

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
PRESS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Enclosed are clippings of the latest local and international press on the Special Court and related issues obtained by the Press and Public Affairs Office as of:

Thursday, July 22, 2004

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Pasadena Star-News

War- crimes victims tell stories

Trials include details of atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone

By Clarence Roy- Macaulay

Associated Press

Wednesday, July 21, 2004 - Witness TF-1196 told her story: Rebels used machetes to hack all movement and life out of her husband. Then a rebel young enough to be her child raped her.

She raised the rounded tips of her arms to show why she had not signed her statement, delivered before a U.N.-backed war crimes court for the diamond- rich west African nation of Sierra Leone.

"After they had killed my husband, a rebel ... chopped off my right and left hands with a cutlass, into four bits,' TF-1196 a downcast, middle-age woman told the court.

Survivors this week and last have started telling their accounts of one of Africa's most heartless wars: a 1991-2002 campaign by rebels who killed, raped, kidnapped and hacked to pieces hundreds of thousands of civilians in hopes of terrorizing Sierra Leone into ceding control of its government and diamond fields.

Rebels, many of them children as young as 5, followed Foday Sankoh, whom they called Pappy. Sankoh gave his fighters AK-47s, marijuana, cocaine, amphetamine and encouragement to kill in the most brutal way their immature minds and unmolded judgment could devise.

The majority of the rebels' campaign played out in Sierra Leone's countryside, leaving the death toll uncertain. And their victims' accounts are attracting little world notice, in contrast to war crimes trials for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

But the stories told in a sterile, specially built courtroom in a country that is officially the world's least-developed stand up to any about the extent of human cruelty.

Another woman, Witness TF-064 the number was assigned by the court to protect her identity testified this week about the day rebels came to her village.

TF-064, the prosecution's fifth witness, was able to make it through telling the court how rebels raped her, even though she was heavily pregnant.

She described how fighters took off her sister's panties, then forced a knife into her.

Her tears came only when she spoke of gunmen separating the adults and children of the village into two groups: adults inside a building, eight children including her 1- and 3-year- old sons under an orange tree.

"We heard the children screaming,' she said.

"After a while, the screaming stopped. ... When we came outside we saw the corpses of the children lying on the ground.'

At that point, Witness TF-064 cried for 10 minutes, uninterrupted.

"Please hold your heart and speak,' Presiding Judge Benjamin Itoe finally told the woman, and she continued.

Rebels killed most of the villagers, then forced survivors to leave with them, she said. They spared one boy to carry

a sack dripping with blood.

The rebels eventually called her over to show what was inside the bag the heads of the village's children, including her sons'.

"Before we left, I turned around and looked at the bodies on the ground. The rebels asked me to laugh as a gun was pointed at my head,' she said.

"I pretended to be laughing.'

Sierra Leone's people are following the testimony via nightly summaries on radio. Most foreign media left after the trials' first days, in June.

Some among the witnesses now appearing spoke of being the only person left alive to tell of a particular attack.

"They came to me directly and asked whether I was the one leading the prayers. I said, 'Yes,' and they replied, 'Your life is finished,' ' said one 67- year-old Muslim man, testifying about the day in January 1999 when rebels overran the capital, Freetown.

"I said, if God agrees.'

Muslims and Christians alike, including one terrified man holding a prayer book and cross, had sought sanctuary in his mosque, he said.

"They started firing randomly from beside me,' the man testified. "One man who was struggling to die kicked me, and I fell down.'

He lived to later count 71 dead at the mosque, he said.

The horrors as rebels repeatedly overran Freetown ultimately helped prompt military intervention by colonial ruler Britain, neighboring Guinea, and U.N. and West African forces, crushing the rebels by 2002.

Sankoh died, of natural causes, in U.N. custody last year.

Prosecutors accuse foreign leaders of giving Sankoh arms, training and cash to help fight the insurrection. Ousted Liberian President Charles Taylor is a fugitive from an indictment against him. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi is named in indictments as an unindicted coconspirator.

Thirteen people have been indicted, nine of whom are in custody. Three former rebel battlefield commanders now are standing trial.

On Tuesday, the tribunal heard for the first time from the other side that of the killers.

TF1-199 was 12 when rebels abducted him in 1998, as he was fetching water, he said.

Rebels trained him how to fire an AK-47, how to smoke marijuana, and how to rape, he said. He learned when his commander gave him a terrified 15- year-old villager.

"I told him it was new to me, and that I was a young boy,' he said.

Ultimately, threatened with his death and that of the girl, he complied and raped her.

"My heart was so mixed up, doing this evil act that he introduced me to,' TF1-199, now 17, told the court.



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Survivors recount atrocities in court

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For the People
Thursday July 22, 2004

SPECIAL COURT WITNESS NARRATES CHILD MASSACRE AT KONO VILLAGE

PROSECUTION WITNESS TF1064 at the Special Court narrated how a number of children were massacred under an orange tree in Foinder, Kono district. The witness who was born in Koikor Gbasseh chiefdom in Kono district but grew up in Kamara chiefdom said she had never lived out of Sierra Leone and speaks Kono and Krio.

by

SU THORONKA

The witness who preferred to speak in Kono through an interpreter told the court that she got married to her first husband and she could neither speak nor write English. Led in evidence by the prosecution, the witness said they were in Foinder when the war started and a lot of things happened. Her husband, two children, three brothers, both father and mother-in-laws,

aunt-in-law, the town chief and others she could not remember, were killed by the rebels.

The witness said when they heard of an imminent rebel attack, her family and that of her husband's ran away to Dogbadu nearby villages where they took refuge for sometime and later returned to Foinder. This time instead of residing in the town they went into the bush where other people from Tombodu joined them.

The witness further ex-

plained that on one occasion, she was captured by the rebels but was released when they found out that she was pregnant and she went back to the bush where she gave birth to a child. She identified one of the rebels as Tambo Joe. On her second and final captivity with many others, the witness said the rebels asked them to surrender guns which they did not possess. "One of the rebels instructed my sister-in-law to undress and attempted to pierce a knife through her vagina

but she pleaded with him, so the rebels directed the lady to a house where he decided to have sexual intercourse with her and since then I could not see that lady."

"I was forced to have sex with one Temne man even though I was a suckling mother. My eldest son could not bear the ugly sight, he burst into tears and he was severely flogged by the rebels for being sympathetic. Immediately after, all of us captives were escorted from the bush to Foinder in a single file. Some of us who were in combat assembled our children under an orange tree while we were told to undress both man and woman and were locked up in a

single room" the witness continued.

The witness said the children outside started screaming but after sometime she could not hear them anymore. She said it was then she realized that they have been killed and the door was later opened and captives were taken out one after the other. She said she was the last person to leave the room. The witness said she was amazed when she found out that her family had been slaughtered including the town chief who was beheaded.

At this juncture, the witness sobbed and burst into tears. As a result the court was adjourned for ten minutes.

Yenga is a future time bomb

Nobody - not even the International Community - appears to have taken Ethiopia and Eritrea's dispute over the ownership of the Port City of Ashmara serious until 1998 when it became an open confrontation between the two countries (an issue that became a problem to be solved by the United Nations). The World Body is today spending millions of taxpayers' monies in an effort to maintain peace around the world.

But one interesting aspect of the International Community is its lack of a proactive mechanism to prevent human catastrophies in the world. The International Community takes nothing serious if it is unaccompanied by the most disgusting tragedy. It is always a sit and watch policy. This has always been the case in all areas of conflict.

Sierra Leoneans are grateful for the efforts of the United Nations in bringing the country's conflict to an end. But it is at the same time true that these efforts were well belated. Now that peace is in place, the trouble is yet to be solved. An occasional disaster seems to be awaiting the country. This is has to do with Yenga and the way the issue is being handled.

Over a year now, Yenga has been a topical issue amongst many Sierra Leoneans. The popular story about Yenga is that a group of Guinean soldiers have occupied the town since RUF rebels attacked Kailahun in 1991. The Guineans may have occupied Yenga as part of a security measure geared towards assisting the Sierra Leonean government to repel the RUF offensive and to also prevent a spillover of the conflict in their country. Since the end of the conflict, it is alleged that several attempts to get the Guineans out of Yenga have failed. Sadly, the Guineans are now claiming ownership of Yenga. They even produce maps to that effect.

The issue of the ownership of Yenga was debated in many public forums across the country until it attracted the attention of the government. Former Internal Affairs Minister, Sam Hinga Norman (now Special Court indictee) once said that the issue had been resolved. But reports are still emerging that Guinean soldiers are currently mining in Yenga and even collecting taxes from Sierra Leoneans resident in the town thereby casting doubts over who really owns the area.

Sierra Leone and Guinea share a common frontier and have a common foreign policy. A healthy relationship has existed between these two countries since independence. Guinea in particular has come to the aid of Sierra Leone more than any other country in this sub-region. Guinea's Ahmed Sekou Toure

But if Yenga is today seized by Tony Blair or George Bush, behold majority of Sierra Leoneans will sing hooray and hallelujah to it simply because it is America or Britain that is involved.

hosted Siaka Stevens and even sent Guinean troops to Freetown in order to help reinstate the then APC regime. The same occurred during the days of President Kabbah. His entire government was hosted in Conakry after the AFRC overthrew him in 1997. It may be right to conclude that had it not been for the assistance of President Conte who provided an abode for Kabbah and his Ministers in Conakry, it would

From The Balcony

By Chernoh Alpha M. Bah

have been impossible for the ousted Kabbah government to lobby international assistance to reinstate him to power in 1998.

Besides, Guinea was the first to send troops to Sierra Leone when Foday Sankoh started his onslaught against the country in March 1991. Have we forgotten the role played by Guinean soldiers in defending Daru? Certainly not! Nobody knows the number of Guinean soldiers who died during our conflict. Guinea stood by our side throughout the conflict. Have we established a monument in recognition of that sacrificial service rendered to us by the Guineans? At least Sani Abacha Street will go a long way to tell incoming generations about the role of Nigeria's Sani Abacha (and the Nigerians in general) in the battle for Peace in Sierra Leone. Do we owe Guinea any gratitude? Guineans offered thousands of Sierra Leoneans refuge at a period when their own brethren, their very kith and kin, were barbarously slaughtering them. This was the same period when both the British and Americans closed their doors to Sierra Leoneans and everything Sierra Leonean. But if Yenga is today seized by Tony Blair or George Bush, behold majority of Sierra Leoneans will sing hooray and hallelujah to it simply because it is America or Britain that is involved.

I am not justifying Guinea's alleged seizure of Yenga. What I'm striving to bring to the

understanding of fellow Sierra Leoneans particularly our educated elites is the extent of ignorance that we have placed on the problems that are confronting our respective communities and country as a whole. The problem of Yenga - if it is indeed a problem - hasn't got anything to do with President Conte or Guinea. These are the legacies of imperialism, the backlash of the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. If anything, Sierra Leoneans should hold Britain to ransom for having improperly negotiated with the French an unmarked frontier.

In fact, Sierra Leoneans should understand that the British were initially unsupportive of an expansionist policy until 1909. Before then, the Colonial Office was only in control of Freetown and the peninsula. It was only in 1896 that Fredrick Cardew, under the directives of the Colonial Office, extended British rule to the hinterlands of the country. He arbitrarily divided the country into five districts and signed treaties with the French establishing common borders between French Guinea and Sierra Leone. This was done without the consultation of the traditional leaders. These common borders were set-up without clear indication of the exact geographic position of each country. Besides, the colonial maps held by these countries vary from each other. This situation is posing a major threat to unity in Africa. It has become a potent problem that successive African governments have to contend with.

The reality is, if the Guineans produced maps showing authoritatively that Yenga belongs to Guinea whereas Sierra Leoneans confidently believe that Yenga belongs to them, whose claims are we to believe? Or are we heading for another ICJ ruling as Cameroon and Nigeria once did over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula? If not, shall we engage Guinea in mortal combat - the winner becomes the owner? Even if that may be the case, is Sierra Leone strong enough to confront Guinea in combat? If we are, then what are the possible consequences - infrastructural and human? These are the questions we ought to ask ourselves before we start shouting over who owns Yenga.

Yenga or no Yenga, this country owes a lot of gratitude to Guineans and Guineans. The issue of Yenga should not be blown out of proportion to warrant a conflict between these two countries. We cannot afford to shatter our relationship with Guinea over a minute issue. That is why government should endeavor to find an amicable solution to this unhealthy phenomenon. Otherwise, the question of who really owns Yenga will remain a time bomb for the future.

Concord Times

Thursday July 22, 2004



Five Years On, Guinea Still Occupies Sierra Leone's Territory

Inter Press Service (Johannesburg)

NEWS

July 21, 2004

Posted to the web July 21, 2004

By Lansana Fofana

Freetown

Angry Sierra Leoneans are demanding that their government ask Guinea to withdraw its troops from their territory which they occupied five years ago.

Troops from Guinea occupied the eastern border town of Yenga during Sierra Leone's civil war between the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and government forces.

But, even though the civil war in Sierra Leone has been over for two years now, Guinea has yet to relinquish control of the town - a diplomatic "problem in the making".

"The Guineans have no stated aim to occupy any inch of Sierra Leonean territory. The matter of Yenga is being negotiated at the highest political level. And I can assure you that it will be resolved soon," remarks Kanji Daramy, spokesperson for Sierra Leone's president Ahmad Tejan Kabba.

Daramy did not say how soon Yenga, a territory in the eastern district of Kailahun, bordering Guinea, would be returned to Sierra Leone. This has angered Sierra Leoneans following recent media reports of continued harassment of the local people by Guinean troops.

"The Guineans have been in Yenga for about five years and our complacent government sits by watching this illegal occupation. This is unacceptable. The Guineans must leave," rants Sheku Kammara, a youth activist in the capital Freetown.

He adds: "Whether or not the Guineans have a genuine reason to hold on to our territory, they must leave that place. It is Sierra Leonean territory."

Yenga is a small but strategic town that lies between Guinea and Sierra Leone. The Guinean army first occupied it in 1999 as a buffer against insurgents who were then crossing from Sierra Leone to attack towns and villages inside Guinea.

The Guineans then stated that their aim was to fight the insurgents inside Sierra Leone and end the cross-border raids. They also used Yenga, as a base, to fight Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front whose headquarter was in that district. Guinea contributed troops to the regional intervention force ECOMOG during Sierra Leone's bloody civil war of the 1990s.

The war itself was officially declared over in Jan. 2001 by President Kabba. And since then Freetown and Conakry have been locked in diplomatic moves to resolve the territorial dispute. But it seems the Guinean army is in no hurry to leave Yenga.

The matter has attracted the attention of the country's legislators. Opposition leader, Ernest Koroma of the All People's Congress (APC), says: "I think this matter should be taken at regional political level. ECOWAS must intervene before the situation deteriorates further."

The politician, who ran as presidential candidate for the APC during the 2002 elections but lost to incumbent president Kabba, adds: "Yenga cannot be a compensation for Guinea's help to us during the war. It's about our sovereignty as a nation and the dignity of our people."

Recent media reports say the occupation force has mobilised heavy military equipment and armed troops in Yenga. They also reportedly disrupt farming activities by the local people and restrict their movements in their own locality.

"The presence of Guinean troops in Yenga is quite intimidating to residents. They harass us and make us virtual slaves in our own land. The government should ask them to leave," Morie Moigua, a resident of Yenga, told IPS.

The exact strength of the Guinean contingent at Yenga has not been made public nor do the authorities in Freetown talk about the issue openly.

"Whatever deal they made with the Guineans is their problem. I think the Guinean troops must leave our territory," comments John Mattia, a civil society activist.

It seems the Guineans are deliberately holding on to Yenga for strategic reasons. Yenga provides easy bypass roads from Sierra Leone and Liberia into Guinea. The Guineans are taking no chances, having watched their neighbours go through years of vicious civil conflicts.

Guinea also still harbours suspicion against its southern neighbour Liberia whose former president Charles Taylor it constantly accused of training rebels to destabilise the sub-

region. Conakry is believed to have backed insurgents that fought Taylor's government in Liberia.

An official from the Guinean embassy in Freetown told IPS on condition of anonymity the issue of Yenga is not one of occupation.

"We have been in Yenga to secure our border and that of Sierra Leone. We used Yenga to fight the rebels inside this country and we don't intend to hold on to Yenga. It's all for security of our common borders and the sub region," he said.

He, however, acknowledged that diplomatic moves were underway to resolve the dispute. At a recent meeting of heads of state of the Mano River Basin countries - Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone - in the Guinean capital Conakry, president Kabba and his Guinean counterpart Lansana Conte discussed the issue of Yenga. Government sources say moves are underway to resolve the dispute diplomatically.

Colonial boundary maps have been used to demarcate Yenga but it is still not clear when the matter will finally be laid to rest.

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Judges speed Milosevic's team

From correspondents in the Hague

July 20, 2004

JUDGES presiding over the war crimes trial of Slobodan Milosevic said today they are determined the former Yugoslav president finish presenting his defence case by October 2005.

Mr Milosevic's ill health has delayed several times the start of the presentation of his defence, and is now scheduled to begin only at the end of August.

In an order issued today on the further conduct of the the trial, the chamber noted its "resolve and determination ... to conclude the presentation of the defence case by October 2005."

It set the target was based on 150 days for Mr Milosevic, who is defending himself, to present his case, with three court sessions per week beginning from August 31.

After the repeated delays in the last weeks, the judges are now considering forcing Mr Milosevic, 62, who suffers from a high blood pressure and is deemed at risk for a heart attack, to take on a defence lawyer.

The court today ordered the prosecution to make submissions by next Monday on the possible role of such an assigned counsel and what should happen if Mr Milosevic refuses to cooperate with his lawyer. After these submission they will decide what further action to take, the judges said.

The former Serb leader has repeatedly told the court that he wants to keep presenting his case and said he would not cooperate with a court appointed defence lawyer.

Despite his continuing health problems Mr Milosevic has been doggedly conducting his own defence against more than 60 charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity for his role in the 1990s wars in the Balkans.

He has been on trial in The Hague since February 2002.

Agence France-Presse

This report appears on NEWS.com.au.



Court boycott hits US aid budget

The US House of Representatives has voted to stop aid to countries that do not grant American soldiers immunity from prosecution for war crimes.

The bill is aimed at the International Criminal Court, described by House leader Tom DeLay as a "kangaroo court".

It adds tough financial penalties to a ban on military aid imposed last year.

The ICC, which began operating in The Hague last year, can try individuals for war crimes committed after 1 July 2002 anywhere in the world.

The US has signed immunity deals with 90 countries, but last month dropped a request for the UN to extend a two-year exemption for US personnel, because of lack of support.

The legislation is part of a \$19.4bn foreign aid bill for 2005 that must be adopted by the Senate and signed by President George W Bush before it becomes law.

It is \$1.9bn more than this year - but also \$1.9bn short of Mr Bush's request.

The bill also:

- cancels \$25,000 in aid to US ally Saudi Arabia - triggering the loss of millions of dollars in discounts of military purchases and training
- offers \$1.25bn to countries moving towards democratic reforms
- pledges \$2.2bn to help fight Aids in Africa and other poor regions
- gives Sudan \$311m to help the victims and refugees from the fighting in the western region of Darfur
- gives Pakistan, an ally in the US "war on terror," \$300m and Poland - an ally of the US in Iraq - \$66m.

'Mr Annan's court'

The Republican-controlled House voted 241-166 to impose the new curbs.

Mr DeLay, a Republican, described the ICC as "[UN Secretary General] Kofi Annan's kangaroo court" - a "shady idea... of laughable legitimacy".

"The ICC presents a clear and present danger to the war on terror and to Americans that are fighting it all over the world," Mr DeLay said.

But opponents of the bill said it would punish US allies, including Jordan, Turkey, South Africa, Kenya, Mexico and Peru.

But the US does not recognise it, saying its forces could be subjected to politically-motivated prosecution.

OUTSOURCING WAR CRIMES



Wed Jul 21, 7:03 PM ET

By Ted Rall

SAN DIEGO--It was late fall 2001, and the U.S. conquest of Afghanistan ([news - web sites](#)) was nearly complete. A passel of foreign war correspondents milled about the lobby of the Hotel Tajikistan, waiting for the Tajik foreign ministry to issue permission papers we needed to pass the checkpoints between Dushanbe and the Afghan border, so we could go on to cover the siege of Kunduz. I popped into the Soviet-vintage hotel's business center to check my email. That's when I met Jonathan Keith "Jack" Idema, the former Special Forces soldier charged on July 5 along with two other Americans for kidnapping and torturing Afghans as part of an unauthorized, vigilante anti-Taliban operation run out of a private home in Kabul.



Ted Rall

"U.S. citizen Jonathan K. Idema has allegedly represented himself as an American government and/or military official," the U.S. military said in a statement. "The public should be aware that Idema does not represent the American government and we do not employ him."

That's their current story, anyway.

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Agents of the National Security Directorate, Afghanistan's new intelligence agency, say they found eight starved Afghan detainees--three of them hanging by their feet--in Idema's rented house in central Kabul, along with a few AK-47 rifles and blood-soaked clothes. None of Idema's prisoners were working against the Karzai regime, so the NSD plans to release them. Idema, say officials, was probably hoping to torture his victims into telling him the location of Osama bin Laden ([news - web](#)

[sites](#)) so he could collect a \$25 million bounty.

Idema was nice at first, chatting me up with jittery intensity as he alternately identified himself as belonging to--or, more accurately, implying identification with--the CIA ([news - web sites](#)) and U.S. Special Forces. Griping about a Pentagon ([news - web sites](#)) ban against supplying Northern Alliance forces with medical supplies, Idema slipped me a computer disc containing photos of gruesome wounds that had gone untreated because of the inhumane policy. He asked me to pitch a piece on the subject to my editors at *The Village Voice*, but with a caveat: "Don't publish those photos before talking to me first." I promised that I wouldn't. "If you do," he added, "you will die in great pain." He went on at length about the special shadowy brotherhood of Green Berets past and present, and described how anyone who crossed them would be marked for death. I would never have broken my pledge, but I didn't need a story that badly. I soon left for Afghanistan; so, eventually, did Idema.

"Kabul is brimming with plainclothes agents and former military types working for private security firms," notes *The New York Times*. "United States Special Forces troops also move around unhindered in unmarked cars, sometimes looking like Afghans in Afghan clothes and beards, and sometimes more recognizable as Americans, in uniforms, baseball caps and sunglasses." This odd mix of the official and unofficial, public and private, was even more pronounced during November and December 2001.

You'd see them speeding around in SUVs with tinted windows and sipping tea with Afghan warlords and commanders, barrel-chested men in their thirties and forties with short-cropped hair and accents from the South and Midwest. Ask them who they were or what they were up to and you'd get a broad, insolent grin. "Just visiting," one such goon replied. "Didn't you hear? Afghanistan's open for tourism!" He carried enough guns and ammo to take out a large Colorado high school. Who *were* these guys?

Most journalists assumed that these non-uniformed soldiers were just what they wanted us to believe: U.S.-government employed covert operatives. Why not? Until the fall of Kabul, the uniformed U.S. military presence in Afghanistan was virtually nil. Burly men with big guns ran the war. Besides, Afghanistan is a dangerous, unpleasant and expensive place to live. No one would put in time there without good reason.

But there was no reliable way to know for certain. Roughly a hundred six-man Special Forces commando units authorized to wear local garb, ignore standard rules of engagement and otherwise apply "unorthodox tactics" worked alongside a new CIA

"Special Activities Division" composed of about 150 retired fighters, pilots and specialists. These 800 men, not officially employed by the Pentagon, spearheaded the U.S. war against the Taliban, coordinating air strikes, bribing Northern Alliance warlords, and allegedly supervising the massacre of thousands of Taliban POWs. Afghanistan was America's first fully privatized war.

Jack Idema, reportedly retired from the Special Forces in 1992, fought alongside the Northern Alliance in 2001. He had enough money to buy goods and services at inflated war zone prices, not to mention references in the U.S. military--and a lot of chutzpah. He convinced Afghan cops to help him conduct raids. On three occasions he even got NATO ([news](#) - [web sites](#))'s ISAF peacekeeping force to check buildings for mines and bombs. Admitted a duped NATO spokesman: "ISAF personnel believed that [Idema] was what he purported to be, which was a Special Operations agency and therefore they believed they were providing legitimate support to a legitimate security agency."


Beginning in Afghanistan and now in Iraq ([news](#) - [web sites](#)), the Bush Administration has assigned jobs previously carried out by the traditional uniformed military to private contractors, covert intelligence officers and retired commandos. The idea is "plausible deniability"; should a character like Idema go too far, the government disavows his crimes as the acts of a renegade. Only Idema and the Pentagon will ever know the truth about his status.


Unprecedented power has been placed in the hands of *Soldier of Fortune* types, to guys who carry grenades but not IDs and don't even bother to make up phony names. At Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, such men relied upon their anonymity--the prison's commanding general says that they refused to identify themselves to her--to deflect blame for their torture and rape of Iraqi inmates onto such minions as Private Lynndie England. In Kabul, Jack Idema allegedly took advantage of the blurred line between private and public soldiering to run his private war on terror.

You don't need to be a four-star general to see that nameless soldiers in civilian clothes aren't America's ideal ambassadors, or that a lack of accountability invariably leads to confusion and rampant abuse. Considering the Bush Administration's disdain for law and order, maybe that's the point.

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Many people to blame for war problem

By Eric Jones

LETTERS

As always, I may be wrong ...

After some overzealous administrators edited the CIA's intelligence reports to remove the caveats, disclaimers, qualifiers, suppositions, etc., to change what was, "Saddam Hussein may have weapons of mass destruction that he might use against somebody sometime" to "Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction he will use against the USA now," our president and his administration used those reports to justify launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq. Now after our soldiers have suffered more than 800 deaths and more than 5,000 wounded, the president and his administration are still trying to sell us on the benefits of this war. It ain't workin'.

Our dear president and his administration should be indicted for war crimes. We invaded a country without just cause and killed and wounded tens of thousands of Iraqis. Unless, of course, spreading democracy at the point of a bayonet is a good cause. The end justifies the means? So, let's see if the International Court is tough enough to indict our president and his administration for war crimes.

And even though our president and his administration are the chief culprits, we all can take some blame in what happened and is happening in Iraq. Our news media let us down, especially our print media. The time to find out this war was based on false intelligence reports was before we went to war. Our faith-based community let us down, especially our Christians. They should have repudiated the end-justifies-the-means arguments out of hand by now. The Congress and the intelligence community let us down, too.

And I let us down. I knew this was an unjust war and I didn't do everything in my power to stop it. A few letters to the editor in opposition doesn't cut it. More was required.

We shirked our duty as citizens and should be thoroughly ashamed of ourselves on this one. We've stupidly gotten a lot of our soldiers killed and wounded, killing and wounding a lot of Iraqis in vain.

As always, I may be wrong ...

Eric Jones

Zanesville

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Liberia: UN Probes Cross-Border Arms Smuggling

UN Integrated Regional Information Networks

NEWS

July 21, 2004

Posted to the web July 21, 2004

Monrovia

UN peacekeepers are investigating reports of smuggling arms and the movement of combatants across Liberia's international borders, General Joseph Owonibi, the deputy force commander of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) disclosed on Wednesday.

He told reporters that residents in several border towns and villages had informed peacekeepers that former combatants were smuggling weapons, mainly AK-47 assault rifles, into neighbouring countries. There they were bartered for consumer goods such as motorbikes, he added.

Owonibi did not say which of Liberia's three neighbours were involved in the arms smuggling. There have recently been persistent reports of Liberian weaponry moving into Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire and of Liberian fighters made idle by last year's peace agreement drifting into Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire.

"We have reports of cross-borders arms smuggling and arms exchange for motorcycles," Owonibi said. This is not a media report, but our patrol teams and military observers got the reports from the local population on the ground," he added.

"We are investigating these reports," the UNMIL deputy commander said. "We are also aware that Liberian ex-combatants are crossing into neighbouring countries."

Although UNMIL has deployed 15,000 UN peacekeepers across Liberia to maintain security following the end of a 14-year civil war in August 2003, fighters of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel groups still control many of the key frontier posts.

An IRIN correspondent who visited northwestern Liberia last week found LURD combatants to be in control of a key border crossing to Guinea near the town of Voinjama.

Another IRIN correspondent who visited southeastern Guinea in June was told by residents in Nzerekore, the main town in the region, that there were several hundred armed LURD fighters in the vicinity.

"It is not possible for our forces to seal off the entire borders of Liberia, but what we can do is exchange information with our sister missions in neighbouring countries and the local people by monitoring border points through air, ground and foot patrols," Owonibi said.

Diplomats believe that LURD was strongly backed by Guinea and that MODEL received heavy backing from Cote d'Ivoire during their war against former Liberian president Charles Taylor, who was forced to quit power and go into exile last year.

Owonibi said he was unable to confirm claims made by Liberia's Independent Human Rights Commission this week, that some 500 child soldiers had been secretly recruited in the Monrovia's eastern suburb of Paynesville and sent to a training base in Gueckedougou, just over the border in Guinea.

Commission Chairman Dempster Brown told IRIN on Wednesday that his organisation had overwhelming evidence that Liberian children had been secretly recruited as fighters to destabilise Guinea, where President Lansana Conte, is grappling with a declining economy, popular discontent at rising food prices and the overspill of conflict from Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire.

"Our report on this secret and forcible recruitment is intended to alert the transitional government to these rebellious activities. We have cogent and overwhelming evidence to prove our claims," said Brown.

Paynesville is known in Monrovia as a stronghold of former fighters loyal to ex-president Taylor.

An official close to Gyude Bryant, the Chairman of Liberia's transitional government, said Bryant was "taking the Commission's report very seriously".

He disclosed that a joint Liberian security and UNMIL investigation into the reported recruitment of child soldiers was under way.

"Guinea is our good neighbour. We have been fostering brotherly relations with that country since this government came to power in October and it would be an embarrassment if it is found out that Liberia is a breeding ground for dissident activities into Guinea and steps would be taken to immediately halt it," he told IRIN.

Relations between Liberia and Guinea became strained under Taylor. Each accused the other of trying to destabilise his government.


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Another dictator's antics say Iraqis must try Saddam

Wed Jul 21, 6:52 AM ET

The man known as the Butcher of the Balkans, Slobodan Milosevic ([news - web sites](#)), is the current focus of huge international concern. Not so much because of the former Yugoslav president's war crimes, but because of his high blood pressure, which has delayed his trial in the Netherlands.

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It was supposed to resume last week. Then this. Now, it has been put off until late August. Speculation is rife that the trial could collapse along with Milosevic's health.

For a counterpoint of sorts, shift to Baghdad. Another murderous former dictator, Saddam Hussein ([news - web sites](#)), has just begun facing justice. As he appeared before an Iraqi judge earlier this month, he seemed for all the world a Middle Eastern Milosevic clone, trying the same legal antics. He refused to recognize the court, insisted he was still president and proclaimed that the wars he waged were for honorable national causes.

While the parallels could fill a psychology book about cowardly dictators - both surrendered meekly when captured - most pertinent right now is the lesson in the difficulty of bringing a tyrant to justice.

For more proof, examine the long list of international bad guys who've gotten off the hook. They range from Uganda's Idi Amin, who died in gilded exile, to Chile's Augusto Pinochet ([news - web sites](#)), who has slipped Houdini-like through the courts' best efforts to snare him.

Instead of heeding that record to ensure Saddam doesn't escape justice, too, much of the world is bickering over a side issue: Should he be tried before an Iraqi or international court?

Advocates for shifting his trial out of Iraq ([news - web sites](#)) make some reasonable arguments. Among them: The Iraqi justice system may have become too corrupted under Saddam to hold such an important trial; an international court can set better standards for dictators; Saddam's crimes weren't limited to Iraq, so the trial shouldn't be; and U.S. interference threatens to create a victors' show trial.

But those arguments have the insincere feel of supposedly well-meaning relatives who try to grab control over a wealthy aunt's trust fund to her young nephew in the hopes of getting some loot for themselves.

Of course, Saddam's trial isn't going to be perfect. Still, the focus can be on two aims:

• *Providing justice Iraqis understand.* Norms of justice vary widely around the world - from Sweden's open prisons to instant death for some crimes under Islamic and Chinese law. Crafting a judicial process that respects basic human rights and wins acceptance from the Iraqi people is vital. Those twin goals can best be reached in Saddam's own courts, where language and culture don't have to be translated, as they do in foreign venues.


• *Avoiding a political circus.* For two years, Milosevic has turned his trial into a theatrical spectacle, as he has conducted his own capricious defense against charges of crimes against humanity. Saddam's family has hired lawyers who could help him create a similar platform for diatribes aimed at turning him into a sympathetic martyr.


Some international tribunals have worked well, such as the court trying mass murderers in Rwanda. And the U.S. stands guilty as charged in fighting efforts to set up a fair global system of justice. It has refused, for example, to join a new International Criminal Court, fearing Americans could end up in the dock on trumped-up charges.

But in a far-from-ideal country, an Iraqi trial, even with heavy-handed U.S. help, promises to deliver a more fitting outcome. At the very least, it's less likely to be derailed if Saddam develops high blood pressure.

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The Journal of Sex Research May 1, 2004

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The Journal of Sex Research

May 1, 2004

SECTION: No. 2, Vol. 41; Pg. 129; ISSN: 0022-4499

IAC-ACC-NO: 119269006

LENGTH: 8456 words

HEADLINE: Explaining wartime rape.

BYLINE: Gottschall, Jonathan

AUTHOR-ABSTRACT:

In the years since the first reports of mass **rapes** in the Yugoslavian **wars** of secession and the genocidal massacres in Rwanda, feminist activists and scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, and social scientists have dedicated unprecedented efforts to document, explain, and seek solutions for the phenomenon of **wartime rape**. While contributors to this literature agree on much, there is no consensus on causal factors. This paper provides a brief overview of the literature on **wartime rape** in historical and ethnographical societies and a critical analysis of the four leading explanations for its root causes: the feminist theory, the cultural pathology theory, the strategic **rape** theory, and the biosocial theory. The paper concludes that the biosocial theory is the only one capable of bringing all the phenomena associated with **wartime rape** into a single explanatory context.

BODY:

In the years since the first reports of mass **rapes** in the Yugoslavian **wars** of secession and the genocidal massacres in Rwanda, feminist activists and scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, and social scientists have dedicated unprecedented efforts to document, explain, and seek solutions for the phenomenon of **wartime rape**. While some researchers argue that the frequency, savagery, and systematic organization of **wartime rape** increased in late 20th-century conflicts (Barstow, 2000, p. 8; Brownmiller, 1993; Mackinnon, 1994b, p. 75; Sajor, 1998, p. 3), most emphasize the phenomenon's timeless ubiquity, tracing it back to early accounts in the Torah, in Homer, in the Anglo-Saxon chronicles, and in mythological events like the **rape** of the Sabine **women**. Researchers are also unified in their belief that the lack of attention to **wartime rape** by scholars and international courts represents a serious dereliction of moral and intellectual duty (e.g., Sajor, 1998, p. 2; Thomas & Regan, 1994). Most importantly, these writers agree that the only way to attack the problem of **wartime rape** is to identify and understand the factors and conditions that promote it (for representative samples of this literature see contributors to Barstow, 2000; contributors to Dombrowski, 1999; contributors to Sajor, 1998; contributors to Stiglmayer, 1994).

On this most critical issue, however, the consensus in the literature wavers. While there is

significant agreement on some of the causal factors for **wartime rape**, there is no unified theory that can bring coherence to all the information associated with it. There are presently four leading theories for the prevalence of **wartime rape**. I will refer to these hereafter as the feminist theory, the cultural pathology theory, the strategic **rape** theory, and the biosocial theory. While the first three theories emphasize different causal factors for **wartime rape**, they are firmly unified in their ability to decisively rule out sexual desire as a major causal factor. Moreover, proponents of the first three theories generally contend that **rape** in **war** is the result of social and cultural influences particular to given types of societies, and argue against explanations based upon "human nature." These theories differ only in the identification of which sociocultural factors are most responsible. On the other hand, the biosocial theory suggests that researchers must consider not only sociocultural factors but also the evolved sexual psychology of human males, and it emphasizes that sexual desire is likely to be a primary influence on a soldier's decision to **rape**.

The fundamental test of any theory is its ability to explain and bring coherence to information. A favored theory accounts for more information more economically than its rivals. Theories also generate expectations about how phenomena should be organized if the theory is valid; a favored theory is one whose logically derived expectations are satisfied more fully than those generated by its rivals. This paper evaluates each of the four major theories of **wartime rape** according to the following criteria: first, descriptive power (is there good "theory/data fit?") and second, parsimony (does the theory account for information with the fewest numbers of assumptions and posits?)

Before evaluating the four theories of **wartime rape**, however, it is necessary to establish the information base against which these theories will be judged. The following section provides a short overview of consensus knowledge about **wartime rape**.

BACKGROUND ON **WARTIME RAPE**

First, the term **wartime rape**, as it is employed in the literature, never indicates isolated examples of **rape** by individual fighters. Rather, the term is used interchangeably with mass **wartime rape** to indicate distinct patterns of **rape** by soldiers at rates that are much increased over rates of **rape** that prevail in peacetime. While there are no reliable statistics on **wartime rape** due to the reporting biases of the opposing sides and the reluctance of victims to come forward, these increases can range from the calculated 300% to 400% increases over American civilian **rape** rates that accompanied American breakouts in France and Germany toward the end of World **War** II (Morris, 2000, p. 170) to rates of increase that likely reached into the thousands in the weeks after the Red Army first swept into Berlin and **committed** between 20,000 and 100,000 **rapes** (Brownmiller, 1975; Ryan, 1966; Siefert, 1994). Incidentally, these figures represent good examples of the mushiness of **wartime rape** statistics: The American figures are almost certainly underestimated because they are based solely on **rapes** reported to authorities, and estimates of the number of Red Army **rapes** in Berlin climb as high as 1,000,000 (Grossman, 1999, p. 164). A partial list of countries that have been identified as loci of mass **rapes** conducted by military or paramilitary forces just in the 20th century includes Belgium and Russia during World **War** I; Russia, Japan, Italy, Korea, China, the Philippines, and Germany during World **War** II; and in one or more conflicts, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Bosnia, Cambodia, Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Pakistan, Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. (1)

There is no reason to believe that mass **wartime rape** was less common prior to the 20th century. Perhaps most well documented historical **wars** include examples of widespread military **rape**. For instance, mass **rape** is well documented in the **wars** between Jews and their enemies described in the Bible (e.g., Deuteronomy, 21; Isaiah, 13:16; Lamentations, 5:11; Zechariah, 14:2), in AngloSaxon and Chinese chronicles (Littlewood, 1997), in

Medieval European warfare (Meron, 1993), during the crusades (Brownmiller, 1975, p. 35), in Alexander's conquest of Persia (Hansen, 1999, p. 188), in Viking marauding (Karras, 1990), in the conquest of Rome by Alaric (Ghiglieri, 2000, p. 90), in the petty **wars** of Ancient Greeks (Finley, 1954), and so on. It is important to note that the level and extent of mass **rape** in many conflicts—for instance, the German "**rape** of Belgium" in World **War** I--has been hotly contested by scholars (Gullace, 1997). Yet, a review of the historical evidence conveys the distinct impression that whenever and wherever men have gone to **war**, many of them have reasoned like old Nestor in the Iliad, who concludes his pep talk to **war**-weary Greek troops by reminding them of the spoils of victory: "So don't anyone hurry to return homeward until after he has lain down alongside a wife of some Trojan" (Homer, 1999, Book 2, 354-355).

Moreover, strong evidence indicates that the roots of mass **rape** stretch back into human prehistory. The myth of the noble savage has been irreparably damaged by the finding that the abduction and **rape** of outgroup **women** has been common, if not ubiquitous, in conflicts between band and tribal societies (for overviews see Boehm, 1999; Chagnon, 1997; Divale & Hams, 1976; Gat, 2000). The words of Ongka, a big man of the Kawelka people of Papua New Guinea, are not exceptional in ethnographical accounts of primitive **wars**:

When we fought in earnest, with lethal weapons, we went to the help of our friends also. We burnt houses, slashed banana trees, tore the aprons off **women** and raped them, axed big pigs, broke down fences; we did everything. We carried on until the place was empty of resources... When we left our **women** behind and went out to fight, they were in danger. Men came to find them, chasing them down to the edges of streams until they seized hold of them, especially if their bodies were good to look at. Twenty men might lay hold of the same woman, pulling her around for a day and night and then letting her go. (Strathern & Stewart, 2000, p. 41)

In fact, the promise of sexual access to outgroup **women** has often been identified by anthropologists, ethnographers, and native informants (see Ritchie, 1996; Strathern & Stewart, 2000; Valero, 1970) as a primary instigator of conflict in prestate societies.

In short, historical and anthropological evidence suggests that **rape** in the context of **war** is an ancient human practice, and that this practice has stubbornly prevailed across a stunningly diverse concatenation of societies and historical epochs.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THEORIES FOR MASS **WARTIME RAPE**

Feminist Theory

Feminist scholars and activists deserve credit for being the first to systematically investigate, document, and "raise consciousness" about the problem of mass **wartime rape**. The classic feminist orientation is to extend the so-called power hypothesis of **rape into the wartime milieu** (see Brownmiller, 1975). That is, **rape** in **war**, like **rape** in peace, is identified not as a crime of sexual passion but as a crime motivated by the desire of a man to exert

dominance over a woman (see contributors to Barstow, 2000; contributors to Sajor, 1998; contributors to Stiglmayer, 1994). Feminist theorists get this theory up in opposition to what they call the "pressure cooker" theory of **wartime rape** (Siefert, 1994, p. 55). The pressure cooker theory, as feminists describe it, suggests that **war** rapists are the victims of irresistible biological imperatives and that the chaos of the **wartime** milieu encourages men to vent their urges to terrible effect.

However, the feminist theory of **wartime rape** is also a pressure cooker theory; in this case, however, the pressure that builds is not libidinal in nature but misogynistic. Under this theory, men in patriarchal societies are conditioned to distrust, despise, and dominate **women**. Warrior rapists "vent their contempt for **women**" (Brownmiller, 1975, p. 32; see also Siefert, 1994) while enforcing and perpetuating patriarchal gender arrangements from which all men benefit. Therefore, **rape** in **war** is deemed a result of a conspiracy, not necessarily conscious but still systematic, of men to dominate and oppress **women**. While men may fight on different sides and for different reasons, in one sense they are all warriors on behalf of their gender--and the enemy is woman.

Since **rape** is seen as the result of specific types of socialization practices particular to specific types of societies, feminist **rape** theory generates the expectation that **rape** in the context of **war** (and peace) should only prevail in a limited subset of societies. Specifically, **rape** in **war** is expected to occur largely in Western and staunchly patriarchal societies and in societies that are somehow distant from or out of harmony with nature (Siefert, 1996, p. 36). In this aspect, the feminist theory has poor theory-data fit. Not only does evidence indicate that peacetime **rape** (and its proscription) is a cultural universal (Palmer, 1989), but it also shows that large-scale **rape** is a common outcome of conflicts among bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and state societies spread across continents and centuries. Thus, despite the invaluable contributions of feminists to documenting and analyzing mass **wartime rape**, the classic feminist theory cannot itself account for all of the data.

Cultural Pathology Theory

The cultural pathology theory has the character of cultural psychoanalysis. The goal is to peer back into a nation's history and see what developmental factors conspired to cause its men to descend to the vilest barbarism. Iris Chang's well-known study of the **rape** of Nanking represents a case in point. One scholar describes Chang's work as follows:

Her research points to the high level of militarization in Japanese education and culture at that time, the brutality of military training, and the new attitude toward the Chinese, previously admired but now looked down upon. She also describes the deeply ingrained contempt for **women** within Japanese military culture.

(Barstow, 2000, p. 47)

Another scholar argues that the sexual crimes perpetrated by the Japanese military in Asia during World **War** II were the result of "the sado-masochistic tendencies in Japanese child-rearing brought on by collective trauma having to do with natural disasters and subjugation by other countries" (Rosenman, 2000, p. 15; for a different psychoanalytic approach see Parin, 1994). Other writers indict military culture generally for fostering hostile attitudes toward **women** that, too often, culminate in feelings of entitlement to **rape** (e.g., Morris, 2000; Chang, 1997). MacKinnon (1994b) explained Serb **rapes** of Muslim and Croat **women** as a direct result of the widespread availability of explicit pornography prior to the **war**:

"When pornography is this normal, a whole population of men is primed to dehumanize **women** and to enjoy inflicting assault sexually... Pornography was the perfect preparation--motivator and instructional manual in one for the sexual atrocities in this genocide" (p. 77).

For the cultural pathology theory, the fit between theory and data can be quite suggestive. Writers paint plausible portraits of sociocultural factors that may have contributed to the frequency or ferocity of **wartime rape**. However, while cultural pathology theory may help us do a better job of understanding the dynamics of **wartime rape** in given cases, it provides little help in understanding the phenomenon as a whole. Why is it that **wartime rape** occurs not only in individual, pathological cultures but prevails across eras and all types of cultures? Why is it evident not only in mechanized modern states that are "distant from nature" but in band and tribal contexts? How is it that **wartime rape** is regularly perpetrated by men who have massively different socialization experiences: imperial Japanese troops, Mongol raiders, Maori, Yanomamo, Jivaro, and New Guinean tribesmen, and American soldiers in Vietnam?

Strategic **Rape** Theory

Strategic **rape** theory is currently the most influential theory of mass **wartime rape**. It is widely credited by activists and scholars and largely taken for granted by international commissions and journalists. Therefore it will be examined at somewhat greater length than the preceding alternatives. Starting with Susan Brownmiller's important book, *Against Our Will* (1975; see also Brownmiller, 1993), and increasingly since the Yugoslavian and Rwandan mass **rapes**, a consensus has been building that wholesale **rape** represents just another ordinance--like bombs, bullets, or propaganda--that a military can use to accomplish its strategic objectives; **rape** is a tactic executed by soldiers in the service of larger strategic objectives. While supporters of this position do not always claim that military planners explicitly instruct soldiers to **rape**, the implication is clear: **Wartime rape** is a coherent, coordinated, logical, and brutally effective means of prosecuting warfare (see Allen, 1996; Kamal, 1998; Littlewood, 1997; Thomas & Regan, 1994).

Variations on the theory that **wartime rape** is strategic **rape** are predicated on the deleterious effects that mass **rape** has on enemy populations. It is credited with spreading debilitating terror, diminishing the resistance of civilians, and demoralizing, humiliating, and emasculating enemy soldiers who are thereby shown to have failed in their most elemental protective duties. Further, mass **rape** is said to cast blight on the very roots of the afflicted culture, affecting its capacity to remain coherent and to reproduce itself. By raping **women**, soldiers split the familial atoms of which every society is composed. Raped **women** may become pregnant by the enemy, they may suffer grievous physical and psychological injuries, they may die, they may be abandoned or disavowed by shamed families and husbands, all of which degrade the ability of a culture to replenish itself through sexual reproduction. For these reasons, advocates of strategic **rape** theory often refer to it as "genocidal **rape**"--**rape** designed, whether with full consciousness or not, to annihilate a people and a culture (see Allen, 1996; Barstow, 2000; Hyun-Kyung, 2000, p. 20; MacKinnon, 1994a, 1994b; Salzman, 2000).

While mass **wartime rape** can surely result in the damage discussed above, it remains possible that the supporters of strategic **rape** theory may be confusing the consequences of **wartime rape** with the motives for it. Just because these consequences may include demoralized populaces or fractured families does not mean that these were the goals for which the **rapes** were perpetrated in the first place. All of these results may be unintended (which is not to say unwelcome) consequences of **wartime rape**.

In just nine months spanning 1971 to 1972, Pakistani soldiers raped as many as 200,000 Bengali **women** (Habiba, 1998; Kamal, 1998). An Indian novelist commented, "The **rapes** were so systematic and pervasive that they had to be conscious army policy" (as cited in

Siefert, 1996, p. 35). However, there is virtually no evidence cited in the literature to support the notion of conscious planning aside from this appearance. While some documentary evidence does exist suggesting that some modern militaries have considered **rape** strategically valuable, this evidence is sparse and of dubious authenticity (see Salzman, 2000). On the other hand, we do possess concrete evidence that many military planners have recognized that **rape committed** by soldiers can represent a serious threat to their larger strategic interests and have therefore sought to proscribe it. As different commentators on the subject have indicated, one of the most effective ways of galvanizing resistance in an embattled population is by exposing it to propaganda forecasting orgies of **rape** when and if the enemy triumphs (e.g., Brownmiller, 1975, p. 128; Thomas & Regan, 1994, p. 93). In short, there is at least as much reason to suspect **wartime rape** can be strategically counterproductive, resulting not in cowed and crushed populations but in galvanized and vengeful populations of civilians and soldiers.

A well-documented example of a **situation where wartime rape** ran counter to strategic interests is represented by the experience of the Japanese military in Korea and China throughout the 1930s and until the end of World **War II**. In their Asian conquests, Japanese commanders found that the frequent **rapes** of civilian **women** created serious strategic problems. Far from cowing or breaking populations, it served to antagonize, even to enrage them. The Japanese inaugurated their massive system of forced military prostitution, the so-called "comfort **women**" system, in large part because **rape** was considered detrimental to military goals. The first comfort station was inaugurated in 1932 in Shanghai, using not local **women** but imported Japanese prostitutes for the pleasure of the Japanese navy. The station was set up in direct response to an official request for comfort **women** who could prevent the sailors from raping local **women** (Chung, 1995, p. 13). Tanaka's (1999) historical study of the comfort **women** issue concludes the following:

[Japanese] Military leaders were deeply concerned that such serious crimes [i.e., **rapes**] would arouse the antagonism of civilians toward their conquerors in the occupied territories and believed that a ready supply of **women** for the troops would reduce the incidence of **rape**. In other words, the system was introduced for strategic reasons [italics added], not out of concern for the civilians.

(p. xi)

Chung's (1995) overview of the Korean comfort **women** system reaches the same conclusion:

The most direct reason for expanding military comfort stations during the **war** was the frequent **rape of women** carried out by Japanese soldiers. Soldiers plundered towns, raped **women**, started fires and brutally killed any captives. **Rape**, in particular, tended to provoke strong anti-Japanese local feeling. This made it difficult

to rule the occupied territories, hence the military ordered:

Each soldier's behavior must be tightly controlled and sexual

comfort facilities should soon be set up. (p. 14)

There were other reasons for the inauguration of the comfort **women** system--like controlling venereal disease and providing sexual release, which was considered healthy--- but decreasing the incidence of **rape** was a primary goal.

While this represents only one example, it is relatively uncontroversial, and similar examples could be adduced. For instance, to cite a more recent example, consider the following 1997 report of **rapes** during civil conflict in Zaire:

On December 5 or 6, according to several local sources, soldiers brutally raped school girls at the Lycee Likovi secondary school in Bunia [Zaire] ... The population of the town turned against the soldiers--there were protest marches and a soldier was reportedly killed. A witness said, "these people have been pushed beyond their limits--now they are going to kill soldiers." This was not the only girl's secondary school to be attacked by soldiers bent upon violating young girls. At Idohu ... a witness reporting that the soldiers who went to Bunia raped and kidnapped the young girls in late November, said: "This has turned disgust with the FAZ [Forces Armes Zairoises] to bitter hatred." (Amnesty International, 1997)

Thus, as with Japanese **rapes** in the World War II era, there is much reason to believe that **rapes committed** by members of Zaire's security forces were strategically counterproductive, stirring up resentment and resistance in victimized populations rather than cowing them into submission.

Furthermore, the strategic **rape** hypothesis makes a poor fit with evidence from band and tribal populations. Far from helping aggressors realize their strategic objectives, **rape** in the context of primitive **wars** seems to have exactly the opposite effect. The common **rapes** of outgroup **women** in the context of non-state **wars** inspire feelings of hatred and vengeance, and often result in long and exhausting cycles of retributive raids and counter-**rapes** (see accounts in Chagnon, 1997; Gat, 2000; Ritchie, 1996, Strathern & Stewart, 2000). In summary, it seems that the strategic **rape** hypothesis, while perhaps accounting for some instances of mass **rape**, does not succeed in bringing **wartime rape** within a single explanatory context.

Summary Assessment of Sociocultural Theories

While each of the above theories is distinct from the others, clearly they share major factors

in common. First, all of the theories agree that **rape** in **war** is not incidental but functional. That is, **rape** in **war** serves a purpose larger than itself. More specifically, **wartime rape** functions to serve the interests of the collective over the interests of the individual soldier. For instance, Thomas and Regan (1994) write: "Documenting where and how **rape** functions as a tool of military strategy is essential to counteract the longstanding view of **rape** in **war** as private or incidental" (p. 85). Second, most writers either explicitly deny that sexual desire is a factor in a soldier's decision to **rape** or define it as a minor contributing factor--**rape** in **war** is mainly about power, sadistic **violence**, and strategy, not sex. For example, Siefert (1996) is representative in writing that **rape** "... has nothing to do with sexuality but with the exertion of sexual **violence** directed against **women**" (p. 36). Stiglmeier's (1994) formulation is more emphatic, but still representative:

A **rape** is an aggressive and humiliating act, as even a soldier knows, or at least suspects. He **rapes** because he wants to engage in **violence**. He **rapes** because he wants to demonstrate his power. He **rapes** because he is the victor. He **rapes** because the woman is the enemy's woman, and he wants to humiliate and annihilate the enemy. He **rapes** because the woman is herself the enemy whom he wishes to humiliate and annihilate. He **rapes** because he despises **women**. He **rapes** to prove his virility. He **rapes** because the acquisition of the female body means a piece of territory conquered. He **rapes** to take out on someone else the humiliation he has suffered in the **war**. He **rapes** to work off his fears. He **rapes** because it's really only some "fun" with the guys. He **rapes** **because war**, a man's business, has awakened his aggressiveness, and he directs it at those who play a subordinate role in the world of **war**. (p. 84)

Third, and finally, all three theories assume that the roots of the phenomenon are sunk not in biological soil but in strictly sociocultural factors that are separate and distinct from biology. Most writers follow Brownmiller's (1975) argument that **rape** is biological only in the sense that an "accident of biology" (male size and strength and the nature of human sex organs) gave males the "structural capacity" to **rape** and females the "structural vulnerability" to be raped (pp. 13-15). Finally, for all of their valuable contributions, each of the three sociocultural theories have been found wanting in theory-data fit and/or parsimony and therefore fail as generalizable theories of **wartime rape**.

It must be acknowledged that this failure would come as no great surprise to many proponents of sociocultural theories who often claim that a phenomenon as complex as **wartime rape** is unlikely to distill to a single cause, and that a pluralistic approach is therefore most likely to yield results. Thus, at different times in her 1975 book, Brownmiller advocates for all three of the above sociocultural theories. This pluralistic approach is well

represented in the excerpt from Stiglmayer above and in Swiss and Giller (1993), who write: "In **war**, **rape** is an assault on both the individual and her family and her community. As well as an attempt to dominate, humiliate, and control behavior, **rape** in **war** can also be intended to disable an enemy by destroying the bonds of family and society ... **Rape** can be both a military strategy and a nationalist policy" (p. 612). For sociocultural theorists, military **rape** is often the result of a complex combination of causal factors. However, as stressed above, the sexual impulses of individual soldiers are almost never allowed a significant place in the causal mix. This stands in stark contrast to the biosocial theory, which I move to consider now.

The Biosocial Theory

Biology-based theories of **wartime rape** are often described by critics as indicating that sociocultural factors are insignificant variables in soldiers' decisions to **rape** and that the activity is wholly under genetic control. In this view, **rape** in **war** is an inevitable, genetically determined reflex. This view is sometimes identified with the above mentioned "pressure cooker" theory of **wartime rape**: the idea that men possess instincts for sexual aggression that are restrained under normal conditions but that, in the chaotic **wartime** milieu, spew forth like the vented gas of a pressure cooker.

The pressure cooker metaphor is based on hydraulic models of aggression championed by Freud and 20th-century ethologists like Konrad Lorenz and Robert Ardrey, and critics are right to treat it dismissively. However, human behavioral biology has changed radically over the last 3 to 4 decades, and the current generation of evolutionary and biological researchers stridently oppose the older view that **rape** and other aggressive behaviors result from blind biological drives; rather they emphasize that all behavior (including aggressive behavior) is acutely sensitive to and influenced by environmental cues (e.g., Daly & Wilson, 1988; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000, p. 167-178). However, because the hydraulic model is still commonly identified with biology-based theories, it is important to point out its shortcomings before discussing the biosocial theory proper. The key aspect of the hydraulic model of **wartime rape** is its context-insensitive determinacy. Therefore, to distinguish it from the biosocial theory, I will refer to it as the biological determinism theory of **wartime rape**.

Since it hinges on the assumption of biological adaptations functioning to promote **rape** in **war** that are all but insensitive to environmental conditions, a biological determinist theory generates the expectation that virtually everywhere we find hostile soldiers in the midst of civilians identified with the enemy there will be high rates of **rape**. On this measure, the biological determinist theory enjoys strong theory-data fit. Of all the theories so far discussed, it comes closest to accounting for the pervasiveness of **rape** in **armed conflict situations**.

A biological determinism theory of **wartime rape** also accounts well for the demographic characteristics of its victims. If **wartime rape** is primarily motivated by sexual desire (as opposed to, for instance, strategic concerns or misogyny) then soldier rapists would be expected to predominately target **women** at the ages of peak physical attractiveness. Since redundant research demonstrates that, across societies, men (and **women**) consider young **women** to be most attractive (see Buss 1989; for an overview see Symons, 1995), the theory predicts that young **women** will be overrepresented as the victims of **rape**. And the evidence is indeed clear that, as in peacetime **rape** (Ghiglieri, 2000; Jones, 1999; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000), young, reproductive-aged **women** are vastly overrepresented as **wartime rape's** victims. While this conclusion cannot be statistically demonstrated, anecdotal accounts leave little doubt as to its accuracy (see accounts in Brownmiller, 1975, pp. 45, 52, 55, 58; Chagnon, 1997; Chung, 1995, p. 17; Gutman, 1992; Stiglmayer, 1994; Strathern & Stewart, 2000; Tanaka, 1999, p. xvi; Valero, 1970).

However, the theory is limited in its ability to account for other phenomena associated with **wartime rape**. For instance, a biological determinist theory generates the expectation that, since **wartime rape** is under tight genetic control, the character, intensity, savagery, and prevalence of **wartime rape** should fluctuate within exceedingly narrow bounds as we cross from conflict to conflict. Yet, clearly, these characteristics do vary widely from conflict to conflict. Moreover, the theory does a poor job of accounting for the fact that in many conflicts, many soldiers apparently do not **rape**. If the tendency to **rape** in **war** is biologically determined, then why do some soldiers **rape** freely while others abstain? In sum, while the biological determinism theory accounts well for the prevalence of **wartime rape** around the world it does not account well for variation from conflict to conflict and variation in the motivation and willingness of individual soldiers to **rape**.

Finally, the biological determinism theory, with its insistence on rigid biological adaptations ultimately functioning to perpetuate the genes of the rapist, does not anticipate the common reports of wanton and perversely sexualized **violence committed against women in war** zones, up to and including post-**rape** murder. These are accounts in which warriors implement degrees of force far in excess of that required to perpetrate the **rape** and, in the process, greatly diminish their likelihood of passing on genes.

In point of fact, however, the biological determinist theory, so described, is a straw man with no scholarly adherents; the theory exists in its fullest form in the critiques of sociocultural theorists who identify it with the opinions of sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists (e.g., H. Rose, 2000; S. Rose, 2000). Modern biology-based theories of **wartime rape** are not theories of genetic determinism; they are, in fact, biosocial theories that place fully coequal emphasis on genetic and sociocultural factors. This pluralism is typical of biology-based theories of human behavior and psychology generally, which are founded on the premise, here voiced by Tooby and Cosmides (1992), that "Every feature of every phenotype is fully and equally codetermined by the interaction of the organism's genes ... and its environments" (p. 83).

The biosocial theory is premised on a significant genetic substrate to the phenomenon of **wartime rape**. **Wartime rape** occurs in societies of all different races, religions, ethnicities, and political and economic systems. Since this behavior is well documented in societies spaced widely in dimensions of space, time, and cultural complexity, the simplest assumption is, as recognized by the anthropologist Roland Littlewood (1997), that **wartime rape** is in some sense "natural" to human males. Given its cross-cultural and cross-historical prevalence, and given the age ranges of its primary victims, biosocial theorists conclude that a prominent motive for **wartime rape** is the simple sexual desire of individual fighters (e.g., Ghiglieri, 2000; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000).

However, the variability of **wartime rape** across conflicts and the fact that many soldiers with the option to **rape** apparently choose not to decisively rules out the view of **wartime rape** as a blind genetic drive that is, and ever will be, expressed when men meet to fight and kill. This variation is best explained as a result of sociocultural influences. In short, genetic and sociocultural explanations cannot be profitably viewed as antagonistic or as mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, each approach complements and completes the other. Without a genetic perspective, the ubiquity of **wartime rape** makes no sense nor does its disproportionate focus on victims at the ages of peak physical attractiveness. On the other hand, without sociocultural consideration, the variability of **wartime rape** makes no sense. Integrating the perspectives into a single biosocial theory allows a view of **wartime rape** in which all the data are, finally, brought within a single explanatory context.

The biosocial theory of **rape** is most often identified with the work of biologist Randy Thornhill and anthropologist Craig Palmer. In *A Natural History of Rape*, Thornhill and Palmer (2000) argue that strictly sociocultural explanations for **rape**, including **wartime rape**, are incomplete (see also contributors to Buss & Malamuth, 1996; Jones, 1999; Shields & Shields,

1983; Thornhill & Thornhill, 1983). Moreover, they lay out a case--based on **rape** statistics, evolutionary theory, and comparison with other species where sexual coercion is common (including nonhuman apes and other primates)--that sexual desire is a common motivation for human **rape** and that this desire ultimately traces back to men's evolved sexual psychology. Thornhill and Palmer's argument is not that men are necessarily adapted to commit **rape** in certain contexts. While they do tentatively advance the theory that men--like scorpion flies, orangutans, and certain species of ducks--may possess condition-dependent biological adaptations that are specifically designed to promote **rape** in appropriate cost-benefit environments, they stress the fact that an equally plausible theory is that **rape** is a nonadaptive by-product or "spandrel" (see Gould & Lewontin, 1979) of adaptations for consensual sexual activity. Therefore, the main value of Thornhill and Palmer's work is not to provide a final answer to the vexed question of whether or not **rape** and other forms of sexual coercion are biologically adaptive for human beings but to present a formidable case against "not sex" theories of human **rape** in both peace and **war** contexts.

CONCLUSION

Contributors to the literature on **wartime rape** do not see themselves as debating a merely academic question. Rather, the goal is both to bring attention to the crime so that international lawmakers will get serious about punishing it and to "carve it at the joints" so that we can begin to take practical and efficient steps toward diminishing its incidence. Contributors to the literature do their research and report their findings in the ancient conviction that we must understand our problems before we can hope to solve them. This characterization applies just as truly to biosocial theorists, many of the most important of whom are **women** (these include Barbara Smuts, Nancy Thornhill, and Leah Shields), as it does to strictly sociocultural theorists. Yet, while any support for biological pressure cooker theories has vanished, an equally inadequate theory continues to enjoy near universal moral and intellectual dominance, not only among mainstream contributors to the literature on **wartime rape** but also among the wider educated public. This is the notion that mass **wartime rape** is a purely sociocultural phenomenon, and that, for however varied the motives that culminate in mass **rape**, sexual desire can play no significant role. This insistence on the deterministic power of culture and the reliance on the mantra that **rape** is not "about sex" (except in the most trivial and literal sense) represents a significant obstacle to expanding our understanding of mass **wartime rape** and thus to devising practical strategies for limiting its occurrence.

There are many and complex reasons for the continued resistance to plausible, empirically supported, and theoretically satisfying biosocial theories of **wartime** (and peacetime) **rape**. Part of this doubtlessly owes to disciplinary inertia and the tendency of researchers to defend theories on which they have staked their careers, their reputations, and their worldviews. However, other factors are operative, which come into play whenever biology is invoked as a significant player in human behavior and psychology. There is the legacy of social Darwinism that, for many, has forever stigmatized the application of biology to human social affairs. There is the lingering sense that the invocation of any but the most limited biological role in human behavior is insidiously deterministic, suggesting that human misbehaviors are inevitable and immune to social remediation. There is the impression that invoking a sexual or biological component to **rape** mitigates the rapist's culpability, making him a helpless victim of innate and ineradicable impulses. Most important, there is the sense that if human nature truly does underpin **wartime rape**, then we are powerless to fight it. After all, while you can conceivably change sociocultural factors, you cannot hope to change human nature. Therefore, allowing biology a beachhead in the explanation of mass **wartime rape** seems, to those passionately **committed** to seeking solutions, like the first step toward the surrender to inevitability.

However, this would be true only if mass **wartime rape** were to be considered wholly under genetic control and if sociocultural factors were denied a major role in meliorating or

enhancing men's undeniably increased propensity to commit **rape** in the context of **war**. This, as stressed above, is not the case. The biosocial theory is founded on the premise that sociocultural factors play an integral part in influencing the incidence, prevalence, and savagery of **wartime rape** from conflict to conflict and from man to man. Moreover, the logical conclusion of the biosocial hypothesis is not that we can only stop men from raping when we gain the capacity to change human nature. On the contrary, the biosocial perspective actually leads logically to a practical approach of exactly the same kind as those logically reached by sociocultural theorists: While it is unlikely that the scourge of **wartime rape** can ever be eradicated, we can effect changes in the sociocultural factors that make men far more likely to **rape** in **war** than in peacetime milieus. Where the biosocial theory might differ from its strictly sociocultural rivals is in the identification of changes that are most likely to be effective. While it is beyond the scope of this article and the present author's expertise to suggest practical measures, it is clear that a theory that accounts for genetic as well as sociocultural factors and allows sexual desire an important causal role may lead to different and more effective strategies for limiting the occurrence of **wartime rape**.

(1) This list is drawn from the following sources: Amnesty International (1997, 1998, 2000); Barstow (2000, p. 3); Brownmiller (1975); Chelela (1998); Ghiglieri (2000, p. 90); Littlewood (1997); Menon (1998); Neier (1998, pp. 172-191); Oosterveld (1998, pp. 64-67); Swiss and Giller (1993); Tanaka (1999, pp. 174-176); Thomas and Regan (1994).

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