



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 8 JULY 2010
9.04 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg

For the Registry:

Ms Advera Nsiima Kamuzora
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Nicholas Koumjian
Ms Kathryn Howarth
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the Office of the Principal
Defender: Ms Claire Carlton-Hanciles

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor: Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Silas Chekera
Ms Logan Hambriek
Ms Fatiah Balfas

1 Thursday, 8 July 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.]

09:01:12 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,
6 please.

7 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,
8 your Honours and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this
9 morning, Brenda J Hollis, Kathryn Howarth, Maja Dimitrova and
09:05:03 10 Nicholas Koumjian.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours
12 and counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself, Courtenay
13 Griffiths; with me, Mr Silas Chekera, Ms Logan Hambrick, Ms
14 Fatiah Balfas, Ms Fatmatu Jalloh, and we are also joined today by
09:05:26 15 the Principal Defender.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, I remind you of the oath that
17 you took initially. That oath is binding on you today.

18 Please proceed, Mr Griffiths.

19 WITNESS: DCT-172 [On former oath]

09:05:43 20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Cont'd]

21 Q. Mr Sesay, yesterday when we adjourned overnight, we had
22 reached the stage where you had been wounded during an attack on
23 Bo, you had gone from there to Makeni, where you were discovered
24 or heard reference to Operation Pay Yourself. Now, help us with
09:06:12 25 this, first of all, as we take up that narrative: For how long
26 did you remain in Makeni?

27 A. Where we were in Makeni for about a week.

28 Q. And during that time were any other senior commanders of
29 either the RUF or the AFRC based in Makeni?

1 A. Yes, sir. Many of them were there.

2 Q. Could you just slowly tell us which commanders were present
3 in Makeni at that time?

09:07:13 4 A. Johnny Paul was in his village 10 miles from Makeni, but in
5 Makeni Town itself, late Colonel Charles Conteh was there, SAJ
6 Musa was there, Brigadier Mani was there, SO Williams was there.
7 Many colonels were there, including majors and captains. All the
8 AFRC commanders, the senior officers who had run away from
9 Freetown also went to Makeni, but to name them now is something I
09:08:06 10 cannot. SFY Koroma too was there, he was the chief of defence
11 staff for the AFRC.

12 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, now that we have reached this point, can I
13 ask you this: Was the withdrawal of the RUF and AFRC troops from
14 Freetown in the face of the ECOMOG intervention a planned and
09:08:45 15 orderly affair?

16 A. No, it was not in an orderly way because ECOMOG dislodged
17 the AFRC from Freetown, so the pull-out was not in order.
18 Everybody was running away to save his life. That was the
19 situation.

09:09:13 20 Q. And from what you could observe of that withdrawal from
21 Freetown, was anyone in command or control of that withdrawal?

22 A. Well, there was no control, as I said. Everybody was
23 running away to save his life. From the senior commanders, that
24 was how the troops were withdrawing. There was no control from
09:09:57 25 Freetown to Masiaka and up to Makeni.

26 Q. Now during the week that you were in Makeni how were those
27 combatants who had withdrawn from Freetown, both AFRC and RUF,
28 how were they behaving in Makeni?

29 A. Well, they had looted Makeni before they arrived. That was

1 the situation there. For example, for the RUF, when the
2 withdrawal took place all the men who had come from the Western
3 Jungle who joined the AFRC in Freetown, all of them were going
4 with Superman. It was the same with Isaac Mongor from the
09:10:58 5 Kangari Hills. That was the situation. Fighters were in
6 vehicles. That was the situation. Moving up and down. Actually
7 they just looted Makeni, they did not keep people there, because
8 there was nobody in Makeni who was to fight against the
9 withdrawing troops. So there was no killing that took place
09:11:26 10 there, only looting.

11 Q. Now another matter that I would like to deal with at this
12 stage, Mr Sesay, is this: You have just mentioned Superman and
13 the group from Kangari Hills, yes? From Western Jungle, sorry,
14 yes?

09:11:46 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You also mentioned Isaac Mongor and a group from Kangari
17 Hills. Is that correct?

18 A. Then in Makeni itself we had SAJ Musa, members of the AFRC
19 and also members of the RUF who had withdraw from Freetown .

09:12:11 20 Q. Now help us, looking at those groups, was there somebody
21 coordinating those groups by the time people had got to Makeni?

22 A. Well, when the troops withdrew to Makeni I said the
23 fighters who were under Superman's control, they were with
24 Superman before the AFRC joined in. It was the same with the
09:12:42 25 others with the RUF who came from Kangari Hills, they were with
26 Isaac Mongor. The army, the AFRC army, some were with SAJ Musa
27 and some were with Brigadier Mani. The others - STF were with
28 General Bropleh. The honourables too had their own group. It
29 was just like that. That was what the situation was in Makeni.

1 So when SAJ Musa left for Kabala most of the AFRC fighters, the
2 army, they followed SAJ Musa to Kabala. The STF who were with
3 General Bropleh and Brigadier Mani too had his own military
4 group. They too went to Kabala.

09:13:30 5 Q. Now you have described there, Mr Sesay, a number of
6 different groups and my question is: At that stage was there
7 someone in overall charge of those various groups?

8 A. Well, the overall by then was Johnny Paul Koroma. But, for
9 example, SAJ Musa and Brigadier Mani, General Bropleh they went
09:13:59 10 on their own. They left Makeni and went on their own while
11 Johnny Paul had said the troops were to withdraw to Kono. At
12 that stage there was no coordination.

13 Q. So Johnny Paul had given an order for whom to withdraw to
14 Kono?

09:14:19 15 A. He said all the troops, both AFRC and RUF were to go to
16 Kono while SAJ Musa, Mani and Bropleh, they took the Koinadugu
17 route. They did not go by Kono.

18 Q. Now when Johnny Paul Koroma gave that order for withdrawal
19 to Kono, was it supposed to apply to all the various groups you
09:14:46 20 earlier described?

21 A. Yes. That was what was to happen, because he was the
22 chairman but it did not happen that way.

23 Q. So when SAJ Musa and Mani decided to go elsewhere, was that
24 against the order given by Johnny Paul Koroma?

09:15:12 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. So at that stage did Johnny Paul Koroma have control over
27 those groups?

28 A. No. He hadn't any control over the groups who went to
29 Koinadugu in Kabala.

1 Q. And can you help us as to why it was those individuals
2 decided not to obey the order given by Johnny Paul Koroma?

3 A. Well, what I understood was that they did not want to take
4 instructions from Johnny Paul. That was why they went on their
09:15:58 5 own.

6 Q. But was there a stated reason as to why they didn't want to
7 take instructions from him?

8 A. Well, later I understood that SAJ Musa was looking at
9 Johnny Paul as someone who did not have a strong command. He did
09:16:27 10 not have a command. That was what led to the fall of the AFRC.
11 That was - I got that information later.

12 Q. Now at this stage, Mr Sesay, moving on, where were your
13 family and your wife and your children?

14 A. Well, at that time I was with one of my friend before the
09:16:55 15 war and I lodged at his house in Makeni. He was the son of the
16 late Dr Conteh, they called the fellow --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat the name.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. What was the name of the person at whose compound you were
09:17:14 20 staying?

21 A. My friend's father is called Dr Conteh but the fellow who
22 is my friend is called Atharity. I was lodging to him. I was
23 staying in his compound, together with my wife and my one child.

24 Q. Now help me. Can you spell Atharity for us, please?

09:17:37 25 A. I think A-T-H-A-R-I-T-Y.

26 Q. Now, did you in due course, in line with the instruction
27 given by Johnny Paul Koroma, withdraw to Kono?

28 A. Yes, because I can recall after I had taken three days in
29 Makeni, we went - we attended a meeting at Johnny Paul's village.

1 I, Mike Lamin, Isaac Mongor, Eldred Collins, all of us left
2 Makeni and went to Johnny Paul's village. Because I had visited
3 him when I came to Makeni. That was the second time that he can
4 called for this meeting.

09:18:53 5 Q. And what was the name of Johnny Paul's village?

6 A. The name of the village is Magbonkineh.

7 Q. Can you help us with a spelling of that please?

8 MR KOUMJIAN: It is on the record previously.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

09:19:19 10 Q. Now what happened at that meeting?

11 A. At that meeting, the honourables were present, SAJ Musa was
12 there, Charles Conteh was there, Brigadier Mani too was there,
13 SFY Koroma was there.

14 Q. Was General Bropleh there?

09:19:48 15 A. Yes, he was there and Boise Palmer from Bo was there
16 because they too had withdrawn from Bo at that time. AF Kamara
17 was there. Many AFRC officers were there, including us the RUF.
18 I Issa, Mike Lamin, Isaac Mongor, Superman, Eldred Collins, Peter
19 Vandi, all of us were present at that meeting. The only person
09:20:27 20 who was not there among us the RUF was Morris Kallon because at
21 that time he was not in Makeni. At that meeting Johnny Paul said
22 we should withdraw to Kono because he was going to withdraw to
23 Kailahun.

24 Q. Pause there.

09:20:51 25 A. Because he said when we withdraw to Kono, we were to start
26 preparing ourselves to defend ourselves. We shouldn't continue
27 running away from ECOMOG. So he spoke to all the commanders who
28 were at the meeting. He said because he had spoken with Sam
29 Bockarie and he had informed Sam Bockarie that he was going to

1 withdraw to Kailahun to Sam Bockarie and he said that's not a
2 problem. So, after that meeting, Johnny Paul said - he
3 instructed Superman to be the commander to mobilise the RUF to
4 move to Kono and Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara, the PLO-3 --

09:21:42 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I see some spellings which
6 perhaps ought to be corrected at this stage. I appreciate that
7 we have a new shorthand-writer and it may be that the machine is
8 getting used to the new name, but rather than California on line
9 12 page 11 we should have Kailahun. And rather than Michael
09:22:09 10 minimum, at page 10 line 24 we should have Mike Lamin. And also
11 at page 8 line 4 the witness answered yes and no answer has been
12 recorded:

13 Q. So we had reached the stage, Mr Sesay, where you told us
14 that after that meeting Johnny Paul said Superman was to be the
09:22:59 15 commander to mobilise the RUF to move to Kono. Is that right?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Now two questions to clarify matters. First of all, did
18 Johnny Paul Koroma explain why he thought it expedient to
19 withdraw to Kailahun?

09:23:24 20 A. Well, at this stage, because Johnny Paul too had seen that
21 all the senior commanders of the AFRC from the withdrawal from
22 Freetown - because I was not in Freetown, but he was grumbling
23 before he withdrew from Freetown that his commanders were not
24 operating in - were not cooperating in organising the men to
09:23:51 25 fight against the ECOMOG advancing troops in Freetown, so he was
26 becoming suspicious of some of his commanders.

27 Q. So how would withdrawing to Kailahun cure that?

28 A. Well, what I observed at that time was that the man was
29 feeling indifferent towards his officers. He was talking to his

1 officers but that they were leaking out information to SLPP
2 government and the ECOMOG. So in fact he concluded that being in
3 Kailahun would be safer for him than being with his men in any
4 other place. That was why he decided to go to Kailahun from
09:24:46 5 Makeni - from his village, to go to Kailahun from Magbonkineh.

6 Q. Now the other matter about which I seek some clarification
7 is this: You mentioned during your description of that meeting
8 that Johnny Paul Koroma advised you all that he had spoken to Sam
9 Bockarie. Now, during this period in Makeni, were you, Issa
09:25:14 10 Sesay, in contact with Sam Bockarie?

11 A. Yes. When I was in Makeni I informed Sam Bockarie about
12 the failed attack in Bo and about my injury and that I had
13 withdrawn to Makeni. I was in contact with him. And Bockarie
14 himself told me that he and Johnny Paul were in contact and
09:25:38 15 Johnny Paul has told him that he was going to Kailahun. He said
16 so - he told me that. I was in contact with him.

17 Q. Now help me with this: To what extent, if any, was Sam
18 Bockarie in control of events in Makeni at this stage?

19 A. No. At that time, Sam Bockarie was not in control, because
09:26:10 20 the troops had withdrawn to Makeni before he started talking to
21 any other person. At that time, it was Johnny Paul who was in
22 control. Everybody was taking orders from him, because he was
23 the boss and he was the one with the troops in Makeni.

24 Q. Now, in due course, you have explained that some elements
09:26:35 25 didn't follow Johnny Paul Koroma's order. Let's ignore that then
26 for the moment, but in time, did you and others withdraw to Kono
27 as instructed?

28 A. Yes. They advance team, Superman and others, they
29 organised, with some of the honourables, and they went and

1 captured Kono.

2 Q. Pause there. Captured Kono from whom?

3 A. From the Kamajors, because during the attack on Freetown,
4 the Kamajors too attacked Kono and they dislodged the AFRC from

09:27:20 5 Kono. So the AFRC that was in Kono at that time, the majority of
6 them withdrew from Kono, through Kayima to Kabala. Then the
7 others, like the PLO-2, withdrew with his bodyguards from Koidu
8 Town in Kono to Kailahun. He too went there and joined Sam
9 Bockarie. Then some of them withdrew from Koidu Town, through

09:27:51 10 Masingbi to Makeni. Those who withdrew came --

11 Q. Those who withdrew came, yes, to where?

12 A. They came to Makeni. They brought the information that the
13 Kamajors attacked them in Kono and they've captured Kono. So the
14 youths and the Kamajors were burning up some AFRC soldiers alive.

09:28:20 15 They were putting petrol on them and burning them alive. That
16 was the information that the retreating troops in Makeni got from
17 the retreating soldiers from Kono.

18 Q. Now, when you, Issa Sesay, left Makeni for Kono, with whom
19 did you travel?

09:28:42 20 A. Well, when they had captured Kono, Superman brought the
21 information that they had come to collect Johnny Paul from the
22 village. I, Mike Lamin, Peter Vandi, all of us drew from Makeni
23 and we met Morris Kallon in Magburaka at Mayolo Junction and all
24 of us drove to Kono. Even the vehicle that I was using, it was
09:29:12 25 Eldred Collins who was driving that vehicle, the Land Rover. It
26 was Eldred Collins who was driving. So his wife - we were in
27 the vehicle with his wife and the bodyguards. Then we went to
28 Koidu Town in Kono.

29 Q. On the route to Kono, did you see any signs of destruction

1 or looting?

2 A. Well, like in Magburaka I did not see destruction. Makali,
3 we did not meet civilians in the town. But the doors of a few
4 houses on the road side were open and Masingbi, too, we did not
09:29:58 5 meet civilians in the town. But I saw doors of some houses open,
6 so we continued to Kono. So the only site I saw destruction or
7 burning was between Masingbi and Gold Town, because I understood
8 that some fighting took place there between the advancing team to
9 Kono and the Kamajors. And also like Futane Junction and some
09:30:24 10 other villages before reaching --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be
12 advised to slow down?

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. "Coke" Town, how do you spell that?

09:30:36 15 A. Gold Town, G-O-L-D Town.

16 Q. And you mentioned another junction beginning with T. What
17 junction was that?

18 A. Futane.

19 Q. How do you spell that?

09:30:52 20 A. I think it is F-U-T-A-N-E, Futane Junction.

21 Q. And during this journey, Mr Sesay, did you see any dead
22 bodies?

23 A. No, I did not see corpses. The only place I saw about two
24 or three corpses was around Mortema and they were in -- they were
09:31:29 25 in Kamajor gears, they had Kamajor fatigue on.

26 Q. Now, was it only RUF individuals who were travelling to
27 Kono?

28 A. No, no. Both the AFRC and the RUF, including civilians,
29 family members, some of the civilians who had been part of the

1 AFRC, and families of soldiers and families of the RUF, that was
2 the group that was withdrawing to Kono.

3 Q. And during the course of your journey to Kono, Mr Sesay,
4 were you involved in any fighting?

09:32:29 5 A. No, I did not - I was not involved in fighting. By the
6 time I got to Kono, they had already captured Kono before the
7 time I even left Makeni.

8 Q. Also this: During the course of that journey from Makeni
9 to Kono, was there any signs to you that Operation Pay Yourself
10 was still effective?

11 A. Yes, because I saw some houses in Makali with doors open,
12 and I also saw some houses in Masingbi with doors open.

13 Q. But help me: So far as the group that you were travelling
14 with, was that group involved in looting?

09:33:28 15 A. No. We were in the vehicle. We were travelling in the
16 vehicle, myself and my bodyguards, Mike Lamin and his bodyguards.
17 That was the same with Peter Vandi and Kallon and our families.

18 Q. And help us: How long did it take you to get from Makeni
19 to Kono?

09:33:47 20 A. Well, under normal circumstances, if you are driving from
21 Makeni to Kono without stopping, you would spend something like
22 five hours, because there are areas where the road condition is
23 bad, but at this time we stopped in Magburaka, Makali, Masingbi.
24 So I think we spent up to seven to eight hours.

09:34:18 25 Q. Now, in due course you arrived in Kono. At what point in
26 Kono? Where in Kono did you arrive?

27 A. Well, we entered Kono through the Masingbi Road because
28 that is the main road entering into the town from Masingbi Road,
29 from Bumpe, Mortema - I mean Gieya Junction, Mortema, and then we

1 entered Koakoyima and part of Koidu Town. That is because there
2 is Koakoyima, Lebanon Junction, those are areas that are very
3 close to Koidu Town. Then we went to Tankoro Junction and when
4 you get to Tankoro Junction, that is now Koidu Town almost.

09:35:10 5 Q. Now, did you stay in Koidu Town?

6 A. Yes. I passed two nights in Koidu Town, and the third day,
7 let me say by 3 o'clock to 4, I left Kono, I left Koidu Town, I
8 went to Gandorhun. I was now on my way to Kailahun.

9 Q. Now, help me: Whilst in Koidu Town, did you see any signs
09:35:34 10 of damage to property?

11 A. Well, when we arrived in Koidu Town, I went - I stayed on
12 the way going to Gandorhun - Kainkordu, Kimberlite area, and the
13 other people were in Koidu Town, but when I arrived in Koidu,
14 that was Tankoro Junction, I saw two houses burnt, and a vehicle.

09:36:11 15 So the soldiers, the RUF whom I met at the junction, I asked
16 them, I asked, "Who burnt down these houses?" And they said it
17 was done by the retreating Kamajors. And at that time, the
18 Kamajors and the civilian population in Koidu Town had all left
19 Koidu Town when they heard that the AFRC/RUF were coming, were
09:36:37 20 coming to Kono. So thousands of people crossed into Guinea.

21 Some went to the surrounding villages, the towns around Kono,
22 around Koidu. They went and stayed there. So at that moment
23 that I entered Kono, there were no civilians in Koidu Town, but
24 some looting had taken place because you will see doors of houses
09:37:03 25 open, and this looting had been on since the time the Kamajors
26 captured Kono, because they said they too looted before the
27 AFRC/RUF came and dislodged them from Kono. So that was the
28 situation under which Koidu Town was.

29 Q. Now, you told us that from Koidu Town, you went to

1 Gandorhun. Is that right?

2 A. Yes, but before I left for Gandorhun, we had a meeting, and
3 after that meeting, just after that meeting that day, the third
4 day, I left for Gandorhun, myself, Morris Kallon, Isaac Mongor
09:37:41 5 and Peter Vandi, including RUF Rambo.

6 Q. Now, by this stage, where was Johnny Paul Koroma?

7 A. Well, when my colleagues and I arrived in Koidu Town, I
8 think Superman had gone to Makeni. He went to the information,
9 saying that they had captured Koidu Town. So he went with his
09:38:26 10 convoy, his bodyguards and the CSO Rambo, Honourable Sammy. All
11 of them travelled with Johnny Paul. Samuel Kargbo and others,
12 they travelled with Johnny Paul, and they met us in Koidu Town.
13 So late in the evening, they met us in Koidu Town, and it was on
14 the very day we arrived. So when they too got to Koidu Town,

09:38:49 15 Johnny Paul also went and stayed around the kimberlite on the
16 edge of Koidu Town on the way to Gandorhun. So it was that same
17 route that I settled, that was the same place he settled, but he
18 was a little bit ahead of me. That was towards the Gandorhun
19 Road.

09:39:07 20 Q. Now, did any further meeting take place, called by Johnny
21 Paul Koroma?

22 A. Yes. On the third day, in the morning, let me say around
23 9/10 o'clock, by 10 o'clock Johnny Paul said all of us should
24 assemble at his place for a meeting. So both the AFRC/RUF
09:39:31 25 commanders, all of us went there at the meeting, and Johnny Paul
26 chaired the meeting.

27 Q. Pause there. Taking matters in stages, who was present at
28 that meeting?

29 A. For those of us, the RUF, myself, Issa, I was there; Mike

1 Lamin was there; Peter Vandi was there; Morris Kallon was there;
2 Rambo was there.

3 Q. Which Rambo?

4 A. RUF Rambo, RUF Rambo. That is Boston Flomo. And then
09:40:14 5 Isaac Mongor was there. Those of us, the RUF commanders,
6 including some Vanguard, all of us attending at the meeting.
7 And for the AFRC, the PLO-3 was there, Bazy Kamara, Bomb Blast,
8 Hassan Papa Bangura, that is Bomb Blast, he too was there.
9 Santigie Kanu was there. And CSO Rambo to Johnny Paul was there.
09:40:50 10 Honourable Samuel was there. And some other officers,
11 lieutenants, captains of the AFRC, all of them were there,
12 because at this stage--

13 Q. Okay. Now what transpired at that meeting?

14 A. Well, at that meeting, after all of us had assembled,
09:41:16 15 Johnny Paul came from his sitting room, he came to the veranda to
16 the stairs because all of us sat under the mango trees in front
17 of the house and he greeted us and he said, "Good morning,
18 gentlemen." All of us responded. So he chaired the meeting and
19 he spoke about unity within the RUF and AFRC and he told every
09:41:44 20 one of us that this is now the place for us to stop running away
21 from ECOMOG. And he said we cannot continue giving our back to
22 ECOMOG whilst they are advancing on us. So he said whilst the
23 RUF/AFRC are in Kono they should act as one body. He said he did
24 not want any more conflict between the two parties and that we
09:42:08 25 should know that we are fighting for the same goal. And he
26 promised the troops that when he gets to Kailahun he will speak
27 with Sam Bockarie for them to be able to arrange how they will
28 get materials to send materials to Kono to the troops so that
29 they will defend Kono. And that also they will send food supply,

1 that is ration.

2 So he said the RUF/AFRC should defend Kono and he was
3 appointing Superman as the commander for the two groups and he
4 appointed Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara as the deputy to Superman for the
09:42:50 5 two groups. So he told us during the meeting that - he said we
6 should move. He said we were going to Kailahun and he said he
7 was going to Kailahun. He said we should organise for us to go
8 to Kailahun, myself, him and Mike Lamin, and he said Isaac should
9 lead the troops. Because at that time we had understood that the
09:43:18 10 Kamajors were in Gandorhun so he said Isaac should lead the
11 troops to Gandorhun so that they would be able to open the way
12 for us to go to Kailahun.

13 So after he had given this appointment of command in Kono,
14 that was the end of the meeting. So, from the meeting, myself,
09:43:40 15 Mike Lamin and Isaac, we said that being that Johnny Paul has
16 said Isaac should advance, we told Isaac that he should go in
17 front with Rambo and that we would follow later to Gandorhun.

18 So immediately after the meeting, Isaac, Mongor and Flomo,
19 Boston Flomo Rambo, they left together with some of the RUF
09:44:07 20 fighters, including their bodyguards, they moved to Gandorhun.
21 So when they went to Gandorhun they met Kamajors there, they
22 fought them and they pushed them out of Gandorhun. So after they
23 had left, going towards 3 o'clock to 4 in the evening, that was
24 when I, Kallon - Morris Kallon and Peter Vandi, we also left our
09:44:31 25 family members, we went to Gandorhun. So we met Isaac and others
26 in Gandorhun. So they told us then that the Kamajors were in
27 Koindu Gieya. He said they had moved from Gandorhun so they went
28 to establish a defence in Koindu Gieya. So we passed the night
29 in Gandorhun and the following morning we organised Isaac and the

1 others, including Rambo, they went and attacked Koindu Gi eya, but
2 they could not make it. They were not successful.

3 Q. Koindu Gi eya, how do you spell the second part of that
4 name?

09:45:09 5 A. I think it is G-I-E-Y-A.

6 Q. Thank you. So carry on?

7 A. So we were in Gandorhun, they attacked them that day but
8 they were not successful and the following day they attacked -
9 they attacked them in the morning. They could not make it also.

09:45:34 10 From then we organised again. We attacked them in the evening.

11 It was not successful. So I communicated with Johnny Paul in
12 Kono and I sent a message to Johnny Paul and I sent a message to
13 Bockarie in Kailahun. So Sam Bockarie said if that is the
14 situation, he said he was sending a receiving team and that the

09:45:57 15 receiving team that was coming, they would attack Koindu Gi eya
16 from the Sandaru road through Baoma Tanyamui hun. The road coming
17 towards Koindu Gi eya.

18 Q. Pause there. Spell that last name for us, how do you say
19 it?

09:46:16 20 A. Baoma Tanyamui hun. That is difficult for me to spell.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the translators could assist?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honours. B-A-0-M-A

23 T-A-N-Y-A-M-U-I -H-U-N.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

09:46:41 25 Q. Sorry for that interruption, Mr Sesay. So carry on?

26 A. So Sam Bockarie sent about 60 to 70 armed men - he sent 60
27 to 70 armed men with radio set and the commander was Major Gua.

28 Q. How do you spell that name?

29 A. I think is G-U-A.

1 Q. Thank you. Go on?

2 A. So, they left Kailahun, they came and they reached Baoma
3 Tanyamuihun and they contacted our radio in Gandorhun. So that
4 was when my radio operator informed me that the guys have got to
09:47:32 5 Baoma Tanyamuihun. And I said okay. He said they should tell
6 them that we are also organising ourselves but that they from
7 Baoma, they should first attack in the following morning. And
8 then after the attack, those of us from the Gandorhun road we
9 would also respond. So they came and launched the attack at
09:47:52 10 about 10 to 11 in the morning and the Gandorhun group too
11 responded. But still we were not successful against the
12 Kamajors. So they withdrew on the way to Baoma Tanyamuihun and
13 we also withdraw from Koindu Geiya and we came to Koindu Bui
14 because that was where we had our defensive information.

09:48:13 15 Q. Koindu Bui ma?

16 A. Koindu Bui ma.

17 Q. How do you spell the second part of that?

18 A. I think it's B-U-I-M-A.

19 Q. I am grateful. Go on.

09:48:29 20 A. So after they had withdrawn to Koindu Bui ma, Morris Kallon
21 came and told me that they attacked but they were not successful.
22 So the men from - the receiving team bypassed Koindu Geiya and
23 they came to Koindu Bui ma. So they came to Gandorhun. And when
24 they came they had about two wounded soldiers with them. So the
09:49:00 25 combat medic had to take care of the wounded soldiers. So I sent
26 the information to Sam Bockarie and Sam Bockarie sent a response
27 saying that if that is the case he will inform Johnny Paul about
28 the situation, that Johnny Paul should come to Gandorhun so that
29 we will use a bush push to Gandorhun to the Moya River.

1 So on that day we are in Gandorhun up to the evening and
2 then Mike Lamin and Johnny Paul came with their family members
3 together with their guards. And when they came that evening
4 around to 5 to 6 o'clock in the evening we passed the night in
09:49:50 5 Gandorhun and the following morning - that evening I received a
6 radio message from Sam Bockarie saying that Johnny Paul, myself,
7 Issa, Mike Lamin, they said only the three of us were supposed to
8 go to Kailahun together with our family members and securities,
9 but he said all the other commanders should stay in Gandorhun.

09:50:12 10 Q. Why?

11 A. Well, Bockarie said he did not want a very large group so
12 that the Kamajors will not take notice of Johnny Paul's movements
13 into Kailahun. So that was the reason that I understood from
14 him. So the receiving team that had come, the commander Major
09:50:37 15 Gua, because he was used to me and I was used to him, he was an
16 elderly person to me but we were friends, so he told me, oh, he
17 said, Bra Issa, he said you are --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be
19 advised to repeat that area slowly.

09:50:57 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Pause. Could you just go over that part again, please.
22 The translator missed that?

23 A. I said when Major Gua came with the receiving team in that
24 evening that they came to Gandorhun because they arrived in
09:51:12 25 Gandorhun let me say around 2 o'clock, so whilst we were
26 discussing with Major Gua told me about the incident that had
27 taken place in Kailahun. He said the commander had killed some
28 people in Kailahun and they had arrested --

29 Q. Pause there, which commander killed some people in

1 Kailahun?

2 A. That is Sam Bockarie.

3 Q. And those people killed in Kailahun, who were they?

4 A. Well, because for me that was the first time I heard about
09:51:46 5 the arrest and the execution of those people. I think they said
6 they were alleged Kamajors, so Major Gua told me that the
7 Kamajors they arrested, he said Sam Bockarie had killed some and
8 he had given orders that he had executed all of them and they
9 were 65. And he said it was right in the centre of Kailahun Town
09:52:06 10 that they were killed. He said Bockarie killed some at the
11 roundabout and the others were killed at the back of the MP
12 office. And I said, "Oh, if that is the case, okay." And I said
13 but that number of people was many; why didn't Bockarie decide to
14 keep them in custody? And he too said he did not know why. He
09:52:26 15 said in fact some of the men whom he had come with in the
16 receiving team, he said he saw some of them in Kailahun Town and
17 they took part in the killings. So that evening, Johnny Paul and
18 Mike Lamin came to Gandorhun and the following morning we
19 travelled.

09:52:46 20 Q. Pause there. I want to ask you a little bit more about
21 this information that you received regarding the killing of 60
22 plus people in Kailahun. Now, just going through that carefully.
23 First of all, who gave you that information?

24 A. I said Major Gua, he was the commander.

09:53:14 25 Q. Of the receiving party sent by Sam Bockarie, is that right?

26 A. Yes, he was the commander.

27 Q. And where were you at the time you received this
28 information?

29 A. They met us in Gandorhun.

1 Q. And when you heard this, Mr Sesay, how did you feel about
2 the fact that Sam Bockarie had killed so many people?

3 A. Well, I was shocked because I thought that the number of
4 people was too much for them to be killed and Major Gua told me
09:53:57 5 that most of the people were natives of Kailahun and I did not
6 feel good about it. And in fact that was the same time I heard
7 about the killing of BS Massaquoi in Kenema and some other people
8 before Sam Bockarie and others withdrew from Kenema. They said
9 the man killed some people in Kenema and when he came to Kailahun
09:54:20 10 also he had executed those other people.

11 Q. So who told you about the killing of BS Massaquoi and
12 others in Kenema?

13 A. It was the same Major Gua who told me that evening that we
14 met. He said it, because he was in Kenema with Sam Bockarie when
09:54:41 15 they retreated.

16 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, as far as you understand the situation, who
17 was responsible for the killing of BS Massaquoi in Kenema?

18 A. Well, according to what I understood from that receiving
19 team, it was Sam Bockarie who arrested them. They said he had
09:55:05 20 got information that BS Massaquoi and others were sending
21 single-barrel rounds to the Kamajors including food, so they
22 arrested them and they put them at the police station under
23 custody in Kenema. So when the Kamajors attacked he ordered that
24 they should go and remove them from the police station and they
09:55:25 25 took them to the brigade headquarters where they executed them
26 before they pulled out of Kenema, because they attacked Kenema
27 and the whilst they were pulling out from Kenema that was the
28 time he killed them. So it was Bockarie who was responsible for
29 the killing of BS Massaquoi in Kenema in February '98.

1 Q. And who was responsible for the killing of those 60-odd
2 suspected Kamajors in Kailahun?

3 A. Well, it was the same Sam Bockarie who gave orders to the
4 MP commanders to arrest those people whilst he set up a board for
09:56:06 5 the investigation. And what I understood later was that it was
6 two sets of people and one was --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
8 to repeat the name of the chiefdoms.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:56:27 10 Q. Could you repeat, please, the names of the chiefdoms that
11 you have just mentioned?

12 A. Well, one was Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun Town. And Bambara
13 Chiefdom, that was Pendembu and the surroundings.

14 Q. Mr Sesay, can I please offer a caution. Having spoken to
09:56:52 15 the shorthand writers I am told that the difficulty arises when
16 you mention place names. So in future, when you mention a place
17 name can we pause, sort out a spelling before we move on. Okay.
18 Now assist me to this extent: BS Massaquoi, who was he?

19 A. Well, BS Massaquoi was a prominent civilian in Kenema. I
09:57:30 20 think around that time he was the town council man in Kenema and
21 he commanded high respect from the civilian population in Kenema.
22 He was a figurehead.

23 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, was those killings by Sam Bockarie in line,
24 as you understood it, with the philosophy of the RUF?

09:58:01 25 A. No. It was not part of the RUF ideology because the RUF
26 ideology is even against the killing of prisoners of war, so let
27 alone the killing of civilians.

28 Q. And from your understanding what effect would such killings
29 have on the effectiveness of the RUF as a revolutionary force?

1 A. Well, that created a very bad image for the RUF because all
2 those things would make people look at the RUF that the RUFs were
3 just there to kill people, which was not good for the name of the
4 group.

09:58:54 5 Q. And help me, as far as you were concerned or understood,
6 did anyone order Sam Bockarie to carry out those killings?

7 A. Nobody ordered Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie killed those
8 people on his own volition, and even within the RUF he did not
9 consult any other commander about it. He only took that decision
10 on his own.

09:59:21

11 Q. And you told us that you then left, a group of you, that is
12 yourself, Mike Lamin and Johnny Paul Koroma, to travel to where,
13 from Gandorhun?

14 A. We travelled to go to Kailahun through the Moa River.

09:59:57

15 Q. And what was your mode of transport?

16 A. Well, we walked. We used the bush path from Gandorhun Town
17 and we went close to Baoma Tanyamuihun.

18 Q. Pause. Do you remember the rules. How do you spell that?

19 A. Yes. It was the interpreter who spelt it.

10:00:27

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: It was spelt before. I am sure it will
21 be picked up.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: All right:

23 Q. So you went there, then where did you go?

24 A. From there we went to Sandaru.

10:00:41

25 Q. And from there to where?

26 A. From Sandaru we passed through some other smaller villages
27 and we went to the Moa River.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, please take a pause. The
29 court reporters have asked for a five-minute break to do some

1 changes. Let me just consult.

2 I think we will give the court reporters 10 minutes or so
3 while we rise off the Bench to sort out something on their
4 machines. Court is adjourned.

10:03:06 5 [Break taken at 10.03 a.m.]

6 [Upon resuming at 10.15 a.m.]

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, please proceed.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Mr Sesay, before the short adjournment you were describing
10:15:13 10 the route taken from Makeni to get to Kailahun. Do you recall
11 that?

12 A. Yes, I recall.

13 Q. And we had reached the Moa River, hadn't we?

14 A. Yes.

10:15:27 15 Q. From there where did you go?

16 A. From the Moa River we crossed and passed the night at a
17 village called Lowa Boama.

18 Q. Do you know the spelling for that? How do you spell the
19 first part of that?

10:16:02 20 A. L-O-W-A.

21 Q. And the second part?

22 A. B-O-A-M-A.

23 Q. And from there where did you go?

24 A. We all arrived on that evening. I sent a message to
10:16:24 25 Bockarie, because I was with the radio set and the operator. So
26 Bockarie too responded. That was about 6 o'clock in the evening.
27 Bockarie responded that he was sending vehicles to pick us up
28 from one village called Kenewa close to Kailahun - 2 miles away
29 from Kailahun.

1 Q. Were those vehicles sent?

2 A. Yes, because we too walked from Boama to Kenewa the
3 following morning and we arrived in Kenewa. The vehicles were
4 parked there waiting for us.

10:17:05 5 Q. Were you then taken to Kailahun?

6 A. Yes, because Bockarie sent his own jeep for Johnny Paul, so
7 we all boarded the pick-ups, I and Mike Lamin, and we drove to
8 Kailahun Town and we went to Augustine Gbao's house; he had
9 prepared food for us. So together with Johnny Paul we went
10:17:32 10 there. We ate. Then Johnny Paul left in Mosquito's jeep and one
11 pick-up, and they drove off Buedu whilst I and Mike Lamin stayed
12 in Kailahun Town.

13 Q. When you arrived in Kailahun Town, Mr Sesay, did you see
14 any signs of the killings of the 60 plus Kamajors which had been
10:17:58 15 reported to you by Major Gua?

16 A. Yes, like the 10 who were killed at the roundabout, their
17 corpses were on the road entering Kailahun Town, but the majority
18 were killed behind the - behind the MP office. I did not go
19 there, but those corpses that we met there had started going bad.
10:18:25 20 When we entered Kailahun Town I saw the corpses.

21 Q. Have you any idea how long before your arrival these
22 killings had taken place?

23 A. Well, it could be between - it was not up to one week, but
24 it could be within five to six days.

10:18:47 25 Q. And the bodies were still by the roundabout?

26 A. No, they had removed them from the roundabout. Because
27 when you are coming from the roundabout, the road from Pendembu
28 going downhill was - they were by the roadside. The corpses were
29 by the roadside. They had taken them out of the roundabout.

1 Q. Since yesterday afternoon when we commenced looking at the
2 withdrawal from Freetown, we've been look at various journeys
3 taken by you. And just so that we get a picture, I would like
4 you now, please, to be shown a map. It is map P-5. It should
10:19:47 5 look like that. Mr Sesay, have you seen this map before?

6 A. Yes, this is a map of Sierra Leone.

7 Q. Let's just take a moment, shall we, and acquaint ourselves
8 with some of the locations. To the left middle of the map we see
9 Freetown; is that right?

10:21:37 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. At the tip of that peninsula, with other locations around
12 it being Wellington, Hastings, Waterloo and York, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now first of all, using York as a reference point, where is
10:22:03 15 Tumbo fishing village?

16 A. Well --

17 Q. And it might be of assistance, Mr Sesay, if you changed
18 places, sat in the other seat. And there is a pen next to the
19 projector, and if you use the pen to indicate just roughly where
10:22:29 20 Tumbo fishing village would be?

21 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, are we marking the Court exhibit -
22 is it admitted - or a copy?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I wasn't asking for it to be marked. I was
24 asking for the witness to indicate where roughly that location
10:23:06 25 would be.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is it in fact a Court exhibit, or just a
27 clean map?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm told that it's a Court exhibit.

29 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, it's a Court exhibit.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Just keep the top on the pen, Mr Sesay, because I don't
3 want to offend anyone, and just point, please, where Tumbo
4 fishing village is?

10:23:43 5 A. I'm seeing York, but I can't see Tumbo.

6 Q. I know it's not there, which is why I'm just asking you to
7 just point on the map in front of the projector just roughly
8 where it is. It doesn't have to be precise?

9 A. Well, I think - let me use that one.

10:24:20 10 Q. Okay. If you want - if you prefer to?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Just point on the screen?

13 A. Tumbo should be at the back of York because from York you
14 go to Tumbo and from Tumbo you go to Waterloo.

10:24:49 15 Q. Unfortunately, Mr Sesay, that doesn't help us because we
16 can't see that on the screen. So sadly, you will have to go back
17 to the other chair and indicate from that position. Just point
18 on the map. Don't mark it, just point?

19 A. I said from York here - because this is Freetown. Around
10:25:21 20 here could be Goderich, then you go to York. From York you would
21 find Tumbo here, then you get to Waterloo, because you would see
22 - you would see from York the line is coming down and there is a
23 bend. Then you get to Waterloo.

24 Q. And just hold the pen still roughly where Tumbo is?

10:25:47 25 A. Well, I think Tumbo should be here.

26 Q. Okay. And then the next place I want you to - because you
27 told us that those retreating from Freetown came to Tumbo, then
28 they took boats and went to Fogbo. Just help us, roughly where
29 is Fogbo? The same exercise. Just point the pen?

1 A. Well, I would expect that Fogbo should be around here.
2 Because from Tumbo they used a boat and they got around here.
3 Fogbo should be around here because from here - this is Songo.
4 Songo is the junction. That is Four Mile. This is Fogbo. From
10:26:34 5 there you go to the junction, which is Four Mile.

6 Q. Thank you. And then from there people regrouped at
7 Masiaka, you told us, yes?

8 A. Yes, from Songo they went to Masiaka.

9 Q. Now, you told us that you personally then went to Bo to
10:26:56 10 attack the Kamajors. Can you see Bo on the map?

11 A. Yes, here is Bo.

12 Q. After Bo, you then - after that failed attack, you went to
13 where?

14 A. From Bo I was wounded and I went back to Mile 91.

10:27:42 15 Q. Thank you. And then from there to where?

16 A. From Mile 91 we went back to Masiaka.

17 Q. And then from Masiaka to where?

18 A. From Masiaka, you would find Gberi Junction around there
19 and I went to Lunsar from Masiaka. Gberi Junction should be
10:28:11 20 around here. Then I went to Lunsar, and from Lunsar I went to
21 Makeni.

22 Q. And then you told us about the meeting in Johnny Paul's
23 village near to Lunsar and then, following that meeting, yes, you
24 went to where?

10:28:31 25 A. From Makeni we - I went to Binkolo here. Just about a
26 stone's throw from Binkolo there is a road branching off to
27 Johnny Paul's village. That is around Binkolo here. We left
28 there and came back to Makeni, and from Makeni I went to
29 Magburaka, from Magburaka to Matotoka, and from Matotoka to

1 Masingbi. From Masingbi I travelled to Kono.

2 Q. Pause there. And if we can now find Kono, please?

3 A. Yes, here is Sefadu. This is Sewafe.

4 Q. And from there you went to where?

10:29:32 5 A. From Sewafe, Yengema; and from Yengema I went to Koidu
6 Town. This is Koidu Town, Sefadu.

7 Q. You told us that there was a further meeting, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And thereafter you set off on foot to Kailahun. Is that
10:29:58 10 right?

11 A. No. From Koidu Town I drove in a vehicle to Gandorhun, and
12 from Gandorhun I set off on foot to Kailahun.

13 Q. Crossing the Moa River?

14 A. Yes.

10:30:11 15 Q. Thank you. We can put the map away now, please. Having
16 eaten at Augustine Gbao's house, where did you spend that night
17 on arrival in Kailahun?

18 A. Well, I said I did not pass the night in Kailahun, because
19 after we had eaten, it was not up to one hour after we had eaten
10:30:59 20 Johnny Paul went to Buedu. He went ahead of us. Then I and Mike
21 Lamin stayed in Kailahun Town; let me say about 3 to 4 we too
22 drove off to Buedu, we passed the night in Buedu that very day.

23 Q. Help us with this Mr Sesay, please. In what month was it
24 that you arrived in Kailahun?

10:31:22 25 A. This was in late February - late February or early March.
26 Within that, but I think it was in late February.

27 Q. Having arrived in Kailahun, did you, in due course, meet
28 with Sam Bockarie?

29 A. Yes, the very day that we got to Kailahun I met with Sam

1 Bockarie in Buedu in the evening.

2 Q. And what did you discuss with him, if anything?

3 A. Well, because I was in the pick-up with Mike. The driver
4 took us along to Sam Bockarie's house. We greeted him. We
10:32:18 5 greeted his wife. He asked me to use the house across the road.
6 That was opposite his own house. So my own wife and my child
7 went to that house. We sat down and we talked. He asked me
8 about my wound and I showed - I removed my shirt and I showed him
9 the wound, because at that time it was not completely healed. He
10:32:49 10 asked me how we had retreated, just like I had explained. From
11 that, I went to where I was lodged, had my bath, and they called
12 me around 7 o'clock and we ate and we had some discussions and
13 from then - there I went and slept.

14 Q. Now, when you arrived in Buedu, Mr Sesay, what was the
10:33:18 15 command structure within the RUF in that period late
16 February/March 1998?

17 A. Well, at that time Bockarie was the field commander.

18 Q. Pause there. Who had appointed him field commander?

19 A. That was Foday Sankoh's appointment as field commander.
10:33:46 20 That was the title he was still carrying.

21 Q. And at or about that time did Mr Bockarie remain as field
22 commander or was he promoted?

23 A. No, just after a few days Johnny Paul promoted Sam Bockarie
24 to brigadier and he appointed him as chief of defence staff.

10:34:11 25 Q. Now, pausing there. Help me with this, please, Mr Sesay,
26 because I want to be sure about this, you see. Who was it who
27 gave Sam Bockarie that appointment?

28 A. It was Johnny Paul who appointed Sam Bockarie as chief of
29 defence staff and he promoted him to the rank of brigadier.

1 Q. Are you sure, Mr Sesay, that it wasn't Charles Taylor who
2 so promoted him?

3 A. No, it was not Charles Taylor. In fact, this was - it was
4 in the presence of many of us. I was not the only person or
10:34:57 5 Bockarie alone; Mike Lamin was there and all the other officers
6 in Buedu were at Sam Bockarie's house when Johnny Paul announced
7 that promotion to Bockarie.

8 Q. And help us, what power did Johnny Paul have to so promote
9 Sam Bockarie? On what authority?

10:35:12 10 A. Well, at the time that we arrived in Buedu, Sam Bockarie,
11 Mike Lamin and myself were still looking, regarding Johnny Paul
12 as leader of the AFRC and --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this
14 area slowly.

10:35:37 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Can we start again please. The interpreter is having
17 problems following. At this time, you told us, "Mike Lamin and
18 myself were still looking, regarding Johnny Paul as leader of the
19 AFRC", and you were going on to add a further comment.

10:35:53 20 A. Yes. I said at the time that we arrived in Buedu, Sam
21 Bockarie, Mike Lamin and myself, all of us in the RUF, everybody
22 was regarding Johnny Paul as the leader for the AFRC, and
23 Mr Sankoh had said that we should take instructions from Johnny
24 Paul Koroma. So Johnny Paul Koroma, when we arrived, Sam
10:36:18 25 Bockarie left his bedroom and lodged Johnny Paul Koroma there.

26 So Bockarie was considering him as his authority, so it was
27 Johnny Paul who gave him that promotion. And, even before the
28 dispute occurred, Johnny Paul sent Bockarie to Daru to organise
29 the soldiers. We were all working together, in terms of

1 defending Daru.

2 Q. Now, I had interrupted you as you were going on to explain
3 what the structure was in the RUF at the time. So Sam Bockarie
4 was the field commander, you told us, yes?

10:37:01 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. At this time who, if anyone, was above Sam Bockarie?

7 A. Well, at this time it was only Johnny Paul that was ahead
8 of Sam Bockarie.

9 Q. And below Sam Bockarie was who?

10:37:30 10 A. Well, before the promotion, Sam Bockarie was a field
11 commander. I was a battle group commander. Then we had colonel
12 Mike Lamin who was the adviser to Bockarie. Although at that
13 time I was a lieutenant colonel because it was at that same time
14 that Johnny Paul promoted Sam Bockarie that he also promoted me
10:37:58 15 to a colonel. We had colonels, whilst I was a lieutenant colonel
16 when I arrived in Buedu, but I was the battle group commander.

17 Q. Now, pausing there, you've spoken now of two promotions:
18 Sam Bockarie being promoted to brigadier; you being promoted to
19 full colonel. Were there any other promotions?

10:38:30 20 A. No, in Kailahun that was the promotion. At the time that
21 Johnny Paul --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat this section
23 very slowly.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:38:43 25 Q. Could you say that again, please?

26 A. Johnny Paul said I should become the brigade commander for
27 the RUF/AFRC for Kailahun District, and I was to be a colonel. I
28 was promoted to colonel. Those are the appointments that Johnny
29 Paul gave at the initial stage that we arrived at Buedu.

1 Q. Thank you. Now, did Johnny Paul stay in Buedu at this
2 time?

3 A. Yes. After the promotions, he was in Buedu, but within
4 those days after the promotions, Johnny Paul had discussions with
10:39:36 5 Sam Bockarie wherein he told Sam Bockarie that he wanted to
6 travel to Ghana in order to get ammunition because the two of
7 them cannot only stay in Buedu in the Kailahun District and not
8 get material to send to the front line to allow the men to fight.
9 So Bockarie welcomed the idea, saying that it was a good idea.
10:40:02 10 So he asked Johnny Paul when Johnny Paul wanted to travel, and
11 Johnny Paul said within 72 hours he would like to travel, and Sam
12 Bockarie said, "No problem."

13 Q. Pause there. Whose idea was it to travel to Ghana to
14 obtain ammunition?

10:40:21 15 A. That was Johnny Paul's idea. He came up with the topic to
16 Sam Bockarie.

17 Q. And did he say whether he had any contacts in Ghana to make
18 such a trip possible?

19 A. Well, yes. The man said he had a contact in Ghana because
10:40:47 20 at the time that he was chairman of the AFRC, he had sympathisers
21 from the Ghanaian government, so he said he had friends whom he
22 was going to meet in order for him to get ammunition.

23 Q. Did he give the names of such friends?

24 A. No, he did not discuss with me. He discussed with
10:41:10 25 Bockarie. It was later that I knew of this. I did not know the
26 name of the people whom he was going to meet, but I knew that he
27 was going to Ghana. That was what he said.

28 Q. When later you discovered about this, who informed you?

29 A. Well, the fellow was there - the following day when Johnny

1 Paul had selected those who were to travel with him, his family
2 and some of his guards, then the CSO to Johnny Paul, that is
3 Rambo, Johnny Paul did not select him to go. So it was Rambo who
4 went and met Bockarie and explained to Sam Bockarie that: Sam
10:41:55 5 Bockarie, he said, this man, the chairman, is talking about going
6 to Ghana. Now he has selected people with whom he wanted to go,
7 his family members and some of - his communication man and few of
8 his guards. He said: I, who is the CSO to Johnny Paul, has not
9 been included in the list. He said - so he has grown suspicious
10:42:22 10 that if Johnny Paul goes, Johnny Paul will not return. So Johnny
11 Paul - Sam Bockarie should not allow - he said that Sam Bockarie
12 should not allow Johnny Paul to leave.

13 Q. Could you stop there a minute, please, because there's one
14 matter that I want to clarify before we go any further. First of
10:42:43 15 all, were you present at this meeting when Johnny Paul mooted the
16 idea of going to Ghana?

17 A. I said I was not at the meeting, but after he had discussed
18 with Bockarie, Bockarie told me and Mike Lamin. He called us and
19 told us that the chairman wanted to travel to obtain ammunition,
10:43:04 20 so all of us supported the idea at the initial stage.

21 Q. Pause there. And I pause for good reason. So tell me,
22 when Bockarie told you that, given the nature of the allegation
23 in this case, why did you not say to Bockarie: Why is he going
24 to Ghana? Why not go to see the Papay, Charles Taylor, in
10:43:30 25 Liberia just next door? Why didn't you suggest that?

26 A. Well, the man had no business with Mr Taylor. That was why
27 he decided that he was going to Ghana to meet his friends in
28 order for him to be able to obtain ammunition supplies to come
29 and fight the war.

1 Q. Which man had no business with Mr Taylor?

2 A. I mean Johnny Paul Koroma.

3 Q. Thank you. So you were saying that there was some
4 suspicion that if Johnny Paul goes, Johnny Paul would not return.

10:44:06 5 Who expressed that suspicion?

6 A. That was his CSO, one of the 17 guys who overthrew. He was
7 called Rambo.

8 Q. Just remind us, what was Rambo's real name?

9 A. Well, Rambo's real name I don't know. But when you look at
10 the exhibits, the AFRC Gazettes, amongst the honourables he was
11 the only Rambo. So if you saw any Rambo there, then that is the
12 Rambo.

13 Q. Just so that we're clear, let's --

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is obviously different from RUF
10:44:51 15 Rambo, is it?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. This is different from RUF
17 Rambo Flomo - Boston Flomo and it's different from RUF Rambo, who
18 was Daniel Wankay. This is SLA Rambo who was the AFRC Rambo. He
19 was the only council member who's called Rambo amongst the 17
10:45:19 20 honourables.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Let's pause to sort this out, shall we. Let's look again
23 at exhibit P-58, second page, please. Take your time, Mr Sesay,
24 and just glance down that list and tell us the name of this AFRC
10:46:15 25 Rambo?

26 MR KOUMJIAN: We have no objection to counsel leading on
27 this. It's not in dispute, the name.

28 THE WITNESS: Rambo is the Kabbia.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Just give us the number?

2 A. 29.

3 Q. Staff Sergeant Kabbia. Is that right?

4 A. Yes, that is Rambo.

10:47:40 5 Q. Thank you. Yes, let's put that away, shall we. So he,
6 Rambo, Mr Kabbia, had expressed suspicions about Johnny Paul
7 Koroma motives. Is that right?

8 A. Yes, he said because --

9 Q. Because why?

10:48:25 10 A. He said because he was the CSO, everything pertaining to
11 Johnny Paul's security, he was responsible for it. And since the
12 time they released Johnny Paul from Pademba Road Prison and they
13 made him chairman of the AFRC, he had been CSO to him up to that
14 moment. So if Johnny Paul decided to leave him there and take

10:48:51 15 with him some other people who were not part of the coup makers,
16 then for that reason alone he believed that Johnny Paul was not
17 going to come back. So that was what he explained to Sam
18 Bockarie. And he said if Johnny Paul went and did not come back,
19 then he was leaving us in hot waters. And then Sam Bockarie

10:49:11 20 said: Okay, I'll heard it. Because that was at night when they
21 discussed that, and Bockarie told him: The following morning I
22 will discuss with you more. So the following morning Bockarie
23 stood in his veranda across the road and he explained this thing
24 to me. And when he explained it to me I said: Oh, this - I said
10:49:30 25 that they should call Mike Lamin.

26 Q. So initially you started explaining to you; then he said
27 they should call Mike Lamin. Was Mike Lamin called?

28 A. Yes, they called Mike Lamin. He sent his bodyguard to call
29 Mike. The bodyguard used a bike, because Mike was living at the

1 upper part of the town, and then he came back.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
3 to slow down and repeat that last bit.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:49:59 5 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. So a bike was sent to fetch Mike,
6 who lived in another part of the town, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did Mike arrive?

9 A. Yes, Mike came.

10:50:14 10 Q. When Mike arrived, where did Mike arrive?

11 A. Mike came with his vehicle and he parked. He alighted from
12 the vehicle. He came to the veranda where Bockarie and I were
13 seated. So when Mike came --

14 Q. Was it just the three of you?

10:50:40 15 A. Yes, we were three. And then Bockarie also sent for Rambo
16 to come, and then Rambo too came. When Rambo came --

17 Q. The Rambo who came, is that the Rambo the CSO?

18 A. Yes, that was the CSO.

19 Q. Pause there. And "CSO" stands for what?

10:51:02 20 A. CSO, chief security officer.

21 Q. And when Rambo arrived, what, if anything, did Rambo say?

22 A. Well, when Rambo arrived, Sam Bockarie then told Rambo that
23 could you please explain what you explained to me yesterday so
24 that me brothers will hear it? And then Rambo repeated the same
10:51:28 25 explanation on the topic that he had told Mosquito about the
26 previous day. So Mosquito said: Have you heard it? Then we
27 said yes. So Rambo said: If you allow this man to go, this man
28 will not return back. So the best you can do, he said, Mosquito
29 should collect the diamonds from the man because the man had

1 diamonds with him. So from that point, he said, Mosquito would
2 be able to utilise the diamonds so that we'll be able to continue
3 with the offensive against ECOMOG. And then Bockarie too said
4 yes, that is an idea.

10:52:01 5 Q. Pause there. Now, when Johnny Paul Koroma had suggested
6 this idea of going to Ghana, help us, Mr Sesay, how would he have
7 travelled from Kailahun to get to Ghana?

8 A. Well, he could have even travelled from Guinea. Because by
9 then we had people who used to go to Guinea and come back, and
10:52:33 10 they went through the crossing point and through another crossing
11 point by - around Koindu, because we used to cross over those
12 areas to enter Guinea and return.

13 Q. So in any event, Bockarie is now informed that Johnny Paul
14 Koroma is in possession of diamonds and he's intending to leave
10:52:53 15 and not return. So what was decided to be done?

16 A. Well, Bockarie decided that they should ask Johnny Paul to
17 hand the diamonds over. Because Johnny Paul had come and he had
18 spent almost two weeks, and at that stage Bockarie never knew
19 that Johnny Paul had diamonds, and Johnny Paul did not tell
10:53:16 20 Bockarie that he had diamonds. So had it not been Rambo, nobody
21 would have known that Johnny Paul had diamonds with him.

22 Q. So what happened thereafter?

23 A. It was then that I, Bockarie and Mike Lamin, we walked
24 across the road - because Johnny Paul was in Bockarie's room - so
10:53:39 25 we walked across the road and Mike Lamin ordered the bodyguards
26 of Johnny Paul to disarm. So some of the bodyguards started
27 asking, say, Oh, colonel, what has happened? What has happened,
28 sir? So Mike Lamin took a gun from one of his bodyguard called
29 India and he started shooting on the ground.

1 Q. Pause there. You said earlier, "So we walked across" --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the interpreter would want
3 to make a correction. It was the gun that was referred to as
4 LAR.

10:54:16

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Now, you said earlier, "So we walked across the road and
7 Mike Lamin ordered the bodyguards of Johnny Paul to disarm."
8 Yes; is that right?

9 A. Yes, that was what happened.

10:54:28

10 Q. Was Johnny Paul himself disarmed?

11 A. No, Johnny Paul did not have a gun. It was his bodyguards
12 who had guns.

13 Q. I'm grateful. So Mike Lamin then fires shots from this
14 weapon into the ground, you say?

10:54:45

15 A. Yes, the weapon that he collected from his bodyguard, he
16 fired shots into the ground. And Johnny Paul's bodyguards were
17 afraid and they had to put their guns down. And then Mike Lamin,
18 myself and Bockarie, we entered the room where Johnny Paul was.
19 And Johnny Paul said, "Oh, what has happened that people are

10:55:06

20 shooting like that?" He said, "If anything happened, Bockarie
21 and Issa, you should come and meet me." He should, "You should
22 come and meet me. Leave the boys alone." So we entered the
23 room. And then Bockarie asked Johnny Paul that know that you and
24 I had arranged that you should go to Ghana, but your CSO has told
10:55:29 25 us that if you went you would not come back and he said you have
26 diamonds, so he said present these diamonds. Then Johnny Paul
27 said, "Oh, is that the way you come to me?" Then he said, "Okay,
28 you wait for me. I will give you the diamonds." And Johnny Paul
29 opened his bag, he took the diamonds out and the diamond was

1 in --

2 Q. The diamond was in what?

3 A. It was in a container, a rubber like container, something
4 like the Ludo game container, the cup, the diamonds were in
10:56:04 5 there. It was something like a small cup.

6 Q. You said something like a something game. What game?

7 A. Ludo. The Ludo that we play, the Ludo seeds. You know
8 there is a container where they put the seeds to play. That was
9 the kind of rubber cup in which the diamonds were, so Johnny Paul
10:56:30 10 took it out and handed it over to Bockarie.

11 Q. Just pause for a minute, Mr Sesay, because I think it might
12 be helpful if we get an idea of the dimensions of this cup.

13 Using your fingers just show us roughly how tall the thing was?

14 A. The Ludo cup can just fit in between my fingers. It is
10:56:54 15 something round.

16 Q. One second. I'm going to see if we can get some
17 measurements here. Just put your fingers together, Mr Sesay, as
18 to the height of it. What does it say? 6 centimetres. And just
19 help us with the diameter of this.

10:57:31 20 A. Something like this.

21 Q. 4 centimetres. So 6 centimetres tall, about 4 centimetres
22 in diameter. Would you agree, Mr Sesay?

23 A. Yes, but the diamonds did not - the diamonds did not fill
24 the rubber. It was up to the middle. It was not up to the brim.
10:58:18 25 There was one in there that was up to 14 carats and the rest were
26 small diamonds.

27 Q. And do you know - can you help us as to how many diamonds
28 in total, how many individual pieces of diamond were in that
29 rubber?

1 A. Well, I do not recall the number of pieces, but the value
2 of the diamond, one was 14 carats, but the rest were small
3 diamonds. 25 per cent, 50 per cent, 75 per cent. Those were the
4 diamonds.

10:58:50 5 Q. I'm grateful. Now, just another detail to complete the
6 picture. Did Johnny Paul Koroma voluntarily hand over the
7 diamonds or was he forced to hand them over?

8 A. Well, he was not forced because Johnny Paul realised that
9 the information has been leaked by Rambo and that he had been in
10:59:21 10 Buedu for about ten days now, he had never told Bockarie that he
11 had diamonds. So if Rambo went and told Bockarie that he had
12 diamond, then he just took the diamonds out and handed them over.
13 He was not forced.

14 Q. Was Johnny Paul Koroma's wife molested during this process?

10:59:39 15 A. No, she was not molested.

16 Q. Those diamonds, were they industrial or commercial diamonds
17 or gem diamonds?

18 A. Minus the 14 carat, the rest were industrial diamonds. It
19 was just the 14 carat that had heavy value amongst the diamonds.

11:00:06 20 Q. And help us with this: Apart from Johnny Paul Koroma, who
21 was present in that room when those diamonds were handed over?

22 A. Johnny Paul was there, his wife was there, Mike Lamin,
23 myself and - Mike Lamin, myself and Bockarie were the ones in the
24 room, whilst Bockarie's bodyguards were in the living room by the
11:00:32 25 door.

26 Q. I see the time, Mr Sesay. We normally have a morning break
27 at this time. So we'll resume with this narrative later.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. We will adjourn for half an
29 hour and reconvene at 11.30.

1 [Break taken at 11.00 a.m.]

2 [Upon resuming at 11.35 a.m.]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, please continue.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:37:06 5 Q. Mr Sesay, before the adjournment you were telling us about
6 the removal of certain diamonds from Johnny Paul Koroma, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Johnny Paul Koroma having handed over the diamonds, was
9 anything done to him?

11:37:41 10 A. No, nothing was done to him. Nothing else was done to him.
11 The only thing was that Bockarie told his driver, and they were
12 put into a vehicle, together with his family, and driven to
13 Kangama, and they went to a former minister's house in Kangama.

14 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, at the time of this incident did Johnny Paul
11:38:16 15 Koroma have a radio set?

16 A. Yes, before the incident he had a radio set. Because when
17 he was going to Buedu, he had his communication man with him
18 called --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat the
11:38:33 20 name of the communication man he said.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. What was the name of the communications man?

23 A. It was - the communication was called Control Station. The
24 station was called Control Station.

11:38:49 25 Q. Now, after the discovery of these diamonds, did Johnny Paul
26 Koroma retain his radio set?

27 A. No. The radio set remained in Buedu with Bockarie, and
28 Johnny Paul went with his family to Kangama. They were sent
29 there.

1 Q. So after this incident did Johnny Paul Koroma thereafter
2 have access to a radio set?

3 A. No, he did not have access to a radio. Because Kangama
4 area, where he was, there wasn't any set there.

11:39:41 5 Q. I want to leave that incident now. Now, during this time,
6 Mr Sesay, where were you personally based?

7 A. At this time I was in Buedu.

8 Q. And where were you living?

9 A. I was living at the house opposite Sam Bockarie's, just
11:40:04 10 across the road. That is the road leading to the Liberian border
11 in Buedu.

12 Q. Help us: How regularly would you see Bockarie?

13 A. I saw Bockarie every morning. Because at that time, in the
14 morning the other officers will come to his house. All of us - I
11:40:30 15 will go across the road and I will say hello to him, we will have
16 breakfast together, and from then he will come to the radio set,
17 that was at court barri at his house. He will go there and he
18 will be sitting there, but I saw him every day for the whole day
19 on, because I just live opposite his house.

11:40:51 20 Q. Now, what was your relationship with Bockarie at this time?

21 A. At this time I had a good working relationship with
22 Bockarie.

23 Q. Now, at this time, Mr Sesay, who was in effective control
24 of the RUF?

11:41:21 25 A. At this time Sam Bockarie was in effective control of the
26 RUF. Because after this incident he appointed me as the field
27 commander, and he sent a message to Superman Colonel that he was
28 the battle group commander now, and at that time he had now
29 become the Chief of Defence Staff.

1 Q. Now --

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: What incident are we referring to? He
3 says "after this incident". Which incident?

4 THE WITNESS: That is the diamonds that were taken from
11:41:58 5 Johnny Paul when they were sent to Kangama; that's what I'm
6 talking about.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Thank you. Now, you say at this time Sam Bockarie was in
9 effective control and that, in fact, he had appointed you as
11:42:14 10 field commander and sent a message to Superman that he was the
11 battle group commander. Did he consult with Foday Sankoh before
12 making those appointments?

13 A. No. At this time - even before this time there wasn't any
14 communication between Foday Sankoh and Bockarie or any other RUF
11:42:40 15 member.

16 Q. Just remind us, Mr Sesay, when was the last time you had
17 received any form of communication from Foday Sankoh up to the
18 point we are discussing now?

19 A. Well, for me - you mean myself personally, or Sam Bockarie?

11:43:02 20 Q. Sam Bockarie, you, or any other senior figure in the RUF;
21 when was the last time you had had effective contact with Foday
22 Sankoh?

23 A. The last contact that Foday Sankoh received - sorry, that
24 Bockarie received instructions from Foday Sankoh - was when Foday
11:43:23 25 Sankoh gave instructions to Bockarie for the RUF to join the
26 AFRC. So when Foday Sankoh spoke on the BBC that the RUF should
27 join the AFRC, that was the last time that the RUF had contact
28 with the - with Foday Sankoh when he was in Nigeria. That is - I
29 can say that was in May. May 1997.

1 Q. So when in Buedu Sam Bockarie promoted you to field
2 commander, on whose authority did he do that?

3 A. Well, he do that - he did that on his own. Because on the
4 RUF side he was the one whom Foday Sankoh had left in command.
11:44:24 5 Even before the AFRC regime, in early 1997 it was Bockarie who
6 had the last say in the RUF after Foday Sankoh had been arrested.
7 In fact, at that time Foday Sankoh used to give instruction to
8 Bockarie, but on the ground it was Bockarie that was the head.
9 So at this time Foday Sankoh was arrested and this problem had
11:44:49 10 arisen with Johnny Paul Koroma, so Bockarie was the head on the
11 ground. So he did it on his own.

12 Q. In that last answer, Mr Sesay, you said, "In fact, at that
13 time Foday Sankoh used to give instruction to Sam Bockarie." At
14 what time?

11:45:11 15 A. Talking about early 1997 to the time of the coup, so May
16 '97.

17 Q. Now, when had Foday Sankoh given Sam Bockarie command of
18 the RUF?

19 A. Well, Foday Sankoh while he was in Nigeria, that's when he
11:45:51 20 sent an instruction that Sam Bockarie should command the RUF and
21 instructed Sam Bockarie and the other commanders to join the
22 AFRC.

23 Q. How was that instruction communicated by Foday Sankoh to
24 Sam Bockarie?

11:46:10 25 A. Foday Sankoh used to call through telephone at his house in
26 Cocody in Abidjan, and the radio operator that was in Abidjan, in
27 Cocody, he used to decode the message and send it to Sam
28 Bockarie.

29 Q. At the time that that instruction was sent that Sam

1 Bockarie was in charge and he should join with the AFRC, was
2 there a further instruction that Sam Bockarie should henceforth
3 take instructions from Charles Taylor?

4 A. No. The message that I saw, no, he never gave such an
11:46:58 5 instruction. Foday Sankoh never gave an instruction like that,
6 that he should take that - that Bockarie should take instruction
7 from Charles Taylor. Foday Sankoh said Bockarie should take
8 orders from Johnny Paul Koroma. That was the instruction shortly
9 before joining the AFRC. And even while we had joined the AFRC,
11:47:19 10 when Foday Sankoh sent Gibril Massaquoi with the letters, that
11 was what was in the letter. Foday Sankoh said Bockarie should
12 continue to work with Johnny Paul and should take all
13 instructions from Johnny Paul. That was from Mr Sankoh.

14 Q. Pause there. Now, you don't have LiveNote in front of you,
11:47:39 15 Mr Sesay, so let me just remind you. You began that last answer
16 but in answer to my question:

17 "Q. At the time that the instruction was sent that Sam
18 Bockarie was in charge and he should join the AFRC, was
19 there a further instruction that Sam Bockarie should
11:47:59 20 henceforth take instructions from Charles Taylor?

21 A. No, the message that I saw, no, he never gave such an
22 instruction."

23 Question: Did you see a message sent by Foday Sankoh
24 containing instructions for Sam Bockarie to take command?

11:48:22 25 A. Take command from whom?

26 Q. That he should take command and join the AFRC; did you see
27 such a message?

28 A. Yes, I saw it. When Bockarie came from Buedu and he met me
29 in Giema for us to travel to Pendembu to join to AFRC, I saw the

1 radio message that Foday Sankoh had sent, and I heard it myself
2 over the BBC when Foday Sankoh was interviewed. And Foday Sankoh
3 even spoke on the SLBS national radio, instructing Sam Bockarie
4 and the RUF to join the AFRC.

11:49:00 5 Q. Now help us with this, please, Mr Sesay. The message that
6 you saw, was that a handwritten message?

7 A. Yes. It was written in a message book, handwritten.
8 Because when the operator received it, at that time Sam
9 Bockarie's operator was T-Man. When T-Man received a message, he
10 would write it down.

11 Q. So that message that you saw was written down by whom?

12 A. By the operator who received the message called T-Man.

13 Q. Thank you. Now, you also spoke of a letter brought by
14 Gibril Massaquoi from Sankoh in Nigeria. Did you physically see
15 that letter?

16 A. No, I did not read the letter. But when Gibril came, he
17 told me that he had a letter for Bockarie, and I told him that
18 Bockarie was in Kenema and Gibril took the letter to Bockarie in
19 Kenema. And when --

11:50:09 20 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat the
21 name somebody called him in Freetown, whether it's --

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Mr Sesay, I'm sorry, you're going to have to start that
24 answer all over again because there was a name missed by the
11:50:25 25 interpreter, okay? You said that "I did not read the letter, but
26 when Gibril came, he told me that he had a letter for Bockarie,
27 and I told him that Bockarie was in Kenema, and Gibril took the
28 letter to Sam Bockarie in Kenema," and then you say that - you
29 called the name of someone in Freetown. Who was that person?

1 A. I said Johnny Paul. Johnny Paul invited Sam Bockarie to
2 Freetown because when he saw - when Johnny Paul himself saw the
3 letter that Foday Sankoh had sent to him, he decided to invite
4 Sam Bockarie to Freetown.

11:51:14 5 Q. Thank you. Now, you knew Bockarie, did you not, before
6 Sankoh went to the Ivory Coast?

7 A. Please repeat.

8 Q. You knew Sam Bockarie before Foday Sankoh went to the Ivory
9 Coast?

11:51:46 10 A. Yes, very well.

11 Q. Now, when you got to Buedu in the aftermath of the ECOMOG
12 intervention, was Sam Bockarie behaving in the same way as you
13 had known him prior to Sankoh's departure?

14 A. No. Sam Bockarie at this time, his behaviour had changed.

11:52:12 15 Before we joined the AFRC, when we were in Kailahun, at this time
16 he made himself so powerful and whatever he decided, he never
17 sought advice from anybody. Whatever he thought was good for him
18 to do, that's what he would do. He was the last commander and
19 everybody should listen to him. That was the kind of behaviour
11:52:31 20 he was putting up.

21 Q. Now, we were just a moment ago talking about a radio
22 message which you had seen written down by T-Man, and I want to
23 use that as the take-off point to deal with communications with
24 you. First of all, Mr Sesay, have you ever heard Charles Taylor
11:53:15 25 talking on an RUF radio?

26 A. No, I never heard that.

27 Q. When did you first have your own assigned radio and radio
28 operator?

29 A. From November '93 I had an assigned radio when I was at

1 that Liberian border right up to this time that we were now
2 discussing. In fact, right up to the end of the war I had an
3 assigned radio.

11:53:59 4 Q. And with that assigned radio which you had from 1993 up
5 until the end of the war, was it possible for you to tune in to
6 radio traffic within the RUF?

7 A. Well, my operator would tune to other frequencies, because
8 I was not the one operating the radio. He would tune to other
9 frequencies, and there were times I would be sitting near the
11:54:27 10 radio when the operator would be receiving a message. If
11 I wanted to talk to somebody, or if Bockarie had called and
12 wanted to talk to me, I would sit by the radio for dialogues like
13 that.

14 Q. From 1993, when you were first assigned a radio, until the
11:54:44 15 end of the war, did you, Issa Sesay, ever speak to Charles Taylor
16 on a radio?

17 A. No, never did that happen. I never spoke to Mr Taylor on
18 the radio.

19 Q. As far as you're aware, did Sam Bockarie ever speak to
11:55:08 20 Mr Taylor on a radio?

21 A. No, I did not know about that.

22 Q. Now, we'll come to other forms of communication in a
23 moment. But just for now, could you please explain how the
24 operations of radios within the RUF was organised? For example,
11:55:35 25 taking things simply: Firstly, who would have access to, and use
26 of, radios within the RUF?

27 A. Well, one is the operators. They would have access to
28 radios. They had a signal commander. He was their commander.
29 And the signals commander, the time that Mr Sankoh was there, he

1 was the one who trained the operators. Mr Sankoh himself trained
2 the RUF operators. He taught them about the codes and he taught
3 them - he taught the commander how to prepare the codes for them
4 to operate the radio, and from that they had a book where they
11:56:26 5 would write all the words in the code form. So if you are a
6 commander, you would have access to a radio that is assigned to
7 you; for example, if you're an area commander or a battalion
8 commander, you would have access to a radio.

9 Q. Pause there. Yes. Could the witness please be shown
11:57:27 10 Exhibit P-99A?

11 Mr Sesay, you spoke just now --

12 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, it's a confidential exhibit,
13 just in case counsel is not aware.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm not asking for it to be put on the
11:59:04 15 overhead.

16 Q. Mr Sesay --

17 A. Yes, my Lord.

18 Q. Open the book at the first page, please. Have you seen
19 this document before?

11:59:42 20 A. Well, I've not seen this particular one before, but I have
21 been seeing - I used to see similar books like this.

22 Q. And the similar books that you saw, who had them?

23 A. It was the radio operators.

24 Q. And you said earlier that it was Foday Sankoh himself who
12:00:08 25 had trained the RUF operators; is that right?

26 A. Yes. Because Mr Sankoh, we all knew that he was - he was a
27 professional communication man in the Sierra Leonean army. He
28 was the one who trained all the RUF operators the time that he
29 was with the RUF.

1 Q. Now, just looking at this document, let's open it at the
2 first page, please. We see on the left-hand page someone has
3 written a definition of sophism: "A clever but specious argument
4 lacking real merit."

12:01:03 5 Now, if we then go over the page, please, the top of the
6 left-hand page, we see: "Security, Accuracy and Discipline, this
7 can be remembered as 'SAD' ". I want to ask you about one aspect
8 of that. What security was applied to the use and access to
9 radios by the RUF, Mr Sesay?

12:01:45 10 A. Well, security involved in communication. Like, for
11 example, if the leader or the commander was sending a message to
12 a subordinate and those messages would be pertaining the
13 battlefield, the opponent should not monitor those messages. So
14 the message should be encoded and transmitted in an encoded form,
12:02:15 15 and the one who will receive the message would have to decode it
16 and will give to the person to whom the message was addressed.

17 Q. Now, whilst communications are taking place over the set,
18 who would be present in the radio room or the place where the
19 radio was being used?

12:02:44 20 A. That is only the operators and the radio securities because
21 the station would always have security personnel at times, two or
22 three armed men who would be around to secure the set, and the
23 operators. They would be the ones who would be there. Or you
24 the commander. But just an officer who had nothing to do with
12:03:05 25 the radio would not go there, except if he asked for permission
26 and the commander allowed him to go and send a message. Or, for
27 example, like if that officer had his family in Kailahun and he
28 was in another part of the country and wanted to talk to his
29 family members, he would ask for permission and he would tell the

1 station commander to conduct dialogue for that officer and the
2 next person in Kailahun. But that fighter would not just go to
3 the radio station when he was not allowed to go there and when he
4 had nothing to do there.

12:03:51 5 Q. So would it be possible say for a fighter, a combatant or a
6 civilian just to sit around in the radio room listening to
7 communications?

8 A. No, no, no. That area was a restricted area where the
9 radio was.

12:04:12 10 Q. And when a message is received on the radio, Mr Sesay,
11 would that be in normal spoken English or Krio or what?

12 A. No, if it was just a dialogue, just a casual - or just a
13 casual discussion, you can speak Krio or Temne or Mende or
14 English. But if it pertained to operation, that radio operator

12:04:51 15 would encode the message and he would send the message in a coded
16 form and the receiving operator would decode that message and
17 write it in the radio book, in the radio logbook, and he will
18 take it to the person, the commander, to whom the message was
19 addressed.

12:05:07 20 Q. So such a coded message, Mr Sesay, could someone just be
21 sitting in the radio room because they were idle and had nothing
22 to do, listen to such a message and understand what it said?
23 Would that be possible?

24 A. No, that is not possible. Say an officer who had no
12:05:35 25 business at the radio station would just go there and sit there.
26 No, the place is a restricted area. Even if you're just passing
27 around and you hear the operator sending a message, if you are
28 not a radio operator you would not understand what the man is
29 saying because you don't understand the codes.

1 Q. Thank you. Now, that's radios. Let's talk now about
2 satellite phones. When was the first time anyone in the RUF had
3 access to a satellite phone?

4 A. From my recollection and what I know it was Mr Sankoh first
12:06:25 5 who had satellite phone in 1995.

6 Q. Where was Mr Sankoh in 1995 when he had a satellite phone?

7 A. Mr Sankoh was at Camp Zogoda.

8 Q. From where did he get that first satellite phone?

9 A. When Dr Sebo and Philip Palmer came from Abidjan and they
12:06:53 10 came through Guinea, crossed over to Kailahun and from Kailahun
11 they went to Zogoda. That was the first time Mr Sankoh received
12 a satellite phone from Dr Sebo and Philip Palmer's visit.

13 Q. Thank you. By the way, Madam Court Manager, we can put
14 that document away now. What happened to that satellite phone

12:07:22 15 when Foday Sankoh left Zogoda in February 1996 to go to and
16 Abidjan in Cote d'Ivoire? What happened to that satellite phone
17 brought by Dr Addai-Sebo?

18 A. When Foday Sankoh was going to Abidjan he left the
19 satellite phone from Zogoda for Mohamed Tarawalli and that was
12:07:49 20 what Mohamed Tarawalli was using to communicate with Mr Sankoh
21 from Abidjan.

22 Q. When was the first time you saw Sam Bockarie with a
23 satellite phone?

24 A. It was in 1998.

12:08:06 25 Q. Can you give us a month in 1998?

26 A. It was October.

27 Q. As far as you're aware, where did he get that satellite
28 phone from?

29 A. Well, in October, that was the second visit that Sam

1 Bockarie paid to Liberia to Mr Taylor. When he returned he
2 brought a satellite phone with him.

3 Q. Apart from that satellite phone, did you see Sam Bockarie
4 with any other satellite phone?

12:08:58 5 A. Yes. In 1999, he had a business partner who also brought
6 another satellite phone for him. That one was a mobile satellite
7 phone that you can just attach to your trousers and you walk
8 around with it. It was possible.

9 Q. Now, just so that we can get the picture, the first
12:09:21 10 satellite phone he had, describe it, please.

11 A. The first satellite phone, it had a plate. The phone would
12 be like here, but it had a plate that they would put in the sun.
13 Like this thing, they would put in the sun and it will connect to
14 the screen on the phone. It's like a plate like. So that was
12:09:51 15 the kind of phone he first had.

16 Q. And the next phone he had, describe that one for us.

17 A. The next phone he had was more portable and it was more
18 advanced. It was just slightly bigger than this.

19 Q. And the --

12:10:17 20 A. The thing that I have in my mind.

21 Q. The witness is holding a spectacle case.

22 A. It was bigger than this, like this - like this point, but
23 it had the antenna, but you can hold it like this in your hand
24 and it had a hook that you can use to attach it to your trousers,
12:10:40 25 but it was portable and more advanced than the previous one.

26 Q. Right. Just give us an idea, Mr Sesay, how tall was this
27 second phone?

28 A. Well, this second phone, he used it right up to before the
29 Lome Accord and after the Lome Accord he had another phone, same

1 type, a mobile sat phone. He got that also from another business
2 partner called Michel.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, the witness called another
4 name for Michel.

12:11:28 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Pause there. I think we will forget about
6 the measurement because I think we get an idea of the size:

7 Q. That first satellite phone obtained you say by Bockarie in
8 1999, who gave it to him?

9 A. A business partner with whom he was doing business with
12:11:53 10 Bockarie called Carlos from Canada.

11 Q. The second one that you saw him with after Lome, where did
12 he get that phone from?

13 A. It was Ibrahim Bah who brought this other set of people,
14 because he was the one who also brought Carlos to Buedu. He
12:12:17 15 brought those other man called - people called Michel and Louis.
16 They were from Belgium. Carlos too was a white man. These
17 people were white people. Michel and Louis were also white
18 people. It was Ibrahim Bah who brought them back to Bockarie and
19 they were doing business in 1999. They were the ones who brought
12:12:36 20 the third satellite phone for Sam Bockarie.

21 Q. Thank you. I'm just dealing with the communications now,
22 so we will come back to the other individuals in a different
23 context in due course. Apart from Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie,
24 and Mohamed Tarawalli who was left that initial satellite phone
12:12:58 25 by Foday Sankoh when he left, did anybody else in the RUF have
26 access to a satellite phone?

27 A. No. No other person had access to a satellite phone except
28 those people. I had access to a satellite phone but it was
29 later. But at this time, in 1998, it was only Sam Bockarie,

1 Mr Sankoh, Mohamed; they were the ones who had access to
2 satellite phone up to this time.

3 Q. At that time. At a later date, did you, Issa Sesay, have
4 access to a satellite phone?

12:13:38 5 A. Yes. I had access to a satellite phone in 2000.

6 Q. When in 2000?

7 A. First, when Sam Bockarie resigned from the RUF in December
8 1999 --

9 Q. Yes?

12:13:57 10 A. -- Mr Sankoh sent a satellite phone to me from Freetown.

11 That was in January 2000. With a bodyguard of his called Jabaty.
12 He was the one operating the satellite phone. But the only thing
13 was that the sat phone never had credit so I could not call with
14 it, I would only receive. Mr Sankoh would call - that was the

12:14:25 15 sat phone that I was using until May 8 when Mr Sankoh was
16 arrested.

17 Q. And did things change after May 8 when Mr Sankoh was
18 arrested?

19 A. Yes. Things changed.

12:14:38 20 Q. How did they change?

21 A. So before the arrest of Mr Sankoh, the RUF had abducted
22 United Nations peacekeepers. That is UNAMSIL. We had abducted
23 them and they were in the custody of the RUF. They were
24 hostages. From that point, Mr Taylor sent Benjamin Yeaten who

12:15:05 25 came and landed in - from a helicopter in Pendembu, Kailahun
26 District and he spoke to the commander who was in Pendembu called
27 Denis Lansana.

28 Q. And?

29 A. He asked him and said, "Where is Brigadier Issa?" And

1 Denis told him that Brigadier Issa is in Makeni and he said,
2 "It's President Taylor who has sent me to come and invite
3 Brigadier Issa. But I cannot go to Makeni, so you send a message
4 to him informing him that President Taylor wants to see him." So
12:15:43 5 Benjamin Yeaten returned with the helicopter and Denis Lansana
6 sent a radio message to me in Makeni and the operator sent a
7 message to me and I read the message and I invited Kallon, Gbao
8 and others and I told them that President Taylor had invited me,
9 so I have to go there. So at that time I was a bit worried. You
12:16:08 10 know, Mr Sankoh had been arrested and there was nobody to talk
11 to, nobody ever contacted me before that time.

12 Q. Pause. Mr Sesay, I'm grateful for that detail but I'd like
13 to just concentrate on one matter now, please. I asked you and
14 the question was after the arrest of Mr Sankoh did things change
12:16:31 15 in terms of your personal access to a satellite phone? Did it
16 change?

17 A. Yes. Later on. It was not at that moment. It was when
18 things changed that I got a satellite phone myself from Mr Taylor
19 in late 2000.

12:16:51 20 Q. When in 2000? Can you give us a date?

21 A. Yes. That is around - around November, when I went to
22 escort the --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat --

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:17:15 25 Q. Around November when you did what?

26 A. When I went to escort the external delegation, when I went
27 to escort the delegation that we were to attend Abuja I, the
28 peace meeting to implement the Lome Accord.

29 Q. And you received a satellite phone then, did you?

- 1 A. Yes, because during the first meeting, when I was invited,
2 that I had with the five Heads of State at the Executive Mansion,
3 Mr Taylor's office, that is at that time President Taylor,
4 President Obasanjo, President Alpha Konare, and President Yahya
12:18:03 5 Jammeh, and President Late Eyadema of Togo. When they said
6 I should be the interim leader in that meeting, I told them that
7 one of our problems that we had was communications because the
8 satellite phone that I had, I had a problem, and it was old. And
9 so Mr Taylor turned towards Obasanjo and said, "What can we do?"
12:18:26 10 And Obasanjo said, "If the young man is ready to work with us,
11 whatever he needs we will provide for him, we will give that to
12 him, in respect to the job that we have given him to do."
13 Q. So was it after that that you were provided with a
14 satellite phone?
12:18:40 15 A. Well, after that time, after the request, we had a second
16 meeting, when I was appointed. So this was the third time when
17 I met with Mr Taylor, after I had made the request when I went to
18 escort the Abuja 1 delegation in 2000.
19 Q. Now that satellite phone, Mr Sesay, if I understand what
12:19:04 20 you've told us, that was the second satellite phone that you,
21 Issa Sesay, had?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, the first satellite phone which had been sent by Foday
24 Sankoh, were you able to make outgoing calls on that phone?
12:19:24 25 A. No. The sat phone, I could not make outgoing calls, I only
26 received calls on them - on it - until Mr Sankoh was arrested.
27 Q. Why couldn't you make outgoing calls on that phone?
28 A. Because the phone hadn't any credit, it hadn't any air time
29 in it. So what I thought was that Mr Sankoh did not want me to

1 call anybody, that's why he did not put any credit in it. You
2 know, it was like you having somebody and you want to control and
3 monitor that person, that's what he did.

4 Q. Who would contact you on that satellite phone?

12:20:05 5 A. From the time I got the phone, right up to May.

6 Q. May of which year?

7 A. May 2000, it was only Mr Sankoh that called me on that
8 phone, no other person ever called me on that phone.

9 Q. Did you ever speak to Charles Taylor on that phone?

12:20:33 10 A. No, no.

11 Q. The second satellite phone that you received in late 2000,
12 did you speak to Charles Taylor on that phone?

13 A. No, never. I never spoke with him.

14 Q. Now, going back to the narrative, but still on the issue of
12:21:15 15 communications, where we left off your account, you were living
16 in a house opposite Sam Bockarie's, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. At that stage, Mr Sesay, did you have your own radio?

19 A. Yes. I retreated to Buedu with my Thompson radio.

12:21:53 20 Q. And when you were in Buedu living opposite Sam Bockarie,
21 were you using that radio?

22 A. No, I was not using it because it was not useful at that
23 time; Sam Bockarie's set was there, and I also had my own set
24 just the same place, almost - just opposite the road - no, I was
12:22:13 25 not using it, my operator was not using it. He packed it in the
26 bag.

27 Q. Now, at that stage - so we are talking about 1998 now,
28 February, March - who were Sam Bockarie's radio operators?

29 A. He had CO Sellay, who was a signal commander.

1 Q. How could do you spell that name?

2 A. S-E-L-L-A-Y.

3 Q. Any other radio operator for Sam Bockarie?

4 A. Yes. He had Ebony Prince. He had T man. And there was

12:23:14 5 Daf. They were the ones in Buedu, those that I met there.

6 Q. And those radio operators whom you've named, would they all
7 be present operating the radio at the same time or what?

8 A. No, no. There were running shifts, working by shifts, six
9 hourly.

12:23:44 10 Q. Six-hourly what?

11 A. They would be on duty for six hours. So after six hours,
12 the other person would come to the area. So there were two
13 shifts on the day, the one who come in the morning up to 12, 1,
14 and they would go off, and the other person would go on to the
15 evening hours. That's how they were changing shifts.

16 Q. Were the radios operated 24/7 or what?

17 A. No, no. They would start work - they start work by 8 and
18 they would stop by 8 p.m., 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.

19 Q. And where in Buedu was that radio situated?

12:24:42 20 A. That radio was in a court barri. That is - there were only
21 two houses in between the court barri and Sam Bockarie's house.
22 The court barri was under the mango trees, but, because of the
23 air raid at this time, that's why the radio operators used to put
24 radio there. So in the evening, around 6.30, going to 7, they
12:25:18 25 will bring it. At times it would be at Sam Bockarie's veranda.
26 At times they would bring it across to me on my own veranda,
27 that's where they would install the set.

28 Q. And so did anyone else, apart from Bockarie, have an
29 operational radio in Buedu at this time, one that was being used?

1 A. Well, at this time, when Bockarie was in Buedu, no, no,
2 other radio set was operational. The only other set that was
3 there was a monitoring set, and that one, the RUF operators never
4 had knowledge in it. It was a Morse communication. It was only
12:26:20 5 the SLA's who had retreated. They were the ones operating that
6 monitoring set, to monitor the ECOMOG on the net. So they would
7 put it into a message form and bring it to Sam Bockarie to know
8 the plans about the ECOMOG and their movements.

9 Q. Now, I want to move on from that topic of communications
12:26:49 10 and to pick up the narrative, please. You mentioned earlier this
11 morning, Mr Sesay, how diamonds were handed over by Johnny Paul
12 Koroma. What happened to those diamonds?

13 A. Well, those diamonds that Sam Bockarie kept them up till
14 around mid-April, going towards 20th April, and Sam Bockarie
12:27:22 15 decided to send me, to go with those diamonds to Ibrahim Bah, and
16 Memuna Deen and I - Memunatu Deen - were to travel to Monrovia
17 and, when we get to Monrovia, Memunatu Deen was to contact
18 Ibrahim Bah on the telephone and he would come to pick me from
19 Monrovia and take me to Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou.

12:27:55 20 Q. So you travelled with Memunatu Deen to Monrovia to meet
21 with Ibrahim Bah carrying those diamonds; is that correct?

22 A. I got the diamonds. I was to wait for Ibrahim Bah in
23 Monrovia. From there he was to pick me and we were to travel to
24 Ouagadougou.

12:28:17 25 Q. I am going to ask you about the details of this when we
26 come to discuss a discrete topic in due course but, for now, just
27 answer this shortly, please: What happened to those diamonds
28 that you took to Monrovia in April of which year?

29 A. 1998.

1 Q. What happened to them?

2 A. The diamonds got missing.

3 Q. And after the diamonds went missing in April 1998, what did
4 you do? Did you return to Sierra Leone?

12:28:55 5 A. Yes. I was in Monrovia for about five days and Sam
6 Bockarie sent Major Mulbah to go and check what had happened, and
7 Major Mulbah went there to ask what - and we returned to meet Sam
8 Bockarie in Sierra Leone.

9 Q. Right. Let's pick up the narrative then from there, okay?

12:29:22 10 When you got back to Sierra Leone, after that mission, what was
11 Bockarie's reaction to the fact that you had lost those diamonds?

12 A. Well, Bockarie was angry with me. He was not happy with
13 me. He was angry until Pa Rogers spoke to him. Because when

14 I came I explained to him, you know, himself, Mike Lamin, Pa
12:29:55 15 Rogers - Mike Lamin and Bockarie, they were angry, but the
16 information that I gave to them was what - and Pa Rogers told
17 Bockarie, he said, "Well, this man - you've been working with
18 this man. If you sent him to do something and he is giving you
19 this information, we should investigate even if you don't trust
12:30:17 20 him", because when I said that the diamonds had got missing,
21 I told them that when I went to a tea shop I drank there and when
22 I was returning --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this
24 area slowly.

12:30:31 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Pause there. You told them that you went to a tea shop.

27 In fact, Mr Bockarie, can we just ignore these details for now.

28 We will come back to them later. Just help us with this: What
29 was the outcome of all these discussions about what happened to

1 the diamonds? Let's just deal with this shortly now and we will
2 come back to it as a discrete topic. What was the outcome?

3 A. Bockarie was annoyed. That was why he posted me to
4 Pendembu. I left Buedu and I was assigned to Pendembu to monitor
12:31:12 5 the front line towards Daru, Baima, Mobai, Kui va and Jojoima.
6 I was there.

7 Q. And when - could you give us a month when you were posted
8 to Pendembu?

9 A. This was late April towards --

12:31:29 10 Q. And how long did you remain in Pendembu?

11 A. I was there up to November.

12 Q. November of which year?

13 A. 1998.

14 Q. Now, let's come back to the narrative. Apart from Johnny
12:31:53 15 Paul Koroma, were any other members of the AFRC who retreated
16 from Freetown in possession of diamonds?

17 A. The only person whom I knew had diamonds was Gullit. We
18 met him in Kailahun. He was not part of the retreating group
19 from Freetown. He was in Kono from when I went to Kailahun. But
12:32:26 20 from us, the retreating group from Freetown, from Makeni to Kono,
21 then to Kailahun, apart from Johnny Paul, nobody else had
22 diamonds.

23 Q. Now, the diamonds which you've told us Gullit had in his
24 possession, first of all, how did you come to learn about that?

12:32:50 25 A. Well, it was when Johnny Paul arrived initially. He had no
26 problems with Sam Bockarie and he asked Bockarie, he said, When
27 Gullit came, did he report any diamonds to you? Bockarie said
28 no. He said, Oh, this was the man whom I sent to Kono to go and
29 supervise the mining for the AFRC, the mining that was going on

1 there, so how can he come without reporting any diamonds?

2 Q. Pause there. Gullit, what was his real name?

3 A. Alex Tamba Brima. He was the PLO-2.

12:33:40

4 Q. Thank you. And so Johnny Paul Koroma having said that to
5 Bockarie, how did things progress thereafter?

12:34:15

6 A. Well, Johnny Paul said Gullit should present the diamonds,
7 and Johnny Paul Koroma sent for me and Mike Lamin. He said we
8 should come to Kailahun. At that time Gullit was in Kailahun
9 Town. So he said Mike and I should go to Kailahun to Gullit and

12:34:36

10 Gullit should present the diamonds. So we drove from Buedu
11 together with Mike and we came to Kailahun Town. When we came
12 there we did not meet Gullit there. They said he had gone to the
13 trading site at the Guinea border. He had gone there to buy some
14 basic things, needs. So we drove to the riverbank at the

12:34:59

15 crossing point. That's where we met him. When we met him,
16 I told him that this was - that that was the instruction that
17 that man had given. In fact, Johnny Paul gave orders that if
18 Gullit put up any resistance, that we should execute him. So
19 when he came - because Gullit was my friend during the AFRC. He
20 was the one who had given me a pick-up. So I told him, I said:

12:35:16

21 Fellow, the chairman is angry with you because if - he say if you
22 have diamonds, give them to us. Because the orders he gave are
23 not in your favour; they are really bad. And he said, Diamonds
24 that I have, look at them here. And he put his hand into his
25 back pocket and took out his wallet and presented the diamonds to
26 me. We opened it. The diamonds were really small pieces even.
27 And Mike Lamin and I took it out with Gullit. All of us came to
28 Buedu and presented the diamonds to Johnny Paul and Sam Bockarie.
29 So apart from Gullit, who was the SLA from whom we took diamonds,

1 I did not know of any other person possessing diamonds in
2 Kailahun at that time.

3 Q. Those diamonds retrieved from Gullit - shortly - what
4 happened to them?

12:35:57 5 A. Well, at that time, it was Johnny Paul Koroma who had the
6 diamonds. These were not good diamonds. They were industrial
7 diamonds that were in Johnny Paul's possession. He had them.

8 Q. Do you know in due course what happened to those diamonds?

9 A. Well, the day Bockarie and us asked Johnny Paul to give the
12:36:26 10 diamonds. He took out those diamonds and they were wrapped in a
11 paper, and he said these were the diamonds that Mike brought from
12 Gullit. So we handed everything over to Sam Bockarie, including
13 his own diamonds that he had.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Would your Honours give me a moment, please?

12:37:24 15 Yes.

16 Q. Now, at the time you are sent to Monrovia with those
17 diamonds which you told us were lost, help us. Could you just
18 pause for a moment and give us an overview of the situation in
19 Sierra Leone so far as the RUF and the AFRC were concerned? And
12:38:02 20 before you begin, Mr Sesay, first of all let's break it down. At
21 this time, what areas did the RUF control?

22 A. At this stage the RUF were just in Kailahun; the RUF and
23 AFRC were based in Kono. So those were the only two areas where
24 the RUF were.

12:38:30 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, sorry to interrupt. The
26 time frame we are dealing with is when the witness went through
27 Liberia and lost the diamonds. Has that time frame been given by
28 the witness?

29 MR GRIFFITHS: April 1998.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: April 1998, thank you.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. So in April 1998 the RUF controlled which areas, Mr Sesay?

12:39:07

4 A. I said the RUF controlled Kailahun, and the RUF and AFRC
5 were in Kono. So those are the only areas where the RUF were
6 present.

7 Q. Now, you say the RUF controlled Kailahun. At this time
8 were there any AFRC in Kailahun?

12:39:36

9 A. Yes, some AFRC were in Daru. Because by then, before
10 I left to go to Liberia Daru had not yet fallen. Before I left
11 to go to Liberia on that mission, Daru had not yet fallen. It
12 was when I came back I met Daru had fallen. But before I went,
13 the AFRC and the RUF were still in Daru.

12:40:01

14 Q. We will come back to that. But at the point when you
15 leave, okay? So at the point when you leave, AFRC/RUF in
16 Kailahun. Were there also AFRC/RUF in Kono?

17 A. Yes, you are right.

18 Q. And were there any AFRC anywhere else in Sierra Leone?

19 A. Yes, the AFRC some and STF were in the Koinadugu District.

12:40:31

20 Q. Now, those AFRC/STF in the Koinadugu District, how were
21 they behaving up there?

22 A. Well, at that time I did not know. I did not know at that
23 time. It was later that I knew. Especially when I came to
24 Makeni, that was when I got more details about their behaviours
25 then. But at that time, there was no communication because -
26 I did not know. Because even SAJ Musa, Mani and Bockarie, they
27 were not in communication at this time.

12:41:00

28 Q. So at the time you leave to go to Monrovia there is no
29 communication between Bockarie, SAJ Musa and Mani?

1 A. Not at all. There was no communication at that time.

2 Q. At that time - and I'm taking things deliberately
3 specifically - was there any communication between Bockarie and
4 General Broplah?

12:41:43 5 A. No, no.

6 Q. At this time, when you leave to go to Monrovia, how large
7 is the AFRC presence in Kailahun and Kono?

8 A. Well, the RUF were in Kailahun, the Daru Barracks, although
9 they were not up to a battalion, but there were many in the Daru
10 Barracks, and the AFRC/RUF - the AFRC was also in Kono, but SAJ
11 Musa too had a large group with him that left Makeni and went to
12 Koinadugu, so that was the situation.

13 Q. What I'm trying to understand, Mr Sesay, is this: What's
14 the balance of forces? In Kailahun and Kono is it mainly AFRC,
15 or is it mainly RUF? And in Koinadugu is it just AFRC, or are
16 there RUF up there as well? Do you follow me?

17 A. Yes. The RUF were many in Kailahun than the AFRC. The RUF
18 were in the majority than the AFRC. In Kono, the AFRC was in the
19 majority. In fact, the AFRC and the RUF were almost the same
20 amount of the - the same number of them, so I cannot tell which
21 one was in the majority. The only time --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
23 to repeat that area.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Pause there.

12:43:24 25 Q. Let's start again, Mr Sesay, because this is quite
26 important. In Kailahun, what's the balance of forces between RUF
27 and AFRC? Who is in the majority?

28 A. RUF was in the majority than the AFRC.

29 Q. Let's move to Kono. In Kono, what's the balance?

1 A. Well, in Kono, I can say - I cannot - they were - they had
2 equal numbers. Because the AFRC troops and the RUF troops that
3 came to Kono, they were almost equal. And I was not based in
4 Kono to make a head count of the two parties. I only used to
12:44:08 5 come to Kono to check. But the presence of AFRC and the RUF in
6 Kono, they were almost in equal numbers. But the only time
7 I realised that the number of AFRC became less in Kono was when
8 Gullit came to Kono and collected the AFRC troops to join SAJ
9 Musa in Kurubonla, but from May going to December I know that the
12:44:35 10 presence of the AFRC troops in Kono was not that much.

11 Q. Now, just to clarify that last answer: When did Gullit go
12 to Kono, collect AFRC troops, and join SAJ Musa? When?

13 A. That was in May. Early May.

14 Q. Question 2: Why did Gullit go to Kono, collect those AFRC,
12:45:11 15 and go to join SAJ Musa in early May?

16 A. Well, the instruction by then was as a result of the
17 pressure on ECOMOG - the pressure of ECOMOG and the Kamajors who
18 were still attacking Kono, that was when Sam Bockarie said Gullit
19 should come and join the troops in Kono so that they would be
12:45:37 20 able to defend Kono. Because Sam Bockarie called Morris Kallon
21 to report to Buedu from Kono because Morris Kallon too was based
22 in Kono. Morris Kallon had a problem with Superman about burning
23 of vehicles or no burning of vehicles. So Superman had to
24 control to Sam Bockarie about the attitude of Kallon. So that
12:46:00 25 was when Bockarie ordered Kallon to report to Buedu. But later
26 when Bockarie came and discussed with Kallon, he asked Kallon to
27 return to Kono to go and join Superman to defend Kono from the
28 ECOMOG and the Kamajor advance. So when they arrived in Kono, by
29 then ECOMOG was almost coming close to Bumpe, according to the

1 information I heard later when Kallon came to Kailahun later.

2 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. Mr Sesay, I'd like us to keep this
3 in context, because I want to go back to my original starting
4 point: The balance of forces in those three areas. Do you
12:46:39 5 follow me? And you've told us there came a point in early May
6 when Gullit takes the AFRC troops from Kono, joins SAJ Musa in
7 Koinadugu, yes?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. I want to go back now to my starting point. We've looked
12:46:57 10 at Kailahun and the balance of forces. We've looked at Kono and
11 the balance of forces and the change which takes place at the
12 beginning of May. Now, at the time you go to Monrovia, what's
13 the balance of forces in Koinadugu? Who is up there?

14 A. Well, the RUF were not in Koinadugu from February to
12:47:26 15 August. The whole of Koinadugu District, there was no RUF
16 presence there.

17 Q. Pause there. So between February to August there is no RUF
18 presence in Koinadugu?

19 A. Yes.

12:47:38 20 Q. Shortly - we will come to it later in more detail - what
21 changes in August 1998 in terms of RUF presence in Koinadugu,
22 what happens?

23 A. Well, Sam Bockarie had to call Superman in July that
24 Superman should report to Buedu with his bodyguards and two radio
12:48:12 25 operators King Perry and Top Marine, they went to Buedu and Sam
26 Bockarie had a meeting with Superman and with Mike Lamin. So Sam
27 Bockarie gave the instruction to Superman to attack Koidu Town,
28 to attack the ECOMOG in Koidu Town, and he gave him some
29 ammunition and when Superman came with a woman, two - one woman

1 and two men who were medicine men, juj u men, who used to give
2 protection, they came from the Foya area in Liberia, and Superman
3 came and they conducted the attack. Then Sam Bockarie asked
4 Superman to report to Buedu. He asked Superman to report to
12:49:08 5 Buedu. Superman refused to go and he said no, he was going to
6 Koinadugu and Sam Bockarie said he should report. So they had a
7 conflict. Then Superman took all his men from the Western Jungle
8 and part of the other fighters who were in the Northern Jungle,
9 all of them moved with Superman in August and they went to the
12:49:31 10 Koinadugu District.

11 Q. Thank you. Now that we've got that general picture,
12 Mr Sesay, help us with this: At the time you leave to go to
13 Monrovia, are those three RUF/AFRC positions under attack?

14 A. Yes. They were under attack in April because at this time
12:50:02 15 the Alpha Jet was attacking every day, it flew over Kailahun and
16 Kono and at this same time ECOMOG was attacking trying to capture
17 Daru. That was how I left the fighting when I went to Monrovia.

18 Q. And when you returned from Monrovia, and just shortly again
19 - again, as I say, I will come back to it - you've told us that
12:50:27 20 the trip to Monrovia was supposed to have ended in Burkina Faso,
21 in order to do what?

22 A. Well, that was for me to go and meet Ibrahim Bah to meet
23 Diendere with the diamonds so that I would be able to get some
24 material - fighting materials to come and fight against the
12:50:52 25 ECOMOG. That was the purpose of my travel.

26 Q. Thank you. Now, you lost the diamonds, you get back. When
27 you get back in April, what is the situation on the ground in
28 terms of what areas the AFRC/RUF are able - remain in control of?

29 A. Well, at this time, before my return, ECOMOG had captured

1 Daru Barracks and the Daru Town from the RUF/AFRC, so the
2 majority of the AFRC who were in Daru Barracks with a very large
3 population of civilians, all of them went and crossed over into
4 Liberia. They crossed into Liberia, because at this time there
12:51:48 5 was a displaced camp in Vahun, Kolahun where Sierra Leonean
6 civilians were there, about 200,000 at that time in those
7 displaced camps. Because all the people of Kenema District, part
8 of Kailahun District, all of them crossed over there as a result
9 of the attacks that were launched by ECOMOG and people were
12:52:12 10 afraid that the Alpha Jets were bombarding, so most of the people
11 crossed into Liberia and most of the SLAs from the Daru Barracks
12 also crossed into Liberia. They went and stayed in the refugee
13 camps.

14 Q. So that's the situation in April. Did things improve in
12:52:32 15 May?

16 A. Well, no. In May things did not improve because at that
17 time, we were - they were advancing to capture Kono. So by early
18 May they pushed the RUF out of Koidu Town, so the RUF/AFRC, the
19 AFRC they - a large number of the troops went with Gullit and
12:52:57 20 they joined SAJ Musa in Kurubonla. So few of the RUF and few
21 AFRC and few number of STF force that was with Superman, they
22 withdrew from Koidu Town and were living in the surrounding
23 villages around Koidu Town, sometimes 2 miles away from Koidu or
24 a mile away from Koidu, so that was how they decided to set up
12:53:16 25 themselves and took defensive positions.

26 Q. Thank you.

27 A. And at the same time --

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I've noted it.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well do something about it, please.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. The last answer you gave, Mr Sesay, was to this effect: In
4 May things did not improve because at that time they were
12:53:47 5 advancing to capture Kono, so by early May they pushed the RUF
6 out of which town?

7 A. Koidu Town.

8 Q. Pause there. "So the RUF/AFRC, the AFRC they - a large
9 number of their troops went with Gullit and they" - where did
12:54:12 10 they go, the ones who went with Gullit?

11 A. Okay. They went and joined SAJ Musa in Kurubonla

12 Q. In Kurubonla?

13 A. And that was based on the advancement of ECOMOG to take
14 Koidu Town. That was when Gullit and this AFRC group, all of
12:54:37 15 them pulled out of Koidu Town. They went through Tombodu and
16 went to Kurubonla.

17 Q. And after Gullit went, who of the RUF/AFRC or STF remained
18 in Koidu Town?

19 A. Well, it was Superman who was in command of Koidu Town at
12:55:05 20 this time in Kono.

21 Q. And you said something about a few number of STF that was
22 with Superman, they withdrew from Koidu Town and were living in
23 the surrounding villages around Koidu Town. Who had withdrawn to
24 the surrounding villages around Koidu Town?

12:55:33 25 A. I said the RUF and some STF who were with Superman and few
26 AFRC, they withdrew based on the advancing ECOMOG to Koidu Town.
27 So they withdraw and some areas they stayed a mile to Koidu Town
28 and some areas 1 mile to Koidu Town, sometimes 3 miles to Koidu
29 Town. So they settled in villages surrounding Koidu Town.

1 Q. Thank you very much. So that's the situation in May. Did
2 the situation improve in June?

3 A. Well, in May - in May, ECOMOG also advanced and captured
4 Bunumbu from the RUF. They captured Manowa from the RUF. They
12:56:26 5 captured Bandajuma Jawie from the RUF.

6 Q. Anywhere else?

7 A. So they came as far as the Moa River. That was where they
8 finally deployed by late June to July.

9 Q. Pause there. Bandajuma, how do you spell that?

12:56:47 10 A. B-A-N-D-A-J-U-M-A.

11 Q. And they had captured there by what time, by what date?

12 A. I said by late May ECOMOG and Kamajors had captured from
13 Bandajuma Jawie up to Bunumbu and from Bunumbu to Jukubu to
14 Manowa, down to Manowa ferry by the Moa.

12:57:23 15 Q. You mentioned Jukubu. How do you spell that?

16 A. J-U-K-U-B-U.

17 Q. Now, in these two months that we've been discussing, May
18 and June 1998, what was the position of the RUF/AFRC in terms of
19 materials?

12:58:00 20 A. Well, at that time, the condition about material was very
21 bad because we were not getting materials except when we bought
22 some few boxes of AK rounds from Guinea and at the same time
23 Bockarie sent Matthew Kennedy Sesay to Voinjama to meet the
24 ex-ULIMO fighters because Bockarie had got information that the
12:58:31 25 ex-ULIMO fighters were burying some ammunition during the
26 disarmament. So since it was Kennedy who had been used to them
27 before because they had broken into the bank in Kono in April, so
28 they looted money there and Superman sent this money through
29 Matthew Kennedy to report this money to Bockarie in Buedu. So

1 Sam Bockarie took some of this money and gave it to Matthew
2 Kennedy so that he would go to Voinjama and then try hard to buy
3 these things from the ex-ULIMO fighters.

12:59:16 4 Q. Pause there. Now, you've mentioned a couple of things
5 there about which I seek some clarification. First of all, there
6 is a word missing, line 15, sent Matthew Kennedy Sesay to
7 Voinjama you said to meet ex-ULIMO fighters. Is that right?

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

12:59:43 9 Q. Secondly you speak of a bank being broken into in Kono in
10 April. April of which year?

11 A. April of 1998. Early April 1998. That was when they broke
12 into that bank.

13 Q. Who broke into the bank in April 1998?

13:00:06 14 A. Well, according to the information that I got when Kennedy
15 brought the money to Kailahun, he said it was some elements of
16 the AFRC, RUF and STF who broke into this bank. So when Superman
17 got the information he went and arrested those who did it. So
18 the monies that they collected from them, that was the monies
19 looted from the bank, those are the monies he put together and
13:00:27 20 put them in empty rice bags and he gave them to Kennedy to take
21 them to Sam Bockarie in Buedu.

22 Q. And then you say that in due course Sam Bockarie sent
23 Kennedy with some of that money to Liberia to purchase arms from
24 ex-ULIMO fighters. Is that right?

13:00:45 25 A. Ammunition, yes, because Bockarie had got information that
26 the ex-ULIMO fighters during their disarmament they were burying
27 some ammunition and some arms. So when Kennedy went he was able
28 to buy some of the ammunition, because by then when I had
29 returned from Monrovia I met Kennedy in Voinjama. So I passed

1 through there and came to Kailahun and to Buedu. So Kennedy was
2 now based in Voinjama since that time up to July and he was
3 withdrawn by Sam Bockarie, because by then he was no longer
4 making purchases because they said the ammunition had finished so
13:01:26 5 when he came back to Buedu. In fact that was the ammunition that
6 Bockarie gave to Superman for the attack on Kono in July, the one
7 they referred to as Fitti-Fatta.

8 Q. So the ammunition for the Fitti-Fatta mission came from
9 where?

13:01:46 10 A. I said it was the ammunition that Kennedy had been buying
11 from the ex-ULIMO fighters, because those ammunition were
12 ammunition they had buried. So when they brought them, Bockarie
13 had to ask the S4 Jabaty to put them into the - into the big
14 jerry cans so that they could wash them clean and put them under
13:02:14 15 the sun and they get dried.

16 Q. Why did they have to be washed and dried, this ammunition
17 brought from the ex-ULIMO fighters?

18 A. Because they had buried them. It was almost a year they
19 were buried because the disarmament in Liberia was around April,
13:02:40 20 May, June. That was the disarmament time in 2007 so and --

21 Q. 2007?

22 A. Sorry, sorry, 1997. Now we are talking about - I said they
23 had buried those ammunition around April, May, to June 1997, and
24 now we are talking about April, May, June to July of 1998. So it
13:03:09 25 was almost a year passed when those ammunition had been buried in
26 the ground.

27 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, did you personally see this ammunition
28 bought from ULIMO?

29 A. Well, when I returned from Monrovia I met some of the

1 ammunition in Kennedy's room, the ones he had bought. It was not
2 a secret. Everyone who was in Buedu by then knew about this.

3 Q. Kennedy's room where?

4 A. In Voinjama where he was lodged. When I returned from
13:03:48 5 Monrovia, that was where myself and Major Mulbah came. So it was
6 from there that we boarded a transport and we came to Foya,
7 myself and Major Kennedy - I mean, sorry, myself and Major
8 Mulbah.

9 Q. Now I want us to take things slowly, Mr Sesay, because this
13:04:10 10 part of your evidence is of critical importance. And I want
11 detail. Now, you go to Kennedy's room in Voinjama, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Who with?

14 A. Myself and Major Mulbah, the one that Sam Bockarie had sent
13:04:35 15 to go and check on me in Monrovia.

16 Q. Right. Just describe for us what this ammunition that you
17 saw in Kennedy's room looked like. Let's take it in stages.
18 First of all, what kind of ammunition was it?

19 A. There were AK rounds, G3 rounds and HMG rounds. Those were
13:05:06 20 the ammunition.

21 Q. What were they contained in?

22 A. Well, when I met them in Kennedy's room, they were in bags.

23 Q. What kind of bags?

24 A. I did not see where they were taken from, but when I met
13:05:29 25 them in Kennedy's room, the bags that they used to put - sell
26 rice in. Rice bags, that was where I saw them. Rice bags, those
27 are the type of bags.

28 Q. And next: What was the physical state of that ammunition
29 that you saw?

1 A. Well, Kennedy showed me. He said, These are the ammunition
2 I have bought, and I said, Oh. He opened the bags and I saw the
3 AK rounds, I saw the G3 rounds. But the ammunition looked rusty,
4 so that was why when they brought them to Buedu they had to put
13:06:10 5 them in pig foot rubbers - in jerry cans, put some oil on them,
6 and they would be able to clean them from the rust and later put
7 them in the sun.

8 Q. And where did that cleaning process take place?

9 A. I said it was in Buedu. It was Sam Bockarie's S4 who used
13:06:31 10 to put them in pig foot rubbers. He was called Jabaty. He used
11 to put them in pig foot rubbers.

12 Q. What are pig foot rubbers?

13 A. Well, these were rubbers that contain pig foot. They are
14 like drums, but they are not up to the size of a drum. They are
13:07:00 15 shorter than a drum. They used to put the AK rounds there and
16 they would pour diesel oil on them.

17 Q. Who was Bockarie's S4?

18 A. He was called Jabaty Jaward.

19 Q. What quantity of ammunition did you see in Kennedy's room
13:07:35 20 in Voi njama?

21 A. Well, the one that I saw, they were up to six bags - half
22 bags. They were not full bags. They were up to six half bags in
23 Kennedy's room that I saw.

24 Q. Now, you're going to have to help us. How big is a half
13:08:01 25 bag? Just use your hands, Mr Sesay, and just - how wide?

26 A. Well, when you talk about a rice bag it would be the size
27 of this, and when you talk about half it's like this. So if you
28 talk about a bag of rice, you mean a bag of rice divided into
29 two. That is what I mean by half. That was how the half-bag

1 sizes were.

2 Q. I understand that, Mr Sesay, but some of us don't come from
3 Sierra Leone. So I just want you to hold your hands and show me.
4 How tall is a half bag of rice? So about 2 feet tall, yes?

13:08:46 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And how wide is it? Show me again. How wide is this?

7 A. Like this.

8 Q. About a foot and a half wide. And you saw how many such
9 bags in Kennedy's room?

13:09:06 10 A. I said I saw six.

11 Q. Now, another detail: During that time in '98, when had
12 Kennedy been sent to Voinjama?

13 A. That was in April after I had departed to Monrovia. That
14 was when Bockarie sent Kennedy. Because at the time I was
13:09:39 15 returning from Monrovia I met Kennedy in Voinjama, so that was in
16 April '98.

17 Q. And how long did Kennedy stay in Voinjama?

18 A. Kennedy was there up to July when Sam Bockarie recalled him
19 to come back. Because from July now he was not getting items to
13:10:04 20 be bought, so Bockarie asked him to come back to Buedu.

21 Q. And just so that we are crystal clear about this, why was
22 Kennedy sent to Voinjama?

23 A. Because the ex-ULIMO were used to Kennedy, and it was
24 Kennedy who used to buy ammunition from them. Even at the time
13:10:31 25 they were - you know, Bockarie had deployed him to Koindu from
26 January to May, so the ex-LIMO fighters had been working with
27 Kennedy even before this time.

28 Q. Bockarie had deployed him from Koindu from January to May
29 of which year?

1 A. 1997.

2 Q. Now, the ammunition purchased by Kennedy in Voinjama, what
3 was that used for?

13:11:14

4 A. Well, we are using it to fight. That was - Bockarie used
5 some of them when he called Superman to Buedu for Superman to
6 carry out the Fitti-Fatta attack on Kono. You know, when they
7 went and attacked they called the operation Fitti-Fatta. That
8 attack was in July of '98 when Superman attacked the ECOMOG in
9 Kono, and Bockarie used to send --

13:11:32

10 Q. Go on.

11 A. Bockarie used to send the same ammunition for me in
12 Pendembu for the various front lines. Because by then I was also
13 experiencing attacks from the Kamajors at Baima and Kuiva and
14 even the attack that we undertook in Niama. Those were the
15 ammunition that we used.

13:11:54

16 Q. I just want to be clear about this. The ammunition given
17 to Superman by Bockarie for the Fitti-Fatta mission, where did it
18 come from?

13:12:13

19 A. That was the ammunition that Kennedy bought from Voinjama
20 from the ULIMO - the ex-ULIMO fighters, when I said they were
21 buried in the ground.

22 Q. Did the ammunition for the Fitti-Fatta mission come from
23 Charles Taylor?

24 A. Oh, no, no, no.

13:12:34

25 Q. Was the Fitti-Fatta mission a success?

26 A. No, it was a failed attack. In fact, Superman incurred
27 heavy casualties from that attack. That kind of casualty has
28 never been experienced by the RUF before.

29 Q. Why was the Fitti-Fatta mission such an abject failure?

1 A. Because the ammunition was not up to standards. The
2 ammunition was not enough for such an attack and they did not
3 organise themselves properly, so that was why they incurred heavy
4 casualties.

13:13:21 5 Q. Why was the ammunition not up to standard?

6 A. It was because those were the ammunition that Kennedy
7 bought from the ULIMO fighters that were buried ammunition, and
8 that was the only ammunition that was available which Sam
9 Bockarie sent to Superman to go on the attack, and the ammunition
10 was not enough.

13:13:48

11 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier - and we might as well deal with
12 this matter now so that we don't have to return to it - that some
13 medicine men came from Lofa County, yes?

14 A. Yes.

13:14:04 15 Q. Who were these individuals?

16 A. Well, it was one of the ex-ULIMO fighters, an officer
17 called Titus. He was a Loma guy.

18 Q. An officer called what?

19 A. Titus. He was an ULIMO man.

13:14:30 20 Q. Do you spell Titus T-I-T-U-S?

21 A. Yes, I think that is the same.

22 Q. Go on.

23 A. So Titus was a friend to Bockarie and he was a brother to
24 one of our colleague vanguards called Major Mulbah. It was
13:14:53 25 Bockarie who asked for this request to Titus through Major Mulbah
26 that the people who were protecting the ULIMO in Voinjama, whilst
27 they were fighting, he said he would need those people for them
28 to come and protect the RUF fighters. So Major Mulbah went and
29 called Titus from Voinjama, and Titus came. When he came,

1 Bockarie gave him some money and he - he pleaded with him to go
2 and bring the people. So Titus went to Voinjama to a village.
3 He went and brought that man, that woman and the two men. He
4 brought them to Buedu, and they protected people in Buedu. And
13:15:33 5 from there, they went with Superman - Sam Bockarie sent them with
6 Superman to go on the attack in Kono.

7 Q. Now --

8 A. So they returned to Buedu.

9 Q. Now, those two men and a woman, did you learn their names?

13:16:00 10 A. Well, I do not recall their names, but they were Loma
11 people. They were natives of the Voinjama area.

12 Q. And just help us. Just so that we are all appreciate what
13 is being said, did these individuals bring any special skills?

14 A. No. They were just marking their bodies, and they said it
13:16:35 15 was for protection. They would mark their bodies and they will
16 rub some kind of poultice there. Because we also had such people
17 in Kailahun who were doing the same thing, you know.

18 Q. Now, were you present when this happened, Mr Sesay?

19 A. Yes. I - they also gave me the marks in Buedu .

13:17:04 20 Q. And who had sent these medicine men to Sierra Leone?

21 A. I said it was Sam Bockarie who requested for those people.
22 It was when he discussed with Titus and Titus told him that they
23 had some people in the village close to Voinjama you know who
24 were protecting them while they were fighting the ULIMO war. So
13:17:31 25 he said it would be nice whilst the enemies who are giving the
26 RUF hard time, he said it was good for him to protect his men.
27 So that was when - and this Titus man had a family connection
28 with one of our majors, Mulbah, Augustine Mulbah; he was also a
29 vanguard within the RUF. So in fact when those people came, they

1 were lodged in Major Mulbah's house in Buedu before they left for
2 Kono.

3 Q. Now, what do you say to the suggestion, Mr Sesay, that
4 those medicine men were, in fact, sent by Charles Taylor?

13:18:13 5 A. No, that is a black lie.

6 Q. That name Fitti-Fatta, what does it stand for?

7 A. Well, before the attack the operation did not have a name.
8 It was after the attack that they came up with that name because
9 so many RUFs died during the operation, Fitti-Fatta, that was why
10 they referred to the operation as Fitti-Fatta. I said that was a
11 casualty type all on its own that the RUF never experienced in an
12 attack. So when - I was not there, but that was what

13 I understood after the attack. It was Kallon who was the deputy
14 to Superman who came and explained to us, because they withdrew
15 from Kono just after that - just after that attack, Bockarie
16 withdrew him from Kono and he went to Kailahun.

17 Q. How do you translate Fitti-Fatta into English?

18 A. Well, Fitti-Fatta was something that was plenty, something
19 someone would regard in abundance, something that went beyond the
20 expected number. That is what I understand.

21 Q. And what had gone beyond the expected number?

22 A. What do you mean?

23 Q. Well, you've just given me a translation that Fitti-Fatta
24 means something which has gone beyond the expected number. What
25 was it about the Fitti-Fatta mission which had gone beyond the
26 expected number?

27 A. Well, the killing, the killing in action, the wounded in
28 action that took place. The commander and the officers who
29 carried out the attack did not expect that kind of figure.

1 Q. What was Sam Bockarie's reaction to that failure?

2 A. Well, Sam Bockarie was angry because I had gone and lost
3 the diamonds and he was frustrated by that. And the ammunition
4 again that he had been able to gather and - and he had sent that
13:20:57 5 to Superman, that Kennedy brought and he sent to Superman. That
6 was why he in fact ordered Superman to come to Kailahun, but when
7 he failed in the attack and when Sam Bockarie invited him to come
8 to Kailahun he refused to come there, so he decided to go to
9 Koinadugu.

13:21:16 10 Q. Now, by this stage, the end of the Fitti-Fatta mission,
11 let's just pause for a minute and take stock. You just mentioned
12 Superman decides to not go to Buedu but to go to where?

13 A. To go to Koinadugu District where he went and joined SAJ
14 Musa in Kurubonla.

13:21:51 15 Q. Now, prior to Superman going to join SAJ Musa, were there
16 any RUF fighters in that part of the country?

17 A. No, the RUF was not in Koinadugu District. That was the
18 first time Superman went there with the RUF in August 1998.

19 Q. Now, did Superman, when he went to join SAJ Musa, have any
13:22:19 20 radio operators with him?

21 A. Yes. He had radio operators.

22 Q. Who were they?

23 A. He had Top Marine. He had - because Nya was with him,
24 Alice Pyne was with him, Nya's wife. And then he had - he had
13:22:52 25 some - he had operators. He had Waco-Waco also. He had his
26 operators from the Western Jungle. Those of them who were with
27 him, all of them left and went. The only operator that I knew
28 about that stayed, that was before Superman left Kono, that was
29 King Perry, Alfred Brown. For them, Bockarie had sent them to go

1 and team up with the Gullit group, SAJ Musa and the Gullit group,
2 but they were there, I think there were about three operators:
3 Alfred Brown, Gullit - I mean, sorry, King Perry and another
4 operator. So they left, they went to Koinadugu even before
13:23:50 5 Superman went there in August. I think they went to Koinadugu in
6 July because King Perry came with --

7 Q. Came with what?

8 A. King Perry came with Superman to Buedu and it was after
9 their return, it was from the time Superman came with King Perry
13:24:16 10 from Buedu, and that was the time Bockarie had the plan that when
11 Superman returns to Kono he should send some operators to go to
12 the Koinadugu area so that he, Bockarie, will be able to know
13 what SAJ Musa and others were up to in the other areas. So when
14 he returned to Kono --

13:24:38 15 Q. So Bockarie sends which operators to the Koinadugu area?

16 A. No. He gave instruction to Superman to send Alfred Brown,
17 King Perry and another operator to go and join the AFRC operation
18 in the Koinadugu - at the Koinadugu flank.

19 Q. Why did Bockarie do that?

13:25:10 20 A. Because he did not know what SAJ Musa, Gullit and others
21 were doing in the Koinadugu District and even the Bombali
22 District area, let's say in that other part of the country.

23 Q. And did those three - were those three operators dispatched
24 to the Koinadugu area before Superman went to that area?

13:25:39 25 A. Yes. They went there, they were dispatched to there before
26 Superman went there. They went in July.

27 Q. Now, there is one - we need to go back a little bit,
28 Mr Sesay, and it's my fault. And it's just to - we've dealt with
29 Fitti-Fatta, but I failed to deal with one or two matters. Who

1 planned the Fitti-Fatta mission?

2 A. It was Sam Bockarie, Superman and Mike Lamin. They held a
3 meeting in Buedu because, after the meeting, Mike Lamin came to
4 Pendembu and he explained to me. He and Superman came to
13:26:26 5 Pendembu. Superman went and visited the men at the front line at
6 Baima, Kui va, whilst Mike Lamin stayed with me in Pendembu. So
7 he told me that Bockarie had given mission to Superman to attack
8 Koidu Town, to attack the ECOMOG.

9 Q. Did Charles Taylor plan and order the Fitti-Fatta mission?

13:26:53 10 A. No, no. It was not Mr Taylor. Because as far as - as far
11 as I know what happened at this time, Bockarie was not in contact
12 with Mr Taylor.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, has the witness given us a
14 rough time, time frame, for the Fitti-Fatta mission?

13:27:15 15 MR GRIFFITHS: He said the end of July 1998.

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. And when was it that you discussed with Mike Lamin the
19 planning of that mission? Was it before or after you went to
13:27:34 20 Monrovia and lost the diamonds?

21 A. No. I had returned and I had been posted to Pendembu in
22 late April. I was in Pendembu May, June. We are now talking
23 about July. I was in Pendembu when after - Bockarie had invited
24 Superman and Superman came to Buedu. That was when Superman said
13:27:59 25 he wanted to go and visit the front lines. He gave them few
26 bodyguards, and Mike Lamin too used his own jeep, and they came
27 and met me in Pendembu. That was when Mike Lamin told me.
28 Superman came and greeted me and I also greeted him. He went and
29 visited the front line, but Mike stayed with me in Pendembu

1 because, when I was in Pendembu from late November to - November
2 1998, Bockarie used to come to Pendembu, he used to hold meetings
3 there. Mike Lamin --

13:28:34

4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be
5 advised to repeat that area slowly?

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Bockarie used to come hold meetings there. Mike Lamin
8 would do what?

13:28:50

9 A. I said Mike Lamin used to come to Pendembu weekly because
10 he did not base in a particular area. After a few days, two or
11 three days, he would come to Pendembu, he would go to Baiwala,
12 just like that.

13 Q. Why? What was Mike Lamin's role at this time?

13:29:08

14 A. Well, Mike Lamin was an adviser to Bockarie and at the same
15 time he was a senior commander that all of us respected, so he
16 will stay in Buedu sometimes three or four days and then he will
17 tell Bockarie that he was going to Issa at Pendembu. He would
18 come to me in Pendembu. Then he will move to Baiwala; he will be
19 there for the whole day and maybe in the evening he would return
20 to Pendembu. That was how he used to move. In fact, there was a

13:29:26

21 time in September when he went and collected a machine in
22 Baiwala, when he went and crossed the border and he sold it,
23 machines that they use to dig water wells, it was the big
24 machine. He went and sold it to the AFL battalion commander in
25 Bomi Hills. He was called Bob Gibson. So he, Mike, crossed with
26 the machine, he took the machine from Baiwala, and he took it to
27 the ULC camp in Liberia. So Bob Gibson came with his vehicle and
28 collected the machine and he, in return, he gave some ammunition
29 in return for the machine.

13:29:45

1 Q. Who is Gibson?

2 A. Bob Dixon, Dixon. He was the AFL battalion commander for
3 the Bomi Hills county.

4 Q. Is it Gibson or Dixon?

13:30:24 5 A. Well, I think it's Gibson.

6 Q. And that person was what - had what role?

7 A. He was the AFL battalion commander for Bomi Hills county.

8 Q. And when had Mike Lamin conducted this transaction?

9 A. I said it was around September of 1998.

13:30:57 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point?

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly. We will take our luncheon
12 break now and reconvene at half past 2.

13 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

14 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:32:07 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon.

16 Mr Griffiths, please continue.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I announce, before I recommence, Madam
18 President, that the Principal Defender has left us this
19 afternoon:

14:32:28 20 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, before the luncheon adjournment, we were
21 looking at the Fitti-Fatta mission and the source of the
22 ammunition which was used for that operation and the reasons for
23 its failure and the alleged involvement of Charles Taylor in the
24 whole episode. I would now like us, please, to look at exhibit
14:33:06 25 D-9. Now, this is a document we've looked at before, Mr Sesay,
26 but I would now like to direct your attention to a different part
27 of it. Page 5, please. My apologies, page 4. Penultimate
28 paragraph on that page:

29 "We also rescued Johnny Paul Koroma and his family, and

1 under the escort of Brigadier Issa and Brigadier Mike, he was
2 brought to Kailahun as was advised by your brother. His
3 mother-in-law had to be carried on a hammock the duration of the
4 journey. On his arrival in Kailahun, I gave up my bedroom for
14:34:47 5 Johnny Paul Koroma and sought his permission to enter in order to
6 go through my drawers.

7 The enemy had succeeded in demoralising our troops, and
8 soldiers, both RUF and SLA, raced for the Moa River in retreat
9 and with the intention of crossing as refugees into neighbouring
14:35:07 10 countries. Sensing that this would greatly deplete our fighting
11 forces, I instructed that strong grates be placed along the Moa
12 crossing and threatened to open fire on anyone attempting to
13 cross. I further instructed that defences be set in Kono and
14 ahead and to put an effective halt to the retreat.

14:35:32 15 I immediately set about establishing a defence headquarters
16 in Kailahun. It was from this DHQ that I intended to organise a
17 stance and a counteroffensive and from where command and control
18 would be maintained. Later when Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in
19 Kailahun, he appointed me to take over command for both the RUF
14:35:58 20 and the SLA as chief of defence staff, with the rank of brigadier
21 general. In order to motivate the most senior officers, I took
22 it upon myself to appoint Brigadier Issa as battlefield commander
23 and Colonel Mingo as battle group commander. All this was done
24 especially to encourage Colonel Mingo and ensure smooth
14:36:26 25 operation. After our Freetown invasion in January 1991, I was
26 again promoted by JP Koroma to the rank of major general. Issa
27 was promoted to brigadier and Mike to the rank of brigadier, and
28 other SLA officers were also promoted.

29 Sir, during this period I had been in contact with various

1 diplomats and other international agencies such as the United
2 Nations, Commonwealth, OAU, ECOWAS, and even the Sierra Leone
3 government, with a view of effecting your release and a
4 negotiated settlement of the Sierra Leonean crisis. These bodies
14:37:10 5 lent deaf ears to my propositions, as they thought that the
6 Kabbah government would be able to achieve military victory."

7 Going through that - going through that, Mr Sesay, do you
8 recognise what the writer of this report is describing?

9 A. Yes, I understand what you are reading. I said yes, I'm
14:37:59 10 listening to what you are reading.

11 Q. Well, let's go back to page 4 and just examine the sequence
12 of events described. Where we see in the second-to-last
13 paragraph on that page, "We also rescued JP Koroma and his
14 family, and under the escort of Brigadier Issa and Brigadier
14:38:26 15 Mike, he was brought to Kailahun," who is the Brigadier Issa
16 referred to there?

17 A. That's - I am.

18 Q. And who is the Brigadier Mike referred to?

19 A. That's Mike Lamin.

14:38:45 20 Q. And this event described, the rescuing of JP Koroma and his
21 escort to Kailahun, which event is being described there?

22 A. This is referring to the withdrawal from Freetown to Makeni
23 from Kono to Kailahun, February '98.

24 Q. That is the matter you described to us this morning?

14:39:17 25 A. Yes, that's it.

26 Q. Let's go to page 5, please. Where, in the middle of that
27 first complete paragraph beginning, "I immediately set about
28 establishing," where in that paragraph it refers to "JP Koroma
29 appointing me to - over command for both the RUF and SLA as chief

1 of defence staff," what is that a reference to?

2 A. Well, this is the appointment that JP gave Bockarie upon
3 our arrival in Buedu. But that was the appointment - what the
4 appointment said, chief of defence staff, but SAJ Musa, Brigadier
14:40:14 5 Mani, Gullit and others were no longer taking instructions from
6 Bockarie.

7 Q. Thank you. Now, moving on to the next paragraph --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, the interpreter would like
9 to make a correction. That was from May, they were not taking
14:40:31 10 instructions from Bockarie.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Sir, during this period --

13 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, I don't know if others followed
14 that, but I'm a little confused by that interpretation, the
14:40:45 15 intervention of the interpreter. I'm not sure what was said by
16 the witness.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the interpreter can help us as
18 to the context in which reference was made by the witness to
19 "that was from May."

14:41:09 20 THE INTERPRETER: That is in relation to the appointment.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Let's see if we can clarify that further. Mr Sesay, you
23 made reference in your last answer to the month of May. Could
24 you assist us? What was it that you were telling us?

14:41:25 25 A. Yes. I was trying to say - I said yes, this appointment
26 was given by Johnny Paul. He appointed Sam Bockarie as chief of
27 defence staff, but SAJ Musa, Brigadier Mani in the Koinadugu
28 District, they were not taking instructions, they did not subject
29 themselves to this appointment. Then, from May 1998, Gullit and

1 all the AFRCs in Kono who joined SAJ Musa, they too did not
2 subject them to this appointment made by Sam - to Sam Bockarie's
3 appointment. That's what I mean.

4 Q. Thank you very much:

14:42:13 5 "Sir, during this period I had been in contact with various
6 diplomats and other international agencies such as the UN,
7 Commonwealth, OAU, ECOWAS, and even the Sierra Leonean
8 government."

9 Mr Sesay, can you help us as to that? Were you aware of
14:42:37 10 such contacts being made with those agencies by representatives
11 of the RUF at this time?

12 A. Yes, I was aware of Gullit and others attending meetings in
13 Abidjan in '98, and I knew about Sam Bockarie meeting Mr Taylor
14 from September 1998, November and December, which was a meeting -
14:43:15 15 which was to meet Mr Taylor to facilitate with the five ECOWAS
16 states in respect of --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat the
18 last bit of this answer.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:43:32 20 Q. In respect of what?

21 A. In respect of revisiting the Abidjan Accord because at
22 least he would - can you give me time to explain how Bockarie
23 started - how he got into this contact?

24 Q. Not yet. We'll come to it. Let's deal with this, and in
14:43:54 25 due course we'll come to that, okay? So you were aware of these
26 contacts. We now come to this, the next paragraph:

27 "Back at headquarters, I renewed my contact with ULIMO and
28 tried to secure materials from them. It was out of these
29 materials that I gave Superman a good quantity to attack and

1 capture Kono. This move I thought would pressure the government
2 into abandoning their mock trial against you and provide us with
3 the ground necessary to move the war and the movement forward.

4 Superman used the materials to attack Kono and was able to
14:44:40 5 control parts of Koidu Town. Though they were able to raise the
6 ammo dump, they then concentrated on looting and later withdrew,
7 leaving the enemy to reoccupy the town. Even prior to that, all
8 instructions to maintain the ground were not implemented. With
9 the captured materials from Kono, Superman went to the Kabala
14:45:09 10 axis to join SAJ Musa. I instructed him to send some materials
11 to which he agreed. Later he refused to dispatch the materials
12 and refused to grant permission to the receiving officer to
13 return to me."

14 I would like us to examine this now in a little more
14:45:33 15 detail. Where in that paragraph it says, "Back at headquarters,
16 I renewed my contact with ULIMO," what is that a reference to?

17 A. Well, at this time we sent Kennedy to Voinjama, who started
18 buying the ammunition.

19 Q. Is this what you were telling us earlier about Kennedy
14:46:01 20 being stationed in Voinjama between April and July?

21 A. Yes, when he was buying the ammunition.

22 Q. And where this goes on to speak of an attack on Koidu Town,
23 what was the name given to the operation which led to that attack
24 on Koidu Town?

14:46:30 25 A. Well, after the attack, it was then that it was named
26 Operation Fitti-Fatta.

27 Q. Thank you. And then the penultimate paragraph on that
28 page: "With the captured materials from Kono, Superman went to
29 the Kabala axis to join SAJ Musa." Again, what is that a

1 reference to?

2 A. The reference to this is the time that Superman left Kono
3 and went to Koinadugu to join SAJ Musa at Kurubonla.

4 Q. Let's just pop over the page to have a look at one other
14:47:17 5 passage, which deals with matters you told us about this morning.
6 Page 6, please, the third paragraph on this page: "Prior to
7 this" - in order to know what happened prior, perhaps I ought to
8 go back to page 5 so that we can put this in context:

9 "With the captured materials from Kono, Superman went to
14:48:00 10 the Kabala axis to join SAJ Musa. I instructed him to send some
11 materials, to which he agreed. Later he refused to dispatch the
12 materials and refused to grant permission to the receiving
13 officer to return to me.

14 A special forum of vanguards was held to brief them of
14:48:26 15 happenings since the Freetown retreat and other important issues.
16 It was at this forum that I learned that Superman had a mixed
17 Lebanese girl with him who was deterring his concentration on
18 military matters. It was reported that she would sit on his lap
19 during meetings with officers and publicly flirt with one
14:48:54 20 another. This information concerned me greatly, and in the
21 presence of vanguards I instructed Superman to report for
22 briefing. I told him that he should not be moving with his woman
23 on a military operation such as the one he was on, as it was
24 obvious that his priority was not his military duties. In this
14:49:20 25 light, I instructed him to prepare within 72 hours and to report
26 to defence headquarters. He agreed to report but later sent a
27 long message denouncing my command and refusing to come to my
28 call. He said that he would stay where he was and would take no
29 instructions from me until the arrival of the leader.

1 The War Council chairman and other senior officers joined
2 me in trying to convince him to report, but he refused, resorting
3 to molesting Pa Rogers and Brigadier Isaac on set, whilst all
4 stations were monitoring. Indeed he remained in his location,
14:50:16 5 threatening any soldier attempting to comply with my instruction
6 for all loyal forces to the RUF leadership and high command to
7 leave his location for the closest operational area."

8 Go back to page 5, please. The forum referred to in the
9 last paragraph on that page, were you present at that forum,
14:50:47 10 Mr Sesay?

11 A. I was not at that forum. I was at Pendembu. Bockarie did
12 not call me to that forum.

13 Q. Were you aware that such a forum had been called?

14 A. Yes, I knew.

14:51:09 15 Q. Where was that forum held?

16 A. In Buedu.

17 Q. Who called for that forum?

18 A. It was Sam Bockarie.

19 Q. This reference to a mixed Lebanese girl, were you aware of
14:51:25 20 this?

21 A. Yes, I knew the lady. I knew her before this time, because
22 I knew her since the time she and Superman were in love.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat his
24 answer slowly?

14:51:47 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Say that again, please. Give us the answer. You knew her
27 from where?

28 A. I said I knew the lady. I knew her from Freetown before
29 the retreat, and during the retreat I saw the lady with Superman.

1 So I knew the lady before this time that Sam Bockarie invited the
2 vanguards for a forum. That's what I mean.

3 Q. It appears to suggest in this paragraph that Superman's
4 attention was being somewhat distracted by this young woman.

14:52:23 5 A. Yes, Superman loved the lady. Yes, that caused him to
6 forget about the woman who had gotten two children for him. He
7 liked this lady.

8 Q. Over the page now, please, to page 6. Last line in the
9 first paragraph:

14:52:46 10 "Refusing to come to my call, he said that he would stay
11 where he was and would take no instructions from me until the
12 arrival of the leader."

13 Were you aware of that active insubordination by Superman?

14 A. I heard about Superman's refusal. When Superman refused to
14:53:14 15 take the instructions of Sam Bockarie when he called him to Buedu
16 and he refused to go there, it was from that - there that he went
17 to Buedu. He and Bockarie were having arguments on the radio.
18 From then on he stopped reporting to Bockarie. He said he was
19 going to stop taking instructions from him. So he broke away
14:53:34 20 with his own group. From August to December 1998 he stopped
21 taking instructions from Sam Bockarie. I was aware of that.

22 Q. Pause there. I now want us to pause at this point, at this
23 point when Superman decides that he will no longer take
24 instructions from Bockarie. First of all, when did that occur?

14:53:57 25 A. That was in August 1998.

26 Q. Beginning or end of August?

27 A. At the beginning.

28 Q. And you say that that state of affairs continued until
29 when?

1 A. Until December '98.

2 Q. Let us pause again then and take stock of what Bockarie was
3 in control of in August 1998. Where was SAJ Musa at this time?

14:54:43

4 A. In August SAJ Musa was in Kurubonla in the Koinadugu
5 District.

6 Q. Now you told us earlier that from Bockarie's appointment as
7 chief of defence staff, SAJ Musa decided not to take instructions
8 from him. Is that right?

9 A. Yes, that's a fact.

14:54:59

10 Q. When had Bockarie been appointed chief of defence staff?

11 A. It was between late February or early March. It was
12 between those times.

13 Q. Now, at this time --

14 A. 1998.

14:55:20

15 Q. Around about August 1998, where was Brigadier Mani?

16 A. Brigadier Mani too was in the Koinadugu area.

17 Q. And was he taking instructions from Sam Bockarie?

18 A. No. From February 1998 up to part of 1999 when Brigadier
19 Mani went back to Freetown from Kabala he never took instructions
20 from Sam Bockarie.

14:56:04

21 Q. Now, you also told us that members of the STF had also gone
22 with SAJ Musa and Brigadier Mani to the Koinadugu District. Were
23 they taking instructions from Sam Bockarie?

24 A. No, no.

14:56:24

25 Q. As of when did they stop taking instructions from Sam
26 Bockarie?

27 A. These people were not taking instructions from Sam Bockarie
28 before the AFRC or during the AFRC. They were not taking
29 instructions from Sam Bockarie. And from - and from February of

- 1 '98 when they broke away from Johnny Paul's command they were not
2 taking instructions from Sam Bockarie until - throughout '98 up
3 to the time that SAJ Musa died in Benguema in December '98 and up
4 to the time that I came to Makeni in December '98 when I met
14:57:18 5 Bropleh and Mani they were not taking instructions from Sam
6 Bockarie. And this continued up to 1999 until after the Lome
7 Accord when they left Makeni and went to Freetown.
8 Q. Let's try and put that together then. That group involving
9 SAJ Musa, Brigadier Mani, and the STF led by General Bropleh --
14:57:53 10 A. Yes, yes.
11 Q. -- in February or March you tell us they refused to take
12 instructions from Sam Bockarie. Did they ever thereafter take
13 instructions from Sam Bockarie again?
14 A. From February of '98 Brigadier Mani, SAJ Musa, General
14:58:22 15 Bropleh, they never took instructions from Sam Bockarie at any
16 stage throughout '98 and part of '99, no.
17 Q. Superman, you tell us, as of August '98 stopped taking
18 instructions from Sam Bockarie. Is that correct?
19 A. Yes, that was what happened.
14:58:49 20 Q. Did there come a time thereafter when he took instructions
21 from Sam Bockarie?
22 A. Yes, in December of '98.
23 Q. Where was Superman in December of '98 when he agreed to
24 accept Bockarie's instructions?
14:59:15 25 A. Well, in '98 from August Superman was in the Koinadugu
26 District. So around December he and the Mani group, the Bropleh
27 group, they came down. They were coming to attack Makeni and
28 indeed they attacked Teko Barracks but they failed and they were
29 now based in Binkolo whilst my own group from Kono --

1 Q. Binkolo, how do you spell that?

2 A. B-I-N-K-O-L-O.

3 Q. And your group from Kono?

4 A. Yes, because I was the commander who led the attack from
15:00:04 5 December '98 against ECOMOG in Koidu Town, so my own group left
6 Kono - we captured Kono, we came to Magburaka. From Magburaka we
7 went to Makeni.

8 Q. Mr Sesay, I apologise for interrupting you. We will come
9 to the detail of that but could I just get a short answer. Where
15:00:24 10 was Superman when he began taking orders from Bockarie again?

11 A. In Binkolo. Bockarie instructed him to join our own group
12 in Makeni to capture Teko Barracks because ECOMOG and the
13 Kamajors were in Teko Barracks at that time. That was from
14 August - since August that was the first time Superman took
15:00:52 15 instructions from Sam Bockarie, around 24 December.

16 Q. Thank you very much. That was my second question.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: So to be clear, this taking of
18 instructions resumed around 24 December?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. Around December 24, 1998,
15:01:14 20 ma'am.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: But between December 24 and August
22 previous there was no taking instructions?

23 THE WITNESS: No, my Lord. He was not taking instructions,
24 ma'am.

15:01:29 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: And, Mr Griffiths, again to digress a
26 bit, in the last paragraph on page 5 of the document that we're
27 looking at it speaks of a special forum of vanguards. I wonder
28 if the witness knows when this meeting is said to have taken
29 place exactly.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Mr Sesay, when did that special forum of vanguards take
3 place?

4 A. I think this meeting took place before the attack on Koidu
15:02:06 5 Town. Because this meeting took place in Buedu when Sam Bockarie
6 called for the vanguards from Kono and those in Buedu, they
7 attended the meeting. Because I did not go to Buedu for that
8 meeting.

9 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, my attention has been drawn to the
15:02:40 10 transcript at page 118 line 16. My question has been recorded
11 as, "Superman you tell us as of August '98 started taking
12 instructions from Sam Bockarie." That is the complete opposite
13 of the question I asked and I'm not - I apologise, but I just
14 want to ensure that we can keep abreast of these corrections.

15:03:09 15 So in August, Mr Sesay, whom did Bockarie have control -
16 effective control over?

17 A. Bockarie had effective control over the remaining RUF in
18 Kono. At that time when Superman left he withdrew Kallon,
19 recalled Kallon to Buedu. He arrested him too and locked him up
15:03:47 20 at the MP. That's Morris Kallon. In August of 1998 because it
21 was Kallon who was the deputy to Superman before and during the
22 attack in Kono. So after that when Superman had gone Bockarie
23 appointed Rambo to be the brigade commander and Colonel Isaac at
24 that time to become the adviser to Rambo. So Rambo and Colonel
15:04:18 25 Isaac from around May to August, they were in Gandorhun. They
26 were based in Gandorhun.

27 Q. Pause there. To avoid confusion, which Rambo is this?

28 A. I am talking about the brigade commander in Kono whom Sam
29 Bockarie appointed, Boston Flomo.

1 Q. Thank you very much. Now, I'm grateful for all the detail,
2 Mr Sesay, but at this point in time I am looking at a topic,
3 command and control, so I just want the basics. In August 1998
4 who did Bockarie have control over?

15:05:07 5 A. Well, it was the remaining RUF and few AFRC who were in
6 Kono under the RUF command at this time. And it was Isaac who
7 was the adviser to the brigade commander. And we were in
8 Kailahun. Those were the two groups, those were the two areas
9 where Bockarie had effective command from August 1998.

15:05:31 10 Q. Until?

11 A. Until - well, I can say until he left the RUF in December
12 '99.

13 Q. So from August '98 until December '99, that was the group
14 Bockarie had effective control over. Is that correct?

15:05:51 15 A. Yes, and - but things used to change. Things changed in
16 '99 because in '99 when we captured Magburaka that was the -
17 that's the Tonkolili District headquarters, Magburaka. We
18 captured there in December '98. We moved to Makeni. I was in
19 Makeni from late December to March. They attacked me, Superman
15:06:25 20 and others and I left Makeni. So I and my own men like Kallon,
21 Boston Flomo, and other people, they withdrew to Magburaka. So I
22 can say from late December '98 Bockarie had effective control of
23 the RUF that was in Magburaka until around October, November 1999
24 because around November, December he and Foday Sankoh had some
15:07:00 25 problems so those of us who were in that axis were not taking
26 instructions from him from November 1999 up to December when he
27 resigned.

28 Q. Thank you for that clarification. There's a couple other
29 aspects of this I want to deal with whilst we're on the topic.

1 Do you remember before the Luncheon adjournment you told us about
2 three radio operators who Bockarie had sent to join SAJ Musa and
3 Brigadier Mani in Koinadugu? Do you remember?

4 A. Yes, very well. I can remember.

15:07:38 5 Q. Tell us again, please, Mr Sesay, who were they?

6 A. I said Alfred Brown, King Perry and another operator whose
7 name I cannot recall now. But there were three whom I understood
8 Bockarie sent.

9 Q. Why did he send them?

15:08:01 10 A. Well, because Bockarie wanted to know what was happening in
11 the Koinadugu District and the Bombali District, what the AFRC -
12 what they were doing in those areas, in terms of their
13 operations. That was why Bockarie sent those men to be with them
14 so that at the end of the day they will be able to send messages
15:08:21 15 to Bockarie and Bockarie would know what was going on.

16 Q. For how long did those three remain with that group in -
17 which at that time was in Koinadugu?

18 A. Well, those groups, from July, when Bockarie said Superman
19 should dispatch them from Kono, July of '98, they went to
15:08:44 20 Koinadugu. Alfred Brown and others went to SAJ Musa. From
21 there, SAJ Musa said they should join up with Gullit and others.
22 Since that time, July, they were still with this group until they
23 withdrew from Freetown in February 1998.

24 Q. February of which year?

15:09:04 25 A. February 1999, I'm sorry.

26 Q. During that time, from July '98, when Bockarie sent them,
27 and just pausing there, seeking your clarification, when Bockarie
28 sent them, was Bockarie sending them to be seconded to the AFRC
29 or to spy on them?

1 A. Well, Bockarie sent them saying that he - in the open, he
2 said he was supporting the operation, but on the ground he
3 actually sent them to be a spy so that the people would be able
4 to monitor the operations, what they were doing there. That was
15:09:58 5 the purpose.

6 Q. You tell us these three radio operators remained with that
7 group from July '98 up until February 1999. Throughout that
8 period, were they able to stay in contact with Bockarie?

9 A. Well, when the group left they went to Kurubonla and they
15:10:28 10 joined up with Gullit because where Gullit was he had left the
11 place because they said initially their base was Camp Rosos. So
12 before this group came to join up with Gullit and others, they
13 had moved from Camp Rosos and had gone to Major Eddie Town.

14 That's where they were. So when the group left from SAJ Musa's,
15:10:57 15 because - yes, I think they left SAJ Musa's place I think late in
16 August or late July or early August, and they went to Gullit in
17 Major Eddie Town, and that's a very long distance. So when they
18 got there and they were with Gullit, I think at that time they
19 were communicating with Bockarie. But in September an infighting
15:11:31 20 broke out between SAJ Musa and Superman. Superman's troop
21 overran SAJ Musa's, so SAJ Musa and his men ran to Kurubonla and
22 they joined Gullit and --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat the
24 name of the person and speak slowly.

15:11:58 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Superman troop's overran SAJ Musa's so SAJ Musa and his men
27 ran to Kurubonla and they joined Gullit. Pick it up from there,
28 please.

29 A. They ran away from Kurubonla and they joined Gullit's troop

1 in the town. In fact, they were the ones who named that town.
2 They called it Major Eddie Town. That's around the Bombali
3 District.

4 Q. Pause there. Can we just go back before we lose sight of
15:12:33 5 it? There was reference to a Camp Rosos. The spelling of Rosos
6 is R-O-S-O-S. It is at line 6 on page 124. It appears as "Camp
7 Brussels" but it's actually Camp Rosos.

8 So you were telling us that they got to Major Eddie Town, a
9 town which they themselves had named. And then what happened?

15:13:17 10 A. Then Alfred Brown, King Perry and the other fellow, they
11 were now with Gullit and his group. And SAJ Musa, because of the
12 infighting, he had left. So on the way going to Major Eddie
13 Town, he sent a message to Gullit to send a receiving team around
14 a town called Gbendembu, that is between Kamakwie and Makeni.

15:13:48 15 Q. He sent a message to Gullit to send what?

16 A. A receiving team.

17 Q. Around a town called where?

18 A. Gbendembu.

19 Q. How do you spell that, please?

15:14:05 20 A. I think it is G-B-A-D-U or G-B-A-D-E-B-U. G-B-A-D-E-B-U.

21 Q. And that town is between where and where?

22 A. I said the town is between Makeni and Kamakwie.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could the witness say that name again,
24 please, the name of this town.

15:14:43 25 THE WITNESS: Between Makeni and Kamakwie, Gbendembu.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, could you give us a
27 spelling of that location, please?

28 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour. It is
29 G-B-E-N-D-E-M-B-U.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. So he sent this message to Gullit, and what happened
3 thereafter?

4 A. Gullit sent fighters to receive SAJ Musa and others, and
15:15:17 5 they all went to the base at Major Eddie Town. Upon SAJ Musa and
6 his troops' arrival, they held a meeting with Gullit and others,
7 and he gave orders that Alfred Brown, King Perry and the other
8 fellow were not to go near the radio set and if he caught them
9 around the radio set he would execute them, so they should
15:15:48 10 distance themselves from the radio set.

11 Q. Who gave that order?

12 A. It was SAJ Musa who gave the order, according to the ones
13 who were there.

14 Q. Where was he when he gave that order?

15:15:58 15 A. He was in Major Eddie Town with Gullit.

16 Q. When was that order given?

17 A. That was after the infighting in September between Superman
18 and him. I believe it was in September, because it was not up to
19 a month to walk from Kurubonla to Bombali District, so I believe
15:16:37 20 it is the same month.

21 Q. And that ban on the three RUF radio operators having access
22 to the radio, which was imposed by SAJ Musa at that time, for how
23 long did that ban remain in place?

24 A. Well, even at that time I did not know about that. It was
15:16:58 25 later that I came to know. That ban remained in place even when
26 they had the meeting, because they held the meeting planning
27 about SAJ Musa's arrival, and they held the meeting when SAJ Musa
28 was there. It was in that meeting that the plan - it was in that
29 meeting that they planned the Freetown invasion. So after this

1 meeting they divided themselves and they gave themselves
2 appointment, who were to move, who were to be in the advance
3 team. They were divided. So they left and started moving,
4 gradually coming down from Bombali District to Port Loko
15:17:45 5 District, attacking in these, and in early December they attacked
6 Lunsar, and from Lunsar they attacked - they moved and attacked
7 Masiaka.

8 Q. Mr Sesay, I apologise for interrupting you. We will come
9 in due course, I promise you, to the details of that. I am

15:18:09 10 looking at events now in categories, and what I want us to
11 concentrate on is command and control of these various groups
12 that you've described. So let's just concentrate on that. You
13 have told us that sometime in September a meeting is held at
14 Major Eddie Town, where the attack on Freetown is planned and a

15:18:42 15 ban is imposed on the three RUF radio operators from contacting
16 Bockarie. Question: When, if at all, was that ban lifted?

17 A. Well, that ban was lifted after SAJ Musa's death, because
18 when SAJ Musa died, according to Gullit or according to
19 themselves who were on the ground, after SAJ Musa's death in

15:19:21 20 December, Benguema, that is Waterloo, that was when Alfred Brown
21 contacted Sam Bockarie that Gullit wanted to talk to him. So Sam
22 Bockarie and Gullit had a dialogue, and Gullit informed Sam
23 Bockarie that --

24 Q. So between September 1998 and December 1998, was there any
15:19:42 25 contact between that group controlled by SAJ Musa and Sam
26 Bockarie?

27 A. What I came to know later was there was a time when Alfred
28 Brown tried to inform Sam Bockarie secretly where they had
29 attacked. That's when they attacked Masiaka. So the information

1 got to SAJ Musa, and SAJ Musa slapped Alfred Brown many times and
2 he even threatened to kill him, and he said - he did not actually
3 kill him but they said he flogged him.

15:20:24 4 Q. Was there any communication between Bockarie and that SAJ
5 Musa group between September 1998 and December 1998?

6 A. No. It was only after SAJ Musa's death, that is December
7 '98, around 23rd or 24th.

8 Q. Do you know why SAJ Musa imposed that ban on communication
9 between his group and Sam Bockarie?

15:21:01 10 A. Well, one, whether SAJ Musa was regarding himself as the
11 head in his own operational area, and from that time the plan
12 that they had for Major Eddie Town was that they were going back
13 to Freetown to reinstate the army. So as far as he was
14 concerned, Bockarie and his group were not part of his army and
15:21:25 15 they were not part of the army.

16 Q. Tell me, what you've been telling us over the last few
17 minutes about the radio operations - operators and the ban placed
18 on them from contacting Bockarie, where do you know this from?

19 A. Well, at this time I did not know, but when these gentlemen
15:21:55 20 withdrew from Freetown, I came to Waterloo. Bockarie sent me.
21 So I knew this from Alfred Brown himself after they had withdrawn
22 because he was in Waterloo and later he came to Makeni. So he
23 too came. He was in Makeni. And he came to Mosquito in Buedu.
24 So when he was in Makeni, he explained to me.

15:22:15 25 Q. And was he the only one of the three radio operators to
26 whom you spoke after the event?

27 A. No. Even King Perry himself, I met him in Waterloo. And
28 after that, even during my own trial, I knew all of these things.
29 I knew that those were the things that happened.

1 Q. Can we go back to that document, please? Remember, we made
2 that diversion as a result of that first paragraph, which ends
3 with, "Superman would take no instructions from me until the
4 arrival of the leader." Let's go to the third paragraph:

15:23:24 5 "Prior to this", that is prior to the refusal of Superman
6 to take orders, "diamond mines from Kono were given to Brigadier
7 Issa in order for him to make contact and delivery to a business
8 associate of yours."

9 Let's just pause there for a minute. Go back to the first
15:23:56 10 page of this document. We see that this is entitled "A salute
11 report from Major General Sam Bockarie to the leader of the
12 revolution." Who was the leader of the revolution, Mr Sesay?

13 A. Mr Sankoh.

14 Q. So let's go back now to page 5 and try and make sense of
15:24:26 15 what is being said in this paragraph:

16 "Prior to this diamonds mined from Kono were given to
17 Brigadier Issa in order for him to make contact and delivery to a
18 business associate of yours."

19 Firstly, who is the Brigadier Issa therein referred to?

15:24:50 20 A. I was the only Issa in the RUF who was a commander. I was
21 the Brigadier Issa.

22 Q. So is that you?

23 A. Yes, that's me.

24 Q. When it says at the end of the sentence, "To a business
15:25:11 25 associate of yours," who is the "yours"?

26 A. Well, the business associate from my understanding --

27 Q. No, we'll come to the business associate, but who is the
28 business associate a business associate of? Who is the "yours",
29 the very last word at the end of the sentence? Who is that?

1 A. The "yours" is referring to Mr Sankoh.

2 Q. So you were given some diamonds to deliver to a business
3 associate of Mr Sankoh. Now, before we leave that sentence, just
4 so that we're clear, you see it refers there on the first line of
15:26:08 5 the paragraph, "Diamonds mined from Kono." The diamonds which
6 you told us this morning you received came from Johnny Paul
7 Koroma. But where had those diamonds come from originally, do
8 you know?

9 A. Well, Johnny Paul had honourables who were in Kono during
15:26:41 10 the AFRC regime. When he was in Freetown they were mining, so
11 the diamonds were from the mining that was being done in Kono.

12 Q. So the diamonds that were taken from Koroma had been mined
13 in Kono, yes?

14 A. Yes, because AFRC mined in Kono.

15:27:02 15 Q. Now, go back to the paragraph:

16 "At his transit point, whilst awaiting General Ibrahim,
17 Brigadier Issa reports that he had gone to a nearby tea shop and
18 on his way back to the hotel he realised that the diamonds were
19 missing from his pocket."

15:27:28 20 Now, this General Ibrahim, who's that?

21 A. This is a friend of Mr Sankoh's and he was now an RUF
22 agent. He transacted businesses on our behalf. He brought
23 business partners, especially diamond dealers. That is the
24 Ibrahim Bah. He was stationed in Burkina Faso. His family was
15:28:02 25 based in Ouagadougou so he was based there.

26 Q. Now, going back to the beginning of that sentence: "At
27 this transit point." What was the transit point?

28 A. The transit point that is being referred to is Monrovia,
29 because Ibrahim Bah was to pick me up at Monrovia and from

1 Monrovia we would travel to Burkina Faso.

2 Q. And these diamonds, let us deal with it head on, Mr Sesay,
3 were these diamonds intended for Charles Taylor?

15:29:02

4 A. No, not at all. Because if Bockarie had sent me with the
5 diamonds to be taken to Mr Taylor then they wouldn't have gone
6 missing because I was in Monrovia for five days. It was on the
7 sixth day that the diamonds got missing. I was at a motel called
8 African Plaza at Carey Street. I was there for five days and on
9 the sixth night was when the diamonds got missing from my pocket.

15:29:28

10 Q. What was the name of the hotel at which you were staying?

11 A. It was called African plaza.

12 Q. And in which street is it located?

13 A. Carey Street.

14 Q. How do you spell that?

15:29:46

15 A. I think it is C-A-R-I-E.

16 Q. Could I have a moment, please. I am told that the proper
17 spelling is C-A-R-E-Y. During the course of that visit in April
18 1998, Mr Sesay, did you see Charles Taylor?

19 A. Not at all. I did not see him.

15:30:32

20 Q. Did you see any representative of Charles Taylor?

21 A. No, not at all.

22 Q. Now, whilst we're still here with this:

15:31:05

23 "His claims of the diamonds dropping from his pocket were
24 substantiated by live broadcasts over the radio announcing that
25 diamonds had been found on the streets of the city."

26 Were there such broadcasts on the radio, Mr Sesay?

27 A. Yes, but it was not just one person. In fact it was the
28 broadcast that saved me from the hands of Bockarie, Lamin and the
29 others because they were really angry with me because of the

1 diamonds. You know it was raining at night when the diamonds
2 dropped, because it was in the rain that I was running. So when
3 we were running in the rain, myself and Jungle, when we were
4 climbing the stairs in the hotel when I looked into my pocket I
15:31:44 5 did not see the parcel. I searched all the way in my pocket, it
6 was not there. So it was possible that - because the diamond was
7 wrapped in a paper, so it was in the gutter that the - the
8 diamonds --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this
15:32:03 10 part he is talking about the diamond.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. You were saying the diamonds were in a paper and you were
13 running up the stairs. Pick it up from there and tell us slowly,
14 please, what happened?

15:32:13 15 A. I said the parcel - the diamonds were wrapped in a paper.
16 That was how it was parcelled. It was in my pocket. So when we
17 went for tea, myself and Jungle, it started raining. That was
18 late in the evening going towards 7 o'clock. So I told Jungle to
19 run back to go across the road so we would go to the hotel
15:32:36 20 because the tea shop was just across the street. So it was
21 raining and when we were running to the hotel we climbed up to
22 the reception. After I climbed up to the reception, two set of
23 stairs, I touched my pocket and I did not feel the diamond
24 inside. I told Jungle, I said, "Hey, my man, I have not seen
15:33:05 25 this diamond." We climbed down the steps again looking out for
26 the parcel in the rain.

27 So even the security man who was at the place, an old Kissi
28 man, joined us using a torch but we did not find the diamonds
29 because the - because of the water draining - it was running in

1 the drainage, so the water went over the diamonds. So in the
2 morning people were picking the diamonds in the street. And in
3 fact it was in the - it was on the radio that they had discovered
4 diamonds at Carey Street. That was the broadcast that made Sam
15:33:50 5 Bockarie and others that indeed the diamonds dropped off from me.

6 Q. In the next paragraph on that page - and you also have just
7 mentioned him - mention is made of Colonel Jungle. How did
8 Colonel Jungle come to be in Monrovia with you on that occasion?

9 A. Well, like I said earlier, Mr Kallon in Danane - sorry
15:34:28 10 Abidjan. Foday Sankoh had left a set there, so this set and
11 Bockarie's set in Koidu used to communicate. So it was Bockarie
12 who sent for Jungle to come and meet him in Buedu, that is in
13 Kailahun.

14 Q. We need to take this slowly. The Mr Kallon to whom you
15:34:52 15 refer, who is that?

16 A. That is David G Kallon. There was one Pa Kallon who was an
17 adviser to Pa Sankoh whom Foday Sankoh had left in charge in the
18 house in Cocody, Abidjan.

19 Q. In which city? Abidjan. Was that man Mr Kallon married?

15:35:18 20 A. Yes, he was Mamie I's husband. Mamie Isatu.

21 Q. Just so we're clear for the sake of the record, which
22 Kallon we're talking about. Now, in the context of these lost
23 diamonds in April 1998, help us. How did Jungle come to be in
24 Monrovia?

15:35:44 25 A. Jungle was in transit to come to Buedu because Sam Bockarie
26 had send a message that he should come to Buedu to meet him
27 there. So Jungle came from Abidjan, travelled to Danane and he
28 came to Liberia. He was at his brother's place in Monrovia when
29 Memuna and I came from Kailahun, because Memuna too was in

1 Abidjan. She was called by Bockarie. Memuna came through
2 Danane. She boarded a vehicle and came to Monrovia. From
3 Monrovia she went to Buedu.

15:36:25 4 Q. Pause, because I again want to make sure I understand your
5 evidence for the sake of the record. So when you met Jungle in
6 Monrovia he had travelled to Monrovia from Ivory Coast, had he?

7 A. Yes, from Ivory Coast came to Monrovia.

8 Q. And Memunatu Deen, who you mentioned earlier on more than
9 one occasion, from where had she come to be in Monrovia at that
15:36:56 10 time?

11 A. Memuna had come from Ivory Coast.

12 Q. Pause there. So had you travelled with anyone from Sierra
13 Leone to Monrovia?

14 A. Yes, Memuna came from the Ivory Coast and came to Monrovia
15:37:14 15 and to Buedu because Sam Bockarie had invited her. You would use
16 transport through Ganta to Monrovia; you come to Lofa and you
17 cross the border to Buedu. So because Bockarie wanted to send
18 me. That's why he sent for Memuna, so Memuna would pick me up,
19 because Memuna knew Jungle's brother where we had lodged. Where
15:37:37 20 Memuna was, I was also at the motel while we were waiting for
21 Ibrahim Bah. So when Jungle came, Memuna met Jungle in Monrovia,
22 because Jungle himself was to come to Bockarie in Buedu. So that
23 was the time Jungle used to go to keep my company at the hotel.
24 At night he would return to where he was at his brother's place
15:37:58 25 at ELWA area. It was Red Light.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, excuse my interruption.
27 The witness - the interpreter said this at page 136 line 10,
28 which appears as "indiscernible". I heard the interpreter say,
29 "So because Bockarie wanted to save me, that's why he sent for

1 Memuna." Now, the words "wanted to save me" are missing.

2 Another, I think, vital lacuna in the transcript is at page
3 135 line 11 where the witness tells us who was Mr Kallon married
4 to. The witness said: "Yes, he was Mami e I's husband, Mami e
15:38:59 5 Isatu." The words "Mami e Isatu" are missing.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

7 Q. But just to further clarify, Mr Sesay, why had Bockarie
8 sent Memuna Deen?

9 A. Bockarie called for Memuna to come to Sierra Leone because
15:39:23 10 he wanted to send me to the Ivory Coast. And Memuna was to take
11 me to Monrovia, and she had Ibrahim Bah's contact number, and she
12 would have called Ibrahim Bah from Monrovia and would talk - and
13 I would talk to Ibrahim Bah and he would pick me up from Monrovia
14 to go to Ouagadougou. That's why Bockarie sent for Memuna to
15:39:46 15 come.

16 Q. And why had Jungle come?

17 A. Jungle was called by Bockarie to come to Kailahun. So he
18 used the same route, because Jungle's elder brother was living
19 around that Red Light area so that's where he and Memuna lodged
15:40:11 20 when he came.

21 Q. But --

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Whose contact number did Memuna have?

23 THE WITNESS: Ibrahim Bah, his telephone number. Memuna
24 brought it so when we would have got to Monrovia, we would call
15:40:36 25 him.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. I just want to stick to Jungle for a minute. You said that
28 Jungle came from the Ivory Coast via Danane to Monrovia where he
29 was lodging with his brother in ELWA, near the Red Light

1 district; is that right?

2 A. Yes, that's what I said.

3 Q. I just want us to pause for a moment and concentrate on
4 Jungle. Prior to that visit by Jungle to Monrovia, how long had
15:41:08 5 Jungle been in the Ivory Coast?

6 A. Well, Jungle had been in the Ivory Coast before the
7 intervention. And even after the intervention, that was the
8 first time for him to come through Liberia to meet Sam Bockarie.

9 Q. When had he - can you help us? When had - you told us a
15:41:35 10 couple days ago you first met Jungle in 1992; is that right?

11 A. Yes, that's what I said. '93.

12 Q. There came a time, you told us, when Jungle left to go to
13 the Ivory coast?

14 A. Yes, that is in '96.

15:41:56 15 Q. How long did Jungle stay in the Ivory Coast on that
16 occasion?

17 A. Well, he was in the Ivory Coast from '96 with Mr Sankoh.
18 The only time I knew that Jungle came to Sierra Leone during the
19 AFRC was when Pa Kallon sent Jungle to Sam Bockarie that he had
15:42:19 20 nothing, and they were stranded - were having strains because
21 there was no money for food. So that was the only time that
22 Jungle came to Sierra Leone. After he had gone, this was the
23 other time that Bockarie sent for him. That was around April
24 1998.

15:42:35 25 Q. So I'm getting slightly confused, and I'm sure it's my
26 fault, Mr Sesay, so let's go slowly. Jungle goes to Ivory Coast
27 in 1996, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. [Microphone not activated]

1 A. Well, because it was after I had returned from Ivory Coast
2 in April, then I went to Zogoda. That was the time Jungle and
3 others went. Maybe it would be around May or June when Jungle
4 and others went to Ivory Coast.

15:43:12 5 Q. [Microphone not activated]

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. You tell us the next time you see Jungle is during the rule
8 of the AFRC; is that right?

9 A. Yes, that's what I said.

15:43:31 10 MR GRIFFITHS: What I said - my last question has not been
11 captured.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's because you speak over each other,
13 that's why. When that happens, it's because the two of you are
14 speaking simultaneously and your microphone is switched off
15 automatically.

15:43:50

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

17 Q. Let's start again. You meet Jungle in 1992?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Jungle, you tell us, goes to the Ivory Coast April/May -
15:44:14 20 was it April/May of 1996?

21 A. I said May/June.

22 Q. When is the next time you see him?

23 A. During the AFRC when he came to Freetown, together with
24 Ibrahim Bah.

15:44:34

25 Q. Can you give us a date for that, a month and a year?

26 A. I said I think it was around August of 1997.

27 Q. How long did he stay in Sierra Leone on that occasion?

28 A. No, when they came it was about a week, and he returned
29 together with Ibrahim Bah.

1 Q. Did he return to Sierra Leone thereafter?

2 A. No, after that he did not come to Sierra Leone until this
3 time now, when we met in Monrovia in April 1999 - 1998, when he
4 was en route to Sam Bockarie in Buedu from Abidjan.

15:45:23 5 Q. So between May/June 1996 and April - or sometime after
6 April 1998, Jungle had only been in Sierra Leone for a week or so
7 in August 1997; is that correct?

8 A. Yes, you are right.

9 Q. After your unfortunate visit to Monrovia in April 1998, how
15:46:01 10 long - where - let me start again. When, in relation to your
11 visit to Monrovia in April 1998, did Jungle go to Sierra Leone?

12 A. Well, Jungle was not really part of my mission. It was
13 myself and Memunatu Deen. Jungle was coming to respond to Sam
14 Bockarie's request from Abidjan. So when we got to Monrovia,
15:46:38 15 Memuna told him that she had come together with me to Monrovia.
16 So I was at the hotel with him, Ibrahim Bah. So Jungle and I
17 were friends, so he used to come to my place to keep my company.
18 So we were there for two or three days, and this diamond got
19 missing. So when Sam Bockarie invited me, he was afraid to come
15:47:02 20 until around June, when he started coming to Buedu. Because Sam
21 Bockarie came to know that, yes, indeed, it was true that the
22 diamonds got missing from me.

23 Q. So jungle comes to Sierra Leone in about June of 1998?

24 A. Yes.

15:47:18 25 Q. And how long does he remain in Sierra Leone thereafter?

26 A. Well, he was in Buedu with Bockarie and he went back,
27 because Bockarie used to send him to these two Lebanese guys.
28 They were buying cacao and coffee from the RUF area. So Jungle
29 was the one who was in contact with these men on behalf of Sam

1 Bockarie.

2 Q. Pause. These Lebanese guys, where were they based?

3 A. These Lebanese, they were now in Monrovia, but they were
4 initially in Sierra Leone. It was because of the intervention
15:48:06 5 that they went to Monrovia. Those two Lebanese guys were Sierra
6 Leoneans, natives of Makeni.

7 Q. What were their names?

8 A. One of them was called Mohamed and the other was called
9 Fayard.

15:48:32 10 Q. How do you spell Fayard?

11 A. I think F-A-Y-A-R-D.

12 Q. And for how long, beginning in June 1998, did Jungle carry
13 out those functions for Sam Bockarie?

14 A. Well, those men used to transact business with Sam Bockarie
15:48:54 15 up to '99 when Sam Bockarie left the RUF.

16 Q. When did Sam Bockarie leave the RUF?

17 A. Sam Bockarie left the RUF in mid-December of '99.

18 Q. Now, between June 1998 and December - and mid-December
19 1999, did Jungle continue acting for Sam Bockarie in this way?

15:49:20 20 A. Yes. Sometimes he'll come and he would be there for one or
21 two weeks or three weeks or one month, and Sam Bockarie would
22 send him to Fayard and his colleague, and sometimes he'll go and
23 he will be with his family in Foya Tengia. He will be with his
24 mother in Foya. That's how it obtained.

15:49:53 25 Q. Let's put that document away now, please. Foya Tengia, how
26 do you spell that?

27 A. F-O-Y-A.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps, Mr Interpreter, you could assist
29 with the spelling.

1 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour. It's F-O-Y-A, one
2 word, T-E-N-G-I-A, another word.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:51:29

4 Q. I want to pause for a minute now, Mr Sesay, and deal with
5 another matter.

6 Could the witness please be shown exhibit P-66? Just take
7 a moment, Mr Sesay, and have a look at that document. Have you
8 finished looking at the document, Mr Sesay.

9 A. Yes.

15:55:44

10 Q. Have you seen this document before?

11 A. No, I've not seen it before.

12 Q. Do you see a name at the bottom of the document, bottom
13 right-hand corner?

14 A. Yes, I've seen it: Sam Bockarie.

15:56:06

15 Q. And look at the date in the top right-hand corner.

16 A. Yes. It's 24 June 1998.

17 Q. Now, this is the period of time we've been discussing
18 today. In late June 1998, where were you?

19 A. I was based in Pendembu.

15:56:36

20 Q. Where was the supposed writer of this letter at the time?

21 A. He was in Buedu.

22 Q. Did you maintain contact with him at this time in June
23 1998?

24 A. Yes, I had contacts with him.

15:57:03

25 Q. Now, we see that the letter, which it appears to be, headed
26 "Confidential" and thereafter being the subheading "Revolutionary
27 United Front of Sierra Leone, Brigade Headquarters, Buedu", Buedu
28 being, of course, where Bockarie was based at this time, yes?

29 A. Yes, Buedu was where Bockarie was.

1 Q. Now, you see that the letter is addressed to the President
2 of the Republic of Liberia, Dr Charles G Taylor. Do you see?

3 A. Yes, I see it.

4 Q. And it is being sent through the chief of protocol,
15:58:00 5 Republic of Liberia, Alhaji Musa Cisse. Who is Alhaji Musa
6 Cisse?

7 A. He was the chief of protocol.

8 Q. For whom?

9 A. For the President of Liberia, Mr Taylor.

15:58:24 10 Q. As far as you're aware, where was this chief of protocol
11 based in June 1998?

12 A. Well, he was in Monrovia.

13 Q. As far as you're aware, had he, the chief of protocol, been
14 in contact with Bockarie prior to this date, June 1998?

15:58:56 15 A. Well, I did not know that. I did not know of him being in
16 contact with Alhaji Musa Cisse because even when he sent us to go
17 to Monrovia, when I went he did not tell me that.

18 Q. At this time in June 1998, as far as you're aware, was
19 Bockarie in direct contact with Charles Taylor? June 1998.

15:59:37 20 A. No, he hadn't direct contact with Mr Taylor at that time.

21 The time I came to know that Bockarie had direct contact with
22 Mr Taylor was when Bockarie sent Eddie Kanneh to Guinea. He went
23 to Conakry from --

24 Q. I'm grateful for that. Let's just - I'm going to come to

16:00:03 25 that. Can I just concentrate on this document for now, and
26 hopefully, if time allows, we can deal with other matters this
27 afternoon. But I have good reason to be doing things in order,
28 just so that we can all follow. Just to recap: As far as you're
29 aware, in June 1998, did Bockarie have direct contact with

1 Charles Taylor?

2 A. As far as I know, no.

3 Q. Can you help us, then, as to why at this time this document
4 is not directed directly to Charles Taylor but it is being sent
16:00:58 5 through somebody else, his chief of protocol? Can you help us?

6 A. Well, because the man hadn't any direct contact with
7 Mr Taylor. That's why he sent him, his protocol.

8 Q. Now, we see that the subject is this:

9 "Be informed that the Guinean government, in collaboration
16:01:26 10 with the Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops, are carrying out a
11 cross-border attack on our position at Koindu and Kailahun. This
12 attack has been going on since 15 June this year and is still
13 continuing on our ground by the riverbank."

14 Pause there. Is that true?

16:01:52 15 A. Yes, that is true. They Guineans crossed over in June '98
16 from Nongowa, and they came and occupied that Yanga, where they
17 are up to today. It was in June that they crossed and occupied
18 that place without --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the witness said something
16:02:15 20 about a previous government. Can he repeat that, please?

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. I want you to start right from the beginning. The Guineans
23 crossed over in '98 from Nongowa, and they came and occupied
24 where?

16:02:28 25 A. They came and occupied Yanga. The village is called Yanga.

26 Q. How do you spell that?

27 A. I think it is Y-A-N-G-A.

28 Q. And you went on to say that they still occupy Yanga?

29 A. Yes. Even up to the time that I was taken away from Sierra

1 Leone, that is last year, October 31, they were still in Yanga.
2 And it was an agreement between the Guinean government and the
3 former Sierra Leonean government, because, honestly, from the
4 time the RUF invaded Sierra Leone in March 1991 to that time,
16:03:26 5 June 1998, the Guineans never crossed and occupied any part of
6 Kailahun District. This was the first time. And those
7 cross-border attacks continued in '98, this Yanga, Kailahun,
8 Mafindor, Kono District, these cross-border attacks continued,
9 even in '99, 2000, between the RUF and Guineans.

16:03:57 10 Q. Thank you. Back to the document, please.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: The location after Kailahun was Mafindor?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, it's Mafindor, a village called
13 Mafindor, because at the same time they crossed into Mafindor and
14 Yanga, at the same time, I was in Pendembu when I heard the
16:04:20 15 bombardment, so I withdrew to Baima, Mobai, Kuiva, and we
16 repelled them from Mafindor, sent them back to Guinea, but those
17 in Yanga could not repel them, so they were able to occupy the
18 place, and they have been based there ever since up till now.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

16:04:45 20 Q. Paragraph 2: "Furthermore, we are trying our best to
21 resist their intention, which is to occupy Koindu and Foya. But
22 because of the heavy bombardment, we have not been able to send
23 them back across the border, and we do not have rockets or bombs
24 which are badly needed to handle the situation. We are merely
16:05:19 25 managing the small ammunition we have at hand as at now, but we
26 would not want to wait till we completely run out of ammunition,
27 which may cause a big setback for all of us."

28 Pause there. At this time in June 1998, Mr Sesay, did the
29 RUF have rockets and bombs?

1 A. No, there were no rockets or bombs. The only ammunition
2 the RUF used to have at this time, from the ammunition they
3 bought from Voinjama, from the ex-ULIMO fighters, and those
4 ammunition did not contain bombs. They were only ammunition, G3
16:06:12 5 rounds, AK rounds, and HMG rounds.

6 Q. Now, at this time - and bear in mind this is the time where
7 the Guinean troops have crossed the border in Kailahun, were you
8 able to trade across the Guinea border to buy ammunition at this
9 time?

16:06:33 10 A. No. At this time, it was not possible. It was not
11 possible because the Guineans had crossed over to Yanga and into
12 Mafindor. We repelled them from Mafindor and they crossed again
13 into Kono.

14 Q. So at this time, what was the source of ammunition for the
16:06:54 15 RUF?

16 A. At this time, it was difficult, except when we would set
17 ambush and we would capture ammunition from there. Those were
18 the things that - things that Mike Lamin went and bartered that
19 machine to get ammunition.

16:07:19 20 Q. And remind us, when did he do that?

21 A. Mike Lamin? It was around August - no, around September.
22 But I also used to leave Pendembu to go to Vahun to the commander
23 who was there. He was called Major Tengbeh. I used to buy one
24 or two or three sardine tins from him, at times one box or two
16:07:43 25 box. We used to buy that from him because he was the commander
26 there from Vahun until Masabulahun. He was the commander there.
27 So I used to come from Pendembu, drive my pick-up, and I would go
28 to Bomaru and meet him and I would buy those little amounts of
29 ammunition and I will buy some other basic things and I would

1 return to Pendembu.

2 Q. Carrying on:

3 "In the light of this, sir, I am hereby appealing and
4 requesting that you please meet the President and explain things
16:08:21 5 to him in detail for his immediate attention."

6 Now, Mr Sesay, can you help as to why that paragraph is
7 written in that way:

8 "I am hereby appealing and requesting that you please meet
9 the President and explain things to him in detail for his
16:08:55 10 immediate attention."

11 So where it says "explain things to him," who is the "him"
12 from your understanding of this letter?

13 A. This, except if you say we should go through what - what is
14 in this document, but I can tell you that at the time that they
16:09:19 15 wrote this document I was in Pendembu. But if you say I should
16 comment on what they have written in this document then that
17 wouldn't be a problem.

18 Q. So who is the him being - explain things to him. "Him"
19 who?

16:09:34 20 A. Well, the letter was addressed - he sent the letter to the
21 President, then I think they are referring to the President for
22 the protocol to talk to the President for him to understand the
23 situation. Something like that.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, allow me to interrupt. The
16:10:00 25 witness was talking of buying sardine tins from a commander in
26 Vahun. This commander was a commander of what group? I'm
27 looking at page 148 at the beginning.

28 Mr Sesay, commander from what group?

29 THE WITNESS: This commander was a company commander for

1 AFL. He was working under the battalion commander of Lofa. They
2 called him Major Tengbeh.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. And who was the battalion commander of Lofa?

16:10:34 5 A. At this time it was a former old Doe soldier called Colonel
6 Togba. He was the battalion commander in Lofa.

7 Q. And help us, this transaction that you had with Major
8 Tengbeh, describe what kind of transaction was that? Was Major
9 Tengbeh acting on behalf of someone, was he ordered by someone,

16:11:15 10 or was he doing this in a private commercial capacity with you?
11 Which?

12 MR KOUJIAN: Objection. Leading.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you could have asked in
14 what capacity, without suggesting the various capacities that
16:11:32 15 exist. Rephrase, please.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I gave him a choice.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Rephrase the question, please.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Mr Sesay, help us, please. What was the nature of that
16:11:46 20 deal you were having with Major Tengbeh? Help us.

21 A. Major Tengbeh's business, I and Mike used to go to Vahun.
22 It was purely Major Tengbeh who was doing it undercover on his
23 own. The ammunition that they were giving him for the
24 borderline, that was what he was selling to us. So he was doing
16:12:10 25 it secretly and he didn't want his colleagues to know about it.

26 So it was like --

27 Q. Which colleagues?

28 A. Like his soldiers who were deployed on the ground with him.
29 It was a small border - it was only his small brother who knew

1 the business when he was selling the ammunition to us, but the
2 other soldiers like his deputy, his clerk, they only knew that we
3 were going to buy condiments with which Tengbeh was assisting us
4 with, including fuel. But Tengbeh was keeping it secret so that
16:12:51 5 people would not know. That was a personal deal that he was
6 making.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: When the witness says buying sardine
8 tins, I assume these were tins of sardines, fish.

9 THE WITNESS: No, my Lord, the ammunition - sorry, my Lord.
16:13:09 10 The ammunition, one box contains two tins. Those are the tins we
11 refer to as sardine tins. Sardine tins of AK round, sardine tins
12 of HMG rounds. It's not sardine to be eaten. It contains
13 ammunition.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

16:13:34 15 Q. When you refer to condiments, Mr Sesay, what are you
16 talking about?

17 A. I'm talking about salt, Maggi.

18 Q. And help me, that phrase "sardine tins" as used by
19 combatants in the RUF, does it refer to tins of fish or does it
16:13:58 20 refer to something else?

21 A. No, this was sardine tins that contained ammunition in
22 them. Because the tin was sealed. When you open it - when you
23 open it you would see the ammunitions in packets. Each contained
24 20 rounds. One sardine tin contained some boxes - some sardine
16:14:25 25 tins contained 30 and others 35 and 40, sometimes 20 rounds in
26 each packet.

27 Q. Those things they call sardine tins that you've just
28 described, what material are they made out of?

29 A. It's a tin. It's metal. When you open it just like

1 sardine, you open it, you turn it and it rolls. But it's a thick
2 metal.

3 Q. And what do you use to open this sardine tin as described?

16:15:08

4 A. It had its key that could be plugged on its side and you
5 press it and it opens the tin and it gets to the edge, then you
6 open it.

7 Q. Is it like those keys that they have on sardine tins which
8 do contain fish?

16:15:28

9 A. No, it's different. This one that had the sardine that had
10 fish, you have somewhere to hook it up and turn it and roll it.
11 It's not like that. This one has - the key is an eye and you
12 plug it on the side of it, you hit it, it would make a hole in
13 the tin, then you start moving it until it cuts it right around
14 and it would open up.

16:15:45

15 Q. And when you pull it open does it open like a sardine tin
16 which contains fish? Do you pull it back?

17 A. Yes, when you open it it opens like this and it would open
18 flat. Sometimes you would cut it out and remove the entire top
19 and the tin would be left open and you can take the ammunition
20 out.

16:16:10

21 Q. And what kind of ammunition would come in such a sardine
22 tin?

23 A. AK rounds, G3 rounds, HMG rounds. They used to be in such
24 sardine tins. And even BZT rounds could be in those sardine
25 tins.

16:16:33

26 Q. And tell me, what were you buying from Major Tengbeh,
27 sardines or ammunition?

28 A. Ammunition. AK rounds. We used to buy them. Sometimes
29 when I go there I get one or two sardines, I and Mike Lamin would

1 bring that to Pendembu up to the time that he transacted that
2 business with the battalion commander for Bomi Hills when the two
3 of them met at ULC camp.

16:17:20 4 Q. How did you first establish that contact with Major
5 Tengbeh?

6 A. Well, before this time after the retreat before I was
7 posted to Pendembu business was going on at the border between
8 the RUF security and Tengbeh's men. Civilians were doing
9 business in that Vahun area.

16:17:40 10 THE INTERPRETER: Can he kindly repeat the two places he
11 has just spoken about.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Pause there. Civilians were doing business in that area,
14 and you named two places. What are they?

16:17:49 15 A. Folima in Liberia. That's the last village from Liberia to
16 enter Sierra Leone. Bomaru is the last village in Sierra Leone
17 to go - when you cross the border that's the last village,
18 Bomaru. So at the border where there are no villages that's
19 where they used to meet to transact those businesses.

16:18:16 20 Q. Pause. That village, the last village in Liberia, what's
21 it called?

22 A. F-O-L-I-M-A.

23 Q. And just give us a time frame for when that trading began?

24 A. I think that business started around - around March, ending
16:18:45 25 April they were doing that business.

26 Q. Which year?

27 A. 1998. Because when you look at the people who were along
28 that border, on the Sierra Leonean side they were Mende people.
29 When you cross into Vahun they were Guma Mende people. They were

1 the same Mende people. They were transacting business along that
2 border.

3 Q. And how did you personally come to meet Major Tengbeh?

4 A. Well, when Bockarie posted me and I was now in Pendembu, in
16:19:21 5 May I went to visit Bomaru and I met the commander in Bomaru and
6 I asked him how the business was along the border and he said the
7 business was going on well, there was no problem. So he told me
8 that he had met with the company commander that was in Vahun,
9 that they have met there two or three times.

16:19:43 10 Q. What was the name of the company commander in Vahun?

11 A. I said his name was Major Tengbeh.

12 Q. Thank you. Go on?

13 A. While the commander who was in Bomaru for the RUF was Vandy
14 Kosi a, so it was Vandy Kosi a who sent Tengbeh when the two of us
16:20:05 15 met after had I come from Pendembu. So we met at the border, we
16 became friends. Then I told him that I would like to be buying
17 two or three items. Then he said whenever you want to come to
18 Vahun, the only thing that you would do is to come late in the
19 evening and when you come late in the evening I wouldn't have any
16:20:22 20 problems. So we used to come late in the evenings. After we had
21 bought what we wanted to buy then we would return at night.

22 Sometimes we would come around 7 o'clock and we'll be there until
23 9 o'clock then we would return. Tengbeh used to send his younger
24 brother called Patrick. He used to come and spend two to three,
16:20:43 25 four, five days with us in Vahun and then he would return.

26 Q. And what was the cost? How much would you pay for a
27 sardine tin of ammunition?

28 A. Well, I at that time used to talk to the RUF in Pendembu
29 who had retreated with bikes, generators. Those were the things

1 we used to give - those were the things I used to give. Because
2 if you had a bike in Pendembu and you do not have petrol and you
3 were in Baima, the area was small and you couldn't use it. So we
4 would talk to you to sell it so that we can have basic items for
16:21:25 5 the front line and the soldiers used to agree to that. Those are
6 the things we used to use, I and Mike, to sell in exchange.

7 Q. Mike being who?

8 A. Mike Lamin. Who used to meet me in Pendembu and the two of
9 us used to go to Vahun.

16:21:43 10 Q. Let's go back to the letter, shall we. The document in
11 front of you. This Alhaji Musa Cisse, is he related to you?

12 A. Oh, no. He's not my relation.

13 Q. I think we had reached the fourth paragraph:

14 "We appreciate the assistance we have been receiving and we
16:22:23 15 want you to believe that we have nowhere else to go to cry to for
16 help besides you and His Excellency."

17 Pausing there, Mr Sesay, were you aware of any assistance
18 being provided by either Alhaji Musa Cisse or Dr Charles Ghankay
19 Taylor prior to this letter of June 1998?

16:22:57 20 A. No, I was not aware of any assistance that Mr Taylor had
21 given us before this time. The only time I was aware of was in
22 1991, 1992 after the withdrawal of the Liberians. I did not know
23 of any other assistance up to this time of this letter.

24 Q. "We usually receive materials without bombs and not even up
16:23:24 25 to 20 boxes which makes the operation to capture and defend any
26 strategic point difficult."

27 Who were you receiving materials from at this time?

28 A. Well, I understand - I did not know if he was receiving
29 material. The ammunition that we used to buy --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat his
2 answer slowly.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Could you go through that again, please?

16:23:56 5 A. I said apart from the ammunition that we used to buy, that
6 Bockarie sent Kennedy to buy from ULIMO at this time, I was not
7 aware that he was receiving materials from any other person.

8 Q. "To conclude, sir, in the light of all the above we are
9 appealing that you please discuss the matter with His Excellency
16:24:18 10 for his timely intervention of the situation on the ground. Also
11 we hope to receive some cash for the welfare of the men as we've
12 presently run out of cash to purchase medicines, food, and morale
13 boosters for the men. The bearer of this letter, Prince Rennie,
14 will explain to you in detail on situation on the ground. May
16:24:48 15 God almighty continue guide, protect and bless you always. Your
16 obedient son, Brigadier Sam Bockarie."

17 Now, where reference is made to presently run out of cash
18 to purchase medicines, was that the situation in June 1998?

19 A. Well, in June 1998 I knew that Bockarie had that money that
16:25:22 20 they had looted from that bank. That was the money he was
21 sending that they were using in Kolahun - I mean Voinjama.

22 Q. Who is Prince Rennie?

23 A. I don't know this name.

24 Q. Do you have any idea how a letter such as this would have
16:25:45 25 been transmitted to Liberia in Monrovia where you say the chief
26 protocol was located?

27 A. I did not have any knowledge because I did not see this
28 letter and I was not in Buedu, I was in Pendembu so I can't
29 confirm this letter.

1 Q. And can you assist before we dispense with this document as
2 to why it's unsigned? Can you help us?

3 A. I don't know, because if it was Bockarie who sent the
4 letter, he would have appended his signature. Because you saw
16:26:40 5 the salute report that he sent to Mr Sankoh, he signed it. So if
6 he was going to send an important letter in relation to the
7 shortage of ammunition and his signature is not on it, I don't
8 seem to understand this letter.

9 Q. Because let's look again, please, at - let's put that one
16:26:58 10 away and look at exhibit D-9. Let's look at the last page of
11 that document. We've looked at this document on several
12 occasions and we know that it's a salute report from Sam Bockarie
13 to the leader. Whose signature is that?

14 A. This is Bockarie's signature.

16:27:54 15 Q. Now, knowing Sam Bockarie as you did, Mr Sesay, would Sam
16 Bockarie write to the President of Liberia through Musa Cisse,
17 the chief of protocol, and not sign the letter?

18 A. No, I think if it was a letter that he himself sent it, he
19 would have signed it. And if you look at the letterhead, it said
16:28:26 20 from the brigade commander from brigade headquarters Buedu.

21 Buedu was not the brigade headquarters at this time. At this
22 time people were calling Buedu - everybody in the RUF was calling
23 Buedu as defence headquarters, not brigade headquarters. By this
24 time in June brigade headquarters was to be Pendembu but not
16:28:49 25 Buedu because Buedu was defence headquarters, not brigade.

26 Q. Finally before we depart from these matters, the dealings
27 with Major Tengbeh, Mr Sesay, was that something you were
28 directly involved in, or was that something you were told about?

29 A. I used to go to Vahun, I and Mike went to Vahun on

1 different occasions. The only one that I was not involved in was
2 when Mike went to the machine from Baiwala and sold to Dixon at
3 ULC. But I and Mike used to go to Vahun. Because we used to go
4 there to buy condiments and ammunition from Tengbeh.

16:29:48 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: What machine is this that he is referring
6 to that Mike sold?

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. What machine did Mike sell, Mr Sesay? Remind us?

9 A. My Lord, it was a machine that used to dig water wells. A
16:30:06 10 machine that used to dig water wells, but I did not know its name
11 but I had seen the machine at Baiwala when it was parked there.

12 Q. And when was it taken by Mike to Liberia?

13 A. I said Mike took it to Liberia around September when he
14 transacted that business.

16:30:26 15 Q. With whom did he transact that business?

16 A. With the AFL battalion commander for Bomi Hills, Bob
17 Dixon.

18 Q. Was that a person who Mike Lamin knew from before?

19 A. I believe that Mike had known him before.

16:30:53 20 Q. From where?

21 A. Well, Mike withdrew in October 1999, went through Liberia
22 and disarmed to ECOMOG and went to Monrovia. So he passed
23 through Gbarnga and went to the Ivory Coast, then he came back,
24 passed through - even at the time that he was coming in that 1997
16:31:21 25 it was through Bomi Hills that he passed and crossed into
26 Kailahun, Baiwala, then he entered Sierra Leone. So I believe
27 that he had known Bob before that time.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you very much. Would that be a
29 convenient point?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly. Mr Sesay, as I usually do I
2 caution you against discussing your evidence with anyone. The
3 proceedings are adjourned to tomorrow at 9 o'clock.

4 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.32 p.m.
5 to be reconvened on Friday, 9 July 2010 at
6 9.00 a.m.]

16:32:54

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WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DCT-172	43987
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	43987