



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 7 SEPTEMBER 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Monday, 7 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:25:10 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances
6 first, please.

7 MS. HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. Today for the prosecution Brenda J Hollis,
9 Christopher Santora and Maja Dimitrova, the case manager.

09:31:21 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
12 counsel opposite. For the defence today myself Courtenay
13 Griffiths, assisted by my learned friend Mr Morris Anyah, and we
14 are joined by Mr Issac Ip and Haydee Dijkstal, both of whom have
09:31:38 15 been with us before, who are interns in our office.

16 Mr President, before I sit down, can I thank the Court for
17 the indulgence of allowing me a few extra days to recover. I am
18 not feeling perfect, but I am lot better than I was last week and
19 I thank everyone for all the messages of goodwill.

09:31:54 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Well, that's noted, Mr Griffiths,
21 and it's good to see you back on deck again.

22 Mr Taylor, you are going to be asked some further
23 questions. I will remind you that you are still bound by your
24 declaration to tell the truth.

09:32:12 25 Yes, please, Mr Griffiths.

26 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

27 [On former affirmation]

28 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

29 Q. Mr Taylor, last week before we adjourned we had begun to

1 Look at an edition of the New African magazine which included an
2 interview with you; do you recall that?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Unfortunately, through some error on our
09:32:37 5 part, the document had not been photocopied properly. Now, can I
6 invite your Honours, please - you should have a new copy of the
7 document. Now, before it goes AWOL can I ask, please, that it be
8 placed behind divider 125 in bundle 3 of 4 for week 33 and can I
9 ask, please, that the current document behind that divider be
09:33:25 10 discarded.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We have gone that, yes. We have
12 done that, Mr Griffiths.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, as we see, this an edition of the New
09:34:04 15 African magazine - "Liberia Special Report" it is headed - for
16 July-August of the year 2002, do you see that?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Now, we see that below a photograph of yourself is the
19 caption, "World Exclusive - Charles Taylor: Powerful countries
09:34:27 20 want me out". Yes?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Now, let's turn over the page, please, and whilst we are
23 turning, do you recall giving this interview, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Oh, yes, I do.

09:34:43 25 Q. And, Mr Taylor, whilst we - before we delve into the
26 document, help us, was there any particular reason for you giving
27 this interview?

28 A. Yes. By this time there were tremendous pressures coming
29 and we had a war approaching Monrovia. There were a lot of

1 difficulties at this time.

2 Q. And how did you think - or did you think that the giving of
3 this interview would assist you?

4 A. In most cases dealing with a political environment, when
09:35:30 5 you get the information out and for the other side to know that
6 you are aware of their moves and machinations, I guess under some
7 conditions they either slow down, quit, or even intensify. But
8 we figured that by getting the information out, it would have
9 alerted them that we knew exactly what they were trying to do and
09:36:00 10 to keep our people informed.

11 Q. Okay. Now, when we come then to page 2 of the report, we
12 see that it reads as follows:

13 "Liberia's President, Charles Taylor, is sure that 'some
14 powerful countries' are out to get him. But he does not want to
09:36:25 15 name them, 'because they punish you the more if you do'. Yet the
16 names are all over in the streets of Liberia - 'USA and Britain',
17 once freelance photographer told me, letting the names roll off
18 his tongue like sweet apple.

19 Britain, after sorting out neighbouring Sierra Leone, its
09:36:48 20 former colony, is said to be changing its policy on Liberia for
21 the better. 'But Washington is implacable', said one
22 well-connected British expatriate in Monrovia."

23 Now, can we pause there, Mr Taylor. That passage appears
24 to suggest that with the successful conclusion of the conflict in
09:37:08 25 Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom were minded to change their
26 attitudes towards Liberia, but the United States wasn't. Was
27 that a perception you had?

28 A. Yes. Based on our own analysis from our intelligence
29 people and diplomats, it appeared that - and I am saying it

1 appeared - that Britain was convinced that we had done all that
2 we could have in the Sierra Leone crisis and had given it our
3 sincere help; but that on the other side our old American friends
4 were not convinced, and this was just based on our own analysis.

09:37:54 5 Q. "Apart from the direct covert activities against Liberia,
6 including arming and funding a rebel war against Taylor, these
7 'powerful countries' are also known to have used the United
8 Nations Security Council to impose punitive sanctions on Liberia,
9 including an arms embargo, even as the country is under attack by
09:38:18 10 rebels supported by Guinea which, Taylor says, is 'under pressure
11 by the powerful countries to continue supporting the rebels'."

12 Did you believe that?

13 A. Well, yes. And to clarify something for the Court, the
14 arms embargo were not imposed during my administration. I think
09:38:39 15 the arms embargo were imposed under, I think, Security Council
16 resolution 788 back in 1992 that had never been removed. It was
17 just continuous.

18 Q. "Calling themselves Liberian United for Reconciliation and
19 Democracy (LURD) their leader Sekou Konneh is married to the
09:39:01 20 adopted daughter of President Lansana Conte, who has gladly given
21 the rebels operating bases in his country, Guinea."

22 Was Sekou Konneh married to Lansana Conte's adopted
23 daughter?

24 A. Yes, he was.

09:39:20 25 Q. "The objective of the old effort appears to be to get
26 Taylor's government sucked into the debilitating rebel war, lose
27 focus, put whatever money it gets into the war and general
28 security and leave the people who voted Taylor into office with a
29 thumping 75 per cent of the vote in 1997 hungry and uncared for;

1 and so make the government unpopular with the people and
2 eventually turn against it. Fortunately for Taylor, that has not
3 happened yet, but who knows - the way the people are suffering,
4 anything is possible.

09:39:59 5 European expatriates working in Liberia agree that there
6 was great optimism after Taylor's election in mid 1997.
7 Businesses started to open, some investment trickled in, but
8 since last year when the UN imposed the punitive sanctions on
9 Liberia for 'supporting the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone and
09:40:21 10 handling blood diamonds on their behalf', everything has gone to
11 pot. The businesses that opened after 1997 have closed and there
12 is great suffering in the country.

13 Our editor, Baffour Ankomah, is just back from Liberia and
14 confirms the great human suffering in the country.

09:40:47 15 The UN sanctions and the blocking on finance and assistance
16 have hit the ordinary people hard, much more than the intended
17 target; the government and its ministers. The problem has been
18 compounded by the rebel war which is now in its fourth year.
19 President Taylor firmly believes the war is the work of the
09:41:08 20 powerful countries he would not name. Interestingly, the rebels
21 first struck in August 1999, three weeks after the United Nations
22 had supervised the demobilisation of Taylor's former NPFL
23 fighters and the public burning of their guns.

24 Now the war is three years old and still going strong.
09:41:31 25 Sadly, it has led to severe dislocation of people and the economy
26 in the affected areas, mainly along the borders with Sierra Leone
27 and Guinea. The conditions in which they live in the refugee
28 camps at Sinje and elsewhere are just a disgrace to the world.

29 Ironically, the United Nations agencies and other NGOs

1 operating in Liberia, perhaps forgetting that the UN has placed
2 an arms embargo on Liberia, have been pressuring the government
3 to provide them with security in the war affected areas so they
4 can continue with their humanitarian work. "

09:42:11 5 Is that true?

6 A. That is true.

7 Q. And were you able to provide such security?

8 A. A little, but not at the level that we could have and it
9 was - we had to stop them from going into certain areas because
10 guerilla warfare, you never know where the guerillas are and so
11 we could not provide the level that we wanted to.

09:42:27 12 Q. "But in the current Liberian situation nobody can provide
13 security without arms and the United Nations has banned Liberia
14 from buying arms. A nation does not die, but Liberia is dying a
09:42:50 15 slow death as a result of the United Nations sanctions, the
16 convert activities of the powerful countries, the rebel war, the
17 blocking of the country's access to international finance and
18 assistance, the lack of foreign and domestic investment and
19 America's dislike of the man at the head of the country.

09:43:11 20 Everywhere you look, there is a decay. Monrovia, once a
21 spritely capital city, is decaying at an alarming rate. "

22 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

23 A. That's very, very true, yes.

24 Q. "Unless the powerful countries stoking the flames are named
09:43:29 25 and shamed or made to stop their disturbing activities (and who
26 will bell the cat?) it will be more of the same for Liberia and
27 its long suffering people. It is absolutely incredible that a
28 nation that will be 155 years old as an independent sovereign
29 state this July has very little to show for it.

1 On 20 June, President Taylor talked extensively with
2 Baffour Ankomah about some of these issues. Here is the full
3 text of the interview.

09:44:08 4 Q. 1997 was the election year in Liberia and you won with
5 more than a landslide, in fact 75 per cent of the vote. It
6 is now five years since that victory. How has life been at
7 the top as the democratically elected President?

8 A. Life at the top has been very tough. It's been very
9 tough because of several reasons. First of all, I want to
09:44:30 10 praise God; the Liberian people have been very good.
11 They've been very understanding.

12 But when I say it has not been very good at the top, coming
13 out of seven years of civil crisis where there were some
14 20,000 to 30,000 deaths, winning in fact more than 75
09:44:51 15 per cent of the vote, we have not got any assistance from
16 the international community in stabilising the country.
17 This has been most unfortunate and has caused a lot of
18 additional pain and suffering for the Liberian people.

19 Q. In 1992, almost 10 years to the day when I first
09:45:14 20 interviewed you in Gbarnga, you had brought in experts from
21 Africa, Europe, America and elsewhere to look at Liberia's
22 educational system, the health system, agriculture, mining,
23 the infrastructure, investment climate, et cetera, in
24 preparation for the day when you eventually became
09:45:38 25 President. But five years into office, Monrovia, the
26 capital city, is still without running water and
27 electricity. In fact, the city is decaying, and a good
28 section of your people (not counting political opponents
29 and critics) say the President hasn't delivered. But this

1 is the same man who run 'Greater Liberia' and delivered, as
2 I saw it in 1992. What is going on? What is there to show
3 for the last five years?

4 A. Why haven't I delivered?

09:46:17

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. I will tell you. I have not delivered, yes, and I have
7 told the Liberian people that I have not delivered and I
8 have explained to them. Look any nation, in fact, all
9 nations coming out of civil crisis, whether we go to as far
10 back as World War II where Germany was rebuilt, Japan was
11 rebuilt, you need assistance.

09:46:34

12 Liberia started off on a very terrible, terrible note. In
13 the first instance, there was great opposition from some
14 powerful countries to my being elected as President.

09:46:53

15 Following my election, there were predictions that the
16 government would not last for six months, and then it would
17 not last for 12 months. And, in fact, on the famous CNN
18 programme 'Diplomatic Licence', experts predicted that I
19 would have been gone. As a result, everything has been
20 done to stop this government from moving.

09:47:16

21 I will give you an example. Talking about water. When I
22 took office I met no money in the coffers. My initial
23 budget was US \$12 million. That was the sum total of
24 maritime resources coming into the country. We started
25 building, but water projects are capital intensive
26 projects. Electricity projects are capital intensive
27 projects.

09:47:38

28 This nation from its inception to date has never been able
29 to fund electricity or water projects. The United States

1 under USAID and the Japanese foreign assistance programme
2 all funded electricity and water projects in this country.
3 A hydroelectric dam was built, it was destroyed during the
4 war, we've done feasible studies, it's going to cost about
09:48:16 5 US \$50 million to get it back going.

6 Let's look at capacity building after the war. Capacity
7 building as far as retraining of our armed forces to help
8 us to restructure our economy, getting it back on track, I
9 mean, no nation, no individual is going to invest in
09:48:36 10 Liberia unless he is assured there is security.

11 We have not had our army retrained, we have had not our
12 security retrained, but every pressure that you can think
13 of, through World Bank programmes, through IMF programmes,
14 have all been applied. So it is impossible to deliver.

09:48:57 15 Next month, July, will be three years since we have been
16 engulfed in a renewed state of crisis, where terrorists
17 continue to attack us from neighbouring countries, fully
18 financed and equipped by powerful states.

19 I'm using 'powerful states' here because I don't want to
09:49:18 20 get into calling of names because each time you present
21 them face to face with the facts they punish you even the
22 more. So little countries are frightened, even when they
23 do wrong to you. You are frightened to talk about their
24 wrongs.

09:49:37 25 Q. That's not right, is it?

26 A. It's not. But that's the reality of the world now.
27 It's like when powerful nations begin to plan propaganda,
28 lies and disinformation about you, every other little
29 country begins to scramble for cover because you become a

1 target. And so you are left out there hard and dry to
2 suffer. It is very terrible, even against the point where
3 the United Nations, that you hope you could go to for
4 mediation and solace, becomes your whipping rod.

09:50:12 5 For example, this rebel war has led us not to deliver to
6 our people, yet we've been punished. In the first
7 instance, there was an embargo placed upon us, sanctions
8 placed upon us, our officials have been barred from
9 travelling to even present our case. Thanks to you, you
09:50:33 10 are here today. Our officials can't even travel to present
11 our case.

12 The country has a national budget of less than US \$90
13 million, how do you deliver? There has been a conspiracy
14 out there to destroy this country and our people. And we
09:50:53 15 don't know why.

16 So, yes, we have not delivered. We've told our people we
17 are capable of delivering, we want to deliver, but our
18 hands are tied, our feet are tied, and the propaganda
19 machine of these powerful countries are just overwhelming
09:51:12 20 for us."

21 Now, let's pause again, Mr Taylor. The tail of economic
22 woe which you relate there, Mr Taylor, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now I ask because it might be suggested to you, is it the
09:51:29 25 case that because you were running in effect a near bankrupt
26 country that you decided to supplement your income from elsewhere
27 like next door in Sierra Leone. Do you understand the point?

28 A. I understand. No, not at all. That was not the - no, no,
29 no, no. It had nothing to do with that. We had - we have

1 resources in Liberia. We were trying to point out what our own
2 problems were and we had the remedy for our problems. All we
3 needed was some assistance to get us going, get security in the
4 country that would encourage investment in the country and some
09:52:13 5 stability.

6 But if even one were to suggest such silly ideas, what
7 benefit would it be even going to another country when you still
8 don't have the stability in your country to even move the
9 resources. So it would just be ludicrous for anyone to suggest
09:52:32 10 that you've got fire in your house, as if the fire is not
11 sufficient, you are going to go next door and get a torch and say
12 I'm bringing an additional torch. There's already fire in your
13 country, so it would be nonsensical for anyone to even suggest
14 that.

09:52:51 15 We were trying to present a picture here for people to
16 understand that we wanted to move. We had the technical know-how
17 in terms of manpower, we had done the studies, but we were just
18 targeted apparently and we - everything was done to stop us, so
19 this is what we were trying to get across, not because anyone
09:53:15 20 would in a silly way suggest that, "Oh well, you are doing all of
21 this because you need resources from next door." We had
22 everything that we needed.

23 Q. You appreciate, Mr Taylor, I need to ask you these
24 questions because they are relevant to any alleged motive. You
09:53:29 25 understand that, don't you?

26 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely.

27 Q. "Q. From what you've just said, do elections matter?
28 Right from 1992, everybody here and the international
29 community wanted Liberia to hold elections. And so

1 elections were finally held in 1997. My question is: Why
2 hold elections and ask the people to vote in leaders of
3 their choice if some rebels hiding in the forests of Guinea
4 can just come in and try to impose their will on the people
09:54:03 5 and country? And the international community that wanted
6 the elections in the first place, does not even condemn the
7 rebel attacks but rather punishes, as you say, the
8 legitimate government that came out of the elections?
9 A. I will tell you, this baffles anyone and everyone. But
09:54:25 10 that's not even the strongest question. Even if that were
11 to happen, I think the greatest travesty of justice is the
12 fact that we are told by the international community: 'We
13 are aware that terrorists are attacking you. We are aware
14 that thousands of people have been killed. We are aware
09:54:44 15 that more than a million of your people are displaced, but
16 we don't like you and so you may not defend yourself. And
17 so we go to the UN Security Council and we impose an arms
18 embargo and we deny you the right to self-defence even
19 under Article 51 of the UN charter.'
09:55:05 20 And who is there to talk about it? No one. Because the
21 most powerful countries are the ones that are perpetrating
22 the injustice against Liberia?
23 So we are left in a very, very terrible situation where,
24 except for continental organisations such as the OAU and
09:55:25 25 regional organisations such as the ECOWAS, you get no
26 diplomatic help. In fact, some of our member states are
27 scrambling for their own protection."
28 What do you mean by that, Mr Taylor?
29 A. Well, we - you know, people have to understand as the Court

1 listens - and I am sure I am here because it's going all over the
2 world. Look, the way we were confronted with the problems during
3 that period - and I am sure it exists all the time - countries
4 were threatened. People - you know, there's subtle threats:

09:56:08

5 Well, the Liberian situation, we want you to lay off it. We
6 don't want you to get involved. We know Liberia very well, and
7 we will suggest that, you know, there are some interests you
8 have, some loans you are expecting. We do not want members of
9 Congress or Members of Parliament to get involved against you, so
10 we suggest that you lay off the Liberian situation. So these
11 little countries are threatened.

09:56:34

12 Q. Who by?

13 A. Counsel, these big countries that gave the monies. The
14 United States would make these threats. I will tell you what
15 happened in my own case. If I remind the Court about the idea
16 that Britain had at the time that Nigeria wanted to dominate West
17 Africa and they were not going to permit Nigeria to establish
18 hegemony in Sierra Leone. I was told in very simple diplomatic
19 terms that it is not in Liberia's interest to support what we see
20 as Nigeria's move towards hegemony in West Africa, and especially
21 in Sierra Leone. And if Liberia continues to support these
22 actions on the part of the Nigeria in Sierra Leone, we do not
23 think that we will be able to convince Parliament to help Liberia
24 as we want to help. Now, isn't that a threat? You are told:

09:56:52

09:57:21

25 Reverse your course. So that's how it happens. No one comes and
26 tells you, "If you don't do this, we are going to bomb you."
27 They don't put it that way, but it's in clear diplomatic language
28 that you are understand. You either reverse course, or you just
29 don't get the needed aid and assistance. That is what I'm

09:57:48

1 talking about.

2 Q. Is the reality of the situation, Mr Taylor, that those
3 running for cover were running for cover because they perceived
4 that you posed a threat to them?

09:58:15 5 A. Well, pose a threat to them in a way by support. Through
6 their support that would pose a threat, but not in the reverse.
7 Okay? Let me tell you what I mean by that. Well, by supporting
8 me, it posed a threat. Not that I pose a threat to their
9 governments; they saw their support as a threat, okay, to their
09:58:40 10 own assistance.

11 Q. I am suggesting the opposite, Mr Taylor, which I would like
12 you to deal with.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. You posed a threat because you were perceived as being a
09:58:51 15 destabilising force in the region by some of your neighbours.
16 Was that the reality why people were running for cover?

17 A. No, no, no, not at all.

18 Q. You do understand the question, don't you?

19 A. I do understand the question. No. There was this original
09:59:07 20 perception - one that is trying to destabilise the region, you
21 don't get him involved at the level. West Africa is a very small
22 community and when you look at the 16 states, even there are men
23 amongst men in terms of there are some leaders that are more
24 visionaries. There are some leaders that remain internal to
09:59:36 25 their countries. There were a few of us that - I would say that
26 were something like visionaries and were involved in everything
27 by invitation, not because we were viewed as a destabilising
28 effect. If that were true, back in 1997 they would not have
29 asked for the embargo to be lifted; they would not have gotten me

1 involved in the Sierra Leonean crisis; help in the crisis in
2 Guinea-Bissau; help in the crisis in la Cote d'Ivoire; going -
3 getting involved with the France/Afrique summit on la Cote
4 d'Ivoire. No, I was being viewed as be an asset. But the whole
10:00:24 5 point I am trying to explain, in line with your question here, is
6 that because certain nations had identified what they wanted to
7 do, countries had to take a step back to protect their own
8 interests.

9 Q. Let's go back then, shall we. Column three, fourth
10:00:45 10 paragraph:

11 "That's what I call a roundabout way of overthrowing
12 governments. First we go in, we make you a demon, we cut
13 off all resources, we isolate you and your people are to
14 come on the streets. There is anarchy and overthrow you.
10:01:05 15 If that doesn't happen, we will continue to kill the people
16 of Liberia through a proxy rebel war using terrorists until
17 the people see it our way. Thank God the Liberian people
18 have not fallen for that yet. So are elections necessary?
19 That was your question. Yes, elections are necessary
10:01:30 20 because in the final analysis, the strength that I get, or
21 any other nation like Liberia will get, is when your people
22 can say, 'We did it. We voted in this man or woman, and we
23 stand by it.' There is no way for anyone to come from the
24 outside and say, 'Well, we are not sure that you are
10:01:55 25 responsible for electing this man.' Our people are saying,
26 'We did it' and I am sure that, God willing, they are
27 prepared to do it again.

28 Q. Still on the rebel war: Some people say, 'Yes, it
29 serves him right, he started it all, he is being paid in

1 his own coin'. What do you say?

2 A. Well, I'm not sure that we can fuss about that. I did
3 start a war, but it was a different kind of war. I started
4 an uprising here to liberate the Liberian people from the
10:02:30 5 Doe regime that was involved in many atrocities.

6 You know, there were a lot of people in exile. There were
7 a lot of killings. The United Nations compound was
8 violated. 300 children from Nimba were lost and buried
9 alive. There were a lot of atrocities. In fact, my father
10:02:53 10 was killed in the Lutheran Church massacre. That's the
11 difference.

12 The rebels now coming in from Guinea have no political
13 agenda. They have come in, they have raped women, they
14 have burned down towns and villages, they have pillaged the
10:03:12 15 Lofa County, they have hurdled people into buildings, they
16 have burned them alive. These are terrorists.

17 But if one argues that, 'Well, he is getting some of his
18 own medicine,' I say Doe had a level playing field. The
19 Doe government did not have an arms embargo placed upon it.

10:03:33 20 The Doe government did not have powerful nations supporting
21 an arms incursion against it.

22 Here, this government, my government, has powerful nations
23 working against it. We have proof of weapons seized from
24 those countries. We have illegal combatants in jail right
10:03:54 25 now who testified to their training, where they are coming
26 from, and then you put an arms embargo on us. There is not
27 a level playing field.

28 If you want me to, quote and unquote, taste some of my
29 medicine, create a level playing field. Let the government

1 of Liberia be given, under Article 51 of the United Nations
2 charter, the right to self-defence. Lift the arms embargo,
3 and this war will be over.

4 Q. In short, you are saying that Doe had made peaceful
10:04:32 5 change in Liberia impossible and you have not? And that
6 elections are scheduled for next year, and these people -
7 you call them terrorist, but they say they are rebels - who
8 claim to love 'reconciliation and democracy' should wait
9 for next year and come and stand for elections and be
10:04:54 10 elected as President or whatever?

11 A. Of course, of course. We've said, look, there is a
12 democratic process. In fact, there is a standing policy
13 in West Africa and in ECOWAS not to support any government
14 or any group that comes to remove a government by force of
10:05:11 15 arms.

16 I say to these people, the terrorists: 'What is the
17 rightful time? Elections are scheduled for next year, lay
18 down your arms, come to the ballot box. Let's pursue the
19 electoral process. That's the way to go.'

10:05:30 20 We have created all avenues here for peaceful discussions
21 in Liberia. There are no political prisoners in any jails
22 in this country. We have freedom of speech. We have
23 freedom of the press.

24 We do, however, have a state of emergency, but it is
10:05:49 25 because of the war, and that state of emergency is mandated
26 by the constitution of Liberia, that the President must act
27 in case of a threat against the nation or a state of war.
28 War exists, so we have to declare a state of emergency.
29 Apart from that, there is a clear environment here for

1 discussion, for reconciliation, and there is a
2 reconciliation conference coming up in July. We hope they
3 would come to that conference. Let's see if we can talk
4 about it. But not coming to the ballot box is not the
10:06:28 5 right way to go.

6 Q. Does it surprise you that, apart from the
7 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, no leader of
8 note (African or otherwise) or country (African or
9 otherwise, especially the supposedly democracy-loving west)
10:06:51 10 has condemned the rebel attacks that have gone on for
11 almost four years now?

12 A. Well, it does not. When the United States, the world's
13 only superpower, and its junior brother Great Britain,
14 refused to condemn what is going on in Liberia, when the
10:07:09 15 Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Blair, can come next door
16 to Sierra Leone - by the way, we applaud the peaceful
17 transition in Sierra Leone and we support the elected
18 government of President Kabbah - but when the
19 Prime Minister of Great Britain comes next door and talks
10:07:31 20 about promoting peace and democracy in West Africa, and
21 there is an ongoing war in Liberia where there are known
22 covert operations carried out by powerful countries - and I
23 am not going to get to their names - I tell you, one
24 wonders.

10:07:46 25 So you can see why little countries are all scrambling for
26 cover, because they do not want to get their hands dirty,
27 in getting their little assistance cut off, there are
28 threats against those countries.
29 And so, it is very difficult, and this is why it is

1 important for those nations - by the way, I must state here
2 that the Europe Union has been almost the lone ear in
3 listening and understanding and engaging the Government of
4 Liberia. So for the first time, the European Union states
10:08:26 5 are involved in direct engagement with Liberia, in
6 consultations on a wide range of issues, and we applaud
7 them for their efforts.

8 But the reason why no one is talking about Liberia is
9 because the world today is such a - since September 11 -
10:08:45 10 more dangerous world right now and every man has to fend
11 for himself, I guess. Every little country now must fend
12 for itself. That makes the world even more dangerous now
13 than during the Cold War."

14 Now, can we pause for a moment, Mr Taylor. We see on this
10:09:07 15 page a photograph, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Explain what's it a photograph of?

18 A. These are cans holding 81 millimetre mortar shells that we
19 seized from the rebels, and these were British shells.

10:09:27 20 Q. How do we know that?

21 A. Well, as I am looking at the picture here, I do not know
22 why they did not show - he speaks about it at the bottom, but it
23 was showing Her Majesty's government. You see "HMG", I guess
24 maybe since this magazine is published in Britain, I guess for
10:09:53 25 security reasons they did not show it, but it was shown to all
26 the press and he mentions it here, but I don't - he doesn't show
27 the markers, but these are British weapons that were not disputed
28 by the British ambassador nor any British diplomat.

29 Q. "That makes the world even more dangerous now than during

1 the Cold War.

2 Q. So then, where is democracy going? If I see my
3 brother's house on fire, but because I am afraid that this
4 big man over there will come and knock my head off, so I
10:10:30 5 won't help my brother put out the fire, then whether
6 democracy?

7 A. Democracy is relative right now in the world. It
8 is relative. If you look at some of the pronouncements
9 coming out of powerful nations right now, it is
10:10:47 10 frightening. It is frightening that you see not just
11 Liberia but other injustices and you dare not talk about
12 it. It is very frightening. I am not sure what a little
13 country like Liberia can do about it. We really cannot do
14 anything about it.

10:11:05 15 Until today, this date, no one has presented any factual
16 evidence of any of the allegations made against Liberia
17 about diamonds smuggled from Sierra Leone, about whatever.
18 Nobody has asked for proof. We said it, take it, that's
19 it. Liberia is punished.

10:11:29 20 We've gone through it all. Elections are held in
21 Sierra Leone, the Mano River Union countries are working
22 very well. President Kabbah and I are on the phone
23 talking."

24 Are you still on the phone talking to him at this time,

10:11:47 25 Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes, I am talking to him, yes.

27 Q. "I have met President Conte of Guinea. We will meet again
28 in Guinea in about a week. Everything is going on well in
29 the Mano River countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and

1 Gui nea.

2 But someone from outside says 'we are not happy'. But it
3 doesn't require any assistance from anyone. Right now,
4 it's a law of the jungle. Powerful nations are exerting
10:12:16 5 themselves nowadays in disturbing ways and, quite frankly,
6 there is nothing that I or any little country alone can do
7 about it. It's very sad.

8 Q. Let's look at something on the domestic front in your
9 ruling party. Is there an internal crisis?

10:12:35 10 A. No.

11 Q. But do you accept that there are some dead wood in the
12 party and the government that need to be purged, at least
13 to correct the impression that there is a culture of
14 impunity and mediocrity. The people of Liberia who voted
10:12:52 15 you into office expect to you do something about the dead
16 wood, don't they?

17 A. Oh, definitely, definitely. But I will tell you what
18 happened. If you listen to the crisis in the media,
19 really, there are more crises in the media than in the
10:13:07 20 party.

21 Look, the issue of corruption as raised by a senior member
22 of the party is a legitimate issue, something that must be
23 dealt with."

24 Pause there. So what were you doing to deal with it?

10:13:20 25 A. With the issue of corruption?

26 Q. Yes, please.

27 A. Well, it depends on what they were talking about at the
28 time. We had - we put together a commission on good governance
29 that would look at whatever allegations there were and try to do

1 it through the Courts. You know, we have this situation that
2 we've had in that entire West African region for a long time,
3 when, for example, Doe came to power, the then PRC government
4 passed a decree against what they say rumours, lies and
10:14:07 5 disinformation. A law was made against that in Liberia.

6 So you have a situation where people in that region just
7 get up and say things and you will be dismissing hundreds of
8 people every day of the week. So what we did at that particular
9 time was to say, "Well, look, if there is an accusation, instead
10:14:30 10 of making it political, let the Attorney-General do his work, let
11 the justices of the peace do their work. You have a case, there
12 is a case, take it to the courts. Let's not destroy somebody's
13 character on just rumours." And so we were investigating, but we
14 said we wanted to make it an issue of law and not of rumours.

10:14:56 15 Q. "But there are procedures in government in every society.
16 Every society has its own rules and here in the party and
17 government, there is a procedure for presenting any qualms
18 that one may have. And the party, knowing about this, laid
19 down the rules. And the partisans went against the party
10:15:19 20 rules.

21 We are going to look at the corruption, we are going to
22 investigate it. But when you have a situation where we are
23 in the middle of a war, the capital city is under siege at
24 a particular period, there are some very frightened people,
10:15:36 25 and then you come out in effect to say to the world
26 overthrow this government because it is corrupt, that is to
27 say the war is a result of, quote and unquote, a corrupt
28 government, which is not the case.

29 The war started some four years ago for, I would say,

1 unresolved problems of the last civil war 1989-1995. They
2 felt that they lost and the way to get back at this
3 government is to start a new crisis.

4 The rules were broken by the party members. The executive
10:16:13 5 committee of the party removed them. The party is
6 together. Party elections are going to be held in about
7 two weeks and we would probably have a new chairman. And
8 there we move on.

9 Q. Liberia will be 155 years old as an independent country
10:16:35 10 on 26 July. But from what we see on the ground, there is
11 not much to show for it. Do you agree?

12 A. I fully agree. I fully agree.

13 Q. In another 155 years, if we were alive and sitting here
14 and talking about Liberia, would there be something to show
10:16:55 15 for the next 155 years?

16 A. Look, I will tell you. I have to be very frank with
17 this particular answer. Liberia finds itself in a unique
18 position on this planet. An NGO was organised in the
19 United States in the 1800s called the American Colonisation
10:17:19 20 Society. It was formed for two reasons: To bring freed
21 slaves from the United States back to someplace. Among
22 them were some illegitimate mulatto children. The kings,
23 JJ Roberts - JJ Roberts who later became the first
24 President of Liberia was Thomas Jefferson's son. Jefferson
10:17:42 25 was America's third President. All the top hierarchy of
26 the United States decided to send their illegitimate
27 children with African women slaves here.

28 But you can tell they didn't really care about these
29 children because from the time they came, they did nothing

1 for them. Liberia has been left to fend for itself since
2 then. And this NGO, one would wonder, it was not under the
3 real auspices of the United States government at the time.
4 They shied away from the project and placed it in the hands
10:18:20 5 of an NGO.

6 We declared ourselves a free sovereign independent state in
7 1847. It took the United States more than ten years to
8 recognise us. It demonstrated that they really didn't give
9 a damn about what those illegitimate children were doing
10:18:40 10 here. But other countries did.

11 And we go through our history. There were a lot of things
12 going on in Africa at the time. You had slavery and the
13 colonial era. You had the British and the French. They
14 had carved out West Africa and later, as a response to the
10:18:58 15 nationalist fervour, started a process of gradual
16 independence to the states.

17 And one interesting thing that happened in that period was
18 that the British remained engaged with their former
19 colonies. The French remained engaged with their former
10:19:15 20 colonies as well, up until today. Liberia was left alone
21 with no assistance from the United States. So we've had to
22 go scratch by scratch, day by day, to fend for ourselves.
23 You look at French investment in Francophone Africa,
24 massive, billions of dollars. I say to people I applaud
10:19:42 25 the Prime Minister of Great Britain. There have been a lot
26 of things that the British have done against Liberia, but
27 am I angry? No.

28 Because Tony Blair did for Sierra Leone what the British
29 were supposed to do. For a former colony, they did what

1 they were supposed to do and should even do more. One
2 would expect that the United States of America would do for
3 Liberia what the British are doing in Sierra Leone and what
4 the French are doing in Francophone Africa.

10:20:12 5 Q. But didn't the Americans do that in Liberia in the
6 past, particularly under Doe's government?

7 A. What did they do? Let's look at that. Nothing.

8 Q. They gave Liberia in those days a lot of money, didn't
9 they, and they even sent in experts to oversee how that
10:20:32 10 money was spent?

11 A. Let's look at American investment in Liberia in the
12 past 150 years. None. Let's look at it.

13 Roberts International Airport was constructed during World
14 War II as a military base for the allied forces. The

10:20:51 15 Freeport of Monrovia was built to export, and in fact
16 during that time Malaysia had been captured, the allied
17 forces needed rubber to support their operations during the
18 war, so Robertsfield was built. The Freeport was built to
19 export rubber. Firestone was here and rubber started
10:21:14 20 leaving this country.

21 Since Firestone came to this country in 1926, not even
22 rubber bands have been manufactured here. Firestone
23 operations have never been to the advantage of the Liberian
24 people. And when leaders like Charles Taylor come and talk
10:21:35 25 about it, we become pariahs right away.

26 Let's look at it, there is not one major highway in this
27 country constructed by anybody, with the exception of the
28 Ibrahim Babangida Highway constructed by Nigeria. God
29 bless the people of Nigeria. So I'm trying to say that

1 this special relationship between Liberia and America, for
2 me, I want to redefine. I want to look at it and I want
3 to engage the people because there is something wrong
4 here."

10:22:16 5 Mr Taylor, can I pause for a moment, please.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Many of the sentiments you are here expressing about the
8 United States seem tinged with a great deal of bitterness, do you
9 agree?

10:22:34 10 A. I am not - no, I would not say bitterness; I would say
11 frankness. I would say frankness. Because if we look at the
12 history of Liberia, I was the first President of the Republic of
13 Liberia to have received a university degree or better. I
14 studied in the United States. No other President of Liberia had
10:23:06 15 ever earned a university degree before me. I studied in the
16 United States. I also had - or still have American background,
17 and when you look at the whole relationship between the
18 United States and Liberia, it's been one where no one - and I
19 gave it to some of my predecessors - no one had been able to
10:23:35 20 articulate the issues, and the issues were very fundamental.
21 What were they.

22 We talked about the history going back to the whole slave
23 movement and the American Colonisation Society that I call the
24 first real NGO - that's what it was - the problem in the
10:23:57 25 United States, the emancipation, slaves were freed, and they
26 wanted to find a place for these slaves to come to West Africa.
27 They found this NGO, they came, illegitimate children, first into
28 Sierra Leone, and on to Liberia from Shebro into Providence
29 Island. They come to Liberia, they are so upset that they have

1 left their parents, they decide to declare themselves a free,
2 sovereign and independent state.

3 Fifteen years later the United States recognised Liberia,
4 Britain being the first, followed by Brazil and other countries.

10:24:40 5 Now, we go through this entire period. Liberia continues to
6 exist. Very, very, very meagre assistance. Firestone, that I
7 talked about in this interview, comes to Liberia in 1926. What
8 do they do? They have a million - one million acres of land is
9 given to them to plant rubber. They have planted some 350,000
10:25:09 10 acres of land in rubber. Since 1926 up until today, I simplified
11 it by saying not even a rubber band is produced in Liberia.

12 There is no value added to rubber in Liberia. Nothing. Not even
13 an eraser for a pencil. Not even that. The rubber is tapped,
14 the lay tax is loaded and transported to Akron, Ohio. So when
10:25:43 15 you look at all of these things, and being used to this over the
16 past 150 some years, someone coming in now and raising these
17 issues, we are not - look, I never advocated throwing America out
18 or what. Liberia - no President of Liberia can exist without
19 support of the United States. But I believed - and still believe
10:26:08 20 - that it's time that we sat and looked very seriously at this
21 relationship, which I think America is capable of being a better
22 friend.

23 We talk about Francophone investment. At the time I was
24 President, France had invested some \$5 billion in la Cote
10:26:26 25 d'Ivoire alone, not talking about Senegal and the other
26 Francophone countries. Britain went full force into
27 Sierra Leone. When I met Herman Cohen in the bush and told
28 Herman Cohen, "If one US Marine stood in the centre of Liberia
29 and says 'Cease fire', we would." They lost all the

1 opportunities to bring peace to Liberia. Well, you hate
2 Charles Taylor so much, well, why not help the country? So I'm
3 not - it is not a matter of vengeance or anger. It's a matter
4 where - because of the change in times that they had for the
10:27:01 5 first time - and I think they were shocked - someone that
6 understood the issues and were prepared to articulate them.

7 I come to office and there are times that really - during
8 my presidency that I said no to America, something that they had
9 never experienced before. When we sat on the Human Rights
10:27:21 10 Commission I said no. There were other things they wanted to do
11 I said no. I started calling for redefining our relationship in
12 a way that we were not just seen as some old plantation back here
13 in Africa. So it is not out of anger at all. It is just trying
14 to articulate the issues that I felt was proper.

10:27:40 15 Q. Let me tell you what prompted the question, Mr Taylor.
16 We've looked now at a number of letters penned by you to various
17 Presidents of the United States, and one recurring phrase is
18 "Given the historical loving ties between our two countries", you
19 know the phrase I am talking about, don't you?

10:28:03 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Now, there appears to be a disjuncture between the
22 continual use of that phrase and the kind of sentiments that you
23 are using here. That's why I am asking; do you follow me?

24 A. I do. Not loving. Not loving. I talk about the
10:28:17 25 historical ties. There are historical ties. There still remains
26 historical ties. You send these free slaves. That's how Liberia
27 started, okay? You stood there, you pull us into the League of
28 Nations, you pull us into United Nations. We've always carried
29 your bag on some of these international issues. When you had

1 certain operations in Africa, we were always there. So it's not
2 always been sweet, but it's historical and I would stick more to
3 historical than the sweetness of it. There's been a bittersweet
4 relationship, but I just felt that no one had properly raised the
10:28:55 5 issue with them as forcefully as I intended to - and did.

6 Q. Very well:

7 "So I'm trying to say that this special relationship
8 between Liberia and America for me, I want to redefine it.
9 I want to look at it and I want to engage the people,
10:29:13 10 because there is something wrong here.

11 We have to scramble tooth and nail. The hydro project
12 built for us in the 1960s under the American Assistance
13 Programme, we had to pay for it eventually.
14 The Freeport of Monrovia, eventually, we had to pay for it.

10:29:35 15 So what's the special relationship?

16 The largest amount of American assistance to Liberia came
17 during the Doe government - \$500 million during that
18 particular period. If you look at it, it was mostly in
19 military assistance. We have not had any major long-term
10:29:55 20 investment.

21 Let's look at Lamco, the iron ore company. It was put up
22 there in Bomi Hills. And what do we have now over there?
23 A big hole in the ground. The iron ore was depleted. In
24 fact, over the last 10 or more years, there has been not
10:30:18 25 one singular US investment in Liberia. Firestone is now
26 Japanese owned.

27 So what I want to do - and it goes back to your question
28 about what to expect in the next 155 years. In the past
29 155 years we have had toiling and sweating of the Liberian

1 people. We have not been able to sit down and engage in a
2 long-term constructive economic programme. It's been an
3 assistance here with strings attached from here to the
4 North Pole.

10:30:55 5 Liberia has natural resources. People now have to come in
6 to invest in the country long term. Don't come and dig the
7 iron ore and take it out. You dig the iron ore, you must
8 smelt it here and you must produce steel rods here. That's
9 long-term economic development for our country. It has not
10:31:17 10 happened in the past 155 years.

11 And so if things continue, and I, and maybe other
12 Presidents after me, cannot get some of our friends to look
13 at real investment in Liberia, 155 years from now things
14 will be the same, because Liberia has been left on a little
10:31:38 15 island to fend for itself. And this is the reason why
16 there is no development.

17 Q. Let me take you back to the rebel war, because it is
18 something really disturbing the peace of the people and the
19 security of the country. If you are asked to sum up the
10:31:57 20 rebels' grievances, what would you say?

21 A. To be frank, I don't even know what the grievance is.
22 Some of the people supporting them - Ellen Johnson Sir-Leaf
23 comes backwards and forwards here."

24 Pause there. Are you suggesting that she was supporting
10:32:18 25 the rebels, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Oh, yes, Ellen was supporting LURD, yes.

27 Q. "... Alhaji Kromah has not come. He was in the last
28 election and lost immeasurably. Some of the other people,
29 I don't know what the grievances are.

1 We don't have political prisoners here. We have freedom of
2 speech. There are 17 political parties in this country.
3 No political leader is under arrest. Hope I knew their
4 grievances. I don't know, but we invite them, if they have
10:32:51 5 any grievances, to come here in July to the National
6 Reconciliation Conference. No matter who you are, once you
7 learn to use this airport or any border to enter this
8 country peacefully for this conference, you will not be
9 arrested, you will not be harassed, you will not be
10:33:11 10 intimidated. It's about reconciliation. It's not about
11 elections next year.

12 And I said something earlier. Let me tell you again. I
13 said elections are scheduled for next year. But the
14 scheduling of those elections are based strictly on
10:33:27 15 Liberian law, and whether they are held or not held will
16 depend on Liberian law. And so I hope they will take
17 advantage of the reconciliation conference and come, and
18 let's prepare.

19 Q. You guarantee their safety?

10:33:46 20 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely. We guarantee their
21 safety. We are inviting other African leaders to be
22 present here. President Obasanjo and others, we are
23 inviting them here. We want to give them full assurance.
24 I have said before, if Ellen Johnson Sir-Leaf can come to
10:34:07 25 Liberia, anybody else can. We guarantee their safety.
26 This is their country. They come here as Liberians, not as
27 LURD or any other guerrilla group, and we want to talk to
28 them.

29 Q. There is something that fair-minded people in this

1 country and abroad do not understand. You and your
2 government received UN punitive sanctions for, according to
3 the United Nations, supporting the RUF rebels in
4 Sierra Leone. Guinea supports the LURD rebels attacking
10:34:41 5 Liberia, and Guinea gets no sanctions, not even a slap on
6 the wrist.

7 A. (Laughs) Nothing. There is nothing.

8 Q. Why?

9 A. Because powerful countries are involved. My Ministry
10:34:56 10 of Information has just told me that when your master is
11 your enemy, you are doomed. That's why I am saying the
12 world is more dangerous now than during the Cold War. It
13 is more dangerous because if you look at the whole issue
14 of equilibrium, that balance does not exist in the global
10:35:15 15 community right now. It's both good and bad.

16 Let's face it. I know I am going to get hammered for this,
17 but it's the truth. If we believe, we must always strike a
18 balance. If we look at democracy, the strength of
19 democracy is what? The issue of balance. Why is the
10:35:37 20 United States strong? You have you have the
21 executive, Congress and the Courts - three branches of
22 government equal and strong.

23 Now, if that is true in support of democracy, why is it not
24 true for there to be an international balance of states?

10:35:54 25 If that international balance of states does not exist,
26 then democracy - the whole concept of democracy becomes
27 relative.

28 Whether we are talking about the United Nations, or whether
29 we are talking about the United States being the only

1 superpower, there is some good about it, but there is also
2 some bad about it. Because the United States then have a
3 free way to exert its will at any time anywhere.

4 This is not in criticism of the United States. But I look
10:36:30 5 at, again, the general concept of democracy and balance.

6 If that balance is responsible for the stability and
7 greatness of the United States internally, it must be true
8 globally, or that imbalance is the root of all crises
9 throughout the world.

10:36:53 10 Q. You met with President Kabbah and Conte in Morocco
11 recently. Are you on speaking terms? Do you have regular
12 contacts?

13 A. Yes. I have called President Conte. We have spoken.
14 I speak with President Kabbah frequently. And I understand
10:37:12 15 he made a speech in Europe recently in which he was very,
16 very kind to Liberia because he understands.

17 It is as if you go to the doctor. This is the irony of
18 what is going on. You go to the doctor and say, 'My head
19 is hurting me', and he says, 'No, it's not your head; it's
10:37:34 20 your stomach.'

21 West African countries are saying, 'We are at peace around
22 here. We are talking.' But the powerful countries say,
23 'No, you are not at peace; you have crises.'

24 So what does the patient do when he goes to the doctor and
10:37:52 25 complains about a headache and the doctor says, 'No, your
26 head is hurting.' Come on. I mean, it's crazy.

27 Q. So what does President Conte say are the reasons for
28 supporting the LURD rebels?

29 A. We decided in Morocco not to get into the intricacies

1 of this crisis. I don't envy President Conte. He is under
2 tremendous pressure from powerful states to continue
3 supporting the rebels for some reasons. But we have agreed
4 that we are going to keep our differences out of the
10:38:29 5 press. "

6 Pause. Why?

7 A. I was just in agreement that, look, we will try to - the
8 press will always misinterpret what we are doing. So let's work
9 together and if we are going to quarrel, let's not put it in the
10:38:44 10 press, and a lot of countries do that. And we agreed that we
11 would keep it out of the press and that if I had a difference
12 with him I would call him directly, and he will do the same thing
13 with me.

14 Q. What about naming and shaming?

10:38:57 15 A. Well, this is about the big countries. Naming and shaming
16 between --

17 Q. Not talking about naming and shaming President Conte?

18 A. No, but that's what I am saying. For us, we agreed that we
19 should not use this method, that we should remain in contact.
10:39:12 20 Because it is through contacts that a lot of the
21 misunderstandings could be corrected.

22 Q. "And I must say that I want to commend him. He has done
23 very well in recent weeks. He intercepted two shipments
24 of arms coming through Guinea to Liberia and informed
10:39:33 25 us about it. I think he means well?

26 But, like I said, the world now is such that sometimes if
27 you are not careful, they will make you turn against your
28 own mother or your own brother. I want to use this
29 occasion to commend President Conte. In spite of the

1 difficult times, I think he means very well and we've got
2 to move forward.

3 Q. There was a time in the past that President Conte
4 accused you and your government of supporting rebels
10:40:04 5 against him and his government. Was that right?

6 A. That was not true. And as a matter of fact, if you
7 were to ask President Conte now, he would tell you that,
8 that's all in the past.

9 You know, sometimes perception outside can be so, so
10:40:25 10 serious. And when you begin to deal with the powerful
11 organs of western propaganda, you know, I like the British
12 and I hope that I can get close to them. They are very
13 smart people.

14 Years ago, when we were not even thinking about it, the
10:40:42 15 British started the BBC. They knew that by building radio
16 and getting to the ears around the world they had some
17 control. Smart people. And for a long time they
18 outsmarted the Americans. Somehow the Americans realised
19 what was going and said, 'Oh my God, we've got to catch up
10:41:03 20 with this' and then came the CNN.

21 Now, by the time that you are lambasted on the CNN and the
22 BBC, you are already a demon. And then all their little
23 organs, their little covert arms begin to take over.

24 And they destroy you unless God first and your people are
10:41:23 25 there. Again I say it's frightening."

26 Are you suggesting there was some kind of media campaign
27 against you, Mr Taylor?

28 A. That's the basic - it's so clear, that's how it starts.
29 Little media here, they throw it all around. By the time they

1 are through with you, everybody has heard it so many times that
2 they just say, "Oh, it's got to be true." That's what they do.
3 It's a media - they start with the media, but it's a covert write
4 up. It's almost like a movie script that is written.

10:42:00 5 Q. Well, we will come back to movie scripts later:

6 "Q. Now there is peace in Sierra Leone, elections have
7 been held and the rebels there, the RUF that the United
8 Nations accused you of supporting have smoked the peace
9 pipe with the government. Britain has trained a new armed
10:42:22 10 forces for Sierra Leone, so why did the United Nations in
11 May renew the sanctions against Liberia, sanctions imposed
12 because they said you supported the RUF?

13 A. I think maybe Kofi Annan could answer this. But I
14 don't think he knows. I think the British and the

10:42:44 15 Americans would know because the sanctions resolution was
16 backed and written by Britain.

17 Frankly, I see the continuation of, quote and unquote, the
18 sanctions regime as a ploy by these powerful nations to
19 interfere in the democratic process of Liberia. I think
10:43:01 20 even the support for the LURD by powerful nations is an
21 attempt to keep this country engaged in crisis management
22 over an extended period of time, lose control, anarchy
23 enters and then they come to install their own government.

24 I see for the first time the United Nations and its
10:43:25 25 truthfulness are being used indirectly to perpetrate evil
26 against a member state because of personal reasons of other
27 member states. And again, we don't have an equal
28 opportunity to confront these allegations. It's very
29 difficult.

1 In recent times, Asia was very, very sharp at the
2 United Nations, a resolution was passed and Asia was able
3 to practically stop it. But Asia has some powerful
4 countries who have some powerful friends. A resolution was
10:44:04 5 passed against Liberia for no reason, even interfering with
6 in our internal affairs, in almost a violation of our
7 constitution where a resolution calls for the Government of
8 Liberia to make a somewhat financial report to the United
9 Nations Security Council of how we spend our money."

10:44:25 10 Q. I was going to ask you about that, the special UN
11 demand.

12 A. Now, that is a violation of our constitution. And I
13 think we must talk about that because we are a member state
14 of the United Nations. It's a complete violation of our
10:44:41 15 rights as a nation. The President of Liberia acts in line
16 with the mandate given him by the national legislature on
17 expenditure and we owe all explanations to the people of
18 Liberia.

19 When the Security Council of the United Nations tells a
10:44:59 20 government we want to know how you spend your money, it is
21 a violation of international regulations and a violation of
22 the united charter itself.

23 Q. Has it happened anywhere before?

24 A. Nowhere, nowhere.

10:45:16 25 Q. So why Liberia?

26 A. Because the most powerful nations of the world want to
27 destroy the government of President Charles Taylor. But we
28 are not saying to the world that we will not abide by that.
29 We have written to the United Nations to inform them that

1 we wish to engage the Secretary-General for some
2 clarification on the intent of the Security Council.
3 We want to cooperate with the Security Council, but we need
4 to know their intent. If we don't know the intent, we may
10:45:45 5 not know which direction to take. And I do not think it
6 was the intent of the Security Council to interfere in the
7 constitutional right of the Liberian nation. I do not
8 know. And I do not know who knows why expenditures in
9 Liberia, mandated by the national legislature, disturbs
10:46:06 10 international peace and security. I don't understand it.
11 And if there are things that you do not understand, you
12 have to question because the purpose of the
13 Security Council is to preserve international peace and
14 security.
10:46:20 15 If Liberia now, which is true, is not involved in any
16 external aggression against any state, if this legitimate
17 government is under an armed invasion and the
18 Security Council bars us from self-defence and now wants to
19 interfere in how we expend our money domestically, how we
10:46:41 20 build schools and hospitals, our question is how does this
21 affect international peace and security?
22 That question is now before them and we expect that there
23 will be some answers as we engage the Secretary-General on
24 the intent of the Security Council.
10:47:02 25 Q. You have mentioned powerful countries a lot in this
26 interview, but you don't want to name them. We've read
27 that the Americans are training the Guinean armed forces,
28 is right that?"
29 Which is followed by a sarcastic laugh.

1 "Q. Or are they training the LURD rebels in Guinea? Which
2 is which? Do you have information about this?"

3 Still laughing.

4 "A. Well, we have captured some people here who said they
10:47:35 5 were trained by the Americans. Now, I do agree with the
6 United States that they are training the Guinean army. I
7 have no reason to doubt what the American government said.
8 But it may be important for them to understand that some of
9 the people, in fact most of the people that they are
10:47:50 10 training are ending up in Liberia, and maybe they could put
11 in place some system that could prevent them from coming in
12 here after their training. This will help us.

13 Like I say, I take them for their word and I believe that
14 they may be doing it genuinely. But we have in our custody
10:48:14 15 several people that have been trained by them and I guess
16 maybe these are the bad ones that slipped out after
17 training.

18 Q. Is it just a coincidence that America is training the
19 Guinean armed forces at the time that Guinea is supporting
10:48:33 20 a rebel incursion against Liberia?

21 A. I will tell you this, you know, again one does not want
22 to question the authenticity of the American pronouncement.
23 What my interest would be, the Mano River Union countries
24 really need capacity building. The British have trained
10:48:52 25 the Sierra Leonean armed forces. The Americans are now
26 training the Guinean armed forces. I would hope that both
27 Britain and the United States and other countries would
28 help Liberia in training its armed forces so that you do
29 not create an imbalance in training.

1 I applaud them for what they are doing in those countries.
2 My concern is that they do that also here and not to
3 question their motives. Because, you know, we in this
4 business have to understand how people do things. I mean,
10:49:28 5 people engage in actions based on their interests. It may
6 be in the interests of the United States to train the
7 Guinean army. I hope it would become the interest of the
8 United States to do the same here, thus creating a balance.

9 Q. It has been said that Britain has been flying arms to
10:49:50 10 the LURD rebels, dropping them in Sierra Leone's parrot's
11 beak. Do you have any information about this?

12 A. We have. We missed a helicopter in Liberia, a white
13 helicopter, unmarked, not a United Nations helicopter. We
14 also have some marked arms whose serial numbers have been
10:50:13 15 traced back to Britain."

16 Now I want to pause and ask about that white helicopter,
17 Mr Taylor, in light of certain evidence this Court has heard.
18 When you say you missed a helicopter in Liberia, what are you
19 saying?

10:50:28 20 A. By "miss" we are talking about in terms of attack, not that
21 we lost. We missed the white helicopter. There was an unmarked
22 white helicopter, most white helicopters are UN helicopters.
23 This was unmarked. And parrot's beak, that's an area up at the
24 junction between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. It's called
10:50:53 25 parrot's beak. Arms were being off-loaded in that area and we
26 attacked it but we missed it.

27 Q. And you say it was a white painted helicopter?

28 A. A white painted helicopter, unmarked.

29 Q. Are you able to assist with the make of the helicopter?

1 A. Well, I don't - I can't help directly, but I would - it was
2 the size of the UN helicopters and the UN helicopters operating
3 in Liberia at that time were Mi-8s. So I would suppose it was an
4 Mi-8.

10:51:35 5 Q. "We have presented this case to Great Britain. But I just
6 want to ensure that the whole question here is not to
7 accuse Britain. Let's be frank, Britain did engage in a
8 lot of covert activities in Liberia and did arm the LURD.
9 But I want to believe they did it at that particular time
10:52:06 10 because they had a programme in Sierra Leone and I guess
11 Tony Blair had to make sure that what he said to
12 Parliament, that there were no failures in Sierra Leone."
13 Pause there. What are you suggesting there, Mr Taylor,
14 just so that we all understand?

10:52:27 15 A. Oh, I guess I am trying to be a diplomatic. Quite frankly,
16 that Tony Blair --

17 Q. Well, we are not here for diplomacy. We are here for the
18 truth, Mr Taylor. What are you saying?

19 A. No, you are asking me what I am saying here. I am being
10:52:42 20 diplomatic here where I am saying that, okay, Tony Blair promised
21 Parliament that he is going to make sure that Sierra Leone is
22 brought under control. He's assisting. We have the weapons.
23 And I guess this is just an ongoing process of the training and
24 arming of the Sierra Leonean armed forces that we've dealt with
10:53:03 25 with the British government, including the letter from the
26 ambassador - as a reminder to the Court, I am just dealing with
27 it here and saying, "Well, okay, maybe this is for the army but
28 it's slipping out." I am just trying to be good, hoping that
29 there can be some constructive results.

1 Q. "And I guess Tony Blair had to make sure that what he said
2 to Parliament, that there was no failures in Sierra Leone.
3 But I hope Britain now, and I have some indications that
4 British policy is shifting, their policy against the
10:53:34 5 covert war in Liberia is waning and I hope it's true.

6 Q. Is it correct to say that the Americans don't like you
7 personally and don't want you as President of
8 Liberia? 'Anybody but Taylor' seems to be the Washington
9 line. What have you done to deserve this?

10:53:55 10 A. Really nothing. I hope they change their minds
11 because, again, I think America is a great nation and there
12 are some great people in the United States and their
13 support for democracy and democratic values ought to lead
14 them away from that.

10:54:09 15 We had elections here in 1997, and those elections were one
16 of the freest, fairest and most transparent in the history
17 of West Africa. So I hope they see it that way.

18 I see myself as the leader now in West Africa who is
19 capable of understanding and dealing with almost any

10:54:31 20 country. My colleague Heads of State, I don't know what
21 they say privately, but publicly we get along very well?

22 I would want to - in fact, I am anxious to engage the
23 United States. You know I went to school there. Most of
24 the officials of my government are all United States

10:54:51 25 trained. If there is any time that the United States can
26 help in Liberia, it is now because we have the personnel
27 that understands their kind of language.

28 Now, it's understandable that there have been some
29 hard liners that have supported their friends in all

1 governments that had an anti-Taylor mentality. And most of
2 these new people coming in in Washington do not really know
3 me. They have never talked to me. They have never dealt
4 with me. All they have read are lies and disinformation
10:55:27 5 and I tell you, that database in Washington is still
6 terrible. It came several years from the war in Liberia,
7 1989-1995, when they really did not want me, but at one
8 time they did. During the war there was full cooperation
9 between me and Washington and then we got into a different
10:55:51 10 phase."

11 Full cooperation, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, we had a lot of cooperation.

13 Q. And what does cooperation mean?

14 A. Well, we had a situation where we had Herman Cohen coming
10:56:07 15 in, we had been supplied equipment for radio monitoring, we
16 exchanged letters with the State Department immediately upon
17 beginning our revolution. We had the Deputy Assistant Secretary
18 of State at that particular time coming into Senegal, meeting us.
19 Along in that meeting was Len Robinson, John Dobrin, we evacuated
10:56:43 20 American citizens from harms way in Liberia. There were constant
21 communication and assistance along the lines I mentioned.

22 Q. "And God willing we have got to get back to the original
23 phase where I want to do business with America. I want to
24 engage it. I hope they understand that we are a free
10:57:03 25 sovereign and independent state and a sovereign people. I
26 hope they understand it. And I think they understand it
27 well, because the Americans have laws and they respect
28 freedom and they respect human beings, and I hope they will
29 respect the wishes of the Liberian people. If they do not,

1 then it would be a contradiction of their own values. And
2 I know American values are great values.

3 Q. But over the last five years that you have been in
4 power, they haven't respected the wishes of the Liberian
10:57:36 5 people, the more than 75 per cent of the people that voted
6 you in.

7 A. That's true.

8 Q. And they are doing everything to undermine you and as a
9 result the people of Liberia are suffering terribly.

10:57:48 10 A. That's true. That's why I am hoping that they would
11 change their policy and engage us. Because in fact what
12 I'm trying to say is as long as God first, and the
13 Liberians say we want Charles Taylor, they ought to respect
14 it.

10:58:06 15 But you see the American government is such a large
16 bureaucracy. It's like an aircraft carrier. There are
17 segments of the American government that don't understand
18 what other segments are doing, which is anti-Taylor. And
19 so when you have a policy in limbo, the people of Liberia
10:58:24 20 suffer.

21 And for me, I say this: It's not what America does for
22 Liberia now that is of concern to the Liberian people. It
23 is what they do not do. If America leaves Liberia alone,
24 stop using multilateral agencies to punish the Liberian
10:58:41 25 people, Liberia will live. We will live.

26 Liberia is a rich country. We have diamonds, more diamonds
27 than Guinea and Sierra Leone. In fact just in recent
28 months, British companies working in Liberia have
29 discovered more than eight kimberlite sites. Gold in

1 abundance, oil and natural gas. Liberia now is holding one
2 of the largest reserves of oil in West Africa. We have
3 natural resources, timber, our fisheries, everything. All
4 we need is to be left alone. If you don't want to help us,
10:59:18 5 don't hurt us.

6 Whether you like Charles Taylor, there are a lot of people
7 who do not like their President, but that's none of our
8 business. It should not matter who the Liberians elect,
9 and that's what we are saying to them.

10:59:32 10 So what I am doing, we are calling their values to the
11 table. We believe in these democratic values, you believe
12 that the will of the people should prevail. What is your
13 problem? And we hope that we can engage them, that they
14 can answer some of these questions.

10:59:50 15 Q. By extension, can we also say that America is using its
16 huge influence over the UN and its Security Council to
17 undermine and compromise your ability to govern here?

18 A. Is there anything unusual about that? There is nothing
19 unusual about that.

11:00:11 20 Q. But is it the job of the United Nations Security
21 Council to compromise the ability of some members state to
22 govern?

23 A. (Laughs). Who is the largest contributor to the
24 United Nations?

11:00:26 25 Q. The US.

26 A. Look, when the United States sneezes, the world catches
27 a cold. That's the reality now unfortunately, but that's
28 the reality. And so everybody listens and waits for what
29 the United States has to say. That's the reality of the

1 world and I am sure the world knows.

2 Q. Let's talk about this arms embargo imposed before the
3 elections of 1997 and renewed last year as part of the
4 United Nations sanctions against you and renewed again only
11:01:02 5 this May.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You are under attack by rebels?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And the United Nations is trying to tie your hands
11:01:11 10 behind your back and prevent you from defending yourself,
11 the people and the country.

12 A. Excuse me, they are not trying to. They have.

13 Q. They have tied your hands behind your back?

14 A. Unfortunately.

11:01:22 15 Q. That is unfair.

16 A. Not only is it unfair. I have called it a form of
17 genocide. This has not happened anywhere in the world.

18 The United Nations has imposed embargoes when you have
19 conflict between two states in an attempt to stop the

11:01:38 20 crisis. Never before has the United Nations imposed
21 sanctions against a legitimate government in the face of an
22 illegal invasion against the country where some of the most
23 powerful United member states are supporting the illegal
24 invasion.

11:01:57 25 I am bewildered by this, and Liberians are amazed. Some
26 Liberians stand up and say, 'But where is this great
27 friendship with America that this genocide is going on?'
28 Well, some people even say, 'With the friends that Liberia
29 has, who needs an enemy?' It's unfortunate. But, again, I

1 keep repeating it: That's the reality of the world that
2 must be spoken about.
3 Liberia is under attack, it has been acknowledged by the
4 UN Secretary-General. Powerful nations at the UN have
11:02:32 5 acknowledged that other countries are involved. But they
6 are saying, 'Stand up and be shot.' Well, we cannot do
7 that because I am between a rock and a hard place.
8 Number one, I was elected as the President of Liberia, a
9 member state of the United Nations. I took an oath to
11:02:53 10 protect and defend this country. The legislature of
11 Liberia has powers to deal with the presidency, and the
12 people have said to me, 'Mr President, you must defend us.
13 In fact, you will defend us or else.'
14 So who do I listen to? I have to listen to the people
11:03:12 15 because that's my primary responsibility. I am in no
16 violation of international law which should warrant the
17 United Nations Security Council barring a legitimate
18 government here from legitimate self-defence.
19 If fact, if Liberia had the resources, sadly we do not have
11:03:31 20 the means, we would challenge this decision in the
21 International Court of Justice, because it is a violation
22 of the United Nations charter. The Security Council does
23 not have the right, even under the charter, to bar a
24 country from legitimate self-defence.
11:03:46 25 If this were true, the United States would not have the
26 right to self-defence. After September 11, this terrible,
27 terrible terrorist attack against the United States, I back
28 the steps that the United States has taken in Afghanistan,
29 and they are leading the war against terrorism.

1 Liberia is shoulder to shoulder with the United States and
2 the exercise of that self-defence in Afghanistan.
3 And the United States has said the war will be extended to
4 any country that supports terrorism. But why can't the
11:04:24 5 United States support Liberia's right to legitimate
6 self-defence under Article 51 of the UN charter?
7 So I think the Security Council is in violation of the
8 charter. And maybe not now, but in the future, we may test
9 this case when we can afford the means in the International
11:04:45 10 Court of Justice.
11 In trying to sustain international peace and stability, the
12 Security Council cannot and should not do anything that
13 threatens people, that could cause them to become extinct.
14 And in the case of Liberia, this is pure genocide where
11:05:00 15 there is no evidence of our attack against any other
16 country, there is no conflict against any other country or
17 war, this is pure genocide and it's illegal.
18 Q. From what you've just said, isn't it time that African
19 countries had their own arms industries to prevent the case
11:05:22 20 like Liberia's where the legitimate government, as you say,
21 has had its hands tied while rebels slap you all over the
22 face, and yet the people expect the government to defend
23 them and the country. And as you correctly point out, it
24 is the job of any government to protect and defend the
11:05:40 25 people and country. And you cannot do it using food, you
26 must do it with arms. And now the UN says you cannot have
27 the arms from abroad, and you don't produce the arms
28 yourself because you have no arms industry here. So how do
29 you defend the country?

1 If Liberia had its own arms industry, then you wouldn't
2 bother about what they say in Washington. I think it is a
3 dangerous policy that Africa has left its security hinging
4 on arms imports, the over-dependence on imported arms.
11:06:15 5 It's like sitting there and expecting to import all your
6 food needs from abroad. What if the foreigners refuse
7 to export the food to you? You go hungry.
8 And this is what Africa is doing with its security
9 needs - depending on the whims of foreigners for our
11:06:32 10 security. America does not depend on foreigners for its
11 security. Britain, France, Japan and the other do not
12 either. They may have NATO, but NATO members produce their
13 own arms individually or collectively. They don't depend
14 on foreigners for their security. Why Africa?
11:06:51 15 A. That's one of the things. The whole concept of the
16 military industrial complex in Africa would be good, but
17 that would not be sufficient. Because Africa does not have
18 any permanent representation at the UN Security Council.
19 So whether Africa decided to build such a military
11:07:15 20 industrial complex, as long as Africa did not or does not
21 have a permanent voice or permanent seat on the
22 Security Council, the very Security Council could use
23 council resolutions to defeat the whole purpose of the
24 defence industry in Africa.
11:07:31 25 So the whole posture of the international community right
26 now, where countries cannot perpetrate their evils against
27 other countries, they use the United Nations to do so.
28 Very, very unluckily, in fact, I think it's a shame.
29 And so, for African countries to even develop a military

1 industrial complex and to deal with problems, even ECOWAS
2 cannot deal with the Liberian problem or West African
3 problem without going to the Security Council which is
4 responsible for international peace and security. But that
11:08:08 5 international peace and security lacks democratic strength
6 because the five permanent members of the Security Council
7 control the world.
8 So the only way Africa can contribute to peace and
9 stability on the continent, whether it is through a
11:08:25 10 military industrial complex or whether it is through states
11 getting together, is to have a permanent voice on the
12 Security Council. So that if anybody tries to perpetrate
13 any evil against an African country, Africa's
14 representative on the Security Council can say no.
11:08:44 15 So the answer to your question, short of that permanence at
16 the Security Council, Africa or any other part of the world
17 is just in trouble.
18 Q. In short, you are calling for reforms at the United
19 Nations and its Security Council?
11:09:02 20 A. Definitely, definitely. There have to be reforms of
21 the Security Council. And the continent of Africa must
22 have, under the auspices of the African Union, a permanent
23 seat on the Security Council.
24 Because, often you find the rest of the permanent members,
11:09:20 25 in fact, the west making decisions for Africa. You know,
26 it is almost foolish. Can you imagine the whole continent
27 of the Africa sitting there and saying to the five
28 permanent members of the Security Council and the rest of
29 them, 'Do anything you want to do with us. We will accept

1 it.' This is what it amounts to.

2 So what Africa has to do, there's got to be international
3 peace, there's got to be security, there's got to be rules.

4 And for Africa to get a fair share and for African

11:09:53 5 countries to reap the benefits of having their voices

6 heard, Africa has no choice but to seek a permanent seat on
7 the Security Council.

8 When was the last time you heard any European countries

9 under sanctions? The three European countries on the

11:10:11 10 Security Council - Britain, France and America - what is

11 the last time you heard any far eastern Asian country under

12 sanctions, embargoes and restrictions. China would not

13 allow it if it violated the UN charter, as it does in

14 Liberia's case.

11:10:32 15 So the whole thing here is that again you talk about

16 democracy, that's questionable again. If you are so

17 democratic, why are you refusing Africa a permanent seat on

18 the Security Council. Why are you refusing to enlarge the

19 permanent membership of the Security Council. It is

11:10:52 20 because people want to perpetrate their own deals. And it

21 goes back to the famous meeting between Churchill and

22 Roosevelt.

23 Q. On that ship.

24 A. On that ship in 1944. That's what we have today. This

11:11:07 25 desire to continue to rule the world at all cost, using

26 surrogate organisations, surrogate means to rule the world.

27 It still exists. Whether it is the IMF, whether it is the

28 World Bank, whether it is these piggy bank organisations,

29 they still continue to dominate the world. And as long as

1 Africa does not have their permanent position on the
2 Security Council, we can expect to be dominated. And so
3 Liberia, as a little country, is finished.

4 Q. What is the current situation on the rebel front? I
11:11:52 5 hear you have driven them back from whence they came,
6 except in Lofa County on the border with Guinea and
7 Sierra Leone?

8 A. Yes, we are doing our best. The forest canopy of
9 Liberia is so dense that people can sneak back and forth
11:12:13 10 and we hope this can stop. We are not looking for a
11 military victory as a solution to the Liberian problem.
12 This is why we see the national reconciliation conference
13 as being important.

14 We have a war thrust upon us. It is not of our making.
11:12:34 15 This war was thrust upon us, and so we don't have a choice.
16 We have to fight. But we believe that while fighting we
17 want to pursue the process of reconciliation. And so even
18 if we succeed in pushing them outside of Liberia, this
19 government does not see this as the final solution. We
11:12:53 20 still believe that we must engage the issues, we must talk,
21 we must reconcile, because the wounds in Liberia are very
22 deep and old.

23 Q. Are you allowed to chase them across the border, as
24 America is chasing the terrorists all over the place?

11:13:14 25 A. (Laughs). Even if we were allowed under international
26 law to do that, we would still not do it. We believe that
27 working with Guinea, Guinea can take care of those we will
28 push back across the border. It is working well with
29 Sierra Leone. All the rebels who have tried to cross back

1 into Liberia from Sierra Leone have been disarmed and
2 arrested. The Sierra Leonean government is cooperating."

3 Pause there. What are we talking about there, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Well, we are told that some of the rebels that were pushed
11:13:49 5 into Sierra Leone were disarmed by the Sierra Leonean government.
6 We believed what Kabbah told me.

7 Q. And what happened to them after they were disarmed?

8 A. They kept them. They did not turn them over to us. We
9 were just informed that they were arrested and disarmed and we
11:14:08 10 believed it.

11 Q. And what were the nationality of these individuals?

12 A. These were Liberians.

13 Q. "With the deployment on the borders, we believe that Guinea
14 can handle it. We look up to Guinea and expect that they
11:14:25 15 will handle it.

16 Q. Some people say the United Nations and the big powers
17 controlling it don't want elections here next year because
18 they fear you will win again. They want a climate of war
19 and insecurity so that the legitimacy of the elections will
11:14:39 20 be questioned. Is that correct?

21 A. Exactly. Exactly. That is what they want to do. And
22 they are working diligently at it. But I can tell you one
23 thing, if elections are held next year, and again I am
24 using the word 'if', because I said previously that
11:14:57 25 elections are scheduled for next year, and barring any
26 decision of the Courts or something, elections should be
27 held.

28 We want to make sure that as many organisations as possible
29 are involved here. These elections are going to be held by

1 the Liberian government. It is not going to be held by any
2 other government on this planet. It is not going to be
3 held by any NGO either. Nobody is going to hold these
4 elections but the Liberian government under Liberian law,
11:15:32 5 under our constitution.

6 I want to sound this caution: We've seen some countries
7 that are preparing to interfere in the process. We have
8 warned that it is against the laws of Liberia for any
9 country to fund any political party in Liberia. And we do
11:15:50 10 not want any party barred from the elections by receiving
11 funds from other countries. Any funds received from
12 outside by any party can cause that party to be barred.
13 And so we want to make sure it does not happen.

14 Having said that, we are going to have the OAU involved.
11:16:15 15 We are going to have African organisations involved. We
16 are going to have the European Union that has engaged us
17 involved. We are not going to go after personalities. We
18 want reputable organisations, the OAU, EU, ECOWAS, SADC and
19 other African groups.

11:16:36 20 An election held in any part of Africa, we don't need
21 somebody from a different country to come and tell us that
22 the election is free and fair and transparent. I think
23 Africans are educated and smart enough to come and observe
24 and be objective, and they are people with higher moral
11:16:54 25 values.

26 So we are not going for special personalities. We are
27 going after major global institutions and they will come
28 in. But these elections are going to be held under the
29 auspices of the Liberian government.

1 Q. Some of your political opponent have been talking
2 recently about a transitional government. But why talk
3 about a transitional government when a substantive
4 government is in place? What is going on?

11:17:24 5 A. A transition from what to what? Well, a transitional
6 government. Okay, I will tell them. I will put it to them
7 this way: If you say you want a transitional government,
8 are you prepared to consider my first six years in office
9 as a transition?

11:17:44 10 If you are prepared to say that my first six years were a
11 transition and I begin my first term after I win the next
12 election, then; but you cannot look at a legitimately
13 elected government or constitute a government and go into
14 transition except where you are expecting anarchy that you
11:18:04 15 are trying to promote using military means.

16 There will be no anarchy by the grace of God, there will be
17 no transition. These elections are going to be held under
18 Liberian law when the time is ripe. And we hope this is
19 next year. And nobody will be permitted to obstruct that
11:18:22 20 process.

21 Q. Let's talk a little bit about wider Africa. What is
22 the ECOWAS position on the goings on in Liberia, the rebel
23 attacks, et cetera?

24 A. I think ECOWAS has been very strong. ECOWAS has said,
11:18:38 25 'Look this is wrong'. In fact, there is a travel ban on
26 LURD in the West African region."

27 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

28 A. That is true.

29 Q. Can you recall when that was imposed?

1 A. Yes. I would say that was imposed back in - I think about
2 the third attack in '99 that was imposed.

3 Q. "I think ECOWAS has been looking at other organisations to
4 find a way through it. I am somewhat satisfied with the
11:19:22 5 position because all of my colleague Heads of State know
6 me. I am not the type of President that anybody is going
7 to push around, or anybody is going to make a decision for.
8 They know me. All of my colleagues in West Africa know
9 that Liberia will not permit any state in this region to
11:19:44 10 dictate what happens here, because we will not dictate what
11 happens in their countries. And in ECOWAS we have always
12 respected each other. Whether it is Senegal with the war
13 in the Casamance, or whether it is Guinea-Bissau who had
14 their war, we have respected the right of states.

11:20:04 15 And so I am very satisfied with the ECOWAS position. The
16 executive secretary is doing an excellent job. He is new
17 on the job, he is trying to keep the understanding among
18 the states.

19 In Nigeria, the largest state in the region, President
11:20:20 20 Obasanjo and I are on the best of terms. In fact, I am
21 scheduled to visit him right after Morocco and I am equally
22 on good terms with President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, the
23 ECOWAS chairman, but I think they will understand me as I
24 understand them.

11:20:42 25 Q. But are they doing anything concrete to stop the rebel
26 attacks? I remember before the 1997 elections ECOWAS had
27 sent in ECOMOG in 1990 as a peacekeeping force and they
28 stayed until 1997, but when they found it necessary they
29 changed the ECOMOG peacekeeping mandate to peace

1 enforcement and I remember the pitch battles ECOMOG fought
2 with you and the NPFL. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG became a
3 direct intervention force. Why is ECOWAS not doing
4 something similar now to stop the rebel attacks from
11:21:18 5 Guinea?

6 A. Well, I will use a typical African parable. In the
7 Serengeti a lion is chasing a zebra. There are other
8 animals standing and watching and saying, 'Lord, I wish I
9 can help.' But which slow animal is going to stop this
11:21:38 10 lion from taking the zebra I think is the question.

11 And so (laughs) when you look at the parade of powerful
12 voices coming out of big countries, it is like a lion
13 catching a game in the Serengeti. Little countries are
14 scrambling for cover. It is pathetic and terrible, but
11:21:59 15 that's the reality of the world unfortunately.

16 They call me and express their frustrations. They express
17 their frustrations. They want to find out how they could
18 help. How can ECOWAS help when the UN Security Council
19 never even listened to the views of ECOWAS, never listened
11:22:14 20 to the request of the OAU to stay any additional sanctions
21 against Liberia.

22 So they are trying. But the permanence on the
23 Security Council is the solution. Short of the permanence,
24 Africa is really nothing in the eyes of some of these
11:22:31 25 powerful countries. Nothing.

26 Q. And what is the OAU doing? I met the Secretary-General
27 recently, Mr Amara Essy, and he comes off as a very good
28 and intelligent man, the type Africa need at the OAU.

29 A. Yes, he is a good man. Right now the issue is going to

1 come up at the OAU/AU summit in Durban, South Africa, in
2 early July. The Secretary-General is doing so well and he
3 is the right person to do the job. He is going to need
4 some strong African leaders to hold his hands up.

11:23:13 5 You know it is time and I tell you, I must commend some of
6 our long serving leaders in Africa, they are very patient
7 people and I do not want to be misinterpreted. The African
8 leaders are trying, but they are hampered in so many ways.

9 Q. Would you say the same about Kofi Annan, our brother at
11:23:30 10 the UN?

11 A. Secretary-General Annan has been elected for another
12 term. I think he is a very good Secretary-General. I will
13 tell you what I mean by a good second general. Who decides
14 who becomes the Secretary-General of the United Nations?

11:23:48 15 Q. In his case, the US decided.

16 A. Okay. So as long as he is serving the interests of the
17 United States, he is going to remain Secretary-General.

18 Q. Yes, correct.

19 A. That's it. I am not going to judge whether he is a
11:24:02 20 good or bad one, good or bad becomes relative now. He had
21 to be doing something good to be there for a second term.

22 That is why I say good is relative. He is a good man and I
23 think he is doing his best. He understands international
24 politics. And I think he is a sharp man. All he has to do

11:24:21 25 is just turn the first back page of history and look at
26 Dr Boutros-Boutros Ghali, and he is right on target?

27 Q. But it is on his watch that an African country like
28 Liberia is unjustifiably being pushed down by the powers
29 that control the UN. For him as an African and a

1 Ghanai an - and Ghanai ans are a j ust peopl e, they love
2 justice - it must be really galli ng for Kofi Annan to see
3 all these thi ngs happeni ng on hi s watch, and yet he can' t
4 do very much to hel p.

11:25:00

5 A. Well, he looks as Dr Boutros-Boutros Ghal i and, you
6 know, he is blessed wi th the benefi t of hi ndsi ght. He is
7 tryi ng wi thi n the context of hi s job.

8 So I am sayi ng that I thi nk he is doi ng an excell ent job as
9 an admini strator, but as Secretary-General of the Uni ted
10 Nations, he knows how he got there.

11:25:16

11 I thi nk if the Uni ted Nations was the type of global
12 organi sation that we all si gned up for some 50 years pl us
13 ago, I thi nk we have an excell ent Secretary-General. All
14 he is doi ng, in the context of the new global communi ty
15 wi th the new global poli tics, he is playi ng it extremel y
16 well.

11:25:35

17 And so in that process, some countries like Liberia are
18 goi ng to suffer while others live. That is the nature of
19 the beast ri ght now. And so you fi nd a good man like Kofi
20 Annan. I know someti mes he may feel like pulli ng hi s hairs
21 out, but he does not have a free wi ll as Secretary-General
22 of the Uni ted Nations. He doesn' t. I doubt if some
23 powerf ul countries even bother to look at hi s reports and
24 recommendati ons at all.

11:25:53

25 I wi ll tel l you thi s: Our own suspici on is that most
26 members of the UN panel of experts that came to Liberia, as
27 they were comi ng, thei r reports were al ready writt en.
28 Because I read the reports, and some of the reports were a
29 year behi nd, about thi ngs that happened a year previ ously.

11:26:08

1 It is all just a charade."

2 Do you honestly believe that, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. "You know, as the President of a nation that is a member of

11:26:47 5 the United Nations, I have to speak very frankly, my people

6 are dying. But if we were to look justifiably at the

7 issues, review the facts, tests the facts, Liberia should

8 have never been punished as we are. But the nature of the

9 world now is such that if certain powerful countries want

11:27:04 10 you to live, you live. If they want you to die, you die.

11 That's the nature of the beast.

12 Q. So then, is there any hope of lasting peace in

13 Liberia? The emphasis is on lasting.

14 A. Lasting peace will come because God is more powerful

11:27:24 15 than any person or nation or group of nations. It is God's

16 will that peace comes in Liberia. And, you know, the devil

17 is mighty but God is almighty.

18 I will give you a little incident. Look, remember people

19 or countries that have problems, you do not have problems

11:27:45 20 most times because you are not doing the will of God. In

21 fact, in most cases it is when you are doing the will of

22 God that you have problems as a Christian.

23 Remember Jesus was on the boat on the Sea of Galilee and

24 the devil intervened and brought a storm. They woke Jesus

11:28:02 25 up and Jesus said 'peace be still'.

26 There was another time that Jesus instructed his disciples

27 to go ahead and wait for him, and the devil intervened.

28 The disciples went through a lot of problems not because -

29 in fact, their problems were because they were carrying out

1 the instructions of Jesus.

2 No human will or desire will prevail forever. God permits
3 his people to suffer, but in the final analysis, only the
4 will of God will prevail in Liberia.

11:28:29 5 And those countries that are trying to persecute Liberia,
6 God will touch their hearts. President Bush is a
7 Christian. He has been fed with a lot of filth, lies,
8 disinformation. He doesn't know the difference. He gets
9 the reports and he reads them.

11:28:49 10 Twenty, twenty-five years from now when you read through
11 the Freedom of Information Act about the covert actions of
12 Liberia, somebody is going to say: 'But I be damned, you
13 want to tell me they were doing this to Liberia and I did
14 not know?'

11:29:05 15 We are seeing the pages of history that occurred, 25, 30
16 years ago, when covert wars went on, lies were told,
17 justifications were made only to lie. The same thing is
18 going on right now.

19 And so, they will pass. This too shall pass by the grace
11:29:27 20 of God. And lasting peace will come to Liberia because I
21 love this country. I love my people more than anyone in
22 the United States, Britain or any other part of the world
23 can. I love my people and I want to see good for my
24 people. And so God will give us peace, because only God
11:29:48 25 can give lasting peace.

26 Q. There is a big national reconciliation conference
27 coming up in July. What do you expect to achieve? I was
28 here at the last one held in July 1998 and, judging by the
29 rebel war launched soon after, it seems not much came out

1 of it."

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I think we will wait until
3 after the break to continue. The tape is almost exhausted now.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

11:30:20 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: So we will adjourn and resume at 12
6 o'clock.

7 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

8 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue, Mr Griffiths.

12:01:09 10 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

11 Q. Mr Taylor, can we conclude this document, please. We're on
12 the last page. Yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And your penultimate answer during the course of this
12:01:33 15 interview:

16 "This time it's a lot different. This national conference
17 opens in July and it runs for about six months. We want to
18 - for the first time in Liberia - look at the following:
19 Who are we? What does it mean to be a Liberian? The freed
12:01:55 20 slaves who came here who were called Ameri-co-Liberians met
21 their brothers the Aborigines. Why did they fail? Why
22 this disconnection? Why are certain tribes still fighting?
23 What can we do?

24 And so this conference is not going to be about academia or
12:02:15 25 presentation of papers at the Unity Conference Centre and
26 then we go and do a report. The conference runs for about
27 six months. Maybe more than that. We're going to tour the
28 regions, to the people, the towns, the villages. We want
29 to know what the people think. Why are there these

1 problems there? Can it be resolved traditionally? How did
2 this happen?

3 Sometimes most of us do not know the history of the
4 problem. I am told that the conflict between the Krahn
12:02:53 5 and the Gios and Manos in Liberia goes way back to a Gio
6 woman who married a Krahn King in Grand Gedeh. She died of
7 natural causes in Grand Gedeh but her body was not sent
8 back to Nimba. At the time Nimba was not a county, it was
9 just a region, and that caused a major problem and war

12:03:17 10 broke out. That has been the hatred between the Gios and
11 the Krahn. And then during that period a Kru man called
12 Tapeh came and built a village between the two regions to
13 stop them from fighting so between Grand Gedeh and Nimba
14 County there is a place called Tapehtown. Tapeh was as
12:03:40 15 a Kru man, a Kru warrior, who came to live there to stop
16 the Gios and Krahn from fighting.

17 So what we want to do, for example, why are the Mandingos
18 and the Lomas fighting, because the Mandingos who are now
19 coming from Guinea under the auspices of the LURD
12:03:55 20 terrorists and destroying Lofa County, that war in fact is
21 200 years old, so what can we do about it?

22 The coming conference is about reconciling ourselves and,
23 by the way, for the first time we want the United States
24 government to be a part of this reconciliation process
12:04:15 25 because those illegitimate children who came here made some
26 mistakes. We also want to invite the American Colonisation
27 Society to come and participate in the conference. This
28 NGO which came and set up this country, what did they do?
29 What were their plans for the country?

1 So the conference is going to be different and through the
2 grace of God it is going to work. Because we are going to
3 go into the root causes of the problem or problems. We are
4 going to go back 150 plus years. We want to uproot this
12:04:48 5 whole thing and bring it out for the first time. So the
6 conference starts in July and runs for several months,
7 and our hope is that through this process of the creation
8 of history, factual matters for the first time, we would
9 have the opportunity to be reconciled.

12:05:13 10 Q. My last question, last but not least, are you going to
11 stand for re-election next year?

12 A. Well, if God grants me the strength the Liberians are
13 already saying to me, 'Don't even think about it.' Not
14 only am I going to stand, I am going to beat the whole
12:05:31 15 field."

16 That sounds rather confident, Mr Taylor?

17 A. It does.

18 Q. Was there a basis for such confidence?

19 A. Well, the people. From all of our reports, from all of the
12:05:51 20 samples that had been taken across the country, yeah.

21 Q. Twelve months later would you step down though?

22 A. By force.

23 Q. "You know the reason why. I understand from my own
24 intelligence that there is a whole bunch in America now
12:06:07 25 waiting for the war to succeed. They are all frightened.
26 None of them wants to run against me because me they know
27 that they cannot win, so they are over there calling for
28 elections and yet hoping that the elections never happen.
29 I am going to beat the pants off them and the Liberian

1 people are going to say to the world, 'This is our
2 choice'."

12:06:48 3 Before we move on can I ask, please, that that article, New
4 African Magazine, July-August 2002 edition, entitled "Charles
5 Taylor, powerful countries want me out" be marked for MFI-225,
6 please.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-225.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, as we've noted, that was an extensive
12:07:03 10 interview conducted with you in the summer of 2002. Help us,
11 before you step down the following year did you give any further
12 interviews of this magnitude to the international press?

13 A. Not to this magnitude, no.

14 Q. And at the time you gave this interview in July/August 2002
12:07:50 15 did you contemplate in due course you would be facing an
16 indictment?

17 A. No, not at all. Not at all, no.

18 Q. Did you have any inkling that such a thing was on the
19 horizon?

12:07:50 20 A. No, not at all, no.

21 Q. Prior to dealing with this report, Mr Taylor, the last
22 matter we had dealt with last week was a letter which you had
23 written to President Bush dated 3 October 2002 pledging support
24 in the global fight against terrorism.

12:08:09 25 What I would like us to do now, please, is to leave behind
26 the chronology of events at the end of 2002 and I would like us
27 now to clear up one or two loose ends which for various reasons
28 are currently outstanding. Do you follow me?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. One such loose end is this, Mr Taylor: You will recall
2 that in recounting events during the course of the Doe regime,
3 you had made mention of a decree passed by the Doe government.
4 Do you recall that?

12:08:51 5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. What decree was that?

7 A. That was the decree 88-A.

8 Q. And help us, what did it deal with?

9 A. That decree dealt with what was called lies, rumours and
12:09:13 10 disinformation that could cause problems within the state.

11 Q. Yes. What I would like us to do, please, could we take up
12 for the purpose of the next few documents volume 1 of 4 for week
13 33, please, tab 1. Now, Mr Taylor, do you have that document in
14 front of you?

12:10:41 15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. Do you recognise this document?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. What is it?

19 A. This is decree 88-A that was promulgated by the People's
12:10:59 20 Redemption Council Government against what they called the
21 spreading of rumours, lies and disinformation.

22 Q. Now, we see that it's dated at the bottom right-hand corner
23 21 July 1984, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

12:11:13 25 Q. And it provide as follows:

26 "People's Redemption Council decree number 88-A.

27 Degree by the People's Redemption Council of the Armed
28 Forces of Liberia to protect the public against the spread of
29 rumours, lies and disinformation.

1 That a person has committed a felony of the first degree if
2 he accuses any executive authority, judicial authority, member of
3 the Interim National Assembly, or any other individual, either by
4 word of mouth, writing, or by public broadcast, of conduct or any
12:11:53 5 act which constitutes the commission of a crime, provided that at
6 the time of such accusation the purpose of the author is:

7 (a) to thereby injure the official or other individual in
8 his reputation to undermine his official or personal status;

9 (b) to create disharmony, spread rumours, lies and
12:12:17 10 disinformation;

11 (c) to undermine the security of the state, cause civil
12 strife or confusions, labour unrest, hinder, impede or interfere
13 with the electoral process;

14 (d) word of mouth means spreading or making known by verbal
12:12:34 15 communication;

16 (e) writing means any written production, engraving,
17 drawing or effigy of a government official; and

18 (f) public broadcast means any dissemination through public
19 channels or individuals by sound or picture.

12:12:52 20 Section 2: That the security forces are hereby empowered
21 to arrest and detain any person who violates any of the
22 provisions contained in Section 1 herein.

23 That any person violating any provision of this decree
24 shall be arrested and detained without bail pending a judicial
12:13:12 25 hearing. This decree shall take effect upon the signature of the
26 Head of State and chairman of the People's Redemption Council."

27 Mr Taylor, did you support the passing of this decree?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Why not?

1 A. The because rule of law was absent from such a decree, and
2 as a military government, they just decided to do it, I guess,
3 the military way, and we were opposed to this because even the
4 deny of bail, probably the suspension of the writ of habeas
12:13:50 5 corpus, all of these were things that a lot of us in government
6 did not support.

7 Q. And tell me, following your election as President, did you
8 do anything about it?

9 A. This was one of the first two things that I did was to have
12:14:06 10 the legislature repeal this Act.

11 Q. Have a look behind tab 10 in this bundle, please. What do
12 we see behind tab 10, Mr Taylor?

13 A. This is the repeal of another Act of the PRSA that barred
14 political activities within the country. This was also repealed
12:14:40 15 by me.

16 Q. Now, when you say that you repealed 88A, when was that
17 done?

18 A. Immediately. We just don't have the documentation, but we
19 did that - I would say about the second act taken by my
12:14:58 20 government.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask, please, that that decree,
22 number 88-A, be marked for identification MFI-226, please.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, marked MFI-226.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:15:30 25 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, as you appreciate, it is alleged that you
26 entered into a design to adopt means of terrorism to take over
27 control of the territory of Sierra Leone in order to terrorise
28 it's public and exploit its resources. You appreciate that,
29 don't you?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. You appreciate that by extension it is suggested that the
3 RUF was a terrorist organisation, don't you?

4 A. That is correct.

12:16:06 5 Q. Have you seen or read any document which bears upon that
6 suggesti on?

7 A. Yes, I have.

8 Q. What is that?

9 A. There is a document that was provided by the OTP that was
12:16:26 10 published in 1995 that was published by the RUF called Footpath
11 to Democracy that set out exactly what the RUF was, what their
12 politics was and what they sought to do.

13 Q. Have you read that document, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Oh, yes, I have read the Footpath to Democracy.

12:16:53 15 Q. Why did you read it?

16 A. Because I was interested - this is a time - a document
17 published in 1995, I had no contact with the RUF at this
18 particular time, and I seen a document published by them upon,
19 really, my incarceration. It was very much of interest for me to
12:17:17 20 know exactly what the politics of the RUF was, so I read it.

21 Q. And prior to reading this document, Mr Taylor, what was
22 your knowledge as to the politics of the RUF?

23 A. Well, except for public pronouncements that had been made
24 on radi o by them and the brief time that I spoke wi th Sankoh, my
12:17:40 25 understanding was that they were - they felt that they were
26 fighting a just war against a government that had - what they say
27 had suppressed the people over time. They surely didn't come off
28 to me at the time - and let me be speci fic about the time. I'm
29 talking about the brief time between 1991 up to May of 1992, that

1 there was some contact with them - they didn't come across as a
2 terrorist organisation to me.

3 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you've accepted that you had in Libya
4 contact with one Ali Kabbah?

12:18:22 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And help us, through your discussions with him, did you
7 gain some insights into the politics of this group of men who
8 were in Libya from Sierra Leone?

9 A. Well, from my interaction with Ali Kabbah, what I would
12:18:41 10 call a very educated and smart man, Pan-Africanist, it was more
11 about the Pan-African approach to Africans solving their own
12 problems and taking charge of their own destiny. He surely also
13 did not come across to me as a terrorist.

14 Q. Did your discussions with him include, for example, the
12:19:09 15 ways and means by which he proposed to change the political
16 complexion of Sierra Leone?

17 A. Yes, Kabbah did mention that, in fact, they were there for
18 military training and he had said to me that they had planned to
19 remove their government by a revolutionary means of force of arms
12:19:44 20 to rebuild and build a new Sierra Leone.

21 Q. But, Mr Taylor, in light of certain events which had
22 dominated the current media, supply of Semtex to the IRA in the
23 north of Ireland by Colonel Gaddafi the bombing over Lockerbie,
24 what do you say about your involvement with Ali Kabbah in Libya
12:20:08 25 in such terroristic activities? You follow me?

26 A. Uh-huh. Well, I'll tell you, the view of most of the
27 Pan-African states at that particular time, whether we're talking
28 about east Africa, whether you are talking about southern Africa,
29 or whether you are talking about West Africa, in specific terms,

1 I would like to deal with southern Africa. What are we talking
2 about? The fight of the ANC or the fight at that time that was
3 being put up by SWAPO that was hated by - I forgot the
4 gentleman's name. It will come to me. We were not looking at
12:20:59 5 the activities of Gaddafi on the African continent at that time
6 as acts of terrorism. And I must admit, I was not involved with
7 all of the information outside of Africa, so I would not be
8 clothed with the strength to really debate some of the issues you
9 raised about Lockerbie and all of that. But on the African
12:21:24 10 continent Gaddafi was and for me still considered an African hero
11 because getting rid of the colonial and neocolonial rule on
12 Africa took the strength and the will of a Gaddafi, okay, to
13 assist in liberating Africa and giving Africa back to the
14 Africans. And I'm saying all over Africa, whether we're talking
12:21:52 15 about east, central, southern Africa.

16 So, as far as I'm concerned, our dealing there at that time
17 was in strict adherence to our liberation struggle on the African
18 continent and we did not see the fight against the apartheid
19 regime in South Africa as terrorism. We did not see Sam Njoma's
12:22:15 20 fight in southern Africa or SWAPO as terrorism, neither did we
21 see the fight that we were planning in Liberia as terrorism
22 because we were going out to remove dictatorial governments and
23 governments that we felt were not in the interest of our people.
24 So we do not and did not view him at that time, in dealing with
12:22:40 25 the African problem, as acts of terrorism.

26 Q. Now, with that in mind, can we look now, please, at the
27 document you informed us you read following your indictment. Can
28 we look behind divider 2 in the same bundle, please.

29 Now, Mr Taylor, firstly, in what circumstances did you come

1 to see this document?

2 A. This document was a disclosure by the OTP that I saw.

3 Q. Had you seen it prior to that?

4 A. Prior to that, no, I had not seen this document.

12:23:34 5 Q. Now, I want us to try and put the document in context. So
6 can we turn to the third page of it, please. And I turn to the
7 third page for this reason - it should bear an ERN number at the
8 top, 9702. Do you have it?

9 A. Yes.

12:24:03 10 Q. And we see there a date, 1995.

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Now, as I say, I'm seeking to put this document in context,
13 Mr Taylor. In 1995, did you have any contact with the RUF?

14 A. None whatsoever.

12:24:18 15 Q. Help us further, and I ask this question in light of the
16 suggestion that you were, in effect, the founding father of the
17 RUF and its controller; do you follow me?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Did you have any input in the creation of this document?

12:24:38 20 A. None whatsoever. No.

21 Q. Did anyone associated with either you or the NPFL have any
22 input in the creation of this document?

23 A. No, none whatsoever.

12:24:56 24 Q. Were either you or anyone associated with the NPFL
25 consulted before the publication of this document?

26 A. No. Not at all, no.

27 Q. As far as you are aware, was this document available in
28 Liberia?

29 A. In 1995, no. No.

1 Q. And help us, when is the first time you saw this?

2 A. This document was disclosed to me upon my incarceration by
3 the Special Court. Amongst the disclosure, a few amongst after
4 my disclosure, I think about three months into my incarceration,
12:25:32 5 disclosure started coming out. I do not remember the exact
6 sequence of the number of documents or whether it was in the
7 first group or second.

8 Q. Don't worry about that.

9 A. But this was disclosed by the OTP to me.

12:25:46 10 Q. Now, let's go back to the first page, please, so that we
11 can remind ourselves of the title of this document. It is called
12 Footpaths to Democracy Towards a New Sierra Leone, Volume 1. And
13 then when we go back to that page bearing the ERN number, 9702,
14 we see that, as we've mentioned, published, it appears in '95,
12:26:23 15 the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leon. There is then a
16 contents page. And let's go over to the page thereafter, please.

17 Now, Mr Taylor, help me, have you read Frantz Fanon?

18 A. A long time ago, yes.

19 Q. Now, you see there at the top of the page a quote from
12:27:00 20 Dr Fanon, as he was, "Each generation must, out of relative
21 obscurity, discover its mission, fulfil it or betray it."

22 And then we see two quotes from Foday Sankoh:

23 "When a society demands a change, there is no need
24 attempting to change it on old principles. We deem as more
12:27:23 25 dangerous to quick fix and prescriptive hidden agendas of
26 self-seeking mediators. We have every right to be suspicious of
27 those who have made careers out of Africa's plight. They
28 invariably end up as meddlers in internal conflicts prolonging
29 the suffering of our people."

1 Finally, we see a quote from people's "War and Peace"
2 council: "In furtherance of sustainable peace, we call on the
3 United Nations Security Council to place a universal arms
4 embargo, including the importation and use of land mines, on
12:28:06 5 Sierra Leone forthwith."

6 Now, were you aware that in 1995 the RUF was making such a
7 request to the Security Council, Mr Taylor?

8 A. No, I was not.

9 Q. Over the page and I'm not going to ask you to sing the RUF
12:28:33 10 anthem, so we can skip the next two pages, please. Let's go
11 directly to the foreword. You'll be relieved to know, Mr Taylor,
12 that I have no intention of going through every single word of
13 this document but what I would like to do is to address one or
14 two salient aspects of it. Now, the foreword:

12:29:01 15 "We can no longer leave the destiny of our country in the
16 hands of a generation of crooked politicians and military
17 adventurists. It is our right and duty to change the present
18 political system in the name of national salvation and
19 liberation. This task is the historical responsibility of every
12:29:26 20 patriot. We must be prepared to struggle until the decadent,
21 backward and oppressive regime is thrown into the dustbin of
22 history. We call for a national democratic revolution, involving
23 the total mobilisation of all progressive forces. The secret
24 behind the survival of the existing system is our lack of
12:29:50 25 organisation. What we need then is organised challenge and
26 resistance. The strategy and tactics of this resistance will be
27 determined by the reaction of the enemy forces. Force will be
28 met with force, reasoning with reasoning, and dialogue with
29 dialogue."

1 Now, remember why I'm asking you about this document,
2 Mr Taylor, in the context of you being a terrorist. Do you
3 understand me?

4 A. Yes, I do.

12:30:22 5 Q. And sponsoring a terrorist organisation. Do you follow me?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Now help us. When you see in the foreword of this document
8 reference to crooked politicians and military adventurists and
9 also the name for national salvation and liberation and the need
10 to struggle against decedent, backward and oppressive regimes,
11 did that strike any chord with what you launched in December of
12 1989?

13 A. Yes, we had in 1989 when we launched our revolution some
14 problems with the government that were similar.

12:31:06 15 Q. Remember we're dealing with an alleged terrorist
16 organisation here. It goes on:

17 "We entered Sierra Leone through Liberia and enjoyed the
18 sympathy of Sierra Leonean migrant workers, some of whom joined
19 us to cross the border to start our liberation campaign. This
12:31:30 20 generation of Sierra Leoneans who have had to migrate to make a
21 living in Liberia are now referred to as mercenaries and bandits
22 by the Freetown based military junta. The military junta has
23 also used this fact to gain support from Guinea, Nigeria, Ghana,
24 the United States and Britain in its avowed policy of war to rid
12:31:55 25 Sierra Leone of alien rebels."

26 Now, pause again. Sierra Leonean migrant workers, a
27 generation who had to migrate to make a living in Liberia. Now,
28 Mr Taylor, were you aware that such recruitment had taken place
29 by the RUF in Liberia?

1 A. No, I was not aware.

2 Q. "We do not deny the fact that some of those who volunteered
3 to join our cause were veterans of the Liberian civil war, but
4 majority were of Sierra Leonean parentage."

12:32:39 5 Now, Mr Taylor, have you ever denied the involvement of
6 veterans of the Liberian civil war?

7 A. No, I have not.

8 Q. "But the majority were of Sierra Leonean parentage." What
9 did you understand by that when you read it?

12:32:58 10 A. A lot of these people that were in Liberia, some of them
11 were half - maybe mother Sierra Leonean or father Sierra Leonean
12 or both.

13 Q. Like who?

14 A. You have - we've had evidence led here, for example Isaac
12:33:15 15 Mongor was part - this radio boy that came here, Nya Nissar, Nya
16 Lansana, he was partly Sierra Leonean. A lot of them had this
17 connection with Sierra Leonean parents.

18 Q. "However, this minor alien involvement in our just and
19 human cause was curtailed as early as May 1992, when it became a
12:33:44 20 nightmarish experience for our civil population. Ever since we
21 have fought a self-reliant war depending mainly on what we
22 capture from the troops of the rebel National Provisional Ruling
23 Council of the regimes in Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana and of the
24 United Liberation Movement For Democracy in Liberia."

12:34:10 25 Again let us pause. Now bear in mind, Mr Taylor, the date
26 of this publication. 1995, yes?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, do you recall telling us hitherto that you had
29 recalled NPFL fighters from Sierra Leone?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Why?

3 A. That was - the problem in Sierra Leone involving your Top
4 20, Top 40, when the conflict arose between the security people
12:34:44 5 that we had in and the RUF and there was this major battle that
6 was referred to as Top 20, Top 40 and Top Final, and based on
7 that it was just such a bitter conflict we then ordered all of
8 our people out and cut off all contact with the RUF.

9 Q. Now hold that thought. We need to examine these few
12:35:23 10 sentences with care. Note in this paragraph the writer is
11 accepting initially Liberian assistance. Do you see that?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. The writer then notes back in 1995, before any indictment
14 has appeared on the horizon, that that was curtailed in May 1992?

12:35:37 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Do you see that?

17 A. That is correct, yes.

18 Q. And over the page gives the reason for that curtailment: A
19 nightmarish experience for our civil population. Now did
12:35:53 20 Mr Sankoh complain to you, Mr Taylor, about the behaviour of
21 Liberians in Sierra Leone?

22 A. He did.

23 Q. And he goes on - and remember this is 1995 this is being
24 written.

12:36:08 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. "Ever since we have fought a self-reliant war depending
27 mainly on what we capture from the troops of the NPRC, the
28 regimes of Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana and of ULIMO."

29 Mr Taylor, help me. This is why I asked you at the

1 beginning. Did you, for example, way back in 1995 anticipate
2 that several years later you would be on trial and therefore
3 dictated this passage in order to get your defence in a bit
4 early? Do you follow me?

12:36:54 5 A. I follow you now. That did not happen. Only God I think
6 is capable of that.

7 Q. "The RUF/SL is surrounded on all sides by hostile forces.
8 To the north and west Guinea exercises a stranglehold on the
9 common border. To the east and south the Liberian counties of
10 Lofa, Bomi and Grand Cape Mount, sharing a common border with
11 Sierra Leone, have been controlled by ECOMOG by way of ULIMO."

12 What do you understand by that?

13 A. Well, for some time ULIMO was used by ECOMOG to do a lot of
14 little dirty work. They helped to arm them.

12:37:41 15 Q. And so that the point is not lost, we remind ourselves that
16 the writer spoke of curtailment in May 1992?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. And here writing in 1995 he speaks of the border being
19 controlled by ECOMOG by way of ULIMO:

12:38:03 20 "The sea and air space are patrolled by ECOMOG. With the
21 situation as it is, how do we get supplies from the National
22 Patriotic Front of Liberia or, for that matter, from anywhere
23 else? The NPFL could not have lost those three strategic
24 counties if it had sufficient arms to spare. Therefore, the
12:38:31 25 theory and accusations that we receive weapons and ammunition
26 from Libya by way of Burkina Faso and the NPFL and at the same
27 time being a conduit for the supply of materials to the NPFL are
28 nonsense."

29 Mr Taylor, tell me, are you sure you didn't dictate this?

1 A. I had no contact with these people after 1992. None
2 whatsoever. I did not even know that they were capable of even
3 writing a book. I had none whatsoever.

12:39:08 4 Let's not forget what is happening in 1995. 1995, I'm not
5 even in Gbarnga in 1995. Even though the borders are closed,
6 1995 I go to Monrovia and I am now a part of the Council of
7 State, the collective presidency, getting ready for disarmament,
8 demobilisation of combatants. I have no contact whatsoever with
9 them.

12:39:33 10 Q. And it goes on:

11 "These are calculated lies to justify the pursuit of a
12 policy of military option by the Freetown based military junta
13 against our entreaties for peace through dialogue. It is an
14 insult to every patriotic Sierra Leonean for the Libya card to be
12:39:54 15 played to confuse as well as betray the genuine democratic and
16 equal opportunity demands of our people.

17 In respect of the above we hereby challenge the US and
18 Britain to support and see to the implementation and monitoring
19 of our call for the United Nations Security Council to place a
12:40:27 20 universal arms embargo on Sierra Leone forthwith. We are tired
21 of being demonised only to prolong the civil war which, left to
22 themselves, the African people of Sierra Leone are capable of
23 resolving through an enlightened process of dialogue. And for
24 this process of dialogue to be successful, it has to be entirely
12:40:49 25 owned by the people as a vehicle for their empowerment."

26 Now I'm going to skip the next few paragraphs unless I'm
27 asked to read any aspect of it and I would like to go to page 10,
28 please, and pick it up in the last paragraph on that page. So
29 over the page, page 10, the last paragraph, please:

1 "Our self-reliant revolution deserves a more objective
2 study and analysis. We continue to be demonised by those who
3 benefit by doing so. As Pan-Africanists, we are proud of our
4 self-reliant struggle. Initially we fought a semi-conventional
12:41:48 5 war, relying heavily on vehicles for mobility. This method
6 proved fatal against the combined firepower of Nigeria, Guinea
7 and Ghana. By late 1993 we had been forced to beat a hasty
8 retreat as successful infiltration almost destroyed our ranks.
9 We were pushed to the border with Liberia. Frankly, we were
12:42:20 10 beaten and were on the run but our pride and deep sense of
11 calling would not let us face the disgrace of crossing into
12 Liberia as refugees or prisoners of war. We dispersed into
13 smaller units, whatever remained of our fighting force. The
14 civilians were advised to abandon the towns and city, which they
12:42:44 15 did. We destroyed all our vehicles and heavy weaponry that would
16 retard our progress as well as expose our locations. We now
17 relied on light weapons and on our feet, brains and knowledge of
18 the countryside. We moved deeper into the comforting bosom of
19 our mother earth, the forest."

12:43:13 20 Miss the next paragraph:

21 "We have created settlements we call sowo bushes (i.e.
22 sacred grove for the initiated). We endeavoured to provide
23 limited health care, schooling, housing and seedlings free. Our
24 civilians receive no humanitarian assistance."

12:43:37 25 Now, Mr Taylor, that retreat into the bush, have you heard
26 that reflected in any testimony before this Court.

27 A. Yes, I have.

28 Q. Over the page, please, middle paragraph:

29 "We have learnt the value of treating captives and

1 prisoners of war with utmost civility. Our ranks keep swelling
2 daily. We have no need to conscript by force. Force
3 conscription is an inferior method which tends to pose security
4 risks in the long run. Those forcibly conscripted, when they
12:44:26 5 manage to escape, lead enemy troops back to locations they are
6 familiar with. Experience and honesty have been our best
7 teacher."

8 Right. Can we skip and go to the page which bears the ERN
9 number 9715 at the bottom, please. And, again, anyone can
12:44:59 10 intervene at any stage and invite me to refer to any passage
11 which I've ignored. So 9715, third line from the top:

12 "No more slave and no more master. The importation of the
13 apartheid dogs of war Executive Outcomes to strengthen the chosen
14 policy of war by the rebel NPRC is a case in point. What irks
12:45:39 15 the population most is the fact that the mercenaries are
16 businessmen to boot and they are mining away the nonrenewable
17 resource of diamonds. If they came to fight the RUF/SL, that
18 would not have bothered the population because they know that the
19 apartheid dogs of war will be handled the same way. Gurkhas were
12:46:07 20 disgraced to a man on the battlefield."

21 Now, Mr Taylor, were you aware of the involvement of
22 Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone.

23 A. Yes, we heard about it, yes.

24 Q. Over the page, please. And, Mr Taylor, I remind you it is
12:46:28 25 in the context of the indictment that I'm referring you to this
26 document.

27 A. Uh-huh.

28 Q. Let's look at the second paragraph on that page, 9716:

29 "As a practical demonstration of our commitment to peace,

1 we call for a universal arms embargo to be placed on Sierra Leone
2 forthwith. We herein appeal to the United Nations Security
3 Council to seize itself of the grave matter of the spread of
4 small arms and the planting of anti-personnel mines. The
12:47:05 5 constant use of heavy artillery and cluster bombs have devastated
6 the countryside. We demand an arms embargo now in anticipation
7 of the problems associated with disarmament and demobilisation.
8 The RUF/SL is confident that it can disarm its freedom fighters
9 as soon as it becomes necessary to do so. Our stringent
12:47:32 10 discipline is such that every single bullet is recorded and
11 accounted for."

12 Now, this was the forward to the document. And when we go
13 over a couple of pages to the page bearing the ERN number 9718,
14 we see that the forward is signed by - the prologue, I should
12:48:03 15 say, is signed by Foday Sankoh.

16 Now, let's go over the page, please. And we see that the
17 next chapter is called "What are we fighting for?", and we see
18 that set out here:

19 "We continue to fight because we are tired of being
12:48:38 20 perpetual victims of state sponsored poverty and human
21 degradation visited on us by years of autocratic rule and
22 militarism, but we shall exercise restraint and continue to wait
23 patiently at the rendezvous of peace where we shall all be
24 winners. We are committed to peace by any means necessary, but
12:49:02 25 what we are not committed to is becoming victims of peace. We
26 know our cause to be just and God/Allah will never abandon us in
27 our struggle to reconstruct a new Sierra Leone. We are fighting
28 for a new Sierra Leone, a new Sierra Leone of freedom, justice
29 and equal opportunity for all. We are fighting for democracy,

1 and by democracy we mean equal opportunity and access to power,
2 to create wealth through free trade, commerce, agriculture,
3 industry, science and technology. Wealth cannot be created
4 without power. Power cannot be achieved without struggle. And
12:49:44 5 by struggle we mean the determination, the humanistic urge to
6 remove the shame of poverty, hunger, disease, squallor,
7 illiteracy, loafing and hopelessness for this African land of
8 Sierra Leone blessed with minerals, forests, rivers and all that
9 is required to restore the dignity, prestige and power of the
12:50:10 10 African as an equal competitor on the world stage. This is what
11 we are fighting for and this is why we are fighting to save
12 Sierra Leone. For a society has already collapsed when the
13 majority of its youth can wake up in the morning with nothing to
14 look up for."

12:50:43 15 Let's go to the end of that chapter. The next chapter
16 begins on the page bearing the ERN number 9722. Do you have it,
17 Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. "We have chosen the long and winding road to democratic
12:51:06 20 salvation. Sooner or later the citizens of Freetown, Bo and
21 Kenema shall wake up to our call, and with brooms and dusters,
22 buckets and pans, sticks and stones, they will rid themselves of
23 the rotten APC system along with its watchdogs, including the
24 apartheid dogs.

12:51:32 25 Why not? When those who by our votes or default use state
26 power to enrich themselves by accumulating wealth and property in
27 foreign lands while teachers, doctors, nurses, civil servants,
28 the police soldiers and workers are not paid for weeks and
29 months. And what happens to them, their children and other

1 dependants when they say enough is enough and ask for what is
2 theirs? And what happens to them when in addition they demand
3 wages they can survive on? What happens to them when they point
4 out the fact that it is immoral for those who hold state power to
12:52:08 5 run down the health services and go abroad periodically for
6 medical checkups with all expenses paid out of state fund? What
7 happens to those journalists and press houses who take up the
8 cause of the suffering and denied and comment on it?"

9 Yes, again, I'm not going to dwelling overlong on that
12:52:49 10 unless I am asked, save to note one or two pertinent comments
11 made. Firstly, at page 9725, please. You have it?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Last sentence at the end of that first paragraph:

14 "The APC scorned the RUF/SL and provided the spark that set
12:53:15 15 off the armed challenge on 23 March 1991."

16 Go over to page 9727, please. Top of the page:

17 "In effect, Freetown was Sierra Leone and has always been
18 Sierra Leone, like Monrovia was Liberia and Port au Prince was
19 Haiti."

12:53:45 20 Would you agree with that about Liberia, Mr Taylor?

21 A. To a great extent, yes.

22 Q. Over the page. Page 9728, ERN number, second paragraph:

23 "The coup makers promised to get back to us. The next
24 thing we heard over the air was what amounted to summoned visits
12:54:14 25 to the military rulers of Ghana and Nigeria, JJ Rawlings and IB
26 Babangida respectively. They returned to Freetown, and without
27 coming back to the RUF/SL, announced a continuation of the APC
28 policy of war. Assured of sponsorship, the young coup leaders
29 opted for a military solution and made the defeat and

1 extermination of the RUF/SL as their priority. It is said that
2 birds of the same feather flock together. It is sad that West
3 Africa was under the boots of military dictators at that
4 historical period and the NPRC chose to go the way of all
12:55:00 5 dictators. The RUF/SL has been defending itself ever since from
6 unprovoked military operations with various enthusiastic code
7 names (like Operation Clean Sweep for Kono District, Operation
8 Destroy All for Kailahun District, and Operation Locate and
9 Destroy, to name a few)."

12:55:32 10 Now, Mr Taylor, in the context of great reliance upon
11 Operation No Living Thing, help me, had you heard hitherto of
12 operation Clean Sweep or Operation Destroy All or Operation
13 Locate and Destroy?

14 A. No, I had not heard of them at all.

12:56:02 15 Q. I mean, do you recall any witness called by the Prosecution
16 helpfully informing us that such operations had been mounted by
17 the Sierra Leonean government?

18 A. No, I did not. It probably missed me, but I do not recall
19 hearing any of the witnesses mentioning these.

12:56:39 20 Q. Let's go to the next chapter, 9730, "Why we continue to
21 fight". I want us to go straight to page 9732 in that chapter,
22 please. Middle paragraph:

23 "By lending recognition to the NPRC military junta in a
24 civil war situation, ECOWAS, dominated by military rulers, set a
12:57:13 25 pattern for the OAU and UN to follow without critical examination
26 of the consequences. A military incursion, civil uprising and
27 sustained pro-democracy campaigns bring to question as well as
28 challenge the centres of power and governance in a given nation
29 state. In a successful guerrilla campaign, in the light of a

1 full-blown civil war where the only source of strength and
2 capability to engage the guerrilla movement lies in external
3 support and interests, the national capacity to resolve the
4 conflict is removed by these very same external forces and
12:57:55 5 interests. For it is their presence and contribution which
6 prolong the civil conflict by ever confusing the balance of power
7 on the ground. A state of permanent war develops only to the
8 benefit of the hawkers of military hardware and those who benefit
9 from the arms trade."

12:58:20 10 What do you understand by that paragraph, Mr Taylor.

11 A. I think they are blaming the major producers of weapons and
12 that it is in their interests to keep wars going because they get
13 to sell more weapons and while [indiscernible] kill themselves.

14 Q. Yes. Let's conclude that chapter and move on to the next.

12:59:01 15 "Ideas and ideals we believe in":

16 "The RUF/SL is committed to democratic ideals and holds as
17 sacrosanct the right of a people to organise themselves to retake
18 powers when a government fails to be representative and
19 sustaining in all intent and purpose. Through the armed struggle
12:59:41 20 we, the African people of Sierra Leone, have chosen not to fold
21 our arms and sit on the fence while our society collapses in
22 front of our eyes. We have chosen to act to remove a rotten
23 system and be our own champion and champion our destiny in
24 pursuance therefore of the sacred objective of total empowerment
13:00:06 25 of the people for genuine democratic order or culture. The
26 RUF/SL has divided the struggle into three phases:

27 1. Arms to the people. Believing that it is an organised
28 and informed people who constitute the motive force of any
29 political and economic revolution, the RUF/SL has trained the

1 Large number of men and women including the elderly, youth,
2 children, and the disabled from all corners of Sierra Leone and
3 given them arms to dismantle the corrupt APC system and its
4 sordid successors. This phase is currently being vigorously
13:01:01 5 pursued and the RUF/SL will not relent until the task is
6 accomplished. The RUF/SL believes that the possession of arms
7 should not be the monopoly of a privileged group. Everybody
8 should be a fighter to defend their rights.

9 2. Power to the people. The RUF/SL has abiding faith in
13:01:33 10 the necessity of democratic empowerment of the people in order to
11 wipe out the scourge of poverty and human degradation that
12 afflicts us as a people. The power to initiate policies and to
13 make decisions must be the preserve of the people. Politics, the
14 RUF/SL is convinced, is the process by which the people provide
13:02:00 15 the standards of judgment and choose the government officials to
16 apply them so as to get results that will not be intolerable to
17 any section of the community.

18 Political power can only stand the test of time when it
19 originates from the people themselves. This is the kind of
13:02:23 20 political power that the RUF/SL aspires for. All local
21 government structures are going to be overhauled so that
22 everybody participates fully and actively in the decision-making
23 and implementation processes according to their ability.
24 RUF/SL's mission is to redeem Sierra Leone from economic,
13:02:50 25 political and social enslavement and to radically bring about a
26 change of positive attitudes so that people will live as humans
27 should in an enabling environment.

28 3. Wealth to the people. We all know that Sierra Leone is
29 endowed with natural resources that would have ranked us as one

1 of the richest in the West African sub-region. Yet the mass of
2 our people live in state-sponsored squalor and our children
3 denied a brighter future. We have a clique, a handful of
4 unscrupulous elite who enjoy our resources. This horrendous
13:03:43 5 situation cannot be allowed to continue if posterity should live
6 meaningful lives. We either destroy this horrible system or we
7 perish by it. When the RUF/SL voices out the slogan 'wealth to
8 the people' this is what it means. It means that the people
9 should empower themselves in order to harness their resources and
13:04:12 10 use them for their own survival and development. The natural
11 resources are the natural property of the people; therefore, the
12 exploitation of these God/Allah given resources must be to their
13 natural benefit. In the past we have seen how our resources have
14 been snatched from us by small, selfish groups. The wealth of
13:04:41 15 this blessed nation of ours belongs to all of society. It should
16 not be monopolised by anybody. As stated clearly in the basic
17 document of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, the
18 second liberation of Africa prepared in 1989: We can no longer
19 leave the destiny of our country in the hands of a generation of
13:05:06 20 crooked politicians and military adventurers who everyday since
21 independence have proved beyond all reasonable doubt that they
22 are inefficient, irresponsible and corrupt."

23 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Go back over the page, please.
24 "As stated clearly in the basic document of the Revolutionary
13:05:34 25 United Front of Sierra Leone, the second liberation of Africa
26 prepared in" - note the date - "1989". Help us, in 1989 where
27 were you?

28 A. Well, it depends on what part now of 1989. By late 1989 we
29 are - I'm in West Africa.

1 Q. Note, according to what is being said here, from 1989 there
2 was already in existence a body calling themselves RUF/SL which
3 had published some kind of manifesto, the basic document. Do you
4 follow that?

13:06:30 5 A. I do.

6 Q. Did you have anything to do with that, Mr Taylor?

7 A. I had nothing to do with it and I have never seen such a
8 document.

9 Q. No, but hold on. You see, we've been told that you were
13:06:46 10 the creator of the RUF for your own purposes so help us. So back
11 in 1989 you were forming two organisations then, Mr Taylor: The
12 RUF and the NPFL. Is that the case?

13 A. That's not the case, no.

14 Q. So help us, how did this come about without you knowing
13:07:08 15 anything about it as you now claim?

16 A. Because I didn't have anything to do with them, so I could
17 not have known what they were doing. I didn't know them in 1989,
18 no, at all.

19 Q. Did you know that the creation of the RUF dated to this
13:07:26 20 year?

21 A. No, I did not. I did not. Because I had never heard of an
22 organisation called the RUF. I heard in Libya, Ali Kabbah, there
23 was a different name, a different organisation. I have never
24 heard of this.

13:07:41 25 Q. Mr Taylor, this document, the basic document of the
26 Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, have you seen such a
27 document introduced by the Prosecution in this case?

28 A. No, I don't remember seeing such since I've been here. No,
29 I have not.

1 Q. In fact, the document we're currently looking at,
2 "Footpaths to Democracy", do you recall that being introduced as
3 part of the Prosecution case?

4 A. Just to the extent that it was exhibited but not as - to
13:08:31 5 the extent that it was exhibited as a disclosure document.

6 Q. About what about in court in evidence?

7 A. No, no, I have not. I don't remember it being presented,
8 no.

9 Q. "We can no longer leave the destiny of our country in the
13:08:56 10 hands of a generation of crooked politicians and military
11 adventurists."

12 One moment. It occurs to me, Mr Taylor - perhaps we should
13 deal with this before we move on. Remind us, when did the NPFL
14 enter Liberia?

13:09:38 15 A. The NPFL entered Liberia on 25 December 1989.

16 Q. By what date had the NPFL consolidated any control over
17 territory in Liberia?

18 A. Oh, not until I would put it to about - oh, by the end of
19 January of 1990 just in that border region we had a little bit of
13:10:11 20 territory.

21 Q. Help us. You see, we need to cover all the bases because
22 we're unaware what suggestions might be made. Was the NPFL in a
23 position between 24 December 1989 and the end of that month - so
24 we're talking about what, just over a week?

13:10:36 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. Were the NPFL in a position during that week or so to
27 provide the RUF with the facilities and ability to publish this
28 document - basic document of the Revolutionary United Front of
29 Sierra Leone - in Liberia? Do you follow me?

1 A. I follow you. No, we were not in the position for them or
2 anybody else. Neither were we in that position to do it for
3 ourselves.

4 Q. So help us then. Bearing in mind the date of this
13:11:13 5 document, was the RUF created in Liberia?

6 A. Not at all, no. The RUF could not have been created and
7 was not.

8 Q. So help us then. Where was it created?

9 A. This RUF - from what I can see - had to be created long
13:11:32 10 before they even entered Liberia. This shows a lot of
11 preparation, okay, on their part to publish a basic document so
12 it had to be - I would suspect sometime before 1989 or by that
13 time.

14 Q. And do you have any idea where this organisation the RUF,
13:12:11 15 publishers of this document - where they were created? Do you
16 have any idea?

17 A. No, I don't. I really don't. I have no idea where they
18 created this document.

19 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, because I want to cover all the bases I
13:12:27 20 need to ask: We know that your combatants were based in Burkina
21 Faso --

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. -- for some time before later infiltrating via Cote
24 d'Ivoire and Guinea into Liberia. Now help us. Whilst in
13:12:49 25 Burkina Faso were you aware of the creation of a body called the
26 RUF?

27 A. No, I was not aware and to the best of my recollection
28 there was no one in Burkina Faso that I knew that was associated
29 with any group called the RUF, no.

1 Q. And again because of the nature of the allegations against
2 you I have to put it to you four square so you have an
3 opportunity of dealing with it. Is it the case, bearing in mind
4 from the existence of this document that a body called the RUF
13:13:30 5 was in existence prior to the invasion of Liberia, had you made a
6 pact with the leader of the RUF, in effect, "You help me in
7 Liberia, I'll help you in Sierra Leone"?

8 A. No, there could not have been any such thing because if
9 there had been, assuming for a minute that anyone would believe
13:13:54 10 that such existed, then you will have to, first of all, look at
11 what help the RUF would have had to give me. And all of the
12 evidence before this Court, I have heard - and it could have
13 missed me. It could have slipped by me. I've heard no evidence
14 led before this Court talking about Mohamed Tarawallie and
13:14:21 15 Foday Sankoh and the third gentleman, I don't quite remember his
16 name, being involved in combat or commanding NPFL forces. So
17 there was no pact. There was no contact. I did not know them.
18 And so there could not have been. It's impossible.

19 Q. You understand what it is I'm suggesting, Mr Taylor?

13:14:39 20 A. I understand. I understand.

21 Q. What I'm suggesting is and I'm asking you for your
22 assistance: Was there some of "you scratch my back, I scratch
23 yours" arrangement with Foday Sankoh before you entered Liberia?
24 Do you follow me?

13:14:55 25 A. There was no such thing. I follow you. There was no such
26 thing because I did not know him so there could be no scratching
27 backs here and there. I did not know Foday Sankoh at this time
28 that I entered Liberia. Did not know him.

29 Q. Let's take this to another level, Mr Taylor, because you

1 will recall the suggestion being that you created the RUF,
2 trained them at Camp Naama, then unleashed them on Sierra Leone.
3 You appreciate that, don't you?

4 A. Yes, I do.

13:15:28 5 Q. But according to this, they existed before Camp Naama. In
6 1989, had you captured Camp Naama?

7 A. No. 1989, no. No, no, no.

8 Q. Do you follow what I'm suggesting, Mr Taylor? I'm giving
9 you now an opportunity of dealing with this aspect of the

13:15:47 10 Prosecution case.

11 A. I follow you. No. If we look at it - let's look at 1989.

12 On the eve, December 24, by December 25 we are in full operation
13 on the morning. We do not even get - if you look from December
14 25 to the end of the month, the end of the year, we're talking

13:16:11 15 about, what, less than a week, we have not even gained full

16 control at Butuo where we carried out the initial operation.

17 And so we are not even in Liberia. And even after we get into
18 Liberia, we do not reach Naama until somewhere after July of 1990
19 where we even approached the Bong County area.

13:16:41 20 If you look at evidence led before this Court, we come via

21 Buchanan in Harbel and on to Monrovia before we backtrack going
22 to it. So we are talking about some six months into our

23 operation before we even get into that part of the country that
24 we could even vaguely think about - so we're not in control of

13:17:05 25 any real territory. In fact, I can say - I can say

26 categorically, by 1989, December 25, as we launched this attack,

27 we are not really in any control of territory - real territory

28 that we can say control of in Liberia until actually beginning

29 January of 1990 that we can - I can say without stupor that we

1 have control of territory in Liberia. The initial, just push and
2 pull, we attack Buutuo, we - you know, the boys run back. We're
3 talking about five, six days. So I would put to any real control
4 as of, really 1990, January.

13:18:00 5 Q. "... who, every day since independence, have proved beyond
6 all reasonable doubt that they are inefficient, irresponsible and
7 corrupt. Posterity will never forgive us if we sit passively by
8 while a few desperate men and women who are nothing but an
9 'organised' bunch of criminals continue to despoil, rape and loot
13:18:27 10 the people's wealth. It is our right and duty to challenge and
11 change the present political system in the name of national
12 salvation and liberation. We must build a new political system
13 over which we, the oppressed African people of Sierra Leone, must
14 have absolute control. It must be reflective of our needs and
13:18:53 15 aspirations; a political system that will give maximum priority
16 to popular participation and control. This task is the
17 historical responsibility of every patriot. We must be prepared
18 to struggle until the decadent backward and oppressive regime is
19 thrown into the dustbin of history. We call for a national
13:19:19 20 democratic revolution involving the mobilisation of all
21 progressive forces. The secret behind the survival of the
22 existing system is our lack of organisation. What we need then
23 is organised challenge and resistance. The strategy and tactics
24 of this resistance will be determined by the reaction of the
13:19:45 25 enemy forces. Force will be met with force, reasoning with
26 reasoning and dialogue with dialogue.

27 The economic crisis today is enough evidence to justify the
28 level of determination. We are told that our foreign debt stands
29 at over \$1 billion. What happened to the money? Mismanagement,

1 poor economic planning and shameless thieving of public wealth
2 stand as the root causes of the loans having no impact. The
3 'vouchergate' and 'squandergate' phenomena have assumed a more
4 frightening proportion under the much defamed regime of 'new
13:20:38 5 order'.

6 We are determined, through our collective struggle, to
7 liberate the economy from all forms of abomination both local and
8 foreign. The wealth of the people belongs to the people.

9 The parasitic and unscrupulous few will have to live or
13:20:51 10 perish on the people's terms. A people and environmental
11 friendly, self-reliant, flexible and interdependent economy is
12 our goal. The major sectors of the economy, agriculture, mining,
13 industry and energy will have to feed each other in the noble
14 task of national reconstruction. Cash crops production in itself
13:21:17 15 does not help in the anti-neocolonial struggle for genuine

16 independence. This is because the crops go to feed the
17 industries of Europe and North America. In turn, we buy finished
18 products at incredibly high cost. In the end, we produce what we
19 don't consume and consume what we don't produce. The centuries
13:21:41 20 of unequal exchange can be corrected only through an integrated
21 economic programme that is designed, tailored, suited and
22 implemented to fulfil and satisfy our internal, sub-regional,
23 African and Pan-African needs and aspirations.

24 The RUF/SL position on the social plight is a radical
13:22:09 25 social transformation of our society. To achieve this, the RUF
26 calls for a cultural revolution whose main objective will be the
27 liberation of our minds to instill in every one of us a high
28 sense of African patriotism. The building of alternative social
29 structures created by the people and for the people is the only

1 way to destroy the existing corrupt and rotten ones.

2 There is a need for a complete overhauling of the present
3 educational system. The prevailing system is a major
4 contributing factor to our current state of industrial and
13:22:54 5 technological backwardness. The educational system was initially
6 a colonial imposition which did not take into consideration the
7 aspirations and needs of our people. The sole intention was to
8 train passive and obedient Africans to man the colonial state
9 structure. What was expected of any serious-minded African
13:23:19 10 ruling class was to radically alter the inherited educational
11 system immediately after the attainment of independence. In our
12 country, the ruling class simply continued from where the British
13 colonialists left. Now it has become the common dictum of the
14 APC ruling class that education is a privilege and not a right.

13:23:45 15 The way to end exploitation and oppression, economic and
16 social injustice, ignorance, backwardness and superstition is to
17 make education available to all, both the young and old, male and
18 female, and also the disabled. We need to create a new
19 educational system that is more purposeful, dynamic and relevant
13:24:10 20 which will take into consideration the demands of the present
21 scientific and technological world and value of research,
22 critical thinking and creativity."

23 So that's the end of that quote from the 1989 document.
24 This document continues in this way:

13:24:40 25 "In summary, from the conceptualisation of the revolution,
26 the RUF/SL has firmly believed in the organised power of the
27 people as the motive force critical to the radical
28 transformations of society and in our particular circumstances in
29 the reconstruction of a new Sierra Leone. It is with this

1 conviction that the RUF/SL has mobilised the people to pursue the
2 armed struggle to bring about the demise of the decadent system.
3 Every citizen in the liberated zone is made responsible for the
4 security of the zone by the formation of a civil defence unit.

13:25:25 5 The RUF/SL believes that the new Sierra Leone cannot afford
6 to keep a standing army for the defence of the state, because
7 experience has shown that a state army is manipulated by
8 dictators to perpetuate their regimes and to terrorise the
9 people. What the RUF/SL is doing now during the 'Arms to the
13:25:50 10 People' phase is the development of the nucleus of a people's
11 defence system, wherein every citizen will be equipped to defend
12 the state at any time so no one person or a cabal of conspirators
13 can monopolise the tools of physical violence.

14 The RUF/SL revolution is a democratic revolution whose aim
13:26:18 15 is to create the enabling space for the democratic empowerment of
16 the people. It is only an organised people who can liberate
17 themselves from political suppression and economic exploitation.

18 It is the aspiration of the RUF/SL that the new
19 Sierra Leone will decide on an economic policy that is consistent
13:26:43 20 with the national and Pan-African interest. We must seek not to
21 be polarised to either state capitalism or private capitalism,
22 instead, RUF/SL believes we must seek enabling and turnkey
23 partnership with investors in the exploitation of the natural
24 resources. It must be a partnership which leaves no opening for
13:27:07 25 anybody to claim economic hegemony over others.

26 The RUF/SL is of the conviction that both political and
27 economic powers are inalienable rights of the people. In
28 recognition of this fundamental principle, the RUF/SL has
29 encouraged and motivated the people in the liberated zone to form

1 administrative structures through which they can effectively
2 manage their resources and direct the course of the armed
3 struggle to its successful conclusion.

4 This is our vision in the period of the second liberation
13:27:48 5 of Sierra Leone. Our mission, therefore, is to contribute to the
6 task of total political and economic liberation and unification
7 of Africa."

8 Now can I ask, please, in the time remaining, your Honour,
9 that that document, "Footpaths to Democracy", a publication of
13:28:16 10 the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, be marked for
11 identification MFI-227, please.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
13 identification MFI-227. I think this is an appropriate place to
14 break for lunch, Mr Griffiths.

13:28:34 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: So we'll adjourn now and reconvene at
17 2.30.

18 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

19 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:30:16 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

22 Q. Mr Taylor, before the luncheon adjournment we were looking
23 at a pamphlet produced by the Revolutionary United Front of
24 Sierra Leone and published in 1995. Do you recall that?

14:30:37 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Now, I explained to you earlier that I proposed through you
27 to clear up one or two loose ends at this point. So we'll be
28 jumping around a little bit. Now, Mr Taylor, you recall that
29 various mentions have been made of the imposition of sanctions,

1 an arms embargo, on Liberia in 1992 by the United Nations
2 Security Council?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. I would like you, please, to look behind divider 6 in
14:31:15 5 volume 1 of 4 for week 33. Yes, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Is this the resolution?

8 A. Yes, this is 788, yes.

9 Q. Let's just remind ourselves quickly of its terms, shall we.
14:32:04 10 We see it's dated 19 November 1992, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And let's go - it's adopted by the Security Council on that
13 date, 19 November 1992?

14 A. Yes.

14:32:21 15 Q. Recalling the statements by the President of the council on
16 its behalf on 22 January 1991 and 7 May 1992 on the situation in
17 Liberia;

18 Reaffirms its belief that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30
19 October 1991 offers the best possible framework for a peaceful
14:32:56 20 resolution of the Liberian conflict by creating the necessary
21 conditions for free and fair elections in Liberia;

22 Taking into account the decision of the joint meeting of
23 the Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee of Five of 20
24 October 1992 held at Cotonou, Benin, and the final communique of
14:33:18 25 the first meeting of the Monitoring Committee of Nine on the
26 Liberian conflict issued at Abuja, Nigeria, on 7 November 1992;

27 Regretting that parties to the conflict in Liberia have not
28 respected or implemented the various accords to date, especially
29 the Yamoussoukro IV Accord;

1 Determining that the deterioration of the situation in
2 Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
3 particularly in West Africa as a whole;

14:33:59 4 Recalling the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Charter of
5 the United Nations;

6 Noting that the deterioration of the situation hinders the
7 creation of conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair
8 elections in accordance with the Yamoussoukro IV Accord;

14:34:17 9 Welcoming the continued commitment of ECOWAS to and the
10 efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict;

11 Further welcoming the endorsement and support by the OAU of
12 these efforts;

13 Noting the request of 29 July 1992 from ECOWAS for the
14 United Nations to dispatch an observer group to Liberia to verify
14:34:38 15 and monitor the electoral process;

16 Taking note of the invitation of ECOWAS of 20 October 1992,
17 in Cotonou, Benin, for the Secretary-General to consider, if
18 necessary, the dispatch of a group to observe the encampment and
19 disarmament of the warring parties;

14:35:01 20 Recognising the need for increased humanitarian assistance;

21 Taking into account the request made by the permanent
22 representative of Benin;

23 Also taking into account the letter of the foreign minister
24 of Liberia endorsing the request made by - on behalf of ECOWAS;
14:35:22 25 and convinced that it is vital to find a peaceful, just and
26 lasting solution to the conflict in Liberia; and commending
27 ECOWAS for its efforts; reaffirms its belief that the
28 Yamoussoukro IV Accord offers the best possible framework for a
29 peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict; and condemning the

1 violations of the ceasefire and the continued armed attacks upon
2 all parties. And after requesting that they respect the
3 provisions of the peace accord. At 8, over the page, decides,
4 under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations that all
14:35:57 5 states shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and
6 stability in Liberia, immediately implement a general and
7 complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
8 equipment to Liberia until the security Security Council decides
9 otherwise;

14:36:18 10 Decides within the same framework that the embargo imposed
11 by paragraph 8 above shall not apply to weapons and military
12 equipment destined for the sole use of the peacekeeping force of
13 ECOWAS in Liberia, subject to any review that may be required in
14 conformity with the report of the Secretary-General. And all
14:36:47 15 states to respect the measures. I don't think we need anything
16 more than that.

17 Now, Mr Taylor, for how long was that resolution in place,
18 if you can help us?

19 A. Well, to the best of my knowledge, it is still in place.

14:37:10 20 Q. And that is despite, is it not, the efforts on behalf of
21 the Liberian government through ECOWAS to have it lifted?

22 A. That is correct.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I ask, please, that that
24 UN Security Council Resolution 788 of 1992 be marked for
14:37:43 25 identification MFI-228.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-228.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Now, from there, Mr Taylor, again, we jump. Now, following
29 your election in 1997, Mr Taylor, do you recall any communication

1 from the Secretary-General on that issue?

2 A. Yes. There was a letter from the Secretary-General, a
3 report.

4 Q. Yes. From the Secretary-General to whom?

14:38:45 5 A. To the Security Council detailing the efforts of the
6 elections in Liberia, detailing the results and some of the
7 difficulties they had in executing the elections, but that they
8 were free, fair and transparent.

9 Q. And remind us, who did you say wrote it?

14:39:09 10 A. The Secretary-General.

11 Q. Have a look behind divider 11 in that same volume, please.
12 Do you recognise that document, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, this is the document.

14 Q. And we see that it's dated 24 July 1997?

14:39:44 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Remind us, what was the date of the election?

17 A. The elections were held on 7 July.

18 Q. Yes. The document we see reads as follows:

19 "Following the official announcement of the results of the
14:40:24 20 recently concluded elections in Liberia, I am pleased to inform
21 you of the successful completion of the electoral process which
22 constituted the final element of the revised schedule of
23 implementation of the Abuja agreement. In support of the efforts
24 of the Economic Community of West African States, the United
14:40:48 25 Nations observer mission in Liberia played an effective and
26 critical role in bringing about this outcome.

27 In February 1997, consistent with the United Nations
28 recommendation on a framework for the holding of elections in
29 Liberia, ECOWAS and the Liberian parties established an agreed

1 framework for the conduct of elections. On 2 April 1997, an
2 Independent Elections Commission was established in Liberia, with
3 the support of ECOWAS, for the purpose of organising and
4 conducting elections in Liberia. A special elections law was
14:41:25 5 drafted by the Independent Election Commission providing for the
6 preparation and conduct of the elections in conformity with
7 international standards for democratic elections. The law was
8 endorsed by the extraordinary summit of the ECOWAS Leaders held
9 at Abuja on 21 May 1997 following consultation with the Liberian
14:41:51 10 political parties.

11 Logistical constraints experienced throughout the country
12 during the registration process were overcome with the
13 coordinated support of all the international actors, particularly
14 the ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG), UNOMIL, the European Union
14:42:11 15 and the United States of America. In the end, the Independent
16 Elections Commission succeeded in registering over 750,000
17 voters, including many returning refugees. This impressive
18 achievement far exceeded expectations and clearly demonstrated
19 the enthusiasm of the Liberian people for the electoral process.

14:42:43 20 The large number of registration sites and their wide
21 distribution throughout the country afforded Liberians a fair and
22 adequate opportunity to register themselves for the elections.

23 The political parties contesting the elections conducted a
24 vigorous campaign. The campaign extended across the country and
14:43:02 25 was conducted in a generally civil and peaceful atmosphere. With
26 ECOMOG providing security, political parties were free to travel
27 and open offices in all parts of the country and thereby take
28 their messages to the people.

29 In order to observe and verify the polling exercise, over

1 500 international electoral observers, including a total of 317
2 medium- and short-term observers from UNOMIL, were deployed
3 throughout all 13 counties of the country. The UNOMIL observers
4 visited over 1,500 of the 1,864 polling stations. Throughout the
14:43:50 5 country they reported that polling was conducted in an organised
6 and efficient manner and without reports of violence or
7 intimidation. Voter turnout was high, and voters everywhere
8 conducted themselves in an orderly and peaceful manner. No
9 serious incidents were reported on polling day, and while a
14:44:15 10 number of technical irregularities were noted, there were no
11 reports of major irregularities or of any circumstances that
12 could have affected the outcome or credibility of the polling
13 process. Many observers noted the relatively large number of
14 people asking for assistance in casting their ballots, owing to
14:44:41 15 the very high rate of illiteracy throughout the country. In
16 assessing the overall conduct of the polling, it was apparent
17 that all eligible Liberians had a fair opportunity to vote for a
18 political party of their choice.

19 Counting took place at polling stations immediately after
14:45:08 20 the close of voting. In all cases, party agents and national and
21 international observers had an opportunity to be present at the
22 unsealing of the transparent ballot boxes and the counting and
23 tallying of votes at the polling sites by the presiding officers.
24 ECOMOG was also present at every polling station, including
14:45:29 25 during the counting and tallying of votes. Final results from
26 each polling site were announced by the presiding officer in the
27 presence of party agents, national and international observers,
28 and ECOMOG. Tally sheets were verified by the party agents
29 present, who were also entitled to receive copies of the tally

1 sheet.

2 The tabulation of results was conducted by the Independent
3 Electoral Commission in Monrovia in the presence of party agents,
4 national and international observers, and ECOMOG. Partial

14:46:13 5 results were released by the Independent Electoral Commission
6 beginning on 20 July as they became available. Tabulation of the
7 results was completed on 24 July, and final official results were
8 announced by the Independent Electoral Commission at that time.

9 The official results showed that Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor of the
14:46:41 10 National Patriotic Front had received an absolute majority of
11 votes cast, thereby making unnecessary the holding of a second
12 round of balloting.

13 Earlier today, I issued a joint statement with the Chairman
14 of ECOWAS, General Sani Abacha, Head of State of Nigeria,
14:47:02 15 verifying that the elections had been held in a secure
16 environment, that the process had been credible and transparent,
17 and that the announced results were in accordance with the votes
18 cast. On behalf of the United Nations and ECOWAS, the elections
19 were certified as having been free and fair.

14:47:24 20 I commend the Independent Electoral Commission for its
21 effective management of the elections and ECOMOG for ensuring a
22 secure environment for the electoral process. I also commend the
23 international donor community for its effective and generous
24 assistance to the electoral process. I commend and congratulate
14:47:44 25 ECOWAS countries for their persistence and determination in
26 seeing the peace process through to a successful conclusion and
27 for their efforts at making this unprecedented joint operation
28 between the United Nations and ECOWAS under Chapter VIII of the
29 charter of the United Nations a success. It is an example of the

1 type of cooperation that can help to give new impetus to
2 international efforts to promote peace and stability in Africa
3 and throughout the world.

4 Above all, however, I congratulate the people of Liberia
14:48:22 5 for the serious and responsible manner in which they've
6 demonstrated their commitment to democracy and their support for
7 the peace process. I look forward to early discussions with the
8 new government on how the United Nations can best assist
9 Liberia's efforts at national reconciliation, reconstruction and
14:48:43 10 development. "

11 Can I ask, please, Mr President, that that document be
12 marked for identification, letter dated 24 July 1997 from the
13 Secretary-General addressed to the President of the United
14 Nations Security Council, MFI-229, please.

14:49:02 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI-229.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

17 Q. Now, let's move now, please, Mr Taylor, to 1997. Do you
18 follow me?

19 A. 1997.

14:50:02 20 Q. Now, can you assist us now as to what ECOWAS was engaged in
21 at that time with regard to Sierra Leone?

22 A. Well, you had - at this particular time the Committee of
23 Five is constituted.

24 Q. Yes.

14:50:24 25 A. Later that year the committee meets and prepares a report
26 for the Security Council dealing with the problems in Sierra
27 Leone, and that report is forwarded to the Security Council.

28 Q. Yes. And can you recall now the import of that report?

29 A. Yes, the report - in fact, these are - they deal

1 specifically with the plan - the ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra
2 Leone, and we go on to talk about the process of disarmament,
3 demobilisation and the prospect of moving forward with the peace
4 process in Sierra Leone, especially with the date that had been
14:51:30 5 set by ECOWAS for the return of power by the junta to the
6 legitimate government of President Kabbah.

7 Q. Yes. And were these decisions reported anywhere,
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, they were reported. The Committee of Five did a
14:51:55 10 report on those procedures.

11 Q. Yes. And can you help us as to a month in that year?

12 A. That report - in fact, this occurred in Conakry. That had
13 to be about - I would put it to the last quarter of 1997.

14 Q. Very well. Can I, for a little while, please invite
14:52:24 15 everyone's attention to the bundle of documents served for week
16 34, which should be a slim volume in a plastic folder. Yes,
17 could invite your attention, please, behind divider 2 in that
18 document - in that bundle, I mean. Do you have it now,
19 Mr Taylor?

14:53:42 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. What is this?

22 A. This is the meeting in Conakry of the Committee of Five
23 dealing with the plan - the whole peace plan for Sierra Leone.

24 Q. Now help me. Were you present at this meeting?

14:53:57 25 A. No, I was not. This is a foreign ministers' meeting.

26 Q. Now, we see that the document is headed "Economic Community
27 of West African States, Sixth Meeting of Foreign Affairs
28 Ministers of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, Conakry,
29 22-23 October 1997, Communique":

1 "The ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone
2 held a meeting in Conakry on 22-23 October 1997.

3 In continuation of the negotiations initiated in Abidjan on
4 17 and 18 July 1997 and 29 and 30 July 1997, the committee held
14:54:53 5 discussions with an enlarged delegation of Major Johnny Paul
6 Koroma.

7 The meeting reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone since
8 the breakdown of the negotiations between the Committee of Five
9 and the representatives of the junta since 30 July 1997. It
14:55:12 10 recalled the ECOWAS decisions concerning the monitoring of the
11 ceasefire, the imposition of sanctions and the embargo, as well
12 as the restoration of peace to Sierra Leone by ECOMOG. It also
13 recalled resolution 1132 of the United Nations Security Council,
14 dated 8 October 1997, placing an embargo on Sierra Leone.

14:55:39 15 The Committee of Five and the junta's delegation agreed to
16 accelerate efforts towards the peaceful resolution of the Sierra
17 Leonean crisis.

18 To this end, the Committee of Five and the representatives
19 of Major Johnny Paul Koroma adopted an ECOWAS peace plan for
14:55:56 20 Sierra Leone and a timetable for its implementation over a
21 six-month period with effect from 23 October 1997. "

22 Now, Mr Taylor, that plan - that timetable, I should say,
23 do you recall now what it entailed?

24 A. Yes. What the decision was was that there would be
14:56:33 25 negotiations and that in April, actually - it should have been
26 April of 1998 was the official turnover date by the junta to the
27 legitimate government of President Kabbah. But as we all know,
28 it was short circuited by at least two or three months when the
29 intervention occurred in February. But the actual time should

1 have been April of 1998 when it involved the process where there
2 would be a turnover and the RUF would be disarmed and demobilised
3 and that the legitimate government would take over of President
4 Kabbah.

14:57:13 5 Q. So I just want to make sure I understand. So we have this
6 agreement in October 1997?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. That there will be this six-month timetable?

9 A. That is correct.

14:57:30 10 Q. And that was due to conclude, was it, in April 1998?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. So what occurred to change things and lead to the
13 intervention in February?

14 A. Well, one of the things that came to light was that it was
14:57:52 15 believed that the junta had intentions of holding power for an
16 extended period and not adhering to the date. In fact, at a
17 meeting this information came out and everybody said well, if the
18 junta is not going to be serious to turn over, then we may as
19 well act, you know, sooner than was expected, and this is what
14:58:18 20 led to the intervention, because --

21 Q. Who's "we"?

22 A. Well, ECOWAS. ECOWAS.

23 Q. "It is recognised that Corporal Foday Sankoh as a leader of
24 RUF should continue to play an active role and participate in the
14:58:38 25 peace process. In the spirit of the Abidjan accord and in the
26 context of this agreement, Corporal Foday Sankoh is expected to
27 return to his country to make this contribution to the peace
28 process.

29 The ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone provides for:

1 The reinstatement of the legitimate government of President
2 Tejan Kabbah within a period of six months; the immediate
3 cessation of hostilities; cooperation of the junta with ECOMOG in
4 order to peacefully enforce the sanctions; disarmament,
14:59:18 5 demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; the provision of
6 humanitarian assistance; return of refugees and displaced
7 persons; immunities and guarantees to the leaders of the 25 May
8 1997 coup d'etat; modalities for broadening the power base in
9 Sierra Leone.

14:59:41 10 The Committee of Five and the representatives of Major
11 Johnny Paul Koroma agreed to continue negotiations towards
12 effective and prompt implementation of the peace plan.

13 The meeting renewed its appeal to the international
14 community to provide appropriate humanitarian assistance to the
15:00:02 15 refugees and displaced persons and to facilitate their return.

16 The meeting reiterated its appeal to the international
17 community to provide adequate assistance to the neighbouring
18 countries of Sierra Leone which have recorded an increased influx
19 of refugees on their territory.

15:00:20 20 The meeting expressed its appreciation to the United
21 Nations and the Organisation of African Unity for their
22 cooperation with ECOWAS and appealed to them for material,
23 logistic and financial support to ECOMOG to enable it to carry
24 out the mandate given by the Authority of Heads of State and
15:00:43 25 Government and the United Nations Security Council."

26 And expression of thanks, and then we see that this was
27 done at Conakry, 23rd day of October 1997.

28 Now, Mr Taylor, just to look at another detail in relation
29 to that, did Liberia have a representative at that meeting?

1 A. Defi ni tel y.

2 Q. And who was that?

3 A. The forei gn mi ni ster.

4 MR GRI FFITHS: Now, before I lose track of things, can I
15:01:18 5 ask, please, that that communi que be marked for i denti fi ca ti on
6 MFI -230.

7 PRESI DI NG JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI -230.

8 MR GRI FFITHS:

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, prior to that meeting of the foreign
15:01:37 10 affairs mi ni sters, had ECOWAS devel oped any programme regardi ng
11 events in Sierra Leone and any potential role for ECOMOG in that
12 country?

13 A. Yes. Well, there were a series of decisions taken and
14 published by the ECOWAS journal on the di fferent roles because
15:02:16 15 what - ECOMOG was then given a more substantive role in Sierra
16 Leone, that came out, if I'm not mi staken, a little around August
17 or so where --

18 Q. What came out?

19 A. The deci sion on the role of ECOMOG in - and how it would
15:02:38 20 perform in Sierra Leone.

21 Q. Okay. And this was a journal, you say?

22 A. Yes. The ECOWAS journal publishes all decisions that are
23 taken by ECOWAS and that journal - those decisions were taken and
24 came out in August of 1997, if I'm not mi staken.

15:03:02 25 Q. Have a look behind di vider 3 in that same volume, please.
26 Do you recognise that document?

27 A. Yes, this is the official journal and it comprises several
28 decisions and of which one of them is that of what ECOMOG would
29 do in Sierra Leone.

1 Q. Yes. Now, a quick look at the index and the only, it would
2 appear, items which concern us are 7, 8, 9 and 11. Is that true,
3 Mr Taylor?

4 A. That is correct.

15:04:02 5 Q. So let's restrict ourselves to those, shall we. Let's go
6 to page 13. We see there, do we not, in the left-hand column
7 "decision extending the scope of activity and mandate of ECOMOG
8 to cover Sierra Leone:

9 "The Authority of Heads of State and Government, mindful
15:04:42 10 of Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the revised treaty of the Economic
11 Community of West African States establishing the Authority of
12 Heads of State and Government and defining its composition and
13 functions.

14 Mindful also of the decision of the Authority of Heads of
15:04:58 15 State and Government of 28 November 1990 approving the creation
16 of an ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group in Liberia.

17 Considering that the objectives being pursued by ECOWAS
18 with regard to the situation prevailing in Sierra Leone following
19 the coup d'etat of 25 May 1997 are the speedy reinstatement of
15:05:22 20 the legitimate government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the
21 restoration of peace and security in Sierra Leone and the
22 resolution of the problem of refugees and displaced persons.

23 Welcoming the unreserved support of the United Nations
24 Security Council and the Heads of State and government of the
15:05:40 25 Organisation of African Unity for the above-mentioned objectives.

26 Deploring the breakdown on 30 July 1997 of the negotiations
27 between representatives of the illegal regime in Sierra Leone and
28 the ECOWAS ministerial Committee of Four set up to monitor the
29 situation in Sierra Leone.

1 Considering that the intransigence and negative attitude
2 shown by the junta constitute a serious obstacle to the efforts
3 being made by ECOWAS to ensure a peaceful settlement of the
4 crisis and poses a serious threat to peace and security in the
15:06:21 5 sub-region.

6 And deeply concerned at the worsening of the crisis in
7 Sierra Leone.

8 Convinced that the strict application of certain measures
9 instituted to make possible the attainment of the objectives of
15:06:33 10 ECOWAS requires the urgent intervention of the armed forces.

11 Convinced further that the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring
12 group in Liberia is the only force in the sub-region capable of
13 prompt response to any requests in this regard and that it has
14 the relevant expertise to achieve this purpose.

15:06:53 15 Convinced of the needs to extend the scope of activity of
16 ECOMOG to Sierra Leone and to modify its mandate accordingly.

17 On the recommendation of the second meeting of ministers of
18 foreign affairs on Sierra Leone decides:

19 The scope and activity of ECOMOG is hereby extended into
15:07:23 20 the territory of Sierra Leone to assist in creating the conducive
21 atmosphere that would ensure the early reinstatement of the
22 legitimate Government of Sierra Leone. To this end, it shall
23 carry out the following tasks:

24 Monitor and supervise all ceasefire violations; enforce the
15:07:40 25 sanctions regime and the embargo instituted by the authority of
26 Heads of State and government against the illegal regime and
27 undertake any other assignments in Sierra Leone as may be given
28 to it by the authority."

29 And then further, supplementary decisions are made which

1 need not detain us. And we see that that is done at Abuja on 29
2 August 1997 and bears the signature of His Excellency General
3 Sani Abacha, the chairman.

15:08:29 4 Now, the second document is page 14, sanctions against the
5 illegal regime in Sierra Leone. And I think we can deal with
6 this quite swiftly because, having borne in mind and recalled and
7 considered various matters, over the page, please, page 15,
8 decides:

15:09:00 9 "Article 1. The community and its member states reaffirm
10 their decisions to spare no effort to restore the democratically
11 elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as soon as
12 possible.

15:09:18 13 Article 2. Member states hereby place a general and total
14 embargo on all supplies of petroleum products, arms and military
15 equipment to Sierra Leone. They shall also abstain from
16 transacting any business of a commercial nature with that
17 country. To that end, member states shall:

15:09:41 18 A. Prevent the sale or supply by their nationals or from
19 their territories of the use of their flag vessels or aircraft of
20 petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related materials of
21 all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles
22 and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the
23 aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories,
24 to any person or legal entity for the purpose of any business
15:10:00 25 carried out in or operated from the Republic of Sierra Leone and
26 any activities by their nationals or in their territories which
27 promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply.

28 Prohibit any and all traffic from entering the territory or
29 territorial waters of the Republic of Sierra Leone carrying

1 petroleum or petroleum products, or arms and related material of
2 all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and
3 equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the
4 aforementioned.

15:10:35 5 Prevent from entering their respective territories all
6 members of the illegal regime as well as military officers,
7 members of their families and other persons directly or
8 indirectly connected with the regime and deny the use of their
9 airspace to aircraft belonging to or carrying any member of the
15:10:57 10 regime.

11 Prevent any activities by their nationals or on their
12 territories which would promote the export or transshipment of
13 commodities or products originating in Sierra Leone and
14 transactions by their nationals or flag vessels or aircraft or in
15:11:17 15 their territory any commodities or products originating in the
16 Republic of Sierra Leone or exported therefrom.

17 Member states shall prohibit the importation of commodities
18 and products originated in Sierra Leone and the exportation of
19 goods to that country except goods meant for humanitarian
15:11:41 20 purposes.

21 Member states shall freeze funds held in their territories
22 by members of the illegal regime, military officers and civilians
23 directly or indirectly connected with the regime as well as their
24 families.

15:11:56 25 The embargo imposed by this decision shall not apply to
26 arms, military equipment, military assistance, police equipment
27 and spare parts meant for the exclusive use of the sub-regional
28 force which shall be responsible for applying the measures
29 contained in the decision. "

1 Then ECOMOG shall employ all necessary means to implement
2 this decision.

3 I don't think we need trouble any further with that.

4 Now, Mr Taylor, quickly go over to page 16. This was a
15:12:33 5 decision made in Abuja on the 25th day of August 1997, so shortly
6 after your inauguration. Were you present at this meeting?

7 A. No, I was not.

8 Q. Right. And whilst we're here, on that page 16 we see a
9 decision extending the tenure of the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring
15:13:03 10 group in Liberia. Let's just quickly get the flavour of this,
11 please. Having borne in mind various matters, let's go straight
12 to the decision, over the page, page 17:

13 "In order to consolidate peace: Article 1. The tenure of
14 the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group in Liberia shall, at the
15:13:27 15 request of the Government of Liberia, be extended for a period
16 mutually agreed by both parties.

17 The decision shall enter into force upon signature. It
18 shall be published in the official journal of the community by
19 the executive secretariat."

15:13:47 20 Now, two matters there, Mr Taylor, with which you can
21 assist us. Firstly this: It says there at Article 1 that it was
22 at the request of the Government of Liberia that the tenure of
23 ECOMOG be extended. Was it at your request?

24 A. Yes.

15:14:10 25 Q. Why?

26 A. Well, we just had come into office and the situation is
27 still fragile on the ground. That's not the time to ask for
28 ECOMOG to be withdrawn, but what we did ask for was to have a
29 status of forces agreement considered that would define the

1 functions of - and I just want to - I'm sorry, I probably misled
2 the Court when I answered your question. This is my first
3 meeting at the end of August to - ECOWAS meeting. I am present
4 at this meeting. The question was asked I am present at the
15:14:51 5 meeting in August --

6 Q. So you were present at the Abuja meeting on 29 August?

7 A. At the Abuja meeting. My first meeting to the committee,
8 yes.

9 Q. And again remind us, what was mutually agreed as the
15:15:09 10 departure date?

11 A. For ECOMOG? Well, there were several things that I asked
12 for. A status of forces agreement, but I also was interested in
13 ECOMOG being present for capacity building, helping to train our
14 security forces, our police and other things. So we had not set
15:15:30 15 a definite time limit for ECOMOG to leave. We just wanted to
16 make sure that the draw down was one that did not place any
17 threat to the national security of Liberia, but that they would
18 be contained and not continue to behave as though they are an
19 occupying military force.

15:15:53 20 Q. The final document I'd like us to look at in this journal
21 is the one which commences at page 18. And see that it is a
22 decision relating to the lifting of the sanctions and embargo
23 against Liberia, yes?

24 A. Yes.

15:16:19 25 Q. Now, let us skip the "mindfuls" and the "considering" on
26 the page and go straight to the decision overleaf, please, on
27 page 19 yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. "The member states - Article 1 - hereby immediately lift

1 the embargo on the import of arms and military hardware to
2 Liberia as well as all other sanctions imposed against Liberia
3 and all the parties to the Liberian conflict.

4 The Executive Secretary shall request the Secretary-General
15:16:59 5 of the United Nations to have the embargo imposed against Liberia
6 by the Security Council lifted."

7 Yes, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, I take it that was at your request?

15:17:12 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, just so that we get the perspective, recently we
12 looked at the year 2002 when additional measures were imposed
13 against Liberia?

14 A. Yes.

15:17:29 15 Q. So are we to understand that from as early as a few days,
16 in fact, after your inauguration, your neighbours in West Africa
17 were advocating that sanctions be lifted against Liberia?

18 A. Definitely. Definitely.

19 Q. And so from August 1997 until - well, at least 2002, five
15:18:02 20 years, they remained in place, despite the fact that your
21 neighbours were advocating their lifting?

22 A. Yes. That's true, yes.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Unless I'm asked to, that's all I intend to
24 refer to in that document.

15:18:21 25 Mr President, could I ask that the official journal of the
26 Economic Community of West African States, volume 33, dated
27 August 1997, be marked for identification, please, MFI-231.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, marked MFI-231.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, earlier we looked at that communique which
2 followed the meeting of the ministers of the Committee of Five on
3 Sierra Leone in Conakry in October 1997, yes?

4 A. That is correct.

15:19:03 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, at or about that time did your government
6 take any steps with regard to the situation in Sierra Leone?

7 A. Yes, we did.

8 Q. October 1997. What was that?

9 A. What we did, we - in furtherance of moving the process in
15:19:37 10 Sierra Leone, we closed - my government closed the border with
11 Sierra Leone in October. To make sure that we would begin the
12 process of helping to implement the return, we closed the border
13 with Sierra Leone.

14 Q. Was that decision made public, Mr Taylor?

15:20:08 15 A. Yes, it was made public. As a matter of fact, it was
16 published in - we made the statement on the radio. It was
17 covered by journals in Liberia and in Sierra Leone.

18 Q. Stay with that same volume, please, and have a look behind
19 divider 1. Do you have it?

15:20:37 20 A. Yes, just a minute. Yes, yes.

21 Q. 22 October 1997, Sierra Leone News :

22 "Talks aimed at resolving the crisis in Sierra Leone got
23 underway in Conakry, Guinea, Tuesday. The AFRC-led military
24 junta sent a 21-member delegation led by Secretary of State for
15:21:03 25 Foreign Affairs Pallo Bangura to meet with foreign ministers of
26 the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone.

27 Liberia closed its border with Sierra Leone on Wednesday
28 and said it would strictly limit the use of its territory for
29 military action to restore the government of President Ahmad

1 Tejan Kabbah. A Foreign Ministry statement said any military
2 operations would have to be explicitly sanctioned by ECOWAS, the
3 United Nations Security Council, and the Liberian government.
4 Liberia would only support the use of force as a last resort if
15:21:44 5 ECOWAS decided it was necessary and it received the approval of
6 the Security Council. The action followed Liberian Foreign
7 Minister Monie Captan's criticism of bombing raids by the
8 Nigerian-led ECOMOG force.

9 Military officials in Kenema said Tuesday that Nigerian
15:22:06 10 ECOMOG troops attacked a commercial vehicle at Bandama Village on
11 Sunday, killing the driver and seriously wounding two passengers.
12 A military spokesman said the vehicle, which was carrying 30
13 passengers, were passing through the town when it ran into an
14 ambush. The driver, Borbor James, was shot in the head and died
15:22:27 15 instantly. The injured passengers, diamond miner Ibrahim Koroma
16 and businessman Forward Bah, were admitted to Bo Government
17 Hospital, where they remain in serious condition.

18 Kenema is reported tense after an attack Tuesday by a
19 Nigerian Alpha fighter jet which, according to AFRC spokesman
15:22:48 20 Alyiu Kamara, killed 20 civilians and four military personnel.
21 Residents reported that Sierra Leonean and Nigerian troops traded
22 artillery fire throughout Tuesday night. There was no report on
23 casualties. A retired military officer in Kenema was reported as
24 saying, 'The atmosphere is so tense the renewed fighting can
15:23:09 25 break out at any time'.

26 British United Nations Ambassador Sir John Weston expressed
27 dismay over ECOMOG's bombing raids in Sierra Leone and questioned
28 whether the Nigerians had any authority from anyone to undertake
29 such action. Weston said he had raised the issue in the Security

1 Council and that several delegations were concerned about the
2 bombings, which have killed and injured civilians and caused many
3 others to flee the capital. Weston said that the United Nations
4 resolution had not authorised Nigeria to bomb Freetown in order
15:23:42 5 to restore ousted President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power. 'I have
6 asked for clarification on the basis of what authorisation,
7 whether from ECOWAS or the United Nations, such action is being
8 carried out,' Weston said, adding that the United Nations
9 Security Council would discuss the issue again this week."

15:24:10 10 So, Mr Taylor, I take it from that that Nigeria's or
11 ECOWAS's efforts to secure the return of President Ahmad Tejan
12 Kabbah didn't attract the wholehearted support of the United
13 Kingdom?

14 A. No, no, no. I'm not sure if we can interpret it that way.
15:24:35 15 I would say that the United Kingdom supported the return of
16 President Kabbah within the context of the peace plan that ECOWAS
17 had put together. Now, what had occurred during that time was
18 that efforts were underway to begin the process, and what the
19 British were trying to do - that I have mentioned here a couple
15:25:04 20 of times - the British were trying to make sure that all actions
21 that would be taken: (1), would be the decision of ECOWAS; and
22 (2), would be under Chapter VII, the Security Council, that
23 authorises the use of force. I figure by this, Britain - who
24 have a control over whatever Nigeria was doing - because even
15:25:32 25 though we're talking about ECOWAS, most other major countries in
26 the international community, especially Britain, saw this whole
27 ECOWAS situation and ECOMOG as being dominated by Nigeria and had
28 no intention of letting Nigeria have her way, you know, so to
29 speak, in Sierra Leone. And this accounts for my own position

1 too, where my government has said that we would not support any
2 action unless it was approved by ECOWAS and had received backing
3 under Chapter VII authorising the use of force, and this was done
4 because we had also been warned in a little way - remember, we've
15:26:25 5 led evidence here that - in fact, in the letter that I wrote to
6 Abacha warning him that we have been warned that Nigeria would
7 not have her way, and I guess because of that, ECOWAS did not
8 seek finally Chapter VII approval in February for the
9 intervention. And so I do not read it as though Britain did not
15:26:49 10 want, but rather Britain wanted it done within, as I said, the
11 context of an ECOWAS approval and the Security Council Chapter
12 VII resolution granting that approval.

13 Q. Very well. Mr Taylor, we have already considered a
14 communique that was issued following the meeting of the Committee
15:27:24 15 of Five in October, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, following that communique, did the ECOWAS Committee of
18 Five - were they required to report to the United Nations at all?

19 A. Yes. All of these decisions had to be taken to New York.

15:27:52 20 So following that October meeting, and seeing all these bombing
21 raids starting - and there were criticism from all parts - later
22 that year, to the best of my recollection I think it was in
23 December, the Committee of Five did go to New York to explain the
24 position of ECOWAS to the Security Council.

15:28:20 25 Q. Yes. And was that explanation provided in writing or what?

26 A. The committee went. They provided it in writing.

27 Q. And was there a report of some kind brought into existence?

28 A. Yes, there was a report. There was a report that was
29 delivered on the activities of ECOWAS at that time, ECOMOG and

1 what the peace plan - what the plan was that had been developed
2 for Sierra Leone.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, I apologise for inconveniencing
4 everyone, but could we put that bundle to one side momentarily
15:29:08 5 and please take up volume 1 of 4 of week 33. Can I invite
6 everyone's attention behind divider 12, please:

7 Q. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I forget, can I ask, please, that the
15:30:13 10 Sierra Leone News, October 1997, reporting the closing of the
11 border between Sierra Leone and Liberia be marked for
12 identification MFI-232, please.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, marked MFI-232.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:30:36 15 Q. And now we're looking, Mr Taylor, are we not, at the second
16 report of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone to the
17 United Nations Security Council, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Let's go to the second page of this document, please:

15:31:35 20 "The third round of negotiations between the ECOWAS
21 ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and the
22 representatives of the junta in Sierra Leone, held in Conakry,
23 culminated in the signing of the ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra
24 Leone on 23 October 1997.

15:31:53 25 The six-point peace plan aims at restoring constitutional
26 rule to Sierra Leone and the reinstatement of President Ahmad
27 Tejan Kabbah. As a prelude to that, the peace plan provides for
28 cessation of hostilities, reintegration of combatants,
29 humanitarian assistance, return of refugees and displaced

1 persons.

2 This is the second report to the Security Council on the
3 situation in Sierra Leone and is made pursuant to the Security
4 Council Resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997. It concerns
15:32:38 5 the measures taken including political and military to implement
6 the peace plan, the United Nations Security Council resolution
7 and the decision of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and
8 Government imposing sanctions on the illegal regime in Sierra
9 Leone.

15:32:55 10 The peace plan is to implemented over a period of six
11 months, from 23 October 1997 to 22 April 1998, when it is
12 expected that President Kabbah will resume the leadership of the
13 country. It provides for concerted military, diplomatic and
14 political initiatives on the part of all ECOWAS member states,
15:33:21 15 ECOMOG, the United Nations, the international community and the
16 actual stakeholders in the peace process, namely the government
17 of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the junta and the Sierra Leonean people
18 themselves.

19 ECOMOG has been mandated under the peace plan, the decision
15:33:39 20 of the ECOWAS Heads of State and government on sanctions against
21 the illegal regime in Sierra Leone and the United Nations
22 Security Council Resolution 1132 of 8 October 1997, to take
23 certain military action in collaboration with the junta, the
24 legitimate government and the United Nations to bring an end to
15:34:01 25 the crisis. Such military action includes monitoring the
26 ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants,
27 enforcement of the sanctions, et cetera.

28 The peace plan provides for immediate cessation of
29 hostilities (that is, from 23 October 1997) and the establishment

1 of a monitoring and verification mechanism which will be
2 supervised by ECOMOG and assisted by the United Nations military
3 observer group. The ceasefire had substantially been observed
4 except for intermittent clashes between the Kamajor militia and
15:34:44 5 the junta's forces. These fights take place mainly around the
6 diamond rich areas and are carried out over the economic control
7 of the diamond fields. It is expected that ECOMOG forces, once
8 deployed into Sierra Leone, will put an end to these clashes.

9 With regard to the monitoring and verification of the
15:35:13 10 ceasefire, a Ceasefire Violations Committee has been established
11 on 11 November 1997 following the first meeting in Sierra Leone
12 between ECOMOG and the AFRC junta to discuss modalities for the
13 implementation of the peace plan.

14 Activities of had Ceasefire Violations Committee are yet to
15:35:34 15 begin and will be in full force following the deployment of
16 ECOMOG troops and the United Nations military observer team.

17 From the beginning of the crisis, the ECOMOG force
18 commander, who has his headquarters in Monrovia, Liberia, had
19 been in constant one to one contact by telephone with the leader
15:35:57 20 of the junta in Sierra Leone, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, to
21 discuss one issue or another. This has proved to be very
22 useful."

23 Mr Taylor, can I pause there.

24 A. Yes.

15:36:14 25 Q. Who was this ECOMOG force commander? Remember, we're
26 talking about 1997.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Who was it?

29 A. That was Major General Victor Malu.

1 Q. And so operations by ECOMOG in Sierra Leone were being
2 directed from Monrovia, were they?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And bearing in mind the various documents we've recently
15:36:41 5 looked at today, when was it that ECOMOG had been deployed in
6 this mandated capacity in Sierra Leone?

7 A. This came a little - I would say a little earlier in 1997
8 that had ECOMOG had been put in this role.

9 Q. "Formal discussion between ECOMOG and the junta started on
15:37:09 10 11 November 1997 when top-ranking representatives of both sides
11 met in Kossoh Town, Sierra Leone, to concretely discuss
12 modalities for the implementation of the military aspects of the
13 peace plan.

14 This meeting was the ice-breaker between ECOMOG and the
15:37:28 15 AFRC and may be considered as one of the most important in the
16 quest for peace in Sierra Leone. The following is a summary of
17 the outcome of that meeting:

18 1. Deployment of ECOMOG.

19 The ECOMOG force commander assured the AFRC delegation of
15:37:51 20 the need for ECOMOG to be deployed as soon as possible in order
21 to ensure the cessation of hostilities. ECOMOG troops would act
22 as buffer between the Kamajor militia and the AFRC combatants.

23 As a start, ECOMOG troops and the AFRC soldiers would be
24 jointly deployed to Freetown and its sea and airports in order to
15:38:31 25 facilitate the transition to legitimate rule and to re-open these
26 facilities to domestic and international traffic. It was also
27 agreed that ECOMOG could deploy to vantage points in Sierra Leone
28 for effective enforcement of the embargo.

29 Subsequent deployment for disarmament purposes would

1 involve all parties concerned, namely ECOMOG, the UN military
2 observers and the AFRC. It was also agreed that full details of
3 deployment would be worked out at subsequent meetings.

4 The creation of safe havens was considered not necessary
15:39:13 5 for the moment given the near total absence of hostilities. It
6 is to be noted, however, that internally displaced persons
7 continue to flow into ECOMOG-controlled areas for safety."

8 Mr Taylor, can I pause for a moment and seek your
9 assistance in relation to something. Going back over the page to
15:39:36 10 page 3, we see that "formal discussions between ECOMOG and the
11 junta started on 11 November 1997", yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And we see that paragraph 10 that that was regarded as the
14 ice-breaker, yes?

15:40:01 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, this would have been some four months after the coup
17 on 25 May of that year, wouldn't it?

18 A. Yes, yes.

19 Q. And this would be, what, less than two months after you had
15:40:21 20 been inaugurated as President?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Now, bearing in mind, of course, Mr Taylor, that you were
23 supposed to have conspired with the AFRC and were in control of
24 them, help us, why did you allow them to speak to ECOMOG in this
15:40:39 25 way?

26 A. Well, I didn't even know of the AFRC, and for anyone to say
27 that I would think that would be just out of this world. If we
28 even look at the facts surrounding the AFRC taking over power
29 that we know, let's be reminded that the armed forces of Sierra

1 Leone seized power from their government. Even Johnny Paul
2 Koroma that took over the government, as far as we know, was in
3 prison at the time of the coup and was released from prison. So
4 unless somebody is saying that at this particular time that I am
15:41:35 5 not even President of Liberia but busy involved in preparing to
6 be elected, for elections in Liberia, where we are seriously
7 campaigning, unless somebody is assuming that I am in contact
8 with Johnny Paul Koroma, who is in Pademba Road Prison, I don't
9 know how they can come up with this whole thing that I was
15:42:01 10 supposed to be in charge of the AFRC. This is totally false.

11 Q. But, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind, of course, what is being
12 alleged against you, were such a meeting to take place between a
13 group under your control and ECOMOG who you do not control, they
14 might just let slip to General Malu, "Guess what? We're being
15:42:31 15 given arms by Charles Taylor." So why did you allow this meeting
16 to take place?

17 A. Well, it's not that I allowed. The meeting took place
18 because there was no such contact and they could not have even
19 said that. I see the point you're making. Because there was no
15:42:45 20 such thing, no such slippage could occur. There was just such -
21 no contact with them, this junta or anyone at that particular
22 time, and so we cannot look at the possibilities of, well, why
23 didn't this, why didn't that happen. I just didn't know them -
24 didn't even know they were meeting.

15:43:12 25 Q. "The creation of safe havens was considered not necessary
26 for the moment given the near total absence of hostilities. It
27 is to be noted, however, that internally displaced persons
28 continue to flow into ECOMOG-controlled areas for safety.

29 The AFRC delegation agreed to remove all land mines which

1 the junta had laid. The PAE (the United States outfit for
2 assistance to ECOMOG in Liberia) promised to assist with mine
3 detectors.

15:43:52 4 Efforts should be made to guarantee free and safe movement
5 throughout Sierra Leone. Ferry services should be resumed and
6 borders re-opened.

7 ECOMOG had released all prisoners of war in its custody.
8 The AFRC, on its part, agreed that all equipment belonging to
9 ECOMOG in Bo, Kenema would be handed back to ECOMOG at the
15:44:11 10 appropriate time.

11 A disarmament committee was established comprising the
12 ECOMOG as chair, the armed forces of Sierra Leone, the People's
13 Army (RUF), the Kamajors, the UN military observers, and other UN
14 agencies. The first meeting of this committee, which began on 4
15:44:35 15 December 1997, resumed on 10 December 1997.

16 The leader of the AFRC delegation vehemently opposed the
17 disarmament of the armed forces of Sierra Leone and requested
18 that the matter be considered by the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee
19 of Five on Sierra Leone."

15:44:58 20 Now political issues:

21 "While political and diplomatic initiatives began from the
22 onset of the crisis, the first face-to-face negotiation with the
23 leader of the junta took place on 28 November 1997. This was the
24 first time ECOWAS and the United Nations would visit Sierra Leone
15:45:20 25 since the outbreak of the crisis.

26 The ECOWAS executive secretary, the United Nations
27 Secretary-General's special envoy and the accompanying team must
28 be commended for their courage and determination in taking the
29 first step and thereby paving the way for a smoother

1 implementation of the United Nations and ECOWAS mandates.

2 The delegation, headed by the ECOWAS executive secretary,
3 Mr Lansana Kouyate, and comprising the ECOMOG force commander,
4 the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General to
15:45:59 5 Sierra Leone, the military attaches of the American embassy and
6 British High Commission to Sierra Leone, and staff of the ECOWAS
7 executive secretariat, travelled to Freetown and met first with
8 representatives of the junta in Kossoh Town and later with its
9 chairman, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, in Freetown.

15:46:19 10 At the meeting held in Kossoh Town, the representatives of
11 the junta aired their recriminations and expressed their concern
12 over certain issues which, as far as the ECOWAS executive
13 secretary's delegation was concerned, were issues which the junta
14 had continued to consistently harp on and which the peace plan
15:46:43 15 had already adequately addressed.

16 The issues are:

17 One of the first issues discussed concerned the burning
18 issue to the junta of the dominance of Nigerian soldiers in
19 ECOMOG. It was pointed out to the AFRC delegation that Nigeria
15:47:04 20 had no territorial ambitions and had played a similarly prominent
21 role in Liberia. ECOMOG is presently composed of troops from
22 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger,
23 Nigeria and Togo. Nigeria, by virtue of her population and
24 relative economic strength vis-a-vis other ECOWAS member states,
15:47:34 25 coupled with the fact that it is the only country that can
26 mobilise 5,000 troops within a short period of time, may make its
27 stance seem prominent. The AFRC delegation was assured that the
28 implementation of the peace plan would be carried out in close
29 collaboration with the United Nations observer team, when

1 deployed, and other agencies.

2 The above notwithstanding, it was made clear that neither
3 the ECOWAS executive secretary nor the junta itself had powers to
4 modify the composition of ECOMOG. That is a political decision
15:48:15 5 that can be taken only by ECOWAS member states.

6 The junta had also raised this issue, that is, the
7 immediate release of Corporal Foday Sankoh, with the ECOMOG force
8 commander. The RUF element of the junta is making the release of
9 Sankoh a precondition for disarmament. The inherent danger in
15:48:40 10 Corporal Foday Sankoh's return before President Kabbah was
11 pointed out to the AFRC delegation. In conclusion, however, it
12 was agreed to refer the matter to the ECOWAS Ministerial
13 Committee of Five on Sierra Leone.

14 Disarmament of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

15:49:02 15 The junta is once again putting forward arguments against
16 the disarmament of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces. The executive
17 secretary's team views this persistent argument as a ploy to
18 delay the disarmament exercise, which is an activity that will
19 determine undoubtedly the success of the peace process itself.

15:49:26 20 The executive secretary reminded the junta of the negotiations
21 preceding the signing of the Conakry peace plan in Conakry and
22 the fact that the Committee of Five did not agree to the
23 exemption of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces from disarmament.

24 An allegation was made by the junta that ECOMOG forces were
15:49:48 25 ferrying Kamajor militia fighters from Liberia into Sierra Leone
26 and were providing them with logistical support to fight the
27 junta."

28 We have dealt with that issue, have we not, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, we have.

1 Q. And your position is that you have clear evidence that such
2 was going on?

3 A. That is true.

4 Q. "That allegation had earlier been made during the meeting
15:50:15 5 between the junta's representative and the ECOMOG force commander
6 and communicated through a letter to the ECOWAS Ministerial
7 Committee of Five.

8 Upon receipt of these allegations, the ECOWAS executive
9 secretary immediately demanded explanations from the ECOMOG
15:50:39 10 commander. In addition, the executive secretary had investigated
11 the allegations and had found them to be totally false and
12 unfounded."

13 Is that true?

14 A. That is not true.

15:50:48 15 Q. What's not true?

16 A. That the allegations are false. I mean, I do not dispute
17 that he may have investigated and come up with his own thing, but
18 he knows within our ranks we had voiced concerns about Liberians
19 being recruited and put into this Kamajor group from Ricks
15:51:12 20 Institute. He had the information. But don't forget where they
21 are right now. They are making this report in December to the
22 Security Council, and of course we are not going to wash this -
23 these dirty clothes before the council.

24 Q. And help me with something else. "Upon receipt of these
15:51:34 25 allegations, the ECOWAS executive secretary immediately demanded
26 explanations from the ECOMOG commander." Now, who was supposed
27 to be in charge of ECOMOG, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Well, the commander on the ground. But administratively,
29 the way how it is done, ECOMOG is under the direct command of the

1 executive secretary.

2 Q. Of the executive secretary of what?

3 A. Of ECOWAS.

4 Q. Of ECOWAS?

15:52:04 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So am I to understand that effectively ECOWAS is the
7 authority for ECOMOG?

8 A. That is correct. ECOWAS --

9 Q. Now that being the case, can you explain why the executive
15:52:22 10 Secretary-General, who is supposed to be in charge of ECOMOG, has
11 to ask the ECOMOG commander if this is true?

12 A. Well, counsel, it works similar to the way the United
13 Nations works. All UN peacekeeping forces around the world
14 operate under the direction of the Secretary-General. That's how
15:52:45 15 it works. Now, you have a commander on the ground that reports
16 to you and - that reports to the Secretary-General of the United
17 Nations, and he reports to the Security Council. That's the same
18 procedure that's used in ECOWAS. The member states put the
19 troops together. They are put under the command of a senior

15:53:04 20 general. But the executive secretary, who administers ECOWAS
21 throughout a particular period, is responsible. So that general
22 reports to him, and he reports to the authority. So all
23 questions, if it is working - and I'm using the word "if" it is
24 working - properly, that's how it's supposed to work. But we had
15:53:29 25 difficulties with it working that way because of the - you know,
26 Nigeria having the largest contingent in ECOWAS - I mean, ECOMOG.
27 And even the command of the troops, most cases the executive
28 secretary would, you know, hear later what happened.

29 Q. "Hear later"? I don't follow you, I'm sorry.

1 A. Well, the commander of ECOMOG - I think the highest they
2 ever went was lieutenant general. But when he reports first, the
3 first to get to know would be his chief of army staff back at
4 army headquarters in Nigeria, and I'm sure, you know, the
15:54:15 5 executive secretary would be fed, but he didn't wait on an issue
6 to go through the chain of command, the channel, to go, as he
7 should go, to the executive secretary and let the executive
8 secretary speak beyond that. It would - because he is commander
9 and a Nigerian general and having the largest unit, he would
15:54:39 10 report to his chief of army staff even before the executive
11 secretary got to know sometimes.

12 Q. I'm still having difficulty, Mr Taylor. Are you suggesting
13 that the ECOMOG commander might take decisions and not
14 communicate them to the executive secretary?

15:54:56 15 A. Well, in terms of - in terms of orders in the military
16 field, there are a lot of things that - a military commander has
17 discretion within a particular framework, so certain things would
18 happen. Let's say, for example, if the forces commander of
19 ECOMOG ran out of ammunition, he is not going to call - the first
15:55:20 20 place he's going to go to will be he will inform what? His chief
21 of defence staff.

22 Q. Well, I'm addressing quite a separate issue here,
23 Mr Taylor. Would it be possible, given the way you understand
24 ECOMOG to operate, for the force commander, say, to be arming
15:55:40 25 Kamajors without telling the executive secretary? Would that be
26 proper?

27 A. It would not be proper, but it was done.

28 Q. Are you saying that's what was done?

29 A. Yes, it was done. I doubt very much if the executive

1 secretary authorised the recruitment of Liberians and others out
2 of Liberia for Kamajor activities in Sierra Leone. I doubt that
3 very much. Once a decision had been taken by Nigeria - and don't
4 let's forget, Nigeria led this whole operation in Liberia and in
15:56:15 5 Sierra Leone, and there were decisions that were taken that had
6 not even been approved by the authorities in general. But don't
7 forget that Nigeria is the largest and most powerful country in
8 that region and once a decision had been taken by Abacha that
9 there was going to be military intervention and all of us had
15:56:38 10 agreed - but beyond April of 1998 - I'm sure that everyone didn't
11 have to know what happened.

12 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, if I may inquire. Who was
13 the executive secretary at the time?

14 THE WITNESS: The executive secretary, your Honour, at that
15:56:59 15 time was Lansana Kouyate of Guinea.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: That's a name we've encountered before, your
17 Honour.

18 THE WITNESS: Lansana Kouyate.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:57:23 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I would like your assistance with the next
21 sentence, because I'm having difficulty understanding it. "The
22 executive secretary had noted that there were no Kamajor military
23 fighters in Liberia, and so ECOMOG could not have been ferrying
24 them from Liberia to Sierra Leone." But if they've been ferried
15:57:34 25 into Sierra Leone they wouldn't be in Liberia, so can you help me
26 as to the sense of that?

27 A. That's why I'm saying I don't think Lansana knew what was
28 going on. Listen, the Kamajors, when I took office, were
29 stationed at Ricks Institute, a Liberian Baptist mission just

1 outside of Monrovia on the road going to Bo Waterside in Sierra
2 Leone. There, my good old friend, former friend, the late Hinga
3 Norman operated from there and there is no principal Kamajor
4 commander that is in Sierra Leone now that does not know about
15:58:15 5 the Ricks Institute operation. They left from Ricks and were
6 ferried across the border. They were flown out of Robertsfield
7 airport. We complained about it. I raised this issue with
8 General Abacha. I have said in evidence led before this Court,
9 documented evidence, that I could not help him. In that letter
15:58:38 10 that I wrote to Abacha, I made it very clear to Abacha that I
11 could not assist and that my government was new and fragile, if I
12 can remind the Court, and I said that Guinea was stronger and
13 maybe Guinea could help.

14 So Lansana did what he had to do, but he was not aware,
15:58:57 15 probably, of what was going on. I'm talking about the executive
16 secretary Lansana Kouyate. And if he had known of the letter
17 that I wrote to General Abacha, he would - you know, he would
18 have said something differently. But just as a reminder to this
19 Court, in that letter that has come before this Court, that issue
15:59:17 20 of the fragility of my government was mentioned.

21 The second issue that was mentioned in that letter, I had
22 warned Abacha that the British had said very clearly that they
23 were not going to permit Nigerian hegemony, and that I did not
24 want him being isolated, that he had to work in Sierra Leone
15:59:40 25 within the framework of ECOMOG. And that letter is led in
26 evidence before this Court.

27 So, you know, he really - I do not think he meant any harm
28 here, but he really didn't know. I don't think the executive
29 secretary knew. And probably, may I add, if he knew, I do not

1 think that he would have put such a statement before the Security
2 Council. I don't think he would have.

3 Q. Let's go back to the document, shall we:

4 "Furthermore, the ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone were not
16:00:16 5 equipped with any helicopters, contrary to the allegation that
6 helicopters were being used for the exercise. The helicopters
7 presently being used by ECOMOG were given to it on lease by the
8 United States of America and are strictly restricted to
9 operations in Liberia.

16:00:36 10 The junta wants its soldiers to be involved in the delivery
11 of humanitarian materials in Sierra Leone. It is important to
12 note at this point that the NGOs and humanitarian agencies had
13 strongly opposed the escort of their convoys by armed personnel
14 as this would greatly put their personnel accompanying such
16:00:58 15 shipments great at risk of armed attack.

16 The junta's delegation expressed disappointment at the
17 postponement of the evaluation mission which was to have been
18 undertaken by the ECOWAS ministerial Committee of Five on 20
19 November 1997 as provided by the Conakry peace plan.

16:01:21 20 It was explained that the postponement was not deliberate.
21 The ECOWAS ministers were delayed in New York and could not meet
22 in time with the Un Security Council due to the demanding issue
23 of Iraq at the time. Moreover, the ministers were compelled to
24 leave New York immediately for Addis Ababa to attend the meeting
16:01:49 25 of the OAU central organ.

26 Hostile Radio/TV Propaganda.

27 The meeting agreed that all hostile propaganda must be
28 stopped immediately and all radio programmes should be aimed at
29 entertaining, educating and promoting peace and reconciliation.

1 At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that the three
2 joint committees on the ceasefire, disarmament and humanitarian
3 issues earlier established should start meeting without any
4 further delay.

16:02:22 5 The team later travelled into the city of Freetown to meet
6 with the chairman of the AFRC, Major Johnny Paul Koroma. The
7 team met Major Koroma first at a public ceremony and later in
8 private.

9 In his speech during the public ceremony, Major Koroma
16:02:44 10 underscored the point that his government was the only one that
11 had implemented the terms of the Abidjan accord and was therefore
12 committed to its implementation as well as the implementation of
13 the ECOWAS peace plan. He issued an appeal to the international
14 community to provide humanitarian aid. He gave assurances that
16:03:08 15 the AFRC would contribute actively to the successful delivery of
16 humanitarian aid. Major Koroma also pleaded for the release of
17 Corporal Foday Sankoh and asked that the sanctions and embargo
18 regimes be lifted during the six-month transition period. In his
19 reaction, the executive secretary reiterated the fact that
16:03:33 20 sanctions are linked to the return of the democratically elected
21 government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. "

22 Can I pause, Mr Taylor, and inquire, "The meeting agreed
23 that all hostile propaganda must be stopped immediately", what's
24 that a reference to, do you know?

16:03:50 25 A. The use of the airwaves to what they would call to cause
26 anxiety in the population.

27 Q. And was that directed to any particular radio station?

28 A. Both sides. Tejani was broadcasting, President Kabbah was
29 broadcasting from his side where he --

1 Q. From where?

2 A. From Lungi Airport where they had their radio installed.

3 Q. And how had that been installed?

4 A. By the British, provided the radio facilities for President
16:04:30 5 Kabbah at Lungi. And then in the Freetown arena, you had the
6 junta with the former government radio stations being used and,
7 you know, these stations were competing for their own
8 constituencies, and the best thing to do was to try to get them
9 to tone down the propaganda and that would help to reduce
16:04:56 10 tension.

11 Q. Yes.

12 "The public ceremony was immediately followed by a closed
13 session between Major Koroma, the executive secretary and the
14 United Nations special envoy.

16:05:11 15 The ECOWAS executive secretary's team came away from these
16 meetings with the impression that:

17 Major Johnny Paul Koroma is undoubtedly under the control
18 and strong influence of the RUF."

19 Pause there. I'm going to ask you again, Mr Taylor. Now,
16:05:35 20 earlier you were at pains to deny any contact between yourself
21 and Johnny Paul Koroma during the lead up to the Liberian
22 elections because you tell us he was in prison in Pademba Road.
23 But here you see it being suggested that he's undoubtedly under
24 the control and strong influence of the RUF. You're supposed to
16:05:57 25 be controlling the RUF, so ergo you're controlling Johnny Paul
26 Koroma as well, aren't you?

27 A. Well, I'm not controlling the RUF, but if I am, then I'm
28 controlling Johnny Paul Koroma, of course, you're right. I doubt
29 it. The briefings that reached to us was that Johnny Paul

1 Koroma, after speaking to Foday Sankoh, had been - you know,
2 before the RUF joined had promised Sankoh that he would do
3 everything to get him released. And so even the meeting in
4 Abidjan where his delegation was represented, the whole thing
16:06:38 5 was, in order to bring lasting peace, we suggest that you release
6 Sankoh. But the fact of the matter is I was never in control of
7 the RUF and never wanted to be.

8 Q. And interestingly, it goes on:

9 "That the junta is sensitive to the refusal to grant it
16:07:00 10 recognition; that the RUF is only interested in obtaining the
11 return of Corporal Foday Sankoh to Sierra Leone; the composition
12 of the junta is very wide, and apart from the quest for power,
13 they seem to have no other point of cohesion. They are
14 suspicious of one another, and when they talk in public, they
16:07:21 15 seem only to play to the gallery.

16 Meeting with President Tejan Kabbah.

17 Accompanied by the special envoy of the United Nations
18 Secretary-General, the ECOWAS delegation paid a visit to
19 President Tejan Kabbah.

16:07:49 20 The discussion with the Sierra Leonean Head of State
21 focused on: The Foday Sankoh factor; the deployment of a
22 military observer mission to Sierra Leone; disarmament.

23 The Foday Sankoh Factor.

24 President Kabbah reminded the delegation that he had signed
16:08:05 25 the Abidjan Peace Accord with Corporal Foday Sankoh and his
26 position remained valid. He also reiterated his adherence to the
27 ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone and acknowledged that Foday
28 Sankoh had a special role to play in that process.

29 He declared further that he had no objection to the idea of

1 Foday Sankoh returning to Sierra Leone at the appropriate time.

2 Deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra
3 Leone.

4 President Kabbah raised the issue of the deployment of the
16:08:45 5 UN observer mission to Sierra Leone.

6 He and the ECOWAS delegation agreed that the deployment of
7 ECOMOG forces and UN observers was essential to a climate of
8 security to Sierra Leone. The presence of these forces would
9 constitute a mark of good faith and commitment to the

16:09:07 10 implementation of the ECOWAS peace plan.

11 President Kabbah and the ECOWAS delegation therefore
12 expressed satisfaction that a United Nations evaluation team had
13 been sent to Sierra Leone and hoped that the United Nations would
14 accelerate its procedures and dispatch the military observers.

16:09:31 15 Disarmament.

16 President Kabbah and the ECOWAS delegation acknowledged
17 that the coup d'etat of 25 May 1997 had put an end to law and
18 order in Sierra Leone. It was therefore of vital importance that
19 all the combatants be disarmed. The disarmament exercise should
16:09:56 20 commence immediately ECOMOG troops and UN military observers are
21 deployed.

22 Restoration of Normalcy to Sierra Leone.

23 President Kabbah expressed his commitment to ending the
24 suffering of the Sierra Leonean people and the deterioration of
16:10:11 25 their living conditions. He also announced that he had received
26 offers of help from brother countries and international
27 institutions to this end."

28 And then the document goes on to deal with the worsening
29 humanitarian situation for the general public. Yes, I think we

1 can skip the section on Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire and go to the
2 conclusions on page 16, please:

3 "ECOWAS expresses its appreciation to the United Nations,
4 the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations
16:11:31 5 Secretary-General as well as the OAU for their cooperation and
6 assistance to ECOWAS and also wishes to appeal to the UN, OAU,
7 ECOWAS member states and international community to provide
8 necessary assistance towards the realisation of its objectives in
9 Sierra Leone, including aid to the refugees especially in the
16:11:54 10 neighbouring countries of Guinea, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire as
11 well as to displaced persons and to facilitate their return.

12 ECOWAS is committed to continue negotiations with the junta
13 towards effective and prompt implementation of the peace plan.

14 ECOWAS, the OAU, UN and the rest of the international
16:12:14 15 community should continue to put pressure on the illegal regime
16 to make it comply with the ECOWAS peace plan within its
17 stipulated time frame.

18 To this end, the sanctions should be effectively imposed
19 and should, in fact, be tightened by ECOWAS member states and the
16:12:33 20 international community.

21 In addition, the mechanisms of exemption to the sanctions
22 established between ECOWAS and the humanitarian community should
23 be strictly implemented.

24 ECOWAS and OAU member states and the international
16:12:50 25 community should speedily provide ECOMOG with the logistical
26 support needed to enable it to carry out its mission
27 successfully.

28 ECOWAS member states should immediately make available to
29 ECOMOG the troops necessary for the operation.

1 The international community is urged to assist with the
2 reintegration of disarmed former fighters into their various
3 communities.

4 ECOWAS requests the United Nations Security Council to
16:13:20 5 expedite the process of sending a team of United Nations military
6 observers to participate in the monitoring and verification of
7 complete cessation of hostilities, as envisaged in the ECOWAS
8 peace plan for Sierra Leone."

9 Now, if we go, please, to the annex which comes behind
16:13:47 10 this. It might be helpful to look at the list of AFRC members
11 and advisers as listed in this annex. We see amongst them Major
12 Johnny Paul Koroma at number 1; staff sergeant - well, Captain
13 Solomon A J Musa at 3; Alex T Brima at number 6; Colonel Sam
14 Bockarie at number 8; a Colonel Issa Sesay at 11; a Colonel
16:14:35 15 Gibril Massaquoi at 12; a Colonel Mike Lamin at 13; and if we go
16 over the page there's an Eldred Collins at 9; S Y B Rogers at 10.
17 And then over the page is a list of honourables with an
18 Honourable Tamba Alex Brima at 2. And finally on the last page,
19 advisers, a Terrence Terry at number 9 and a Steve Bio at number
16:16:10 20 16. Yes, and I'm helpfully reminded if we go to the previous
21 page, at number 11 at the top of the page Samuel Kargbo.

22 Can I ask, please, then, Mr President, that that document,
23 the second report of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone
24 to the United Nations Security Council, dated December 1997, be
16:17:34 25 marked for identification, please, MFI-233.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI-233.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

28 Q. Now, whilst we're in this volume, Mr Taylor, following the
29 provision of that report by the Committee of Five to the United

1 Nations Security Council, did the Security Council thereafter
2 adopt any relevant resolution in regard to that situation?

3 A. No, not as regard to this particular plan, no, they did
4 not, because this is around December. By February - there have
16:18:49 5 been some contentions, but this is factual. The intervention
6 starts early February, but actually it concludes on about 14
7 February, because this is the day even the - there are two
8 helicopters from Sierra Leone that come into Liberia with the
9 Sierra Leonean air force chief on board. That caused some
16:19:16 10 problems with the government and ECOMOG, so this is what we have
11 at that time. The intervention occurs before there is any
12 serious action on the part of the Security Council in dealing
13 with Sierra Leone.

14 Q. So did they thereafter take any serious action?

16:19:36 15 A. Yes. Immediately following the intervention in February,
16 I'd say around or about the 14th when it concluded, there were a
17 lot of problems. A lot of problems. And so the Committee of
18 Five rushed the foreign ministers over to New York immediately to
19 deal with this whole question of the action on the part of ECOMOG
16:20:12 20 without the approval of the Security Council under Chapter VII.

21 In fact, based on the report that I can still recall from
22 my foreign minister, there was some very tough questions. And my
23 foreign minister informed me that the Foreign Minister of Ghana,
24 Victor Gbeho at the time, really came on very strong on the side
16:20:44 25 of ECOWAS, defending the action on the part of ECOWAS, and almost
26 said something similar to what was said during World War II when
27 a part of North Africa was taken, and I think General Eisenhower
28 asked, "Why did General Patton go in?" and he said "Well, we
29 haven't asked the general if he wants me to return it." So we

1 had a similar situation. You know, you're confronted with a
2 situation where we've restored the President, so what do you
3 want? So finally in early - a little after that meeting - in
4 fact, that meeting was about the first week in March. On or
16:21:31 5 about the second week in March, if I recall, or thereabouts,
6 President Kabbah returned to Sierra Leone close to the middle of
7 March in 1998, and thereafter the Security Council passed a
8 resolution in fact welcoming President Kabbah back to Freetown,
9 which we read as a form of acquiescence.

16:21:57 10 Q. I'll come back to that in a moment to seek some more
11 clarification from you. But before we lose sight of it, Victor
12 Gbeho. G-B-E-H-O?

13 A. Yes, Victor Gbeho was the Foreign Minister of Ghana at the
14 time. Ghana was a member of the Committee of Five that went.

16:22:25 15 Q. Mr Taylor, just so that we understand with some clarity the
16 situation, when ECOMOG intervenes in February does it have the
17 authority of the Security Council to intervene?

18 A. To the best of my knowledge, no, there is no Chapter VII
19 resolution on that.

16:22:44 20 Q. Okay. Did it need the sanction of the Security Council in
21 order to make its action legal according to the UN charter?

22 A. Definitely. The use of force, in my understanding of the
23 charter of the United Nations, is authorised under Chapter VII
24 only by the Security Council.

16:23:06 25 Q. Right. So the intervention takes place without such
26 sanction. Now, under normal circumstances would you expect the
27 Security Council to be publicly critical of such behaviour?

28 A. Well, counsel, expect: Yes. But normally it would not
29 happen. You would expect, yes, but it does not happen.

1 Especially in the case of success. You do not want a fuss with
2 success. Don't let's forget that the United Nations - everybody
3 had been toiling with this problem, and I think ECOWAS had built
4 a very strong case about Johnny Paul Koroma not being sincere
16:23:56 5 about the turnover of power. We have a situation where it is
6 claimed that the junta is going to stay in and that the
7 legitimate government must return. And don't forget what was the
8 argument used by I would say us, by ECOWAS, in seizing power.
9 ECOWAS claimed that they were attacked near Lungi Airport and in
16:24:23 10 self-defence they reacted, and that reaction continued and led to
11 the full takeover because the junta had shown such belligerence
12 that they did not believe that they would be sincere. So under
13 normal conditions, of course you would expect that the Security
14 Council would - I guess if we had failed, they would have
16:24:48 15 condemned it, but behind closed doors a lot of things are
16 accomplished. And so in direct response to your question: You
17 would expect that, but under certain conditions you don't get it.
18 Q. Now, let's have a look at the resolution itself. In the
19 same volume behind the next divider, that's divider 13, please.
16:25:26 20 Is this the document, Mr Taylor?
21 A. This is the document. One page. March 16. This is it.
22 Q. Now, the date we see, 16 March - so, what? Roughly a month
23 after the intervention?
24 A. Just about, yes.
16:25:42 25 Q. "Resolution 1156 (1998) adopted by the Security Council at
26 its 3,861st meeting on 16 March 1998.
27 The security counsel, recalling its resolution 1132 of 8
28 October 1997, and the relevant statements of its President,
29 taking note of the letter from the charge d'affaires AI of the

1 permanent mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations to the
2 President of the Security Council of 9 March 1998, acting under
3 Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations, welcomes the
4 return to Freetown of its democratically elected President on 10
16:26:31 5 March 1998; decides to terminate, with immediate effect, the
6 prohibitions on the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum
7 and petroleum products referred to in paragraph 6 of resolution
8 1132; welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to make
9 proposals concerning the roles of the United Nations and its
16:27:01 10 future presence in Sierra Leone; decides to review the other
11 prohibitions referred to in resolution 1132 in accordance with
12 paragraph 17 of that resolution, and in the light of developments
13 and further discussion with the Government of Sierra Leone and
14 decides to remain seized of the matter."

16:27:24 15 I note, Mr Taylor, no congratulations to ECOMOG.

16 A. No. If you see how the resolution reads, there is
17 something couched in here. "The Security Council, acting under
18 Chapter VII, welcomes back". So what they've done, they've
19 legitimised the whole action after the fact. And so if you read
16:27:53 20 this diplomatically, there is some anger wrapped up in here, and
21 that's why you don't see, Well, thank you very much. You did
22 what - if there had been a resolution, "Well, thank you. In line
23 with what we've ordered you to do, you've done it." But it's
24 couched in such a way here that you know that there is friction
16:28:14 25 here. One page: We welcome you back, thank you, see you later.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I ask, please, that that
27 United Nations Security Council resolution 1156 (1998) adopted by
28 the Security Council on 16 March 1998 be marked for
29 identification, please, MFI -234.

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	28116
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	28116