



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 6 JULY 2010
9.00 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Al Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg

For the Registry:

Ms Advera Nsiima Kamuzora
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Mr Nicholas Koumjian
Ms Kathryn Howarth
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the Office of the Principal
Defender:**

Ms Claire Carlton-Hanciles

**For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Silas Chekera
Ms Logan Hambriek
Ms Fatiah Balfas

1 Tuesday, 6 July 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.]

09:02:38 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,
6 please.

7 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,
8 your Honours and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this
9 morning, Kathryn Howarth, Maja Dimitrova and Nicholas Koumjian.

09:03:49 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,
11 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay
12 Griffiths; with me, Mr Silas Chekera, Ms Logan Hambrick,
13 Ms Fatiah Balfas and Ms Mason Hubbard.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Are we ready to proceed with
09:04:09 15 the witness?

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, we are.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning, Mr Sesay. As we proceed
18 with your evidence this morning, I'll just remind you that you
19 are still under the oath you took yesterday to tell the truth.

09:04:22 20 WITNESS: DCT-172 [On former oath]

21 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Cont'd]

22 Q. Good morning, Mr Sesay.

23 A. Yes, good morning.

24 Q. Mr Sesay, you will recall that yesterday afternoon when we
09:04:39 25 adjourned, we had reached the stage where you were telling us
26 about an injury you had sustained in November 1994. Do you
27 recall that? Was it December 1994?

28 A. Yes, it's December of '94.

29 Q. And you went on to tell us that - and I'm looking at page

1 43705 of yesterday's transcript - that you remained as a
2 commander to November 1995 when you went to the Ivory Coast and
3 then Foday Sankoh appointed Peter Vandi as area commander. And
4 then I asked you this: "You mentioned a name Fayia Musa earlier
09:05:32 5 and also mentioned the fact that he went to the Ivory Coast."
6 You said: "Yes, he was a member of the external delegation."

7 Now I want to ask you about that topic of the external
8 delegation. How did that delegation come about, Mr Sesay?

9 A. Well, first let me say November 1993 to December when
09:06:12 10 Foday Sankoh was leaving the Koindu area to come to Giema, Fayia
11 Musa, Deen-Jalloh, David Kallon, and Konomanyie, Alhaji Kamara,
12 Pa Kamara, and Philip Palmer, all of us were in that border
13 between Bendu and the Liberian border. So sometime in - that is
14 around April/May, Foday Sankoh sent a message that Fayia Musa and
09:06:50 15 Deen-Jalloh should transfer to Giema. So they were in Giema
16 throughout to December when Foday Sankoh sent a message, he spoke
17 to Fayia Musa and he spoke to Deen-Jalloh and Philip Palmer on
18 the radio and he told them that they should organise themselves
19 to go to the Ivory Coast as external delegation so that they will
09:07:07 20 be able to contact Foday Sankoh and Foday Sankoh's good friends,
21 because in 1992 Foday Sankoh was not going out. So he set up the
22 external delegation so that they would be able to spread out his
23 contacts to establish the RUF to the outside world.

24 So in that December, Foday Sankoh said he would send
09:07:34 25 somebody. He sent Sam Kollah with some money, that he should
26 give the money to Fayia Musa and others as their transport fare
27 and their feeding and rent while they will be in the Ivory Coast.
28 So Sam Kollah arrived in Giema and gave me the money, and so I
29 invited Fayia Musa and Deen-Jalloh and gave them the money. And

1 the remaining money, Foday Sankoh told me that I should purchase
2 rice and medicine for the civilians and the RUF in Kailahun. So
3 he said I should go and accompany them at the border, because at
4 that time Philip Palmer, Alhaji Kamara, Konomanyie and Pa Kallon
09:08:24 5 were in that Koindu area, Pumudu. So Fayia Musa, Deen-Jalloh and
6 myself, together with Deen-Jalloh's wife, we travelled from Giema
7 on foot and we met those in Pumudu. And the following day
8 Foday Sankoh spoke to them as a delegation. That is Fayia Musa,
9 Deen-Jalloh, Dr Barrie - no, Dr Barrie wasn't there at that
09:08:52 10 point. Fayia Musa, Deen-Jalloh, Alhaji Kamara, Konomanyie, and
11 Philip Palmer, including Deen-Jalloh's wife; six of them. So
12 Foday Sankoh spoke to the five men. He did not speak to the
13 woman on the radio. He said they should get prepared, and the
14 following morning I should accompany them to the Guinea border,
09:09:18 15 and at the same time we should contact our business contractors
16 at the border so they would receive them and take them to
17 Gueckedou. So we sent the contractor at the Guinea border who
18 contacted Mamie I Brown, that is late CO Brown's wife.

19 So on that very day we were not - we could not go because
09:09:46 20 we did not hear from the contractor. So the following day --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak
22 slowly and repeat from this point.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, you've not been doing too badly
24 for speed, but please slow down a bit more. The interpreter
09:10:02 25 can't keep up with you. Now, start where you were talking about
26 CO Brown's wife. You contacted Mamie I. Continue from there,
27 please, slowly.

28 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Yes, my Lord. I said we sent the
29 contractor and the contractor contacted Mamie I Brown. She was

1 in Guinea. She was our business partner. So I Brown made
2 arrangements. She had a vehicle to come and pick the delegation
3 - the delegates at the border. So when we got the information, I
4 escorted them the following day until we got to the border and
09:10:57 5 they boarded the canoe and they crossed over into Guinea. So
6 when they went there, they went to Gueckedou. But after there, I
7 don't know what happened. The security got the information so
8 they arrested Alhaji Kamara and Philip Palmer.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:11:19 10 Q. Now, you've taken us through a lot there, Mr Sesay. What I
11 would like to do, please, is to break that down into one or two
12 categories so that we can clarify matters. Now, first of all,
13 when --

14 A. Yes, sir. Let me just explain this area. When the two
09:11:40 15 people were arrested, the other four people continued their
16 journey and they went to Ivory Coast. So Alhaji Kamara was
17 detained in Gueckedou and Philip Palmer was taken to Conakry, but
18 later Alhaji Kamara was released and Philip Palmer also was
19 released in '95, I think around March '95.

09:12:06 20 Q. I'm grateful for that, Mr Sesay. Now, as I said and
21 mentioned earlier, I would like certain clarifications, please.
22 Now, first of all, when was it that this decision was made to
23 create an external delegation?

24 A. It was in December that Foday Sankoh made a decision. He
09:12:36 25 contacted Fayia Musa and others, and they too were in support of
26 the idea. Early December '94.

27 Q. Now, secondly, who originated the idea of establishing this
28 external delegation?

29 A. Well, that was an idea that flowed from among Deen-Jalloh,

1 Fayia Musa and Foday Sankoh, because those three used to have
2 dialogue on the radio before that December. While he was in
3 Zogoda, those were the ones who were in Giema together with
4 myself.

09:13:20 5 Q. And the next point is this: Why was it thought necessary
6 to establish such an external delegation?

7 A. Like I said earlier, I said from '92 Foday Sankoh did not
8 travel out so he did not have any outside contacts. So the RUF
9 at that time only depended on captured materials, captured arms,
09:13:51 10 and nobody outside the RUF-controlled area knew what the RUF
11 stood for and knew what the RUF was doing. So that was why
12 Foday Sankoh deemed it necessary that those civil administrators
13 should go to the Ivory Coast as external delegation.

14 Q. So if I understand the point you're making, there had been
09:14:18 15 this period of isolation from 1992 down to December 1994, and
16 consequently it was thought necessary to get out the message as
17 to what the RUF stood for. Is that the position?

18 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, your Honour, objection. Counsel
19 is suggesting answers to the witness. The witness should make
09:14:41 20 his own explanation.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I am merely seeking to summarise the
22 evidence given by the witness, nothing more.

23 MR KOUMJIAN: If the evidence is given, it's asked and
24 answered.

09:14:53 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, perhaps you should move on
26 in such a way that you don't - you don't suggest phraseology.
27 Yes.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. You said earlier during the course of the narrative,

1 Mr Sesay, that the idea was that these individuals would meet
2 with Foday Sankoh's good friends in the Ivory Coast. Do you
3 recall that? I hope I'm not misstating the evidence. Do you
4 recall telling us that?

09:15:35 5 A. Yes. I said those external delegates were to go out and
6 meet with Foday Sankoh's friends, and at the same time that they
7 would be able to spread out the RUF message and to explain to
8 people what the RUF stood for, because from '92 the RUF had had a
9 cut-off because the world did not know what was going on. Nobody
09:16:00 10 knew what the RUF stood for. So that was why Foday Sankoh deemed
11 it fit that the external delegation would go out and reach out to
12 people, contact other people, those who were sympathisers and
13 friends of Foday Sankoh.

14 Q. Did you know who these goods friends of Foday Sankoh were
09:16:17 15 in the Ivory Coast?

16 A. Well, yes. I knew the move the delegation was making
17 because I went to the Ivory Coast myself in '95 November, so I
18 knew what they had been doing from '94 up to time. And even
19 after that time when Foday Sankoh got there I know where he
09:16:48 20 visited.

21 Q. We'll come to that later but my question is this: Who were
22 these friends of Foday Sankoh in the Ivory Coast?

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, the witness didn't say the
24 friends were in the Ivory Coast, did he? I'm looking for the
09:17:05 25 text where the witness said these were friends in the Ivory
26 Coast. I think they were generally friends. Friends out there.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, if I could be afforded a moment. I
28 was looking at page 10 line 1:

29 "He told them they should organise themselves to go to the

1 Ivory Coast as external delegation so that they will be able to
2 contact Foday Sankoh and Foday Sankoh's good friends because in
3 1992 Foday Sankoh was not going out."

09:18:13 4 PRESIDING JUDGE: That doesn't mean the friends were
5 necessarily in the Ivory Coast or limited to the Ivory Coast.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. Let me clarify it:

7 Q. Where were these good friends, Mr Sesay?

8 A. Well, at this time that Foday Sankoh was sending the
9 people, the friends were not in Ivory Coast at that time. It was
09:18:32 10 later that they befriended people in the Ivory Coast, but at that
11 time, like, the Libyan government was a friend to Mr Sankoh,
12 including the Libyan leader. And Burkina Faso, they too were
13 friends to Mr Sankoh. And even the Libyan ambassador who was in
14 Ghana was a friend of Mr Sankoh's. So the delegation was
09:19:00 15 actually sent to those people by Mr Sankoh and they assisted the
16 delegations. They gave us something towards their welfare,
17 shelter, and even the movement, in terms of finance. So it was
18 later - that was late '95 that the delegation created friends
19 with certain authorities in the Ivorian government, like the
09:19:36 20 Foreign Minister Mr Amara Essy, and not some other people that
21 led to the Abidjan - the Yamoussoukro peace talk, sorry.

22 Q. Now taking things slowly, the Libyan ambassador who was in
23 Ghana, do you know the name of that individual?

24 A. Yes, but I forgotten the name. There was one who was
09:20:15 25 called Alie Talasie. The other one, I've forgotten the name now,
26 because those are the two people they contacted.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, what did you say? Called
28 who?

29 THE WITNESS: I said the one was Alie Talasie. But the one

1 who was the ambassador in - you know, Alie Talasie was
2 responsible for African Affairs, I think Ambassador for African
3 Affairs from Libya. Then they had the ambassador who was in
4 Accra who dealt with Fayia Musa and others, but I've forgotten
09:20:52 5 the name.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. And can you help with us a spelling for Talasie, please,
8 Mr Sesay?

9 A. I think it is A-L-I-E T-A-L-A-S-I-E.

09:21:16 10 Q. I'm grateful. Now, you've mentioned that those friends
11 were the Libyan leader, Burkina Faso, and the Libyan Ambassador
12 in Ghana. Now help us. You had trained in Liberia, had you not,
13 at Camp Sokoto?

14 A. Yes, sir.

09:21:39 15 Q. So why was the external delegation being sent to Ivory
16 Coast and not Liberia?

17 A. Well, I told you yesterday - I said in court yesterday that
18 when Dopoe Menkarzon had withdrawn the Liberians, Mr Sankoh
19 became unhappy with Mr Taylor, and he was disgruntled, and they
09:22:17 20 had no dealings - he had no dealings with Mr Taylor. But
21 Mr Sankoh used to say that he would never have any business to do
22 with Mr Taylor and that he was going into the jungle, so he had
23 made up his mind from that time - up to this time, when he
24 decided to send the delegation outside in December '94.

09:22:35 25 Q. So let me ask you this quite bluntly: We've reached this
26 stage in discussing Mr Sankoh's good friends, and you've listed
27 the Libyan leader, Burkina Faso, and the Libyan Ambassador in
28 Ghana. Was Mr Taylor a good friend of Mr Sankoh at this time?

29 A. No, at this time they were not good friends because I never

1 heard that the delegation went to Liberia. He never sent them to
2 Mr Taylor.

3 Q. And in order to get to the Ivory Coast through which
4 country did they travel?

09:23:26 5 A. They passed through Guinea. It was through Guinea. When
6 they left Sierra Leone they crossed the river into Guinea. So it
7 was in Gueckedou, Guinea, that Philip Palmer and Alhaji Kamara
8 were arrested, so the remaining four went to the Ivory Coast.

9 Alhaji Kamara, when he was released, he did not go to the Ivory
09:23:52 10 Coast, nor did he come back to the RUF until 2000 when

11 Foday Sankoh was in Freetown. That was when he came back to
12 rejoin Foday Sankoh. Philip Palmer, when he was released, he
13 went to the Ivory Coast to join the external delegation. And
14 this time, when the delegation was in Ivory Coast, some other

09:24:20 15 people grew interest to contact the external delegation. They
16 said they had interest in the RUF. Like one Mr Omrie Golley, he
17 came from England, and he came to the Ivory Coast and met with
18 the external delegation, and one Dr Sebo, he too came to meet
19 with the delegation in the Ivory Coast. He was working with the

09:24:43 20 International Alert. Some other people also used to come right
21 up to the peace talks.

22 Q. Now, by what date was this external delegation established
23 in the Ivory Coast?

24 A. Well, I cannot tell you the exact date but I will tell you
09:25:13 25 the month that I escorted them. It was around the second week,
26 between the 10th and the 20th of December, when I accompanied
27 them to the Guinea border and they crossed over.

28 Q. From the 10th to the 20th December of which year?

29 A. 1994.

1 Q. I'm grateful. Now, how did things develop, so far as that
2 external delegation is concerned, in the Ivory Coast? Can you
3 take us through it slowly, please?

09:26:07 4 A. Well, I think I forgot the name Konomanyie, Pa Konomanyie,
5 he was among the delegation. So when they arrived they were in
6 Danane. They rented out - they rented houses and they were
7 staying there up to sometime in '95 - no, at this time in '94
8 some of the delegates' wives Foday Sankoh said should go. Like
9 Faya Musa's wife went, and Pa Kallon's wife too left Liberia and
09:26:40 10 went - no, I think she was in Ivory Coast as a refugee, Mamie I.
11 So she just met up with her husband. So from there she was
12 coming from there coming to Guinea to buy ammunition and she
13 would take them to Koindu and receive them and she would take
14 some other things to us like medicine, food and some other stuff
09:27:04 15 for us. She used to do that, going to Guinea, coming to the
16 Sierra Leonean border and going back to Danane. Up to 1995, 1995
17 Mamie I was arrested. She was arrested and brought to Conakry
18 and the Guinean government handed her over to the Sierra Leonean
19 government and she was brought to Freetown. So the delegation
09:27:45 20 was there, and around 1995 Dr Sebo himself came to Ivory Coast
21 from England and he spoke to Mr Sankoh.

22 Q. Pause there. By what means did he communicate with
23 Mr Sankoh?

24 A. The delegation had a radio set, a field radio, and they had
09:28:06 25 an operator called Stephen Kamanda. He was with them.

26 Q. And what was the nature of that conversation, if you know?

27 A. Well, at the initial stage they did not monitor the
28 communication, but, when they travelled, they agreed that
29 Mr Sankoh should invite Mr Sebo and he will come to visit him

1 where he was. So Philip Palmer brought him from Ivory Coast
2 through Guinea and they came to the Sierra Leonean border and
3 they crossed over into Sierra Leone and they met me in Giema.
4 When they met me there, Philip Palmer introduced the man to me,
09:28:55 5 Dr Sebo, and he told me their mission, that they had been in
6 communication with the Pa, so it was the Pa who allowed them to
7 visit him. That is Foday Sankoh. So I said okay, now that they
8 have gone there late in the day, the following morning I will let
9 them to talk to Mr Sankoh.

09:29:19 10 So the following morning I took them to the radio set and
11 they spoke to Mr Sankoh. After they had spoken, Mr Sankoh was
12 happy about their arrival. So he instructed me to organise an
13 armed escort team to escort them at Peyima. That is the other
14 jungle. So Peyima would be responsible for escorting them to the
09:29:47 15 receiving point and Mr Sankoh would send a receiving team to
16 receive them. Dr Sebo brought a satellite phone and he had video
17 cameras and they went.

18 Q. Can I ask you, please, Mr Sesay, when did this event occur,
19 the arrival of Dr Sebo from International Alert?

09:30:19 20 A. This was between - I think between March and April 1995.

21 Q. And you say that Dr Sebo brought a satellite phone and
22 video cameras with him, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What happened to the satellite phone brought by Dr Sebo?

09:30:54 25 A. Well, when he brought it, he went with it to Mr Sankoh at
26 Zogoda and he took photos of him and he recorded using the video
27 camera. From there they returned from Zogoda and they passed
28 through Giema and they returned to the Ivory Coast.

29 Q. But what happened to the satellite phone?

1 A. The satellite phone was left with Mr Sankoh. That was what
2 he used to communicate with Dr Sebo and some other people.

3 Q. Now help us. Prior to Dr Sebo bringing that satellite
4 phone, did the RUF have access to such technology?

09:31:45 5 A. No, that was the first time for Mr Sankoh to have a sat
6 phone.

7 Q. As far as you're aware, Mr Sesay, what was the purpose of
8 Dr Sebo's visit?

9 A. According to my understanding at that time Mr Sebo's visit
09:32:11 10 was for him to make the international community know what the RUF
11 was about.

12 Q. And who had organised for Dr Sebo to go into the jungle to
13 meet with Foday Sankoh? Who had made those arrangements?

14 A. It was the external delegation.

09:32:33 15 Q. Prior to this visit by Dr Sebo, had the RUF hitherto had
16 contact with the outside world?

17 A. Well, except the delegation, that is to Mr Sankoh's friend,
18 but minus that, no.

19 Q. And so far as Mr Sankoh is concerned, what was the upshot
09:33:11 20 of the meeting between him and Dr Sebo?

21 A. Well, Mr Sankoh too was interested in the international
22 community's knowing about his cause and what the RUF stood for
23 because in that meeting they discussed that they should write a
24 book and that was suggested in their meeting at Zogoda, because
09:33:42 25 when they returned that was what Dr Sebo and Philip Palmer told
26 me. So Mr Sankoh told them that. You know, Philip Palmer was a
27 senior man and he was a military attache to the external
28 delegation. Foday Sankoh told them that when they would return
29 they should prepare a book and bring it to Mr Sankoh at Zogoda so

1 he would go through it and the book would be launched and the
2 book would be called Footpaths to Democracy.

3 Q. That book Footpaths to Democracy, Mr Sesay, have you seen
4 it?

09:34:24 5 A. Yes, I saw it.

6 Q. When did you first see it?

7 A. When the idea was brought up at Zogoda they came and passed
8 through to Ivory Coast. So the external delegation, these were
9 educated people, Philip Palmer, Deen-Jalloh, Fayia Musa,

09:34:52 10 Dr Barrie and even David Kallon. They were the ones who sat
11 together and they wrote the proposals. Then around June

12 Deen-Jalloh, Fayia Musa, David Kallon, left the Ivory Coast and
13 they came. They passed through Giema and I gave them escort and
14 they went to Peyima. They met Mr Sankoh. And whatever they had

09:35:20 15 written Mr Sankoh went through. So they - the book was approved
16 for it to be launched. So it was after '95 that I saw the book.
17 The book was launched in '96. That was when it was published.

18 Q. So when you say that around June Deen-Jalloh and others
19 passed through Giema, June of which year?

09:35:51 20 A. June '95. Early June '95. That was when they passed
21 through and they returned in late June, because in fact on that
22 day they came around June 27 - no, June 25 in Giema, because I'll
23 never forget that date.

24 Q. Was the publication of that book preceded by debate within
09:36:20 25 the RUF as to its contents?

26 A. When they went to Zogoda to meet Mr Sankoh I wasn't
27 present, so they discussed. From their discussion the idea
28 continued. The idea progressed and Mr Sankoh met them in Ivory
29 Coast and the book was published.

1 Q. You say that in 1996 you saw that book, Mr Sesay?

2 A. At that time the book had not yet been published. The
3 draft was written from the Ivory Coast. The external delegation
4 went and - with Mr Sankoh they went through it. I don't actually
09:37:19 5 recall when it was formally launched. Maybe it was late '95 or
6 early '96. I don't recall. It was a small book, a booklet.

7 Q. Have you read the book, Mr Sesay?

8 A. Yes, I read it.

9 Q. As far as you're concerned, does that book reflect the
09:37:40 10 philosophy of the RUF?

11 A. Well, this was not a collective idea from all the RUF
12 commanders. It was just the external delegation, the leader.
13 They were the ones who prepared the book. And the leader was the
14 head of the organisation because with time some other people used
09:38:12 15 to grumble around that it was too early for that book to be
16 launched at that time.

17 Q. But what was your own personal view?

18 A. Well, my personal thoughts were that - even according to
19 some of my friends when we would sit together and discuss, we
09:38:40 20 were thinking that Mr Sankoh and the external delegation's
21 idea --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness explain
23 what he means by "too fast"? Your Honours, can the witness --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause, Mr Sesay. The interpreter
09:38:56 25 is trying to say something.

26 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the witness used an
27 expression that the idea was too fast. I don't know what that
28 means.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, can you repeat your answer or

1 your evidence from where you say - the lawyer asked you what was
2 your personal view - personal thoughts on this book as to whether
3 it reflected the policy and ideology of the RUF.

09:39:36 4 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said that was the idea of
5 Mr Sankoh's and the external delegation. They were the ones who
6 wrote the book. It was not a collective idea from all the RUF
7 commanders. And Mr Sankoh's policy, who owned the organisation,
8 was what was portrayed in the book. But I said myself and some
9 of my friends who were more educated than myself, we used to say
09:39:56 10 that you know this book that this Pa has said should be launched,
11 Mr Sankoh cannot challenge the international community or the
12 colonial masters when he has not had control over the country at
13 this time. And nobody should dictate to Sierra Leone. If the
14 book thinks like that, nobody should take things from Sierra
09:40:26 15 Leone. You know, you put the cart before the horse.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness could now be shown,
17 please, D-336.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: While the witness is being shown the
19 exhibit, I'm sure that this will be picked up, but at line 17 of
09:40:59 20 page 24 LiveNote has the words "he would not challenge the
21 international community or the colonial masters when he was not
22 happy to live in the country." I think what the interpreter said
23 was "when he was not in control of the country."

24 MR GRIFFITHS: That's precisely what was said:

09:43:30 25 Q. Mr Sesay, do you recognise this document?

26 A. Yes, this is the book, paths to democracy.

27 Q. And after the publication of this book, tell me was it
28 widely disseminated amongst members of the RUF?

29 A. Well, the copies for us in Kailahun, it was not everybody

1 that was able to have one.

2 Q. And was it openly discussed by members of the RUF after its
3 publication?

4 A. Well, it was not criticised openly. But like commanders,
09:44:28 5 like officers, when we sit together, those that were not in
6 favour would make comments. They would say that this book is too
7 early to be published for the RUF to show their intentions to the
8 world that if they are able to get power what they intend to do.
9 So the senior officers and the educated ones amongst us, we used
09:44:50 10 to make those comments. But we could not tell Mr Sankoh that one
11 because they had already taken decision together with the
12 external delegation.

13 Q. I would like us to look quite quickly, please, to the
14 foreword to this publication:

09:45:10 15 "We can no longer leave the destiny of our country in the
16 hands of a generation of crooked politicians and military
17 adventurists. It is our right and duty to change the present
18 political system in the name of national salvation and
19 liberation. This task is the historical responsibility of every
09:45:50 20 patriot. We must be prepared to struggle until the decadent,
21 backward and oppressive regime is thrown into the dustbin of
22 history. We call for national democratic revolution - involving
23 the total mobilisation of all progressive forces. The secret
24 behind the survival of the existing system is our lack of
09:46:16 25 organisation. What we need then is organised challenge and
26 resistance. The strategy and tactics of this resistance will be
27 determined by the reaction of the enemy forces - force will be
28 met with force, reasoning with reasoning, and dialogue with
29 dialogue. Basic document of the RUF."

1 Now, Mr Sesay, that basic document of the RUF, did that
2 feature in ideology training at Camp Sokoto?

3 A. Yes, to say that the system should be changed from the
4 politicians, yes.

09:47:09 5 Q. Now, when we continue we see that the publication
6 continues:

7 "We entered Sierra Leone through Liberia and enjoyed the
8 sympathy of Sierra Leonean migrant workers, some of whom joined
9 us to cross the border to start our liberation campaign. This
09:47:30 10 generation of Sierra Leoneans who have had to migrate to make a
11 living in Liberia are now referred to as 'mercenaries and
12 bandits' by the Freetown-based military junta. The military
13 junta has also used this fact to gain support from Guinea,
14 Nigeria, Ghana, the US and Britain in its avowed policy of war to
09:47:57 15 rid Sierra Leone of 'alien rebels.'"

16 Pause there. Were you a migrant worker in Ivory Coast when
17 were you recruited, Mr Sesay?

18 A. Yes, I travelled to the Ivory Coast. That was when
19 Mr Sankoh contacted us. But I did not go to Liberia. I wasn't
09:48:25 20 in Liberia before the war.

21 Q. Now, why had you, a Sierra Leonean, migrated to Ivory
22 Coast?

23 A. I said yesterday that there came a time when things were
24 very difficult with my father to take care of our educational
09:48:48 25 needs, my brothers and my sisters and myself, so that's why I
26 left.

27 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak
28 slowly and repeat this part of his answer.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause, Mr Witness. You were

1 telling us about the difficulties with your family. You need to
2 slow down a bit, for the interpreter's sake. Now start again
3 with your family, please.

09:49:18 4 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said when the lawyer asked
5 me, I said I told the Court yesterday that I had difficulty with
6 support from my father because my father was working with the
7 Ministry of Works and there were times it could take up to three
8 months or four months they will not pay them their salary, so
9 that's why I decided to go to my sister. That's how I
09:49:40 10 discontinued my education, because things were difficult with my
11 father. I was not the only son there. I had my sisters and my
12 brothers to take care of.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Now, bearing that in mind, your reason for going to Ivory
09:49:59 15 Coast, when you returned to Sierra Leone with the RUF, did you
16 consider yourself a mercenary and a bandit?

17 A. Well, no, I did not consider myself to be a mercenary
18 because I'm a Sierra Leonean. A mercenary is a foreigner who
19 comes from another country to fight in another country; that's a
09:50:22 20 mercenary, and I was not a bandit. Because when the war started
21 it was a civilian who lodged me. I was at SYB Rogers's house
22 right up to the time we were pushed to Pendembu.

23 Q. Mr Sesay, in light of what we've just read I'm asking you
24 bluntly: Why did you, a Sierra Leonean, decide to invade your
09:50:53 25 own country militarily? I'm not asking what was said to you by
26 Foday Sankoh. I'm interested in why you, Issa Sesay, decided to
27 take that step. Do you follow me?

28 A. Yes, I follow.

29 Q. Well, help us?

1 A. Well, it was the system that caused that, because at the
2 initial stage I did not know what Sankoh stood for, but when we
3 came to Cuttington at Naama, that's when he explained that it was
4 about to organise a revolution. And, when he explained, I saw
09:51:33 5 myself in the picture that oh, no, what this Pa is saying, if my
6 father was having his salary I don't think I would have abandoned
7 my father's place for my sister's and discontinued my education,
8 because if my father was able to sustain me and my siblings to
9 further our education, there was no reason for me to have gone to
09:51:52 10 my sister. But because my father could not pay for my
11 educational needs that's why I had to leave him.

12 Q. Let's go back to the text, shall we:
13 "We do not deny the fact that some of those who volunteered
14 to join our cause were veterans of the Liberian civil war but
09:52:19 15 majority were of Sierra Leonean parentage. However, this minor
16 'alien' involvement in our just and human cause was curtailed as
17 early as May 1992 when it became a nightmarish experience for our
18 civil population. Ever since we have fought a self-reliant war,
19 depending mainly on what we capture from the troops of the rebel
09:52:49 20 NPRC of the regimes in Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana and of the
21 United Liberation Movement For Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO).

22 The RUF/SL is surrounded on all sides by hostile forces."
23 Now, where in that first paragraph mention is made of a
24 nightmarish experience for our civil population, what's that a
09:53:24 25 reference to, Mr Sesay?

26 A. Please repeat the question.

27 Q. Where at the top of that page reference is made to a
28 nightmarish experience for our civil population, what is that a
29 reference to? Maybe if we go back to the previous page to get

1 the context:

2 "We do not deny the fact that some of those who volunteered
3 to join our cause were veterans of the Liberian civil war, but
4 the majority were of Sierra Leonean parentage. However, this
09:54:14 5 minor 'alien' involvement in our just and human cause was
6 curtailed as early as May 1992, when it became a nightmarish
7 experience for our civil population."

8 What happened in May 1992?

9 A. May 1992, that was when the Liberians were withdrawn, and
09:54:49 10 what I understood was that the NPRC used to tell people what the
11 previous governments were saying, that it was the Liberians who
12 had come to invade Sierra Leone, that they had brought the war to
13 Sierra Leone. And, at the end of the day, even the Liberians, we
14 had problems with them, so Foday Sankoh asked that the Liberians
09:55:11 15 return and we would continue the war. And the Liberians who
16 stayed, some of them had Sierra Leonean connections. Some of
17 them were born at the border. Like, for example, there was some
18 RUF who were vanguards and some of them were NPFL fighters from
19 Foya right up to around - from Foya right up towards Mosquito's
09:55:57 20 village. I've forgotten the name. Bockarie's village. All that
21 area, it's the Sierra Leonean end. It's Kissi - but even when
22 you cross over to Liberia end, that is Kissi as well, so some
23 people - some people's mothers are Sierra Leoneans and their
24 fathers are Liberians, so because they are all Kissi people. So
09:56:18 25 if you continue towards that village, that is towards Nyandehun
26 Mambaabu, right up to - these are Gbandi people, but you know
27 Gbandi and Mende are mutually intelligible, so that's how the
28 people were.

29 Q. Let's go back to the text then: "So since May 1992 ever

1 since we fought a self-reliant war." What do you understand by
2 "a self-reliant war"?

3 A. Well, from May '92 the Liberians had been withdrawn, and
4 those of us who stayed behind - and "self-reliant" means was what
09:57:12 5 the RUF captured was what we used to sustain ourselves with; that
6 is in terms of ammunition, food, the RUF did not get any support
7 from anybody outside the borders of Sierra Leone.

8 Q. Thank you. Let's continue then:

9 "The RUF/SL is surrounded on all sides by hostile forces.
09:57:32 10 To the north and west, Guinea exercises a strangle-hold on the
11 common border. To the east and south the Liberian counties of
12 Lofa, Bomi and Grand Cape Mount sharing a common border with
13 Sierra Leone have been controlled by ECOMOG by way of ULIMO.
14 The sea and air space are patrolled by ECOMOG. With the
09:58:03 15 situation as it is, how do we get supplies from the National
16 Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) or, for that matter, from
17 anywhere else? The NPFL could not have lost those three
18 strategic counties if it had sufficient arms to spare.

19 Therefore, the theory and accusations that we receive weapons and
09:58:29 20 ammunition from Libya, by way of Burkina Faso and the NPFL, and
21 at the same time being a conduit for the supplies of materials to
22 the NPFL are nonsense. These are calculated lies to justify the
23 pursuit of a policy of military option by the Freetown-based
24 military junta against our entreaties for peace through dialogue.

09:59:01 25 It is an insult to every patriotic Sierra Leonean for the 'Libya
26 card' to be played to confuse as well as betray the genuine
27 democratic and equal opportunity demands of our people. In
28 respect of the above, we, hereby, challenge the United States and
29 Britain to support and see to the implementation and monitoring

1 of our call for the UN Security Council to place a universal arms
2 embargo on Sierra Leone, forthwith. We are tired of being
3 demonised only to prolong the civil war which, left to
4 themselves, the African people of Sierra Leone are capable of
09:59:50 5 resolving through an enlightened process of dialogue. Now, for
6 this process of dialogue to be successful it has to be entirely
7 owned by the people as a vehicle for their empowerment. It has
8 become quite clear now, even in Freetown, that the NPRC was
9 'introduced' to hijack the revolution and betray the cause of the
10:00:21 10 uprising against a rotten plantation system which impoverished
11 Sierra Leone while, at the same time, enriched its slave masters.
12 Why is it therefore strange to the backers of the besieged NPRC
13 that the historically neglected, used and abused countryside
14 would rise up to the simple call that 'no more slave, no more
10:00:53 15 master and arms to the people, power to the people and wealth to
16 the people'. It is this rallying call that has been set to song
17 as the RUF anthem which journalists are jailed for publishing and
18 distributing this motivating anthem in Freetown. What is clear
19 is that the patriotic and democratically minded Africans of
10:01:20 20 Sierra Leone are waging a successful guerilla warfare using their
21 feet and brains, footpaths and bypasses to surprise, disarm, and
22 totally disorganise the offensive operations of the rebel NPRC.
23 The rebel NPRC has made its priority the defeat and destruction
24 of the RUF/SL. Why seek to defeat and as well as destroy your
10:01:49 25 own brothers and sisters that you were forced into conflict with?
26 Why inherit the destructive policies of the masters you overthrew
27 if you mean peace when you say so? Where does the rebel NPRC
28 want to drive us away to? Maybe this is why the regime in Guinea
29 is fighting on the rebel NPRC side, to prevent an anticipated

1 spillover which has never occurred because the RUF/SL has no
2 quarrel with the people of Guinea and likewise Nigeria, Ghana and
3 Britain.

4 Our self-reliant revolution deserves a more objective study
10:02:38 5 and analysis. We continue to be demonised by those who benefit
6 by doing so. As Pan-Africanists, we are proud of our
7 self-reliant struggle. Initially we fought a semi-conventional
8 war relying heavily on vehicles for mobility. This method proved
9 fatal against the combined firepower of Nigeria, Guinea and
10:03:06 10 Ghana. By late 1993 we had been forced to beat a hasty retreat.
11 A successful infiltration almost destroyed our ranks. We were
12 pushed to the border with Liberia. Frankly, we were beaten and
13 were on the run, but our pride and deep sense of calling would
14 not let us face the disgrace of crossing into Liberia as refugees
10:03:30 15 or prisoners of war. We dispersed into smaller units, whatever
16 remained of our fighting force. The civilians were advised to
17 abandon the towns and cities, which they did. We destroyed all
18 our vehicles and heavy weapons that would retard our progress as
19 well as expose our locations. We now relied on light weapons and
10:03:52 20 on our feet, brains and knowledge of the countryside. We moved
21 deeper into the comforting bosom of our mother earth - the
22 forest.

23 The forest welcomed us and gave us succour and sustenance.
24 The forest continues to be our main source of survival and
10:04:15 25 defence to date."

26 Let me pause there, Mr Sesay. Where were the various
27 jungles set up? In what kind of environment?

28 A. Well, the various jungles that were established after
29 Mr Sankoh left Kailahun was the Zogoda Peyima Jungle. That is in

1 Kenema District. They also established a Koribundu Jungle. They
2 set up the Bo Highway Jungle, the Kangari Hills, the Malal Hills,
3 which later moved to the Western Jungle. Those were the jungles.
4 And also including the Pujehun flank. Those were the jungles.

10:05:17 5 But those jungles, sometimes the people there will move from
6 Kangari Hills, attack Kabala, and then return to Kangari Hills.
7 And Gibril Massaquoi, he was in the Malal Hills. He would leave
8 there, go, attack Kambia, Port Loko and then return. That was
9 how it used to happen.

10:05:34 10 Q. "We regained our composure and engaged ourselves in a
11 sustained period of intensive self-examination and
12 self-criticism. We moved forward with a clearly defined
13 programme and liberation ideology. We learned from our mistakes
14 and laboured hard to correct them. We continue to make mistakes

10:05:56 15 but we are not overwhelmed by them. Our collective sense of
16 discipline continues to mature, and the result is an effective
17 command and control procedures and structures in our
18 administrative territory.

19 We have create settlements we call sowo bushes (ie sacred
10:06:18 20 grove for the initiated). We endeavour to provide limited health
21 care, schooling, housing and seedlings free. Our civilians
22 receive no humanitarian assistance. Efforts by the International
23 Committee of the Red Cross to supply much-needed relief aid have
24 been undermined by the rebel NPRC. The rebel NPRC behaves as if

10:06:45 25 we are despicable aliens from another planet and not Sierra
26 Leoneans. We bear all these deprivations with equanimity and a
27 collective sense of purpose. We have not lost our sense of
28 humanity. We have learnt the value of treating captives and
29 prisoners of war with utmost civility. Our ranks keep swelling

1 daily. We have no need to conscript by force. Forced
2 conscription is an inferior method which tends to pose security
3 risk in the long run. Those forcibly conscripted, when they
4 manage to escape, lead enemy troops back to locations they are
10:07:26 5 familiar with. Experience and honesty have been our best
6 teacher.

7 We do exercise limited martial rule in our liberated zone
8 for the sake of internal security. We are religiously Godly in
9 our bearings and beliefs. We enjoy communal prayers and
10:07:53 10 communion twice daily and on all occasions prayers are said both
11 in the Islamic and Christian ways. The people, through their own
12 initiative, have removed doctrinal differences from their way of
13 worship. They say if there is one God/Allah, then there ought to
14 be one congregation. In respect of this awakening, there has
10:08:17 15 emerged the Jungle United Christian Council and the Jungle United
16 Muslim Council. The different divisions in Islam and
17 Christianity respectively worship under one roof and under the
18 guidance of a chief imam or priest and church mother."

19 Now, that reference to religion, Mr Sesay, is that the
10:08:43 20 truth?

21 A. Yes, it's the truth, sir.

22 Q. "We survive by hunting, gathering and vigorous rice
23 farming. We tend the cocoa, coffee and palm fruit and fruit
24 farms, and we find ways to barter them for drugs, clothes,
10:09:01 25 footwear, supplementary food items, schooling materials and, of
26 course, radios, music cassettes and batteries. Sometimes we have
27 the presence of mind to indulge our young ones with sweets and
28 toys.

29 It is our collective sense of purpose, the ideals and ideas

1 we believe in and discipline that have brought us so close to
2 Freetown. Oftentimes towns have fallen to our advancing troops
3 without a single shot being fired. The rebel NPRC troops run
4 away, leaving behind quantities of weapons and ammunition. We
10:09:41 5 are blessed by God/Allah, because of our just cause. It has
6 become crucial that the world knows that there is something
7 happening in the Sierra Leone countryside. A change for the
8 better has gripped Sierra Leone. A consciousness of ourselves as
9 an enterprising people has developed because of the self-reliant
10:10:03 10 struggle. We are daily diversifying our stock of food and eating
11 habits. We are discovering new nutritional values in the flora
12 and fauna that we have grown to respect as our embodiment. We
13 have become proactive conservationists and we live close to and
14 by the soil, rivers, streams, hills, valleys and mountains. In
10:10:30 15 effect, we have come to know our country better and understand
16 the potential of its pristine flora and fauna and the resources
17 that lie underneath our soil. The developing consciousness is
18 all-embracing and enriching. We continue to say that we are
19 blessed and by God/Allah. We are therefore guided by a
10:10:59 20 liberation theology consistent with our pride in ourselves as
21 Africans.

22 No more shall the rural countryside be reduced to hewers of
23 wood and drawers of water for urban Freetown. That pattern of
24 exploitation, degradation and denial has gone forever. No RUF/SL
10:11:23 25 combatant or civilian will countenance the re-introduction of
26 that pattern of raping the countryside to feed the greed and
27 caprice of the Freetown elite and their masters abroad. In our
28 simple and humble ways we say, 'no more slave and no more
29 master.' That these very exploitative measures instituted by

1 so-called central government that create the conditions for
2 resistance and civil uprising. The importance of the 'apartheid
3 dogs of war' Executive Outcomes, to strengthen the chosen policy
4 of war by the rebel NPRC is a case in point."

10:12:13 5 Let's pause there. Executive Outcomes, Mr Sesay, are you
6 aware of that label?

7 A. Yes, I know that name.

8 Q. Who are they?

9 A. Well, it was a mercenary company from South Africa.

10:12:36 10 Q. Who brought them?

11 A. It was the NPRC that brought them.

12 Q. When did they bring them?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness said it was the NPRC.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:12:55 15 Q. And my question was when did they bring them?

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: The point I'm trying to make is that it
17 shows NPFL.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: It should be NPRC. That's what the witness
19 said.

10:13:13 20 Q. Is that right, Mr Sesay?

21 A. Yes. I said NPRC.

22 Q. And when did the NPRC bring these "apartheid dogs of war"
23 into Sierra Leone?

24 A. It was in '95.

10:13:34 25 Q. And in '95, that's when the external delegation were in
26 Ivory Coast. Is that right?

27 A. Yes, at that time they were in Ivory Coast.

28 Q. And that's when they were in Ivory Coast seeking to broker
29 peace in Sierra Leone. Is that right?

1 A. Yes.

2 MR KOUMJIAN: Actually, that's leading and suggestive, and
3 the witness had not testified to that.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, please avoid leading the
10:14:04 5 witness.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Let's go back to the text, shall we?

8 "The importation of the 'apartheid dogs of war', Executive
9 Outcomes, to strengthen the chosen policy of war by the rebel
10:14:25 10 NPRC is a case in point. What irks the population most is the
11 fact that the mercenaries are businessmen to boot and they are
12 mining away the nonrenewable resource of diamonds. If they came
13 to fight the RUF/SL, that would not have bothered the population
14 because they know that the 'apartheid dogs of war' will be
10:14:50 15 handled the same way as the Gurkhas were disgraced to a man on
16 the battlefield.

17 As much as we continue to seek a peaceful solution to our
18 internal civil conflict, we do not at the same time become a
19 casualty of peace. We have every reason to mistrust military
10:15:24 20 juntas, and particularly those waging war against us, even if
21 they have mutated into mufti presidents. How they came to power
22 and how they managed their countries are a matter for their own
23 people. With Sierra Leone, our people continue to say no to the
24 rotten system of the All People's Congress (APC) Party, which the
10:15:50 25 rebel NPRC has inherited as a matter of course because they were
26 the watchdogs of the APC government.

27 We continue to appeal to Guinea, Nigeria, Ghana, and
28 Britain not to interfere. We have put these concerns to song and
29 sing them knowing that the people of these countries do not

1 support the warring policies of the ruling elite. In this
2 respect, we find it so reasonable to make a simple demand that
3 all foreign troops, including military and intelligence advisers
4 and trainers, leave the soil of Sierra Leone to give the required
10:16:33 5 space for Sierra Leoneans to settle their own internal conflict.
6 The presence of foreign troops and the importation of mercenaries
7 indicates a continuation of a policy of war and the choice of the
8 military option. It signals that all the declared intentions of
9 the rebel NPRC for a negotiated settlement have been mere
10:17:03 10 prattle. This also justifies our conviction that the hopes of
11 our people for an enriching and enterprising democratic culture
12 cannot be placed in the hands of a military junta.

13 As a practical demonstration of our commitment to peace we
14 call for a universal arms embargo to be placed on Sierra Leone
10:17:24 15 forthwith. We herein appeal to the United Nations Security
16 Council to seize itself of the grave matter" --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could counsel be advised to
18 reduce his pace a little, please.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:17:40 20 Q. "We herein appeal to the United Nations Security Council to
21 seize itself of the grave matter of the spread of small arms and
22 the planting of anti-personnel mines. The constant use of heavy
23 artillery and cluster bombs have devastated the countryside. We
24 demand an arms embargo now in anticipation of the problems
10:18:19 25 associated with disarmament and demobilisation. The RUF/SL is
26 confident that it can disarm its freedom fighters as soon as it
27 becomes necessary to do so. Our stringent discipline is such
28 that every single bullet is recorded and accounted for.

29 The RUF/SL is open to dialogue and has consistently

1 demonstrated this fact by risking to meet with representatives of
2 independent civic groups, peace movements, labour unions,
3 teachers, students, professional bodies, religious leaders, and
4 chiefs and elders. In late 1994 we risked to meet with a
10:19:27 5 Freetown-based peace group at the Mano River Bridge, but a
6 scouting jet bomber forced us to abandon that contact. In
7 September 1995, we entertained the idea of trying another meeting
8 and went ahead and spoke with some political leaders and peace
9 activists. An independent delegation being put together was
10:19:54 10 rudely interfered with by the rebel NPRC which objected to the
11 inclusion of certain personalities. Such is the character of
12 military juntas that seek to control every aspect of national
13 life in order to feel secure.

14 The RUF/SL seeks the path of peace. In this respect, our
10:20:34 15 unilateral declaration of ceasefire announced in April 1992, as
16 soon as the rebelling government troops seized power from their
17 masters, still stands. We remain steadfast to this ceasefire
18 declaration so far as we are not attacked and the civil society
19 is allowed to determine its own future through a representative
10:21:10 20 sovereign national conference leading to a people's constituent
21 assembly which, in turn, would form a government of national
22 unity.

23 We recognise that, even in the event of a victory, the
24 RUF/SL will have to sign a political, economic and social
10:21:35 25 contract with the rest of society in keeping with the demands of
26 democratic governance. We are democrats and we stand for
27 progress through work and happiness. The new Sierra Leone we are
28 striving for can only be built by the combined energy and
29 industry of all Sierra Leoneans and others of goodwill in a

1 programme of work and happiness drawn up by the empowered people
2 to create that essential wealth vital to the elimination of the
3 scourge of poverty and human degradation. Our liberation
4 ideology and theology are therefore clear and unambiguous."

10:22:28 5 Now, we see that it is signed by Foday Saybana Sankoh at
6 Zogoda, Sierra Leone. Taking things in stages, at the time of
7 the publication of this book, where was Sankoh?

8 A. Well, Sankoh was at Zogoda. He left it - he went to Ivory
9 Coast from Zogoda.

10:23:05 10 Q. We'll come to his move to Ivory Coast in due course. But
11 the narrative contained in that passage which I've taken a little
12 time in going through, Mr Sesay, do you agree with the narrative
13 as to the way in which the conflict in Sierra Leone unfolded from
14 the time of the invasion up until the sending of the external
10:23:30 15 delegation to the Ivory Coast?

16 A. Yes, I agree with it.

17 Q. That during that period, from about May 1992 up until the
18 time of this publication, the RUF struggle in Sierra Leone was a
19 self-reliant struggle as described by you earlier; do you agree?

10:24:04 20 A. Yes, it was a self-reliant struggle.

21 Q. We can put that document away now, please. Now, you
22 mentioned earlier Mr Sankoh leaving Zogoda to go to the Ivory
23 Coast. Do you recall that, Mr Taylor - sorry, Mr Sesay? Do you
24 recall that?

10:24:33 25 A. Yes, I remember that.

26 Q. When did Mr Sankoh go to the Ivory Coast?

27 A. Well, it was between February to March '96 that Mr Sankoh
28 went to Ivory Coast. '96.

29 Q. Secondly, why did Mr Sankoh go to the Ivory Coast?

1 A. After Strasser-King had been overthrown, when Maada Bio
2 overthrew Strasser and he became Head of State and chairman of
3 the NPRC, they then started a dialogue between the delegation and
4 Maada Bio. So it was at that time that they start a delegation,
10:25:30 5 spoke to Amara Essy that they wanted the Ivorian government to
6 host a peace talk between the NPRC and the RUF. And then the
7 external delegation told Mr Amara Essy that they would be able to
8 speak to Mr Sankoh to come out and join the RUF people so that
9 they meet with the NPRC because they showed the connections that
10:25:55 10 some members of the external delegation had with Maada Bio.

11 Q. I'll come back to Maada Bio in a moment. Why was it that
12 when Sankoh left, he did not go to Liberia?

13 A. Well, I had told you that Mr Sankoh had said since '92 that
14 at the time he was now in Kailahun, that moment he said since
10:26:26 15 those people left Kailahun, he will never have any business to do
16 with Mr Taylor. And since then he never had any business with
17 Liberia.

18 Q. I just want to press you a little further on that, please.
19 You've just told me that Mr Sankoh travels to Ivory Coast in or
10:26:48 20 about February/March 1996. How long did he stay in the Ivory
21 Coast thereafter?

22 A. From that time he was in Ivory Coast, and in November he
23 visited Kailahun for just two days. He came to Sierra Leone for
24 just two days, and that was in Kailahun. And the day he arrived,
10:27:19 25 he visited the Kangari Hills and the Western Jungle by
26 helicopter. And he went back to Kailahun, he spent two days
27 there, after which he returned to Ivory Coast until around March,
28 when he travelled to Nigeria, where he was arrested later. And
29 since then he did not return to Sierra Leone any more until

1 October 1999.

2 Q. During that period then, Mr Sesay, from February/March 1996
3 until October 1999, to your knowledge did Foday Sankoh ever go to
4 Liberia?

10:28:06 5 A. No, he did not go to Liberia. I don't have any idea about
6 that.

7 Q. I now want to return to your mention of Maada Bio and him
8 overthrowing Strasser. Do you remember mentioning that to us?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10:28:29 10 Q. When did that occur?

11 A. Mmm, I think it was either November or December '95.
12 Something like that. It was between that time, November to
13 December '95, I think.

14 Q. And thereafter, Mr Sesay, how long did Maada Bio, who then
10:28:56 15 initiated these peace talks, how long did he stay in power?

16 A. Well, Maada Bio seized power from Strasser, and from then
17 they had the meeting with Mr Sankoh around March in Yamoussoukro,
18 and after that - because they, the armed forces, were saying in
19 Freetown that - because I think they had a meeting that they
10:29:38 20 called Bintumani I and Bintumani II. So they, the armed forces,
21 were saying we should have peace before elections. But they said
22 they had politicians who were the advisers to the NPRC. It was
23 the same politicians who incited the civil society to launch a
24 demonstration and to say that they should have election before
10:30:04 25 peace. So in fact, those were the reasons why Maada Bio even
26 went into an agreement with Mr Sankoh and said that if the
27 politicians were forcing the election to come before peace, and
28 he said on the day of the election the RUF should attack Bo,
29 Kenema and Magburaka, and by then he will instruct the army to

1 withdraw back to Freetown. And all those arrangements like they
2 arranged with Mr Sankoh did them as they decided it --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be
4 advised to slow down and repeat that area.

10:30:41 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause, Mr Sesay, you are going too
6 quickly. The interpreter can't keep up with you. Pick up where
7 you said, "All those arrangements that were made with Mr Sankoh
8 did them as they decided it". Continue from there.

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. Those arrangements with Maada
10:31:12 10 Bio were undertaken by Maada Bio and the external delegation,
11 because at that time Maada Bio, including Tom Nyuma himself, all
12 of them were present at the Yamoussoukro talk. And by then I had
13 also travelled to the Ivory Coast to have my medical attention,
14 and Pa Sankoh met me at the Ivory Coast. And the meeting at
10:31:44 15 Yamoussoukro, the NPRC delegation came there, including Kes Boya
16 and the former chief of defence staff Carew, Tom Nyuma and some
17 other officers. So it was at the reception at Hotel d'Ivoire
18 that I, Faya Musa, Deen-Jalloh and Tom Nyuma were discussing,
19 when they said the people - the people of Freetown had a low
10:32:15 20 mentality. He said they do not see things ahead. He said they
21 are seeing things ahead. That was the reason why they were
22 saying that we should have the peace first. They said the
23 disarmament should go on before the election, but the politicians
24 were looking in their own direction, just what they see.

10:32:31 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please, I don't know why you are running.
26 Why? Why are you running with your testimony? Why can't you do
27 what I ask, which is to slow down? It's not very difficult. If
28 you listen to the way that the lawyer is talking to you, that is
29 the speed at which you should speak, please.

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I will try.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Mr Sesay, just to give you some assistance, you were saying
4 that the people - someone was saying peace before election, but
10:33:14 5 the politicians were looking in their own direction, just what
6 they see. Pick it up from there, please.

7 A. Yes, according to Tom Nyuma in Hotel d'Ivoire in
8 Yamoussoukro in Abidjan, that is Cocody, myself, Fayia Musa, Tom
9 Nyuma, Deen-Jalloh, we were discussing because they were trying
10:33:44 10 to book rooms for us. That was when Tom Nyuma started talking
11 about the peace. He said, "This peace that we have started, it
12 would be good for us to disarm first before the elections in
13 Sierra Leone." He said, "But the politicians, they don't want to
14 listen to that." And those were the same politicians who sat as

10:34:02 15 advisors or advisory committee to the NPRC, and they again
16 turncoat and decided that there should be election before peace,
17 and that was Pa Kabbah and others. And they incited people to
18 demonstrate against the army in Freetown, and that was what led
19 to Maada Bio to go and start up the arrangement with the external
10:34:26 20 delegation, saying that if the politicians force that there
21 should be election before peace, then he was saying that on the
22 very day of the elections, the RUF should attack Bo, Kenema, and
23 Freetown - I mean Bo, Kenema and Magburaka. And he said he at
24 that time would instruct the army - the CDF and the army chief of
10:34:52 25 staff to order the army to withdraw from Bo, Kenema, Magburaka
26 and come back to Freetown.

27 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, I just want to clarify a couple of -

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause.

29 MR KOUMJIAN: I notice the LiveNote, one name appeared to

1 be misspelled, and I don't know if we've had it before. Tom
2 Nyuma. I think it's a well-known name in Sierra Leone. The
3 interpreters could spell it.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: It appears as "Tom Newman." Tom Nyuma is
10:35:28 5 on the record before. Tom Nyuma, it's N-Y-U-M-A.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

7 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, let me clarify one point with you before I
8 go back to the narrative, and it's this: You mentioned you
9 travelling to the Ivory Coast and obtaining rooms at Hotel
10:35:57 10 d'Ivoire. When did you travel to the Ivory Coast?

11 A. I travelled to Ivory Coast in November 1995. I went for a
12 medical operation and they did my operation in January, so by
13 March I could now walk. So when the delegation went there, I was
14 there with the external delegation, Fayia Musa, Philip Palmer.
10:36:19 15 In fact, I was staying in Philip Palmer's house in Danane. So
16 all of us travelled to Yamoussoukro to see Mr Sankoh and we went
17 on the delegation. So after that in April I was instructed to go
18 back, so I went back to Kailahun.

19 Q. So you were in the Ivory Coast from November 1995 until
10:36:41 20 April 1996?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Two things. Firstly, this: That debate which you have
23 narrated between the politicians and Maada Bio as to peace before
24 elections or elections before peace - yes - in due course, was an
10:37:13 25 election held?

26 A. Yes, the election was held.

27 Q. When was the election held?

28 A. My Lord, I do not recall exactly because I cannot recall
29 the exact month of the elections now, but it was something

1 popular that took place in Sierra Leone, that day for the
2 election - I think people should know that - and when it was
3 pronounced later that Tejan Kabbah won the elections.

10:38:01 4 Q. I can't provide you with the date, Mr Sesay, although it's
5 a matter of public knowledge, because I've been told not to lead.
6 So let's move on. When the election in fact took place, what did
7 - if anything - the RUF do?

8 A. Well, that was what led to the amputations that took place
9 when people's fingers were amputated during the Operation Stop
10:38:39 10 Elections. Because when Foday Sankoh and Maada Bio had this
11 agreement that if the politicians forced him in Freetown, then
12 the RUF should attack. So it was like Maada Bio had been talking
13 with the politicians in Freetown, but at the same time
14 sympathetic to Mr Sankoh. Because the arrangement was that if
10:39:01 15 the politicians were to put pressure on him, then the RUF should
16 attack, and at this time the RUF was observing a ceasefire with
17 the NPRC. So it was like what - the things he were saying were
18 actually not being said with some faithfulness to Mr Sankoh.

19 Because the plan was on the day of elections if the RUF attacked,
10:39:30 20 he was not going to withdraw the army, and then the RUF would
21 have been able to control Bo, Kenema, Magburaka, going towards
22 Makeni, And then the election wouldn't have been possible.

23 Q. Who gave the instruction --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, if you read your LiveNote,
10:39:49 25 there's a plea from the recorders to the witness to go slow.
26 Personally, I am tired of asking the witness to slow down. He's
27 not listening. It's up to you now. It's your evidence. It's
28 your witness.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Let's go back a little bit, Mr Sesay. If the RUF attacked,
2 he was not going to withdraw the army and then the army would
3 have been able to control what?

4 A. I said the agreement that Maada Bio had made promise of to
10:40:26 5 Mr Sankoh was that if the politicians and the people in Freetown
6 put pressure on his government, then Mr Sankoh should attack.
7 The RUF should attack Bo, Kenema, Magburaka, and then he would
8 then give directive to the chief of defence staff and the army
9 chief of staff for the army to withdraw from those towns. So if
10:40:58 10 the RUF were to control Bo, Kenema, Magburaka and Makeni, and
11 then the election wouldn't have been successful, so the election
12 wouldn't have taken place.

13 Q. Now, did the army withdraw from Bo, Kenema, and Magburaka?

14 A. And when the RUF attacked, the army did not withdraw. They
10:41:28 15 responded adequately. They responded to the fire power and they
16 did not give chance to the RUF, and the army did not withdraw at
17 all. So that was the reason that led to the amputations that
18 took place.

19 Q. Now, I'll come to the amputations in a moment, but I want
10:41:47 20 to ask you this, first of all: Where were you at the time of the
21 election?

22 A. Well, at this point in time I had travelled from Abidjan.
23 I was now staying in Danane. And by the time I returned to
24 Sierra Leone, it was then Pa Kabbah who was President.

10:42:12 25 Q. So were you in Sierra Leone at the time of Operation Stop
26 Elections?

27 A. No, I was not in Sierra Leone. I was in Danane in the
28 Ivory Coast.

29 Q. Who gave the order for Operation Stop Election?

1 A. It was Mr Sankoh who gave the order, based on the
2 agreements that they had reached, he and Maada Bio.

3 Q. Where was Mr Sankoh at the time that he gave that order?

4 A. Well, he was in Abidjan.

10:42:58 5 Q. How did he transmit that order?

6 A. He had a radio set that he used to send messages. He would
7 write the message, the operators will code - encode the message
8 and then send it over, and the others there will receive it and
9 then they will decode it.

10:43:21 10 Q. How do you know about this?

11 A. Well, that was the system all of us used to send messages.
12 When you wrote a message, or if your adjutant wrote a message,
13 you will give that to your operator and the operator will encode
14 the message and then when he send the message, the others will
10:43:44 15 decode it and then hand it over to the commander for whom the
16 message was meant.

17 Q. Were you able to monitor the message sent by Foday Sankoh
18 ordering Operation Stop Election?

19 A. Well, at that time, where I was in Danane, I could not
10:44:04 20 monitor the message, but I later understood that it was Mr Sankoh
21 who ordered the Operation Stop Elections. Because at that time
22 when he had left and he was in Ivory Coast, he still had direct
23 control over the RUF. Up to the time he went to Nigeria, even at
24 the time he was arrested he still had control over the RUF. It
10:44:28 25 was after he made the announcement that the RUF should join the
26 AFRC in 1997, that was the time they stopped having
27 communications with him. So by then he did not actually have
28 direct grip over the RUF like the time he was in the Ivory Coast.

29 Q. Now, what was the response of the leaders on the ground in

1 Sierra Leone to that order Operation Stop Election?

10:45:23 2 A. Well, Mr Sankoh, from what I understood later, it was that
3 he sent the instruction and explained to Mohamed Tarawalli. And
4 at the time Mr Sankoh was going to the Ivory Coast, he left his
5 satellite phone at Zogoda with Mohamed Tarawalli, and so he used
6 to call Mohamed Tarawalli on the satellite phone and explain
7 things to him. So he had explained to him all the development
8 that had taken place between him and Maada Bio. So all the
9 people who went on the different operations, they went with the
10:45:47 10 confidence that if they opened fire, the army was going to
11 withdraw, but when the army did not withdraw. So those were the
12 things that happened during the various attacks.

13 Q. Now, what I want to understand, Mr Sesay, and I'm seeking
14 your assistance with, is this: There's an order to attack Bo,
10:46:15 15 Kenema, Magburaka, yes? Is that right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. With the agreement that the government troops would
18 withdraw. Is that right?

19 A. Yes.

10:46:30 20 Q. In fact, when those locations were attacked, the government
21 forces did not withdraw. Is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And as a consequence, you've told us, the amputations
24 began. Is that right?

10:46:52 25 A. Yes, I said it was during that operation that people's
26 fingers were amputated. Yes, that happened.

27 Q. Now, I've gone through that sequence for this reason. The
28 order stop election, was that an order to attack those three
29 locations, or was it an order to amputate people if those attacks

1 failed; which is it?

2 A. Well, what I understood was that it was an order to attack
3 those towns and after which the army would withdraw, but it was
4 when the army failed to withdraw that they started doing the
10:47:39 5 amputation.

6 Q. But my question, Mr Sesay, is did the fact of those
7 amputations arise spontaneously as a result of the plan not
8 working, or was the fact of those amputations ordered by someone?
9 Do you follow me?

10:48:02 10 A. Yes, I understand the question. Well, the way I understood
11 it was that it was because the plan did not work as agreed on,
12 and the fighters then decided to resort to those things.

13 Q. So was there a direct order to amputate?

14 A. No, I did not know about that.

10:48:41 15 Q. Was Operation Stop Elections a directive from Charles
16 Taylor to Foday Sankoh?

17 A. No, at this time Mr Sankoh and Mr Taylor had no business.
18 Mr Sankoh was leader of his own organisation. He was the CIC of
19 the RUF. He gave the directive to the field commander to carry
10:49:19 20 out the Operation Stop Elections.

21 Q. Are you aware of any communication from Charles Taylor to
22 Foday Sankoh at this time ordering Operation Stop Election?

23 A. No, not at all. Because by then I was with Mr Sankoh.
24 When he came out I join them in Yamoussoukro and we all went to
10:49:52 25 Abidjan. I was there up to the time Mr Sankoh went to Burkina
26 Faso, and during that time I never heard that Mr Sankoh had any
27 communications with Mr Taylor. No, they did not communicate at
28 the time I was there. And even at the time I left there, I did
29 not hear from anyone that Mr Sankoh had any communication with

1 Mr Taylor whilst he was in Ivory Coast and even during the time
2 of this attack, no.

3 Q. What would you say about the testimony of any individual
4 who would suggest that it was Charles Taylor who gave the order
10:50:24 5 for Operation Stop Election? Would that person be telling the
6 truth?

7 A. No, that person would not be telling the truth. It's not
8 true at all.

9 Q. Can I seek to clarify one matter before the short
10:51:07 10 adjournment. Do you know of a location in Sierra Leone called
11 Sierra Rutile?

12 A. Well, I heard the name, but I never went there. But I
13 heard the name and I know about operations that the RUF undertook
14 there. Yes, RUF attacked there.

10:51:27 15 Q. As far as you're aware, when was the first time that the
16 RUF attacked Sierra Rutile?

17 A. In 1995.

18 Q. Can you help us with a month?

19 A. Well, I cannot be specific about that, because at this time
10:51:52 20 I was in Giema and it has taken a long time. If it were an
21 operation that I led myself, I would have been able to recall.

22 But when they attacked there, the white people, the Americans,
23 the British who were captured during that operation, they brought
24 them. Those were staff - they were ex-pats working at Sierra
10:52:15 25 Rutile. They brought them to Zogoda, and from there Mr Sankoh
26 sent - in fact, he released them. He sent them to me at Giema,
27 and from Giema I escorted them to the Guinean border and they
28 were received by there by the ICRC. And in fact, when they got
29 there --

1 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. We'll come back to that, but I just
2 want to break things up so that we can follow in sequence. Who
3 led the attack on Sierra Rutile in 1995?

4 A. It was Mohamed Tarawalli and Superman. They led the attack
10:52:58 5 from the Kangari Hills. They came and attacked Sierra Rutile,
6 and Foday Sankoh instructed Sam Bockarie to mobilise troops from
7 the Zogoda area from the Kambui Forest to proceed towards Matru
8 Jong, when he went and took over command from Mohamed Tarawalli.
9 And then Mohamed Tarawalli, Superman and their own troops, they
10:53:29 10 moved ahead to go and create the Western Jungle. So by then Sam
11 Bockarie was the battle group commander. He was a major. So he
12 went over to Rutile and took over command from Mohamed. So after
13 that, about a month or two, Sam Bockarie too killed some fighters
14 there. I think they were about two in number. So Foday Sankoh
10:53:51 15 became angry with him, so he withdrew him and change him and he
16 later sent --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the last name that was --
18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. What was the last name you mentioned, Mr Sesay?

10:54:03 20 A. I said it was then Morris Kallon who went and replaced Sam
21 Bockarie because Foday Sankoh withdrew Sam Bockarie from there.
22 Mr Sankoh then charged Sam Bockarie. He demoted him, in fact,
23 from battle group commander to a staff sergeant and then sent him
24 to a training base for advanced training.

10:54:28 25 Q. Pause there.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Did the witness say Sam Bockarie killed
27 some fighters?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Two RUF fighters. Is that right, Mr Sesay?

29 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am - my Lord.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Because you are speaking so fast, that is
2 not in the record and it's important. So as long as you keep
3 running with your testimony, you might as well waste your time if
4 things are not going to be picked up. That is why I keep
10:54:56 5 interrupting and asking you to slow down, please. But you keep
6 running.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Now - so how many fighters did Sam Bockarie kill, Mr Sesay?

9 A. Two fighters. He killed two fighters in Sierra Rutile.

10:55:18 10 Q. Pause there. The ex-patriots who were captured at Sierra
11 Rutile, who was the commander of the operation which led to their
12 capture?

13 A. Mohamed Tarawalli.

14 Q. Who ordered the attack on Sierra Rutile?

10:55:46 15 A. Mr Sankoh.

16 Q. Did the order to attack Sierra Rutile come from Charles
17 Taylor?

18 A. No, not at all.

19 Q. As far as you're aware, was Charles Taylor in contact with
10:56:04 20 Foday Sankoh at the time of the attack on Sierra Rutile?

21 A. No, Mr Sankoh was not willing to talk to Mr Taylor at that
22 time, because when things became rough with him he was very angry
23 with Mr Taylor, let alone when things were now going maybe better
24 with him at that time. He was very, very much angry with

10:56:31 25 Mr Taylor because according to him, he said Mr Taylor thought
26 that without him he will not be able to fight his war. So he cut
27 off all communications with him.

28 Q. Now, the hostages that were taken at Sierra Rutile, in due
29 course you told us that you took them to the Guinean border to

1 hand them over to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

2 Is that right?

3 A. Yes, my Lord.

4 Q. Who organised the release of those hostages?

10:57:07 5 A. Well, what I understood it was the ICRC who contacted
6 Mr Sankoh on the field radio, and Mr Sankoh responded to them and
7 he decided to release the people. And he asked the ICRC to come
8 to the Guinean border, that is Nongowa - that is on the Guinean
9 side - and to come to the side of Sierra Leone, that is the
10:57:43 10 Koindu-Nyanga area. He said he would send the people there so
11 that the ICRC would be able to receive them.

12 Q. In what year was it, Mr Sesay, that these hostages were
13 released?

14 A. It was '95.

10:58:02 15 Q. Can you help us with a month?

16 A. I recall it was during the dry season, sometime around
17 maybe going towards May. I think it was sometime around May
18 going towards June, because by then the river - the water level
19 of the rivers was still low. Something like April, May, June or
10:58:34 20 something like that. I cannot actually be very more specific
21 about the month. Because I was the one who walked with them from
22 Giema up to the Guinean border, which is about 34 miles - about
23 37 miles from Giema to the border. It's about 37 miles. And one
24 of them, in fact, was an American. When he walked from Zogoda to
10:59:03 25 Giema, when he got there he was, like, helpless and we had to put
26 him in a hammock and --

27 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
28 to repeat that area and slow down.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. You had to put him in a hammock and do what at Giema, the
2 American?

3 A. Yes, because he could no longer walk because he had a
4 swollen foot by then, so he was put in a hammock and my fighters
10:59:30 5 had to tote him and take him to - as close to the border line,
6 and we had to put him into the canoes because he could not walk
7 at all. He could not even stand on his own.

8 Q. Mr Sesay, I hate to sound like a stuck record, but I need
9 to ask the same question again. Did Charles Taylor give the
10:59:54 10 order to Foday Sankoh to release those hostages?

11 A. Not at all. During this time, I said since '92, Mr Sankoh
12 was operating independently. He was operating as the leader of
13 the RUF. He was not taking any instruction from Mr Taylor, nor
14 were they having any communications at this point in time.

11:00:18 15 Q. You appreciate, of course, why I need to sound like a stuck
16 record, Mr Sesay. I'm dealing with allegations made by the
17 Prosecution. Do you follow?

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, this is a good time to take
19 the midmorning break. We will take half an hour's break and
11:00:41 20 reconvene at 11.30.

21 [Break taken at 11.00 a.m.]

22 [Upon resuming at 11.32 a.m.]

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, please continue.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:33:15 25 Q. Mr Sesay, before the short adjournment we were discussing
26 the attack on Sierra Rutile and the taking of hostages and your
27 involvement in their later release. Do you recall that?

28 A. Yes, I recall that.

29 Q. And you explained to us that the release took place

1 sometime in the dry season, April/May 1995, yes?

2 A. Yes, that is what I recall.

3 Q. Now, you had told us of your presence in the Ivory Coast.

4 Do you remember? You'd gone for medical treatment. Just remind

11:34:07 5 us, when had you gone?

6 A. I went in November '95.

7 Q. So after your involvement in the release of these hostages,
8 later that same year you went to the Ivory Coast. Is that right?

9 A. Yes.

11:34:25 10 Q. When you arrived in the Ivory Coast in November, what was
11 actually going on so far as the external delegation was
12 concerned?

13 A. Well, the external delegation got instructions from
14 Mr Sankoh, and they too briefed Mr Sankoh. People used to come
11:34:56 15 and talk to them like Dr Sebo, Omrie Golley. That was what was
16 going on. And they were lodged at different houses that were
17 rented. But when they were ready for meetings they would go to
18 Deen-Jalloh, who was the head of the delegation.

19 Q. And because of your presence there in the Ivory Coast, did
11:35:19 20 you become involved at all in those discussions?

21 A. Well, yes, I attended one or two meetings with them before
22 I went for my medical operation in Abidjan. And after the
23 operation when I returned, I wasn't well until Foday Sankoh
24 returned. When Foday Sankoh was going to Yamoussoukro, we
11:35:47 25 travelled then to receive him.

26 Q. Now Yamoussoukro, can you provide us with a date for that,
27 Mr Sesay?

28 A. I cannot provide the date now for the arrival of Mr Sankoh,
29 but when Mr Sankoh came from Zogoda - because it was the Ivorian

1 Foreign Minister Mr Amara Essy, he was the one who received
2 Mr Sankoh on board a helicopter from Camp Zogoda. The very day
3 they left Kissidougou, they boarded the flight. It was that very
4 evening that they arrived in Yamoussoukro.

11:36:39 5 Q. I'm grateful. Now, did the talks in Yamoussoukro lead to
6 any kind of agreement, Mr Sesay?

7 A. Well, the talks in Yamoussoukro, what I recall was that the
8 Ivorian President at that time, His Excellency Konan Bedie,
9 invited Mr Sankoh and Mr Bio, and they went to his residential
11:37:19 10 palace and he had a private meeting with them. From that - it
11 was from that night that the peace talks started, and they spoke
12 about declaration of ceasefire, and the following day the talks
13 continued. After about two days Maada Bio returned to Freetown,
14 and Sankoh himself returned to Ivory Coast with the NPRC

11:37:46 15 delegation. All of us went to the Ivory Coast, and they
16 travelled the following day back to Freetown while we stayed in
17 the Ivory Coast in Abidjan.

18 Q. Now, we also spent a little time before the break
19 discussing the elections which took place in Sierra Leone and its
11:38:06 20 effect so far as the RUF was concerned. Now, after Yamoussoukro,
21 how did things develop so far as the peace process is concerned?

22 A. Well, that peace process - after the declaration of the
23 ceasefire, the ceasefire declaration was signed - yes, Mr Sankoh,
24 at that initial stage he had good intentions for the peace
11:38:37 25 process. But after the elections when Mr Kabbah was elected
26 President of Sierra Leone, the Kamajors became stronger and they
27 started attacking RUF positions.

28 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay.

29 A. And these attacks --

1 Q. And I pause you for this reason: When you returned to
2 Sierra Leone, you've told us in April 1996, where did you go to?

3 A. I - from Yamoussoukro Mr Sankoh informed me, he said,
4 "Issa," and I said "Yes, sir". He said, "The two of us something
11:39:31 5 to resolve". He said, "After the signing of the ceasefire you
6 have to return, because I have instructed Captain PS Binda to set
7 up a commission of inquiry". He said, "The money that I was
8 sending to you in Kailahun, Peter Vandj and others have
9 complained that you were not utilising the money the way I

11:39:52 10 instructed you to do, so you have to give account". So I said,
11 "Okay, no problem, sir". So after the signing of the ceasefire
12 we went to Abidjan, and Mr Sankoh and others left us at Hotel
13 d'Ivoire, that is, myself, late SYB Rogers, Dr Barrie,

14 Mr Sankoh's wife, Deen-Jalloh's wife and Fajia Musa's wife, all

11:40:27 15 of us were at the hotel. Then Foday Sankoh, Fajia Musa,
16 Deen-Jalloh, Philip Palmer, Pa Kallon, Jonathan Kposowa, they
17 travelled to Burkina Faso. They wanted to go to Libya, but when
18 they got to Burkina Faso - you know, they all went together with
19 Peter Vandj, because Peter Vandj went with Mr Sankoh in his
11:40:57 20 delegation. So when they got to Burkina Faso, that was when
21 Mr Sankoh sent Peter Vandj back to Ivory Coast. He said he
22 should return to Kailahun to his posting as area commander, but
23 he told him that when he would reach in Abidjan, he should go
24 with Issa because Issa should --

11:41:23 25 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak
26 slowly and repeat this part of his answer.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. I've actually been listening to you
29 quite carefully and you are speaking very slowly, but it's quite

1 clear that the interpreters are having difficulty following you.
2 So what I think we need to do, Mr Sesay, is for us to break
3 things up a little bit. Do you follow me? Because I can see you
4 making an effort to speak slowly, and I'm listening to the Krio.
11:41:57 5 And you are actually speaking very slowly, but it's quite clear
6 that the interpreters can't keep up. So let's try and break it
7 up, okay? Now, you speak of Peter Vandi coming back from Burkina
8 Faso to Ivory Coast, yes?
9 A. Yes.
11:42:18 10 Q. Just pick things up from there.
11 A. Yes, Peter Vandi returned and met us at the hotel. That
12 was when he delivered the message to me that Mr Sankoh said I
13 should go together with him and I should answer to the board of
14 inquiry, and I said "okay".
11:42:37 15 Q. Pause. And then?
16 A. Then from that Mr Sankoh himself on that very day called
17 Dr Barrie and told him - he instructed him to give transportation
18 to me and Peter Vandi so we should travel to Guinea and to Sierra
19 Leone in Kailahun.
11:42:57 20 Q. And did you go back to Kailahun with Peter Vandi?
21 A. Yes, I went to Kailahun and to Giema. When I went to
22 Giema, after 48 hours was when Captain PS Binda met me at my
23 house and he showed me a document that was from Mr Sankoh, an
24 instruction that I was to report at any time Mr Binda called me
11:43:30 25 to answer to questions regarding the money that was being sent to
26 me in Kailahun. So when Mr Binda showed the letter to me and I
27 said, "Okay." So I asked Mr Binda, I said, "When would it be?"
28 I said, "Whenever you need me, I'll be available. Just send for
29 me, I'll be there." He said, "Okay." So Mr Binda - in the next

1 two days the commission of inquiry was formed that comprised IDU,
2 MP representative - IDU, MP, G5, combat medics and some paramount
3 chiefs, civilian chiefs in the Kailahun District. And I went to
4 the court barri where I was invited, and the investigation
11:44:17 5 started until around two weeks when Mohamed Tarawalli sent
6 instructions to Peter Vandi - sorry - yeah, to Peter Vandi, yeah,
7 that the board of investigation was to be moved to Zogoda instead
8 of Kailahun. So Pa Binda told me and I said, "Okay." So after
9 72 hours Pa Binda told me to move to Zogoda. We moved to Zogoda.
11:44:48 10 When we went to Zogoda, the panel sat there again and the
11 investigations continued. I was investigated and I explained - I
12 called out the people whom I had distributed the money amongst,
13 that is, like the contractor - because, like, the money was sent
14 to me in different instalments. Whenever the money would come to
11:45:16 15 me, I'll explain the instruction that was given to me by
16 Mr Sankoh, the amount that I gave to the external delegation, the
17 amount that I was to use for medicine, the amount that I was to
18 use for rice and condiments, and the other money, the amount that
19 I was to use to buy rice for the family of the civilians. I
11:45:37 20 called the contractor who did the import from Guinea. He brought
21 the records, and from then the board said - and I named the G5s
22 who distributed the rice to the civilians. And I named the
23 combat medics who received the medicine that the contractor
24 bought, because they signed for all of those stuff. But the
11:46:04 25 board said their finding was that I distributed the money and I
26 bought the items, but I did not follow up on the distribution.
27 So they reported to Mr Sankoh, and Mr Sankoh in turn demoted me
28 to captain. So when I was demoted to captain, he said I was to
29 be at Zogoda, and I was there. I wasn't doing anything, because

1 I had not recovered fully yet. I was there up to September - up
2 until September. Foday Sankoh instructed Mohamed that I was to
3 return to Kailahun, and in late September --

4 Q. Pause there. So in late September, where did you go?

11:46:45 5 A. I returned to Giema in Kailahun from Camp Zogoda.

6 Q. Now, just so that we can clarify that period, please. So
7 from what date - when did you go to Zogoda when the inquiry was
8 transferred from Kailahun?

9 A. Well, it was in May that I went to Zogoda, and I returned
11:47:09 10 to Kailahun in September.

11 Q. So from May of which year?

12 A. 1996.

13 Q. So from May 1996 until September 1996 you were in Zogoda.
14 Is that right?

11:47:25 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Then you returned to Kailahun?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, during that time, Mr Sesay, 1996, were peace talks
19 going on in the Ivory Coast?

11:47:42 20 A. Well, at that time, yes, I understood that Mr Kabbah's
21 government used to meet with Mr Sankoh - Mr Sankoh's delegation
22 in the Ivory Coast. They had two or three meetings where they
23 concluded that they were to - they were to sign the peace accord
24 in November. But during this period there were negotiations
11:48:07 25 going on but the Kamajors were attacking the RUF positions, the
26 Kamajors and the army. Because I can recall while I was at
27 Zogoda they used to attack Kori bundu Jungle because at that time
28 Monica Pearson was at Kori bundu Jungle. That was where she had a
29 training base. They were attacked there many times, and they

1 were dislodged from that area and they came to Zogoda. They came
2 to Zogoda in September and they met me there. At the same time,
3 the men like Kallon in the Bo Jungle, he too was being attacked
4 many times, and he moved around September. He moved from Bo
11:48:55 5 Jungle, and he joined up with Isaac Mongor and others in the
6 Kangari Hills. And even Zogoda itself, like that Blama area
7 towards Bandawor, they used to attack there frequently until they
8 left Zogoda.

9 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier a ceasefire, Mr Sesay. When had
11:49:14 10 that ceasefire been signed?

11 A. Between the NPRC and the RUF?

12 Q. Yes, please.

13 A. I cannot recall the date, but that was the first meeting
14 between Maada Bio and Foday Sankoh, Yamoussoukro. That was when
11:49:33 15 the declaration of the ceasefire mandated. And even when I was
16 at Zogoda, I saw actions of the implementation of the ceasefire.
17 Because, for instance, Sam Bockarie off-loaded a truck that had
18 food, rice and condiments that was travelling from Kenema to
19 Tongo Field. At that time he was battalion commander under
11:49:59 20 Matthew Kennedy Sesay at Peyima. So Sam Bockarie set ambush and
21 he off-loaded that truck. So Mohamed Tarawalli called him to
22 Zogoda to answer questions about why he did that, and he was
23 warned strongly that he should not repeat what he had done. That
24 was the same thing that was done when --

11:50:24 25 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness slow down
26 and repeat the name of the person who did this?

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Can you just go back over that part? There was a truck
29 stopped between Blama and where?

1 A. Blama Junction and Kenema Town, by --

2 Q. And who stopped the truck?

3 A. It was the battalion commander who was at Bandawor called
4 Base Marine.

11:50:53 5 Q. And what was Mohamed Tarawalli's response to that?

6 A. Mohamed Tarawalli invited him, and he was detained at the
7 MP, and a statement was obtained from him. He spent about a week
8 there, and he was warned not to repeat that and he was sent back
9 to his place, Bandawor.

11:51:12 10 Q. So were the RUF taking steps to maintain that ceasefire
11 during that period when you were at Zogoda from May through to
12 September?

13 A. Yes. Especially from May to June, July, Mohamed Tarawalli
14 took actions. But when he saw that the government troops and the
11:51:39 15 Kamajors were attacking RUF positions continuously, he stopped.

16 Q. So were the government troops and the CDF respecting the
17 ceasefire?

18 A. No, they did not respect the ceasefire. Especially the
19 CDF, they never respected the ceasefire.

11:51:57 20 Q. And then you described how, during this period, the various
21 jungles which had been established were being attacked by the
22 government forces and the CDF. What in due course happened at
23 Zogoda?

24 A. Well, when I left Zogoda, Foday Sankoh instructed Mohamed
11:52:23 25 that I was to go back to Kailahun. While I was going, Mohamed
26 told me, he said, "Jack, when you'll be going, please make sure
27 you make contact to get some ammunition." He said, "I will talk
28 to the leader for us to get some money so you'll buy the
29 ammunition and you'll send it to me at Zogoda. You see, when the

1 people are attacking us and we don't have ammunition on the
2 ground." And I said, "Okay." So when I came, upon my arrival in
3 Kailahun and in Giema, I went to the Guinean border and I met
4 Abdul Rahman at Dia. I spoke to Abdul Rahman at the border and I
11:53:08 5 said, "Well, we're in need of ammunition, so talk to your
6 business partners, that is, the Guinean soldiers, for them to
7 assist us."

8 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. What were you going to use to pay
9 for this?

11:53:21 10 A. Well, Mohamed told me that he will talk to Mr Sankoh in
11 Abidjan to send money - for somebody to bring money through
12 Guinea to come to Kailahun, because the woman who used to buy
13 ammunition at this time had been arrested. That is Isatu Kallon,
14 Mamie I. She had been arrested and had been brought to Freetown
11:53:46 15 at that time. So I went and spoke to Abdul Rahman, and he told
16 me that the officer who used to assist him wasn't there, that he
17 had gone to Conakry. So I waited for about a week, and I came
18 back to the border and I said, "Okay." So then I returned to
19 Giema. When I returned to Giema, I went to the G4 store. When I
11:54:10 20 went there, I saw about six boxes of AK rounds and I said, "Oh,
21 these guys have ammunition here and we are in lack of it," and I
22 came and told Peter Vandj. I explained to him - and I explained
23 to him about what Mohamed had told me. And I told him if he
24 could send three boxes of ammunition, say, AK and G3 rounds, then
11:54:37 25 later when we would have got our ammunition for the one that I'm
26 waiting for, then we will give back his. And Mohamed said no.
27 He said because if anything goes wrong in Kailahun, he was the
28 commander there.

29 Q. Pause there. I had heard the witness say, "Peter Vandj

1 said no", and it appears on the record as "Mohamed said no."
2 Which did you say, "Peter Vandi said no", or "Mohamed said no"?

3 A. No, I was talking to Peter Vandi. He was the one who had
4 the ammunition that I was talking to. Peter Vandi said no.

11:55:13 5 Because if anything went wrong in Kailahun, it was him that
6 Mr Sankoh was to ask. It was not me, because I wasn't the
7 commander. So I sent a message to Mr - sorry, to Mohamed
8 Tarawalli and informed him. And Mohamed Tarawalli sent orders to
9 Peter Vandi to send two boxes of the AK rounds for him and a box
11:55:37 10 of G3 rounds. And Peter Vandi put armed men together as escort
11 to go with the ammunition in Peyima where Kennedy was as area
12 commander.

13 So at that time the Kamajors - this is October. The
14 Kamajors - the attack of the Kamajors was now becoming serious
11:56:04 15 between Peyima and Zogoda, so the ammunition could not get to the
16 place and the men returned. They continued attacking Zogoda, and
17 the targets were dissolved. The CDF attacked and dissolved the
18 targets around Zogoda. So all the groups had come and assembled
19 in the Zogoda headquarters, and Mohamed communicated with
11:56:30 20 Mr Sankoh in Abidjan, and Mr Sankoh gave Mohamed instructions to
21 divide the group into two. Mohamed was to head the group that
22 was to withdraw from Zogoda to Kailahun, while Mike Lamin was to
23 head the group that was to withdraw from Zogoda to Pujehun. This
24 was in October 1996.

11:56:57 25 Q. And the group led by Mohamed Tarawalli, what happened to
26 that group?

27 A. When they left Zogoda, they got to a village called --

28 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat the
29 name of the village?

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Could you give the name of the village again, please? They
3 left Zogoda and they got to a village called?

4 A. On the way to Kenema District, the village is called
11:57:36 5 Basala. There was a big Kamajor force that they could not - and
6 they were destabilised. So at that time the Kamajors had
7 occupied right up to Bunumbu. They were there in those villages.
8 So they captured some of the fighters' wives and some civilians
9 who were administrators in Zogoda, the combat medic, Mr Sankoh's
11:58:03 10 secretary, and a lot of RUF men were killed. Even Mohamed
11 Tarawalli himself, later we understood that he was killed between
12 Bunumbu and --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat the
14 name of the last village?

11:58:19 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. He was killed between Bunumbu and where?

17 A. The village is called Makababebu.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if one of the translators could
19 assist with a spelling of that, please.

11:58:37 20 THE INTERPRETER: Phonetically it is M-A-K-A-B-A-B-E-B-U.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. I am grateful. So he was killed there. Did any of
23 Mohamed's Tarawalli group survive, Mr Sesay?

24 A. Yes, some of them survived, like Daniel Wankay, who was
11:59:00 25 Mr Sankoh's bodyguard commander at that time. He was called
26 Rambo. Then the other Rambo Flomo, Boston Flomo, he too
27 survived. FOC, Osman Tolo and one other lady, she was a
28 secretary, one of the secretaries to Mr Sankoh at Zogoda. It was
29 Gibriil who captured that lady and her colleagues. She was called

1 Zainab. They were not many. They were not even up to then,
2 those that got to Giema.

3 Q. Pause there. Now you mentioned FOC. Who is that?

4 A. FOC was one of Mr Sankoh's bodyguards.

11:59:53 5 Q. What was his proper name?

6 A. I think Francis O Charles. Something like that.

7 Q. And you mentioned, when you were talking about your
8 dealings on the Guinea border with a view to purchasing arms, an
9 individual called Abdul Rahman. Who is that?

12:00:19 10 A. Abdul Rahman was a businessman. He was based in Gueckedou.
11 He was the head of the Guinean business people. He was a
12 Guinean. He was doing business with the RUF at the border.

13 Q. Now returning to the destabilisation of Zogoda. You
14 mentioned a group led by Mohamed Tarawalli following the order by
15 Foday Sankoh that the men should be split in two. Now the second
16 group was led by Mike Lamin. What happened to that group?

12:00:50 17 A. Mike Lamin moved, they were being attacked but they fought
18 their way through and they got to Pujehun and they joined the
19 other RUF in Pujehun. So they were in Pujehun up to around
12:01:15 20 November and the CDF, the Kamajors had a stronger power against
21 our men, so they attacked our men continuously. So at that time

22 Mr Sankoh had sent Jonathan Kposowa and Joseph Brown from Abidjan
23 for Kposowa and Brown - for Kposowa to come to Monrovia to be in
24 contact with ECOMOG, to buy ammunition from ECOMOG so we would be
12:01:56 25 able to take it to the border and Mike and others would receive
26 the ammunition to defend Pujehun. So the money that Mr Sankoh
27 sent, I think it was about \$50,000, Kposowa came to Monrovia but
28 ECOMOG used the money and the deal did not go through. So under
29 that pressure Mike Lamin and others crossed and they surrendered

1 in November 1996 to December.

2 Q. Surrendered to whom?

3 A. Surrendered to ULIMO-K. It was the ULIMO-K forces that
4 disarmed them.

12:02:30 5 Q. Now another detail, please, Mr Sesay. How do you know
6 about this supposed deal between Jonathan Kposowa, Joseph Brown
7 and ECOMOG? Where do you know that from?

8 A. Well, Mr Sankoh came to Kailahun in November for him to
9 consult with the RUF and the civilians, the civilian
10 administrators in the RUF, about the signing of the Abidjan
11 Accord in November. So he came with Amara Essy and some members
12 of the external delegation like Fayia Musa, Deen-Jalloh and
13 Philip Palmer. So they came with the helicopter and he sent a
14 message to Bockarie, so we came and received him Balahun. The

12:03:05 15 helicopter came and it landed. Mr Sankoh disembarked and greeted
16 us and we greeted the external delegation and he said he was
17 going first to Kangari Hills and the Western Area, the Western
18 Jungle. So he left - he left Deen-Jalloh and Fayia Musa in
19 Balahun with us and he travelled with Philip Palmer. He took the
12:04:10 20 MP commander Kaisuku in Kailahun and he went with him to Kangari
21 Hills. He held a meeting with the RUF and they came to the
22 Western Jungle and they had a meeting with Superman and others,
23 Isaac and others in the Northern Jungle, and he returned - around
24 3 to 4 he returned to Kailahun and the helicopter returned while
12:04:34 25 Mr Sankoh and the external delegation walked from Balahun to
26 Giema.

27 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, I'm grateful for all of that and I'll come
28 back to that visit by Mr Sankoh in due course. But my question
29 was: How did you, Issa Sesay, come to learn about this deal for

1 the purchase of arms worth - or ammunition worth \$50,000 from
2 ECOMOG in Monrovia? How did you find out about that?

3 A. When Mr Sankoh came it was that time that he told us
4 because when he came he told us that he had given money to
12:05:20 5 Kposowa for him to buy ammunition from the ECOMOG and that the
6 ammunitions should be escorted to Mike and others, but Kposowa
7 could not - in fact, he said he did not hear anything from
8 Kposowa. It was like Kposowa had misused the money. It was
9 later in '99 when Kposowa returned after the Lome Accord when he
12:05:44 10 came to rejoin the RUF, that was when he explained what had
11 happened. But at the initial stage Mr Sankoh said he had sent
12 Kposowa and Brown to buy ammunition but up to that time he had
13 not heard anything from Kposowa, and Brown had told him that
14 Kposowa - the money had been seized from him.

12:06:04 15 Q. Thank you, Mr Sesay. Now, Mr Sesay, another detail on that
16 and it's this: You've told me a moment ago that the second group
17 led by Mike Lamin surrendered to ULIMO-K in Liberia. Can you
18 help us as to why Mike Lamin and that group did not go to NPFL
19 territory?

12:06:36 20 A. Well, at that time the NPFL wasn't close to Bomi Hills or
21 Lofa. It was ULIMO that controlled Bomi Hills right up to -
22 right down to Lofa. So I can say from this sea coast, that is
23 where Liberia and Sierra Leone meet on the border, that is south
24 of Sierra Leone, right up to between Guinea and Sierra Leone, it
12:07:04 25 was ULIMO that was controlling the border. It was ULIMO that
26 controlled those countries, Bomi Hills and Lofa. So there was no
27 means of contacting the NPFL.

28 Q. I'm grateful.

29 A. Except the ULIMO.

1 Q. Now another detail, Mr Sesay, and it's this: You've told
2 us now in detail about the fall of Zogoda and the retreat from
3 that location led by Mohamed Tarawalli and Mike Lamin. Help me
4 with this, please: After the fall of Zogoda in late October 1996
12:07:44 5 what areas did the RUF control at that point?

6 A. Well, after the fall of Zogoda in October '96 the only
7 areas now - because Peyima itself was attacked and Mosquito and
8 the area commander withdrew to Kailahun. So the only area that
9 was under the RUF's control was Western Jungle under the command
12:08:12 10 of Superman, and Kangari Hills that was under the command of
11 Isaac Mongor, and Kailahun. Those were the places that RUF were
12 now in the entire Sierra Leone, and even --

13 Q. So it was the Western Jungle under the command of Superman,
14 Kangari Hills under the command of Isaac Mongor and who was in
12:08:34 15 command in Kailahun?

16 A. Well, before the arrival of Mr Sankoh it was Peter Vand
17 who commanded as the area commander, but when Bockarie and
18 Kennedy withdrew in late October to Giema, Kennedy was an area
19 commander before, so that was how the command was like, but Peter
12:09:02 20 was the commander on the ground, but when Foday Sankoh came in -
21 when Foday Sankoh visited for consultations regarding the signing
22 of the accord in November that was when he reinstated Sam
23 Bockarie as battle group commander and promoted him to major and
24 I also was promoted to major but without assignment.

12:09:25 25 So Kailahun was now like - from November it was Sam
26 Bockarie that was the senior man on the ground and the area
27 commander was there, that was Peter Vand. Sorry, I was there.
28 I was the major and Peter Vand was staff captain, but he was the
29 area commander but I was a major. So in terms of rank I was

1 senior to him. But from that November now the administration in
2 Kailahun, after Mosquito it was me in rank, then Peter Vandi the
3 area commander.

12:10:07 4 Q. Thank you. Now you spoke in that answer of when Bockarie
5 and Kennedy withdrew in late October to Giema, withdrew from
6 where?

7 A. They did not just withdraw like that. They were under
8 attack from Peyima Jungle, they were being attacked. The CDF,
9 the Kamajors chased them and they killed up to 80 to 100 people
12:10:33 10 around that Moa River when the Kamajors attacked them. When they
11 attacked the retreating RUF and their family members, they were
12 massacred at the riverbank.

13 Q. Thank you. Now whilst all of this is going on in Sierra
14 Leone, RUF reduced to controlling only three areas, Western
12:10:56 15 Jungle, Kangari Hills and Kailahun, meanwhile you've told us
16 there were peace discussions going on in Ivory Coast. Is that
17 right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Which resulted in the Abidjan Accord which you've just
12:11:12 20 mentioned, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And following the Abidjan Accord, Foday Sankoh came to
23 Sierra Leone for consultations. Is that right?

24 A. Yes.

12:11:27 25 Q. And when he came for consultations he came by helicopter
26 bringing members of the external delegation, as you've explained.
27 Is that right?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And when he came did he visit the three areas still

1 controlled by the RUF, those being the Western Jungle, Kangari
2 Hills and Kailahun?

3 A. Yes, he went there.

4 Q. Now you've mentioned already, Mr Sesay, one matter which
12:11:59 5 you discussed with Mr Sankoh when he arrived. That is the issue
6 of the \$50,000 for the purchase of ammunition from ECOMOG. What
7 else did Mr Sankoh say to you - well, let me start again. When
8 Foday Sankoh arrived by helicopter in Kailahun for that
9 consultation where were you at that time?

12:12:32 10 A. Myself, Sam Bockarie, including Peter Vandi, were all in
11 Giema, Kennedy. So when Mr Sankoh came, we received him at
12 Balahun. And he left us there and he went to the north and west,
13 and he returned to Balahun. And we walked, and the helicopter
14 returned with Mr Amara Essy, the Foreign Minister there for Ivory
12:12:59 15 Coast. So we walked from Balahun to Giema, and Mr Sankoh passed
16 the night there. And the following morning he went to the parade
17 and addressed the fighters and explained the Abidjan Peace
18 Accord. And the fighters told Mr Sankoh - they said, "You are
19 talking about going to sign the accord. Look at the men

12:13:18 20 attacking us in these areas. Even when you are here you can hear
21 the sound of the launching. So why are you going to sign the
22 accord when these people are attacking us incessantly and they
23 have dissolved our areas?" Mr Sankoh's response was that he
24 would in turn go and tell the negotiators what now if he said he
12:13:40 25 was not going to sign the accord, the international community
26 would think that he was the problem. So we told him to explain
27 to the external delegation, because they were members of the
28 Ceasefire Monitoring Committee in Freetown. That is Deen-Jalloh,
29 Faya Musa, Philip Palmer, they were members of the RUF, they

1 were representing the RUF on that committee. So before the visit
2 they were in Freetown. I think they came to Kenema and to Bo and
3 they returned, even before they joined Mr Sankoh in Abidjan when
4 they came to Kailahun. So Mr Sankoh referred some of the issues
12:14:20 5 that were put to him that - to those people. He told them that
6 you know, you are - you are with these people in the communities.
7 Have you heard what they're saying? So refer the issues to them,
8 the delegates. So after that Mr Sankoh held a meeting with the
9 civilians, the civilian chiefs, and he explained to them about
12:14:41 10 the accord. And the following day we went to Buedu. We walked
11 from Giema to Buedu. When we got to Buedu in the evening hours -
12 because we arrived there around 4 o'clock. So around 6 o'clock,
13 going to 7, was when Mr Sankoh invited Sam Bockarie, and I too
14 was sent for and Peter Vandi was sent for. Mr Sankoh opened his
12:15:07 15 briefcase. He took out money that amounted to \$7,000, and he
16 said, "Now that Kposowa has misused that money, so Bockarie, you
17 can try it. Let me give you this money. When I return to
18 Abidjan, I'll try hard to send some other money for you." He
19 said, "You should be brave because now the way these people are
12:15:29 20 attacking us, I'm going to sign the accord, but it will be
21 necessary for us to defend ourselves, so try to establish
22 contacts with ULIMO. So when you establish these contacts with
23 ULIMO, you can use this money to buy ammunition from them. If
24 the deal goes through, you send to me - send a message to me so
12:15:49 25 I'll be able to send someone with some money that you will use to
26 continue to buy ammunition from them that you will use to defend
27 Kailahun." So he gave Sam Bockarie \$7,000 in my presence and
28 Peter Vandi's presence, including Lawrence Womandia. He told us
29 that we should hold the ground firm and that we should encourage

1 the fighters and the civilians that he was going to sign the
2 accord. And the following morning the helicopter came back.
3 Mr Sankoh - because before this time Gibril Massaquoi had not
4 been in Kailahun. Because Gibril was in the Western Jungle, but
12:16:29 5 he got injured in his throat during the attack on Lumpa, because
6 he and Mohamed attacked there in '95. So in late '95 the wound
7 was disturbing him, the injury, and so Mr Sankoh had told him to
8 come to Kailahun. So he had been in Kailahun since July, because
9 he left me in Zogoda in July and he came to Kailahun. So from
12:16:59 10 July Mr Sankoh had told him to wait in Kailahun until that
11 November, when Mr Sankoh came. So Mr Sankoh said he should
12 travel with Gibril. So Massaquoi and Massaquoi's wife, that is
13 Baby T, and Mr Sankoh himself and Philip Palmer, Fayia Musa,
14 Deen-Jalloh, they all travelled together back with the
12:17:25 15 helicopter back to Kissidougou and they went to Abidjan. That
16 was November '96.

17 Q. All right. Now, I want to go over that now, Mr Sesay,
18 please, and seek some assistance with one or two matters. When
19 Mr Sankoh arrived on that consultation, you tell us that you
12:17:51 20 walked from Giema to Balahun to meet him, yes?

21 A. Yes, from Giema to Balahun.

22 Q. When you met him in Balahun, did you have time for a
23 discussion with him at that point?

24 A. No. At that time he just disembarked from the helicopter,
12:18:12 25 he greeted us, he waved to the civilians, and he said he was
26 going first to the Western Jungle, and from there he'll go to the
27 north. But when he returned to Kailahun, he could not talk to
28 us. He only greeted us and he returned. He left Fayia Musa and
29 Deen-Jalloh behind and he went with Philip Palmer.

1 Q. To the Western Jungle and Kangari Hills, yes?

2 MR KOUMJIAN: Objection. Counsel continues to lead the
3 witness and suggest answers.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please desist from leading the witness,
12:18:43 5 Mr Griffiths.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: [Overlapping speakers] Lead the witness.
7 The witness has already said he left Balahun, went to the Western
8 Jungle and Kangari Hills.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Why can't you simply ask returned where?
12:18:54 10 Returned to where? Why can't you ask that?

11 MR GRIFFITHS: I'll ask a simple question:

12 Q. Mr Sesay, when Foday Sankoh left Balahun, where did he go?

13 A. Mr Sankoh left Balahun and he went to Western Jungle to
14 meet Superman and others, and he came to Kangari Hills to meet
12:19:13 15 Isaac and others.

16 Q. So did he go to both the Western Jungle and Kangari Hills,
17 yes or no?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And after he went to the Kangari Hills, where did he go
12:19:25 20 after that?

21 A. From there he returned to Kailahun.

22 Q. Thank you very much. Now, now that he's back in Kailahun,
23 help us. That night, did you have a chance to speak to him?

24 A. Yes. That night, in fact, he came to Balahun. All of us
12:19:50 25 walked, we were talking. He was talking to us while we were
26 walking, and we came to Giema. From there we went to the house
27 where he was lodged - where we lodged him. Because the house
28 where he was lodged was the house where ICRC was occupying
29 initially. During that time, ICRC used to come to the place to

1 Look around. So that was the house Mr Sankoh was lodged. We
2 were there talking to him. You know, he too was talking about
3 the disappointment in the government, that the government was
4 forcing him to sign the Abidjan Accord. But look at how the RUF
12:20:33 5 was losing ground. They had lost Koribundu, they had lost
6 Pujehun, they had lost Peyima, they had lost in Zogoda, and they
7 had lost Kailahun. Even Kailahun, the RUF was attacked there.
8 They lost the Bo Jungle as well --

9 Q. [Overlapping speakers]

12:20:50 10 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, I didn't hear the rest of the
11 interpretation. Counsel's question interrupted it.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could I please say this: Could we try
13 and keep some order in this Court so that you do not speak over
14 each other. There's absolutely no point in speaking over each
12:21:04 15 other, because what you say is not captured. Surely you all know
16 that.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Mr Sesay:

19 "We were there talking to him," you said, "and he was
12:21:18 20 talking about his disappointment in the government, that the
21 government was forcing him to sign the Abidjan Accord, but look
22 at how the RUF was losing ground. They'd lost Koribundu, they'd
23 lost Pujehun, they'd lost Peyima, and they lost Zogoda and they'd
24 lost Kailahun. Even Kailahun, the RUF was being attacked there.
12:21:42 25 They lost the Bo Jungle as well."

26 Pick it up from there, please.

27 A. Yes, that was what we were discussing that night, and
28 Mr Sankoh himself was not happy. He was unhappy with the whole
29 situation, and he told us, he said, "Now, if I don't sign the

1 accord the international community will feel that I am the one
2 who doesn't want peace in Sierra Leone." He said, "But even the
3 SLPP government is not honest with the whole process and that
4 indeed the SLPP government, before signing the Abidjan Accord,
12:22:20 5 they were on serious offensive, and even after signing the -
6 after signing the accord, they never respected it, they never
7 recognised it," because I can recall before Mr Sankoh left --

8 Q. Yes?

9 A. No. When Mr Sankoh returned from Western Jungle and
12:22:46 10 Northern Jungle and came to Balahun, he got those reports from
11 the - about the attacks on Western Jungle and the borders and
12 Kangari Hills, they had explained to him about the withdrawals,
13 that many RUF brothers had been killed in the jungle, so when he
14 came to Balahun he had a satellite phone, he decided to call the
12:23:13 15 President of Sierra Leone at that time, that was Alhaji Tejan
16 Kabbah.

17 On that day, myself, Bockarie, Peter Vandi and Philip
18 Palmer and Deen-Jalloh were all sitting together at the veranda,
19 and Mr Sankoh called from the house where we were. He called on
12:23:41 20 the satellite phone. He told Mr Kabbah, he said, "I have come
21 and I have visited the west and the north and now I am in
22 Kailahun to consult with my people about the peace accord that I
23 am to sign with you." He said, "But even when I'm in Kailahun, I
24 could hear launching sound, my men are attacked on the ground,
12:24:04 25 they are being attacked from the north and the western jungles,
26 and it is the CDF and the Kamajors that are doing these attacks."
27 And Mr Kabbah said he hadn't any control over the CDF and the
28 Kamajors. He said he hadn't any control over the people. He
29 said the people wanted to go back to their homes. And Mr Sankoh

1 said, "Oh, you are the President. You are the ones who - you are
2 the person who armed these people. Why would you say you don't
3 have control over them?" So Mr Sankoh wanted to get angry during
4 the conversation, so he stopped the conversation. So he said he
12:24:34 5 was going back to Abidjan to explain to the government that had
6 hosted the talks. So he packed the satellite phone and we
7 returned to Gie ma.

8 Q. Now, you mentioned also another meeting that took place at
9 which Sam Bockarie was present and in that meeting Mr Sankoh gave
12:25:00 10 Bockarie some money. Is that right?

11 A. Yes, he gave him \$7,000.

12 Q. Were you present, Mr Sesay, when Foday Sankoh handed over
13 that \$7,000 to --

14 A. Yes, I was present.

12:25:21 15 Q. And remind us, for what reason did Foday Sankoh give Sam
16 Bockarie that money?

17 A. Foday Sankoh gave the money to Sam Bockarie, and he told
18 Sam Bockarie that he was to make contact with the ULIMOs so that
19 he would be able to buy ammunition to defend Kailahun, and he
12:25:52 20 said, "Because you have monitored the - you monitored the
21 conversation between myself and Mr Kabbah these few days, so you
22 know what to do," so Bockarie should try very hard to contact the
23 ULIMOs to buy ammunition to defend Kailahun.

24 Q. Pause there. Could the witness please be shown exhibit
12:26:11 25 D-9, please? Now, you'll see, Mr Sesay, that this document is
26 headed, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, RUF, Defence
27 Headquarters" and you'll see it's dated 26 September 1999. It's
28 addressed to the leader of the revolution from Major General Sam
29 Bockarie, and it's described as a salute report: "The leader,

1 sir, before leaving the ground in November 1996 ... " That's the
2 point we're discussing now, Mr Sesay, do you follow? The visit
3 by Mr Sankoh to Sierra Leone at the end of November 1996 that
4 you've just been describing, yes?

12:27:56 5 "... you placed me in command as the battlefield commander
6 of the RUF/SL and instructed me to take command in your absence
7 and to maintain the ground by any means necessary. In that
8 light, I have acted in the capacity you saw fit to entrust me
9 with and done all in my power and wisdom to maintain the ground
10 until your return to Sierra Leone.

11 Upon your departure I initiated contact with ULIMO, as per
12 your instructions, in a bid to buy materials to repel the vicious
13 attacks of the Kamajors at a time when there was a peace document
14 in place and we were not expecting to fight. At first ULIMO
12:28:42 15 arrested me, thinking that I had come to them to surrender.
16 Later I was able to convince them to release me and we commenced
17 a mutually beneficial relationship. I used the 7,000 USD to
18 purchase vitally needed materials that gave us the stance to
19 fight and challenge the SLPP government until they were ousted by
12:29:13 20 the AFRC coup. The efforts of the civilians must be highlighted
21 as they provided agricultural produce which I traded for
22 materials during the same period."

23 Now the reference there, Mr Sesay, to \$7,000, which \$7,000
24 is that?

12:29:38 25 A. This is the \$7,000 that I was talking to you about when I
26 was explaining to the Court that Mr Sankoh gave to Bockarie when
27 he came in November to Kailahun. That is the money that
28 Mr Sankoh gave to Bockarie and gave him instructions to make
29 contact with ULIMO to buy ammunition.

1 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, I would like us to dwell on this paragraph
2 for a moment and I seek your assistance with regard to a number
3 of matters. First of all, looking at the first paragraph on the
4 page, "Before leaving the ground in November you placed me in
12:30:23 5 command as the battlefield commander of the RUF." Is that true?

6 A. No, in November Bockarie was appointed battle group
7 commander by Mr Sankoh. It was in March that Mr Sankoh, after he
8 had been finally convinced that Mohamed wasn't there, that was
9 when Bockarie was appointed battlefield commander and I was
12:30:52 10 appointed battle group. That's March 1997. But in this November
11 Bockarie was reinstated by Foday Sankoh as battle group
12 commander, major. So by that time when we are talking about high
13 command it was only Bockarie that was there.

14 Q. So in November 1996 Bockarie becomes battle group
12:31:17 15 commander. Is that right?

16 A. Yes, for the second time because he had once become a
17 battle group from December '93 to early '95. Then he was
18 suspended and now he was then reinstated by Mr Sankoh in
19 November.

12:31:37 20 Q. Now at the time that Bockarie, in November 1996, was made
21 battle group commander where was Mohamed Tarawalli?

22 A. At this time Mohamed was missing in action, but Foday
23 Sankoh was not convinced that - Foday Sankoh was not convinced
24 that Mohamed had died, but going up to January and February,
12:32:10 25 March '97 he was not seen so he concluded Mohamed was really not
26 alive. So he sent a promotion list. Bockarie was promoted to
27 colonel and appointed battlefield commander and he promoted Isaac
28 Mongor to colonel - from major to colonel. He promoted Mike
29 Lamin from major to colonel, adviser to Bockarie, and he

1 promoted --

12:32:56 2 Q. Can we just pause for a minute. The reason being, looking
3 at my LiveNote, "At this time Mohamed was missing in action but
4 Foday Sankoh was not convinced." Now I distinctly heard "he
5 thought he would turn up", but that doesn't appear on the
6 transcript. Did you say Sankoh thought he would turn up?

7 A. Yes, that's what I said. I said at that time Sankoh was
8 not convinced that Mohamed was finally missing in action. He was
9 still going with the idea that Mohamed will show up in Kailahun,
10 but up to March he did not see him, so that was when he --

11 Q. Pause there. I'm listening to the Krio and I distinctly
12 heard that said but it wasn't translated.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I don't know whose fault it
14 is. Perhaps it could be that the witness is speaking too fast,
15 the interpreter either can't catch up with him or the transcriber
16 can't catch up with him. You just have to keep on keeping an ear
17 to the Krio version as you are doing.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I have no difficulty following what the
19 witness is saying, your Honour.

12:34:02 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: What is important is what is recorded.
21 We are following the English translation, we don't understand
22 Krio, and that's what matters to us.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:34:18 24 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, you were going on - no, let's look at it in
25 this way: Let's go back to that document in front of you,
26 please. When in November 1996 Foday Sankoh appointed Bockarie as
27 battle group commander, was that a promotion?

28 A. Yes, it was a promotion because at that time Bockarie was a
29 captain and battalion commander from Peyima Jungle under Matthew

1 Kennedy Sesay.

2 Q. Now at the time of the promotion of Bockarie was anybody
3 else promoted?

4 A. Well, I was the only one that was re-promoted from captain
12:35:11 5 to major. Apart from that, no other person was promoted.

6 Q. Now in March you tell us that Bockarie was appointed as
7 battlefield commander, yes?

8 A. Yes, that's what I said.

9 Q. And you were going on to describe some other promotions at
12:35:29 10 that time. Could I ask you to start right at the beginning,
11 please, and assist us with who was promoted at that time in March
12 1997?

13 A. Mr Sankoh promoted Sam Bockarie to colonel, battlefield
14 commander, from major.

12:35:58 15 Q. Anybody else?

16 A. He promoted Mike Lamin from major to colonel. Although he
17 was in Monrovia, he was promoted in absentia.

18 Q. Anybody else?

19 A. He promoted Superman from major to colonel.

12:36:15 20 Q. Anybody else?

21 A. He promoted Isaac Mongor from major to colonel.

22 Q. Anybody else?

23 A. He promoted me from major to lieutenant colonel, battle
24 group commander.

12:36:31 25 Q. Anybody else?

26 A. Peter Vandi from staff captain to lieutenant colonel.

27 Q. Anybody else?

28 A. Gibril Massaquoi from staff captain to lieutenant colonel.

29 Q. Anybody else?

1 A. And Alfred Brown was reinstated as signal commander.

2 Q. Now, where was Sankoh when in March 1997 he authorised
3 these promotions?

12:37:23

4 A. After he sent this promotion he was in Abidjan and, after a
5 few days, he travelled to Nigeria and he was arrested there.

6 Q. Now, I want us to be quite clear about this, Mr Sesay. Who
7 was it who ordered these promotions; was it Mr Sankoh or was it
8 in fact Charles Taylor?

12:37:49

9 A. No, this one had nothing to do with Mr Taylor. It was an
10 RUF business and Foday Sankoh was the CIC for the RUF, so he was
11 the one who thought it to himself that he should give out
12 promotions before he travelled to Nigeria, together with Steve
13 Bio.

12:38:09

14 Q. At the time of these promotions, as far as you're aware,
15 March 1997, was there any contact between Foday Sankoh and
16 Charles Taylor?

17 A. No, I never heard of that.

12:38:42

18 Q. Let's go back to the sheet, please. Paragraph 2: "Upon
19 your departure I initiated contact with ULIMO." Now, help us.
20 How was that contact initiated, Mr Sesay?

21 A. Well, at this time we were living in Giema, we were staying
22 in Giema, after we had escorted Mr Sankoh to Buedu and he had
23 gone, that is myself, Peter Vandj --

12:39:14

24 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness call the
25 last name.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. The interpreter missed something.
28 So let's start again. At that time "we were living in Giema, we
29 were staying in Giema, after we had escorted Mr Sankoh to Buedu

1 and he had gone, that is myself, Peter Vandi" and who?

2 A. Sam Bockarie, and the others like Kennedy, Matthew Kennedy
3 Sesay, and Lawrence Womandia. All of us went. So we returned,
4 all of us, back to Giema. So after two days Sam Bockarie said he
12:39:51 5 was going to the border to try and meet the ULIMO to make contact
6 at Foya.

7 Q. Pause there. And did he go to Foya? Did he go to the
8 borderline?

9 A. Yes. He went there, along with Matthew Kennedy Sesay, his
12:40:12 10 bodyguards, Sam Bockarie's bodyguards, Matthew Kennedy Sesay and
11 one other vanguard Big Daddy, and CO Sellay, all of them went.

12 Q. Pause there. By what means did they go to the borderline
13 from Giema?

14 A. Well, they walked because at that time we hadn't any
12:40:41 15 vehicle. They walked.

16 Q. Pause there. So they walked?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did they go armed?

19 A. Yes, they were armed.

12:40:55 20 Q. At the time that they went to the borderline who controlled
21 that borderline?

22 A. At this time it was the ULIMO that was in control of the
23 borderline. For Liberia and Sierra Leone it was the RUF. So
24 they walked from Giema to Buedu, from Buedu through Kangama to
12:41:19 25 Koindu. Then from Koindu they walked to Bendu and they contacted
26 the ULIMO across the border in Mendekoma. So they met them, they
27 greeted them, and they told the ULIMOs, those who were at the
28 border, that they had come to see their commanders at Foya. So
29 the ULIMOs who were at the border, the lieutenant, said, "Okay,

1 go." So all of them walked, because Bockarie went with a group
2 of about, a platoon of men. So when they arrived in Foya the
3 ULIMO were going with the idea that Bockarie and the RUF in
4 Kailahun wanted to surrender like what had happened in the
12:41:59 5 Pujehun District.

6 Q. And so what happened?

7 A. So upon Sam Bockarie's arrival, together with his
8 delegation in Foya, the commanders there sent a message to their
9 headquarters, the ULIMO headquarters, at Voinjama and some ULIMO
12:42:20 10 generals came, but at that time I didn't know them, I only heard
11 their names, but later I knew them.

12 Q. Pause there. Before we lose sight of this I just want to
13 clarify a couple of matters. Firstly, you said this a few
14 moments ago:

12:42:38 15 "A platoon of them went, so when they arrived in Foya, the
16 ULIMO were going with the idea that Bockarie and the RUF in
17 Kailahun wanted to surrender like what happened in the Pujehun
18 District."

19 What are you referring to when you refer to what happened
12:42:57 20 in the Pujehun District?

21 A. Well, they were thinking that the way Mike Lamin had gone
22 there to surrender with the RUF was the same way Bockarie had
23 gone there with his men to surrender.

24 Q. Pause there. Now, when you further refer to, "In Foya, the
12:43:21 25 commander there sent a message to their headquarters, the ULIMO
26 headquarters at Voinjama, and some ULIMO generals came but at
27 that time I didn't know them, I only heard their names, but later
28 I knew them", first of all, who was the ULIMO commander in Foya?

29 A. Well, the ULIMO commander who was in Foya, I cannot recall

1 his name. One colonel was in Foya but I cannot recall his name
2 now. But he sent the message to Voijnjama when the generals came
3 together with their bodyguards.

4 Q. And who did these generals turn out to be?

12:44:03 5 A. One was General Abu Keita and the second one was --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat the name of
7 the other general?

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. What was the second general's name?

12:44:19 10 A. Varmuyan Sherif. Varmuyan Sherif.

11 Q. So the two ULIMO generals who came were Abu Keita and
12 Varmuyan Sherif, yes? Is that right?

13 A. Yes, sir. They came together with some of their staff and
14 bodyguards. They came to know Bockarie's purpose of coming to
12:44:43 15 Foya from the message their commander on the ground had sent to
16 them.

17 Q. Now, pause again.

18 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, the witness has given
19 evidence of Bockarie and others going to meet ULIMO, and then
12:44:59 20 later he says, "I did not know them then, I did not know their
21 names." I find it unclear whether the witness was with the group
22 and did not hear the names but came to hear them later, or he is
23 reciting what he has been told of what happened.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I will clarify that:

12:45:17 25 Q. First of all, Mr Sesay, on this trip by Bockarie and others
26 whom you've named to Foya to make contact with ULIMO, did you
27 travel with them?

28 A. No, I did not go with them. I was at Giema on the ground.

29 Q. What you've since gone on to tell us about two ULIMO

1 generals, Abu Keita and Varmuyan Sherif, when did you find out
2 their names?

3 A. Well, when Bockarie came he briefed me, Lawrence Womandia
4 and the other officers on the ground. It was then that I knew
12:45:59 5 their names. But the commander who was in Foya - in fact, he
6 came with Bockarie but I have forgotten his name because after
7 their meeting, after Bockarie had told them about his intention
8 of going to Foya, that is not to surrender but to make a friendly
9 relationship that would benefit ULIMO and the RUF, they too sat
12:46:21 10 down and decided that, oh, this is something we cannot let slip
11 by, so they accepted. The ULIMO - the commanders in the ULIMO
12 said they were going to give Bockarie 20 to 25 armed men who
13 would escort Bockarie for them to come and know Giema and how the
14 RUF-controlled areas were, so they too would feel safe with the
12:46:45 15 RUF. That is, they would know that the RUF meant what they said.
16 So when Bockarie came, he brought them and they spent four to
17 five days in Giema before returning to Foya.

18 Q. Pause, please, Mr Sesay. So Bockarie goes to Foya?

19 A. Yes.

12:47:10 20 Q. In due course he meets with some ULIMO generals?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. When Bockarie returned, he returned with members of ULIMO,
23 did he?

24 A. Yes.

12:47:26 25 Q. Did you physically see these ULIMO members?

26 A. I saw them.

27 Q. Where did you see them?

28 A. At this time, I and Bockarie were sharing the same house
29 together with Lawrence in Giema, so when he brought them, they

1 were staying to the next house where our other family members and
2 bodyguards were. That was where we lodged the men. In the
3 morning we would eat together and we would go to the parade
4 grounds and we would discuss together. So they were our guests.

12:48:03 5 It was not a secret. Everybody in Kailahun knew about this.

6 Q. How many of those ULIMO came?

7 A. I said they were up to 25. They too were armed.

8 Q. Who were they led by?

9 A. Sam Bockarie. He brought them to build confidence.

12:48:24 10 Q. Did they come with a senior ULIMO officer?

11 A. Well, the senior men did not come at this stage. It was
12 the commander on the ground, the colonel in Foya, he came along
13 with the men. Because he was the commander that was near us, he
14 came into Sierra Leone.

12:48:45 15 Q. For how long did they stay in Giema?

16 A. They were in Giema for about five days and they returned.

17 Q. And what did they do whilst in Giema?

18 A. Well, we used to take them to the parade grounds, introduce
19 them to our RUF people, and we just interacted for the rest of
12:49:16 20 the day. The whole thing was just a confidence-building measure,
21 for them to know that the relationship that had been requested by
22 Bockarie was appreciated by the RUF and that they had accepted
23 the relationship. That was the goodwill that we too were showing
24 them.

12:49:33 25 Q. When they came on this occasion, did they bring with them
26 any arms and/or ammunition?

27 A. No. It was when they were returning, when Bockarie was -
28 when Bockarie accompanied them and when he was returning, he
29 brought ammunition - RPG rockets and ammunition that he had

1 bought from Abu Keita and others.

2 Q. So just to be clear, when these ULIMO members returned to
3 Liberia, who went with them?

4 A. I said Bockarie returned with them.

12:50:18 5 Q. Did anybody go with Bockarie back to Liberia with these
6 ULIMO members?

7 A. Yes. Kennedy Sesay went and Bockarie's bodyguards, all of
8 them went to accompany those men.

9 Q. How long did Bockarie stay in Liberia on this return
12:50:43 10 journey?

11 A. He was in Foya for about three days, for three days. He
12 was in Foya for three days. Then he explained the whole thing to
13 the men, that he was interested in buying ammunition and they too
14 were willing to sell ammunition to Bockarie. Then Abu Keita and

12:51:11 15 Sherif brought ammunition that was bought by Bockarie. That is
16 45 RPG rockets and boxes of AK rounds, G3 rounds, GMG rounds.

17 Q. How many boxes of AK rounds were bought?

18 A. Well, some were in sardine tins. Some were open. The
19 sardine tins, the first one that came was 15 sardine tins and

12:51:48 20 there were open ones that were in empty bags of rice. Those were
21 the AK rounds. The G3 rounds were about ten sardine tins.

22 Q. And what about the GMG rounds?

23 A. Yes, it was the same, eight to ten sardine tins. They
24 brought them.

12:52:12 25 Q. When Bockarie returns to Kailahun, having purchased these
26 items, did any members of ULIMO return to Kailahun with him?

27 A. No. At that stage they did not come. When the men turned
28 up, Keita and Sherif, when they brought the ammunition from
29 Voinjama, then the commander on the ground told Mosquito that he

1 too had some ammunition. Then Mosquito told him - but he did not
2 want the other commanders to know, but he said he had his own
3 separately that he would like to sell. Then Bockarie told him to
4 wait and that he would transport that later to Koindu and he
12:52:54 5 would come to buy them. He said because he was going to leave
6 Kennedy in Koindu. So he introduced Matthew Kennedy Sesay to
7 Sheriff, Keita and to the commander who was in Foya and all the
8 other men and told them whoever had a consignment that he wanted
9 to sell, he would bring them to Koindu, and if he meets Kennedy
12:53:17 10 there, Kennedy would send a message to him. So even the - when
11 Bockarie had returned, even the other ranks used to put
12 ammunition in wheelbarrows from Kailahun, they would pass through
13 Foya, and they would come to Koindu to sell to Kennedy Sesay.

14 Q. When you say --

12:53:36 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could I interrupt, Mr Griffiths, to seek
16 two time frames. One is a time frame when the ULIMO team came to
17 visit, and the other is the time frame for when the actual arms
18 or ammunition was brought back into Sierra Leone by Bockarie.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

12:54:00 20 Q. Mr Sesay, you've already told us that the idea to trade
21 with ULIMO was put to Sam Bockarie by Foday Sankoh during his
22 visit in late November. Is that right?

23 A. Yes, that's it.

24 Q. How long after Foday Sankoh left did Bockarie make that
12:54:30 25 first visit to Liberia to meet with ULIMO?

26 A. I said when Mr Sankoh left, on that day we returned to
27 Giema. After two days, Bockarie, Kennedy, Big Daddy, all of them
28 left to go to Foya.

29 Q. In which month was that?

1 A. Well, that was in late November. Then Bockarie was in
2 Foya. He was in Foya for the first visit for about a week. So
3 when he returned, that was in December that he came along with
4 those men. From that, he went back - the time that he brought
12:55:17 5 the ammunition, that was at the end of December. From then on,
6 the business - the ammunition business from ULIMO started from
7 December ending and it continued up to May of the AFRC overthrow.

8 Q. So this dealings between the RUF and ULIMO, that continued
9 from late December 1996 down to the AFRC coup in May 1997. Is
12:55:50 10 that right?

11 MR KOUMJIAN: I believe that's asked and answered. He just
12 said that.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: The year was not given, so please answer
14 the question.

12:56:02 15 Go ahead, Mr Griffiths, and restate your question.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. So this trade began in late December 1996 and continued
18 until the AFRC coup in May 1997. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes, it's correct. It continued to after the AFRC took
12:56:26 20 over power, and it continued up to '98. But when we get to '98,
21 I'll explain that.

22 Q. Very well. Now, just concentrating on this period between
23 late December 1996 and May 1997, you mentioned Kennedy being
24 based in where?

12:56:50 25 A. In Koindu. He was posted by Sam Bockarie to Koindu because
26 Koindu was close to the border, so that he would be able to
27 receive the men and be paying for the ammunition and stocking
28 them. When it has accumulated, they would transport them to
29 Buedu.

1 Q. Now, this Kennedy, could you give us his full name or
2 title?

3 A. Kennedy --

12:57:24

4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat the name
5 slowly.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. What's the name, Mr Sesay? What's the name of this
8 Kennedy?

9 A. Matthew Kennedy Sesay.

12:57:31

10 Q. Next question: When was Matthew Kennedy Sesay first based
11 in Koindu for this purpose?

12 A. From December of 1996 he was there up to after the
13 overthrow of the AFRC in May '97.

12:58:09

14 Q. And during that period of seven or so months, how regular
15 were ammunition or any other materials being obtained from ULIMO?

12:58:51

16 A. Well, when the process started in December it continued.
17 In fact, there came a time when even the ULIMO, who were in Foya
18 Tinkia, towards Masabulahun, they too were bringing ammunition to
19 Buedu. They will carry them to Buedu. Some will bring them in
20 wheelbarrows to Buedu and Bockarie would buy them. And even in
21 Koindu, General Abu Keita, Sherif and others, they came there for
22 about two to three occasions, they were bringing ammunition in
23 their pick-ups. And Kennedy would send a message to Bockarie,
24 and Bockarie would go to Buedu and they would purchase the
25 ammunition. But the money that was left by Mr Sankoh was not
26 enough and at this time, because from December 1996 the
27 government troops were attacking - the Kamajors were attacking
28 our positions in Giema Town, Kailahun, Bandajuma, Boubu Gao,
29 Sembehun, they were attacking us frequently, so fighting was

1 going on in Kailahun at this time. So the civilians too, the
2 chiefs decided to call a meeting with the War Council. They had
3 this meeting and at this meeting the civilians decided that
4 before the Kamajors and soldiers could come and take their
12:59:50 5 produce that they had harvested, they deemed it necessary to hand
6 over that produce to the RUF command in Kailahun so that the RUF
7 command would sell this produce and buy more ammunition to defend
8 them in Kailahun.

9 Q. Pause there. Go back to the page, end of the second
13:00:10 10 paragraph:

11 "The efforts of the civilians must be highlighted as they
12 provided agricultural produce which I traded for materials during
13 the same period."

14 What is that a reference to? What does that refer to?

13:00:30 15 A. Well, what I'm saying is what is being confirmed here.
16 That was what happened, because it was the War Council chairman
17 who chaired the meeting, the late SYB Rogers, and all of the
18 chiefs said that instead of the Kamajors taking the produce and
19 drive them to Liberia as refugees, they decided that the RUF
13:00:53 20 should use the produce to defend them, that would be better
21 rather than them becoming refugees in Liberia.

22 Q. Pause there. I want to clarify something whilst it's still
23 fresh in your mind. What was the War Council?

24 A. Well, the War Council was the committee that was created by
13:01:19 25 Foday Sankoh and they were working directly with Mr Sankoh. I
26 can say members of the War Council were well recognised people,
27 administrative people in the RUF. They used to advise Mr Sankoh
28 about the war and they used to talk to Mr Sankoh, or any RUF
29 commander, about the welfare of civilians or anything that was

1 happening within the RUF. So it was like a decision-making body
2 set up by the leader.

3 Q. And were the people on that War Council, were they military
4 personnel, civilian personnel or what?

13:02:08 5 A. Well, the council was dominated by civilians. It was the
6 civilians who were in the majority. The military men, like
7 Mr Sankoh - even Pa Kallon was not a military man. Mr Sankoh -
8 this council was created in 1992 and by then the only military
9 personnel who were there - who were there as members of the
10 council were Mr Sankoh, Rashid Mansaray and Mohamed Tarawalli.

11 Q. Thank you. Now going back to the details of what you told
12 us, now you've mentioned the two names Abu Keita and Varmuyan
13 Sherif on more than one occasion. When did you first meet them?

14 A. Well, at one time when Sherif brought some ammunition,
13:03:13 15 because at that time the ECOMOG had deployed at Mendekoma, so
16 there was no way of doing transaction in Mendekoma, so he brought
17 this ammunition to - some AA rounds, G3 rounds, AK rounds, to
18 Masabulahun. From Masabulahun I can say is almost opposite
19 Gbandiwulo. Gbandiwulo was Mosquito's village that I was
13:03:42 20 testifying about when I said I had forgotten its name.

21 Gbandiwulo. So Mosquito said, "Now that this man has come to
22 Masabulahun it's better for us to go there." Then I left Giema
23 and came to Buedu. So all of us went. And I met - that was the
24 time I knew Sherif - and the money that Bockarie had was not
13:04:07 25 enough, so he paid half, received the ammunition and Bockarie
26 told him to return in a week's time. The other time he used Foya
27 because he came to Foya Tinkia and received the money at Dawa.
28 That was the time that I knew him. But Keita, for me to meet
29 with him in person, it was in December 1998 because it was only

1 Mike Lamin who knew him in person. I only heard his name. And
2 that's December '98 that I met with him.

3 Q. Pause there. Now I need to deal with some spellings and I
4 may need the assistance of the interpreters. Masabulahun, how do
13:04:53 5 you spell that, Mr Sesay, do you know?

6 A. I think it is M-A-S-A-B-U-L-A-H-U-N.

7 Q. And then there was Gbandiwulo. How do you spell that?

8 A. Gbandiwulo, it's difficult to spell.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the interpreters can help.

13:05:27 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, could you help us with
11 that latter spelling, please?

12 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, I can only do it
13 phonetically and it is G-B-A-N-D-I-W-U-L-O.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:05:45 15 Q. Now this meeting - let's forget Abu Keita for now, whom you
16 say you didn't meet until '98. That meeting with Varmuyan
17 Sherif, when did that meeting with you take place?

18 A. Well, this was around April of '97, because it was in April
19 that he brought the ammunition, because at that time they were
13:06:11 20 unable to come through the Liberian main road because there was a
21 main road from Foya to the Sierra Leonean border, that is
22 Mendekoma, because at that time the Malian troops had deployed in
23 Mendekoma. They were unable to come there - through there when
24 they were bringing ammunition to the RUF so they had to go up the
13:06:31 25 border to Masabulahun. That was in April of '97.

26 Q. Now thereafter did you personally see Varmuyan Sherif
27 again?

28 A. After those two times, from that to up to the overthrow I
29 was in Giema. It was after the overthrow that I came to

1 Freetown. I did not see him until '98 when I heard that he was
2 working with Mr Taylor's government. That was in 2000 I saw him
3 again going to Monrovia.

13:07:25 4 Q. Now when between December - late December 1996 and May 1997
5 this trade was going on with ULIMO, were Varmuyan Sheriff and Abu
6 Keita working for the Liberian government?

7 A. Well, at that time, no, they were there as ULIMO generals
8 because this was before the Liberian election. It was after the
9 election in August, September that there was a government.

13:07:53 10 Q. Now the arms and ammunition that the RUF were purchasing at
11 this time, what was the source of those arms and ammunition; were
12 they coming from Charles Taylor or were they coming from ULIMO?

13 A. No, this was an ULIMO ammunition. They were owned by
14 ULIMO. And at that time ULIMO were armed and they were an
15 independent group on their own. It was an organisation on its
16 own. This was before the disarmament in Liberia.

17 Q. That was the next question I was going to ask you. What
18 was happening in Liberia at the time when this trade was going on
19 between the RUF and ULIMO between December 1996 and May 1997?
13:08:49 20 What was going on in Liberia?

21 A. At this time - at this time in Liberia ECOMOG was deploying
22 in order to carry out the disarmament and, from that, after the
23 disarmament, demobilisation, they were to go into elections.

24 Q. Apart from these purchases from ULIMO was the RUF, during
13:09:27 25 this period down to May 1997, receiving ammunition from any other
26 source?

27 A. No, at that time it was only - it was - we were getting
28 ammunition more from ULIMO. We can only buy two to three boxes,
29 but to get 10 to 15 boxes, you could get that from ULIMO. You

1 could only get large quantities from ULIMO. A good number of the
2 RPG rockets we were only able to get from the ULIMO.

3 Q. And what was being used to pay for these purchases from
4 ULIMO?

13:10:18 5 A. Well, at first we used money, the one that Mr Sankoh left.
6 So when the civilians provided the produce, Bockarie instructed
7 Peter Vandi, as area commander, for him to mobilise people to
8 transport the produce to the trading areas and the contractor
9 would be able to sell that and Peter Vandi would bring the money
13:10:39 10 to Bockarie, which Bockarie would use to send to Kennedy in
11 Koindu, and some would stay with him in Buedu, because he too
12 would be buying from the Dawa customs area while Kennedy would
13 purchase from the Mendekoma border area. So this was what was
14 going on until there came a time when the men came with

13:11:03 15 ammunition and they were asking for single barrels and Bockarie
16 too used to collect single barrels and giving them to the people.

17 Q. Which people?

18 A. I mean the ULIMO, the ULIMO fighters, because it came to a
19 time when it became rampant. People were coming from Kolahun,
13:11:25 20 others were coming from Foya Tinkia, Masabulahun, everybody was
21 asking for ammunition, and they would bring the ammunition to
22 RUF, sell and get what they request for.

23 Q. Who were these people who were bringing the ammunition to
24 the RUF?

13:11:42 25 A. The ULIMO, the ULIMO fighters and their commanders.

26 Q. And you've told us that some of the ranks would also bring
27 material to Kennedy. Is that right?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. When you say the ranks, who are you referring to?

1 A. I mean - like when I talk about the ranks I mean the
2 majors, the lieutenants, they used to bring ammunition. The
3 other ranks are sergeants, corporals, all of them used to come.
4 Even the private soldiers used to bring ammunition, together with
13:12:21 5 the lieutenants.

6 Q. So this trade with ULIMO, Mr Sesay, was it controlled by
7 Abu Keita and Varmuyan Sherif or was it a free-for-all where any
8 number of ULIMO could come to sell arms to the RUF? Which was
9 it?

13:12:52 10 A. Honestly, it was not a controlled thing. Keita and others
11 used to sell theirs from the headquarters, but even the soldiers
12 who were deployed at the border, the fighters in the villages
13 used to bring theirs. There would be majors - like the major,
14 for example, who was in Foya Tinkia, he too used to bring his own
13:13:11 15 ammunition to Buedu for sale, and that would be unknown to his
16 commanders. They were not selling arms. But the ammunition,
17 different types, grenades, they used to bring them for sale.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths - Mr Sesay, are you saying
19 that the ULIMO would bring AK-47 ammunition and other types of
13:13:41 20 ammunition in exchange for single-barrel guns?

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. Some of them, when they come
22 with the ammunition, they would say they want single-barrel guns.
23 And when they pay them the money, they would say, "I want a
24 single-barrel gun", and they would give them the single-barrel
13:14:03 25 guns. Because the single-barrel guns were used for hunting.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Where were the RUF getting these single-barrel guns from?

28 A. We used to capture the single-barreled guns from the
29 Kamajors. Four to five rounds single-barrel guns. It was the

1 government who used to distribute them to the Kamajors all over
2 the country.

3 Q. And were these purchases made just with single-barrel guns,
4 or were they also made with money and other times of payments?

13:14:46 5 A. They would ask for money. They would also ask for
6 generators, tape recorders. It came to a time when it became
7 rampant. Even if you had a tape they would come, and if you tell
8 them, "I don't have money, but I have a tape recorder", they
9 would take it. That was how it was. That was during the
13:15:08 10 overthrow.

11 Q. Now, during this period, Mr Sesay, were the RUF - and I'm
12 talking about late December 1996 down to May 1997 - were the RUF
13 receiving arms and/or ammunition from Charles Taylor?

14 A. No. At that time we had no communication with Mr Taylor.
13:15:57 15 We did not receive anything from him. At this time ULIMO was
16 controlling from St Paul's River up to Mendekoma. That's a very
17 long distance.

18 Q. Was it possible to have contact with Charles Taylor at this
19 time?

13:16:21 20 A. Impossible. It was not possible. It was not possible at
21 all, because ULIMO was controlling the entire Lofa and they
22 entered parts of Bong County. In fact, the whole of Lofa was
23 under their control, because from St Paul River to Mendekoma it's
24 all Lofa and the entire Bomi Hills, so there was no means. There
13:16:45 25 was no way to contact Mr Taylor or the NPFL. It was not
26 possible.

27 Q. Did you, for example, have radio contact with Mr Taylor at
28 this time during this same period? Just to be clear, late
29 December 1996 down to May 1997 was there radio contact with

1 Charles Taylor?

2 A. No, we hadn't any radio contact with Mr Taylor.

3 Q. Now, during this same period, late December 1996 down to
4 May 1997, where was Mr Sankoh?

13:17:38 5 A. I had earlier said that Mr Sankoh left Abidjan together
6 with Steve Bio and Gibril Massaquoi. They left Abidjan around
7 March and they travelled to Nigeria. That was where Mr Sankoh
8 was arrested. Since then up to the overthrow of the AFRC,
9 Mr Sankoh was in Nigeria up to the end of '97 up to '98.

13:18:06 10 Q. Pause there. After Mr Sankoh's arrest - no, let me start
11 again. Between November 1996, when Mr Sankoh came to Sierra
12 Leone for consultations, up to the time of Mr Sankoh's arrest in
13 Nigeria, were you in contact with him?

14 A. Well, he was not sending direct messages to me, but he used
13:18:49 15 to send message to the commander in charge. That is Bockarie.

16 Q. What messages did he send during that period?

17 A. I want you to repeat the time frame. I missed the
18 question.

19 Q. Between November 1996, when Mr Sankoh returned following
13:19:19 20 his short visit to Sierra Leone when he returned to Ivory Coast,
21 until his arrest in Nigeria what contact did Mr Bockarie have
22 with him?

23 A. Well, when Mr Sankoh returned to Abidjan, I mean - Sam
24 Bockarie used to send the reports, situation reports, about,
13:19:49 25 like, this contact - this ULIMO contact. He sent a message to
26 Mr Sankoh that it has gone through and that he had met ULIMOs.
27 He had also sent messages of attacks from SLPP government,
28 violations of the accord, and how RUF was repelling the attacks.
29 Mr Sankoh too used to send instructions to Bockarie that he

1 should continue defending Kailahun. These were the types of
2 messages that were going on up to the time he left Ivory Coast
3 for Nigeria. That communication was going on on the field radio,
4 the Thompson radio sets.

13:20:30 5 Q. And that included, did it, the promotions in March of 1997?

6 A. Yes, that was what I said just now.

7 Q. Thank you. Now, following Mr Sankoh's arrest in Nigeria,
8 did contact between him and Bockarie continue?

9 A. Yes, Mr Sankoh used to communicate from Abidjan - I mean,
13:21:06 10 from Nigeria to Abidjan through telephone lines. Then from
11 Abidjan they used to send the message to Mr Sankoh through
12 radio - through radio messages. That continued up to after the
13 overthrow of the AFRC. Bockarie was still receiving messages
14 from Mr Sankoh.

13:21:32 15 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this
16 last answer.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. We've missed something, so let's
19 start again. Mr Sankoh used to communicate from Nigeria to
13:21:50 20 where?

21 A. To Abidjan. The house where he was in Abidjan in Cocody,
22 they had a radio set there. So he left Pa Kallon there, radio
23 operators, and some wounded soldiers and their securities there.
24 So through telephone conversations, whatever message that was
13:22:11 25 meant for Bockarie, he will send the message on telephone, and
26 the radio operator would decode it and - would code it and send
27 it to the radio station in Buedu, and they would decode it and
28 give it to Bockarie.

29 Q. I know this might appear boring, Mr Sesay, but I have to

1 get the details down, so I need to go over that with a little
2 care, okay? Let's start a little bit earlier. The first time
3 frame I want to ask you about now is November 1996 down to
4 Mr Sankoh's arrest in Nigeria, okay?

13:22:51 5 A. Okay.

6 Q. During that period, where in the Ivory Coast was Mr Sankoh
7 located?

8 A. Mr Sankoh was in Abidjan in an area called Cocody. In
9 fact, that was where most of the important people in Abidjan
10 lived. The President, the embassies, the ambassadors, that was
11 where they were.

12 Q. Did Mr Sankoh have a radio operator or operators at that
13 address in Cocody?

14 A. Yes, he had radio operators whom he left there.

13:23:39 15 Q. Who were these radio operators?

16 A. Well, at this time Mr Sankoh had three radio operators with
17 him in Abidjan. One was in Danane at the base of the external
18 delegation. Those who were in Abidjan, one Martin, he travelled
19 with Mr Sankoh. Martin, he went with Mr Sankoh. Memunatu Deen
20 and another lady, but I have forgotten her name, the two of them
21 were there, Memunatu and another lady. The two of them stayed.
22 Mr Sankoh left them in the house when he went to Nigeria. They
23 were there as radio operators.

24 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, thereafter, after his arrest
13:24:34 25 in Nigeria, when Sankoh wanted to contact Bockarie what would he
26 do?

27 A. Well, Foday Sankoh called to Abidjan --

28 Q. Pause there. And how was that call made? By what means?

29 A. By telephone.

1 Q. And who would he telephone in Abidjan?

2 A. At this time Jungle was in Abidjan at Mr Sankoh's house.
3 Because in 1996 Mr Sankoh called Jungle, and Jungle was with him
4 as one of his security guards in Abidjan. Because Jungle, he
13:25:31 5 came to become an RUF member. He became part of the RUF in 1992
6 when ULIMO pushed them from Foya, because Jungle was a native of
7 Foya Tinkia. Most of the NPL fighters then crossed into Guinea.
8 So Jungle --

9 Q. Mr Sesay, can I stop you there and can we - I note the
13:26:03 10 time - after lunch come back to how Jungle came to be involved
11 with the RUF. I just want to try and finish lines of contact
12 with Mr Sankoh before lunch, okay? We've only got five minutes.
13 So a telephone call to who in Abidjan?

14 A. He used to call in the house where Jungle was. And
13:26:24 15 sometimes Jungle would answer the call, and sometimes it is Pa
16 Kallon who would answer the call. And after receiving -
17 sometimes it is Memunatu Deen who would receive the call. If it
18 was Jungle or Pa Kallon who received the call, he would give them
19 a message for Bockarie. Memunatu Deen would write out the
13:26:40 20 message, code it and send it to Bockarie. That was how the
21 communication was going on.

22 Q. Thank you. And for how long were those lines of
23 communication maintained? Nigeria to Abidjan, Abidjan to
24 Bockarie, for how long did that continue?

13:27:03 25 A. Well, this started after Mr Sankoh had travelled and when
26 he got to Nigeria. From the time that he got to Nigeria, that
27 was the time the communication started. It continued, because
28 they detained him in a hotel and they had access to a telephone.
29 So this continued until after the overthrow of the SLPP by the

1 AFRC. It continued. But when Mr Sankoh spoke, when he had an
2 interview with the BBC and implored the RUF to join the AFRC, it
3 was at that time that the Nigerian authorities blocked
4 Mr Sankoh's line. Since then the communication stopped after he
13:27:50 5 had instructed the RUF to join the AFRC, because he said it over
6 the BBC. And he also had a conversation with Johnny Paul Koroma
7 on telephone, and that interview was also played over the SLBS
8 where Foday Sankoh instructed the RUF and that Mosquito was to
9 take orders from Johnny Paul and that the RUF should join the
13:28:18 10 AFRC and that the RUF should stop attacks against the AFRC. Also
11 that the army was not an enemy of the RUF, and we should join the
12 army to form the People's Army. But at the same time he had also
13 sent a radio message to Bockarie while these interviews were
14 going on. From that time they stopped him from communicating.
13:28:45 15 At that time communication stopped between Bockarie and Mr Sankoh
16 through Abidjan.

17 Q. Thank you. Now, again before we adjourn for lunch I want
18 your assistance with two important matters. After Sankoh's
19 arrest in Nigeria, did Sankoh tell Bockarie that thenceforth he
13:29:11 20 should take instructions and orders from Charles Taylor?

21 A. No, no, no. It was from Johnny Paul. The message that I
22 saw, it was from Johnny Paul. And the broadcast on the SLBS,
23 Bockarie was to take orders from Johnny Paul. He never mentioned
24 Charles Taylor there.

13:29:39 25 Q. Who gave the order for the RUF to join the AFRC in
26 Freetown?

27 A. It was Mr Sankoh who gave the order to Sam Bockarie on BBC
28 radio, on national radio and through field communication. It was
29 Mr Sankoh who gave the order to Bockarie. Then Bockarie turned

1 around and gave the instruction to Superman to move and join from
2 the Western Area to join the AFRC in Freetown, and Isaac Mongor
3 from the Kangari Hills was to move and join the AFRC. He was to
4 move with his troops to join the AFRC in Makeni.

13:30:20 5 Q. Did that order to join the AFRC come from Charles Taylor?

6 A. No, no. No, it did not come from him.

7 Q. After lunch we'll return to Jungle, okay.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. We'll take the luncheon break
9 and reconvene at 2.30.

13:31:10 10 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

11 [Upon resuming at 2.35 p.m.]

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, please
13 continue.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, can I first of all announce
14:35:12 15 a change in representation, that we've now been joined by the
16 Principal Defender.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is noted, thank you.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Mr Sesay, before the luncheon adjournment, we were dealing
14:35:27 20 with contact between the RUF and ULIMO consequent upon an
21 instruction given by Foday Sankoh in late November 1996. Do you
22 recall that?

23 A. Yes, I recall.

24 Q. Now, in the context of that discussion, you mentioned a
14:35:50 25 name Jungle. Do you recall that?

26 A. Yes, I recall that.

27 Q. Now, Jungle, does Jungle have a different name?

28 A. Yes, he has his real name. That is --

29 Q. And what is his real name?

1 A. His real name is Daniel Tamba.

2 Q. Mr Sesay, how well do you know Daniel Tamba?

3 A. Well, I came to know Daniel Tamba in 1992 when ULIMO took
4 control of Lofa, because Daniel Tamba was an NPFL. He himself,
14:36:55 5 Late Major Brown, they were NPFL members in Foya. So when ULIMO
6 attacked Foya, they crossed. Their commander by then - they
7 crossed by Guinea and came to Sierra Leone. Jungle, that is
8 Daniel Tamba, and the Late Major Brown and some of their men,
9 they came to the Sierra Leonean side by Bendu. They were there
14:37:26 10 with the RUF up to the time we retreated. So they stayed with us
11 at Galehun in that Koindu area. So we were there up to the time
12 Foday Sankoh left. We were still there until around June '94
13 when Mr Sankoh said I should come to Giema. Daniel Tamba,
14 Jungle, the Late Major Brown and some of their men, all of us
14:37:53 15 came to Giema and we lived in Giema. So from '94, '95, we were
16 all staying in Giema. '96, when Mr Sankoh went to Abidjan, he
17 called him.

18 Q. He called who?

19 A. He called Daniel Tamba. He went with some of the people
14:38:11 20 who had come from Kailahun, like Pa Rogers, the late paramount
21 chief Pa Ganawa, they went with Daniel Tamba through Guinea to
22 the Ivory Coast and to Danane, and they went and met Mr Sankoh in
23 Abidjan.

24 Q. Pause there. Firstly, why did Daniel Tamba, also known as
14:38:34 25 Jungle, go to the Ivory Coast at that time?

26 A. Well, before Mr Sankoh left Kailahun, he had met Daniel
27 Tamba, and he knew him. So he's the leader. When he goes,
28 whoever he wanted to call, he will call him. So he said he
29 should be an additional member of the security guards who were

1 with him. So he went with Pa Rogers.

2 Q. But was Daniel Tamba at this time still a member of the
3 NPFL?

4 A. No, no. From '92, he was now with the RUF up to this time.

14:39:21 5 Q. And so what was he a member of?

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please excuse me. I think the witness
7 said from 1992 he was now with the RUF.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: That's correct:

9 Q. So which group was he a member of?

14:39:47 10 A. He was a member of the RUF. When he left to go to Abidjan,
11 he was a member of the RUF.

12 Q. Between 1992, when you first met Jungle, until he went to
13 Abidjan - first of all, in which year did he go to Abidjan?

14 A. It was in 1996. After Mr Sankoh had gone to Abidjan, it
14:40:22 15 was at that time - it was later that he called him. They too
16 went to Abidjan, because Mr Sankoh was changing his security
17 guards. When some had stayed with him for some time, he will
18 change them and call for another set. Jungle and others were in
19 Giema from 1994, '95, and all the RUF men had recognised him as
14:40:49 20 being part of the RUF officers. I was with him with the late
21 Major Brown in Giema.

22 Q. Now, during that period from when you first met Jungle in
23 1992 until '96 when he went to Ivory Coast, to your knowledge did
24 Jungle go to Liberia?

14:41:19 25 A. No, Jungle did not go to Liberia. From the Koindu border,
26 '94, we were staying in Giema. From '94, '95, I left him in
27 Giema and I went to the Ivory Coast. When I left the Ivory Coast
28 and when we were in Zogoda, it was then that Pa Sankoh called
29 them and they went to the Ivory Coast in Abidjan.

1 Q. How long did Jungle remain in the Ivory Coast?

2 A. Well, Jungle was in the Ivory Coast, because I recall he
3 came to Freetown with Ibrahim Bah, but that was - that is a 1997
4 issue. He was in Ivory Coast until 1998. Then he returned. So
14:42:05 5 he and Bockarie, both of them were Kissi people, so Bockarie used
6 to send him to buy medicines at Baiwala.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Correction from the interpreter: Not "at
8 Baiwala." "They used to buy medicines and other items."

9 Your Honour, can he kindly repeat the last bit of his
14:42:27 10 answer slowly?

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause, Mr Sesay. The interpreter
12 was trying to explain something that you had said to us and then
13 you were continuing. Now, start again with your recent
14 testimony.

14:42:39 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. You said Bockarie used to send him to buy medicines where?

17 A. Yes. To buy medicines from Liberia, and sometimes he would
18 meet the Lebanese men who were doing business with Bockarie in
19 Monrovia, and he would return. Sometimes he used to come with
14:43:04 20 the Lebanese men, up to the time Bockarie left the RUF. That was
21 the time he too left the RUF. That was in December '99.

22 Q. Mr Sesay, did you know Jungle to be an agent for Charles
23 Taylor?

24 A. No. Jungle, I knew him for Sam Bockarie. In fact, at that
14:43:31 25 time, I knew him as a member of RUF.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, what does the witness mean by "I
27 knew him for Sam Bockarie"? What does that mean?

28 THE WITNESS: That Sam Bockarie used to send him to meet
29 his Lebanese business people with whom he was doing business.

1 Sam Bockarie used to send him to buy medicines to bring back.
2 And even when they were in Abidjan during the AFRC time, Pa
3 Kallon sent him to come and take supplies - take food money from
4 Sam Bockarie. They had said that the money that Pa Sankoh had
14:44:10 5 left had finished. So that was how I knew him for Sam Bockarie.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Mr Sesay, at an earlier stage, when dealing with Mr Tamba,
8 did you describe him as a runner for Sam Bockarie?

9 A. Yes.

14:44:33 10 Q. Because that was not translated. When you earlier said
11 that he was a runner for Sam Bockarie, what did you mean?

12 A. That Sam Bockarie used to send him - after the
13 intervention, Sam Bockarie used to send him to meet his Lebanese
14 partners, like Fayard, Mohamed and Fayard. They are Sierra

14:45:00 15 Leonean-born Lebanese, but they were buying produce in part of
16 1998 and they used to buy from Sam Bockarie in Kailahun. Jungle
17 used to come to Buedu. He would stay in Buedu for three weeks,
18 one month, and Bockarie would say, "Go and meet those men, and
19 they will give you so-and-so amount of rice and medicines." He
14:45:21 20 would go and tell the Lebanese, and all of them would come with
21 Jungle. That's what I mean.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could the witness repeat the names of
23 these Lebanese partners, please?

24 THE WITNESS: One was Mohamed and the other Fayard.

14:45:40 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Could you spell Fayard for us?

27 A. I think it's F-A-Y-A-R-D.

28 Q. Now, I want to come back to those two Lebanese men in a
29 moment, but before doing that, you told us earlier about Jungle,

1 on Sankoh's orders, moving to the Ivory Coast and remaining there
2 for some time. To your knowledge, whilst Jungle was in the Ivory
3 Coast, do you know if Sankoh ever sent him to Liberia to meet
4 Charles Taylor?

14:46:34 5 A. No, I never heard that. I never heard that, and Jungle
6 never told me that.

7 Q. How close were you to Jungle?

8 A. Jungle was my friend. In fact, the two of us became very
9 close before Sam Bockarie, because the two of us were in Kailahun
14:46:56 10 from November 1993. We were at the border, you know, up to 1994.
11 We were together in Giema, '95. Then I left him and went to
12 Ivory Coast. So when I was in Giema, we were together on a daily
13 basis. When we were going on patrol at the targets, we would go
14 together. So we were together.

14:47:18 15 Q. Just help us, Mr Sesay, because this is important. How
16 close were you? Were you best friends, or what? Just comrades
17 in arms, or what?

18 A. He was my friend.

19 Q. And --

14:47:39 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, what does the witness mean when he
21 says "the two of us became very close before Sam Bockarie"? That
22 means what exactly?

23 THE WITNESS: What I mean, my Lord, Sam Bockarie was not in
24 Kailahun in 1994, 1995. I was in Giema with Jungle. Sam
14:48:01 25 Bockarie was in Kenema, then part of Rutile, so he was not close
26 with anybody who was in Kailahun then. I was in Giema with
27 Jungle. Then we were together in the same village.

28 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, they are doing some repair
29 works in the building that is giving us some trouble.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Manager, can something be
2 done, maybe through the head of the sub-office, to deliver some
3 sort of message so that at least the proceedings can continue
4 uninterrupted.

14:48:48 5 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, I'll liaise with him.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I think you better take a
7 seat momentarily so we can sort this out.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

9 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, he's going to follow up and
14:49:25 10 will get back to us.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, it has subsided for now. I
12 don't know if it will start again.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I note the interpreter says the noise has
14 subsided for now. Mr Interpreter, please let us know when you
14:50:19 15 get to the stage where the noise is overwhelming you. In the
16 meantime, the head of sub-office is trying to address the
17 problem, but I think we have to press on for as long as we can.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:50:37 20 Q. Mr Sesay, can I return to the question asked by the learned
21 judge before we were interrupted, and can I pose it in this way:
22 Who was closer to Jungle, you or Sam Bockarie?

23 A. I said at the initial stage between '94, '95 I was close to
24 Jungle, because Bockarie was not in Kailahun, so I and Jungle
14:51:11 25 were close before Bockarie. That's what I mean.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's the assumption that the relationship
27 changed after Bockarie arrived on the scene?

28 THE WITNESS: No, it did not change, but I got used to
29 Jungle before Bockarie knew him. That's what I mean.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. And after Bockarie came to know Jungle, how did your
3 relationship with Jungle continue?

4 A. We were still friends. We were still friends. Because I
14:51:49 5 can recall at the time that he went to Abidjan and I was under
6 investigation in Zogoda, since then he did not come. It was
7 after the AFRC that he met us in Freetown and, when he came, he
8 was my friend. We walked around Freetown. We took a drive
9 around Freetown, and from there he went back to Abidjan because
14:52:09 10 Pa Kallon had sent him to Sam Bockarie to take food money along.

11 Q. And when on occasions you would meet or speak to Jungle,
12 Mr Sesay, would you discuss his activities?

13 A. Yes, he used to tell me.

14 Q. Would he tell you, for example, what activities he would
14:52:38 15 conduct on behalf of Sam Bockarie?

16 A. Yes, I knew what he was doing.

17 Q. And in regard to that earlier question as to how close you
18 were to Jungle, could the witness please be shown exhibit P-163,
19 please.

14:53:54 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: What the witness is being shown is a
21 clean copy of what?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I am giving the witness a clean copy of that
23 item, a totally unmarked copy:

24 Q. Could we put that unmarked copy on the overhead, please?

14:54:59 25 Mr Sesay, is that photograph now displayed on the screen in front
26 of you - is it displayed?

27 A. Yes, I'm seeing it.

28 Q. Who is the individual in the vertical striped top to the
29 left of the photograph?

1 A. That's Daniel Tamba, aka Jungle.

2 Q. Who is the person to the right of the photograph as we look
3 at it?

4 A. That's myself.

14:55:39 5 Q. Why are you both linking fingers?

6 A. Well, I told you he was my friend. We used to have fun.

7 We used to play together. He was my friend.

8 Q. Now, help us. When was this photograph taken?

9 A. This photograph was taken during the time of the AFRC when

14:56:14 10 Pa Kallon sent him and when he came along with Ibrahim Bah. When
11 he came from Ivory Coast to Guinea to Freetown, this was the
12 office that was given to the RUF at Cockerill. This is the
13 picture.

14 Q. And can you help us as to - we know the period of the AFRC.

14:56:34 15 Can you help us hopefully with a month as to when this photograph
16 was taken?

17 A. This could be around - it could be around July/August.

18 Q. Of which year?

19 A. Of August '97, yes. July/August '97.

14:57:09 20 Q. And on that occasion, for how long was Jungle in Freetown?

21 A. Well, he came with Ibrahim Bah. When they came, Ibrahim
22 Bah saw Johnny Paul for the purpose they had come. Then Bockarie
23 gave the money that he had to send to Pa Kallon for their feeding
24 in the Ivory Coast. So Jungle returned with Ibrahim Bah through
14:57:39 25 Guinea.

26 Q. To where?

27 A. To Abidjan. It was Pa Kallon who had sent him from
28 Abidjan, when Ibrahim Bah and others were coming to see Johnny
29 Paul, so Johnny Paul - Jungle returned with Ibrahim Bah.

1 Q. Now, just so that we can complete the picture, and
2 undoubtedly we will come back to the topic in due course, just
3 briefly tell us what was Ibrahim Bah's purpose in going to
4 Freetown in July 1997?

14:58:18 5 A. Well, after we had joined with the AFRC on the instruction
6 of Mr Sankoh, around July Gibril Massaquoi brought letters from
7 Mr Sankoh in Nigeria.

8 Q. Mr Sesay, I promise you we will come back to this topic,
9 but just briefly: What had Ibrahim Bah come to Freetown to
10 discuss with Johnny Paul Koroma in July 1997 - in a couple of
11 sentences, please?

12 A. No, I said Ibrahim Bah came to talk to Johnny Paul Koroma
13 to arrange with Johnny Paul Koroma, because it was Johnny Paul
14 who invited Ibrahim Bah, through Sam Bockarie and Gibril
15 Massaquoi, so in order to arrange for Ibrahim Bah to hire a
16 flight to transport arms and ammunition that Mr Sankoh had for
17 safekeeping in Burkina Faso. That was Mr Ibrahim Bah's purpose
18 in Freetown, to see Johnny Paul.

19 Q. And again just very quickly, did Ibrahim Bah arrange such a
15:00:03 20 flight?

21 A. Yes, he arranged it.

22 Q. And to where did - where did that flight come into?

23 A. That flight landed at a field that had been prepared by
24 AFRC at Mayagba between Makeni and Magburaka. The village is
15:00:28 25 called Mayagba. That is where the airfield was established.

26 Q. And again, just very briefly, who is Ibrahim Bah? We will
27 come back to this in more detail, I promise. But just briefly,
28 who is Ibrahim Bah?

29 A. He was Mr Sankoh's close friend. According to Mr Sankoh he

1 said they were in Libya together. He was the runner for
2 Mr Sankoh and, when Mr Sankoh was not there, he continued that
3 with Bockarie and, even with myself, we used to - he used to do
4 some runs for me. It was like Ibrahim Bah was like an agent for
15:01:12 5 the RUF.

6 Q. Thank you. Can I have that photograph of Daniel Tamba
7 back, please. Now, whilst we're on the topic of photographs, I
8 would like the witness, please, to be shown a clean copy of
9 photograph P-680.

15:02:14 10 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honours, I don't believe the P numbers
11 go up that high. I believe counsel might have the wrong citation
12 to the exhibit number.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Oh, it's 68D, sorry. I'm grateful. 68D.

14 Madam President, the copy here is marked, so what I propose
15:03:03 15 to do is to cover the markings in such a way that what's written
16 cannot be seen, and I wonder if this could now be shown to
17 Mr Koumjian for his approval.

18 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, we don't dispute that the
19 witness would recognise these people, so whether the names are on
15:03:48 20 it or not, it's fine with us.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please show the witness the photograph as
22 covered.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Could that be displayed on the screen as
24 covered, please.

15:04:09 25 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, it's confidential.

26 MR KOUMJIAN: I don't think there will be a problem.
27 Perhaps the handwriting needs to be covered because of that being
28 confidential.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I've covered it all up, as will be seen when

1 i t ' s di spl ayed.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think go ahead and display it as
3 covered.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:04:54 5 Q. Mr Sesay, the gentleman to the left of that photograph as
6 we look at it, wearing a red beret and a sleeveless, pocketed
7 waistcoat, who is that?

8 A. That's Mr Sesay.

9 Q. Is that the Mr Sesay sitting now in court?

15:05:25 10 A. Yes, that's me.

11 Q. The man standing in the middle of the trio, who is that?

12 A. That man in the centre is Lawrence Womandia.

13 Q. And the man to the right of the photograph as we look at
14 it, who is that?

15:05:49 15 A. That's General Abu Keita.

16 Q. Next question: Where was this photograph taken?

17 A. This photograph was taken at the billet - at the quarter
18 where I was in Teko Barracks in Makeni. That's the quarter.

19 Q. And when was this photograph taken?

15:06:23 20 A. This was in October 1999, when we left Buedu to Makeni.

21 Q. And what was Abu Keita doing in Makeni at this time?

22 A. Well, Abu Keita was in Buedu. It was Bockarie who said I
23 should go with him to Makeni. Since then, we were in Makeni
24 together, because at this time in Makeni there was no fighting.

15:06:56 25 When I came to take over command again from Superman, October
26 1999, we came together. So we were all living in the barracks.
27 This was the quarter where I was.

28 Q. But what was he doing in Sierra Leone, Abu Keita, at this
29 time?

1 A. I knew Abu Keita in person in December because I used to
2 hear his name. Initially, I used to hear his name. It was in
3 the RUF, it was Mike Lamin who first knew Abu Keita. Then when
4 Bockarie went to Foya, he knew him as well. So he used to come
15:07:40 5 and transact business with Bockarie, but I did not meet him in
6 person. It was in December 1998 when Keita came with 25 to 30 of
7 his ex-fighters but they were all Mandingo boys. He said he had
8 come to Bockarie to seek refuge because he was afraid for his
9 life. Then Bockarie said he should stay there because he was his
15:08:00 10 friend and he had been assisting the RUF. So that was why he was
11 in Buedu. That was how this man came to stay in Sierra Leone
12 with the RUF.

13 Q. And help me: What was the concern about his life which had
14 forced him to take refuge in Sierra Leone?

15:08:28 15 A. The way I understood it, it was that he was getting threat
16 from Mr Taylor's government. That was why he came to Sam
17 Bockarie as a friend, for him to be able to stay in Sierra Leone.

18 Q. Thank you. Okay. Now, I think you have quite sufficiently
19 described on the record the details of the three figures
15:08:54 20 contained in exhibit P-68D, and so consequently I'm not asking
21 you to write anything. Can I have my copy back, please?

22 Again, whilst we're on the topic of photographs, just to
23 clarify one other matter, could the witness please be shown
24 exhibit P-68B? There are no markings on this photograph.

15:10:26 25 Mr Sesay, the individual to the left of that photograph,
26 wearing a camouflage jacket and sunglasses, who is that?

27 A. That's myself.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Over the right shoulder of Mr Sesay can be
29 seen a gentleman wearing a red beret, and just in front of that

1 gentleman, another face with short, cropped hair. Can your
2 Honours - do your Honours have this?

15:11:13 3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think - we do have it, but I think
4 to be on the safe side, I would rather Mr Sesay perhaps switched
5 places and pointed to the people that you are referring to on the
6 screen.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, that's what I was seeking to avoid.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: How shall we know who you are talking
9 about and whether the witness actually agrees with you?

15:11:28 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. My concern is this: A copy of
11 the photograph before the witness has been marked confidential.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. Try your best, Mr Griffiths,
13 to describe the people in the photograph.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Would it be possible to proceed in this way?
15:11:54 15 I have a clean copy of the photograph. The copy of the
16 photograph in front of the witness is also unmarked. I don't
17 know if that is the original or whether the original is kept
18 elsewhere. If it is merely a copy, then it should be possible
19 for the witness to mark on the copy currently before him, which
15:12:17 20 might be the safest way of proceeding. So can I inquire first of
21 all, what has been put in front of the witness, is that the
22 original or a copy? Can I be assisted on that, please?

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Manager, that's a question
24 for you.

15:12:38 25 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, I'm consulting the records.
26 I'll get back to you soon.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, if you have a clean copy of
28 this photograph, it would expedite matters if you gave that copy
29 to the witness to mark.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: But my difficulty then is I don't have any
2 image in front of me to which I can direct the witness's
3 attention. That's the only problem.

15:14:12 4 MR KOUMJIAN: Perhaps one suggestion would be to put the
5 colour copy that the Court Manager has on the screen, counsel can
6 look at the screen, and then the witness can have the counsel's
7 copy to mark.

8 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, what we have is the original
9 copy.

15:14:54 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, what I have here, very
11 usefully given to us by our legal officer, is a black-and-white
12 photocopy. Is that of any use to you?

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I think perhaps we could proceed with the
14 black-and-white copy. I think we might have found a solution. I
15:15:33 15 will donate my copy to the witness, and I will bring up another
16 copy on my screen which I can look at:

17 Q. Mr Sesay, what I'm going to ask you to do in a moment, when
18 I'm in a position to observe myself - yes. If I provide you with
19 a pen, Mr Sesay, what I'm going to ask you to do is to mark on
15:16:27 20 this photograph the individuals you can identify. Do you follow
21 me? Do you follow me, Mr Sesay?

22 Now, we need to do this in a structured manner so that we
23 don't become confused. The individual front left, forefront of
24 the photograph, wearing the camouflage jacket, what appears to be
15:17:00 25 a V-necked white T-shirt underneath and sunglasses, with short
26 hair, who is that?

27 A. I am.

28 Q. Could you put a small arrow to the left of that
29 individual's head and mark out over the top of it "Issa Sesay"?

1 A. Up top of the head?

2 Q. Yes. Now, Mr Sesay, over your right shoulder, as we look
3 at the photograph, appears to be a man wearing a red beret in the
4 background. Do you see that?

15:17:56 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Just in front of that man we can see the face of another
7 man. Could you put an arrow towards the middle of that man's
8 head and write the name down if you know it. Do you know which
9 man I mean?

15:18:27 10 A. On the left?

11 Q. Just in front of red beret, that face, who is it?

12 A. This is a civilian.

13 Q. Very well. Just over your left shoulder is a gentleman
14 appearing to be wearing reflective sunglasses and a crew neck

15:18:54 15 shirt, beige in colour. Who is that?

16 A. This is Jackson Swarray.

17 Q. Could you put an arrow to that man's head and write the
18 name "Jackson Swarray", please. To the left of that man is
19 another black gentleman wearing sunglasses and what appears to be
20 a wooly hat, wearing a T-shirt of a man wearing a blue, what
21 appears to be football shirt with a red horizontal band. Who is
22 that man?

23 A. This is my bodyguard called Boy George.

24 Q. Could you go through the same exercise, please, arrow to
15:20:05 25 the middle of the head and mark "Boy George". There is a black
26 female carrying what appears to be a camera, wearing a hat in the
27 right foreground. Who is she?

28 A. This is the head of - this is the head of UNAMSIL Radio -
29 UNAMSIL radio at Mammy Yoko. This was the lady who was there as

1 head, but I can't remember her name, but they came on a visit to
2 Makeni.

3 Q. Just put an arrow to the head and write "Head of UNAMSIL
4 Radio". Now, I'm not going to ask you to identify anybody else
15:21:16 5 in that photograph, Mr Sesay, but what I would like you to do
6 now, please, is turn the photograph over and, on the back of the
7 photograph, I want you to write today's date, which is 6 July
8 2010, and then I want you to append your signature to the back of
9 that photograph.

15:22:30 10 Now, Mr Sesay, you helpfully identified someone I didn't
11 ask you about and I'm grateful for that. The chap in the red
12 beret over your right shoulder, you've actually given a name to
13 that person, haven't you?

14 A. Yes, that's the MP clerk in the Makeni MP office. His name
15:22:54 15 is Mohamed.

16 Q. MP clerk, is that in C-L-E-R-K, clerk?

17 A. Yes. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Thank you. Could I have it back now, please. I should ask
19 where was this photograph taken?

15:23:22 20 A. In Teko Barracks.

21 Q. When was this photograph taken?

22 A. Around November or December 1999.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the photograph could now be
24 shown to Mr Koumjian and the judges, please.

15:25:32 25 Could I ask, please, that that photograph be marked for
26 identification MFI-2.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. The photograph, which is in
28 fact a replica of exhibit P-68B as now marked by the witness Issa
29 Sesay, is marked MFI-2.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Mr Sesay, are you absolutely certain about who is shown in
3 that photograph?

4 A. If I'm actually sure about those in the picture? The only
15:26:13 5 person whose name I did not know, whom I said was a civilian, I
6 know that person but - I don't know that person, but all the
7 other people I'm quite sure. If you want me to write that
8 person's name, I will, but I'm quite sure of those people.

9 Q. I'm not interested in you writing the name of a civilian,
15:26:33 10 but is Abu Keita in that photograph?

11 A. Abu Keita is not in that photograph.

12 Q. Are you certain about that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, let's put photographs to one side and move
15:27:01 15 on to other matters. Earlier, just prior to lunch, you told us
16 about an instruction from Foday Sankoh for the RUF to join the
17 AFRC in Freetown. Do you remember telling us that, Mr Sesay?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. I now want to deal with that period of time, and can we
15:27:41 20 start in this way: At the time of the AFRC coup, where were you?

21 A. I was in Giema. It was during the very day of the
22 overthrow that I was under attack from the Kamajors and soldiers
23 in Giema Town.

24 Q. How did you come to learn of the overthrow of the Kabbah
15:28:07 25 government?

26 A. That morning I was in Giema with CO Lion and Bockarie, we
27 were all sitting down at my house when they said the Kamajors and
28 the soldiers were coming. They had opened fire at Boubu Gao,
29 which is about 5 miles to Giema. That was where we heard the

1 firing from. They said they were approaching Giema. Then I said
2 the men should --

3 Q. Boubu Gao, before we forget, can you spell that?

4 A. Boubu Gao, 5 miles from Giema.

15:28:49 5 Q. Can you help us with a spelling, Mr Sesay, or shall I ask
6 the translators? I wonder if the interpreters could assist with
7 a spelling for that?

8 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, phonetically it's B-0-U-B-U then
9 G-A-O.

15:29:13 10 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

11 Q. Now you hear that the government troops and the Kamajors
12 were approaching Mr Sesay, so what happened?

13 A. So I gave instruction. I told Rambo and others to move the
14 troops so that we can block them, we can prevent them from

15:29:36 15 entering Giema. To our surprise, we just heard firing behind
16 Giema. That is in Sembehun. The road from which we were
17 expecting them to come, they did not use that, they used another
18 route to come through the back. So the house where I was, that
19 was where the road was to go to Sembehun. Then I said, "Okay,

15:30:06 20 I let some armed men use the route to cut in front of them so they
21 cannot go to Nyandehun and surprise us from the back." So whilst
22 we were expecting that the soldiers and the Kamajors were moving
23 from Sembehun to go by Mendekama [phon] to Nyandehun, they did
24 not use that route. They used a route from Sembehun to Giema.

15:30:29 25 So we were there when I told two of my bodyguards to go and stand
26 at the roadside to observe. When the bodyguards went there, it
27 was not up to ten minutes when we heard firing at the place that
28 I said, "If our men had not gone to stand there these people
29 would have just surprised us with an attack." So from that they

1 entered Giema Town. Then I too - we organised ourselves to repel
2 the attack, so we were fighting from 11 o'clock in the morning up
3 to 2 - up to 3 o'clock, 3 p.m. Before 3 p.m. they captured one
4 soldier called Corporal Mohamed; they brought him where I was
15:31:17 5 sitting down on the road going to Talia. That was where I was
6 sitting down. So Lion tuned his radio World News at 3 o'clock.
7 Then we heard that the SLPP has been overthrown in Freetown, that
8 the soldiers have overthrown the SLPP. Then I told the soldier,
9 "You are lucky. We have just captured you today and the brothers
15:31:42 10 are overthrown." Then the soldier - I, together with the
11 soldier, laughed. That was my first day; it was my first day of
12 knowing about the coup, when I listened to the radio on 3 o'clock
13 on 25 May World News.

14 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, when you heard that news did you anticipate,
15:32:05 15 at that time, that you would, in due course, be forming an
16 alliance with the AFRC?

17 A. Well, I did not think about that then, but by then the only
18 relief that I had was that now that the government of the
19 Kamajors has been overthrown, now the attack on us is going to
15:32:30 20 stop. That was my own concern then. Indeed, before evening,
21 those who were attacking Giema ran away to Pendembu, but I did
22 not think about joining the people who had overthrown because
23 right then I did not know them. I just believed that the fact
24 that they have removed the SLPP from power and they have run away
15:32:54 25 to Guinea, the attack on our positions was going to stop.

26 Q. Now, how soon thereafter did you hear from Foday Sankoh?

27 A. Well, from the 25th to the 28th of May, I got message from
28 Sam Bockarie that he had received instruction from Mr Sankoh that
29 he should join - he should join the AFRC. So, in fact, he too

1 had sent instruction to Superman, to Isaac, because he said they
2 had even played his voice on the SLBS and that he too had sent
3 instruction to the others that he should join Johnny Paul Koroma
4 and that he should take orders from the AFRC Johnny Paul Koroma,
15:33:51 5 because he was residing in Buedu and I was in Giema. So on the
6 29th, Bockarie himself came from Buedu, together with his wife,
7 his bodyguards. He came along with one Ambassador Jabbie, who
8 was the Sierra Leone ambassador to Guinea, but he joined the
9 external delegation who crossed over. That is the group that had
15:34:21 10 been arrested by the RUF. So he too was in Buedu. So Sam
11 Bockarie came along with him too, together with his own
12 bodyguard, a soldier.

13 Q. Now, you said during the course of that answer, Mr Sesay,
14 "So, in fact, he too had sent instructions to Superman, to Isaac,
15:34:49 15 because he said they had even played his voice on the SLBS." Who
16 is the "he" who sent the instructions to Superman and Isaac?

17 A. It was Sam Bockarie who sent instruction to Superman and
18 Isaac on the directives that he had received from Mr Sankoh, and
19 it was Mr Sankoh's voice that the AFRC played over the SLBS
15:35:18 20 radio, wherein he had a conversation with Johnny Paul about the
21 RUF joining the AFRC.

22 Q. Now, what was your personal reaction, Mr Sesay, to this
23 instruction that the RUF should ally itself with the AFRC? What
24 did you feel about that?

15:35:44 25 A. Well, it was a shocking news because on that day I was
26 under attack. If I had not - I could have even decided to run
27 away to join the ULIMO, and if I did not have ammunition, they
28 could have captured me, and that the government that did this had
29 been overthrown, and if they called me and said, "From today the

1 war is over and you are no longer our enemies and you should join
2 us," so it was something like a shocking news to me. We had been
3 fighting against the soldiers since 1991 up to that moment. So
4 if just within the twinkle of an eye that same soldier came up
15:36:36 5 and said, "Say, fellow, look, you are no longer my enemy." So I
6 looked happy that the war had come to an end. "You are now my
7 brother. Come along. Let us make peace." So I think it was
8 going to be a safer side for us. I thought we were now saved
9 from the war.

15:36:57 10 MR GRIFFITHS: I think - I've helpfully been informed that
11 part of what the witness said has not been translated. Could I
12 have a moment, please? I'm told the witness said, "I'm happy
13 that the war had actually come to an end," and looking at the
14 passage, I cannot see where those words appear.

15:37:39 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, did you hear such words
16 being uttered by the witness?

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, I did interpret that the
18 war has now - the war is now over, but I wonder what went in.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm afraid we have to go by what the
15:38:03 20 interpreter has interpreted, unless the interpreter draws to my
21 attention that he has missed something. Now we have to leave the
22 record as is. Perhaps you may wait and review the record later,
23 in line with the procedures that we've prescribed before.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

15:38:35 25 Q. Now, following that instruction from Foday Sankoh, what
26 steps were taken by the RUF to put that order into practice?

27 A. Well, like I said earlier, I said Sam Bockarie came on the
28 29th from Buedu with some - some of his family members, the
29 ambassador, Ambassador Jabbie, who was the Sierra Leone

1 ambassador to Guinea, and his bodyguard. All of them walked to
2 Giema. They met us there.

3 Q. And then what happened?

4 A. Sam Bockarie then told us that we should go to Daru. He
15:39:33 5 said we should go to Daru to meet the soldiers in Daru, because
6 he said Johnny Paul had called him on the radio and they had
7 spoken and he told him to go to Freetown. So all of us went to
8 Daru. But at that time, we left our families in Giema. Then
9 myself, the ambassador, Bockarie, Peter Vandi, Lion and so many
15:39:58 10 other officers, together with the troops, we left Giema to go to
11 Pendembu, because by then the government troops' position was at
12 Pendembu, and that was their defensive position. So when we left
13 Giema, we just walked about 2 miles and we saw a group of
14 soldiers who came, and they were all saying, "Safe, safe, safe,"
15:40:26 15 and all of us came together and we started hugging each another.

16 And they had about - a lieutenant with about 30 to 40 soldiers,
17 and the lieutenant said that they got an order that they should
18 come and receive Bockarie. So that was the reason why they moved
19 to come ahead. So it was 2 miles out of Giema that we met them.
15:40:51 20 So we all walked to Pendembu, and when we got to Pendembu we met
21 two vans and two trucks - two vans and one truck that transported
22 us to Daru, and they later provided transport for all the other
23 fighters from Giema and that took all the other RUF soldiers from
24 Pendembu to Daru. So we went, we met the battalion commander --

15:41:15 25 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
26 to repeat that name.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Pause a minute. Who was the battalion commander?

29 A. I said Lieutenant Colonel Sal Momodu.

1 Q. And the next morning they called - he called what?

2 A. He called for a parade. So all the battalion soldiers in
3 Daru paraded, and we the RUF soldiers too paraded, and they
4 introduced themselves to us and we also - Sam Bockarie too
15:41:50 5 introduced himself and introduced us. So we and his commanders
6 shook hands, and from then he said we should go and have
7 breakfast together and went to their mess and had breakfast. So
8 whilst we were in the mess having breakfast, then the adjutant
9 came with one old man who was a chief from Daru.

15:42:12 10 Q. And then what happened?

11 A. So the Pa who came with the adjutant, the adjutant told the
12 colonel that the paramount chief and the other chiefs and the
13 elders and the civilians in Daru had sent this Pa and said,
14 "Please, the battalion commander should go and talk to them, the
15:42:33 15 civilians, and they should go together with Mosquito," and they
16 said that the RUF had moved to Daru, and then the civilian
17 authorities wanted to know what was actually going on. So
18 Colonel Momodu told Mosquito and Mosquito said, "No problem with
19 that." So they told the adjutant to tell the Pa that in an
15:42:52 20 hour's time to two hours they were going to Daru. So after they
21 had got the breakfast, we went to the place where we were lodged
22 in the quarter and, from there, in an hour plus, Colonel Momodu
23 came and asked us to go to Daru. So we went to the chief's
24 compound. We met so many people there, civilians, they were
15:43:13 25 assembled there.

26 So Colonel Momodu addressed the civilian population, and he
27 said the war had now ended, and he said, "About four days ago
28 these men - these men could not come to us and we were not brave
29 to go to them, but today they have come, so you should know that

1 the war has come to an end." So he said, "They were now talking
2 to you, the civilians, that you should not follow the
3 politicians. We were fighting against each other, and we have
4 asked these people to come and join us. So you also talk to the
15:43:43 5 Kamajors to come out and join us."

6 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
7 to slow down his pace.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Mr Sesay, further complaints about speed. It's not so much
15:43:56 10 speed, Mr Sesay; it's that you have to give yourself breaks. You
11 are recounting an event that you can remember. We're hearing
12 this account for the first time. So you need to break up your
13 account so that we can follow it, okay? I know it's frustrating,
14 Mr Sesay, but just bear with us, please. So let me just remind
15:44:17 15 you where we got to:

16 "We were fighting against each other. We should not follow
17 the politicians, and we've asked these people to come and join
18 us. So you also talk to the Kamajors to come out and join us."

19 What else was being said at that meeting?

15:44:41 20 A. After the colonel had addressed the civilian population and
21 he then said Sam Bockarie too should speak. So Sam Bockarie also
22 greeted the chiefs. He told the chiefs that he was a field
23 commander of the RUF. He introduced himself to the civilians,
24 and he told the civilians that the war had come to an end and
15:45:03 25 that they too have heard it from the battalion commander, and
26 what the battalion commander has told them is the reality. And
27 he said, "Because you, the civilians in Daru, you are now seeing
28 the RUF come to Daru, so that alone will prove to you that the
29 war has come to an end." So he too spoke to the civilians about

1 this.

2 Q. Go on.

3 A. So he informed the civilians that from that day onwards,
4 they are free to go to any area around Kailahun and Daru where
15:45:38 5 they controlled, and they said they were now allowed to go to
6 their home towns and villages.

7 Q. Go on.

8 A. They are allowed to leave the displaced camp from Daru and
9 return to their respective villages and home towns, so after the
15:45:54 10 meeting they should go back to their respective homes. So they
11 were asked to leave the place in Daru. So we too returned to
12 Daru. After our return to Daru, because when we came back, the
13 day after that, the colonel sent a message to Freetown to inform

14 Johnny Paul that Mosquito was now in Daru, so they dispatched
15:46:21 15 other vehicles, buses and trucks, to come and collect Mosquito
16 from Daru. So after the meeting, around 3 o'clock - by 2

17 o'clock, the vehicles arrived in Daru from Freetown. So Sam
18 Bockarie and most of the officials and the fighters, we went on
19 board the trucks and the government buses, and so Sam Bockarie

15:46:48 20 told me that I and Peter Vandi should stay in Daru for the
21 moment. They are going ahead. He said when he gets to Freetown
22 he will contact us on when and how we go to Freetown. So he said
23 he was advising that we stay for the moment. So I said, "Okay."
24 So he left myself and Peter Vandi in Daru for the moment, and
15:47:07 25 then went to Freetown.

26 Q. And in due course, Mr Sesay, did you go to Freetown?

27 A. Yes, after a week, that was now in June, Sam Bockarie sent
28 and he said I too should prepare to go to Freetown. And he sent
29 a Tata, the small trucks, he sent one to go and select us from

1 Daru. So when on the truck myself, I ate Major Brown we went to
2 Freetown. Because by then Mosqui to came, he met Superman and
3 Isaac in Benguema. That was where they had given them quarters.
4 So when Mosqui to came, that was where he was given a quarter
15:47:55 5 also. He was there. So before I came in June I met - the RUF
6 had captured - the RUF and SLA had captured Hastings because by
7 then ECOMOG was in Hastings by then, so they went and captured
8 there and removed them from there. So the --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
15:48:16 10 to repeat this area slowly.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Go back to the capture of Hastings from ECOMOG, Mr Sesay.
13 Mr Sesay, although I told you earlier to watch the judges, just
14 for now just watch my hand, yes. Every time I do that, stop.

15:48:34 15 All right? Okay?

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. So ECOMOG are pushed out of Hastings. Go on.

18 A. Yes, I said when Superman, Bockarie met some fighting took
19 place in Hastings and they captured Hastings from the ECOMOG.

15:48:55 20 And the soldiers too attacked Mammy Yoko. When they attacked
21 Mammy Yoko they captured over 300 soldiers there. That was on
22 June 2nd. But that attack was launched by the soldiers, that was
23 according to what I understood when I came to Freetown because by
24 then I was not yet in Freetown. So during this period --

15:49:24 25 Q. During this period, yes, go on.

26 A. Before I arrived in Benguema, Superman was now deployed in
27 Hastings and some of them deployed in Allen Town. So when I came
28 I met Superman, Isaac, Bockarie. They were all in Benguema. So
29 that was where I joined them. So we passed the night in Benguema

1 and the following morning we went to Freetown.

2 Q. Where in Freetown were you housed, Ms Sesay?

3 A. Well, when I came I was not given a quarter. Since June
4 when I came up to - from June, July, August I was in Benguema. I
15:50:16 5 would go to Freetown and return to BTC, Benguema. The first time
6 I was given a villa I think it was in August or September in the
7 Hill Station area, between August and September. They secured
8 some villas for us, the RUF commanders, in the OAU Village. So
9 Bockarie was given one villa, they gave Mike Lamin one, they gave
15:50:41 10 me one and they gave one Mohamed Tarawalli's wife you know
11 because the other commanders went and lived in civilians' houses,
12 big houses, because like Superman was on Wilkinson Road, Isaac
13 Mongor was at Hill Station at a big compound. But we were given
14 government quarters, the OAU quarters. It was just something
15:51:06 15 like a self-contained room and two smaller rooms. I was living
16 in the villa 47.

17 Q. Mr Sesay, did you in due course come to meet Johnny Paul
18 Koroma?

19 A. Yes, when I came in June I passed the night. Then we went.
15:51:32 20 When we went to Freetown, Mosquito introduced us to Johnny Paul
21 Koroma because that day he did not come to Cockerill, so in the
22 evening Mosquito went to his house. He was living around
23 Wilkinson Road, just off Wilkinson Road going towards Cockerill,
24 that was where his residence was. So we went there and we
15:51:54 25 greeted him, so Mosquito introduced him to me. And the following
26 day we went, we met him in Cockerill. So he was using Cockerill
27 in June, July up to August as his office.

28 Q. Now --

29 A. Before he was transferred to the State House and he started

1 using State House as his office, but initially he was using
2 Cockerill as his office.

3 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before I lose sight of it,
4 the witness had said earlier, it's at page 140 line 1 or 2, that
15:52:24 5 the soldiers captured 300 soldiers. Which soldiers captured
6 which soldiers?

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Can you help with that, Mr Sesay?

9 A. The Sierra Leone Army captured 300 plus Nigerian ECOMOG
15:52:45 10 troops in Mammy Yoko, because they had all moved to Mammy Yoko.
11 That was where their headquarters was, so that was where they
12 attacked them and captured all of them.

13 Q. Mr Sesay, I would like you at this point please to be shown
14 exhibit P-131. Mr Sesay, you will see that this document is
15:54:07 15 headed "AFRC Secretariat, State House, 19 July 1997. Minutes of
16 the first meeting of the AFRC held at the conference hall,
17 defence headquarters, on Saturday, 19 July 1997." If you go down
18 to the list of those present, at number 10 you will see
19 Lieutenant Colonel Issa H Sesay. Is that a reference to you?

15:54:53 20 A. Yes, I am.

21 Q. Did you attend this meeting?

22 A. Yes, I attended a meeting at Cockerill but that was not
23 State House.

24 Q. I don't think it's being suggested that this meeting was
15:55:12 25 held at State House. It was held at the conference hall, defence
26 headquarters. Where are the defence headquarters?

27 A. It's Cockerill.

28 Q. So did you attend this meeting at Cockerill?

29 A. Yes, I attended a meeting at Cockerill in the conference

1 hall at Cockerill. That was when members - the coup makers and
2 army officers, we were all there, including the RUF.

3 Q. Now, you see - let us just go down and familiarise
4 ourselves with those who were present. Major Johnny Paul Koroma,
15:55:59 5 Chairman. Captain SAJ Musa, Chief Secretary of State. Staff
6 Sergeant A Sankoh. Staff Sergeant Tamba Alex Brima. Staff
7 Sergeant Brima Bazy Kamara. Now, those five named individuals,
8 Mr Sesay - Koroma, Musa, Sankoh, Brima, Kamara - had you met them
9 before?

15:56:37 10 A. You mean before this meeting? Yes, I met Koroma, I met
11 Musa, I met Zagalo Sankoh, I met Brima. But I was not used to
12 Kamara. But I met Brima, yes, but I had not met Kamara before
13 that meeting. That meeting my first meeting with Kamara, Brima
14 Bazy.

15:57:09 15 Q. The four that you met before this meeting, how soon before
16 this meeting had you met them?

17 A. Well, when I came in June, I did say that the following day
18 Bockarie took me to Koroma when he went and introduced me to
19 Koroma. So when SAJ Musa too came, because I understood that he
15:57:32 20 came from England through Guinea and he came to Freetown. So I
21 had to meet with him. But for Zagalo, within two days' time
22 after my arrival I met Zagalo because the very day that we met
23 Johnny Paul in his house and the following day we met him at
24 Cockerill, that was the day I met Zagalo, Alex and Brima because
15:57:56 25 Zagalo was the PLO-1 and Brima was the number 2 man, so these
26 were very important men at that time.

27 Q. Pause there. PLO stands for what?

28 A. Public relations officer.

29 Q. Now, prior to --

1 A. Public Liaison officer, sorry.

2 Q. Now, prior to June 1997, had you ever met any of those five
3 individuals, Koroma, Musa, Sankoh, Brima, Kamara, prior to June
4 1997?

15:58:41 5 A. No, I had never met them before. That was my first time
6 meeting with them.

7 Q. We then see Major Katta-Tarawalli, Squadron Leader King and
8 then Colonel Denis Mingo. Now, what I would like us to do,
9 Mr Sesay, is for you just to go down this list of names and just
10 read out the names of the RUF members present. Do you follow me?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. So which is the first name?

13 A. You mean the RUF.

14 Q. Yes, the RUF members.

15:59:31 15 A. Well, the first is Colonel Denis Mingo.

16 Q. Yes?

17 A. Colonel Isaac T Mongor.

18 Q. Yes?

19 A. Lieutenant Colonel Issa Sesay.

15:59:45 20 Q. Yes?

21 A. Lieutenant Colonel Gibril Massaquoi.

22 Q. Yes?

23 A. Major Morris Kallon.

24 Q. Yes?

15:59:53 25 A. Captain Lawrence Womandia.

26 Q. Yes?

27 A. Lieutenant Eldred Collins.

28 Q. Yes?

29 A. I think those are the RUF.

1 Q. Just take your time and go all the way down the list so
2 that we're sure.

3 A. Those are the RUF.

4 Q. Just so that we get the picture, we see there 26
16:01:02 5 individuals present. Of those, seven are RUF members. Is that
6 right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, where was Sam Bockarie at the time of this first
9 meeting?

16:01:24 10 A. Well, Sam Bockarie - Sam Bockarie - because what happened,
11 Sam Bockarie - Sam Bockarie used to go to the provinces. He used
12 to go to the provinces. Because I know of the delegation that
13 Sam Bockarie took. This man went with him, but this man attended
14 the meeting also, so I believe they had returned by then. But
16:01:58 15 Sam Bockarie used to go to Bo, Kenema. He was too fond of
16 attacking the Kamajors, so he was not that much resting in
17 Freetown and later in fact he finally went and based in Kenema.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: When the witness refers to "this man",
19 who does he mean?

16:02:22 20 THE WITNESS: That is Sam Bockarie. I said during this
21 time he used to attack the Kamajors because I know about the
22 Kamajors - Kamajor attacks that he carried out in Bo and Kenema
23 Districts.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, but you said "this man went with
16:02:38 25 him", meaning this man went with Sam Bockarie.

26 THE WITNESS: No, what I mean, I said this man and Sam
27 Bockarie went with a delegation just after the coup when Sam
28 Bockarie arrived in Freetown. When Sam Bockarie and some AFRC
29 members like Tamba Brima and others, they used the helicopter

1 that the AFRC was using and they flew to Banjul.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. You missed the question.
3 When you say "this man" you are pointing at something and I'm
4 asking you, for the record, who is "this man" that you are
16:03:22 5 referring to.

6 THE WITNESS: Well, my Lord, that is the story that I want
7 to explain. It's Tamba Alex Brima that I mean. That is the
8 story that I want to explain. I said he and Bockarie went to the
9 delegation, but by this time as long as he attended this meeting
16:03:40 10 it means he must have returned from that trip.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Can we go over to the second page, please. Do you have the
13 second page of this document? I want to look at a couple of
14 paragraphs. Paragraph 2:

16:04:12 15 "The principal liaison officers and the honourable members,
16 he went on, that is the chairman, must be seen to be setting the
17 best of examples. He emphasised that all hostilities must now
18 stop, noting that the success of the revolution will depend on
19 how well the civilians are treated. He further went on to say
16:04:39 20 that the principal liaison officers must be able to control
21 situations and make sure that looting is stopped. On the
22 question of arrest, he intimated members that henceforth the
23 proper police procedure must be adopted."

24 Now, Mr Sesay, you tell us you were at this meeting and we
16:05:10 25 see here in the minutes that one of the remarks made by the
26 chairman in July 1997, at the start of what he describes as a
27 revolution, that that success will depend on how well the
28 civilians are treated. Do you see that?

29 A. Yes, I see it.

1 Q. Do you recall that being said by the chairman at this
2 meeting?

3 A. Yes, because at this time his men were arresting people and
4 they were harassing civilians, so these were some of the things
16:05:52 5 he was talking about. He said if anybody wanted to arrest
6 anybody they should inform the police. He said the coup makers
7 did not have right to be arresting people.

8 Q. So that was the attitude then. But you tell us - and you
9 told us yesterday - that it was the soldiers who were responsible
16:06:17 10 post the ECOMOG intervention for amputations, didn't you? You
11 remember telling us that yesterday?

12 A. Yes, I said it was the army. Because the AFRC were members
13 of the army. They were the people who did the attack on
14 Freetown. So amputation, including all other crimes that were
16:06:42 15 committed during the Freetown invasion, they were the ones who
16 did it, because we were not part of it.

17 MR KOUMJIAN: I'm a little late in objecting, but actually
18 yesterday the witness said RUF and the soldiers did amputations
19 in '98.

16:07:06 20 MR GRIFFITHS: In fact, what was said was some elements of
21 the RUF, if Mr Koumjian remembers correctly:

22 Q. Now, let's ignore that and just move on to important
23 matters, shall we? Paragraph 7 at the bottom of the page. Can
24 you have a look at paragraph 7, please:

16:07:34 25 "The chairman observed that there is a problem among some
26 members of the People's Army which has to be addressed
27 immediately. He therefore asked what was the problem between
28 Lieutenant Collins and Colonel Issa."

29 Now, Mr Sesay, taking things in stages, when had the

1 People's Army been established?

2 A. Well, this People's Army, it was Foday Sankoh who wanted us
3 to join the AFRC, and, joining the army, that is the AFRC, that
4 meant that we would become one and the same army. That is the
16:08:22 5 People's Army. But the AFRC did not accept it. So even in '97
6 it was just the RUF who were referred to as the People's Army,
7 but not them.

8 Q. Who gave - who provided that name, People's Army?

9 A. It was Mr Sankoh.

16:08:42 10 Q. Second point. What is the chairman referring to when --
11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, which Sankoh is this? We have
12 more than one Sankoh in this meeting.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Which Sankoh provided the name People's Army?

16:08:59 15 A. Foday Sankoh.

16 Q. Are you talking about Foday Sankoh, the commander-in-chief
17 of the RUF?

18 A. Yes. Yes.

19 Q. Thank you. Second page, please, top line:

16:09:15 20 "He, the chairman, therefore asked what was the problem
21 between Lieutenant Collins and Colonel Issa."

22 What's that about?

23 A. Well, the problem was Johnny Paul asked what the problems
24 were, and they explained. But before the meeting Collins had
16:09:39 25 explained to Johnny Paul. Collins - it was Bockarie who said I
26 should tell Collins to report to him in Kenema, but Collins was
27 afraid to go, so he went and informed Johnny Paul, so that was
28 the problem, because Collins was impersonating to be a lieutenant
29 colonel and that he was the spokesman of the RUF. So Gibril took

1 complaint to Bockarie. So Bockarie said I should tell Collins to
2 report in Kenema; so he was afraid, so he went and explained to
3 Johnny Paul so that Johnny Paul could look into his problem. So
4 that was actually the problem.

16:10:22 5 Q. Let us now look, in light of that answer, at paragraph 8:

6 "In his reaction, Colonel Issa blamed Lieutenant Collins
7 for bypassing, dodging and impersonating. In addition,
8 Lieutenant Collins is reported to have failed to adhere to an
9 order from Colonel Sam Bockarie for him to report to Kenema with
10 Colonel Issa. Members had the view that jealousy may have arisen
11 against Lieutenant Collins for the several foreign trips he has
12 made. Colonel Issa, however, clarified that Lieutenant Collins
13 is responsible for foreign missions and that there is no need for
14 envy. In his reaction, Lieutenant Collins reported that he spoke
15 to Colonel Sam Bockarie who gave his orders in anger and abruptly
16 cut off the communication. Since then, Lieutenant Collins has
17 been extremely worried. The question of Lieutenant Collins going
18 to report to Colonel Sam Bockarie in Kenema was extensively
19 discussed. The idea of giving him an escort for his security was
20 also examined."

16:11:35

21 Pause there. Was Lieutenant Collins responsible for
22 foreign missions?

23 A. Yes, because he used to go as part of delegates, because he
24 went - he went on one or two trips as a delegation before he was
25 appointed as a minister. He went on an AFRC delegation in
26 Conakry. He went on another delegation to Abidjan. And he and
27 Sam Bockarie also went on another delegation to Libya from
28 Freetown to The Gambia, from The Gambia to Libya, together with
29 Tamba Brima and other members of the AFRC.

16:12:06

1 Q. Now, in paragraph 9 mention is made of tensions between
2 Collins and Bockarie. Is that true?

3 A. Yes, because Bockarie was angry. He said Collins banged
4 the phone on him. He said that was gross insubordination. He
16:12:51 5 said he was afraid to pick his calls, and he was no longer
6 picking his calls, so he too was afraid, so he went and reported
7 the issue to Johnny Paul.

8 Q. Let us now move please to paragraph 10:

9 "It was decided that the senior members of the People's
16:13:13 10 Army must ensure that no problem arise amongst them until the
11 return of Corporal Foday Sankoh."

12 Could you explain that to us, please, Mr Sesay?

13 A. Yes, because it was Johnny Paul who said some of these
14 kinds of misunderstandings are not good. He said we should stay
16:13:32 15 united until the return of Mr Sankoh. He said we should work
16 together.

17 Q. Now, if we just remind ourselves. We note that this
18 meeting is 19 July 1997, so it's almost two months after the
19 coup. Help us, Mr Sesay. To your knowledge, during that two
16:14:00 20 -month period, had the AFRC been in contact with Charles Taylor?

21 A. No. You mean the AFRC or the RUF? The AFRC government?

22 Q. Let's take it in turns. To your knowledge, was the AFRC,
23 during that period up to this meeting, in contact with Charles
24 Taylor?

16:14:22 25 A. No, no. I never heard that.

26 Q. During that period was the RUF in contact with Charles
27 Taylor?

28 A. No, we were not in contact with him.

29 Q. At this meeting was anything discussed about contacting

1 Charles Taylor?

2 A. Nothing of the sort. I never heard that in the meeting.

3 Something about a contact with Mr Taylor? I never heard that.

4 Q. At this meeting, the minutes of which are before us, was

16:15:01 5 there any discussion about obtaining aid and assistance from

6 Charles Taylor?

7 A. No, no. No.

8 Q. [Microphone not activated] Let's just go through the

9 minutes, shall we? We see at paragraph 11 that it was decided

16:15:20 10 that Johnny Paul Koroma would look into the problem of Sam

11 Bockarie and Lieutenant Collins. And then we see from paragraph

12 12:

13 "Corporal Gborie joined the meeting and briefed members

14 about the trip to Abidjan. He explained about the initial

16:15:41 15 difficulties they encountered with the Nigerian Foreign Minister,

16 especially with the position he took on the deliberations. He

17 explained in detail how they went about things until there was a

18 change of mind by the Nigerian Foreign Minister and the delegates

19 in favour of the Sierra Leone delegation.

16:16:05 20 He, however, cautioned that we can only retain the success

21 we have made so far if we can maintain a very high standard of

22 discipline. He emphasised that any act of aggression against

23 civilians will not help us in the next ECOWAS meeting."

24 We see there again reference to "aggression against

16:16:30 25 civilians".

26 "In his contribution, the chairman urged members to take

27 note of Corporal Gborie's report, emphasised that the People's

28 Army had been doing extremely well. He reported having spoken to

29 the 1st Battalion on the same line and hoped to talk to the

1 People's Army and the Special Task Force very shortly."

2 Pause there. This trip to Abidjan, Mr Sesay, at whose
3 request had that trip been made?

4 A. Well, I think it was the AFRC chairman who asked for the
16:17:21 5 delegation to go to Abidjan.

6 Q. And who were members of that delegation, if you know?

7 A. Well, the first group comprised Collins, the late SYB
8 Rogers. They went with the AFRC members. They went with the
9 members.

16:17:49 10 Q. And why was Abidjan chosen as the place for them to go?

11 A. Well, the peace talks had taken place in Abidjan even
12 before the coup, so they thought that going to Abidjan, Abidjan
13 would have been able to facilitate to host the delegation and
14 recommend those meetings.

16:18:18 15 Q. Why had the delegation not been sent to Monrovia?

16 A. The AFRC and RUF did not have any business with Monrovia by
17 then, so how would they have sent a mission there?

18 Q. But help us. In May, June, July 1997, tell us, if you
19 know, what was going on in the neighbouring Liberia?

16:18:49 20 A. At this time - did you say what was going on in Liberia
21 between --

22 Q. Yes, please.

23 A. Please give me the question once more.

24 Q. At this time, in late May, June, July 1997, the months
16:19:14 25 immediately after the AFRC coup, what was going on politically in
26 neighbouring Liberia?

27 A. Well, during that time, I think they had now disarmed and
28 they were now running their campaigns to meet the general
29 elections in Liberia.

1 Q. At this time, late May, June, July 1997, what was Charles
2 Taylor's role, if you know, in Liberia?

3 A. Well, according to the news we heard from Liberia at that
4 time, they said all the warring factions had disarmed, so
16:20:08 5 everybody had formed their own political parties, like Mr Taylor,
6 Alhaji Kromah and others, so they conducted an election. That
7 was what we heard. That was what I heard.

8 Q. And let's just jump forward to come back in this document
9 to pursue this topic. Go to paragraph 18 on the fourth page,
16:20:33 10 please. Let's start, in fact, at paragraph 17:

11 "Following the difficulties that came along with the
12 political impasse, an initiative was taken to send a team down to
13 Kono to do some mining. By all indications, the team was not
14 believed to have worked well and therefore the Chief Secretary of
16:21:08 15 State was mandated to go to the spot check and stop all mining
16 operations.

17 He was able to come with the following: One piece of
18 diamond weighing 14 carats and two assortments of small diamonds
19 weighing 19 and 31 carats respectively."

20 Then this:

21 "The chairman reminded members that with the mineral
22 resources we have in this country, there should be no need to
23 rely on funding from external agencies."

24 Which external agencies were they, Mr Sesay?

16:22:07 25 A. External agencies.

26 Q. Did that include Liberia?

27 A. Liberia is external; it's not Sierra Leone. But at this
28 time I did not know about any assistance that came from Liberia
29 to the AFRC, nor the RUF.

1 Q. In contrast, let's go over the page to paragraph 19.

2 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, your Honour, before we move on,
3 the question has still not been answered, when counsel asked the
4 witness what external agencies were being referred to in that
16:22:48 5 document.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, do you know the answer to that
7 question, or not?

8 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know an answer for this,
9 because I did not know about any assistance from Burkina Faso
16:23:14 10 through Ibrahim Bah. That was all I know about. That was what I
11 knew about in terms of arms and ammunition, because in terms of
12 food, the Lebanese who did the shipment of the rice, they were
13 based in Freetown, the Kasim and the other people. But besides
14 those people, I did not know about any other external assistance.

16:23:38 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. Please proceed.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. So you knew of assistance from Burkina Faso and through
18 Lebanese businessmen; is that right?

19 A. No, that is not what I'm saying. I said the shipment of
16:23:54 20 arms and ammunition that came from Burkina Faso, that came with
21 Ibrahim Bah to that airport, and the shipment of rice that the
22 Lebanese people did, but the Lebanese people themselves were
23 based in Freetown, those who were responsible for the shipment of
24 the rice. Those are the only two external assistance that I saw
16:24:17 25 during the AFRC.

26 Q. Thank you. Let's go to paragraph 19:

27 "The chairman further went on to note that there have been
28 indications about secret deals between Tejan Kabbah and General
29 Sani Abacha which are being investigated.

1 It was decided that the diamonds would be sold as time goes
2 on to provide salaries for government workers.

3 It was decided that council members would be informed the
4 sooner any information about the deal between Tejan Kabbah and
16:24:56 5 General Abacha is confirmed."

6 And then we look now at item number 6, "Any other
7 business". Let's look at (ii):

8 "On the issue of indiscriminate shooting, he asked all
9 principal liaison officers and honourable members to try and work
16:25:42 10 out a programme that would support the Western Area security
11 patrol. He went on to emphasise that the May 25 revolution
12 cannot be justified by mere political rhetorics and that only
13 practical result orientated programmes would be the answer. In
14 his contribution, Colonel Isaac reported about the problem of
16:26:09 15 recognition between the People's Army and other servicemen."

16 Who is that Colonel Isaac?

17 A. Isaac Mongor. Isaac Mongor was the Colonel Isaac, because
18 he was the - he was the anti-looting squad commander that was
19 appointed by Johnny Paul.

16:26:34 20 Q. Now, we see it continues:

21 "He emphasised that it is awkward to see the People's Army
22 on one side and the armed forces personnel getting a
23 confrontation in public."

24 What is that about?

16:26:52 25 A. Well, he was talking about misunderstandings that were
26 taking place between the AFRC and the RUF personnel. Because
27 there was not that common teamwork and understanding, we had
28 frequent misunderstandings.

29 Q. So that as early as July 1997 there were differences

1 between the RUF and the AFRC, were there?

2 A. Yes, yes.

3 Q. [Microphone not activated]

4 A. [Overlapping speakers]

16:27:36 5 Q. Over to the final page:

6 "In his contribution, Lieutenant Collins drew the attention
7 of the council to the importance of meeting the people. He
8 emphasised that the arms belong to the people and that arms are
9 also used to protect the people. The people must therefore be
10 embraced to avoid hostilities. If the AFRC is to claim to have
11 brought changes, the minds of council members must be liberated
12 first to get God's wisdom. He further intimated that the
13 Ministry of Information must come up with programmes that will
14 reflect our rich cultural heritage."

16:28:16 15 And we see that this is - we also see at (ii) he also
16 highlighted the need to come up with active agricultural
17 projects. And we see that the document appears to be signed by
18 AK Sesay, and if we go back to the front page we see that Colonel
19 AK Sesay's name appears at number 26 as the Secretary-General.

16:28:49 20 Now, Mr Sesay, finally before I seek the adjournment, does
21 this document accurately reflect the meeting you attended, that
22 first meeting of the AFRC on Saturday, 19 July?

23 A. Yes. Yes.

24 Q. Thank you very much.

16:29:12 25 A. Everything that is written there.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,
27 your Honour.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, indeed Mr Griffiths, thank you.

29 Mr Witness, we're going to adjourn today's proceedings

1 until tomorrow. I caution you, as I usually do, that you are not
2 to discuss your evidence with anyone. The proceedings are
3 adjourned to tomorrow at 9 o'clock.

4 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
5 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 7 July 2010 at
6 9.00 a.m.]

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DCT-172	43706
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	43706