



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

FRIDAY, 9 JULY 2010  
9.04 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding  
Justice Richard Lussick  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Mr Nicholas Koumjian  
Ms Ruth Mary Hackler

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Ms Logan Hambriek  
Ms Fatiah Balfas

1 Friday, 9 July 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.]

09:04:20 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,  
8 your Honours, and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this  
9 morning, Ruth Mary Hackler and Nicholas Koumjian.

09:04:50 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,  
11 counsel opposite. For the defence today myself, Courtenay  
12 Griffiths. With me Ms Logan Hambri ck, Ms Fatiah Bal fas and  
13 Ms Elizabeth Espinosa.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Sesay, good morning. We  
09:05:12 15 continue with your testimony this morning. I just remind you, as  
16 I normally do, that you're still bound by the oath that you took  
17 to tell the truth.

18 Mr Griffiths, please continue.

19 WITNESS: DCT-172: [On former oath]

20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Cont'd]

21 Q. Mr Sesay, yesterday afternoon when we adjourned we just  
22 concluded looking at a document dated 24 June 1998 addressed to  
23 the President of the Republic of Liberia, Dr Charles G Taylor,  
24 which was sent through the chief of protocol, Mr Alhaji Musa  
09:06:08 25 Cisse; do you recall that?

26 A. Yes, I recall.

27 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness's mic be  
28 raised up a little?

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, in the context of that letter, I'd like you  
2 to help me with the following matter. To your knowledge --

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, could you remind us exactly  
4 what exhibit that was? We looked at several letters yesterday.

09:07:04 5 MR KOUMJIAN: I believe it's P-66.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

7 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, in the context of that letter, could you  
8 help me with the following: As far as you're aware, when was the  
9 first contact between Sam Bockarie and Charles Taylor?

09:07:32 10 A. The time that I can recall is that before Sam Bockarie

11 left, he told everybody in Kailahun. It was in September 1998.

12 Q. And help us: How did that come about?

13 A. Well, I understood from Sam Bockarie when he came to  
14 Pendembu he told me and other people - that is the time he came

09:08:05 15 to establish the brigade structure. So we had a meeting and he  
16 told me that he had been sending Major Mulbah - Major Augustine

17 Mulbah, he was a vanguard, he had been sending him to Varmuyan  
18 Sheriff so that Varmuyan Sheriff could make a contact in - for him,

19 Sam Bockarie, to meet with Mr Taylor, he said, but that did not  
09:08:30 20 work.

21 Q. So he had attempted - he had sent Major Augustine Mulbah to  
22 try and contact Varmuyan Sheriff to arrange a meeting with Charles  
23 Taylor; is that right?

24 A. Yes.

09:08:48 25 Q. Why Varmuyan Sheriff?

26 A. Well, Varmuyan Sheriff had once become - had been Sam  
27 Bockarie's friend since late 1996 to 1997.

28 Q. And did Varmuyan Sheriff organise such a meeting with  
29 Charles Taylor?

1 A. No, he did not organise it. That was why --

2 Q. That was why what?

3 A. That was why Sam Bockarie decided to send Eddie Kanneh,  
4 former SOS for the Eastern Region for the AFRC. He sent him to

09:09:39 5 Conakry to meet the Liberian ambassador.

6 Q. What was the name of the Liberian ambassador?

7 A. Well, I can only recall the last name: Wantee.

8 Q. Now, help us: First of all, when was it that Bockarie  
9 tried to get Varmuyan Sherif to arrange a meeting with Charles

09:10:06 10 Taylor?

11 A. Well, what I understood from Bockarie was that it was from  
12 May that he had been sending Pa Mulbah to meet Varmuyan Sherif.

13 He sent him in May, and he also sent him in June.

14 Q. And why was Bockarie wanting to meet with Charles Taylor?

09:10:39 15 A. Well, one, Bockarie was thinking that if somebody wanted to  
16 see Mr Taylor regarding Abidjan Accord, because the RUF had been  
17 pressured from the Guineans, the ECOMOG and the Kamajors, and  
18 that was the situation that the RUF was facing.

19 MR KOUMJIAN: That does not answer the question.

20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Now, when did Sam Bockarie send Eddie Kanneh to meet with  
22 the Liberian ambassador in Guinea?

23 A. That was in August 1998.

24 Q. And why did Sam Bockarie send Eddie Kanneh to meet with the  
09:11:41 25 Liberian ambassador in Guinea?

26 A. Because Bockarie had been sending Pa Mulbah and he did not  
27 get any positive - when he did not get positive result from  
28 Varmuyan Sherif, that's when he decided to send Eddie Kanneh, who  
29 was influential in Guinea, to meet the Liberian ambassador in

1 Conakry.

2 Q. When you say that Eddie Kanneh was influential in Guinea,  
3 what do you mean?

09:12:19

4 A. Well, Eddie Kanneh, one, he spoke very good French, and  
5 even during intervention, he was in Freetown. He went through  
6 Guinea - he went through Guinea into Foya and came to Buedu to  
7 join Sam Bockarie there, and he had friends in Guinea.

8 Q. Now, did Eddie Kanneh go to Guinea and meet with the  
9 Liberian ambassador?

09:12:40

10 A. Yes, Eddie went to Conakry and met with the Liberian  
11 ambassador.

12 Q. And what was the outcome of that meeting?

09:13:05

13 A. Well, what I understood, after Eddie had returned he  
14 informed Bockarie that he had taken the letter that Bockarie had  
15 sent to the ambassador, and the ambassador said that Eddie should  
16 go there again because the ambassador said he will try to inform  
17 the government in Monrovia.

18 Q. And did Eddie Kanneh go back again?

19 A. Yes, Eddie came back to Buedu.

09:13:27

20 Q. And what happened thereafter?

21 A. So in September 1998 Sam Bockarie came to Pendembu and  
22 informed me and the other officers who were in Pendembu that he  
23 had got a message that General Dopoe Menkarzon had come to Foya  
24 Tinkia at the border with the message that Sam Bockarie was to go  
25 and meet him for him to be taken to Mr Taylor in Monrovia.

09:13:55

26 Q. That was General Dopoe Menkarzon. I see that it's missing  
27 from the transcript at line 17. That spelling is on the record.  
28 The spelling, as I recall it, is D-O-P-O-E M-E-N-K-A-R-Z-O-N.

29 When did General Dopoe Menkarzon come to the border?

1 A. It was in September 1998.

2 Q. Now, General Dopoe Menkarzon, you have mentioned that name  
3 before, haven't you, Mr Sesay?

4 A. Yes.

09:15:02 5 Q. And remind us, in what context was it that you had  
6 encountered that or heard of that general before this?

7 A. Well, that general, he was the one who came to withdraw the  
8 NPFL fighters in 1992 from Sierra Leone, Kailahun District.

9 Q. Okay. Now, are you sure that it was General Dopoe  
09:15:30 10 Menkarzon who came to the border at that stage in September 1998?

11 A. Yes. When Bockarie came to Pendembu, that was the name he  
12 told us that it was the man who came to collect him to go to  
13 Monrovia.

14 Q. And did Bockarie go with General Dopoe Menkarzon to  
09:15:55 15 Monrovia?

16 A. Yes, Bockarie went.

17 Q. Now, I want to be sure about this. It's a matter of some  
18 importance. Was it not Varmuyan Sherif who came to collect Sam  
19 Bockarie to take him to see President Taylor?

09:16:19 20 A. No, it was General Dopoe Menkarzon. Because Sam Bockarie  
21 came and he said it to us, and everybody knew about that in  
22 Kailahun because that was not any hidden thing.

23 Q. And can you help us as to what stage - what part of  
24 September 1998, this occurred? Was it the beginning, the middle  
09:16:41 25 or the end?

26 A. I think it was around the middle of September.

27 Q. And as far as you recall, Mr Sesay, how long was Sam  
28 Bockarie away on that occasion?

29 A. Well, Sam Bockarie spent between three to four days, and he

1 sent a message that he had returned to Buedu.

2 Q. Did Sam Bockarie return to Monrovia thereafter?

3 A. Yes, in October he went back to Monrovia in 1998.

4 Q. Why did he go back in October 1998?

09:17:40 5 A. Well, he said he was invited.

6 Q. And how long was he away on this occasion?

7 A. At this time he was in Monrovia for up to a week, and he  
8 returned.

9 Q. Yesterday when we were discussing satellite phones, you  
09:18:00 10 mentioned Bockarie returning with - from Monrovia with a  
11 satellite phone. When was it that he returned to Monrovia with a  
12 satellite phone?

13 A. It was the second visit that he made in October, when he  
14 was returning he brought a satellite phone with him.

09:18:24 15 Q. Now, the two visits you've described, Mr Sesay, in  
16 September and again in October, did Bockarie travel to Monrovia  
17 by himself or did any other member of the RUF travel with him?

18 A. He did not travel alone. At times he will go with CO  
19 Sellay or CO Mulbah or Eddie Kanneh. He did not go there alone.  
09:18:57 20 But these were the people he used to travel with. At times it  
21 would be Rashid Sandy, at times he would go with Lawrence  
22 Womandia.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, could the witness repeat the first  
24 two names that he mentioned? I think both of them were Theo  
09:19:17 25 something.

26 THE WITNESS: I said Major Mulbah and CO Sellay.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. CO Sellay, how do you spell Sellay?

29 A. I think it's S-E-A-L-L-Y.

1 Q. After that trip in October did Bockarie make any further  
2 trips to Monrovia in 1998?

3 A. Yes. He went to Monrovia in 1998.

4 Q. After the trip in October, did he make any further trips?

09:20:20 5 A. Yes. I said he went to Monrovia in December, late November  
6 1998.

7 Q. With whom did he travel on this occasion?

8 A. On this trip, because this time he called me from Pendembu  
9 to be in Buedu, myself and Mike Lamin. So he travelled with late  
09:20:48 10 SYB Rogers, War Council chairman, Eddie Kanneh, Lawrence  
11 Womandia, Rashid Sandy, Junior Vandi and late Shabado. All of  
12 them travelled together.

13 Q. And on this occasion, did Bockarie and those individuals  
14 only travel to Monrovia?

09:21:20 15 A. No. They passed through Monrovia.

16 Q. And went where?

17 A. They went to Burkina Faso, and from there the three of them  
18 went to Libya, Bockarie - four of them went to Libya; Bockarie,  
19 Ibrahim Bah, late SYB and Eddie Kanneh.

09:21:46 20 Q. Where had they met up with Ibrahim Bah?

21 A. They met Ibrahim Bah in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

22 Q. Why did they travel to Burkina Faso?

23 A. Well, at that time, we understood that the President of  
24 Burkina Faso was the OA chairman, so it was with regards that  
09:22:23 25 proposed - regarding the revisiting of the Abidjan Accord.

26 Q. And why did they then go to Libya?

27 A. Well, when they got to Burkina Faso, Ibrahim Bah discussed  
28 with Sam Bockarie that they were to go and see Gaddafi for  
29 assistance for the RUF.

1 Q. How long did they spend in Libya?

2 A. Well, I cannot tell the exact number of days that they  
3 spent in Libya but when - from the time they left Sierra Leone  
4 they spent two weeks away from Sierra Leone and they returned.

09:23:08 5 Q. Did Bockarie and others meet with Gaddafi in Libya?

6 A. Yes and I understood that it was - Sam Bockarie said it was  
7 himself and SYB Rogers who were able to see the Libyan leader.

8 Q. And did the Libyan leader provide them with assistance?

9 A. Yes. They gave Bockarie money.

09:23:39 10 Q. Can you help us as to how much money was provided by the  
11 Libyan leader to Bockarie?

12 A. Well, I think the money that was given to Bockarie was  
13 about \$50,000.

14 Q. Did Bockarie return to Sierra Leone with that money?

09:24:05 15 A. Well, when Bockarie returned he did not bring all of the  
16 money because when he came - he informed us in Buedu, because  
17 when he came we had a meeting at Waterworks and he told us he had  
18 used some of the money, he bought ammunition at Lofa and he used  
19 some other to buy medicine and he brought the medicine and the  
20 ammunition.

09:24:29 21 Q. So he used some of the money to buy - well, let's take  
22 things in stages. By what route did Bockarie return to Sierra  
23 Leone?

24 A. It was the same route that he had used to go, through Lofa  
09:24:53 25 County. From Monrovia, Kakata, Gbarnga. From Gbarnga he came to  
26 Zorzor, from Zorzor to Voinjama and Kolahun, Foya and he crossed  
27 the border through Foya Tinkia to Buedu.

28 Q. I'm grateful for that, Mr Sesay. And it's my fault. After  
29 Libya, where did Bockarie go?

1 A. From Libya, he came back to Burkina Faso.

2 Q. And then from --

3 A. Because some of the men had been left there.

4 Q. And from Burkina Faso, to where did he go?

09:25:31 5 A. They came to Monrovia.

6 Q. And then you tell us he purchased ammunition and medicine  
7 in Lofa and then returned to Sierra Leone. Is that right?

8 A. He bought the medicines in Monrovia and he bought the  
9 ammunition at Lofa, according to what he told us. That's what I  
10 can recall.

09:25:53

11 Q. From whom did he buy the ammunition in Lofa?

12 A. Well, he said he bought the ammunition from the battalion  
13 commander - some from the battalion commander and the other one  
14 from Benjamin Yeaten.

09:26:17

15 Q. And what was the nature of those --

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Excuse me, the battalion commander of  
17 where? Or which battalion - commander of which organisation?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to that:

19 Q. The battalion commander of where, Mr Sesay?

09:26:38

20 A. The battalion commander at Lofa for AFL, the Liberian army.

21 Q. What was his name?

22 A. I don't recall the person's name because the first man who  
23 was there was replaced towards the end of the year.

24 Q. And he also bought some, you say, from Benjamin Yeaten. Is  
25 that right?

09:27:06

26 A. Yes, that's what I said.

27 Q. And what was the nature of these deals with these two  
28 individuals?

29 A. Well, I wasn't with Bockarie at that time, but when he

1 returned that's what he told us, that he bought the ammunition  
2 from Lofa. He said he bought from the battalion commander in  
3 Voinjama and when he came he got some other ammunition in  
4 Kolahun.

09:27:42 5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this  
6 part of his answer.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Could you repeat that answer, please, Mr Sesay?

9 A. I said he said he bought some of the ammunition from the  
09:27:50 10 battalion commander in Voinjama and when he came he got some  
11 other ammunition from Benjamin Yeaten in Kolahun that he bought.

12 Q. And did Bockarie say whether or not these purchases were  
13 with the knowledge and permission of Charles Taylor?

14 A. No. Bockarie did not tell me that.

09:28:24 15 Q. I don't understand that answer, Mr Sesay. Were those  
16 purchases made with the permission of Charles Taylor?

17 A. I said Bockarie did not tell me that. The answer is no,  
18 Bockarie did not tell me that Mr Taylor knew about the purchase  
19 of those ammunition or the sale.

09:29:02 20 Q. And what was the quantity of ammunition purchased by  
21 Bockarie from these two individuals?

22 A. You mean the quantity of the ammunition? Well, the AK  
23 rounds were up to 40 boxes and the G3 rounds, I think it was  
24 about 15 boxes and the HMG rounds were about 10 boxes.

09:29:37 25 Q. And how was this ammunition transported to Sierra Leone?

26 A. They were in a truck.

27 Q. How big was this truck?

28 A. It was a civilian truck, a ten-wheel truck.

29 Q. And when did this ammunition arrive in Sierra Leone?

1 A. The very day that Sam Bockarie arrived in Buedu.

2 Q. Can you give us an idea as to when - well, let's start  
3 with in which month was that?

4 A. That was in December 1998.

09:30:22 5 Q. Can you help us as to whether it was the beginning, middle  
6 or end of December 1998?

7 A. Well, I think it was around the 11th and the 12th that  
8 Bockarie arrived in Buedu, December.

9 Q. And where was that ammunition stored?

09:30:48 10 A. The ammunition was at Bockarie's house because his bedroom,  
11 there was a store by his bedroom. It was in that store that he  
12 packed the ammunition.

13 Q. Now, you mentioned the meeting in Waterworks. When did  
14 that meeting take place?

09:31:09 15 A. When Bockarie and others arrived, it was the following day  
16 that the meeting was held at Waterworks.

17 Q. Who attended that meeting?

18 A. Sam Bockarie, myself, late SYB Rogers, Mike Lamin, Eddie  
19 Kanneh, Rashid Sandy, Lawrence Womandia. We were in the meeting.

09:31:49 20 Q. What was the purpose of the meeting?

21 A. Well, the purpose was for Sam Bockarie and he gave  
22 instruction that I was to move to Kono to join the troops there  
23 and attack the ECOMOG positions in Kono, and he briefed us about  
24 the trip that he had made. That was the purpose.

09:32:16 25 Q. Now that we've established those visits by Bockarie to  
26 Monrovia, and dealt with that meeting at Waterworks, I would like  
27 now to go back to you, Mr Sesay. Yesterday we had reached the  
28 month of August. What were you doing during September, October  
29 and November whilst Bockarie was making these trips you've

1 described to Monrovia? What were you doing?

2 A. Well, I was the commander based in Pendembu. Because after  
3 I lost the diamonds, when I returned Bockarie posted me to  
4 Pendembu. So I was the one to supervising the front lines in the  
09:33:07 5 Kailahun District, Baima towards Daru, Mobai, Kui va and Jojoima.

6 Q. And during those months, September, October and November,  
7 what was the position of the RUF?

8 A. Well, at this time the RUF - their main three targets in  
9 Kailahun - we were in defensive positions at that riverbank. The  
09:33:42 10 only attack that we carried out was to attack the ECOMOG and  
11 Kamajors at Nyeyama and we captured the place. Our men were in a  
12 zoebush. We had a zoebush there at Nyeyama.

13 Q. And during these months, Mr Sesay, did the RUF have contact  
14 with those AFRC forces up in Koinadugu and with Superman, who was  
09:34:23 15 in that area as well?

16 A. No, no.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, could you give us a  
18 spelling of this place, Nyeyama?

19 THE INTERPRETER: It's N-Y-E-Y-A-M-A.

09:35:07 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Now, at this time, Mr Bockarie, what was your position -  
22 what was your rank within the RUF?

23 A. Well, at this time Issa was the colonel and I was the  
24 battle group commander. I was based in Pendembu. But when  
09:35:36 25 Bockarie was about to post me to Pendembu, he said I only had  
26 business to do with the front lines in the Kailahun District, and  
27 I should have no business to do with any other areas regarding  
28 the RUF like the Kono District, because that was the only other  
29 place that the RUF was. So my activities were located in the

1 Kailahun area at this time.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, what was the answer that the  
3 witness gave? "At this time Issa was the colonel", was it?

4 THE WITNESS: Myself. I said at that time I was a colonel  
09:36:14 5 at the RUF and I was the battle group commander. But because of  
6 the diamonds that I had lost, Bockarie sent me to Pendembu. He  
7 said I should only have business to do with the three targets in  
8 the Kailahun District.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:36:30 10 Q. In November of 1998, Mr Sesay, did you have the power to  
11 grant promotions to individuals within the RUF?

12 A. No. In November, I did not give promotions to people.  
13 I would recommend to Sam Bockarie, and Sam Bockarie would approve  
14 of promotions.

09:36:56 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness be shown Exhibit P-136,  
16 please.

17 Q. Mr Sesay, have you seen this document before?

18 A. No, this document, I've not seen it before. This is my  
19 first time.

09:38:09 20 Q. Is that your signature?

21 A. This is not my signature, and I was not an acting chief of  
22 defence staff in November. When Sam Bockarie left, Mike Lamin  
23 and I were there. I was - I was a field commander.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this  
09:38:38 25 part of his answer.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Could you start again, please, Mr Sesay?

28 A. I said this is not my signature. This is not the way  
29 I sign. That is not the way I write my "Y", so definitely that's

1 not my signature. And in November 1998 when Sam Bockarie called  
2 me from Pendembu to join Mike Lamin and to take care of Buedu  
3 until he returned, Bockarie did not pronounce me as acting chief  
4 of defence staff. And I never used that title and I never wrote  
09:39:19 5 that title on any document. I was a field commander.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: When Bockarie left, who was acting CDS?

7 THE WITNESS: No, there was no acting CDS. I was a field  
8 commander. I was at the ground together with Mike Lamin at  
9 Buedu. But I did not act as CDS. I was carrying my position,  
09:39:51 10 battlefield commander.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment, please?

12 Q. Now, whilst you've got that document there in front of you,  
13 Mr Sesay, you were saying that is not how you write the "Y" in  
14 "Sesay".

09:40:20 15 Could the witness - leave that document there, and could we  
16 now have Exhibit P-483, please. P-483, please.

17 Madam Court Manager, could you help me to this extent:  
18 That document that you have in your hand also has Mr Sesay's  
19 signature on it. I would like you to place both that document  
09:42:13 20 and the other document on the screen side by side so that we can  
21 see the two signatures.

22 Mr Sesay, the document on the right bearing the date 27 May  
23 2003, is that your signature?

24 A. Yes, this one is my signature on 7 May 2003.

09:42:49 25 Q. What are you saying to us about the way you write the  
26 letter Y?

27 A. The "Y", I'll bring the line down and at the end, the "Y"  
28 always come back a little and I put it up.

29 Q. So the signature on the left, is that - did you write that?

1 A. No, this is not my signature. And I even have a comment  
2 about this particular fellow whose name is on this document.

3 Q. Do you spell your name I-S-S-A-H, as appears on this  
4 document on the left?

09:43:46 5 A. No. My name is I-S-S-A. That was how it was spelt, and  
6 that is how I spell it. On - all the documents that was written  
7 regarding Issa in the RUF was I-S-S-A. There was no "H" after  
8 the "A".

9 Q. So what do you say about this document on the left,  
09:44:09 10 Mr Sesay? Does that document have anything to do with you?

11 A. No. This document has nothing to do with me.

12 Q. Thank you. Can we put those two documents away now,  
13 please.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: For the record, Mr Griffiths, just to  
09:44:29 15 eliminate any shadow of doubt, which document is the witness  
16 discounting?

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Mr Sesay, could you please point to the document which you  
19 say is not - has nothing to do with you?

09:44:53 20 A. The one that is 19/11/98. And I said even the person who  
21 alleged that I signed this document, I know this person and  
22 I said I have a comment to make with regards to this person.

23 Q. Who is the person?

24 A. This is Albert Saidu, who is aka Eyeball. And this  
09:45:22 25 individual made a statement to my defence case, and when it came  
26 to the time it was sent for the second time - a statement was  
27 obtained from him for the first time, and because the first time  
28 he - a statement was obtained from him, it was presented to my  
29 lawyers. When I read it - any time I read defence statements, I

1 will write question marks and I will say I need some more details  
2 from this witness. And when he was met for the second time, he  
3 said no, he had no more interest in the defence case because -  
4 and he said because the Prosecution had met him and what the  
09:46:02 5 Prosecution was offering him, I could not offer him. And if you  
6 check my defence statements, this name is amongst there. This  
7 person made a statement to my defence.

8 Q. Now, help me with this, Mr Sesay, because I'm not clear  
9 what it is you're telling us. The person who signed this, do you  
09:46:37 10 know that person?

11 A. Well, I don't know who signed, but I know the name that  
12 they are alleging that I promoted, and this person made a  
13 statement to my defence team.

14 Q. And what is the name of the person? Is it the name of the  
09:46:59 15 person that appears on this document, P-136 - Exhibit P-136?

16 A. Yes, that's the name of the person on this 19/11/98.

17 Q. Captain Albert Saidu, yes?

18 A. Yes, that is his name and another name for him is aka  
19 Eyeball.

09:47:26 20 Q. And you're saying that this person made a statement to your  
21 lawyers for your defence; is that right?

22 A. Yes, that's what happened. That's what he did.

23 Q. And then you say that later he said that he was being  
24 offered more by the Prosecution, so therefore he didn't want to  
09:47:49 25 appear for your defence; is that right?

26 A. Yes, that's what he said.

27 Q. Offered more what?

28 A. Well, he just used the expression, he said what the  
29 Prosecution had offered him, I could not offer him, so he was not

1 interested in my case any more. So that's what he said.

2 Q. So did this man --

3 A. And the documents are with the Defence in my office.

09:48:28

4 Q. And did this man Albert Sai du in due course give evidence  
5 for the Prosecution?

6 A. Well, I did not know, because when he said that, from that  
7 time we avoided him.

8 Q. So in due course this man Albert Sai du became a Prosecution  
9 witness, did he?

09:49:03

10 A. Well, I don't know exactly --

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Excuse me, I think the witness has  
12 already answered by saying he doesn't know.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:49:21

14 Q. As far as you're aware, Mr Sesay, did this man in due  
15 course give a statement to the Prosecution?

16 A. Well, yes, based on the statement that he made to my  
17 investigation team that what the Prosecutor offered him I could  
18 not offer him, so he left me and went to the Prosecutor. And  
19 that was not him alone, it happened with other witnesses.

09:49:49

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, the question you were asked is  
21 very simple: Whether or not you are aware that this man gave a  
22 statement to the Prosecution. So do you whether he gave a  
23 statement to the Prosecution or not?

09:50:10

24 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know but from the expression -  
25 I was in detention, ma'am.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, thank you. You don't know and  
27 that's a good enough answer.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. So just so that we are clear, Mr Sesay, this document

1 bearing the date 19 November 1998, exhibit P-136, has nothing  
2 whatsoever to do with you. Is that right?

3 A. No, this has nothing to do with me.

4 Q. Can we put those two documents away, please. Now,  
09:51:41 5 Mr Sesay, you told us earlier about a meeting you attended at  
6 Waterworks in December 1998. Do you recall that?

7 A. Yes, I recall that.

8 Q. And you said one of the things discussed was a proposed  
9 attack on - a proposed attack on Kono. Is that right?

09:52:12 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Who was to lead that attack?

12 A. Bockarie said it was me.

13 Q. And help us, were you provided with material in order to  
14 mount that attack?

09:52:35 15 A. Yes. Bockarie gave me some of the ammunition he'd brought.

16 Q. How much ammunition were you given for this attack?

17 A. Bockarie gave me 20 boxes of AK rounds, eight boxes of G3  
18 rounds and about five or six boxes of HMG rounds.

19 Q. And did you carry out that attack in Kono?

09:53:17 20 A. Yes, I carried out the attack in December 1998.

21 Q. Was that attack successful?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did you capture any arms and ammunition during that attack?

24 A. Yes, I captured a lot of arms and ammunition including  
09:53:39 25 tanks, armoured tanks and many armoured tanks rockets because the  
26 entire ammo dump from the ECOMOG was captured.

27 Q. Are you quite sure, Mr Sesay, about what you were provided  
28 with in terms of arms and ammunition in order to carry out that  
29 attack?

1 A. I was not given arms. I was given ammunition. That's what  
2 I recall.

3 Q. And are you quite sure about the quantity of ammunition  
4 that you were given?

09:54:26 5 A. Yes. That's what I can recall.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness be shown exhibit P-93,  
7 please:

8 Q. Mr Sesay, have you seen this document before?

9 A. Yes. They showed this document to me.

09:55:32 10 Q. When?

11 A. During my trial.

12 Q. Now, you see that - did you write this document, Mr Sesay?

13 A. No, I did not write this document.

14 Q. Now, we see that it's headed "Restricted, Revolutionary  
09:55:57 15 United Front of Sierra Leone." It's addressed to Major General  
16 Sam Bockarie chief of defence staff and it's from Brigadier Issa  
17 H Sesay battlefield commander. Now, first of all, Mr Sesay, in  
18 December 1998, were you a brigadier?

19 A. No. In December '98 I was a colonel. In January too I was  
09:56:31 20 a colonel. It was in February that Bockarie promoted me to  
21 brigadier.

22 Q. You see that it's headed, "Subject, comprehensive report"  
23 and it's dated January 9 - I don't know whether that's a 20 or  
24 what, but January - a date in January 1999:

09:56:57 25 "Remarks. Sir, on 6 December 1998, I left the defence  
26 headquarters on your instruction for assignment and mission to  
27 attack Koidu."

28 Earlier, Mr Sesay, you told us that Bockarie returned from  
29 Monrovia on or about 11 or 12 December. Is that right?

1 A. Yes, that's what I said.

2 Q. And the meeting at Waterworks took place after his return?

3 A. Yes. The meeting at Waterworks, it was when Bockarie had  
4 returned.

09:57:47 5 Q. And the attack on Kono took place after that meeting at  
6 Waterworks, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So where we see on this document, "On 6 December 1998  
9 I left the defence headquarters on your instructions for

09:58:10 10 assignment and mission to attack Koidu, the 2nd Brigade", did you  
11 leave defence headquarters on 6 December to attack Koidu?

12 A. No.

13 Q. "The below enumerated materials and items were then handed  
14 over to me for said mission: 30 boxes of AK rounds." Is that  
09:58:40 15 correct?

16 A. No, that is not correct.

17 Q. "16 boxes of G3 rounds." Is that correct?

18 A. That is not correct.

19 Q. "Two and a half boxes of RPG bombs." Is that correct?

09:58:57 20 A. No. Bockarie did not bring RPG rockets.

21 Q. Bockarie didn't bring RPG rockets from where?

22 A. The ammunition that he brought, he did not bring RPG  
23 rockets.

24 Q. Which ammunition are you talking about here?

09:59:23 25 A. The ammunition that was given to me to go to Kono, that  
26 Bockarie gave to me to attack Kono.

27 Q. Were you given drugs, diesel, petrol, for that attack?

28 A. Yes. Bockarie gave me medicines, and he gave me five jerry  
29 cans of diesel and five jerry cans of petrol.

- 1 Q. What about a mortar gun?
- 2 A. No, we did not go with a mortar gun.
- 3 Q. What about a Bazooka?
- 4 A. No, we did not go with a Bazooka.
- 10:00:15 5 Q. Were you provided with any 50 calibre rounds?
- 6 A. No.
- 7 Q. What are chasers?
- 8 A. No.
- 9 Q. What are they?
- 10:00:31 10 A. Chaser is like the gun that I described that were brought  
11 to Magburaka. The chaser is the same as SAM-7.
- 12 Q. And were you provided with any of those by Sam Bockarie for  
13 this attack on Kono?
- 14 A. No, no.
- 10:01:00 15 Q. What about 20 boxes of GPMG rounds?
- 16 A. No, the GPMG rounds that were given to me were about five  
17 or six boxes. It was not 20 boxes, no.
- 18 Q. Just looking at the first page of this document, Mr Sesay,  
19 is this accurate?
- 10:01:30 20 A. This document is not correct.
- 21 Q. Go over the page, please. We see further items listed  
22 there which were allegedly provided to you for this attack. Were  
23 you provided with any of those items we see listed there?
- 24 A. Yes, I was given cigarettes. Bockarie gave me cigarettes.  
10:02:06 25 And he gave me cartons of Maggi. And my operator was given acid  
26 for the battery. And stationery was given, together with engine  
27 oil to clean the arms. But cane juice, no I was not given cane  
28 juice.
- 29 Q. Now, where we see the sentence, "The below listed materials

1 and items were also given to me for Sengema" - is that Sengema or  
2 Sengema?

3 A. It's Sengema.

4 Q. Sengema. Were you ordered to attack Sengema?

10:03:02 5 A. No. Sengema was a combat camp across the Moa River. That  
6 was the one that protected the road between Sandaru and the Moa  
7 River.

8 Q. Did you, during the course of this operation, attack  
9 Sengema?

10:03:23 10 A. No, I did not attack Sengema.

11 Q. Just so we are clear, those items listed 1 through 7 for  
12 the Sengema target, were you provided with those items?

13 A. No, I was not given these items.

14 Q. Going down the list, we see:

10:03:52 15 "Members of delegation included myself as head, Colonel  
16 Morison Kallon, Lieutenant Colonel Foday Lansana, Major Edward  
17 Fembeh, Major Samuel F Jabba, Major Victor Kamara."

18 What does "S/Captain" mean?

19 A. That is staff captain.

10:04:25 20 Q. "Staff Captain Mohamed Kamara, Captain Morie Jibae, Captain  
21 Abdulai Massalay and Captain Musa Vandii." Did those individuals  
22 accompany you on the attack on Kono?

23 A. We went together with Morris Kallon. He was the deputy  
24 that Mosquito appointed.

10:04:59 25 Q. What about the others?

26 A. No. Like this Foday Lansana, he did not leave Kailahun  
27 with me. We came together with Edward Fembeh. Samuel Jabba was  
28 my adjutant. Victor Kamara was my bodyguard. Staff Captain  
29 Mohamed Kamara, was the armourer, all of us came. Captain Morie

1 Jibae was Mr Sankoh's bodyguard who was with Mosquito. He said  
2 the two of us should come, and Abdulai Mansaray was my bodyguard,  
3 Musa Vandi, aka Boys, was my bodyguard.

10:05:55

4 Q. So of those names, who do you say did not attend on this  
5 mission?

6 A. This Lieutenant Foday Lansana, he did not go with us.

7 Q. Now, Colonel Morrison Kallon --

10:06:20

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Excuse me, Mr Griffiths I'm a little  
9 lost. When you talk of mission - the first question you asked was  
10 which of these people accompanied him on the attack on Kono. And  
11 then you asked him - or his answers were - he described the  
12 various persons and the offices that had he held. But this  
13 letter, I think, speaks of a delegation going somewhere. Doesn't  
14 speak of a team that is going on war. So I'm a little lost now.

10:06:50

15 When you speak of mission, what are we talking about? What  
16 mission?

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Tell me, Mr Sesay - let's go back to the first page, shall  
19 we? We see that this document begins in this way:

10:07:08

20 "On 6 December 1998, I left the defence headquarters on  
21 your instruction for assignment and mission to attack Koidu."

22 Now, help us: Were you sent as a delegation to Koidu, or  
23 were you sent to attack it?

24 A. They sent me to go and attack Koidu.

10:07:37

25 Q. When, on this second page, we see reference to "members of  
26 the delegation", what's that about?

27 A. Well, I do not - I don't know about the delegation. I only  
28 know about the men who went with me on the mission to attack  
29 Kono, Koidu.

1 Q. Now, the names that we see listed as members of this  
2 delegation, yes, did some of those names accompany you on the  
3 attack on Kono?

4 A. Yes.

10:08:19 5 Q. Which ones accompanied you on the attack on Kono?

6 A. Morris Kallon was the deputy to me for the attack on Kono;  
7 Edward Fembah, Bockarie appointed him as adviser to me; Samuel F  
8 Jabba was my adjutant; Victor Kamara was my bodyguard commander;  
9 Mohamed - Staff Captain Mohamed Kamara was the armourer; Captain  
10:09:00 10 Morie Jibae was Foday Sankoh's bodyguard who was there with  
11 Mosquito, but Mosquito asked him to go with me on the mission;  
12 captain Abdulai Massalay was my bodyguard; captain Musa Vandi was  
13 my bodyguard.

14 Q. Now, when it says "members of a delegation", were you -  
10:09:28 15 apart from the attack on Kono - involved in some other activity  
16 at the same time which you were attending as a delegation?

17 A. No, no. The only activity that I carried out in Kono at  
18 this time was for me to attack Koidu Town.

19 Q. Now, let's just continue reading, shall we, to try to make  
10:09:59 20 sense of this, if possible:

21 "Captain Musa Vandi, including other soldiers and NCOs,  
22 December 7, 1998 we made a cross to Sengema, materials and items  
23 were handed over to the commander in charge. We then arrived at"  
24 - I can't make that word out. I don't know if anyone can assist.

10:10:32 25 Is that Wuwama?

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think it looks like Wuwama or Wuyama.

27 I don't know.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Do you know of such a place, Mr Sesay?

1 A. Yes, I know Wuwama, it was a village 7 miles away from  
2 Koi du Town.

3 Q. And did you spend the night in Wuwama in the course of that  
4 mission to attack Kono?

10:11:04 5 A. That was the second night. Because the first night we  
6 spent the night the first village immediately after Sandaru.  
7 That was how we passed the night. And the second night we passed  
8 the night in Wuwama, and then the following morning we reached  
9 Superman ground.

10:11:25 10 Q. "December 9, 1998 we arrived safely at Guinea Highway..."  
11 where is Superman Ground?

12 A. That's the Guinea Highway.

13 Q. "... 2nd brigade headquarters. We were 100 per cent  
14 welcomed by the commander, Colonel Boston Flomo, alias Rambo,  
10:11:53 15 including his adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Peter B Vandi and  
16 others."

17 Did you meet up with Rambo at the Guinea Highway on 9  
18 December?

19 A. Yes. Rambo was the brigade commander at the Guinea Highway  
10:12:13 20 in Kono.

21 Q. Now, that date - you told us when we looked at the first  
22 page that that date, 6 December 1998, was incorrect. This date,  
23 9 December 1998, is that correct?

24 A. No, it's not correct.

10:12:34 25 Q. What about four lines above, 7 December 1998, is that  
26 correct?

27 A. It's not correct.

28 Q. But do you accept that you did meet up with Rambo at Guinea  
29 Highway, also known as Superman Ground?

1 A. Yes, I met Rambo there on the Guinea Highway.

2 Q. Did you also meet there Peter B Vandt and others?

3 A. Yes, I met Peter B Vandt. They were all there.

10:13:19

4 Q. And did you, as suggested here, hand over to the commander  
5 materials and items as mentioned above?

6 A. The items were parked in the other booth that was close to  
7 me, because when I got there it was Peter Vandt who lodged me.  
8 So the next booth to Peter Vandt was where we parked everything  
9 that I took along with me.

10:13:50

10 Q. That date which follows thereafter, December 11, 1998, is  
11 that correct?

12 A. It's not correct.

10:14:08

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm sorry, the answer that the witness  
14 has given, in light of the question you asked him, Mr Griffiths,  
15 is not clear.

16 Mr Sesay, the question that counsel asked you was:

17 "And did you, as suggested here, hand over to the commander  
18 materials and items as mentioned above?"

19 And then you answered:

10:14:25

20 "The items were parked" - or packed - "in the other booth  
21 that was close to Peter Vandt was where we parked everything that  
22 I took along with me."

23 Now, how does that answer the question? The question you  
24 were asked was, Did you hand over the materials as named above to  
25 the commander? The commander being - I'm not sure who the  
26 commander is here. But the commander in charge anyway - the  
27 commander in charge of Superman Ground. The answer is either yes  
28 or no.

10:14:59

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Can we approach it in this way, Mr Sesay: Did you hand  
2 anything over to the commander?

3 A. Well, I did not hand them over to the commander. We parked  
4 them - we parked them in the booth close to where I was lodged,  
10:15:36 5 all the items that I took with me.

6 Q. Now, what was it that you handed over? Was it the items  
7 listed above, or the items that you have told us you took with  
8 you?

9 A. It's the foodstuffs, the Maggi, the cigarettes that  
10:16:06 10 I handed over. Because those were meant for the brigade in Kono.  
11 That was what I handed over to the commander. But the ammunition  
12 stayed with me where I was lodged, and the next booth to where  
13 I was lodged was where they were parked and my bodyguards were  
14 there.

10:16:25 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, do you mean where they  
16 were stored?

17 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. It then goes on:

10:16:42 20 "On 11 December 1998, the commander then called a general  
21 forum at his headquarters. Battalion and unit commanders were  
22 then invited to this forum."

23 Now, just so that we are clear, who was the commander?

24 A. At this time I was the senior commander on the - for those  
10:17:17 25 of us who came on the ground. But the brigade commander was  
26 Rambo.

27 Q. So where we see in that sentence "the commander," who is  
28 that a reference to?

29 A. I called the forum.

1 Q. "Battalion" --

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: What kind of an answer is that? So "the  
3 commander" means Issa Sesay? And what forum are we talking  
4 about?

10:18:01 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. The reference to "the commander" in that sentence, "The  
7 commander then called a general forum at his headquarters", who  
8 is that a reference to?

9 A. Well, I said I was the commander when I got to Kono, and  
10:18:24 10 the meeting, the forum for the - for us to plan for the attack on  
11 Kono, I was the one who called for that meeting.

12 Q. "Battalion and unit commanders were then invited to this  
13 forum. At 11 a.m, the forum commenced and mostly centralised on  
14 the mission given to me by you to attack and capture Koidu  
10:18:58 15 including Yengema and the airfield for quick transportation of  
16 our materials by air."

17 Mr Sesay, what's that a reference to, the "quick  
18 transportation of our materials by air"?

19 A. That is a lie. I did not discuss anything pertaining to  
10:19:24 20 the Yengema airfield during that meeting and we did not have any  
21 further agreement for the airlift of ammunition to the RUF, no.  
22 And when we captured Kono, until the time the RUF disarmed, we  
23 never airlifted ammunition to the RUF-controlled area. This is a  
24 lie. And we did not even target Yengema. To say that we were  
10:19:54 25 targeting Yengema so that we would bring the airfield under our  
26 control, no.

27 Q. During the duration of the conflict in Sierra Leone,  
28 Mr Sesay, on how many occasions were you aware of materials being  
29 transported into Sierra Leone for the use of either the RUF or

1 the AFRC by air?

2 A. It was once, in Magburaka, the Mayagba field. That was in  
3 late 1997. That is the only time I know about.

10:20:48

4 Q. "The brigade commander, Colonel Boston Flomo, thanked us  
5 for said mission and promised to cooperate on the mission  
6 together with his men. During the forum, Colonel Kailondo S  
7 Banyu 3rd Battalion commander was appointed as mission  
8 commander."

9 Is that correct?

10:21:12

10 A. No. Banyu was not the mission commander. The mission  
11 commander was Rambo, Boston Flomo, he was the mission commander.

12 Q. "Details of the forum is attached to this document.

10:21:40

13 16th of December 1998, the mission was carried out as  
14 rescheduled by me. It was carried out successfully and there was  
15 understanding among the officers and other ranks."

16 Pause again. That date, December 16, 1998, is that  
17 correct?

10:22:10

18 A. No. It was December - on December 16 that we held the  
19 meeting, and on the 17th we carried out the attack on Koidu Town.  
20 That was the actual thing that took place in Koidu Town. On the  
21 16th we held the meeting and it was on the Guinea Highway where  
22 they called Superman Ground. And we divided the group. Morris  
23 Kallon stayed because he had a distance. Immediately after he  
24 moved, he went and set an ambush. And on the 17th we attacked  
25 Koidu Town and we fought there for the whole day, we attacked  
26 around 6 a.m. and the fighting continued until 7 p.m. when we  
27 finally captured Koidu Town.

10:22:36

28 So the reality was that I came and spent three nights at  
29 the Superman Ground, that is the Guinea Highway, and the fourth

1 night I spent it in Koidu Town. That was the reality and that  
2 was what actually happened.

3 Q. "After the mission, when Koidu was under complete control,  
4 the below listed items and materials were captured: Five 50  
10:23:29 5 calibre but incomplete."

6 Is that correct?

7 A. The calibre that we captured in Kono was not [sic]  
8 complete, because the ECOMOG were using them and when we captured  
9 the place they ran away and they left them behind.

10:23:55 10 Q. Were they complete or incomplete?

11 A. I said they were complete.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, did you say it was not complete  
13 because ECOMOG had used it?

14 THE WITNESS: No, my Lord. I said the weapons - the 50  
10:24:18 15 calibres that we captured, they were all complete. They were in  
16 functional - they were in functional positions when we captured  
17 them.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. "One full set of SPG." First of all, what does SPG stand  
10:24:40 20 for?

21 A. Well, I don't know what SPG stands for. I only know the  
22 weapon.

23 Q. What weapon is that?

24 A. Well, SPG is a one-barrel that is as long as the table  
10:25:07 25 where you are standing and it has a stand. You can put the  
26 rocket at the back, you close it and then you shoot it, then it  
27 goes a long range.

28 Q. Did you capture such a weapon in Koidu?

29 A. No, we did not capture SPG. There was already SPG that we

1 had, I met them, they had captured it at the Guinea border, but  
2 during this attack we did not capture any SPG.

3 Q. "Three full sets of 81 millimetre gun." Did you capture  
4 such a weapon?

10:25:55 5 A. Yes, we captured mortar guns, the different types. We  
6 captured a 120 millimetre mortar gun, it was a very heavy mortar.  
7 82 millimetre guns, 81 millimetres guns, and 60 millimetres guns.

8 Q. I am going to skip some of these items, Mr Sesay, and go to  
9 the bottom. Did you capture three armoured tanks?

10:26:41 10 A. We captured four armoured tanks but two were not  
11 functional. It was only the other two that were functional.  
12 They were in good operational order.

13 Q. Go over the page, please. Those items, listed at the top -  
14 drugs, diesel, petrol, twin-barrel rounds - did you capture such  
10:27:19 15 items?

16 A. Yes. We captured such items and we captured items because  
17 the whole ammo dump, they had just left everything behind like  
18 that, the hospital and every other thing. They just left Kono  
19 abruptly and we captured them from the ECOMOG.

10:27:47 20 Q. Where we see that reference to Kimberlite, December 17,  
21 1998, what is that a reference to?

22 A. Well, Kimberlite was the place that I told you  
23 initially that I lodged during the retreat. That is the road  
24 going towards the Gandorhun part out of Koidu Town.

10:28:15 25 Q. During what retreat?

26 A. February 1998, that was during the intervention.

27 Q. This reference to the Kimberlite here, what's the  
28 association of that with the attack on Koidu?

29 A. Well, ECOMOG had a very strong guard post, a defensive

1 position there because they had occupied the roads that entered  
2 Koidu Town and they had a very strong defensive position at  
3 Kimberlite, the Guinea road, the --

10:28:57 4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
5 to repeat that area slowly.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay, could you start again, please, and  
8 deal with that question?

9 A. Please ask the question once again.

10:29:11 10 Q. That reference to the Kimberlite on this page, how is that  
11 linked to the attack on Kono which you carried out?

12 A. Well, I said Kimberlite was the road going towards  
13 Gandorhun and immediately after Kimberlite that was where the RUF  
14 had their own defensive position towards the ECOMOG, and the  
10:29:37 15 ECOMOG also had their own defensive position at Kimberlite. That  
16 was where they were based on the road. And I said all the roads  
17 entering Koidu Town, they deployed at the entrances to Koidu  
18 Town. So that was how they were deployed and they had other  
19 deployments in the town, but all the roads like DO Barracks,  
10:30:03 20 Yardu Road, Hill Station Road, the road going towards the Guinea  
21 Highway they were all deployed there and they were also deployed  
22 at Kimberlite.

23 Q. Could you just give us those locations, all the roads like  
24 DO Barracks and what were the other roads you mentioned?

10:30:23 25 A. I spoke about the Yardu Road, I spoke about Hill Station,  
26 I spoke about Kuyor Junction.

27 Q. Yardu Road, how do you spell Yardu?

28 A. I think it's Y-A-R-D-U R-O-A-D.

29 Q. And you mentioned the junction, what's the name of that

1 junction?

2 A. Kuyor.

3 Q. How do you spell that?

4 A. It's K-U-Y-O-R.

10:31:11 5 Q. Thank you. Go back to the page, please:

6 "Sewafe was also captured by the ambush team and some team  
7 advanced to attack Gold Town on the highway leading to Makeni.  
8 The below listed materials were captured in this mission."

9 Was Sewafe also captured by you, Mr Sesay?

10:31:48 10 A. Yes. We did not fight in Sewafe because when we had an  
11 ambush and when a reinforcement was coming from Makeni to  
12 reinforce the ECOMOG in Kono so they fell in the ambush, so our  
13 men moved because it was very close to Koidu Town where they set  
14 the ambush, so they moved to Koidu Town and captured Koidu Town  
10:32:16 15 but there was no fighting that took place in Sewafe because the  
16 retreating ECOMOG troops and civilians, they used the Sewafe.  
17 From Sewafe they crossed the Sew River and they went to Boama  
18 Konta so all the other vehicles and their ammunition that they  
19 were retreating with, they left everything in Sewafe.

10:32:42 20 Q. Now, you said --

21 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, can I take it that the "they"  
22 left is the ECOMOG left?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm going to seek clarification.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, I'm going to ask you to slow  
10:32:56 25 down, please, because the transcribers have requested that. In  
26 your testimony you're running too fast for them to keep up with  
27 you. Do you understand what I'm saying?

28 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Mr Sesay, let's go over that area again, please. You said  
2 because the retreating ECOMOG, they used the what?

3 A. I said they ambush close to Gold Town, there was a  
4 reinforcement coming from Makeni to reinforce the ECOMOG in Koidu  
10:33:39 5 Town so they fell in our ambush. The RUF ambush. So our men  
6 moved; they came and captured Gold Town. So the retreating  
7 ECOMOG and civilians from Koidu Town, as a result of the  
8 fighting, they had - they heard the firing that took place in the  
9 ambush, so they did not go to Gold Town any longer, so they  
10:34:07 10 stopped at Jiama Sewafe and they crossed the Sew River.

11 Q. They stopped at where?

12 A. Jiama Sewafe.

13 Q. How do you spell Jiama?

14 A. I think it's J-I-A-M-A S-E-W-A-F-E.

10:34:30 15 Q. Carry on with your account, please.

16 A. So they crossed the Moa River through - sorry, they crossed  
17 the river through a village called Puduru, through a village  
18 called Puduru, and then they went to Boama Konta.

19 Q. Could you spell that? Is it Puduru?

10:35:01 20 A. No, Puduru, something like P-U-D-U-R-U. This is different  
21 from Pumudu which is in Kailahun.

22 Q. And you mentioned another location, Boama Konta. How do  
23 you spell that?

24 A. B-O-A-M-A K-U-N-T-A.

10:35:30 25 Q. And carry on with your account now, please.

26 A. K-O-N-T-A, Konta. So the ECOMOG retreated through that  
27 flank, so they left all their vehicles that they were retreating  
28 with in Sewafe so fighting did not take place at that time in  
29 Sewafe town. That was what happened.

1 Q. Let's skip the items listed below that, please, and go to  
2 about two-thirds of the way down the page, where there is a  
3 reference to 22 December 1998 --

4 A. Yes, because - because even the items they listed there are  
10:36:23 5 not the correct items because I recall that in that ambush, one  
6 of the pickups that the ECOMOG were using, that was trapped in  
7 the ambush, that pickup contained 250 RPG rockets. They were all  
8 screwed with TNT. So those were the rockets that we used to go  
9 to Makeni, and I sent some to Makeni who requested for some of  
10:36:51 10 the rockets to be sent to him. They were not 120 RPGs, there  
11 were 250 RPG bombs. They were all screwed up with TNT.

12 Q. And you sent some to whom?

13 A. I said I sent some to Sam Bockarie, because I explained to  
14 him, because what happened was when we captured Koidu Town, that  
10:37:16 15 very night and the following morning, I sent a message to  
16 Bockarie on the radio. So that was how I used to send my  
17 reports, I will send the message - when I came to Gold Town on  
18 the ambush mission, I sent a message. And when we captured  
19 Masingbi, what's happened there, I sent a message. Makali, what  
10:37:37 20 happened there, I sent a message. Magburaka, what happened  
21 there, I sent a message. Up to Makeni. For every place we  
22 captured, I sent a message to that effect. It was not that  
23 I went and put down a comprehensive report to Bockarie because  
24 Bockarie too was eager for any movement we did, I should inform  
10:37:54 25 him about the activities and the development so far.

26 Q. Thank you for that, Mr Sesay. Because that leads us  
27 helpfully to the next reference:

28 "December 22, 1998, Masingbi was attacked and captured  
29 after the 2nd Brigade commander, Captain Boston Flomo, advanced

1 with the troops."

2 Now, you've mentioned just now capturing Masingbi. Was  
3 Masingbi captured on 22 December, as suggested here?

10:38:37

4 A. Well, I do not recall the exact date, but it was after the  
5 capture of Koidu Town, Gold Town, and then the troops moved to  
6 Masingbi and captured Masingbi.

7 Q. Did you capture further war materials in Masingbi?

8 A. We captured war materials in Masingbi from the Kamajors,  
9 and Kamajors, over 400 of them surrendered to us in Masingbi.

10:39:04

10 Q. And where we see items listed as having been captured, is  
11 that accurate?

12 A. Well, I do not recall that actually now to say that these  
13 are accurate, but we captured AK rounds, RPG rockets in Masingbi.

14 Q. Let's go to the top of the next page, then, please.

10:39:35

15 "The following day, on 23 December 1998, Magburaka was  
16 captured. Not much was captured, however, in this town as its  
17 military strength was not much."

18 Taking things in stages, was Magburaka captured on the day  
19 after Masingbi was captured?

10:40:02

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Can you help us as to the accuracy of that date, 23  
22 December?

23 A. Yes. Magburaka was captured on 23rd because I recall that  
24 our troops arrived in Makeni on the 24th.

10:40:24

25 Q. And we see there, continuing with this account:

26 "On 24 December 1998, Makeni was captured. Sir, some of  
27 these materials were used for operation, i.e. defensive,  
28 et cetera, and as events unfolded our troops were able to capture  
29 some Nigerians. To my knowledge some Kamajors are surrendering

1 too."

2 Did you capture some Nigerian soldiers?

3 A. Yes. During the attack on Koidu Town, we captured 11  
4 Nigerian soldiers.

10:41:04 5 Q. And how many Kamajors were captured?

6 A. In Kono, the Kamajors were over 100. Masingbi, there were  
7 400 - they were 450. At Makali, they were more than 200.  
8 Magburaka also they were more than 200. And in Makeni --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
10:41:29 10 to repeat that area, how many thousand? It was not clear.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Mr Sesay, how many were captured in Magburaka?

13 A. I said there were more than 200 in Magburaka. And in  
14 Makeni, there were up to a thousand who surrendered.

10:41:50 15 Q. What happened to these Nigerians and Kamajors who were  
16 captured?

17 A. Well, for the Nigerians, the very day we captured Koidu  
18 Town, because we were able to overrun Koidu, like I said, around  
19 7 p.m. and we captured those Nigerians, because before the attack  
10:42:14 20 I gave a standing order and I said those are the orders they  
21 should observe during the operation.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, I don't know if you're having  
23 problems understanding the question. The question was, quite  
24 simply, what happened to the Nigerians and the Kamajors who were  
10:42:34 25 captured. You haven't answered that question.

26 THE WITNESS: Well, my Lord, the Nigerians whom we captured  
27 in Koidu Town, when we captured Koidu Town, I went to Opera and  
28 they brought them to me one after the other to where I was. So  
29 we were there around 7.30 to 8 o'clock, the figure went to 11, 11

1 of them, so I too instructed the MP commander, Mohamed Jalloh,  
2 for them to take them to the Guinea - to the Guinea base, that is  
3 at Superman ground. I said they should stay at the MP until the  
4 following morning. And the following morning, I was in Koidu  
10:43:24 5 Town, I sent them to go and bring them. They put them in the  
6 pick-up and brought them to Koidu Town. And when they brought  
7 them, I spoke to them. I asked among them who knew something  
8 about an electrician's job. So I said they should help to fix  
9 currents in the house where I passed the night, the following  
10:43:47 10 morning. So I gave them food, they ate, and I told them that  
11 they should not be worried, that nothing was going to happen to  
12 them. So they spent about four hours with me in Koidu Town, and  
13 I sent them back to the base where the RUF were. So they were  
14 there, and the following morning they also brought them. And  
10:44:10 15 I told the MP commander that they should stay with him at the MP  
16 office at Koakoyima until I informed Sam Bockarie. So after  
17 I had informed Sam Bockarie, Sam Bockarie said I should send them  
18 to Kailahun. So he too - I informed the MP commander to organise  
19 an escort, so I sent them to Buedu, and they were now in Buedu  
10:44:40 20 under custody. It was during the Lome Accord that they were  
21 released.

22 For the Kamajors who surrendered in Kono up to Makeni, we  
23 detained them because Bockarie had said we should retrain them  
24 for them to join the RUF. So they were trained - starting from  
10:45:00 25 March, they were trained at the Yengema training base. So after  
26 that, I redeployed them where we had left, like Makeni,  
27 Magburaka, Makali --

28 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
29 to repeat that area slowly?

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Slow down. Can you repeat where you said  
2 so they were trained and you retrained them to join the RUF  
3 starting March, and then you sent them to Yengema training base,  
4 and what happened after that?

10:45:45 5           THE WITNESS: Well, from that, they - I told them to return  
6 to the various towns where they had surrendered. Like, for those  
7 in Kono, they went back to Koidu Town. Koakoyima and those from  
8 Masingbi, I appointed a commander. The ones who had surrendered  
9 at that time, I appointed the commander amongst them to be the  
10:46:17 10 RUF commander, and they were there, he and his deputy, up to  
11 disarmament. And those from Makali, I appointed another Kamajor  
12 commander, that he should go -

13           THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, the name of the junction is  
14 not clear.

10:46:34 15           PRESIDING JUDGE: What junction did you say?

16           THE WITNESS: Makonie Line Junction, that is between  
17 Masingbi and Makali.

18           MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. How do you spell Makonie Line Junction?

10:46:54 20 A. M-A-K-O - M-A-K-O-N-I-E L-I-N-E. Junction.

21           MR GRIFFITHS: Can I take advantage of this hiatus to  
22 mention something? At page 44, line 23, it's recorded that 8,000  
23 Kamajors were captured in Makeni. In fact, the witness said  
24 1,000.

10:47:27 25           PRESIDING JUDGE: Which brings me to the question. You've  
26 told us, Mr Sesay, about the Nigerians that were captured, the  
27 Kamajors that surrendered. What about the Kamajors that were  
28 captured? What happened to them?

29           THE WITNESS: Well, those were all the Kamajors that we

1 retrained, and they then became part of the RUF at this time.

2 JUDGE DOHERTY: Incidentally, Mr Griffiths, my recollection  
3 was that it was up to 1,000 Kamajors that were captured, which  
4 implies to me that it was less than 1,000.

10:48:03 5 MR GRIFFITHS: But it certainly wasn't 8,000, your Honour:

6 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, before we leave this document, help me with  
7 this: The signature we see on that last page, whose signature is  
8 it?

9 A. I don't know whose signature is this.

10:48:46 10 Q. Who was your adjutant?

11 A. My adjutant was Samuel Jabba.

12 Q. Is that Samuel Jabba's signature?

13 A. No, this is not Jabba's signature.

14 Q. And help us: Who was the battlefield commander?

10:49:14 15 A. It was I.

16 Q. And we see that this document was to be approved and signed  
17 by the battlefield commander, that is, you. Why didn't you sign  
18 it?

19 A. Well, I have said I was not the one, because I don't know  
10:49:36 20 about this document.

21 Q. Did you have any role whatsoever in preparing this  
22 document, Mr Sesay?

23 A. No.

24 Q. But do you agree, Mr Sesay, that in December of 1998 forces  
10:50:02 25 under your command did capture Kono and various other locations  
26 leading up to Makeni? Do you agree?

27 A. Yes, I agree with that. Because I was the one who  
28 supervised the operations, and I was the senior commander for all  
29 those operations starting from Kono up to Makeni.

1 Q. Now, apart from the forces you commanded, Mr Sesay, were  
2 any other forces involved in the attack on Makeni?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Who were they?

10:50:41 5 A. Superman's group came from Koinadugu, Brigadier Mani, and  
6 General Bropleh's group, all of us came and teamed up together  
7 and attacked Teko Barracks from the ECOMOG when the ECOMOG  
8 withdrew from Teko Barracks, that is, Makeni.

9 Q. Now, that attack, then, on Makeni, who coordinated it?

10:51:21 10 A. Well, it was Sam Bockarie. Because Superman, they had -  
11 Superman and his group had attacked Teko Barracks. First they  
12 failed and they withdrew to Binkolo. So when our troops came  
13 from Magburaka and entered, they entered part of Makeni.  
14 Bockarie then sent a message to Rambo and told Rambo that he had  
10:51:48 15 spoken to Superman and that Superman and others said they were  
16 around Makeni and that they were there trying to join the  
17 operation. So Sam Bockarie coordinated for the troops to team up  
18 together and attack the ECOMOG at the Teko Barracks.

19 Q. Did the forces controlled by Superman, Brigadier Mani, and  
10:52:19 20 General Bropleh, remain in Makeni with you?

21 A. Well, Superman left and went to Lunsar with his group.

22 Q. What about Brigadier Mani?

23 A. Brigadier Mani's troops were in Makeni.

24 Q. And what about General Bropleh?

10:52:52 25 A. They also were in Makeni.

26 Q. For how long did those two groups stay in Makeni?

27 A. Well, those groups were in Makeni, although some of their  
28 fighters were deployed in various areas. But Mani and Bropleh  
29 were in Makeni with me until the time Superman and Gibriil

1 Massaquoi attacked me in March when we left Makeni. So they were  
2 in Makeni until October 1999, those troops.

3 Q. You were attacked by Superman in March of which year?

4 A. 1999.

10:53:35 5 Q. Now, whilst you were engaged in this operation which  
6 culminated in the capture of Makeni, Mr Sesay, did you have any  
7 contact with the group led by SAJ Musa, who had been in Koinadugu  
8 District?

9 A. No, no. We were not in contact.

10:54:01 10 Q. Were you aware that an attack on Freetown was imminent  
11 around about Christmas of 1998?

12 A. At that time I did not know.

13 Q. Was the RUF involved in the planning of that attack on  
14 Freetown in January 1999?

10:54:37 15 A. No. RUF had no hands in the planning of that attack on  
16 Freetown in January 1999.

17 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, I want you to help me with this: Who was it  
18 who ordered the attack on Kono which culminated in the capture of  
19 Makeni?

10:55:02 20 A. It was Sam Bockarie who ordered me to attack Kono.

21 Q. Was it Charles Taylor who had given Sam Bockarie an order  
22 to attack and capture Kono?

23 A. No, no. During that meeting Sam Bockarie did not make  
24 mention of Mr Taylor's name. Sam Bockarie only said that he

10:55:28 25 thought it fit for us to attack Kono because --

26 Q. Because?

27 A. He said because he had been getting information that the  
28 ECOMOG troops were many in Kono and that the Government of Sierra  
29 Leone by then had brought mercenaries, the Sandline, and at the

1 same time those Sandline mercenaries were doing mining in Kono,  
2 and he said he thought it fit to attack Kono because that was the  
3 best thing, and it was an order from Sam Bockarie.

10:56:10 4 Q. During that meeting at Waterworks, was Sam Bockarie in  
5 contact with Charles Taylor by satellite phone?

6 A. No, no. He did not speak on any phone during that meeting.  
7 And even after the meeting he did not speak on the phone, and  
8 after the meeting we all joined the people came to Buedu. And  
9 when we came to Buedu I did not see him speak on the phone, and  
10:56:34 10 in the evening Bockarie, myself, Mike Lamin, we drove and went to  
11 Johnny Paul in Kangama, and Bockarie went and explained to Johnny  
12 Paul about the plan that we had at hand for the attack on Kono.

13 Q. Before the meeting, to your knowledge was Bockarie in  
14 contact with Charles Taylor by satellite phone?

10:57:00 15 A. No. He did not speak to Mr Taylor on satellite phone  
16 before the meeting.

17 Q. At the time of the Freetown invasion in January '99,  
18 Mr Sesay, where was Bockarie?

19 A. Bockarie was in - as far as Buedu.

10:57:38 20 Q. Where were you?

21 A. I was in Makeni.

22 Q. Where was Superman?

23 A. Superman was in Lunsar.

24 Q. Were there any RUF forces in Freetown during that invasion?

10:57:59 25 A. During that invasion, the RUF were not in Freetown. The  
26 only RUF who was in Freetown that I later knew about was - were  
27 Alfred Brown and King Perry. But no senior RUF took part in the  
28 attack in Freetown, and we did not send any reinforcement there,  
29 and RUF did not send any ammunition to them. RUF did not play

1 any part in the attack on Freetown.

2 Q. When did you first become aware that Freetown was being  
3 attacked, Mr Sesay?

4 A. Well, it was on the BBC. It was on the VOA, the RFI. They  
10:58:44 5 spoke about it, and even the SLBS radio.

6 Q. As far as you're aware, Mr Sesay, when was the first time  
7 that contact was made between those forces attacking Freetown and  
8 the RUF?

9 A. Well, the time I came to know was when they had entered  
10:59:23 10 Freetown when Gullit called Bockarie and told Bockarie that they  
11 had captured Freetown. He said they had captured the State House  
12 and in fact their troops were now up to the Congo Cross Bridge,  
13 but that they had started pushing them back and that they were  
14 short of ammunition. He said Bockarie should send reinforcements  
10:59:53 15 and ammunition.

16 Q. As far as you're aware, was there any contact between those  
17 forces and Bockarie prior to that?

18 A. Well, at the time they entered that dialogue, I did not  
19 know about it. It was later that I knew that when the AFRC,  
11:00:18 20 under the command of SAJ Musa, captured Waterloo and captured  
21 Benguema, Gullit then called Bockarie through Alfred Brown when  
22 they had the dialogue when Gullit informed Sam Bockarie that Sam  
23 Bockarie was dead. So Sam Bockarie too did not believe at that  
24 initial stage, according to what I understood later from him, but  
11:00:46 25 Sam Bockarie then told Gullit that if Gullit was saying the truth  
26 that SAJ Musa was indeed dead, he then asked Gullit about his  
27 next plan, and then Gullit told Bockarie that to move on Freetown  
28 was their next plan. And then Bockarie told Gullit that if it  
29 was true that SAJ was actually dead, he said they should wait at

1 Waterloo. So Bockarie said he will begin to send reinforcements  
2 to them at Waterloo so that they will carry out their attack on  
3 Freetown. But Gullit did not wait, and it was within one to two  
4 days they attacked the Orugu Bridge and they attacked Allen Town  
11:01:31 5 and entered Freetown.

6 JUSTICE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I notice the witness said  
7 that Sam Bockarie was dead. I presume that was a slip of the  
8 tongue.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:01:44 10 Q. Who was dead, Mr Sesay?

11 A. I said SAJ Musa, SAJ.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: We are going to take the midmorning break  
13 now and reconvene at 11.30.

14 [Break taken at 11.00 a.m.]

11:24:45 15 [Upon resuming at 11.32 a.m.]

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Mr Sesay, I would now like you to listen to a tape  
18 recording of a BBC broadcast. It is exhibit P-279A, and the  
19 transcript of that is exhibit 279B?

11:33:46 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the witness have a copy of the  
21 transcript in front of him?

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Then please play the tape.

24 [Exhibit 279B played to the Court]

11:44:56 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Mr Sesay, was that you speaking on the BBC?

27 A. No, that is not me. This is Colonel FAT Sesay. He was a  
28 Sierra Leone army officer who was with the AFRC, FAT Sesay. They  
29 were the ones who withdrew from Freetown. At that time I could

1 not speak English like this. I could not speak like this. That  
2 was not me. I was in Makeni. I heard this. I heard this  
3 broadcast.

11:45:37 4 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, go to the first page of that document - of  
5 that transcript, please. We see after the second reference  
6 "Music plays", the reporter says this:

7 "It's been an extraordinary day in Freetown, the capital of  
8 Sierra Leone after days of skirmishing outside the city between  
9 ECOMOG forces and RUF rebels."

11:46:10 10 Were RUF rebels engaged in skirmishes with ECOMOG outside  
11 Freetown, as reported by the BBC here?

12 A. Not at all. The forces who were outside Freetown before  
13 the attack were the Gullit forces - were the RUF forces that were  
14 in Waterloo and around there - Hastings before the attack on  
11:46:40 15 Freetown, but it was not the RUF. At this time the RUF was in  
16 Makeni because --

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, you said they were the what  
18 forces, the ones that did attack?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. I said it was the AFRC forces  
11:46:59 20 under the command of Gullit. They were the ones that carried out  
21 the attack on Freetown, and they were the ones around Freetown  
22 during this time.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Go over the page, please, to the second page. The second  
11:47:23 25 reference to Macauley on that page which begins, "Yes, and they  
26 were fighting alongside ECOMOG". Do you see that? Do you see  
27 that, Mr Sesay?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And it continues: "But after recent attacks at on Kono,

1 Makeni, Masiaka, Lunsar and Hastings."

2 My question is this: Was the attack on Kono by the RUF  
3 coordinated with the attack on Freetown by those AFRC forces led  
4 by Gullit?

11:48:06 5 A. No, it was not a co-ordinated attack.

6 Q. Go to three lines from the bottom of the page, please. We  
7 see Colonel Sesay saying: "We, the combined forces of the AFRC  
8 and the RUF forces." Was that the case?

9 A. Not at all. That wasn't what happened.

11:48:34 10 Q. Was Colonel Sesay telling the BBC the truth when he said it  
11 was the combined forces of the AFRC and the RUF?

12 A. No, he was not telling the BBC the truth.

13 Q. Because when we go to page 4, the fourth reference to Sesay  
14 on that page, again he says:

11:49:09 15 "It is a combined forces. A combined forces. We have the  
16 RUF, you have the AFRC, the former revolutionary council."

17 Was that the truth, Mr Sesay?

18 A. No. They were not combined forces. Even some of the  
19 attackers, those that carried out the Freetown invasion, some of  
11:49:35 20 them were witnesses against me and they testified about that,  
21 that the attack was not inclusive of the RUF. It was the AFRC  
22 that conducted the attack on Freetown.

23 Q. Who is Brigadier TAB Yahya?

24 A. Well, I don't know this name. The only one I know about  
11:50:03 25 the operation was the former PLO-2. He was the one that led the  
26 operation at Freetown. But I don't believe that this was the  
27 name we knew for him. The name we knew for him, that is the  
28 PLO-2 was Tamba Alex Brima, aka Gullit.

29 Q. Now, in that regard, let's keep that document there for the

1 minute , and can we go back to exhibit P-58, please. I'm sorry,  
2 no, exhibit P-131, please. Now, these are the minutes, just to  
3 remind ourselves, of the first meeting of the AFRC held at the  
4 conference hall, defence headquarters, on Saturday, 19 July 1997.

11:51:39 5 Who is listed there, Mr Sesay, as the PLO-2?

6 A. It is Staff Sergeant Tamba Alex Brima.

7 Q. Did Staff Sergeant Tamba Alex Brima have a nickname?

8 A. Yes, he is Gullit.

9 Q. So, when going back to the transcript - let's put that one  
11:52:06 10 away, please - when this Colonel Sesay is saying on the radio  
11 that Brigadier TAB Yahya, former PLO-2, is he telling the truth  
12 to the BBC?

13 A. Well, that is the truth that he was telling the BBC. The  
14 only problem is where he inserted the "Yahya". I did not know  
11:52:32 15 about the Yahya. But TAB Tamba Alex Brima - and he was the only  
16 PLO-2 for the AFRC - was among the attackers in Freetown, and I  
17 knew he was the commander that led the troops after the death of  
18 SAJ Musa because he was the 2IC to SAJ Musa.

19 Q. Yes, we can put that document away now. I want at this  
11:53:21 20 stage now, Mr Sesay, to ask you one or two questions about this  
21 period, to put matters in context. First of all, did Charles  
22 Taylor send a force of Liberians under the command of a man  
23 called Senegalese to assist the RUF in the attack on Kono?

24 A. Not at all.

11:53:52 25 Q. Do you know someone called Senegalese?

26 A. Yes, I know Senegalese.

27 Q. Who is Senegalese?

28 A. Senegalese was a former ULIMO fighter.

29 Q. Did Senegalese have any link with the RUF?

1 A. Yes, Senegalese, yes.

2 Q. What was that link?

3 A. Well, Senegalese was at the Mano River with the ULIMO-K  
4 forces, the time the RUF crossed around that November 1996, when

11:54:41 5 Mike Lamin and others surrendered to the ULIMO. That was the

6 first time Senegalese had a contact with the RUF. So in 1997,

7 when Mike Lamin left Liberia to come, he came along with

8 Senegalese to Sierra Leone. From that time, Senegalese was in

9 Kenema with Sam Bockarie during the AFRC period. And when the

11:55:09 10 intervention happened, Senegalese withdrew with Sam Bockarie to

11 Kailahun, and he was in Kailahun before we arrived there. If you

12 see in that report that Sam Bockarie wrote to Mr Sankoh, that

13 salute report, he said he had sent people to Superman to receive

14 ammunition that he captured during the Fitti-Fatta attack, and

11:55:40 15 Superman seized the people. Senegalese was among that group. He

16 was in that group, and he went to Superman. He was with Superman

17 until December. Senegalese came to Makeni with Superman, and I

18 was in Makeni when Superman went to Lunsar. So Senegalese was in

19 Sierra Leone from 1997, before this invasion in Freetown which

11:56:12 20 occurred in 1999, January.

21 Q. The second question: Have you heard of a Red Goat  
22 Battalion?

23 A. Yes. That battalion operated with the Mani group in

24 Koinadugu. I heard about that name in December 1998 when we met

11:56:47 25 at Makeni.

26 Q. Who made up that Red Goat Battalion?

27 A. They were the RUF soldiers.

28 Q. Were they Liberians?

29 A. No.

1 Q. Was the Red Goat Battalion, to your knowledge, involved in  
2 the attack on Freetown?

3 A. Well, I didn't know about their involvement in the attack  
4 on Freetown because that battalion operated with the Mani group  
11:57:30 5 and when those people attacked Freetown, they were not with them  
6 at that time, when they came to Makeni.

7 Q. Were the AFRC involved in the attack on Kono, which you  
8 led?

9 A. The AFRC - few of them were among, yes, few, but the attack  
11:57:59 10 on Kono was dominated by the RUF.

11 Q. Did the RUF have control over the AFRC forces who attacked  
12 Freetown?

13 A. No. The RUF was not in control of the AFRC after Freetown,  
14 no.

11:58:28 15 Q. Did the RUF form part of a common operation with the AFRC  
16 forces in that attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999?

17 A. No. It was not a common plan, nor was it a common purpose,  
18 because, when you look at the reality that obtained at that time,  
19 there were two separate operations. They were not similar.

11:59:04 20 Q. Did Bockarie send troops to reinforce the AFRC in Freetown?

21 A. No, Bockarie did not send troops.

22 Q. Did RUF Rambo and - did RUF Rambo and Superman - let me  
23 start again. Where were RUF Rambo and Superman at the time of  
24 the Freetown invasion?

11:59:42 25 A. RUF Rambo and Superman, they were in the invasion of  
26 Freetown. Superman was in Lunsar, and RUF Rambo joined Superman  
27 to attack Port Loko. That was the time after those people had  
28 attacked Freetown.

29 Q. Did they move towards Freetown at some stage in January

1 1999, Superman and Rambo?

2 A. Yes, sir, on Sam Bockarie's instruction.

3 Q. And where did they go to?

4 A. Well, after the failed attack on Port Loko, Sam Bockarie  
12:00:30 5 said they should take the road to advance towards Waterloo  
6 because when the AFRC had attacked Freetown, ECOMOG redeployed at  
7 Masiaka Mile 38, and ECOMOG and the Guinean contingents were at  
8 Waterloo. So Rambo, Superman, they attacked Masiaka and captured  
9 there. They moved on 38 and they went and attacked Waterloo.

12:01:05 10 The fighting took up to two weeks before the Guinean contingent  
11 withdrew from Waterloo to Port Loko.

12 Q. But did RUF forces get any closer to Freetown than  
13 Waterloo?

14 A. Well, as far as I knew, they stopped in Waterloo. In fact,  
12:01:30 15 at the time the Guineans withdrew from Waterloo. By then, the  
16 AFRC also had been withdrawing from Freetown.

17 Q. Now, you told us earlier, Mr Sesay, that you were led to  
18 understand that the attack on Freetown was organised by SAJ Musa,  
19 who wanted to reinstate the army. What did you understand that  
12:02:09 20 to mean?

21 A. Well, that was just - that was just to prove that the  
22 attack, the planning and execution of the attack, was an  
23 individual - I mean, it was an independent plan by the AFRC. It  
24 had nothing to do with the RUF because the RUF was not part of  
12:02:34 25 the army.

26 Q. That AFRC force which attacked Freetown, Mr Sesay, who was  
27 in control of them?

28 A. Well, before the attack, it was SAJ Musa who controlled the  
29 troops.

1 Q. And during the attack, who controlled the troops?

2 A. It was SAJ Musa's deputy, the PLO-2, Tamba Alex Brima,  
3 alias Gullit.

4 Q. Now, you told us that after the Freetown attack, you spoke  
12:03:24 5 to the RUF radio operators who had been with that AFRC force who  
6 attacked Freetown. Do you remember telling us that?

7 A. Yes. I said I spoke to them after they had withdrawn to  
8 Waterloo.

9 Q. Did any of those operators tell you that Charles Taylor was  
12:03:46 10 giving instructions to either SAJ Musa or Gullit during the  
11 attack on Freetown?

12 A. No, no. Mr Taylor never spoke to Gullit, nor SAJ Musa.  
13 The operators did not tell me that.

14 Q. As far as you are aware, was Charles Taylor in contact with  
12:04:10 15 Sam Bockarie during the course of the Freetown - the attack on  
16 Freetown?

17 A. No. I did not know about that.

18 Q. Did you hear any radio traffic between Liberia and the RUF  
19 during the course of the attack on Freetown?

12:04:34 20 A. No. I did not monitor any communication between the  
21 station in Liberia and the RUF.

22 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, it has been helpfully brought to my  
23 attention that there is a document I should have brought to your  
24 attention when we were dealing with that meeting at the  
12:05:28 25 Waterworks. Could the witness please be shown exhibit P-63  
26 please?

27 Mr Sesay, have you seen this document before?

28 A. I have not seen this document before.

29 Q. For example, during your trial in Freetown, was this

1 document shown to you?

2 A. Well, I do not recall that I was shown this document, but -  
3 I don't recall that I was shown this document.

4 Q. Let's just have a look at it. You see it is headed

12:07:33 5 "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - defence  
6 headquarters" and it is dated 2 December 1998. And it is headed  
7 "Forum with the external delegates led by the" something "of  
8 defence staff". External delegates, who is that?

9 A. Well, I don't know this terminology "external delegates"  
12:08:10 10 because the only external delegation that had the name that I  
11 knew among the RUF were the delegation who were in Ivory Coast  
12 because --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
14 to repeat that area slowly.

12:08:25 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Say that again please, Mr Sesay. The only external  
17 delegation you knew of?

18 A. Was the RUF external delegation who were in Ivory Coast  
19 from December '94 up to some part in '97. Those were the only  
12:08:48 20 people that I knew for this expression "external delegates." But  
21 the people whom Sam Bockarie travelled with, they went on a trip  
22 and they returned in two weeks time. So they were not called  
23 delegation or delegates.

24 Q. Then it goes on:

12:09:07 25 "This meeting was summoned by the high command Brigadier  
26 Sam Bockarie in order to acquaint members present with report on  
27 the external mission they went on. The venue was the Waterworks  
28 and the time was 1.23 Greenwich mean time."

29 Is this the meeting at Waterworks, Mr Sesay?

1 A. No. The meeting I attended at Waterworks took place in the  
2 evening. It was not in the afternoon.

3 Q. Now this day, 2nd December 1998, is that accurate for the  
4 meeting which you attended at Waterworks?

12:09:57 5 A. 2nd December '98, by then Sam Bockarie had not yet  
6 returned.

7 Q. Now it says that in attendance were Brigadier Sam Bockarie,  
8 Mr SYB Rogers, Colonel Edward Kanneh, Major Lawrence Womandia,  
9 Major Junior Vandi, Major Mohamed S Banya, Lieutenant Colonel  
12:10:36 10 Rashid Sandy, external delegates, Colonel IH Sesay battlefield  
11 commander and members of various units were also in attendance.  
12 Now, before we look at some of the detail of that, you said in  
13 your last answer that Sam Bockarie had not yet returned on 2  
14 December 1998. Not yet returned from where?

12:11:05 15 A. He had not returned from his trip that he took to Burkina  
16 Faso and Libya via Monrovia. He had not yet returned.

17 Q. "The meeting was opened with a short Muslim and Christian  
18 prayers." Was that the case at the meeting you attended,  
19 Mr Sesay?

12:11:46 20 A. No. The meeting I attended, we did not offer prayers,  
21 because I said I think it was just about seven of us who attended  
22 that meeting.

23 Q. "The chairman CDS Brigadier Sam Bockarie welcomed everyone  
24 who attended the forum. He told us all the forum was intended to  
12:12:11 25 brief us on the mission they had gone through. The CDS appointed  
26 Mr SYB Rogers to give a salute report about the mission. Mr SYB  
27 Rogers extended his heartfelt thanks to all persons in  
28 attendance. Pa Rogers wasted no time to tell us the mission was  
29 a very big success through our blessings and cooperation.

1 According to Mr SYB Rogers, this plan of sending out people to  
2 seek our welfare at the international front at hand, many of  
3 these people failed us but God almighty blessed the very  
4 outstanding effort made by the CDS and indeed the success was  
12:12:59 5 great in terms of what they were able to receive.

6 Mr SYB Rogers stated further that since the 1997, May 25  
7 coup, the RUF/Sierra Leone was invited to join our brothers AFRC  
8 but he lamented that the merger was unsuccessful because there  
9 was no common understanding or ideology. He reiterated that  
12:13:27 10 indeed God is behind our movement, so that we shall not be  
11 disgraced. He admonished that we must reckon with the efforts  
12 played by the high command when it deserved praise. It is the  
13 sole right of the senior command structure and all combatants to  
14 defend the civilians. This is the reason why he, as chairman of  
12:13:56 15 the people's War Council and an elder among us, he confirmed it  
16 as his primary duty to advise and educate the higher authorities  
17 as to what they must do. Let no-one feel or say that Brigadier  
18 Mosquito is doing things on his own. We must come together and  
19 consult even with ourselves and the high command on problems we  
12:14:26 20 don't understand.

21 Pa SYB Rogers pledged his sincere thanks and credit to the  
22 CDS for his leading role in the external mission they went on.  
23 Indeed, the CDS's effort was very excellent. Pa SYB Rogers noted  
24 with profound gratitude the effort applied by our host government  
12:14:55 25 and the other side for granting us the inlet and exit facilities,  
26 even with escort. It was very surprising to note that, according  
27 to Pa SYB Rogers, most Heads of State have been thinking that the  
28 RUF/Sierra Leone had been in disarray since the kidnapping of our  
29 dear leader. It was therefore good and a blessing in disguise to

1 us all that the young brigadier himself, who has held the  
2 garrison strongly against the enemies, went to see some of the  
3 Heads of State in person. According to Pa Rogers, both the CDS  
4 and himself paid a courtesy call on His Excellency CGT."

12:15:48 5 Who is CGT, Mr Sesay?

6 A. CGT, that is Mr Taylor.

7 Q. Now just pausing for a minute, Mr Sesay. Do you recall the  
8 meeting you attended discussing the matters recorded here?

9 A. Well, yes, because Bockarie spoke about - he said when they  
12:16:23 10 got to Monrovia they visited Mr Taylor before they left for  
11 Burkina Faso and that it was Mr Taylor who made efforts to speak  
12 to President Blaise Compaore who was the OAU chairman for the RUF  
13 delegation to meet him. And the meeting with the ECOMOG chairman  
14 and the OAU chairman at that time was purely for them to revisit  
12:16:52 15 the Abidjan Accord. That was what I understood.

16 Q. Now at the meeting you attended, who gave that report; was  
17 it Bockarie or SYB Rogers?

18 A. No, it was Bockarie who said that.

19 Q. Let's go back to the document:

12:17:14 20 "To everybody's delight there are friendly countries who  
21 are wishing to receive serious minded people that will seek  
22 RUF/Sierra Leone interests abroad. Pa Rogers lamented that we  
23 were disappointed by most of the past external delegates who  
24 squandered RUF/SL funds and made no headway so as to open our way  
12:17:40 25 to success. They have met their fate, says Pa Rogers. The  
26 people's sin has fallen on them. The mission extended to Burkina  
27 Faso where they, delegates, were warmly received and attended to.  
28 All discussions with the Burkinabe authorities were highly  
29 fruitful. There was, however, a diplomatic test on the CDS to

12:18:41

1 prove his ability and seriousness as commander on the ground.  
2 The CDS behaved excellently maturely to the admiration of His  
3 Excellency Compaore. The brigadier has done a very historic job  
4 for the RUF/SL movement. He has signed a rich contract for us  
5 and, with our support given to him and the movement we shall do  
6 everything possible to promote this struggle. The War Council  
7 chairman made it public that people had been meeting on the note  
8 that the CDS is intending to take the leader's power. According  
9 to Pa Rogers, he advised everyone not to think of the CDS in that  
10 way. He, Pa Rogers, told us that he has examined the brigadier  
11 in and out and has not suspected the least of such intention in  
12 the brigadier. We must give the brigadier all fervent support so  
13 as to encourage him, brigadier, so his great sacrifice. Pa  
14 Rogers concluded by thanking Colonel Issa Sesay, the battlefield  
15 commander, AG CDS and all authorities who held the ground and  
16 front line strongly while the CDS and delegates were out."

17 Now can we pause there for a second. Now we see there  
18 reference to the courtesy call on CGT who you tell us is  
19 Mr Taylor and we see reference to the meeting with Compaore.  
20 Have you seen any reference at this stage to a visit to Libya or  
21 Gaddafi, Mr Sesay?

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, our LiveNote seems to have  
23 frozen. If you could just pause for a moment. Madam Court  
24 Manager, what's going on? Can you please find out what is going  
25 on?

26 MS KAMUZORA: Your Honours, I have consulted our IT staff.  
27 They are coming down to assist us.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: We are experiencing a technical problem  
29 with the LiveNote and I think it would give the technical people

1 space to rectify the problem if we adjourned for a brief moment,  
2 so we will do that. We'll adjourn briefly.

3 [Break taken at 12.25 p.m.]

4 [Upon resuming at 12.34 p.m.]

12:35:10 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: We apologise for the interruption, but I  
6 understand the technical problem has now been fixed.

7 Mr Griffiths, just to remind you that today's session is  
8 slightly smaller, in that we end at 1 o'clock.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well, Madam President.

12:35:34 10 Q. Mr Sesay, can we go back to this document, please, and  
11 we're at page 2. I will pick it up seven lines from the bottom  
12 of the page:

13 "According to Pa Rogers, he advised everyone not to think  
14 of the CDS in that way. He, Pa SYB Rogers, told us that he has  
12:36:07 15 examined the brigadier in and out and has not suspected the least  
16 of such intention in the brigadier. We must give the brigadier  
17 all formal fervent support so as to encourage him, brigadier, for  
18 his great sacrifice. Pa Rogers concluded by thanking Colonel  
19 Issa Sesay, the battlefield commander, CDS, and all authorities  
12:36:40 20 who held the ground and front line strongly while the CDS and  
21 delegates were out.

22 Next to speak was Colonel Eddie Kanneh, SLA representative.  
23 The young colonel thanked everybody for their courage to attend  
24 the forum. According to the colonel, all the trip was very  
12:37:07 25 successful. He dilated on how, at several times, he faced  
26 embarrassment on account of his association and deep commitment  
27 to the RUF Sierra Leone. He made us understand that since his  
28 familiarity with our brigadier, or CDS, he, Colonel E Kanneh,  
29 sees the CDS as a man who does not want to get involved into

1 politics and that he has known the CDS to be far-sighted person  
2 who can predict with possible results. He therefore asks all and  
3 sundry not to picture the CDS that the way other people are  
4 classing him to be, that is power hungry. He warned that there  
12:38:07 5 must be solid declaratory among us all. He commended Pa SYB  
6 Rogers for his fatherly part he is playing in the movement,  
7 Colonel Issa Sesay for his gallant party he played in the absence  
8 of the CDS for keeping the ground under control. He asked us to  
9 remember outstanding our external friends of this movement like  
12:38:44 10 General Abraham.

11 Let us mobilise, unite, be conscious and I leave a general  
12 warning that no one must take revolution lightly to avoid  
13 subversion. We must care for the junior ranks, and I hope and  
14 pray that this movement shall continue to live and prosper in  
12:39:25 15 good faith, concluded the young colonel.

16 The chief of defence staff, Brigadier Sam Bockarie,  
17 buttressed the speeches of Pa SYB Rogers and Colonel Eddy Kanneh.  
18 He threw light on some important things, however, for the general  
19 understanding of those who attended the meeting. In the first  
12:39:52 20 place, the CDS told us that they were not financially strong to  
21 make the trip as successful as it turned out to be. He said that  
22 in the first attempt they stopped halfway and heard about the  
23 shocking news on Focus about the trial and death sentence passed  
24 on our father and leader, Corporal Foday S Sankoh. The CDS made  
12:40:23 25 hasty preparation and were turned back to the brothers as to  
26 launch offensives against the government of Tejan Kabbah for the  
27 release of our leader.

28 The CDS congratulated Colonel Jungle and General Abraham  
29 for their sincerity and honesty in delivering the parcels that

1 were given to them for our father across. The CDS said the  
2 father showed him the parcels and said that he was keeping the  
3 parcel until the cater and get more for us to be able to purchase  
4 reasonable quantity of whatever we want. The CDS reiterated that  
12:41:26 5 if we work hard and remain united, victory will be on our side.  
6 According to the CDS, he took along Major Lawrence Womandia  
7 because he can speak French and it was the delegates' intention  
8 to visit France - countries and even Libya. The CDS said due to  
9 copious arrangements Colonel Eddie and Pa Rogers had at hand, he  
12:42:06 10 did not hope he would see them to make the trip as planned, but  
11 God greatly helped us, we, Pa Rogers and Colonel Eddie, and we  
12 made the trip together. The CDS concluded that the trip was a  
13 big success on the whole. The brigadier told the forum that he  
14 was able to formally hand over our struggle and petition about  
12:42:34 15 our leader to the President of Burkina Faso, who is the current  
16 chairman of the OAU, so that as OAU chairman he will step in and  
17 mediate peace between us and the SLPP government. He warned that  
18 now is the time to work together to secure the release of our  
19 leader and to avoid funny things like gossips that would lead to  
12:43:05 20 disunity among us. The CDS admonished and placed a curse on  
21 anyone who would plan to mismanage the small logistics they had  
22 laid down their lives for in the interests of the struggle. The  
23 brigadier inferred that he went with a two-and-a-half carat  
24 diamond and some other items which he gave as present to a senior  
12:43:40 25 security Benjamin in order to facilitate easy access to all  
26 chances for the undelayed access of our mission. The CDS  
27 concluded by thanking everybody, both missionaries and those  
28 who" - there appears to be something missing there. "The  
29 battlefield commander, Colonel Issa Sesay, thanked the delegates.

1 He promised that we shall put our efforts together to consolidate  
2 our strength for victory. We are to strike for the release of  
3 our leader and victory of our movement. A commander will feel  
4 good when he attacks and captures rather than being called to  
12:44:26 5 join with others. It will make no prospect. The field commander  
6 extended many blessings to all those who joined the CDS to bring  
7 us the expected good which will bring success for us all.  
8 Colonel Isaac Mongor thanked the CDS and delegates for their  
9 grand efforts. He advised everybody to work hand in hand for the  
12:44:53 10 victory of the RUF Sierra Leone. We're not fighting for Pa  
11 Sankoh or the brigadier but ourselves and our country, Sierra  
12 Leone, for victory and peace. This, RUF Sierra Leone leader has  
13 been telling us all along. Colonel Mike Lamin thanked the CDS  
14 and the delegates who went with him on the mission. We as RUF  
12:45:20 15 Sierra Leone must consider this gesture as a brilliant challenge  
16 and we must do some things impressively in return of the  
17 challenge. He warned that we must not talk on how the material  
18 was channelled to our base, for security reasons.

19 Colonel Morris Kallon thanked the CDS and delegates for the  
12:45:47 20 great efforts. He stated in the first place that, for the person  
21 or persons who go about saying that the CDS wants to take the  
22 leadership of the RUF Sierra Leone, Colonel Kallon noted that  
23 except such people do not construct themselves in a way to be  
24 understood without grudge or malice, but the second in a command  
12:46:13 25 appointment was given to the CDS by our leader himself and that  
26 it is natural that he shall succeed our leader after long years  
27 of the leader's services to the movement and the nation. He  
28 compared a combatant's risk of life to that of an external  
29 delegate's own, by which he stated that the later's own risk of

1 life was far more greater than the combatant's because he doesn't  
2 know the enemies around him. Colonel Kallon warned all persons  
3 to put to good use what the CDS has fought hard to get for the  
4 movement.

12:47:02 5 Chief commander, JV Samuka thanked the CDS and delegates  
6 and prayed for God's blessing for them. He juxtaposed Tejan  
7 Kabbah/God hearing prayers as a chance now gracefully given to  
8 the RUF/SL.

9 Pastor Alpha on behalf of the Christian group thanked the  
12:47:37 10 CDS and delegates. He threw in a proverb which says, "Uneasy  
11 lies the head that wears the crown." He prayed fervently to  
12 almighty God for our senior officers, junior officers, against  
13 the enemies and grand success of the RUF Sierra Leone. Pastor  
14 Alpha invoked the spirit of Taburakar and Jehoja, the great God.

12:48:10 15 Major E Collins stated that the CDS has killed two birds  
16 with one stone. That is, political and military problems. The  
17 CDS announced a senior officers' meeting from where arrangements  
18 were to be done for full-scale operations. The meeting ended in  
19 harmony."

12:48:37 20 Now, Mr Sesay, does the minutes of this meeting jog your  
21 memory about attending a meeting such as this?

22 A. No, I did not attend such a meeting, because the meeting --

23 Q. Go on.

24 A. Because the meeting which I attended, that Sam Bockarie -  
12:49:12 25 Morris Kallon was not there, Isaac Mongor was not there. The  
26 meeting I attended was just about six to seven, the meeting that  
27 we attended at Waterworks.

28 Q. Whose is the signature we see on this document?

29 A. I don't know this signature because there is no name

1 underneath. Joint security rep, there is no name.

2 Q. Who was the joint security rep?

3 A. Well, we had the joint security commander who was Mr Gbao,  
4 but I did not know anybody who was a joint security rep who had a  
12:49:56 5 title "joint security rep", no.

6 Q. Could you give us the name of the joint security commander  
7 again?

8 A. Augustine A Gbao, Augustine Attu Gbao.

9 Q. As far as you're aware, Mr Sesay, who would have  
12:50:23 10 responsibility for compiling a report for such a meeting?

11 A. Well, the people that have been called, it was the  
12 general's adjutant who was assigned to Bockarie was the  
13 appropriate person to take the reports of the minutes of the  
14 meeting and --

12:50:47 15 Q. And who was there?

16 A. That is Rashid Sandy. This is not the job of joint  
17 security, to take minutes of a meeting, no.

18 Q. Now, there are one or two other things that I want to ask  
19 you about, about this document. Let's go to page 3 please.

12:51:31 20 Count down 15 lines from the top of the page. "Outstanding  
21 external friends of the movement, like General Abraham". Who is  
22 that?

23 A. That is Ibrahim Bah.

24 Q. So that should be Ibrahim, not Abraham, is that correct?

12:52:06 25 A. Yes, it is General Ibrahim Bah, Ibrahim Bah.

26 Q. Count up seven lines from the bottom of the page, please.

27 "The CDS congratulated Colonel Jungle and General Abraham."

28 Pause there. Is that the same Ibrahim Bah?

29 A. Well, I only knew one General Ibrahim Bah.

1 Q. But let's look at this sentence in total:

2 "The CDS congratulated Colonel Jungle and General Ibrahim  
3 for their sincerity and honesty in delivering the parcels that  
4 were given to them for our father across."

12:53:03 5 What's that about?

6 A. What is that about?

7 Q. Yes, please.

8 A. Well, what you've read here says the right side is saying  
9 that Colonel Jungle, General Abraham, and Bockarie congratulated  
10 them because they delivered the parcel to their father across. I  
11 don't know about this, if General Abraham delivered the parcel or  
12 Colonel Jungle delivered them also the parcel across. I didn't  
13 know about that, to any father.

14 Q. Who was our father, the father of the movement?

12:53:59 15 A. Well, the only father that we had in the RUF was Foday  
16 Sankoh. We did not have any other father, because he was the one  
17 we refer to as Papay.

18 Q. Go over to the next page, please. Did, as appears on that  
19 front line, did Bockarie on this trip go to France? On his trip  
12:54:36 20 in late November 1998, did he go to France?

21 A. No, he did not tell me about France.

22 Q. And let's go to the last four lines in that first  
23 paragraph:

12:55:03 24 "The brigadier inferred that he met with - he went with a  
25 two-and-a-half carat diamond and some other items which he gave  
26 as present to a senior security Benjamin in order to facilitate  
27 easy access to all chances for the undelayed success of our  
28 commission."

29 You told us, Mr Sesay, that Bockarie purchased ammunition

1 in Liberia on his return from Burkina Faso, didn't you?

2 A. Yes, that's what I said.

3 Q. From whom?

12:55:45

4 A. Well, he said he bought some part of the ammunition from  
5 Benjamin Yeaten and the other part was bought from the battalion  
6 commander in Lofa.

7 Q. Do you know who the senior security Benjamin, who is being  
8 referred to in this document?

9 A. Well, Benjamin was the SS director, Benjamin Yeaten.

12:56:15

10 Q. So who - this reference to Benjamin, who is that?

11 A. Well, the man whom Bockarie told us bought - he bought the  
12 ammunition from was Benjamin Yeaten.

13 Q. Now, just to be clear, Mr Sesay, this document, is it an  
14 accurate record of a meeting you attended on 2 December 1998?

12:57:03

15 A. I told you that I did not attend a meeting on 2 December  
16 1998. I attended a meeting, which I believe should have been on  
17 13 December 1998, and on the 14th we left for Kono. Or the 12th  
18 of - the meeting which I attended, it would have either been on  
19 13 or 12 December 1998 before my departure for Kono. But on 2  
20 December, at that time Sam Bockarie had not come yet. So what I  
21 knew was that Bockarie left in late November and returned around  
22 10 or 11 December '98 before he sent us to Kono.

12:57:39

23 Q. The reason I ask, Mr Sesay, is this: If we look finally at  
24 the last page, right at the end, you see that this document was  
25 copied to the CDS. Who is that?

12:58:20

26 A. CDS, that is Bockarie. He was the one with the title.

27 Q. Who is the BFC?

28 A. At that time I was.

29 Q. So, according to this, this document was copied to you.

1 Did you receive a copy of this document?

2 A. Not at all. I did not receive a copy of this.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: I am about to move to another document,  
4 your Honour. Would that be a convenient point?

12:59:18 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, indeed. Of course that will have to  
6 be next week, won't it. We don't sit for this trial this  
7 afternoon; we do other work. So we are going to adjourn the  
8 proceedings until Monday at 9 o'clock, Mr Sesay. In the meantime  
9 you are not to discuss your evidence with anyone. The Court is  
12:59:39 10 adjourned until 9 o'clock Monday.

11 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.00 p.m.  
12 to be reconvened on Monday, 12 July 2010 at  
13 9.00 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DCT-172	44119
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	44119