



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 8 SEPTEMBER 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Tuesday, 8 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:30:07 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J
9 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura, Christopher Santora and our case
09:31:18 10 manager, Maja Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Mr Courtenay
14 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah of counsel and Mr Isaac Ip who
09:31:35 15 has been with us before.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Just before we proceed,
17 Mr Taylor, I'll remind you that you are still bound by that
18 declaration you took to tell the truth. Yes, please go ahead,
19 Mr Griffiths.

09:31:49 20 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

21 [On former affirmation]

22 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, yesterday when we adjourned for the evening
24 we looked at the Security Council resolution 1156 adopted by the
09:32:02 25 Security Council at its meeting on 16 March 1998 in response to
26 the ECOMOG intervention in February of 1998. Do you recall that?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. We're still tidying up one or two loose ends. With that in
29 mind can we move on, please, to deal with another matter. Now,

1 do you recall mention being made of an operation called Operation
2 No Living Thing, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes, during the trial here, yes.

4 Q. At the time whilst you were President were you aware of
09:33:00 5 such an operation?

6 A. No, I was not aware.

7 Q. Had you ordered such an operation?

8 A. No, surely I didn't. I was not even aware of such an
9 operation.

09:33:17 10 Q. When was the first time you became aware that such an
11 operation had allegedly been mounted?

12 A. I heard of that here in this courtroom.

13 Q. Now, bearing in mind that you may be asked about this,
14 Mr Taylor, help us. Whilst President, did you, for example,
09:33:40 15 listen to the BBC?

16 A. Very, very rarely. Well, we have to divide that up now.
17 Sometimes BBC TV. But radio, I very, very rarely listened to BBC
18 radio.

19 Q. What about CNN?

09:34:02 20 A. Yes, I would listen to CNN.

21 Q. And when we say CNN, just so that we're clear, would you
22 watch CNN on a regular basis?

23 A. Yes. Evening hours, yes, I would watch CNN on a regular
24 basis.

09:34:21 25 Q. What about Focus on Africa which appears to be a popular
26 programme in West Africa?

27 A. As President, no, very rarely did I listen. I had people
28 doing that. If there were anything important, I would get a
29 briefing probably either that evening or the next morning, but

1 personally to sit down to listen to radio, no, very rarely.

2 Q. That's what I was coming to ask you, Mr Taylor. Did your
3 government have a press office?

4 A. Definitely.

09:34:52 5 Q. And what was the function of that office?

6 A. Well, let me just probably say one or two things. One, by
7 press, we had a Ministry of Information. That's a government
8 office. But also I had a press secretary. Now these are two
9 different press offices, I think we should know.

09:35:17 10 Q. If you could explain the difference between the two,
11 please?

12 A. Yes. Well, the Ministry of Information is really the
13 official voice of the Liberian government. They gave the public
14 all government pronouncements. In terms of programmes they
09:35:40 15 helped with the explanation in different dialects. Some people
16 may call it the talking arm of the government. That's the
17 Ministry of Information.

18 Now, the press secretary of the President in the office of
19 the President is responsible for giving official statements from
09:36:03 20 the Presidency, okay. So they - then you also - they listen to
21 radio. They listen to television. They monitor as much as they
22 can to gather information. That's their function.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the reason I'm asking you about all of this
24 is that you appreciate, of course, that one of the matters this
09:36:29 25 Court will have to consider in due course is the extent of your
26 knowledge of events in Sierra Leone. Do you follow me?

27 A. Uh-huh.

28 Q. And so consequently it's important for us at this stage to
29 examine what access you had to information about Sierra Leone and

1 elsewhere. Do you understand that?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. So in that context you tell us there was a Ministry of
4 Information and you also had a press officer, yes?

09:36:58 5 A. Press - yes.

6 Q. And so you had ample resources, can I put it this way, to
7 monitor international news and also to monitor events unfolding
8 in next door Sierra Leone, yes?

9 A. Well, I can say yes, but I mean, we have - I don't want to
09:37:24 10 limit it. Sierra Leone is just one of many areas that these
11 people are responsible to monitor. I don't just want to limit
12 it. They were not just sitting there to monitor Sierra Leone.
13 If there were anything important of course they listened to it,
14 but then we have to be very careful if we qualify it before you
09:37:47 15 go further because even those individuals, the Minister of

16 Information and the press secretary to the President, are not
17 responsible for giving the President information. Whatever they
18 collect it is the duty of the national security adviser. The
19 press secretary doesn't come to the President and give him

09:38:06 20 information or the Minister of Information. So I think we need
21 to put it into context here. They listen to things, but the
22 individual that is responsible for coming to the President to
23 give him updates of important events as they determine it is the
24 national security adviser. So the minister doesn't come to the
09:38:24 25 President's office and say, "Guess what I heard on the radio."

26 It doesn't work that way.

27 Q. Very well. So that your source of information about events
28 comes from, if I understand you correctly, yes, the national
29 security adviser?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. So what is the extent of your contact with the Minister of
3 Information and also your press secretary?

4 A. The Minister of Information, cabinet meetings. He is
09:39:02 5 present at cabinet meetings. If there are any extra issues that
6 we need to get out to the public he would be called in by the
7 chief of staff, which is the Minister of State, and briefed. So
8 his contact is not too much. The press secretary, there's a lot
9 more contact because the press secretary is present both in
09:39:30 10 cabinet meetings and the press secretary had clearance for
11 national security council meetings. And so there's a lot more
12 contact with the press secretary than with the Minister of
13 Information. Okay, so if we wanted to assign let's say on a
14 scale from 1 to 10, let's say if the Minister of Information is
09:39:57 15 on a scale of 4 the press secretary would be up to about 7.

16 Q. Very well. Now, we're still on the same topic and you
17 appreciate why I'm asking you this?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. What about your national media sources such as television
09:40:14 20 in Liberia, newspapers in Liberia, radio in Liberia. To what
21 extent would you as President - putting aside whatever other
22 resources may have been available to you, to what extent do you
23 as President monitor that?

24 A. Newspaper more than radio and even television. There were
09:40:39 25 principal newspapers that I read. So in the morning, every
26 morning when the national security adviser came in for briefings
27 there would be copies of specific newspapers that they know I
28 liked to read.

29 Local radios, even national radios, I very rarely had the

1 time to really listen to it. I would probably listen to - let's
2 say if there's a news hour, if I had the time in the evening I
3 would go into the news hour. But other than that, in terms of if
4 you look at radio, television, and newspapers, I would have more
09:41:25 5 contact with newspapers over the other two.

6 Q. Right. And bearing your answer in mind, what were your
7 particular preferences so far as newspapers were concerned?

8 A. I would read the The Patriot which was the party newspaper.

9 Q. Which party?

09:41:47 10 A. The National Patriotic Party, the ruling party. They had a
11 paper called The Patriot. And there was an interesting newspaper
12 in town that I always used to want to see because I knew that it
13 was connected somehow with western voices, a newspaper called The
14 Inquirer. These are the newspapers that I read. I read The
09:42:11 15 Inquirer almost every day.

16 Q. Now The Inquirer you say had some western contact, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What do you mean by that?

19 A. It was our knowledge and belief that they obtained
09:42:25 20 financial assistance to remain in publication from the United
21 States embassy and other NGOs, which we had no quarrel with,
22 because newspapers in Liberia don't make money and so there was
23 some like the US embassy and I think a couple of NGOs helped them
24 and this was our information and we didn't have a quarrel with
09:42:51 25 that.

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, was that "Inquiry" or
27 "Inquirer"?

28 THE WITNESS: Inquirer.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind evidence given to this
2 Court by Hassan Bility, I want to ask you a bit more about
3 newspaper publication in Liberia before we move on. Now, you
4 tell us that The Patriot was, in effect, the newspaper of your
09:43:26 5 political party, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Did other political parties in Liberia have a connection
8 with particular newspapers in the same way?

9 A. Yes.

09:43:40 10 Q. Well, assist us with that, please.

11 A. For example, The Analyst that was run by Mr Bility, the
12 ALCOP, the political party of ULIMO-K, had affiliation with
13 ALCOP. There was The News. My understanding is that - I can't
14 be exact, but my understanding was that that paper was
09:44:11 15 sympathetic and controlled by some other parties.

16 Q. Which parties?

17 A. I don't want to mislead the Court. I don't know exactly,
18 but it was our information that, you know, that's the whole trend
19 in Liberia. Every party tried to put out its voice through some
09:44:31 20 little paper, so there were a host of papers. I think there were
21 about a dozen or more.

22 Q. What about The National?

23 A. The National newspaper, yes. I can't be too sure, but it
24 was associated if not with the Unity Party, maybe one other
09:44:57 25 party, but The National was also associated with another party.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, let's be frank about this, given these party
27 affiliations to newspapers, did each such newspaper have a
28 particular bias in their reporting?

29 A. Of course. Of course, yes. There would be a slant. They

1 would have their own slant to whatever story and propaganda they
2 wanted to get out.

3 Q. Did that include your party's paper, The Patriot?

4 A. I would say yes. I have to be frank, yes. We had our own
09:45:34 5 slant.

6 Q. I'm grateful. Now, still on the same topic, Mr Taylor,
7 what was your view as President about freedom of the press?

8 A. I was very, very, very, very, very, very much in favour of
9 freedom of the press. As a matter of fact, there were several
09:46:02 10 things that we did to promote press freedom. In fact, it was
11 during my administration that several things happened.

12 The first thing that we did that was very important was the
13 repeal of the PRC decrees, both 2A and 88A, because those were
14 serving as certain constraints on the views, especially when we
09:46:29 15 look on yesterday at 88A what they talk about lies, rumours and
16 disinformation, and that included the press. That was - on the
17 first day in office, that was removed.

18 During my administration, several new newspapers opened up.
19 Television stations opened up. Talk radio, call-in radios opened
09:46:58 20 up during my administration. And it was during my
21 administration, I was the first President of Liberia to establish
22 a radio call-in programme. Once every month the public could
23 call the President for up to - I took sometimes up to two hours
24 to answer questions from anyone anywhere. We didn't even know
09:47:19 25 who were calling. So we promoted that.

26 And, as far as I'm concerned, I'm aware of at least maybe
27 two - at least two sets of journalists that - at least I would
28 say one set of journalists and one individual, like Mr Bility,
29 that I still do not consider a journalist, and I will get into

1 why --

2 Q. Tell us later. But just answer the question first. We'll
3 come back to it.

4 A. So that we really encouraged that. Television, radio, talk
09:47:57 5 shows were all brought about - repeal of decree 88A were all done
6 by me. So even political leaders and their expressions, very
7 open. Even though I had difficulties with Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf,
8 evidence has been led here, she came into the country and she
9 spoke her will. So freedom of speech, freedom of press, I
09:48:21 10 supported it 100 per cent.

11 Q. And why?

12 A. Well, if you look back at my whole life - let's go back to
13 the United States, when I arrived in the United States, the
14 setting up of the union, fighting for rights, demonstrations in
09:48:42 15 the United States. In fact, what took me back to Liberia in 1980
16 was because of freedom of speech and press and what had happened
17 with the Tolbert administration that led me back to 1980
18 remaining in Liberia until the coup occurred. So I fought for
19 rights of individuals and rights of speech throughout my adult
09:49:08 20 life and that is very, very, very clear.

21 Q. Now, bearing all of that in mind, Mr Taylor, bearing also
22 in mind where we stopped yesterday, just after the Freetown
23 invasion, does the name James P Rubin mean anything to you?

24 A. Yes, Ambassador Rubin, yes.

09:49:43 25 Q. Who is he?

26 A. Ruben, at the - in or around 1999, Ruben was the official
27 spokesperson for the United States State Department during the
28 incumbency of Madeline Albright as Secretary of State.

29 Q. And I mentioned earlier Operation No Living Thing. Was

1 anything said by the State Department about that operation which
2 you have seen?

3 A. Yes, there was a statement that I have seen that was
4 released somewhere, I think, back in May of, I think, 1998, 1999,
09:50:39 5 if I'm not mistaken, from the State Department that was stated by
6 James Rubin. I have seen that.

7 Q. Yes. Can we have a look, please, behind divider 7 in the
8 material disclosed for week 34. Now, Mr Taylor, can we take
9 matters slowly, please. We see that this is a statement issued
09:51:49 10 by the US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, on 12 May
11 1998, and it's been published on the Sierra Leone Web. Now, help
12 us, when did you first become aware of this item?

13 A. Since my incarceration.

14 Q. And how did you become aware of it?

09:52:17 15 A. I've read it among the documents assembled by our team and
16 since I've been held by the Court.

17 Q. Now, just so that we can get some context for this, can you
18 help us, in May 1998 - so we're talking about less than a year
19 after you had been inaugurated as President - putting it bluntly,
09:52:53 20 what were you up to?

21 A. May 1998? I was busy trying to get my administration
22 going, that's all. There was nothing I was up to beyond that.

23 Q. Now, let's have a look at the article, and then I'll come
24 back and ask you one or two questions about this time frame:

09:53:15 25 "For immediate release.

26 May 12, 1998. Statement by James P Rueben spokesman,
27 Sierra Leone: Rebel Atrocities Against Civilians.

28 The United States urgently calls for an immediate end to
29 the violence being wreaked on the civilian population of

09:53:56 1 Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary United Front and the deposed
2 military junta. Our ambassador in Freetown and State Department
3 officials have visited survivors and heard stories of entire
4 villages being slaughtered or mutilated by rebel forces. The RUF
5 calls its campaign 'Operation No Living Thing'. Hundreds of
6 people are being treated in hospitals after rebels chopped their
7 arms, legs and/or ears with machetes. Thousands more have died
8 before they were able to reach medical help. Many women and
9 children have been raped. This unspeakable cruelty is a gross
09:54:20 10 violation of every tenet of human rights and International
11 Humanitarian Law.

12 The United States strongly condemns the rebels' horrific
13 actions and urges rebel leadership to order an immediate end to
14 the senseless slaughter, mutilation, and torture of the rural
09:54:40 15 civilian population in Sierra Leone.

16 There are distressing rumours that RUF and ex-junta forces
17 are being assisted in their campaign of terror by other
18 governments. Although we cannot confirm these rumours, it should
19 be clear that any government or other party which is found to be
09:55:01 20 helping the rebels to prolong the tragedy in Sierra Leone will
21 face the strongest condemnation of the United States and the
22 international community. "

23 Now, first of all, the date, May, at that time, Mr Taylor,
24 were you aware that there was this horrific campaign being waged
09:55:29 25 against the civilian population in Sierra Leone?

26 A. May of 1998, yes, there were news reports of that, yes.

27 Q. Were you aware that the campaign had been given the name
28 Operation No Living Thing?

29 A. No, I was not aware of any operation by the name of that,

1 no.

2 Q. Had you instructed anyone to launch such a campaign?

3 A. No, I - how could I? No, I did not instruct anybody. I
4 had no control over anybody in Sierra Leone to instruct them in
09:56:02 5 any way. No.

6 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor, because, you appreciate, as we've
7 indicated in opening our case, that this period, February 1998
8 through to the end of January 1999, is at the core of this
9 indictment. Now, help us. Could you see, from your vantage
09:56:37 10 point as President of neighbouring Liberia, any advantage to be
11 gained by launching such a campaign?

12 A. No, none whatsoever. If we look at even - if you look at
13 this date, if you go back a few months, if you look at February,
14 what happens in February of 1998? That's the intervention. The
09:56:59 15 intervention occurs. This is an intervention that is - while we
16 do not have a Security Council approval, but it is an ECOWAS
17 operation. In March, Kabbah returns to Sierra Leone. In March.
18 We are all working towards peace, so there is no way that - I
19 mean, I would be in control or even acquiesce in any type of
09:57:29 20 situation of this sort when, throughout the revolution in
21 Liberia, we never had this - these kinds of atrocities and all.
22 So this is impossible.

23 Q. But, Mr Taylor, my question is slightly different and I am
24 going to ask it again. Bearing in mind what is suggested against
09:57:53 25 you by the Prosecution in this case, what advantage could you
26 gain by terrorising the population of Sierra Leone as that
27 population clearly were being terrorised in May of 1998? What
28 did you stand to gain?

29 A. No advantage. Nothing to gain whatsoever.

1 Q. Can you help us as to any kind of strategic gain you would
2 have obtained from such a campaign?

3 A. None. None. None whatsoever. Strategic or otherwise, no
4 gains.

09:58:36 5 Q. We appreciate from the evidence, Mr Taylor, and we've never
6 challenged this fact, that gross atrocities were committed during
7 that period. Is that right? Do you accept that?

8 A. Oh, we accept that and we condemned it even at that time.
9 We accept that.

09:58:56 10 Q. That people's limbs were, for example, chopped off?

11 A. Yes, we condemned it. It was unconscionable, we said.

12 Q. Now help us. Would it have helped to solve Liberia's
13 economic problems to embark on such an orgy of violence?

14 A. Not only economic. It would not have helped any problem;
09:59:26 15 economic, political, social or otherwise. It would not help
16 Liberia in any way.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, given the centrality of this issue I have to ask
18 you further about this. Could such a campaign have bluntly put
19 money in your pocket?

09:59:47 20 A. No.

21 Q. Could such a campaign have put diamonds in your pocket?

22 A. No. No.

23 Q. Could it have given you control of West Africa?

24 A. No. No.

10:00:15 25 Q. Now, going back to that article, last paragraph:

26 "There are distressing rumours that the RUF and ex-junta
27 forces are being assisted in their campaign of terror by other
28 governments although we cannot confirm these rumours."

29 Did you hear any such rumour at the time, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes, we heard rumours that in Sierra Leone following the
2 intervention - and don't let's forget where it all started from.
3 After the intervention from that memo from Okelo what was said
4 that there were mercenaries from Liberia, Burkina Faso and other
10:01:10 5 countries, and they were just what he describes in here; rumours.
6 We did hear these rumours and we said that they were untrue.

7 Q. Have you ever been presented by the US State Department of
8 State or any other body with evidence to substantiate such
9 rumours?

10:01:33 10 A. No. We have not, and knowing how the United States
11 government works - and I don't claim to know all the ways they
12 work. James Rubin, speaking at the State Department here in the
13 memo like this, would have said bluntly, "We have evidence. We
14 have proof that X or Y or Z government is involved in assisting."
10:02:03 15 The United States government is not afraid of any country or
16 person to speak its mind and when it comes to these kind of human
17 rights abuses they would have been specific and to the point.
18 And I guess just as they had received it and evaluated it, he was
19 factual here when he said, "We've heard these rumours and we
10:02:25 20 cannot confirm them." They are just what he described them;
21 rumours. That's all.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, on the same note, President Kabbah, as you've
23 told us, is reinstated in office in March of 1998 following the
24 intervention?

10:02:45 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Thereafter did you make contact with him?

27 A. Oh, yes. There was always contact with Kabbah, yes.

28 Q. Well, help us. Did President Kabbah ever make any
29 suggestion to you that you were the hidden hand behind those

1 atrocities?

2 A. No. No. He never did that. In conversations with Kabbah
3 he would always say, "Oh, my brother, there are Liberians
4 involved in what is happening here." And I would say to him, "My
10:03:24 5 dear, I don't know how these Liberians got over there, but I
6 didn't send them. So if they are there, we are going to do the
7 best that we can to encourage them to leave Sierra Leone and come
8 home, because as far as Liberia is concerned, the war is over."
9 But he had mentioned Liberians.

10:03:45 10 Now, the twist to this, even at that time I did not know
11 that he, Tejani Kabbah, knew who these Liberians, or at least
12 some of them, were until I read his statement in the truth
13 commission. So in a way I do feel a little betrayed because I do
14 admit that Kabbah did mention that Liberians were there, but what
10:04:16 15 he did not tell me at that time was that he knew why some of them
16 were there.

17 Q. So at the time, Mr Taylor, when you heard reference to
18 Liberians in Sierra Leone, do I understand you correctly that you
19 were unaware that they were actually members of the Sierra Leone
10:04:40 20 Armed Forces?

21 A. Totally unaware. I knew that ULIMO was there, J and K. I
22 knew that following my elections Liberians had crossed. I also
23 knew that ECOMOG had taken some Liberians out of Liberia and they
24 were part of the Kamajors that were being fully, 100 per cent
10:05:01 25 backed by ECOMOG. But what I did not know was that they had
26 formal employment with the Sierra Leonean government and some of
27 them calling themselves STF. I did not know that.

28 Q. So when did you discover that?

29 A. Really, I first discovered this after I read - okay, after

1 I read the report - President Kabbah's statement before the truth
2 commission before I said, "Oh, my God." You know, we used to
3 hear rumours, but confirmation came when I read his accounts in
4 the truth commission report. I said, "Oh, my God," but he knew.

10:05:44 5 Q. So, Mr Taylor, when at the time - and I know it's difficult
6 sometimes to unpack from one's mind information gleaned after the
7 event, but try and put yourself in the mindset you were in in May
8 1998. When you heard Liberians in Sierra Leone, who did you
9 think they were?

10:06:06 10 A. I thought they were just ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K and other AFL
11 personnel that were down there that had run away following my
12 election in 1997. That was my thing. And that, operating as
13 normal mercenaries, that they would just go and fight. That was
14 my own understanding of the situation. I did not know it was
10:06:38 15 contractual.

16 Q. And as far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, because remember
17 we're in 1998 now and you've already been promoted to the
18 Committee of Six, yes, 1998?

19 A. Well, five, yes.

10:06:59 20 Q. Committee of Five, sorry.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. As far as you're aware, your colleagues on that committee,
23 did they know of the existence of the STF?

24 A. I can't speak - no, I can't say precisely if they knew,
10:07:22 25 because no one mentioned it to me in any meeting, so I can't - I
26 can't be sure that they knew. Because don't forget now, we had
27 to have been put on the Committee of Five since 1997. In fact as
28 far back as August. Right after my inauguration, my first
29 meeting, that took place. So no one had mentioned, no. So I

1 can't be sure that they knew.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we move on, can I ask, please,
3 Mr President, that that article appearing on the Sierra Leone
4 Web, "US Department of State, statement by James P Rubin,
10:08:12 5 spokesman, Sierra Leone rebel atrocities against civilians,"
6 dated 12 May 1998, be marked for identification MFI-235, please.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-235.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, as I say, we're jumping about in an effort
10:08:57 10 to tie up one or two loose ends. Now, during the course of
11 evidence we heard about an incident during the course of the
12 interim government when an attempt was made to kill you. Do you
13 recall that?

14 A. That is correct.

10:09:22 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, first of all, just you tell us in your own
16 words what occurred?

17 A. Well, that was - if my recollection is correct, that was
18 back in 1996. There was a meeting scheduled by the Council of
19 State at the Executive Mansion. I normally went to work on time,
10:10:15 20 you know, to get some staff activities done. On this particular
21 morning it was just real luck, I would call it, through the grace
22 of Almighty God. This day I drove - I was taken to work in a
23 Peugeot. A Peugeot car that had been given to me. A Peugeot
24 armoured car that had been given to me by a very good friend, and
10:10:54 25 this particular armoured vehicle operates a little differently.

26 In some cases you will find a presidential armoured vehicle, the
27 President would ride the back. But this car was designed in a
28 way that the President actually rode the front seat and the
29 securities sat in the back because the door of the car was

1 designed that if the President came under attack, the securities
2 would slide a chute open that you could slide open on the door
3 and you could fire from within the car outside. Now that's
4 unlike most other presidential security cars.

10:11:47 5 So this particular day the securities - I just came out and
6 through the grace of God I said, "Listen, I'm not going to ride
7 this other car, I want to ride the Peugeot today because we
8 haven't been using it," not knowing that at the mansion a trap
9 had been set to assassinate me. Even other members of the
10:12:07 10 Council of State who were supposed to all be going in early
11 observed that nobody was going, so I went. I get to the mansion.
12 And not knowing these guys are upstairs, my office then was on
13 the sixth floor of the Executive Mansion, and not knowing that
14 guys were looking through the window and they are used to the
10:12:37 15 President getting out of the back of the car. Now, my security,
16 who happened to have been my aide-de-camp at the time - in fact,
17 a Gambian, Jackson Mani - got out of the car and he was in
18 military uniform. And so those that were upstairs looking down
19 to see what I was wearing saw this person getting out of the back
10:13:01 20 of the car and the boys did not know - those individual upstairs
21 did not know me, and so they had, really, what you call trained
22 their eyes in on me.

23 So by the time I get off the elevator on the sixth floor,
24 the first thing I hear is a massive explosion on the sixth floor
10:13:24 25 of the building followed by suppressive gunfire. Now, it is so
26 terrible because the mansion at this time with all of the Council
27 of State members going to office in that mansion, there was a
28 rule that none of our security personnel could enter the building
29 with arms. ECOMOG was responsible for the building. So we get

1 upstairs and there is this suppressive fire.

2 I managed to run and get into a bathroom, keep the door
3 open. In fact, Jackson and all of them had rushed me into this
4 room. I go into the bathroom, keep the door ajar, and I'm
10:14:10 5 standing in a tub in the small bathroom. Jackson is in the
6 floor. These guys come in and they fire and they killed the guy,
7 and --

8 Q. Killed which guy?

9 A. Jackson, who is in the military uniform, my aide-de-camp,
10:14:25 10 and then they leave. By this time my securities that are
11 downstairs on the first floor begin to fight their way from the
12 ground floor upstairs to the sixth floor to get to me.

13 There is a Nigerian captain with me. I just remember his
14 first name, Ali, Captain Ali. He is hit. In fact, he is
10:14:51 15 weakening and bleeding. So after these guys flee, we don't know
16 the consequences. So he rushes into the room, he finds me,
17 but he is too weak to even hold his rifle. He says,
18 "Mr President, hold the rifle for me." And I am holding the
19 rifle. By this time some of my guards fight their way upstairs.

10:15:10 20 In fact, one of the first security men to reach me was an SS man
21 called Ocebio Dehme. That name is on the records here. I am
22 saved. I come downstairs. We lose about six or more persons
23 that are killed because they don't even have guns to fire back.
24 I'm taken downstairs. I get into the car and I run straight to
10:15:36 25 the radio station.

26 By this time - and it happened at a very crucial time. By
27 this time the news has reached wrongly into Kakata and the Harbel
28 area. These areas are familiar known by the Court. By this time
29 thousands of my fighters are moving into Monrovia. It's a very,

1 very, very tense time. I rush to the radio station and I
2 announce that I'm okay and that all individuals that are en route
3 to the city should return. And that is what brings it under
4 control. Ali is taken by the ECOMOG people to their base, given
10:16:19 5 some treatment. He has to be flown out to Nigeria. We bury most
6 of our people. Those injured are taken to the hospital. This is
7 what happened.

8 Q. Who was responsible?

9 A. We - at that time, quite frankly, I would say we blamed the
10:16:37 10 LPC individuals headed by George Boley because Boley's nominee at
11 the time was the Minister of State and he had access to the
12 building and his men, and the Minister of State then was a
13 gentleman called Charles Breeze. That's B-R-E-E-Z-E. Now, I
14 must state that this was what we calculated. I cannot say for
10:17:15 15 certain that Boley was responsible, but they were the only people
16 that had access to the building to have brought in weapons at the
17 time.

18 Q. Now, was the matter reported to the United Nations as far
19 as you're aware, Mr Taylor?

10:17:35 20 A. Oh, yes, that was reported. A letter - a full report was
21 reported on the shooting incident at the Executive Mansion at the
22 time.

23 Q. Who sent that report; do you know?

24 A. They changed special representatives so much, I - at this
10:18:02 25 particular time, if I'm not mistaken, it could have been Anthony
26 Nyaki. I'm not too certain, but I'm sure it was not
27 Downes-Thomas. Thomas had not come in. It was most probably
28 Nyaki, if I'm not mistaken.

29 Q. Have you seen that report, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes, I have. I have seen it.

2 Q. When did you see it for the first time?

3 A. I saw it for the first time here amongst some of the
4 documentation put together by different investigators and
10:18:46 5 different things.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness please be shown the
7 document behind divider 9 in binder 1 of 4 for week 33:

8 Q. Do you have the document, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10:19:39 10 Q. Now, we see that it's from Nyaki, Special Representative of
11 the Secretary-General, UNOMIL Monrovia, to Annan, Goulding,
12 Gharekhan, at the United Nations in New York, and it's a
13 Situation Report covering the period from 30 October to 5
14 November 1996. Do you see that?

10:20:10 15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. And when we go over the page, we see that under the heading
17 "Highlights: Shooting incident at the Executive Mansion." Yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And that's the only aspect of this report that I'm
10:20:37 20 interested in. It goes on:

21 "Political:

22 The political developments over the past week were
23 dominated by the shooting incident at the Executive Mansion which
24 had the potential to disrupt the Liberian peace process ..."

10:20:52 25 Did it have that potential Mr Taylor?

26 A. Oh, definitely.

27 Q. Why?

28 A. If I had, God forbid, gotten killed, oh, I don't know what
29 would have happened. In the Harbel area of - which is - Harbel

1 is very near Monrovia and the Kakata general area, I - we had in
2 that general area between 10,000 to 15,000 fighting men in that
3 general area. The chaos that this would have caused before it
4 was brought under control, I can't begin to imagine what could
10:21:42 5 have happened. I don't think ECOMOG was in a position to have
6 been able to stop the conflict from there, because it was
7 construed from the beginning: (1) that ECOMOG had complicit in
8 this because they were responsible for the building and the
9 security of the building; and the fact that this was carried out
10:22:07 10 by what was seen at that time to be carried out by individuals
11 associated with LPC, which LPC meaning the Liberian Peace Council
12 that we've talked about in this Court. It would just have been
13 catastrophic.

14 Q. "... as well as by the preparations for the forthcoming
10:22:30 15 meeting of the ECOWAS chiefs of staff and the Committee of Nine
16 at the ministerial level and the organisation of a peace rally by
17 the chairman of the Council of State."

18 And then I just jump to the next paragraph because, as I say,
19 I'm only interested in this incident, nothing else.

10:22:49 20 "The shooting incident at the Executive Mansion on 31
21 October, which was allegedly an attempted assassination of
22 Councilman Charles Taylor, posed a serious threat to the peace
23 process. This incident was condemned by the NPFL leader, the
24 force commander of ECOMOG, the chairman of the Council of State,
10:23:09 25 and the mediating team and strongly deplored by UNOMIL."

26 Just so that we can put some faces to titles, who was the
27 commander of ECOMOG at the time?

28 A. Oh, '96, that's got to be - that's Victor Malu.

29 Q. And the chairman of the Council of State at the time?

1 A. Ruth Sando Perry.

2 Q. "Moreover, while taking swift actions to contain the
3 situation, the ECOMOG force commander gave assurances that every
4 effort will be made to preserve the security in Monrovia and that
10:23:49 5 a thorough investigation into this incident will be carried out.
6 For her part, in drawing lessons from this worrying development,
7 the chairman of the Council of State stressed the need to augment
8 ECOMOG's troops strength to enhance the security arrangements in
9 Monrovia and to start searching members of the Council of State
10:24:22 10 as they enter the Executive Mansion.

11 In the wake of the shooting incident, the mediating team
12 met with the chairman of the Council of State and with Councilman
13 Charles Taylor to express to them the international community's
14 solidarity and to appeal to the councilman to continue to
10:24:41 15 exercise maximum restraint."

16 That's all I intend to look at in this document, Mr Taylor,
17 just so that we can fix a date to that incident, unless I'm asked
18 to refer to any other section.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask then, please, Mr President, that
10:25:34 20 this report be marked for identification MFI-236. It's a
21 Situation Report from the Special Representative of the
22 Secretary-General Nyaki to the United Nations Headquarters re
23 attempt to assassinate Charles Taylor, dated 5 November 1996.

24 THE WITNESS: This may help, counsel, his first name is
10:25:57 25 Anthony. Anthony Nyaki.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Anthony Nyaki. Thank you.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
28 identification MFI-236.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we're still jumping around, as I indicated.
2 Now, can we go, please, to - yes. Can we go, please, to October
3 1998. Now, at that time, Mr Taylor, do you recall any meeting of
4 ECOWAS?

10:27:22 5 A. In October of 1998, what I do recall, at this time there
6 are decisions. Because normally ECOWAS would meet a little
7 earlier than October. But decisions of ECOWAS are normally
8 published - the journal comes out every October and these ECOWAS
9 journals would give decisions, because we have these bi annual
10:27:59 10 meetings. August is normally the time. But in October - the
11 journal is published in October that gives accounts of our major
12 decisions and one that I remember very well is the one dealing
13 with the status of forces agreement that is published in October.

14 Q. In October?

10:28:21 15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Now, could we please take up the Defence proposed exhibits
17 for week 34 behind divider 4, please. Yes, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. This is the official journal and which decision is it that
10:29:05 20 you're directing our attention to?

21 A. The decision relating to the status of ECOMOG in Liberia.
22 Let me see. That should be in October. I think this is related
23 to item 3.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, turn over until you come to a page at the bottom
10:30:19 25 with 39. It's six pages in. Have you got it?

26 A. Just one minute. Yes. Yes.

27 Q. What does it say?

28 A. That's what I'm talking about. That's the status of ECOMOG
29 in Liberia. It's a status of forces agreement that I referred

1 to.

2 Q. Right. Let's go over the page, please:

3 "Agreement relating to the status of ECOMOG in Liberia
4 between the Economic Community of West African States and the
10:31:17 5 Republic of Liberia.

6 This status of ECOMOG agreement is made and entered into
7 this 5th day of June 1998 by and between the Economic Community
8 of West African States represented by and through its executive
9 secretary, Lansana Kouyate, hereinafter known and referred to as
10:31:37 10 ECOWAS, and the Republic of Liberia represented by and through
11 its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monie R Captan, hereinafter
12 known and referred to as the government hereby.

13 Whereas the Republic of Liberia was plunged into a civil
14 war on 24 December 1989 resulting into massive destruction of
10:31:59 15 property, loss of lives and breakdown of law and order;

16 Considering the pathetic plight of innocent civilians as a
17 result of the civil war and its threat to international peace and
18 security, particularly to neighbouring countries and the West
19 African sub-region as a whole;

10:32:19 20 Conscious of the need for a stable and secure regional
21 environment as an essential ingredient for effective regional
22 cooperation;

23 Considering that the ECOWAS standing mediation committee
24 established by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of
10:32:33 25 ECOWAS at its first summit meeting held in Banjul, The Gambia,
26 from 6 to 7 August 1998, decided to deploy an ECOWAS ceasefire
27 monitoring group, ECOMOG, to restore peace and stability to
28 Liberia and to enforce a ceasefire amongst the warring factions;

29 Aware that the aforesaid ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group

1 was deployed in the Republic of Liberia in August 1990 and has
2 since its deployment not only undertaken vital humanitarian
3 activity to alleviate the hardship of the people of Liberia, but
4 has also provided security, maintained law and order and has
10:33:16 5 successfully contributed to providing a conducive environment
6 which facilitated the holding of a free, fair and democratic
7 presidential and legislative elections in Liberia on 19 July
8 1997;

9 Mindful that a democratically elected government has now
10:33:35 10 been inaugurated and has assumed all sovereign powers of the
11 republic;

12 Aware, however, of the need for ECOMOG to remain on
13 Liberian soil not only for the implementation of the remaining
14 aspects of its mandate under the Abuja Accord but also to assist
10:33:53 15 the government in providing security and the maintenance of law
16 and order;

17 Aware of the enormous commitment and the sustained efforts
18 exerted by ECOWAS towards the peaceful resolution of the Liberian
19 conflict and its desire to ensure that peace is maintained in
10:34:12 20 Liberia even after elections and the installation of an elected
21 government;

22 Aware also that ECOMOG is made up of military, paramilitary
23 and police personnel contributed on a voluntary basis from ECOWAS
24 member states;

10:34:34 25 Recalling the ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia as contained in
26 the Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30 October 1991;

27 Recalling also the peace agreement Cotonou Accord, the
28 Akosombo Agreement and its clarification signed in Accra on 21
29 December 1994 and the supplement to the Cotonou and Akosombo

1 Agreements signed in Abuja on 19 August 1995, the Abuja
2 Agreement;

3 Conscious of the sovereignty of the Republic of Liberia and
4 the need to define the status of ECOMOG, its members and its
10:35:14 5 operations within the Republic of Liberia;

6 Now therefore the parties hereby agree as follows."

7 And following the definitional part which need not concern
8 us, going to page 42, please:

9 "Application of the agreement.

10:35:47 10 Article II. Unless specifically provided otherwise, the
11 provisions of this agreement and any obligation undertaken by the
12 government or any privileges, immunity, facility, or concession
13 granted to ECOMOG, or any member thereof, apply in the territory
14 only.

10:36:07 15 Article III. Application of the convention privileges and
16 immunities of ECOMOG. The convention shall apply to ECOMOG
17 subject to the special provisions specified in this agreement.

18 Notwithstanding the application of the convention, ECOMOG
19 shall enjoy the most favourable of any privilege, immunity,
10:36:29 20 facility or concession granted under the convention as may be
21 applicable to the parties concerned and the subject matter under
22 consideration.

23 ECOMOG, as a subsidiary organ of ECOWAS, enjoys the status,
24 privileges and immunities of ECOWAS in accordance with the
10:36:47 25 convention and as provided for in the present agreement. The
26 provision of Article III of the convention shall also apply to
27 the property, funds and assets of participating states used in
28 the territory in connection with the national contingents serving
29 in ECOMOG operations as provided for in Article II of the present

1 agreement.

2 The government recognises the right of the ECOMOG
3 operations in particular:

4 (a) to import free of duty and taxes equipment, provisions
10:37:19 5 supplies and other goods which are for the exclusive and official
6 use of ECOMOG operations or for resale in the commissaries
7 provided for hereafter.

8 (b) to establish, maintain and operate commissaries at its
9 headquarters, camps and posts for the benefit of the members of
10:37:43 10 the ECOMOG operations, but not of service personnel.

11 (c) to clear ex-customs and excise warehouse free of duty
12 and taxes equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods which
13 are for the exclusive use of the ECOMOG operations or for resale
14 in the commissaries provided for above.

10:38:05 15 (d) to re-export or otherwise dispose of such equipment
16 free of duty and taxes, all provisions, supplies and other goods
17 so imported or cleared ex-customs and excise warehouse.

18 To ensure that such importation, clearance, transfer or
19 exportation may be effected with the least possible delay, a
10:38:27 20 mutually satisfactory procedure, including documentation, shall
21 be agreed between ECOMOG and the government.

22 The special representative, the force commander and such
23 other senior officials as the special representative or the force
24 commander may designate shall be entitled to diplomatic
10:38:52 25 privileges, immunities and facilities in accordance with the
26 provisions of the convention.

27 Military personnel assigned to the military section of
28 ECOMOG shall have the privileges and immunities specifically
29 provided for in this agreement.

1 Members of the ECOWAS assigned to the civilian section to
2 serve with the ECOMOG operation remain officials of their
3 respective organisations entitled to the privileges and
4 immunities provided by the convention.

10:39:23 5 Other persons assigned to the civilian section of ECOMOG,
6 as well as civilian personnel assigned to the military section
7 whose names are for the purpose notified to the government by any
8 of the special representatives, shall be considered as experts on
9 mission within the meaning of the convention.

10:39:43 10 Service personnel of ECOMOG shall not enjoy diplomatic
11 immunities and tax exceptions. The government agrees to inform
12 the special representative or the force commander of any incident
13 concerning a service personnel."

14 Now, Mr Taylor, we're going through this document in order
10:40:09 15 to establish what the status of ECOMOG was following you coming
16 to power as President, okay?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, from the section we've just looked at, effectively
19 ECOMOG forces in Liberia enjoyed diplomatic immunity?

10:40:30 20 A. That is correct, yes.

21 Q. Does that mean that they could go wherever they wanted to,
22 whenever they wanted to, free of any kind restraint by your
23 government?

24 A. No, it did not mean that. This type of diplomatic immunity
10:40:52 25 - this is unlike an ambassador accredited by a nation. The type
26 of immunity that is granted here is one that, for example, if in
27 the line of duty an ECOMOG personnel carried out something that
28 was improper their respective governments would deal with them.

29 Now, not being able to go any and everywhere would simply

1 mean that, for example, if there were a particular government
2 ministry or agency or a government post, maybe civilian or
3 otherwise, that posed no security threat to the country that we
4 requested their presence, they could not go there. They would
10:41:49 5 have to seek the permission of government to go there.

6 The function here of the status of forces agreement is to
7 define specifically what the military will do in view of the fact
8 that before my being elected as President, they operated really,
9 I can say, as an occupation - well, no, that's a little harsh.
10:42:21 10 They were in full control and did not have any authority to
11 report to except really the chairman of ECOWAS.

12 Now this status gave them the opportunity to work with the
13 Government of Liberia and that will mean under some instructions
14 from the authority of ECOWAS because each President forms a part
10:42:45 15 of the authority. So there's a little different kind of immunity
16 here. If something happened we could not just arrest them,
17 incarcerate them and try them. What we would do is that we would
18 turn them over to their governments. But this is a different
19 kind of immunity.

10:43:02 20 Q. Now, let's have a look at Article IV. Not all of it, just
21 certain aspects of it:

22 "Recognising the sovereignty of Liberia members of ECOMOG
23 shall refrain from any activity incompatible with the impartial
24 and international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the
10:43:26 25 spirit of the present arrangements. They shall respect the
26 sovereignty of Liberia and observe all its local laws and
27 regulations.

28 Without limiting the generality of paragraph 1 above,
29 members of ECOMOG shall: Refrain from any involvement in private

1 civil disputes between citizens of Liberia or otherwise attempt
2 to settle such private disputes. "

3 "Not engage in any commercial business within the
4 territory.

10:44:12 5 3. ECOMOG shall collaborate with the government in the
6 implementation of its remaining mandate in line with the
7 protocols to be entered into between ECOWAS and the government. "

8 And the government undertakes at 4 to respect the
9 exclusively international nature of ECOMOG. Let's not bother
10:44:35 10 with taxation and customs and fiscal regulations. Quickly look
11 over the page at 8 and 9:

12 "The special representative, the force commander and
13 members of ECOMOG shall wherever so required have the right to
14 enter into, reside in, and depart from the territory.

10:44:58 15 "9. The Government of Liberia undertakes to facilitate the
16 entry into and departure from the territory of the special
17 representative, the force commander and members of ECOMOG.
18 ECOMOG undertakes to keep the government informed of such
19 movements. For that purpose, the special representative, the
10:45:19 20 force commander, and members of ECOMOG shall be exempt from
21 passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection and
22 restrictions on entering into or departing from the territory.
23 They shall also be exempted from any regulations governing the
24 residence of aliens in the territory including registration, but
10:45:45 25 shall not be considered as acquiring the right to permanent
26 residence or domicile in Liberia. "

27 Can I pause there, Mr Taylor, to ask this: There's a
28 provision in the Liberian constitution which allows anyone who
29 enters, you've told us, to become a Liberian citizen, yes?

1 A. Yes, upon request, yes.

2 Q. Did the same apply, for example, to ECOMOG forces despite
3 this provision?

4 A. Yes. If a military personnel from Nigeria, Ghana or
10:46:15 5 whatever while serving with ECOMOG decided that maybe upon the
6 termination of their term of duty wanted citizenship of Liberia,
7 yes, that would apply.

8 Q. Okay. At 10, 11, 12 and 13 it deals with various
9 administrative matters regarding the movement of that personnel
10:46:38 10 which need not detain us. Let us just look quickly, please, at
11 paragraph 14, uniform and arms:

12 "Military members of ECOMOG operations shall wear while
13 performing official duties the national military or police
14 uniform of their respective states with standard ECOWAS
10:46:59 15 accoutrements. The wearing of civilian dress by the above
16 mentioned members of ECOMOG may be authorised by any of the
17 special representatives or the force commander at other times.
18 Military members of ECOMOG and such civilian personnel as may be
19 designated by the force commander may possess and carry arms
10:47:21 20 while on duty in accordance with their functions."

21 Let's ignore permits and licences, please, but look
22 quickly at paragraph 16:

23 "The force commander shall take all appropriate measures
24 to ensure the maintenance of discipline and good order amongst
10:47:48 25 members of ECOMOG as well as service personnel. To this end,
26 personnel designated by the force commander shall police the
27 premises of ECOMOG operations and such areas where its members
28 are deployed. Elsewhere such personnel shall be deployed only
29 subject to arrangements with the government if necessary to

1 maintain discipline and order."

2 Then at 17 we see that they have the power of arrest over
3 military members of ECOMOG and to take appropriate disciplinary
4 action and it deals with arrangements for taking into custody.

10:48:44 5 Can we go, please, over to page 47 and I'm looking at Article VI
6 which deals with communications:

7 "ECOMOG shall enjoy the facilities in respect of
8 communications provided for in the convention only for the
9 purpose of executing its task. Issues with respect to

10:49:11 10 communications which may arise and which are not specifically
11 provided for in this agreement shall be dealt with pursuant to
12 the relevant provisions of the convention.

13 Subject to the provisions of paragraph 1, ECOMOG shall have
14 authority to install and operate radio sending and receiving
10:49:32 15 stations as well as satellite systems to connect appropriate
16 points within the territory with each other and with ECOWAS, UN
17 and OAU officials in other countries and to exchange traffic with
18 their communications networks.

19 The telecommunications services shall be operated in
10:49:52 20 accordance with the United Nations International
21 Telecommunications Convention and regulations and the frequencies
22 on which any such station may be operated shall be decided upon
23 in cooperation with the government.

24 ECOMOG shall enjoy, within the territory, the right to
10:50:13 25 unrestricted communication by radio (including satellite, mobile
26 and handheld radio) telephone, telegraph, facsimile or any other
27 means and of establishing the necessary facilities for
28 maintaining such communications within and between the premises
29 of ECOMOG."

1 We need not deal any further with that. Let's jump to
2 travel and transport. Article VII:

3 "ECOMOG and its members shall enjoy, together with its
4 vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment freedom of movement
10:50:57 5 throughout the territory. The special representative and the
6 force commander shall inform the government of planned movements
7 of personnel, stores or vehicles through airports, railways or
8 roads used for general traffic within the territory. The
9 government undertakes to supply ECOMOG, where necessary, with
10:51:15 10 maps and other information that may be useful in facilitating its
11 movements.

12 Vehicles, including all military vehicles, vessels and
13 aircrafts of ECOMOG shall not be subject to registration or
14 licensing by the government."

10:51:37 15 Let's go to 4:

16 "ECOMOG may use roads, bridges, canals and other waters,
17 port facilities and airfields without the payment of dues, tolls
18 or charges, including wharfage charges other than charges for
19 services rendered."

10:52:07 20 Then quickly look at Article IX.

21 "The Government of Liberia shall provide without cost to
22 ECOMOG and in agreement with the special representative and the
23 force commander, such areas for headquarters, camps or other
24 premises as may be necessary for the conduct of the operational
10:52:25 25 and administrative activities of ECOMOG and for the accommodation
26 of its members."

27 And 2:

28 "The government undertakes to assist ECOMOG in obtaining
29 and making available where applicable water, electricity and

1 other facilities free of charge and in the case of interruption
2 or threatened interruption of service, to give, as far as is
3 within its powers, the same priority to the needs of the group as
4 to essential government services. "

10:53:13 5 "Only the force commander or a duly authorised" - this is
6 number 4 - "official of ECOMOG may consent to the entry of any
7 government official or any other person not a member of the group
8 to such premises. "

9 And we see at 7 the provision for the recruitment of local
10 personnel. Over the page at Article XII, Liaison:

11 "The special representative, the force commander and the
12 government shall take appropriate measures to ensure close and
13 reciprocal liaison at every appropriate level. "

14 Then there are various miscellaneous provisions and we see
10:54:09 15 that it's signed by Lansana Kouyate and by Monie Captan and it's
16 dated 5 June 1998. But before we leave here, Mr Taylor, can we
17 just go back to pages 11 and 12, please. Do you have them?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And we see that it's a list which relates to those
10:54:46 20 individuals and organisations who participated and contributed to
21 the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. And we see
22 first of all troop contributing countries, Benin, Burkina Faso,
23 La Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria,
24 Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Tanzania.

10:55:23 25 Let's ignore the next one. Over the page, please. At 5,
26 ECOMOG force commanders which will be helpful. We see that from
27 August 1990 to September 1990 it was Lieutenant General Arnold
28 Quainoo. He was succeeded by Lieutenant General Joshua
29 Dogonyaro; then by Major General Rufus M Kupolati; then by Major

1 General Ishaya Bakut; then by Adentunji I Olurin; then Brigadier
2 General John N Shagiya; then Major General John Mark Inienger;
3 then Major General Malu; and then Major General Timothy M
4 Shelpidi. Now Malu, Shelpidi and Quianoo you've mentioned
10:56:29 5 before, haven't you, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes, I have.

7 Q. So, Mr Taylor, this agreement made in June of 1998, did
8 that govern the status of ECOMOG forces in Liberia until they
9 departed?

10:57:01 10 A. Yes, it did.

11 Q. So the various legal privileges, et cetera, which they
12 enjoyed, they enjoyed throughout that period?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And just for completeness sake, what was the situation
10:57:13 15 prior to June 1998?

16 A. Well, it was very, very problematic. If you remember an
17 issue that was stated before this Court where following the
18 intervention in Sierra Leone on or about 14 February 1998 when
19 two helicopters of the Sierra Leonean government flew into
10:57:52 20 Spriggs Payne Airport and there was an issue as to jurisdiction.

21 And they wanted to exercise jurisdiction. We said no, and we've
22 testified here about the flying over my convoy and all that kind
23 of stuff. So we had a lot of problems before then because they
24 had not worked themselves out of the initial mode of peacekeeper
10:58:21 25 and almost Lord of the Land into the new role that had to be one
26 of capacity building and one not still of peace enforcement. So
27 we had a lot of difficulties before this time.

28 Q. Let's look quickly, I'm helpfully reminded by Mr Anyah, at
29 page 12 just so that we can look at a couple other names before

1 we put this document to one side. Let's look, first of all,
2 please, at category 8 on page 12. And we see under that
3 Receiving a Citation in Recognition of His Contribution to
4 Regional Peace, we see at number 11 Brigadier General Mujakperuo.

10:59:12 5 Yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Again, another name which we've encountered before?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And then under number 9, Citation in Recognition of Your
10:59:20 10 Contribution to Regional Peace as Special Representative to
11 Liberia, we see one Mr James Victor Gbeho, who you had mentioned
12 yesterday.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And also Ambassador Joshua Iroha.

10:59:36 15 A. Late.

16 Q. Who was Ambassador Joshua Iroha?

17 A. Ambassador Iroha lastly served even as international
18 investigator for the Defence in my case, but he was ambassador
19 and worked very closely throughout the Liberian crisis of the
10:59:57 20 years of the civil war. He had previously served as Nigerian
21 ambassador to the European Union, a very career diplomat.

22 Q. And, sadly, died recently?

23 A. Yes, while serving as international investigator for my
24 team.

11:00:18 25 Q. Then under 10, Citation in Recognition of Your Contribution
26 to Regional Peace as ECOMOG Task Force Commander Sierra Leone,
27 Brigadier General - that's Maxwell Khobe, yes?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Yes. I think we can leave this document now.

1 A. If I may just add here for you, counsel, there was a
2 statement on page 47 under "communications", 2A, that I just want
3 to draw the Court's attention to maybe what could be important in
4 the future:

11:00:59 5 "ECOMOG shall have authority to install and operate radio
6 sending and receiving stations as well as satellite stations to
7 connect appropriate points within the territory with each other
8 and with ECOWAS, UN and OAU officials in other countries and to
9 exchange traffic with their communication network."

11:01:26 10 I think, counsel, this may be very helpful. This is
11 referring to intelligence. And let's not forget about the time
12 we're talking about. At this particular time in that region, the
13 British are there with communication facilities, and a little
14 later on, in 1998, we are aware of the Chinook incident. So the
11:01:52 15 Americans and the British have assets, communication and other
16 assets within that region, and so what is going on here, ECOMOG
17 has contact and can receive and they share intelligence with
18 these assets that are in those areas. I think it's important to
19 mention here because some of these accusations that have been

11:02:22 20 made, not only were they there, but even ECOMOG had the
21 opportunity of connecting with these assets that were available
22 to them not just in Liberia, Sierra Leone, but other countries,
23 whether it was Guinea or whether it was Ivory Coast. So the
24 point I'm trying to make here, that they had access to factual
11:02:43 25 evidence. I think it may be very important before we go.

26 Q. Now, that is extremely important, Mr Taylor. So - and help
27 us, did you have knowledge of the extent of ECOMOG's
28 intelligent-gathering capability in Liberia at the time? We're
29 talking about 1998 here, a very critical year in terms of the

1 indictment. What kind of intelligence-gathering capability did
2 they have, to your knowledge?

3 A. They had a lot. They had a major intelligence unit, but
4 even assisting them was the presence of these assets that I
5 talked about that are being held by other countries. Because at
6 this time ECOMOG is now moving into Sierra Leone, and so because
7 ECOMOG is operating as an international force, even though it is
8 ECOWAS's force but it is international, and then let's not forget
9 another very important point, the deployment of ECOMOG in

10 Liberia, while it is an ECOWAS venture, that deployment - and its
11 actions in Liberia - are also covered under Chapter VII of the
12 United Nations. So these large forces that are deployed around
13 the world, whether it is the African Union force or ECOWAS force,
14 they do not take place unless they take place under authorisation
15 of Chapter VII of the United Nations. So by operating under
16 Chapter VII, member states have a responsibility at least to
17 assisting them carry out their duties.

18 So even if ECOMOG forces internally to Liberia and
19 Sierra Leone did not have certain capabilities, member states
20 within the facilities having certain capabilities would provide
21 them with those capabilities. So it really didn't matter how
22 strong they were, they did have these, but they had the
23 assistance of other countries, specifically these countries that
24 had assets within the area.

25 Q. So that - does that mean that, for example, ECOMOG
26 commanders could avail themselves of satellite imagery provided
27 by the United States of America or other western states?

28 A. Well, let me put it this way, because some of these
29 intelligence agencies - I mean, I'll put it this way: If Britain

1 or the United States, with assets in those areas, picked up
2 something that it felt was essential to the operation of ECOMOG
3 in carrying out its duties in Sierra Leone or Liberia, they would
4 make it available.

11:05:43 5 Q. Now, with that in mind, let's go over the page and perhaps
6 in haste I overlooked something else in that regard. Let's go
7 over the page to page 48 and complete paragraph B, which we - I
8 ended at the words "ECOMOG including". Let's have a look at it
9 toto:

11:06:05 10 "For maintaining such communications within and between the
11 premises of ECOMOG including the laying of cables and landlines
12 and the repeater stations. The frequencies on which the radio
13 will operate shall be decided upon in consultation with the
14 government, it being understood that connections with the local
11:06:32 15 systems of telegraphs, telex and telephones shall be made in
16 consultation with the government; it being further understood
17 that the use of local system of telegraphs, telex and telephones
18 shall be at no cost to ECOMOG." Yes?

19 A. Yes.

11:07:03 20 Q. Does that mean, Mr Taylor, that the Government of Liberia
21 would share frequencies with ECOMOG?

22 A. No. No. What would happen is that, when they talk about
23 repeaters here, what a repeater station is, a repeater is a
24 communications system set up that will operate on a fairly,
11:07:34 25 fairly medium frequency that would provide long - a little longer
26 range communication between groups. So you would have them
27 operate on different frequencies and you have to assign
28 frequencies because you do not want several people being assigned
29 the same frequency. This is not like the two-way radio that we

1 were talking about being used by military people like the RUF
2 explained here. These repeaters come in different - from my
3 understanding, 25 watts, 50, 150 watts. You click on - you have
4 a handpiece and you click to activate the repeater and it sends
11:08:32 5 out the message over a long period, I mean, area. But it does
6 not go very, very far, so you may have a series of repeaters.

7 But what is important about this I think that we ought to
8 emphasise is that while it is true government gave those
9 frequencies, government did not have access to listening in,
11:08:55 10 because what would happen with these frequencies, for example,
11 you can be given a frequency, you can put on a repeater, so we
12 may think, no, for example, you may be on a particular number,
13 but major countries, and like ECOMOG, they have a system that is
14 installed to the repeater called a scrambler. So what you would
11:09:19 15 do, you would know the frequency, but they will scramble the
16 communication, intelligence, top agencies do this, even telephone
17 calls are scrambled, that you would not listen to it if you -
18 let's say if somebody was on the phone and you were listening to
19 it, it would just sound like a lot of noise. You would get
11:09:42 20 nothing from it.

21 So the important point here to emphasise is that we gave
22 the frequencies, they had them, but access to information is so
23 controlled and scrambled that only those that are privileged to
24 listening to them had, you know, the ability to do that.

11:10:02 25 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, that's what I was going to ask you about.
26 So you as the President of Liberia or your security forces, would
27 you have access to the ECOWAS radio frequencies?

28 A. No. No. We couldn't listen to them. We couldn't listen
29 to them.

1 Q. So did you have the capability then to monitor their radio
2 traffic so that in order - bearing in mind the allegation you
3 face, in order to facilitate, for example, the easy,
4 uninterrupted movement of arms and ammunition to Sierra Leone?
11:10:38 5 Do you understand?

6 A. Yes, I understand. No, no, no, no, we could not listen in
7 to the communication. No, we couldn't.

8 Q. Could you, for example, monitor when Alpha Jets might be
9 deployed?

11:10:57 10 A. No, we couldn't. The only time we would know there is an
11 Alpha Jet, we would hear it in the air. They are very, very
12 noisy, but we would not know. All of their communication was -
13 in fact, the word that is used was secured. That is, they are
14 scrambled at a level where you can't listen to it, no.

11:11:18 15 Q. Yes. Now, unless there is any other matter that you would
16 like to draw our attention to in this document, Mr Taylor, I
17 would like us to move on, please.

18 A. Yes, I'm fine.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask then, please, Mr President, that
11:11:29 20 the ECOWAS Journal, Volume 35, dated October 1998, containing a
21 document on the status of ECOMOG in Liberia, be marked for
22 identification MFI-237, please.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-237.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

11:12:02 25 Q. Now, whilst dealing with the question of ECOMOG status in
26 Liberia, was there equally a decision made as to ECOMOG's mandate
27 in Sierra Leone, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes. Yes, an extension to that mandate was done by the
29 Heads of State extending ECOMOG's mandate into Sierra Leone.

1 Q. Right. And was that decision reported?

2 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. That decision was reported by - in
3 fact, in the journals also. You know, though it required some
4 clarifications later, but it was reported.

11:12:50 5 Q. Yes. Let's have a look behind divider 5, please, in that
6 same volume. Do you have it?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. And we're only interested in the first document which
9 begins at page 2. Let's go to page 2, please. What are we

11:13:28 10 looking at, Mr Taylor?

11 A. We are looking at the new decision redefining ECOMOG's
12 mandate in Sierra Leone.

13 Q. And we see that, bearing in mind, as they say, Article 7, 8
14 and 9 of the revised treaty establishing the authority of Heads
15 of State and also Article 8(2) of the revised treaty relating to
16 the chairman of the authority of Heads of State and also the
17 final communique emanating from the 21st authority of Heads of
18 State and Government meeting, notably paragraph 32, which states
19 that Heads of State and Government have unanimously elected

11:14:01 20 Republic of Togo as the chair of ECOWAS for 1998 to 1999. And
21 also bearing in mind the decision of August 1997 extending the
22 scope of ECOMOG activity and mandate to cover Sierra Leone, and
23 also the ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone signed in Conakry on
24 23 October 1997 and the ceasefire signed in Lome on 18 May 1999;

11:15:00 25 and the peace agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone
26 and the Revolutionary United Front signed in Lome on 7 July 199 -
27 that should be 1999, shouldn't it?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. It reads 1989, but it should be 1999. Lome is 1999, isn't

1 it, Mr Taylor?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. So we should correct that to 1999.

4 And also considering the 21st session of the authority of
11:15:38 5 Heads of State and Government had recommended that the Sierra
6 Leonean crisis should be resolved through a combination of
7 dialogue to foster national reconciliation and the strengthening
8 of ECOMOG; and also the consultations held with his peers, the
9 ECOWAS chairman initiated an organised internal dialogue between
11:16:06 10 the leader of the Revolutionary United Front and his lieutenants;
11 and considering that negotiations organised between the Sierra
12 Leonean parties by the ECOWAS chairman led to the signing in Lome
13 on 7 July 1999 of a peace agreement between the Government of
14 Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone;
11:16:30 15 that in order to ensure effective and efficient implementation of
16 the above mentioned peace agreement, it will be necessary to
17 immediately adapt the mandate of ECOMOG to reflect the new
18 exigencies of peace and national reconciliation in Sierra Leone.

19 And on the recommendation of the signatories to the peace
11:16:57 20 agreement of 7 July 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone
21 and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, and acting on
22 behalf of the authority of Heads of State and Government,
23 decides: Article I, the new ECOMOG mandate in Sierra Leone shall
24 hereinafter be defined as follows: ECOMOG shall maintain peace
11:17:20 25 and security of the Sierra Leonean state; ECOMOG shall provide
26 protection for UNOMSIL and the personnel working in the
27 disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme.

28 In this connection, ECOMOG shall monitor, verify and
29 collate within the joint ceasefire monitoring commission to be

1 created throughout the country and of which it shall be a member
2 all reports of ceasefire violations received from the commission
3 and, together with the other members, carry out the necessary
4 investigations and take appropriate measures. "

11:18:10 5 Cause we pause there for a minute, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. When it says monitor, verify and collate all reports of
8 ceasefire violations, would the supply of arms to the RUF be
9 considered a ceasefire violation?

11:18:30 10 A. Oh, yes. Yes.

11 Q. So it was part of ECOMOG's job, was it, to monitor such
12 things?

13 A. Oh, definitely. But even, counsel, if you look at A, this
14 is a little - "A, ECOMOG shall maintain peace and security of the
11:18:52 15 Sierra Leonean state." This marks the beginning of a very
16 serious point in that whole Sierra Leonean crisis. In effect,
17 what has happened here - and I can remember the discussions very
18 well - what happens here, now, ECOMOG becomes the armed forces in
19 everything of the state of Sierra Leone. In fact, they now run
11:19:22 20 all security and maintenance of peace within the republic. Not
21 as they had operated before as aiding. Now they are in full
22 control of everything. I think this is - I remember this
23 discussion. We were concerned about this level of mandate in
24 view of the fact that President Kabbah was back in office and as
11:19:52 25 the legitimate President. But this gave ECOMOG now a new type of
26 mandate, and so they are responsible to monitor arms going in,
27 arms coming out, security movement, everything now is under the
28 forces commander's command.

29 Q. Right. And 2B, "provide security throughout the country

1 for the authorities and persons resident in Sierra Leone and for
2 military observers of UNOMSIL, human rights monitors,
3 humanitarian aide workers, and staff of the disarmament,
4 demobilisation and reintegration programme. In conjunction with
11:20:33 5 UNOMSIL, disarm all fighters of the Revolutionary United Front,
6 the CDF, the ex-Sierra Leone armed forces, and paramilitary
7 groups; establish roadblocks and checkpoints to check movement of
8 arms and ammunition and assist in directing refugees and
9 displaced persons. "

11:21:08 10 And that power could be exercised throughout Sierra Leone,
11 could it, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Throughout, yes.

13 Q. To establish roadblocks and checkpoints to check movement
14 of arms and ammunition?

11:21:19 15 A. That is correct, borders, airports, seaports, everything.

16 Q. And, Mr Taylor, just so that we're clear about this, you
17 were involved in the discussions, were you, which led to the
18 establishment of this mandate?

19 A. Yes. This is a decision of the Heads of State, yes.

11:21:43 20 Q. "Man entry points, land, sea, and air, in order to prevent
21 illegal movement of arms and ammunition into or out of the
22 country."

23 Is that right?

24 A. That is correct.

11:21:56 25 Q. "Conduct confidence patrols to provide free movement of
26 people and easy distribution of relief materials. Conduct,
27 cordon and search operations to recover hidden arms. Provide
28 protection and escort duties to VIPs including government
29 officials, United Nations officials, and NGO personnel involved

1 in humanitarian relief activities. Clearing of land mines and
2 opening of all major roads to commercial activities and normal
3 civilian traffic. Deployment of troops in all disarmament
4 centres and arms collection sites to enhance disarmament and
11:22:51 5 provide security to encamped ex-combatants. Restrict the ex-SLA
6 to the barracks and supervise the return of arms and ammunition
7 to armouries and magazines; establish safe corridors and location
8 for the settlement of refugees and the distribution of
9 humanitarian relief materials. Provide assistance in the
11:23:27 10 screening of combatants. Provide security for the weapons and
11 ammunition retrieved during disarmament and demobilisation as
12 well as the arms depot. Assist in the destruction of recovered
13 arms and ammunition. Conduct security patrols guarding of key
14 points and vital points. Supervise the withdrawal of mercenaries
11:23:54 15 from Sierra Leone in collaboration with the joint ceasefire
16 monitoring commission."

17 Can we have a look at that a little closer, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, as a consequence of this - and we see when we glance
11:24:10 20 below that this is signed on 25 August 1999.

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Now, as a consequence of that provision, supervise the
23 withdrawal of mercenaries from Sierra Leone, did, for example,
24 former members of the STF return to Liberia?

11:24:33 25 A. No, they did not. They did not. They remained there.

26 Q. Did, for example, those Liberians recruited, as you told
27 us, by Hinga Norman and ECOMOG for the CDF, did they return?

28 A. Some of them returned. Not identifiable. People were
29 slipping into the country. But the real ones that were with the

1 STF did not.

2 Q. So what happened to the - those who were with the STF, as
3 far as you're aware?

4 A. As far as I'm aware, most of these guys with the STF
11:25:15 5 remained in Sierra Leone. Some of them even applied to join the
6 new armed forces. In fact, they were considered as such even
7 with the reorganisation of the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Some
8 of them were given, to the best of our knowledge, compensation
9 during the process of reorganising the Sierra Leonean army. In
11:25:39 10 fact, I have seen documents where their commander was demanding
11 some attention from the Sierra Leonean government because of
12 their long-term services.

13 Q. Who was their commander?

14 A. General Broplah was demanding certain services for his men.

11:26:00 15 Q. Mr Taylor, as you've told us, you were party to the
16 decisions which led to this mandate being drawn up?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So you were aware then, as of August 1992 or shortly before
19 that, that this was the nature of the power exercised by ECOMOG
11:26:26 20 in Sierra Leone?

21 A. Did you say August 1992?

22 Q. '99.

23 A. August 1999, yes. Don't forget now, counsel, this is right
24 after Lome. This is right after Lome, and this is now putting
11:26:41 25 into prospective what is supposed to happen, dissolving, in fact,
26 the Sierra Leonean armed forces as it existed and even the group
27 associated with President Kabbah - remember, there's a portion of
28 the Sierra Leonean armed forces that are still loyal to Kabbah
29 while he is even in exile. So this, really, now, by putting

1 ECOMOG in control of the entire country, this will set into
2 motion the process of disarming everyone, the Sierra Leonean
3 armed forces, including that group, the STF, and everybody else.

11:27:18 4 Q. So, Mr Taylor, knowing that ECOMOG had the power to
5 establish roadblocks and checkpoints to check movement of arms
6 and ammunition and that they had power to man entry ports, land
7 sea, and air, in order to prevent illegal movement of arms and
8 ammunition, why did you, as alleged, continue to make arms
9 shipments to the RUF?

11:27:38 10 A. I don't know why that allegation was made, because that
11 didn't happen. It was not possible. Not possible at all.

12 Q. "Supervise technical assistance with regard to the
13 demining, dismantling and destruction of all devices and similar
14 weapons. The force commander shall report to the chairman of
11:28:08 15 authority through the executive secretary on the implementation
16 of the ECOMOG mandate. This decision shall be published by the
17 executive secretariat in the official journal of the community."
18 We see that it is signed by President Eyadema, yes?

19 A. Yes.

11:28:30 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I use the remaining time
21 to ask that this ECOWAS journal dated August 1999 dealing with
22 ECOMOG's mandate in Sierra Leone be marked for identification
23 MFI-238, please.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-238, and I
11:29:01 25 think we'll take the morning break now and we'll resume at 12
26 o'clock.

27 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

28 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment, we looked at
2 the ECOWAS journal for August 1999 dealing with the ECOMOG
3 mandate in Sierra Leone, yes?

4 A. Yes.

12:01:38 5 Q. Now, I'd like us to move on, please. Now, you recall,
6 Mr Taylor, that there were difficulties between your government
7 and the Guinean government following incursions across your
8 mutual border?

9 A. That is correct.

12:02:09 10 Q. Now, was any decision taken by ECOMOG with regard to that -
11 ECOWAS, I mean?

12 A. Well, there was a discussion. ECOWAS met, but this is a
13 little in front, I think it's around 2000 we're talking about
14 now, where a decision was taken that encouraged the cooperation
15 between our countries and the establishment of monitors at the
16 borders and cooperation that was taken by the authorities to help
17 calm the situation between Liberia and Guinea.

18 Q. And which year do you say that was?

19 A. Well, that was coming towards the end of 2000, if I recall
12:03:01 20 correctly, yes.

21 Q. Could you please look behind divider 6 in the documents
22 disclosed for week 34, please. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, item number 4 on this list, yes, do you see decision 4
12:03:47 25 December 2000 relating to the deployment of ECOMOG along the
26 border areas of Guinea and Liberia?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Let's go over the page, please:

29 "24th Session of the Authority of Heads of State and

1 Government. Decision relating to the deployment of ECOMOG along
2 the border areas of Guinea and Liberia.

3 The Authority of Heads of State and Government, mindful of
4 Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the revised treaty establishing the
12:04:31 5 Authority of Heads of State and Government and defining its
6 composition and functions;

7 Mindful also of Article 7 of the protocol relating to the
8 mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution,
9 peacekeeping and security establishing the ECOWAS ceasefire
12:04:49 10 monitoring group;

11 Mindful also of Articles 21 and 22 of the protocol relating
12 to the composition and role of ECOMOG respectively;

13 And of pledges made by member states to contribute troops
14 that would constitute ECOMOG stand-by units;

12:05:09 15 Deploring the deteriorating security situation along the
16 border areas of Guinea and Liberia resulting in the massive loss
17 of life and property as well as the displacement of thousands of
18 people;

19 Desiring to monitor the border areas between the two
12:05:32 20 countries to arrest the armed incursions and re-establish peace
21 and security in the area;

22 On the recommendation of the fourth and fifth ministerial
23 meetings of the mediation and Security Council held in Abuja on 4
24 October 2000 and in Bamako on 12 and 13 December 2000
12:05:55 25 respectively;

26 On the proposal of the meeting of ECOWAS ministers of
27 foreign affairs held in Bamako on 13 December 2000.

28 Decides.

29 Article 1. The ceasefire monitoring group (ECOMOG) shall

1 be deployed as an interposition force along the border areas of
2 Guinea and Liberia. "

3 We'll come back and deal with the implications of that in a
4 minute but let's just complete the decisions.

12:06:30 5 "Article 2. The ECOMOG interposition force shall be armed
6 and may need to take measures to ensure the security and free
7 movement of its personnel during the execution of its mandate.

8 Article 3. The executive secretary shall convene a meeting
9 of the defence and security commission to make appropriate
10 proposals to the ministerial level of the mediation and Security
11 Council on the force structure, strength, mandate and its rules
12 of engagement taking into account the report of the
13 reconnaissance team.

14 Member states shall in accordance with Article 35 of the
12:07:16 15 protocol release upon request ECOMOG stand-by units pledged.

16 The United Nations is requested to provide all the
17 necessary support that will make the force operational. "

18 And the decision shall be published in the official
19 journal, and that is dated the 16th day of December 2000. Now,
12:07:43 20 let's go back and look at this now, Mr Taylor. Firstly, was an
21 ECOMOG force deployed on the border as a consequence of this
22 decision?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Why not?

12:08:01 25 A. What was termed then logistical, financial and other
26 reasons we did not get the support for the deployment of this
27 force. If we look at this period, ECOMOG is now concentrated in
28 Sierra Leone, and so conducting reconnaissance, moving a new
29 force requires money, logistical support and there was just no

1 financing for that.

2 Q. Now, where at Article 3 reference is made to a
3 reconnaissance team, had there been deployed such a
4 reconnaissance team along the border area?

12:08:54 5 A. Not deployed. A reconnaissance team visited the area, and
6 I'm using deployment in the sense of stationed, they were not,
7 okay, but they visited the general area both on the Guinean and
8 on the Liberian side of the borders.

9 Q. Very well. Yes, let's move on then, Mr Taylor.

12:09:27 10 MR GRIFFITHS: But before we do so, Mr President, could I
11 ask, please, that that ECOWAS journal, volume 38, dated December
12 2000, relating to the deployment of ECOMOG along the border areas
13 of Guinea and Liberia, be marked for identification MFI-239,
14 please.

12:09:47 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-239.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, can I invite your Honours, please, to
17 put to one side this volume dealing with week 34 and could I ask
18 you to take up at this stage now, please, volume 35:

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, again, we're engaged in tidying up one or
12:10:43 20 two loose ends, okay?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, I want to take you now then, please, to the year 1999,
23 yes?

24 A. Yes.

12:11:05 25 Q. Now, you've already assisted us by explaining the process
26 of arms destruction that year, okay?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Which eventually culminates in August with the beginning of
29 that destruction.

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Which is concluded by October of 1999. And we've looked at
3 documentation in that regard, yes?

4 A. Yes.

12:11:31 5 Q. I would like us now, please, just to deal with one or two
6 other documents outlining that process, okay? Now, first of all,
7 Mr Taylor, was the Liberian government desirous of retaining some
8 of those arms for its own use?

9 A. Yes, we were.

12:12:01 10 Q. Now, did you, in 1999, at the beginning of the year,
11 communicate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in
12 those terms?

13 A. Yes, I wrote a letter.

14 Q. And what did you speak to the Secretary-General about in
12:12:26 15 that letter?

16 A. Well, we wrote a letter to the Secretary-General mentioning
17 that we were proposing the inspection of the arms and a process
18 where the very good ones could be put up and laid aside for
19 future armed forces and the very bad ones being destroyed. But
12:12:54 20 we did not get our way with that. In fact, when the
21 Secretary-General responded, it was more like that he would send
22 a team down to look at it, but he did not concur - in fact, he
23 could not have concurred alone with our proposition.

24 Q. Okay. I'd like you, please, to look behind divider 1 in
12:13:19 25 this volume. What are we looking at, Mr Taylor?

26 A. This is the January letter written in dealing with the arms
27 and who maintains possession of the arms. This is generally the
28 scope of this letter.

29 Q. Right:

1 "22 January 1999, Mr Secretary-General, I am pleased to
2 present my compliments and to raise the matter of arms collected
3 by ECOWAS and verified by UNOMIL during the disarmament process
4 in Liberia prior to the holding of general and presidential
12:14:23 5 elections in July 1997. These arms which are presently in the
6 joint custody of the United Nations and ECOWAS are the properties
7 of the sovereign Government of Liberia. The commitments of my
8 government and the decisions of the United Nations and ECOWAS
9 will continue to be respected by my government.

12:14:46 10 The recent developments surrounding the present withdrawal
11 of ECOMOG from Liberia raises concerns regarding the safeguarding
12 of those arms. My government wishes to state that it will not
13 accept the removal of these arms from the territory of Liberia
14 and that the United Nations must ensure that the arms remain in
12:15:08 15 its custody. The continued safekeeping of the arms by the United
16 Nations will provide sufficient satisfaction to my government."

17 Can I pause, Mr Taylor. Why were you concerned about the
18 removal of the arms from the territory of Liberia?

19 A. We were getting, I will call it, intelligence from our
12:15:33 20 people that two things were in process. That there was a plan
21 underway to evacuate the containers containing the arms out of
22 Liberia to either Sierra Leone or Nigeria and we were opposed to
23 that.

24 Q. Why?

12:15:53 25 A. They were the properties of the Liberian people, and so, if
26 they needed to move them, they should have sought our - at least
27 our acquiescence. And so, you know, you can't just come into a
28 sovereign country and just take things out without anybody
29 knowing. We, under most circumstances, would not have objected,

1 but just to hear tomorrow, "What happened? The containers are
2 gone." So we said no, because we were concerned, again, that
3 those arms could either be resold, reused in other conflicts
4 somewhere and so we wanted to make sure that the United Nations
12:16:32 5 in the first instance and my government knew exactly what was
6 happening to those arms.

7 Q. "Excellency, I wish to assure the United Nations that
8 despite speculations in some quarters, my government will make no
9 attempt to take custody of these arms by force or engage in any
12:16:52 10 unilateral course of action. It should be noted that the
11 presence of ECOMOG in Liberia did not deter my government from
12 taking custody of the arms, instead it was our respect for the
13 commitments we have made and our recognition for the proper
14 procedures of dealing with ECOWAS and United Nations regarding
12:17:15 15 this matter.

16 At the same time, I wish to bring to your attention that
17 Liberia remains threatened by dissidents outside of the country
18 and the withdrawal of ECOMOG leaves the country vulnerable to
19 external aggression and the activities of Liberian dissidents.
12:17:34 20 Additionally, the continued United Nations Security Council arms
21 embargo on Liberia jeopardises and compromises the national
22 security of Liberia and our democratically elected government.
23 If we are ever subjected to external aggression, we will not
24 hesitate to request the use of these arms from the United
12:17:57 25 Nations.

26 Finally, I wish to state that my government is amenable to
27 the possible destruction of unserviceable arms, while the
28 remaining arms could remain in the custody of the United Nations
29 for the future utilisation by the Liberian army.

1 Excellency, permit me to assure you that the Republic of
2 Liberia shall remain disposed to giving the United Nations peace
3 building office in Liberia its fullest cooperation. "

4 Now, Mr Taylor, why were you saying that serviceable arms
12:18:34 5 could be retained for the future utilisation by the Liberian
6 army?

7 A. Well, you know, as I think back, it was a very, very silly
8 decision that I and my government took to permit the destruction
9 of the good arms. It was very - it was a silly decision, okay,
12:19:00 10 because let's - I mean, we were going to train a new army anyway,
11 so you're going to have good arms, burn them, destroy them, then
12 you go and train an armed force and take taxpayers money and buy
13 arms to equip the army. Isn't that silly? I mean, it was a
14 very, very, very bad decision. So we wanted to - it would have
12:19:23 15 been good to retain them to avoid the process of having to take
16 taxpayers money again to equip an army that had to be trained.
17 It was a very - but we were under so much pressure, and I can see
18 the sinister motive involved in this destruction, and we saw it
19 immediately after we succumbed to that process.

12:19:46 20 Q. So, Mr Taylor, if it was such a silly decision, why did you
21 take it in the first place?

22 A. My dear counsel, the pressures - oh my God, the pressures
23 that come from this international community when they want
24 something done, you - the biggest of country falls sometimes
12:20:06 25 under this. You don't rest. They are giving every - they give
26 you every reason to do what they want. "Mr Taylor, Mr President,
27 you know, we want to help this country, you want to put the war
28 behind us, this will be a very good indication that the war is
29 finished." What was said to me - I forgot the Biblical thing

1 where you - something into plough shares and something in pruning
2 hopes. I don't know the Biblical thing. We're going to have to
3 find that. All kinds of things. "This will open doors for you.
4 Assistance will come from the international community." Only to
12:20:49 5 know that this was a trap and this caused this whole LURD
6 invasion. That's what I mean by it was very silly, but the
7 pressure brought us to accept this.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just to divert slightly at this point, now,
9 as I say, we're busy clearing up loose ends here.

12:21:17 10 MR GRIFFITHS: But before I go to another loose end, can I
11 ask, please, that that letter from President Taylor to the United
12 Nations Secretary-General, dated 22 January 1999, relating to the
13 destruction of arms collected in Liberia, be marked for
14 identification MFI-240, please.

12:21:41 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI-240.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Now, a different topic, Mr Taylor. Now, in 1999, did your
18 government produce a white paper on the Sierra Leone civil
19 crisis?

12:22:24 20 A. Yes, we did produce a white paper, but let's probably put
21 here into perspective the process and what led to this white
22 paper. We're dealing with a very crucial year here. We know
23 that 6 January of 1999, I think it's accepted that that's the
24 Freetown invasion. Following that invasion in January, there
12:23:04 25 were immediately some accusations because of Liberians that were
26 supposed to have been killed or captured in Freetown at that
27 time, and so the world is filled with rumours that Taylor sent
28 people into Freetown.

29 Following the three or four days of fighting, ECOWAS and

1 the Committee of Five is into motion trying to get a ceasefire
2 and the whole process back on track. I can remember I helped in
3 putting together - in fact, I announced the first ceasefire by
4 mid-January, that the RUF had agreed to a ceasefire, and that was
12:23:57 5 also discussed with colleagues on the committee, but there were
6 these continuous accusations.

7 So by February, I can remember, we did an official paper
8 outlining our own contribution to the peace process and what we
9 were proposing as how we could help in getting these Liberians
12:24:23 10 out of Sierra Leone because we had never argued with the fact
11 that Liberians were involved in Sierra Leone, but what we had
12 said was that we were not responsible and that they had been, in
13 fact, co-opted by governments before then. So that paper -
14 that's the whole set up for that paper that came out in February
12:24:45 15 and formally announced by the Government of Liberia in February.

16 Q. Now, what did you do with the white paper once it had been
17 published, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Well, we published the white paper through the foreign
19 ministry and then I officially wrote the Secretary-General of the
12:25:13 20 United Nations later on in that month of February detailing not
21 the entire paper but at least something like a precis of the
22 important issues and steps that Liberia was taking in trying to
23 help and restore peace to Sierra Leone and also detailing the
24 fact that we were not involved in any sinister move in Sierra
12:25:45 25 Leone.

26 Q. And tell me, Mr Taylor, was a copy of the document made
27 available to the United Nations at any stage?

28 A. Yes, yes, yes. In fact, the Special Representative
29 Downes-Thomas was given a copy and he officially sent through

1 that document to the United Nations in February about the
2 initiatives and some of the actions that the Liberian government
3 was undertaking to bring peace to Sierra Leone.

4 Q. Now, how do you know that he sent it?

12:26:22 5 A. That particular code cable is a part of my archives that
6 was delivered to my government at the time.

7 Q. Can you have a look behind divider 3 in that bundle,
8 please. Do you recognise this, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, I do.

12:26:55 10 Q. Now, we see it's one of those code cables from Felix
11 Downes-Thomas to Prendergast at the UN dated 11 February 1999 and
12 it's headed "Government of Liberia initiatives related to
13 national and sub-regional stability.

14 Category 1 - initiatives on Sierra Leone. President
12:27:28 15 Taylor, on 10 February, called on the RUF leader Foday Sankoh to
16 show more leadership skills in helping to end the Sierra Leonean
17 conflict. He also welcomed President Kabbah's announcement of 7
18 February allowing Sankoh to hold talks with his commanders. He
19 urged all sides in the conflict to use this opportunity to work
12:27:50 20 for peace and condemned all acts of violence against civilians.

21 His foreign minister, Monie Captan, who is currently on a
22 diplomatic mission to the United States, emphasised his country's
23 willingness to continue to search for peace in Sierra Leone and
24 its determination to respect all relevant Security Council
12:28:14 25 resolutions on Sierra Leone. The Government of Liberia has also
26 reiterated its position vis-a-vis the allegations levelled
27 against it in the attached white paper, which was made public
28 during the week.

29 Workshop on good governance. Last week the Government of

1 Liberia held a week-long workshop on good governance with the aim
2 of infusing transparency and accountability in all branches of
3 government. The standard of debate - characterised by frankness
4 and soul searching - that marked the just ended workshop was
12:28:58 5 reminiscent of the national conference held in July last year.
6 In several no-holds-barred discussions, participants diagnosed
7 some of the current problems confronting Liberia and came up with
8 recommendations that, if implemented, could go a long way towards
9 improving the quality of life of the average Liberian. More than
12:29:26 10 300 participants deliberated for six days on issues that ranged
11 from public security, bureaucratic transparency and
12 accountability, the justice system and the rule of law, to
13 economic and social rights, amongst others."

14 Can I pause there, Mr Taylor. Did you attend that?

12:29:43 15 A. No, I did not attend this.

16 Q. "The recommendations of the workshop including curbing
17 presidential powers ..."

18 Were you aware of that?

19 A. Yes, I was encouraging that.

12:29:58 20 Q. What powers in particular were you encouraging that might
21 be curbed?

22 A. Well, I tell you, under the constitution of Liberia the
23 President has tremendous powers. I was mostly concerned about
24 certain powers of appointment I really wanted to go back. The
12:30:27 25 President could appoint mayors until now - mayors of townships,
26 of cities. The President could appoint superintendents of
27 regions, and I was really thinking about a process that would
28 lead to an eventually constitutional amendment to curb some of
29 those powers.

1 Q. "... making security forces accountable for their
2 decisions, increasing the salaries of public servants as an
3 incentive to greater productivity, and periodic audits and
4 monitoring systems for public institutions. The workshop closed
12:31:08 5 on a high note as participants learned from the good governance
6 coordinator, Blamoh Nelson, that President Taylor was anxious to
7 receive the workshop's recommendations and promised that they
8 would be implemented to the fullest. It is to be hoped that the
9 Government of Liberia would give serious attention to the
12:31:28 10 recommendations of the good governance workshop, which would
11 constitute a welcomed departure from how the results of the
12 national conference were implemented. It is perhaps worth noting
13 that Mr Blamoh Nelson, who chaired the workshop, is currently the
14 Director of Cabinet at the Executive Mansion and has managed the
12:31:50 15 affairs of state on occasions when President Taylor was out of
16 the country."

17 Now, your Honours should have behind this a rather - a
18 large A4 document. Now, I apologise for the quality of the
19 reproduction, but it's the best we could do and so I'm going to
12:32:11 20 test everybody's eyesight whilst we try and go through this
21 Government of Liberia white paper on the Sierra Leone civil
22 crisis.

23 Now, do you recognise this document, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Yes, I do.

12:32:27 25 Q. And as you see, it's published in The New National,
26 Wednesday, 10 February 1999, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now, I will welcome assistance as we go along:

29 "Liberia's response to allegations of her involvement in

1 the Sierra Leone civil war and dismisses such accusations as an
2 international conspiracy spearheaded by the United States and
3 Britain in an attempt to internationally isolate, economically
4 destroy, and politically destabilise the government of the
12:33:07 5 Republic of Liberia. Presented by the Deputy of Minister of
6 Information, Milton Teahjay, London, United Kingdom, 25 January
7 1999.

8 Introduction

9 The government of the Republic of Liberia has, over the
12:33:29 10 past few months, come under intense international pressure,
11 largely spearheaded by the governments of the United States and
12 Britain, alleging, inter alia, that Liberia is fuelling the
13 Sierra Leonean crisis by supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels
14 fighting to overthrow the government of President Tejan Kabbah.

12:33:58 15 Liberia has also been accused of secretly committing fighting
16 forces on the side of the rebels and has allegedly granted safe
17 haven to some top AFRC/RUF officials in Monrovia.

18 The Liberian government has categorically and repeatedly
19 denied any military involvement in Sierra Leone. Liberia has
12:34:24 20 also rejected and described as ridiculous the notion that she
21 will be involved in attempts to destabilise any of her
22 neighbours, including Sierra Leone. The Liberian government has
23 gone beyond mere denials and has proposed numerous options by
24 which the allegations of her involvement could be disproved,
12:35:03 25 including, among other things, the contribution of a joint United
26 Nations-ECOMOG border patrol contingent to monitor troop
27 movements and the setting up of an international body of inquiry
28 by the United Nations Secretary-General to investigate these
29 accusations.

1 At the core of the onslaught against Liberia by the United
2 States and Britain is the demonstrated failure and unquestionable
3 inability of the two countries to evidentially prove their
4 allegations against Liberia. Despite repeated challenges to
12:36:11 5 authenticate their claims, the British and Americans have only
6 relied on rumours, speculations and a massive disinformation
7 campaign intended to internationally isolate, economic
8 strangulate, and diplomatically destroy Liberia, and by so doing
9 to successfully disintegrate ECOMOG, which has earned the success
12:36:50 10 story of an African capacity to solve an African military problem
11 in Liberia, culminating in the ushering in of a broad-based
12 democratically elected government headed by Charles Taylor as
13 President.

14 Interestingly, the Americans and the British have depended
12:37:12 15 only on the uncorroborated accounts of Sierra Leonean government
16 officials, especially her Finance Minister James Jonah, a well
17 connected veteran of the United Nations system who meticulously
18 uses his connections in the world body to scapegoat Liberia by
19 deliberately ignoring the irrefutable evidence of American and
12:37:44 20 British complicity calculated to destabilise Sierra Leone by the
21 use of private arms and individuals.

22 Objectives of Document

23 Fundamentally the purpose of this document is to carefully
24 provide a detailed account of Liberia's efforts, nationally and
12:38:06 25 internationally, to bring peace to the government and people of
26 Sierra Leone and remove the existing notion that Liberia is
27 providing arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels. Further, the document
28 intends to undermine future efforts by western countries,
29 especially Britain and the United States, aimed at playing one

1 ECOWAS country against the other ... ECOWAS as a sub-regional
2 economic and political organisation in substantially ... in its
3 future capacity to cohesively deal with subsequent political
4 and/or military problems in any member state.

12:39:11 5 Also the document attempts to expose the manner in which
6 international conspiracy of disinformation, lies and deceit,
7 spearheaded by stronger powers, can destroy smaller and weaker
8 countries, even in the face of the lack of material evidence of
9 any kind to prove the allegations against the weaker and smaller
12:39:47 10 nations.

11 And finally, the document seeks to call the attention of
12 some other reasonable members of the international community to
13 the need to pressure the countries accusing Liberia to go beyond
14 empty circumstantial and unsubstantiated speculations by
12:40:15 15 providing material evidence in support of their allegations.

16 Who is supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels in Sierra
17 Leone?

18 As far as physical evidence available to the international
19 community is concerned, it is Britain, the former colonial master
12:40:36 20 of Sierra Leone, that is supplying arms to the forces of seeking
21 the ouster of the Kabbah government through private British
22 companies and individuals. Using plausible deniability, however,
23 the British government has successfully disassociated itself from
24 any involvement in the shipment of arms to the Sierra Leonean
12:41:03 25 rebels. Specifically involved in the arms trade on behalf of the
26 British government are two British firms owned and operated by
27 retired British military generals, who, is it alleged, have
28 strong connections with the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook.
29 Sky Air Cargo of London and Occidental Airlines, partly owned by

1 a British pilot, are at the centre of supplying arms to the AFRC
2 RUF rebels.

3 It must be noted that Mr Cook's involvement in arms trade
4 has a history. Last year Robin Cook quickly came to the defence
12:41:49 5 of Sky Air Cargo when that company was implicated in arms
6 trafficking to government forces for the restoration of President
7 Kabbah. Mr Cook has always been the first in the British
8 Government to put up defences for private arms dealers to the
9 rebels in Sierra Leone whenever such practice becomes scandalous
12:42:19 10 and publicly embarrassing.

11 Is Liberia supporting the AFRC/RUF rebels?

12 The Government of Liberia has consistently and
13 categorically denied providing any form of support, military,
14 political or otherwise, to the AFRC/RUF rebels fighting the
12:42:39 15 government of President Tejan Kabbah. As a matter of fact,
16 Liberia at many international forums has repeatedly declared that
17 it recognises the Kabbah administration as the sole legitimate
18 and constitutional political authority of the Republic of Sierra
19 Leone and as such would do nothing to thwart and/or overthrow the
12:43:05 20 democratic will of the Sierra Leonean people by subverting their
21 choice of government.

22 Additionally, except for colonial boundaries dividing
23 Liberia and Sierra Leone, Liberia has consistently maintained
24 that the people of the two countries are one and identical,
12:43:45 25 politically and culturally. The traditional relationship between
26 Liberians and Sierra Leoneans was so vividly manifested by Sierra
27 Leone's acceptance of thousands of Liberian refugees during the
28 Liberian conflict, reciprocated by Liberia's acceptance of
29 thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees over the past months.

1 Have the Americans and British provided any evidence that
2 Liberia supports the AFRC/RUF rebels?

3 The governments of the United States and Britain, despite
4 international pressure demanding material evidence to
12:44:32 5 substantiate their allegations against Liberia, have been unable
6 to back their charges. For the United States and Britain,
7 providing material evidence to prove an allegation has been
8 effectively replaced by misinformation, propaganda and a war of
9 words. They are attempting to reinvent the universal wheels of
12:45:20 10 justice by replacing the provision of evidence to back
11 allegations by the use of propaganda and disinformation. They
12 believe that might makes right.

13 Realistically, Liberia is being scapegoated by Britain and
14 America, masking their involvement by using private British firms
12:45:57 15 and secret American military advisers to fuel the war in Sierra
16 Leone. Liberia has become blameworthy because the new political
17 authority in Monrovia is not dancing to the dictates of
18 Washington and London. This British and American desperation was
19 so clearly manifested when they, in a rather ridiculous manner,
12:46:41 20 erroneously accused Liberia of making territorial claims against
21 Sierra Leonean territory.

22 Furthermore, intelligence reports from diplomatic quarters
23 speak of a covert plan afoot to destabilise the Government of
24 Guinea and subsequently blame the same on Liberia. Evidently,
12:47:05 25 Liberia is a classic victim of a well-coordinated ... contrived
26 international conspiracy calculated to internationally and
27 diplomatically isolate and economically stifle the country's
28 national reconstruction programme, hoping that in the final
29 analysis domestic political discontent will ensue, which could

1 lead to civil unrest and thereby make the country ungovernable.
2 The ultimate game plan of the British and Americans to install a
3 puppet regime in Liberia that would look after the commercial
4 interests of Britain and American companies operating in the
12:48:09 5 sub-region should their plan succeed.

6 Practical steps by Liberia to bring peace to Sierra Leone:

7 1. In the ECOWAS sub-region Liberia is the immediate past
8 beneficiary of collective sub-regional initiatives politically
9 and militarily after seven years of brutal civil war. A peace
12:48:34 10 plan brokered by ECOWAS and supported by all parties in the
11 Liberian crisis used dialogue as the foundation for what later
12 became a politically negotiated settlement of the Liberian
13 problem. Drawing from the experience, Liberia has repeatedly and
14 diplomatically encouraged President Tejan Kabbah to engage with
12:49:00 15 the AFRC/RUF rebels in a political dialogue, since historically
16 political problems have never been resolved by military means.

17 2. In support of Liberia's proposal for dialogue between
18 the Government of Sierra Leone and the AFRC/RUF, the Liberian
19 government proposed, supported, and subsequently participated in,
12:49:25 20 at least three regional summits attended by both Presidents
21 Kabbah and Taylor. The first summit was held under the joint
22 auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General Annan and ECOWAS
23 Chairman, Nigeria Head of State General Abubakar in Abuja,
24 Nigeria. At that summit both Presidents agreed to work together
12:49:54 25 in finding a politically negotiated solution to the Sierra
26 Leonean problem and signed a joint communique in respect of their
27 collective disposition.

28 3. Following the Abuja summit, and based on Liberia's
29 urging for the second time, the governments of the United States,

1 represented by President Clinton's envoy to Africa, the Reverend
2 Jesse Jackson, convened a second meeting between President Taylor
3 of Liberia and President Kabbah of Sierra Leone in Monrovia. The
4 Monrovia Summit was fundamentally attended to achieve two goals:
12:50:41 5 One, to build more confidence between the two leaders; two, to
6 ensure that the focus on resolving the problem in Sierra Leone
7 was not lost in the midst of other sub-regional distractions, as
8 in the case of the Guinea-Bissau crisis. At the Monrovia Summit
9 both Presidents signed another communique reaffirming their
10 respective commitments to bringing peace to Sierra Leone.

11 4. In continuation of Liberia's efforts towards resolving
12 the problems in Sierra Leone a third summit was called in
13 Conakry, Guinea, by President Lansana Conte within the framework
14 and spirit of the Mano River Union protocols. At that meeting,
12:51:39 15 President Taylor informed President Kabbah of Liberia's continued
16 disposition to remain actively engaged diplomatically and
17 politically until peace is restored to the brotherly people of
18 Sierra Leone.

19 5. On the military front, the Liberian border with Sierra
12:52:19 20 Leone has been well fortified so as to prevent any situation
21 where remaining AFRC/RUF rebels could contemplate the use of the
22 Liberian side of the border to launch hit-and-run military
23 operations into Sierra Leone. Because of this preventative
24 measure, the Liberian side of the border has remained absolutely
12:52:41 25 calm from any military activity.

26 And finally, in an attempt to ensure international
27 verification of Liberia's neutrality in the Sierra Leone crisis,
28 the Liberian government has invited the United Nations, the OAU,
29 and ECOWAS to send a joint observer mission at the border that

1 would monitor the movement of forces from both the Liberian and
2 Sierra Leonean sides of the border. To this date, such
3 verification has yet to be put in place.

4 Are there Liberians fighting in the Sierra Leone war?

12:53:33 5 Unfortunately, yes. There are Liberians fighting on both
6 sides of the military divide: One group on the side of the
7 government, and the other on the side of the AFRC rebels
8 respectively. The involvement of mercenary Liberians in Sierra
9 Leone appears to be the only concrete evidence being paraded by
10 Sierra Leone in the international community as constituting proof
11 of Liberia's involvement in the war without explaining how, why,
12 when, and who invited them.

13 Up to the present, the Government of Sierra Leone has
14 managed to cleverly evade and deliberately avoid any public
12:54:23 15 explanation as to how these mercenary Liberians got involved,
16 why, and who enlisted them in the National Armed Forces of the
17 Republic of Sierra Leone. Absurd as it appears, one wonders if
18 it is normal practice for a sitting government to recruit the
19 nationals of another country into the national security
12:54:54 20 apparatus.

21 During the early years of the RUF incursion in Sierra Leone
22 in 1992, Liberia was already embroiled in a brutal civil war
23 which resulted in massive social dislocation of her citizens into
24 Sierra Leone as refugees. While in Sierra Leone, some of the
12:55:13 25 Liberian refugees organised themselves and formed what came to be
26 known as ULIMO, one of the factions in the just-ended Liberian
27 conflict. It was claimed that these refugees had organised ULIMO
28 as a counterbalance resistance movement to the then NPFL.

29 But as the RUF made significant advances against government

1 forces in the field, the constitutional government of President
2 Momoh approved a strategic military engagement plan which, inter
3 alia, envisaged a military partnership between generals in the
4 Sierra Leone Armed Forces to help prosecute the war against the
12:56:16 5 RUF, and in return the Momoh administration would give permission
6 to ULIMO for the use of Sierra Leone territory for training and
7 other military activities into Liberia. Interestingly, all this
8 took place while Sierra Leone was ostensibly, but pretentiously,
9 participating in peacekeeping operations in Liberia within ECOMOG
12:56:48 10 with the view of restoring peace there.

11 In the midst of this military pact President Momoh was
12 overthrown in a military coup by Captain Valentine Strasser, who
13 inherited and gratefully embraced the strategic military
14 engagement plan. Captain Strasser remained the ULIMO-Sierra
12:57:12 15 Leone Army pact and used it for continuous prosecution of the war
16 against the RUF. Captain Strasser after a few years also became
17 victim when he was toppled by Maada Bio, who also inherited the
18 situation, and finally following the election of President Ahmad
19 Tejan Kabbah he also took up the military mess which three of his
12:57:36 20 predecessors created - and which subsequently toppled his
21 government - and joined forces with the RUF, thereby creating
22 what is now referred to as the AFRC/RUF rebellion.

23 Clearly, Liberians who are fighting in Sierra Leone are
24 there on the account of the Government of Sierra Leone and not on
12:58:03 25 orders of the Liberian government as is being misleadingly and
26 mischievously floated around the world by the Government of
27 Sierra Leone.

28 Conclusions.

29 The government of the Republic of Liberia reaffirms its

1 respect for and commitment to respecting all international
2 protocols and conventions to which she is a signatory regarding
3 the conduct of rebellions between warring sovereign states.

12:58:42 4 The Republic of Liberia recognises the sovereignty of the
5 Republic of Sierra Leone as a member state of the OAU, ECOWAS and
6 a Mano River Union and the right of its citizens to
7 self-determination.

8 The Liberian government reiterates that it has absolutely
9 no military involvement in supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels
12:59:00 10 fighting the Government of Sierra Leone and has no intention to
11 do so now or in the future.

12 Liberia also calls on Britain and the United States to
13 immediately stop fuelling the war in Sierra Leone through the use
14 of private American and British firms and individuals.

12:59:19 15 As a matter of national sovereignty and integrity, Liberia
16 will not allow herself to be used as the beachhead to macromanage
17 and regulate the politics and economies of the ECOWAS sub-region
18 in the interest of western multinational corporations.

19 Finally, the Government of Liberia will remain engaged
12:59:51 20 diplomatically and politically in the search for lasting peace in
21 Sierra Leone through dialogue and negotiations as the means of
22 achieving a political settlement of the problem."

23 Now, Mr Taylor, we see that this white paper is published
24 in The New National newspaper. How wide was the coverage given
13:00:22 25 to it in Liberia?

26 A. It was published widespread, but it was also published in
27 all of the other papers.

28 Q. Did you, for example, make a copy of it available to the
29 Sierra Leonean government?

1 A. Not directly, no, but I'm sure the diplomatic mission -
2 that's a part of their job - did pick it up.

3 Q. Because, although a government document, was it a public
4 document?

13:00:44 5 A. It was a public document, yes.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we get distracted, could I ask,
7 please, Mr President, that that code cable dated 11 February 1999
8 from Felix Downes-Thomas, the Special Representative of the
9 Secretary-General, attaching the Government of Liberia's white
10 paper on the Sierra Leonean civil crisis, be marked for
11 identification please MFI-241.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-241.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, was there any response to that white paper
13:01:31 15 from either the United Nations or the Sierra Leonean government?

16 A. Well, no and yes. Let me tell you what I mean by no.
17 Following the publication of this white paper, what the Liberian
18 government did was to use excerpts from this white paper and
19 construct a position on what Liberia would do along with this
13:02:05 20 white paper and what were some of our future plans. It is this
21 programme that we conveyed to the UN that we got a response on.
22 So that new document incorporated some of the ideas put forward
23 here in this white paper. And so this is what I mean by no and
24 yes because it's a part of it, but if I go directly to your
13:02:31 25 question, did they respond to this document, in total, no.

26 Q. Okay. Now, Mr Taylor, moving on. Earlier we looked at the
27 letter you wrote to the Secretary-General on 22 January 1999,
28 yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you receive a response to that letter?

2 A. Yes. Well, I received a response from the
3 Secretary-General about the arms and what his suggestions would
4 be regarding sending experts and different things.

13:03:15 5 Q. Well, have a look behind divider 6 in this volume, please.
6 Now, what we see here is another code cable, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Attaching, when we go over the page, a response to your
9 letter of 22 January.

13:03:51 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And we see that it's from the Secretary-General, addressed
12 to you:

13 "Excellency, I have the honour to refer to your letter
14 addressed to me dated 22 January 1999 concerning the disposal of
13:04:10 15 the weapons surrendered to ECOMOG during the disarmament exercise
16 of 1996 to '97 and to my preliminary response dated 22 February
17 1999.

18 I am sure you will agree that this matter can be speedily
19 resolved. We are currently assembling a team of small arms
13:04:38 20 experts who can determine which weapons are serviceable and which
21 are not and will dispatch them to Monrovia as soon as possible.

22 The team will, of course, look forward to the full cooperation of
23 your government. After conducting a technical assessment of the
24 arms and ammunition, accompanied by representatives of your
13:04:54 25 government and ECOMOG, the team will make its determination
26 accordingly.

27 I note and welcome your government's willingness to destroy
28 any arms found to be unserviceable. The United Nations team will
29 therefore be prepared to offer your government technical advice

1 on the modalities for the destruction of such weapons. As
2 regards any weapons or ammunition which may be found to be
3 serviceable, we would assume that further consultation on their
4 disposition between your government, ECOMOG and ourselves would
13:05:31 5 be necessary.

6 In order to expedite this process, we are sending the
7 deputy chief military observer of the United Nations Observer
8 Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), Colonel David Chepkwony, to
9 Monrovia in order to make the preliminary contacts with your
13:05:52 10 government. We would therefore be grateful for your government's
11 cooperation with Colonel Chepkwony."

12 So that was the response, Mr Taylor, yes?

13 A. Yes, to the ^ January/general, yes.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, Mr President, that that
13:06:26 15 letter from the Secretary-General, dated 5 March 1999, in
16 response to letter from President Taylor, dated 22 January 1999,
17 be marked for identification MFI-242, please.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-242. Are you
19 including in that document the covering outgoing cable?

13:06:57 20 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't think we need to, Mr President.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Just the letter then is
22 marked MFI-242.

23 Incidentally, I notice an anomaly in that document. The
24 covering code cable is dated 1 March purporting to attach a
13:07:42 25 letter dated 5 March.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I hadn't spotted that, but you're perfectly
27 correct, Mr President, which is rather curious. But
28 interestingly, there's a stamp to the right which, if you turn
29 this paper sideways, you can just make out. It's stamped

1 "received 5 March", it would appear, at 9.57.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I see. I think it's clear that the
3 date of that code cable must be an error.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: It must be:

13:08:44 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we see that that response to your letter is
6 dated 5 March, as we've now established. Now, from both your
7 letter and the response, there appears to be this debate as to
8 what to do with the serviceable weapons, yes?

9 A. That is correct.

13:09:08 10 Q. Now, who was your defence minister at the time, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Daniel Chea. That's C-H-E-A.

12 Q. Now, was he involved in this ongoing discussion with regard
13 to what use the serviceable weapons could be put to?

14 A. Yes. In fact, there was a committee. He was involved,
13:09:36 15 along with the foreign minister.

16 Q. And we see from that letter that what the Secretary-General
17 Kofi Annan was suggesting was that there was a need for further
18 consultation on the use of the serviceable weapons by the
19 Government of Liberia.

13:09:56 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, was there any further discussion with the United
22 Nations regarding the use of those serviceable weapons?

23 A. Yes. We held discussions. That's just diplomatic
24 language. There's a need for further discussions. It's simply -
13:10:18 25 when you read between the lines to that, you are getting a clear
26 signal that there's a decision or at least the intention - the
27 strong intention on the part of the international community of
28 those weapons - of all of those weapons being destroyed. That's
29 just the diplomatic language for saying, "Well, I don't think

1 you're going to have your way, but let's talk about it." That's
2 how it comes.

13:10:57 3 Q. Now, your Defence Minister Daniel Chea, what was his
4 attitude towards the suggestion that there be further
5 discussions?

6 A. I tell you, not just Daniel Chea, the legislature, the
7 whole country, there were a lot of people that were concerned
8 about this. Some senior members of the National Security Council
9 were opposed to the total destruction of these weapons. They
10 wanted the serviceable weapons to be kept. And so he was one of
11 those, along with other top legislators, that didn't want to see
12 this happen, so he was very much interested in keeping some of
13 the serviceable weapons.

13:11:38 14 Q. Was this a matter discussed with the special representative
15 of the Secretary-General?

16 A. Yes. As a matter of fact, he was just about the point man
17 that the Secretary-General had on the ground in dealing with
18 these day-to-day operations. In fact, he was filing cables maybe
19 two or three times a day. I can remember, because back in, I
13:12:08 20 think, as early as January, February, he was filing cables
21 dealing with the question of these arms. And, in fact, the
22 internal debate that was going on in my government about this
23 arms, he was on pins and needles, because he was in charge,
24 really, of the discussions on the UN side.

13:12:32 25 Q. Did he communicate the discontent felt within Liberia about
26 the destruction of the serviceable weapons to the United Nations
27 headquarters?

28 A. Of course he did. Yes, he did.

29 Q. How do you know?

1 A. Well, the memo that he filed, we were provided copies of
2 the memos that he filed because we wanted the UN to know how
3 strongly we felt about it.

4 Q. Have a look behind divider 7 in this bundle, please.

13:13:12 5 Mr Taylor, have you seen this document before?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What is it?

8 A. This is a memo from Downes-Thomas to Prendergast normally
9 telling him about the weapons and the disposal of these weapons
13:13:33 10 and the discussions that are ongoing. Because one of the things
11 - just to lay the premise that we must consider in this time.
12 Besides the disposal of these weapons there was also an argument
13 of sovereignty, who could even be involved in the discussions of
14 what would happen with these weapons and how. We felt that it
13:14:04 15 was the sole prerogative of the Government of Liberia and it did
16 not involve any other outside countries being involved. So there
17 were two levels of discussions going on at that time.

18 Q. Right. Now, we see that it's a code cable from
19 Downes-Thomas to Prendergast at the United Nations dated 23 March
13:14:26 20 1999.

21 "On the morning of 22 March, we met with Defence Minister
22 Daniel Chea to present him with a copy of the terms of reference
23 as expanded and revised in order to meet with concerns expressed
24 by the Government of Liberia. Minister Chea said he was in
13:14:49 25 agreement with the revised terms of reference. He also
26 requested, and the Minister agreed, to provide personnel to
27 unpack the containers and lay out the weapons and ammunition for
28 inspection under the guidance of the experts.

29 In the afternoon of the same day we met with Foreign

1 Minister Monie Captan to present him with a copy of the revised
2 terms of reference and to request his Ministry's assistance in
3 issue visas to members of the team of inspectors upon their
4 arrival in Monrovia. The Minister agreed to the request and
13:15:24 5 advised that his Ministry be provided with a list of their names
6 and passport numbers as early as possible.

7 On the revised terms of reference the Minister took
8 exception to the last point, which provides for further talks
9 between UNOL, the Government of Liberia, and ECOWAS to determine
13:15:45 10 the fate of weapons and ammunition deemed serviceable. The
11 Minister questioned the validity of including an issue of a
12 political nature in what was essentially the terms of reference
13 of a technical team. He also urged that he saw no reason why
14 ECOWAS should be involved in a matter that has direct

13:16:08 15 implications on the national security of Liberia. However, after
16 we reiterated the history of ECOWAS's involvement in the whole
17 exercise and the United Nations difficulty in finding the basis
18 for excluding ECOWAS from future consultations on the ultimate
19 disposal of the serviceable weapons, the Minister stated that his
13:16:32 20 government would not pose any obstacle to the envisaged weapons
21 inspection exercise. He nonetheless pointed out that he would
22 inform us of his government's final position on the terms of
23 reference following consultations with his President. Today
24 Minister Captan informed us that the government had agreed to the
13:16:57 25 revised terms of reference."

26 So eventually the issue was resolved not in your favour; it
27 was decided to destroy the serviceable weapons as well, is that
28 true?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, we're still on this tidying up exercise Mr Taylor.

2 I can ask, please, that that code cable from Felix
3 Downes-Thomas dated 23 March 1999 on the disposal of weapons be
4 marked for identification MFI-243?

13:17:50 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see it's got some - it looks like
6 handwriting on it. What is that, Mr Griffiths?

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Mr Taylor, can you help us?

9 A. No, I can't.

13:18:11 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: It looks like "internal not redacted",
11 and then down at the bottom it looks like five sets of initials.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, it does:

13 Q. Can you assist us with that, Mr Taylor?

14 A. No. We got it from them, so this is probably their

13:18:37 15 internal thing that did it. Those parts of a document that they
16 don't want for public - what do you call it - they redact them
17 before we get them.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who is that, Mr Taylor?

19 THE WITNESS: I'm talking about the Special

13:18:55 20 Representative's office. The part that is not for public
21 consumption, that does not involve the government, they don't let
22 it go.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. So you're saying the markings are
24 probably from the Special Representative's office?

13:19:14 25 THE WITNESS: Yes.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. And there's a second page to
27 that, Mr Griffiths, which does not appear to be relevant. It's a
28 routing slip. That's not to be taken as part of the document?

29 MR GRIFFITHS: That's not to be part. I'm not interested

1 in marking that for identification, Mr President. It's there for
2 completeness rather than being necessary.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. All right. The document just
4 described will be marked for identification MFI-243.

13:19:45

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we're still engaged in this same exercise.
7 That issue regarding Liberians in Sierra Leone, you recall
8 telling us that your government had considered provisions in your
9 penal code regarding mercenarism. Do you remember telling us
10 about that?

13:20:21

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And also an invitation for such Liberians who may have been
13 involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone to return home to
14 Liberia. Do you remember telling us that?

13:20:30

15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. Now, did you write to the Secretary-General regarding those
17 proposals?

18 A. Yes, I did write to him, I would say late in February, but
19 then before then we - the decision on the part of the Government
20 of Liberia, a decision was taken, a public decision that was made
21 available. I think we've already dealt with that decision in
22 previous testimony, the official position that was disclosed by
23 the Foreign Ministry. And late in February, I would say about
24 the last week in February, if I recollect, I wrote the

13:20:50

25 Secretary-General detailing what the official Liberian government
26 position was as had been laid out by the Foreign Ministry about
27 asking our people to come back and assuring them that they would
28 not be prosecuted under the law of mercenarism. That was done in
29 late February.

13:21:16

1 Q. And did you get a response?

2 A. Yes, early March, I think, or thereabouts the
3 Secretary-General responded to that.

4 Q. Have a look behind divider 8, please. Now, behind divider
13:22:03 5 8 there's this covering letter dated 31 March which need not
6 detain us. It's there for completeness. Behind that is a
7 routing slip which again need thought detain us, but look behind
8 there, Mr Taylor. To you see a letter dated 31 March 1999?

9 A. Yes, this is a reply to the late February letter, yes.

13:22:29 10 Q. And it's a letter from the Secretary-General to you dated
11 31 March 1999?

12 A. That is right.

13 Q. "Excellency, I wish to thank you for your letter dated 21
14 February 1999. I have taken note with interest of the
13:22:52 15 initiatives of the Government of Liberia outlined therein which
16 are aimed at enhancing peace and security in Sierra Leone and the
17 sub-region.

18 I welcome the steps noted in your letter to encourage
19 Liberians who are engaged in the conflict in Sierra Leone to
13:23:08 20 return home. I also welcome your proposal on the convening of a
21 ministerial meeting of the Mano River Union. This meeting and
22 the proposed subsequent summit could contribute significantly
23 towards the development and establishment of cooperative measures
24 to build confidence amongst the organisation's member states and
13:23:35 25 enhance sub-regional security. I believe that sub-regional
26 cooperation in a range of spheres could be enhanced under the
27 auspices of the Mano River Union and would like to note that the
28 United Nations stands ready to assist efforts by the leaders of
29 the organisation's member states to bring about its

1 revitalisation.

2 I have taken note of the renewed request made in your
3 letter for the United Nations to consider the deployment of
4 observers on the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. As I
13:24:11 5 informed you in my reply dated 25 June 1998 to your letter
6 addressed to me dated 5 May 1998, I have shared with the Security
7 Council my view that the deployment of ECOMOG troops at the
8 border between Liberia and Sierra Leone could help to lay to rest
9 allegations of the influx of arms or the provision of armed
13:24:33 10 assistance to the rebel forces in Sierra Leone. I continue to
11 believe, as noted in that letter, that verification on the basis
12 of impartial observation that such allegations were groundless
13 would improve the security climate throughout the entire
14 sub-region and improve mutual confidence amongst its member
13:24:57 15 countries.

16 In this regard I would like to refer to Security Council
17 resolution 1231 adopted on 11 March 1999 in which the Security
18 Council expressed its grave concern at continued reports that
19 support was being afforded to the rebels in Sierra Leone,
13:25:24 20 including through the supply of arms and mercenaries, in
21 particular from the territory of Liberia. A copy of the
22 resolution is attached for your reference.

23 In that context, the council requested me to continue to
24 consider, in coordination with the countries of the Mano River
13:25:45 25 Union and other member states of the Economic Community of West
26 African States, the practicability and effectiveness of the
27 deployment of United Nations monitors along with forces of the
28 monitoring group ECOWAS along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border.

29 Pursuant to the council's resolution, I am writing to the

1 chairman and executive secretary of ECOWAS to seek their views
2 concerning the possibility, practicability and effectiveness of
3 the possible deployment of ECOMOG at the border and the
4 subsequent deployment of United Nations personnel alongside
13:26:25 5 them."

6 Signed Kofi Annan. Now, could I ask, please, Mr President,
7 that that letter from the United Nations Secretary-General, a
8 response to a letter from President Taylor dated 31 March 1999,
9 be marked for identification MFI-244, please.

13:26:57 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, marked MFI-244. Are you going to go
11 on to another document?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time though.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think rather than reach that now,
14 we'll go to lunch and we'll resume at 2.30.

13:27:21 15 [Lunch break taken at 1.28 p.m.]

16 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please, your Honour:

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, as I've indicated to you earlier, we are
14:30:52 20 currently seeking to tidy up one or two loose ends, so my
21 apologies if we are jumping from topic to topic. But dealing
22 with another matter now: Upon your inauguration as President,
23 what was the State of the Liberian Police Force?

24 A. Oh, terrible. Like the army, the police was involved in
14:31:25 25 the war and so there was virtually no police force, even though
26 we were trying to hang on to a few old personnel.

27 Q. And thereafter what attempts, if any, were made to
28 reorganise the police?

29 A. What we did was, under the United Nations programme in

1 Liberia, we had arranged to begin an assistance programme of
2 training for the police officers, and the United Nations was
3 involved in the training programme.

4 Q. I'm sorry. You go ahead?

14:32:16 5 A. They were involved in the training programme of Liberian
6 police personnel at the Liberian National Police Academy.

7 Q. And help us, what did the training comprise?

8 A. Basically police science, but it also involved dealing with
9 human rights, the rule of law, international conventions, dealing
14:32:45 10 with rights, laws of war, all of these were taught at the
11 academy.

12 Q. Okay. And when did that programme begin, to the best of
13 your recollection, Mr Taylor?

14 A. That programme commenced, I would say, somewhere in middle
14:33:07 15 to late '98. By the period we are in right now, that should have
16 been the second, third or fourth training programme. And the
17 special representative was very seriously involved with that
18 programme. It commenced around 1998.

19 Q. Right. In that regard, please, could you look behind
14:33:34 20 divider 12 in that bundle for week 35, please. Yes, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, we see this is another code cable. On this occasion
23 it's from Downes-Thomas to Prendergast, and the topping is
24 "UNOL's fourth police service training series with the Liberian
14:34:21 25 National Police."

26 "On Tuesday, 13 April, UNOL commenced its fourth series of
27 training courses for the Liberian National Police at the national
28 Police Training Academy in Monrovia. The current series of
29 lectures and interactive workshops will cover the period 13 April

1 to 15 May, 1999.

2 The course is the second part of one which was conducted
3 from October to December 1998 to meet the needs of newly
4 recruited police officers. The current batch of trainees is made
14:34:55 5 up of 110 recruits, both male and female.

6 As you will see from the attached summary of the course
7 content, UNOL has incorporated into this programme a number of
8 guest lecturers and facilitators representing human rights,
9 professional and non-governmental organisations."

14:35:17 10 And when we go over the page, Mr Taylor, you will see the
11 topics dealt with including: "What are human rights; what are
12 the sources of international human rights law; who makes the
13 rules; who monitors human rights; UDHR" --

14 What's that?

14:35:44 15 A. I can't help. I am not too sure.

16 Q. "Code of conduct for law enforcement officers; policing in
17 democracies; what happens when police uphold, protect and defend
18 human rights; what happens when police violate human rights; what
19 is the mandate of law enforcement; investigations,
14:36:08 20 general/criminal; arrest and detention; what is arbitrary arrest;
21 treatment of detainees; torture; the use of force; use of
22 firearms; civil disorder; states of emergency; humanitarian law".

23 And then we see we below that:

24 "Clarify any topics not understood above, especially arrest
14:36:30 25 and detention; use of force; women in law enforcement; children
26 and the law - juvenile justice". And we see, amongst others,
27 "UNICEF, assisting with that; refugees and IDPs; UNHCR;
28 non-nationals; pre-trial detention; human rights organisations;
29 political history and human rights in Liberia; community

1 policing; UN position on human rights".

2 Now, Mr Taylor, frankly, was the police in Liberia in need
3 of this kind of training?

4 A. Well, yes. Yes. I'd say they were in need of this kind of
14:37:26 5 training. Following the war, police had been really trained. We
6 had training professionals from the United States that had
7 trained the whole police force. But because the police were also
8 involved in combat and fighting and on different sides, some
9 people had really, I guess, lost their concept of what they had
14:37:52 10 learned. I was necessary, I would say, yes.

11 Q. And help us. This was a United Nations sponsored exercise,
12 was it?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Yes. Let's move on from that, please.

14:38:11 15 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before you move on, could I
16 ask for clarification of the term "police signs" that Mr Taylor
17 used at the beginning of his series of answers. That's page 101
18 line 18 of the LiveNote transcript.

19 THE WITNESS: Well, I may have pronounced it badly. I'm
14:38:30 20 speaking to science. Police science, S-C-I-E-N-C-E. Police
21 science.

22 JUDGE DOHERTY: Thank you.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask, please, Mr President, that that
24 code cable from Felix Downes-Thomas to the United Nations
14:38:50 25 headquarters regarding UNOL's fourth police training series with
26 the Liberian National Police dated 14 April 1999 be marked for
27 identification MFI-245, please.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-245.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Now jumping again, Mr Taylor, there came a time, did there
2 not, when preparations were being made for the peace talks in
3 Lome; is that correct?

4 A. That is correct.

14:39:57 5 Q. And one of the necessary prerequisites for that was the
6 transport of Foday Sankoh to Lome. Is that right?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. And he was in custody at the time, yes?

9 A. That is correct, yes.

14:40:15 10 Q. Now, were you involved in the discussions regarding his
11 transport, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Not directly, but I got to know - let's probably - I think
13 for - to best put a handle on this, I would suggest, for the
14 Court, let's look at the period and put it in some context. We
14:40:41 15 are talking about the month of April of 1999. This whole month
16 is dealing with the movement of RUF delegates to the Lome
17 conference, air transport from them in from Sierra Leone, the
18 provision of travel documents, assisted by the Liberian
19 government, coming in, overflight rights and all this kind of
14:41:11 20 stuff. This was what is going on in this period. Amongst this
21 is this - is the removal of Foday Sankoh from Freetown to Lome,
22 and that occurs around about the middle of April.

23 Q. Of which year?

24 A. Of 1999.

14:41:34 25 Q. Yes.

26 A. That's when there is an overflight - the negotiations for
27 his removal are conducted in Freetown by the special
28 representative at that time, coordinated with the special
29 representative in Liberia Downes-Thomas and Adeniji. Liberia is

1 involved to that we grant overflight rights for that particular
2 operation. I know that he is on that particular flight, and I'm
3 not sure a lot of other people know, but generally it's just the
4 overflight right of Sankoh was removed about mid April, I would
14:42:17 5 put it to.

6 Q. Right. Okay. And were you kept abreast of these
7 developments, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Oh, definitely.

9 Q. Who by?

14:42:25 10 A. At least three persons: The foreign minister - my foreign
11 minister, Monie Captan; the special representative of the
12 Secretary-General was up to his head in this, kept government
13 informed of what was going on. Cables were sent regarding these
14 movements, the acquiescence of government, the agreements and
14:42:49 15 all. We were fed with copies of these cables especially.

16 Q. Okay. Now, just so that we can conclude this particular
17 chapter, I would like us quickly to look at three documents,
18 please. Firstly, can we look at the document behind divider 13.
19 We can do this quite quickly, Mr Taylor. We see it's dated 16
14:43:22 20 April 1999 and it's a request for overflight clearance for a
21 Beechcraft 200 en route Liberia to Lome on Saturday 16 April
22 1999. "I should be grateful for your help if you could follow it
23 up from your end" and we see your end is Downes-Thomas, the
24 special representative in Monrovia.

14:43:48 25 "Although the arrangements are not yet final, it would seem
26 that UNOMSIL may need to pick up some RUF delegates to the Lome
27 consultations from Monrovia, requiring clearance for our
28 helicopter and/or Beechcraft and Government of Liberia transit
29 permission for these delegates. I shall phone you for further

1 details. Best regards."

2 Okay. And then we go over the page, we see the details of
3 the flight. It's a Beechcraft King Air 200 aircraft, we see its
4 registration number, its call sign, the number of crew, the dates
14:44:32 5 required, estimated time of departure, estimated time of arrival
6 in Abidjan, estimated time of departure from Abidjan and then
7 estimated time of arrival in Lome. Okay?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And let's, to complete the picture, quickly look behind
14:45:00 10 divider 14, please. This is another code cable into which
11 Downes-Thomas is being copied and we see:

12 "Foday Sankoh's trip to Lome. Further to my code cable and
13 my fax message of 16 April 1999 on the overflight clearance, I
14 wish to inform you that the trip in question will now take place
14:45:31 15 tomorrow, 18 April 1999, at the personal request of President
16 Eyadema to President Kabbah and me. The necessary flight
17 clearance has now been obtained with the assistance of my
18 colleague, representative Downes-Thomas, for which I am most
19 grateful. Arrangements for the rest of the RUF delegation is in
14:45:57 20 progress, again with UNOL/Government of Liberia cooperation and I
21 will keep you informed."

22 And the rest of that and the document to which it refers
23 doesn't concern me, but it's there for completeness.

24 Then finally, Mr Taylor, if we look behind divider 15,
14:46:26 25 there is another code cable, this time dated 19 April 1999,
26 headed "Arrival of Foday Sankoh in Lome":

27 "Many congratulations to you and to Downes-Thomas and your
28 staff for the successful preparations you have made for the Lome
29 talks. We were thus able to report to the members of the

1 international contact group today the contribution you are making
2 to the conduct of the talks and, we hope, to their eventual
3 success."

4 Right. Now the point there being, Mr Taylor, throughout
14:47:06 5 this episode you were being kept abreast, were you, of
6 developments?

7 A. Definitely, yes.

8 Q. Yes?

9 A. Yes.

14:47:15 10 Q. And so the transport of these individuals via Monrovia and
11 Liberia was something agreed at the highest levels with the
12 United Nations, wasn't it?

13 A. Oh, definitely, definitely.

14 Q. It wasn't a personal favour being done by you to your pet
14:47:32 15 rebel organisation next door, was it?

16 A. Definitely not.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Now can I ask, please, Mr President, that
18 these three documents be marked for identification together, the
19 first being the code cable dated 16 April 1999 become MFI-246A,
14:48:09 20 the code cable dated 17 April 1999 become MFI-246B and the code
21 cable dated 19 April 1999 become MFI-246C and that they all bear
22 the legend "Foday Sankoh journey to Lome".

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those documents are marked
24 accordingly.

14:49:21 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, also in April of that year, as we know,
27 there was an incursion, was there not, from Guinea?

28 A. Yes, there was.

29 Q. Now, did you take the matter up with the Guinean

1 government?

2 A. Yes. What we did was to, for the first time, dispatch a
3 formal diplomatic note of complaint to the Guinean government via
4 the New York office complaining about the incursion and putting
14:50:15 5 them on what we would call official notice of our dissatisfaction
6 with this continuation of the attacks out of Guinea.

7 Q. Have a look behind divider 16, please. Yes, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. We see that it's a letter --

14:50:59 10 A. Did you say divider number 16?

11 Q. Behind 16. Skip the first two pages, which is the routing
12 slip, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you see a letter dated 23 April 1999?

14:51:20 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, we need to take this in stages. Go back one page,
17 please, Mr Taylor. Yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, we see that this letter dated 23 April bears the
14:51:42 20 address of the Liberian mission to the United Nations, yes?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And it's addressed to the Secretary-General, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. From Fatmatta R - who's that?

14:51:58 25 A. Osode.

26 Q. Who is she?

27 A. The charge at the mission in New York.

28 Q. And it reads:

29 "Mr Secretary-General, I present my compliments to you and

1 upon instruction of my government have the honour to forward
2 herewith a copy of a note dated 22 April 1999 which the Ministry
3 of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Liberia addressed to the
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Guinea concerning
14:52:32 5 the events of 21 April that occurred in Voinjama city, Lofa
6 County, Liberia. A legible version of the note is attached."

7 Over the page, please. Now we see the note which is
8 attached:

9 "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Liberia
14:52:55 10 presents its compliments to the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs
11 of the Republic of Guinea and wishes to bring to the attention of
12 the government of the Republic of Guinea the rather disturbing
13 matter which bears on the safety, peace and security of Liberia
14 and our sub-region.

14:53:12 15 Around 0400 hours on Wednesday 21 April 1999 a group of
16 armed men launched an attack into Voinjama city in Lofa County,
17 temporarily abducting and holding hostage personnel of the United
18 Nations and representatives of a number of donor countries and
19 organisations from their compounds in that city.

14:53:38 20 The Government of Liberia is gravely concerned that
21 confirmed reports have established that the incursion was carried
22 out by these individuals from Guinean territory. It may be
23 recalled that the Government of Liberia has repeatedly brought to
24 the attention of the Government of Guinea persistent reports of
14:54:01 25 ongoing military training on Guinean soil near the Liberian
26 border by individuals whose purpose ostensibly is to destabilise
27 Liberia and induce conflict and chaos.

28 The Government of Liberia is particularly concerned and
29 dismayed that despite these repeated warnings it would appear

1 that the Government of Guinea did little to ensure that its
2 territory would not be used to launch an incursion into a
3 neighbouring state. Needless to say that this act of apparent
4 acquiescence on the part of a neighbouring state contravenes the
14:54:43 5 letter and spirit of relevant charters, agreements and protocols
6 of the Mano River Union, the ECOWAS, OAU and the United Nations
7 respectively.

8 Owing to the vigilance of the Liberian security personnel,
9 the situation in Voinjama has been brought under control. The
14:55:04 10 government is informed that some members of the incursion forces
11 retreated into Guinea as Liberian government security personnel
12 consolidated control of Voinjama city while some dissident
13 elements, wounded in the exchange of fire, are now receiving
14 medical treatment in Nzerekore.

14:55:29 15 Where is that is that town, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Nzerekore is just a few kilometres from the Liberian
17 border.

18 Q. In which country?

19 A. In Guinea.

14:55:40 20 Q. "In view of the foregoing, the Government of Liberia wishes
21 to lay the following on record:

22 That a formal protest is hereby lodged with the government
23 of the Republic of Guinea regarding the incident and requests an
24 urgent investigation and response regarding the matter raised
14:55:59 25 supra;

26 That those elements of the incursion forces who are
27 presently in Nzerekore receiving medical treatment, as well as
28 others on Guinean soil, be turned over to the Liberian
29 authorities for investigation, and that the Government of Guinea

1 provides substantive guarantees that its territories will not be
2 used to facilitate military activities against Liberia. "

3 Did they hand them over, Mr Taylor?

4 A. No, they did not.

14:56:33 5 Q. "That information on this protest to the Government of
6 Guinea is being forwarded to ECOWAS, the OAU and the
7 United Nations.

8 The Government of Liberia takes very seriously its
9 responsibility to safeguard and protect its territorial integrity
14:56:50 10 as well as the lives of its citizens and foreign residents within
11 its borders in the face of incidents like the one under
12 reference. The Government of Liberia's determination to exercise
13 its sovereign duty will stop short of nothing in ensuring that
14 the peace and tranquility of Liberia go undisturbed. "

14:57:11 15 And the normal salutation there follows. Now, just to
16 complete, if we go over the page we see the official copy of that
17 letter on the Liberian government letterhead. It's the same
18 document though, isn't it, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes, it is.

14:57:36 20 Q. And reference was made in the initial code cable to the
21 document MFA/1078 and that appears behind that document, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And then right at the end there is a note verbale, yes?

24 A. Yes.

14:58:07 25 Q. Regarding the same incident?

26 A. Uh-huh.

27 Q. Let's just have a quick look at that for completeness,
28 please.

29 "The office of the resident coordinator of the

1 United Nations operational systems in Liberia presents its
2 compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and would like to
3 register its serious concern regarding the abuse, including
4 psychological trauma, suffered by UN personnel and the losses
14:58:40 5 incurred by them during the recent outbreak of conflict in
6 Voi nj ama, Upper Lofa.

7 On 21 April, a group of senior UN officials and donor
8 representatives was in Voi nj ama on a mission to assess future
9 food relief needs when it was caught up in a conflict between
14:58:59 10 government security forces and an unknown group of dissidents.
11 After being robbed of personal effects by the rebel group, they
12 then suffered further harassment at the hands of the government
13 security forces who repelled the dissidents. The group further
14 report that some of these men were obviously under the influence
14:59:18 15 of alcohol or marijuana and that there was an apparent absence of
16 discipline. The obvious dangers of their situation demanded
17 evacuation by an UN helicopter on 22 April 1999.

18 Reports made by mission members show that men identified as
19 Liberian security forces by their uniforms, and in some cases by
14:59:42 20 name and rank, looted the UN offices and stole 19 vehicles, three
21 motorbikes and the teammembers' remaining personal effects.
22 With the assistance of the Ministry of Defence, eleven vehicles,
23 including trucks, have been retrieved, although some are in a
24 deplorable condition and will require major repairs.

15:00:03 25 This incident has raised much concern among the diplomatic
26 and international community.

27 Continued UN assistance in Upper Lofa will depend on
28 genuine commitment and written assurances from the Government of
29 Liberia that it will: Provide adequate security for UN personnel

1 and their property; protect UN property; compensate for the loss
2 of personal property; compensate for the loss of UN assets which
3 have been looted or damaged.

15:00:36 4 As you are aware, throughout the world the security of UN
5 personnel and property is the responsibility of the host
6 government.

7 Although some UN staff remain in Upper Lofa, full
8 resumption of UN activities will be impossible without the return or
9 replacement of looted assets and full guarantees for the future
15:00:52 10 safety of staff and property.

11 Beyond satisfactorily settling the above issues, the UN
12 seeks guarantees that its activities within Lofa county, such as
13 road repairs, food distribution, and other programmes will be
14 provided adequate security.

15:01:11 15 Please find attached reports from UNHCR and World Food
16 Programme written by mission members and a list of looted UN
17 assets. We are compiling inventories of personal property stolen
18 from staff.

19 The UN resident coordinator stands ready to clarify any
15:01:30 20 issues with you."

21 You see that it's addressed to Monie Captan, copied to
22 Daniel Chea.

23 Now, Mr Taylor, the kind of ill discipline mentioned in
24 that note verbale, was that endemic in the Liberian security
15:01:54 25 forces?

26 A. Counsel, what are we talking about here? April 1999.

27 Q. Yes, we are.

28 A. We dealt with this matter internally. You have this
29 conflict in Liberia. I am elected to office in July. 1997 goes,

1 1998 goes. All of the weapons that we need for security are
2 locked up with the very United Nations. What do they expect us
3 to protect people with, our hands? Okay? We had been talking to
4 these people. Our people are not trained. Train our army. They
15:02:29 5 are not trained. It was just a very unfortunate situation, and
6 we dealt with it on the ground in Liberia where we told them that
7 it was improper. The behaviour of these people were just
8 improper and uncalled for. But you are dealing with a situation
9 where you come out of a war. The United Nations and other
15:02:47 10 countries that are capable of assisting these little countries do
11 nothing about it and expect you to do the impossible. Well, the
12 word endemic, you could say yes, but we are still dealing with
13 people that are not trained, that are not armed, that are not
14 equipped to deal with these kind of matters. They refuse to
15:03:06 15 help, okay, in any shape or form, and they expect us to do - it
16 was just an unfortunate thing. And we told them that they had to
17 accept responsibility for this.

18 The people that were seized by these rebels were European
19 Union ambassadors. What did the UN do about it? These
15:03:23 20 individuals were handed over in Conakry - in Conakry - to the
21 United Nations. The rebels came from Guinea. They did nothing
22 about it. So we told them and they agreed finally - this is an
23 official transmission, but by the time we got through - it took
24 about a month or so - they understood that they had to accept
15:03:43 25 some responsibility for this. Those individuals that were
26 involved were disciplined, okay? And you can see some of the
27 vehicles were returned and most of the personal property. But we
28 told them this is what you expect when you have crisis in the
29 country. At the end of the crisis and the international

1 community, because they made this - like, one or two officials of
2 that government refused to assist and to get people training.
3 The only training programme we were beginning to get was the
4 police training programme that we are talking about.

15:04:16 5 And you are talking about Voinjama, and the Court has seen
6 the distance of Voinjama and where Voinjama is. Voinjama is in
7 the heart of rainforest way in Lofa County on the border. Rebels
8 attack. We were - in fact, we just didn't have the means. I am
9 not justifying the attitude of those military people that were
15:04:40 10 there. They were totally wrong, but I told the UN they had to
11 accept some responsibility, training was very important, and
12 something to help to equip our people in the future to deal with
13 these matters.

14 Q. So the short answer to my question, Mr Taylor, is it that
15:05:02 15 the use of marijuana and alcohol was a problem within the
16 security services in Liberia?

17 A. No, it was not a problem with the security services in
18 Liberia, no.

19 Q. But were there instances of it?

15:05:17 20 A. Well, I tell you, all around the world sometimes before
21 soldiers go to war they take a shot of whiskey, brandy, or
22 something, in fact --

23 Q. Mr Taylor, with respect --

24 A. Yes?

15:05:28 25 Q. -- the question is very simple. Was this kind of problem
26 something associated with the behaviour of the security service
27 in Liberia?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Have you any reason to doubt that this behaviour did take

1 place by your security services in Voinjama on 21 April 1999?

2 A. No, I have no reason to doubt this explanation.

3 Q. Very well. Okay. We are going to leave that now.

4 Could I ask, please, Mr President, that the documents

15:06:17 5 behind divider 16 be marked for identification in this way: That

6 the letter to the UN Secretary-General dated 23 April 1999 be

7 marked MFI-247A; that the appendix to that, which is the letter

8 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Guinea from

9 the Liberian foreign minister dated April 1999 be marked for

15:06:48 10 identification MFI-247B; and that the note verbale regarding the

11 treatment of UN personnel be marked for identification MFI-247C.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those documents just described are
13 marked accordingly.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:07:13 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I am still on that same issue, okay, but a

16 different aspect of it. Now, so far as that Voinjama incident is

17 concerned, help us. As far as you are aware, was it brought to

18 the attention of the United Nations by Mr Downes-Thomas?

19 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely. He filed a full report, a

15:07:52 20 coded report, to his boss detailing what had happened in

21 Voinjama.

22 Q. And did you see it?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. Have a look behind divider 17, please. Do you have it?

15:08:13 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Now, you see that this is dated 27 April 1999, so we are

27 talking about six days after the incursion.

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And it's the Voinjama incident/incidents, and it's from

1 Felix Downes-Thomas.

2 "I attach for your information copies of the following:

3 A preliminary and partial report on the events of 21-22
4 April 1999 in Voinjama; a note from Liberia's Ministry of Foreign
15:08:57 5 Affairs to its counterpart in the Republic of Guinea."

6 We've looked at that.

7 "A related press release from the Liberian Ministry of
8 Information. Please note that the author of the preliminary and
9 partial report mentioned above, representative Ebrima O Camara,
15:09:17 10 wishes that his report be considered as incomplete and that
11 missing from it is the yet-to-come World Food Programme
12 prospective."

13 Over the page, please. And we see there a letter to
14 Mr Kakonge. Who is he, Mr Taylor?

15:09:41 15 A. Mr Kakonge is the UN DP to Liberia, United Nations
16 Development Program.

17 Q. And we see that it provides:

18 "I hasten to submit to you the report referred to above in
19 order to assist you with your presentation to the government.

15:10:02 20 I have explained why the report should be considered
21 partial and incomplete in the text itself. The World Food
22 Programme perspective is being prepared by the regional office in
23 Abidjan and should be completed with minimum delay.

24 For the purpose of your discussions with government,
15:10:19 25 however, the list of vehicles commandeered and equipment looted
26 and UN properties unaccounted for is accurate, through
27 incomplete. It is also incomplete in terms of inclusion of
28 properties belonging to NGOs.

29 My concern is that if we await the compilation of a

1 comprehensive list of properties, we would lose the momentum and
2 freshness of the intolerable rape of the international community
3 in Voinjama by the security forces of Liberia."

15:10:55 4 Over the page, and we see that there is a list of
5 individuals who travelled by air to Voinjama on Tuesday, 25
6 April, yes, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And we see those who travelled by road, those who travelled
9 by air, including the Ambassador for the Netherlands, do you see
15:11:21 10 that?

11 A. Yes. Yes, he was one of those that was picked up by the
12 invading forces.

13 Q. And the individuals were housed in four guesthouses?

14 A. Yes.

15:11:36 15 Q. And when we go over the page, we see the rest of the
16 report. And for completeness, let's go through it:

17 "They were divided between four guesthouses. The
18 guesthouses are also the home bases for expatriate staff of
19 respective agencies and NGOs. At the time of the outbreak of the
15:12:10 20 armed confrontation, the following expatriate staff were on post
21 in Voinjama."

22 And they are named.

23 "The fact that the mission was dispersed between four
24 locations, coupled with the time of commencement of the fighting,
15:12:26 25 0415 on 21 April, gave rise to the differences in perspectives
26 on, and experience of the fighting, according to where members of
27 the mission were staying. It also explains why this report is
28 considered a partial report that needs to be complemented by the
29 report of the group of mission members who were accommodated at

1 the World Food Programme guesthouse and by that of those who
2 stayed at the IRC guesthouse.

3 It should be noted by late afternoon of Wednesday 21 April,
4 the mission members and World Food Programme staff who were
15:13:04 5 accommodated at the World Food Programme guesthouse reached the
6 UNHCR sub-office compound. The author of this report and two
7 UNHCR staff of the Voinjama sub-office had reached the sub-office
8 compound earlier that day. By the end of the working day of 21
9 April all members of the mission had regrouped in the UNHCR
15:13:31 10 sub-office compound and accounted for except for" the Dutch
11 ambassador, someone from the Norwegian embassy and someone from
12 Abidjan?

13 "The first shots were heard at 4.15 a.m. on Wednesday 21
14 April. It was a mixture of semi-automatic rifle fire and the
15:13:54 15 flat report of shotguns and perhaps home-made guns. There was no
16 sustained automatic fire, and there were no heavy explosions.
17 The shooting remained sporadic for the next three hours,
18 approximately. It remained distant and did not appear to be
19 shifting away from the area around the centre of town.

15:14:14 20 Shortly after the shooting commenced, the UNHCR local staff
21 member and his family fled to the guesthouse. The staff member
22 said that rebels had entered the town and were fighting the
23 government forces. At daybreak, a few uniformed men were spotted
24 along the road that runs uphill toward the army barracks from the
15:14:37 25 UNHCR guesthouse. They appeared to be patrolling the area but
26 not all of them were armed. Two of the men dressed in tie-dyed
27 blue fatigues later on walked past the guesthouse to the UNHCR
28 sub-office approximately 300 metres away and back to the barracks
29 area.

1 At approximately 10.30 a.m. a group of civilians escorted
2 by three uniformed men were observed approaching the guesthouse
3 along the road from the direction of the barracks. Among them
4 the author recognised the head of the GTS Liberia operations."

15:15:16 5 What's GTS, Mr Taylor?

6 A. No, that's GTZ.

7 Q. GTZ?

8 A. It's a German NGO involving road construction.

9 Q. "The author called out to the GTZ officer. The group
15:15:33 10 approached the guesthouse and were led into the compound. When
11 it was established that the group were being escorted to the
12 UNHCR sub-office compound for safety, the author asked that
13 everyone in the guesthouse join the group to be escorted to the
14 sub-office compound.

15:15:47 15 Of the three uniformed escorts, two were dressed in blue
16 tie-dyed fatigues and one in regular military green fatigues.
17 The latter appeared to be in command. The younger of the two in
18 the tie-dyed fatigues no more than 18 years old was drawing on a
19 large, crude joint of marijuana while we organised to leave.

15:16:07 20 They became interested in a Land Cruiser station wagon, a Land
21 Cruiser pick-up and a Yamaha 125 motorcycle that were parked in
22 the guesthouse compound.

23 The author was requested to hand over the keys of the Land
24 Cruiser station wagon. He avoided doing so by explaining that
15:16:30 25 the keys were kept in the office and they could be retrieved from
26 there once we arrived. When someone inattentively started to
27 load personal effects into the back of the pick-up, the uniformed
28 men questioned the truthfulness of the authors's assertion that
29 the keys to the cars were in the office. They became visibly

1 incredulous and the young marijuana smoker became aggressive. It
2 was explained that the key to the pick-up was unusually in the
3 possession of the associate field officer, that he would drive it
4 to the sub-office compound and return with the key to the Land
15:17:04 5 Cruiser station wagon. This was initially rejected but
6 subsequently accepted on condition that the author remain with
7 the uniformed men until the pick-up returned with the keys. The
8 head of the sub-office elected to remain with the author. All
9 the other people left for the UNHCR sub-office compound.

15:17:24 10 Some 20 minutes later, with the patience of the uniformed
11 men running out, the pick-up returned. It was given to the men
12 and it was explained that the keys to the second car could not be
13 found. The men loaded the motorcycle in the pick-up and drove
14 away. The author and head of sub-office then walked unescorted
15:17:43 15 to the sub-office.

16 The men had told the author that they were fighting to
17 bring down the government of Charles Taylor. They said they were
18 tired of fighting in Sierra Leone and one of them said he had
19 lost a brother during the 18 September incident in Monrovia."

15:17:58 20 What's the 18 September incident, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Okay. I see. The 18 September incident is the situation
22 involving the fight with Roosevelt Johnson when he tried to take
23 over in Monrovia. I see. Okay.

24 Q. Now, we are going to come back to that little passage in a
15:18:25 25 moment, but let's continue:

26 "They said they would be in Monrovia within two days. The
27 men had also said that they do not harm civilians and they
28 respect the United Nations and NGOs.

29 The compound became a safe haven for upwards of 150 people

1 by the evening hours of Wednesday 21 April. The group was
2 composed of members of the joint food assessment mission,
3 Voinjama based expatriate staff of WFP, UNHCR, NGOs, local staff
4 of UN agencies and unknown persons in search of safety. It was
15:19:05 5 later learned that many of the women and children were the
6 families of soldiers and members of the different Liberian
7 security units who had directed them to go there for safety.
8 From its vantage point on top of the hill, the compound allowed
9 for a better view of the surrounding area. By late afternoon (21
15:19:27 10 April) the fighting intensified. Machine gun fire could be
11 heard, heavy explosions like mortar echoed from the hills and men
12 could be seen, though not distinguishable, moving in a pattern.
13 The weaker group was routed and was in full retreat towards the
14 north. The government security forces had prevailed, and the
15:19:49 15 rest of the evening and night was pierced by sporadic small arms
16 fire.

17 The chairman of the joint security visited the compound at
18 approximately 19.30 hours to reassure everyone that the situation
19 was under control. We took the opportunity to request for an
15:20:08 20 escort to the airstrip the following morning, and then to
21 Monrovia for the convoy of vehicles.

22 During the course of the night and into the early hours of
23 Thursday morning, three separate calls were made on the compound
24 by the Liberian security forces. With each call they demanded
15:20:26 25 and commandeered an UN or NGO vehicle. At 11.45 p.m. a group of
26 men, claiming they were acting under instructions, told us to
27 prepare to leave immediately for Vahun under their escort. The
28 group declined. The group drove away with one of the vehicles in
29 the compound. At 0200 on Thursday 22 April yet another call was

1 made on the compound and another vehicle taken.

2 The members of the security services who visited the
3 compound were, without exception, visibly under the influence of
4 alcohol, marijuana or some other substance. They were
15:21:07 5 undisciplined and aggressive. There did not appear to be a
6 single kind person among them.

7 In planning for the evacuation by air, the group had
8 foreseen two scenarios: Evacuation by helicopter and by
9 Kilo-One, (UNHCR aircraft), from Tenebu airstrip (20 minutes by
15:21:37 10 road from Voinjama city); evacuation by helicopter only from the
11 football pitch near the army barracks. The group had planned for
12 both, preferred the former, and was in the process of organising
13 the departure of the vehicle convoy when information was received
14 that evacuation would be staged only from the barracks and that
15:21:57 15 the helicopter would arrive there after an hour and 20 minutes.

16 This delay complicated the chaos in the sub-office compound. The
17 commander of the joint security left; the men they left behind to
18 escort the convoy became engaged in extortion from Liberians in
19 the convoy. They commandeered an IRC pick-up that was lined up
15:22:21 20 for the convoy. The men were all armed; they were highly
21 undisciplined, and some of them were clearly under an influence
22 at 10.00 hours.

23 A short ride to the barracks was uneventful even without
24 escort. The football pitch was under guard when the convoy
15:22:40 25 arrived. The helicopter landed and took off without incident.
26 An escort was arranged for the convoy of cars that was leaving
27 for Monrovia.

28 Upon arrival in Monrovia it was learned that shortly after
29 the helicopter took off from Voinjama, Liberian security forces

1 entered and looted the UNHCR sub-office and the guesthouse of all
2 its contents. These consisted of UNHCR property and personal
3 effects of expatriate UNHCR staff.

15:23:17 4 The previous day, the WFP sub-office and guesthouse were
5 similarly looted by the Liberian security forces and all their
6 contents taken. It was reported that the WFP warehouse holding
7 600 tons of food stocks was being systematically looted by the
8 night of Thursday 22 April.

15:23:40 9 The offices of NGOs in Voinjama were also reportedly
10 looted. It should be noted that the looting of office premises,
11 residences and warehouses, et cetera, commenced only after the
12 government security forces had routed the enemy and that the
13 looting was not done by the ordinary civilian citizens of
14 Voinjama. The looting was done by government security forces.

15:24:02 15 A total of 19 vehicles and three motorcycles were
16 commandeered, hijacked from the UN agencies and NGOs in Voinjama,
17 Kolahun and Vahun between 21 and 22 April. Most of them having
18 been taken by government security forces rather than 'the enemy'
19 they were fighting. The list of vehicles is in annex. Also
15:24:29 20 included in the list are other UNHCR properties looted from the
21 sub-office and guesthouse. The list for WFP and other agencies
22 was not available at this writing.

23 It remains extremely difficult for this author to determine
24 whether the armed confrontation that broke out in Voinjama was:
15:24:54 25 (a) an attempt at invasion by Liberian rebels from a neighbouring
26 country; (b) a stage managed incident that was intended to send a
27 strong signal to discredit or to warn; (c) a mutiny within the
28 various units of the Liberian security forces.

29 Suffice it to say that that even for a non-military pundit

1 Like the author the confrontation appeared so amateurish,
2 disorganised and unstructured in its execution that the routing
3 of the adversary after only ten hours of engagement relegated the
4 seriousness of their intent. The three uniformed men referred to
15:25:29 5 earlier in this report, with whom this author came into contact,
6 gave the impression from their uniforms and from their
7 pronouncements that they belonged to the government security
8 forces but they had become so disgruntled as to be fighting to
9 remove Charles Taylor from the presidency.

15:25:47 10 There was a lot of gunfire coming from the direction of the
11 army barracks on Wednesday throughout the day. The author
12 noticed no bullet impacted walls on any of the buildings near the
13 barracks football pitch while the helicopter was awaited.

14 With regard to the speculation that the confrontation could
15:26:04 15 have been stage managed, its possibility in actual fact was
16 prompted only by the compulsion to rationally comprehend such an
17 obviously bloody and senseless endeavour. Should it be true,
18 however, it would constitute a most odious cynicism towards the
19 peace and physical security of common men and woman in Liberia.
15:26:27 20 Civilised judgment on this is unanimous.

21 The behaviour of the various units of the Liberian security
22 forces towards civilians, the expatriate and the United Nations
23 community, et cetera, failed every standard of military
24 discipline. In the eyes of most, they were more dangerous to
15:26:43 25 them than the enemy they were fighting. Every unit of the
26 security forces was involved in systematic looting of property
27 and the commandeering of vehicles. This was how a GTZ driver was
28 shot in the arm and seriously wounded because he refused to hand
29 over his car keys to soldiers of the AFL.

1 The bullying of innocent civilians at gunpoint, the
2 confiscation of personal property, the all pervasive extortion,
3 the commandeering of vehicles, complete with load sometimes; the
4 looting frenzy that characteristically accompanies armed
15:27:21 5 confrontations. These have been the distinguishing features of
6 the Liberian security forces during the confrontation in
7 Voinjama. They can be synthesised in two words: undisciplined,
8 untrained.

9 Most of the soldiers that this author had contact with were
15:27:40 10 either drunk on alcohol or high on marijuana. In appearance they
11 were sloppy, their language was rough and they were frightful.
12 It was hard to imagine them in polished boots and dress uniform,
13 ever.

14 Increasingly this author has come to acknowledge the
15:28:02 15 important role of the security forces in rural Liberia. The.

16 The Liberian government expressed dismay that, despite
17 these repeated warnings, it would appear that the Government of
18 Guinea did little to ensure that its territory would not be used
19 to launch an incursion into a neighbouring state?

15:43:09 20 The Government of Liberia said this act of apparent
21 acquiescence on the part of a neighbouring state contravenes the
22 letter and spirit of the relevant charters, agreements and
23 protocols of the Mano River Union, ECOWAS, OAU and UN
24 respectively. "

15:43:26 25 Now, Mr Taylor, before we move on from this, I would like
26 us to discuss a little further the implications of the report
27 made by this individual. Hitherto you have accepted that there
28 was a breakdown of law and order and control in Lofa County. Do
29 you agree?

1 A. I agree.

2 Q. And in this letter there is reference to there being an
3 absence of administrative control in that area which had to be
4 supplied by the security service. Do you agree with that?

15:44:13 5 A. I agree.

6 Q. Had you done anything, Mr Taylor, to address those issues?

7 A. To the best of my ability, yes. We've tried to send, like
8 I say, some of the old commanders that we figured until we could
9 get the proper means of really training them we will try to put
10 in individuals that we felt could at least contain the situation.

15:44:38

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the reason I am pressing you on this is
12 because of its direct relevance to the allegations being made
13 against you, because you appreciate, don't you, that this is the
14 part of Liberia through which arms and ammunition were said to be
15 going to the RUF?

15:45:09

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Now, if as suggested, Mr Taylor, there was this breakdown
18 in administration and there was this absence of discipline in the
19 security services, can you say, in all honesty, that arms and
20 ammunition were not going over that border?

15:45:38

21 A. I cannot say with all honesty that arms were not going
22 across that border.

23 Q. But, Mr Taylor, there is another aspect to this. This is
24 1999 April?

15:45:57

25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. We've had the Freetown invasion in January?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Thereafter, there have been major allegations of Liberian
29 involvement in Sierra Leone?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Yes?

3 A. Yes.

15:46:17 4 Q. The finger was being pointed directly at you and your
5 government as being the hidden hand behind that conflict,
6 particularly in 1999. That's right, isn't it?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, that being the case, why didn't you try and
9 clean up your act, if I could put it that way, in Lofa County and
10 Voijama? Why didn't you? You see what I'm saying?

11 A. I see what you're saying. When you say clean up,
12 what - for me, I'm innocent, I'm in Monrovia, I'm President of
13 the country. We have a situation where the individuals in that
14 particular area are former combatants of another faction that
15 have come under government control. We are not in the position
16 to pay army. There is no such thing as an AFL at the time. We
17 have people that are virtually volunteering and carrying on
18 security work within that particular area. You send one
19 commander from the former ULIMO that you think can help to
15:47:02 20 contain the people while you are begging the international
21 community for assistance to begin to retrain and to train people.

22 We did everything that we could to try to control the
23 situation, but it was virtually impossible, especially in those
24 non-former NPFL areas, to really control the situation. But we
15:47:54 25 did the best that we could.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, the reason why I am asking you is this: Any
27 reasonable person would expect that in light of those kind of
28 accusations and being concerned to put an end to these rumours,
29 it would behove you as President to ensure that you have in that

1 sensitive area critical forces you can depend upon to just put an
2 end to the rumour. Do you understand the point I'm making?

3 A. I understand. I understand what you are saying.

4 Q. Why didn't you ensure then that there was such a force in
15:48:34 5 Lofa at the time?

6 A. Counsel, you know, for the Court, you know, it's like
7 putting the cat in the pigeon cage. Look, what are we dealing
8 with here? We are dealing with a conflict, you have ended, you
9 have got people that are virtually not trained. You are talking
15:48:59 10 about the forest region where you can put the best of commander
11 in an area to command Voinjama. Voinjama is some 50, 60 miles
12 almost from the Sierra Leonean border. You have got to go
13 through Kolahun and Foya. There are people over there. You've
14 got forest - that's the entire forest region of Liberia.

15:49:19 15 We send a few people in that place to try to contain the
16 situation, but it is a virtual impossible situation if a man is
17 not a disciplined trained man.

18 In fact, those former NPFL officers, I could remember we
19 sent a gentleman called Christopher Vambos, a very, very good
15:49:42 20 former NPFL general to command the area. He is stationed in
21 Kolahun. These are long distances. It's an impossible situation
22 when you are dealing with undisciplined people, especially these
23 people that were in that area that we know now as we have
24 listened had hidden weapons, had done different things. It was a
15:50:05 25 very, very, very, very near impossible situation with people that
26 are not trained. We sent officers, but they just could not
27 contain it.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm sorry, I have to continue questioning you on
29 this.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now help me in this respect: Where did the disciplining
3 and restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia - where did that
4 come on your list of priorities as President?

15:50:42 5 A. Oh, that was very, very, very high on the list. Almost
6 immediately we started talking about it. I am talking as early
7 as 1997. We even put together a commission supported by certain
8 NGOs to draw up a restructuring plan for the government for a new
9 armed forces. It was all on the cards. We did not get the
10 assistance to do that.

11 And I have said to this Court why did we start the ATU?
12 Why did we employ a former South African general to begin to
13 train the ATU? It was to begin - first of all, we could have had
14 almost a similar situation like this in Monrovia. Had it not
15 been for the ATU that was trained to take care of embassies and
16 government buildings, we would have had a similar situation like
17 this. We had begun the process. That was very high on my list
18 beginning 1997.

15:51:37 19 Q. And was it possible to carry it out within your budgetary
20 constraints?

21 A. No, no, no. We are talking about, what, a \$30 million
22 budget. We could not even pay civil servants. No, we could not
23 have. We could not have.

24 Q. So just give us an idea, Mr Taylor, how much control did
15:52:19 25 you have of this region - this lawless region, as you describe it
26 - from Monrovia?

27 A. If I put it on a scale from 1 to 10, I would put it to
28 about a 5 in terms of actual control. I am not talking about
29 sovereign control, we are not talking - yes, as President I have

1 sovereign control of the country. Coming out of this war with
2 the different factional groupings, in that part of the country I
3 would put it to about a 5. I would put it to about a 5.

4 Q. So 50 per cent control?

15:53:03 5 A. That's what I would say. If I may just add something here
6 for the Court, under these conditions, any time you have these
7 kinds of situations where you've got people not on salary, they
8 are not being paid, you've got so-called security forces calling
9 themselves security forces running around trying to help. Once
10 you have this problem of lack of training, lack of payment, at
11 least some incentive of control, you understand me, it's a very
12 tough thing. This is why we kept pushing for the complete
13 demobilisation of the combatants. That was never really done.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, sorry to ask, this 50
15:54:18 15 per cent control, is this throughout the presidency or is this
16 only in 1999?

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. The question is very straightforward, Mr Taylor.

19 A. I would say beyond 1999 and going close to the end of my
15:54:44 20 presidency because right after this 1999, your Honour, we are
21 right back into a war. It's the same group that attacked in
22 Lofa, that group is LURD. It continues and that's the LURD that
23 continues all the way to Monrovia, okay.

24 And the funny part about this, and the very serious part of
15:55:07 25 it, is that who's LURD? LURD is the same ULIMO-K, the same
26 ULIMO-J that were being used as so-called security in Lofa. They
27 are the same LURD. That's the bad part of it. So I would say
28 going all the way into close to the end of my presidency, because
29 the war starts as of that time, LURD, and then it changes into

1 MODEL.

2 Q. Mr Taylor, I would like to examine that in a little bit
3 more detail, please.

4 A. Okay.

15:55:40 5 Q. Because you will recall that we have on more than one
6 occasion worked out a time line regarding control of that part of
7 the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia, yes?

8 A. Uh-huh.

9 Q. Beginning with the outbreak of ULIMO in 1992, yes?

15:56:05 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Continuing up until you come to the presidency in 1997,
12 yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. From '95 there is this period of disarmament, yes?

15:56:18 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Which concludes with the burning of the weapons in July
17 1999?

18 A. That is correct. The beginning of the process of burning,
19 yes.

15:56:30 20 Q. And thereafter, as you've indicated, in August 1999 and
21 continuing thereafter we have further incursions from Guinea. Is
22 that right?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Now, bearing all of those factors in mind, Mr Taylor,
15:56:53 25 question number one: What's the period when there is no - is
26 there a period when there is no fighting whatsoever in
27 Lofa County, and identify what that period is for us? Weakness
28 and near absence of critical administrative institutions has left
29 the security institution comparatively well deployed to play a

1 prominent role in day-to-day local administration. Throughout
2 the period of the confrontation, no member of the local civilian
3 administration was available or seen. The chairman of the joint
4 security and his assistants were the only contact between the
15:28:36 5 UN/NGO community and the government.

6 The personnel of the Liberian security forces are mortally
7 undisciplined and untrained; however, many of them are unsuitable
8 for service during this non-combatant period of transition from
9 war to peace. They were not kind to people in Voinjama.

15:28:59 10 If the role of the security forces/services in rural
11 Liberia is as prominent as I think it is, it will be an
12 investment in peace and the respect for human rights in Liberia
13 to support materially all efforts to restructure and train the
14 security forces and to gainfully engage in endeavours those
15 incorrigible elements whose time has anyway passed."

16 Now, Mr Taylor, let's be frank about this. That's quite an
17 indictment of the Liberian security forces, isn't it?

18 A. I agree, yes.

19 Q. And, Mr Taylor, let us remind ourselves. Voinjama is in
15:29:46 20 which county?

21 A. It's in Lofa.

22 Q. Near which border?

23 A. The border with Guinea.

24 Q. It's not a million miles away from the Sierra Leone border
15:29:58 25 as well, is it?

26 A. No, it's not.

27 Q. And in fact, just not too far from Voinjama is where?
28 Kailahun --

29 A. Yes, in a way.

1 Q. -- that province in Sierra Leone?

2 A. Yes. Kolahun then on, yes.

3 Q. Let's just pause and put this together, shall we. This
4 area of Liberia is quite critical in terms of what was going on
15:30:21 5 in Sierra Leone, is it not?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And even in the year 1999, April, on the eve of Lome, that
8 border with Sierra Leone is quite sensitive, isn't it?

9 A. Very sensitive, yes.

15:30:36 10 Q. And, Mr Taylor, if the author of this report is correct, in
11 that very critical and sensitive area you have quite an
12 ill-disciplined security force, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, were you aware of the situation?

15:31:01 15 A. Yes. And for some context, who was there? We are talking
16 about the people that are still there, we are talking about 1999,
17 we are talking about ULIMO is still basically settled in this
18 area. It is a lawless area, in fact.

19 Q. No, Mr Taylor, let's forget the lawlessness of the area.

15:31:22 20 We are talking about Liberian security forces, okay?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, help us. What had you done to address this issue of
23 ill discipline amongst those forces?

24 A. Quite frankly, the only thing that we had tried to do were
15:31:41 25 to get some of the old commanders to return to Lofa to try to
26 contain these people and those that were calling themselves a
27 security, to use them, and those that were the bad ones, to rub
28 them out; that's number one. The second thing we were trying to
29 do, we were trying to get a training programme. We're just

1 talking about a year into this, and people are still lodging in
2 areas that are part of former warring factions that are calling
3 themselves Liberian security. They are not paid, and you have to
4 get this picture: Lofa, Voinjama, Kolahun are still being
15:32:31 5 occupied by the former ULIMO fighters. Because they are there,
6 they are called Liberian security forces now. That's very
7 important. I want to get this across of what is going on, okay?
8 So we have to try to try to get former ULIMO commanders to go up
9 into that area to try to control them and then begin to seek a
15:32:56 10 programme of training for the new security forces.

11 Q. So the security forces, are you telling us, who are in that
12 part of Lofa, were former ULIMO combatants?

13 A. Yes. These are the same people that are digging up arms
14 and selling it into Sierra Leone that we have heard about in this
15:33:17 15 court. That's what I am telling trying to tell you, okay? These
16 are former ULIMO-K fighters that are there, and everybody is
17 grouped up in the bunch called Liberian security.

18 Q. Now Mr Taylor, the author of the report makes quite clear
19 in that last paragraph that what is needed is material support to
15:33:44 20 restructure and train the security forces. Did you receive any
21 such support?

22 A. None. Not a bit.

23 Q. You know in the same way that the British came in and
24 retrained the Sierra Leonean army, did you ever receive any such
15:34:04 25 support?

26 A. None whatsoever.

27 Q. As identified as necessary by this author?

28 A. We never received any such support, and I agree with this
29 author's assessment. We never received any.

1 Q. And, Mr Taylor, that behaviour by the "Liberian security
2 forces" in Lofa, was that with your consent or knowledge or
3 acquiescence?

4 A. Oh, no. No. In fact, we - no, no, no. We disciplined
15:34:40 5 those that we could identify. We returned United Nations
6 property. No, this was not without our consent, acquiescence,
7 none.

8 Q. And tell me, Mr Taylor, from Voinjama how much effective
9 control did you have over those forces in Lofa - I mean, from
15:35:01 10 Monrovia?

11 A. Not very much. Not very much. They were not being paid.
12 We had no money to pay them. People were just there. We didn't
13 have very much control.

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if they weren't being paid, did this kind
15:35:21 15 of - let's call it what it is - mercenary behaviour surprise you;
16 looting property?

17 A. No, it didn't surprise me.

18 Q. Did you have the money to pay them?

19 A. No, we did not have the money to pay them. This is why we
15:35:40 20 were trying to get the international community to assist us
21 in - in fact, I have mentioned before this Court. In fact,
22 demobilisation never completely took place, as I mentioned before
23 the Court once, as you see in Mozambique where you disarm, you
24 demobilise, you try to find some money or something, give it to
15:36:06 25 the ex-combatant, get them resettled. It never happened. We
26 were in the process of trying to get this international community
27 to help us, and that is why in that particular region most of the
28 trouble that happened, whether it is this LURD - and as you
29 mentioned and I was shaking my head - when I see this person here

1 refer to the Monrovia incident I'm beginning to --

2 Q. We'll come back to that. Don't worry about it. I'm coming
3 back to that.

4 A. I am beginning to see what happened.

15:36:35 5 Q. I am coming back to that. In fact, let's go back to it
6 now, Mr Taylor. Now, Mr Taylor, after the Camp Johnson Road
7 incident, let's just remind ourselves, certain of
8 Roosevelt Johnson's followers took refuge in the United States
9 embassy. Is that right?

15:36:59 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. And as you told us and as we dealt with earlier, some of
12 those were airlifted to Sierra Leone, weren't they?

13 A. That is correct. That is correct.

14 Q. Now, bearing that in mind, let us go back to page 3, last
15:37:22 15 paragraph:

16 "The men had told the author that they were fighting to
17 bring down the government of Charles Taylor. They said they were
18 tired of fighting in Sierra Leone, and one of them said he had
19 lost a brother during the 18 September incident in Monrovia."

15:37:40 20 What does that suggest to you, Mr Taylor?

21 A. That these people were part - you know, I have read this
22 before and it never occurred too to me. These people were part
23 of that Roosevelt Johnson situation, just as Abu Kieta that sat
24 here - these are the same people - these are the same people that
15:38:04 25 tried to overthrow the government in September of 1998, okay, and
26 failed, that are out, okay, and now here are the rest of them
27 coming back in here as LURD. These are the same people. And
28 when I first read this, it never occurred to me. And Abu Kieta,
29 who was ULIMO-K that fought along with Roosevelt Johnson that was

1 captured in Monrovia, who sat in this Court and said that I had
2 sent him to Sierra Leone, that's the group. That's the group.

3 Q. And you see, "... they were tired of fighting in
4 Sierra Leone." What do you understand by that?

15:38:44 5 A. That means that these are some of the ULIMO-K people that
6 had been used across the border, okay, that were now tired and
7 wanted to come home and wanted to use force to come home. These
8 are some of the same ex-combatants that I can put back to those
9 that were recruited with the Kamajors. All of them are now
15:39:08 10 saying that they are tired and they want to come back, and this
11 is the method they used to get in.

12 Q. Okay. Now, let's just see what else is behind this. Let's
13 turn over to the next page. We see the list of vehicles stolen -
14 we needn't delay too long over that - and the next page, various
15:39:40 15 other items stolen; and then various other items on the next
16 page; and then finally we come to, do we not, a press release
17 issued by your government? Is that right, Mr Taylor?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. "The government of Liberia's filed a formal protest to the
15:40:13 20 Guinean government regarding the recent armed incursion into
21 Voinjama, Lofa County, by an unidentified group from the Guinean
22 territory. The government is also requesting the Guinean
23 government to investigate and respond to the matter.

24 The government of Liberia is also requesting the Guinean
15:40:34 25 government to turn over to Liberian authorities for investigation
26 elements of the incursion forces who are presently receiving
27 medical treatment in Nzerekore as well as others on Guinean soil.

28 The Liberian government has further requested the Guinean
29 government to provide substantive guarantees that its territory

1 will not be used to facilitate military activities against
2 Liberia.

3 According to an Information Ministry release issued this
4 evening, the government's protest was contained in a diplomatic
15:41:13 5 note from the Foreign Ministry in Monrovia to the Foreign
6 Ministry of Guinea.

7 'The government of Liberia takes very seriously its
8 responsibility to safeguard and protect its territorial integrity
9 as well as the lives of its citizens and foreign residents within
15:41:32 10 its borders in the face of incidents like the one under
11 reference', the protest note said.

12 According to the protest note to the Guinean government,
13 the Liberian government's determination to exercise its sovereign
14 duty will stop short of nothing in ensuring that the peace and
15:41:53 15 tranquility of Liberia go undisturbed.

16 The government of Liberia has also expressed grave concern
17 about the Voinjama armed incursion of April 21 during which a
18 group of armed men, temporarily abducted and held hostage
19 personnel of the United Nations and representatives of a number
15:42:13 20 of donor countries and organisations from their compounds in
21 Voinjama.

22 Noting that confirmed reports have established that the
23 incursions were carried out by individuals from Guinean
24 territory, the government of Liberia recalled that it has
15:42:37 25 repeatedly brought to the attention of the Guinean government
26 persistent reports of ongoing military training on Guinean soil
27 near the Liberian border by individuals whose purpose ostensibly
28 is to destabilise Liberia and induce conflict and chaos.

29 A. I would say there is no fighting in Lofa County up to about

1 the third quarter of 1998. If you're reminded, there was an
2 initial incursion by a group calling themselves Mosquito Spray,
3 and that was not in that area, but it was further up towards the
4 Kolahun side. And then there was another incursion, this one
15:57:51 5 that now occurs in Voinjama - this is now in 1999 - and there are
6 other incursions that just never stopped, all starting and ending
7 and continuing from Lofa.

8 Q. All right. Let me put the question differently. Can you
9 identify for us a time period with a start and a finish date when
15:58:25 10 Lofa was not occupied by either ULIMO, or LURD, or some other
11 rebel faction?

12 A. I would say about a year, from July 1997 to roughly
13 July-August 1998, that there were no - that I could say there
14 were no - and I don't want you to use "occupy" in a general
15:58:53 15 sense, but there were no problems where there was someone in
16 there making trouble. I would put it to that one year.

17 Q. And during that one-year period, using your scale, to what
18 extent did the writ of the Liberian government extend to
19 Lofa County; do you understand me?

15:59:20 20 A. Yes, I understand you. The Liberian government did extend
21 to Lofa [indiscernible] in terms of sovereign - in terms of
22 sovereign control, yes.

23 Q. What about effective control?

24 A. I would not say effective, because once I have said that
15:59:41 25 there was this 50 per cent control factor, that's not effective.
26 So I would say that in terms of effective control coming out of a
27 crisis like that, I would put it to about that same level too.

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I don't understand why the
29 answer is 50 per cent in these new circumstances. Perhaps you

1 could shed some light. I could understand the answer when it
2 related to LURD and the other rebel forces being in charge, but
3 for this one year when there wasn't fighting, when there were no
4 rebel incursions, I don't understand that answer.

16:00:27

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Well, you understand the query that's being raised
7 Mr Taylor, I am sure. Can you assist us?

8 A. I do. Well, your Honour, the question was to the effect of
9 effective control, okay? Within that one-year period, while we
10 do not have war and crisis going on, there are other difficulties
11 in that area. He was talking about occupation and effective
12 control. So during that particular period, yes, you have control
13 as President because you are President of the country. But for
14 effective control in that area, I would interpret it as follows:

16:00:43

15 I would have identifiable security forces. They would be paid,
16 they would be trained, and they would be responding to the direct
17 instructions from central government. That's what I would call
18 in government effective control, your Honour. And once I could
19 not provide that level of support from central government, I
20 would not call it effective control.

16:01:05

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I hope that clarifies the position,
22 your Honour.

23 A. No, I don't think your Honour is satisfied with it.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: [Microphone not activated].

16:01:50

25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Mr Taylor, those forces in Lofa County as described in this
27 note by this individual, did they accept orders from Monrovia?

28 A. Well, yes, I would say they accepted orders from Monrovia.

29 Q. But are they responding to orders from Monrovia?

1 A. Now, the execution is questionable.

2 Q. What do you mean?

3 A. You can accept an order, but you do not execute. It's the
4 execution - if you are a disciplined person, you would execute an
16:02:42 5 order, okay? Yes, an order comes from Monrovia. You say okay,
6 but if you don't carry it out, you are indisciplined and you are
7 not - then, you know, then you are not executing your order. So
8 yes, they would accept orders from Monrovia, but they were not
9 being - in fact, they were not disciplined enough to effectively
16:03:02 10 carry out orders. If they were, they would not have looted the
11 UN compound, okay? So they were indisciplined. While they are
12 listening to the orders, they are not executing.

13 Q. And did you have the power or the ability or the means to
14 punish them for that, Mr Taylor?

16:03:23 15 A. For those that were identifiable and we could get them
16 arrested, yes, we could remove them from the location and punish
17 them, and we did on some occasions.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before moving on, Mr President, can I
19 ask, please, that that code cable from Felix Downes-Thomas to
16:03:52 20 United Nations headquarters dated 27 April 1999, and to which is
21 appended various documents on the incident in Voinjama, be marked
22 for identification MFI-248, please.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, you want all of those marked as the
24 one document?

16:04:20 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I think it would assist, Mr President,
26 because they are all listed under code cable at the front. So
27 that's why I thought it might be of assistance to have them
28 together with that providing, in effect, an index.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: I agree with that, Mr Griffiths. We will

1 marked those documents as described as MFI-248.

2 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, counsel, may I just make a point
3 here, your Honours? Because the Justice asked a very important
4 question. I just wanted to make a point. As we sit in this
16:05:05 5 courtroom - as we sit in this courtroom, this - the context of
6 what is going on must be very, very clear now as we sit here.
7 India, for example, has a large police contingent in Liberia.
8 From 1997 we've talked about up until now, we're talking close to
9 ten years, India has a police contingent - huge contingent in
10 Monrovia. The armed forces of Liberia is just beginning to be
11 trained. The United Nations still has one of the largest
12 peacetime forces still stationed in Liberia in order to correct
13 these kinds of problems. So we're talking about a year or so,
14 1999, when I come in in 1997. It is the absence of this kind of
16:06:03 15 assistance that we must look at in the context. It has nothing
16 do with being derelict in duty. But here we are ten years after
17 the war. My presidency goes. We have an interim government. We
18 have a new government. We still have an international police
19 force and an international army in Liberia to continue to
16:06:26 20 maintain a peace and security. So that's how difficult the
21 situation is.

22 So when I talk about the matter of not having effective
23 control, it is these kinds of actions on the part of the
24 international community that would have afforded this type of
16:06:43 25 effective control that the Justice asked about.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Okay. Now, those documents we've just looked at,
28 Mr Taylor, deal with that incident on the 21 April 1999. Now,
29 apart from that particular security concern in Voinjama, at or

1 about that time did your government have any other concerns about
2 security or the possibility of other incursions from overseas?
3 Did you?

16:07:37 4 A. Yes, we were still concerned, yes, that they were supposed
5 to - we were getting information that people were supposed to
6 attack us by way of the sea and all of that.

7 Q. Where did you get that information from?

8 A. Security. We had conveyed this to - in fact, we had picked
9 up the information from our own intelligence sources that there
16:07:58 10 could have been a possible seaborne attack and all of that.

11 Q. Who by?

12 A. By the people out of Sierra Leone. We were understanding
13 that LURD was going to launch another prawn attack via
14 Sierra Leone on the ocean.

16:08:19 15 Q. And did you communicate those concerns to anyone?

16 A. Oh, yes. In fact, if I'm not mistaken, that report was
17 also sent about our fears. In fact, we informed ECOMOG. We even
18 had some personnel placed at the ECOMOG base to - you know, to
19 keep an eye out. The UN was informed about it, yes.

16:08:49 20 Q. Who at the UN?

21 A. The special representative.

22 Q. Have a look behind divider 18, please. Do you recognise
23 that document?

24 A. Yes, I do.

16:09:15 25 Q. We've seen that it is another code cable, and this one is
26 dated 5 May 1999 from Felix Downes-Thomas to Prendergast at the
27 United Nations in New York entitled, "Possible incursion from the
28 seaward side of Liberia and AFL presence at the former
29 headquarters compound:

1 "The Minister of State For Presidential Affairs,
2 Dr Jonathan Taylor, informed me on Saturday, 1 May 1999, that his
3 government had received intelligence reports about possible
4 incursion from the seaward side of Liberia. He intimated that
16:10:12 5 the individuals who are bent on executing the incursion were
6 either being supported or encouraged by elements within ECOMOG."

7 Where did you get that from?

8 A. From our intelligence along the borders we had been told
9 that ECOMOG, after leaving, we were trying to help to
16:10:37 10 destabilise - remember, General Shepeldi was gone across the
11 border, so we are getting reports that he is upset and might try
12 to encourage people to destabilise the government.

13 Q. "One of the areas of immediate concern to the government of
14 Liberia was the compound in which the headquarters of the ECOMOG
16:10:58 15 high command had been situated. That compound has a beachfront
16 and is the very location where the weapons and ammunition
17 recovered during the disarmament process in Liberia are stored.
18 Dr Taylor also informed me that given the strategic significance
19 and the danger which any incursion into the area is likely to
16:11:21 20 pose, the President was going to maintain a military-security
21 presence in the compound as a contingency. He advised me that he
22 had been making unsuccessful efforts to reach the US head of
23 embassy in Liberia to provide the information which he had just
24 shared with me.

16:11:42 25 In a meeting with Lofa citizens, which took place at the
26 Executive Mansion yesterday, President Taylor referred to reports
27 his governments has received regarding a planned incursion into
28 Liberia by sea. He further noted that certain people from the
29 sub-region were on their way to Monrovia by sea. He also

1 informed the group that he has ordered a small contingent of
2 government troops to the former ECOMOG headquarters compound and
3 that these troops would also keep an eye on the containers in
4 which the arms and ammunition collected during the disarmament
16:12:24 5 exercise are stored. In this connection, he stated that
6 government troops and those of ECOMOG were working cooperatively.

7 Defence Minister Daniel Chea today provided UNOL with
8 confirmation that the government has indeed deployed a
9 company-sized unit of the AFL in the compound on 1 May 1999 with
16:12:50 10 the sole purpose of establishing a security parameter in the area
11 and with the aim of ensuring the safety and security of the arms
12 and ammunition which were surrendered during the disarmament
13 process.

14 Now, did that incursion in fact materialise, Mr Taylor?

16:13:16 15 A. No, it did not.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask, please, Mr President, that that
17 code cable from Felix Downes-Thomas dated 5 May 1999 on possible
18 incursion from the seaward side of Liberia be marked for
19 identification MFI-249, please.

16:14:05 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-249.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

22 Q. Now we are jumping to another matter, Mr Taylor. You had
23 told us of attempts to reinvigorate the Mano River Union, yes?

24 A. Yes.

16:15:05 25 Q. In May of 1999 did anything occur with regard to that
26 intent?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. What was that?

29 A. We established the Mano River Union into a parliamentary

1 organisation of the three parliaments and in May, Liberia hosted
2 the inter-parliamentary meeting of the Mano River Union in
3 Monrovia.

16:15:51 4 Q. And what was the purpose of that inter-parliamentary
5 groupi ng?

6 A. They were really looking at the general objectives of the
7 union, in fact, and, in the face of the crisis hitting the
8 regi on, they were di scussi ng ways and means of cooperati on. How
9 the governments could cooperate, the parliaments could cooperate
16:16:14 10 in trying to execute the various agreements of the union.

11 Q. Now, this meeting in May, you tell us, May of which year,
12 may I ask?

13 A. This is in 1999.

14 Q. And where in Liberia was it held?

16:16:33 15 A. The meeting was held at the Unity Conference Centre in
16 Monrovia. I addressed that conference. I remember that very
17 well.

18 Q. You addressed the conference, did you?

19 A. Yes, I did.

16:16:46 20 Q. Have a look behind di vi der 19, please. What are we looki ng
21 at, Mr Taylor?

22 A. This is the resoluti on at the end of the conference. But I
23 addressed the conference at the begi nni ng.

24 Q. You addressed the conference at the begi nni ng?

16:17:22 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. All right. Just to orientate oursel ves, have a look behind
27 di vi der 20. Second page of that behind di vi der 20. What have we
28 got there?

29 A. This is the speech I delivered at the conference.

1 Q. Right. Go back to behind divider 19. Let's look at the
2 resolution, then we will come to the speech. Yes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, we see that this is the first annual
16:18:12 5 inter-parliamentary conference of member states of the Mano River
6 Union at the Unity Conference Centre, Virginia, Liberia, May 26
7 to 29, 1999:

8 "Resol uti on.

9 Whereas, we the parliamentarians of the Mano River Uni on
16:18:34 10 member states, realising the prevailing sociopolitical situati on
11 in the Mano River states;

12 Whereas, the Mano River Uni on serves as a stimulus for
13 social, economic and political integration of member states and a
14 conducive atmosphere;

16:18:53 15 Whereas, the prevailing socioeconomic, political and
16 security conditions have undermined the effectiveness of the
17 union in this direction;

18 Whereas, desiring to promote and consolidate sub-regional
19 peace, stability and socioeconomic cooperation;

16:19:14 20 Whereas, we the parliamentarians of member states,
21 cognizant of these conditions, are determined to strengthen the
22 union by improving relation among member states, thus
23 substituting state of warfare, distrust and refugee problems
24 within the sub-region, with trust, peace, security and unity;

16:19:36 25 Whereas, deeply concerned that the instability in
26 Sierra Leone and the cross-border attacks on members states have
27 led to suspicion and mistrust; have caused a high degree of
28 destruction to lives and properties; and have adversely affected
29 the good neighbourly relations at all levels;

1 Whereas, the purpose of this first inter-parliamentary
2 conference of the Mano River Union is to set in motion genuine
3 cooperation, integration and the finding of solutions to
4 intra-union problems through peaceful means, thus eliminating all
16:20:15 5 forms of barriers to peace and security within the Mano River
6 Union member states;

7 Now, therefore, we the participants at this first
8 inter-parliamentary conference of the Mano River Union do hereby
9 resolve as follows:

16:20:34 10 (a) the formation of the Mano River Inter-Parliamentary
11 Union;

12 (b) that this union be empowered to review and assess the
13 refugee situation in the Mano River Union member states and its
14 socioeconomic and environmental impact;

16:20:54 15 (c) the conference appeals to the civic groups, traditional
16 and religious leaders in the Mano River Union member states to
17 lend their support to efforts being made by the Mano River Union
18 parliamentarians in finding genuine peace in the Mano River Union
19 member states;

16:21:12 20 (d) the conference sincerely calls on the three Heads of
21 State of the union to take additional steps in the enhancement of
22 peace, security, development, commerce and trade between and
23 amongst the peoples of the sister republics. "

24 Can I pause, Mr Taylor, to inquire you've told us and
16:21:37 25 indicated already the speech you made at this conference. Help
26 us, were the other two Heads of State present?

27 A. No.

28 Q. Was any other Head of State present?

29 A. No.

1 Q. "The conference further entreats the three Heads of State
2 to employ their good offices in setting up an early warning
3 mechanism that would facilitate the timely prevention and
4 resolution of conflict that may arise from time to time;

16:22:12 5 It is also resolved by this inter-parliamentary conference
6 that the next meeting of the Mano River Inter-Parliamentary Union
7 be held in Conakry, the Republic of Guinea;

8 It is further resolved that this conference lends its total
9 and unflinching support to the efforts ECOWAS at the ongoing Lome
16:22:36 10 conference on Sierra Leone."

11 Because of course, Mr Taylor, if we remind ourselves of the
12 date, this is 26 to 29 May, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And, as we looked at earlier, on or about 16 to 19 April,
16:22:57 15 people are being transported down to Lome for these talks which
16 are still ongoing at this time, yes?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. "It is also resolved that this conference condemns in no
19 uncertain terms any and all cross-border attacks on the
16:23:13 20 territories of Mano River Union member states;

21 The conference therefore calls on all member states not to
22 allow their territories to be used by dissident groups;

23 The conference expresses sincere appreciation to His
24 Excellency Dankannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor for hosting and
16:23:39 25 participating in the conference;

26 The conference also expresses its profound gratitude to the
27 Presidents Alpha Oumar Konare of Mali and Lansana Conte of Guinea
28 for their enabling support and approving the attendance of the
29 members of their parliaments;

1 The conference acknowledges with profound gratitude and
2 immense appreciation to the honourable Alieu Nouhoun Diallo,
3 President of the National Assembly of Mali, for his remarkable
4 role in organising this first inter-parliamentary conference of
16:24:19 5 the Mano River Union member states."

6 Mr Taylor, help me, why is the President of the National
7 Assembly of Mali involved? Are they a member of the Mano River
8 Union?

9 A. No, no, no. Mali is not. But he is now sitting as head of
16:24:38 10 the ECOWAS parliament and he has experience in organising these
11 parliamentary things, so he is invited to assist.

12 Q. Okay:

13 "The conference sincerely regrets the absence of the
14 parliamentary delegation of Sierra Leone and hopes that it will
16:25:02 15 be able to attend future meetings of the Mano River
16 Inter-Parliamentary Union."

17 Now, just on that note, Mr Taylor, was there a reason for
18 the absence of the Sierra Leoneans?

19 A. Really to the best of my knowledge it had to be financial,
16:25:21 20 I think. There was no other reason given me by the government.

21 Q. And, at this time, to your knowledge, was there a
22 delegation of the Sierra Leonean government in Lome for those
23 ongoing talks?

24 A. During the July discussions in Lome?

16:25:45 25 Q. No, during this period when this conference is going on in
26 Liberia, yes? The conference we are talking about now.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. At this time, in May, is there a Sierra Leonean delegation
29 in Lome for the talks that are going on there?

1 A. Yes, there is a Sierra Leonean delegation in Lome, yes.

2 Q. "Finally, the conference wishes to appeal to the President
3 of the Republic of Liberia and the President of the Republic of
4 Guinea to establish contact with their colleague and brother, the
16:26:27 5 President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, to ensure the
6 participation of the members of the parliament of Sierra Leone at
7 the next meeting of Mano River Inter-Parliamentary Union in
8 Conakry, Guinea."

9 We see this is dated 29 May 1999. Now, could I ask,
16:26:55 10 please, Mr President, that that document be marked for
11 identification MFI-250, please.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI-250.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful. I note the time,
14 Mr President. Would that be convenient?

16:27:16 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think rather than start on another
16 matter now we will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9.30.

17 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.27 p.m.
18 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 9 September 2009
19 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

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EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	28264