang them. No recruit had a gun at
6 the base.

7 Q. So who had guns at the base?

8 A. Rashid had a gun, Mr Sankoh too had, Mohamed had, Mike
9 Lamin also had.

10:08:01 10 Q. Did you see anybody else with guns apart from those four?

11 A. No, the other people hadn't a gun.

12 Q. Now, did you receive any money at all during training?

13 A. No, they were not giving us money. They only gave us food.

14 Q. So who was paying for the accommodation, food and so on at
10:08:38 15 Camp Sokoto? Who was paying for that?

16 A. Well, the accommodation, it was Foday Sankoh; it was Pa
17 Morlai who was in charge of that. We understood that it was Pa
18 Kallon who was sponsoring it, feeding, medication. They used to
19 send money to him and he was buying medicine for the base. He
10:09:02 20 would buy plastic sandals and he issued those to us. And Pa
21 Kallon also was sending condiments and food.

22 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier about four instructors having
23 arms. First of all, what kind of arms were they?

24 A. They had AK-47, and they had two G3s, one LAR that was in
10:09:37 25 Rashid's room. Those were the ones they used to train us.

26 Q. And did the instructors ever leave the base?

27 A. Yes, a time came before the invasion took place,
28 Foday Sankoh sent them on reconnaissance - for them to do
29 reconnaissance in Sierra Leone, to know the position of the army

1 and the strength of their deployment at the borders, at the towns
2 at the border.

3 Q. We'll come back to that in a moment, Mr Sesay, but before
4 we come to that, during the period of training, were you, the
10:10:16 5 recruits, allowed to leave the base?

6 A. No, no, it was not even possible for us to go on the other
7 side of the barracks. Nor did we have the chance to go to the
8 Naama town itself, no. It was out of bounds. If you went to the
9 village, except you were given a pass, and it was the MP who was
10:10:39 10 responsible for writing the pass, and then it was signed by the
11 commander Rashid. But without that, you were not allowed to go
12 out. If you were caught, it would be a problem.

13 Q. Did Pa Sankoh, Pa Morlai, ever leave the base?

14 A. Yes, sometimes Pa Sankoh went to Pa Kallon in Harbel, and
10:11:05 15 sometimes he went to his wife in Gbarnga, and he would return.

16 Q. His wife's name, remind us?

17 A. Her name was Fatou Brown.

18 Q. Now, on the occasions when Pa Morlai would leave the base,
19 would he take his AK-47 with him?

10:11:26 20 A. Yes, he kept it in his vehicle, but he did not used to
21 strap it. He only kept it in the vehicle.

22 Q. Now, help me with another detail, please. Can you give us
23 a rough idea when it was that you arrived at Camp Naama?

24 A. Well, it was around October, October 1990.

10:12:07 25 Q. And you mentioned the numbers who were there. Over what
26 period of time did the number of recruits reach the number you
27 told us about earlier? Over what period of time, beginning in
28 October?

29 A. Well, when we got to Naama in October, going towards

1 December we were now - our number had increased on the base, but
2 people continued to come, even a week or two weeks before we
3 left, even like, for example, Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie,
4 Mosquito, he came two weeks before the attack took place in
10:12:59 5 Sierra Leone, but we were there for a long time. But some people
6 came even two weeks before we left. But before December, we -
7 the number was about that.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I would like to deal with a
9 matter with the witness now which I think might be more
10:13:46 10 appropriately dealt with in private session.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: I would need some more detail on why we
12 should go into private session, please.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: It's dealing with an exhibit which has been
14 marked confidential. I'm quite happy to deal with it in open
10:14:13 15 session because, as far as I'm concerned, nothing I will be
16 dealing with will affect the security of any individual, so I'm
17 perfectly happy to deal with the matter in public session.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: You see, Mr Griffiths, I don't know the
19 exhibit number. You need to give us some indication of why we
10:14:33 20 should abandon open session to go into private session.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I am perfectly willing, as I say, to
22 deal with the matter in open session. It's exhibit P-277.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I think I know the exhibit
24 you are talking about. This is the exhibit that is in several
10:15:45 25 parts. It's a book, obviously, and you know the issues for which
26 it was admitted confidentially.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I can deal with the matter without dealing
28 with any area which might be considered sensitive.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: I will ask the Prosecution if they have

1 any objection to us remaining in open session, with the caveat
2 that counsel has just given.

3 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, no, as long as the exhibit is
4 dealt with in a manner to protect the reasons it was marked
10:16:33 5 confidential.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. I trust Mr Griffiths's skills
7 in that regard.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful for that. Could the witness
9 please be shown page 71 of that exhibit. And could the exhibit
10:17:22 10 be turned over, please - yes, in that fashion:

11 Q. Now, you will see, Mr Sesay, on that page 71, do you see
12 it's headed "List of Some Vanguard", yes? Do you see that?

13 A. Yes, I've seen that, sir.

14 Q. Help me. First of all, what does the term "vanguard" refer
10:17:53 15 to?

16 A. Well, vanguards were those of us who were trained in Camp
17 Naama. We were those Foday Sankoh called the vanguards.

18 Q. Now, the first name on that list, Rashid Mansaray, you
19 mentioned he was one of your trainers, yes?

10:18:21 20 A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Did he have any special name?

22 A. We used to call him CO Rashid, because he was a Special
23 Forces, he was trained in Libya.

24 Q. So he was a Special Forces. Now, the second name, Mohamed
10:18:43 25 Tarawalli, Zino, was he a Special Forces?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. The third name, Mike Lamin, was he a Special Forces?

28 A. Yes, sir.

29 JUDGE LUSSICK: Was that Patrick Lamin?

1 THE WITNESS: Patrick, yes, sir.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Sorry. Patrick Lamin, was he a Special Forces?

4 A. Yes, sir, he was a Special Forces.

10:19:13 5 Q. And Special Forces, you tell us, refers to what? Where
6 were they trained?

7 A. They were trained in Libya.

8 Q. Now, Kei fa Wai, you mentioned a Kei fa Wai earlier in
9 relation to the Ivory Coast; do you remember? Do you remember
10:19:44 10 mentioning that name?

11 A. Yes, sir, I recall, sir.

12 Q. Is that the same Kei fa Wai?

13 A. Yes, sir, he's the same.

14 Q. Now, looking at that list, you've mentioned that Kei fa Wai,
10:20:04 15 number 5, came from Ivory Coast. Can you identify anyone else on
16 that list who came from Ivory Coast?

17 A. Well, we have Kei fa Wai. We have Abdul Rahman Bangura, he
18 was also from Ivory Coast. Then we have Ishmael Bangura; he was
19 also from Ivory Coast. Ibrahim Nabeu from Ivory Coast. Yusufu
10:20:39 20 Sillah from Ivory Coast.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, just to be sure, these are
22 Sierra Leoneans by origin who travelled to Camp Naama from Ivory
23 Coast?

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:20:51 25 Q. Is that right, Mr Sesay? Those were Sierra Leoneans
26 recruited by Pa Morlai in Ivory Coast, yes? Is that right?

27 A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We were all Sierra Leoneans.

28 Q. Now, you had mentioned earlier that Pa Kallon had brought
29 some people to Camp Naama, Camp Sokoto, from Harbel, Buchanan and

1 Kakata. Do you remember telling us that?

2 A. Yes, sir, I recall.

3 Q. Looking at this list of names, can you help us as to who
4 among these were brought by Pa Kallon?

10:21:50 5 A. Well, like Morris Panda, those are the ones that Pa Kallon
6 sent, Momo Kallon, Amidu Jozie, Jackson Sama, those were all in
7 the group, Moses Steward, Magnus Palmer, Isatu Palmer, all of
8 those. It was Pa Kallon who brought them, who sent them. Alfred
9 Hindowa Kamanda, they were all from Harbel. Robert Johnson,
10:22:23 10 Daniel OK George, Joseph Michael, Bockarie Kallon, Patrick
11 Lalubah.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, that name was not clear to
13 the interpreter. Could the witness be asked to repeat that,

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm sorry, you said - Mr Sesay, you said
10:22:39 15 Patrick Lafuba or Lalubah, what did you say?

16 THE WITNESS: Lalubah, Lalubah.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Continue from there. From Patrick, who
18 else?

19 THE WITNESS: After Patrick, you have Richard Honero,
10:23:01 20 Alusious Caulker, Alusine Buckle, Jimmy Lloyd, Jaffar Massaquoi,
21 Isaac Massaquoi, John Kargbo - CO Kargbo. But this person Noah,
22 Noah was not at Naama. It was when the war started that I came
23 to know Noah in Kailahun, but he too was brought by Foday Sankoh.
24 Foday Daboh was a Special Forces but he too was not at Naama but
10:23:46 25 he later joined us in Kailahun. Augustine Koroma was from
26 Kakata. Mohamed Koroma from Kakata. Mohamed Banya from Kakata.
27 Raka Kallon - this was Pa Kallon's son, and in fact he was a
28 small boy; he was about 14, 15 years old by then, and he was the
29 last son of Isatu Kallon. Michael Johns, Michael - John Sei,

1 Musa Kemokai , Tom Kabangai Tucker, Omaru Banks, Momo Massaquoi ,
2 Memunatu Sesay, Momo Rogers, Alfred Decker - it was Fatou Brown
3 who brought Alfred Decker. Yes, I know all of these people.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:24:51 5 Q. So, those names that you've called out, with the exception
6 of Noah Kanneh, Foday Daboh and Alfred Decker, who brought them
7 to Camp Naama?

8 A. It was through Pa Kallon that these people came to Camp
9 Naama.

10:25:09 10 Q. Now we see at number 16 the name Magnus Palmer. Did Magnus
11 Palmer have a brother?

12 A. Yes, his brother is Philip Palmer.

13 Q. And number 17 is Isatu Palmer, Mrs. Who is she married to?

14 A. Married to Magnus Palmer. He was the husband to her before

10:25:43 15 I came to know them at Naama.

16 Q. Right. So just so that we're clear, on this page is listed
17 four Special Forces: Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli, Patrick
18 Lamin, and Foday Daboh. Is that right?

19 A. Yes, sir, you are right.

10:26:09 20 Q. But Foday Daboh was not at Camp Naama; he joined you later?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Noah Kanneh, number 31, was not at Camp Naama. You first
23 saw him in Kailahun. Is that right?

24 A. Yes, sir.

10:26:26 25 Q. And whilst we're on this page still; number 36, Raka
26 Kallon, is the son of Pa Kallon and Mamie I. Is that right?

27 A. Yes, that's their last son.

28 Q. And number 38, John Sei, I hope I pronounced that
29 correctly, did he have any special role prior to the invasion?

1 A. Yes, sir. John Sei was among the group that Foday Sankoh
2 sent to go and do the reconnaissance mission in Sierra Leone
3 before the attack, but he went to Jojoima; he went to a bar and
4 he got drunk. When we came to Sierra Leone later we got the
10:27:18 5 information and whilst he was sitting there at the bar - he was
6 born in Jojoima so his --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
8 to reduce his pace.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:27:27 10 Q. Mr Sesay, you really do need to slow down. I know it's
11 very difficult when you are giving a narrative, but if you could
12 try and speak slowly and clearly, because of the translation. I
13 know it's not easy.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could we start, Mr Interpreter, with a
10:27:46 15 spelling "Jojoima" please.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour. It is J-O-J-O-I-M-A.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said John Sei was among the
18 group that Mr Sankoh sent to go and do reconnaissance in Sierra
19 Leone. So he went to the Kailahun area. But when he went, he
10:28:04 20 went to his home town, Jojoima, and he was sitting at a bar.

21 Whilst he was drinking, he started boasting that very soon he
22 would become a big man in Sierra Leone. He said very soon people
23 in Jojoima will have more respect for him, but from then the
24 people he was speaking to, they also informed the soldiers who
10:28:28 25 were in Jojoima, and he was arrested. So he was forced to
26 confess. So by then, after that, we did not see him any more
27 until the time we entered. They said he had been executed.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now, whilst we're on that topic, just so that we're clear,

1 how many individuals were sent by Pa Morlai on that
2 reconnaissance mission?

3 A. Pa Morlai sent Mohamed Tarawalli, Mike Lamin, Philip
4 Palmer, and John Sei. They were four.

10:29:07 5 Q. Now, you've told us what happened to John Sei. What
6 happened to Philip Palmer?

7 A. Philip Palmer's mission - he divided them. Some went to
8 Kailahun, some went to Kenema. Palmer and Mike went to Pujehun
9 and Bo. So Philip Palmer - Mike went to Bo and returned. When
10:29:30 10 Philip Palmer went - on his way to Bo he was arrested, so when he
11 was arrested the government soldiers interrogated him. Since
12 then, he was detained. He was locked up in the police station I
13 think in Zimmi. So he was there in custody until the time the
14 RUF attacked. It was the RUF who finally freed him from his
10:29:49 15 detention.

16 Q. Now, did Mike Lamin return from that reconnaissance
17 mission?

18 A. Yes, Mike Lamin returned. He got back to Naama, and when
19 he got to Naama I think it was just a day, and the following day
10:30:05 20 we left to enter Sierra Leone, Mohamed and I.

21 Q. Now, did Mohamed Tarawalli return from that reconnaissance
22 mission?

23 A. Yes, he too returned.

24 Q. Right. Could the witness now be shown the next page,
10:30:21 25 please, page 72? Do you have it, Mr Sesay?

26 A. Yes, sir, I have it.

27 Q. Now, the first name on that list, who is that?

28 A. It's my name, Issa Sesay.

29 Q. You note the spelling of it, I-S-S-A-H. Is that the way

1 you spell your name?

2 A. Well, that is not how I spell my name. For me it's
3 I-S-S-A. There is no H.

4 Q. Now, you see in brackets beside the name, a name Paul Vaye.

10:31:15 5 Who is Paul Vaye?

6 A. Well, the name written here is Paul Vaye, but my own name
7 is Polvia. It's not Paul Vaye. Polvia is a settlement in
8 Abidjan and it was the name that I was using, Polvia.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, I'm quite lost by that answer.

10:31:45 10 What in fact is your name, Mr Sesay?

11 THE WITNESS: My name is Issa Sesay, Issa Hassan Sesay, but
12 this was a nickname. It is just like in Freetown you have Shell
13 Company, Blackhall Road, you have different areas. So this name,
14 Polvia, is a settlement, a particular settlement, in Abidjan.

10:32:07 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: But it was a nickname that you used; is
16 that correct?

17 THE WITNESS: Well, they used to refer to me by that
18 nickname, but my popular name in the RUF was CO Issa. That was
19 how I was called.

10:32:25 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. How do you spell Vaye?

22 A. How do you spell what?

23 Q. This spelling of Vaye, V-A-Y-E, is that correct?

24 A. Vaye, no. It's P-O-L-V-I-A. That was what I was using.

10:32:53 25 That was the name I was using, it was my nickname.

26 Q. Now, we see also the name Mike Lamin, and if we go further
27 down, at number 11, we see Daniel Kallon. Who is that?

28 A. Daniel Kallon is Pa Kallon.

29 Q. And Isatu Kallon, who is that?

1 A. That is Mami e l.

2 Q. Now, at number 23, we see the name Vandy Kosi a?

3 A. Yes, Vandy Kosi a was one of my colleagues.

4 Q. Yes. And was he at Naama?

10:33:52 5 A. You mean number - yes, Vandy Kosi a, he was not at Naama.

6 But when the war started, I later knew him to be Foday Sankoh's
7 driver, and Foday Sankoh had to put his name under the vanguards,
8 so we were all in Kailahun throughout the war until May 8.

9 Q. But he wasn't at Naama?

10:34:16 10 A. No, sir, he was not at Naama.

11 Q. Number 25, Edward Fembell, was he at Camp Naama?

12 A. No, he was not at Camp Naama.

13 Q. But apart from those two, the other people on this page,
14 were they at Camp Naama?

10:34:38 15 A. Yes, sir, they were there.

16 Q. Could the witness now be shown, please, page 73. Do you
17 have it, Mr Sesay?

18 A. Yes, I have it.

19 Q. Sam Bockarie, the first name at number 1, remind us, was he
10:35:13 20 at Camp Naama?

21 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie came about two to three weeks before we
22 left for Sierra Leone. So they were the last batch of people who
23 came to Naama.

24 Q. Now, the first 16 names on that list, were they all at Camp
10:35:38 25 Naama?

26 A. Please give me a second. Let me just go through it.

27 Q. Yes, just take your time and go through the list.

28 A. Yes, they were there, but for the other one, when the war
29 started, he did not become part of the RUF any longer. He said

1 he went back and joined - rejoined his family in Liberia.

2 Q. Which one?

3 A. "Momo Gebah", he did not fight in Sierra Leone. After our
4 training, whilst we were entering, he decided to make his way
10:36:53 5 back. He did not enter Kailahun.

6 Q. Now, let's look at the 12 names on the second half of that
7 page, please. Denis Mingo, Superman, was he at Camp Naama?

8 A. Not at all, sir.

9 Q. Did Denis Mingo belong to any organisation, as far as
10:37:26 10 you're concerned?

11 A. Well, at the time I knew him in Kailahun, he - yes, I knew
12 he was - he said he was a fighter in Lofa. But later I came to
13 know that he was - Foday Sankoh's girlfriend in Kolahun, Denis
14 Mingo was her brother.

10:37:51 15 Q. Denis Mingo was the brother of Foday Sankoh's girlfriend in
16 Kailahun, yes?

17 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, your Honours, I don't believe
18 there's been an answer to the last question: "Did Denis Mingo
19 belong to any organisation, as far as you're concerned?"

10:38:09 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths?

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I deal with my question first, please?

22 Q. Is it right that Denis Mingo was the brother of
23 Foday Sankoh's girlfriend in Kailahun?

24 A. Yes.

10:38:26 25 Q. To your knowledge, was Denis Mingo a member of any
26 organisation?

27 A. Yes, Denis Mingo, by the time I knew him in Kailahun, they
28 said he was an NPFL fighter in Lofa.

29 Q. How do you know that?

1 A. Well, I later knew him, and his sister was Foday Sankoh's
2 wife, and I knew that he was NPFL from Lofa at the time we were
3 in Kailahun District. But when we had a problem with the NPFL,
4 Foday Sankoh said the man was his in-law so he should stay. So
10:39:23 5 it was through that that I came to know that he was actually a
6 member of the NPFL, but it was as a result of the relationship
7 that they had now got with Pa Sankoh, so he decided that he
8 should stay in Sierra Leone. And his sister was called Louisa.
9 That was Sankoh's girlfriend.

10:39:46 10 Q. Now, the names from number 2 through to 12, were they at
11 Camp Sokoto, Naama?

12 A. Yes, sir, they were there.

13 Q. Now, help us: Do you know who recruited those
14 individuals - they are said to be Liberians - to train at Camp
10:40:33 15 Sokoto? Who recruited them?

16 A. Well, for the ones I was used to speak to, they told me
17 that it was Pa Kallon who was speaking to them.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be also
19 asked again to slow down his pace.

10:40:48 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, you have to repeat your answer.
21 You are going too quickly. Please repeat your answer where you
22 were asked who trained them.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Who recruited those at numbers 2 through to 12; can you
10:41:05 25 help us?

26 A. Yes, my Lord. I said these Liberians, it was Pa Kallon who
27 recruited them in Harbel and Kakata. You see, because, like for
28 most of these men, it was Pa Kallon who spoke to them, who
29 persuaded them, and it was through Pa Kallon that Pa Sankoh was

1 able to get them. So he spoke to them and he later sent them to
2 Naama.

3 Q. Can the witness now be shown page 74, please. Now, I want
4 us to deal with the first half of that page first, Mr Sesay. Do
10:42:03 5 you follow me?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Numbers 13 through to 41, yes? Just the first half. Just
8 take your time and go through those names, please. Yes?

9 A. Okay.

10:42:17 10 Q. Go through those names and then help us whether they
11 trained at Camp Naama.

12 A. The only person here that was not trained at Camp Naama is
13 number 15, Mohamed Jalloh, Fullah Mon Amie; he was not at Camp
14 Naama. I later knew him in Kailahun in 1991.

10:42:55 15 Q. And do you know who recruited these individuals, apart from
16 Mohamed Jalloh?

17 A. Well, some of these people met Pa Sankoh, he brought them,
18 and some of them were from Pa Kallon and some of them were
19 recruited by Sankoh's wife, Fatou Brown.

10:43:31 20 Q. Let's look at the second half of that page please. Now we
21 see this is a list. At number 1 we have Isaac Mongor. Now can
22 you help us as to when - first of all, did he train at Camp
23 Naama?

24 A. Well, I later knew Isaac Mongor I think in February 1991,
10:43:57 25 January to February '91. That was when he came to the base. And
26 when he came to the base I understood that it was Pa Kallon who
27 sent him to the base and that he was an old Doe soldier so he had
28 some military experience. So that was how I came to know him.

29 Q. He was an old Doe soldier. Doe is who?

1 A. Doe was the late President of Liberia, and that was what he
2 that Isaac too used to tell us, and that was when he went in fact
3 and he did a very serious blunder during his lectures.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: The question was: Did he train at Camp
10:44:42 5 Naama? Mr Sesay, that was the question. Could we have an answer
6 to that question, please.

7 THE WITNESS: No, he was not trained at Camp Naama but he
8 went there. He went there later.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:44:57 10 Q. And can you help us as to roughly when it was he arrived?

11 A. I said it was in '91, between January to February; that was
12 when Isaac came to the base with his training group.

13 Q. Now, we see at number 11 the name Miss Monica Pearson.
14 Now --

10:45:27 15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Did you know Monica Pearson?

17 A. Very well, sir.

18 Q. How so?

19 A. Well, I knew her at the base when they were brought there
10:45:42 20 by their sister for them to train.

21 Q. Yes. And?

22 A. And she was taking care of Mr Sankoh's food. She used to
23 cook for Mr Sankoh when her sister was not around, so all of us
24 trained, and later, during the training, she became my
10:46:09 25 girlfriend, but we later separated in '91 by the time we had
26 entered Kailahun.

27 Q. Now the Liberians that are listed here in this second half
28 of the page, did they have any particular ethnic origin?

29 A. Which one, sir?

1 Q. The one starting with Isaac Mongor, Allens Blamo, Emmanuel
2 Jones and so on, did they have any particular ethnic origin?

3 A. Well, I see some - some are mixed tribe because, like for
4 Isaac, he is Bassa. Allens Blamo, Lion, in fact he had some
10:47:11 5 connection in Sierra Leone; he's Kru, and he went to school in
6 Bo. For Emmanuel Johnson, Rocky CO, he too is Kru. Kollo Mulbah
7 is Mandingo. Martin George also is half Mandingo. Richard
8 Cooper is Kpelle. Joseph Jenteh, he also has some Mandingo.
9 Alfred Sin, Isaac Galema - I don't know Alfred Sin's tribe anyway
10:47:56 10 - Isaac Galema is Kpelle. Sam Kolleh is Kpelle. Matthew Barbu,
11 he too is Kpelle. Robert Freeman, I don't know his tribe.

12 Q. Now, the Kpelle ethnic group, where in Liberia are they
13 found?

14 A. Well, all the surrounding villages around that area, even
10:48:28 15 Naama was a Kpelle village, and some of them used to come and
16 meet Foday Sankoh and join the group. Like, I do recall a lady
17 who --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
19 to repeat the name of that lady.

10:48:46 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause, Mr Witness.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. What was the name of the lady, please? What was the name
23 of the lady you mentioned, Mr Sesay?

24 A. I said Nyepan Weah Weah, Nyepan Weah Weah. She was a
10:48:59 25 native of Naama village.

26 Q. Were there many Liberians recruited from Naama village and
27 the surrounding area?

28 A. Yes, sir.

29 Q. Then could the witness be shown page 75, please. Now, the

1 names on this page, Mr Sesay, and take your time to go through
2 them, did they all train at Camp Naama, Camp Sokoto?

3 A. Yes, sir, all of us trained.

4 Q. Right. Could the witness now be given together pages 71

10:50:51 5 through to 75, please. I want you to help me with one final

6 matter, Mr Sesay, before we move from this particular topic.

7 Starting at page 71, you will see that is headed "Sierra Leoneans
8 (Deceased)." Do you see that?

9 A. Yes, sir. I have seen it.

10:51:27 10 Q. And the total number of Sierra Leoneans under that heading

11 is 46. Do you see that?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Go now to page 72, please. Yes? Have you got it?

14 A. Yes, sir.

10:51:46 15 Q. You'll see that this is headed "Sierra Leoneans (Still In
16 RUF)". Do you see that?

17 A. Yes, sir. I've seen it, sir.

18 Q. And they number 25, yes?

19 A. Yes, sir.

10:52:00 20 Q. Page 73, please. "Sierra Leoneans (Left RUF)"; do you see
21 that?

22 A. Yes. Yes, I have seen it.

23 Q. They number 16, yes? Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I've seen it.

10:52:25 25 Q. So putting that together, 46, 25 and 16, we come to 87,
26 yes?

27 A. Uh-huh.

28 Q. Back to page 73, "Liberians (Deceased)". We see going from
29 73 to 74 that there is a total of 43; do you see that? There's a

1 handwritten 43 "Charles Tinba" on page 74. Yes? Page 74, middle
2 of the page, do you see that? I'm just trying to get the total
3 figures here?

4 A. Yes, sir, I've seen it.

10:53:19 5 Q. So we see 43 there. And then in the next batch we have 23
6 "Liberians (Still in the RUF)". Do you see that?

7 A. Yes, I've seen it.

8 Q. Then when we go finally to page 75, "Liberians (Left RUF)"
9 we see that there are 36 in number, yes?

10:53:45 10 A. Yes, I've seen that.

11 Q. So we add those figures together, 42, 23, 36, it comes to
12 101, yes?

13 A. Uh-huh.

14 Q. Now, making one or two allowances, because you've told us
10:54:05 15 that not everyone listed in these pages trained at Camp Naama -
16 do you remember telling us that? And you mentioned somewhere in
17 the region of four names - three names of persons who didn't
18 train at Camp Naama, but, when we put that together, question
19 one: The majority of those who trained at Camp Sokoto were
10:54:34 20 Liberians, weren't they?

21 A. Yes, the Liberians were many. They were more than us the
22 Sierra Leoneans.

23 Q. And those Liberians who trained at Camp Sokoto, did they
24 see themselves as RUF?

10:54:57 25 A. Yes, sir. They considered themselves as RUF throughout the
26 war.

27 Q. Could those pages be put away, please. And I would now
28 like to take the witness to page 82. Do you have it?

29 A. Yes, sir, I have it.

1 Q. Do you see the number 6 three lines from the top of that
2 page?

3 A. Yes, I see it.

4 Q. And the heading "Daniel and Isatu Kallon", yes?

10:56:21 5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Individuals you've mentioned earlier as being responsible
7 for recruiting individuals sent to Camp Naama. Do you remember
8 telling us that?

9 A. I recall that, sir.

10:56:38 10 Q. Now, you see that the passage reads as follows:

11 "Mr Daniel Kallon left Sierra Leone for Liberia in 1958.

12 His last employment was with the Firestone Rubber Company where

13 he served as cashier at the central office in Harbel. His wife

14 Isatu, with whom he had three children, was the head of the

10:57:01 15 Harbel Marketing Association between 1990 and 1994. She was

16 popular among the NPFL officers and fighters as she used to

17 mobilise the market women to make protests and demonstrations in

18 Liberia against ECOMOG intervention in the Liberian civil crisis.

19 Corporal Sankoh had his first recruiting meeting with Sierra

10:57:28 20 Leoneans in September 1990 at the home of the Kallons."

21 Mr Sesay, were you aware of that?

22 A. Yes, I knew that Mr Sankoh used to go to Pa Kallon and that

23 was where they used to assemble the recruits before they were

24 brought to Naama.

10:57:51 25 Q. "Since then their home served as the transit point for the

26 trafficking of recruits and NPFL fighters to the RUF training

27 base. The Kallons provided soda, soap, palm oil, and money

28 regularly in order to support the training base; and they had

29 always seen the RUF as their personal property. They are

1 die-hard tribalists."

2 Now, was it true that the Kallons provided soap, palm oil
3 and money regularly to support the training base at Sokoto?

4 A. Yes, sir, it was Pa Kallon and his wife who used to give so
10:58:38 5 many provisions to Mr Sankoh for the training base in Sokoto.

6 Q. Let's go to the last paragraph on that page, please:

7 "Isatu is an illiterate, yet Corporal Sankoh entrusted the
8 finances of the external delegation in her care."

9 Were you aware of that?

10:59:11 10 A. Well, at first when the external delegation went Mamie I
11 was not with them. It was later that she joined them. But
12 Foday Sankoh trusted her because she used to do - run so many
13 missions in Guinea.

14 Q. Could we put that document away for the moment, please.

10:59:57 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, before you move on to the
16 next area, I think this would be an appropriate time to take the
17 midmorning break. Mr Witness, we're going to break for half an
18 hour. We will return at 11.30.

19 [Break taken at 11.00 a.m.]

11:29:22 20 [Upon resuming at 11.43 a.m.]

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I understand your machine
22 was not working properly.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: There was a technical problem and the
24 LiveNote screen just went blank, with no image whatsoever, and it
11:43:46 25 took some time for the technicians to restart it.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Now you may proceed, please.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, before the short adjournment, we were
29 looking at a document containing various names of individuals who

1 trained at Camp Naama. You recall that, yes?

2 A. Yes, sir, I can recall that.

3 Q. Now, still on the topic of Camp Sokoto/Naama, help us with
4 this: Whilst at Camp Naama, did you hear the name Charles
11:44:38 5 Taylor?

6 A. Well, pertaining to the RUF, no.

7 Q. Was it, for example, suggested to you by Pa Morlai or any
8 of the other instructors that Charles Taylor was the individual
9 in charge of your presence in Camp Naama? Was that said to you
11:45:11 10 by anyone?

11 A. No, nobody told me that.

12 Q. Did Pa Morlai, for example, suggest to you or the other
13 recruits that he had made an agreement with Charles Taylor?

14 A. No.

11:45:39 15 Q. Now, you spoke earlier of some individuals who were sent on
16 a reconnaissance mission. Do you recall that?

17 A. Yes, sir, I do recall.

18 Q. And just remind us, please, who were the individuals sent
19 on that reconnaissance mission?

11:45:58 20 A. I said Mike Lamin, Mohamed Tarawalli, Philip Palmer and
21 John Sei.

22 Q. Was anybody else sent on that reconnaissance mission?

23 A. No, I don't know any other person. These are the four
24 people I can recall, but the two returned and the other two
11:46:32 25 remained in Sierra Leone. Later, the one died and the other one
26 joined us. That was Philip Palmer. Those were the ones I knew
27 of.

28 Q. Now the two who returned, you mentioned something about the
29 timing of their return. When did they return in terms of the

1 launch of the invasion?

2 A. It was in March that they returned to Naama. Just about
3 two days we were - we boarded in the truck and we came to Sierra
4 Leone, attacked.

11:47:15 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: That would be March '91, yes?

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. March of which year, Mr Sesay?

8 A. Yes, my Lord, March '91.

9 Q. So they returned a day or two before you departed from Camp
11:47:29 10 Sokoto, yes, in a truck?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, help us: Apart from those four who went on the
13 reconnaissance mission, did any of the other recruits leave Camp
14 Naama prior to leaving in that truck a couple of days after the
11:47:52 15 return of Lamin and Mansaray - Tarawalli, sorry? Did any of the
16 other recruits leave the base at all?

17 A. No, no one left the base.

18 Q. I want to ask you specifically: Did Joseph Brown go on
19 that reconnaissance mission?

11:48:20 20 A. Joseph Brown, no, I don't think so. I don't think that he
21 went there. I don't recall.

22 Q. As far as you recall, prior to departing in the truck, did
23 Joseph Brown leave Camp Sokoto?

24 A. Joseph Brown? I don't recall. I don't recall that because
11:48:48 25 Joseph Brown, Alfred Brown, they were close people to Mr Sankoh,
26 so I don't know. Because Alfred was the driver. He used to
27 drive for Mr Sankoh at that time, and that is Joseph's elder
28 brother. So they had close link with Mr Sankoh at that time.

29 Q. Now, before we come to your departure from Camp Naama, were

1 there any children at Camp Sokoto?

2 A. Yes, there were few children there. Because like Kallon
3 was a child, because he was between 14 to 15 years, and there
4 were other people who came. Some of them had their children
11:50:04 5 around the age of 12, they were there. Because even Fatou
6 Gbembo's younger brother was a small boy, Musa Gbembo. And even
7 Monica herself, Theophilous Pearson, that was Monica's younger
8 brother, he was around 14, 15. They were there about - below 15,
9 below 15 in number, the children who were at Naama, Camp Sokoto.

11:50:37 10 Q. And did those children engage in military training at Camp
11 Sokoto?

12 A. Those children were not - they were not engaged in active
13 military training, like when we went into bush camping, like when
14 we were going for physical jogging in the morning, they didn't go
11:51:03 15 there. The only classes that they attended were ideology,
16 courtesy and discipline training, but other classes they did not
17 participate in them.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: This name Fatou Gbembo, do we have it on
19 the record already? Or could we have a spelling, please.

11:51:24 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Could you help us with a spelling, please, Mr Sesay, of the
22 name Fatou Gbembo?

23 A. My Lord, except if we would check the record because the
24 name is in the records. I don't know if it is G-B-E-M-B-O
11:51:49 25 F-A-T-U, something like that.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, could you assist --

27 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: -- please, with the surname spelling?

29 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour. It is G-B-E-M-B-O.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, these children who you tell us were at Camp
3 Sokoto, did they have any particular name?

4 A. While we were at Sokoto, there was no name for them.

11:52:41 5 Q. Did they later come - at a later stage, did children of
6 that age come to be known by any particular name?

7 A. Yes. When we went to Kailahun, they used to refer to them
8 as SBU. That was the name Mr Sankoh told us for the children,
9 because even in Kailahun people used to take their younger

11:53:06 10 brothers and their children and they were taking them to the
11 bases, and they were trained in '91.

12 Q. So at Camp Sokoto, apart from attending ideology training,
13 what would these children do?

14 A. Those children were just at the camp because most of them
11:53:31 15 were there with their family members. Apart from the ideology
16 classes that they attended, they were just around doing no other
17 thing.

18 Q. Coming then to the day when you tell us that a truck
19 arrived, taking your time, Mr Sesay, just explain to us how all
11:54:03 20 of that occurred.

21 A. Okay. While we were at the base in Sokoto, it was when
22 Mr Foday Sankoh came one day with four trucks. He came along
23 with Anthony Mekunagbe and Oliver Varney.

24 Q. Pause there. And Mr Sesay, I'll be interrupting you at
11:54:37 25 stages just to seek clarification, okay? Now, those two
26 individuals, Anthony Mekunagbe and Oliver Varney, prior to that
27 day when the trucks arrived, had you seen them before?

28 A. Well, that was my first time to see Oliver Varney, but
29 Anthony used to come there to Mr Sankoh.

1 Q. And who were these men?

2 A. Well, Foday Sankoh introduced Anthony because when he came
3 there for the first time, he said he was the commander for Lofa.
4 He introduced him on that day. And he introduced Oliver Varney,
11:55:20 5 saying he was the commander at Bomi Hills towards the Pujehun
6 border.

7 Q. And these two men, what was their relationship with
8 Foday Sankoh?

9 A. Well, Mr Sankoh introduced them as friends. He said they
11:55:47 10 all trained in Libya. He said they were friends and that they
11 were assisting him to transport us to the border so that we could
12 start the war in Sierra Leone.

13 Q. So four trucks arrive. If you could just pick up your
14 account again, please.

11:56:03 15 A. Yes, sir. Before the four trucks arrived, because we were
16 down at the formation grounds, we heard Rashid talking loudly.
17 He said because something had happened at the border before
18 Foday Sankoh brought those vehicles with the two men, the trucks
19 and the two men, the fighting broke out between the NPFL at the
11:56:36 20 border at - in Bomaru with the Sierra Leonean soldiers, because
21 the NPFL fighters, according to what I understood later, they
22 said they were transacting business and - with the Sierra Leonean
23 soldiers at the border in Bomaru and looted vehicles and some
24 other property. So the Sierra Leonean soldiers' commander, who
11:57:02 25 was in Bomaru, took some vehicles that he did not pay for, so
26 that was the reason why a fight erupted between them. And
27 Foday Sankoh used that to bring us. So when they went, they said
28 no, this is a revolution that they had organised, so Foday Sankoh
29 should not use that opportunity to go and launch the attack.

1 Q. Pause. Who was saying that?

2 A. Rashid Mansaray --

3 Q. And just explain --

4 A. -- who was the --

11:57:41 5 Q. -- to us again slowly: What was Rashid Mansaray saying
6 that we should - about the revolution?

7 A. Rashid said that was the revolution that they had started
8 for a long time, from Libya, and they had come, and we had been
9 trained, so Foday Sankoh should not use that opportunity because

11:57:59 10 there was a conflict between the NPFL and the Sierra Leonean
11 soldiers in Bomaru regarding the looted vehicles that they had
12 sold - that the NPFL had sold the vehicles to the Sierra Leonean
13 soldiers, and the commander who was in Bomaru said - refused to
14 pay the commander, the NPFL commander, so Rashid was not

11:58:23 15 supportive of our attacking during that time. So Foday Sankoh
16 became annoyed, and he was put under arrest. So we were - we
17 boarded the truck.

18 Q. Pause there. Who was put under arrest?

19 A. Rashid Mansaray, at the initial stage.

11:58:45 20 Q. Thank you. And then you were put on the trucks, you say,
21 yes?

22 A. Yes, sir. Foday Sankoh himself stand in front of us in the
23 parade ground and he would point at people and say, "You go into
24 this truck, you go into that truck." We were loaded into two
11:58:59 25 trucks, and Foday Sankoh said the first two trucks were to go to
26 the Pujehun way and the other two trucks, that was the one that I
27 was part of, was to go to the --

28 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat
29 slowly.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, what you are saying is being
2 recorded, as you know very well. Please slow down. Now, pick up
3 where you said "the other two trucks, that was the one that I was
4 part of was to go". Start from there.

11:59:27 5 THE WITNESS: The trucks - the two trucks, of which I
6 boarded one, we were to come to Lofa and to go to Kailahun
7 District. But all the four trucks were - we all use the Lofa
8 Road. So we crossed St Paul's River and the two trucks for
9 Pujehun took their own route going towards Bomi Hills, and the
12:00:00 10 other two trucks, that is for us, we continued and we arrived in
11 Kolahun, and, from Kolahun - when we arrived in Kolahun,
12 Foday Sankoh and Anthony Mekunagbe, all of us, we were there with
13 Mike Lamin and others, and we disembarked and the group was
14 further subdivided into two. Foday Sankoh divided the group into
12:00:28 15 two. He said one of the groups was to attack by Koindu, and I
16 fell into the group that was to attack Bomaru.

17 Q. So just to recap, Mr Sesay, four trucks set off, yes? Is
18 that right?

19 A. Yes, sir. Correct.

12:00:49 20 Q. Question number one: Did those four trucks carry all of
21 the people who had trained with the RUF at Camp Naama?

22 A. Yes, all of us were brought but three - three MP stayed
23 behind with Rashid at the base, because Rashid was in detention;
24 he was detained on the day that we were leaving.

12:01:20 25 Q. And you say that the four trucks go over the St Paul's
26 Bridge, two then go to Pujehun, two go towards Kailahun, yes?

27 A. Yes, two went by Bomi Hills because from Bomi Hills if you
28 cross the border you go to Pujehun. They went by Bomi Hills and
29 we came towards the Lofa end.

1 Q. You were with the two trucks to go towards Lofa, yes? Is
2 that right?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. But those two trucks divide again, yes?

12:02:01 5 A. Yes, in Kolahun.

6 Q. One truck goes to attack where?

7 A. One truck came by Foya to attack Koindu, and the other one
8 we went to Vahun to attack Bomaru.

9 Q. Pause there.

12:02:21 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could I seek a clarification that I
11 should have sought a little earlier. The witness said at page
12 58, when Sankoh was introducing Anthony Mekunagbe and Oliver
13 Varney, he introduced Mekunagbe as the commander for Lofa and
14 Varney as the commander for Bomi Hills. But these are commanders
12:02:41 15 in what organisation?

16 THE WITNESS: They were NPFL commanders.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Now, at the time at the point where the two trucks going to
19 Kailahun divide, you mentioned something about Mike Lamin and
12:03:07 20 others. What was that?

21 A. I said Mike Lamin, Mohamed Tarawalli, all of us were there,
22 so Mike Lamin, myself, Mohamed Kallon and others, we fell in the
23 Bomaru group to go and attack Bomaru because Mike and Mohamed
24 were the commanders for us.

12:03:28 25 Q. The two trucks that go towards Kailahun, did either Anthony
26 Mekunagbe or Oliver Varney accompany those two trucks?

27 A. Yes, because when we separated, Oliver Varney went with the
28 Pujehun group to Bomi Hills and Mekunagbe brought us to Kolahun
29 in Lofa and we carried on with the attack.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Did the witness say Oliver Varney went
2 with the Pujehun group or went to the Pujehun group,
3 Mr Interpreter?

4 THE INTERPRETER: "With", your Honour.

12:04:32 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. So what happened to the group that you were with, Mr Sesay?

7 A. Well, from Kolahun, our truck continued and we came to
8 Vahun. When we came to Vahun we were given some Beretta guns,
9 but not all of us were armed. There were some armed men and they

12:05:03 10 greeted each other, that is Mike Lamin and the others, and they
11 greeted us and they said they were to divide the group into two
12 because we were given some Beretta guns. Mohamed was the one who
13 distributed the guns to us, but not all of us had the guns. So
14 the group was divided into two and they said one of the groups

12:05:22 15 was to attack Bomaru. That was to be headed by Mohamed. And the
16 other was headed by Mike Lamin and that was to attack Baiwala.

17 Q. Pause there. You mentioned that you were issued with some
18 guns. What kind of guns were they?

19 A. I said Berettas. They were short guns. They were
12:05:46 20 short-range guns.

21 Q. Could you spell Baretta for us?

22 A. I think it is B-E-R-E-T-T-A.

23 Q. Beretta?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: And the location where they were to
12:06:05 25 attack - where Mike Lamin was to attack is what?

26 THE WITNESS: Baiwala.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Now, just so that everybody is clear, at what point were
29 some of you provided with these Beretta guns?

1 A. You know, like we were to leave this evening to go to the
2 border for the attack. When we got to Vahun, that was the time
3 that we were given the weapons.

12:06:46

4 Q. And, Mr Sesay, do you have any idea where those guns came
5 from?

6 A. Well, according to Mohamed at that time, because he was the
7 one that was giving the guns, it was Oliver - sorry, Anthony
8 Mekunagbe that had given the guns to him upon Mr Sankoh's request
9 because even the NPFL fighters whom we met at the ground, they
10 too had - some of them had Beretta guns, so all of us came
11 together.

12:07:11

12 Q. Pausing again. Can you give us any idea, Mr Sesay, of how
13 many trainees from Camp Sokoto were in the group with you
14 carrying out that specific mission? How many? Just a rough
15 number?

12:07:37

16 A. Well, we were about a platoon plus. A platoon is about 60.
17 We were about 70. About that.

18 Q. And can you give us an idea as to how many of you were
19 given these Beretta guns?

12:08:08

20 A. Yes, about three squads. That is 45. The other ones did
21 not have guns.

22 Q. Just describe again for us please what these Beretta guns
23 looked like?

12:08:44

24 A. Beretta guns were short guns, just like this distance from
25 the table, you know, and they were short-ranged weapons.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if we could for the record just
27 borrow the tape measure, please, and measure the width of the
28 table?

29 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, it's 60 centimetres.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. And you say, Mr Sesay, that these were short-range weapons.

3 Is that right?

4 A. Yes, sir.

12:09:55 5 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that when you got to the ground
6 you met up with some NPFL fighters. Is that right?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Which ground was that?

9 A. Vahun.

12:10:12 10 Q. And how many NPFL fighters did you meet up with?

11 A. Well, I cannot give you the exact figure now but they were
12 not up to 100, the ones that we met at the Vahun border.

13 Q. And where had these fighters come from?

14 A. Some of them were sent with us by Anthony Mekunagbe from
12:10:46 15 Kolahun and the other ones from Vahun also joined up.

16 Q. Now, before we proceed with the attack, you mentioned
17 sometime this morning a radio announcement by Foday Sankoh when
18 you first discovered that his name was Foday Sankoh. Do you
19 recall telling us that?

12:11:13 20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. When, in relation to the events you are describing,
22 Mr Sesay, did you hear that BBC broadcast?

23 A. Well, I think the broadcast was in March, because after the
24 broadcast the days that Mr Sankoh had given former President
12:11:40 25 Momoh his ultimatum were - he did not wait for the 90 days. Just
26 after the problem occurred at Bomaru, then he said that was the
27 time for us to go.

28 Q. I see. Now, as far as you're aware, Mr Sesay, was there a
29 planning meeting prior to the launch of this invasion?

1 A. Well, the only place I saw Mr Sankoh and those two men
2 spoke were - was at --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat the
4 name of the place.

12:12:28 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, please repeat the name of the
6 place.

7 THE WITNESS: My Lord, I said the only time I saw Mr Sankoh
8 spoke with those men, when they came to Sokoto, was in Naama.

9 They went into Mr Sankoh's place and they spoke and they came out
10 and Mr Sankoh introduced them to us at the formation, the parade.
11 From that point I did not witness any other meeting because, when
12 we came to Kolahun, there was talk between Mr Sankoh, Mohamed and
13 Anthony Mekunagbe. That was before - that was in the parade. It
14 was not a meeting.

12:13:05 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Now, you say, and I'm quoting your answer, Mr Sesay: "The
17 only time I saw Mr Sankoh speak with those men when they came to
18 Sokoto was in Naama." Which men?

19 A. I'm talking about Anthony Mekunagbe and Oliver Varney.

12:13:28 20 Q. Thank you. Now, just describe for us then, Mr Sesay, how
21 this attack you were going on went. What happened?

22 A. Well, from Vahun, that evening we were given food and we
23 ate that afternoon, and we walked from Vahun to the village at
24 the borderline called Folima, on the Liberian side.

12:14:12 25 Q. Can you spell that for us, or try?

26 A. I think it's F-O-L-I-M-A.

27 Q. Thank you. And then what happened, Mr Sesay?

28 A. So when we got to Folima, then the group was divided into
29 two. One of the groups was to attack Baiwala, and Mike was the

1 commander, and the other group was to attack Bomaru, and Mohamed
2 was in charge of us who had come from the base Sokoto. And
3 Baiwala and Bomaru were short distance - there was a short
4 distance between them. It was just about - I don't think it was
12:15:01 5 up to a mile even. So from Folima we got some civilians, some
6 men. There were some people amongst us who knew civilians and
7 they said they would - told us the route, and from Folima we
8 bypassed Bomaru.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak
12:15:25 10 slowly.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. You do need to remember just to slow down so that the
13 translation can take place. Okay?

14 A. Okay, sir.

12:15:41 15 Q. So can you pick it up from "some people amongst us who knew
16 civilians," yes?

17 A. Yes. I said there were two civilians who were gotten from
18 Folima who knew the bypasses in the area. So we used the bush
19 path and we got into Baiwala without getting to Bomaru. So they
12:16:01 20 were the ones who led Mike Lamin and others to attack. But it
21 was Mike Lamin and others that were to attack first, and we, the
22 Bomaru group, was to respond later after theirs.

23 So we moved that evening, the whole night, and we took our
24 positions. And in the morning we heard the firing from Bomaru.
12:16:22 25 And from Baiwala - from Baiwala, sorry, and from Bomaru we
26 attacked. And the soldiers escaped. They left their ammo cars
27 and all the ammunition in the ammo dump. So we captured Bomaru,
28 but Mike Lamin and others captured Baiwala. So early in the
29 morning - let me say - I will not say early in the morning.

1 Around 8 in the morning was when Mike Lamin brought an XL, and
2 one of my colleagues called Yusufu Siilah from Ivory Coast was
3 the one who was riding the XL, and they met us in Bomaru from
4 Baiwala. So when they met us, Mike told Mohamed that he would
12:17:07 5 prefer to go and join the Pujehun troops because he said he was
6 going to the Pujehun way. So he left with Yusufu on the XL. And
7 from Baiwala, Bomaru, the soldiers escaped. We did not fight in
8 Mobai. The soldiers retreated up to Kuiva and to Baima.

9 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, I'm just seeking clarification from you. I
12:17:41 10 suspect I know what you mean, but I want your answer. XL is
11 what?

12 A. XL is a motorcycle, XL-125. It's a very good motorcycle
13 for rough roads.

14 Q. The second thing is this: First of all, prior to going to
12:18:08 15 Camp Naama, had you received any military training?

16 A. No.

17 Q. What you've described with that attack in which you were
18 involved, was that the first time you were involved in a military
19 operation of that kind?

12:18:29 20 A. Yes, sir, that was my first time to have an experience in
21 attacking, but I was not very brave like the other men. I was
22 not even physically fit.

23 Q. Were you frightened?

24 A. Yes, because that was my first time to have such an
12:18:53 25 experience in my life.

26 Q. Now, after that attack, Mr Sesay - and remember, let's try
27 and keep it slowly - what happened after that?

28 A. Well, after that attack, we joined up with the group at
29 Baiwala. Mohamed divided the group. The other one - the one

1 group came towards Sakiema, the other one went to Mobai, and they
2 went up to Loma Junction and they moved to Kui va. They captured
3 Kui va, and we came to Mobai, because there were no soldiers in
4 Mobai and we captured Mobai. And after two days, Mohamed and
12:19:39 5 other advanced to come to Pendembu because in Pendembu also there
6 was no fighting, the soldiers retreated and they went to Manowa
7 and they went to Bunumbu. From that time, the Koindu group as
8 well captured Koindu, and we came to Kailahun Town, and they
9 joined us in Pendembu.

12:20:03 10 Q. Now, from the time your group left Camp Sokoto in those
11 four trucks until you arrived in Pendembu, as you've just
12 described, did you see Charles Taylor?

13 A. No, I did not see him.

14 Q. Now, how did things progress after Pendembu?

12:20:42 15 A. Well, after we captured Pendembu was when Foday Sankoh came
16 from Liberia. When he came, he held a meeting in Baiwala with
17 the civilians. He came to Mobai. He came to Pendembu. And
18 during those meetings, he used to tell the civilians in the court
19 barris that the people should join the revolution and that they
12:21:04 20 should give their - provide their children to go for training.

21 And he moved to Kailahun, Buedu and all the other towns, and we
22 had meetings there. And the people of Kailahun, in 1991, nobody
23 forced them. They came voluntarily in thousands and they joined
24 the RUF, because the - before the end of 1991, RUF had got about
12:21:28 25 8,000 to 10,000 men in Kailahun from those training bases.

26 Q. Now, I'm glad that you've paused, Mr Sesay, because I'd
27 like to clarify one or two matters. Now, first of all, in those
28 meetings that Foday Sankoh had in Baiwala, Mobai, Pendembu, just
29 give us a bit more detail about what he was saying to the

1 civilian population of Kailahun. What was he saying to them?

12:22:28 2 A. Like the meeting which I witnessed in Pendembu, when
3 Foday Sankoh arrived in Pendembu the people came. Many people, a
4 large population, came to the court barri, and I saw people who
5 had known Mr Sankoh before. One woman came and embraced him and
6 they said that one is Mr Sankoh's wife. They have children,
7 older children like myself. We saw other people saying hello to
8 him. So I concluded that these people had known Mr Sankoh and he
9 too knew them before.

12:22:50 10 So during that time he told the people that the revolution
11 was for them and that he needed their cooperation and that they
12 should join the revolution by sending their children to go and
13 train and they will become combatants of the RUF. And Foday
14 Sankoh was talking about, you know, the people of Kailahun, about
12:23:10 15 how they had been neglected, and so the people bought the story.

16 Q. The second aspect of that that I want to clarify is this:
17 When you say that Mr Sankoh told the people to send their
18 children - "children", what are you talking about there?

12:23:47 19 A. You know, like myself, like my age, I can be somebody
20 else's child. You know, talking to chiefs, to elderly people,
21 you know, he was referring to adult children. Talking about
22 providing your people to go and join the RUF doesn't mean that
23 they were actually small children. They were adult children. It
24 was adults. Elderly people went to the training bases in
12:24:12 25 secondary schools, because mostly that was - that was where
26 Foday Sankoh said they should open the training bases. Because
27 at Pendembu it was the vocational school that the training base
28 was established. So when I said "children", it doesn't mean they
29 were actually small children. They were adult children, because

1 they were children of their parents.

2 Q. Now, training bases, where were training bases set up?

3 A. Like Baiwala, the school that was there, there was a base
4 there. Pendembu, at the vocational secondary school, there was a
12:24:54 5 base there. And Kailahun National Secondary School was another
6 training base. And Koindu, Kissi Bendu Secondary School was
7 another training base.

8 Q. And Mr Sesay, help us: Who was in charge of training at
9 each of these bases?

12:25:21 10 A. Well, when we came to Pendembu was when I came to know
11 Mr CO Kargbo. He was appointed by Mr Sankoh as battle group
12 commander. We had some Vanguarders at these bases who were
13 training the recruits. Like CO Kargbo was the battle group, he
14 supervised the various bases. Because like Kailahun, for
12:25:52 15 example, it was Memuna Sesay who was there as training
16 commandant.

17 Q. Now, at this point, Mr Sesay, what rank did you have?

18 A. At this time I had no rank. The only title we were all
19 referred to as were - was Vanguarders.

12:26:26 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, the witness mentioned a Sesay who
21 was a training commandant at Kailahun. Did you say Memunatu or
22 Mymuna? What did you say?

23 THE WITNESS: Well, the name is Memunatu, but we used to
24 shorten it to Memuna. But it's the same person, Memunatu.

12:26:54 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Now, pausing again for a moment, Mr Sesay, at this point in
27 time at the launch of the invasion, can you help us with the
28 hierarchical structure of the RUF? First of all, who was the man
29 - the person in charge?

1 A. During this time the leader was the CIC Foday Sankoh. He
2 was in charge.

3 Q. And the next rung down from him, who was there?

4 A. After that we had Mohamed Tarawalli. He was the
12:27:40 5 battlefield commander. And we had CO Kargbo, who was the battle
6 group commander.

7 Q. And then below them?

8 A. After the battle group commander - below the battle group
9 commander we had target commanders and unit commanders.

12:28:09 10 Q. And below them?

11 A. Below the unit commanders - below the unit commanders,
12 except junior ranking officers and the civilian administrators.

13 Q. Okay, thank you for that. Now, you've told us that
14 Foday Sankoh's appeal to the people of Pendembu and the other
12:28:44 15 places where he spoke resulted in some 8,000 to 10,000 people
16 joining the RUF; is that correct?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Over what period of time did the numbers swell to that?

19 A. Well, it was throughout '91 there was training going on in
12:29:12 20 Kailahun, so let me say the end of '91. At that time the RUF had
21 attained that figure in the Kailahun District.

22 Q. Now, those NPFL fighters who had come with you, were they
23 under the command of Foday Sankoh in the structure you've just
24 described, or what?

12:29:40 25 A. Yes, they were under the command of Mr Sankoh, those whom
26 Anthony Mekunagbe had given Mr Sankoh in Lofa. But when the war
27 started in Sierra Leone, let me say around six months' time the
28 ULIMOs were with the Government of Sierra Leone, the government
29 troop, so the ULIMO had the bases in the Kenema District, because

1 it was there that they were training their men and they were
2 dividing themselves into groups. One group would go by Pujehun,
3 and the other one would come to Kailahun through Joru. So during
4 that period Mr Sankoh came with Anthony Mekunagbe and Sam Tuah
12:30:36 5 and other people, and they brought another set of troops and
6 munitions, and Foday Sankoh told Mohamed that these men are here
7 to join you to attack the ULIMO bases, so that they will help to
8 you fight against the ULIMO, so that they cannot occupy the RUF
9 territory in the Kailahun District or to block them not to cross
12:30:59 10 the border into Liberia, because in late - because in late '91
11 they used to apply pressure on the borders in Sierra Leone,
12 because it was in Joru that they had a base - their main base.
13 So they would divide their group: One group would go by Pujehun,
14 and the other would come with the SLAs towards the Kailahun
12:31:23 15 District. So these two from Joru Mendekoma, they come to Naama,
16 from Naama up to Nyandehun Junction, and from there they would
17 attack Jojoima and Kuiva, and they would come towards the Biawala
18 border.

19 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. Who was based at Joru?

12:31:40 20 A. The SLA and the ULIMOs, but the ULIMOs had a training base
21 in Joru.

22 Q. And so just so that we're clear, about six months after the
23 invasion begins, Anthony Mekunagbe comes with some additional
24 NPFL fighters. Is that right?

12:32:12 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. And also with ammunition; is that correct?

27 A. Yes, the ammunition - the truck that was brought to
28 Foday Sankoh, it was off-loaded at Foday Sankoh's mansion in
29 Pendembu.

1 Q. Was it just ammunition or were there arms as well?

2 A. No, the men who came were armed. It was only ammunitions.
3 The first that came were armed.

4 Q. And you've told us that these additional combatants - NPFL
12:32:49 5 combatants came in order to fight ULIMO. Is that right?

6 A. Yes. That was why the fight was purely around the Kui va
7 flank. So it was near Ni ama and Joru. They were the ones who
8 came to attack the Giema Dama that is the Kenema District. They
9 were trying to capture Joru because if you capture Joru, then
10 you've blocked the route going to Zimmi and towards the Kailahun
11 way and Giema. That's where they were fighting.

12 Q. Now, these additional NPFL combatants, were they too under
13 the command of Foday Sankoh?

14 A. Yes. At that time when they came, Foday Sankoh was the
12:33:47 15 leader. So, whosoever was in Sierra Leone fighting must have
16 been under the supervision of Mr Sankoh - under the control of
17 Mr Sankoh.

18 Q. Now, were these combatants successful in fighting ULIMO?

19 A. Well, these fighters were fighting ULIMO, but they did not
12:34:21 20 succeed because they were committing crimes against the civilians
21 and some junior RUF commanders, and even we ourselves, the
22 vanguards, you know. So they were doing these things, and when
23 one of the vanguards named Edward Fembeh, he organised the junior
24 forces in Mende Bui ma. He organised a Poro society against the
12:34:46 25 NPFL fighters, and at night the Poro society came out and they
26 were chasing the NPFL fighters in Mende Bui ma. And the
27 information got to Pendembu, to Baima, Kui va, and the NPFL
28 organised themselves under the command of Sam Tuah, Pa James.
29 They came to Pendembu and they arrested the acting paramount

1 chief at that time named Pa Sillah. He was executed, and some
2 other prominent civilians were executed.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness slow down?

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, you really need to make an
12:35:32 5 effort to slow down, and while you are giving your answers, what
6 might help is if you face the judges rather than counsel.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, I want to clarify what you've told us, okay?

9 A. Okay. Okay.

12:35:51 10 Q. You said these fighters were fighting ULIMO, but they did
11 not succeed because they were committing crimes against the
12 civilians. Who was committing crimes against the civilians?

13 A. I said the NPFL. They were killing civilians, harassing
14 civilians; and even us, the vanguard, they used to intimidate us
12:36:15 15 and the junior forces. That's why Edward Fembeh --

16 Q. Organised the Poro society, you told us, yes? And then in
17 retaliation, the NPFL under Sam Tuah, you said, went to Pendembu,
18 arrested the acting paramount chief Pa Sillah, and executed him
19 and some other prominent civilians. Is that right?

12:36:45 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't think the witness mentioned Sam
21 Tuah. I have the name Sahr James or Sam James.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. I'm sorry, who was it who organised --

24 A. I called "Sam Tuah", ma'am. I said Pa James and Sam Tuah.
12:37:00 25 So when they got this information, they came from Kui va with many
26 fighters and they came to Pendembu. They arrested the late
27 paramount chief - the late Acting Chief Pa Sillah, and he was
28 executed with other prominent civilians who were working with the
29 RUF in Pendembu.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Now, how did the RUF feel about that, Mr Sesay, about the
3 NPFL treating a paramount chief and other prominent civilians who
4 were working with the RUF in that way, how did you feel?

12:37:41 5 A. Well, at this stage I and others, Morris Kallon, CO
6 Mohamed, who were under the command of Mohamed Tarawalli, we
7 crossed the Moa and went to Bunumbu. So when we heard this
8 information and that the thing was still extending, they even
9 went to Kailahun, killed people. So at the initial stage we were
12:38:07 10 afraid to go there. So the government soldiers had then started
11 attacking our position seriously in Bunumbu, so we decided to
12 withdraw. We withdrew and we came back. We had to hide in the
13 bush, and over two - after two weeks we heard that Mr Sankoh had
14 returned. So we went to Pendembu to meet with Pa Sankoh, and we
12:38:33 15 met him at his ground, the Executive Mansion, and he was briefed
16 by Mohamed Tarawalli about the situation. And he said, yes, that
17 was the reason why they started to run and come back to Pendembu,
18 because I got the information, and this is actually bad, so --

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: You cannot continue running like this,
12:38:49 20 okay? Please slow down. I've requested you so many times to
21 slow down. Make an effort, please.

22 THE WITNESS: Okay, my Lord, I will try.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, you were telling us how Mr Sankoh had arrived, yes,
12:39:08 25 and he was briefed. Is that right, Mr Sesay?

26 A. Yes, sir, that was what I said.

27 Q. Now, just so that we can put all of this in context, this
28 outbreak of problems between the RUF and the NPFL, roughly when
29 did that start? You've told us these additional NPFL combatants

1 arrived about six months after the invasion, so that would be
2 around about September time in 1991, yes?

3 A. Do you mean the time they started misbehaving, when they
4 started executing people?

12:39:54 5 Q. Yes, when they started misbehaving, can you give us a rough
6 time for that?

7 A. Yes, that was in late '91. Towards the end of '91 to early
8 - but anyway, the fight between - the issue of killing, when they
9 went and started killing people in their villages, misbehaving,
10 up to the time Mr Sankoh came, I think it was around April.

11 April 2000. No, sorry, April 1992. Because I recall when
12 Mr Sankoh went to complain and Dpoe Menkarzon came, and he said
13 they came to withdraw all their troops. Mr Sankoh went and
14 complained. But let me just take it from the way things actually

12:40:47 15 started happening. When we came and met Mr Sankoh in Pendembu,
16 you know, and Mohamed explained to him, and then he too replied
17 that he had got the information and that he had seen how people
18 had started escaping from the towns, including Pendembu itself.

19 So the following day Sam Tuah, Pa James got the information that
12:41:10 20 we had all gone to see Pa Sankoh in Pendembu. So they came on
21 board a truck --

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: And now you will slow down, okay? Why
23 can't you slow down? Let me ask. Let me ask: What problem is
24 there? Why can you not slow down?

12:41:21 25 THE WITNESS: My Lord, I will try, Ma'am, please. Patient
26 with me.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Go on, Mr Sesay.

29 A. So this gentleman then came, Sam Tuah, Pa James, they came

1 and met us at Mr Sankoh's place. They disarmed all of us,
2 Mr Sankoh's bodyguards, they arrested us, and they tied us in
3 presence of Mr Sankoh and they put us on board the truck. And
4 they said all the followers with Mohamed should be detained,
12:42:00 5 because they said it was Mohamed who incited Fembeh for them to
6 organise to fight against the NPFL.

7 Q. And then?

8 A. When this situation took place in the presence of Mr Sankoh
9 and we were taken to Kui va --

12:42:22 10 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
11 to repeat that last bit.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Could you just repeat that, please, because the translator
14 didn't catch that, Mr Sesay. I'm sorry.

12:42:34 15 A. Well, when we arrived in Kui va we were all tied on our
16 backs and when we got there we disembarked. They flogged us and
17 they executed Augustine Banabay [phon], one of my friends, he was
18 executed that evening, and some of us were locked up. And they
19 said by tomorrow if we do not kill Morris Kallon we will either
12:43:00 20 kill Issa or Keifa Wai. So they said every day they would kill
21 one of us. So luckily as they were taking us to Kui va, Mr Sankoh
22 too left and travelled to Liberia to go and complain to Mr Taylor
23 and within the next 28 hours to 72 hours Dopoe Menkarzon came to
24 Kui va and when he came he said he had got orders to withdraw all
12:43:27 25 the NPFL, Sam Tuah and every one of them to go back to Liberia.
26 So it was Dopoe who released us.

27 So when we were released we stayed in Kui va and the NPFL,
28 whilst Dopoe was there, they started leaving. So most of them
29 returned to Liberia. But some of them in Kailahun, Buedu they

1 refused to return. So at that time Mr Sankoh had changed
2 Mr Kargbo as the battle group and appointed - because of the
3 actions of the NPFL, Mr Sankoh was looking at - he looked at
4 Mr Kargbo as though he was not fit to be the battle group because
12:44:19 5 he could not stop the NPFL. So he decided to appoint Isaac
6 Mongor as acting battle group until the return of Rashid. So
7 during the Top 20 operation, because that was how the guys
8 referred to the operation, they said Top 20, and it was then the
9 Top 40 that was going on when they retreated.

12:44:41 10 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
11 again to repeat that area and slow down, please.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, nothing of what you have just
13 said was recorded because we didn't hear an interpretation.
14 Repeat from where you said, "So during the Top 20 operation,
12:44:59 15 because that was how the guys referred to the operation".
16 Continue from there. Slowly, please.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. I said during the Top 20
18 operation they went on and referred to another name, they said
19 Top 40. And it was then that Mr Sankoh appointed Isaac Mongor as
12:45:24 20 acting battle group. Isaac Mongor, late CO Foday, Michael
21 Bonday, all of them organised the junior forces in Pendembu and
22 they too said, well, they were are now going to attack the
23 Liberians and they also referred to the operation as Operation
24 Top Final. Then Morris Kallon also said those of us who were in
12:45:53 25 Kuiwa, we should mobilise ourselves and chase those who were at
26 Baiwala and all of them escaped and went back into Liberia. So
27 since then those who remained, they were now vanguards.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now, I want to go back now that you've given us that chunk

1 of testimony and just clarify one or two things. You mentioned
2 Top 20, Top 40, Top Final?

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. Roughly when was Top 20, Mr Sesay?

12:46:32 5 A. Top 20 started around March - March 1992. March to April.

6 Q. And when was Top 40?

7 A. Top 40 was late - late May. Because it only took place for
8 one week and that was when we also organised ourselves for the
9 Top Final.

12:46:58 10 Q. Now, you said that it was around about Top 40 that Anthony
11 Mekunagbe came to withdraw the NPFL fighters. Is that right?

12 A. It was during Top 20 that Dopoe Menkarzon came to Kui va and
13 those of us who were in the cell, he released us. He said he got
14 an order from Mr Taylor to come and withdraw all the NPFL

12:47:29 15 fighters. And indeed we were in Kui va when he released us from
16 the detention and his men started going on board the trucks and
17 they all went back towards the Liberian way.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, exactly what was Top 40?
19 The witness referred to it in name but didn't explain what it
12:47:48 20 was.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. What was Top 40, Mr Sesay?

23 A. Well, the Top 40, that name when it was given, it was the
24 time they went there, they arrested us --

12:48:03 25 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
26 to slow down.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, slow down again and explain
28 again what Top 40 was, please.

29 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said it was when we had been

1 arrested in Pendembu and we were tied in front of Mr Sankoh and
2 we were taken to Kui va and they said the operation was called Top
3 40 then, and this was the operation in which case they wanted to
4 arrest all the vanguards.

12:48:38 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who? I'm not sure who wanted to arrest.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Who arrested the vanguards?

8 A. It was Pa James who came to arrest us upon the instruction
9 of Sam Tuah from Kui va. They came to arrest us and we were the
10 vanguards who were with Foday Sankoh. And it included even the
11 Special Forces commander, Mohamed Tarawalli. They came to arrest
12 us. And they tied us in the presence of Mr Sankoh and even when
13 you look at Kallon's forehead you will see the cut from the
14 bayonet when he was cut in front of Mr Sankoh. And if I take off
15 my jacket also you will see the black mark on my elbow. We were
16 tied with strings in the presence of Mr Sankoh. So we also
17 decided to organise a Top Final and they decided to withdraw
18 them. Mr Sankoh too went and complained and the order came.

12:49:18 19 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:49:40 20 Q. And can you give us a date, Mr Sesay, for Top Final?

21 A. Well, the Top Final was around June.

22 Q. Of which year?

23 A. 1992.

24 Q. Now taking things slowly, after Top Final and Anthony
12:50:14 25 Mekunagbe's removal of NPFL forces, did any members of the NPFL
26 remain behind in Sierra Leone?

27 A. Yes, some NPFL, some junior ones stayed, like Superman.
28 Those who stayed, they became RUF, because like Superman, CO Nya
29 - Superman, CO Nya, CO Morrison, they were there. They were

1 there but their number was not that large. CO Barbay [phon],
2 they all stayed. Few of them. But they decided to become RUF.

3 Q. Now, when the majority of the NPFL left in or about June
4 1992, did that have any impact on the RUF as a fighting force?

12:51:22 5 A. Yes, that affected - in fact it created serious panic among
6 the civilian population and they were saying, "Oh, these people,
7 the Liberians have left, will they be able to fight this war?"
8 Then we, Mr Sankoh, also decided to organise some ambush
9 operations so that after Isaac would have attacked the Liberians
12:51:45 10 in Kailahun Town and chased them up to Koindu to the border and
11 the civilians, when they heard this information, most of the
12 areas around Mano Sewaru, Sandiaru, they were afraid, you know,
13 because some of the civilians around that area had organised
14 themselves and started going to Guinea. So --

12:52:14 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: What were the areas that you named,
16 please? What were the areas again?

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said Sandiaru and Mano
18 Sewaru, towards the Guinea border, and those areas the
19 civilians --

12:52:41 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Mr Sesay, the Isaac you mentioned is Isaac who?

22 A. This is Isaac Mongor.

23 Q. And so you say that he chased them up to Koidu to the
24 border and the civilians, when they heard this information, they
12:53:02 25 were afraid, yes, and wanted to go to Guinea, yes? So what
26 happened?

27 A. Yes, sir. So the civilians were now at the border when
28 Isaac got the information - when he was leaving Koindu to come
29 back to Kailahun he got the information and he went to the border

1 with his bodyguards and the civilians were there, men, women,
2 children, pregnant women. They said the people are up to 200 and
3 Isaac Mongor killed all of them. He killed each and every one of
4 them. So the people were - he said they were now enemies because
12:53:41 5 they were trying to escape to Guinea, so he decided to execute
6 all of them. So when he came back to Pendembu, Foday Sankoh got
7 this information -- -

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please slow down again. We've heard
9 about the execution of the 200 people or so. What happened
12:53:57 10 after?

11 THE WITNESS: From that point Isaac came to Pendembu and
12 Foday Sankoh got the information and he then decided to change -
13 to replace Isaac. So if we had said that the Liberians should go
14 back because they were killing our people and you too have gone
12:54:17 15 and done the same thing then you are not fit to be battle group,
16 so he decided to replace him.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Pause there. Now, is this the same Isaac Mongor who had
19 given a lecture at Camp Naama about killing civilians?

12:54:45 20 A. Yes, that's the same man.

21 Q. Could we look again, please, at exhibit P-277, and I'm only
22 interested in pages 85, 86 and 87. Do you see in the middle of
23 that page a subheading "Colonel Isaac Mongor"? Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, I see it.

12:55:41 25 Q. "CO Isaac (as he is popularly known) is a Liberian from
26 Grand Bassa County. During the Liberian civil war he served in
27 the artillery unit of the NPFL stationed in Harbel, Firestone,
28 until he joined the RUF in October 1990 through the inspiration
29 of Major John Kargbo (the first battle group commander of the

1 RUF). Through the recommendation of the Kallons he became a
2 senior training instructor at the Sokoto base. He claimed to
3 have been a specialist in urban guerilla warfare."

4 Pause there. The Kallons, who is that?

12:56:23 5 A. The Kallon were David Kallon and his wife Isatu Kallon,
6 Mami e I.

7 Q. So who brought Isaac Mongor to Camp Sokoto?

8 A. Well, my understanding was that it was Pa Kallon who
9 introduced Isaac Mongor to Mr Sankoh and it was Mr Sankoh himself
12:56:52 10 who brought them to Naama, Sokoto.

11 Q. Now let's continue:

12 "At the Sokoto base he lost credibility from the Sierra
13 Leonean recruits because during his theoretical lecture classes
14 he would never forget to remind his students that, 'As you get to
12:57:13 15 Sierra Leone, whenever you fight and capture a village or town
16 make sure you assemble all the people. Kill half of that number
17 and tabay (meaning tying both hands on the back of the body) the
18 rest before Papa Sankoh get to that location. By so doing, you
19 would have established your full authority over the people in the
12:57:39 20 area, some of whom may otherwise attempt to betray you by hiding
21 to get to our enemies.'

22 This persistent ideology of guerilla Professor Isaac made
23 most of the Sierra Leonean recruits uncomfortable, who brought
24 the issue to Corporal Sankoh's attention. The recruits argued
12:58:10 25 why a freedom fighter should be told to kill the very people
26 (harmless civilians) he claimed to come and free. Corporal
27 Sankoh gave CO Isaac some advice against the dangers of imparting
28 such knowledge to future armed fighters, but his advice created
29 little or no impact on CO Isaac, who continued teaching that

1 ideology at will.

2 Sometime in 1991 CO Isaac put his training base ideology
3 into reality, much to the satisfaction of the Liberian helpers
4 and to the greatest disappointment of the RUF vanguards, by
12:58:55 5 ordering the summary execution of 18 civilians in Sandialu, Luawa
6 Chiefdom in Kailahun, whom he falsely accused of passing some
7 information to the Guineans. Sandialu is very close to the
8 Guinean border by the Moa River. For this dastardly act, Colonel
9 Isaac is known in RUF circumstance circles as Tombolu, in Mende
12:59:22 10 meaning a person who has caused the desertion of a village by the
11 massacre of its inhabitants. The memories of this incident are
12 still very fresh in the minds of all junior commanders from
13 Kailahun, particularly those from Sandialu Town. Nevertheless,
14 CO Isaac remains as one of Corporal Sankoh's trusted lieutenants,
12:59:49 15 whom he maintains as battle front commander in order to
16 neutralise any dissent from Sierra Leonean vanguards at the front
17 line."

18 Then it goes on to deal with various postings. Now, that
19 reference to his lectures at Camp Sokoto, Mr Sesay, do you recall
13:00:17 20 that?

21 A. Yes, I recall that.

22 Q. And the massacre in Sandialu, do you recall that as well?

23 A. Yes, I recall that also. The only thing, when the person
24 said they were 18 people, it's a lie. Because the people who
13:00:36 25 were killed, I said they were up to 200. Those who were about 18
26 people were the ones that he killed at Tombolu. That was the
27 village between Pendembu and Giema. Those were the people whom
28 Isaac killed there in that same 1992. They were around 10 to 18.
29 But those ones at Sandialu towards the border, in fact

1 Foday Sankoh himself did say that after the war Isaac was going
2 to face his court, and that was the reason why since 1992
3 Foday Sankoh did not give him any appointment until January 1996.
4 And up to the time that I was moved from Sierra Leone, I don't
13:01:37 5 think Isaac was ever brave to go to those areas in Kailahun
6 District.

7 Q. Can we put that away now, please. Now, so far, Mr Sesay,
8 you've taken us on a journey to Camp Sokoto; through the invasion
9 in March 1991; down to Top Final in June 1992, okay? Now --

13:02:23 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- I want you to help me now, please, with a couple of
12 matters. Could the witness be shown exhibit P-54, please. This
13 is a document, Mr Sesay, which is said to represent the command
14 structure of the NPFL around about 1990 to 1991. Are you able to
13:03:44 15 assist as to the accuracy of this document?

16 A. I cannot give comments on the NPFL command structure, so I
17 don't know.

18 Q. Why can't you give any comment on the NPFL command
19 structure?

13:04:06 20 A. Well, in 1990 I was not a member of the NPFL, so I did not
21 even know their structure.

22 Q. Very well. Could the witness now be shown exhibit P-56
23 then, please. Now taking things in stages, first of all take
24 your time and have a look at that document, Mr Sesay. You will
13:05:02 25 see that it is headed, "RUF command structure around about
26 February to October 1996", okay? Ignore the date for the moment.
27 Now, help us. Taking your time, is this diagram accurate?

28 A. Well, this diagram - like, between February to October, in
29 fact, the whole of - between February to October we had no battle

1 group commander in the RUF. The position was a vacant one.

2 Q. That's in February to October 1996, yes?

3 A. Yes, sir. Because it is February that is on the document.

4 But minus the document, since part of 1995 to October 1996 we had
13:06:16 5 no battle group in the RUF.

6 Q. So where it says here "battlefield commander Mohamed
7 Tarawalli, aka Zino," for the time period shown on this document
8 we should really cross that out, shouldn't we? Because it's not
9 accurate; would you agree?

13:06:37 10 A. Yes, sir.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, no, no. Mr Griffiths, there's a
12 difference between battle group and battlefield. I thought the
13 witness said we had no battle group commander. That would take
14 it down to Sam Bockarie.

13:06:54 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay.

16 Q. So you said battle group commander, Mr Sesay, yes?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. And you say that in this period there was no such position;
19 Is that right?

13:07:07 20 A. No, sir.

21 Q. So really where we see "battle group commander", in order
22 to make this diagram more accurate we should cross that out,
23 shouldn't we?

24 A. Yes, sir, because in reality this battle group commander
13:07:27 25 office was not functioning since January up to October. This
26 office was not functioning within the RUF. All instructions came
27 from the leader to the field commander or from the leader to the
28 area commanders, because that was how the leader operated. But
29 we did not have a battle group at this time. The battle group

1 had a problem in Mattru Jong, Sierra Rutile, during the attack on
2 Rutile. So they said he killed a fighter because the fighter
3 killed someone, so Mr Sankoh recalled him to Zogoda. That was in
4 mid '95, and he arrested him and he was locked up. From there he
13:08:24 5 sent him to the training base, and he was demoted from his
6 assignment as battle group - as a major to staff sergeant. So he
7 sent him to Peyima as a battalion commander. So during this time
8 the former battle group was now a battalion commander from
9 January to October 1996, and Foday Sankoh did not appoint any
13:08:48 10 other person to be battle group.

11 Q. Now, who was the person who was demoted, Mr Sesay?

12 A. That was Sam Bockarie.

13 Q. Now, let's go back to the diagram, please. Is there
14 anything else on that diagram which you disagree with? Could the
13:09:08 15 witness be shown the diagram, please. Having crossed out "battle
16 group commander", is there anything else you disagree with?

17 A. Yes, I disagree with the brigade structure. By then we did
18 not have brigades, we only had areas - area commanders. And from
19 area commanders we had battalion commanders.

13:09:34 20 Q. So just spell out for us, then, who were the area
21 commanders?

22 A. Well, between February to October '96, Peter Vandi was the
23 area commander for Kailahun; Kennedy Matthew Sesay was the area
24 commander for Peyima; Isaac Mongor was the area commander for
13:10:12 25 Kangari Hills; Dennis Mingo, Superman, was the commander - area
26 commander for Western Jungle Bradford; and Michael Bonday was the
27 area commander for Pujehun District; and Morris Kallon was the
28 area commander for Bo Jungle. So those are the area commanders
29 between this period up to '96.

1 Q. Let's approach that exercise in a different way, Mr Sesay.
2 Where we see in that box "brigade area commanders", was Morris
3 Kallon the commander for Pujehun and Bo?

4 A. Well, Morris Kallon was controlling Bo as area commander,
13:11:08 5 and Michael Bonday was the area commander for Pujehun.

6 Q. So what we should do then is cross out "Pujehun" next to
7 Morris Kallon's name, shouldn't we?

8 A. Yes, my Lord. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Now, then we see "Northern Jungle, Isaac Mongor", yes? Is
13:11:32 10 that correct?

11 A. Yes, that's correct.

12 Q. So we can tick that. "Kailahun, Issa Sesay, suspended"; is
13 that correct?

14 A. Yes, since November 1995 I was not area commander until May
13:11:49 15 1997. I was not area commander.

16 Q. So should we tick that as being correct?

17 A. No, to say --

18 Q. You see "Kailahun, Issa Sesay"; is that correct?

19 A. Issa Sesay's suspended, yes, because I was not there. It
13:12:12 20 was Peter Vandi who was there as area commander.

21 Q. "Western Area, Dennis Mingo aka Superman"; is that correct?

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 Q. Then we see "deputy commanders". Now, you say that Peter
24 Vandi was the area commander in Kailahun, so was he a deputy to
13:12:40 25 himself in Kailahun?

26 A. Well, during this time, or let me say before this time, his
27 deputy was Vandy Kosi a and when I was there as area commander, it
28 was then that Peter Vandi was there as deputy. But when I left
29 in November to go for medical in Abidjan, Ivory Coast,

1 Foday Sankoh appointed Peter Vandi as area commander, and Vandy
2 Kosi a served as his deputy.

3 Q. Right. So where it says "deputy commander, Kailahun, Peter
4 Vandi at this time"; is that correct, or not?

13:13:26 5 A. No, around this time February to October, no, it's not
6 correct.

7 Q. Right. So let's cross that out. Then we see "Pujehun,
8 Michael Rogers, Deputy Commander"; is that correct?

9 A. No. Michael Rogers was area commander in Pujehun.

13:13:43 10 Q. So that's wrong; yes? So let's cross that out as well.
11 "Bo Jungle, Boston Flomo aka Rambo, deputy commander"; is that
12 correct?

13 A. Yes. It was Rambo who was deputy to Kallon.

14 Q. Now, next to that we see a box bearing the legend "overall
13:14:12 15 unit commanders"; do you see that?

16 A. Yes, I've seen it.

17 Q. Was Augustine Gbao the overall security commander?

18 A. Yes, during this time.

19 Q. Was Co Nya the overall signal commander?

13:14:37 20 A. No, it was not CO Nya.

21 Q. Who was it?

22 A. During this time it was Zman who was the overall signal
23 commander, and then when Foday Sankoh came...

24 Q. Yes, Mr Sesay?

13:15:22 25 A. It was Zman who was there as overall signals commander.

26 Q. So whoever drew up this diagram has got that wrong as well.
27 So we should cross out "CO Nya", yes?

28 A. Yes, since '93 CO Nya never - before '93 CO Nya never
29 became overall signal commander up to the end.

1 Q. Thank you. Was CO Brown the overall G4 commander at this
2 time?

3 A. At this time CO Brown - at this time CO Brown was not in
4 Sierra Leone. CO Brown had gone to Ivory Coast around April, May
13:16:16 5 and he was there up to October. He was there with Mr Sankoh.

6 Q. So again that's wrong. So we should cross that out, yes?

7 A. Yes, because he was not there.

8 Q. Thank you. What about the "overall G5 commander, Prince
9 Taylor"; Is that right?

13:16:36 10 A. Yes, Prince was the overall G5 between this time.

11 Q. And the "overall Military Police commander, Kai Seku"; is
12 that correct?

13 A. Yes, Kai Seku.

14 Q. Now, below that we see various headings: Military Police,
15 Signal Unit, SBU, Internal Defence Unit, Intelligence Office," so
16 on and so forth, yes? Is all of that accurately set out?

17 A. No, some of these units I don't know, but they were not
18 functioning. But the MP was functioning as a unit.

19 Q. That's the Military Police?

13:17:38 20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. So we can tick that?

22 A. Yes, sir. Same for the Signal Unit. The SBU was not a
23 functional unit like the other units were operating.

24 Q. So we can cross that out, yes?

13:17:57 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. Internal Defence Unit, was that functioning?

27 A. Yes, sir.

28 Q. So we tick that. Intelligence Office, was that
29 functioning?

- 1 A. Yes, sir, it was functioning.
- 2 Q. S4, Supplies and Logistics, was that functioning?
- 3 A. Yes, all areas had S4 and they were functioning.
- 4 Q. G2 Intelligence, was that functioning?
- 13:18:28 5 A. It was not functioning, because it was the G2 that
6 Foday Sankoh changed to the Internal Defence Unit.
- 7 Q. Was the Arms and Ammunition G4 functioning?
- 8 A. Yes, every area had their own G4.
- 9 Q. G5 --
- 13:18:50 10 A. Where they kept their arms - yes, they functioned.
- 11 Q. [Microphone not activated] was functioning?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. [Microphone not activated] what about --
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you please not speak at the same
13:19:00 15 time, because the record is completely messed up.
- 16 MR GRIFFITHS:
- 17 Q. Was G5, Civilians, functioning?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. And was WACs functioning?
- 13:19:21 20 A. Yes, WACs Unit was there.
- 21 Q. Let's go to the top of the page now, please. The Black
22 Guard, Commander Rambo, a Liberian, not Boston Flomo; is that
23 correct?
- 24 A. Yes. This was one of my colleagues with whom I trained.
- 13:19:51 25 Q. What was his real name?
- 26 A. It's Joseph something, but I've forgotten the second name.
- 27 Q. Don't worry about that.
- 28 A. No, sorry, it's Daniel Wankay [phon]. I think it's Daniel
29 Wankay. Something like that.

1 Q. I'm grateful for that. And was Mohamed Tarawalli, Zino,
2 the battlefield commander?

3 A. Yes, he was the one.

13:20:33

4 Q. Now, the war council advisers to Sankoh, we see there SYB
5 Rogers, Mike Lamin tasked with teaching ideology to the
6 commanders. Do you see that? Is that correct?

7 A. No, at this time Mike Lamin was not - was no longer
8 responsible for teaching of ideology. Mike Lamin had left the
9 RUF since late 1991 until January 1996, when he returned back to
10 the RUF.

13:21:05

11 Q. Just so that I'm clear about that, so Mike Lamin left the
12 RUF from late 1991 all the way through until January 1996. Is
13 that right?

14 A. Yes, you are correct, sir.

13:21:30

15 Q. Where had he gone?

16 A. Well, what happened was in Pujehun District they said Mike
17 Lamin killed two NPFL fighters, so Oliver Varney ordered his
18 arrest, so he had to hide and he went to Monrovia. So since then
19 he was living in Monrovia. He was in Monrovia until January,
20 when he went to Ivory Coast and met the external delegation in
21 Danane. So it was then that he was able to talk to Mr Sankoh
22 through the radio, and Mr Sankoh asked him to come through Guinea
23 and come to Kailahun. And when he came there, he went to Zogoda
24 and met Mr Sankoh.

13:21:53

25 Q. I see. So between February and October 1996 where was Mike
26 Lamin?

13:22:11

27 A. Well, when Mike came in January, he had a meeting with
28 Mr Sankoh. During that meeting, Mr Sankoh promoted Mike as the
29 overall area commander and he gave him his rank back as major

1 because before the start of the war in '91 he was one of our
2 majors, so Mr Sankoh still recognised him as one of the majors,
3 so he appointed him as the overall area commander. So from then
4 he asked him to visit the various areas. That was before
13:23:11 5 Mr Sankoh's departure for the Ivory Coast from Zogoda. So Mike
6 Lamin went to the Northern Jungle. He met with the commanders in
7 the Northern Jungle. From there he went to the Western Jungle.
8 He met with Superman, and then he came back to Zogoda. By then,
9 when he came to Camp Zogoda back he met me there, so we were
13:23:38 10 there together until the end of September, when we went back to
11 Kailahun. And in October when Zogoda was attacked, Mike Lamin
12 then went to Pujehun. He led the RUF troops from Zogoda to
13 Pujehun. And when he got to Pujehun, as a result of the attacks
14 from the government troops and the Kamajors, so thousands of RUF
13:24:10 15 fighters were then pushed - were forced to surrender to the ULIMO
16 in Liberia. That was now going towards November 1996.

17 Q. Did that include Mike Lamin, who surrendered to ULIMO?

18 A. Yes, he was the most senior RUF man amongst them in the
19 group.

13:24:33 20 Q. Right. So let's just put that together. Late 1991 he
21 leaves, returning in January 1996. He's back with the RUF as a
22 major until November 1996, when he surrenders to ULIMO in
23 Liberia. Is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

13:24:57 25 Q. When did you next see him?

26 A. Well, after he had surrendered he lived in Liberia. Then
27 the only time I saw him again was in 1997 during the AFRC time,
28 because he was also under custody in Ivory Coast because he left
29 Monrovia. He tried to go and see Mr Sankoh in Abidjan. When he

1 got to Abidjan, by then Mr Sankoh had gone to Abuja, and Philip
2 Palmer and others had said they are taking over the leadership.
3 So they arranged with the Ivorian securities for him to be
4 arrested, so he was locked up. It was only when the coup of the
13:25:51 5 AFRC took place that he was released and he came back through
6 Kailahun. He came to Monrovia and came to Kailahun.

7 Q. So if we put all of that together then, between the
8 invasion of Sierra Leone and the AFRC coup, Mike Lamin was in
9 Sierra Leone from March 1991, yes, through to the end of 1991.

13:26:29 10 Is that right?

11 A. Repeat your question, please.

12 Q. Between '91 and '97, Mike Lamin is in Sierra Leone from the
13 time of the invasion until he leaves in late 1991. Is that
14 right?

13:26:51 15 A. No. I will agree with part of what you have said, because
16 Mike Lamin was in Sierra Leone during the invasion and they were
17 the authorities then from March to late '91, and then he went to
18 Liberia. He stayed in Monrovia until January '96. He came back
19 and rejoined the RUF, and he was with the RUF until November '96.

13:27:14 20 He crossed over again and surrendered to ULIMO, but in March when
21 Foday Sankoh promoted us, he also promoted Mike Lamin as colonel,
22 who was adviser to the field commander Bockarie. And from June -
23 from late June, Mike Lamin came back. He was with the RUF until
24 the intervention - until after the intervention up to the time of
13:27:45 25 Lome he was still with the RUF.

26 Q. I'm grateful for that, Mr Sesay. I wonder if we could put
27 that document away now, please. What I was coming to, Mr Sesay,
28 is this: That document claimed to show the structure of the RUF
29 in 1996. Does it bear any relationship to the structure of the

1 RUF at the time of Top Final?

2 A. No, no. No, this has nothing to do with the RUF structure.

3 Q. At the time of Top Final?

4 A. Yes.

13:28:38 5 Q. So help me. At the time of Top Final, who is in charge of
6 the RUF?

7 A. Well, when you talk about the high command it was still
8 Foday Sankoh who was in charge of the RUF in terms of - and
9 Mohamed was field commander and we had - at the start of the Top
13:29:13 10 Final we had Isaac Mongor as the battle group but at that time
11 then in '92 Isaac Mongor was not battle group.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly that would be a convenient time
14 to break for lunch. We will reconvene at 2.30.

13:29:36 15 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

16 [Upon resuming at 2.36 p.m.]

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, please
18 continue.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I first mention a change of
14:36:16 20 representation? Mr Anyah and the Principal Defender, along with
21 the case manager, has left us and we're joined by Ms Fatiah
22 Bal fas:

23 Q. Mr Sesay, before the luncheon adjournment we were looking
24 at the organisational structure of the RUF in February to October
14:36:39 25 1996, and then we went back to that period right at the outset,
26 and you informed us that at the time of Top Final the high
27 command was still Foday Sankoh. Do you recall telling us that?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now, you've also helpfully, Mr Sesay, if I might say so,

1 taken us through events from March 1991 through to June 1992.

2 Now, during that period of time, could you help us with what you

3 as an individual did during that, what, 15-month period or so.

4 What did you personally do after you entered Sierra Leone?

14:37:36 5 A. Well, I was a fighter and I was with Mohamed Tarawalli.

6 Because when Foday Sankoh had said that Tarawalli should go

7 across the Moa River, I was with him together with some other

8 people.

9 Q. And you went across the Moa River for what purpose?

14:38:14 10 A. We were with Mohamed Tarawalli. We were fighting along the

11 Bunumbu axis. We were fighting along that Bunumbu axis.

12 Q. For what period of time?

13 A. Well, we fought there towards Kono at least around - before

14 that time - before we went to that point, after the Top Final,

14:38:51 15 the NPRC also was advancing towards Kailahun, so Mr Sankoh said

16 Mohamed should organise some ambushes and attacks. So I was in

17 the group of Kei fa Wai's when the NPRC advanced from Daru, and

18 Baima was captured from us, and Mobai was captured, and Kui va too

19 was captured, and Mr Sankoh said Mohamed should organise ambushes

14:39:22 20 along the road. So I was in one of the ambushes between Mobai

21 and Baima, and Kei fa Wai was the commander.

22 So our men attacked. Foday Daboh and others, the Special

23 Forces, attacked Baima. We were in the ambush, and they fell in

24 the ambush. We captured a truck that had ammunition and we

14:39:54 25 captured a BZT twin barrels. The ones who attacked Baima

26 themselves were able to capture an O6 and a BZT heavy weapon, and

27 the rockets were captured as well, many. So we retreated and we

28 brought the materials to Pendembu.

29 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. Now, you speak of the NPRC. Can

1 you explain what that stands for?

2 A. Well, NPRC - NPRC was the army group that overthrew the APC
3 in 1992, so they formed a government that was headed by Strasser
4 at that time. I don't know if it was National Provision or
14:40:58 5 Ruling Council, something like that.

6 Q. And when in 1992 did this overthrow of the AP government
7 take place?

8 A. That was April 1992.

9 Q. Now, April 1992 was around about the time of Top 40, wasn't
14:41:24 10 it?

11 A. Yes, yes.

12 Q. So at or about that time the NPRC come to power, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, you had told us earlier about the departure of the
14:41:45 15 NPFL combatants after Top Final. When that occurred, Mr Sesay,
16 what was the position within the RUF so far as arms and
17 ammunition was concerned?

18 A. That was a big problem, because the NPFL fighters who were
19 armed had been withdrawn, and so at that time the arms strength
14:42:17 20 of the RUF was very poor and there was no ammunition. That was
21 why Foday Sankoh said we should organise those ambushes.

22 Q. And those were the ambushes you were just telling us about,
23 yes?

24 A. Yes, those were the ambushes. Because before Foday Sankoh
14:42:37 25 gave the orders to Mohamed to organise the ambushes, you know,
26 the Liberians had been withdrawn, and the remaining ones, we had
27 attacked them during the Top Final. Because even Mr Sankoh at
28 that time was disgruntled at that time, and what I mean was that
29 he used to tell us that he did not expect Mr Taylor to withdraw

1 all the troops. He thought that it was the commanders who were
2 in control of the men that misbehaved that were supposed to be
3 withdrawn. But then he had withdrawn everybody, so how are we to
4 fight? So that was the time he told Mohamed to organise us to
14:43:22 5 set ambushes. That was how we got those weapons and ammunitions.
6 It was between Baima Junction and Baima - the attack on Baima.

7 Q. Now, you speak of those ambushes, Mr Sesay. Apart from
8 such ambushes, did the RUF have access to any source of arms and
9 ammunition? Apart from the ambushes.

14:43:55 10 A. Well, except the Guinea border. Because sometime in '92 -
11 around June to the end of '92, Mr Sankoh used to buy ammunition
12 from Guinea.

13 Q. From whom in Guinea?

14 A. It was from the business people. They were the ones who
14:44:26 15 made a contact with the Guinean soldiers. The Guinean soldiers
16 were selling the items. That was towards late '92.

17 Q. We will come back to arms and ammunition as a discrete
18 topic in due course, but for now I'd like you to help us in this
19 way. Now, you speak of Mr Sankoh's disgruntlement because of the
14:44:53 20 withdrawal of all the troops. Now, did that withdrawal have any
21 effect on the tactics adopted by the RUF in pursuing the war?

22 A. Yes, it had impact. Because if it were not for the
23 ammunition that we were able to capture, the RUF couldn't have
24 stood in Kailahun because the armed strength of the RUF was very
14:45:29 25 poor.

26 Q. Now, when the NPRC government came into power, did their
27 accession to power have an impact on the RUF's ability to
28 maintain ground in Kailahun and Sierra Leone generally?

29 A. Yes, because when the NPRC took power, it did not take long

1 when they got the information that the Liberians had been
2 withdrawn - that the Liberians had withdrawn. So that was the
3 move that they made, to get rid of Kailahun from the RUF. But at
4 the end of the day they were unsuccessful.

14:46:18 5 Q. I'm not sure that I'm following you, Mr Sesay. "When they
6 got information that the Liberians had been withdrawn", who is
7 "they"?

8 A. That is the NPRC. That is what I mean. That is why they
9 advanced from Daru. They captured Kui va, Mobai and Baima.
14:46:42 10 Because civilians too used to escape and they were going.
11 Because they were used to the Liberians and when the Liberians
12 had gone, they were afraid.

13 Q. And so with the withdrawal of the Liberians, the NPRC
14 advanced in Kailahun, did they?

14:47:07 15 A. Yes, they advanced - we are talking about the Kailahun
16 District. Everything is in Kailahun District. But their
17 position before the coup was Daru Barracks and Daru Town. So
18 they advanced and they captured Baima, Mobai and Kui va. These
19 were RUF positions initially.

14:47:23 20 Q. I want to leave Kailahun for a moment now, please,
21 Mr Sesay, and seek your assistance on another matter, and it's
22 this: You told us that right at the outside two trucks were sent
23 to Kailahun; another two under the command of Oliver Varney went
24 to Bomi Hills. So far as that axis in Pujehun is concerned, what
14:47:48 25 happened to it?

26 A. Well, those who went to Pujehun - at the initial stage,
27 Mr Sankoh used to go to Pujehun and return to Kailahun through
28 Bomi Hills. He used to go there and spend time in Pujehun and he
29 will return to Kailahun. But there came a time when the ULIMO

1 forces and the SLA pushed the RUF from Pujehun District. So at
2 the end of the day, the RUF created jungle bases where they were
3 right towards this time, and they carried on some killings
4 amongst themselves when Gibril carried some people - Gibril
14:48:32 5 killed some people, 28 of them. In late '92 they sent some
6 people to Kailahun to tell Mr Sankoh --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this
8 one?

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:48:45 10 Q. Could the repeat the last part of what you just said? The
11 translator missed it.

12 A. I said the RUF in Pujehun were destabilised by ULIMO and
13 the government troops. They were destabilised by that group. So
14 they could not live in the towns, except when they had to create
14:49:05 15 jungles. They were operating from there. And in late '92 they
16 sent people, about seven men, they met Mr Sankoh in Kailahun, and
17 from that they continued operating as independent group in
18 Pujehun till late '94, when they joined Mr Sankoh in Camp Zogoda.

19 Q. Now, pause for a moment. Now, first of all, these jungle
14:49:34 20 bases, what were their names, that were set up in Pujehun?

21 A. Well, the one that I knew for Pujehun was called Libya, and
22 Kailahun was called Burkina Faso.

23 Q. Thank you. Now, you mentioned Gibril killed some people,
24 28 of them. First of all, who is Gibril?

14:50:02 25 A. Gibril Massaquoi was a man who joined the RUF in the
26 Pujehun District, and later he became battalion commander in
27 Pujehun. He had different positions right up to the disarmament.

28 Q. Now, the 28 people you mentioned who were killed by him,
29 who were they?

1 A. They were Vanguard s.

2 Q. Did Foday Sankoh take any action against Gibri l Massaquoi
3 for those killings?

14:50:50

4 A. Well, when Foday Sankoh got the information he did not say
5 anything. He only said everybody should wait. So when he came
6 to Zogoda in '94, he invited Gibri l and others from Pujehun and
7 asked some questions, and Gibri l and the other ones who were
8 there, they answered the questions that Mr Sankoh had asked. So
9 Mr Sankoh said Gibri l had become the second person whom he will
10 try after the war, so everybody should wait. After the war,
11 Gibri l and Isaac were to be tried. That was how the matter was
12 resolved.

14:51:15

13 Q. Isaac being who, for the record?

14 A. Isaac Mongor. Isaac Mongor.

14:51:31

15 Q. So Sankoh was saying that at the conclusion of the war
16 those two men would be put on trial for what they had done. Is
17 that right?

18 A. Yes, that's correct.

14:51:54

19 Q. Now, you mentioned Camp Zogoda, and that's the phase that I
20 want to come on to now, Mr Sesay. Now, you've already mentioned
21 the NPRC making advances in Kailahun, yes?

22 A. Yes. When we stopped their advances, Foday Sankoh sent us
23 to advance, so we advanced under the command of Mohamed Tarawalli
24 as field commander and Sam Bockarie as target commander at that
25 time, for us to advance towards Kono District. And we crossed
26 the Moa River and we captured Sandiaru and we captured a 50
27 calibre in a truck, and the soldiers ran away and so they left
28 the ammunition in the dump. So we captured those ones too, so
29 Mohamed told us to advance to Gandorhun.

14:52:20

1 Q. And did you advance to Gandorhun?

2 A. Yes, we advanced to Gandorhun, where we captured a huge
3 amount of arms and ammunition with a BZT truck and the BZT itself
4 and three Land Rovers. Those were the ammunitions that we
14:53:08 5 advanced with to Koidu Town up to Sewafe.

6 Q. And what happened thereafter?

7 A. When we got to Sewafe, from there the NPRC mobilised
8 themselves. In fact, what they did first, when we got to Sewafe
9 the NPRC sent Alpha Jets to Pendembu that bombarded Pendembu at
14:53:35 10 the hospital and killed over 50 people in Pendembu on that day.
11 So from that, they started attacking us. In fact, that was the
12 first time that the government troops started using Alpha Jets.
13 So we were pushed out of Kono down to Kailahun. They started
14 advancing on us in Kailahun. That is towards '93 now.

14:54:00 15 Q. So we're into the year 1993 now, yes?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. And you say, "They started advancing on us in Kailahun."
18 So how did things develop thereafter?

19 A. When they started these attacks in Kailahun, at that time
14:54:26 20 we were in Kono. So Isaac Mongor, CO Kargbo, they took the 106,
21 and Foday Sankoh sent them to attack government positions in
22 Bombahun. They lost the 106, but we they were still not able to
23 stop the people. We retreated from Kono. The government troops
24 came and captured Pendembu from us. So from Pendembu Foday
14:54:54 25 Sankoh told us to attack them, and we came on the attack and I
26 got wounded. I got wounded in my left buttocks.

27 Q. Pause. Now, first of all, what is a 106?

28 A. 106 is a heavy artillery gun whose barrel looks like this
29 table. This one. It's as long as this attached to the carrier,

1 and to take the rocket and put it into it, you would have to be
2 about five in number. And you put it into the barrel, then
3 you'll fire it. It's a heavy weapon. It will go up to 5 to 6
4 miles off and if it explodes, it will cause serious problems.

14:55:53 5 Q. Thank you. Now, Mr Sesay, you mentioned being shot in your
6 left buttock, yes?

7 A. Yes, when - the attack in Pendembu for us to repel the
8 government troops. So I got wounded there, but we were not able
9 to push the men in Pendembu, so I was brought to Kailahun Town
10 and admitted in the hospital. So during that process --

14:56:17

11 Q. [Overlapping speakers]

12 A. Well, I was at the hospital for about three weeks to a
13 month - three weeks to almost a month. When I was discharged, I
14 was home taking treatment.

14:56:29

15 Q. Home where?

16 A. In Kailahun Town. I was there.

17 Q. With whom were you living at that time?

18 A. At that time I had a wife. I was with my wife and the
19 three bodyguards whom I had.

14:56:51

20 Q. Now, after the attack and capture of Pendembu, how did the
21 fortunes of the RUF fare thereafter in Kailahun?

22 A. Well, after the NPRC had captured Pendembu we tried to
23 repel the attack, but we could not. From that time I was in
24 hospital, and one day Mohamed Tarawalli came from Mafindor in a
14:57:27 25 pick-up, and I saw Jande, Pa Sankoh's girlfriend, was tied on the
26 pick-up together with her brother, who was the RUF contractor,
27 Ansu Nemahun. So I asked what happened and they said those
28 people, Mohamed had arrested them, that they were conniving with
29 the government troops and they were taken to Giahun. Mohamed

1 took them to Giehun, because at that time it was Mohamed, Sam
2 Bockarie and Rashid, they were the ones in Giehun. So they
3 conducted the investigation from there on the instruction of
4 Mr Sankoh, and I had to understand that those who were involved
14:58:09 5 were executed. So after that execution, the government troops
6 continued their move. They came and captured Giehun and they
7 captured Kailahun Town.

8 Q. Pause for a moment. Would your Honour give me a moment.
9 I'm trying to find a reference.

14:59:11 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: While counsel is finding his text,
11 Mr Witness, I am seeking a clarification from you. You said -
12 you told us about the people Jande and someone else who had been
13 tied up on a pick-up, and then you concluded by saying:

14 "So they conducted an investigation from there on the
14:59:34 15 instructions of Sankoh, and I had to understand that those who
16 were involved were executed".

17 Now, who was executed? Involved in what? And who executed
18 them? It's all not clear.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:59:51 20 Q. Mr Sesay, could we approach it in this way: You tell us
21 that whilst in hospital you see Mohamed Tarawalli in a jeep, yes,
22 with Jande tied in the back?

23 A. A pick-up. A pick-up, sir.

24 Q. In a pick-up. Just taking things slowly and carefully,
15:00:12 25 first of all, how was she tied?

26 A. Her hands were tied from her back. That was how she was at
27 the big pick-up. They said Mohamed had sent to arrest them with
28 her cousin called Nemahun.

29 Q. And for what reason had their arrest been ordered?

1 A. Well, according to - what was rumoured around was that
2 Jande and Ansu used to have meetings with one CPO Siafa, who was
3 a CPO police and was working with the NPRC, and he was a top man
4 with the NPRC. And CPO Siafa was a native of Giehun - that is
15:01:07 5 Jande's brother - and he used to come through Guinea, cross over
6 to Mafindor and he would hold meetings with Jande. Those were
7 the allegations. Ansu and Jande could have been able to be
8 giving information to CPO Siafa about the positions of RUF, and
9 this time RUF was in Kailahun and they would have been giving
15:01:39 10 information about Foday Sankoh's position and about what was
11 going on in the border --

12 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness slow down
13 and repeat this part of the answer.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, the reason I ever required from
15:01:50 15 you a clarification is because you go too fast. Now you're
16 trying to give us a clarification, but you're going too fast
17 again and the interpreter can't keep up with you. Now, please
18 repeat your testimony where you said that CPO - they would have
19 been giving information about Foday Sankoh's position and what
15:02:16 20 was going on in the border.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said Jande - the meeting
22 that they alleged that they were holding with CPO Siafa was for
23 CPO Siafa to get information to brief the NPRC government about:
24 (1), the position of the RUF in the Kailahun District; the
15:02:44 25 strength of the RUF in the Kailahun District; and the movement of
26 Mr Sankoh between Kailahun District - within the Kailahun
27 District.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. And who did Mr Sankoh order to investigate these

1 allegations?

2 A. It was Mohamed Tarawalli and Rashid. They were the ones
3 who he ordered to investigate. Mohamed did the arrest.

15:03:20

4 Q. At the time of the arrest and investigation of these
5 individuals, Mr Sesay, where are you?

6 A. I was admitted at the hospital in Kailahun Town.

7 Q. Were you involved in any part of that investigation?

15:03:47

8 A. No, sir. Throughout the investigations I did not go to
9 Giehun. In fact, I was not at my house. I was admitted at the
10 hospital. I was taking treatment.

11 Q. So where was the investigation conducted? Where?

15:04:18

12 A. The investigation was conducted in Giehun, and at this time
13 it was Giehun that was the PC Ground. Because the soldiers, the
14 NPRC - the soldiers were in Pendembu and the RUF had their Combat
15 Camp at Njaiama, and the CO Mohamed and the other commanders were
16 in Giehun. So it was there that the investigation was conducted.
17 At that time there were no civilians in Giehun. It was only the
18 combatants and the commanders that were there.

15:04:36

19 Q. And those who were implicated in this conspiracy, following
20 the investigation what happened to them?

21 A. Some of them were executed and some of them were released,
22 those of whom they said were not found guilty; but Jande was
23 killed, Ansu was killed and other fighters were killed in Giehun.
24 Because I can recall Kaisuku himself was arrested, he was beaten,
25 but he was not found guilty and so he was released.

15:05:02

26 Q. How many people in total were killed or executed?

27 A. They killed up to 40 to 50 people in Giehun.

28 Q. And who ordered those killings?

29 A. Well, it was Foday Sankoh who ordered the killings.

1 Because Rashid was in Giehun; Mohamed was there, and Mosquito
2 himself was there. The three of them conducted the investigation
3 and they carried out the executions.

4 Q. Now, you mentioned a name "Ansu". Who was Ansu?

15:05:46 5 A. Ansu was a civilian who lived in Giehun. The RUF met him
6 in Giehun when they went there and I think he was a relative, I
7 think a brother to Jande, and Foday Sankoh appointed him as the
8 RUF contractor. So he did all the RUF transactions for Foday
9 Sankoh along the Guinea border and Mafindor.

15:06:16 10 Q. Now, could the witness please be shown page 35 and 36 of
11 exhibit P-277. Do you have page 35 there, Mr Sesay?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. At the bottom of the page do you see a heading, "Jande Goba
14 and the Luawa Giehun Massacre in 1993". Do you see that?

15:07:32 15 A. Yes, I see it.

16 Q. Who is Jande Goba?

17 A. That is Foday Sankoh's girlfriend whom I said was arrested
18 by Mohamed and tied at the back of the pick-up.

19 Q. Let's have a look at this account of her death, shall we.

15:07:52 20 "Whenever Corporal Sankoh is beset with problems he always
21 looks for scapegoats. This was because he did not want his
22 combatants to cast any doubt about his capability. With all the
23 problems mentioned above and the pressure from the government
24 forces, the RUF had been pushed out of Kono District by the end
15:08:12 25 of January 1993, followed by consistent massive retreats in the
26 Kailahun District. By November 1993 the RUF was being pursued
27 all the way beyond Koindu Town to the Liberian border."

28 Pause there. Is all of that correctly recorded, Mr Sesay?
29 Do you agree with what I've just read?

1 A. Well, agree with what?

2 Q. With what the writer says about the government forces
3 pushing the RUF out of Kono by the end of January 1993; is that
4 correct?

15:09:10 5 A. Yes, they pushed the RUF from Kono by January, February.
6 By March, finally - March 1993 we had been dislodged from the
7 Kono District.

8 Q. And would you agree that by November 1993, the RUF was
9 being pursued all the way beyond Koidu Town to the Liberian
10 border?

15:09:32

11 A. Yes, in November the RUF had been pushed out of Koidu. Not
12 Koidu: Koi ndu.

13 Q. Now let's go over the page.

14 A. But the killing of Jande and others took place before the
15 pushing out of the RUF.

15:09:58

16 Q. I'm coming to that part now. So let's go to page 36,
17 please, Mr Sesay:

18 "The fall of Pendembu to the government forces in May 1993
19 was viewed by Corporal Sankoh as a plot by a group of people who
20 had incited his combatants against him. Corporal Sankoh became
21 engulfed by fear and paranoia, decided to divert the attention of
22 the combatants from the main reason for the massive retreats. He
23 therefore directed his political machinations to one of his
24 concubines called Jande Goba. It was alleged that Jande, her
25 sister Abie Aruna, the brother, Ansu Nemahun and many others of
26 Luawa Giehun in the Kailahun District had collaborated with Mr
27 Siafa (OC Siafa) so that the government forces could overrun
28 Kailahun District. In pursuance of this plot, it was alleged
29 that Mr Siafa crossed from Guinea to Mafindor in Kailahun where

15:10:19

15:10:46

1 the plot was hatched. To try the alleged coup plotters, Sankoh
2 set up a jungle court and a slaughter machine at Giehun under the
3 command of the chief judges/executioners in the persons of Sam
4 Bockarie (Mosquito) and Issa Hassan Raka Sesay. In this Court,
15:11:42 5 people were summarily executed on very flimsy evidences. It is
6 conservatively estimated that about 200 people, both civilians
7 and combatants, were murdered in cold blood. Once it was proved
8 that somebody hailed from Luawa Giehun, the person was
9 automatically pronounced guilty and then tortured and executed.
15:12:07 10 Jande Goba was murdered in the most gruesome manner. Her hands
11 were tied behind her back and steaming oil poured on her pubic
12 area."

13 Two questions. First of all, the writer of this account
14 suggests that you were involved in the investigation of this coup
15:12:31 15 plot and you were also involved with Sam Bockarie in executing
16 people. Were you so involved, Mr Sesay?

17 A. No, I wasn't involved. I was wounded and I was at the
18 hospital. I was wounded and at the hospital. The nurses who
19 were at the hospital, even now they are in Kailahun, some of
15:12:55 20 them, like Baby Sewa, they were the ones who treated me the very
21 day that Jande and others were arrested. I was at the hospital.
22 I did not go to Giehun when those were killed. Baby Sewa, Nurse
23 Mariama and even Jande's brother, who was called Dr Gina. I was
24 at the hospital admitted. And to go further, that Dr Gina too
15:13:25 25 was born in Giehun. He was Jande's brother. Dr Gina's younger
26 brother, I don't want to call his name because he was a protected
27 witness for me. He came and testified in my Defence case. And
28 even two other people were natives of Giehun. So if those two
29 people had seen me kill their people in this way, they wouldn't

1 have come to aid me in my case. And if you want, I can give you
2 the name of the doctor and they will check my Defence list, they
3 will see his name there.

15:14:12 4 Q. Well, I'm happy for you to write down the name on a piece
5 of paper, if it assists, Mr Sesay.

6 Could the witness be provided with pen and paper, please?

7 Could I see that piece of paper, please?

8 Before I ask that it be passed around, could I ask you to
9 do something else for me, please, in relation to that piece of
15:15:47 10 paper? The name you've written down on that piece of paper,

11 Mr Sesay, you mentioned that that person was from Giehun, yes?

12 A. Yes, a very close relative of Jande's.

13 Q. Okay. Could you now, please, put today's date on that
14 document? And finally, could you sign it?

15:16:32 15 Could I see that again now, please?

16 Could that document now be shown to the learned judges and
17 to counsel opposite, please?

18 Could I have a look at that document again, please?

19 Yes, I wonder if that can be marked for identification.

15:19:02 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: The document on which the witness has
21 written a name, a confidential name, will be marked MFI-1 and
22 will remain confidential.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, before we leave the document, which is still before
15:19:35 25 you, you will see that six lines from the bottom it is said:

26 "It is conservatively estimated that about 200 people, both
27 civilians and combatants, were murdered in Luawa Giehun."

28 Do you agree with that number of 200 people?

29 A. No. The figure was not up to that, according to what I

1 heard, the people who died in Giehun.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: That document can be put away for now,
3 please.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, before we leave this area,
15:20:30 5 I just want to be sure. The witness said he was not one of those
6 that were involved in the investigation and execution of persons.
7 Could he tell us again who it was, then, that was involved?

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

9 Q. Who was involved?

15:20:49 10 A. I said Mohamed Tarawalli, Rashid Mansaray and Sam Bockarie
11 are the ones who conducted the investigation in Giehun, and
12 during the time of the investigation I was hospitalised in
13 Kailahun. I did not participate in that.

14 Q. And who carried out the executions?

15:21:09 15 A. The execution, it was Bockarie and Mohamed. They were the
16 ones who did the execution, from what I understood.

17 Q. And what was the feeling within the RUF about this
18 incident, Mr Sesay?

19 A. Well, the civilians, some of them did not feel good about
15:21:38 20 it because they are seeing that he was a popular man, and that
21 girl was Foday Sankoh's girlfriend. So people did not appreciate
22 it, but that was an order from Mr Sankoh to the commanders who
23 carried out the investigations and the killings.

24 Q. Now, the incident we've just spent a little time discussing
15:22:16 25 occurred at a time when the RUF were in retreat in May 1993,
26 would you agree?

27 A. Yes, I agree. This incident took place before the NPRC
28 captured Kailahun Town. This incident took place when the NPRC
29 took over Pendembu before they advanced --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this
2 last bit?

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please repeat the last bit of your
4 answer, please.

15:22:51 5 THE WITNESS: I said this incident took place when the NPRC
6 had captured Pendembu before they advanced on Kailahun Town.
7 That was when this incident took place.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. And their advance on Kailahun Town, was that successful?

15:23:10 10 A. Yes. When they moved from Pendembu, they advanced and
11 captured Kailahun from the RUF.

12 Q. Now, by this stage, following the capture by the NPRC of
13 Kailahun Town, what towns in Kailahun were still under the
14 control of the RUF?

15:23:32 15 A. Well, the big towns were like Buedu, Kangama, Dia, Koindu.
16 The village where Foday Sankoh himself was, that is Sandiaru.
17 Then there was a village on the main road, Gbalahun, Giema, those
18 villages were under the RUF control.

19 Q. And did they remain in RUF control by the end of 1993?

15:24:08 20 A. No, the government troops pushed the RUF right up to
21 Koindu, to Bendu by the border. That is by November 1993. So
22 the only time - the only town that was not captured from the RUF
23 by the government troops was Giema and those small villages
24 around Koindu by the border, towards the Liberian border.

15:24:38 25 Q. Now, at this stage, end of 1993, what kind of a state was
26 the RUF in, Mr Sesay?

27 A. At this time the RUF was in a dilemma because it was only
28 in those small villages that the RUF lived, and the civilians who
29 were following the RUF in large populations, they were living in

1 those small villages in the bushes. They started setting up
2 zoebushes. When they started advancing from Pendembu, they were
3 killing civilians. Anywhere the RUF was, any civilian who had
4 any contact or link with the RUF, that person would be killed.

15:25:39 5 So they started killing people and burning their houses. That
6 was why the civilian population that we had, that is the RUF
7 fighters and the children, they followed the RUF.

8 Q. So, Mr Sesay, the position is as the NPRC forces advanced,
9 they were killing civilians who had lived in RUF-controlled
10 areas. Is that right?

11 A. Yes, yes, that happened.

12 Q. And the result of that was that civilians were retreating
13 along with the RUF. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes. Some retreated with the RUF, and others crossed into
15:26:26 15 Guinea, and some surrendered. But the fighters, people - their
16 children, they joined their brothers and they withdrew towards
17 the border where they were with the RUF and Giema - from Giema
18 right up to the border, civilians who were family members of the
19 fighters, they were there with the people.

15:26:54 20 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, at this point in time you've been pushed up
21 to the border. What was the state of the RUF in terms of arms
22 and ammunition?

23 A. Well, at this time - because at the initial stage when we
24 were pushed out, Foday Sankoh - at that time it was not all the
15:27:23 25 RUF that went towards Koindu, you know. Sam Bockarie, Superman
26 and a large group of RUF stayed in Giema. So it was myself,
27 Peter Vandi, Mohamed Tarawalli and Foday Sankoh who retreated
28 towards Koindu with a large group of RUF. So it was very
29 difficult for the RUF, the ammunition issue. It was after we had

1 settled - after this time when we had settled within the area
2 there, we started having some ammunition from the Guineans. So
3 we started defending our area.

15:28:12 4 Q. Pause there. Now, why was it that the NPRC troops were
5 able to push the RUF to the edges of Kailahun in this way?

6 A. Well, from the time the Liberians had gone there was
7 ammunition shortage and the ammunitions we captured, we had used
8 them, so we didn't have sufficient ammunition to defend ourselves
9 to that level. That was why.

15:28:41 10 Q. Now, before we move on with the sequence of events, I would
11 just like to recap where we are. So we have a situation now, if
12 I understand your evidence - and I want you to correct me if I'm
13 wrong - whereby: Invasion, March 1991, yes? Is that right,
14 Mr Sesay?

15:29:17 15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. When those who had been trained at Sokoto, along with some
17 NPFL fighters, enter Sierra Leone. Am I right?

18 A. You're right. Yes, you're right.

15:29:42 19 Q. About six months later, further NPFL combatants arrive in
20 Sierra Leone to combat ULIMO. Am I right?

21 A. Yes, you're correct.

22 Q. We then have, by June 1992, the withdrawal of the bulk of
23 those NPFL combatants. Is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

15:30:04 25 Q. Taking with them their weapons, yes?

26 A. Yes, around May.

27 Q. The RUF survive thereafter by trading with the Guineans
28 over the border and by setting ambushes and capturing arms and
29 ammunition, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But by the end of 1993, those arms and ammunition having
3 been exhausted, the NPRC soldiers push the RUF to the border with
4 Liberia. Is that right?

15:30:48 5 A. Yes, that's how it happened. In fact, the weapons --

6 Q. And by the end of 1993 the RUF are in a desperate position.
7 Is that right?

8 A. Yes, that's true.

9 Q. Now, during the period I've just summarised, what
15:31:13 10 communication facilities were available to the RUF; that is, from
11 March 1991 down to the end of 1993, what communication facilities
12 were available within the RUF?

13 A. The RUF used field radios - these field communication
14 radios. Thompson, Yaesu, those sets.

15:31:45 15 Q. Where had they come from?

16 A. Those sets, most of them were captured from the government
17 troops by us - Thompson --

18 Q. And by this stage what was ULIMO's position?

19 A. Before the NPRC pushed us to the border, ULIMO had captured
15:32:18 20 the entire border. Before we went to the border, ULIMO was in
21 control of the border. All the towns from Vahun - because the
22 border, where we controlled from Jojoiima, opposite, towards
23 Kungbon [phon], from that point right up to Mendekoma, ULIMO was
24 there.

15:32:38 25 Q. And when had ULIMO occupied those positions?

26 A. Before we retreated. It was before that time. I can say
27 from - ULIMO started advancing in Lofa coming down to Voinjama,
28 Kolahun around May, June.

29 Q. Of which year?

1 A. 1992. 1992.

2 Q. 1992?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR KOUMJIAN: The interpretation does seem to be getting
15:33:15 5 cut off several times when counsel begins his question before the
6 interpretation is finished.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: I did caution you, Mr Griffiths. You ask
8 a question, and just before we get the full answer you ask
9 another question. Now, please do look out for that kind of
15:33:35 10 interruption.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. So that was from about June of 1992 you tell us, yes?

13 A. Yes, from June, July '92 ULIMO were fighting at Lofa. So
14 before the end of June, ULIMO was now controlling part of Lofa.
15:34:02 15 So by early '93 they were in control of the border. So they
16 controlled the RUF --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this
18 one, and slowly.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, you said, "So by early 1993
15:34:18 20 they were in control of the border". Continue from there,
21 slowly.

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. Because they used to come from
23 Bomi Hills coming down towards Foya. So by early '93 - and some
24 part of the border there, that is Kungbon, had been controlled by
15:34:38 25 them. So before mid-93 they had controlled Lofa. Before we
26 retreated - before we could retreat to Koindu and the border,
27 ULIMO had controlled Lofa, all of the border line before that
28 time.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. And when you were pushed to the border, why did the RUF not
2 cross into Liberia?

3 MR KOUMJIAN: Objection. That assumes a fact that we've
4 heard no evidence of; that they did not cross into Liberia.

15:35:21 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think I'll let the witness answer that
6 question just as it's put.

7 THE WITNESS: RUF did not cross into Liberia. Because
8 ULIMO were our enemies, so we could not cross over. And ULIMO
9 used to attack our positions.

15:35:49 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. And at this point did the RUF make any attempt to obtain
12 arms and ammunition from Liberia, from Charles Taylor's NPFL?

13 A. No. At that time we hadn't any link because the whole Lofa
14 was controlled by ULIMO, so it was not possible. And Foday

15:36:17 15 Sankoh himself was angry with Mr Taylor, because when we were
16 pushed from the last town - because at that time I too was there
17 at Bendu when Mr Sankoh came. He held a meeting. He said he was
18 the leader of the revolution. He would not go anywhere.

19 Instead, he would go into the bush, and that is jungle warfare.

15:36:47 20 So there was no way to go to Liberia, no.

21 Q. Now, this meeting when Mr Sankoh said he would revert to
22 jungle warfare, when was it held?

23 A. I think that meeting could have either been held in late
24 November or early December, when Mr Sankoh left Koindu border and
15:37:14 25 came to Giema.

26 Q. Of which year?

27 A. Of 1993.

28 Q. So is that late November, early December 1993, yes? Is
29 that right, Mr Sesay?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Now by "jungle warfare", did Mr Sankoh spell out what he
3 meant?

4 A. Yes, because the meeting in which he invited us in Pumudu
15:37:58 5 that we attended, including some civilian authorities, he
6 explained what he meant.

7 Q. Where was that meeting held, before I forget?

8 A. The village is called Pumudu.

9 Q. And what were you supposed to do in order to promote this
15:38:35 10 jungle warfare?

11 A. Well, in the meeting - because it was in the meeting first
12 that the jungle plan started in the meeting that Foday Sankoh
13 called. He said he was going - that he was travelling to Giema
14 to meet with Sam Bockarie and others, Superman and others, and so
15:39:04 15 he set off for the Gola Forest to establish a jungle there. And
16 Mohamed Tarawalli was to stay there in charge of the area where
17 we were; that is, myself, Mohamed Tarawalli and Peter Vandi were
18 to be in charge of that area, and Sankoh told us to be setting
19 ambushes between Koindu and Kangama - between Kangama and Buedu,
15:39:34 20 that we were to be setting ambushes there along the road. And at
21 the same time, we were to be making arrangements to be getting
22 ammunition from Guinea through our business partners like Mamie I
23 Brown and Abdul Rahman, a Fullah man from Guinea. He spoke to
24 them so that he would be able to arrange with the Guinean
15:39:57 25 soldiers so we could get some ammunitions to defend ourselves
26 along the border.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, the other two people apart from
28 Mamie I, if the witness could please repeat their names.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Two other names --

2 A. One name. I said Mami e I Brown. This is not Mammy Isatu.
3 It's another woman, Mami e I Brown and Abdul Rahman, a Fullah man.
4 He was in Gueckedou, Guinea. He was called Abdul Rahman Jalloh,
15:40:34 5 but he too was a business partner to the RUF.

6 Q. Is that Abdul Rahman, A-B-D-U-L R-A-H-M-A-N? Is that the
7 spelling?

8 A. Yes, that is Abdul Rahman

9 Q. Now, after these arrangements had been put in place, in
15:41:02 10 what locations did the RUF actually deploy themselves?

11 A. Well, at this time, those of us who were at the Koindu
12 border, we lived between Sierra Leone and Liberia at the border -
13 between Koindu and the border, because there was a road under
14 construction from Kamagbodu to Bendu. That was the road that we
15:41:41 15 occupied. Those small villages were where we were. Kamagbodu,
16 Sandia, Tongoma, Sorokoro Bendu, and Pumudu, while Mohamed was in
17 Teidu. That was how we controlled the border until the time we
18 came to Buedu area. Right up to those Nyandehun Mambaabu, coming
19 towards Giema. That was how we were on the border.

15:42:11 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: We didn't hear. Mr Interpreter, you said
21 right up to where?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the interpreter cannot
23 remember. Let the witness repeat. Right up to Giema.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, no, no. You mentioned one location.
15:42:26 25 Some - right up to something, coming towards Giema.

26 THE WITNESS: That is Nyandehun Mambaabu.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you have an absolute task
28 to provide these spellings. There is so many of them that the
29 record will - I don't know what the transcribers are going to do

1 without those spellings.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. You said there was a road under construction from where to
4 Buedu? From where to where?

15:43:13 5 A. I said - I actually said survey road. These are feeder
6 roads. You know, if you're a Sierra Leonean, you know a feeder
7 road.

8 Q. And from where to where did it stretch? You named two
9 towns, Kamba --

15:43:38 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think it was Kamagbodu. Kamagbodu to
11 Bendu, right?

12 THE WITNESS: Kamagbodu and Sandia, then the road coming to
13 Sorokoro Bendu. That's where it stops. The other ones were
14 footpaths, Pumudu, Teidu.

15:44:08 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. All right. Can we just pause for a minute? Can you help
17 me with some spellings? Kamagbodu, how do you spell that?

18 A. These villages I cannot spell.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: If the interpreter could assist with the
15:44:26 20 spellings, Mr Griffiths, that would help.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I would be most grateful.

22 THE INTERPRETER: K-A-M-A-G-B-O-D-U.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: And whilst we're at it, Nyandehun?

24 THE INTERPRETER: N-Y-A-N-D-E-H-U-N. That is towards
15:44:48 25 Giema.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: And there was another word that
27 accompanied Nyandehun.

28 THE INTERPRETER: Mambaabu, M-A-M-B-A-A-B-U.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I think that's all the spellings that are

1 required at present, unless I've overlooked something. I'm
2 grateful.

3 Q. Now, what was Camp Zogoda that you mentioned earlier?

4 A. Well, when - Camp Zogoda was established from early '94. I
15:45:58 5 only went there in 1996, so they only had huts there. They built
6 huts and booths there. They had the formation ground and a
7 stream that was passing through the formation ground. That was
8 the river from which they drank. A hospital was built there just
9 like the booths, just like the huts.

15:46:26 10 Q. Now, you say that Camp Zogoda was established in early
11 1994. Why?

12 A. Well, it was the leader who established there. He said
13 that was his base. That was the period of the jungle. He was
14 unable to stay in town.

15:46:51 15 Q. Where was Camp Zogoda?

16 A. Camp Zogoda is around the Kambui Hills very close to Kenema
17 Town.

18 Q. Now, was Camp Zogoda the only such location set up during
19 this period of jungle warfare?

15:47:13 20 A. No, not just there. In 1994 other jungles were
21 established. Like, after Camp Zogoda, Foday Sankoh sent to
22 Mohamed Tarawalli in Kailahun in the Koindu area where all of us
23 were that he should mobilise troops to create another jungle in
24 the Kangari Hills. Then Mohamed too left and went around
15:47:41 25 February to March 1994. He left the Koindu area and went to
26 Giema and mobilised troops and moved. But before this time in
27 December, while Foday Sankoh was going in to create the - to
28 establish Camp Zogoda, he instructed the late Papa - the late CO
29 Papa, Superman and Augustine Kargbo to lead another troop from

1 Giema. So they all left at the same - they all left Giema at the
2 same time. They attacked Tongo, but they were not able to stay
3 in Tongo. So they stayed about a mile to Tongo, and they created
4 a jungle there called Peyima Jungle.

15:48:40 5 Q. So thus far you've mentioned Zogoda, Kangari Hills and
6 Peyima. Were there other any jungles established?

7 A. Yes, sir. After the arrival of Foday Sankoh at Zogoda, he
8 sent men to Pujehun. I had told you earlier that --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this
15:49:16 10 answer slowly?

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. Can you please repeat your
12 answer? "After the arrival of Foday Sankoh at Zogoda," continue
13 from there.

14 THE WITNESS: I said before Mr Sankoh went to Zogoda, he
15:49:38 15 had organised another group that left Giema and attacked the
16 Tongo Field. That group was led by the late CO Papa, Superman
17 and the late Augustine Kargbo. They were in that group. When
18 they attacked Tongo, they withdrew from Tongo and created the
19 Peyima Jungle.

15:50:02 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. So now you've got Zogoda, Peyima, Kangari Hills. Any other
22 jungles created?

23 A. Yes. Before the Kangari Hills Jungle was established, when
24 Foday Sankoh was in Zogoda he instructed Mohamed Tarawalli to
15:50:25 25 move, and at the same time he sent some of the men who had come
26 from Pujehun to Kailahun. They all went with Foday Sankoh to
27 Zogoda. He sent some of them with a radio set to Pujehun. When
28 they got to Pujehun, Foday Sankoh was able to communicate with
29 the commanders, that is, Gibriil Massaquoi and others from

1 Pujehun, Momo Rogers and others. He instructed them to come with
2 troops, and they met him at Zogoda. Then they created another
3 jungle called Kori bundu Jungle. Now we had the Pujehun, the
4 Kori bundu, the Zogoda and the Peyima, the Kangari Hills, and
15:51:04 5 those of us who were in Kailahun.

6 Q. Any other jungles created thereafter?

7 A. Yes, sir. In late 1994 Foday Sankoh instructed Gibril, who
8 established another jungle in Malal Hill along Mile 91. That was
9 where he was up to the part of '95 when they left and joined the
15:51:34 10 Western Jungle.

11 Q. And was the Western Jungle a separate jungle from all the
12 others you've mentioned?

13 A. Yes, the Western Jungle was created after the capture of
14 Rutile. It was then that Foday Sankoh instructed Mohamed

15:51:57 15 Tarawalli to move and create the Western Jungle in 1995. He
16 instructed Gibril Massaquoi to leave the Malal Hill to undertake
17 some attacks in Kambia, Port Loko, and he instructed him to join
18 CO Mohamed in the Western Jungle at Bradford. So they advanced
19 down to Lumpa and they withdrew and created their jungle in the
15:52:30 20 Western Jungle.

21 Q. Now, during the period when these various jungles were
22 being created, Mr Sesay - and just help us with this first of
23 all: Over what period of time were these jungles that you've
24 mentioned created?

15:52:56 25 A. Those jungles, they were created in '94 and '95.

26 Q. During that period where were you?

27 A. I was in Kailahun.

28 Q. Doing what?

29 A. Well, when Mohamed Tarawalli left, I was the commander

1 because the area in Kailahun was divided: There was Giema, they
2 had their own commander; and those of us who were in Koindu, I
3 was the commander there. We called the place Galehun.

15:53:43

4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he name the person who
5 was commander there?

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, Mr Sesay, you said - you called
7 the place Galehun and then you named a commander. Could you
8 repeat the name, please.

15:54:00

9 THE WITNESS: In Galehun when Mohamed left, I was the
10 commander there. Galehun. Around the border between Koindu and
11 Liberia, those villages, that's how we called that place. Peter
12 Vandi was my deputy. Foday Sankoh left Sylvester Miller as
13 commander in Giema.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:54:25

15 Q. At this time - well, let me start again. At what time were
16 you appointed commander?

17 A. Well, when Mr Sankoh was leaving, he left me and Peter
18 Vandi as commanders in Galehun. I was the commander and Peter
19 Vandi was the deputy, and we had a field commander CO Mohamed.

15:54:55

20 But in June of 1994, Mr Sankoh appointed me as area commander for
21 Kailahun and he appointed Peter Vandi as my deputy. It was at
22 that time that Mr Sankoh instructed me to --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat the place
24 where he went to base?

15:55:21

25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Where were you instructed to move to in June '94?

27 A. Giema. G-I-E-M-A.

28 Q. And what rank did you have at this time?

29 A. At this time Mr Sankoh promoted me to the rank of major and

1 gave me the appointment for - of area commander for Kailahun
2 District.

3 Q. For how long did you remain area commander for Kailahun
4 District?

15:56:01 5 A. I became the area commander in June '94 and I left in
6 November '95, 1995.

7 Q. Now during that period of time, Mr Sesay, were you involved
8 in massacring civilians along the border with Liberia?

9 A. No.

15:56:53 10 Q. Could we go back to exhibit P-277. I am interested in
11 pages 39 through to 41. Do you have page 39, Mr Sesay?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Paragraph 5.4, the massacre of civilians along the Sierra
14 Leone-Liberian border, December 1993 to October 1994.

15:58:04 15 "After the capture of Lofa County by ULIMO from the NPFL
16 in January 1993 thereby sealing the supply route for the RUF to
17 Gbarnga, it was no secret to everyone residing in RUF-controlled
18 areas that the movement was short of fighting materials and as
19 such it could no longer withstand the firing powers of the Sierra
15:58:34 20 Leone Army who quickly recaptured Kono and Kailahun districts
21 during that year.

22 By mid-November 1993 the RUF had lost all the major towns
23 and villages in the Kailahun District (only Giema Town, Luawa
24 Chiefdom, remained in firm control of the RUF). Corporal Sankoh
15:58:59 25 and his RUF then retreated into the horn of Sierra Leone and
26 opened jungle hideouts along the Kissy Bendu borders with Lofa
27 County (Liberia) from where they regrouped and continued to fight
28 basically for their survival."

29 Pause there. Go back to page 39. Is it true that in the

1 Kailahun District only Giema Town remained in the firm control of
2 the RUF? Is that true?

3 A. Yes, Giema was under the RUF control. But we were also at
4 the border between Koindu and Liberia. It was under our control.

15:59:54 5 Q. Go back over the page, please:

6 "Most of the civilians, fearing any more suffering in
7 RUF-held areas, refused to stay in these jungle hideouts. Some
8 surrendered to the advancing Sierra Leone government troops while
9 others crossed into Liberia and settled in ULIMO-held areas along
10 the borderlines for sanctuary. Both the government troops (then
11 stationed in Koindu, Dia, Buedu, Kangama, Kailahun, Pendembu and
12 Gborbu, among other towns and villages) and ULIMO from Lofa
13 County in Liberia, used to raid the RUF jungle hideouts on a
14 daily basis, inflicting heavy casualties on the RUF.

16:00:47 15 The then Major Issa Sesay, RUF battlefront inspector and
16 overall commander of the RUF forces in Kailahun District, after
17 the departure of the then major Sam Bockarie (Mosquito) and
18 Corporal Sankoh to Zogoda, became nervous and attributed the
19 raids on the RUF rear areas by ULIMO to the civilians who had
16:01:17 20 left the RUF and crossed to ULIMO-held areas in Lofa County. He"
21 - that being you, Mr Sesay - "believed that these civilians were
22 passing information over to ULIMO about the location, numerical
23 strength and shortage of both fighting materials and food by the
24 RUF in order to sustain the war and therefore these civilians had
16:01:45 25 betrayed the RUF.

26 Major Issa Sesay then ordered all his target commanders
27 (commanders at the various fighting axis) to carry out missions
28 along the borderlines in Liberia in order to eliminate all the
29 civilians residing there (by them Sierra Leoneans and/or

1 Liberians) and loot any food and property they could transport
2 back to his headquarters at Pompodu. According to his war
3 strategy, the elimination of every living being along the
4 borderlines in Liberia would stop the military pressure mounted
16:02:30 5 by ULIMO on the RUF from the rear.

6 The mass execution of civilians was prominent in two
7 Liberian border towns of Kongboma and Sanga in the Foya Tinkia
8 district of Upper Lofa County, though other border towns and
9 villages also experienced similar terrible episode. In Kongboma
16:03:00 10 alone, over a hundred civilians, mostly Sierra Leoneans, were
11 massacred by the RUF. Reverend Kendema, a renowned Kissi pastor,
12 who was resident at Damballa Town (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) before
13 the RUF war in Sierra Leone was among the unfortunate casualties.

14 Some commandos (mostly Kissis) who went on that Kongboma
16:03:30 15 mission were able to capture their relatives and loved ones.
16 They brought these civilians with them to the RUF jungle hideouts
17 after the mission for safety. When news reached major Issa Sesay
18 he got furious at these commandos, reminding them that there is
19 no brother in the army. He ordered that these civilians too
16:03:57 20 should be executed immediately on the flimsy excuse that by
21 leaving the RUF, these civilians had already betrayed the RUF
22 cause and could again hide from them at any time to return to
23 ULIMO and gave combat and intelligence information about the RUF
24 in their jungle hideouts."

16:04:15 25 Mr Sesay, you see what is being alleged against you there,
26 don't you?

27 A. Yeah, I've heard what you've read but - I've heard what you
28 read. The time this person is alleging here that I was ordering
29 to cause border attacks to kill civilians in Liberia, in fact to

1 start with, the civilians who were within the RUF at this time,
2 they were close relatives to the RUF fighters who were in the
3 Kailahun District in that Koindu axis. So it was not possible at
4 that time for me to be killing civilians because the civilians,
16:05:06 5 if they became frightened, whoever surrendered to the government
6 troops and they knew that you had close links with RUF fighters,
7 you won't survive. So that was why the civilians joined their
8 relatives, that is the RUF fighters, when we retreated to that
9 border area. We did not have ammunition. So I would find it
16:05:29 10 difficult at that time to send RUF fighters to go across the
11 border to start attacking civilians and killing them. I wonder
12 where I would have got that ammunition from? If I had
13 ammunition, it would have been meant to defend myself - defend
14 myself from the government troops, but not to attack civilians.
16:05:51 15 Really, I don't know if I too can - if I can know those who wrote
16 this, I can give details, but I did not carry out raids to attack
17 civilians in Liberia or give orders to kill them.

18 Q. Mr Sesay, tell me, I asked you this question at the outset:
19 To what ethnic group do you belong?

16:06:26 20 A. I am a Temne man. I am Temne. And at this time Foday
21 Sankoh was not in Kailahun, and all those I was working with was
22 Mendes at that time. Even our own bodyguards were Mendes, and I
23 did not speak Mende, so if I was just killing the Mende people
24 they would have just killed me overnight. That was very easy.
16:06:49 25 So my bodyguards throughout, from 1991 to 1997, 1998 they were
26 all Mendes.

27 Q. Now --

28 A. The wife I had was Mende. I had nobody who was Temne that
29 was living with me. From the beginning of the conflict, apart

1 from Kono in 1992, I never fought in any part. It was only in
2 Kailahun District that I was from '91 to '97. And let me just
3 express myself in relation to these allegations. You know this
4 writer or writers, what they've written here in this exhibit, if
16:07:32 5 that was it, then really, in the name of God, I would haven't
6 have had anybody to be my witnesses from Kailahun, because the
7 people from Kailahun had nothing to be loyal to me. I am a
8 different tribesman. I'm not a native from Kailahun. But when
9 you look at my Defence witnesses, 70 per cent of those who
16:07:52 10 testified for me were natives from Kailahun, Kailahun alone,
11 because they had said that they didn't want evidence to be
12 repeated, but Kailahun people gave evidence on my behalf, over
13 200, only in Kailahun District. So what this document is saying,
14 if that was what Issa Sesay was, I wouldn't have had two or three
16:08:13 15 people to speak on my behalf.

16 Q. Mr Sesay, you make mention of witnesses called on your
17 behalf. During those proceedings when you, yourself, was on
18 trial was any allegation ever put to you, based on what this
19 passage that I've just read to you?

16:08:37 20 MR KOU MJIAN: Objection. That is irrelevant.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't think it's irrelevant.

22 MR KOU MJIAN: Your Honour, the Prosecution in that case may
23 have been limited, we don't know, by the judges or by their own
24 decision to the indictment period.

16:08:57 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: That doesn't mean it's irrelevant.

26 Please ask the question.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Was any allegation made against you in those proceedings,
29 Mr Sesay, based on what I've just read out to you?

1 A. No, no. The Prosecutor brought about 85 witnesses against
2 me but these allegations were not there against me.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you. Madam President, I'm having
4 difficulty, because the same difficulty I had with my screen
16:09:31 5 earlier has returned, so I have a totally blank screen showing
6 nothing, and the more I - I keep tapping the mouse to see if
7 something will happen but it's not.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Manager, I don't know what's
9 going on and why it is only lead counsel's computer that is
16:09:55 10 having problems. What would you advance us to do in the
11 circumstances?

12 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, I will contact our IT support
13 unit to come and advise us on whether it can be treated in
14 seconds or they would need five minutes.

16:10:18 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I'd be grateful if it could be fixed, Madam
16 President, because particularly with spellings and the continued
17 flow of the evidence, it's important to at least have sight of
18 the record.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: What puzzles me is why it is only your PC
16:10:33 20 that's not working. Everybody else's PC is working.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I have no idea, but I have a totally blank
22 screen here.

23 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, the IT staff are coming in to
24 assist.

16:13:52 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes:

26 Q. Can we move on then from this. Can we put that document
27 away, please. Now, Mr Sesay, during this period when these
28 various jungles were established, 1994 through to 1995, what was
29 the position in Pujehun?

1 A. Well, in Pujehun they were still there, only that the
2 government troops still occupied the towns whilst they were
3 living in the villages where they had been, because Mr Sankoh had
4 called for reinforcement. Momo Rogers, Gibril Massaquoi, Monica
16:14:58 5 Pearson and others, all of them were there. They joined
6 Mr Sankoh in 1994 in Zogoda.

7 Q. What about others who had been in Pujehun, that you
8 mentioned Mike Lamin, what happened to them?

9 A. No, Mike Lamin went. I told you that Mike Lamin went to
16:15:25 10 Monrovia in late '91 when he left the RUF. It was Patrick Lamin
11 and the other vanguards. It was Patrick Lamin who was in Pujehun
12 as Special Forces - I mean, as battle group commander, but he and
13 the other vanguards, about 28, whom Gibril Massaquoi and others
14 killed.

16:15:45 15 Q. And when did Gibril Massaquoi kill them, roughly?

16 A. Well, this - I think this happened in late '91 to early
17 '92.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. '92. '92, yes.

16:16:07 20 Q. Now during this period when the RUF were in the jungle,
21 Mr Sesay, how were you surviving, in terms of - let's start with
22 the basics - food?

23 A. Well, for the entire RUF only for those of us who were in
24 the Kailahun who had access to buy from the Guinea border through
16:17:04 25 produce, we used to do barter system. We would sell and buy what
26 we wanted at the border. You will sell, you would receive the
27 money and buy what you wanted at the Guinean border. But apart
28 from that all the other jungles, it was only when they set ambush
29 or attacked a town that they were able to get food to sustain

1 themselves. That was what was going on. But for us in Kailahun
2 at that time, we hadn't any town that we can just attack to get
3 food because at the time the RUF was controlling this place and
4 the soldiers had come and they were staying in the towns, there
16:17:48 5 were no civilians there.

6 Q. Now you mentioned that in Kailahun you had access to the
7 Guinea border through produce you used on a barter system. How
8 was that produce produced? How was it produced, the produce?

9 A. Well, in 1991 - let me just explain how this whole thing
16:18:25 10 came about. In 1991, Foday Sankoh, Faya Musa, Deen-Jalloh, you
11 know, all of them discussed with Pa Kallon and they agreed that
12 the civilian populace should be involved in agriculture so that
13 the civilians would be able to sustain themselves during the war,
14 because they said if there was no food that would be a problem
16:18:49 15 for the civilians. So from that they created a unit called the
16 agricultural unit, which at the initial stage was headed by Faya
17 Musa. So this agricultural system started in '91, '92. But when
18 the government troops pushed out the RUF that stopped. In '93,
19 '94 that was no longer in existence. So in '94 fighters at their
16:19:25 20 targets used to harvest their produce and they would sell that
21 produce, we would collect that produce, we would sell that, buy
22 medicines, condiments, food, and that was how we were sustaining
23 ourselves at the area where I was in Galehun before I came to
24 Giema.

16:19:52 25 So in 1995 we too in Kailahun carried out an attack,
26 although I did not go on the attack because I was wounded in
27 December 1994 when I ran - undertook an attack in Kpandebu behind
28 Kailahun Town. From that, my men attacked Buedu and a serious
29 fighting took place there. That was around April of 1995. The

1 defence secretary, that is Tom Nyuma, for the NPRC, came and
2 withdrew the NPRC troops from Koindu, from Kangama, Dia, Buedu,
3 Kailahun Town, Giahun to Pendembu. So all those areas were -
4 they were withdrawn from all those areas. Since then on the
16:20:55 5 civilians had some freedom to return to their villages and towns.

6 After that April of 1995 Mr Sankoh said that the
7 agricultural unit was to start their programme again. At this
8 time Faya Musa was no longer there, he had gone to Abidjan, so
9 Foday Sankoh appointed JJ Vandi, a civilian, as the
16:21:28 10 secretary-general of the agricultural unit. So during that time
11 the liberated zones, the men and the chiefs, arranged that they
12 would be yielding ten bags of cocoa and that was what we were
13 selling to buy medicines which both civilians and fighters used
14 to treat themselves. We ourselves contributed to buy ammunition
16:21:53 15 at the border, so up to the time that I left in November 1995 and
16 Foday Sankoh appointed Peter Vandi.

17 Q. Now the food crops which were produced during the periods
18 you've just described, Mr Sesay, was forced labour used to
19 produce those crops?

16:22:29 20 A. In fact, no. In 1994 people were unable to do - to engage
21 in agriculture because the locations where we were were tight,
22 because people were unable to farm. It was after the withdrawal
23 of the government forces, that is in April '95, that people
24 started - that even the agricultural unit starting functioning.
16:22:59 25 But by September - August, September of 1994 I think I was the
26 only person who had a small swamp in Giema just to show to people
27 that we were not going to retreat from Giema. That swamp could
28 only contain two bushels. But for the whole of 1994, people were
29 unable to do farming in Kailahun because the government troops

1 were in control of all the areas.

2 Q. But at those times when it was possible to farm, for
3 example, when Fayia Musa was in charge of the agricultural unit,
4 and later in 1995 when the NPRC withdrew from certain parts of
16:23:43 5 Kailahun, during those times was forced labour used?

6 A. In reality it was not forced labour. We were not forcing
7 civilians. But in 1991 I was not part of the agricultural unit.
8 I had nothing to do with that, but I did not see forced labour.

9 Until after this time to 1995 I was the commander in Kailahun

16:24:13 10 when the government troops withdrew. So Foday Sankoh sent some

11 money to me to buy seed rice from Guinea and give that to the

12 agricultural man to distribute to the civilians to do their

13 farming. So it was not force. You know, like during those times

14 the agricultural man used to organise the RUF farm, but they used

16:24:38 15 to provide food on those farms for the civilians to work. So it

16 was like when you go to work there, you would get food. It was

17 like a community farm. It was not to say that they were putting

18 people under gunpoint to go and work there, because the civilians

19 too wanted to be engaged in farming because the problem there in

16:25:00 20 the lines at that time was food. Because at the time that the

21 government troops were in control of Kailahun, from part of '93

22 to April 1995, many civilians died there because of starvation.

23 There was no food.

24 Q. Now, you mentioned that in December 1994 you were wounded

16:25:27 25 in an attack, Mr Sesay. Is that right?

26 A. Yes. That was at Kpandebu Junction.

27 Q. And where were you wounded?

28 A. I was wounded on my right leg, on my hip. That was where I
29 was hit by the bullet.

1 Q. And did you receive treatment?

2 A. Yes, they treated me but the doctor who was treating me
3 said the bullet was still there. It was after a long time when
4 the Court arrested me, it was when I was in detention that I
16:26:14 5 started feeling the pain in my bones. When I was taken to the
6 hospital and X-rayed, that was the time they saw the bullet. And
7 the operation was performed in Senegal.

8 Q. When was that operation performed?

9 A. I think in February of '97, because we went to Senegal in
16:26:42 10 December 1996.

11 Q. Now, the initial treatment you received, yes, following the
12 bullet wound in December 1994, where did you receive that
13 treatment?

14 A. This was at the Special Court that I had the treatment.

16:27:06 15 Q. No, I'm talking about way back in December 1994 when you
16 were hit by the bullet, yes?

17 A. Yes, December 1994, that's what I'm saying, that I was
18 wounded in Kpandebu. But I was first treated in Kailahun, in
19 Giema, because at that time I was in Giema. I was the area
16:27:30 20 commander in Kailahun. After the attack when I was wounded, they
21 brought me to Giema. It was Dr Gina and Dr Foyoh who treated me.
22 But they were not able to discover the bullet. And even when I
23 had medication in the Ivory Coast, they were not able to see the
24 bullet. It was after a long time that they were able to discover
16:27:52 25 that.

26 Q. Now, you mentioned Ivory Coast. When did you go to the
27 Ivory Coast to receive treatment?

28 A. Well, that was in November, but it was not treatment for
29 the bullet. I had another illness. That was what I went for.

1 It was not a treatment for the bullet. I had another personal
2 problem for which I went for operation.

3 Q. Okay. So after that injury in December, tell us what
4 happened to you in January 19 - we're into 1995 now, aren't we?

16:28:37 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did you remain as commander in 1995 in Giema?

7 A. Yes, I remained there as commander up to November 1995 when
8 I went to the Ivory Coast. Then Foday Sankoh appointed Peter
9 Vandi as area commander.

16:29:01 10 Q. Now, you mentioned a name Fayia Musa earlier and also
11 mentioned the fact that he went to the Ivory Coast, yes?

12 A. Yes. He was a member of the external delegation.

13 Q. That's what I want to ask you about now, you see, the
14 external delegation.

16:29:28 15 Now this is going to take me a little time, Madam
16 President, and I note the hour.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Would you prefer to start tomorrow?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I would prefer to make a fresh start on this
19 topic tomorrow morning, please.

16:29:39 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. Mr Sesay, I have to caution
21 you, as I usually do witnesses, you are not to discuss your
22 evidence with anybody. Is that clear?

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Proceedings are adjourned to tomorrow at
16:29:55 25 9 o'clock.

26 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.29 p.m.
27 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 6 July 2010 at
28 9.00 a.m.]

29