

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
PRESS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Enclosed are clippings of the latest local and international press on the Special Court and related issues obtained by the Press and Public Affairs Office as of:

Tuesday, October 05, 2004

The press clips are produced Monday to Friday.
If you are aware of omissions or have any comments or suggestions please contact
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Special Court discloses witness' identity

The Special Court Monday disclosed for the first time the identity of a former Commander of the Liberian Armed Forces,

Brigadier General John Tarnue's identity to the public. General Tarnue, dressed in black

trousers and a long sleeved shirt with blue, green and wine shades was the first witness to be ever

identified publicly by the Special Court.

During cross-examination Tarnue said he was born on 18 December 1954 and he joined the Liberian Army in 1971.

According to him, when the

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Special Court witness

From page 1

NPFL rebels attacked Booker Washington Institute where he was on guard, he was left with no option but to surrender to Taylor's forces because he does not want to die.

"I interacted with Charles Taylor weekly and attended peace meetings," he noted and said later he surrendered to Rufas Dolo who took him to Kakata where NPFL's Battle Field Commander, Isaac

Musa was and he was subsequently led to Taylor.

He says he was responsible for training combatants but denied providing training to child soldiers.

Concord Times

Tuesday 5th Oct 2004

SPECIAL COURT...

NPFL commander to testify

BY THEOPHILUS S. GBENDA

As the joint trial of the RUF set of indictees at the Special Court for Sierra Leone recommences, former training commandant of the defunct National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Brigadier John Tarnue has stated that he would like to testify in public and not hidden from public glance, as it has been the case

for all other prosecution witnesses.

Procedurally, the identities of prosecution witnesses, are supposed to be undisclosed for reasons of security. **CONTINUED PAGE 7**

SPECIAL COURT

FROM PAGE 1

Although the request by star witness, Brigadier Tarnue to let known his identity and be heard in public view came as a surprise to the respective arms of the trial, the trial chamber has endorsed it, even though the defence was badly opposed to it for the reason, it says, that it is a contravention of the rules of evidence and procedure.

The testimony of the witness, which is expected to center on the intentions of the perceived 'criminal enterprise', was supposed to have been heard yesterday, Monday October 4, 2004 but due to one or two legal bottlenecks that needed clarification, was postponed to today, Tuesday October 5, 2004.

One of these bottlenecks had to do with issues relating to the non-disclosure of relevant materials to the defence by the prosecution, principal amongst which is an interview note obtained from the witness and a cassette tape said to contain recordings of the plan by the 'joint criminal enterprise' to impose the late Foday Saybana Sankoh as president of Sierra Leone and subsequently destabilize the entire West African sub-region.

These materials, according to the defence counsel of 1st accused, Issa H. Sesay. Wayne Jordash, are extremely crucial and in essence badly needed by the defence to be able to effectively cross-examine the witness in question.

On the issue of disclosure of materials to the defence, the trial chamber urged the prosecution to make available relevant materials to the former.

This was more or less the reason why the Liberian witness was not heard as scheduled.

Another issue that held the Monday proceedings at bay surrounds the qualification of the waving of the witness protection measure so desired by the witness.

According to the prosecution, it will be out of question to disclose the name of the current country where the witness in question is presently relocated.

The respective defence teams opposed the prosecution's stance on the issue and were able to get the backing of the trial chamber.

Meanwhile, the defence is opposed to the witness testifying in public because it is, in its view, a plan by the prosecution to get widespread publicity especially when he is expected to touch on the role played by Charles Taylor in the alleged criminal enterprise.

Standard
Times

Tuesday 5th Oct
2004

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INDEPENDENT

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Liberian General testifies how Taylor planned Salone war

By Odilia French
The 13th Prosecution Witness- Brig. General John Tarnue yesterday testified at the Special Court how former President and warlord of Liberia planned the attack on Sierra Leone. General Tarnue, a former Commander in the Armed Forces of Liberia said that when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) headed by Taylor started their revolution, all AFL

personnel were asked to surrender. He said that after he surrendered to the NPFL and was taken to Taylor, he was made Training Commander for the Special Forces and assigned to a place called- Konola where he was reporting directly to him. He said that he first came in contact with Foday Sankoh (the deceased leader of the RUF) at Konola when Taylor introduced him as a colleague with whom

he trained in Libya and that they were going to help as Sankoh has also helped them in their movement. "Taylor then advised Foday Sankoh on the formation of

a Military Alliance that would help the two countries," he said. During that meeting he went on. Charles Taylor told him to be careful with the

foreigners among the forces that he was training and to warn the forces that were raising concern over their presence among them.

This message he said Taylor gave him to pass on to them, as defaulters would be executed. The witness went on to narrate that in February

Contd. Page 2

...and Thomas Sankara's assassination

General Tarnue also went on to explain to the Court how he was part of the assassination of Former President of Burkina Faso-

Thomas Sankara. The witness said that Taylor disclosed the part he played in Sankara's assassination when he explained to them in Gbarnga about the purpose of his revolution.

He said that Taylor explained to them that after his escape from prison in America, he went to Ghana where he was granted asylum. It was there he manipulated his way and

met with the Burkina Faso's Ambassador in Ghana who arranged for him to meet with Sankara. According to the witness, Taylor said in 1987, he went to Burkina Faso where he met with Sankara

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Liberian General testifies

From Front Page

1991, Taylor called a meeting in Gbarnga in which Foday Sankoh and Augustine Gbao were present. He went on further to narrate that Taylor said that the time has come for them to help his friend (Sankoh) as he is planning to stage a revolution in Sierra Leone. According to him, Taylor said he has made a promise to him and in

fulfilment had instructed for ammunition, transportation, food and a skeleton battalion of 292 men of which 96 were Sierra Leoneans. "Taylor then told Sankoh to recruit everybody they meet during attacks; young, old, children, men, women or girls and to attack areas with natural resources to sustain the revolution,"

adding that the revolution depends on manpower. Gen. Tarnue said that Taylor instructed Benjamin Yeaton who was his 'Death Squad' Commander to capture Kono; fortify it and engage people to mine diamonds. According to him, these diamonds Taylor said would be sent to Blaise Campoare of Burkina Faso and Mohamar Ghadaffi of Libya to support the two revolutions.

Thomas Sankara's assassination

From Front Page

and told him about his proposed revolution. He said that it was during their third meeting that Sankara accepted to help him. Taylor he went on, said that Blaise Campoare- Sankara's Deputy met him after the meeting and expressed interest in his proposal and informed him that he also want to take over

his country. He (Taylor) then consulted with other Liberians who were interested in his proposed revolution and they planned with Blaise Campoare and Sankara was assassinated and Campoare became President of Burkina Faso. Taylor then became popular with Campoare and opened the communication line

between him and Ghadaffi of Libya. During the first meeting he said, Taylor told them he was able to win Ghadaffi's heart as he assured him that he would train his men. Burkina Faso then became the base for NPFL. Taylor he said revealed that it was in Libya that he met with Foday Sankoh and a lot of people from different countries in West Africa.

Taylor Trained 292 Men To Invade Salone

Taylor Trained 292 Men To Invade Salone

-Liberia Army Brigadier Testifies

By Joseph Turay

13th witness for the prosecution of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), TF 11-39 and Former Brigadier General of the Armed Forces of Liberia, John Tarnue, yesterday testified at the Special Court that ex-President Charles Taylor trained 292 fighters to help the late Foday Saybana Sankoh to invade Sierra Leone in 1991.

The 50-year-old General who was the 1st Special Court witness to testify openly explained that he is married with 9 children, and that he joined the Armed Forces of Liberia in 1971 when he was just 16.

The witness explained that he went through the ranks and had also witnessed many military coups in Liberia until the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invasion when he surrendered himself and was forced by Charles Taylor to join the NPFL and was assigned to train captured civilians to fight and overthrow the government of Samuel



Charles Taylor: master schemer

terviewed he saw the execution of civilians.

The witness said Taylor told him that he had Gambians, Ivorians, Burkinabes who were ready to fight. TF 1139 noted that he trained small boys and girls of different nationalities in which 96 Sierra Leoneans were trained.

The general narrated that in one of the first meeting they held with Taylor where he introduced Foday Sankoh to them saying that he was his brother with whom he trained in Libya and had come to help him. After, he would in return help Sankoh with his RUF forces to invade Sierra Leone.

The witness further explained that Taylor in the meeting said it was

Sankara, under the advice of Blais Campouri.

Brigadier explained that in another meeting held in Namann camp between 1990 to 1991, Foday Sankoh introduced his Special Forces men who included Augustine Gbao.

Charles Taylor the witness said told Sankoh that if he help him capture three-fourth of Liberia he would provide him with all logistics to launch his revolution in Sierra Leone.

The Brigadier further said after he had trained the 96 Sierra Leoneans, Taylor told him to take the boys to camp Nimba and join forces with 15 other Special Forces men and an additional 150 men which brought the total of



Christian MONITOR

The Spirit Of Truth Lives

Vol. 3 No 44 TUESDAY OCTOBER 5, 2004

INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

At The RUF Joint Trial Yesterday


Gadaffi and Campaore Roped In By Liberian General

Brigadier General John Tarnue yesterday told how former Liberian Leader Charles Taylor reported the progress of the war in Liberia and Sierra Leone to the Libyan leader colonel Gadaffi and Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso. Tarnue said Taylor referred to both Gadaffi and Campaore as 'big brothers' and Sankoh as brother.

Tarnue was assistant army chief of staff of the Liberian Army during the transition. He was brigadier and commanding officer during Taylor's reign. He is alleging to have met the late Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leader corporal Foday Sankoh in the early nineties when Charles Taylor who referred to him as his brother whom he met in Libya, introduced them

both. Tarnue said he also met Special Court indictee Augustine Gbao who was introduced to him as military adviser to the RUF. He alleges that when a full-scale onslaught was being planned on Sierra Leone, Taylor told Sankoh to capture economically viable areas. Earlier on Tarnue went on, Taylor convinced Sankoh to launch the attack

promising him support because Sankoh had also supported him during his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) war on the people of Liberia. Brigadier general John Tarnue who is 50 years old this December, testified in public but is not disclosing his present position or abode for obvious security reasons. He started giving evidence at the resumption of the RUF joint trial Monday 4th October after earlier contentions as to how he should proceed with his testimony.



David Crane: building up the case against



[Special Court for Sierra Leone : The Defence]
Sierra Leone: the price of witnesses

Sam Hinga Norman, the former head of the Civil Defence Force (CDF) has announced he is boycotting his trial before the Sierra Leone Special Court until the court revises its measures for witness protection. At the start of the trial, the first prosecution witnesses revealed that they had been paid by the prosecution. Norman is demanding that the court "remove the protective order so that witnesses who are not sexually assaulted could testify in full view of the public in order to discourage the giving of false testimonies that the prosecution has been paying prosecution witnesses to give under a hidden identity". The two other defendants in the CDF trial have also joined the boycott.

04 October 2004

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Questions plague policeman's trial

October 2, 2004



Peter Halloran arriving at court in Freetown in August.

Photo: AFP

The trial of Peter Halloran continues amid corruption claims and denials, report Gavin Simpson in Sierra Leone, and Martin Daly.

They say Pademba Road Prison bears the ghosts of its brutal past. It is an imposing structure in the middle of a teeming, impoverished and war-torn city and is notorious for the number of people who have gone in there never to come out alive.

The prison is infamous in the recent past for hundreds of summary executions, and torture and rampant diseases that kill prisoners, some of who have never been charged with a crime. Even beggars who virtually starve on the streets of Sierra Leone's capital, Freetown, have complained about the food at Pademba Road.

There are now 837 inmates, about three times its intended capacity. There are often no beds, meaning prisoners must sleep on stone floors. Discipline can be brutal and includes beatings with wooded planks by police and prison guards.

This is where senior Victorian police officer Peter Halloran may have to spend up to 15 years if he is found guilty by Sierra Leone's High Court, in which he faces four charges alleging sex with a 13-year-old girl. He has strenuously protested his innocence.

The Halloran case has transfixed sections of Freetown's West African community amid claims the Australian is the victim of a notoriously corrupt judicial and police system.

Local newspapers run lead stories on the case, and almost everyone has an opinion as to guilt or innocence. In Sierra Leone, child sex abuse by foreigners, many of them working for Western humanitarian agencies, is not unknown. But there is also a view, supported by the National Forum for Human Rights and the Trade Union Coalition of Sierra Leone, one of the country's foremost civil society groups, that Government officials, the prosecution and police have mounted a campaign of intimidation to make the girl and her family "co-operate" with the prosecution in their attempts to frame Halloran.

The forum has published an 11-page report alleging attempts to pervert the course of justice, intimidation by political interference, unlawful imprisonment and faked witness statements.

Peter Halloran, 56, a Victoria Police superintendent and former head of the homicide squad, took a year off to become a senior war crimes investigator at the United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone, where peace is maintained by 17,500 UN personnel. His job was to help decide who should bear responsibility for the decade of civil war that ended in 2001 and cost about 50,000 lives.

Halloran rented a two-storey house with two fellow Special Court investigators. They employed domestic staff to

tend their garden and do housekeeping, among them the schoolgirl that Halloran allegedly assaulted.

The girl has said she was introduced to Halloran by her brother Sheka, who worked as a housekeeper at the house that Halloran shared with former Tasmanian detective sergeant Mandy Cordwell, her husband and another Australian. Cordwell is an 18-year police veteran who spent more than three years on a peacekeeping mission in East Timor.

The girl has said her brother wanted her to try for a job as a nanny who Halloran proposed to hire for a visiting friend's child. The girl met Halloran with Sheka and her elder sister. Although Halloran did not formally offer her the position, the girl went back with Sheka the following day to help him with his chores and then continued to work for Halloran.

Halloran was later charged and imprisoned after Cordwell became concerned about what the girl was doing in Halloran's room and questioned her about her relationship with him. She then took the girl to local police, where the girl allegedly claimed that Halloran had sexually assaulted her.

Halloran was suspended by the UN and his passport confiscated. The UN held two inquiries that found insufficient evidence to sustain the allegations. One inquiry criticised Cordwell's actions as unprofessional and found the girl had been tricked into making a statement against Halloran.

But Halloran was remanded at Pademba Road Prison where, suffering ill health, including pneumonia, he spent his time in the hospital wing. He was eventually released on bail of \$100,000. Charges were also laid against others, including the girl's brothers, one of whom allegedly procured his sister for Halloran.

But the schoolgirl told the court this week that Cordwell had told her to make up the allegations. Members of her family also said they had been beaten by police to force them to incriminate Halloran.

The girl, speaking through an interpreter and looking afraid, told the court that Cordwell had asked her to tell police she and Halloran had been having an affair, and that Cordwell had promised to buy her dresses, a house for the family and a study trip overseas in exchange for such a statement.

Other family members have claimed they were bullied by government officials over their refusal to support the allegations against the girl.

More news

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Africa News October 11, 2004 Monday

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Africa News

October 11, 2004 Monday

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HEADLINE: Nigeria;
Rebels in History - Here is the Profile of Contemporary African Rebels

BYLINE: The News

BODY:
Alhaji Dokubo Asari takes a cue from the life of **rebel** leaders who have tormented or are still tormenting their countries. **Rebel** forces are common in many parts of the world.

Here in Africa, rebellions have never been in short supply since the 60s when many **African** states gained independence. Economic considerations account for most of the hostilities. But the **rebels** want to be costumed as popular ideologues. Dokubo likes to see himself as a freedom fighter in the mould of former South **African** President Nelson Mandela. The list of his heroes include Isaac Adaka Boro and al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden.

Here are some **Africans** notorious for stomping their feet on the much despised path of rebellion: Taylor's story is that of a man who moved from rebellion to the presidency. After nearly a decade of fighting in the trenches of Liberia and a life of opulence as President, Taylor now lives in Calabar, Cross River State, in political asylum. Taylor enjoyed a cosy relationship with his late predecessor, Samuel Doe, until money tore them apart. Doe seized power in 1980 as a master sergeant and joined the increasing rank of Africa's dictators. He accused Taylor of a million dollar fraud and things soon disintegrated between the two friends. Taylor founded the National Patriotic Front of Liberia with about 10,000 drug- dependent fighters. In 1990, Doe was killed by dissidents, led by Prince Yormie Johnson, who also enjoys political assylum in Algeria today. At the peak of the Liberian war, Taylor's men killed two Nigerian journalists, Chris Imodibe and Tayo Awotunsin among thousands of other victims. He is also believed to have sponsored a coup in Burkina Faso, through which his friend, Bliase Compraire, became president. Taylor was later elected president of Liberia, but the war refused to end, until he was forced out the country. Today, he is under pressure as he is wanted for war crimes.

Apart from his ruthless activities in Liberia, Taylor extended his influence well beyond the borders of his country. He is believed to have been a strong supporter of Foday Sankoh, the late **rebel** leader in neighbouring Sierra Leone. Sankoh, with the full support of Taylor, literally killed and maimed his way across Sierra Leone for power and wealth. The country's rich diamond was the trophy in view as Taylor supplied the Sierra Leonean **rebels** in the Revolutionary United Front RUF with arms and ammunition. Even by the standards of other **rebels**, Sankoh's viciousness was considered phenomenal. He was known for chopping off the toes, fingers, arms and legs of his victims. As a result, he left a huge amputee population in Sierra Leone.

Sankoh, fondly called Papa by his followers, was arrested by a mob on the streets of Freetown along with his private witch doctor in the year 2000. By then, the rebellion ignited by the former corporal and radio operator in the Sierra Leonian army, had claimed over 50,000 lives and countless limbs. Sankoh was charged with crimes including rape, sexual slavery, murder and crimes against humanity.

Unfortunately, the wheel of justice was yet to turn full circle when Sankoh died in July 2003. He was already deranged and most of what he knew and the extent of Taylor's complicity in the Sierra Leonean war died with him. Two other **rebels** in the Sierra Leonean crisis, Sam Bockerie and Paul Koromah, had


earlier died in mysterious circumstances.

It was in related circumstances that Mohammed Farah Aideed, a Somalian **rebel** leader, died in August 1996. Aideed was so brutal that the Secretary General of United Nations UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali described him as a menace to public safety. The **rebel** leader had military training in Italy and rose to become the Italian ambassador to India before becoming a full fledged **rebel**. Human life meant little to Aideed while he reigned. For him, the road to the end was better paved with human blood. He killed with impunity. He demonstrated this when he killed 24 Pakistanis who were in Somalia for peace keeping operations. The United States considered that an unpardonable assault and sent 18 of its soldiers to effect his arrest. That was in October 1993.

But Aideed made a game of the 18 American soldiers, killing and dragging them on the streets of Mogadishu. Three years later, Aideed died of an injury-related gun attack.

Another **rebel** who shook his country was Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA movement of Angola. He was born in the region of Bie. In 1966 when he founded UNITA, he was the toast of his people at home and the international community. But 30 years later, when he died in Eastern Angola, it was a big relief to his country and the world at large. Yet, Savimbi, apart from rebellion, had something in common with Dokubo. The former Angolan **rebel** leader abandoned his university education in Portugal, two years into medical school. Dokubo also abandoned his programme in the University of Calabar. Savimbi let loose all hell when he lost a presidential election in his country. Dokubo also says he is angry because of the shoddy manner the 2003 general elections were conducted.

LOAD-DATE: October 4, 2004

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Terms: **nigeria; rebels in history - here is the profile of contemporary african rebels, the news** ([Edit Search](#))

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UNMIL Daily Media Summary
Monday, 04 Oct 2004

Guinea Tops List of Mercenaries in Liberia

(Liberian Express)

- According to the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (NCDDRR), Guinean nationals constitute the largest number of foreign mercenaries who fought in Liberia's civil wars.
- Of the 563 foreign combatants that registered for disarmament, 282 were Guineans, 152 were from Sierra Leone, and 112 were Ivorians.

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Tuesday 5th October, 2004

U.N. and ICC boost cooperation

Big News Network.com Tuesday 5th October, 2004

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The United Nations and the International Criminal Court signed an agreement Monday creating a legal framework for cooperation.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and the president of the ICC, Judge Philippe Kirsch, signed the U.N.-ICC Relationship Agreement that allows U.N. agencies to provide information and services to the court.

The agreement also facilitates ICC requests for testimony from U.N. officials and grants the court U.N. observer status.

The ICC is a permanent, independent court based in The Hague in the Netherlands. It is capable of trying people accused of committing some of the most serious violations of humanitarian law, including war crimes, crimes against



This week U.S. President Bush signed a bill extending tax relief for American taxpayers. Each family next year will pay \$900 less in taxes. The president said the bill comes just at the right time for America, notwithstanding the national debt is now \$7,415 billion, and growing at \$1.7 billion a day. (Click on photo for full story).

Breaking News

Tuesday 5th October, 2004

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humanity, and genocide.

The ICC may only try crimes committed after July 1, 2002, when the court legally came into existence. The number of nations party to the court grew to 97 in September when Burundi, Liberia and Guyana ratified the ICC treaty.

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Security Council to debate rule of law and women's role in peace - President

4 October 2004 – Justice, the rule of law and the role of women in post-conflict peacebuilding will be the subject of two Security Council meetings this month, the President of the 15-member body said today.

Wednesday's open debate on justice and the rule of law will essentially be "part two" of what the United Kingdom presidency did in September 2003 on that topic, UK Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, whose delegation presides over the Council for the month of October, told a press briefing.

In addition, in light of Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report in August, it was time for the Council and the wider membership to see where things stood on the rule of law, he added.

On 28 October, the Council will hold an open debate on women, peace and security, the fourth anniversary of resolution 1325, which had set out very clearly women's role in ending conflict, Ambassador Jones Parry said. It was also one of the first times the Council had recognized the extreme and disproportionate suffering of women during conflict.

On Sudan, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Jan Pronk, will brief the Council tomorrow. He will address not only what is happening in Darfur but also in Naivasha, Kenya, given the general agreement that the Naivasha process - which concerns the separate conflict between the Government and rebels in the country's south - is central to finding a political solution in Darfur.

The Council will also discuss an updated account of the humanitarian situation and the problems on the ground in Sudan and, in particular, how the resolution adopted last month on the issue is being put into place, he added.

Concerning terrorism, the Russian Federation's Ambassador Andrey I. Denisov explained today the current version of the terrorism resolution, which had been issued on Friday evening and was being discussed in the capitals, the Council President said.

On the basis of what he heard this morning, it is clear that there is a strong view in the Council that the resolution should be adopted, but one or two delegations sought different language, Mr. Jones Parry said. He had asked Mr. Denisov to consider what he had heard and to consult especially closely with those countries that were less positive than the others, and in that light, to decide when the draft should be formally put to a vote in the Council.



Features

Dateline: 14/09/2004 22:20:23

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New Dawn for Africa's Security

*The recent consultative meeting of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa held in Abuja should be seen as a wake-up call for Africa's repositioning and integration, writes **Isichei Osamgbi***

Issues of security and intelligence have been of great concern to African nations, and each country has had to face its security problem squarely alone. but recently, about 20 Heads of Intelligence and Security Services from some of the countries on the continent converged in Luanda, Angola, at the invitation of General Fernando Garcia, Head of Angolan Intelligence Services.

The fall-out of this initial gathering in Luanda, in April was the general resolution to establish a forum of Heads of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa. This was followed by a Committee of Experts' meeting in Pretoria, South Africa in June, which produced the initial working documents for the convening of the meeting of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA).

Nigeria was then mandated to host its inaugural meeting, and on August 25 and 26, the consultative meeting of CISSA was held in Abuja. The meeting marked a watershed in the life of the continent's security and intelligence matters, as African nations moved further by jointly taking the bull by the horns on the very critical issue of security, realising the fact that no nation can go it all alone.

The gathering attracted participating heads of security and intelligence organisations from 43 African nations amongst which are, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Comoros, Cote'd'Ivoire, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia and Libya.

Equally in attendance were those from Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, and Nigeria as the host nation, Rwanda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Gambia, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe were also in attendance.

The committee met in three sessions in the typical spirit of African cooperation, and in their discussions, members were guided by the provisions of the African Union (AU) Constultative Act, where they relate to the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), as well as the Lome 2000 Declaration (CSSDCA), the Lusaka 2001 Declaration of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the 2002 Dakar Declaration on Terrorism.

The large turn-out of participants ensured that issues affecting virtually all parts of the continent on security matters where touched, with far reaching resolutions, leading to the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the formal establishment of the CISSA, at the end of the two- day meeting.

According to the communique' at the end of the conference, members identified the need to establish a mechanism, through CISSA, for pan-African consultation and synergy in the area of intelligence and security. This mechanism would seek to be affiliated with the AU through its Peace and Security Council.

Three permanent bodies emerged from the new CISSA, as a result of the MOU. the Conference, Panel of Experts and a Secretariat to be based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where the (AU) is headquartered, while Nigeria was made to lead the group in the next one year, with the Director General of our National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Ambassador Uche Okeke, as the first chairman of CISSA.

In the communique' the meeting also resolved following:

- That CISSA shall develop its own rules of procedure and be funded from asscussed contributions, which could be supplemented by donations from member-countries.
- Mandated Nigeria, in its capacity as chairman of CISSA, to take necessary steps, in consultation with other members of the bureau, to operationalise the MOU.

They equally agreed that the next meeting of CISSA should take place in the nearest future, where activities in the past year would be reviewed and further steps taken, particularly, in the area of cooperation amongst nations, as a result of the first CISSA gathering.

In all, the meeting was a great leap for the African continent, in ensuring that it remains its own gate keeper in matters of security, as events all over the world have shown that every country and every continent will ever remain responsible for its own security matters.

And to ensure that Africa is not left behind, President Olusegun Obasanjo set the tone of deliberations in his opening address at the meeting, when he described the CISSA concept as representing a new dawn in Africa, and a reflection of her determination to transcend the past, consolidate the present and build for the future.

Obasanjo further added that "either as statesmen, politicians or security professionals, we must embrace the wind of change sweeping across the world. Rather than remain under the yoke of our primordial divisions along linguistic lines, we are now obliged to build creative partnerships as against individualism, and to make cooperation and multilateralism the cornerstones of inter-state relations".

Africa as it is all over the world, having realised that there is strength in unity and cooperation, Obasanjo added, must jettison the old divisions along Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone or Arabophone and other lines which they were affiliated and work together as one, in other to join the world as a global village, where we could tap from the strength of one another.

The coming together of Africa security agencies under the CISSA, has shown that Africa has come of age to face squarely its own problems, such that like the European and other developed nations, we will soon put behind us our problems of racism, cultural and social antagonism, and work together with a collective responsibility to tackle the strife in Africa.

The benefits are enormous, and Obasanjo said "as Africa speaks with one voice, consideration must equally be given to the creation of common institutions and values". In that context, he said that the AU, and the NEPAD, provides visible evidence of the new African spirit.

Consequently, it is certain that CISSA would make invaluable contributions towards early warning mechanism, fighting terrorism, conflict management, prevention and resolution, peace building and enforcement, as well as providing an atmosphere of peace, security and stability for the attainment of millennium development goals.

It is certain that with the formation of this all important group, the continent will be better positioned to tackle the very daunting issues on security that are generally perturbing, like human trafficking, the narcotic trade, small arms trafficking, and resurgence of ethnic nationalism amongst others, which has led to several uncontrollable strife, that have been of great concern to the entire world.

With the forming of this bond, Africa is now better positioned to achieve more of its developmental goals, with all its technocrats in intelligence and security being available at all times, to tackle daunting problems collectively.

With the confidence and the backing of the entire Chief of African Intelligence and Security Services, of Obasanjo the current AU chairman, with fellow travellers on the journey to reposition Africa, like President John Kufuor of Ghana and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, would work more assiduously, knowing fully well that the expertise of these all important group at their beck and call.

It is equally in this light that the National Security Adviser, Lt. Gen. Mohammed Gusau (rtd.) in his keynote address, with the theme "Finding a Common Ground for the Security of the African Continent", recognised the need for intelligence sharing among member services, especially in the face of the numerous security challenges in the continent, which include terrorism, economic and financial crimes, mercenarism, armed conflicts, genocide proliferation of weapons, activities of mercenaries, human trafficking and cyber crimes.

Gusau also noted that "while transnational criminal networks and terrorist groups operate in a borderless world, law enforcement still largely operate in a bordered and structured world. To confront these challenges, African countries must strive to overcome the traditional constraints of statehood and criminal justice", adding that the nature and scope of Africa's security problems call for creative collaboration and radical new ways of solving them.


In all, the conference has gone a long way to show that Africa is still very capable of taking the bull by the horn, to fight its own perennial problems to total elimination. It is also in this regard that the task of leading the new CISSA must be result oriented, with the trust African brothers have on Nigeria to always point the way forward, for which Okeke as the new Chairman has shown that it can hold forte, in the way the conference was well hosted. A clear indication that Nigeria will never shy away from Africa's leadership roles, particularly now that Obasanjo is the AU Chairman.

As CISSA grows, there is the need for all African leaders to continue to nurture the group, to ensure that at any point in time, Africa is capable of leaving up to expectations in the area of intelligence and security matters. The result of this incipient gathering can be far reaching and of great benefit to the entire continent and beyond as time goes on.

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Africa News

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**HEADLINE: PanAfrica;
Africa Shows Progress in Tackling Conflicts, UN Secretary-General Reports**

BYLINE: United Nations

BODY:

Africa today is afflicted by fewer serious armed **conflicts** than it was just six years ago, says **UN Secretary-General** Kofi Annan. When he issued his first major **report** on the causes of **conflict** in **Africa** in 1998, there were 14 countries in the midst of war and another 11 were suffering from severe political turbulence.

Today, Mr. Annan notes in his annual follow-up **report**, just a half-dozen African countries are suffering from serious armed **conflicts**, among them Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. And very few other countries are facing deep political crises.

The **UN** and the rest of the international community have been "responding more readily" to armed **conflicts** in **Africa**, the **Secretary-General** notes. But much credit for the improvement also rests with **Africa**. The African Union, various sub-regional organizations and a number of governments have become more active in mobilizing military forces for peacekeeping missions or in defusing political crises before they escalate into large-scale violence, he **reports**.

Despite "steady" improvements in these areas, he adds, there have been only "modest and slow" advances in alleviating the underlying economic and political conditions that foster tension and strife. Poverty reduction has been slow, in spite of efforts by African countries and their external partners to implement the New Partnership for **Africa's** Development (NEPAD). Concerns are rising about high levels of youth unemployment and heightened competition over scarce resources because of demographic pressures. There also has been only limited **progress** in strengthening democracy, enhancing administrative capacity, ensuring independence of the judiciary and promoting transparency and accountability.

International and African initiatives

Reflecting the international community's greater readiness today to respond to **conflicts** in **Africa** ? after a series of peacekeeping setbacks in the 1990s ? **Africa** now receives the highest deployment of **UN** peacekeepers in the world, Mr. Annan **reports**. (This totalled nearly 48,000 troops at the end of August 2004, according to the **UN** Department of Peacekeeping Operations.)

In recent years, the **UN** Security Council has approved new peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia. The **UN** has also dispatched an advance team to southern Sudan, where a peace agreement has been signed, and the world body is collaborating closely with the African Union in efforts to facilitate a solution to the current crisis in Sudan's Darfur region. In Sudan as in a number of other armed **conflicts** in **Africa**, such crises often have serious consequences for neighbouring countries, highlighting the importance of regional solutions.

The African Union's establishment earlier this year of a Peace and Security Council has given a "major boost" to its own peace initiatives, Mr. Annan **reports**. The Council has already taken up the political

situations in a dozen African countries, and has decided to pay particular attention to several of those which have shown little sign of **progress**: in Darfur, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The **Secretary-General** commends the African Union for sending a peacekeeping mission to Burundi in 2002, which helped to stabilize the situation there (a **UN** peacekeeping mission has now taken over from the AU force). The African Union and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, a sub-regional group in the Horn of **Africa**, have been working to help reconcile the various sides in Somalia. In June 2004, the Economic Community of West African States authorized the creation of a standby peacekeeping unit of 6,500 trained and equipped soldiers, for rapid deployment to any country that may fall into crisis in West **Africa**.

The Group of Eight industrialized countries, notes the **report**, have agreed to provide financial support and training for the African Union's plans to set up a similar standby force at the continental level. The European Union has recently pledged E250 mn for the AU's peace fund.

While helping in such ways, Mr. Annan adds, the international community should at the same time be "sensitive and responsive" to the security concerns that **Africa** itself has identified. Especially with a strengthened AU now in place, external assistance should be provided in a way that respects African priorities, institutions and decisions.

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I. Summary

In politics here today whatever the gunmen want ultimately happens. We don't know what kind of democracy this is.

—Political organizer, Jalalabad, May 31, 2004

On October 9, 2004, Afghanistan will hold its first-ever national election. Voters will choose a president for a five-year term. The election could be prove to be a historic event for a country that has, over the last twenty-five years, suffered Soviet occupation, civil war, failed governance, severe repression of women, and the vicious rule of the Taliban. The prospect of a future dictated by ballots, and not bullets and bombs, is a cause for great hope. Taliban forces and other armed anti-government groups are still trying to disrupt the process by targeting election workers and election sites for attack, and some areas in the south and southeast remain highly unstable. Still, election officials maintain that overall preparations are on track. Afghan and international leaders are vowing that elections will be successful.

The reality, however, is more complex—and worrisome. Parliamentary elections have been postponed until 2005 because of security concerns and logistical problems. Major security and human rights problems persist, and seriously endanger the country's future.

Political repression by local strongmen is the principal problem. Throughout the country, militarized political factions—militias and remnants of past Afghan military forces who came into power in the wake of the Taliban's defeat—continue to cement their hold on political power at the local level, using force, threats, and corruption to stifle more legitimate political activity and dominate the election process. Independent political organizers unaffiliated with factions or their militia forces are facing death threats and harassment and are struggling just to organize. Some politically active Afghan men and women, potential leaders who would otherwise be eager to take part in the political life of their country, have instead already opted out of the process, or are very cautious in their activities, literally afraid for their lives. Voters in many rural areas have already been told by warlords and regional commanders how to vote and, given the general political repression and unfamiliarity with democratic processes, are likely to obey. Women, both as voters and as political actors, remain marginalized.

Political instability also persists, caused by ongoing conflicts between armed factions competing against each other for power, and the continuing insurgency against the government of President Hamid Karzai. In some areas—like the western city of Herat—the political situation recently descended into violence, and still remains tenuous and unpredictable. In other areas—like Zabul and Kunar province—whole districts are essentially war zones where U.S. and Afghan government forces engage in military operations against Taliban and other insurgent groups.

Afghans in the south and southeast in particular are facing intimidation from Taliban and insurgent groups, who threaten residents not to take part in the elections, and continue to carry out attacks on the election process and engage militarily with U.S. and Afghan government troops.

While many observers inside and outside Afghanistan continue to focus on the Taliban as the main threat to human rights and political development, in most parts of the country Afghans told Human Rights Watch that they are primarily afraid of the local factional leaders and military commanders—not the Taliban insurgency. Far from a Taliban problem, most Afghans tell us that their main fear is of *jangsalaran*—the Dari and Pashto word for “warlords.” They say that Afghanistan has a warlord problem—a problem with military factions dominating government and national institutions, including local governments and the army, police, and intelligence services.

And as many Afghans say, this warlord problem is ultimately a human rights problem. Almost all of the warlord factions are implicated in past and ongoing human rights abuses and political repression, much

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of which Human Rights Watch has documented in previous reports.

This report, based on research conducted by Human Rights Watch from June through September 2004, details the scope of this ongoing human rights problem in the context of the October 9 election. It outlines specific intimidation tactics used by warlord factions to undermine the organization of political groups, and describes how some presidential and vice-presidential candidates have already faced threats and other harassment. The report shows a pattern of threats made against Afghan journalists and potential candidates for next year's parliamentary and local elections. It concludes that voters in many rural areas have not received adequate information or education about their political rights and either do not understand or have faith in the secrecy of their ballots, making it likely that factional leaders will be able to control how they vote.

The report also explains how factions have used force and deception to collect thousands of voting cards from civilians to use in nominating political candidates, including presidential candidates. The tally of registered voters in Afghanistan, over 10.5 million in an overall population of 26 million, is now believed to be significantly inaccurate, the result of widespread multiple registration by voters. As explained here, pronouncements by Afghan and international officials boasting that 40 percent of registered voters are women ignores the likelihood that tens of thousands of women have been registered more than once (some believing their voting card would entitle them to benefits or food rations), and masks regional variation in the figures, including data from some southern provinces showing that less than 10 percent of those registered are women. Several election officials in Kabul acknowledged to Human Rights Watch in late September that the number of Afghans expected to vote on October 9 could range as low as 5 to 7 million.

In summary, the report describes how the general behavior and continuing power of various armed factions have created an environment of fear in Afghanistan, an atmosphere of political anxiety in which many Afghans—voters, party organizers, journalists, women's activists, even government officials—are afraid to speak openly and are censoring themselves.

Frustrated Hopes

There is a sense of disappointment running through Afghanistan today. Many Afghans are sick of warlord rule and yearn for the rule of law. They are tired of government positions being held by abusive warlords, and they are insulted that the international community appears to think that these military commanders are innocuous, that they have "reformed," or that they are otherwise acceptable. Most Afghans want the warlords out of power, and are angry that Afghanistan's political processes so far—including two Loya Jirgas (grand councils) in 2002 and 2003—have simply been legitimizing their influence.

Credible elections are seen by many Afghans as the way to transform the country from a loose set of warlord-led fiefdoms into a functioning nation with a legitimate civilian government that protects citizens' human rights. In this sense, elections are seen not only as a goal in Afghanistan—a good in and of itself—but also a means of addressing human rights issues and warlordism.

The question is whether the presidential election in 2004 (and local and parliamentary elections in 2005) will move the country closer towards that goal. As this report shows, it is likely it will not. Most signs suggest that warlordism and factional dominance will only increase.

A Mistaken Sense of Complacency

Relief is not on the way. Many politically active Afghans, including presidential candidates, say they feel unprotected—and are scared. Afghanistan is still without an adequately staffed professional and independent police force, and the justice system barely functions. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and various Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), international joint military-civilian teams operated by various nations in Afghanistan, have assisted in some protection efforts but have been unable to bring an overall sense of improved security across the country. The main and continuing reason for their weakness has been the inadequate number of troops made available to their operations by NATO member nations. Amazingly, because of the inadequate provision of international forces, current security plans for the presidential election include the use of deputized warlord or factional forces to guard polling stations—the very people Afghans say they're most afraid of.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), along with several international officials

in other Kabul offices, have been working hard to combat the ongoing problems, and have intervened to support numerous vulnerable persons and groups, especially in Kabul. But international officials and agencies alone are not in a position to protect the majority of politically active Afghans. Until the Afghan government can provide security throughout the country, the need for sufficient international security forces will remain.

The government of President Hamid Karzai has made efforts to address political repression and has made some important moves to sideline abusive commanders, most notably by removing Ismail Khan as governor of Herat in September and by dropping Defense Minister Fahim as his vice-presidential candidate. Karzai's office has also intervened in several cases to prevent specific abuses. But President Karzai's authority over many areas outside of Kabul is still relatively weak—because of security fears he has been unable to campaign and is a virtual prisoner of the presidential palace—and his office is unable to protect vulnerable persons in many areas outside of Kabul. And the Karzai government is itself implicated in some of the abuses, particularly in the south of the country, and may be benefiting politically from repression by others in other areas.

Meanwhile, many in the international community, including U.S. officials closely involved with situation in Afghanistan, appear to be complacent. Many falsely assume that democracy is now on the horizon. But democracy's substance—voters and candidates taking part in an electoral process free of violence and threats, against a backdrop of a system of checks and balances, an independent judiciary, and a free press—is as elusive as ever. Almost three years have passed since the 2001 Bonn Agreement installed the first post-Taliban government, and little progress has been made in laying the foundation for a functioning democratic state.

Poor Planning and Avoidable Delays

It is not surprising that problems persist. Democratic institutions must be developed where few previously existed. Just three years ago, Afghanistan was ruled by one of the cruelest and most incompetent governments of the modern age. The new government is being built in a midst of armed conflict, massive lack of education, and stark poverty. Few in the country have a clear notion of what democracy, the rule of law, or human rights mean in practice.

Ongoing insecurity, poor strategy-making, and poor planning have only made matters worse. The overall democratization process has repeatedly stumbled over the last two years. The constitutional Loya Jirga was postponed for several months during 2003, for poorly explained reasons, and the scheduling of the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Afghanistan was a repeated source of confusion over the last year. National elections (joint elections for president, parliament, and local offices) were postponed—twice—and then parliamentary and local elections were moved to 2005.

These delays, which were announced in stages in early 2004 after weeks and months of unconfirmed rumor, were justified publicly due to ongoing logistical problems, funding shortfalls, delays in implementing necessary legislation, and continuing attacks by the Taliban on election workers and registration sites. But the core reason for delay was that the overall security situation in Afghanistan, including in areas under government control, is still not conducive to conducting free and fair elections.

The Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), a joint U.N. and Afghan government body appointed by President Karzai to oversee and administer elections, concluded in July 2004 that neither the Afghan government nor its international partners can guarantee the security of the many candidates expected to run in parliamentary and local elections this year. The JEMB, with President Karzai's approval, decided on a compromise for 2004: a presidential election in October, with its smaller number of candidates, and parliamentary elections next year.

Political Parties and the Role of Warlords

Afghans clearly hunger to take part in the electoral process. Eighteen candidates have successfully registered to run for president, including several independent candidates not aligned with any military factions. To date, almost 70 political parties have applied to register with the government. At least 40 have successfully registered so far.

The parties vary in scope of organization, membership characteristics, and links to different factions or governmental officials: Some are comprised of former government officials from pre-1992 governments, including the Soviet-supported governments of Najibullah and Babrak Karmal, the government of Daoud

Khan (1973-1978) and even the government of the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. Some are reincarnations of political parties from the 1960s-1980s which never held any significant political power, including various socialist and communist groups, secularist groups, and various Islamist groups. Some parties are entirely new and are headed by youth leaders.

But much of Afghanistan's political activity is being dominated by the warlord factions. There are numerous parties—the most powerful ones in fact—which are merely proxies for the various military factions, or sub-factions within them. Afghanistan's registration law prohibits parties from maintaining their own private militias, but since most militia forces have an official status as divisions or battalions under the control of the Ministry of Defense, faction "parties" can disingenuously claim that they have no private forces. The 10th Army Division, for instance—official units under the control of the Kabul government—are actually factional forces controlled by the Ittihad-e Islami faction ("Ittihad"), which in turn is controlled by the powerful faction leader Abdul Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf.

Moreover, some factions changed their party names for registration purposes, possibly to avoid running afoul of the law. Most members of Jamiat-e Islami (Jamiat), for instance, a mujahidin military force which fought against the Soviet occupation, are now organized as the political party Nehzat-e Melli. Ittihad, a Pashtun armed faction, is now known as Daw'at-e Islami. (For more information on the different factions, see Appendix A.) Parties which change their name can then disingenuously claim that they have no official link with any military faction, and claim to be independent.

To date, the political party registration office in the Afghan government has not disqualified any party on the grounds that it maintains a private militia or is linked with one. Nor have any presidential candidates been disqualified for serving as de facto militia leaders, although some candidates who applied to be registered were disqualified on technical grounds (for instance, not having the requisite 10,000 signatures for a nomination). It would not have been difficult technically for the JEMB to make factual findings that some candidates, like General Dostum, Yunis Qanooni, Mohammad Mohaqqiq, and Karim Khalali, are de facto leaders of military forces, or are linked with such forces. The JEMB received numerous complaints about these candidates, including complaints about their links to militias. But political concerns (if not outright fear of the candidates on the part of JEMB officials) seem to have inhibited them.

Recommendations

The Afghan government and its international partners need to act fast. Although the current election, which is not hotly contested, may pass without a serious political crisis, this should not mask the fact that the country remains in a human rights crisis. With far more heated parliamentary elections scheduled for next year, a serious political crisis that greatly exacerbates the already critical human rights situation is a serious possibility in coming months. And it is difficult to overemphasize just how major a crisis it could be, as military factions compete for official positions, power, and legitimacy (not to mention parliamentary immunity). Afghanistan's diverse factions, who fought a bloody civil war in the early 1990s, are by no means easy allies of each other. This continuing military factionalism, if unchecked in coming years, could spark a new civil conflict in Afghanistan, and put at risk all of the gains and opportunities presented by the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban in late 2001.

To address these problems, Human Rights Watch urges President Karzai and the Afghan government to continue to step up efforts to sideline abusive commanders and refrain from deal-making that would further entrench warlord rule. The government must act immediately on reports of violence, threats, or intimidation against politically active Afghans or voters and denounce abusers. It must offer full support to the work of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), the only Afghan body currently capable of addressing serious human rights abuses.

The United States should clarify its strategy in Afghanistan and make human rights protection, which will enable democratization and nation-building, a primary goal of U.S. efforts. The current strategy of supporting both the central government and regional and local warlords who resist accountability to Kabul, undermines the creation of democratic institutions and the rule of law. The United States must stop working with and supporting abusive warlords. The U.S. and other involved states should redouble efforts to assist the national government with militia disarmament, the development of an effective and rights-respecting national army and police force, while working to protect independent political actors. They must speak out against violence, threats, and intimidation against politically active Afghans and voters and denounce those responsible.

The United States, NATO member states and concerned governments, should increase cooperation with the ISAF and work to expand troop levels to ensure security throughout Afghanistan. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, where they are used in lieu of ISAF troops, should be given clearer mandates to assist with disarmament efforts and protection of vulnerable political actors and groups.

Donor nations should increase support for human rights and democratization promotion. This should be aimed at helping the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) dramatically increase its staffing levels for human rights monitoring and protection and political affairs monitoring. It should also support the work of the AIHRC in monitoring Afghanistan's human rights situation.

Donors should also prioritize additional funding for the JEMB and UNAMA to ensure they have the needed resources to administer 2005 elections. Donor nations should encourage UNAMA to facilitate a central independent monitoring body charged with observing the 2005 elections, and earmark funding for that body.

A full set of recommendations is listed in the [Recommendations](#) section

Note: Methodology

This briefing paper is based on over 150 interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch in June through September 2004 in Nangahar, Paktia, Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar and Kabul, and telephone interviews with sources in several other areas including Kunduz and Herat. Those interviewed included political organizers, candidates, civil society leaders, women's rights activists, human rights monitors, humanitarian workers, journalists, editors, doctors, school teachers, university faculty, and local and national government officials, as well as international officials, including diplomatic staff and officials and staff at UNAMA, UNHCR, and various international NGOs. With a few exceptions, the Afghans interviewed indicated that they did not want their names to be used in conjunction with their testimony. Many international officials interviewed also preferred not to be identified. Accordingly, this report does not quote those sources by name, and in most cases uses initials which do not correspond to actual names.

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