



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 9 SEPTEMBER 2009  
9.57 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Wednesday, 9 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.57 a.m.]

09:56:59 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,  
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J  
9 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura and our case manager, Maja Dimitrova.

09:57:20 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
12 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay  
13 Griffiths, assisted by my learned friend Mr Morris Anyah and  
14 we're joined today by Ms Kathryn Hovington.

09:57:38 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

16 Well, just before we start, I'll place on record the fact  
17 that although this Court starts at 9.30 every morning, this  
18 morning we've been delayed and we haven't been able to start the  
19 Court until 9.57 and that is because, once more, we have been  
09:57:56 20 beset by technical problems. These problems today affect the  
21 internet, the server and LiveNote, and they've just been fixed.

22 Now, Mr Taylor, I'll remind you, you're still bound by the  
23 declaration to tell the truth.

24 Yes, please go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

09:58:22 25 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

26 [On former affirmation]

27 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

28 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday when we concluded for the day we were  
29 looking at the resolution which came at the end of the first

1 annual inter-parliamentary conference of member states of the  
2 Mano River Union, a conference held in May of 1999. Do you  
3 recall that?

4 A. Yes, I do.

09:58:47 5 Q. Now, did you attend that conference, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes, I did.

7 Q. And did you address the conference?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. Can we look, please - can we take up the bundle of  
09:59:00 10 documents for week 35 and can I invite attention behind divider  
11 20, please. Now, Mr Taylor, for my purposes, I would like to  
12 ignore the statement of appreciation to the address of the Malien  
13 parliamentary delegation and go straight to the document behind  
14 it, yes?

09:59:57 15 A. Okay.

16 Q. Is this the speech you gave, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes, this is it.

18 Q. Now, we see that it's dated 27 May 1999:

19 "Distinguished Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great  
10:00:24 20 pleasure to welcome you distinguished delegates to this august  
21 gathering of members of parliament from the Mano River Union  
22 countries, which the national legislature of Liberia is  
23 privileged to host.

24 I understand that this is the first time that a meeting of  
10:00:43 25 this kind is convening and that the purpose of your meeting is to  
26 review and assess the sociopolitical situation prevailing in our  
27 sub-region and what roles you can play in promoting cooperation,  
28 resolving conflict and enhancing peace and security. It is a  
29 laudable idea indeed.

1 With the realisation of these endeavours, you accentuate  
2 our sense of oneness, resuscitate our spirit of mutuality and  
3 energise our resolve for the attainment of those noble pursuits  
4 that lent themselves to the conceptionalisation of the Mano River  
10:01:33 5 Union. No doubt, posterity will pass kind and favourable  
6 judgments on your actions here today.

7 I am sure in your deliberations you will be influenced by  
8 the prevailing concerns in our sub-region, particularly the  
9 crisis in our sister Republic of Sierra Leone and the need to  
10:01:49 10 foster greater understanding and cooperation among our member  
11 states not only of the Mano River Union but of ECOWAS as well.

12 We have been informed that our brothers and sisters from  
13 Sierra Leone could not be here today. This is indeed  
14 regrettable, and it is our hope that they will be able to join us  
10:02:12 15 in future meetings.

16 For and on behalf of the government and people of Liberia,  
17 it warms my heart to welcome all of you to Liberia and most  
18 relevantly into this historic hall of African unity, wishing for  
19 you the sublime guidance of the almighty as you embark upon your  
10:02:33 20 deliberations.

21 Distinguished Sons and Daughters of Africa, you are  
22 assembled in the shadows of former President William VS Tubman  
23 and Richard R Tolbert of Liberia, Sir Milton Margai and Siaka P  
24 Stevens of Sierra Leone and Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea, two of  
10:02:55 25 whom bequeathed the legacy of the Mano River Union to us,  
26 committing the government and peoples of Republics of Liberia,  
27 Sierra Leone and later Guinea to the enhancement of economic,  
28 cultural and security cooperation.

29 Though we are tragically separated by boundary lines of

1 colonial inheritance, those stalwart sons of Africa endeavoured  
2 to dissipate the rigours of those barriers by the creation of a  
3 framework for the free flow of peoples, goods and services,  
4 successes have been recorded in the areas of telecommunications,  
10:03:37 5 maritime affairs, commerce and trade.

6 Political stability was ensured by the exchange of security  
7 information and cooperation."

8 Can I pause there, Mr Taylor.

9 A. Yes.

10:03:51 10 Q. What are we talking about there, "the exchange of security  
11 information and cooperation"?

12 A. Well, between the three countries years before, Stevens,  
13 Ahmed Sekou Toure and Tubman, even coming to Tolbert, had a real  
14 exchange of information and we had no crisis in any of those  
10:04:15 15 countries.

16 Q. Now, did such exchange of security information continue  
17 under the Doe and Taylor regimes?

18 A. Yes. We did have that exchange, yes.

19 Q. And what did it, in practical terms, involve?

10:04:32 20 A. For example, if there were, for example, a dissident from -  
21 that was declared a dissident from one country coming into the  
22 other country, that government would be informed. We would not  
23 tolerate the presence of that dissident. We would either expel  
24 them. Or if there were a serious charge where, say, if there was  
10:04:56 25 a writ for his arrest or something of that sort, we would conduct  
26 the arrest and pursue the issue of extradition.

27 Q. And did that level of cooperation continue throughout your  
28 administration?

29 A. Yes, it did continue. We did exchange information. We did

1 not have a serious issue, but the last one that I can recall was  
2 the issue involving Victor King from Sierra Leone that came, but  
3 we always had this.

4 Q. What was that incident?

10:05:36 5 A. Well, when we go back to February of 1998, the  
6 intervention, Victor King, the air force commander, was on board  
7 one of two helicopters that came into Spriggs Payne Airport in  
8 Liberia. And after sustained conversations, he was sent back to  
9 Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, he was executed.

10:06:07 10 Q. And that's an example, are you suggesting, of the kind of  
11 cooperation being mentioned here?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. I see.

14 "Consequently, a stable environment conducive to economic  
10:06:20 15 growth and development was fostered. A bond of kinship, endemic  
16 only to our distinct African sociology was engendered. The Mano  
17 River Union translated into the beacon of a new sense of African  
18 consciousness. It bespoke of the ability of Africans to  
19 recognise our unique oneness and transform our diversities into  
10:06:49 20 ingenuities, our difficulties into challenges and our  
21 similarities into bulwarks of strength.

22 This is why we believe that the spirit of goodwill,  
23 fraternity and concord, which will characterise your  
24 deliberations over the next few days, could serve as a concrete  
10:07:05 25 basis upon which our relations can be strengthened and sustained.  
26 As our countries share membership in several organisations such  
27 as the Mano River Union, ECOWAS and the OAU, it is my firm belief  
28 that your meeting here in Monrovia will further enhance African  
29 solidarity and brotherhood and above all make us realise that

1 ultimately only Africans can solve Africa's problems.

2 It is in this light that I commend you, distinguished  
3 ladies and gentlemen, for this initiative and the role each of  
4 you is playing in helping to resolve the issues facing our  
10:07:43 5 sub-region. Your being here today is a clear indication of your  
6 desire to foster understanding, peace and goodwill, not only in  
7 our sub-region but throughout Africa and yea the world.

8 By these actions, you are demonstrating to the world that  
9 genuine peace can only be attained when nations and leaders are  
10:08:02 10 willing to sit together and with sincerity deliberate upon the  
11 issues affecting the relations, for in the absence of peace,  
12 nothing else can be achieved. Therefore, peace through dialogue  
13 and cooperation must become a yardstick by which we measure  
14 advances in our relationships.

10:08:34 15 Embedded in you parliamentarians is the power of the  
16 people. You are closest to their hopes, desires and aspirations.  
17 Your enterprise must be to save the union and its  
18 representations. I challenge you to begin with a precise focus  
19 on legislation that would give realisation to the concept of the  
10:08:59 20 West African citizenship and ensure the economic empowerment and  
21 improvement of our people.

22 Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, one century ago, wise  
23 people dreamed and worked for the freedom of the African  
24 continent. This self-selected band comprised people of African  
10:09:21 25 descent, some of them living in the diaspora and others living on  
26 the continent. They shared common concerns, an embryonic vision  
27 for an African continent, free from the yoke of colonialism and  
28 free to determine their own future within the global family of  
29 nations.

1 The vision of such men as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere,  
2 William VS Tubman, Modibo Keita, Milton Margai, amongst others,  
3 that Africa could not be free until apartheid and all vestiges of  
4 colonial rule were finally vanquished became a reality in 1994  
10:10:10 5 when South Africa, the last enclave of colonial or minority rule  
6 achieved majority rule.

7 African independence was achieved through the strenuous  
8 efforts of generations of nationalists, political leaders and  
9 outstanding individuals. A hundred years later, modern Africa  
10:10:28 10 must continue to count on such individuals who have distinguished  
11 themselves as leaders with extraordinary abilities.

12 As in the past, Africa's wise people, while firmly rooted  
13 in the cultural heritage of our continent, must continue the long  
14 and sometimes agonising journey from the village to national,  
10:10:55 15 continental and international prominence.

16 We must be prepared to play our roles well for the sake of  
17 Africa's well being, while remaining both the carriers and the  
18 fruits of Africa's struggle as we transition into the new  
19 millennium. Africa's journey towards well being remains far from  
10:11:13 20 finished. Indeed, the times are heavy laden with stress,  
21 sufferings and sorrows. Therefore, Africa's wise people, blessed  
22 with clear vision, must be drawn together anew in the ongoing  
23 struggle for peace and reconciliation and development.

24 In many areas around the world the last decade of the 20th  
10:11:38 25 century has been particularly challenging. This era has been  
26 characterised by political turmoil and ethnic and tribal  
27 conflict, and in the case of Africa this situation is being  
28 compounded by the debt crisis, which has had a crippling effect  
29 on the economies of our countries. Indeed, we must only see this



1 as a transitional period in the life of our continent. To move  
2 forward to a democratic and economically strong society is not  
3 going to be an easy task.

4 The experience of conflicts and wars reveals the  
10:12:14 5 difficulties of this transition. My deepest concern is that  
6 Africa should transform this process by resolving its conflicts  
7 in order to start reconstruction of our continent. Many people  
8 seem to want to give up too early and think that we as a people  
9 just cannot make it in the march to democracy and development.  
10:12:37 10 Some are even willing to go back to the old regimes of yesteryear  
11 because of the difficulties and losses being faced during this  
12 transitional period. Others may want to exploit our conflicts as  
13 an opportunity to further divide us.

14 We cannot, and must not, turn back the hand of time. After  
10:12:56 15 all, the difficult transitional period is not unique to Africa.  
16 As Africans, we must chart our own course to democracy. We must  
17 know that we are in the wilderness of conflicts and deprivation,  
18 but this is only temporary. We need not die in the wilderness.  
19 There is a land of promise before us.

10:13:21 20 My brothers and sisters, you are meeting at a time when  
21 mutual suspicion is rife and threats to regional peace and  
22 security abounds. Your convocation is being evoked at a time  
23 when Liberia is grappling with the aftermath of a civil war,  
24 whilst Sierra Leone is being decimated and destroyed by war.

10:13:46 25 Providence has shuffled its deck of fate and in your hands  
26 have been placed the urgency of providing hope in the midst of  
27 hopelessness, eschewing divisiveness and embracing oneness,  
28 fostering economic growth and development, and eradicating  
29 poverty and disease, securing for ourselves and our children a

1 better tomorrow.

2 Distinguished Ladies and gentlemen, the Republics of  
3 Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, except for geopolitical  
4 reasons, are but one country. We share common borders. Our  
10:14:26 5 children attend schools in each other's countries, not to mention  
6 the common ethnic background of many of our citizens. How, then,  
7 can we not accept the fact that maintaining peace in our  
8 sub-region is the best that we can do for the betterment of all  
9 us all?

10:14:43 10 As I again welcome you, let me assure you that we in  
11 Liberia are prepared and shall do everything in our power to  
12 ensure the peace and security of the Republic of Guinea and the  
13 Republic of Sierra Leone, for we are convinced that our own peace  
14 can only be assured if our brothers and sisters next door are at  
10:15:07 15 peace.

16 May your deliberations be fruitful, and I wish you God's  
17 blessings."

18 Mr Taylor, I have to ask: That last paragraph, "... our  
19 own peace can only be assured if our brothers and sisters next  
10:15:29 20 door are at peace," was that a genuine sentiment?

21 A. Very genuine, yes.

22 Q. Let's move on, shall we, to this extent: Now, the idea, as  
23 you explained yesterday, behind this inter-parliamentary meeting,  
24 was to foster, as I understand it, greater cooperation between  
10:16:00 25 the three states of the Mano River Union. Is that right?

26 A. That is right.

27 Q. Now help us, did that project bear fruit?

28 A. Yes, following this there were other discussions. But we  
29 were getting deeper engulfed in conflict, but it is still

1 continuing today. So I would say it did bear fruit.

2 Q. It's still continuing today?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, Mr President, that that  
10:16:37 5 document, "Speech delivered by President Charles Taylor on the  
6 occasion marking the official opening of the inter-parliamentary  
7 meeting of the Mano River Union on 27 May 1999" be marked for  
8 identification MFI-251.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for  
10:16:56 10 identification MFI-251.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, moving on. Now, throughout 1999,  
13 Mr Taylor, we've been chasing correspondence between your  
14 government and the Secretary-General regarding the destruction of  
10:17:40 15 arms in Liberia. Is that right?

16 A. That is right.

17 Q. Now, we've already looked at some of that correspondence.  
18 Now, in or about June of that year did you make further contact  
19 with the Secretary-General, or he with you?

10:18:01 20 A. Yes, we made contact with the Secretary-General.

21 Q. And for what purpose?

22 A. Following the long exchanges of views and discussions and  
23 debate, finally at the very beginning of June Liberia formally in  
24 June decides that it is going to participate in the destruction  
10:18:34 25 of all of the arms that were gathered during the disarmament  
26 period. And so the Government of Liberia in a formal  
27 communication informed the Secretary-General through the Ministry  
28 of Foreign Affairs of the decision of the Government of Liberia  
29 to destroy the arms.

1 Q. And having notified the Secretary-General of that decision,  
2 did he respond?

3 A. Yes, he did.

10:19:23

4 Q. Have a look behind divider 23, please. Now, the first page  
5 behind that divider is self-explanatory. I'd like us to go to  
6 the second page, please, and look at the letter itself. Do you  
7 have it?

8 A. Yes, I do.

10:19:42

9 Q. Now, we see that it's a letter from the Secretary-General  
10 of the United Nations addressed to you - no, addressed to your  
11 Foreign Minister?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. It is dated 17 June 1999 and it reads as follows:

10:20:07

14 "Excellency, I have the honour to refer to your later dated  
15 3 June 1999 in which you informed me of your government's  
16 decision to destroy all the arms and ammunition collected during  
17 the 1996-1997 disarmament process. In the same letter you  
18 requested technical assistance from the United Nations.

10:20:30

19 The United Nations welcomes your government's decision to  
20 destroy the arms and ammunition. Accordingly, we are now in the  
21 process of assembling a small team of experts who will travel  
22 shortly to Monrovia to assist your government. Their duties will  
23 be in accordance with the meeting that took place in Monrovia on  
24 10 June between your government and the executive secretary of  
25 ECOWAS, Mr Lansana Kouyate, with the participation of the deputy  
26 chief military observer of UNOMSIL.

10:20:50

27 My representative for the United Nations office in Liberia,  
28 Mr Felix Downes-Thomas, will provide your government with further  
29 details concerning the arrival date of the United Nations

1 military experts."

2 And the normal salutations follow thereafter, and it's  
3 signed by Kofi A Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations,  
4 yes?

10:21:31 5 A. Yes.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, Mr President, that that  
7 letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Monie  
8 Captan, Liberian Foreign Minister, dated 17 June 1999 recording  
9 the decision of the Government of Liberia to destroy arms and  
10 ammunition collected during the disarmament process, be marked  
11 for identification MFI-252, please.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That letter will be marked for  
13 identification MFI-252.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

10:22:41 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: I note there's another document behind  
16 that divider. It's in French about sending a team. Is that  
17 relevant, or should we ignore that?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I think we can ignore that. I certainly -  
19 my French isn't good enough to make sense of it in any event, so  
10:22:57 20 I think we can ignore it.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Thank you. We'll just mark  
22 that letter from Kofi Annan, then, MFI-252.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we are engaged here in a process of tidying  
10:23:20 25 up one or two matters. And moving on and with that in mind, in  
26 June 1999 did you see President Obasanjo of Nigeria?

27 A. Yes, I did.

28 Q. Can you help us as to roughly when that was?

29 A. Well, actually, I saw Obasanjo twice in June. The last

1 time was the very, very last week of June that he visited me in  
2 Monrovia following what I said - I had visited him in earlier  
3 June when I was en route to Libya. So by the final week in June  
4 he paid a visit to me in Monrovia.

10:24:19 5 Q. And as we have noted on earlier occasions, such meetings  
6 normally conclude with the issue of a joint communique, don't  
7 they?

8 A. Yes, they do.

9 Q. Was this meeting any different?

10:24:38 10 A. No.

11 Q. And so was such a communique issued?

12 A. Yes, there was a communique issued.

13 Q. Have a look behind divider 29, please. Can I indicate,  
14 Mr President, as one will see, we're looking at a familiar  
10:25:04 15 document; a code cable sent by Mr Downes-Thomas, and you will see  
16 that there are two attachments to it. I've included both  
17 attachments for completeness, but for our purposes I'm merely  
18 interested in the communique.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understand. Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

10:25:19 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Can we have a look at the communique which follows behind  
22 that then, please, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you have it?

10:25:33 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Now, we see that it's entitled, "Joint communique on the  
27 visit of His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo, President and  
28 Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of  
29 Nigeria to the Republic of Liberia on June 25, 1999.

1 His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo paid a one-day working  
2 visit to the Republic of Liberia on Friday, 25 June 1999, at the  
3 invitation of His Excellency, the President of the Republic of  
4 Liberia. On arrival, the President of the Federal Republic of  
10:26:10 5 Nigeria and his entourage received a warm and cordial reception,  
6 befitting the close ties and friendships binding the two  
7 countries.

8 The two Heads of State reviewed matters of mutual interest  
9 and concern to the two countries and thereafter engaged  
10:26:27 10 themselves in full and frank exchange of views on contemporary  
11 world affairs in general, as well as on inter-African affairs in  
12 particular. The two Heads of State also expressed their  
13 satisfaction with the cordial and excellent relations which have  
14 always existed between the two countries.

10:26:49 15 President Obasanjo noted that technical discussions on the  
16 modalities for the destruction of arms and ammunition collected  
17 from erstwhile warring factions during the disarmament exercise  
18 in Liberia have commenced amongst ECOWAS, the United Nations and  
19 the Government of Liberia. The Nigerian leader also observed  
10:27:12 20 that the decision of the Government of Liberia to destroy these  
21 arms and ammunition, and the successful completion of that  
22 exercise, would contribute immensely to sub-regional peace and  
23 security. President Obasanjo also commended efforts of the  
24 Government of Liberia to consolidate peace through the pursuit of  
10:27:39 25 national reconciliation.

26 On Liberia-Nigeria relations the two President renewed  
27 their determination to encourage, promote and foster economic,  
28 scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries.  
29 They reaffirmed their commitment to the expeditious and full

1 implementation of all agreements and other related instruments  
2 for cooperation in various fields concluded between the  
3 government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the government  
4 of the Republic of Liberia.

10:28:16 5 With regard to the 21 January 1987 agreement on economic,  
6 scientific and technical cooperation, President Taylor and  
7 President Obasanjo decided that the Nigerian-Liberian joint  
8 commission meets at the earliest possible time to draw up an  
9 action programme of implementation.

10:28:39 10 On world affairs the two Heads of State agreed that urgent  
11 reforms are needed in the present international economic and  
12 sociopolitical order to make the United Nations system more  
13 democratic as well as improve the position of developing  
14 countries in the fields of trade, credit flows and debt relief."

10:29:01 15 "... make the United Nations system more democratic",  
16 Mr Taylor, what's that a reference to?

17 A. Well, when you - we were talking about the Security Council  
18 in particular. At this time Africa was pushing very, very hard  
19 to get a seat on the council, because when you look at the  
10:29:32 20 council and the undemocratic nature that we were discussing, you  
21 have a total of 15 members on the Security Council; five  
22 permanent members that have veto powers. But of our concern was  
23 the fact that one permanent member on the Security Council can  
24 even veto the rest of the 14, and the discussion of third world  
10:30:01 25 and non-aligned countries, we were very concerned about Africa's  
26 representation in a permanent seat on the council to look at it,  
27 because we felt that it was undemocratic that one permanent  
28 member of the council is capable of vetoing the other 14 and that  
29 there was discussions that were leading to other countries not



1 being considered for permanent membership on the council. This  
2 is the nature of the discussion.

3 Q. Yes. Let's take up at paragraph 1.7, please:

4 "On African affairs the two Heads of State expressed  
10:30:46 5 concern over the proliferation of conflicts on the continent and  
6 reaffirmed their full commitment to regional and sub-regional  
7 initiatives designed to manage, curb and resolve these conflicts.

8 The two leaders appealed to all African states to quickly  
9 put behind them all conflicts and wars so that they can devote  
10:31:09 10 greater energy and resources to the urgent task of economic  
11 development which will enhance the well-being of African peoples  
12 and position Africa to effectively face the challenges of the  
13 next millennium.

14 On the crisis in the sister Republic of Sierra Leone, the  
10:31:28 15 two Heads of State welcomed the ongoing negotiations in Lome,  
16 Togo, to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and urged the  
17 negotiating parties to achieve an early and final settlement of  
18 the Sierra Leone crisis. President Taylor and President Obasanjo  
19 were unanimous that peace in Sierra Leone can only be achieved in  
10:31:54 20 a climate of mutual confidence and respect. They particularly  
21 stressed that no member state of ECOWAS should encourage, support  
22 or commit acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the  
23 government and people of Sierra Leone. The two leaders also  
24 agreed to intensify their efforts, as well as to consult each  
10:32:25 25 other more closely to bring the civil war in Sierra Leone to a  
26 speedy and permanent end.

27 President Taylor and President Obasanjo expressed their  
28 confidence and commended the tireless efforts of the Chairman of  
29 ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadema, to find a lasting solution

1 to the crisis in Sierra Leone.

2 Finally, the two leaders praised the efforts of the gallant  
3 men and women of ECOMOG in restoring peace to Liberia and ongoing  
4 initiatives to resolve the conflicts and restore peace to  
10:32:59 5 Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. They therefore called on the  
6 larger international community to further support their efforts  
7 by providing the necessary logistics and financial resources to  
8 enable ECOMOG to accomplish, in the shortest possible time, its  
9 peacekeeping mission in the sister Republic of Sierra Leone.

10:33:25 10 At the end of his visit, President Obasanjo expressed  
11 sincere thanks and appreciation to the government and people of  
12 Liberia for the warm and fraternal welcome accorded him and his  
13 entourage throughout the visit and looked forward to a return  
14 visit by President Taylor. This invitation was accepted, and the  
10:33:46 15 date of the state visit will be arranged through diplomatic  
16 channels."

17 And it's signed by both you and President Obasanjo, yes,  
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes.

10:34:00 20 Q. Now, can I take up with you, please, one or two details  
21 about that. Now, would a communique like this - even though it  
22 involved only yourself and President Obasanjo, would it be  
23 distributed to other ECOWAS member states?

24 A. They would get it, I would call it, yes. "Distributed" is  
10:34:28 25 another way of putting it, but they would necessarily get it  
26 through their embassies accredited near the capital of Monrovia.

27 Q. So would, for example, President Kabbah have had sight of  
28 this document?

29 A. Definitely. Definitely.

1 Q. And the other matter I wanted to ask you about is this.  
2 Two of the topics discussed during the course of this visit by  
3 President Obasanjo was: Firstly, the destruction of the arms  
4 collected during the disarmament process in Liberia, and  
10:35:07 5 secondly, the need to resolve conflicts and not support conflict  
6 in the sub-region, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, as you've indicated earlier, Mr Taylor, following the  
9 destruction of the arms in August of - beginning in July of 1999  
10:35:31 10 Liberia was invaded from Guinea, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And you have indicated to us on more than one occasion that  
13 you perceive some sinister design behind the correlation of those  
14 two events, yes?

10:35:50 15 A. Definitely, yes.

16 Q. Now help us. During the course of this meeting with  
17 President Obasanjo, did he suggest to you any perception of such  
18 a sinister motive behind the destruction of the weapons by  
19 Liberia?

10:36:05 20 A. No, no, he did not. If we put some little meat on this,  
21 counsel, remember now Obasanjo is just coming in and he's not in  
22 office very long. He's just coming into the picture and he's now  
23 trying to really get his feet wet, so to speak, by getting  
24 acquainted with the issues. I think this is the one of the main  
10:36:29 25 reasons why he rushes to Monrovia. He is in office, what? I  
26 think April/May or thereabouts, and so he comes down. So he's  
27 not really, I think, fully briefed on all of the issues and would  
28 not necessarily know about any sinister move.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we move on can I ask, please, that

1 that joint communique following the visit of President Obasanjo  
2 to Liberia on 25 June 1999 be marked for identification MFI-253,  
3 please.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-253.

10:37:27

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, as I've already indicated, one of the  
7 themes running through '99 is the destruction of the weapons?

8 A. Yes.

10:37:58

9 Q. Now, in July of 1999 did you have cause to meet with the  
10 Secretary-General of the United Nations?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And what was the purpose of that meeting?

10:38:21

13 A. Well, immediately following the signing of the Lome  
14 agreement on Sierra Leone, which occurred around 7 July. On 8  
15 July the Secretary-General paid a one-day visit to Liberia and  
16 met with me in Monrovia.

17 Q. So did that involve you rushing back from Lome for that  
18 meeting?

19 A. Yes, it did.

10:38:37

20 Q. And what topic was discussed between you both?

10:39:01

21 A. Well, the whole peace process in Sierra Leone, the  
22 agreement that had just been signed in Lome. He had just come -  
23 in fact, he came through Freetown on to Monrovia, where we  
24 discussed - in fact, President Kabbah apparently too had to rush  
25 back to meet with Secretary-General Annan. And so we talked  
26 about the tough time that we had in Lome in getting the  
27 agreement, and also he commented on President Kabbah's own  
28 impression of my own contribution during those discussions. So  
29 it basically settled around Lome and the peace agreement.

1 Q. Right. Could you have a look behind divider 33 in that  
2 volume, please. Now, again a particular document, a code cable,  
3 which attaches a note of the Secretary-General's meeting with  
4 you, yes?

10:40:00 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And if we go over the page to the second page behind that  
7 divider, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. We see that we have here a note of the Secretary-General's  
10:40:17 10 meeting with you in Monrovia on 8 July 1999 at 4.35 p.m. Is that  
11 right?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Present at that meeting was the Secretary-General. Remind  
14 us: Mr Fall, who is he?

10:40:38 15 A. Fall is Assistant Secretary-General from Senegal.

16 Q. Mr Downes-Thomas, who we've become acquainted with.  
17 Ms Lindenmayer, who's that?

18 A. This - she was present. She appeared to be something like  
19 a close personal assistant to the Secretary-General. She took  
10:41:05 20 notes during the meeting.

21 Q. And Eckhard?

22 A. Yes, an official of the United Nations.

23 Q. And Mr Amdur?

24 A. I don't know him, but he was present.

10:41:12 25 Q. And also we see you were present with miscellaneous  
26 officials, yes?

27 A. Yes, that is correct.

28 Q. "Summary.

29 The discussion focused on the peace agreement in Sierra

1 Leone and the consolidation of peace in Liberia. President  
2 Taylor stressed the need for the Secretary-General to do all he  
3 could to solicit international assistance for Liberia.

4 Discussion.

10:41:42 5 President Taylor welcomed the Secretary-General saying it  
6 was a good time to be in the sub-region. Africa was entering the  
7 new millennium blessed with an African as head of the United  
8 Nations and as head of the Commonwealth. It was good that the  
9 Secretary-General had come to Liberia just after the signing of  
10:42:02 10 the peace agreement in Lome. Under tough conditions, an  
11 agreement had been pulled together. Now that there was peace,  
12 Liberia would strongly advise Mr Sankoh to return to Freetown and  
13 establish himself there rather than in Abuja. Liberia would be  
14 naming a career ambassador to stay on top of the situation and  
10:42:32 15 would send a high-power delegation to President Kabbah to discuss  
16 security aspects, such as setting up a hotline between himself  
17 and the President. Liberia would do everything to make this  
18 process work."

19 Now, did such a high-powered delegation go to Sierra Leone,  
10:42:55 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Comprising?

23 A. That delegation comprised the late former Liberian  
24 Secretary of State D Musuleng-Cooper.

10:43:16 25 Q. Was the hotline, was it set up?

26 A. Well, not "hot" as you would know in other countries, but  
27 we established regular communication. That's what we're  
28 referring to here.

29 Q. "President Taylor noted that there were still different

1 perceptions about the methods used to deal with problems but 'no  
2 leader on the planet would any longer support any form of  
3 atrocities'. Liberia had condemned such practices in Sierra  
4 Leone. Sierra Leone had opted for peace. The sub-region had  
10:43:52 5 gone to a great extent to support peace. Those instructed by  
6 ECOWAS to find peace had found it. Now the region expected the  
7 international community to respect its wishes. There was great  
8 concern that the international community would not support the  
9 process officially and would also engage in unofficial activities  
10:44:17 10 that would undermine the process. It was best not to say any  
11 more but to leave it at that."

12 Well, I'd like you to say a bit more about that, please.  
13 What were you hinting at there?

14 A. The 7 July agreement in Lome was backed by ECOWAS 100 per  
10:44:44 15 cent, was backed by the OAU, the AU that was present, it had its  
16 representatives there. And all of the Heads of State at that  
17 meeting left with the impression that members of the  
18 "international community", mostly western countries, did not like  
19 certain aspects of that agreement and hinted to us that they  
10:45:06 20 would work against it. One involved the amnesty that was granted  
21 to participants of the war and some other aspects as to the  
22 position in government, they did not support it, and all of the  
23 Heads of State knew that we would be running into some subsequent  
24 problems from those members of the international community, so to  
10:45:33 25 speak.

26 Q. And so you informed the Secretary-General of that, did you?

27 A. Right away. This is the next day, and I'm sure other  
28 leaders that he met may have hinted this to him also.

29 Q. Over the page:

1 "President Taylor praised the excellent job being carried  
2 out by the United Nations peace building support office in  
3 Liberia. Mr Downes-Thomas was in a tough position, having to  
4 work so closely with the government. President Taylor stressed  
10:46:07 5 that Mr Downes-Thomas was very effective in getting his points  
6 across in private, instead of running to the media."

7 Was that true?

8 A. That was true.

9 Q. "President Taylor informed the Secretary-General that  
10:46:25 10 Liberia was moving forward towards destruction of the weapons  
11 that had been collected. He had studied the report and would  
12 accept the recommendations in area 1. Cambodia, with its few  
13 arms, and Mali, with its good show, had gotten significant  
14 international attention and support with the destruction of arms  
10:46:51 15 used in those conflicts. What Liberia was about to do would be  
16 ten times larger and the country wanted its share of the  
17 limelight."

18 It's share of the limelight, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes. Yes, limelight, but, I mean, he understood what we  
10:47:14 20 were talking about.

21 Q. Which was?

22 A. Recognition of what had happened. This is why we talk  
23 about limelight, because it is through this wide publication of  
24 this process that would encourage other members of the  
10:47:29 25 international community to take Liberia seriously and come in and  
26 assist us. It was not just a matter, "Oh, guess what, we burnt  
27 some arms." But through this process, they would see the  
28 seriousness that we attached to peace and stability and this  
29 would be an encouragement to helping us.



1 Q. "Overall, with peace in Sierra Leone, the destruction of  
2 weapons in Liberia and a resolution of the Roosevelt Johnson  
3 case, this would help the Secretary-General's office solicit  
4 contributions from the international community. By the grace of  
10:48:04 5 God, there had not been a collapse in the process. The notion  
6 that withholding aid would enhance the democratic process was  
7 foolish. It was possible that if he had not been elected,  
8 Liberia would have gone up in smoke. He wanted the  
9 Secretary-General to do everything he could to help. Liberia was  
10:48:28 10 receiving no direct government-to-government assistance. NGOs  
11 were providing some aid. And while this was helpful, it was also  
12 true that NGOs sometimes unknowingly got involved in political  
13 matters, and that was unacceptable. But as was said in Africa, a  
14 beggar did not have many choices.

10:48:53 15 President Taylor said he would visit New York in September  
16 for his 'few minutes at the podium' of the General Assembly. He  
17 reiterated that he was happy to welcome the Secretary-General to  
18 Liberia and thankful to God that all was well for the moment.

19 The Secretary-General thanked President Taylor for  
10:49:18 20 receiving him and for this opportunity to see the progress being  
21 made in Liberia. He had always maintained that for Africa to  
22 develop, it was necessary to resolve its conflicts. Nations  
23 needed to create an environment that would attract investment.  
24 All his efforts - his contacts with the private sector, his  
10:49:42 25 report to the Security Council on conflict and development - were  
26 geared toward this end.

27 With respect to the agreement signed in Lome, it was good  
28 that everyone had pooled their efforts. President Kabbah was  
29 grateful to President Taylor for his efforts, as well as those of

1 President Obasanjo and Eyadema and all others involved."

2 Pause. Now, before coming to Liberia on 8 July, where had  
3 the Secretary-General been?

4 A. He came from Freetown.

10:50:23 5 Q. And as far as you're aware, who had he met in Freetown?

6 A. President Kabbah.

7 Q. And so this meeting with you, does it follow hot on the  
8 heels of that meeting with Kabbah?

9 A. Yes, it does.

10:50:44 10 Q. And he's conveying to you, is he not, that President Kabbah  
11 is grateful to you for your efforts, that's in Lome; is that  
12 right?

13 A. That is right.

14 Q. "Collective pressure was critical in such situations. The  
10:51:03 15 parties involved had to be shown they had nowhere else to turn.  
16 The Secretary-General pledged to try to get the international  
17 community to support the economic development of the region.  
18 Hopefully, the spirit of Lome could be sustained in the years to  
19 come. For example, Liberia could help resuscitate the Mano River  
10:51:30 20 process. The three relevant Presidents might want to consider  
21 meeting periodically, even without an agenda, simply to talk.  
22 This would help suspicions melt away.

23 With respect to the destruction of weapons used in the  
24 Liberian conflict, the Secretary-General said this was a good  
10:51:59 25 decision that would send a powerful message to the region. The  
26 United Nations would help Liberia get its day in the sun.

27 With respect to assistance from the international  
28 community, the Secretary-General agreed with President Taylor  
29 that the international community had been slow to respond. In

1 some cases, the international community had approaches that were  
2 not appropriate, in particular for countries emerging from  
3 conflict. For example, after the massacres in Rwanda, there was  
4 a problem with the disbursement of \$15 billion from the World  
10:52:42 5 Bank because of the country's debts. Today there was a need to  
6 be more flexible and the Bretton Woods institutions, as a result  
7 of the Asian crisis, were getting the message, making it possible  
8 to engage them more honestly. Mr Camdessus and Mr Wolfensohn  
9 were good personal friends and the Secretary-General general  
10:53:06 10 pledged to do what he could in an environment in which the donor  
11 community was being much more stingy. President Taylor noted  
12 that Kosovo was not helping. The Secretary-General said donors  
13 had promised not to divert funds to Kosovo, but one could never  
14 be sure. Donors looked at the total amount of their foreign aid,  
10:53:32 15 forgetting that large portions of that aid went to only a few  
16 countries. As for the United Nations agencies and UNOL would  
17 continue their support. He had stressed to the agencies that  
18 none of them had a programme in Liberia, rather the government  
19 had a programme and the United Nations was there to help. That  
10:53:56 20 was the spirit of United Nations reform. A commitment to working  
21 together would continue to underpin the organisation's ongoing  
22 support for Liberia."

23 Then we see under follow-up action that the DPKO, DPA, DDA  
24 and OCHA were to be informed about Liberia's decision to destroy  
10:54:24 25 the weapons and to discuss assistance to Liberia with the World  
26 Bank and the IMF. And, Mr Taylor, in due course, did the  
27 Secretary-General make contact with the World Bank and the IMF on  
28 Liberia's behalf?

29 A. Yes, subsequent to this, he wrote the World Bank,

1 Wolfensohn and Camdessus of the IMF. He did write them.

2 Q. He did write to them?

3 A. He did.

10:55:40

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, Mr President, that that  
5 note of the Secretary-General's meeting with President Taylor  
6 held in Monrovia on 8 July 1999 be marked for identification,  
7 please, MFI-254.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI-254.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

10:55:59

10 Q. Now, thereafter, Mr Taylor, in July, as you've earlier  
11 mentioned to us, the destruction of the arms and ammunition  
12 collected during disarmament began, did it not?

13 A. Yes, it did.

14 Q. And did it begin on 26 July, Independence Day?

10:56:27

15 A. Yes, it did.

16 Q. And on the following day, did you receive any communication  
17 in respect of that decision?

18 A. Yes. On 27 July, we received a letter from the

10:56:49

19 Secretary-General thanking us for carrying out the symbolic  
20 burning of the first batch of arms and he thanked us for those  
21 actions.

22 Q. Have a look behind divider 42 in that same bundle, please.

23 Now, we see that the letter is dated 23 July 1999 and it reads as  
24 follows:

10:57:55

25 "Excellency, I should like to extend my profound  
26 congratulations on the destruction of weapons and ammunition  
27 which is underway in Monrovia. Allow me also to congratulate you  
28 on celebrating the 152nd anniversary of Liberian independence in  
29 such a memorable and visionary way.

1 The active participation of the United Nations in the  
2 actual destruction of these weapons, and the presence of many  
3 Heads of State and government representatives at this ceremony,  
4 symbolise the international community's support for your act of  
10:58:38 5 statesmanship in ordering the disposal of the weapons. This  
6 decision also represents an important step towards curbing the  
7 proliferation of small arms in the region, and it is a clear  
8 expression of your determination to move the country towards  
9 reconstruction.

10:58:51 10 As you told the participants in the ceremony, Liberians  
11 desire to close the recent dark period of national tragedy.  
12 Please be assured that the United Nations will continue to assist  
13 you in fulfilling that wish so that peace and stability can  
14 return to a country and region whose people have endured  
10:59:12 15 suffering and hardship for too long."

16 And the usual salutations follow.

17 Could I ask, please, Mr President, that that letter from  
18 the Secretary-General of the United Nations to President Taylor  
19 congratulating him on the commencement of the destruction of  
10:59:36 20 weapons and ammunition dated 27 July 1999 be marked for  
21 identification MFI-255, please.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked for  
23 identification MFI-255.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:00:00 25 Q. Now thereafter, Mr Taylor, did the destruction of the  
26 weapons continue?

27 A. Yes, most of the month of August. The team was involved in  
28 the destruction of the weapons throughout the month of August.

29 Q. Yes. And did you continue to liaise with the United

1 Nations in that regard?

2 A. Yes, we did. Responsible for this process in Liberia was  
3 the special representative, and I think this is one of the months  
4 that he sent probably more coded messages than anything. Because  
11:00:42 5 every day or every other day that destructions were carried out,  
6 he would file reports with the United Nations and we would be  
7 supplied copies of those reports on a daily - or maybe every  
8 other - skip day or two of destruction because there were several  
9 - the entire month - I can say maybe about six, seven, eight  
11:01:11 10 different times during that month there were large amounts of  
11 destruction, and memos followed every destruction.

12 Q. Yes. Have a look behind divider 34, please, the next  
13 divider.

14 A. 34?

11:01:34 15 Q. Sorry, 34. My fault. Do we have it, 34?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What we see here, Mr Taylor, is a code cable dated 12 July  
18 1999 attaching a letter from your Foreign Minister, yes?

19 A. Yes.

11:02:05 20 Q. Let's have a look at the letter quickly, please:

21 "12 July 1999. Mr Secretary-General, I am pleased to  
22 present my compliments and to express the gratitude of the  
23 Government of the Republic of Liberia for your timely response to  
24 our request for technical assist for the destruction of arms and  
11:02:35 25 ammunition collected during the disarmament process in Liberia.

26 As you are aware, a tripartite committee constituting the  
27 Government of Liberia, ECOWAS and the United Nations has worked  
28 out the modalities for the implementation of the government's  
29 decision for the destruction of the arms. The committee has

1 submitted a report which includes the technical details for the  
2 method of destruction, a programme, and a budget.

3 Considering government's present financial position and its  
4 desire to complete the destruction by 26 July, the Government of  
11:03:10 5 Liberia wishes to request that the United Nations provide, or  
6 seek funding, for the implementation of the destruction exercise.  
7 Copies of the relevant reports have been made available to the  
8 United Nations peace building office in Liberia."

9 And that is signed by your --

11:03:31 10 A. Foreign Minister.

11 Q. By your Foreign Minister, yes?

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, could I ask, please, that that letter  
14 dated 12 July 1999 from Monie Captan to the Secretary-General be  
11:04:02 15 marked for identification MFI-256.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI-256.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you will recall that following that meeting  
19 you held with Kofi Annan on 8 July, amongst the follow-up actions  
11:04:36 20 discussed was that the Secretary-General would discuss assistance  
21 to Liberia with the World Bank and the IMF. Do you remember  
22 that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. And you will recall in those notes mention being made of  
11:05:00 25 Mr Camdessus and Mr Wolfensohn, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Who are they?

28 A. Wolfensohn was the President of the World Bank, and  
29 Camdessus the International Monetary Fund.

1 Q. Now, did the Secretary-General make good on that promise?

2 A. Yes, he wrote both agencies requesting assistance for  
3 Liberia.

11:05:44

4 Q. Have a look behind divider 44, please. What do we see  
5 there, Mr Taylor?

6 A. This is the letter from the Secretary-General to Michel  
7 Camdessus.

8 Q. And he's the managing director of the IMF?

9 A. That is correct.

11:05:55

10 Q. And it's dated 30 July --

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm sorry, yes, Ms Hollis.

12 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Mr President. Perhaps we could find  
13 out if this is part of the accused's archives. It doesn't appear  
14 to be sent to him and he doesn't appear to be cc'd on this. So  
15 in order to establish even the lower level of foundation, we  
16 don't think that's been done yet.

11:06:19

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, do you wish to reply to that  
18 objection, Mr Griffiths?

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I'll deal with the matter through the  
20 witness:

11:06:34

21 Q. Mr Taylor, where has this letter come from?

22 A. This letter was supplied to us by the Office of the Special  
23 Representative of the Secretary-General to Liberia following the  
24 Secretary-General's promise in our discussions on 8 July that he  
25 would pursue this. We were given copies of the two letters that  
26 had been sent, both to the World Bank and the IMF, in recognition  
27 of the fact that the Secretary-General had fulfilled his promise  
28 to my government.

11:06:52

29 Q. Now, just so that we're clear, at a meeting between you and



1 the Secretary-General on 8 July he mentioned by name two  
2 individuals he would be writing to on your behalf, did he not?

3 A. Yes, he did.

4 Q. He mentioned Mr Michel Camdessus, did he not?

11:07:31 5 A. He did.

6 Q. And he mentioned Mr Wolfensohn, did he not?

7 A. He did.

8 Q. And he indicated that the purpose of him writing would be  
9 to seek assistance for Liberia?

11:07:42 10 A. For Liberia, yes.

11 Q. Yes. That being the case, Mr Taylor, did it surprise you  
12 when you were provided with copies of those letters by the United  
13 Nations?

14 A. No, it did not.

11:07:53 15 Q. Let's have a look at the letter behind divider 44, shall  
16 we. Now, we see it bears the letterhead of the  
17 Secretary-General. It is dated 30 July 1999 and it is addressed  
18 to Mr Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International  
19 Monetary Fund, Washington, DC:

11:08:31 20 "Dear Michel, I'm writing to you with some thoughts and  
21 proposals arising from the experience of my recent visit to West  
22 Africa.

23 I need not remind you of how complex the task of  
24 post-conflict peace building can be and how daunting it can seem  
11:08:50 25 to those who must carry it out. The challenges involved -  
26 including the disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration  
27 of combatants; the rehabilitation of infrastructure; the creation  
28 of democratic institutions; and reconciliation among former  
29 antagonists, often following terrible communal violence - all

1 require substantial resources and intricate synchronisation.  
2 Each element affects the other, for good and bad, and the process  
3 is extremely fragile, much more difficult than waging war.

4 I believe that it is the responsibility of the United  
11:09:38 5 Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, to  
6 strongly support the good faith efforts of peoples and nations to  
7 resolve conflicts and restore stability to their societies. Such  
8 efforts are now being undertaken in Liberia and Sierra Leone,  
9 which are among the countries I have just visited. Their poverty  
11:10:05 10 is evident on nearly every street. But even more apparent, the  
11 faces of the people who looked to me help revealed their dignity  
12 and hopes for lasting peace. We must respond, in the time  
13 honoured tradition of the International Monetary Fund and the  
14 United Nations, in a spirit of solidarity, recognising that such  
11:10:30 15 countries cannot make their way of dire straits on their own.

16 I consider that it would be valuable to set up a group  
17 comprising the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and  
18 the United Nations Development Group to study how best we can be  
19 more supportive of countries such as Sierra Leone that are  
11:10:52 20 emerging from conflict. We should at the same time assist  
21 countries like Guinea, which become flooded with refugees as a  
22 result of instability in the region.

23 I am concerned that without the kind of financial and  
24 organisational support which organisations like ours can bring to  
11:11:10 25 bear on such situations, fragile peace may be threatened and  
26 attempts to achieve stability might falter. I believe that it  
27 should be possible to develop a way of assisting such countries  
28 in a flexible and creative manner. Specifically we might want to  
29 consider organising a meeting of the United Nations Development

1 Group, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to  
2 explore how we can bring into our plans and programmes greater  
3 flexibility for countries in such situations in Africa and  
4 elsewhere. The lack of international funding can slow the pace  
11:11:58 5 of post-conflict peace building, and yet the slow pace of  
6 post-conflict peace building is often cited as a reason to  
7 withhold or delay international funding.

8 Finally, we might also discuss cooperation between the  
9 BWIs" - what's that, Mr Taylor?

11:12:20 10 A. Bretton Woods institutions.

11 Q. "- and the United Nations system in specific programme  
12 areas, such as demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration.  
13 Macro-economic questions are closely linked to such specific  
14 programme issues, and it is crucial that we do not permit a gap  
11:12:38 15 to develop between them.

16 It would be tragic indeed if we did not take advantage of  
17 the current momentum, when some very important steps are being  
18 made towards peace and stability in West Africa. The return to  
19 civilian rule in Nigeria, the peace agreement for Sierra Leone,  
11:13:01 20 the consolidation of peace in Liberia - each of these cases shows  
21 that African leaders and their peoples are taking responsibility  
22 for the well-being of their societies, as we have often called on  
23 them to do. As they fulfil their obligations, I look forward to  
24 exploring with you how we can fulfil ours."

11:13:37 25 Now, if we go behind the next divider, Mr Taylor, we'll see  
26 that the Secretary-General wrote in the same terms - in identical  
27 terms, in fact - on the same date to Mr James D Wolfensohn,  
28 President of the World Bank, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now tell us, Mr Taylor, did those entreaties on your behalf  
2 by the Secretary-General bear fruit?

3 A. Yes, it did bear some fruits later.

4 Q. What fruits?

11:14:14 5 A. A donors' conference was organised on behalf of Liberia  
6 where donor countries met and promised assistance to the country.

7 Q. Did it materialise?

8 A. These are conferences - not - a few countries did, but not  
9 in terms of direct assistance. What they did was to fund  
11:14:44 10 non-governmental organisations and other agencies, but no direct  
11 assistance to government. But we considered that some form of  
12 adherence to their promises.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I inquire, I did mark for  
14 identification that code cable attaching the letter from the  
11:15:10 15 Foreign Minister Monie Captan, didn't I?

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I now ask then, please, bearing in mind  
18 that these two letters are in identical terms, that they be  
19 marked for identification MFI-257A and B.

11:15:28 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those two letters are marked for  
21 identification MFI-257A and B respectively.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just getting back to your previous  
24 question about the code cable, the letter was marked.

11:15:56 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm not asking for the code cable to be  
26 marked, just the letter.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's what I thought, yes.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let us - we've already discussed on more

1 than one occasion the ongoing communications between your  
2 government and the United Nations regarding the destruction of  
3 those arms and ammunition, yes?

4 A. That is correct, yes.

11:16:32 5 Q. Now, were the United Nations provided with progress reports  
6 as to the development of that process?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And who provided them with such progress reports?

9 A. The special representative of the Secretary-General.

11:16:53 10 Q. Have a look behind divider 46, please. Yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. Let's look at these documents together. The first  
13 document is an outgoing fax, is that right?

14 A. That is correct.

11:17:24 15 Q. Dated 2 August 1999?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Addressed to Mr Downes-Thomas?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Yes?

11:17:31 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And you see it's copied to Joshi, UNOMSIL, Freetown. Who's  
22 he?

23 A. He's - as it says here, he's a UNOMSIL officer in Freetown.

24 Q. And we see that the request is:

11:17:51 25 "Please update on how far the military small arms technical  
26 experts have gone in their work and also indicate when they are  
27 likely to finish and leave Liberia. We require this information  
28 as soon as possible."

29 Let's go over the page. That's followed by a note from

1 Elizabeth Lindenmayer, who had been present at that meeting on 8  
2 July, if you recall?

3 A. That is correct.

11:18:34

4 Q. "The Secretary-General has seen the information which  
5 Mr Downes-Thomas has sent you regarding the progress in the  
6 destruction of weapons in Liberia. He has also noted that  
7 equipment has been requested from FALD to complete the process."

8 Can you help us with "FALD"?

11:18:56

9 A. I think he may be referring here to Fall. I don't know why  
10 he said F-A-L-D.

11 Q. "The Secretary-General would be grateful if you could  
12 indicate to him: (1), the estimated time required to complete  
13 the process; and (2), the estimated date of completion, taking  
14 into account the time required to obtain and deliver the  
15 necessary equipment.

11:19:15

16 As you know, the Secretary-General attaches great  
17 importance to this process and does not wish it to drag on. We  
18 would like everything to be done to expedite it and wishes to be  
19 kept closely informed of developments in the area."

11:19:32

20 Over the page, please. And we see overleaf another code  
21 available from the United Nations special representative in  
22 Monrovia, Mr Downes-Thomas, to United Nations headquarters in New  
23 York. "Subject: Destruction of weapons". Then we see:

11:20:09

24 "Please be informed that as of 31 July, progress on the  
25 destruction of weapons is as follows:

26 Small arms destroyed by burning, 1,500

27 Small arms destroyed by cutting machine, 2,000

28 Small arms disabled/destroyed mechanically, 2,500

29 Heavy machine guns, multi-launcher rockets systems

1 destroyed by gas cutting, 500

2 So a total number of weapons destroyed, 6,500

3 Progress on destruction of small arms ammunition by  
4 burning.

11:20:53 5 Number of rounds destroyed on:

6 25 July, 65,680

7 27 July, 150,000

8 28 July, 291,080

9 30 July, 257,370

11:21:24 10 31 July, 227,720

11 Total number of rounds destroyed - 991,850

12 And the revised estimates of the total number of arms and  
13 ammunitions to be destroyed follow:

14 18,000 small arms

11:21:45 15 1,000 mortar and heavy machine guns

16 3 million rounds

17 FALD has been advised that in connection with the  
18 destruction of arms, the following are needed urgently: "

19 Including plastic explosive, detonation cord, safety fuses,

11:22:05 20 electric detonators, non-electric detonators, cap blasting

21 machine or exploding Dynamo condenser, and various other such  
22 material.

23 Mr President, could I ask, please, that those documents be  
24 marked for one identification number, given that they all relate  
11:22:49 25 to the same topic, so they would become MFI-258, and can we call  
26 it progress report on arms destruction dated 2 August 1999.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, those documents as described are  
28 marked for identification MFI-258.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, earlier in your testimony you had told us  
2 about your efforts to bring together Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday  
3 Sankoh following the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement, yes?

4 A. Yes.

11:24:51 5 Q. Now, was that a matter that you discussed with the  
6 Secretary-General of the United Nations?

7 A. Yes, I did discuss that with the Secretary-General.

8 Q. Why?

9 A. Well, the full context of this is in September to be exact  
11:25:19 10 following the situation in August - in August really, the  
11 situation at Okra Hills in Sierra Leone, we finally succeed in  
12 bringing Johnny Paul Koroma into Liberia in terms of exchanging  
13 him with the hostages that the West Side Boys had taken.

14 Now, following the Lome agreement in July Foday Sankoh  
11:25:52 15 moves around a little bit, but he ends up in Liberia in September  
16 while Johnny Paul Koroma is already in Liberia.

17 Now, the committee is working with me on this matter, but  
18 we also have the United Nations engaged in this process and so  
19 upon the arrival of Foday Sankoh in Monrovia following the Lome  
11:26:17 20 agreement and the bringing in of Johnny Paul Koroma I called the  
21 Secretary-General to encourage the United Nations to even be more  
22 involved in this process as I was working with these two men to  
23 bring peace between them in line with our colleagues in ECOWAS  
24 that I wanted him to - I wanted the United Nations involved in  
11:26:43 25 this process in being able to get these men together and move  
26 them on to Freetown.

27 So I called the Secretary-General and we had a discussion  
28 on this and that discussion was, as all discussions on telephone,  
29 were noted and sent back to me where I requested the



1 Secretary-General to be involved in this process, the United  
2 Nations should stay engaged in this process of getting Foday  
3 Sankoh back to Freetown along with Johnny Paul Koroma and not  
4 just leave it with ECOWAS.

11:27:16 5 Q. And you say notes were made of that conversation?

6 A. Definitely, by the Secretary-General's office and, because  
7 the conversation was between us, we were provided copies of the  
8 conversational notes between he and myself.

9 Q. Have a look behind divider 51.

11:27:44 10 Whilst we're doing that, Mr President, can I assist to this  
11 extent: FALD, Field Administration and Logistics Division of the  
12 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:28:07 15 Q. What are we looking at here, Mr Taylor?

16 A. These are the summary notes of the conversation between the  
17 Secretary-General and myself upon the arrival of Foday Sankoh in  
18 Monrovia.

19 Q. Now we see it's headed "Notes of the Secretary-General's  
11:28:23 20 telephone conversation with the President of Liberia" timed at  
21 1.15 p.m. on Thursday 30 September 1999:

22 "Sierra Leone. Summary. President Taylor sought United  
23 Nations involvement in the return to Sierra Leone of Foday Sankoh  
24 and Johnny Paul Koroma on 2 to 3 October. The Secretary-General  
11:28:47 25 replied that he would consult his colleagues and revert to  
26 President Taylor, possibly through Mr Downes-Thomas."

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps before you reach the discussion  
28 part of these notes we'll take the morning adjournment and we'll  
29 resume at 12 o'clock.

1 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

2 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

12:01:41 5 Q. Mr Taylor, we were looking at the document behind divider  
6 51 before we adjourned.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And just to remind ourselves, these are notes of a  
9 conversation held on Thursday 30 September 1999, a telephone  
12:02:11 10 conversation between yourself and the Secretary-General Kofi  
11 Annan?

12 A. Yes. That is correct.

13 Q. And we had just reached the subheading "Discussion":

14 "President Taylor reported substantial progress on  
12:02:28 15 Sierra Leone. He had now brought Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday  
16 Sankoh together in Monrovia and all the arrangements were set for  
17 their departure for Freetown. Their families would not be  
18 transported with them and would move directly from their current  
19 locations to Freetown, rather than travelling via Monrovia.

12:02:53 20 President Taylor believed that it was time that the  
21 international community became involved in the process of seeing  
22 them off to Sierra Leone. They were ready to fly in 48 to 72  
23 hours, that is, on Saturday the 2nd or Sunday the 3rd October.  
24 President Taylor had spoken to the chairman of ECOWAS and had  
12:03:18 25 asked that the ECOWAS executive secretary be present. President  
26 Eyadema of Togo would send his Defence or Foreign Minister to  
27 Monrovia. Since the United Nations had been involved in  
28 transporting Foday Sankoh from Freetown to Lome, it should be  
29 part of the group which would convey him and Johnny Paul Koroma

1 back to Freetown."

2 Now, pausing there. Just to deal with a couple of matters,  
3 Mr Taylor. Why did you consider it important for the  
4 international community to become involved in the process of  
12:03:55 5 seeing them off? That's a fairly straightforward thing, so why  
6 was it necessary for the international community to be involved?

7 A. Well, these were discussions amongst all of us on the  
8 Committee of Six that - remember now I'm not acting on my own.  
9 We've discussed that as mediator I should do everything that I  
12:04:22 10 can to keep the UN engaged, because as soon as they disengage  
11 then probably you run into problems. To keep them engaged and  
12 this is why I called him and kept his special representative on  
13 the ground engaged to make sure that if we had to call upon the  
14 UN system for any additional help it would not be a question of,  
12:04:45 15 "Oh, we didn't know what you guys were doing in ECOWAS."

16 Q. Now we've also looked at, have we not, the United States'  
17 involvement in the transporting of Foday Sankoh to Lome. We  
18 looked at that yesterday, do you recall?

19 A. The United Nations, you mean.

12:05:06 20 Q. Involving in transporting Foday Sankoh from Freetown to  
21 Lome, we discussed that yesterday?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Over the page, please:

24 "In response to a question from the Secretary-General,  
12:05:24 25 President Taylor said that he had not yet spoken directly to  
26 President Obasanjo, although he was on board with the plan.  
27 President Taylor would ask him to make an aircraft available; it  
28 could possibly fly via Lome to collect the Togolese Defence  
29 Minister, then stop in Monrovia en route to Freetown.

1 President Taylor had been in frequent telephone contact with  
2 President Kabbah, who was completely involved in the plan."

3 Is that true?

4 A. That's 100 per cent true, yes.

12:06:05 5 Q. So let us put all of this together then, shall we.

6 According to this note, Mr Taylor, the Secretary-General knows  
7 about this?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. President Obasanjo knows about this?

12:06:18 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. President Kabbah knows about this?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. By inference, the ECOWAS executive secretary knows about  
14 this?

12:06:30 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. President Eyadema of Togo knows about this?

17 A. He's the chairman, yes.

18 Q. "The Secretary-General said that he would consult his  
19 advisers and get back to President Taylor either directly or  
12:06:48 20 through Mr Downes-Thomas."

21 Did he get back to you?

22 A. Yes, through Downes-Thomas.

23 Q. To say what?

24 A. That - in fact what he did was, he authorised Downes-Thomas  
12:07:03 25 to accompany Foday Sankoh to Freetown as part of the UN's  
26 involvement.

27 Q. And did Downes-Thomas accompany them to Freetown?

28 A. Yes, he was on board the plane, yes.

29 Q. "The Secretary-General expressed regret that

1 President Taylor had not been able to attend the General  
2 Assembly. President Taylor explained that this would have been  
3 too expensive. He hoped that now that the situation in  
4 Sierra Leone was being brought under control, it would be  
12:07:43 5 possible for the sanctions on Liberia to be removed. The  
6 Secretary-General said that the United Nations would work with  
7 President Taylor on this."

8 Now, before we complete this, looking at this document,  
9 Mr Taylor, you will recall that the notes of the conversation or  
12:08:13 10 the meeting you had with the Secretary-General on 8 July  
11 concluded with some follow-up remarks. Do you remember that?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Which included, for example, an expressed intent on the  
14 part of the Secretary-General to contact the IMF and the World  
12:08:34 15 Bank on behalf of Liberia?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. I mention that for this reason: You will see here in this  
18 note, under the follow-up section, handwritten redacted internal  
19 decision-making processes, yes?

12:08:52 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What's that about?

22 A. Well, the general discussions were on the IMF and World  
23 Bank, but the mechanism - there are some other mechanisms that  
24 were not for public consumption that were not included in this  
12:09:10 25 particular telephone conversation. Some little personal things  
26 that you talk about that are not official are not part of this.

27 Q. I see. So that has been edited, has it?

28 A. That is correct.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, Mr President, that this

1 note of a telephone conversation between the Secretary-General of  
2 the United Nations and President Taylor, dated Thursday 30  
3 September 1999, be marked for identification MFI-259, please.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, marked MFI-259.

12:10:02 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, can you help us with this: Roughly when  
7 did the process of the destruction of the arms and ammunition  
8 collected during the demobilisation and disarmament process in  
9 Liberia - when did that conclude, roughly?

12:10:30 10 A. The official conclusion date - and I'm saying official  
11 because even though there were little things going - was in  
12 October when the official date was announced as the end of the  
13 destruction period. In October of 1999, that was the official  
14 date, even though minor things were still going on, but that was  
12:10:56 15 the official date. It was announced in Monrovia, it was  
16 announced - in fact there was an official statement from New  
17 York, the United Nations, commemorating this end to the process  
18 of destruction.

19 Q. Now, how do you know that there was an official statement  
12:11:15 20 from New York?

21 A. It concerns Liberia, we were provided a copy of the  
22 official statement from New York by the special representative of  
23 the Secretary-General concerning the arms that were being  
24 destroyed by Liberia.

12:11:31 25 Q. And did you have a copy of that document in your archives?

26 A. I did have a copy.

27 Q. Have a look behind divider 53, please. Do you have the  
28 document?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. Turn to the second page of that document, please. Do we  
2 see there "Statement attributable to the spokesman of the  
3 Secretary-General"?

4 A. That is correct.

12:12:08 5 Q. "Weapons disposal in Liberia.

6 The Secretary-General warmly welcomes the successful  
7 completion, today" - and we see the date is 18 October 1999 - "of  
8 the weapons destruction programme in Liberia.

9 The exercise which begun on 25 July has involved the  
12:12:28 10 destruction of over 19,000 small and heavy calibre weapons and  
11 more than 3 million rounds of ammunition collected by the  
12 United Nations and ECOMOG during the disarmament exercise of 1996  
13 to 1997.

14 The Secretary-General strongly believes that the weapons  
12:12:49 15 disposal in Liberia represents an important step towards curbing  
16 the dangerous proliferation of weapons in West Africa and towards  
17 enhancing confidence and cooperation among the countries and  
18 peoples of the region.

19 The Secretary-General expresses deep appreciation to all  
12:13:10 20 those who worked closely and tirelessly together to ensure the  
21 successful completion of this milestone exercise, in particular  
22 the Government of Liberia under the leadership of  
23 President Taylor, the Economic Community of West African States  
24 (ECOWAS), and its monitoring group ECOMOG, the United Nations  
12:13:35 25 community, as well as those member states which provided the much  
26 needed financial assistance."

27 Now, can I ask, please, that that statement attributable  
28 to the spokesman of the Secretary-General on weapons disposal in  
29 Liberia, dated 18 October 1999, be marked for identification

1 MFI -260, please.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Marked MFI -260.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

12:14:29

4 Q. Right. Now, we are going to move on to a different subject  
5 now, Mr Taylor, and so can I ask that we put away those documents  
6 now and we won't be needing to refer to any of these files for a  
7 little while.

12:15:31

8 Now, Mr Taylor, as you are aware, a number of witnesses  
9 have come before the Court and made various allegations about  
10 you, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, it's important that you have an opportunity of dealing  
13 specifically with the allegations made against you by these  
14 individuals; do you follow?

12:15:43

15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. So what I propose to embark upon now is to go through those  
17 witnesses who made allegations about you to give you an  
18 opportunity of answering them; do you follow me?

19 A. Yes, I do.

12:15:59

20 Q. Now, the first such witness I want to deal with is a man  
21 called Suwandi Camara, TF1-448, who gave evidence before this  
22 tribunal in open session. Do you recall him?

23 A. Yes, I do.

12:16:32

24 Q. Now, on 7 February 2008, that man gave evidence to this  
25 effect - and I'm looking at page 3429, line 9 of the transcript.  
26 He was examined in chief by Mr Werner of counsel, and that  
27 testimony unfolded in this way:

28 "Q. Do you know when they left to go to Burkina Faso?

29 A. I cannot remember the month, but it was in 1990. The



1 beginning of the year, maybe the third or fourth month of  
2 the year. Maybe at the beginning of the year.

12:17:32 3 Q. Now, Mr Witness, you told us about Mataba, and you told  
4 us that you met Kukoi Samba Sanyang in Mataba. Did you see  
5 anyone else in Mataba.

6 A. Yes, I saw some people in Mataba.

7 Q. Who did you see?

8 A. The man who is sitting - who is facing the trial,  
9 Charles Taylor. That was the first time I saw him. Kukoi  
12:17:51 10 was the person who introduced him to me. I also met Foday.  
11 That was my first time to see him before he left Libya,  
12 Foday Sankoh, but these are people who I did not greet one  
13 another, but because of the relationship they have with my  
14 leader, my leader told me these are ..."

12:18:16 15 Then there was a problem with the translation the witness  
16 continued on page 3430:

17 "... I said I used to go to Kukoi in Mataba. I used to go  
18 to Kukoi in Mataba. That was the first time - that was the  
19 first time for me to see the guy, the man who is facing  
12:18:41 20 trial here, Charles Taylor. That was the first time for me  
21 to see him. That was also my first time to see Foday  
22 Sankoh with my naked eyes."

23 Now, Kukoi Samba Sanyang is who?

24 A. Kukoi Samba Sanyang is the leader of SOFA, the Gambian  
12:19:10 25 movement that was in Libya.

26 Q. And is he known by any other name?

27 A. Yes, he is also called Dr Manneh.

28 Q. Now, what this witness was clearly suggesting, Mr Taylor,  
29 was that he was introduced to you by Dr Manneh. Did that happen?

1 A. That never happened. That's a lie. He did not  
2 introduce - he would not have been in a position to be introduced  
3 to me.

4 Q. Why not?

12:19:41 5 A. He, as an element of Manneh's group just coming to Libya to  
6 - what would be the purpose? He would just not be at that level.  
7 He is not an officer, an element introduced to a leader. In  
8 fact, I doubt if he would even be at the Mataba. So that's not  
9 true. It's not possible.

12:20:03 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you have already told us in testimony that  
11 there were people being trained in Libya from various parts of  
12 the world, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And from various parts of Africa?

12:20:19 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Including your soldiers who had been brought from Liberia  
17 and also various refugee camps in Cote d'Ivoire. Is that right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. In terms of those people being trained in Libya - trained -  
12:20:43 20 with whom did you have contact?

21 A. Only leaders of our condition. Dr Manneh, had contact with  
22 Dr Manneh; I had contact with Ali Kabbah; I had contact with  
23 other - with a representative - I don't quite remember his name -  
24 from Ghana and other countries around Africa. Only the leaders I  
12:21:11 25 would have contact with.

26 Q. Now, I want to emphasise the word "those receiving  
27 training". Did you have contact with any of them?

28 A. You say "those receiving training", you are talking about  
29 from the other countries?

1 Q. No. With anybody receiving training. Let's start from the  
2 general and move to the particular. Did you have contact with  
3 anyone receiving training in Libya?

4 A. No. No.

12:21:43 5 Q. Did you have contacts with the Gambians receiving training  
6 in Libya?

7 A. No. In fact, the Gambians, to the best of my knowledge,  
8 were not receiving training. They were already - they had  
9 fought, they were revolutionaries. I did not have any contact  
12:21:59 10 with them in training, no.

11 Q. What about Sierra Leoneans?

12 A. No, had no contact with Sierra Leoneans, except for - well,  
13 you say "training". No, did not have any contact with  
14 Sierra Leoneans.

12:22:11 15 Q. What about the Liberians receiving training in Libya?

16 A. Of course. Those were my men. I had contact with my men,  
17 yes.

18 Q. Now, although it's unclear on the face of the testimony of  
19 this witness, this witness is also suggesting - and I return to  
12:22:35 20 page 3429 of the transcript:

21 "... the man who is sitting - who is facing the trial,  
22 Charles Taylor. I also met Foday. That was my first time to see  
23 him before we left Libya, Foday Sankoh."

24 And he goes on to say:

12:22:58 25 "That was the first time - that was the first time for me  
26 to see the guy, the man who is facing trial here, Charles Taylor.  
27 That was the first time for me to see him. That was also my  
28 first time to see Foday Sankoh with my naked eyes."

29 Now, just in case it's suggested at a later stage, were you

1 introduced by Dr Manneh to this man at the same time as he was  
2 introducing Foday Sankoh? Do you follow me?

3 A. I follow your question. I was never introduced by  
4 Dr Manneh to this man, Suwandi Camara, at all. And it could not  
12:23:41 5 have happened, because there was not a Foday Sankoh that  
6 Dr Manneh could have introduced me to this man in the presence  
7 of. No.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, it's important that we clarify these  
9 issues, so let me ask you some further questions on this. When  
12:24:03 10 that man, Suwandi Camara, appeared in this Court, did you  
11 recognise him?

12 A. No, I did not recognise him. I did not.

13 Q. Now, dealing further with that, you've already indicated  
14 you did not meet that man in Libya?

12:24:24 15 A. I did not, yes.

16 Q. Did you see that man in Liberia?

17 A. Suwandi Camara, no. I don't recall the face of Suwandi.  
18 Amongst the people that came from The Gambia, only those that  
19 worked closely around me, serving me, I knew. A lot of the other  
12:24:50 20 Gambians I did not know.

21 Q. Did you see him, for example, in Burkina Faso?

22 A. No, I did not meet him in Burkina Faso, no.

23 Q. Did you meet Foday Sankoh in Libya?

24 A. No, I did not at all. Did not know of him in Libya, no.

12:25:14 25 Q. Now, you've indicate in the past that there were Gambians  
26 who assisted in the Liberian revolution?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, help me, one of those mentioned was a man called Yanks  
29 Smythe?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Who later became Liberian Ambassador to Libya?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. When did you first meet Yanks Smythe?

12:25:39 5 A. I first met Yanks Smythe in Liberia. In fact, first in  
6 Burkina Faso and then they came on to Liberia. I did not even  
7 meet him in Libya.

8 Q. Now, when you said earlier that the Gambians were not  
9 receiving training in Libya, what are you saying?

12:26:03 10 A. Well, it's important - I think we've gone through this  
11 before - but to understand, there is a difference between the  
12 Mataba and the training camps. The Mataba are the offices where  
13 leaders of different revolutionary movements met in the City of  
14 Tripoli. The training camps are about, I would say 25, 30 miles

12:26:27 15 or so, or even more, away from the city at a place that we've  
16 seen on the map here called Tajura. Now, these people that were  
17 there, their leaders would be in - I mean, at the Mataba and the  
18 elements would be in the training camp. Now, as far as I am  
19 concerned, in my meeting with Dr Manneh the Gambians had staged  
12:26:54 20 an unsuccessful coup attempt against Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara,  
21 and Dr Manneh and the rest had fled many years ago and had gone  
22 to Libya.

23 Now, so the men that he had in Libya did not require  
24 training - military training because they were already - they had  
12:27:19 25 been trained before, had been involved in a revolution, and were  
26 just there because of political reasons and probably protection.  
27 So they were not involved in training. So my interaction with  
28 Manneh were there - in fact, most of the men that Manneh had  
29 there were in fact serving as security guards at the Mataba. I

1 remembered a few of them that were there, but they were not -  
2 from what Manneh had told me, they were not involved in training.

3 Q. Now I am going back to the testimony of this witness. The  
4 witness continued, page 3430 of the transcript:

12:28:00 5 "Q. And do you remember, when did you see for the first  
6 time Charles Taylor in the Mataba?

7 A. It was in the beginning of 1990. That was my second  
8 time in 1990 when I saw this man.

9 Q. Do you remember, when did you see Foday Sankoh in  
12:28:21 10 Mataba?

11 A. That was also in the beginning of 1990.

12 JUSTICE SEBUTINDE: Mr Werner, the question you asked this  
13 witness was, 'When did you first see for the first time  
14 Charles Taylor in Mataba?' and the answer he gave, 'I saw  
12:28:40 15 him in the beginning of 1990 for the second time.' Are you  
16 satisfied with that answer?

17 MR WERNER: I will attempt to clarify:

18 Q. So, Mr Witness, again, when was the first time, not the  
19 second time, the first time that you saw Charles Taylor in  
12:29:00 20 Mataba, if you can remember?

21 A. I said to see him the first time was my second time  
22 when I visited Kukoi in 1990, the beginning of 1990.

23 MR MUNYARD: I am sorry, it may just be me, but I am  
24 confused by that answer when you set it against the first  
12:29:24 25 answer that Justice Sebutinde referred to a moment ago. I  
26 wonder could we try, please, to have some clarification.

27 MR WERNER:

28 Q. Mr Witness, you said that you saw Charles Taylor for  
29 the first time the second time you visited Kukoi Samba

1 Sanyang, is that correct?

2 A. Yes, that is what I said.

3 Q. Could you explain what you mean when you said that?

12:29:58

4 A. I said he came and he greeted my Leader Kukoi Samba  
5 Sanyang. After he left, when he was going, my Leader,  
6 Kukoi Samba Sanyang, told me, 'This man is Charles Taylor.'

7 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. Now, did your Leader, Kukoi  
8 Samba Sanyang, tell you anything about Charles Taylor in  
9 Mataba?

12:30:18

10 A. What he told me about him, that the group in Liberia  
11 which are in Libya with the training, he is their leader.

12 Q. I'm not sure about the sense of that. When you say he  
13 told me about him, that he is in Liberia, which are in  
14 Libya in this training, what do you mean?"

12:30:39

15 Then the witness eventually goes on to say, "I said I don't  
16 say a group in Liberia, a Liberian group in Libya. The Liberian  
17 group in Libya, he was their leader." And then he goes on to  
18 say, "And that's Charles Taylor."

12:31:07

19 So let's deal with the detail of that, Mr Taylor. 1990,  
20 the man is being specific, at the beginning of 1990 he claims he  
21 meets with his leader and thereafter, when you leave, his leader  
22 says, "Guess what, that was Charles Taylor." You have any  
23 recollection of that, Mr Taylor?

12:31:33

24 A. I don't have any recollection. It just never happened. It  
25 just never happened. But then you know, there is something  
26 peculiar about this. The beginning of 1990, okay, let's assume  
27 that we are talking about the first quarter, not even January,  
28 let's put to the to the first quarter of 1990, if this man had  
29 been in Libya, if this man had been in Libya for any time, so to

1 speak, he would have known that there was a Liberian group in  
2 Libya. I mean, because by the beginning of 1990 the Liberian  
3 group is preparing to leave. So when did he get into Libya?

12:32:19

4 Q. Now, hold on a second, Mr Taylor, when did the invasion of  
5 Liberia --

6 A. 1989. I mean, excuse me, 1989. So if he says that he saw  
7 me in 1990.

8 Q. Beginning of 1990. Where are you in the beginning of 1990?

12:32:34

9 A. But that's what makes this man crazy because the beginning  
10 of 1990, the combat in Liberia is already going on. The combat  
11 is already going on. We attack Liberia on the 25 December 1989.  
12 So where is he meeting me in the Mataba?

13 Q. Beginning of 1990, Mr Taylor. I mean, did you, for  
14 example, pay a quick flying visit back to Libya just for old  
15 times sake to say hi to Dr Manneh?

12:33:01

16 A. No, no, no. By the beginning of 1990 I am stuck in  
17 Bin-Houye on the border between Liberia and La Cote d'Ivoire  
18 waiting to go in with my men. I do not leave that area until  
19 about late March or the beginning of April, slip into Burkina  
20 Faso and then come back and enter Liberia in April of 1990. So  
21 it's - there is no way I am in Mataba. There is no way I am in  
22 Libya at this particular - and there is no way that any Liberian  
23 is in Libya at the beginning of 1990. This is purely not true.

12:33:29

24 Q. Mr Taylor, please, can you help us as to what reason you  
25 may have had to be in Libya at the beginning of 1990, having  
26 already had your men trained and having already begun an uprising  
27 in Liberia? What need would you have, help us, to be in Libya at  
28 that time?

12:33:57

29 A. No need whatsoever. My preoccupation at this period, and



1 this is what he says the beginning, I will give him the benefit  
2 of the doubt, let's take the beginning as being the first  
3 quarter, January, February and March, I am not anywhere but in La  
4 Cote d'Ivoire waiting in the town to try to enter Liberia. I am  
12:34:39 5 not in any other place on this planet but in La Cote d'Ivoire.

6 Q. Let's proceed further with the evidence of this man. On  
7 that same date, 7 February 2008, at page 3433 of the transcript  
8 he said this:

9 "This Ali Kabbah, he was the leader of the Sierra Leonean  
12:35:11 10 group in Libya, but he took some money from the Libyan  
11 government, which money was given to him for the purpose of the  
12 group, the Sierra Leonean group in Libya. He came to Burkina  
13 Faso, but when he came to Burkina that was the last time they  
14 hear from him. What they heard was he ran away. That time was  
12:35:36 15 the time I met Foday. By that time he was not considered as the  
16 leader, but he was the coordinator of the Sierra Leoneans in  
17 Libya."

18 Now you are shaking your head, Mr Taylor. Why?

19 A. Yeah, but where did he meet Foday? In Burkina or at the  
12:36:01 20 Mataba? Because what I am seeing here, he is saying that he came  
21 to Burkina Faso, but when he came to Burkina that was the time  
22 they heard from him, what they heard was he ran away. "That time  
23 was the time I met Foday." But I thought we just heard that he  
24 met Foday at the Mataba, so what time did he really meet Foday  
12:36:26 25 again?

26 Q. No point in asking me, Mr Taylor. I am just putting what  
27 the witness has said to give you an opportunity of dealing with  
28 it?

29 A. Yes, and so I mean this man doesn't know what he's talking

1 about. He said before in previous something that you just read  
2 at that at the Mataba - he was introduced to me at the Mataba and  
3 that was the first time we met and that was the first time he had  
4 met Foday also. But now I'm seeing here that he is now for the  
12:36:51 5 first time meeting Foday again while they are in Burkina Faso.

6 So you know these boys, I don't know what prompted them to  
7 do these things, but there is no way that this particular man, I  
8 mean, could have been anywhere around this Mataba, what he is  
9 talking about. These things are total fabrications. Total.

12:37:14 10 Q. Now, when in that same answer he mentions that Ali Kabbah  
11 was the leader of the Sierra Leonean group in Libya, is that true  
12 or false?

13 A. Ali Kabbah was the leader of the Sierra Leonean group in  
14 Libya.

12:37:31 15 Q. As such, who would be at the Mataba, Ali Kabbah or Foday  
16 Sankoh?

17 A. Oh, it would definitely be Ali Kabbah. No personnel, no  
18 trainee, none in Libya ever set foot to the Mataba. None.

19 Whether you were from Liberia or whether you were from Timbuktu  
12:37:56 20 you did not go to the Mataba. The Mataba was for leaders and no  
21 element came from that camp to the Mataba.

22 Q. And just to complete this passage, having given that answer  
23 his testimony continued in this way:

24 "Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. Now, you said that you saw  
12:38:16 25 Charles Taylor in Mataba. Now, did you see him again in  
26 Libya?

27 A. Yes. After I saw him two times in Libya, before they  
28 left to come to Burkina.

29 Q. Who left to come to Burkina?

1 A. Charles Taylor and his people left Libya to come to  
2 Burkina, likewise our people leave Libya to come to  
3 Burkina."

4 Then there was some confusion as to his answer and he is  
12:38:52 5 asked.

6 "Q. Did you say anything about Foday Sankoh in your  
7 answer?

8 A. I said Charles Taylor and his people left Libya to  
9 Burkina. He left with Liberians to Burkina. Foday Sankoh  
12:39:05 10 also left with the Sierra Leonean group to Burkina. We  
11 also, Dr Manneh, his group - Dr Manneh and his group also  
12 left Libya to Burkina. But the first group I was not  
13 among."

14 Now, on the face of that answer, Mr Taylor, this man is  
12:39:31 15 suggesting that the Liberians, the Sierra Leoneans and the  
16 Gambians left Libya together to go to Burkina. True or false?

17 A. Totally, totally false. Totally false.

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we need to deal with this matter properly  
19 because you appreciate the allegation against you is that you  
12:40:01 20 were party to a design to bring terror to the sub-region in West  
21 Africa and that you were you were in cahoots with these  
22 Sierra Leoneans and these Gambians, yes?

23 A. That is true.

24 Q. And so on the face of it this witness is suggesting that  
12:40:18 25 there was a coordinated movement of those three groups from Libya  
26 to Burkina Faso?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Which fits in of course with the design alleged by the  
29 Prosecution. Did anything like that occur?

1 A. There was no such thing like this that occurred.

2 Not anything of the sort, no.

3 Q. I mean, did you, for example, coordinate such a movement  
4 with Dr Manneh and the coordinator, Foday Sankoh?

12:40:53 5 A. No. As a matter of fact, to the best of my knowledge, and  
6 I'm sure if we can get any of the Gambians in here, there was not  
7 one Sierra Leonean - not one Sierra Leonean in Burkina Faso. Not  
8 one. The only people that were in Burkina Faso were the  
9 Gambians. And Dr Manneh had come to Burkina Faso not along with  
12:41:25 10 the Liberian group. Dr Manneh was a well known revolutionary who  
11 had launched a revolutionary far in advance of Charles Taylor and  
12 had travelled widely and knew Burkina Faso even before I got  
13 there.

14 But I will just add one thing for the judges. Look, if  
12:41:46 15 Sierra Leoneans had been in Burkina Faso, when I went back and  
16 asked Dr Manneh to provide - to help to provide some security for  
17 me, why would I leave them behind and they were supposed to be  
18 trained? Why would I leave Sierra Leoneans behind in Burkina  
19 Faso? Why didn't they come along with the Gambians to help to  
12:42:07 20 provide security for me also? They were just not there at all.

21 Q. Now, we know from evidence placed before this tribunal that  
22 Sierra Leonean Special Forces trained in Libya included one  
23 Mohamed Tarawali?

24 A. Yes.

12:42:36 25 Q. And one Rashid Mansaray, yes?

26 A. Yes, that is correct.

27 Q. Did you ever meet them in Libya?

28 A. Never met them in Libya. Never.

29 Q. Did you ever meet them in Burkina Faso?

1 A. Never met them in Burkina Faso.

2 Q. Did you ever meet them in Liberia?

3 A. Never met them in Liberia.

12:43:02

4 Q. Mr Taylor, how many men did Ali Kabbah, who you accept you  
5 met - how many men did he have in Libya being trained?

6 A. I do not know. I cannot help. We did not discuss numbers.  
7 I knew he had men there, but I never got into the numbers.

8 Q. Now, let's move on with the testimony of this man. He went  
9 on to say on the following day of his testimony, 8 February 2008,  
10 at page 3446 of the transcript:

12:43:42

11 "A. I mean the Gambians and Liberians. I saw some people  
12 coming going and coming. Even the man sitting down,  
13 Charles Taylor, he used to go and come.

14 Q. Go and come where, Mr Witness?

12:44:01

15 A. Coming from Liberia, coming to Burkina.

16 Q. Now, you said that the Gambians used to go from Liberia  
17 to Burkina, from Burkina to Liberia. Why did the Gambians  
18 do that?

12:44:20

19 A. I said what I knew. That is, my leaders, what I heard  
20 from my leader, what he told me - sometimes maybe you can  
21 see it in my statements. I said my leader told me that he  
22 and Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh, they made a meeting in  
23 Burkina that they will help him in his war. If he  
24 succeeds, he will also help them in their war because at  
25 that time we are very powerless."

12:44:49

26 Now, Mr Taylor, let us examine this answer, shall we. Now,  
27 bear in mind, and let us remind ourselves, that the allegation is  
28 that the agreement to terrorise the population of Sierra Leone  
29 was made in Libya. We now have this witness saying that

1 agreement is made in Burkina Faso. Now, help me. First of all,  
2 taking them in turn so we can look at the lucky dip choice that  
3 we have, was there such an agreement made in Libya?

4 A. There was no such agreement made in Libya.

12:45:40 5 Q. As this witness suggests, was there such an agreement made  
6 in Burkina Faso?

7 A. There was no such agreement made in Burkina Faso.

8 Q. Now, also note: The witness claims that you were coming  
9 backwards and forwards from Liberia to Burkina Faso, and also the  
10 Gambians were coming backwards and forwards between Liberia and  
11 Burkina Faso. Is that true?

12 A. That's a lie. That is a blatant lie. Look, I will tell  
13 this Court: I went to Burkina Faso. I, Charles Taylor, asked  
14 Dr Manneh to give me some assistance with security after the  
15 famous incident with Prince Johnson that has been mentioned in  
16 testimony in this Court where Prince Johnson had been broken away  
17 and formed the Independent National Patriotic Front. That

18 request was granted by Dr Manneh for the men to come to provide  
19 security for me as another revolutionary leader. That's how most  
12:46:58 20 of them came around me. One became aide-de-camp; Yanks, radio  
21 operator, and all of this. When they landed in Liberia they did  
22 not - and I say did not - return to Burkina Faso for any reason.

23 The Gambians remained in Liberia. There was no going up and  
24 down. They remained in Liberia with me until Dr Manneh left.

12:47:25 25 Some of them left with him and later some stayed with me. They  
26 never moved between those two countries, no.

27 Q. Now, dealing still with that answer:

28 "If he succeeds he will also help them in their war,  
29 because at that time we are powerless."

1 Now, Mr Taylor, did you have the capacity to help Dr Manneh  
2 and Sankoh in the way suggested by this witness?

3 A. Not at all. Not at all. We all went to Libya looking for  
4 help. And what - I had no means to help even myself. That is  
12:48:08 5 not true.

6 Q. Now, the witness continues:

7 "Q. Mr Witness, when you said, 'My leader told me that he  
8 and Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh, they made meeting in  
9 Burkina that they will help him', who are the 'they'?

12:48:36 10 A. That is we, the Gambians, will collaborate with him and  
11 Sierra Leoneans will collaborate with Charles Taylor to  
12 help him, his Liberian war.

13 MR MUNYARD: Can we have a date for this latest piece of  
14 hearsay, please?

12:48:55 15 MR WERNER: I do not think the witness had finished his  
16 answer.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Let the witness finish first, please.  
18 Continue with your answer, Mr Witness.

19 THE WITNESS: He said we should help Charles Taylor in his  
12:49:14 20 war. If he succeeds in this war, he will also help us in  
21 return so that we can also go back to our country, because  
22 we are people who are very powerless at that time. In  
23 terms of human resources in terms of money, we were not  
24 very powerful.

12:49:38 25 MR WERNER:

26 Q. Mr Witness, just to be clear, you say 'If he succeeds  
27 in this war', who is the 'he'?

28 A. I mean Charles Taylor. And he will also help us in  
29 return.

1 Q. Who are 'us'?

2 A. I said we, the Gambians, and Sierra Leoneans for our  
3 war, to make it clear.

12:50:03

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Werner, you haven't dealt with the  
5 time.

6 MR WERNER:

7 Q. When did this meeting take place?

8 A. I said this meeting was held before I came to Burkina.  
9 He said they did the meeting in Burkina. That was their  
10 agreement.

12:50:27

11 Q. And were you told when this meeting took place?

12 A. The meeting was held in Burkina in Ouagadougou.

13 Q. The question was when - not where - but when this  
14 meeting took place?

12:50:42

15 A. No, I cannot remember the day and the month because  
16 that time I was not there.

17 Q. What, if anything, happened after that?

18 A. I left and went to The Gambia. The 16 people I left  
19 with from Libya to Burkina, I went to The Gambia. I went  
20 to accomplish the mission to mobilise the people to read  
21 the security situation, I left Ouagadougou."

12:51:01

22 Now, Mr Taylor, just for completeness sake, was there such  
23 a meeting in Ouagadougou?

24 A. There was no such meeting in Ouagadougou of me telling  
25 someone, "You help me and I will help you", and all this type of  
26 nonsense. There was no such meeting. I had known Manneh from  
27 Libya. So if Manneh and I had to hold any discussions, we would  
28 have held discussions in Libya. We didn't have to come to  
29 Burkina Faso to hold another separate set of meetings. In fact,

12:51:26



1 Manneh had no idea, no idea, that he would have had to give me  
2 some assistance in Liberia. None whatsoever. Because one of the  
3 things that - when we started our revolution in Liberia, we were  
4 very, in fact, very cautious and the last group that I really  
12:52:10 5 wanted involved in Liberia were the Gambians. And the reason  
6 being, once we started our operations in - on the 25th, by the  
7 first, second week in January of 1990, they had synthesised the  
8 reason for this attack in Liberia as one, you know, to  
9 destabilise West Africa, so to speak, and this was put together  
12:52:43 10 by Kairaba Jawara, the President of the Gambia, who was then  
11 serving as chairman of ECOWAS.

12 And so I was going - doing everything not to get the  
13 Gambians involved because I knew that the Gambians were in  
14 Burkina Faso. But it was only after this Prince Johnson incident  
12:53:07 15 where I became concerned that my security was at threat, I had  
16 asked them to only provide security protection for me. And that  
17 is why this lie about Gambians moving up and down, that would not  
18 happen because the Gambians, while they were in Burkina Faso,  
19 they did not move all over the place. They were very quiet, and  
12:53:29 20 in Liberia I wanted it kept very quiet. This is why I did not  
21 want them involved in combat or anything like that. So it is  
22 totally untrue.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's go on with the account given by this  
24 man. He went on to say on that same day, 8 February 2008, page  
12:53:59 25 3451 of the transcript:

26 "Q. So, Mr Witness, please tell us again. When you came  
27 back to Burkina Faso, what was the situation that you  
28 observed?

29 A. Tell him that I said when I got to Burkina from Gambia,

1 the 16 people that I had left behind that I travelled with  
2 from Libya to Burkina, I did not see them again in  
3 Ouagadougou in Burkina. That became a surprise to me, and  
4 when I came and asked our leader - and that is Dr Manneh -  
12:54:38 5 he told me that Charles Taylor came to Burkina and he has  
6 travelled with these 16 people.

7 Q. To where, Mr Witness?

8 A. He took them to Liberia.

9 Q. And did Dr Manneh tell you why Charles Taylor took  
12:54:55 10 these 16 people to Liberia?

11 A. He went with the 16 people to Liberia. As I told you  
12 before, we were supposed to do communication training at  
13 Burkina but when I arrived, the time I arrived at Burkina,  
14 I found that he has already decided to give those 16 people  
12:55:18 15 to Charles Taylor to go with them to Liberia and said they  
16 were going to do their communication training there.

17 Q. Mr Witness, when you say 'he has already decided to  
18 give those 16 people to Charles Taylor', who are you  
19 talking about?

12:55:35 20 A. That is Dr Manneh, our leader. He gave those 16 people  
21 to Charles Taylor."

22 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

23 A. But the Gambians that went to Liberia were more than 16.  
24 But what concerns me even more here is the fact that he is saying  
12:55:56 25 people were supposed to go to Liberia for communication training.  
26 Who was in Liberia to train them in communication? If anybody  
27 was going to receive - we received our training in Libya, so I  
28 don't even know if this man was in Libya. As he is saying it  
29 here, okay, the fact of the matter is the Gambians that were in

1 Burkina Faso - I don't know what Manneh he is meeting again,  
2 because Manneh came to Liberia in April of 1990. Manneh came to  
3 Liberia. So I don't know who he is meeting here, saying that he  
4 is meeting Manneh. The fact of the matter is the Gambians did  
12:56:35 5 come to Liberia in April 1990 and Manneh moved straight to  
6 Buchanan. We had already taken Buchanan.

7 Q. And when Manneh came to Liberia, did he come by himself?

8 A. No, no. He came with about six or seven individuals.

9 Q. Now, no total, Mr Taylor, how many Gambians became  
12:57:00 10 involved, through your request to Dr Manneh, in the Liberian  
11 revolution?

12 A. Oh, I'll put the number about 20, 25. There were not that  
13 many. There were not that many.

14 Q. Do you know where this figure of 16 mentioned by this  
12:57:17 15 witness comes from?

16 A. No, I don't he where he got that 16 from. I think he is  
17 saying that the 16 of his group. But the Gambians that went to  
18 Liberia: About 25, I would put it to.

19 Q. And help me, Mr Taylor. The training received in Libya,  
12:57:36 20 did that cover communications?

21 A. Oh, yes, we did communication.

22 Q. And you said that the Gambians that - when you met with  
23 Dr Manneh in Libya, the Gambians weren't receiving training; they  
24 had already been trained?

12:57:54 25 A. They had, yes.

26 Q. Trained in what, as far as you were aware?

27 A. Military science. Full military science. They had fought  
28 a war. They had been involved in fighting, so they had the  
29 experience in combat.

1 Q. And as far as you were aware, the training they had  
2 received in Libya, had that included communications training?

3 A. Wait a minute. I don't quite understand your question.

4 Q. The training which the Gambians - you told us that the  
12:58:23 5 Gambians had already been trained when you arrived in Libya, yes?

6 A. If I want to, my - what I said was that the Gambians had  
7 already been trained, they had participated in a revolution. But  
8 while I met them in Libya, they were not involved in training.

9 Q. They were not involved in training, yes?

12:58:45 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. But had they received training in Libya, to your knowledge?

12 A. Before their revolution, no, I have no knowledge of that.

13 I have no knowledge of that.

14 Q. But did you provide Gambians with training in  
12:59:03 15 communications in Liberia?

16 A. No, I did not. In fact, Yanks Smythe who was the radio  
17 operator for me amongst the Gambians that came knew how to  
18 operate radios and received only minor technical assistance  
19 because of a special piece of radio equipment that we had  
12:59:23 20 received.

21 Q. And did Yanks Smythe have a code name?

22 A. Oh, yes, he was called Butterfly. That was his code name,  
23 Butterfly.

24 Q. I'm still dealing with the evidence of this man. On that  
12:59:56 25 same day, 8 February 2008, at page 3456 of the transcript he goes  
26 on to say this:

27 "Q. When you say that the soldiers who came together, who  
28 were these soldiers?

29 A. These were his, members of his delegation. I don't

1 know how to say it. His protocol were among those people.  
2 The senior soldiers were among those delegates, junior  
3 soldiers were also amongst his delegates with whom he came  
4 from Liberia, he, Charles Taylor.

13:00:49 5 Q. And when you say that they were taking things out and  
6 taking them to the plane, what are you talking about?

7 A. I said at first where we were standing we did not know  
8 what things were, but when we were coming out going to the  
9 plane, when his people were taking things on board in the  
10 plane, we joined them to take these things to the plane.

11 This was then I came to know these were guns, arms and  
12 ammunition because I and the five other people helped them  
13 to take those arms and ammunitions to the plane and among  
14 us some Burkina soldiers were at the airport at the time.

13:01:32 15 Q. Mr Witness, when you say when his people were taking  
16 things on board in the plane, his people, whose people?

17 A. These were Charles Taylor's people who he came with.

18 Q. What if anything happened after that, Mr Witness?

19 A. When we take these things to the plane Charles Taylor,  
13:01:51 20 himself, came with his delegation and boarded the plane.  
21 After we also joined them in the plane.

22 Q. And what if anything happened after that, Mr Witness?

23 A. After that, the plane took us to a country called  
24 Cote d'Ivoire to an airfield in the provinces called Man.

13:02:14 25 MR VERNER: Man, your Honours, M-A-N, and Cote d'Ivoire,  
26 the country:

27 Q. And what happened, Mr Witness, when this plane landed  
28 in Man in Cote d'Ivoire?

29 A. When the plane landed at Cote d'Ivoire in Man, I and

1 the five ex-soldiers, we joined Charles Taylor's soldiers  
2 to take out the arms and ammunition from the plane and put  
3 them in a truck.

4 Q. If what if anything happened after that, Mr Witness?

13:02:44 5 A. When we put the arms and ammunitions in the truck,  
6 after we finished doing that, then the plane and some of  
7 the Burkina soldiers who escorted the plane returned back  
8 with the plane and we joined Charles Taylor's convoy and  
9 went with him to Liberia. We went by Danane. It's a  
13:03:06 10 village called Danane in Cote d'Ivoire. When we left  
11 Danane we came to Loguato border, which was the border  
12 between Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire."

13 Then Mr Verner gives the spelling of Danane and Loguato.

14 "Q. And, Mr Witness, what if anything happened after that?

13:03:25 15 A. After that we continue with Charles Taylor's convoy to  
16 his town where - the town he was in control, which was his  
17 headquarters.

18 Q. Do you know the name of those headquarters?

19 A. His headquarters were at Gbarnga. This was central  
13:03:43 20 part of Liberia."

21 And he goes on to say how they arrived in the evening. So,

22 Mr Taylor, just so that we are clear, you are supposed to have  
23 gone to Burkina Faso where, assisted by some Burkinabe soldiers  
24 and also by this man, you loaded arms and ammunition onto a  
13:04:19 25 plane, flew them to an airfield in Cote d'Ivoire, transhipped  
26 them onto a truck and then took them to Gbarnga. True or false?

27 A. Well, let's put it in some context because during the early  
28 part of the revolution I did get assistance from the Burkinabe  
29 government, but let's put this whole statement into context.

1 This gentleman, if I am understanding him properly, and I  
2 stand corrected, is saying that at the time he comes to Liberia,  
3 he boards a plane with me and these weapons go to Gbarnga. Well,  
4 let's go back into the records. When do I move to Gbarnga?  
13:05:15 5 Surely not in 1990. So at the time that this man is talking  
6 about - you see these boys do things where they get some  
7 information.

8 Q. Well, let me assist you, Mr Taylor. From our reading of  
9 the transcript of the evidence of this witness, he claims that  
13:05:32 10 this incident took place in October or November 1991.

11 A. But that's - October/November 1991, I did, yes - I did  
12 bring material from Burkina Faso, but he would not have been on  
13 the plane.

14 Q. Why not?

13:05:52 15 A. Because he was - I don't even know if he was in Liberia,  
16 but Gambians did not travel with me. I admit that during the  
17 early part Burkina Faso did give some little assistance. But  
18 Gambians did not move. So this is what he heard that - if he was  
19 in Liberia, and again I don't doubt that he could have been in  
13:06:15 20 Liberia, I didn't know all of the Gambians that were there, but  
21 he would not have gone back with me. So what he is dealing with,  
22 he is dealing with conversations on the ground: Oh well, this  
23 thing came from Burkina Faso, came through Man and on the way.  
24 But he would not have been on the plane. That's where he is  
13:06:34 25 lying. He would not have been on the plane.

26 Q. How can you be sure about that?

27 A. Because I would not travel with a Gambian back from Liberia  
28 to Burkina Faso because the Gambians that were in Liberia were  
29 being kept in Liberia very quietly. Even Dr Manneh would not go

1 backward and forward with me like that, no.

2 Q. And why were you keeping them quiet in Liberia?

3 A. Because I did not want them there in the first instance  
4 because it was misinterpreted by Dawda Jawara.

13:07:17 5 Q. Now, did you confirm, Mr Taylor, that in or about October/  
6 November 1991 you did receive assistance in the terms of arms and  
7 ammunition from Burkina Faso?

8 A. What I am able to confirm are two things. In 1991, about  
9 mid-1991, Gbarnga becomes my headquarters. So he is right about  
10 that. About mid-1991. What I do confirm again is that, yes, I  
11 did receive some assistance from Burkina Faso I would say in late  
12 '91. I can't be sure that it was October or November, but I can  
13 confirm that we did receive some material in 1991, late, yes.

14 Q. And was that material transported by aeroplane?

13:08:14 15 A. Yes, it was transported by airplane. It did come into Man.  
16 And we did drive into Danane and on to Gbarnga, yes.

17 Q. So you can confirm the route taken and the means of  
18 transport?

19 A. That is correct.

13:08:28 20 Q. And the final destination?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. So help us. How would this man know all of those details  
23 to get them right, do you follow me?

24 A. Yes. It's very simple. It's very simple. The chief is  
13:08:46 25 going to Burkina Faso, he leaves Gbarnga, that's the route that  
26 had been taken so many occasions. So it's very simple amongst  
27 the security personnel and the Gambians that were there to know  
28 that the chief went and the chief is back and what he brought.  
29 That would be very simple, because right there working with me,



1 Yanks is there, General Domingo is there, General Jackson the  
2 aide-de-camp is there. So there are Gambians around me. And a  
3 lot of the security people around would know when I leave the  
4 country and they would know when I come.

13:09:24 5 So this information that he is giving, while the  
6 information is right, where he goes wrong is he is not on the  
7 plane, he's lying. He hears it. Now, what he hears is true, but  
8 what I'm doubting here is his presence. He is definitely not on  
9 the plane. He is not in the convoy. That's the point.

13:09:48 10 Q. Right. Let's go on and deal with another aspect of the  
11 testimony of this witness, 8 February 2008, page 3460 of the  
12 transcript:

13 "Q. Now, Mr Witness, when you say SSS, do you know what  
14 SSS stands for?

13:10:32 15 A. SSS, I know it. I know how Liberians call it there,  
16 Special Security Service who were - I can say they are the  
17 elite forces among the soldiers, the high class, the ones  
18 who work with the President.

19 Q. And just to come back once again, you said again that,  
13:11:01 20 'When it comes under the government of Charles Taylor.'  
21 What was your understanding of the government of  
22 Charles Taylor at that time?

23 A. Let me tell you this. Let me tell you this was not a  
24 government. It was a government that was put in place by  
13:11:20 25 Charles Taylor himself. Then there was a rebel war, not a  
26 government that was elected by people. But during the war,  
27 Charles Taylor formed a government because he has  
28 ministers, has protocols and many other things, senior army  
29 leaders.

1 Q. Mr Witness, you said that Charles Taylor has protocols.  
2 Who were his protocols?

3 A. Let me tell you. I can remember the senior protocol  
4 officer whose name is Musa Cisse. Among the protocols I  
13:11:53 5 know other person - another lady whose name is Lydia. He  
6 has many protocols but these were the ones I can remember.  
7 I can remember their names."

8 And then Mr Verner spells the names.

9 "Q. And, Mr Witness, did you say Lilia?

13:12:16 10 A. Lydia.

11 Q. Now, Mr Witness, you said as well that Taylor had  
12 senior army officers. Who were these senior army officers.

13 A. I will start with our own people, among our Gambia  
14 people. General Jackson was among, he was a special  
13:12:37 15 bodyguard to Charles Taylor himself. General Musa was  
16 among. Musang Yai, he is also a special bodyguard to  
17 Charles Taylor. They were all Gambians. General Abdulai  
18 Bah, he was a senior soldier. General Yeaten. Now I will  
19 go to the Liberians. He was then SSS chief of staff."

13:13:02 20 Justice Sebutinde then asked, "Is this the same Yeaten  
21 spelling that we have had before?" Mr Verner clarifies it's the  
22 same spelling.

23 Now, let's go through that slowly now, please. What are we  
24 to understand by the term "a protocol", Mr Taylor?

13:13:32 25 A. That is the individual responsible for ushering in visitors  
26 and arranging the programme of the President.

27 Q. Right. Did you have a protocol officer called Musa Cisse?

28 A. Yes, I did.

29 Q. Did you have a protocol officer, a lady called Lydia?

- 1 A. No.
- 2 Q. Do you know of a Lydia?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. Did such a Lydia have a role within the greater Liberia  
13:14:09 5 administration?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. What was that role?
- 8 A. She was special assistant to me at the time.
- 9 Q. So she was a special assistant, not a protocol?
- 13:14:20 10 A. That is correct.
- 11 Q. What's the difference?
- 12 A. Well, the special assistant is in meetings - takes special  
13 notes of meetings, get them organised for records.
- 14 Q. Now, was General Jackson a bodyguard to you?
- 13:14:47 15 A. General Jackson was senior aide-de-camp. He was a Gambian,  
16 General Jackson. Mande, so Gambian. He was aide-de-camp -  
17 senior aide-de-camp.
- 18 Q. Was he a bodyguard to you?
- 19 A. No, because - I'm answering this because an aide-de-camp is  
13:15:08 20 not considered a bodyguard. No, he was not. He was  
21 aide-de-camp.
- 22 Q. And was he Gambian?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. General Musa?
- 13:15:16 25 A. Yes, Musa N'jie was also an aide-de-camp.
- 26 Q. Musang Yai, who we've seen?
- 27 A. That is correct.
- 28 Q. Who remained even after you became President?
- 29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. What happened to General Jackson?

2 A. General Jackson was killed in the 1996 attack on May in the  
3 Executive Mansion. General Jackson was killed during that  
4 attack.

13:15:44 5 Q. Musang Yai, Y-A-I?

6 A. No, no, no. Well, we - it's - maybe that's the way the  
7 interpreter wrote it, but it's N'jie. It's Musa N'jie.

8 Q. Okay. I am looking at what's written on the transcript.  
9 And just so that we are clear, because it may be that we can

13:16:06 10 clarify things for further reference, the passage reads as  
11 follows:

12 "Q. General Jackson was among - he was a special bodyguard  
13 to Charles Taylor himself. General Musa was among. Musang  
14 Yai..."

13:16:24 15 A. Well, if we go strictly by the transcript, I don't know  
16 anyone with this spelling and pronunciation. I know a Musa  
17 N'jie. It's spell with an N-'-J-I-E. I don't know - if we  
18 follow this transcript, I don't know - in fact, not that I just  
19 don't know. There is no such person with this name. And I can -  
13:16:52 20 if it's associated with Musa N'jie, there is a Musa N'jie.

21 Q. Right. So perhaps we might want to make a mental note that  
22 that is a reference to Musa N'jie, spelt N-'-J-I-E?

23 A. If that is accepted, that's the person that I know. There  
24 is a Musa N'jie.

13:17:15 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't have the transcript here, Mr  
26 Griffiths. What does the transcript spell it as?

27 MR GRIFFITHS: The transcript page 3461, line 7, spells it  
28 at M-U-S-A-N-G, separate word, Y-A-I.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. And Mr Taylor is saying that it

1 should be N-J-I-E.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Musa N'jie. And in the context of the  
3 answer, there appears to be some force in that suggestion. So  
4 all I am suggesting is that perhaps we ought to make a mental  
13:17:53 5 note that in due course that is a reference to Musa N'jie.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: We are trying to get into the transcript.  
7 I think the spelling in the transcript is definitely a  
8 fabrication. I don't recall anything or any name spelt like  
9 that. Musang Yai? I don't recall any witness saying any such  
13:19:16 10 name:

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Mr Taylor, help me. The man who was an aide-de-camp to  
13 you, General Musa?

14 A. N'jie.

13:19:31 15 Q. Spell N'jie for me?

16 A. That's N-'-J-I-E, I think. N'jie.

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Musa?

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. And how do you spell Musa?

13:19:42 20 A. Well, it's spelled two - either M-U-S-A or M-O-U-S-S-A.

21 Q. All I am suggesting, your Honours, is that in the context  
22 of the question and the answer as given, it would appear that  
23 perhaps we ought to correct that spelling, and that is a  
24 reference to Musa N'jie. I don't know if that assists?

13:20:07 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we'd better leave Mr Taylor's  
26 evidence as it is, because I am not sure whether the witness was  
27 saying the same name or not.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And frankly speaking, I think it's the

1 obligation of counsel leading the evidence to ensure that the  
2 names they wish to be on the record are correctly spelt. Even  
3 the next day after the transcript has come out, it remains the  
4 duty of the lawyers to correct those spellings. If they don't  
13:20:35 5 correct them, that is the evidence we have.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

7 Q. Now, going back to this passage, Mr Taylor: "He is also a  
8 special bodyguard to Charles Taylor. They were all Gambians."

9 Now, pause there. What role did the Gambians who you requested

13:21:00 10 Dr Manneh's assistance in terms of, what role did they play with  
11 regard to you?

12 A. Well, in all frankness, they played a dual role. They were  
13 like special securities around me and they had titles, like  
14 aide-de-camp, this, but they were special securities around me.

13:21:20 15 Q. So when, in the context of this answer, the witness is  
16 suggesting that a number of Gambians were playing bodyguard roles  
17 in respect of you, is that true or false?

18 A. Special bodyguard role, I would say that's true. That's  
19 true.

13:21:46 20 Q. General Abdulai Bah?

21 A. No, General Bah was not amongst the special bodyguards.  
22 General Bah was the most senior Gambian military officer that  
23 everyone fell under, Abdulai Bah. But he was not the - he did  
24 not serve a bodyguard function to me, no.

13:22:14 25 Q. He didn't?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Now, just so that we are clear about this, Mr Taylor - and  
28 I take the learned Justice's admonition on board - this Abdulai  
29 Bah, is it the same or a different person from Ibrahim Bah?

1 A. That is a different person. There's an Ibrahim Bah; this  
2 is Abdulai Bah.

3 Q. This is a different person altogether?

4 A. That is correct, yes.

13:22:41 5 Q. Okay. Yes. Now, let's go on to another aspect of this  
6 witness's evidence. 8 February, 2008, page 3465:

7 "Q. Mr Witness, you said that he - and you were talking  
8 about Ibrahim Bah - and Abdulai Bah are the same. What do  
9 you mean when you said that? Could you explain to us?

13:23:25 10 A. What I was saying is that Abdulai Bah, a person of his  
11 own, is also a human being. He is a member of SOFA. He  
12 was the one who was acting as SOFA's chief of staff.

13 Ibrahim Bah was a member of SOFA. He is also a member of  
14 kafoo. He is also a member of SOFA. These two people -  
13:23:53 15 these two people are all citizens of Casamance, but they  
16 have relatives in the Gambia. These two people were all  
17 members of SOFA group in Libya. I am giving you two names  
18 of different people.

19 Q. Thank you for that clarification, Mr Witness. Now, at  
13:24:16 20 the time of this meeting, the Gambian meeting, if you know  
21 what, if anything, was Ibrahim Bah doing in Liberia?

22 A. Let me tell you. Then Ibrahim Bah, he used to go to  
23 Sierra Leone and come back. Ibrahim Bah, when Foday Sankoh  
24 started his war in Sierra Leone, he was a citizen of Gambia  
13:24:38 25 who was given by Charles Taylor to join the war in  
26 Sierra Leone. This was - then I know that Ibrahim Bah used  
27 to go to Sierra Leone. He used to go there, spend some  
28 time there and comes back to Liberia."

29 Now, starting at the beginning of that, Mr Werner's

1 question:

2 "Q. You were talking about Ibrahim Bah, you said that he,  
3 and you were talking about Ibrahim Bah, and Abdulai Bah are  
4 the same. Are they?"

13:25:23 5 A. They are not the same. They are two different people.

6 Q. Now, the witness goes on to say: "What I am saying is that  
7 Abdulai Bah, he is a member of SOFA." Okay. First of all, what  
8 is SOFA?

9 A. I don't know the words, but SOFA is the name of the  
13:25:48 10 organisation that Dr Manneh headed. I don't know what S-O-F-A  
11 really means, but they just called it SOFA. SOFA is Dr Manneh's  
12 organisation that he headed. It was the organisation that was  
13 used when they launched their unsuccessful operation against  
14 Jawara.

13:26:05 15 Q. And as you see, bearing in mind what you told us earlier  
16 about this Abdulai Bah, he was acting as SOFA's chief of staff,  
17 is that true?

18 A. Yes, he was the most senior Gambian military personnel.  
19 All Gambians reported to Abdulai Bah.

13:26:45 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, going back to that answer: "He is also a  
21 member of kafoo." What's kafoo?

22 A. Really I don't know. I don't even know any group called  
23 kafoo. The Gambians that were there were SOFA under Dr Manneh.  
24 Even Abdulai Bah reported to Manneh.

13:27:07 25 Q. Now, he goes on to speak of you giving Ibrahim Bah  
26 effectively to Foday Sankoh. Did you?

27 A. No, no. How would I give Ibrahim Bah to Foday Sankoh? No.  
28 That just never happened. I want to believe that Ibrahim Bah  
29 could have known Foday Sankoh because in Libya, amongst the



1 elements - Ibrahim Bah was really nothing. Ibrahim Bah was just  
2 an ordinary officer. In fact the senior people from the Gambia  
3 were Abdulai, General Mande Jackson, General N'jie, and General  
4 Domingo. These were the senior people. Even Ibrahim Bah was a  
13:28:03 5 junior personnel when they came. In fact Ibrahim Bah did not  
6 even work directly with me. That's how junior he was. He was  
7 not assigned to me as a special bodyguard and even this guy was  
8 not assigned to me as a special bodyguard.

9 Q. Which guy?

13:28:18 10 A. This Camara man here.

11 Q. Suwandi Camara?

12 A. Suwandi Camara was not assigned to me and I don't think he  
13 claims it in his text. The junior people, what we did was to  
14 take the most senior people that were special bodyguards around  
13:28:33 15 me. Yanks who had been a former school teacher, very educated.  
16 Yanks, Domingo, these were the senior people, but the junior  
17 people were not close to me. I did not really know a lot of  
18 them, no.

19 Q. And so far as Bah travelling backwards and forwards to  
13:28:50 20 Sierra Leone, what do you say about that?

21 A. Well, the best I can say, within that window that we had  
22 contact with Foday Sankoh, I cannot confirm or deny that he could  
23 have gone to Sierra Leone. He very well could have.

24 Q. No, no, no. "He very well could have", what I am talking  
13:29:11 25 about is more specific; him going backwards and forwards?

26 A. I don't know. I really wouldn't know.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps we will leave it there,  
28 Mr Griffiths.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: We will adjourn for lunch now and we will  
2 reconvene at 2.30.

3                           [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

4                           [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:31:21 5           PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

6           MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

7           Q. Mr Taylor, before lunch I was putting to you evidence given  
8 by one Suwandi Camara which directly affects you, yes?

9           A. Yes.

14:31:48 10          Q. Now, moving on. Now, he went on to say, did this witness,  
11 on 8 February 2008 at page 3483:

12                   "A. In the context of SBU's, I'm referring to the SBU  
13 company that came there for training, I cannot say their  
14 number.

14:32:26 15          Q. And to clarify, what were the age group of these SBU  
16 companies?

17                   A. The youngsters that came there, the commander of SBU,  
18 Supoon, was not more - at the time I know him, his age  
19 was not more than 16 years. These people, these SBUs, many  
14:32:47 20 - in many occasion, their age is 15 years, 14 years, 13  
21 years, that is what my estimate can give me.

22                   Q. Do you know how to spell Supoon?

23                   A. I will try. I don't know whether I'll be able to do it  
24 correctly, but I will try. S-U-P-O-O-N.

14:33:10 25          Q. And who was Supoon?

26                   A. He was SBU commander. He was the SBU commander. He  
27 was working at the mansion ground. Charles Taylor's  
28 mansion ground.

29                   Q. When did you see Supoon for the first time?

1 A. When I know Supoon was 1991. The first time I arrived  
2 in Liberia, I know Supoon.

3 Q. And, if any, what was his rank at that time?

4 A. He was at that time called brigadier general.

14:33:40 5 Q. How old was he when you met him, when you saw him for  
6 the first time?

7 A. I believe he could be 15 to 16 years, but I don't think  
8 he is 16 years.

9 Q. Did he report to anyone, Supoon?

14:33:54 10 A. Supoon was at Charles Taylor's mansion ground and I  
11 believe Supoon's report used to be given to Charles Taylor  
12 himself, to my belief, because Supoon is a commander of his  
13 own and at that time, wherever Charles was going, Supoon  
14 used to be among his convoy."

14:34:25 15 Now, Mr Taylor, do you know anyone called Supoon?

16 A. No, I do not.

17 Q. Do you know someone who was - who was the head of the SBUs?

18 A. We did not have a military SBU in the NPFL.

19 Q. Were there youngsters in the NPFL?

14:34:50 20 A. Well, there were some teenagers that were soldiers of age  
21 but not military personnel under that particular age.

22 Q. Persons under that particular age, how did you style them?

23 A. Well, people that were under the age of 18 were not trained  
24 as military personnel in the NPFL.

14:35:16 25 Q. What were they used for?

26 A. Well, they were family members associated with soldiers  
27 that went with them from - that helped to take care of them in  
28 their homes and were used by them, cooking for them, but they  
29 were not recruits of the NPFL.

1 Q. Did they have a commander?

2 A. No, no, no, they did not have any command structure. If  
3 you had a bigger brother, you follow him, you were with him, but  
4 there was no fixed command structure of any group calling itself  
14:35:52 5 SBU.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, what does the phrase  
7 "teenagers who were soldiers of age" mean?

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. That was an answer you gave at line 12, Mr Taylor, at page  
14:36:11 10 94 of today's transcript. What did you mean by that?

11 A. I said teenagers of --

12 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: The record has you as saying "there were  
13 some teenagers who were soldiers of age but not military  
14 personnel."

14:36:25 15 THE WITNESS: No, no, then they got it wrong. How would  
16 you be a teenager - a soldier of age but not military? No, I  
17 said, people that were under 18 were not considered as military  
18 personnel. We had teenage individuals, 18, 19, that were  
19 military people, yes. Then he put it in wrongly.

14:36:50 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Right. I'm going on to another matter.

22 A. Excuse me, counsel, before you go further, if I understood  
23 a reading back there relating to the year 1991 when this  
24 gentleman says - claims that he - this is his first time to  
14:37:08 25 Liberia and he is meeting Supoon. You just read it. I can  
26 scroll back.

27 Q. Yes. This was:

28 "Q. He was SBU commander. He was the SBU commander. He  
29 was working at the mansion ground, Charles Taylor's mansion

1 ground. When did you see Supoon for the first time?

2 A. When I know Supoon was 1991. The first time I arrived  
3 in Liberia, I know Supoon."

4 A. Well, that's an interesting twist then. That's an  
14:37:46 5 interesting twist because, if this gentleman came to Liberia in  
6 1991, when I know - I know that the Gambians that came, then  
7 there is - maybe that's why I don't know this man, and then there  
8 is something wrong mere, because the Gambians that came to  
9 Liberia came with me in 1990 along with Dr Manneh. So who this  
14:38:09 10 man is, it may just maybe take another Gambian to - I don't  
11 dispute that. If he came into Liberia for the first time in  
12 1991, then he is a year late. Where is he coming from? Where is  
13 he coming from? He may be a Gambian, but he may just maybe be a  
14 friend of somebody that comes in. That's why I don't know him,  
14:38:30 15 okay? Because the Gambians came in 1990 with Dr Manneh and he  
16 want to be coming in April, May of 1990.

17 So I don't - that's why I don't know this man. And it just  
18 struck me when I saw the year, "when I first came to Liberia in  
19 1991," I don't know how he got into Liberia. Maybe one of these  
14:38:49 20 Gambians may have been a relative of his and he came later, but -  
21 I mean, I see why I don't know him. So this year, 1991, he is  
22 setting out as the first time he comes to Liberia. So I just  
23 thought to mention that.

24 Q. Very well. Thank you. We're grateful for that. Moving  
14:39:11 25 on. The witness also went on to say this, Mr Taylor, and this is  
26 page 3487 of the transcript of 8 February 2008:

27 "Q. What, if anything, happened in the base, in Gbatala  
28 base at the end of three months' training?

29 A. In many occasions, before these recruits are passed

1 out, we used to inform our leader, General Yeaten, SSS  
2 commander. When we inform him, he used to inform Charles  
3 Taylor. Charles Taylor used to come to the base to visit  
4 the recruits, their passing out day. He used to bring - he  
14:39:56 5 used to bring cattle and some food for the recruits. And  
6 when they are passing out, he used to attend the passing  
7 out parade, and that is Charles Taylor. He used to talk to  
8 the recruits.

9 Q. How do you know that, Mr Witness?

14:40:12 10 A. I said I was a training instructor in the base. What  
11 happens in the base is what I am telling you.

12 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Werner, what is it that Mr Taylor used  
13 to bring for the recruits exactly? Was it cattle and food?

14 MR WERNER: I will attempt to clarify that:

14:40:37 15 Q. Mr Witness, just before you go on, can you go over that  
16 again and explain during the passing out day what Mr Taylor  
17 used to bring to the recruits?

18 A. I said he used to bring - he used to give us cattle,  
19 sometimes two, three. He used to bring it to the base. He  
14:40:55 20 used to bring rice also, oil, onion were to be used to cook  
21 - for cooking. Sometimes when he is coming, he used to

22 come advance commander's badge which he was going to give  
23 to the various units, and he attends the passing out parade  
24 that used to be there. I mean, Charles Taylor himself used  
14:41:17 25 to be present and he used to speak to the children before  
26 we dispersed, dispatch them to their various units.

27 Q. Mr Witness, I asked you how did you know that, and you  
28 said that you were a training instructor at the base, and  
29 that what happened there, that is what you are telling us.

1 Did you see Charles Taylor at Cobra base, Gbatala?

2 A. On many occasions. Not three times, four times, five  
3 times, because the battalions we train at that base was  
4 more than ten.

14:41:56 5 Q. You said you saw Charles Taylor many times yourself at  
6 Gbatala during the passing out. So what did you see  
7 exactly?

8 A. He comes there. When Charles Taylor comes there, when  
9 we do the parade for him, after the disperse of the parade,  
14:42:14 10 already he used to address the children, the recruits.

11 Charles Taylor - and he doesn't only address them. He used  
12 to bring along badges which are distributed between the  
13 children which were used to be to stick to their uniforms.

14 Because of happiness - because of happiness, we used to  
14:42:33 15 sing songs and dance. And, in fact, Charles Taylor himself  
16 sometimes danced with us. After, when he goes home, then  
17 various unit commanders will come and take their people to  
18 their units.

19 Q. Before you told us about SBUs. Now, when you spoke  
14:42:51 20 about Charles Taylor coming, you said that he used to  
21 address the children. What did you mean when you said 'the  
22 children'?

23 A. The children are the recruits. That were the  
24 recruits."

14:43:11 25 Very well, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Now, first of all, was there a training base at Gbatala?

28 A. There was.

29 Q. Was it called Cobra base?

1 A. Yes, it was called Cobra base.

2 Q. Are you aware of the identities of training instructors at  
3 that base?

4 A. No. There were many I knew had a couple of Special Forces  
14:43:38 5 training there, but I did not know all of the training  
6 instructors there, no.

7 Q. Now, this witness appears to be suggesting that he was a  
8 training instructor at that base. Are you in a position to say  
9 whether that be true or false?

14:43:54 10 A. No, I'm not in a position to say true or false, but I do  
11 have some - I wouldn't know who was there, but there's some  
12 questions that comes to mind. If this man - this man was one of  
13 the Gambians that was trained and would have come to Liberia, he  
14 would have come earlier than 1991. If he came at the time he  
14:44:34 15 claims he came in 1991 and he went to Cobra base, then he is  
16 lying as an instructor because the military people that are with  
17 Dr Manneh came with me in 1990.

18 So he may have visited there and maybe one of the Gambians  
19 - in fact Domingo trained down there and some of the military  
14:44:58 20 people that we knew. In fact the chief of staff that was  
21 mentioned, Abdulai Bah, was trained there.

22 So my own thinking is that this guy probably went to the  
23 base, you understand me, because Gambians were there, but as an  
24 instructor I don't think so because to become an instructor at  
14:45:18 25 this base you would have had to be one of the Special Forces.  
26 You understand me? Because this was a base that trained some of  
27 our best people. And for him - for me not to know him, it simply  
28 means among the Gambians he was not a senior military officer.  
29 So he may have visited the base to visit with his brothers, but I



1 doubt very much if he was an instructor.

2 Q. This witness goes on to suggest that in effect children  
3 were being trained at that camp, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes, but he mixes it up. No, because as I'm reading the  
14:46:03 5 text he is saying recruits and children. I am not sure as to  
6 whether he is distinguishing between recruits and children or  
7 he's using children to mean all of the personnel. I don't know,  
8 because there were no children trained in Gbatala or no other  
9 base.

14:46:11 10 In fact the year he is talking about, 1991, some of our  
11 best came out of there including one that became General Cassius  
12 Jacob was trained by this particular time. In 1991 our best  
13 training class came out and most of them became commanders in the  
14 field.

14:46:32 15 Q. Now help us. When did this training base at Gbatala first  
16 open?

17 A. Gbatala opened I would say - I moved to Gbarnga in '91. I  
18 would say late '91, early '92. I would say about late '91, early  
19 1992 because this was one of the first things that we did. Now  
14:47:00 20 we were beginning to look for commanders of the future and it was  
21 a very, very, very well put together base. Not to forget that  
22 there are NPFL training bases - total number of training bases I  
23 would say could range to 15 or 20 bases around the country.

24 Now we created Gbatala as something like a Special Forces  
14:47:28 25 base. There were no kids, nothing. These were the best - what  
26 we did at Gbatala, we went around throughout the NPFL and most of  
27 the people that trained at Gbatala at this time were not ordinary  
28 green recruits, no, no, no, no, no. Some of the best fighting  
29 men in the field that showed promise were the people that were

1 brought to Gbatala and I say one of them that I remember very  
2 well that came out to become a senior commander was Cassius  
3 Jacob. So these were not green individuals. By green I mean you  
4 were just looking for fresh people, no. These were men that had  
14:48:06 5 been fighting and had shown promise and were brought to Gbatala  
6 and were trained by some of our best.

7 Q. But he is quite clearly saying here, Mr Taylor - this is  
8 why I want you to have the opportunity to address it - that it  
9 was children who were being trained at Gbatala?

14:48:24 10 A. That is a lie.

11 Q. What do you say about that?

12 A. That is a blatant lie and there will be witnesses to prove  
13 that it is a lie. It is a lie.

14 Q. And he goes on in fact to embellish that account by saying  
14:48:37 15 that you would bring along cattle and food and the like it would  
16 appear as some reward at their passing out ceremony, the  
17 children?

18 A. Not children. I attended on most of these bases when  
19 there's a major graduation. That turnout he is talking about is  
14:49:01 20 graduation. A major graduation let's say with this special  
21 group, I would go and on that day as an appreciation for what  
22 they have done I will probably carry something, we would have a  
23 big - I will let them cook for everybody and they will eat.

24 This boy was around - apparently he was around and he  
14:49:19 25 picked up a lot of side information, but most of this other stuff  
26 I want to believe he observed, okay, this particular graduation  
27 because his brothers were there like Abdulai Bah and senior  
28 people and probably just to make people believe that he is so  
29 important. But this boy, I want to bet anything that he is not a

1 military personnel.

2 Q. So do you accept, Mr Taylor, because I want the record to  
3 be clear about this, that you would on such graduation occasions  
4 perhaps bring cattle, rice, oil and the like as suggested by the  
14:49:59 5 witness?

6 A. Yes, I don't deny that. Yes.

7 Q. And that you would on occasions dance with them?

8 A. No. There's no dancing. At a graduation they are showing  
9 the commander in chief what they have learned. It is not a

14:50:17 10 festival. There is no dancing. At the parade they will show  
11 different tactics, what they learned. They will do demonstration  
12 of tactics. They will use wooden - pieces of wood as guns and  
13 they will demonstrate. I will come in and as an appreciation for  
14 a jolly ceremony I would probably bring a cow and say, "Well,

14:50:40 15 this is available." They will kill it, cook and everybody will  
16 eat as an act of appreciation for what - there's no dancing and  
17 whatchamacallit. Maybe they will dance after doing the eating,  
18 because I'm not even there when they cook and eat. No, there's  
19 no dancing.

14:50:59 20 Q. Very well. Let's move on and deal with another aspect of  
21 his testimony. This is 11 February 2008, page 3514 of the  
22 transcript:

23 "Q. So what if anything happened, Mr Witness, when you  
24 gathered and had a meeting and informed Jackson?

14:51:25 25 A. Jackson informed Charles Taylor. When he informed  
26 Charles - when he inform him - when he informed Charles  
27 Taylor then Jackson told us that Charles Taylor said that  
28 he communicated with RUF soldiers in Sierra Leone so that  
29 they can give reinforcement to Mustapha to come to Gbarnga.

1 Q. And what if anything happened after that, Mr Witness?

2 A. After that RUF soldiers who first came to give Mustapha  
3 reinforcement to come to Gbarnga to open the road for him  
4 to Gbarnga.

14:52:08 5 Q. How did you know that RUF soldiers came to give  
6 Mustapha reinforcement to come to Gbarnga?

7 A. Tell him that when the day that communication was done  
8 when Jackson was doing the communication we went to  
9 Gbarnga. He also responded that the old man told him that  
10 he was informed the RUF soldiers to give reinforcements to  
11 Mustapha Jallow to come to Gbarnga.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm a little confused. I understood this  
13 meeting followed the death of Mustapha Jallow and we are  
14 now having Mustapha Jallow reinforced.

14:52:52 15 MR VERNER: Your Honour, I believe that he said the alleged  
16 death but I will try --

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: You say the alleged death? We are still  
18 not clear if it is alleged or actual.

19 THE WITNESS: I said that was not true. He was not dead.  
20 Mustapha was not killed.

14:53:09 21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Now I understand. We could have had that  
22 a little earlier.

23 MR WERNER:

24 Q. Now, Mr Witness, you said that RUF soldiers came to  
14:53:24 25 give Mustapha reinforcement. If you know, who came to give  
26 Mustapha reinforcement?

27 A. Tell him that the first person who came was the  
28 commander of RUF. He is called General Pa Jean. He was  
29 the one who led the RUF soldiers to reinforce Mustapha

1 Jallow to Gbarnga.

2 Q. Mr Witness, what if anything happened when Pa Jean led  
3 RUF soldiers to reinforce Mustapha Jallow?

14:54:06

4 A. Tell him that when Pa Jean led these soldiers to  
5 reinforce Mustapha they came by the bush to Gbarnga but on  
6 their way Pa Jean died but when they were reaching  
7 Waterside between Bong County and Lofa, at that time Morris  
8 Kallon - Morris Kallon was in charge of RUF soldiers but I  
9 will let you - I will clear one thing to you."

14:54:30

10 Now, Mr Taylor, who is Mustapha Jallow?

11 A. Mustapha Jallow is one of the Gambian soldiers. He was a  
12 general. I know Mustapha very well.

13 Q. And this incident described by the witness of Mustapha  
14 Jallow being reinforced by RUF combatants?

14:55:05

15 A. I have no idea what this man is talking about here about  
16 reinforcing Mustapha Jallow. I really don't know what he is  
17 talking about.

14:55:25

18 Q. But he begins in this way, Mr Taylor: "Jackson told us  
19 that Charles Taylor said that he" - that's you - "communicated  
20 with RUF soldiers in Sierra Leone so that they can give  
21 reinforcement to Mustapha to come to Gbarnga."

14:55:55

22 A. You know, this is total nonsense. That's why I'm saying I  
23 don't know what he's talking about. Reinforcement to come to  
24 Gbarnga. Gbarnga is attacked in 1994. Gbarnga is attacked, so  
25 who is coming - what reinforcement would be coming to Gbarnga to  
26 do what? Gbarnga is attacked in 1994. There is no contact with  
27 the RUF.

28 I really don't think - I do not know. He what he is  
29 talking about here is total foolishness. There is no such thing

1 as Mustapha Jallow waiting for reinforcements. General M Jallow  
2 was in fact not commanding any group. He was a general. He is  
3 one of those individuals that moved around a lot doing inspection  
4 and different things. Very, very, very decent man and an older  
14:56:35 5 type fellow. He was not involved in day-to-day combat. So I  
6 really don't know what this boy is talking about here.

7 Q. Well, let's break it down and see if we can make any sense  
8 out of it, Mr Taylor.

9 A. Okay.

14:56:47 10 Q. Can you think of any circumstance in which Gbarnga would  
11 need to be reinforced?

12 A. No, no, no, no. The only time Gbarnga ever came under  
13 attack was the joint attack by ULIMO and others in 1994 as --

14 Q. Now help us. In 1994 - and I know this is terrain we've  
14:57:17 15 covered on more than one occasion - was the NPFL in contact with  
16 the RUF?

17 A. No. We were not in contact with the RUF. And in fact the  
18 areas that controlled the whole border with Sierra Leone was  
19 controlled by ULIMO as far back as 1992.

14:57:38 20 Q. Now, what about this business of you having communicated  
21 with RUF soldiers?

22 A. Total, total nonsense. Total lie. How would I communicate  
23 with RUF soldiers? RUF is not even in the picture. We have had  
24 our day with RUF ended in 1992. ULIMO is in full control. It is  
14:58:01 25 ULIMO that attacked Gbarnga. To reinforce Gbarnga by the RUF, it  
26 simply means what? That the RUF has to fight from the border  
27 with Liberia, that is at Mendekoma, and the map we've gone  
28 through that. They would have to come Mendekoma, Foya, Kolahun,  
29 Voinjama, Zorzor. They would have to fight through the entire

1 ULIMO line to reach to Gbarnga, so there is no such thing. Upon  
2 1994 - at no other time did Gbarnga come under any attack except  
3 in 1994.

4 Q. Now what about an RUF commander called General Pa Jean?

14:58:56 5 A. I have no knowledge of who this gentleman is and if he had  
6 been any serious general amongst the RUF and other Sierra  
7 Leoneans that came before this Court, at least if he was that  
8 important some - his name would have at least dropped somewhere.  
9 I mean, this - I don't know him. I don't know any General Pa  
14:59:23 10 Jean. Don't know him.

11 Q. But he is supposed to be the commander of this  
12 reinforcement force, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Well, I tell you what, this boy - this is a pure, pure  
14 fabrication on the part of this boy who does not know what he is  
14:59:39 15 talking about and probably just called him General Pa Jean.

16 Q. Well, the witness went on to say this, page 3518,  
17 transcript of 11 February, line 19:

18 "Q. Now, what, if anything, happened after that?

19 A. Tell him that when Mustapha reported at Gbarnga,  
15:00:09 20 Charles Taylor told him to go and rest for a while. So  
21 while he was resting, Charles Taylor made an initiation to  
22 attack ULIMO because at that time they had a discussion. I  
23 don't know whether Ghana - for the ceasefire.

24 Q. Who had a discussion at that time for the ceasefire?

15:00:31 25 A. Tell him Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah, the warring  
26 factions had a meeting. I forgot the country, whether  
27 Ghana or Mali.

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Werner, I don't understand. What is  
29 an initiation to attack? 'Charles Taylor made an

1 initiation to attack ULIMO.' What is that?

2 MR WERNER: I will try to clarify:

15:01:08

3 Q. Mr Witness, you appear to have said that Charles Taylor  
4 made an initiation to attack ULIMO. What do you mean when  
5 you said that?

6 A. This is what I am saying. After ULIMO had attacked -  
7 but he must plan it, because if he did not plan, they will  
8 say he has broken the agreement of ceasefire. This was the  
9 time he formed the group called LDF.

15:01:28

10 Q. So you said after ULIMO had attacked, he must plan it.  
11 Who are you talking about?

12 A. Can you repeat your question? That is not clear to me  
13 because I'm not talking about ULIMO.

15:01:44

14 Q. The answer you gave, Mr Witness, as it appears on the  
15 screen, was that, 'after ULIMO had attacked, he must plan  
16 it, because if he did not plan, they will say he has broken  
17 the agreement of ceasefire.' Who are you talking about?

15:02:07

18 A. I said ULIMO-K were responsible for Lofa, and during  
19 their discussion, they had a ceasefire agreement, the  
20 discussion between Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah. But  
21 Charles Taylor did not want Lofa to be under the  
22 responsibility of ULIMO. I said that it was the time he  
23 decided to form a group that will attack ULIMO so that his  
24 name could not be mentioned. This was the time he formed  
25 LDF. Charles Taylor formed LDF."

15:02:28

26 Now, let's take that in more digestible bites, Mr Taylor.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. "Now, remember, tell him that when Mustapha reported at  
29 Gbarnga." Now, remember the previous passage we looked at, RUF



1 reinforcement are coming to Gbarnga to reinforce Mustapha Jallow,  
2 yes?

3 A. Uh-huh.

15:03:05

4 Q. And you recall explaining before that ULIMO were in control  
5 of the area at this time.

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And it's in this context that the witness says, "Charles  
8 Taylor made an initiation to attack ULIMO." Yes?

9 A. Uh-huh.

15:03:17

10 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor. Can you explain how it is that  
11 you're initiating to attack ULIMO and at the same time asking for  
12 reinforcements from Sierra Leone for Gbarnga?

13 A. That's why I'm saying this man apparently is not a military  
14 man. I can see he - this boy - I see why I don't know him. He  
15 is not a military man. But when he refers to Alhaji Kromah and  
16 Charles Taylor in a meeting, this is what I keep referring to, he  
17 is talking about 1994, which makes it even --

15:03:44

18 Q. How do you know that?

15:04:05

19 A. Because in 1994, Gbarnga came under attack while we are at  
20 Akosombo for the peace agreement, Gbarnga comes under attack and  
21 Gbarnga is captured. So when he talks about the attack on  
22 Gbarnga, he is speaking about 1994. Then he brings about Alhaji  
23 Kromah and he doesn't know which other country. So this  
24 Akosombo, Ghana, in 1994.

15:04:26

25 Now, this being the case, I don't see how under the same  
26 breath he can be talking about reinforcement and making  
27 arrangement to attack ULIMO when ULIMO is already in Gbarnga.  
28 ULIMO attacked Gbarnga and captured Gbarnga in 1994 while I was  
29 away in Akosombo and we had to come back and fight for three

1 months to regain it. So, I mean, he's got it wrong, and I don't  
2 know how these people manage to make up these things. He does  
3 not know what he is talking about. He doesn't know.

4 Q. Mr Taylor, did you form LDF?

15:05:12 5 A. No, I did not form LDF.

6 Q. What is LDF?

7 A. LDF is the Lofa Defence Force.

8 Q. So if you didn't form it, who did?

9 A. The LDF was formed by a gentleman called Francois  
15:05:27 10 Massaquoi. He is late now, but the deputy to him is - was a  
11 gentleman called - oh, Mike Thomas. And what the LDF was at the  
12 time - when ULIMO captured Lofa over those years, Lomas --

13 Q. What?

14 A. Lomas. Lomas. The individual - oh, okay, I need to  
15:06:01 15 clarify this for the Court. The individuals from Lofa County,  
16 the tribe in Lofa County is called the Loma tribe, which are one  
17 of our members of our team, Counsel Supuwood, is Loma.

18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: How do you spell that?

19 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, your Honour. It is L-O-M-A, Loma.  
15:06:25 20 These are - this is the tribe. The Lomas that were behind the  
21 line in ULIMO territory and those that were in Guinea formed a  
22 group, what they say, to remove ULIMO from their soil. We could  
23 not be a part of that because we had an agreement, okay? Because  
24 the Lomas were fighting an insurgency in ULIMO.

15:06:54 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. You had an agreement with whom?

27 A. We had the Akosombo agreement. All of these peace  
28 agreements, we had the Cotonou agreement, so we could not break  
29 the agreement. But the Lomas that had stationed themselves in

1 the forest and different things, because - and this is factual -  
2 because ULIMO-K was predominantly Mandingos and because most of  
3 them were from Guinea, the Lomas in the area decided that they  
4 would resist the Mandingos that had come from Guinea to occupy  
15:07:27 5 their towns and villages and secret societies, and it is the  
6 Lomas - in fact, Mike Thomas is alive and well, and I'm sure that  
7 he may have an opportunity to explain this.

8 Q. And so when was that group, the LDF, formed?

9 A. Oh, I would say the LDF was formed - at least we've heard  
15:07:48 10 about them, I would say beginning late 1992, early '93, the LDF  
11 came into being.

12 Q. And what does LDF stand for?

13 A. Lofa Defence Force.

14 Q. And for how long did they remain in existence?

15:08:08 15 A. They remained in existence until 1995 when there was the  
16 peace that came into being.

17 Q. Now, on that same topic, that same witness, on 11 February  
18 2008, page 3537 of the transcript, said this:

19 "Q. Now, if you know from, what sources did the LDF get  
15:08:52 20 the arms and ammunition from?

21 A. Tell him, the start of the war, I told you, LDF was a  
22 group formed by Charles Taylor himself. We used to take  
23 our supplies from Gbarnga. We have our arms and  
24 ammunition from that place.

15:09:12 25 Q. Now, if you know, who was issuing the weapons in  
26 Gbarnga?

27 A. Tell him that we used to take the weapons from Charles  
28 Taylor's mansion ground, from his armourer at his mansion  
29 ground. If I do not forget the man's name, he is Moses.

1 Q. Now, you told us this morning that the political leader  
2 of the LDF was a man called Yakbawalo. Now, what, if  
3 anything, did you hear Yakbawalo saying publicly about the  
4 LDF?

15:09:51 5 A. Tell him, yes, I heard.

6 Q. What did you hear, Mr Witness?

7 A. Tell him that Yakbawalo has even spoke in BBC to say  
8 that he is the leader of the LDF because the Lofa people  
9 want their freedom. That is why he led people from Lofa to  
10 fight against ULIMO. He said this group is not the same as  
11 NPFL group. I personally heard that from BBC. That  
12 interview, I could recall, was done in Guinea."

13 Now, first of all, does the name Yakbawalo mean anything to  
14 you, Mr Taylor?

15:10:34 15 A. Nothing whatsoever. Nothing whatsoever. The leader of the  
16 LDF that I knew that came to my attention was Francois Massaquoi.

17 Q. Now, what about this suggestion that the LDF were provided  
18 with arms and ammunition from your mansion ground in Gbarnga?

19 A. Well, you see, that's what's wrong with these boys. Why  
15:10:58 20 would Yakbawalo be speaking from Guinea if he is in Gbarnga?

21 Q. Well, I don't understand, Mr Taylor, could you explain  
22 that?

23 A. These boys - this is the - this is the problem with this  
24 whole - these boys get up and destroy people by lies and rumours.

15:11:17 25 Yakbawulo or Yakbawalo, whatever he is talking about here, is  
26 supposed to be speaking from Guinea as the LUF leader, but he is  
27 in Gbarnga, and - so, in fact, the way how he puts this, counsel,  
28 I stand corrected on this, when he is saying "we", he makes  
29 himself a part of the LDF. If I'm reading him properly, he says,

1 "We used to take our arms from Gbarnga."

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. So he is now making himself a part of the LDF. I don't  
4 understand this, okay? The LDF does not get any arms from  
15:11:54 5 Gbarnga. The LDF, I said before this Court earlier, was  
6 operating out of Lofa and some of their expatriates - I mean,  
7 their citizens in Guinea. Now, for him to say that this man is  
8 in Guinea and he is coming to Gbarnga to collect arms, that's a  
9 lie. That's not true.

15:12:20 10 The LDF operated out of Lofa. They carried out attacks  
11 against ULIMO-K, and they got some little assistance, because in  
12 Guinea there are also the Lomas in Guinea, but in Guinea they  
13 call them Toma, okay. And I mentioned to you - to this Court  
14 some time before, that whole Guinea corridor from Nzerekore  
15:12:47 15 coming on through Liberia and going into Sierra Leone, I  
16 mentioned it before, is a group calling themselves the Mende Mai.  
17 These are the people that constitute the Poro, we've talked about  
18 it here, and the Sani societies in West Africa. They are like  
19 brothers and sisters. They are Lomas called Toma in Guinea.

15:13:07 20 They speak the same language, and these people are  
21 traditionalists. And this whole organisation that was set up  
22 were traditional people that said they could not permit these  
23 people to come and destroy their secret societies and they  
24 started their own insurgency in ULIMO area against them. No arms  
15:13:26 25 came from the NPFL.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before you move away from that,  
27 Mr Griffiths, I'm not sure if we've had Mende Mai before.

28 Do you have a spelling for that, Mr Taylor?

29 THE WITNESS: I'll spell it like I did before. I missed

1 it. I think it's M-E-N-D-E, Mende; Mai, M-A-I. Mende Mai refer  
2 to a group of individuals that sit in the corridor between Guinea  
3 straight up into Sierra Leone. If I'm not mistaken, your Honour,  
4 I stand corrected, I think it's in the records.

15:14:07

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm not sure I understand, so can I, through  
7 you, seek some clarification. So the LDF are operating within  
8 ULIMO territory, are they?

9 A. That is correct.

15:14:21

10 Q. And you are positing that what the witness is describing  
11 are events in 1994?

12 A. Well, yes. Yes, I have to say so, from the description of  
13 the attack on Gbarnga and all of this, yes.

14 Q. Now, help me with this: At that time, who controlled Lofa?

15:14:40

15 A. Oh, ULIMO. ULIMO is in full control of Lofa.

16 Q. And help me, in which county is Gbarnga?

17 A. Gbarnga is in Bong County. Bong, B-O-N-G. Bong County.

18 Q. Now help me. In order to obtain supplies from the mansion  
19 ground in Gbarnga, what would the LDF in Lofa within ULIMO

15:15:05

20 territory have to do?

21 A. They would have to come through ULIMO territory before they  
22 get to Gbarnga.

23 Q. Yes?

24 A. And if they get material they would have to go back through  
25 ULIMO territory.

15:15:17

26 Q. Back to Lofa?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now as far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, at that time was  
29 such a venture militarily possible?

1 A. No. It was not militarily possible. And if I remind the  
2 Court, the dividing line I have put in evidence here between  
3 ULIMO and the NPFL is the St Paul River at the so-called St Paul  
4 River Bridge. We've covered that before. And this is a huge  
15:18:01 5 river and it's a bridge that's the only crossing point. ULIMO is  
6 on the other side, the NPFL is on the Bong County side. So you  
7 would have to go through that bridge where there are hundreds of  
8 soldiers on both sides and the long riverbanks, it just wouldn't  
9 work. And the St Paul is the second largest river in Liberia.

15:16:15 10 Q. And help me, did you have a Moses working at the mansion  
11 ground, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, there was a Moses working at the Executive Mansion  
13 Ground, yes.

14 Q. And what was the role assigned to that Moses?

15:16:31 15 A. Moses was one of the boys that worked in the warehouse in  
16 Gbarnga under - he worked under a gentleman called Kai Sonnie.  
17 He was - he worked under Kai Sonnie.

18 Q. Give us a spelling for Kai Sonnie, please?

19 A. Kai is K-A-I. The last name is S-O-N-N-I-E.

20 Q. And what was Kai Sonnie's role?

21 A. Kai Sonnie was in charge of the warehouses of food and  
22 ammunition in Gbarnga.

23 Q. And Moses?

24 A. The Moses that I know that worked with Kai at that  
15:17:15 25 particular time was called Moses Duo who worked with Kai. I'm  
26 not sure if that's the same, but that's the Moses I know.

27 Q. Moses?

28 A. Duo. That's spelled D-U-O.

29 Q. Have we encountered that individual before, Moses Duo?

1 A. Not in this Court, no.

2 Q. I think we have encountered a Moses Duo before?

3 A. Not that I know of.

4 Q. We might have to come back to that. Mr Taylor, let's just  
15:18:07 5 pause for a minute. How many Moses Duos do you know?

6 A. I only know one Moses Duo. I only know one Moses Duo.

7 Q. And what was the role of the Moses Duo you know?

8 A. Moses Duo was one of the boys that worked in the warehouses  
9 in Gbarnga that I know of.

10 Q. Did that Moses Duo have any other role?  
15:18:37

11 A. No, no. That was it. He worked in the warehouse and  
12 that's the Duo that I know.

13 Q. Right. I am going back to the transcript of the evidence  
14 of this witness:

15 "Q. And, Mr Witness, was that true that this group was not  
16 the same as NPFL as you heard Yakbawalo saying on the BBC?

17 A. Tell him that was not true. That was just the coverage  
18 for the international world.

19 Q. Now when did you hear Yakbawalo on the BBC? Can you  
15:19:25 20 remember the date?

21 A. Tell him it was in 1993. I cannot remember the month  
22 but he gave the speech in 1993.

23 Q. Now, Mr Witness, what if anything during this same time  
24 period - what if anything did you hear Charles Taylor  
15:19:47 25 saying publicly about the LDF?

26 A. To talk about LDF what?

27 Q. You told us you heard Yakbawalo talking about the LDF  
28 on BBC. My question was what if anything did you hear  
29 Charles Taylor saying publicly about the LDF?



1 A. Yes, Charles Taylor himself was interviewed about the  
2 LDF. He said he doesn't know anything about the LDF. He  
3 said Lofa people form a group to secure to protect their  
4 county. He has no hand about LDF. That in Charles  
15:20:25 5 Taylor's speech when he was interviewed."  
6 Now pause there. Do you recall being interviewed about the  
7 LDF, Mr Taylor?  
8 A. No, I have no recollection. It could have happened but I  
9 don't have any recollection around this time of any --  
15:20:50 10 Q. 1993 is the year given by this witness?  
11 A. 1993. I can't recall. I very well could have done an  
12 interview and said exactly that, which is true, I didn't know  
13 about them, but I don't recall right now.  
14 Q. Now, did you have any hand in the LDF?  
15:21:12 15 A. None whatsoever.  
16 Q. So where this witness said that you don't know anything  
17 about the LDF and had you no hand about the LDF, as he puts it,  
18 was that correct?  
19 A. That is totally correct. If I did an interview I told the  
15:21:34 20 truth in that interview that probably people will be thinking  
21 that, "Oh, maybe the NPFL is back" - no, no, no. I made it very  
22 clear we had nothing to do with the LDF.  
23 Q. Now, on that question of Moses, the witness goes on to say  
24 this:  
15:21:55 25 "Q. Just one moment. Now, Mr Witness, I am told that the  
26 record is not clear about Moses and so I apologise for  
27 that. But I will just come back and ask one question again  
28 about Moses. You told us about Moses in Gbarnga. Now, who  
29 was Moses again in Gbarnga, if you can remember?

1 A. Moses was - he was the armoury commander. He was the  
2 one responsible for the armoury in Gbarnga. He was the one  
3 who used to give the supplies for arms and ammunition."  
4 True or false, Mr Taylor?

15:22:33 5 A. Totally false. Moses was not at the level to - he worked  
6 in the warehouse. Moses was not the armourer. To become an  
7 armourer over there we had colonel I think John Duo that was  
8 armourer for - because to be an armourer for us, I don't know  
9 what other militaries do, you had to know about arms, their  
15:22:59 10 specification, the type of arms and Moses was not at this level  
11 to - no.

12 Q. "Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. Now this morning you told us  
13 that you and Mustapha Jallow, at the end of your assignment  
14 with the LDF you retreated. Do you remember that?"

15:23:23 15 Let us pause. Do you recall, Mr Taylor, assigning anyone  
16 to the LDF?

17 A. No, not at all. Not at all.

18 Q. Specifically did you assign this man Suwandi Camara along  
19 with Mustapha Jallow to the RUF?

15:23:43 20 A. Not at all. But in fact Suwandi is saying remember he was  
21 as an instructor in 1991. An instructor of that military  
22 calibre, you would not be in the field - military field like  
23 that, no. Nothing of this thing ever happened this way, no.  
24 Special Forces to be assigned in the - where would he be in Lofa?  
15:24:07 25 Because Mustapha Jallow is a Special Force. Very, very, very  
26 trained man, Mustapha Jallow. He is alive and not well, but he  
27 is alive. So where in Lofa would he fight? No. That is not  
28 true.

29 Q. Well, I'll tell you, because he goes on to say in his

1 answer, line 27, page 3538:

2 "Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. Now, this morning you told us  
3 that you and Mustapha Jallow, at the end of your assignment  
4 with the LDF you retreated. Do you remember that?

15:24:44 5 A. Tell him I can remember that when ULIMO pushed us this  
6 was in Belle Fanai."

7 Do you know anything about that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. About what he is saying here when ULIMO pushed them in  
9 Belle Fanai? No. There is a town in Bong County called  
15:25:07 10 Belefanaï but that is --

11 Q. It may be my pronunciation, because it's actually spelt on  
12 the - I don't want to do a disservice to the witness. It is  
13 actually spelt on the record as B-E-L-L-E F-A-N-A-I. So it may  
14 well be my pronunciation. Now what are you saying about that  
15:25:28 15 location?

16 A. Belefanaï is a town in Bong County and he is saying that  
17 ULIMO pushed someone into Bong County. That's what I keep  
18 saying, the only time ULIMO entered Bong County was in 1994. It  
19 can't be 1993. ULIMO did not attack us in 1993. ULIMO attacked  
15:25:50 20 us and crossed the bridge and occupied Gbarnga in 1994 while I'm  
21 at Akosombo. So these years - besides these years, this, as he  
22 explained the year, never happened. And what he is explaining  
23 then about ULIMO coming and attacking across the bridge is in  
24 1994. So he's got it all wrong.

15:26:14 25 Q. "Q. We spelled that name already. What happened to the  
26 LDF troops at that time, if anything?

27 A. That was the time Charles Taylor gave an order and said  
28 LDF soldiers should withdraw from the front line. He said  
29 they handed over themselves to him. What he said over the

1 news that LDF soldiers have handed themselves over to him  
2 because ULIMO pushed them until they entered his territory  
3 in Gbarnga. On the ground he gave us the order to withdraw  
4 the LDF troops and took them to Gbatata base."

15:27:02 5 I don't understand that expression, Mr Taylor. What is it  
6 you want to say?

7 A. I mean nothing really. I'm just amazed how people put  
8 these things together what they don't know. I'm just amazed.  
9 I'm just amazed.

15:27:19 10 Q. Well, let's break it down, Mr Taylor, and see what you have  
11 to say about it. "Charles Taylor gave an order and said LDF  
12 soldiers should withdraw from the front line." True or false?

13 A. False. Totally false.

14 Q. On what basis do you say it's totally false?

15:27:46 15 A. Because I never gave any such order for LDF to withdraw  
16 from front line. Where is the front line? There is no front  
17 line at the time that this man is talking about because the only  
18 time - yes, there were conflicts between ULIMO and NPFL but the  
19 only time we had problems with ULIMO was in 1994 when ULIMO came.  
20 We pushed ULIMO back out of Gbarnga and that ended the conflict.

15:28:09 21 In 1995 I go to Monrovia and in going to Monrovia it brought  
22 total peace. The LDF disarmed at the time of the disarmament by  
23 ECOMOG. I mean, so what he is talking about here - I do not know  
24 what he is talking about here in dealing with ULIMO. I really  
15:28:38 25 don't, and I don't think he knows either.

26 Q. What about this suggestion that the LDF had been pushed out  
27 of, I presume, Lofa into Gbarnga by ULIMO? Did that occur?

28 A. No, that did not occur. That did not occur.

29 Q. And that you thereafter gave an order for the LDF soldiers

1 to be taken to Gbatala base?

2 A. No, that did not - after - at the time that ULIMO took  
3 Gbarnga, Gbatala base closed at the time of my movement to  
4 Monrovia. So by 1994, there was no Gbatala. Gbatala base was  
15:29:33 5 closed by this particular time, because following our - Gbatala  
6 is not far from Gbarnga. Gbatala is about, I would say, 5  
7 kilometres outside of Gbarnga. And at the time of the capture of  
8 Gbarnga - at the time of the capture of Gbarnga in 1994, no one  
9 was left - no one stayed at that base. There was total fighting  
15:30:05 10 from the two sides. Maybe - because to explain this, with the  
11 permission of the Court, I could probably do a little diagram to  
12 show the impossibility of what this boy is talking about.

13 Q. What do you need in order to do that?

14 A. A piece of paper and I can use a marker and we'll draw it,  
15:30:28 15 because we need to show the Court how ULIMO came into Gbarnga and  
16 from where, where is Gbatala - and, in fact, after I came from  
17 Akosombo, I was stationed in Ganta - to show the difficulties and  
18 why that base was dismantled at the coming in of ULIMO. So by  
19 saying that people were pushed and taken to Gbatala, that's a lie  
15:30:58 20 because Gbatala ended with the invasion of Gbarnga by ULIMO.

21 Q. Right. What I'm going to ask, first of all, is this  
22 Mr Taylor - yes, please, do move seats. And I would like you,  
23 first of all, please, to be given a copy of the map of Liberia we  
24 distributed, the map which looks like that. Mr Taylor, first of  
15:32:05 25 all, can you indicate on the map where Gbarnga is, please?

26 A. Here is Gbarnga here.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you've told us on more than one occasion  
28 that the St Paul River marked the boundary of ULIMO territory.

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Could you trace that river for us, please.

2 A. Do you want me to mark on the map?

3 Q. I think --

4 A. Or just trace.

15:32:46 5 Q. I think we have spare copies of that map. So you can mark  
6 on this map.

7 A. Okay. This would mark the St Paul. This is St Paul here.

8 Q. And when you say that it marked the boundary of ULIMO  
9 territory, did that boundary continue to the Atlantic Ocean?

15:33:26 10 A. Let me see. Yes, it continued to the Atlantic Ocean, yes.

11 Q. Well, can you indicate on the map --

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. -- how that boundary continues.

14 A. St Paul comes all the way down and it crosses here at  
15:33:53 15 Brewerville.

16 Q. Mr Taylor, just so that we are clear, the area to the left  
17 of the blue line you have marked, who controlled it?

18 A. ULIMO.

19 Q. Was this the position in 1994?

15:34:12 20 A. That was the position in 1994.

21 Q. Now, you were going on to indicate that you could  
22 demonstrate on a map in relation to Gbatala.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, do you need a blank piece of paper or can you use that  
15:34:29 25 map to indicate?

26 A. I can use this map.

27 Q. Okay. Now, what is it that you are telling us?

28 A. I will mark first, your Honours, and then explain, with  
29 your permission. This arrow here points to the direction that

1 ULIMO came over the St Paul River bridge through Belle Fanai into  
2 Gbarnga and occupied Gbarnga. Right down the road here where I  
3 marked here, this is Gbatala. What ULIMO did, in effect, during  
4 this particular time - and we've mentioned there's only one road  
15:35:50 5 from Monrovia all the way into Gbarnga. It continues on to Lofa  
6 and then comes on to Ganta on this side. By coming in here and  
7 cutting off this particular position, what ULIMO did was to  
8 separate NPFL troops on this side of Gbarnga from NPFL troops on  
9 this side of Gbarnga. Okay? That is, the NPFL by this time had  
15:36:21 10 troops all along this road all the way down to Kakata.

11 So, because of the proximity of Gbatala as a training base  
12 to Gbarnga, whilst ULIMO attacked here, from a military  
13 perspective, ULIMO did not just come and sit down in Gbarnga town  
14 and say, "Oh, we have it." They had to secure Gbarnga. What  
15:36:45 15 they tried to do within - they advanced all the way to Gbatala.  
16 They tried to secure about a three to five kilometre security  
17 corridor to protect their presence in Gbarnga. So they advanced  
18 all the way to Gbatala, because ULIMO, knowing that Gbatala was a  
19 training base, from a military perspective, the generals were  
15:37:12 20 good, they knew that they could not sit in Gbarnga with a major  
21 military training programme going on a few miles down the road.  
22 They actually attacked Gbatala base. We evacuated the base as  
23 soon as we knew that they were going to attack. So this  
24 explanation that Gbatala was in use or thereafter did not exist,  
15:37:35 25 following the dismantling of this base, we never rebuilt Gbatala  
26 up until 1995 when I went to Monrovia.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, so far so good. But just for future  
28 reference, I wonder if you could do this for me: The point where  
29 you've marked Gbatala, could you make that a bit more distinct?

1 Rather than a single line, could you make it a cross?

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. Yes?

4 A. Yes.

15:38:12 5 Q. And you've helpfully written underneath it "Gbatala." But  
6 before we go any further, you've made another marking to the  
7 right of that. What does that signify?

8 A. This signifies where I had to move my headquarters now from  
9 Gbarnga. Because Gbarnga is under attack, I had to move some  
10 almost 25 miles into Ganta. Ganta is also called Gompa, so it's  
11 the same place. So I would put this --

12 Q. What is that marking you've made there, Mr Taylor?

13 A. This would be my new headquarters.

14 Q. All right. Well, if you could write that next to it so  
15:38:55 15 that we know - and if you could write the explanation "NPFL  
16 headquarters moved from Gbarnga from this location following  
17 ULIMO incursion", all right?

18 A. Okay. I'll do that.

19 Q. So that when we come to this map in the future we know  
15:39:10 20 exactly what the markings represent. Do you follow me?

21 A. Yes, I do. Yes. Now, what I have written, your Honour, is  
22 "NPFL headquarters moved to the point marked below following the  
23 fall of Gbarnga in 1994".

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, is there anything else that you want to  
15:40:07 25 mark on that map whilst you're there?

26 A. No, not - well, in line with the evidence before us that -  
27 in fact, there is nothing new here, but I would like to mention  
28 one thing that, probably, you know, I'm sure we might be  
29 confronted with. To the left of this blue line is ULIMO.



1 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, that's what I was going to suggest. I'll  
2 tell you what you do, from that blue line to the Sierra Leonean  
3 border, can you just hatch it in, please, so we can be clear  
4 about it?

15:40:46 5 A. Yes, but let me be clearer because I don't want to mislead.  
6 We must understand that we are talking about at this time two  
7 ULIMOs, and I want to make it - it is occupied by ULIMO, but K is  
8 in this part and J is at the lower part.

9 Q. All right. I'll tell you what you do, put in the boundary  
15:41:04 10 between J and K.

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. Hatching one side in one direction, the other in the other  
13 direction, and then we'll put a key in in the Atlantic Ocean.

14 A. Okay. Very good.

15:41:33 15 Q. Maybe if we hatch one side in red and the other one in  
16 blue.

17 A. Just put arrows?

18 Q. Just put lines in.

19 A. Okay.

15:41:44 20 Q. Okay. And now, if you just put similar lines in in the  
21 Atlantic Ocean in red, first of all, and then explain what it is  
22 the hatched area in red signifies. Do you follow me? So come  
23 down here to the sea, Mr Taylor, yes?

24 A. Uh-huh.

15:42:03 25 Q. Draw some red lines like that and just put next to it what  
26 it represents on the map, all right? You follow me?

27 A. Okay. Oh, okay.

28 Q. Is that blue or red?

29 A. Red.

1 Q. Okay. And what does it represent?

2 A. I have written here "these lines represent areas occupied  
3 by ULIMO-K".

4 Q. Right. Now, do the same thing with the other area, please.

15:42:57 5 Exactly the same thing.

6 A. Would you suggest I do it in a different colour?

7 Q. Do it in the blue, please.

8 A. Very well. And should I make the same note?

9 Q. Yes, please.

15:43:17 10 A. What I have written here is that "these blue lines  
11 represent area occupied by ULIMO-J".

12 Q. I'm grateful.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: What about an arrow in the key showing  
14 the direction of the attack by ULIMO-K on Gbarnga.

15:44:15 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I think that would be helpful:

16 Q. Mr Taylor, you understand the helpful suggestion made by  
17 the --

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. -- I learned Presiding Judge. I think what would be helpful  
15:44:27 20 as well, Mr Taylor, just so that we can compress as much  
21 information into this document as possible, is to put beside the  
22 arrow you are now about to draw, right, that it represents the  
23 advance by ULIMO and capture of Gbarnga and the date when that  
24 occurred. Do you follow me?

15:44:48 25 A. Yes, I do. Now what I have written, your Honours, is the  
26 arrows represent the route and area of advance of ULIMO in the  
27 capture of Gbarnga in 1994 while I was at Akosombo, Ghana.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're talking there about will ULIMO-K,  
29 are we?

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour, let me be specific.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, before we go any further what I would like  
4 you to do, please, is to sign and date that map?

15:47:37 5 A. Yes, I'm through.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, could I ask, please, that the  
7 map marked by Charles Taylor showing the area occupied by ULIMO-K  
8 and J and the attack and capture of Gbarnga in 1994 be marked for  
9 identification MFI-261.

15:48:20 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that map is marked MFI-261.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

12 Q. Mr Taylor, I wonder if you could regain your seat, please.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. The witness went on, and we're still on page 3539 of the  
15 transcript, to say this:

16 "Q. So first you said that you heard that over the news.  
17 Which news are you talking about?

18 A. I meant BBC Focus on Africa. When we retreat he gave  
19 an interview about the whereabouts of the NPFL soldiers.

15:49:16 20 He said LDF soldiers handed themselves over to him so he  
21 retreated them and now they are - they are at Gbatala,  
22 Cobra base.

23 Q. You said that he gave us the order to withdraw the LDF  
24 soldiers and took them to Gbatala base. Who was the he?  
15:49:38 25 Who gave this order?

26 A. The man is Charles Taylor on the ground. What I was  
27 telling was not true when - what he said over the radio was  
28 not true.

29 Q. And when you say he gave us the order to withdraw the

1 LDF soldiers to Gbatala base who are the us?

2 A. That is we the LDF fighters, we the LDF soldiers,  
3 because we were the LDF soldiers."

4 As far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, any Gambians in the LDF?

15:50:14 5 A. None as far as I know. In fact the LDF - you had to - from  
6 my understanding a Gambian could not have been a part of the LDF  
7 and maybe a lot of other tribes in Liberia because to have - it  
8 was something like a traditional group. You had to be a  
9 traditionalist and mostly Loma. If you could not speak Loma I  
10 don't think you could have been in the LDF because I would - I  
11 would say that the man who ran the LDF was Loma, Francois, his  
12 deputy Loma, all of the people were Lomas so they could not have  
13 been in there.

14 Q. Now, let's deal with another aspect of this witness's  
15:51:09 15 testimony. Page 3544 of the transcript of 11 February 2008, line  
16 5:

17 "A. I said Charles Taylor called us, we the Gambians, who  
18 were at Gbatala base that we should come and be the mansion  
19 guards because at that time he did not trust his people.

15:51:44 20 Q. Just pause there, Mr Witness. When you said he did not  
21 trust his people, who are you talking about?

22 A. Tell him I said Liberians because he captured - he  
23 captured some of them. He captured some of them who he  
24 said were on the side of ULIMO. I am referring to  
15:52:03 25 Liberians.

26 Q. If you can remember, you said he captured some of them,  
27 who did he capture at that time?

28 A. Tell him his mansion chief of staff Cassius Jacobs was  
29 captured. He was in custody. I can remember Michael Seboe

1 who was the commander of the task force."

2 Pause for spellings.

3 "Q. Now you said that he captured Cassius Jacobs. What  
4 if anything happened to Cassius Jacobs.

15:52:39 5 A. Tell him when we recaptured Gbarnga the people I've  
6 just mentioned to you were killed. He killed all of them.

7 Q. Who killed all of them?

8 A. Charles Taylor.

9 Q. You told us about Cassius Jacobs and Michael Seboe. If  
10 you know who if anything - who else if anyone was captured  
11 after the recapture of Gbarnga?

12 A. Tell him I can remember six people but I can remember  
13 the name of three of them. They have Liberian names. It  
14 was a long time. I have forgotten those names, some names,

15:53:15 15 but I can remember Cassius Jacobs who was then the mansion  
16 chief of staff, his mansion chief of staff. I can remember  
17 Michael Seboe who was then the task force commander. I can  
18 remember Junior Goe who was then the delta force commander.

19 I can remember the name of these six - these three people,  
20 but there were other people who were with these six who  
21 were with these three commanders.

22 Q. Now what if anything happened to Junior Goe?

23 A. I said these people were all killed.

24 Q. And who killed them?

15:54:03 25 A. Charles Taylor gave order for them to be killed.

26 Q. And, if you know, why did he give this order?

27 A. According to what he said, these people connived with  
28 ULIMO. That's the reason why they captured Gbarnga.

29 Q. When you say that is the reason why they captured

1 Gbarnga, who are you talking about?

2 A. I mean ULIMO-K."

3 Now again let's attempt to unpack that. Cassius Jacobs,  
4 who is that?

15:54:38 5 A. Cassius Jacob was the general that was in charge of Gbarnga  
6 in 1994 when it was captured. That's why I keep saying that this  
7 boy is talking about '94 and he doesn't know what he is talking  
8 about here.

9 Q. Now let's just take time here. Was Cassius Jacobs the  
15:54:58 10 mansion chief of staff?

11 A. No, he was not. He was not chief of staff. In fact  
12 Cassius was the commander of the Executive Mansion Guard  
13 battalion.

14 Q. Was that separate from the mansion chief of staff?

15:55:17 15 A. The mansion did not have a chief of staff. Maybe in his  
16 interpretation, maybe not being a military man. The commander of  
17 the Executive Mansion Guard battalion, that word of chief of  
18 staff is not used for battalion commander. So I'm sure he must  
19 be referring to the overall commander and he is calling it the  
15:55:36 20 chief of staff.

21 Q. Do you know a Michael Seboe?

22 A. Yes, I do. I know Michael Seboe.

23 Q. Was he the task force commander?

24 A. Yes, Michael Seboe was the task force commander.

15:55:51 25 Q. Do you know a Junior Goe?

26 A. No, I did not know a Junior Goe. Well, I'll tell you what  
27 happened. I think here again there is a Junior Gaudi and I will  
28 give him the benefit, there's a Junior Gaudi but not --

29 Q. How do you spell --

1 A. G-A-U-L-L.

2 Q. G-A?

3 A. U-L-L. Some spell it just G-U-L-L - Gull.

4 Q. And what was Junior Gault's role?

15:56:21 5 A. Junior Gault's role was the - if I'm not mistaken, I don't  
6 know the unit he was assigned with but he was a commander.

7 Q. Was he the delta force commander?

8 A. No, that would have been a special force. He was one of  
9 the senior force commanders but he was not the delta force

15:56:47 10 commander.

11 Q. Now that we've dealt with the personalities, the suggestion  
12 is that following the capture of Gbarnga you allege that that  
13 occurred because these individuals connived with ULIMO. Is that  
14 true?

15:57:08 15 A. That is not an allegation. They were tried by military  
16 court martial.

17 Q. We might come to that soon, but was there an allegation  
18 that ULIMO's capture of Gbarnga was occasioned by connivance on  
19 the part of these named commanders?

15:57:34 20 A. No. No.

21 Q. What allegation was made against them then which resulted  
22 in their trial?

23 A. What happened with the Gbarnga situation was that they had  
24 connived with what we call the coalition forces that had allied  
15:58:01 25 themselves with ULIMO led then by Tom Womeiyu along with ECOMOG.  
26 They actually connived with ECOMOG and a breakaway group of the  
27 NPFL. Had nothing to do with ULIMO.

28 Q. Okay. Let's take that slowly. Tom?

29 A. Womeiyu, W-O-W-E-I-Y-U.

1 Q. Now, we came across him way back in January 1990?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. When he prepared a statement for disclosure to the US State  
4 Department following the invasion on 24 December 1989, yes?

15:58:46 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And also you had told us that Tom had been on occasions in  
7 Libya?

8 A. Oh, definitely. All the time, yes.

9 Q. And had been at one time Defence Minister?

15:59:03 10 A. That is correct, and chief spokesman, yes.

11 Q. And then in due course defected?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. To whom?

14 A. Well, really, to himself. They organised a group and broke  
15:59:21 15 away in 1994, and then this is the group that they used to  
16 influence some of these boys. He was not alone. He broke away  
17 for himself, really.

18 Q. And formed an organisation, did he?

19 A. Yes. That organisation they called the coalition forces.

15:59:44 20 Q. And received assistance, you say, from ECOMOG?

21 A. Oh, that is correct, yes. They were directly ECOMOG.

22 Q. And the suggestion was that that coalition group that  
23 Cassius Jacobs et al had connived with that group. That was the  
24 allegation, was it?

16:00:13 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. So this suggestion that they had connived with ULIMO, just  
27 so that I'm clear, what do you say about that?

28 A. Total, total nonsense. Historically in Liberia, that would  
29 have never happened for Cassius Jacobs, who, again, was from



1 Nimba County to connive with these ULIMO-K people.

2 Impossibility, no.

3 Q. Now, were these individuals executed?

4 A. They were tried and executed, yes.

16:00:42 5 Q. And just so that we can clarify the situation, can you  
6 recall now how many were executed? This witness appears to  
7 suggest six.

8 A. I know Cassius, Michael Seboe, Junior Gaul and - I  
9 remember four. I don't quite remember the other boy's name. If  
16:01:18 10 it comes to me, I'll remind the Court, but I remember four of  
11 them that were tried and executed.

12 Q. Four?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, there's another aspect of this that I want to ask you  
16:01:34 15 about.

16 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, before you proceed, the  
17 connivers, I'm not sure I've understood, they connived to do  
18 what? What exactly was their crime and who tried them?

19 THE WITNESS: Okay. I can explain that because of the way  
16:01:47 20 it went. Well, you need to get a full picture, your Honour. Tom  
21 Woveiyu and another senior individual from Nimba County called  
22 Samuel Dokie and another senior individual from Lofa County  
23 called Lavalie Supuwood broke away on a mission to Monrovia and  
24 formed a coalition force. These were three very powerful members  
16:02:19 25 of the NPFL. Samuel Dokie was very, very famous from Nimba  
26 County. Lavalie Supuwood from Lofa and Tom Woveiyu had served as  
27 Defence Minister. In fact, Samuel Dokie served as interior  
28 minister in the NPRAG. That's the National and Patriotic  
29 Reconstruction Assembly Government. They were influenced before

1 my first contact with the late General Abacha to break away from  
2 me and form their own organisation and they would take over the  
3 leadership, because ECOMOG would assist them to invade my  
4 capital, which was Gbarnga, and they would keep me into exile and  
16:03:11 5 take over.

6 Because these were not unknown figures in the NPFL, they  
7 were able to influence senior commanders in the NPFL, one of them  
8 being Cassius Jacobs who was in charge of the Executive Mansion  
9 guard battalion responsible for Gbarnga at my departure from  
16:03:35 10 Monrovia. The other gentleman with the task force, Michael  
11 Seboe, had the task force, another very strong unit, in Gbarnga.  
12 What the connivance was was this: They arranged - in fact,  
13 ULIMO-K got in touch with the coalition forces with Tom Woveiyu  
14 and Samuel Dokie, and the arms and ammunition that were provided  
16:04:03 15 for ULIMO to attack from Lofa to come into Gbarnga was actually  
16 provided by ECOMOG through the coalition. The coalition forces  
17 used their influence amongst the NPFL as their source of power  
18 and provided the arms to ULIMO to attack.

19 So the arrangement that they made with these boys was that,  
16:04:26 20 once the attack occurred, they all would surrender. In fact,  
21 Gbarnga fell without even hardly a shot being fired. When  
22 Cassius Jacobs now - and because we had the forces broken up so  
23 much - and I'm so glad this map that I just marked - told the  
24 face in Gbarnga - remember I said to the right of Gbarnga coming  
16:04:53 25 toward Monrovia, we had NPFL forces all the way into Kakata. I  
26 mentioned that a few minutes ago. To the left of Gbarnga, we had  
27 NPFL forces all the way into Nimba County. So when the fighting  
28 started and Cassius Jacobs ordered the task force, Michael Seboe  
29 cooperated. But not too far from Gbarnga, on the same Lofa

1 highway, as another major unit that had been resisting ULIMO's -  
2 I mean, forward movement into Gbarnga. So they all retreat into  
3 Gbarnga only to find Cassius telling them that they should not  
4 fight to surrender. So they refused.

16:05:35 5 So within about an hour, the word is passed all around.  
6 And everybody is saying, "No, we cannot surrender. Cassius  
7 Jacobs is not the chief of staff of the armed forces, which was  
8 General Isaac Musa. If he's ordering us to surrender, we are not  
9 going to do it. This is mutiny." So before I returned from  
16:05:56 10 Akosombo, the men, the military people on ground have arrested  
11 Cassius Jacobs and all of them that ordered them to surrender  
12 because of their contact with the Monrovia group.

13 This is the connivance, that the men would surrender,  
14 Gbarnga will fall without a shot, I will be discouraged, I will  
16:06:14 15 remain at Akosombo, and then this will be the end of the crisis.  
16 They would then take over the leadership of the NPFL. This is  
17 the whole picture.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Who tried them?

16:06:25 20 A. We set up a - the same military tribunal. We've had a  
21 military tribunal from the time of the NPFL starting that tried  
22 everyone. They had moved to Ganta. The Tribunal met, and under  
23 the Uniform Code of Military Justice, they were tried. In fact,  
24 they did confess that they had made these contacts and they were  
16:06:45 25 executed.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Does that assist, your Honour?

27 Q. Now, the other thing I wanted to ask you about was this:  
28 At the start of this passage of the witness's testimony, you said  
29 this, "I said Charles Taylor called us. We, the Gambians, who

1 were at Gbatala base, that we should come and be the mansion  
2 guards because at that time he did not trust his people." What  
3 do you say about that?

16:07:28 4 A. Well, that's not - that's not accurate. That's not  
5 accurate. This boy is so - the only time that we had called the  
6 Gambians to provide guard duty for me was when I first brought  
7 them in the country. So by this time --

8 Q. When?

9 A. That was in 1990 when they came into Liberia.

16:07:50 10 Q. So, just pause, Mr Taylor, because it's important that we  
11 get clear what you are saying. When the Gambians were initially  
12 brought on board, for what purpose were they brought on board?

13 A. Strictly for security purposes.

14 Q. Whose security?

16:08:07 15 A. My personal security for fear of the breakaway of Prince  
16 Johnson at that time being present in Nimba County and having a  
17 predominant group of Nimbadians with me, we brought in these  
18 people as extra security for me. Some of them were kept with me  
19 in my immediate environs and some of them were outside in the  
16:08:37 20 field also helping but keeping their ears open.

21 Q. Now, you've mentioned more than once that what this witness  
22 is talking about occurs in 1994.

23 A. By all means.

24 Q. Now, in 1994, as a result of what Cassius Jacobs and others  
16:08:57 25 did, did you at that time bring Gambians in from Gbatala base to  
26 provide security for you?

27 A. No. No. No, I did not. I relied strictly in Ganta on the  
28 loyal forces that had said that they would not surrender. I had  
29 all the guarantees just from the loyal forces. And, in fact,

1 with me in Akosombo, there were a few of them and the Gambians  
2 were always there. He probably came around when I moved to  
3 Ganta, but, no, I did not call them specifically. They were  
4 already there for that purpose.

16:09:43 5 Q. Now, there are two other aspects of this witness's evidence  
6 that I would like to deal with before we conclude with him. On  
7 11 February 2008, at page 3572 of the transcript, we find this  
8 passage - no, one moment. Let's start at the top of that page:

9 "Tell him that at that time Mustapha Jallow was in  
16:10:24 10 Monrovia. Musang Yai was also there. Mohamed, Jack the  
11 Rebel, and many other people, are Gambians.

12 Q. What were they doing there at that time?

13 A. At that time I can say they had no fixed place. They  
14 had their ranks, but they were not given any responsibility  
16:10:43 15 at that time. There was only one man I found who has an  
16 important responsibility and that is General Yanks, because  
17 he was appointed as Libyan ambassador."

18 True?

19 A. Counsel, true to what now? This whole thing?

16:11:03 20 Q. No, no, no. Was General Yanks appointed as Libyan  
21 ambassador?

22 A. Yes, Yanks was appointed Libyan ambassador.

23 Q. "Q. Now, Mr Witness, when you came back in 2002, where  
24 was Ibrahim Bah?

16:11:23 25 A. At that time I found that Ibrahim Bah had absconded out  
26 of Liberia. He was in Burkina."

27 Pause there. Before we come to deal with a little bit more  
28 detail, can you help when General Yanks was made Libyan  
29 ambassador?

1 A. Yanks was made Li byan ambassador way up in 1999. Far after  
2 I'm elected as President.

3 Q. "Q. Now, when you came back in 2002, where was  
4 Ibrahim Bah?

16:12:18 5 A. At that time I found that Ibrahim Bah has absconded out  
6 of Liberia. He was in Burkina."

7 Pause. Mr Taylor, do you remember us spending a little  
8 time dealing with the transport of Ibrahim Bah and Omrie Golley  
9 to Lome for the Lome peace? Do you remember that?

16:12:41 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. April 1999?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Now, help me. After that, when next did you see  
14 Ibrahim Bah, if at all?

16:12:50 15 A. I did not see him at all.

16 Q. This answer then, "I found that Ibrahim Bah has absconded  
17 out of Liberia. He was in Burkina," can you help us with that?

18 A. No, I can't. I don't know. If Ibrahim Bah came to  
19 Monrovia or Liberia, I really do not know. Following my seeing -  
16:13:15 20 knowing that they came through in April - around April of 1999,  
21 never I laid my eyes on Ibrahim Bah, no.

22 Q. Now, when in 1999 you saw Ibrahim Bah, in what capacity was  
23 Ibrahim Bah in Liberia?

24 A. Well, Ibrahim Bah and Omrie Golley were the two senior  
16:13:39 25 individuals from the RUF that the United Nations asked the  
26 Liberian government their permission to come through Liberia.

27 Q. So, help me. In 1999, was Ibrahim Bah working for you?

28 A. No, no, no, no, no. Ibrahim Bah was an official of the  
29 RUF.

1 Q. So, help us. That being so, can you help as to why an RUF  
2 official will feel the need to abscond from Liberia?

3 A. I have no idea. That's what I'm saying. But in fact all  
4 the way from the beginning of this reading, everything in there  
16:14:16 5 is just so mixed up. Even though we came a little lower, but  
6 even on top - there's no reason why. They came through in 1999.  
7 Permission was sought by the United Nations for them to come  
8 through. There's no reason for - I don't even know if he knows  
9 what he wanted to say. He says abscond. To abscond, I mean my  
16:14:38 10 he understanding of it would be a little - I don't know what he  
11 meant.

12 Q. "Q. And did you speak with Mustapha Jallow about  
13 Ibrahim Bah when you came back?

14 A. Tell him that Mustapha on the other side is my relative  
16:14:53 15 because he was my nephew. So when I left he was taking  
16 care of my family. When I came we saw each other and had a  
17 discussion.

18 Q. What did he tell you?

19 A. What he told me was that Ibrahim Bah, after when I  
16:15:08 20 left, he was a liaison officer between NPFL and RUF."

21 True or false?

22 A. Totally false.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you recall that following having received  
24 word from your Guinean ambassador in August 1998 you made contact  
16:15:37 25 with the RUF?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. And thereafter you accept that you invited senior members  
28 of the RUF to Monrovia, yes?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. And you accept that thereafter you maintained contact with  
2 them?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. By radio?

16:15:57 5 A. No.

6 Q. How?

7 A. From that particular time if I needed them I would call  
8 them on the telephone. We invited them to Liberia. I would not  
9 get on the radio.

16:16:10 10 Q. I asked for this reason: Bearing that in mind, did you  
11 need a liaison officer?

12 A. No, but look at the year, counsel. We're talking about  
13 what? I'm assuming that he is talking about 2002?

14 Q. Well, I'm not assuming anything.

16:16:27 15 A. Well, it looks like from here he is talking about - when he  
16 says right up on line 12 when he came back in 2002. When he came  
17 back in 2002, okay, where was Bah is the question. And now he is  
18 talking about 2002.

19 Q. Help me. In 2002 was there a NPFL?

16:16:50 20 A. There was not even - there was not a NPFL in 2002 because  
21 I'm elected since 1997. But let's go a little further. In 2002  
22 was there an RUF? Okay. Don't let's forget that the RUF comes  
23 into place. So there is no liaison between military forces. I'm  
24 not aware of any war going - I don't - I don't know what he is  
16:17:18 25 talking about in 2002 he coming back and Ibrahim Bah is  
26 coordinating between NPFL. There is no NPFL in Liberia in 2002.  
27 As of January of 1997 all warring parties in Liberia are  
28 dissolved and form political parties, so I don't know what he is  
29 talking about here in 2002.



1 Q. But go on, look:

2 "A. At that time you used to go to Sierra Leone and come  
3 back. He was engaged in diamond business between Charles  
4 Taylor and the RUF. So he was engaged in this business  
16:17:56 5 until one of his trips, before he came back, he came to  
6 Monrovia with some diamonds on that trip, took it to the  
7 mansion to Charles Taylor, but I think, what he told me  
8 Charles Taylor was supposed to do for Ibrahim Bah he did  
9 not do so he - then he planned to eliminate - to kill him.

16:18:17 10 Q. Pause there, please. Now, you said that he was engaged  
11 in this business and one of his trips he came back and he  
12 came back to Monrovia with some diamonds. Sorry, before we  
13 came back he came back to Monrovia with some diamonds. So  
14 when you say until one of his trips we came back, who are  
16:18:37 15 you talking about?

16 A. No, I said when he - on one of his trips when he  
17 returned to Monrovia, his last trip before we came back to  
18 Monrovia. That was before we came to Monrovia. They said  
19 he had brought some diamonds for Charles. Mustapha was the  
16:18:56 20 one who told me this, that when he brought - when  
21 Ibrahim Bah brought these diamonds for Charles, Charles was  
22 supposed to give him something that he was supposed to take  
23 back to RUF soldiers.

24 Q. You said that he brought some diamonds for Charles.  
16:19:13 25 Who is he? Who are you talking about?

26 A. I'm referring to Ibrahim Bah. Ibrahim Bah.

27 Q. You are talking about a last trip when he brought some  
28 diamond for Charles Taylor. Were you told where he was  
29 coming from when he came to Monrovia?

1 A. Yes. Tell him that at that time he was coming from  
2 Sierra Leone RUF to Liberia, because before we returned to  
3 Monrovia Ibrahim Bah and Charles were engaged in this  
4 business.

16:19:43 5 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Werner, there is a statement that the  
6 witness made to the effect, 'So he then - then he planned  
7 to eliminate - to kill him.' It's not clear who planned to  
8 kill or eliminate who.

9 MR WERNER: Yes, thank you, your Honour:

16:19:58 10 Q. Mr Witness, you said that he planned to eliminate him.  
11 So who planned to eliminate him?

12 A. Tell him that Charles Taylor wanted to kill  
13 Ibrahim Bah. At that time on that trip they said  
14 Ibrahim Bah was at Hotel Africa. That is where he lodged.

16:20:14 15 It was people who informed Ibrahim Bah about that if he did  
16 not go out of the country they will kill him.

17 Q. Did you learn why Charles Taylor wanted to kill  
18 Ibrahim Bah?

19 A. Tell him that that is a habit to Charles Taylor. He  
16:20:30 20 just disappointed him as he had disappointed our other  
21 people.

22 Q. Mr Witness, when you say he just disappointed him, who  
23 disappointed him?

24 A. Tell him that Charles disappointed Ibrahim Bah. He  
16:20:46 25 wanted to kill him. That was why Ibrahim Bah absconded to  
26 Burkina.

27 Q. Now, you talked about this, about the fact that you  
28 were told by Mustapha Jallow that Ibrahim Bah was a liaison  
29 between Charles Taylor and the RUF. Did Mustapha Jallow

1 explain how he knew about that?

2 A. Yes, what I'm explaining to you is Mustapha who told me  
3 that.

16:21:16

4 Q. And my question was when he told you that, did Mustapha  
5 Jallow explain how he himself, Mustapha Jallow, knew about  
6 that?

16:21:34

7 A. Tell him that whatever Ibrahim Bah was doing in  
8 Liberia, Mustapha knew something about that because  
9 Mustapha was the one - Mustapha Jallow was the one who had  
10 - who used to discuss his secrets because Mustapha was  
11 closer to Ibrahim Bah than any of us Gambians, any of us,  
12 any of we the Gambians. And also when Ibrahim Bah came  
13 from Sierra Leone before he could see Charles he used to  
14 see Mustapha first and Musang Yai."

16:22:03

15 Now, Mr Taylor, on the face of it this is happening in  
16 2002.

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Were you receiving diamonds from Ibrahim Bah in 2002?

16:22:16

19 A. I was not receiving any diamond from Ibrahim Bah, not in  
20 2002 and no other time. None whatsoever. And the period that  
21 this man is talking about, if we just remind ourselves, 2002.  
22 2000 Issa Sesay takes over in August of the RUF. By the end of  
23 2000 ceasefire agreements are signed for disarmament and  
24 demobilisation. The RUF is organised. 2001 - I'm not certain  
25 if it's 2001 or early 2002 you have - there's no RUF fighting at  
26 this time that this man is talking about. I don't know what this  
27 boy is talking about. It never happened.

16:22:53

28 Q. When does President Kabbah declare the war to be over,  
29 Mr Taylor?

1 A. Oh, when was that? Early - if I'm not mistaken, I think  
2 that was early in 2001, if I'm not mistaken. I stand corrected  
3 on that that Kabbah declared the war over. I could be wrong  
4 about that.

16:23:30 5 Q. Well, I don't think it's a matter in issue because in fact  
6 it denotes the indictment period. It's 18 January 2002. Now,  
7 help us. In 2002 is there still an RUF?

8 A. There's not even an RUF. There's no fighting. There's no  
9 RUF by this time.

16:23:48 10 Q. Is there still an NPFL?

11 A. There is no NPFL. None whatsoever.

12 Q. And were you threatening to kill Ibrahim Bah?

13 A. Never. Never. There was no reason. Never saw Ibrahim Bah  
14 after these Lome discussions. Never saw him beyond and have no  
15 reason to be angry at Ibrahim Bah whatsoever, no. No.

16:24:11 16 Q. What do you say about this evidence, Mr Taylor, bearing in  
17 mind that the witness claims this is something he was told by  
18 Mustapha Jallow? What's your case with regard to this  
19 allegation?

16:24:34 20 A. Again, you know, it's this typical thing that you see.  
21 These allegations in fact are totally false. But this is another  
22 case of an individual - no - that does not come and say, "Taylor  
23 told me", or, "I saw this." They always have somebody else  
24 telling them and in most cases I hope we get some of these people  
16:25:02 25 here that will tell this Court I never told John Brown or Peter  
26 Doe this. This man is supposed to be around me. He is supposed  
27 to be one of the Gambians providing all the service. There is  
28 nothing here now that I am telling him. Somebody else is telling  
29 him and he is revealing it.

1 Q. Well, let's push the envelope further then. Did you have  
2 any conversation about Ibrahim Bah with Mustapha Jallow?

3 A. No.

4 Q. The supposed source of this information?

16:25:34 5 A. Did not have any conversation with Mustapha Jallow about  
6 Ibrahim Bah, no. No.

7 Q. Help us. Do you accept that you know Mustapha Jallow?

8 A. Oh, yes, very, very well. I know Mustapha very well.

9 Q. How well?

16:25:57 10 A. Well, Mustapha like I say was one of those Gambians, an  
11 older fellow, that was very, very disciplined. He was a very  
12 disciplined fellow. He was one of those that did not provide  
13 internal security protection for me but was always moving all  
14 around observing and different things.

16:26:16 15 Q. Was he a confidante of yours?

16 A. No. No, he was not a confidante of mine, no.

17 Q. Was he someone that you discussed matters of state with?

18 A. No, no, no, no, no, no.

19 Q. Help us. Can you define the period over which you  
16:26:42 20 associated with this Mustapha Jallow?

21 A. Mustapha Jallow was in Liberia with me up until - he stayed  
22 in Liberia up until 2003. The Gambians that were in Liberia with  
23 me before I left Liberia in August of 2003, the President of The  
24 Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, sent an aircraft for the boys because  
16:27:28 25 following my election as President the Gambians - their presence  
26 in Liberia was not a secret. I took some of them with me to  
27 Yahya on my visit. Yahya knew of all of them. They were there  
28 in a very peaceful way. When things got very rough and I was  
29 about to leave Yahya sent - I think about two weeks before my

1 departure he sent an aircraft to Liberia and airlifted Mustapha  
2 Jallow and Musa N'jie and all of them back to the Gambia.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I have one more topic to deal  
4 with in relation to this witness but I do note the time and I'm  
16:28:05 5 not going to be able to finish it in the time available. Would  
6 that be a convenient point?

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, this is a convenient point. Thank  
8 you, Mr Griffiths. Mr Taylor, I probably don't have to remind  
9 you there's an order out that you can't discuss your evidence  
16:28:17 10 with any other person. We'll adjourn now and reconvene at 9.30  
11 in the morning.

12 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.  
13 to be reconvened on Thursday, 10 September 2009  
14 at 9.30 a.m.]

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## I N D E X

### WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

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