



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Monday, 9 November 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:30:12 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J
9 Hollis, Christopher Santora and our case manager Maja Dimitrova.

09:32:39 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours.
12 For the Defence today myself Courtenay Griffiths, with me
13 Mr Morris Anyah of counsel.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, you're still bound by your
09:32:55 15 affirmation to tell the truth.

16 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

17 [On former affirmation]

18 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

19 Q. Mr Taylor, we're coming to the end game now. As we go into
09:33:07 20 the year 2003 what I would like us to do first of all is for you
21 to provide us with a synopsis of the situation as it obtained in
22 Liberia with LURD during 2002 going into 2003. Do you follow?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Now help us. The LURD incursions had begun when?

09:33:36 25 A. Oh, all the way back - I would say they first began around
26 1998/'99.

27 Q. And can you help us with a month?

28 A. Well, we had a series of incursions. Around May 1999 we
29 had some very serious - April/May of 1999 we had incursions. In

1 around August 2000 we had incursions. So these are two --

2 Q. And by the year 2002 what was the situation like?

3 A. Oh, LURD had attacked the city of Monrovia at least twice.

4 By 2002 they were on the outskirts of the city of Monrovia around

09:34:40 5 the town of Virginia. That's about I would say just about 3 or 4

6 kilometres outside of the city. Total chaos. Most of the

7 ministries and agencies had closed, there were bombardments of -

8 in fact long-range mortar shellings of the city. In fact by then

9 the BBC had done several reports, the New York Times was involved

09:35:17 10 in reporting, our own Ministry of Information. There were a

11 series of things going on. The international community had

12 intervened in a way. That led me in 2003 to a meeting in Ghana

13 where I volunteered to step down if it brought peace, but we had

14 near anarchy by this time. Hundreds of thousands of our people

09:35:48 15 had fled city. The United States embassy compound at Greystone

16 had been shelled and several hundred people were injured, some

17 killed. We had a terrible situation during this period.

18 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor. During that time what capacity did

19 you have to withstand this assault by LURD?

09:36:14 20 A. Really hardly none. We were fighting. We knew by this

21 time that there was now direct supplies coming out of Sierra

22 Leone by this time.

23 Q. Sierra Leone?

24 A. Sierra Leone. Before it started with Guinea, by 2002/2003

09:36:40 25 LURD had captured Cape Mount County and part of Bomi holding the

26 road - this famous road across the Mano River bridge. And so now

27 we have direct supplies coming in from Sierra Leone.

28 We also received reports - in fact at the beginning of 2003

29 in a document disclosed to this Court a few days ago, it was

1 mentioned that in fact the United States did send a peacekeeping
2 force to Liberia in late - well, I would say about the beginning
3 of 2003 some 5,000 United States Marines, helicopters and an
4 entire flotilla had been sent and we were receiving information
09:37:34 5 that they were supplying LURD. I have no evidence of this. This
6 is information that our security forces were saying, because US
7 helicopters were flying from on board the ships into Virginia
8 where I'm talking. Virginia, to remind the Court, Virginia is -
9 we mentioned that in line with Ricks Institute where the Kamajors
09:38:00 10 were put together back in 1997, even as mentioned in even the
11 House of Commons report about Sandlines is conducting operation
12 out of Liberia. That's what Virginia has to do with that.

13 We have reports that helicopters are flying into Monrovia
14 supplying LURD with ammunition. Now, like I said, this is all
09:38:29 15 information, but following my departure from Monrovia some of the
16 LURD commanders admit that they did receive some assistance. But
17 we had no capacity at that time, and this is what really, really
18 - we had been boxed in. The President of the United States
19 George Bush had made a speech before the African diplomatic corps
09:38:54 20 in Washington DC and had said that Charles Taylor must leave. So
21 the whole essence of regime change had taken roots with the
22 sending of the 5,000 plus United States Marines to Monrovia and
23 so we had no way of resisting this onslaught and so that brought
24 an end to my Presidency.

09:39:20 25 Q. Now three questions, Mr Taylor. First of all, you spoke in
26 the last answer of your knowledge of admissions made by some LURD
27 commanders after you had stepped down?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. How did you come by that knowledge?

1 A. Well, you know, remember one thing that has been lost is
2 that my government negotiated the peace in Liberia. I didn't
3 just - as Security Council resolution 1688 states and I think it
4 is quite disingenuous to have stated it that way, that I fled
09:40:03 5 Liberia. I didn't flee Liberia. I left Liberia with a normal
6 transfer of power and agreement. But we negotiated the agreement
7 and most of the officials that were left - there were three
8 parties in fact to that agreement: LURD; MODEL; and the
9 Government of Liberia, my government. So most of the officials
09:40:25 10 that were left during the brief two months of the Moses Blah
11 presidency were all officials of my government. There were very
12 little changes, the military people and all. And following my
13 departure when LURD came in, all the LURD and MODEL generals
14 adopted my senior general, General Roland Duoh as the overall
09:40:52 15 commander of all of the combatants, LURD, MODEL and government
16 forces, so that mingling of - and discussions amongst soldiers
17 just out of combat brought out all of the unexpected and all of
18 the unknown.

19 Q. Now the second thing I would like to ask you, Mr Taylor,
09:41:13 20 arising from what you've told us before, is this: LURD, you told
21 us, initially received support from Guinea. Is that right?

22 A. Oh, that is correct.

23 Q. And later you speak of LURD receiving support also from
24 Sierra Leone?

09:41:34 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Now help us. Did you take up these matters with President
27 Lansana Conte?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And President Kabbah?

1 A. Well, the Sierra Leonean end, and I have specifically
2 stated, that's going into late 2002, 2003, I did not raise this
3 substantively with President Kabbah, but Conte and I met twice to
4 discuss the LURD situation. Once with Obasanjo in Nigeria where
09:42:05 5 Obasanjo sat with Conte and myself and Conte denied that there
6 was any support from him. We knew that in fact the United States
7 government was supplying the munitions to Guinea. The United
8 States government had not denied that. We confronted directly
9 the United States government. They admitted that they were
09:42:26 10 giving supplies to the Guinean government. They were also -
11 there were United States Marines training Guinean elements at
12 that time. They said, "Yes, we are training them. We are
13 training Guinean regulars. We are giving them arms and
14 ammunition. We cannot ascertain that they are sending it into
09:42:47 15 Liberia. Under arrangements with them they are not supposed to
16 do so, but we can't be sure they are doing it." What a cop out.

17 The second encounter that I had with President Conte on
18 this issue of supplies was in Morocco. Mohammed VI of Morocco
19 met Lansana Conte. Mohammed IV, presently King of Morocco, and I
09:43:10 20 sat along with Tejani Kabbah. The four of us met and had a
21 discussion about this situation with Guinea supplying material
22 and Conte again denied that this was done. So, yes, on those two
23 occasions we did meet.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, let us pause to deal with a matter which arises
09:43:34 25 from that last answer before I go back to the third of the three
26 points I mentioned earlier and it's this: There had been
27 conflict in the sub-region now since 1989. Is that right?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Now, do you recall us dealing with a letter from the

1 British ambassador which promised that the British government
2 would be providing arms to the Sierra Leonean army?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you remember that letter?

09:44:04 5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 Q. And do you recall providing us with evidence to the effect
7 that arms entering that theatre of conflict were ending up in the
8 hands of LURD combatants? Do you remember telling us that?

9 A. That is correct.

09:44:25 10 Q. Now we have the situation, based on what you've told us,
11 where another major country, the United States, is, on their own
12 admission, sending arms and trainers into that sub-region in
13 Guinea, yes?

14 A. Yes.

09:44:40 15 Q. What was your view as President of Liberia, Mr Taylor, that
16 both Britain and the United States were pumping arms and
17 ammunition into this conflict zone? What was your view about
18 that?

19 A. Well, it was very clear to my government that these two
09:45:06 20 nations were embarked on the process of regime change in Liberia.
21 It was very clear. Several diplomatic sources had mentioned it
22 to us and they were very consistent about the activities.

23 Several things had happened. We had direct sanctions that had
24 been promulgated by both countries. We also had in place - while
09:45:37 25 other members - I would say at least three other members of the
26 Security Council were sympathetic to the plight of the Liberian
27 people in trying to obtain arms, Britain and the United States
28 objected to any lifting of the embargo for legitimate
29 self-defence leading us in 2002 to write and inform the council

1 that we would, in fact, bring arms and stating that we would be
2 prepared to legally argue the point that the Security Council had
3 no right under the charter of the United Nations to deny a nation
4 - a member state legitimate self-defence. So we were of the
09:46:24 5 opinion that regime change was underway.

6 Remember, in documents exhibited before this Court, I sent
7 my - I sent envoys to the British foreign office. We made
8 points. We sent many delegations to the United States. We met
9 with US diplomats, their envoys. Both Under-Secretary of State
09:46:47 10 Pickering came to Liberia, Jesse Jackson came to Liberia.
11 Everything, all of our promises, all of the work that we did,
12 they appeared to pooh-pooh the entire idea of listening to us.
13 That's P-O-O-H, P-O-O-H. So, you know, it was just a disastrous
14 situation and it was real clear to us that regime change was the
09:47:19 15 motive.

16 A third incident that I very rarely like to mention, but I
17 will, an individual - a major evangelist in the United States,
18 Pat Robertson, is well-known, the PTL Club 700, I think it is,
19 who was involved in a little adventure in Liberia volunteered to
09:47:46 20 speak to top administration officials in the United States. He
21 met with George Bush. And following the meeting with George
22 Bush, I got a message from Pat Robertson. He said, "The only
23 thing I can advise you to do, Mr President, is appeal to God," he
24 said, "because what I'm hearing from George Bush, there's nothing
09:48:06 25 that you can do about what America intends to do." And then
26 Liberia - we then launched the famous religious programme in
27 Liberia called Liberia for Jesus. And it was very clear, nothing
28 that we said made any difference.

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the third point I mentioned earlier which I

1 would like to deal with is this: You mentioned that there were
2 BBC and New York Times reports about the situation, yes?

3 A. Yes, in January, yes.

4 Q. Now, could we look, please, in the bundle of disclosure for
09:48:48 5 week 38 behind divider 6, first of all, please. Now, Mr Taylor,
6 have you seen this article before?

7 A. Yes. This is one of the two - two, in fact. One of the -
8 there are two BBC articles that appear, one in January and one in
9 February. Yes, this is one of them. This is it, yes.

09:50:11 10 Q. Now, this is a report from the BBC news dated 4 February
11 2002, and beneath a photograph of Liberian soldiers is the
12 caption, "The Liberian army says it is poorly equipped." Is that
13 true?

14 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. An arms embargo had been imposed on the
09:50:38 15 Republic of Liberia all the way back in about 1980 - around 1992
16 and it was still in effect. So we had no way of getting
17 anything.

18 Q. Now, the article provides:

19 "Liberia's Defence Minister has said that the government
09:51:11 20 army is fighting an unfair war against rebels in the north of
21 the country.

22 Daniel Chea said that his forces are unable to get military
23 supplies because of an international ban on selling weapons to
24 the Liberian government.

09:51:28 25 The international ban was imposed because Liberia was
26 accused of selling diamonds on behalf of the rebel movement in
27 neighbouring Sierra Leone."

28 Now, pause there for the moment, Mr Taylor. Now, help us,
29 unfair in what sense?

1 A. In that the rebels are being supplied, trained and equipped
2 through surrogate Guinea and we are hamstrung by the arms
3 embargo. This is what he is talking about.

4 Q. "Last week ..." so that's the end of January 2002?

09:52:10 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. "... the rebels briefly captured a village just 80
7 kilometres from the Liberian capital Monrovia, causing thousands
8 of refugees to flee." Is that correct?

9 A. That is correct. In fact, I think it's shorter than 80
09:52:28 10 kilometres, but the fact - the factual nature of what they are
11 talking about is true.

12 Q. "The BBC's Sam Howard in Monrovia says that many Liberians
13 will be shocked by this admission."

14 Would you agree with that sentiment Mr Taylor?

09:52:48 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Why shocked?

17 A. Well, most of the population was convinced that the
18 government would do everything and, you know, some - some
19 individuals - in fact, big governments do that sometimes. You
09:53:06 20 deny the advancement of enemy forces to give your people some
21 hope. But my own line was that we had to tell the people the
22 truth that will prepare people in other areas to begin evacuation
23 to avoid massive loss of life.

24 Q. "'We have to make do with what we can lay our hands on from
09:53:35 25 captured weapons, whereby the dissidents have overwhelming
26 external support,' said Mr Chea."

27 Now, pausing there. Mr Taylor, when Mr Chea, the Defence
28 Minister, was speaking to the BBC, was that with your full
29 knowledge?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And when he was saying, "Whereby the dissidents have
3 overwhelming external support," what's that a reference to?

09:54:14

4 A. The supply of material by the United States and Britain
5 through the surrogates of Guinea and other surrogates in Sierra
6 Leone.

7 Q. Over the page, please:

09:54:38

8 "Liberia has repeatedly accused neighbouring Guinea of
9 backing the rebel group, Liberians United For Reconciliation and
10 Democracy.

11 The Defence Minister said that if the arms embargo was
12 lifted, the army could defeat the rebels within a month."

13 Was that a fair assessment?

09:54:55

14 A. Well, not a month, but, I mean, defeat would be imminent.
15 It would be a little longer, but generally I would say that we
16 would have defeated them, yes.

17 Q. "The government said in January that the sanctions should
18 be lifted because the war in Sierra Leone had officially been
19 declared over."

09:55:17

20 Now, to whom had you made that request, Mr Taylor?

21 A. For the lifting of the --

22 Q. Sanctions.

09:55:35

23 A. We had gone to the Security Council. We had, first of all,
24 gone to ECOWAS. We had made the point to ECOWAS. They agreed.
25 We had made the point to the African Union and we had also
26 advanced this to the Security Council and we had obtained the
27 acquiescence of at least three members. France, to a great
28 extent. Russia and China had no real objections. They normally
29 don't get involved.

1 You know, a lot of people don't know - they think the
2 Security Council sits there and goes through a lot of head
3 banging. That's not the way the Security Council works. The
4 Security Council works on deals, arrangements here and there.
09:56:08 5 And we had gone to them, but two members said emphatically that
6 they would not have the arms embargo lifted, and with that, it
7 would not just get lifted. But we had gone through the three
8 areas.

9 Q. And who were the two members who objected?

09:56:24 10 A. Britain and the United States objected to any lifting of
11 the arms embargo for legitimate self-defence.

12 Q. Returning to the article:

13 "The thousands of people who fled the northern towns of
14 Sawmill and Tubmanburg last week are now starting to return.
09:56:43 15 Sawmill was captured by rebel fighters but government troops
16 retook it soon afterwards. The BBC's Jonathan Paye-Layleh says
17 that aid agencies are unable to reach Tubmanburg because of the
18 lack of security.

19 He says that the sick are forced to travel to Klay, 20
09:57:06 20 kilometres away, to seek medical treatment.

21 Tubmanburg mayor Gbeley Karnley said that civilians and
22 government soldiers had looted goods belonging to the fleeing
23 refugees.

24 The military authorities in the town have warned that any
09:57:25 25 soldiers found guilty of looting will be punished."

26 Now, Mr Taylor, as a result of this deteriorating
27 situation, did the Government of Liberia take any steps?

28 A. It depends now. The fighting is going on in terms of - but
29 we're still trying some public relations. The Ministry of

1 Information is busy doing what it ought to do, publishing
2 different situations. We're talking about the war and the LURD
3 threat and what it means. We also have pressure on us at this
4 time now, we're pushing into 2003, a priority of the United
09:58:22 5 States at this time is to get its agent Bility out. So we have -
6 the Ministry of Information is dealing with LURD, we're dealing
7 with the Bility situation and we still are dealing with the peace
8 process now going in Ghana. So there are a series of things
9 going on at this particular time.

09:58:37 10 Q. We'll come back to that Ministry of Information topic in a
11 moment. But before we get there, did your government have the
12 power to declare a state of emergency, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Oh, yes. Yes, all governments do. Yes, we do. Yeah, we
14 did and at one point we did declare a state of emergency.

09:58:58 15 Q. Can you recall when that was roughly?

16 A. When the - I can't get it offhand, but that's somewhere in
17 2003. When the city of Monrovia comes under attack we declare a
18 state of emergency that will give the military an opportunity to
19 deal with the attack, but we are very careful because we -
09:59:26 20 because of the rights of our people, we leave in place the writ
21 of habeas corpus. That is not suspended during the state of
22 emergency, but we do declare a state of emergency.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Can we have a look behind divider 7 in the
24 same bundle and whilst we're looking at that, could I ask,
09:59:49 25 please, that that BBC article, "Liberia struggling to defeat
26 rebels," dated 4 February 2002, be marked for identification,
27 please, MFI-285.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-285.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, have you seen this article before?

2 A. Yes, I have.

3 Q. We see that it's a BBC news article dated 8 February 2002,
4 yes?

10:00:50 5 A. Yes, this is the - this is the first - I misspoke. This is
6 the first attack on the city. I misspoke when I said 2003.
7 2002, yes.

8 Q. So this is the first attack on Monrovia?

9 A. That is correct.

10:01:08 10 Q. Now we see again that same photograph of Liberian soldiers
11 with the same caption?

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. Unsurprising, given that this article is only four days
14 after the previous article we looked at?

10:01:26 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. "Liberian President Charles Taylor has declared a state of
17 emergency as armed rebels appeared to be gaining ground on the
18 capital Monrovia. The President made the announcement hours
19 after rebels attacked Klay, just 35 kilometres (22 miles) north
10:01:52 20 of the city, although he made no reference to the fighting."

21 Pausing there, Mr Taylor. Why did you announce a state of
22 emergency?

23 A. On maps that we've seen previously, Klay - in fact it is
24 spelled in a different way on some maps, but we've gone through
10:02:19 25 this, the Court understands - is at a major junction that leads
26 directly to the Bo Waterside bridge and that is the border with
27 Sierra Leone. That junction also leads to Tubmanburg. So Klay
28 is about midway between Tubmanburg and city of Monrovia. And if
29 you remember Klay, this is where one of the Prosecution witnesses

1 Mr Bility said he was held in whatever he described here that I
2 don't know. But it is a very, very important junction.

3 Now, by attacking Klay Junction this was the open road to
4 Sierra Leone and it is at this particular time that the rebels
10:03:19 5 have an opportunity now to begin to get supplies out of Sierra
6 Leone that I spoke about. So we don't have to look at the map I
7 don't think, but I'm sure the Court has seen where Klay is in
8 relation to the road to Sierra Leone and the road to Bomi Hills.

9 It is a strategic junction and so we had to raise it
10:03:40 10 because this will mean that this opened a short link to the
11 receipt of arms and ammunition. Before this time the rebels had
12 to travel from the Guinean border, through Lofa, through the
13 forest down that took them sometimes - and they had to walk. It
14 took them sometimes a week to two weeks. By attacking the Klay
10:04:11 15 Junction, that gave them a very short route now from Sierra
16 Leone. From Klay to the Bo Waterside I would put it to about 35,
17 40 kilometres. So that is strategic and important because now it
18 gave them a shorter route to receiving arms and ammunition which
19 they did.

10:04:34 20 Q. It goes on:

21 "Forces loyal to President Taylor have been fighting rebel
22 factions in the north of the country since 1999. Earlier this
23 week, Defence Minister Daniel Chea said the government army was
24 fighting an unfair war because of an international ban on selling
10:04:55 25 weapons to the Liberian government. Last week, the rebels
26 briefly captured the village of Sawmill, just 80 kilometres from
27 Monrovia, causing thousands of refugees to flee.

28 'The arms embargo and the government's inability to fully
29 cater to the economic and social well-being of its citizens

1 warrant the declaration of a state of emergency,' Mr Taylor said
2 on state radio and television. 'The state of emergency will be
3 lifted only circumstances which warranted this action are
4 removed; he said. Rebels spokesman Charles Bennie told the BBC's
10:05:41 5 Focus on Africa that they would soon be in control of Klay
6 Junction on the main road to Monrovia."

7 Charles Bennie, known to you, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes, I know that name very well, yes.

9 Q. "Information Minister Reginald Goodridge confirmed to the
10:06:03 10 same programme that they were in the area. Rebels had earlier
11 told Reuters news agency that thousands of rebel fighters were
12 poised to strike Monrovia and could take the city in 72 hours.
13 They said they wanted the President to resign and leave. Liberia
14 has repeatedly accused neighbouring Guinea of backing the rebels,
10:06:29 15 spearheaded by the Liberians United For Reconciliation and
16 Democracy (LURD). The Defence Minister has said that if the arms
17 embargo is lifted the army could defeat the rebels within a
18 month. The international ban was imposed because Liberia was
19 accused of selling diamonds on behalf of the rebel movement in
10:06:52 20 neighbouring Sierra Leone. The government said in January that
21 the sanctions should be lifted because the war in Sierra Leone
22 has officially been declared over. LURD is thought to be led by
23 former chief of staff Charles Julu."

24 Mr Taylor, pause there. Charles Julu, is that the same
10:07:15 25 Julu from the Nimba raids?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. That period in Doe's government?

28 A. Yes, same Julu, yes

29 Q. And was he the leader of LURD?

1 A. No. No. By "leader" here I'm not sure - I can't speak for
2 the BBC, they may be referring to his activities in the military
3 field. Julu was one of the principal commanders. The leader of
4 LURD by this time is Sekou Damate Conneh. That is very - that
10:07:50 5 has been --

6 Q. We've had that name before?

7 A. Exactly. But he is one of the principal - he is one of the
8 principal leaders in terms of leadership in LURD, yes.

9 Q. "... who served in the former regime of President Samuel
10:08:08 10 Doe assassinated in 1990 after Mr Taylor launched an insurgency.
11 The rebels gathered many of the forces that fought Mr Taylor
12 during the country's brutal civil war from 1989 to 1997. Rebels
13 claim to be active in northern Liberia, and the government has
14 sent military reinforcements there to deal with them. But the
10:08:34 15 situation is also confused by a variety of pro-Liberian
16 government militias in the region, some of which are reported to
17 have clashed among themselves."

18 Is that the case, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes.

10:08:49 20 Q. "Our West African correspondent says the conflict in
21 Liberia is complex and fragmented, with no clear rebel front line
22 outside Monrovia. He says the rebels - if they exist as a
23 coherent force at all - are a mixture of dissidents opposed to
24 President Taylor and elements who would best be described as
10:09:13 25 bandits."

26 Would you agree with that assessment?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now, this bandit element, Mr Taylor, help us. Is it the
29 case that law and order had broken down in Liberia by this time?

1 A. To a great extent, in those areas, yes, I would say so.
2 When the capital is under attack and most of the countryside is
3 fighting, yes, I would say - I would say law and order had broken
4 down.

10:09:46 5 Q. Now help us. In February 2002, how far did the writ of the
6 Liberian government extend geographically?

7 A. We had most of the country except for that Lofa, Bomi, Cape
8 Mount region and we've seen the map. That is, we had, I would
9 say, the rest of the country but that strategic region bordering
10:10:19 10 Gbarnga, that's the famous St Paul River bridge that I've talked
11 about, we've seen it so many times, coming all the way down
12 through Cape Mount, Bomi, westward on the border with Sierra
13 Leone, I would say that was the area of problem.

14 Q. Yes. Now you also made mention, Mr Taylor, of a New York
10:10:45 15 Times article?

16 A. Yes. They dealt with the same issue, yes.

17 Q. Dealing with the same issue of LURD. Could we have a look
18 behind divider 8, please. Whilst we're doing that, could I ask,
19 please, that the BBC news article dated 8 February 2002 entitled
10:11:03 20 "Liberia declares state of emergency" be marked for
21 identification MFI-286, please.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-286.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Again, Mr Taylor, have you seen this article before?

10:11:35 25 A. Yes, this is the New York Times article dealing with the
26 fighting.

27 Q. And we see this article also dates from February 2002:

28 "The armed forces went on the offensive today against
29 rebels whose approach to Monrovia, the capital, sent thousands of

1 terrified civilians fleeing and led to the declaration of a state
2 of emergency. The government said the rebels had killed at least
3 16 people. Tension has gripped Monrovia since rebels attacked
4 Klay, a major road junction 22 miles away, on Thursday, rousing
10:12:16 5 grim memories of the seven-year civil war in the 1990s that
6 killed as many as 200,000 people. Founded by freed American
7 slaves in the 19th century, Liberia has become a byword for
8 anarchy in a troubled region. The latest conflict has forced
9 thousands from their homes, and the attack on Klay sent refugees
10:12:43 10 streaming into Monrovia."

11 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And how was your government coping with this influx of
14 refugees?

10:12:57 15 A. There's a terrible situation here, but what happens here,
16 most of the NGOs are stationed in Monrovia. They cannot get out.
17 So as the refugees come into the city, what the relief agencies
18 begin to do is to begin to supply them stocks from within their
19 warehouses in Monrovia, but there's this massive influx of the
10:13:37 20 population and it stretches all of the agencies and hospitals and
21 everywhere. It stretches everything because this is unusual.

22 Q. "The rebels who threatened on Friday to attack Monrovia if
23 President Charles Taylor did not step down say they control much
24 of northwest Liberia and deny the government has the upper hand.
10:14:05 25 'We are still in full control of the areas we have taken and we
26 are moving ahead,' a rebel official in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, said
27 today in a telephone interview."

28 Can I pause again. Now, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind the
29 geographical location of that rebel official in Abidjan, Ivory

1 Coast, was the Ivory Coast at this time harbouring rebel elements
2 opposed to your government?

3 A. I wouldn't say so, no. If you got on a cell phone and -
4 well, we call it cell phone. What do they call it here? Mobile
10:14:51 5 phone and you called, you could make a call on your way out of
6 Ivory Coast, so, no, I have no evidence that La Cote d'Ivoire is
7 doing that at this time.

8 Q. Later a force came into being called MODEL. Is that right?

9 A. That is correct.

10:15:09 10 Q. From where did they attack Liberia?

11 A. From La Cote d'Ivoire.

12 Q. When was that?

13 A. That was later in - I would say by mid-2002.

14 Q. Mid-2002?

10:15:22 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. And as far as you were concerned, was that with the
17 connivance of the government of the Ivory Coast?

18 A. I would not be able to - Gbagbo and I were talking and I
19 would not say so. I could be naïve, but I have no evidence at
10:15:53 20 this time. It is later in 2003 that I get to know that it is
21 been done with the acquiescence of some officers in the Ivorian
22 armed forces, but I was not of the opinion that Gbagbo was
23 directly involved. I have no evidence of that.

24 Q. Now, you say later in 2003.

10:16:16 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. How did you come by that knowledge at that time?

27 A. Well, because of the intensification of the war out of - by
28 MODEL coming into an area in Grand Gedeh County - in fact,
29 specifically an area called Toe Town, that's spelt T-O-E, Toe

1 Town - Gbagbo and I had gone through several exchanges of
2 telephone conversations and he had said that he had no knowledge
3 and did not support them, but because of the intensification
4 their developed some little tension. I was claiming that he
10:17:03 5 should do whatever he can and he was saying that he was doing
6 whatever he could.

7 We also had a situation where there were Liberians that
8 were fighting in the Ivorian civil war and Gbagbo was telling me,
9 'Well, listen, there are Liberians on this side. I don't believe
10:17:25 10 that you are responsible, just as there are Liberians coming out
11 of here fighting in your country. So what we ought to do is not
12 accuse each other, but let's get together." And, finally, he and
13 I get together in 2003 in Togo and settle it. So that's what I
14 mean by "we". None of us had any specific evidence that the Head
10:17:47 15 of State was involved, but we do know some of these things happen
16 at the bottom and you really do not know. Because of tribal and
17 ethnic connections, people do things.

18 Q. Going back to the article:

19 "The government accuses neighbouring Guinea of supporting
10:18:04 20 the rebels and says its own response to the attacks is hamstrung
21 by a United Nations arms embargo. Guinea denies supporting the
22 rebels. The embargo was strengthened last year to halt a
23 diamonds for arms trade between Liberia and Sierra Leone rebels.
24 The Defence Minister Daniel Chea said, 'Because of the arms
10:18:30 25 embargo, we are unable to adequately defend our people.' Mr Chea
26 said he also had evidence that militia fighters from Sierra
27 Leone, known as Kamajors, were fighting on the rebel side."

28 Was that the case, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes. But I think, you know, in all fairness, we need to

1 explain what we were talking about at this time. Let's be
2 reminded that Kamajors recruit from Liberia from ULIMO-J and
3 ULIMO-K. They organise and go with the assistance of - we've
4 seen all the reports of everybody, of ECOMOG. So when we say
10:19:16 5 here that the Kamajors fighting, we are talking about ULIMO-J,
6 ULIMO-K and some of their Sierra Leonean friends that they have
7 obtained that come along.

8 I tell you, the way how these boys fight, it's almost like
9 a joyride for some of these kids that carry all this stuff.
10:19:38 10 ULIMO-J and K fighting in Liberia, Sierra Leoneans say, "Oh, you
11 are my friend. You're fighting. I'll go with you today," and
12 they go. So that's what we're talking about. It's a combination
13 of the three.

14 Q. And your Defence Minister continued, according to the
10:19:54 15 New York times report:

16 "Yesterday we came across somebody whose leg had been
17 chopped off by a blunt object like something that happened in
18 Sierra Leonean's civil war."

19 Did that come to your attention, Mr Taylor?

10:20:08 20 A. Yes. And he mentioned this is the first time we had ever
21 seen that and we know that it is - this appeared to be a
22 phenomenon from that side, and so that's how we say that there's
23 some people involved because this had never happened throughout
24 the civil war in Liberia. So we saw this as something as an
10:20:30 25 incident associated with the war in Sierra Leone only and that
26 for that to happen, someone from that side had to be involved in
27 that kind of atrocity, because from the beginning of our civil
28 war in 1989 up until this particular time we're talking about
29 here, 2002, we had never seen such situation.

1 Q. So what are you telling us, that such amputations were
2 alien to the Liberian civil war?

3 A. Totally alien. There's been - there's no - no - and I mean
4 no recorded incident of any amputation in the Liberian civil war
10:21:10 5 from 1989 all the way through my leaving office in 2003. No
6 recorded incident by NGOs, human rights groups, nothing. This is
7 not a phenomenon associated with Liberia, no.

8 Q. "The war is part of a regional conflict centred on the
9 diamond rich area at the junction of Liberia's border with Guinea
10:21:38 10 and Sierra Leone, where a ten-year war officially ended last
11 month. Both sides - government and rebel - include fighters from
12 the civil war that ended with when President Taylor was elected
13 in 1997."

14 Now, that reference to diamonds, Mr Taylor, so far as the
10:22:00 15 incursion of LURD is concerned, as far as you're aware, were
16 diamonds an element of the conflict between your government and
17 LURD?

18 A. No. Never. Never. No. No. Not at all. No. The
19 conflict with LURD was simply - I can attribute the conflict with
10:22:34 20 LURD and MODEL to the same development of World War II. World
21 War II started as a result of unfinished business from World War
22 I, as simple as that, from all events in history. The war with
23 LURD and MODEL was just what? Unfinished business that led me to
24 the presidency where the Krahn felt that they were unjustly -
10:23:01 25 that I unjustly took power. And the death of Samuel Doe, that
26 was just to finish what was not finished before the elections.
27 So, I mean, that's why I equate it with the circumstances
28 regarding the development of World War II. We don't want to get
29 into the history of that, of who took what part of what country

1 and Britain deciding that they would back one side. That's not
2 the case here, but I'm just trying to say that there's some
3 similarities to that.

10:23:47 4 Q. Now, before we move on, Mr Taylor, the three news articles
5 we've just examined speak of the situation in early February
6 2002. Now, help us, had that situation improved or deteriorated
7 by December - by January 2003?

8 A. Things were still deteriorating, I would say.

10:24:21 9 Q. And what would your assessment be of the situation in
10 Liberia by the beginning of the New Year 2003?

11 A. By 2003 we are - we are trying to resist LURD, but things
12 go a little bad because MODEL begins to develop strength and
13 MODEL attacks the southeastern part of Liberia, so now we are
14 confronted with combat on both sides. By this time, the United
10:25:15 15 States succeeds in bringing about an embargo on the export - for
16 the first time, an economic embargo on Liberia through a Security
17 Council resolution placing a ban on the export of Liberian
18 timber.

19 So here we have, first they start off first with an embargo.
10:25:31 20 They push through a Security Council resolution. And, you know,
21 the issue of diamonds now is front and centre. While there's no
22 evidence, resolutions are flying through, and we know who are
23 drafting these resolutions because all of the resolutions on
24 Sierra Leone or regarding Sierra Leone are drafted by the
10:25:57 25 British. And these resolutions, for the purpose of the wider
26 public that is listening to this, people must know Security
27 Council resolutions, I mean, are drafted. They are proffered.
28 And who wastes time reading all the fine prints?

29 So there's an embargo on diamonds, Liberian diamonds.

1 There's an embargo on the sale of Liberian timber. So what they
2 do, they hamstringing the country. We are - all the those areas
3 economically that we can obtain income for the Liberian people
4 are stopped. So we are just at a point where we cannot move and
10:26:47 5 then MODEL moves in to the southeast and we are just stuck. We
6 can't move.

7 Q. Now, earlier, Mr Taylor, you mentioned action taken by your
8 Ministry of Information in early 2003. Do you recall that?

9 A. Yes. The Ministry of Information, we do a complete
10:27:12 10 statement analysis dealing with LURD, and in that Ministry of
11 Information, to the best of my recollection, the issue of Hassan
12 Bility is hot now. That's an international issue. We also deal
13 with Bility in that particular thing from the Ministry of
14 Information.

10:27:31 15 Q. Could we look, please, in week 39, behind divider 1,
16 please.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just to save us coming back to the
18 New York times article --

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask that that be marked for
10:27:46 20 identification MFI-287, please, Mr President.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's so marked.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

23 Q. Mr Taylor, this document, again, what's its source?

24 A. This is a document basically dealing with the relationship
10:28:48 25 with the United States. The source is the Ministry of
26 Information of the Republic of Liberia. Just trying to detail
27 the long historic ties, the conflict and all of these in - I
28 guess in a way trying to remind the United States, whether they
29 care or not, that there should be some long-term ties and talking

1 about all the efforts that we've made to make sure that that
2 engagement continues.

3 Q. Mr Taylor, we're going to deal with this article.

4 A. Yes.

10:29:23 5 Q. And then after we've dealt with the article in due course
6 we will deal with the further months of 2003 leading to you
7 stepping down. Do you follow?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. So let's have a look at this document now in a little
10:29:37 10 detail. We see that it's dated 7 January 2003, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And it's a press release issued by the Ministry of
13 Information, Monrovia, Liberia. Yes?

14 A. Yes.

10:29:50 15 Q. Where we see in the top right-hand corner the handwritten
16 word "file", whose handwriting is that?

17 A. This is - I'm not sure whose handwriting, but this must be
18 someone in my Ministry of State. This would be our copy.

19 Q. The first subheading is:

10:30:12 20 "Keeping the record straight on US-Liberia relations.

21 As the Liberian government and people begin the critical
22 year 2003, it is incumbent upon the Taylor administration to
23 assess, and if possible redirect the course of its relations with
24 its principal traditional ally, the United States of America. It
10:30:41 25 is the intention of the government to set the record straight on
26 a number of issues that have arisen since Liberia embarked upon
27 its constructive engagement policy with the United States."

28 Second subheading:

29 "The Government of Liberia constructive engagement policy.

1 The government and people of Liberia painfully realised a
2 number of years ago that the United States government had
3 instituted a policy of 'no interest' in Liberia. Washington has
4 since failed to support democracy following the 1997 elections
10:31:21 5 and continues to exhibit apathy towards post-war reconstruction.
6 In spite of this realisation, the Taylor government fostered its
7 constructive engagement policy to build confidence with
8 Washington DC and encourage normalisation of relations.

9 To this end, the government employed diplomatic overtures,
10:31:51 10 public relations efforts and a general show of goodwill in
11 acceding to numerous demands of the United States. It appears,
12 however, that all of these efforts have not been met with an
13 equal measure of goodwill from our American friends.

14 More disappointingly, these efforts have only been recorded
10:32:15 15 by a bellicose behaviour on the part of successive US officials,
16 who have pursued an anti-Liberian policy in support of sanctions
17 and arms embargo, military, economic and diplomatic pressures
18 against the peace-loving people of Liberia. Arrival of US
19 Ambassador John Blaney. The arrival of John William Blaney as
10:32:43 20 the new US ambassador to Liberia, following a period
21 characterised by acrimony during the tenure of his predecessor" -
22 remind us, Mr Taylor, who was his predecessor?

23 A. Blaney. The predecessor - I can't quite recall now who was
24 the ambassador.

10:33:04 25 Q. Okay. We may come back to that:

26 "... gave real hope to the government and people of Liberia
27 that a new page would be turned in US-Liberia relations. This
28 optimism was based on some positive signals emanating from
29 circles in Washington DC that US policy was finally being altered

1 towards Liberia for the better. The government embarked upon a
2 maximum public awareness campaign to improve the battered US
3 image in Liberia. Massive preparations were made to welcome
4 Ambassador Blaney to Liberia in ceremonies befitting a paramount
10:33:48 5 chief. Lapel pins exhibiting the American and Liberian flags
6 symbolically linked together were distributed by the hundreds and
7 proudly worn by American officials and their Liberian
8 counterparts at private and public functions. Touched by these
9 felicitations, Blaney made some broad promises as follows:

10:34:14 10 1. That he was in Liberia to stop the LURD terrorist
11 incursions against the Liberian government and people.

12 2. That he would work for the improvement in relations
13 between Liberia and the United States.

14 3. That he would work to improve the livelihood of the
10:34:30 15 Liberian people.

16 4. That he would work with the Taylor administration to
17 establish a road map for the way forward.

18 To these ends President Taylor summonsed front-line members
19 of his cabinet and senior legislators to a three-hour meeting
10:34:50 20 with Ambassador Blaney to establish the basis for the proverbial
21 road map. The President further instructed his cabinet to
22 maintain an open-door policy and engage the new ambassador and
23 his staff on all points of interest.

24 US intrusive policy.

10:35:13 25 With banners welcoming Ambassador Blaney still adorning the
26 streets of Monrovia and billboards extolling US-Liberian
27 friendship cropping up at strategic locations, the constructive
28 engagement process seemed to falter. Ambassador Blaney began
29 visiting ghettos, internally displaced centres and out of the way

1 villages to implement US intrusive policy. He explained to the
2 desperate and starving populations that the Government of Liberia
3 was responsible for their suffering. He implied that the
4 government had misled them; that the UN sanctions and arms
10:35:54 5 embargo that encouraged the LURD terrorist incursions was not
6 responsible for their plight, but rather the actions of the
7 Taylor government. He went on to refer to government forces
8 defending the country against Guinean-backed LURD terrorists as
9 belligerents."

10:36:21 10 Is all of that true, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Every bit of it.

12 Q. "Coupled with these utterances by the ambassador were
13 renewed bellicose statements from the US State Department that
14 there should be a regime change in Monrovia."

10:36:38 15 Again, was that specifically stated by the US State
16 Department?

17 A. Specifically stated.

18 Q. Who by?

19 A. Their spokesperson and other - and that went on over to
10:36:51 20 Capitol Hill where senior members on Capitol Hill, senators -
21 Judd Gregg, who is still United States senator and was nominated
22 by Barack Obama to a position that he refused, went further to
23 call for the government to be overthrown, Judd Gregg. So there
24 was open warfare, yes.

10:37:17 25 Q. "Throughout the country Ambassador Blaney and former US
26 military officials are moving around dedicating cheaply
27 constructed toilets and clinics in areas with strong support for
28 President Taylor's NPP government. USAID-Liberia and Mercy Corps
29 in collaboration with the US embassy are busy recruiting local

1 government officials, student leaders, members of
2 parents-teachers associations, traditional leaders, ex-combatants
3 and sex workers to form coalitions to effect social and political
4 change in Liberia. They are funding the illegal establishment of
10:38:04 5 up to 45 community-based radio stations throughout the country,
6 and co-opting the transport companies to play propaganda audio
7 cassettes to passengers on long-distance routes. The intrusive
8 policy has targeted 2003, the elections year, for most of their
9 programmes to mature and take effect."

10:38:28 10 Now again, Mr Taylor, is all of that true?

11 A. Every bit of it. Every bit of it. This was a public
12 document. The United States had its representatives in Liberia
13 to counter this by denying or confirming this. There is no
14 evidence of any document that they published decrying these
10:38:54 15 statements. This is a public document.

16 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. Was 2003 an election year in
17 Liberia?

18 A. Oh, yes. And they --

19 Q. When were the elections scheduled to take place?

10:39:06 20 A. November 2003. That would be - that's the constitutional
21 date for elections in Liberia following my election as President
22 in 1997.

23 Q. Now help us. So when you were elected in 1997, that was
24 for a six-year term, was it?

10:39:25 25 A. That's the constitutional term, yes.

26 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor. At the time of this statement in
27 early January 2003 was it your intention to stand for election
28 for a further term?

29 A. Definitely. Under the constitution there are only two

1 terms of the presidency. I was entitled to a second term. We
2 were preparing for the elections. We were running ads and
3 different things. Yes, I was preparing to participate and I was
4 preparing to be a candidate for a second term.

10:39:59 5 Q. Now help us. So that was your view in January 2003, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Now help us. How did you consider your prospects in
8 January 2003 in those elections due to take place in November?

9 A. I considered that the NPP had an excellent chance of
10:40:29 10 winning. There were others that - in fact, to cap off your
11 question, the United States and other international organisations
12 had said that elections should not be held in 2003. It is
13 important to know. So that's why you see all these actions. But
14 we felt that we had an excellent chance of winning. That by this
10:40:53 15 time if we had managed to contain the war that was really in Lofa
16 and Cape Mount and Bomi Counties, most of the population had
17 fled, we could have held the elections, as most countries do if
18 you have crisis in the country, whether we're talking about what
19 we're seeing now in Afghanistan, one cannot argue that the
10:41:11 20 elections could not have been held. But we had planned to hold
21 the elections if things had remained stable as it were at this
22 time, yes.

23 Q. Next heading:

24 "Hassan Bility and other prisoners of war.

10:41:28 25 The Liberian government was quite amazed by the local and
26 global pressures that the US embassy mounted to stifle due
27 process in the case of Hassan Bility and his co-conspirators and
28 to secure their release. The government tried all along to
29 protect the fact of Hassan Bility's connections to the embassy

1 and the frantic secret negotiations that embassy officials were
2 making to quietly slip him and a few of his co-conspirators out
3 of the country. But the Government of Liberia was forced to go
4 public with these behind the scene arrangements when Ambassador
10:42:09 5 Blaney erroneously referred to Bility as a political prisoner and
6 continues to state erroneously that he had been tortured during
7 his incarceration.

8 Even more baffling is the fact that while the Liberian
9 government has aligned with the United States and its allies in
10:42:31 10 the global fight against terrorism, the US government has shown
11 unusual interest in airlifting Hassan Bility, who was arrested
12 for associating with a terrorist organisation, LURD, and
13 operating a terrorist cell on their behalf in Monrovia."

14 Pause. Now Bility had been released and airlifted out of
10:42:55 15 the country in December 2002. Is that right?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. So the Bility situation was still a hot topic at this time
18 in Monrovia. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

10:43:09 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this reference in the first paragraph under
21 this subheading to secret negotiations behind the scenes, had
22 your government been secretly negotiating with the US embassy for
23 the release of Bility?

24 A. Yes. The embassy had visited. Remember, Bility said - the
10:43:31 25 embassy had visited Bility at least twice. They had said to us,
26 "Look, this is an unusual annoyance. Washington is present. Why
27 don't you just let Bility go?" We said, "Well, look, we have
28 evidence" - we showed it to them - "that Bility is not just a
29 journalist, but he is involved in actually recruiting. He is a

1 part - he is - he is a combatant and that's what we term him."
2 We said, "He is an unlawful combatant. So for you to tell us to
3 let him go, we can't let him go. We're prepared to - if
4 possible, let's put him on trial, okay, and see - you know, and
10:44:13 5 bring the facts to the Court." So they said, "Well, a trial
6 would just be, you know, too much." We said, "Okay, we'll keep
7 him until the end of the war. You said that your unlawful
8 combatants are not entitled to the judicial process and can be
9 held until the end of the war, so we'll hold Bility until the end
10:44:32 10 of the war."

11 What annoyed the government that we're explaining here,
12 they go forward and they say, "Oh, Mr Bility is a political
13 prisoner." That opened a new - I mean, that opened a can of
14 worms. And we really got upset that you would term Bility, after
10:44:46 15 we've shown you the emails and Bility's activities, prisoners of
16 war that have admitted that Bility is engaged in certain
17 activities in Monrovia. So we do two things. We go public and
18 this is the incident where we bring Bility out to this public
19 news conference that is mentioned in the last visit where I say,
10:45:08 20 "Great. Since Blaney is now" - we're now going at loggerheads.
21 "Oh, you don't want to release him because maybe he is tortured."
22 Oh, yeah, you know that Bility is not being tortured. This is
23 when I hold a press conference and we bring Bility to the press
24 conference to demonstrate that there is absolutely nothing wrong
10:45:25 25 with him and we will hold him until we very well get ready to
26 release him.

27 Q. So the press conference which you've told us about in the
28 past, Mr Taylor, that was triggered by the assertion he was a
29 political prisoner?

1 A. That is correct and that he was probably being tortured,
2 yes. That's when we bring him out to demonstrate to the world
3 that the statement made by the United States embassy is, in fact,
4 false and misleading.

10:45:57 5 Q. Now, the second aspect of this passage that I want us to
6 deal with is this: What had the Liberian government done to
7 align with the United States and its allies in the global fight
8 against terrorism?

9 A. Some I can state. Some I cannot state. Those that I can
10:46:20 10 state: We had made public statements backing the US's right to
11 go after terrorist cells in, for example, Afghanistan. We backed
12 that publicly. We aligned with the United States's position in
13 international fora. That we did. Some of the other ones, I
14 don't think I'm privileged to speak about because they do involve
10:46:57 15 government to government intelligence activities that I'm sure I
16 cannot talk about. But so far, we aligned with the United States
17 in saying that they had a right to self-defence. We backed their
18 right for Afghanistan. We - as discussions came into national
19 fora, we aligned with them. We held memorial services in
10:47:22 20 Monrovia and all of that kind of stuff and this is what we did
21 publicly.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, just in general terms, and I'm not asking for
23 the details, did the Liberian intelligence service cooperate with
24 the United States intelligence service?

10:47:36 25 A. Following 9/11, yes.

26 Q. Bearing that fact in mind, did you thereafter allow
27 Monrovia to become a base for Al-Qaeda terrorists?

28 A. No. How would that be? If anything close to Al-Qaeda had
29 come near Monrovia, they would have been - they would have been

1 picked up and dealt with even harsher than the Americans would
2 have.

3 Q. Next topic:

4 "US-backed sanctions against Liberia.

10:48:15 5 Having complied with the provisions of the United Nations
6 Security Council Resolution 1343 that brought sanctions against
7 Liberia, and despite the fact that Sierra Leone has returned to
8 peace and stability with the demobilisation of the RUF and the
9 holding of democratic elections, the United States government is
10:48:37 10 still pressing for the continuation of sanctions against Liberia.

11 Two instances attest to this fact:

12 1. The High Diamond Council: Following strenuous efforts
13 by the Liberian government to apply the Kimberly Process to put
14 into place a certification regime for the export of Liberia's
10:49:03 15 rough diamonds, one of the key demands of the US Security Council
16 resolution, United States pressures have succeeded in scuttling
17 the process. Officials of the High Diamond Council were told in
18 no uncertain terms by US officials in Brussels and Switzerland to
19 frustrate Liberia's efforts to become compliant."

10:49:29 20 Is that true?

21 A. Very true. My minister was there.

22 Q. Which minister?

23 A. Jenkins, the late Jenkins Dunbar. My ambassador,
24 Dr Othello Brandy, ambassador to Brussels, present. Members of
10:49:40 25 the High Diamond Council told our delegation. We wanted to
26 become kimberlite compliant so we could resume the trade and
27 export of Liberian diamonds and the High Diamond Council made it
28 very clear to us that we are under pressure to delay the process
29 as much as we can and they did that. And I have that in part, a

1 written report from my minister back in 2003 concerning this -
2 all of the efforts that we made to become compliant.

3 Q. "2. Another key demand of US Security Council resolution
4 1408 is for Liberia to submit its maritime and forestry

10:50:31 5 programmes to an international audit. Initially, the United
6 States State Department tried to coerce the Liberian government
7 to use a hand-picked audit firm, the Crown Agents. The Liberian
8 government opted for the internationally recognised open bidding
9 system to select an audit firm. The US government, the European

10:50:59 10 Union and other local and international representatives were
11 present when Deloitte and Touche were selected in a transparent
12 process from among three reputable companies that had submitted
13 bids. No sooner had Deloitte and Touche begun their work, than
14 the US swept the rug from under our feet again and pressured the

10:51:22 15 company from New York and London to 'drop the Liberian account'.
16 It is true, as Ambassador Blaney has stated in a recent press
17 statement, that 'the United States did not stop this firm from
18 contracting with the Government of Liberia', because they were
19 present for the signing ceremony. But he cannot deny the fact
10:51:44 20 that the US did pressure the firm to drop the Liberian account
21 after the contract was signed."

22 Again, is that true?

23 A. Yes, that's what he says. It's true, yes.

24 Q. "Crown Agents", who are they, Mr Taylor?

10:52:03 25 A. They had different groups. My dear, these people have a
26 web of their nonsense. I don't remember precisely all the names,
27 but they called themselves the representatives - they called
28 themselves Crown Agents representing British interests. Man,
29 it's just - I don't know their actual names, but they represented

1 the British government at the time.

2 Q. Next subheading:

3 "International contact group on Liberia.

4 The International Contact Group on Liberia is a group of
10:52:39 5 self-appointed mediators whose stated intent is to help resolve
6 the Liberian crisis with LURD. As much as the intent and
7 initiative is welcome by the Liberian government, it is expected
8 that several key issues must be taken into consideration.

9 1. The United States, which is a prominent member of the
10:53:01 10 contact group, must show sincerity and good faith by
11 unequivocally condemning LURD for carrying out terrorist
12 aggression against the innocent people of Liberia. In the
13 absence of this condemnation, the US role cannot be taken
14 seriously, especially when the United Nations, the African
10:53:25 15 Union, and ECOWAS have already condemned LURD.

16 2. The Liberian government is the legitimate
17 democratically elected government recognised by the international
18 community. It is unacceptable that the government will be
19 treated by the contact group as a faction or be equated with the
10:53:46 20 LURD terrorists.

21 3. The Liberian government welcomes the US statement that
22 it does not support LURD and urges an end to all military support
23 to the LURD from whatever sources. But the operative question
24 that the US must then answer is that, if the US is training the
10:54:08 25 Guinean army, and the Guinean army is supporting LURD, then who
26 really is encouraging the LURD terrorists to renew their attacks
27 against Liberia after they were pushed back into Guinea a few
28 months ago.

29 The 2003 elections.

1 The Liberian government wishes to make it clear that it is
2 committed to the democratic process and will endeavour to have
3 elections in line with the constitution. However, it is
4 unacceptable for any foreign entity to try to influence the
10:54:49 5 results of the election by trying to subvert the constitution or
6 clandestinely funnel funding to favoured political parties as the
7 US intrusive policy has earmarked."

8 Which political parties are they, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Which political parties are?

10:55:07 10 Q. Were being favoured by funding.

11 A. Oh, we had what - the present party that is leading the
12 government by the present President. You had the NDP and the
13 other parties. All of the other political parties in Liberia
14 that participated in the last election were being assisted. All
10:55:37 15 of them.

16 Q. "It will be recalled that in the 1997 elections, the US
17 government failed to assist with funding and logistics to hold
18 the special elections that brought the war to an end. By now
19 calling for the United Nations to assist with the elections, the
10:55:54 20 US is once again giving indications that it does not intend to
21 assist the Independent Elections Commission with funding and
22 logistics. Besides, Liberia is not a mandated territory and
23 strongly objects to any insinuation that an outside agency should
24 supervise the elections. The government welcomes any number of
10:56:22 25 monitors to observe the elections, but not to supervise it.

26 US-Liberia relations, which way?

27 In spite of its best efforts to pursue its constructive
28 engagement policy with the United States, the Liberian government
29 is convinced that such initiatives are not being reciprocated.

1 Nevertheless, the US must understand certain truths about
2 Liberia:

- 3 1. The Taylor administration is not anti-American.
4 2. The government and people of Liberia will do nothing to
10:57:04 5 adversely affect American interests in Liberia.
6 3. The Taylor administration is firmly committed to the
7 free enterprise system, democratic governance, the holding of
8 free and fair elections, the protection of human rights, freedom
9 of the press and the rule of law.

10:57:27 10 The Liberian government believes that the best way to build
11 confidence and improve relations is that the US and Liberia
12 should be talking to each other, and not at each other through
13 press releases and counter press releases.

14 The US should endeavour to keep its promises to the
10:57:48 15 government and people of Liberia and not continuously sweep the
16 rug from under our feet. The goal post should not be continually
17 moved every time Liberia accedes to new US demands there appears
18 to be progress on the key issues.

19 There is a strong sense of frustration among Liberians from
10:58:10 20 all walks of life that the US is not dealing honestly with
21 Liberia, and that her policy lacks consistency. In fact,
22 Liberians are convinced that US policy toward Liberia is really
23 'no policy', or a 'hands off' policy.

24 While Liberia is not deterred in pursuing its constructive
10:58:34 25 engagement policy, it must be made clear that it is the
26 responsibility of the government to seek the welfare of the
27 people, maintain peace and stability and discourage any attempt
28 by anyone to drive a wedge in the unity and cohesion of the
29 Liberian population. The United States must therefore strongly

1 reconsider the implications of its intrusive policy as it targets
2 certain disadvantaged groups to institute so-called social and
3 political change. Any misguided change without due process could
4 be disastrous for the future of Liberia as the 1980 ill-advised
10:59:20 5 military coup and the prolonging of the 1990 civil war have
6 proven.

7 As much as Liberia cherishes its historic relations with
8 the US, the neglect and apathy exhibited by the US towards
9 Liberia is creating widespread anti-American sentiments.

10:59:42 10 Liberians across the board feel betrayed and disappointed over US
11 policy, no matter how many toilets are built in ghettos or how
12 much money is given to local NGOs. The strongest sentiment
13 pervading the consciousness of every Liberian as elections unfold
14 is that America, if you cannot help an old friend, please don't
11:00:10 15 hurt us."

16 Now, Mr Taylor, what was it that prompted that press
17 release?

18 A. When you look at the whole thing I'm not sure, but this
19 whole process - this whole process that brought me here brings
11:00:32 20 this out. What prompted this is the frustration - the
21 frustration over the years. And, you know, we were really
22 misleading ourselves in so many ways. This is almost like when a
23 piranha smells blood. The United States had taken a decision for
24 regime change in Liberia and nothing was going to stop it. We
11:01:04 25 were busy trying to control the process, but the decision had
26 been taken.

27 I think to a great extent we were our own worst enemies.
28 By "we" I mean the government. Throughout the history of Liberia
29 the United States had never seen a process coming out of Liberia

1 where they were really confronted and the United States was not
2 used to Liberian governments before mine telling them yes or no.
3 It was, "Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Yes, sir." And I guess to a great
4 extent they were stunned. And so the decision was taken.

11:01:58 5 Let's not forget the war that LURD - my government was a
6 democratically elected government. My government was under
7 attack. What would you do as a friend? You help the
8 democratically elected government. No, you help the rebels. So
9 I guess they were confounded by the fact that there was someone
11:02:19 10 in Liberia that was able to say yes or no, or saying things like
11 we will do what's in the best interests. They were not used to
12 it. I mean, what, a little poor African country like Liberia,
13 can't pay it's payroll, would be saying yes or no and talking on
14 terms. They were just not used to that. And so we were
11:02:41 15 frustrated and we just outlined some of - some of these things we
16 are going through really are for historical purposes. The die
17 was cast, we were going to be destroyed anyway and it happened
18 eventually. I'm here. But the pages of history are all that are
19 reflected here. These are not things that are because I'm
11:02:55 20 arrested and was saying - these were things that were on the
21 ground obtaining at the time.

22 So I mean it's just our frustration and trying to detail
23 the record for the pages of history to reveal what was going on
24 at the time. It's good to know that a vast majority of - I would
11:03:18 25 say up to maybe 80 per cent of Liberians that travel abroad for
26 higher education all go to the United States. I personally am a
27 third generation American family. My grandmother migrated from
28 Georgia to Liberia in the late 1890s, so I'm a third generation
29 freed slave that came to Liberia. I'm a third generation family

1 myself. So maybe all that desire that maybe some of our
2 forefathers fought for to fight slavery in America, maybe if some
3 of that was not a part of me maybe I would have had success, but
4 I'm not a coward. And so we were able to state the fact
11:03:59 5 constitutionally I had to have election. I didn't have a choice.
6 And because I - whether I won or lost, I had to have election
7 because the constitution said so.

8 So, counsel, it's just the years of frustration and trying
9 to set the record straight we decided to do. And these are not
11:04:17 10 all of the publications. I don't have all of them because some
11 of them are still in Monrovia, but that's just the story.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in a little while we're going to take up
13 the narrative regarding 2003 knowing that in March 2003 an
14 indictment was signed against you, yes?

11:04:50 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. But before we come to that there are one or two matters
17 which I need to clarify at this stage. Four of them in total.

18 Could I have a moment, please, Mr President? I just need
19 to locate something.

11:05:44 20 Mr President, there are one or two matters which I need to
21 clear up. The first is this, and this document should be treated
22 with care. I do not want it put on the overhead, please. But in
23 disclosure for week 44 there is a photograph behind divider 1
24 which the defendant made reference to during the course of his
11:06:12 25 evidence and I'm being deliberately Delphic about it for reasons
26 which will become obvious once your Honours see the photograph.

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I don't wish to interrupt,
28 but what were we to do with the press release?

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to that. That I would like the

1 press release, "Ministry of Information, Monrovia, Liberia, press
2 release, 7 January 2003", to be marked for identification
3 MFI-288, please.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-288.

11:06:58 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, behind dividers 1 and 2 in the
6 disclosure for week 44 is the photograph of an individual and
7 behind divider 2 is the photograph of the back of that
8 photograph, and I would like those to be marked for
9 identification, please. They are directly relevant to certain
11:07:25 10 testimony given by Mr Taylor on an earlier occasion. Do your
11 Honours have that photograph? Yes?

12 JUDGE DOHERTY: It's one with a DP number on it,
13 Mr Griffiths.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm going to ask for this to be
11:08:03 15 confidentially filed.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: And it will be --

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

19 MS HOLLIS: We would ask that we go into private session so
11:08:12 20 a foundation for this document can be established.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I would object to that process because your
22 Honours will recall the direct testimony given by Mr Taylor
23 regarding this photograph. In our submission, the foundation has
24 already been laid.

11:09:23 25 [Trial Chamber conferred]

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you give us the transcript reference
27 that relates to these two documents?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I can conduct a search for that. I don't
29 have it immediately to hand. You may recall, Mr President, that

1 certain details were mentioned in private session when I was
2 dealing with the testimony of a particular witness, but my
3 learned friend Mr Anyah is busy now searching for that reference.

11:10:46 4 JUDGE DOHERTY: Did it relate to the family background of
5 the witness in question?

6 MR GRIFFITHS: No, it dealt with the current status of that
7 individual. If your Honours give us a moment we can find the
8 reference.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Otherwise we can move on and
11:11:04 10 defer any further consideration until we get the transcript
11 reference.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes. Now, another matter that I would like
13 to deal with at this stage, Mr President, is really a
14 housekeeping matter. Right at the outset of Mr Taylor's
11:11:52 15 evidence, we played - I dealt with in extenso a memo from one Tom
16 Woveiyu, NPFL, to John Dobrin, US Department of State regarding
17 the situation in Liberia, dated 22/01/1990. And following checks
18 made by myself over the weekend, I don't think I asked for that
19 document to be marked for identification, although it was dealt
11:12:25 20 with in some detail. So I would ask, please, that that document
21 so described be marked for identification, unless there's any
22 objection, as MFI-289. And I can give the description again.

23 It's DCT-53, memo from Tom Woveiyu, NPFL, to John Dobrin, US
24 Department of State, regarding the situation in Liberia, dated 22
11:13:02 25 January 1990, and that would become, on my reckoning, MFI-289.

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Could you please remind us where it's
27 located.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: It's located in disclosure for week 30
29 behind divider 2.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: And that was the subject of some
2 evidence, was it?

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, it was. It was read in toto into the
4 record.

11:13:52 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have any transcript reference for
6 that, when it was read into the record?

7 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, we believe that adequate
8 foundation was laid for this document to be marked for
9 identification.

11:14:05 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Thank you for that,
11 Ms Hollis.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. In that case, that document
14 will be marked for identification MFI-289.

11:14:19 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, one other matter which requires
17 clarification is this: At some stage the Reverend Jesse Jackson
18 was appointed as a special envoy in West Africa by the United
19 States government, wasn't he?

11:15:39 20 A. Yes, specifically President Clinton. He was special envoy
21 to the peace process at that particular time, and I'm speaking
22 about around 2000.

23 Q. And what was his specific role? Help us.

24 A. Reverend Jackson was a special envoy because he knew
11:16:07 25 Liberia. He was sent in to look at the Sierra
26 Leonean/Liberian/Guinean situation for the Clinton administration
27 and to see if he could help in the process of bringing about a
28 speedy resolution. In fact, he held meetings in Guinea, in
29 Nigeria; Monrovia, attended by Kabbah; in the case of Monrovia,

1 with me; Conakry, where I attended; and he played a very, very
2 important role during that period, even during the hostage crisis
3 that erupted around 2000, he was in the region while the whole
4 thing was unfolding.

11:17:02 5 Q. And, Mr Taylor, have you seen any record of any of the
6 discussions you had with the Reverend Jackson?

7 A. Yes. In fact, on that tour he was accompanied by Howard
8 Jeter, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at the time.
9 Subsequently given to us by the - in fact, those discussions at
11:17:37 10 that particular time were classified. I held discussions with
11 Reverend Jackson about the accusation of diamonds, arms, and the
12 whole peace process. It was classified at that time. The
13 Government of Liberia was not provided transcripts of those
14 discussions.

11:17:57 15 Subsequent, since my arrest, the Prosecution did provide
16 for us the unclassified version of those discussions that were
17 held with Reverend Jackson, Howard Jeter and the rest, because,
18 in fact, Jackson became the most senior US government official
19 dealing with the crisis at the time. We received an unclassified
11:18:23 20 version of that classified report from the United States
21 government.

22 Q. And what was the thrust of that document that you received,
23 Mr Taylor?

24 A. That document dealt with the issue of the crisis and how I
11:18:38 25 saw it and what my role had been and what it thought my role
26 could continue to be. Reverend Jackson, during the discussions,
27 dealt with the rumours, as he termed them, that had been
28 circulating about diamond dealing and arms trading, where they
29 were talking about gunrunning and diamond smuggling. He urged my

1 government to do everything that we could to try to remove these
2 rumours that were hurting, as he termed, hurting my government.
3 We promised we would do so. He also dealt with the peacekeeping
4 efforts and what I could do, and he recognised the role that
11:19:35 5 Liberia had played and urged Liberia to continue to play such
6 constructive role.

7 Q. Mr Taylor, help us again, please. Precisely, how did you
8 come by this information?

9 A. The unclassified report?

11:19:56 10 Q. Yes, please.

11 A. That's provided by the OTP.

12 Q. And can you recall when that was?

13 A. I don't know exactly when they provided it, but the details
14 of this unclassified report covers 2000 and the issues
11:20:13 15 surrounding that time.

16 Q. Yes. I wonder if we could now look, please, behind divider
17 133, disclosure for week 33, binder 3 of 4.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, whilst that document is being
19 located, I now have the transcript reference in respect of that
11:22:11 20 earlier matter we discussed. And for the assistance of everyone,
21 this was a private session on 16 September 2009 and pages 29073
22 to 29075 of the transcripts refer. Given the time, I wonder if
23 we could, perhaps with the assistance of Court Management, locate
24 those transcripts. So it's 16 September 2009 - I would like to
11:22:54 25 resolve this issue before the break - pages 29073 to 29075.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you want us to look at those? We
27 would have to go back into private session, wouldn't we?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, we would, Mr President. I think it
29 would be of assistance, but I would like to resolve this sooner

1 rather than later.

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, the only problem I would face in
3 regards to broadcasting those transcripts is that they are
4 confidential, and if I put them on the broadcast screen next to
11:23:40 5 Mr Taylor, it will mean that the public gallery will be able to
6 view them.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's why I said private session. I
8 wasn't suggesting you put them on the overhead for public
9 viewing.

11:23:51 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, we can go into private session and I
11 will refer to the particular references from my monitor.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: You want to do that now?

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, please.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. For members of the public,
11:24:08 15 we're going briefly into private session to protect the identity
16 of a witness who is the subject of protective measures orders
17 made by this Trial Chamber. What that means is, you'll be able
18 to still see the proceedings, but you won't be able to hear
19 anything.

11:24:26 20 Madam Court Manager, please put the Court into private
21 session.

22 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of
23 the transcript, pages 31376 to 31381, was
24 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as
25 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

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1 [Open session]

2 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Mr Taylor, before we went - -

12:02:26 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before we go any further, I think
6 we're still in private session, aren't we?

7 MR GRIFFITHS: I indicated to Court Management that we
8 could move out of private session, because I think we concluded
9 that.

12:02:38 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We are in open session, are
11 we, now?

12 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we're in open session.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

14 Q. Mr Taylor, before we concluded for the short adjournment,
12:02:47 15 you had mentioned to us an unclassified report which you had seen
16 disclosed to us by the Prosecution detailing meetings you'd had
17 with Jesse Jackson. Is that right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And when had these meetings taken place?

12:03:05 20 A. These meetings took place around 2000.

21 Q. Can you give us a month?

22 A. I would put it to about May. Jesse was - in fact, Reverend
23 Jackson had come, and I remember it very well during the whole
24 episode of the UN hostage taking and all of that, so I would put
12:03:26 25 it to about May of 2000 or thereabout.

26 Q. Yes, now again can invite attention, please, behind divider
27 133, week 33, binder 3 of 4. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I do now.

29 Q. Now, this document, in terms of its layout, is slightly

1 difficult to follow, so we need to proceed with care.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, if we look below the dotted line about four inches
4 from the top of the page do we see a date, May 2000, yes?

12:04:25 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Now if we move down a few more lines we see the word
7 "Confidential", yes?

8 A. That is correct, yes.

9 Q. And then two lines below that, "Subject: SE Jackson's" -
12:04:41 10 special envoy Jackson's "May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor."
11 Yes?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Miss another line and we see the word "Summary"?

14 A. Yes.

12:04:56 15 Q. "On Sierra Leone, Taylor said the UN hostage release must
16 not be conditioned on Sankoh's fate, that Liberia needs
17 helicopters to help effect the release of US hostages, and he
18 does not control the RUF (at least not Foday Sankoh). He also
19 noted that it is impossible to forcibly disarm the RUF and that
12:05:26 20 talk of a war crimes tribunal is not helpful to securing the
21 release of the hostages."

22 Now, I want to pause there. Now, do you recall this
23 conversation, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Yes, I do.

12:05:41 25 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you in fact indicate, as stated here,
26 that talk of a war crimes tribunal is not helpful?

27 A. For the release of the hostages, yes.

28 Q. Now, when you made mention of a war crimes tribunal, were
29 you in May 2000 aware that in due course you would be indicted?

1 A. Oh, no. No.

2 Q. It continues:

3 "Taylor denied Government of Liberia involvement in
4 gun-running, di amond smuggling and deforestation, but was
12:06:25 5 challenged by Special Envoy Jackson to actively prove his case.

6 In reply, Taylor bemoaned Liberia's not having any friends in
7 Washington to help refute the accusations. When Deputy Assistant
8 Secretary Jeter pressed further on this issues, citing evidence
9 presented to UNSC" - what's UNSC?

12:06:52 10 A. United Nations Security Council.

11 Q. "... of Ukrainian gun-running through Burkina Faso into
12 Liberia, the Liberians embarked on a very aggressive denial."

13 Pause again. Now, Mr Taylor, have you been shown any
14 evidence of Ukrainian gun-running through Burkina into Liberia
12:07:15 15 either in, or prior to, May 2000?

16 A. No, this is something that went - what they said, they
17 presented it to the Security Council. We had never seen
18 anything.

19 Q. Subsequent to this meeting with Jackson, were you ever
12:07:35 20 provided with any such evidence?

21 A. No.

22 Q. To this day have you seen any such evidence?

23 A. No, I haven't been given any - the only thing I have seen
24 in this courtroom is what we saw, a plane, that they say were
12:07:57 25 weapons designated for - that's all I have seen.

26 Q. "The Liberians embarked on a very aggressive denial.
27 Before the meeting ended, Sam Bockarie was summoned and meet with
28 Special Envoy Jackson, Ambassador Myrick, Deputy Assistant
29 Secretary Jeter and Taylor."

1 Pause there. Did Sam Bockarie attend this meeting?

2 A. Yes, at the - not the government side of the meeting.

3 Following the discussions, they wanted to see Sam Bockarie. I

4 asked them to get Sam Bockarie. He was brought. He met with us

12:08:40 5 briefly, and I left them and they met with him separately.

6 Q. This meeting, Mr Taylor, where did it take place?

7 A. At the Executive Mansion.

8 Q. Does it follow that Bockarie was in Monrovia in May 2000?

9 A. Yes, Bockarie, a few months - that's a few months after his
12:09:00 10 arrival, yes.

11 Q. Because Bockarie had arrived in Monrovia in December 1999,
12 hadn't he?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. So subsequent to Bockarie's arrival he met with the

12:09:12 15 Reverend Jackson and these other individuals?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. So, Mr Taylor, in light of that, was Bockarie's presence in
18 Liberia being kept a secret?

19 A. No. Oh, no. In fact, the reason why they wanted to see

12:09:29 20 Bockarie - and you will see here they do not raise any objection

21 to his presence in Liberia - because Bockarie's coming to Liberia

22 was done with the acquiescence of the United States, the United

23 Nations and everybody. So they do not complain about his being

24 there.

12:09:45 25 Q. Over the page, please. Page 2:

26 "2. Presidential Special Envoy Jesse Jackson met 19 May

27 with Liberian President Charles Taylor as part of Jackson's trip

28 to the region to seek ways to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone.

29 Four sessions were held:

1 Closed small meeting with Jackson, Taylor, Ambassador
2 Myrick and Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeter (followed by brief
3 exclusive interviews with Washington Post and Chicago Tribune
4 reporters, accompanying Jackson and CNN videographer in from
12:10:44 5 Freetown):

6 Two larger meetings with Taylor plus nine and Special Envoy
7 Jackson plus six;

8 Small meeting with RUF commander Sam Bockarie, Special
9 Envoy Jackson, Ambassador Myrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary
12:11:00 10 Jeter, Taylor, Mrs Taylor, Foreign Minister Captan, and political
11 adviser Cyril Allen". Yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Number 4 at the bottom of the page, "small closed meeting",
14 do you see?

12:11:10 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. "The initial small closed meeting originally included
17 President Taylor, Foreign Minister Captan, Special Envoy Jackson
18 and Ambassador Myrick. Before discussions got underway, Taylor
19 indicated he wanted a one on one with Jackson. The session
12:11:28 20 lasted about 30 minutes, including press interviews (Washington
21 Post, Chicago Tribune reporters accompany Jackson and CNN
22 videographer)."

23 What was said during those 30 meetings when you were one on
24 one with Jackson?

12:11:46 25 A. I can't say verbatim everything, I mean, it was just
26 basically a special envoy comes in, and normally they have a
27 special message, and I really wanted to find out from Reverend
28 Jackson what in the world is going on. Basically, that's what I
29 want to find out. What in the world is going on that we cannot

1 get America to think constructively about us? What can we do?
2 How can we do it? What is expected? Generally, this is what we
3 are talking about in that meeting.

4 Q. Over the page, please. Number 5:

12:12:17 5 "The day's second session started with 20 minutes open to
6 the press in which Taylor and Jackson gave opening remarks.
7 Taylor began by saying he was there to listen, adding 'We know we
8 must have peace'. Taylor stated the hostages must be released
9 with no linkage to the release of RUF leader Foday Sankoh or
12:12:40 10 demands for changes to the Lome agreement. Once all the hostages
11 are released, then we must go on to disarm the RUF, the SLA, the
12 Kamajors, take the Lome Accord to its logical end. 'I think
13 we're all in agreement here,' said Taylor, cautioning that the
14 process is not easy.

12:13:04 15 Diamonds and guns - Government of Liberia not involved.

16 Taylor went on to deny any Government of Liberia
17 involvement in diamond smuggling or arms trafficking through
18 Liberia or from or to Sierra Leone. 'Liberia has never been
19 involved in gun-running to Sierra Leone or the movement of
12:13:24 20 diamonds from Sierra Leone.' He said ECOWAS has a treaty that
21 covers this. If there are diamonds smuggled through Sierra Leone
22 or from Sierra Leone, he wants to work with Sierra Leonean
23 President Kabbah to get to the bottom of it. Taylor noted
24 reports that after Sankoh fled his Freetown house on 9 May,
12:13:47 25 documents were found showing that Liberia was involved with the
26 RUF in diamond smuggling. Taylor said Kabbah should make these
27 documents available for review. 'If he has facts, let's go
28 through it.'"

29 Did Kabbah ever provide you with those documents?

1 A. Not one line of it, no. The first I ever saw any document
2 from Sankoh's house that even is closely associated with
3 documents that were supposed to be found were given by the OTP in
4 the famous document that we have before the Court, it's called
12:14:31 5 the Michel to The Leader document. It's the first time that I
6 ever saw a document associated with documents found at Foday
7 Sankoh's house.

8 Q. "Taylor said he didn't doubt diamonds were being smuggled
9 from the region, noting Liberia had appealed without success to
12:14:53 10 the IMF and World Bank for assistance in setting up a programme
11 to stop the illegal trade. He said the international community
12 should provide assistance to set up an effective central control
13 mechanism and that the Belgians should know how to do this.

14 Helicopters needed for hostages.

12:15:14 15 Taylor said Liberia was working hard to get UN hostages
16 released, but needed helicopters to carry out the effort. I'm
17 sure they have been debriefed. Even many of the hostages will
18 tell you they walked three days to the border. Helicopters from
19 a neutral source are needed to fly over hostage-holding or
12:15:33 20 staging areas to help find and retrieve the hostages. Libya that
21 day had delivered two toy helicopters, too small, seating only
22 two or three passengers. Liberia was sending these back to Libya.
23 Mi-8s seating 15 to 18 are needed. Liberia is doing what it can
24 with limited means, using a local helicopter company."

12:16:03 25 Pause there. Mr Taylor, I thought you had large
26 helicopters in which you were delivering helicopter loads of arms
27 and ammunition during this period to the RUF.

28 A. We did not have. That's why I told the Court we had Mi-2s,
29 which are very tiny, but we did not have this size of helicopter

1 by this time in early 2000.

2 Q. And who was the local helicopter company that you were
3 using?

4 A. It's the Weasua had - they had an Mi-8.

12:16:37 5 Q. And were you using the Weasua's, that private company's
6 helicopter to transport arms?

7 A. No, never, no.

8 Q. Move on. Number 9:

9 "Jackson's remark - take on the rumours directly. In the
12:16:51 10 portion opened to the press, Jackson's closing line was his
11 strongest and set the stage for the follow-on session from which
12 the press was excluded. Jackson counselled Taylor to take on
13 directly the rumours of Government of Liberia complicity in
14 gun-running/diamond smuggling/bringing mercenaries to the region.
12:17:15 15 These rumours and activities that serve as the basis for them
16 jeopardised Taylor's government."

17 Now, Mr Taylor, did Jackson use the word "that special
18 envoy rumours" or did he say "we have evidence"?

19 A. This is a United States government document. He said
12:17:36 20 rumours. This document is not put together by me. This is a
21 United States government classified document. Neither Jackson
22 nor Under-Secretary of State Pickering, no United States
23 government official or no one has ever brought me any evidence to
24 this date. These are his words, rumours. These are his words.

12:18:00 25 Q. "Reverend Jackson began his remarks by thanking Taylor for
26 the meeting. The Sierra Leone crisis with 10 years in the making
27 and the RUF capture of UN hostages has riveted world attention.
28 Some hostages have been freed and all must work to free those
29 remaining. ECOWAS had charged Taylor to secure the hostages'

1 release and owes a special debt to Taylor for accepting that
2 charge. Seeking helicopters is important and we hope that UN
3 efforts and UN helicopters will be given the access they need.
4 The hostages must be released soon to ensure the injured or ill
12:18:42 5 do not die in the hands of the RUF. We're glad Taylor sees no
6 link between release of hostages and Sankoh's fate. The RUF has
7 broken the Lome Accord. Jackson noted Taylor's statement of
8 support for restoring democracy in Sierra Leone and for an ECOWAS
9 force with a peacekeeping mandate in which Liberia would be
12:19:05 10 willing to take part. We support Taylor's efforts to help
11 release the hostages and bring peace, noting that if the RUF
12 succeeds in Sierra Leone, their banditry and torture would
13 eventually spill over into Liberia."

14 On UN diamond smuggling and gun-running, an international
12:19:29 15 effort to stop these activities is critical. Diamond brokers in
16 consumer countries must be partners to the effort. There are no
17 so many poor people over so much rich soil in the region's
18 diamond producing areas, lamented Jackson.

19 The RUF activities are barbaric. We hope they will agree
12:19:48 20 to disarm and demobilise and finish the remaining work to build
21 peace and democracy in Sierra Leone."

22 Then we come to the confidential meeting:

23 "Referring to his meeting the previous day with Nigerian
24 President Obasanjo, Jackson said Obasanjo had commended Taylor
12:20:08 25 for accepting ECOWAS's charge to seek the hostages' release."

26 Was it ECOWAS who asked you to get involved, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Were you acting on your own initiative in that regard?

29 A. No, I was not.

1 Q. "Jackson said Obasanjo told him that Nigeria was willing to
2 commit five battalions, but their mandate needed to be peace
3 making and not peacekeeping. Jackson thought Obasanjo would
4 welcome Taylor's offer to commit troops.

12:20:46 5 Jackson and Taylor then went into another room for a CNN
6 interview. All press was excluded when they returned.

7 Jackson noted that Liberia is at centre stage as the world
8 press turns its spotlight on Sierra Leone and Liberia's role in
9 the region. Jackson said crisis can turn into opportunity.

12:21:09 10 ECOWAS had turned to Taylor to secure the release of the UN
11 hostages. If he delivers, he will demonstrate leadership.

12 However, if any hostage dies in captivity, the world will blame
13 the RUF. Jackson commended Taylor's clear declaration that the
14 release of UN hostages is not linked to Sankoh's fate. Jackson

12:21:36 15 also praised Taylor for not compromising Liberia's national
16 interests even for a friend like Sankoh. Jackson noted Obasanjo
17 the previous day had called himself Charles Taylor's friend, and
18 based on that friendship was sending someone" - I hope everyone
19 is following. We've had to jump a few lines.

12:22:03 20 "... based on that friendship was sending someone to meet
21 with Taylor to warn him to stop his destabilising activities.

22 Taylor's statements before the world press (while meeting with
23 Jackson) that the Government of Liberia was not involved in
24 gun-running and diamond smuggling was a big step. Now it was
12:22:21 25 time to prove it, to make a case, to take the issue on. It was
26 important to engage ECOWAS countries and others in the
27 international community to help with border control and
28 verification to dissuade traffickers and smugglers.

29 Taylor said he'd been trying for years to do just that, to

1 discredi t rumours about Li beria. He turned to Foreign Minister
2 Captan and said, 'Take thi s stuff on. Thi s is about di amonds and
3 deforestation.'

12:23:00

4 Taylor continued: Reverend Jackson, one of our problems,
5 we've lost the friendship we had with the US government, because
6 we know Washington can stop thi s. Most people know it's not
7 true. Noting that Li beria needs millions of dollars in
8 investment, Taylor said the international community had shunned
9 Li beria. There was no real forestry industry. The company
10 rumoured to be involved in the deforestation has been operating
11 in Li beria for many years. Instead of undermining the company,
12 let's get to the bottom of thi s, demanded Taylor. With no big
13 friends in Washington, Taylor lamented, it's hard to fight the
14 rumours."

12:23:21

12:23:43

15 Which was the forestry company, Mr Taylor?

16 A. We had - I have forgotten the name of the - it was a
17 forestry company run by a Chinese group out of Buchanan. I just
18 don't recall the name right now.

19 Q. Very well. Let's not delay on that:

12:24:08

20 "Later in the meeting Jackson referred to an op-ed piece
21 published by United States Senator Gregg which said that the
22 Government of Li beria should be overthrown. This article had
23 come up during the first session of the afternoon. Taylor
24 recognised that it had not been said on the floor of the Senate
25 and that, in any event, a Senator's remarks do not express US
26 foreign policy, but he questioned why the State Department had
27 not chosen to say that Gregg's remarks did not reflect the
28 administration's policy towards Li beria.

12:24:30

29 In a quick aside, referring to a news report, Taylor noted

1 that a resolution to increase UNAMSIL to 13,000 troops had just
2 been introduced in the UNSC, UN Security Council, about five
3 minutes ago. He then veered back to the topic: Deal with us
4 directly. Hit me on these issues. Don't talk to me through the
12:25:14 5 State Department's spokesman. We need to talk directly.

6 Guns, diamonds, support to the RUF - rumours and
7 misinterpretation (and Taylor says his hands are clean).

8 On gun-running, Taylor said the US should be able to tell
9 what's really going on because it has satellites beaming down on
12:25:41 10 Liberia and Sierra Leone. A recent incident supports this
11 notion. The other day, there were trucks transporting hostages
12 to the border to hand them over. Taylor alleged that Ambassador
13 Myrick had called and said there were hostages on their way and
14 Taylor assumed this was based on satellite images. Taylor
12:26:05 15 further alleged that the satellites showed that the Sierra
16 Leonean Army has Nigerian tanks."

17 Mr Taylor, is that true?

18 A. Very true. We were shocked. In fact, as we negotiated for
19 the release of the hostages, we were there on pins and needles
12:26:25 20 waiting for a response. Ambassador Bismarck Myrick, the US
21 ambassador, called my Minister of State and said, "Some of the
22 hostages are on the truck on their way right now, you can inform
23 the President." And we say, but how did he get to know when
24 we're sitting here waiting for the results. And we got to know
12:26:47 25 later, actually, they had a dedicated - what they call a
26 dedicated line of satellite imagery at the time and focused on
27 the movement of the hostages. So they got to know before - so
28 I'm saying to them, "Well, if you have this kind of" - which we
29 know they had that kind of thing - "you should be able to tell us

1 more." But they told us, from the minute the hostages boarded
2 the trucks, the United States ambassador called and informed the
3 government that, yes, they are actually moving.

12:27:22 4 Q. "Taylor claimed four ECOMOG Nigerians are smuggling
5 diamonds out of Sierra Leone and President Kabbah, members of
6 parliament, and many others know it."

7 Where did you get that information from?

8 A. These are all the reports. There were reports about Khobe
9 and others. You know, these were general reports that the
12:27:37 10 Nigerians - the senior commanders at the time were involved in
11 diamonds. These are all news reports. I'm saying to them.

12 Q. "It's not just the RUF boys. The Nigerians have taken
13 over. In Liberia, there are also a lot of ex-ECOMOG Nigerians
14 about" - I assume that should be 2,000 in Monrovia - "that are
12:28:00 15 involved in nefarious activities.

16 Taylor speculated that the RUF might be getting arms or
17 stealing them from these Nigerians or from Guineans. Problems
18 with smuggling from Guinea got so bad that Liberia had at one
19 point closed the border between the two countries. But the only
12:28:21 20 hypothesis anybody seems willing to investigate is that guns are
21 arriving through Robertsfield. What about Guinea? What about
22 Cote d'Ivoire? Instead, everybody just keep saying Robertsfield.
23 'Say something repeatedly and it eventually takes on the air of
24 fact,' said Taylor.

12:28:41 25 Taylor said, 'Liberia does not have any tanks, much less
26 Nigerian tanks, despite rumours to the contrary.' 'Using serial
27 numbers,' Taylor said, 'we ought to be able to trace or locate
28 tanks stolen from the Nigerians.'

29 Hostage release - I'll do my best, but I don't control the

1 RUF; talking about war crimes is not helpful.

2 Taylor said he can't guarantee the hostages will be freed,
3 because the RUF are out of control. 'You'd have to take more
4 than drugs to take on the UN.' Kabbah knows that Taylor and
12:29:39 5 Sankoh have not been getting along for a while. Sankoh himself
6 said Taylor had called Sam Bockarie to Liberia to join forces
7 against Sankoh. Speaking of Sankoh, Taylor said, 'We had tough
8 differences.' "

9 Had you, Mr Taylor?

12:30:05 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. What differences?

12 A. Well, it started off in 1999 really, and we can go all the
13 way back to 1991, but let's just speak about recent times. The
14 Lome agreement, when I arrived in July of 1997, there were two
12:30:23 15 tough days in getting that agreement, and there were some very
16 tough exchanges and I was very, very forceful in dealing with
17 him, that's why I say that we've had tough differences, beginning
18 with that particular time and even going into after Lome in
19 getting the disarmament process started. There were some very,
12:30:47 20 very firm statements made by me to Sankoh to get that process
21 started, and this is why it is very clear when these hostages are
22 taken nobody asked me, I said point blank: We're not going to
23 tie these hostages' release to Sankoh. These hostages must be
24 released. So we had been having some very tough times since
12:31:11 25 about July 1999, not forgetting the '91/'92 incident that led to
26 the Top 20, Top 40 and Top Final. But we'd had some very tough
27 times.

28 Q. "Taylor says it also doesn't make sense that Sam Bockarie,
29 who ran the RUF for two years while Sankoh was in jail, would

1 come to Liberia for training (with mercenaries). 'This is
2 disinformation', Taylor claimed, 'and if we had friends we'd be
3 able to combat it.'

12:31:45

4 Taylor noted that Human Rights Watch is talking about the
5 need to set up a war crimes tribunal now that the RUF had reneged
6 on Lome. Taylor said this is not helpful to getting the hostages
7 released. Jackson assured Taylor that the US government had not
8 yet taken a position on forming a tribunal; neither had the
9 Nigerians. Delinking the release of the hostages from any
10 conditions allows wriggle room to raise this later, noted
11 Jackson.

12:32:07

12 Johnny Paul Koroma - one shrewd little bugger.

13 Jackson interjected: 'What about Johnny Paul Koroma?'

14 Taylor called him one shrewd little bugger."

12:32:27

15 Is that your assessment of him?

16 A. Yes, I said that. I can explain what I mean later, but I
17 said that.

18 Q. "Taylor said Koroma was never happy that Sankoh had signed
19 the Lome agreement for all of them but he had no choice, as he
20 was under detention. According to Taylor, Koroma's men would
21 only have kidnapped the UN (at Okra Hills in August) if Koroma
22 had given the order. Taylor said prior to then he had not met
23 Koroma."

12:32:45

24 Is that true?

12:33:04

25 A. I had never, ever Johnny Paul Koroma, so those witnesses
26 that they're talking about here - this is me talking in 2000.

27 Q. May 2000.

28 A. May 2000. I had never met Johnny Paul Koroma for someone
29 to say that Johnny Paul Koroma came to Liberia, never. Never met

1 him before then.

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when you told the Reverend Jackson and
3 other US representatives that in May 2000, did you know that
4 three years later an indictment would be unveiled against you?

12:33:33 5 A. No, I did not.

6 Q. "But as a Good Samaritan, Taylor negotiated the hostage
7 release and brought Koroma to Liberia for the first time. Koroma
8 lost credibility after Okra Hills, but now he has worked himself
9 back in as an ally of Kabbah. Taylor called Koroma a very weak
10 man, but said we should be wary of him because he and the SLA are
11 now completely re-armed."

12 Did that concern you?

13 A. Yes, yes. Let's look at what happened. Koroma comes in,
14 he's not happy that Sankoh signed this agreement. We work out an
12:34:16 15 agreement that the SLA is brought back, okay, as a part of the
16 Sierra Leone Army. That's what I mean by he's one shrewd little
17 bugger. Koroma then had figured out once the SLA was a part of
18 the government, he was in control because he controlled the
19 army - the Sierra Leonean army. So what he did immediately,
12:34:35 20 which was a good move, was to ally himself with Kabbah.

21 Immediately from October when he arrived in Freetown, he and
22 Kabbah got very close. This is what I'm referring to when I say
23 he's weak, but he had now gathered strength. And who is being
24 armed right now? The Sierra Leone Army. And who is really,
12:34:56 25 really in control? Even though Kabbah is President, Koroma now
26 is outside. But the Sierra Leonean army look up to Koroma as
27 their actual leader.

28 Q. "On the other hand Koroma has now balanced the equation,
29 and Taylor predicts as a result there will not be any fighting in

1 Freetown. Koroma will demand a place at the bargaining table and
2 will begin pushing for higher stakes for himself. Taylor said,
3 'I'm not talking about the hostages. I believe they will be
4 released. The hostage taking was a stupid thing, it should never
12:35:36 5 have happened.'

6 Taylor then turned to the post-hostage release phase of the
7 crisis. He has heard of ECOMOG plans to add another 5,000
8 troops. All ECOWAS countries would contribute, there would not
9 be a fighting over force composition. ECOMOG has a tradition of
12:35:54 10 creating this kind of force, as seen in Liberia in the last
11 decade. Jackson wondered if Taylor had talked to Obasanjo, as he
12 had been very clear with Jackson, during their May 18 May
13 meeting, about the composition of additional troops to Sierra
14 Leone. Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeter noted the meeting of
12:36:17 15 ECOWAS defence ministers, 17 to 18 May, which recommended either
16 the formation of ECOMOG II, or adding troops to UNAMSIL, but in
17 neither case only if they have a peace enforcement mandate.

18 Taylor said this would be a vast misuse of forces. 18,000
19 (13,000 UNAMSIL plus 5,000 ECOMOG) is too large a force. On
12:36:45 20 peace enforcement, Taylor noted: 'It is impossible to forcefully
21 disarm guerillas in the bush. What must be created is an
22 environment where combatants feel it is safe to disarm.'"

23 Now, did you honestly believe that, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Yes.

12:37:03 25 Q. So help us, if you honestly believed that, why, as alleged,
26 were you seeking to destabilise the situation by pumping arms
27 into Sierra Leone? Do you follow?

28 A. I follow. I just never was involved in that. That's what
29 makes the whole thing just a story.

1 Q. Now let's move on. Given what's alleged about you, about
2 your record on human rights:

3 "Jackson asked Taylor about Star Radio. Taylor said,
4 'There's very little you can do.' Jackson said he was just
12:37:39 5 asking, then underscored that free speech a big deal and it is a
6 huge deal in a democracy. Taylor then explained that Star Radio
7 is a very unique situation and he repeated explanations for its
8 closure that have been reported previously. Taylor noted Star
9 Radio also operates on the internet and there is 'Not one good
12:38:00 10 thing ever about this government.' (PA0" - can you assist as to
11 what that means, Mr Taylor?

12 A. No, I can't.

13 Q. "... not true) Taylor implied Star Radio could possibly
14 resume broadcasting, saying that if it is turned to a new group
12:38:26 15 (possibilities mentioned, University, Electoral Commission) they
16 could apply for a licence."

17 Had you closed down that radio station, Mr Taylor.

18 A. Yes, I had.

19 Q. Why?

12:38:36 20 A. For so many reasons. I'll just give two quickly. Star
21 Radio was operating outside of Liberian law. It was a radio
22 station that had been given by the United States government for
23 the purposes of the election to, quote unquote, level the playing
24 field. Our argument was that: Fine, after elections, turn it
12:38:54 25 over to somebody, University or whatever. Under the laws of
26 Liberia as a foreign entity and you having ownership of this
27 radio station, you cannot operate it in Liberia. That was
28 principally the thing. And I said if you turn it over to any
29 other person, a Liberian group that under the laws of Liberia

1 could be licensed, it could operate. Other than that, no.

2 Q. "Jeter then told Taylor that deforestation was a real
3 concern. Jeter hoped Ambassador Myrick and other international
4 observers would be allowed free access to investigate
12:39:35 5 allegations, under a proactive rumour control programme as
6 suggested earlier by Special Envoy Jackson. Taylor replied that
7 he wanted to protect the environment, but that his government
8 needed financing, not just words from environmental advocates.
9 He would love to set aside 1 to 2 million acres for preservation
12:39:58 10 along the lines of the US National Forest. He said that if
11 someone does investigate the devastating clear-cutting
12 accusations, they could only do so if they visit all of Liberia's
13 wooded areas and not just pick on OTC (Oriental Timber Company)".

14 A. That's it.

12:40:16 15 Q. "Taylor then got a bit animated, as did Foreign Minister
16 Captan and NPP's Cyril Allen, decrying the attacks as a
17 conspiracy against OTC, which had made the first major investment
18 in Liberia under Taylor."

19 Is that true?

12:40:35 20 A. That is true. That is true. In fact, the company that I
21 said I could not recall is OTC. OTC had investigated \$250
22 million into Liberia. The whole point of this problem with
23 deforestation, it was simple. OTC was one of the first major
24 companies to invest. Such investment added income to the
12:41:05 25 Liberian government. They were trying to starve off the
26 government from any source of revenues, and they went after OTC.
27 What was OTC doing? They built, for the first time in Liberia, a
28 \$50 million plywood and veneer factory in Liberia. First thing
29 on the ground. We had set three years as the end of the export

1 of round logs out of Liberia. We were going to break down wood
2 in Liberia for furniture, we were doing plywood, we were doing
3 veneer and everything that would have provided thousands of jobs
4 for the Liberian people instead of exporting just cut round
12:41:49 5 timber out of Liberia. 250 million altogether, and this was the
6 company that they went after to destroy to starve my government
7 from any revenue. So I just said - and we got upset in that
8 meeting. What's this issue about deforestation you people are
9 talking about? Let's bring in the experts. Let's go through it.
12:42:09 10 They wouldn't do it.

11 Q. "Jeter then said that on arms we know for a fact that arms
12 have been moved on a Ukrainian transport that landed in Burkina
13 Faso, unloaded there, then went on to Robertsfield. This
14 information had been presented to the United Nations Security
12:42:30 15 Council by the United States, the United Kingdom and Nigeria
16 alleging the Ukrainian involvement. Taylor said, 'We were never
17 confronted' about this, and that 'We want our date in Court.'"

18 Have you ever been confronted with that, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Never. I said it in that meeting in 2000.

12:42:51 20 Q. "On diamonds, Jeter noted efforts to help the Government of
21 Sierra Leone restructure its diamonds trade and marketing.
22 Taylor asked if diamonds are smuggled from Guinea. Jeter said,
23 'Probably, yes.' Taylor asked why everyone made an issue of
24 diamonds in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but not in Guinea. He said
12:43:13 25 he wouldn't deny for a minute that diamond smuggling occurs in
26 Liberia, but he was irritated by accusations that 'Charles Taylor
27 and his carpetbaggers are surviving on this illegal trade.'
28 Taylor then said he wanted our help on this, emphasising that 'We
29 will cooperate 100 per cent to get this under control in all

1 countries.' He then repeated his lament of having no friends in
2 Washington.

3 Jackson then counselled Taylor to take these accusations
4 one by one and address them, emphasising dialogue. Taylor again
12:43:51 5 said, 'That's why we need friends, to have our day in court. If
6 you have charges against me, tell me. We're never given an
7 opportunity to defend ourselves.' Taylor then mentioned that
8 Foreign Minister Captan had a copy of an intelligence report,
9 about \$12 million in arms off-loaded involving former Roosevelt
12:44:22 10 Johnson and Charles Breeze, saying the idea that Taylor would
11 ally himself with his former enemy's close friend was
12 ridiculous."

13 What's that about?

14 A. There was this famous intelligence report that I had
12:44:37 15 brought, along with Roosevelt Johnson, some \$12 million worth of
16 arms and ammunition in Liberia and I'm saying to them, "But
17 you're crazy. We threw Roosevelt Johnson out of Liberia in 1998
18 in the famous attack on Monrovia. How can you then come back and
19 say that Roosevelt Johnson, along with the Government of Liberia,
12:44:54 20 are bringing in arms into Robertsfield? What craziness is this,
21 that the man that is at war with my government and I are involved
22 in bringing in arms to the country?" Typical, typical
23 intelligence. But it's not intelligence. This is what you call
24 disinformation. But it is just flooded out there, and like the
12:45:15 25 report sent from Mark Doyle when he spoke to US officials in
26 Monrovia, they have a - "You have a public relations problem,
27 deal with it."

28 So, I mean, most of this stuff as you're seeing here in
29 this report, and I have to emphasise this, about Jackson saying

1 he counsels Taylor, "Take these accusations one by one," these
2 issues are not issues for courtrooms. What these countries do,
3 they come up with an idea. They throw it out there. They may
4 have no knowledge of the facts involved, and they leave you to
12:45:53 5 fight it out, and after some time, they get it. So if you've got
6 friends some place, they will say, "Well, wait a minute guys.
7 This is not right." If Washington or maybe London or Paris back
8 you, they will say, "Listen, cut thing out. It's wrong. Don't
9 publish it any more." Other than that, it continues.

12:46:17 10 And it is not intended to reach to these levels. These are
11 diplomatic tricks that are played. It's a part of a whole
12 intelligence collection process that helps you to find out maybe
13 that which you don't know. If somebody jumps and says what you
14 want to hear, then it becomes something that you use, and this is
12:46:34 15 the process that is going on here.

16 Q. "Taylor repeated that he would like to have a chance to
17 refute such allegation. 'You should be talking to us, not
18 talking at us.' An agitated NPP chairman, Cyril Allen, jumped in
19 noting that the accusations against OTC on deforestation were out
12:46:59 20 of context and unnecessary, forgetting that Taylor himself had
21 raised this issue. 'They had nothing to do with Sierra Leone.
22 When meetings are set up, a line should be drawn about what is
23 discussed.' Jackson noted that this was a difficult setting, but
24 since we had this opportunity for open dialogue, we should use
12:47:18 25 it. Allen said that bringing up OTC was not friendly and another
26 example of rumour mongering. Taylor interjected, 'I think the
27 observations have been made. It is not bad. There are problems
28 we have to deal with.' He added, 'I want to rebuild this
29 relationship. It is the absence of bringing it up that keeps us

1 from moving ahead.' He then noted that Liberia is turning out to
2 be a linchpin on lots of activities in West Africa. He said he
3 hoped that things would work out in Sierra Leone, then noted,
4 'Don't let Cote d'Ivoire break up. That's a bigger case.'

12:47:57 5 Taylor emphasised his good relations with Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina
6 Faso, Nigeria and others. He said that if Liberia's economy was
7 stronger, he would be able to become ECOWAS chairman in a few
8 months, but without resources, he could not take on the
9 responsibility. Jackson then reinforced the need for ongoing
12:48:17 10 dialogue that did not side step or avoid issues due to diplomatic
11 niceties.

12 Turning the conversation again to Sierra Leone, John T
13 Richardson noted that it is quite clear that the SLA and the
14 Kamajors had re-armed during the crisis, but the US government is
12:48:38 15 constantly calling for the RUF to disarm. Richardson emphasised
16 that disarmament of all parties had to be simultaneous. Jeter
17 retorted that prior to 1 May, the vast majority of DDR
18 participants were SLA or Kamajors. Jeter reminded that it had
19 been the RUF which had disarmed UNAMSIL Guineans when they first
12:49:02 20 arrived, an early and clear violation.

21 Taylor turned to the upcoming ECOWAS summit in Nigeria. He
22 re-emphasised that the release of the hostages has to happen. It
23 will happen. He noted that Kabbah is the person under the Lome
24 Accords who has to enforce them. At the 9 May ECOWAS summit on
12:49:24 25 Sierra Leone, Kabbah's position was that he couldn't control the
26 mobs that ended up ransacking Sankoh's house on 8 May. Taylor
27 said Kabbah should have taken responsibility and that he should
28 have been able to stop the crowds.

29 Taylor then noted that Kabbah's lack of control was

1 worrisome, as Liberian opposition groups ULIMO-J and K are all
2 now in Freetown."

3 Is that true?

4 A. Yes, yes.

12:49:54 5 Q. What do you mean they were in Freetown?

6 A. Well, we're talking about 2000. They were all part of that
7 whole Kabbah set-up. Remember, ULIMO-J and K had been - they
8 were part of the Special Task Force, the STF. They were all
9 there. They were part of the Sierra Leonean government. And

12:50:18 10 once Kabbah brought the SLA back, you had brought back the SLA.
11 And then a part of the SLA were, what, the STF. So my problem
12 now, I still have ULIMO-J and K as a part of the Sierra Leonean
13 army and the STF, just as you have right now. There's still
14 Liberians in the Sierra Leonean armed forces, as we sit in this
12:50:40 15 Court.

16 Q. "If Kabbah can't control mobs, how can he control Taylor's
17 opponents?"

18 Shortly before the meeting ended, Taylor mentioned there
19 would be a follow-on meeting of a small group with RUF commander
12:50:58 20 Sam Bockarie who had just arrived at the Executive Mansion.
21 Bockarie told reporters waiting in the hallway when he arrived
22 that he had been summoned.

23 At the end of the two-hour session, Special Envoy Jackson
24 led the group in prayer.

12:51:14 25 Comment.

26 Taylor's message was predictable but unbelievable. He
27 doesn't control the RUF, he is not involved in gun-running,
28 diamond smuggling or deforestation. He obviously does retain
29 some influence with at least some portions of the RUF and with

1 newly re-armed Johnny Paul Koroma. Taylor is also effectively
2 engaged on the UN hostage release, and we should encourage him.
3 He seems to think he will succeed.

12:51:49 4 If he does, we should press Taylor on efforts to seriously
5 investigate the rumours that plague him. We need also to be
6 watchful for his influence on Bockarie and Koroma. With Sankoh
7 sidelined and Kabbah weak, Taylor may use one or both to increase
8 his influence in Sierra Leone."

12:52:12 9 Now, Mr Taylor, the note of the conversation as per that
10 comment expresses a degree of scepticism about your position,
11 don't you agree?

12 A. I agree. And fear. Scepticism and fear. I agree.

13 Q. And was that scepticism and fear justified?

12:52:34 14 A. No, it was not. It was not. But, you see, these are
15 things - you know, we're in a court of law. These are the
16 political decisions that affect small countries. You go to a
17 major meeting and this - at the end of the meeting, here is a
18 classified comment by - made by maybe an analyst. This is at
19 the end of it. And the analyst says, "Well, we don't believe
12:52:54 20 Taylor, but we think he's doing his best. We have to be careful.
21 We can't let him get any influence over these people, what they
22 talk about, we need also to be watchful of his influence on
23 Bockarie and Koroma. With Sankoh sidelined and Kabbah weak,
24 Taylor may use one or both to increase" - now, these things,
12:53:16 25 really, over time affect governments.

26 And whether this analysis on the part of this analyst is
27 correct or not, it affects foreign policy, it affects the policy
28 towards you as an individual, and this is only a comment being
29 made, well, which is an assessment by maybe an individual. And

1 these are some of the problems that little countries have. I
2 still have it. And years going on, people will read it, well,
3 after this meeting, this was our assessment. This assessment for
4 me is totally wrong.

12:53:58 5 Q. Putting the comment aside, Mr Taylor, this record of the
6 meeting with Jackson on 19 May, is it a fair account of what
7 transpired?

8 A. Yes, it is.

9 Q. That's putting the comment at the end to one side, yes?

12:54:14 10 A. That is correct, yes.

11 Q. Very well. Let's leave that topic, shall we. Now,
12 Mr Taylor, what I now ask for your assistance with is this: Do
13 you recall Thursday last when we were dealing with the issue of
14 diamonds, yes?

12:54:31 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, before I move on --

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before you go on, do you want to
18 mark that?

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm going to mark it for identification. So
12:54:44 20 record of discussions with Reverend Jesse Jackson, unclassified,
21 released in full, of a meeting on 19 May 2000, may that be marked
22 for identification, please, MFI-291.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-291.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Grateful:

12:55:05 25 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall last Friday when we were
26 dealing - last Thursday when we were dealing with the issue of
27 diamonds?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You made mention of a report from your Minister of Mines?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Jenkins Dunbar?

12:55:29 5 A. That is correct, yes. That is a report that was compiled
6 for me in 2001, if I recollect properly, 2001, of all the
7 meetings. He had travelled to Belgium to meet with the World
8 Diamond Council in looking at the issues of trying to get Liberia
9 Kimberley compliant and those meetings - there were several of
10 them in different countries and a report was done for me - it was
11 in 2001 - about the different efforts and what would happen.

12 Q. Mr Taylor, just to complete then - well, there's one other
13 topic we need to deal with. Just to complete the issue of
14 diamonds, can we look in the same binder behind divider 110,

12:56:31 15 please. Do you have it?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. Let's deal with this then. So we see that it's addressed
18 to you and dated 1 March 2001, yes?

19 A. That is correct.

12:57:26 20 Q. "Dear Mr President:

21 We have the honour most respectfully to inform you that
22 pursuant to the panel of experts appointed pursuant to United
23 Nations Security Council resolution 1301 (2000) paragraph 19 in
24 relation to Sierra Leone and the alleged conflict diamonds
12:57:44 25 through Liberia, we have held several meetings with the Diamonds
26 High Council, official representative of the Belgian diamond
27 industry accompanied by His Excellency Othello Brandy, Liberia's
28 ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium, and report the following:

29 1. Only the HRD has statistics on the flow of diamonds

1 from Liberia and have subsequently prepared a report on conflict
2 diamonds with the Liberian statistics to the World Diamond
3 Council and the United Nations.

4 Our review of HRD progress report on conflict diamonds
12:58:25 5 shows significant reduction of diamond exports from Liberia to
6 HRD since 1999. The report is very clear that Liberia has been
7 exporting diamonds to Belgium, starting in 1966 before Sierra
8 Leone starting in 1979 at predictable quantities and prices. That
9 rough diamonds coming to HRD since early 1990s show high volume
10 and high or very low quality which the HRD from experience can
11 compare to Russia and Angola diamonds."

12 What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor?

13 A. A lot of the diamonds that were going in under the
14 so-called name of Liberia were not Liberian diamonds. These were
12:59:23 15 diamonds smuggled out of Russia and Angola, and for some reason
16 people were passing them through in Belgium as Liberian diamonds.
17 So the percentage was very high, but these were not actually
18 Liberian diamonds and they were just saying Liberian diamonds,
19 Liberian diamonds.

12:59:34 20 Q. "That since the certification scheme for Angola and Sierra
21 Leone went into effect late last year, the diamond imports from
22 Liberia and Sierra Leone have dropped to more predictable
23 capacity" --

24 A. I can't help.

12:59:54 25 Q. I don't know if anyone can assist me with the other two
26 words?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: It might be "which would".

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Yes, that would make sense. "... which would indicate that

1 the statistics before 1999 was full of falsification. We do not
2 have access to figures from other worldwide diamond centres in
3 Israel, India, the USA, Switzerland, Britain, Johannesburg, Dubai
4 and other emerging markets.

13:00:26 5 During our discussions with HRD, we discussed and agreed
6 that Liberia is on track in kimberlite exploitation and would
7 certainly want prosperity from its diamonds as a producing
8 country in an important way than being subject to sanctions as
9 recommended and sponsored by the United States and Great Britain
13:00:49 10 on the Security Council.

11 5. That since diamonds purchased by businessmen from all
12 countries are valued and packaged based on carat, colour, cut and
13 clarity, we would welcome openness in buying and exporting from
14 Liberia for the moment: (a), with appointed diamond traders by
13:01:11 15 the World Diamond Council; and (b), before the eyes of the UN
16 representative in our trading centre in Monrovia."

17 Was there a diamond trading centre in Monrovia, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, we set up one for clarity, yes.

19 Q. "The objective of this proactive process is to create a
13:01:33 20 closed loop between Liberia and importing countries in order to
21 match our exports with import statistics and create a complete
22 audit trail of Liberian diamonds and guarantee the Liberian
23 exports to contain no conflict diamonds until the UN global
24 solution is found.

13:01:54 25 The UN General Assembly in resolution 55/56 of 1 December
26 2000 mandated" - and again, can you help us what that mandate
27 was, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Well, the only mandate I can recall at that time was to
29 become Kimberley compliant. That's the mandate. But these words

1 here, I don't know.

2 Q. That's what it says. "... mandated the expansion of the
3 Kimberley Process, which is being attended by diamond producing
4 countries, processors and traders. Our absence at these meetings
13:02:56 5 has hurt us. We have been briefed by the HRD on these meetings
6 with strong recommendations that our participation will keep us
7 proactive and limit the damaging reports that continue to
8 circulate unanswered. We are closing the communique of Windhoek,
9 16 February 2001, and schedule of further meetings for your
13:03:21 10 perusal.

11 Our best defence to international propaganda, which come to
12 far reaching conclusions concerning alleged smuggling of Sierra
13 Leone diamonds to Liberia, is to develop political and technical
14 data based on: (a), pre-conflict data; and (b), present
13:03:40 15 production. The Ministry must be supported in these efforts with
16 equipment. The information gathered must be also be
17 independently verifiable to give it the transparency we need. It
18 would seem, Mr President, that were we to fail in these attempts,
19 the UN, (US and Britain) would want to impose the kind of
13:04:07 20 sanctions which would be interpreted that only certain diamond
21 bearing countries have a right to mine."

22 Pause there. Mr Taylor, what action did you take on that
23 recommendation from your minister?

24 A. We made funds available, and all of the conferences
13:04:21 25 thereafter we were present and participated.

26 Q. "In view of the comments and observations from our meeting
27 and visit to the HRD, we recommend the following:

28 1. We are proposing that our visit to the HRD be reported
29 to the UN Security Council as being proactive in correcting the

1 condemnatory and prejudicial tone of reports from the US and
2 Britain on the Security Council."

3 Did you do that?

4 A. Yes.

13:04:51 5 Q. "2. That Liberia will henceforth attend all World Diamond
6 Congress and participate in the world-wide diamond certification
7 scheme being worked out by the World Diamond Council under the
8 'expanded' Kimberley Process as mandated by the United Nations
9 General Council resolution 55/56 of 1 December 2000 as a member
10 of and signature to the final communique.

11 3. That Liberia will request the assistance of the HRD to
12 assist the government in putting an effective certificate of
13 origin regime in place which should create the transparency for
14 the flow of official Liberian diamonds to create an audit trail.

13:05:36 15 This request should be made to the United Nations to
16 specify help from HRD to establish the certification process.

17 4. That government will aid the Ministry immediately to
18 begin field monitoring and documenting production. Government of
19 Liberia is to ask the United Nations for independent verification
13:05:58 20 of production figures.

21 5. That the government should take steps now to licence
22 two reputable diamond traders from the High Diamond Council to
23 begin a system of control with absolute transparency."

24 Was that done?

13:06:17 25 A. That is done too, yes.

26 Q. "6. That after touring and observing the diamond exchange
27 in Antwerp, we recommend that Liberia adopts a similar system of
28 controlling and regulating our diamond sales. This will require
29 the setting up of a centralised one stop shop (housed within

1 the Ministry of Land, Mines and Energy or the Central Bank of
2 Liberia) providing centralised services, including appraising of
3 individual diamond parcels, financial assessment and payment of
4 taxes to the Government of Liberia, custom verification and
13:07:02 5 finally, repackaging with the attached certificate needed for
6 export."

7 And then the usual salutations. Now, Mr Taylor, was such a
8 one stop shop set up?

9 A. Yes, that's the whole Kimberley Process. We put that into
13:07:22 10 motion and we had designated at that time, not the ministry, but
11 that the Central Bank would take that, yes.

12 Q. Now, for your assistance, Mr Taylor, your minister also
13 provided behind that covering letter various annexes, did he not?

14 A. Yes, he did.

13:07:40 15 Q. And so if we look behind, we see the Kimberley Process
16 roadmap, annex A, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. At annex B, the Kimberley Process task force?

19 A. Yes.

13:07:54 20 Q. Then behind that, minutes of the task force meeting held on
21 16 February 2001?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Then the final communique of the Kimberley Process meeting
24 and technical workshop, yes?

13:08:12 25 A. Yes. In Namibia, yes.

26 Q. And then, Mr Taylor, before that we find a graph, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now, the lines on this graph, do they demonstrate diamond
29 production in various producer countries?

- 1 A. Yes, yes.
- 2 Q. Now, looking at the graph for Liberia which is labelled at
3 the top, yes?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 13:08:45 5 Q. We see that production appears to plateau in 1998?
- 6 A. That is correct.
- 7 Q. Indeed, by the end of the first quarter of '98 it dips?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. There's a rise in '99?
- 13:09:06 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And by April of 1999 there's a huge peak in production?
- 12 A. That is correct.
- 13 Q. And then a dramatic drop by 2000?
- 14 A. That is correct.
- 13:09:21 15 Q. So that by April 2000 production is below that of Guinea,
16 yes?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. And below that of the Ivory Coast?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 13:09:38 20 Q. And also what we note is at or about the same time as we
21 have that dramatic reduction in Liberian production, which has a
22 steep reduction between April '99 and January 2000 - do you see
23 where I mean?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 13:10:06 25 Q. There is a peak in production from Guinea, yes?
- 26 A. Yes.
- 27 Q. Was Guinea a diamond exporting country as well?
- 28 A. No.
- 29 Q. So can you assist as to that peak in Guinean production,

1 which reaches a peak by February, it would appear, 2000?

2 A. Well, let's put this in some perspective then. This drop
3 that you mentioned, let's look at this, beginning with the
4 increase in 1999 where it peaks of about - going towards 2000.

13:10:47 5 That's the period that the Russian and Angolan diamonds are all
6 carried as part of Liberian diamonds. So that's that massive
7 peak. The drop comes into place when Sierra Leone, okay, and
8 Angola become Kimberley certified. As a result, okay, the
9 Angolan diamonds that are going as Liberian diamonds no longer
13:11:21 10 are going as Liberian diamonds, so there is that drop. Now, this
11 very deep drop from about 2000 or going on about - in fact, this
12 is a little over 2000, this is the period that there is a
13 Security Council resolution that banned the trade of Liberian
14 diamonds. This is the period that we do not export at all where
13:11:45 15 we fall below Ivory Coast; you understand? That's why we fall
16 below the Ivory Coast. While this is going on, the Sierra
17 Leonean diamonds that used to come through Liberia for the US
18 dollars and whatnot begin to go through Guinea, and so that's why
19 you see Guinea begins to rise, because Guinea is not a major
13:12:04 20 diamond producing country.

21 Q. Well, help us with this, Mr Taylor. The evidence which has
22 been placed before this Court by, inter alia, among other people,
23 Varmuyan Sheriff and others of diamonds being taken to you in
24 mayonnaise jars in or about 1998 - do you recall that testimony?

13:12:40 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Now we have figures for '98, '99 which appear to plateau
27 and in fact a fairly steep drop in April 1999; do you see that?

28 A. I see. I see.

29 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. Can you see the kind of traffic

1 suggested by Prosecution witnesses reflected in this graph?

2 A. No. No, but don't let's - you know, these things are - you
3 know, when they come up, we just have mention it. This so-called
4 - let's just crosscheck one bit of information. This so-called
13:13:27 5 mayonnaise jar of diamonds, which is not the case in 1998, if we
6 remember very well, in 2003 there is Sam Bockarie returning to
7 Liberia with a mayonnaise jar of diamonds. So if one concludes
8 that Sam Bockarie entered in 1998, according to Varmuyan Sheriff,
9 with a mayonnaise jar of diamonds, he still has it. And even
13:13:57 10 though he's outside in 2003, there's another witness that says,
11 while he's coming back from Ivory Coast, he returns with a
12 mayonnaise jar of diamonds. So this is all not true. So this
13 drop is real. There are no diamonds running in and out by no
14 mayonnaise jars full, that kind of stuff. That's not true.

13:14:18 15 Q. Very well. Now, I'm going to move on from that, Mr Taylor.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask, please, that that document,
17 Report by Jenkins Dunbar, Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy, to
18 President Charles Taylor, dated 1 March 2001, be marked for
19 identification, please, MFI-292.

13:14:48 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked accordingly.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I'm conscious of the time and my promise
23 that we would conclude today. Now, before we go back to deal
24 with events leading up to your arrest in 2003, are there any
13:15:07 25 other outstanding matters that you'd like to clear up at this
26 stage?

27 A. Well, just - you know, just one. There's one intelligence
28 report that I think the Court and these judges ought to see
29 because - in fact, two. There are two. You have another Dutch

1 or Belgian, depending, I can't speak their language, report. But
2 also, the former Prosecutor of this Court, David Crane, who
3 started this whole bandwagon, David Crane wrote the Government of
4 Liberia and assembled asking them to provide a massive amount of
13:15:54 5 information, documentation and everything to the Prosecution to
6 substantiate its case following the indictment but before my
7 arrest. I think that was back in 2004 or thereabout. And so in
8 looking at all of these intelligence reports, we didn't - the
9 Defence would never have had access to the kind of money to get
13:16:27 10 these governments to participate.

11 You have this other major intelligence report that was
12 released to us by the Prosecution and David Crane's letter also.
13 One would wonder why they did not use it, but I think it's
14 important for my life and my defence that these documents be
13:16:45 15 brought before this Court, that this treasure-trove of
16 information that they were supposed to obtain, okay, through that
17 request was never brought before this Court. I think we should
18 because that has to do with my own defence and clearing me that
19 if they had all this important information from the Government of
13:17:03 20 Liberia, all these major intelligence agencies, since they chose
21 not to bring it, I think we should. Now, I know we have time on
22 our side, but my life is on the line too.

23 Q. Very well, Mr Taylor. Now, there is two issues that you
24 raise there. One, a letter from David Crane.

13:17:22 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. To whom?

27 A. To the Government of Liberia, then the Ministry of Justice,
28 requesting all kinds of information, regarding to monies,
29 regarding to anything to substantiate the allegations levelled

1 against me by him.

2 Q. What's the date of that letter, Mr Taylor?

3 A. That letter is done in 2004.

4 Q. And have you seen that letter?

13:17:46 5 A. Yes, I have read the letter.

6 Q. Well, I'm seeking to deal with matters sequentially, so
7 we'll come to the letter in due course. But you mentioned one
8 other matter, Mr Taylor. What's that?

9 A. That's another intelligence report that was obtained
13:18:01 10 through the OTP that deals with, again, the issue of diamonds,
11 the issue of arms and all these issues of insecurity that were
12 sought by the Prosecution to validate their claims against me.
13 And I think this report was done by a major western government.

14 Q. Which government?

13:18:24 15 A. Well, the way I see the topic - the title of the report -
16 the word looks Dutch to me - bijlage. It looks Dutch to me. It
17 could be Belgium, or whatever these people - but it's either by
18 the Dutch or the Belgian, but the word, I think we can verify
19 which country it is.

13:18:50 20 Q. Can you help me with a spelling of the word?

21 A. Bijlage, B-I-L-J - you know, they spell their things
22 differently. I don't know. But it deals with talking to all of
23 the principal people mentioned in this case. It deals with
24 interviews with Ibrahim Bah, Bah who is supposed to work for me
13:19:07 25 and he's interviewed --

26 Q. Who by?

27 A. By this intelligence agency where they state that he's
28 interviewed by the Americans, okay. It talks about Eddie Kanneh.
29 It talks about all of the individuals that are supposed to be

1 associated with me. An entire investigation was done, okay, and
2 I'm sure it took them a long time to do it, similar to the other
3 investigation that was presented before this Court done by the
4 Belgian government.

13:19:36 5 Now, I keep saying - and I don't want to appear as though
6 I'm fluttering here - that it could be Dutch or some Belgian
7 name, but it's not French, so I could probably think it's Dutch,
8 but that word looks like Dutch to me, but I could be wrong about
9 it.

13:19:55 10 Q. Very well, Mr Taylor. Can we have a look, please --

11 MS HOLLIS: We do want to put on the record our objection
12 to the introduction of this material through 89(C) by this
13 witness. Certainly there has been no foundation laid that meets
14 the requirements that were imposed on the Prosecution, but it
13:20:21 15 does not even meet the very relaxed requirements that have been
16 imposed during the accused's testimony, which were initially that
17 it had to be part of his archive, his official archive, as the
18 President. So we suggest there is no adequate foundation.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I accept the - I understand the
13:20:42 20 thrust of your objection, but I don't think this Court ever said
21 that the document to be admissible pursuant to 89(C) had to be
22 part of his archives. It helps if it is part of his archives,
23 but it doesn't have to be.

24 MS HOLLIS: Our understanding is, there has to be a
13:20:58 25 connection to this witness other than a name and a report. He
26 has no connection to this document.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: There has to be some connection, yes, but
28 I understood you to say we had ruled that it has to be part of
29 his archives.

1 MS HOLLIS: You had ruled earlier that if it was part of
2 his archive and he had read it, then it was admissible, even
3 though that was a lesser standard than the Prosecution had been
4 held to. In this instance, it's not even part of his archive.
13:21:25 5 So we suggest that there is no connection here sufficient for
6 introduction through a witness under 89(C).

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. What do you say to that
8 objection, Mr Griffiths?

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, we submit that the witness has
13:21:42 10 laid sufficient foundation for the introduction of this document.
11 In our submission, the first principal of admissibility is
12 relevance, relevance to an issue before the tribunal of fact.

13 Now, as far as this is concerned, the Prosecution have
14 named Ibrahim Bah as a co-conspiracy in the JCE alleged in the
13:22:07 15 indictment. Consequently, where there is material available
16 emanating, as in this particular case, from the Prosecution
17 themselves which throws light upon those issues, and I give that
18 as but one example, it seems to me, where the accused has had an
19 opportunity, as quite properly and rightfully he should in the
13:22:29 20 circumstances, to examine that material, he should be at liberty,
21 if, as he submits, it points to his innocence, to place that
22 material before the Court. And in our submission, any attempt to
23 exclude from the gaze of this Court such relevant material, in
24 our submission, is an attempt, and I say this quite bluntly, to
13:22:55 25 mislead the tribunal of fact and, consequently, we submit this
26 material is admissible through Mr Taylor.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we will just pause there.

28 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, I know you've talked about reply,
29 but in light of the language that was used, implying that the

1 Prosecution is trying to mislead this tribunal, we do have a
2 right to put a response on to the record. You will note that my
3 objection was very clear. That there was no foundation to put it
4 in through a witness which was a big issue, which has been a big
13:23:27 5 issue in this case, at least in the Prosecution case. There are
6 other means by which they can attempt to put it in. The rules do
7 not go away because it is the accused testifying. It is not an
8 attempt to mislead, but it certainly is an explication of our
9 understanding of the requirements of the means by which evidence
13:23:44 10 can be placed before your Honours. And in this instance, 89(C)
11 through a witness and our suggestion is not sufficient
12 foundation.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understood your submission before.
14 We'll pause there for a moment.

13:24:30 15 [Trial Chamber conferred]

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: The majority of us think that the Defence
17 has established that there is sufficient connection of these
18 documents with the witness and that his evidence given so far on
19 the documents goes to the relevance of the documents. We hold
13:26:11 20 that sufficient foundation has been laid and we will allow your
21 questions to continue, Mr Griffiths.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want you to have an opportunity to
24 comment on the contents of these documents.

13:26:25 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Because, frankly, not all of the contents of the documents
27 are favourable to you. Now, can we look, please, behind divider
28 4 in disclosure for week 37, please. Can I inquire whether
29 everyone has this document?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, I'm helpfully assisted by my learned friend, Mr Anyah,
4 who has conducted some research and explains that the word
13:27:39 5 bijlage is a Dutch word and means appendix. Now, we see on the
6 first appendix that it's numbered 003, Mr Taylor, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Now, let's turn to the first page of it, please, over the
9 page. Do you have it?

13:28:12 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Now, this is why I suggest, Mr Taylor, you need to have an
12 opportunity to address this, in case in due course you are asked
13 about these issues.

14 A. Yes.

13:28:27 15 Q. "CT" - Charles Taylor - "has to have a share in every
16 logging company that wants to operate in Liberia - the money goes
17 to his private budget from which he operates the ATU."

18 Quite an allegation, Mr Taylor. What do you say?

19 A. I say it's false. And, in fact, if this were true, the
13:28:56 20 legislature of the Government of Liberia through the general
21 accounting office would have noted this. Monies for the payment
22 of the ATU were all approved by the national legislature under a
23 special programme, like is going on in Liberia right now. What
24 happens is that in order to get the level of professionalism that
13:29:18 25 you need in security, and even some of the individuals coming
26 into Liberia right now, salaries are paid over and above local
27 salaries to encourage people to do right. So this is approved by
28 the national legislature. So this intelligence is wrong.

29 Q. "Logging companies make regular payments. A common method

1 of payment is to pay a portion in cash and a portion in weaponry.
2 50/50 not uncommon."

3 True?

4 A. That is untrue.

13:29:52 5 Q. "Charles Taylor's brother, Bob Taylor, is on the board of
6 the FDA, he runs everything."

7 True?

8 A. No, that's not true. My brother Bob Taylor is the managing
9 director of the company. He serves as secretary to the board,
13:30:09 10 but there is a separate board of directors that is in line with
11 the laws of Liberia. He is not the chairman or any senior member
12 of the board. He's secretary to the board.

13 Q. Which board?

14 A. The board of the FDA, the Forestry Development Authority.

13:30:30 15 Q. I'm going to skip the next one, but you may be asked about
16 it in due course. Let's go to the Koffi Woods bullet point.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think that looks as though it might
18 have enough substance in it to take us over the lunch hour, so it
19 might be appropriate to adjourn now. We'll adjourn for lunch and
13:30:57 20 come back at 2.30.

21 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

22 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Mr Taylor, before lunch we were looking at a document.
14:31:18 25 Before we return to that document, can I just deal with another
26 issue which arose this morning.

27 Your Honours, I have the original of that item.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thanks. Is that something you said the
29 Prosecution has seen or not seen?

1 MS HOLLIS: We have not seen it, Mr President.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, what I propose, Mr President is now
4 that the original is available, that that be the item marked for
14:32:54 5 identification. I don't know if we need to give it an additional
6 number. I would doubt that that is necessary.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I think it might be, because we
8 gave the original copies two numbers. It's going to lead to
9 confusion. But we can give it a number. These are just - the
14:33:18 10 numbers are just to identify the various documents. It doesn't
11 mean that you are compelled to tender everything that's been
12 marked for identification.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, can we - would this be a convenient
14 way of doing it, Mr President: To mark it as MFI-290 C.

14:33:35 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We note the original
16 photograph, then, is marked for identification MFI-290C.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful.

18 JUDGE DOHERTY: The original didn't seem to bring us any
19 closer to ascertaining the date that it was taken.

14:33:56 20 MR GRIFFITHS: No, but I will cause further inquiries to be
21 made:

22 Q. Mr Taylor, with can we go back to this document now then,
23 please. And we had reached the sixth bullet point on that first
24 page.

14:34:32 25 "Koffi Woods is also on the board of the FDA. He controls
26 the hammer ('stamp' in the shape of an 'S') at Buchanan for OTC
27 from the mansion. One hundred ATU officers are currently
28 deployed at Buchanan to make sure that all logs that are exported
29 are done with mansion approval to ensure that Charles Taylor is

1 not ripped off."

2 Is that true?

3 A. That is not true.

4 Q. Was there a hundred ATU officers based at Buchanan for that
14:35:11 5 purpose?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Was there a hundred ATU officers at Buchanan for whatever
8 purpose?

9 A. Not quite a hundred. There were ATU officers in the
14:35:21 10 Buchanan area, yes.

11 Q. Just below that do you see, "Aziz Nassour used to pay for
12 the arms that were brought in for Sam Bockarie." What do you
13 know about that?"

14 A. Nothing whatsoever.

14:35:37 15 Q. Now, that name Aziz Nassour, we've encountered that last
16 Thursday, did we not?

17 A. Yes, we did.

18 Q. In relation to diamonds?

19 A. That is correct.

14:35:49 20 Q. Now, help us. Were you aware of a relationship between him
21 and Sam Bockarie?

22 A. No, I was not. I was not aware.

23 Q. Just below that: "The shipment in May came from Bulgaria.
24 OTC provided the vessel, but it was orchestrated by Fawaz and
14:36:14 25 MWPI." Taking things in stages, what does MWPI stand for?

26 A. I really don't know. But this is the name of a timber
27 company working there. I do not know the - what the meaning of
28 this acronym is. I really have no idea.

29 Q. Who is Fawaz?

1 A. He's a timber - he is a logger in Liberia. One of the
2 loggers.

3 Q. Were you using timber companies to bring in shipments of
4 arms from Bulgaria?

14:36:47 5 A. Not at all. And that's a part of this very investigation
6 that shows that there were no such thing. If I may just remind
7 the Court, this investigation is also a part of that
8 investigation that was - that cleared up this whole issue of arms
9 being brought by sea into the ports in Liberia as contained in
14:37:11 10 the Dutch case, that Dutch trial of Guus Kouwenhoven or something
11 he's called, the Dutchman tried for war crimes along - that is
12 supposed to be a co-conspirator. So there is no such thing.

13 Q. "CT has a bank account in Burkina Faso. It goes under the
14 name Jean-Michel Some. The bank is the BICEO owned by all
14:37:40 15 countries that using the CFA and BIB. He has had the account
16 since 1987. Musa Cisse used to withdraw money from the account
17 with cheques given to him by CT. CT also has a Swiss bank
18 account that was set up by Grace Minor - it is controlled by
19 Talal El-Ndine. Money from logs makes its way to the Swiss
14:38:07 20 accounts, and it is then transferred to the BF account. The
21 Swiss account was set up in 1993. Gaddafi was pumping money into
22 the Swiss account during the war. Taylor, in turn, gave gifts?"

23 Where is the money, Mr Taylor?

24 A. There was no such thing. These are the type of things that
14:38:29 25 led to all of this trouble. No bank accounts. Just phantom
26 names, phantom - there is some truth in this bullet point. I did
27 have an account in 1987.

28 Q. Where?

29 A. In Burkina Faso, true, long before the revolution started.

1 I was in exile in Burkina Faso, that's true. But the rest of
2 this stuff is all lies about Swiss bank accounts - Swiss bank
3 accounts being set up by Grace Minor and Talal El-Ndine and
4 Gaddafi pumping money. All lies. That's what they've been
14:39:05 5 searching for until today and still haven't found them, because
6 they never existed.

7 Q. Was the account in Burkina Faso under the name Jean-Michel
8 Some?

9 A. That is correct. It was under Jean-Michel. So, I mean,
14:39:17 10 it's an alias I used at the time hiding from Samuel Doe as I
11 I launched the revolution. That is true.

12 Q. Did Gaddafi use that account to pay sums into - to you?

13 A. Never. Not a dime. Never ever, no.

14 Q. Did Musa Cisse withdraw money from that account on your
14:39:51 15 behalf?

16 A. Yes. I gave Musa Cisse - at times I was not there, yes, he
17 did withdraw money from that account, yes.

18 Q. When?

19 A. I would say about '89, when I was released from jail in
14:40:15 20 Ghana. In fact, before I was released from jail in Ghana, Musa
21 Cisse used to - he was a countersigner to the account and he
22 withdrew money from it.

23 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, is this the same Cisse that
24 is usually spelled C-I-S-S-E?

14:40:35 25 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honours. Some spell it
26 with S-E-S-S-A-Y, yeah. But it's Cisse. Musa Cisse.

27 Q. Now, Musa Cisse was a Special Forces, wasn't he?

28 A. No. He is listed as a Special Forces. Musa Cisse,
29 remember, became chief of protocol for me. But he is listed as a

1 Special Forces because he is with the group at the time. But
2 Musa is an older man - by far older than I am - and never took
3 any training.

4 Q. And he's the one who was an uncle to Varmuyan Sherif?

14:41:08 5 A. Yes, he is late --

6 Q. A Mandingo man?

7 A. Yes, he's late now.

8 Q. So that account in Burkina Faso, he was a joint signatory
9 to that account, was he?

14:41:15 10 A. That is correct. That is correct.

11 Q. For how long did you use that account, Mr Taylor?

12 A. I used that account up until 1989, when I came from jail.
13 There was hardly anything in it, and it was closed in 1989.

14 Q. Have you ever reactivated it?

14:41:36 15 A. Never, never.

16 Q. Did you ever have a Swiss bank account?

17 A. Never.

18 Q. Next bullet point:

19 "Joe Tuah is the assistant director of the SSS, in charge
14:41:56 20 of getting the weapons. He makes sure that everything runs
21 smoothly when he goes to the ports when the arms come in."

22 True?

23 A. Untrue. Totally lies.

24 Q. "Liberia currently has four helicopters that it uses. Two
14:42:12 25 are helicopter gunships, but only one of these is operational.
26 It's used to bring supplies to Lofa. The other two are police
27 helicopters and are also used to bring supplies to Lofa, but need
28 to make a re-fuelling stop on its way up and on its way back
29 down."

1 True?

2 A. Some true, some false. Let me tell you what's true about
3 this. There are four helicopters: Two Mi -2s - that's what he is
4 referring to as having to make refuelling. You cannot even fly
14:42:54 5 in Liberia very long. There are two Mi -8s. The fact that we
6 have helicopter gunships, no. These are Mi -8s. Helicopter
7 gunships are MI -24s and Mi -25s. We only have an Mi -8. And what
8 is also true here is that one of the Mi -8s is down, and so we
9 don't have anything. Now depending on when this report comes
14:43:25 10 out, by this time it is - we have only one operational.

11 Q. Right. Now, based on this bullet point, you will note to
12 date, Mr Taylor, there is nothing on this document to date it, do
13 you follow me?

14 A. Yes.

14:43:47 15 Q. Now, based on the information about the helicopters, can
16 you help us with a date after which this document must have been
17 compiled. Do you follow me?

18 A. Yes. I can give a - once they say four helicopters, just
19 dealing with four helicopters, I would put this to around 2001.

14:44:17 20 Q. When you say put it to 2001, are you saying it's in 2001 or
21 at sometime after 2001?

22 A. No, I would say within 2001.

23 Q. That's when you had the four helicopters?

24 A. By then we have four in total, yes.

14:44:37 25 Q. Okay. Thank you. Next:

26 "The helicopters used to be flown by Ukrainians. There
27 used to be six men to each flight, but they left because they
28 weren't being paid. They are supposedly back in Liberia now."

29 True?

1 A. At one point they did leave, yes, they did --

2 Q. Why?

3 A. We were hard-pressed - we couldn't pay them and so
4 everything was grounded. That's true.

14:45:05 5 Q. "Obasanjo sent Liberia weapons and supplies in April. The
6 shipment came in at around 3 or 4 in the morning to
7 Robertsfield."

8 True?

9 A. Totally false. Obasanjo never, ever gave Liberia even a
14:45:22 10 pistol. Never.

11 Q. "All ten satellite phones were bought by Nazi. All the
12 phones had 500 units. Sesay dropped three of the phones in the
13 river when he was drunk."

14 What do you know about that?

14:45:38 15 A. I know nothing about it. But these phones, if you
16 remember, are contained in the Belgium report. So we are talking
17 around, what, I think based on that Belgium report we are talking
18 about 2000 when - 2000, 2001 when this is going on. I don't know
19 anything about that.

14:45:59 20 Q. Go over the page, please. Does the next page have the
21 number 0000190 on the top right-hand corner?

22 A. Yes, it does.

23 Q. Right. Let's look at this:

24 "Government militias.

14:46:15 25 All those in militias are aged ten and older."

26 True or false?

27 A. Total nonsense. False.

28 Q. "All the different militias report to Benjamin Yeaten who
29 is the chief field commander of the war in Liberia."

1 True or false?

2 A. False.

3 Q. "All logging company militias are assigned security from
4 the army division, headed by Roland Duoh."

14:46:41 5 True or false?

6 A. False.

7 Q. "The Marine division: They are headed by Melvin who has a
8 BSE in business administration. They used to be called the
9 Strike Force Marines, but ceased to exist and then they were

14:46:56 10 reinstated. They are approximately 6,700 men and are the largest
11 militia. They wear no uniform. They are all located in Lofa."

12 True or false?

13 A. Some true, some false. The Marine division is headed by
14 Melvin the last name is Sogbandi, that's S-O-G-B-A-N-D-I. He

14:47:23 15 does have a BSE degree. And they are approximately some 6,000.
16 Now at this time we're really getting into the heart of the war.

17 Q. Which war?

18 A. That's the LURD war because following my - Sogbandi doesn't
19 come back to - he obtained a BSE degree at the early part of my
20 administration and then is made a minister. He becomes Minister

14:47:50 21 of Post. The war starts and so, yeah, we are really talking
22 about 2001, 2002 in Lofa. So I can put a bearing on it because
23 of these I would say points when he talks about the Marines and
24 Melvin Sogbandi and the men assigned in Lofa, we are talking
14:48:17 25 about going into 2002 now. 2001, 2002.

26 Q. "SSS: They are headed by Benjamin Yeaten, who is also the
27 overall field commander of the war in Liberia. All the different
28 militias report to him. The SSS wear yellow T-shirts with a red
29 dragon."

1 True or false?

2 A. That's false. He is not the head. The SSS is not involved
3 in wearing yellow T-shirts with red dragons. Nobody goes to war
4 with a yellow T-shirt. This could be another unit, but that's
14:48:52 5 false.

6 Q. Well, I wanted to ask you about the yellow T-shirts,
7 Mr Taylor. Which unit was Varmuyan Sheriff in?

8 A. He was in the army division.

9 Q. Well, I thought he told us that they wore dark blue
14:49:07 10 overalls?

11 A. That's what he said, but not overalls. The army division
12 did not have overalls at all.

13 Q. Did the SSS, or Mr Sheriff for that matter, ever wear a
14 gaudy yellow T-shirt with a red dragon on the front?

14:49:29 15 A. I don't recall seeing him with one.

16 Q. But did the SSS ever wear such clothing?

17 A. No, no, not yellow at all. The SSS wore blue. The sky
18 blue shirt, navy blue pants, that's the SSS uniform. And during
19 the war, the Secret Service was not involved in the active
14:49:52 20 combat. They had to still protect VIPs, so what would they be
21 doing in yellow? And who goes to war in yellow? That only
22 magnifies your position. Nobody goes to war in yellow.

23 Q. "Delta Force: They are headed by Major Sam Cheplary. They
24 are in Fasama in Lower Lofa. They are in total about 150."

14:50:15 25 True or false?

26 A. False.

27 Q. What's false about it? Everything?

28 A. Everything. There is no Sam Cheplary that will lead a
29 major force and the place he is talking about Fasama, which is in

1 Lofa, there are two divisional commanders; either Melvin Sogbandi
2 who is commanding the Marine division or General Roland Duoh that
3 is commanding the Navy Special Forces division.

4 Q. Welcome to Duoh in a moment. Next militia, "Man Moving Man
14:50:50 5 Dropping." Was there a militia so named in Liberia, Mr Taylor?

6 A. No. There was no militia so named that I know of.

7 Q. Headed by Major General Samuel Varney, a name we have
8 encountered?

9 A. Samuel Varney was deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces
14:51:04 10 of Liberia. A career soldier. He was not leading any little
11 unit. He was the number two man, the deputy chief of staff of
12 the Armed Forces of Liberia.

13 Q. They are about 300 men. Was he the deputy of Prince
14 Johnson?

14:51:23 15 A. At the time of the crisis when he was - when Prince Johnson
16 led the INPFL, yes.

17 Q. "They are 300 men and operate on the highway between Lofa
18 and Gbarnga." True?

19 A. I don't really know. 300 men in - what would they be doing
14:51:43 20 between Lofa and Gbarnga? They could be 300. There are men
21 along that highway. The whole division is there. I wouldn't
22 place a number on it. There could be 300, there could be a
23 thousand depending on the combat on that highway.

24 Q. The Wild Geese. Who were they?

14:52:03 25 A. The Wild Geese was a unit. It was a fighting unit under
26 the - I think they may have been under the Strike Force. They
27 took that name from some movie and always thought that they were
28 special and called themselves the Wild Geese. I don't know the
29 movie.

1 Q. That's the movie about a coup led by some white mercenaries
2 in an African country?

3 A. I think so. But they just said that they saw a movie and
4 the group called themselves the Wild Geese, so they felt that
14:52:37 5 they could penetrate enemy lines and they just called themselves
6 Wild Geese.

7 Q. Well, according to this, they had a special ability; they
8 could climb trees and spot people coming. What do you know about
9 that?

14:52:47 10 A. That's possible. I wouldn't know the details, but if they
11 did this I wouldn't see this as being strange because --

12 Q. But my question, Mr Taylor, is this: Did you have a
13 special unit who had developed this unusual skill of climbing
14 trees?

14:53:05 15 A. No, no, no, no. I mean --

16 Q. A "Major Sam Chepla", that name again?

17 A. I know Cheplay, yes. Cheplay was one of our fighting -
18 very good commanders.

19 Q. "Army division: Headed by Roland Duoh", true or false?

14:53:27 20 A. True.

21 Q. "Lofa Defence Force: Headed by Major General George
22 Dwanah"?

23 A. That is not true. There was no Lofa Defence Force. George
24 Dwanah, AKA Jack the Rebel, he was deputy in the Marine division
14:53:45 25 headed by Melvin Sogbandi. He was not leading any group called
26 the Lofa Defence Force.

27 Q. Was it made up of boys from Lofa?

28 A. No, no, no, no. The Marine division was some - like they
29 say here, was some 6,000 plus men. They were from all areas.

1 They were the Marine - very, very good fighting force.

2 Q. "RUF: Fatou Sankoh is trying to restructure the RUF from
3 the outside. She is trying to do this with Bockarie and
4 Charles Taylor. Bockarie is suspicious of her - he has never met
14:54:29 5 her, she was new to Foday when he was jailed. She is trying to
6 arrange a reunion, but it hasn't happened yet. Bockarie wants to
7 be head of the RUF - he doesn't want a boss, he wants to allocate
8 positions. He is in Burkina Faso, as is Bah."

9 What do you know about this?

14:54:49 10 A. Nothing whatsoever. I don't know Fatou. And by this time
11 if he is saying that Bockarie is in Burkina Faso, we know we are
12 talking after 2000. So I know nothing about his desires or plans
13 of having met this lady called Fatou.

14 Q. "OTC came to Liberia via Guus Kouwenhoven in 2000." True
14:55:13 15 or false?

16 A. True.

17 Q. "So Guus Kouwenhoven made the business link", did he?

18 A. Yes, Guus made the business contact for this multi, multi,
19 multimillion dollar corporation to come in, yes.

14:55:28 20 Q. Who is this person called Lloyd in Zimbabwe?

21 A. I do not know him.

22 Q. "OTC essentially buys logs from Charles Taylor and then
23 sells them to France and China. OTC has live and strong
24 connections in France."

14:55:45 25 Mr Taylor, were you running a logging business whilst you
26 were President?

27 A. Not at all. And if I had been running a logging business,
28 the Liberian people would have strongly objected to it. It would
29 be against the law. Why would I run a logging - no, never

1 ran - all the FDA is an arm of the Government of Liberia. All
2 monies from logging in the Republic of Liberia were reported to
3 the Central Bank and paid into the Central Bank of Liberia. All
4 accounts.

14:56:17 5 Q. Was there a landing strip in Buchanan, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes, there was a --

7 Q. For small aircraft?

8 A. Very small, yes. Not any - in fact single engine Cessnas,
9 yes. Nothing bigger than that.

14:56:37 10 Q. Now before we turn over the page, let us inform ourselves,
11 three lines from the bottom, the SNP stands for Sapo National
12 Park. Now, Mr Taylor, when we go over the page now, do you
13 recall telling us about the investment made by OTC in Liberia and
14 that they were your biggest investors?

14:57:01 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Is it right that they opened a road between Buchanan and
17 Zwedru?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And that they started building that road in the year 2000?

14:57:12 20 A. That is true.

21 Q. And that there are a total of some 15 roads in SNP?

22 A. I don't know their numbers, but there were some roads built
23 toward the park.

24 Q. Okay. I won't bother with the rest of that.

14:57:36 25 "OTC buyers", I am only interested in the second part of it
26 in light of something you told us this morning. "The OTC ships
27 wood to Malaysia. It is then made into furniture and then resold
28 to the United States." True?

29 A. True. Malaysia and China.

- 1 Q. Unless I am asked to I am not going to deal with the next
2 section, nor the section about people in the logging industry,
3 unless I am asked. But over the page, please. I want us just in
4 passing to look at a couple of names mentioned - well, Cuckoo
14:58:24 5 Dennis, who is he?
6 A. Cuckoo Dennis is one of the - he was a military commander.
7 Q. In which?
8 A. In the Navy division.
9 Q. Now, we see when we go over the page, Musa Cisse. Name
14:58:40 10 ring a bell?
11 A. Beg your pardon?
12 Q. Over the page, the number 192, are you there?
13 A. Yes, I am.
14 Q. First bullet point, "Mossa Sessay", who is that?
14:58:55 15 A. That's the same Musa Cisse. I don't know why he calls it -
16 it's the same Musa Cisse.
17 Q. Did he run a company called the Maryland Group of
18 Companies?
19 A. No, he did not.
14:59:05 20 Q. Was he the chief of protocol for the Executive Mansion?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Was his brother the Liberian ambassador to Saudi Arabia?
23 A. That is correct. Jebbeh Cisse, that is correct, yes.
24 Q. Talal El-Ndine, you have already accepted you know him,
14:59:27 25 yes?
26 A. Yes.
27 Q. Was he your business manager for foreign deals?
28 A. Definitely not.
29 Q. Did Bah, to your knowledge, give most of the diamond money

1 to Tal al El -Ndine?

2 A. I doubt it. No, not that I know of the. And you know the
3 people have talked to all these people, Tal al El -Ndine like I say
4 is a Lebanese American that every agency in the world has spoken
15:00:04 5 to. Every one, from the American government, FBI, you name it.
6 And I am sure if he had said that he had gotten diamonds, he was
7 never stopped, there is no travel ban on him, he is an American,
8 right in Lebanon between Lebanon and the United States.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want us to look at the full passage in
15:00:26 10 which that appears.

11 "Bah would give most of the diamond money to him. Ndine
12 was not involved in arms shipments?"

13 What is the allegation in this Court as to how arms
14 shipments were paid for?

15:00:41 15 A. Through diamonds.

16 Q. So help us. If the money from the diamonds is going to
17 El -Ndine and he is not involved in arms shipment, can you help us
18 with that illogicality?

19 A. I can't. It's illogical. I can't.

15:01:01 20 Q. "The bigger money's controlled by Ndine. Ndine has met
21 Gaddafi."

22 Do you know anything about that?

23 A. No. Tal al - not to my knowledge.

24 Q. Who is Joseph Wong?

15:01:17 25 A. Joseph Wong is the son of the Malaysian Chinese businessman
26 billionaire that is in charge as the general manager of OTC.

27 Q. Very well. I won't trouble you further with him. Aziz
28 Nassour we have encountered before on more than one occasion.
29 Was he being given a concession in the southeast of Liberia to

1 hide him from the Special Court?

2 A. Oh, no.

3 Q. As far as you are aware, was he ever indicted by the
4 Special Court?

15:01:55 5 A. No, not to my knowledge.

6 Q. Roland Duoh, who is he?

7 A. That's same General Roland Duoh, commander of the navy
8 division.

9 Q. Was he trained by the Taiwanese government?

15:02:22 10 A. Never put his foot on Taiwanese soil. Never.

11 Q. Gabriel Doe, who is he?

12 A. Gabriel Doe is very good friend of mine - old friend. Old
13 time businessman who had been involved in logging for more than
14 25, 30 years in Liberia. Very good friend of Ellen

15:02:49 15 Johnson-Sirleaf, everybody. He was - in fact, during the Tolbert
16 administration he was doing logging business. He's a very good
17 man.

18 Q. "Weapons are stored under CT's house."

19 There we go again, Mr Taylor?

15:03:03 20 A. Exactly.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help me. So many people have mentioned
22 this underground warehouse under your house. So help us, where
23 have you caused it to disappear to?

24 A. I don't know, counsel. When you repeat these lies
15:03:21 25 sufficiently, it begins to sound - there is nothing under my
26 house and if it were there, this OTP - the Prosecution has been
27 there at least twice. They have searched my house, the entire
28 ground more than once. There is no - never been any such thing
29 and that's a part of it. There is nothing there.

1 Q. I just need to clarify something, Mr Taylor. What was
2 Roland Duoh head of?

3 A. He was the general in charge of the navy division.

15:04:10

4 Q. "Arms are being stocked", second line from the bottom, "at
5 a place called the 'flower factory' at Buchanan by OTC. What do
6 you know about that, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Never. I don't know it because it's not true.

8 Q. Over the page, 193, at the top. Do you have it?

9 A. Yes, I do.

15:04:28

10 Q. "Jean-Christophe Mitterand was involved in Liberia." Who
11 is he?

12 A. I don't know, but this name looks like the son of late
13 French President Francois Mitterand, but he was never involved in
14 Liberia. Never did any work in Liberia.

15:04:50

15 Q. Let's look at the next one.

16 "Jean-Pierre Maurice lives in Neuilly (a rich Parisian
17 suburb). He has been involved in Liberia since 1991 and has
18 connections in Bulgaria."

19 True?

15:05:03

20 A. I don't know him. I don't know him.

21 Q. "He knew Bah from before 1991. He hasn't been involved for
22 the past four years. He was, however, involved in the May 2002
23 shipment of arms to Liberia. Aziz Nassour was involved and OTC
24 bought the arms and shipped them. The weapons were loaded in
25 Nice."

15:05:26

26 Q. What do you know about that?

27 A. Never, never happened.

28 Q. Did you have any dealings with any French men or any French
29 port in arms importations, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Never, in my entire life, no.

2 Q. "When Jacques Chirac was Mayor of Paris he was good friends
3 with Houphouet-Boigny, who helped CT in his efforts to gain power
4 in 1990s."

15:05:56 5 What do you know about Jacques Chirac, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Well, what's factual here, Jacques Chirac has been friendly
7 with Houphouet-Boigny for so many years. As far as
8 Houphouet-Boigny helping me to gain power in the 1990s, that's
9 not true. And neither was Jacques Chirac ever involved with me
10 prior to my visit there in 1998 when I was elected President.

15:06:16

11 Other than that I never knew - I knew the name Chirac but had
12 never met him and never done any business with him.

13 Q. Who is Melbo?

14 A. Melbo? I don't know him.

15:06:37

15 Q. Half German, half French?

16 A. No, I don't know him.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you see the next sentence, don't you:

18 "He lives in Nice, received iron ore from Buchanan used to
19 make arms."

15:06:52

20 So that's where the arms were coming from that you were
21 supplying to the RUF. You were producing them yourself, weren't
22 you, from iron ore exported through Buchanan?

23 A. This is total nonsense. In fact, throughout my
24 administration of President of Liberia, there were - you see,
15:07:09 25 this is why these people take facts and twist them. There was a
26 large amount of arms at the port of Buchanan that had been
27 stocked there before my presidency. The iron ore - several
28 attempts were made to buy it. I refused to sell it below, in
29 fact, the actual cost, which should have been about \$17, \$18 a

1 ton. Some people proposed up to \$7, \$8. I refused. The iron
2 ore remained in the port of Buchanan and was sold by the interim
3 government of Gyude Bryant. That is a subject of Gyude Bryant's
4 own prosecution now, the head of the interim government. My
15:07:57 5 government did not sell not one ton of ore throughout my entire
6 administration. I told them that before I gave the ore away
7 free, it would stay there and if it had to rot, it would rot
8 because \$7 or \$8 was nothing compared to the \$17, \$18 a ton and
9 it would not be sold. And Gyude Bryant sold it, and right now -
15:08:20 10 in fact, I think the case just got through. He was prosecuted in
11 Liberia, and Gyude Bryant again is the guy that headed the
12 interim government after Moses Blah left office.

13 Q. "Nigeria. CT and Obasanjo have known each other since the
14 civil war in Liberia."

15:08:38 15 True or false?

16 A. Yes, I have known him, yes.

17 Q. Since the civil war in Liberia?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. "CT's younger sister, Jibeo Taylor is going out with
15:08:50 20 Obasanjo's son." True?

21 A. No, that's not true.

22 Q. "JT" - that must be a referring to Jibeo Taylor's -
23 "husband is doing life in jail since 1998 when he shot someone in
24 a road-related incident." True or false?

15:09:05 25 A. Yes, during my - yes, he was tried for murder in 1998
26 during my presidency.

27 Q. So do you have a sister called Jibeo?

28 A. Jibeo, yes, my sister's husband. Yeah, my brother-in-law
29 was tried in the courts of Liberia for murder and sentenced, and

1 he was jailed.

2 Q. Whilst you were President?

3 A. Oh, yes.

4 Q. Jailed for what?

15:09:33 5 A. Murder. He was accused of murder and he was tried in the
6 courts of law and had nothing - I did not intervene and he was
7 convicted.

8 Q. "Obasanjo sent Liberia weapons and supplies in April. The
9 shipment came in at around 3 or 4 in the morning to

15:09:53 10 Robertsfie ld." True or false?

11 A. Blatant lie. That's not true.

12 Q. Does it follow that the suggestion that one person involved
13 was a Nigerian named Salim Dada, do you accept that?

14 A. No, I do not - yes, this is what is said here, but there
15:10:08 15 was no such person.

16 Q. Very well. I am going to leave that document now,
17 Mr Taylor, and if you look behind the next page you should see
18 bi j l age 004, yes?

19 A. Yes.

15:10:25 20 Q. Let's go to that document. The first page of which I am
21 interested in is 196. Now, we see that this is headed "Notes of
22 Meeting with X". These meetings took place Tuesday the 3rd,
23 Thursday the 5th of September 2002; do you follow?

24 A. Yes.

15:10:51 25 Q. And we see that:

26 "Discussions related to diamonds and timber", yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. This was the second rounds of meetings, the first having
29 taken place a couple of months previous in July. Do you see

1 that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And that the purpose of this follow-up meeting was to
4 corroborate and clarify the information, because there had been
15:11:20 5 some contradictory information from the first meeting.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Right. "Information. On both timber and diamonds there
8 was the same pattern of Charles Taylor asking for split payment
9 in cash and weapons."

15:11:41 10 True or false?

11 A. Totally false.

12 Q. "Jebbeh Cisse is the Liberian ambassador to Saudi Arabia.
13 He is the younger brother of Musa Cisse", yes?

14 A. Yes, true.

15:11:53 15 Q. "Musa Cisse is involved both in diamonds and timber."

16 A. I am not aware of that. I doubt it. I am not aware.

17 Q. "Do you know" - miss the next paragraph. I am trying to
18 get through this as quickly as possible.

19 "From May 2000 onwards, Mohamed Salemi and M Cisse got
15:12:21 20 diamonds. This was a bit of a con and they seated some Saudi
21 Arabians, who then came to Liberia and spent three unsuccessful
22 weeks trying to see Taylor, but Musa Cisse wouldn't let them
23 through." True or false?

24 A. I really don't know. It's possible, but I really don't
15:12:37 25 know. If they did something like that, he was the chief of
26 protocol. He was in position to try to block people seeing me.
27 I really don't know.

28 Q. Yeah, but do you recall any situation where some Saudi
29 Arabians were trying to contact you, but couldn't?

1 A. No, I don't. This is what I am saying. He could have
2 stopped it, I am trying to say, in his position, but I am not
3 aware of it.

4 Q. I am going to go to the penultimate paragraph on that page:
15:13:07 5 "X says that he and Bah thought that Aziz knew Desaedeleer
6 in Congo."

7 Know anything about that?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Bah's connection with the Congo?

15:13:21 10 A. No.

11 Q. Over the page, please: "Bah is closely linked with
12 Gaddafi." Do you know about that?

13 A. No, I don't know. Bah is too low to have known Gaddafi. I
14 doubt it very much. No, that's not true.

15:13:41 15 Q. "Both Bah and Taylor are in the Massawa." What's the
16 Massawa?

17 A. I don't know what this is really. In trying to help the
18 Court, I can suggest they may be talking about the Mataba, but
19 not Massawa. I mean, I'm just helping.

15:14:03 20 Q. Let's work on the assumption that it's Mataba and X can't
21 either spell or pronounce. Was Bah in the Mataba?

22 A. No, I don't know. No, Bah was not a member of the Mataba.

23 Q. And then you note on the next line, "Sankoh also". Was
24 Sankoh also a member of the Mataba?

15:14:27 25 A. Never.

26 Q. "The three would use it to communicate together."
27 Know anything about that?

28 A. No.

29 Q. "Only Africans in the Massawa, none from the Middle East."

1 Do you understand that?

2 A. That's not true. There were members of the Mataba from
3 different parts of the world.

4 Q. Now, let's look at the next one:

15:14:56 5 "X's story. X says that Mack (the person who liaises with
6 him at the UK embassy in Accra)" - now what does that
7 relationship suggest to you, Mr Taylor, if X is relating - X
8 is - Mack is X's liaison at the UK embassy in Accra, what do you
9 think is going on there?

15:15:26 10 A. This looks like intelligence activities to me.

11 Q. Right. Now, if that be right, note the rest of the
12 sentence:

13 "X says that Mack, the person who liaises with him at the
14 UK embassy in Accra, says that they, the UK, knew about the
15:15:48 15 diamond stuff and shared it with the Americans."

16 What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Oh, this is normal. The sharing of intelligence
18 information between the British and Americans, that's normal.
19 Yes, that would happen.

15:16:08 20 Q. Now it may be important for us to look at the rest of X's
21 story in order to position the possible source of the contents of
22 these documents:

23 "X says that both the UK and the US went to the house and
24 confirmed the story about the presence of the three men I'd as
15:16:32 25 AIQ" - or AI-Q or AI-Qaeda?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. "They also showed the pictures to neighbours in the area
28 who also confirmed the presence of the three men.

29 The number one photo is Mustapha who is the same person as

1 Zen. He came first in 1998 and the promised weapons didn't
2 happen and then he came again in 2001.

3 Mustapha (known as Zen in 2001) was not controlled by Aziz.
4 Mustapha controlled K and S.

15:17:13 5 Aziz met Bah in Burkina Faso in 2002. He sent Darwish and
6 Ossaily."

7 Now, remember those two names from the Belgian report we
8 looked at last Thursday, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes.

15:17:30 10 Q. Darwish being an American national of Lebanese origin, do
11 you recall that?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Ossaily being based in Belgium and linked to a diamond
14 importing company, yes?

15:17:42 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. "X says that Aziz did not tell Bah about Mustapha (Zen)
17 when he met him.

18 X confirmed that Mustapha knew Bah through his father.

19 In 1998 X did help Mustapha and another to go to Kono. X
15:18:04 20 says that on his first visit Mustapha would go out and womanise
21 and preferred young girls of 14 or 15, one time paying a girl
22 \$200. But at that time he only drink supermalt (which X
23 describes as a non-alcoholic malt drink that is like Guinness).

24 It seems that in 2001 he was much stricter. Also in 1998 he
15:18:32 25 had had photos of his wife and baby with him and said it was the
26 first time he had been so far from his wife since she had given
27 birth. He didn't mention her name. In 2001 he didn't show any
28 photographs."

29 Now, let's look at this, Mr Taylor, in case anything may

1 arise out of this in due course. Note the date, 1998. Right?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. Helped Mustapha and another to go to Kono. You remember
4 some evidence about some white men appearing in Sierra Leone?

15:19:13 5 A. Exactly.

6 Q. Supposedly sent by you in relation to diamond mining, you
7 recall that?

8 A. I recall that, yes.

9 Q. Now, help us, who is the Mustapha, Mr Taylor?

15:19:23 10 A. I don't know him. I never met him and if they went to
11 Kono, it is saying right here, the intelligence would have picked
12 up they were sent to Kono by Mr Taylor. No, I don't know these
13 people.

14 Q. What about Zen? Do you know anybody called Zen?

15:19:40 15 A. No, I don't. I don't.

16 Q. "In 1998 Mustapha (Zen) said a big Arab company was coming
17 in to help the RUF and that it was called Al-Qaeda and that it
18 had built roads in Saudi Arabia and Sudan and could help Liberian
19 reconstruction."

15:20:02 20 Now, did you know Al-Qaeda to be a construction company,
21 Mr Taylor?

22 A. Never no. And no such discussions were held with them.

23 Q. Well, we know of them destroying buildings, but did you
24 ever know of them constructing?

15:20:19 25 A. No, I didn't.

26 Q. Let's jump to the penultimate paragraph on this page:

27 "Bah didn't like the idea of Ossaily not working in
28 Liberia. He and Ossaily were doing deals on the side. This was
29 regular, but always small amounts of stones.

1 We need to be careful that this info isn't influenced by
2 Bah's current US connections, as they are all selling each other
3 out."

4 What do you know about Bah's American connections,
15:21:05 5 Mr Taylor?

6 A. Very little. None whatsoever, because I haven't talked to
7 Bah. The only thing that I have gotten to find out subsequently
8 about any connection is through these intelligence reports
9 because this is not all, this report as we go forward talks about
15:21:26 10 money that he received from the Americans. So Bah, that's why I
11 keep saying, who is supposed to be featured as the one that is my
12 businessman, working for me, all of these intelligence agencies
13 throughout the world have known all these years that Bah is not
14 connected to me in any way. Including the Prosecution. Every
15:21:45 15 one of them.

16 Q. We have heard that before, Mr Taylor, so let's move on.
17 Let's go to the next page:

18 "X says that Mustapha was manipulating Issa Sesay. Eddie
19 Kanneh twice took parcels of diamonds straight to Mustapha. Bah
15:22:06 20 took these diamonds at gunpoint from Mustapha on 5 July 2001."

21 Now, Mr Taylor, help us with this. Why did you allow this
22 Mustapha to be manipulating your man Issa Sesay? Why did you
23 allow it? You are supposed to be in control of the RUF.

24 A. Because I am not in control. I know nothing about all
15:22:31 25 these actions. Nothing.

26 Q. What about allowing Eddie Kanneh to take parcels of
27 diamonds straight to Mustapha? I thought they were going to you.

28 A. No. None whatsoever.

29 Q. What do you know about Bah taking diamonds from this

1 Mustapha at gunpoint?

2 A. Nothing whatsoever. Know nothing about it.

3 Q. "Mustapha didn't talk to Taylor direct, but via Aziz when
4 doing the diamond valuation at the house."

15:23:09 5 So there's the link, Mr Taylor. You were dealing with this
6 Mustapha through Aziz.

7 A. Well, that is not correct. That is why when you look there
8 from I guess some senior person, you see the question there,
9 "Really?" They are not certain about that because it never

15:23:35 10 happened. I know someone is saying, "Well, wait a minute now,
11 there is something wrong here."

12 Q. "There were small side deals going on or attempts at them.
13 In March 2000 Ossaily gave Eddie Kanneh \$10,000 and Issa Sesay
14 caught them."

15:23:51 15 What do you know about that?

16 A. Absolutely nothing. I don't know.

17 Q. "Bah told X that Aziz wanted him (Aziz) and Bah to cut a
18 deal and Bah claimed that he had said no, thinking it might be a
19 set up."

15:24:06 20 What do you know about that?

21 A. Nothing. I don't know what these people are doing. I
22 don't know them, no.

23 Q. "Bah also told X that Aziz had stolen \$16 million via
24 Ossaily and that Aziz had gone missing in relation to an
15:24:23 25 Amsterdam bank job."

26 I am sorry, Mr Taylor; the microphone can't pick up a shake
27 of the head.

28 A. I don't know anything about this.

29 Q. "Towards the end X says he could feel things falling apart

1 (shades of Chi nua Achebe)."

2 Have you read anything by Chi nua Achebe, Mr Taylor, the
3 Nigerian writer?

4 A. Yes, years ago. Things Fall Apart, yes, I that read.

15:24:53 5 Q. "X described Bah as saying, 'We will not operate at a
6 losing point. If come out of this game must have money.'"

7 Do you understand that?

8 A. Yes, it looks like a bunch of, you know, people working
9 together and just trying to make money.

15:25:14 10 Q. "X also talked about the patterns of Bah meeting with
11 people. Bah and Mustapha met once a week at which there were no
12 RUF present. One time Issa Sesay came from the jungle and had to
13 wait in Bah's room while Bah and Mustapha were meeting."

14 You know about this connection?

15:25:34 15 A. No.

16 Q. "X says that after 9/11 Bah said that Aziz's cash was
17 stolen from 'the organisation' and that Aziz thinks that the
18 organisation is finished everywhere and so ran off with the cash.
19 Bah thought it was 160 million, not 16 million."

15:25:58 20 What do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Absolutely nothing.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, is it the case that the Prosecution have been
23 unable to find the money because you in turn got ripped off to
24 the tune of 160 million? Do you follow?

15:26:12 25 A. Yes, I follow. No, never, never. It was not the case.

26 Q. "USA and Bah.

27 X has been told that Bah talked to the USA in January 2002
28 in Ivory Coast and in February 2002 in Ouagadougou. The USA had
29 given Bah \$10,000 and bought him a ticket to Abidjan. This was

1 before he made up with Taylor (was this rapprochement USA backed
2 to set up Taylor and others). X was told by Sekou Conde the
3 Guinean dissident on 7 July to be careful of Bah because the USA
4 gave him \$10,000 in February 2002. Bah had told X that he had
15:26:55 5 talked to the Americans but didn't say anything about the cash.
6 Bah told the Americans that the information that Doug Farah -
7 Douglas Farah who we were looking at last Thursday.

8 A. That's him, yes.

9 Q. "... got was from X.

15:27:13 10 Bah is now getting monthly cash from the Americans and I
11 wonder if X is wondering why he isn't from anyone." That is, he
12 isn't getting anything from anyone. "Confirming what Perleman
13 said."

14 Now, remember we had come comments from this person
15:27:33 15 Perleman - Peleman it was spelled - in the Dutch report?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Now, help us. Let's go through this bit in a little
18 detail, shall we. What do you know about Bah meeting with the
19 United States, Mr Taylor?

15:27:47 20 A. Well, from all indications, when you look at the
21 accounting, Bah met with them, based on the reports that, you
22 know, I got to know, that he had been talking to them since 9/11
23 because --

24 Q. Talking to "them" who?

15:28:10 25 A. The Americans.

26 Q. Who in particular in relation to the Americans?

27 A. Bah. That Ibrahim Bah.

28 Q. Yes, I know, but any particular institution within the
29 United States?

1 A. The CIA. He had been talking to both the CIA and the FBI
2 about the 9/11 situation. He had spoken extensively to them.

3 Q. In particular what about the 9/11 situation?

4 A. Because they were trying to draw a connection between
15:28:38 5 Al-Qaeda and diamonds. This was the issue. And there were, if
6 you look at a Douglas Farah report, Douglas Farah claimed that I,
7 Charles Taylor, in Monrovia through diamonds was giving
8 protection in the other document to Al-Qaeda personnel in
9 Monrovia.

15:29:02 10 Q. We know that, Mr Taylor, and we will come to the Douglas
11 Farah connection in a minute. But for now all I am interested in
12 is this: As far as you understand, why was Bah speaking to the
13 CIA and others?

14 A. To clarify the situation of diamonds and the connection to
15:29:23 15 Al-Qaeda.

16 Q. And secondly this: As far as you're aware, did Bah speak
17 to any other intelligence agency around the world?

18 A. Oh, yes.

19 Q. Who else did he speak to?

15:29:37 20 A. He spoke to the Belgian intelligence agency.

21 Q. Who else?

22 A. And now he is speaking - he spoke to - from the best of my
23 knowledge, he spoke to even this OTP, Bah spoke to them.

24 Q. So you understand that the Office of the Prosecutor have
15:29:58 25 also spoken to Bah, your co-conspirator, yes?

26 A. That is correct. That's my understanding.

27 Q. What do you know about Bah receiving these large sums of
28 money from the Americans?

29 A. I have no idea because I had no connection with Bah. I

1 really don't know.

2 Q. Now, you see this last sentence that I read out:

3 "Bah told the Americans that the information that Douglas
4 Farah got was from X."

15:30:34 5 Now, remember we looked at Douglas Farah last week, who was
6 making that connection firstly between the Michel letter and you
7 in that Washington Post article, yes?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And secondly made a connection between you and Al-Qaeda in
15:30:51 10 the November article of the same year, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Now, who is this X then, Mr Taylor?

13 A. I tell you, since I have gotten this report I have been
14 trying to - we have had investigators looking out, trying to - in
15:31:07 15 some old contacts of - in the intelligence community. I haven't
16 gotten yet to know who this X is. The only person that I think
17 can verify X is Bah.

18 Q. Now, we have mentioned - remember the reference to Perleman
19 in the documents we looked at last week, Mr Taylor?

15:31:29 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. In particular, the Belgian document which quoted Perleman.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And this document is now suggesting that Perleman thinks
24 that this X who is providing all of this information wants to get
15:31:44 25 on the payroll of the Americans like Bah; do you see that?

26 A. Yes, I see it.

27 Q. Now help us. What do you know about that? Does that help
28 you with who X is?

29 A. No, I because I don't know these people. If I knew them,

1 then maybe I could put my finger. I don't know these people.

2 Q. What about this business that Compaore and Taylor don't
3 know that Bah has met the Americans?

4 A. He is probably right about that. Because at that time when
15:32:11 5 he is doing this, I am not in contact with Bah, but I don't know
6 who he is meeting at this time. So he is probably right that Bah
7 is meeting with them.

8 Q. "At this point X threw in that it was through Gaddafi that
9 Bah started the war in Liberia."

15:32:30 10 Who started the war in Liberia, Mr Taylor? Was it Ibrahim
11 Bah?

12 A. No, it was not Bah.

13 Q. Now, help me, Mr Taylor, with this. You having been a Head
14 of State, help me: Are intelligence reports normally of this
15:32:50 15 kind of content? Can you help us?

16 A. Yes, I can help you. Intelligence reports are not - they
17 don't carry this form. This is - this form is the form that -
18 from all my experience, this is information. This is
19 information, because you take information and you process it. It
15:33:15 20 goes through an intelligence - the word used is scrubbing. You
21 scrub it; that is, you check the sources, once, twice, three
22 times and get - when you verify the information, then it becomes
23 intelligence. As far as I am concerned, this is information.
24 And a lot of people have taken information and have spread it
15:33:37 25 knowing that it has not been scrubbed.

26 Q. "Mack told X that he had been told by the Americans who
27 interviewed Bah that he cried" - when that's Bah cried - "when
28 they mentioned Al-Qaeda and he said - he said yes, he commanded
29 the RUF to buy peace, not friendly with Taylor."

1 Not friendly with Taylor? Was Bah ever your friend,
2 Mr Taylor?

3 A. Never, never. He's telling the - "not friendly" is true.

4 Q. Now I am going to skip the woman from Pakistan, because I
15:34:22 5 can't see that that can assist us in any way save that if we look
6 at one sentence over the page about an inch from the top of page
7 199 we see another reference to Bah, but I am not going to delay
8 over that. Likewise, I am not going to delay over Suleiman and
9 Keneme.

15:34:50 10 But let's go over the next page, and I want to us look at
11 fourth paragraph on that page which begins:

12 "Sulei called X in August threatening to kill X, saying 'We
13 will get you. Mr Ibrahim has explained everything to me, but you
14 can't hide. We will get you.' X thinks that Bah gave Sulei his
15:35:14 15 number. X said that he could hear Arabic prayer in the
16 background (what a coincidence) and could have been anywhere,
17 even Finsbury Park. X later confirmed that Bah did make contact
18 with Sulei. Interesting that Bah is able to do this so long
19 after Sulei left Liberia, or is it X trying to tie Bah into
15:35:37 20 Al-Qaeda. Interesting to also think why he might have done this,
21 especially as it was after he started dealing with the
22 Americans."

23 Now, it's possible from that passage, Mr Taylor, to
24 recognise that whoever is putting this document together is
15:35:55 25 adding a commentary to the information being provided by this X,
26 yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And in part this commentary is somewhat skeptical, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, we see again the reference to Talal El-Dine?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Skip the first three paragraphs:

4 "El-Dine controls Taylor's account in Burkina Faso and
15:36:20 5 Switzerland. Repeated the names of the Burkina Faso accounts but
6 doesn't know about the Swiss ones. In Burkina Faso the cash was
7 in a number of banks: BIB, which is Libyan owned, and Bank BICEO
8 which prints the CFA's, is jointly owned by 13 countries and has
9 French backing. It was set up by France and operates in the way
15:36:46 10 that Air Afrique does."

11 Is that true?

12 A. Well, this is just too many things. I do not have any
13 Swiss bank account. El-Dine doesn't control, and never
14 controlled, any bank account for me in Burkina Faso. The one
15:36:59 15 account I had in 1987, only Musa Cisse could co-sign on that
16 account. I didn't even know El-Dine at the time.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, there is a hidden clue in this paragraph.
18 You notice, "repeated the names of the Burkina Faso accounts",
19 yes?

15:37:23 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, when we go back swiftly to the first page of bijlage
22 004, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Remember there was reference to an earlier meeting in July
15:37:38 25 and then this follow-up meeting in September, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Now, when one goes to the first page of the first bijlage
28 document, at the end of the first paragraph remember there was
29 that reference to the bank accounts in Burkina Faso and so on?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Bearing all of those facts in mind, when we come back now,
3 "repeated the names of the Burkina Faso accounts", it would
4 appear that X is the source of the information in the first
15:38:10 5 appendix and in this appendix. Do you follow?

6 A. Yes, yes, that can be concluded, yes.

7 Q. "Taylor's Jean-Michel Some may account was opened in 1987."
8 Is that right?

9 A. That is correct.

15:38:25 10 Q. "Musa Cisse used to withdrew cash for him and would give
11 cheques in that account name. X received some cheques from this
12 account."

13 Who is X, Mr Taylor?

14 A. I can't put my finger on --

15:38:39 15 Q. X is someone, according to this - you accept the account -
16 you accept the link to Musa Cisse and the account. Now, in the
17 same breath X is saying he received cheques from you from that
18 account. Who is X?

19 A. I don't know. I can't put my hand on it. I can't. But
15:39:02 20 there is another clue here as the investigation before this case
21 is over, the fourth paragraph from the top gave, I think, the
22 clearest clue to who X is. As we are still trying to
23 investigate, I am sure we will come up with X, because it talks
24 about Sulei calling X and I think through this we will find X -
15:39:28 25 who X is.

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, before I lose track of this, let us remind
27 ourselves of the content of the third paragraph from the top of
28 the current page.

29 "Sulei left a sat phone with Mohamed Adams, a Ghanaian with

1 the ATU."

2 Remember the reference to Adams in that Belgium document
3 last week?

4 A. Yes, I do.

15:39:56 5 Q. Go back to the penultimate paragraph on this page, please:

6 "The BIB account is under the same name, Same, since 1990."
7 Was there a second account?

8 A. No, there was not a second account, no.

9 Q. "Gaddafi put money in there for Taylor. X said that
15:40:15 10 Gaddafi was not getting anything back in return for the cash.
11 Compaore complained to Bah one time that the RUF should give some
12 'thank you' diamond parcels to himself from Gaddafi."

13 What do you know about that?

14 A. Nothing. I don't.

15:40:35 15 Q. Now, I am not going to bother with the penultimate
16 paragraph, because you have already denied having an account in
17 Switzerland and I don't want us to waste time.

18 Over the page, please. Count six lines down from the top,
19 yes?

15:41:05 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. "OTC have their own connections in France for weapons which
22 are different from Melbe's ones. X doesn't know what they are."

23 What do you know about that?

24 A. Nothing. No weapons from France. None.

15:41:17 25 Q. Now I am going to skip Wong. Wong, you will recall, was
26 mentioned - one of the names mentioned in the first report that
27 we looked at, remember?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. We've already dealt with him. We know who he is. Let's

1 move on. And we see also in the penultimate paragraph Melbe's
2 mentioned, yes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now we see a new name: Ruprah. Who is he?

15:41:41 5 A. No, I don't know Ruprah.

6 Q. All right. Let's go over the page then. 202, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Have a look at Obasanjo, bottom of the page, just below the
9 second ring binder:

15:42:05 10 "Obasanjo was sending weapons to Taylor in April 2002. The
11 hotel confirmed to Douglas Farah that Major Salim Dada, a
12 Nigerian, did stay at the Metropolitan Hotel, room 308, in
13 Monrovia. He now lives in a house in Congo Town near Taylor. X
14 knows his girlfriend. He was one of the bodyguards sent by
15:42:31 15 Abacha to Taylor, and Taylor then asked Obasanjo to send Dada
16 back to him."

17 Who is this man Dada?

18 A. Dada? I don't know Dada but --

19 Q. Did Abacha ever provide you with a bodyguard?

15:42:50 20 A. Abacha, yes. Abacha - not a bodyguard. But this is
21 Obasanjo. You are asking for Abacha.

22 Q. No, no. The full sentence reads:

23 "He was one of the bodyguards sent by Abacha to Taylor, and
24 Taylor then asked Obasanjo to send him back."

15:43:08 25 A. No, no, no, no, no. Abacha gave me, oh, about a platoon
26 size, close to 40 men, Secret Service - Nigerian Secret Service.
27 When I became President, Abacha sent them to me.

28 Q. Give us a rough year?

29 A. 1997.

1 Q. How long did they stay?

2 A. They stayed there until about the end of '98.

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, these would appear to be intelligence
4 reports, would you agree?

15:43:43 5 A. Yes. This is, yes.

6 Q. Now, help us. Are you aware of any contact between Douglas
7 Farah from his writings and intelligence sources?

8 A. No, I am not aware. But now it's coming clearer how he
9 could write all this trash about me. Maybe from just maybe
10 talking to people out there.

15:44:12

11 Q. Forget the next sentence. We have dealt with that.

12 "In March 1999, Obasanjo went to Monrovia to agree a
13 delaying tactic on the ceasefire so that the RUF could get enough
14 diamonds to turn themselves into a political party. Obasanjo,
15 Gibril Massaquoi, Issa Sesay and Taylor met at the Executive
16 Mansion, i.e. Obasanjo was agreeing to stall the peace process."

15:44:45

17 Now, note the date, Mr Taylor: March 1999, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. When was the Lome agreement?

15:45:06

20 A. July.

21 Q. Which year?

22 A. 1999.

23 Q. Now help us. In March 1999, did you agree with President
24 Obasanjo to delay the peace process to get some more diamonds?

15:45:22

25 A. No, no, never happened.

26 Q. Had you at any stage discussed such a tactic with President
27 Obasanjo?

28 A. Never, never.

29 Q. Over the page to page 203, please. Let's have a look at

1 UN, United Nations:

2 "X says that logging money" - and the commentator writes in
3 parenthesis "and why not diamond money" - "being paid to a UN
4 person in New York and to the head of the UN in Liberia", yes?

15:46:22 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. Now help us. Who was the head of the UN in Liberia?

7 A. The head of the UN in Liberia was Downes-Thomas.

8 Q. Felix Downes-Thomas?

9 A. That is correct.

15:46:36 10 Q. Were you buying him off, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Nonsense. No, not at all. This is a career UN man.
12 Never, no.

13 Q. Well, this is what's clearly being suggested by X; that
14 Downes-Thomas was being bought, you see?

15:46:55 15 A. Yeah. Total nonsense.

16 Q. And who is the UN person in New York who was also on the
17 payroll, Mr Taylor?

18 A. I had nobody on the payroll anywhere. I don't know what he
19 is talking about, who X is talking about.

15:47:19 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, whilst we are on the topic, did you run an
21 escort agency in Liberia?

22 A. No.

23 Q. I mean, in addition to diamond smuggling, arms production
24 and supply, timber companies, were you also running some girls,

15:47:40 25 20 of them?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Have a look at the next paragraph:

28 "Taylor and his girls.

29 He ran what was basically an escort agency of about 20

1 girls called Dankpannah's Movement. It is run by Emma Smallwood,
2 Taylor's cousin, who recruits the girls. The girls are
3 handpicked, offered scholarships, clothes, apartments and \$200.
4 In turn they can be called on by Taylor and his cronies. The
15:48:13 5 head guy at OCHA has one of these girls, her name is Tito
6 Djallah. Other senior UN people also have access to the girls."

7 What's that about?

8 A. Total nonsense. Total - trying to destroy people's
9 careers. Total nonsense. The President of Liberia involved in
15:48:36 10 call girls, that's not - nonsense.

11 Q. Now, O-C-H-A stands for what, Mr Taylor?

12 A. I am going to need some help on that. I don't - I am not
13 sure if this is a UN agency. I have heard this before.

14 Q. The UN Office For the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs?

15:49:01 15 A. Okay.

16 Q. Over the page, please, 204. Third paragraph:

17 "In May 2002 Aziz not only used his own money to pay for
18 the May arms shipment, but also gave \$200,000 to Taylor's party
19 for the elections. Taylor didn't get any of this and the money
15:49:49 20 has all disappeared. Taylor is upset about this and has sacked
21 Cyril Allen."

22 First of all, 2002, were there elections?

23 A. No, none.

24 Q. So which elections were you being given this \$200,000 for?

15:50:08 25 A. I have no idea. The elections were scheduled for November
26 2003, so .

27 Q. Did you sack Cyril Allen?

28 A. Never.

29 Q. Was there a May shipment of arms into Harper Port?

1 A. Never, no.

2 Q. And then it goes on, skip the next paragraph: "The July
3 shipment, again to Harper." What do you know about that?

15:50:50

4 A. We never received any arms shipment in Liberia through any
5 ports. That's a lie. That's not true.

6 Q. Count up nine lines from the bottom of the page, please.

7 "No arms have gone to Sierra Leone since disarmament, and
8 weapons have come in from there."

9 What do you know about that?

15:51:21

10 A. Weapons coming in from Sierra Leone?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. No.

13 Q. But do you remember a witness saying that you asked for
14 your weapons back? Remember?

15:51:31

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. After disarmament. You had given them, "Not having them
17 hand over to the UN, I want them back," you remember that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now was that taking place, Mr Taylor?

15:51:42

20 A. That was not taking place, no.

21 Q. Penultimate paragraph in that page:

22 "The weapons were stored in just one place. In the bunker
23 under Taylor's house. The bunker stretches under the house, pool
24 and tennis courts. It is dark and full of crates. You can [sic]
25 tell that it is there. There is a driveway outside the fence
26 that goes down into the bunker."

15:52:04

27 Mr Taylor, there is a detailed description of the bunker
28 there. Where is it?

29 A. There is no bunker on that property whatsoever. Never

1 been.

2 Q. Over the page, please. Fourth line:

3 "People around Taylor are ripping money off and blaming the
4 embargo."

15:52:46 5 True?

6 A. Untrue.

7 Q. Look about just above halfway down the page:

8 "Bah continues to play a key role with what might happen
9 with the RUF in the future."

15:53:09 10 What do you know about that?

11 A. Nothing. He has been with them. I have no idea.

12 Q. Just below that:

13 "If Taylor is pressed things are likely to return to chaos.

14 The ATU is looking after ex-combatants who are going from Sierra

15:53:29 15 Leone into Liberia."

16 What do you know about that?

17 A. Nothing. No, nothing.

18 Q. Do you see a heading just below that "Satellite phones"?

19 Do you see?

15:53:50 20 A. Yes, yes, yes.

21 Q. "Desaedeleer bought one (some) in Washington in 1998, some

22 of which were found in Sankoh's house, but the rest came from

23 Aziz. Ossaily brought in ten sat phones which each had 500

24 units, about six hours. Issa Sesay dropped three in the river

15:54:13 25 and killed the three guys in the small boat whom he blamed for

26 maliciously rocking the boat while he was standing up and

27 dropping the phones. Kallon, Massaquoi, Superman and Rogers all

28 got phones. But they quickly burnt up the time on boastful

29 calls, so could not make calls but they could still receive

1 them."

2 Could you help us with that?

3 A. No, I don't know nothing about it.

4 Q. And then we see:

15:54:47 5 "Patterns:

6 There seems to have been a pattern of a number of possibly
7 competing people involved in moving out diamonds and bringing in
8 arms. Bah, Ruprah and increasingly Wong, have all been involved.
9 Was Bah the only one linked in to Al-Qaeda."

15:55:13 10 Do you see that?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. And then we see a list of questions for which clarification
13 is required regarding Wong, yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:55:25 15 Q. You see?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. "... Perleman going to Abuja. Clarify re Mack saying they
18 shared the diamond information with the Americans" - yes,
19 Mr Taylor?

15:55:39 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And that concludes what I ask you about that document, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in looking at that document and the earlier
24 document, and I say this for everybody's assistance, we have lost
15:55:58 25 a little time today, but we are now on definitely the last lap,
26 okay. Can I ask that those two documents, bijlage 003 and
27 bijlage 004, intelligence reports, be marked for identification
28 MFI-293A and B, please.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

1 MS HOLLIS: I object to the characterisation as
2 intelligence reports. This is speculation. There is nothing
3 here to indicate what kind of documents these are.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We will just mark them.

15:56:38 5 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't mind. There is nothing in a name,
6 as we are told, so we are quite happy with bijlage.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: The documents headed bijlage 003 and 004
8 are marked for identification MFI-293A and B respectively.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

15:57:07 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, definitely the last lap now, okay?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. 2003, and we have dealt with already the press release
13 published on 7 January 2003 setting out the position, yes?

14 A. That is correct.

15:57:37 15 Q. Now you also mentioned to us, Mr Taylor, that in the course
16 of that year, 2003, you met with the President of the
17 Ivory Coast, yes?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Where?

15:57:52 20 A. Gbagbo and I met in Togo along with the then chairman of
21 ECOWAS, Gnassingbe Eyadema, to discuss continued cooperation
22 between our two countries and peoples in the town of Pya.

23 Q. How do you spell Pya?

24 A. Some people say P-Y-E. Some people spell it with a K like
15:58:26 25 Kpya [phon]. I prefer pronouncing it Kpya, but for the Court
26 purposes Pya is fine.

27 Q. Okay. Now at the end of that meeting, was there any
28 document prepared?

29 A. Yes, a communique was prepared and signed by the three of

1 us.

2 Q. Right. Could we have a look, please, in volume 3 of 4,
3 disclosure for week 33, behind divider 127, please. Do you
4 recognise this document, Mr Taylor?

16:00:06 5 A. Yes, this is the communique signed in Pya.

6 Q. And we see Pya is spelt P-Y-A on this document, yes?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. And the document also indicates that the meeting took place
9 on 26 April 2003, yes?

16:00:23 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. When we go over the page, we see that the meeting took
12 place at the invitation of President Eyadema of Togo, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. You were present, Laurent Gbagbo President of the Republic
16:00:41 15 of Cote d'Ivoire was present?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Lansana Kouyate was also present, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Paragraph 3:

16:00:50 20 "During their discussions, the Heads of State exchanged
21 views on issues relating essentially to peace and security in
22 West African sub-region, especially in Cote d'Ivoire and in
23 Liberia."

24 Now, was there civil unrest in la Cote d'Ivoire at this
16:01:07 25 time?

26 A. Yes, there was.

27 Q. And as you have already indicated, a similar situation
28 obtained in Liberia, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. "In this regard, they held thorough discussions on the ways
2 and means aimed at safeguarding, maintaining and strengthening
3 peace, security and stability in the sub-region.

4 Touching on the subject matter of their meeting, President
16:01:31 5 Eyadema recalled that no development is possible without peace
6 and security and that dialogue, negotiations, and preventative
7 diplomacy are essential in order to avoid armed conflicts which
8 cause many innocent victims in West Africa and seriously hinder
9 the effort towards progress.

16:01:50 10 In this context, President Gbagbo and President Taylor
11 committed themselves to actively strive for the restoration of a
12 climate of confidence and understanding which, for long,
13 characterised the historical relations linking their two
14 peoples."

16:02:07 15 Let's forget the next few paragraphs, yes? Go over the
16 page, page 3, paragraph 11:

17 "They encouraged all the Ivorian political leaders to work
18 together with this government in order to consolidate peace and
19 security.

16:02:36 20 They, however, deplore that armed attacks are still going
21 on in some regions. They, therefore, decided to coordinate their
22 initiatives and efforts in view of putting, as quickly as
23 possible, an end to these hostilities which threaten peace and
24 the reconciliation process.

16:02:55 25 President Taylor appraised his colleagues about the ongoing
26 efforts by the Liberian government through the International
27 Contact Group on Liberia."

28 Now, mention was made of that in the press release we
29 looked at this morning, wasn't it?

1 A. Yes, it was.

2 Q. "... to resolve the Liberian conflict. In this regard, the
3 three leaders expressed satisfaction with the initiatives of the
4 ICGL and committed themselves to assist in finding a lasting
16:03:25 5 solution to the Liberian conflict.

6 Taking into account the infiltration of armed groups
7 causing terror and havoc from each side of the border between
8 Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia, the Heads of State agreed that it was
9 necessary to deploy immediately joint forces composed of the
16:03:45 10 French troops of Operation Licorne, ECOWAS troops, armed forces
11 of Cote d'Ivoire and Armed Forces of Liberia over 200 kilometres
12 along the border from Toulepleu to Grabo-Tai."

13 Yes?

14 A. Yes.

16:04:06 15 Q. Mention is then made of the UN Security Council meeting,
16 March 2003, on the proliferation of light weapons and small arms
17 and mercenaries, threats to peace and security in Africa.
18 "President Eyadema drew the attention of his colleagues to the
19 fact that the series of armed conflicts in the sub-region is a
16:04:34 20 direct result of the illegal proliferation and circulation of
21 light weapons and small arms, as well as the availability of
22 local and foreign human resources ready to carry out
23 destabilisation and aggressive acts and war."

24 Can we go over the page, please. Paragraph 20:

16:05:07 25 "They expressed their appreciation with the negotiations
26 going on within the Security Council concerning the sending of a
27 mission to West Africa from 19 to 27 May 2003, with the main
28 objective of contributing to the preservation of lasting peace
29 and stability in the region."

1 Did that mission take place, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes, in part. Yes.

3 Q. What do you mean, "in part"?

16:05:41

4 A. Because some of the forces were deployed in La Cote
5 d'Ivoire and some of them eventually were deployed in Liberia.

6 Q. And then when we look at the final page we see your
7 signature there, don't we?

8 A. That is correct.

16:05:59

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, could I ask, please, that that
10 document, "Final communique following meeting between
11 President Taylor and His Excellency Laurent Gbagbo, President of
12 Cote d'Ivoire in Togo, 26 April 2003", be marked for
13 identification MFI-294.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is so marked.

16:06:20

15 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, that's April, okay?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. By April, what's the situation in Liberia?

16:06:43

19 A. There is fighting in the city. I proceed to Accra for a
20 summit with the head of the African Union ECOWAS in a major
21 discussion, including Tejan Kabbah.

22 Q. When do you go to that meeting in Accra?

23 A. I think that's around April-May, if I am not mistaken,
24 2003.

16:07:05

25 Q. Now, at the time when you left to go to this meeting in
26 Togo which we have just looked at, had the situation deteriorated
27 since January 2003?

28 A. Yes. I would say so, yes.

29 Q. Now, at the time that you went to this meeting in April,

1 Mr Taylor, had the thought yet crossed your mind to step down
2 from the presidency?

3 A. No. No.

4 Q. Now, we know that in due course you did.

16:07:41 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. What changed your mind after 26 April 2003?

7 A. There was massive shelling of the city of Monrovia.

8 Q. When?

9 A. By - I would say this happened about February-March 2003,
16:08:08 10 even before I went to Togo, and some of the rounds fell on the
11 grounds - on the diplomatic grounds owned by the United States
12 embassy. It's called Greystone. Several people were killed. I
13 have mentioned that in this Court before. Several were wounded.

14 And we got some of the shrapnel from the mortar and some of the
16:08:38 15 unexploded ones - unexploded mortar rounds, 60- and 81-millimetre
16 mortars, and we complained to the United States embassy and the
17 United States government about the fact that this was going on,
18 that these mortars were United States mortars and that look at
19 what has happened. On diplomatic grounds, people have been

16:09:02 20 injured. The United States government failed to - and refused to
21 - condemn LURD's attack at Greystone. At that point, I decided
22 that if I did not leave, their intent was to kill Monrovia and
23 everyone. I decided that I would leave for the sake of peace.

24 Q. Right. Now, Mr Taylor, at some point in 2003, a matter
16:09:38 25 you've already dealt with, you went to Accra, did you not?

26 A. Yes, I did.

27 Q. For what purpose?

28 A. I went for peace, to meet my colleagues, to discuss what
29 would happen in Liberia, and how to go along in trying to

1 reconcile between the government and LURD.

2 Q. What colleagues?

3 A. Well, present at that meeting were Thabo Mbeki. Thabo came
4 down. Tejan Kabbah was there, John Kufuor was there. The
16:10:25 5 Prime Minister of Togo was there. Obasanjo was also present.
6 This was a mini summit in Accra. LURD's representatives were
7 also present.

8 Q. And who had called that meeting?

9 A. I had asked for such a meeting to be held, and it was
16:10:49 10 called by the then chairman of ECOWAS. I - in fact, there was
11 something strange that had happened. About a month before I went
12 to Accra, thereabouts, we had held a meeting in Senegal. In
13 fact, the chairmanship of the ECOWAS came to me, in fact, because
14 I had seniority to Obasanjo, Wade, every one of them. But I
16:11:16 15 turned down, after - I accepted the chairmanship of ECOWAS at
16 that meeting and said that because of the war in Liberia, I could
17 not take it. So I turned over, in that meeting, my chairmanship
18 to John Kufuor of Ghana.

19 Q. So who was the chairman of ECOWAS at the time of the Accra
16:11:35 20 meeting?

21 A. Kufuor.

22 Q. Why was Thabo Mbeki at that meeting?

23 A. Thabo was there as - because at that particular time he was
24 - Thabo was serving - I think he was on - he was about to leave
16:11:52 25 the position of OAU chairman. Just on his way out. He had a lot
26 of interest in making sure that we had peace in the West Africa
27 sub-region. You know, Thabo practically spent a lot of time in
28 West Africa, in Nigeria.

29 Q. Now, help us. How long did that meeting in Accra last?

1 A. Not very long. While we were at that meeting, that was
2 when this - we were told just as we walked out of the meeting
3 that an indictment had been unsealed against me.

4 Q. Now, I want to pause and deal with that moment in a little
16:12:31 5 more detail. Firstly, had anything been agreed at that meeting
6 in Accra, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What had been agreed?

9 A. I had voluntarily told them: Gentlemen, look, I have had
16:12:46 10 enough of this. I explained to them what happened at the US
11 Embassy and everything. I said: Look, if I end the problem in
12 Liberia, I am prepared to go out there to that meeting and tell
13 the people, "Listen, that's it. I will step down," forget about
14 this whole thing. Because it is apparent to me that these people
16:13:05 15 intend to kill Liberia just to get me out of power, so I am
16 prepared to leave. And I can remember Obasanjo was sitting next
17 to me and he hit me on the leg and he said, "Oh, but my brother,
18 if this is what you really want to do, I think we have peace, you
19 can come to Nigeria." Thabo said, "No, you can come to South
16:13:23 20 Africa." I said, "Okay, I'll make up my mind at that time." But
21 that decision had been taken that I was going out to announce to
22 the world that I was going to step down at that particular point.
23 So when we came out and this announcement unfolded, I tell you,
24 there was some very angry Heads of State.

16:13:39 25 Q. Not too quickly, Mr Taylor. We need to take our time here.
26 What do you mean, "as you came out of the meeting"?

27 A. We had been behind closed doors in a meeting. We walked
28 out - we were walking from the meeting, going to the conference
29 centre.

1 Q. Who is "we"?

2 A. Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo, Tejani Kabbah, John Kufuor,
3 myself were walking together from Kufuor's office towards the
4 conference centre.

16:14:12 5 Q. Yes. And you discover what?

6 A. When we came outside, the aides, my Foreign Minister and
7 other people, rushed to inform all of the heads: Oh, we just
8 heard on the BBC that there has been - BBC or some radio report,
9 and I don't want to be quoted - that an indictment had been

16:14:33 10 unsealed against President Taylor by the Special Court in Sierra
11 Leone. Everybody just got upset, and we cut short and went back
12 into the meeting.

13 Q. "Everybody" is who?

14 A. All of the Head of State.

16:14:45 15 Q. Became upset at what?

16 A. At the announcement of such - in fact people - Kufuor had
17 mentioned that he felt that he had been betrayed of why would
18 this happen when we are talking peace for such an indictment or
19 whatever to be unfolded. Mbeki was upset. I was upset.

16:15:07 20 Everybody was - in fact the meeting almost ended. And so we got
21 into a period when we returned as to whether I would stick to my
22 statement that I would step down or say, "Well, okay, if that's
23 what they want to do I am not going any place." So we sat in
24 that meeting. We returned now, let me get it straight. We come
16:15:26 25 out, we are briefed and all hell breaks loose there. We decide
26 to return, just the Heads of State, to hold discussions. One, to
27 show our disapproval of what happened, and really to find out if
28 I would still hold my word that I would step down.

29 We go through the discussion. I promise them that, "Look,

1 I will still step down." But what was decided in that meeting
2 was that, "Fine, if this is the case, if you will still step down
3 we are going to inform the Security Council and the world that
4 this indictment is unacceptable." John Kufuor in that meeting,
16:16:09 5 as chairman of ECOWAS, acting with Thabo Mbeki, were asked to
6 invite both the American and British ambassadors that evening to
7 inform them that everything had to be done, what had happened was
8 unacceptable and that this indictment would not stand, that the
9 Security Council should make sure that it was quashed. And that
16:16:33 10 was based on that - I have never raised this and I am not raising
11 it now as a defence, as I have heard in other cases. But that
12 was the decision. You step down. I was informed hours later,
13 that night before I left Ghana - in fact I left Ghana on the
14 plane provided by the President of Ghana. I was informed after
16:16:55 15 that meeting that the security five permanent members would meet
16 and a decision would be taken that the indictment would not be
17 followed, that everything would be done to stop it because the
18 Security Council had a way of stopping it. The Security Council
19 could have ruled for a year or two years or indefinitely from
16:17:15 20 what was advised, we were advised. And it was based on that that
21 I got on John Kufuor's plane and returned to Liberia.

22 Q. Now, you say that you heard this after a meeting. After
23 which meeting?

24 A. The meeting between and amongst the Heads of State that
16:17:32 25 were present for this conference on peace in Liberia.

26 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor. You spoke of a meeting between
27 John Kufuor and the US and British ambassadors, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Did such a meeting take place?

1 A. The meeting took place.

2 Q. And what was the result of that meeting?

3 A. They were told that - the decision of ECOWAS and the
4 African Union and they said that they would convey that to their

16:18:02 5 governments and that the permanent five would consider that
6 request. This was what Kufuor was told, that he reported back to
7 us.

8 Q. So Kufuor told you that the British and American
9 ambassadors would be reporting back to their governments and to
16:18:18 10 the Security Council in due course?

11 A. On the decision of the African Union, that is correct.

12 Q. Now, did you discover at any stage, Mr Taylor, whether or
13 not the Security Council had made a decision based on those
14 representations?

16:18:33 15 A. Oh, yes, yes. Subsequent to that, and before - in fact,
16 following my return to Liberia, between June and August, there
17 are a series of negotiations going on. Let nobody think that I
18 just jumped up and left Liberia. Negotiations - in fact my
19 Minister of State is between Nigeria and Monrovia where we are
16:19:02 20 assured - Obasanjo finally comes to Liberia and he tells me that
21 he has spoken with the permanent five and they have assured him
22 that the issue of the indictment would be squashed and that there
23 was no need to worry. And based on that, Obasanjo made a public

24 statement in Monrovia when he announced to the Liberian people
16:19:26 25 President Taylor has been offered a place to come in Nigeria and
26 in his famous statement, and no one would harass me, is because
27 of what had been said to him by, he told me, the permanent five
28 members that this issue of this Sierra Leonean court indictment
29 would not suffice.

1 Q. I am going to come back to that, but, Mr Taylor, so far as
2 the timing of the unsealing of that indictment is concerned, what
3 do you know about the specific timing of the unsealing of the
4 indictment?

16:20:11 5 A. Well, when you say what do I know about the timing.

6 Q. Why at that particular time, do you know?

7 A. Well, my own point is that the issue of regime change had
8 been put into place. There was a special operation at that
9 particular time that while I was out of the country, that they
10 would unseal the indictment, I would be stuck in Ghana while they
11 carry out the covert plan of asking Moses Blah to take over, I
12 would not be able to return, like a coup d'etat would occur in my
13 absence. Being held in abeyance, may I call it, through that
14 process I would be arrested and taken to the Court. This is what
15 my - our analysis came down to. So my return to Monrovia that
16 night destroyed the whole plan of getting me arrested during that
17 particular time or within a few days of the unsealing of the
18 indictment.

19 Q. Now, at that time, Mr Taylor, were you aware who was the
16:21:19 20 Chief Prosecutor of this Court?

21 A. I was not aware. The first time I heard it was on that day
22 when I say that David Crane had been on the BBC, had been
23 speaking about what he had done. I did not even know his motives
24 at that particular time. I get to find out subsequently.

16:21:37 25 Q. Find out subsequently what?

26 A. What were all of the nuances behind the unsealing of the
27 indictment at that time and why I became a target of David
28 Crane's whatever, as he has termed me, his nemesis.

29 Q. Now from what source did you discover this?

1 A. Well, later in 2006, David Crane - just before I am turned
2 over to the Special Court, I am arrested, David Crane appears
3 before the House of Representatives subcommittee on Africa. In
4 fact he, and I took notice of he and another individual of
16:22:33 5 interest to me, and during which time he explained in detail the
6 purpose, the motives, the opportunities, and everything that
7 settled around the decision to move against Charles Taylor and
8 the other individual is a Dr Peter Pham, that's spelled P-H-A-M,
9 who is from the James Madison University and is supposed to be an
16:23:04 10 expert on international affairs and dealing with Africa, that I
11 get to know the real details of the reasons why they decided to
12 make this move against me to bring me to where I am.

13 Q. Yes. I would like us now, please, to look in binder 3 of 4
14 for week 33 binder divider 136, please. Do you have it,
16:24:30 15 Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. We see from the frontispiece of this document that these
18 are minutes of a hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa,
19 Global Human Rights and International Operations of the Committee
16:24:44 20 on International Relations, House of Representatives 109Th
21 Congress, dated 8 February 2006, yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Now, I would like us, please, in light of your answer, to
24 turn immediately to page 79 of this document, please. Do you
16:25:14 25 have it?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. Now we will see a footnote number 10, do you see that?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. Now this is a footnote, as we learn if we turn back a

1 couple of pages to page 77 - this is a footnote in a prepared
2 statement prepared by David Crane, former Chief Prosecutor
3 Special Court for Sierra Leone. Do you follow?

4 A. Yes, I do.

16:25:50 5 Q. And in this footnote number 10, let us see:

6 "The indictment signed in a moving ceremony on 3 March 2003
7 in my office in Freetown, Sierra Leone, is attached as appendix

8 1. I told the assembled trial counsel of investigators that 'The
9 ghost of a hundred thousand Sierra Leoneans are in this room

16:26:20 10 right now.' The unsealing of the indictment against

11 Charles Taylor on the day he arrived in Accra, Ghana, for the
12 peace talks in June 2003 was a calculated move on my part to

13 publicly strip, in front of the world, this warlord of his power
14 by my signature on the indictment. It was never intended to

16:26:46 15 force his transfer that day to the tribunal, though we would have
16 accepted him and were ready to arraign him on the charges within

17 the indictment immediately. My intent was to humble and

18 humiliate him before his peers, the leaders of Africa, and to

19 serve notice to Taylor and others that the days of impunity in

16:27:12 20 Africa were over. Taylor is the first African Head of State ever

21 to be indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity and

22 only the second in history. His indictment paved the way for the

23 eventual election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the first fairly

24 elected President of Liberia, and also the first African woman

16:27:37 25 ever to be elected a Head of State. It must be noted that the

26 United States was given a copy of the Taylor indictment two

27 months before I unsealed it in June 2003. It was personally

28 given to Walter Kansteiner, then the Assistant Secretary of State

29 for Africa, at a breakfast meeting in April 2003 with the US

1 Ambassador, Peter Chavez, at his home in Freetown. Another copy
2 was given to Pierre Prosper, the Ambassador-at-Large For War
3 Crimes Issues as well. All parties were warned 24 hours in
4 advance of the unsealing while Taylor was in Accra. The
16:28:24 5 Government of Ghana was served with the indictment and the
6 warrant of arrest the morning of the unsealing of Taylor's
7 indictment."

8 Now, let's just pause there, Mr Taylor. What do you
9 understand by the term "a sealed indictment"?

16:28:41 10 A. That's what it says, it's sealed. It's a legal document.
11 It's not a political document. It's sealed by the Courts and
12 it's sealed.

13 Q. Can you help us as to how it is that two months before it
14 was unsealed it was being shown to the American ambassador?

16:29:01 15 A. Because a decision had been taken for regime change in
16 Liberia and this whole thing has never been legal, because it was
17 political, and so he had to show it to his boss. As simple as
18 that.

19 Q. So consequently they knew two months before it was unsealed
16:29:26 20 in June what the contents were, but you and the other African
21 leaders in the region, directly concerned with this, only found
22 out when you got out of that meeting. Is that right?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Yes. And just to put some of this in context, knowing that
16:29:53 25 time is short, let's quickly go to page 81, please. We will come
26 back to this document tomorrow.

27 Footnote number 26. Again, David Crane's writing:

28 "Believe me, the trick to getting a West African leader's
29 attention is cash, plain and simple."

1 What do you say to that, Mr Taylor?

2 A. One word: Raci st.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,
4 Mr President?

16:30:32 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's a convenient time. We are going to
6 adjourn until tomorrow morning, Mr Taylor. I remind you not to
7 discuss your evidence. We will adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow.

8 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 10 November 2009
16:31:19 10 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR 31329

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS 31329